Referendums and agendas : The challenge of single-issue votes
Ropponen, Jonatan (2019-02-27)
Referendums and agendas : The challenge of single-issue votes
Ropponen, Jonatan
(27.02.2019)
Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty.
avoin
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on:
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe201903016812
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe201903016812
Tiivistelmä
Referendums are a potential alternative to representative institutions in democratic practice. In fact, referendums have been promoted as particularly democratic because they connect the electorate to policy decisions directly, avoiding the layer of representation altogether. However, even though the electorate can freely choose how to cast their votes, they cannot exert control over the agenda, more specifically the decision alternatives on the ballot. Depending on the rules in place, there may also exist opportunities for strategic voting, which further distorts the expression of the popular will.
When referendums are held, there may exist any number of potential items that could reasonably be added onto the agenda, depending on the issue at hand, but there does not appear to be any evident universal method of determining suitable agendas in a non-arbitrary way. The choice of included decision alternatives affects the ultimate outcome, undermining the democratic legitimacy of referendums and their policy decisions. This may also leave voter groups disenfranchised, as their preferred alternatives are not featured on the ballot.
It may appear tempting to hold referendums issue by issue. This approach is endorsed by Hugh Ward and Albert Weale in "Is rule by majorities special?" in which they formulate a system labeled "majorities rule." They argue that it is highly responsive to the popular will and immune to strategic voting. However, if such a system is adopted, the problems with agendas grow even greater. Even if each individual issue is decided by majority, the combined outcome on multiple issues may turn out highly unpalatable to the electorate. Real-world issues may be closely intertwined, and it is unclear which topics should be considered single issues to begin with.
In this thesis, problems related to agenda formulation and strategic voting are examined analytically with the tools of social choice theory, a field that studies the aggregation of individual preferences into collective decisions. Relevant examples are also provided, including both hypothetical scenarios and real-life referendums. Of the latter, it most prominently features the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, less formally known as Brexit.
When referendums are held, there may exist any number of potential items that could reasonably be added onto the agenda, depending on the issue at hand, but there does not appear to be any evident universal method of determining suitable agendas in a non-arbitrary way. The choice of included decision alternatives affects the ultimate outcome, undermining the democratic legitimacy of referendums and their policy decisions. This may also leave voter groups disenfranchised, as their preferred alternatives are not featured on the ballot.
It may appear tempting to hold referendums issue by issue. This approach is endorsed by Hugh Ward and Albert Weale in "Is rule by majorities special?" in which they formulate a system labeled "majorities rule." They argue that it is highly responsive to the popular will and immune to strategic voting. However, if such a system is adopted, the problems with agendas grow even greater. Even if each individual issue is decided by majority, the combined outcome on multiple issues may turn out highly unpalatable to the electorate. Real-world issues may be closely intertwined, and it is unclear which topics should be considered single issues to begin with.
In this thesis, problems related to agenda formulation and strategic voting are examined analytically with the tools of social choice theory, a field that studies the aggregation of individual preferences into collective decisions. Relevant examples are also provided, including both hypothetical scenarios and real-life referendums. Of the latter, it most prominently features the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, less formally known as Brexit.