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**SAATTEEKSI:**  
**VIRKAANASTUJAISESITELMÄ**



## **ORGANISAATIOIT JA NIIDEN JOHTAMINEN - HISTORIALLISIA KUVIA JA TÄTÄ PÄIVÄÄ<sup>1</sup>**

Organisaatiot ovat ihmisten laatimia. Nämä niiden muodot ja niiden johtamistavat ilmentävät ihmisten aikaan ja kulttuuriin sidottuja käsityksiä. Organisatorinen todellisuus vaikuttaa organisaatioita koskeviin käsityksiin, ja organisaatioita koskevat käsitykset näkyvät organisaatioiden johtamistavoissa.

Liietaloustiede: hallinto on nimekkeenä 15 vuotta nuori laskettuna aineen ensimmäisen professuurin perustamisesta maassamme. Sen identiteetistä on käyty aivan viime vuosina vilkasta keskustelua – kuten kai murrosrikäiselle sopiaakin. Nimikettä liiketaloustiede: hallinto tavataan tiettävästi vain Suomessa, ja sen synty on ymmärrettävässä osana suomalaisen kauppakorkeakoululaitoksen historiaa.

Aineen ydinalueiksi ovat muodostuneet johtamis- ja organisaatiokysymykset. Niitä on luonnollisesti käsitellyt jo kauan ennen liiketaloustiede: hallinnon syntyä eri tutkimuksienalojen piirissä ja jo ennen tieteiden syntynä legendoissa, myyteissä ja tarustoissa. Alan historia on yhtä pitkä kuin ihmisen historia. Jo varhain ihminen joutui pohtimaan osansa organisoiduissa yhteisöissä. Tarkoituksenani on tässä esityksessä piirtää joitakin historiallisia kuvia organisaatio- ja johtamisajattelun taipaleelta ja lopuksi ottaa mittaa tämän päivän tilanteesta.

\* \* \* \* \*

En aio ottaa kantaa kiistoihin siitä, olivatko sumerien ylipapin valvontamenettelyt, egyptiläisten pyramidien rakentamisessa käytetty projektinjohtamismenetelmät vai kiinalaisten organisaatoriakenteet ja vastuualuekuvaukset ensimmäisiä dokumentoituja organisaatio-oppeja. Sen sijaan otan ensimmäisen historiallisen kuvan muutamaa tuhatta vuotta edellisiä myöhemmältä ajalta noin kolmen vuosisuhannen takaa tapahtumista, jotka ovat tänäkin päivänä elävä osa länsimaista kulttuuriperintöämme. Toinen

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<sup>1</sup> Virkaanastujaisesitelmä 2.9.1985

Mooseksen Kirja Vanhassa Testamentissa – sekä kristittyjen että juutalaisten pyhässä kirjassa – kertoo tapauksesta, jolloin Mooses johdattaessaan kansaansa Egyptistä Kanaaniin uupuneena johdettaviensa napinasta pysähtyi kuuntelemaan seuraavia appensa Jetron sanoja:

”... Ole sinä kansan edusmies Jumalan edessä, ja saata sinä sen asiat Jumalan eteen, ja neuvो heille tie, jota heidän on kuljettava ja mitä heidän on tehtävä. Mutta valitse kansasta kelvollisia ja Jumalaa pelkääväisiä, luotettavia ja väärää voittoa vihaavia miehiä, ja aseta ne heille tuhannen, sadan ja viidenkymmenen päämiehiksi. Nämä tuomitkoon kansaa joka aika. Kaikki suuret asiat he saattakoot sinun tietoosi, mutta kaikki vähäiset asiat ratkaiskoot itse. Huojenna näin jotakin itseltäsi, ja kantakoot he kuormaa sinun kanssasi.”

Mooses toteuttikin tämän konsulttinsa Jetron ehdotuksen ja linjaorganisaation, erotti sen, mitä nyt sanomme strategiaksi siitä, mitä nyt sanomme operaatioiksi ja huojensi tai – kuten nyt sanoisimme – delegoi tehtäviä aluepäälliköilleen, jotka raportoivat Moosekselle nykykielessä sanottuna poikkeamaperiaatteeen mukaan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Hyppään tuhatkunta vuotta. Antiikkia ja sen helleenistä kulttuuria voidaan hyvin perustein pitää länsimaisen kulttuurin kivijalkana. Kreikan suurista ajattelijoista monetkin esittivät oppeja organisointiperiaatteista ja hyvän johtajan ominaisuuksista. Mutta näitä pysyvämpi vaikutus organisaatioajatteluille tuli olemaan juuri helleenisenä aikana muotoutuneille länsimaisen ajattelun ydinpiirteillä. Ne tulivat vaikuttamaan näkemyksiimme organisoinnista ja johtamisesta tavalla, joka tänäkin päivänä erottaa eurooppalais-amerikkalaisen organisaatiokäsityksen muiden kulttuuripiirien organisaatiokäsityksistä.

Niinpä analyttisen ajattelun perinne näkyy tavassamme osittaa organisaatioita yksiköiksi, toimintoiksi, osastoiksi, organisaatiotasoiksi siinä, missä muiden kulttuuripiirien organisaatioajattelu korostaa organisaation ykseyttä, kokonaisuutta, kollektiiviluonnetta tai ihmisuhteita.

Kreikkalainen teleologinen ajattelun teoria loi perustaa tavoitteellisuudelle, eräälle länsimaisen organisaatioajattelun ja tämän päivän yritystoiminnan hyvin keskeiselle piirteelle.

Helleenien kaupunkivaltioiden mikro-organisaatioissa tapahtui sekä pystysuoraa että vaakasuoraa työnjakoa. Johtajat – vapaat miehet ja talouden valtiaat – erikoistuivat miettimään suuria kysymyksiä sekä hoitamaan organisaation ulkoyhteyksiä delegoiden toimeenpanon alaisilleen. Tälle järjestelylle antiikin suurimmat ajattelijat laativat filosofisia perusteluja ja oikeutuksia. Ajatus johtamistyön ja operaatioiden erottamisesta on ikivanha,

mutta juuri antiikin filosofit julkilausuvat sen tavalla, joka tuli vaikuttamaan antiikin ajatusten leviämisen myötä esimerkiksi kristillisten organisaatioiden toimintaan. Tämä pystysuoran työnjaon periaate on myös ollut olennainen osa vielä 20. vuosisadan liikkeenjohto-oppia.

Minkä tahansa alan tieteellisen käsittelyn alun ajoittaminen on hyvin kiistanalaista ja se riippuu siitä, mitä käsitteillä tiede ja tieteellinen tarkoitetaan. Senkin huomioon ottaen on varsin hyviä perusteita väitteelle, että antiikin filosofit ensimmäisinä toivat johtamis- ja organisointikysymykset tieteellisen tarkastelun kohteiksi.

\* \* \* \* \*

Vanhalbella ajalla syntyivät, keskiajalla kasvoivat ja yhä edelleen keskuudessamme vallitsevat kirkon ja armeijalaitoksen organisaatiot ja organisaatioajatuukset. Eriaisista toiminta-ajatuksistaan huolimatta kirkolla ja armeijoilla on ollut organisaatio-opillisesti paljon yhteistä, ja aika ajoin on niiden yhteistoimintakin ollut hyvin läheistä. Katolista kirkkoa voidaan hyvin perustein pitää ensimmäisenä todesti monikansallisena organisaationa, ja se on toiminut suvereenisesti yli valtakuntien ja kansakuntien rajojen. Katolinen kirkko samoin kuin keskiajan armeijat olivat ymmärtäneet mittakaavaedut, ja ne käyttivät niitä tehokkaasti hyväkseen laajoilla operaatioalueillaan. Strategisen johdon ja operaatioiden hierarkkisuus oli niissä korostunut: niiden ylin johto oli korotettu kaiken arvostelun yläpuolelle erehtymättömyyteen ja edusti Jumalaa tai – jos se ei riittänyt – aseita maan päällä.

Katolisessa kirkossa ja armeijoissa luotiin keskiajalla tehokkaat linja- ja alueorganisaatiot, joissa alayksiköiden johtajat vastasivat strategioiden toteutuksesta vastuualueillaan. Pyrkimys yhdenmukaiseen toimintaan oli katolisessa kirkossa silmiinpistävä. Myös esikuntien käyttö yleistyi, kasvoi ja vakiintui juuri katolisen kirkon ja armeijalaitoksen piirissä. Samoin operatiivisen toiminnan jakaminen spesialismeiksi saavutti ennenäkemättömän organisoitumisen asteen juuri näissä kahdessa organisaatiotyypissä.

Etenkin kirkon, mutta myös armeijoiden vaikutuksen kansan organisaatiokäsitynni on täytynyt olla hyvin suuren. Ne opettivat ihmisiä Herran pelkoon – ja varmaan myös aikanaan viisauden alkuun. Niiden operatiivinen tehokkuus on ollut aikansa infrastruktuurin huomioon ottaen, liioittelematta sanoen, valtava. Tähänkään päivään mennessä eivät myöhemmät organisaatiot ole saaneet yhtä suuria markkinaosuuksia kuin etenkin kirkko mahtavimmillaan.

Aikakausilla on luonteenkaan erityyppisillä instituutioilla on omat systeemiset ominaisuutensa ja eri organisaatioilla omat hahmolaatunsa. Tästä

syystä on varottava liian oikoisia vertailuja vuosisatain takaisten ja tämän päivän organisaatioiden kesken. Sen voi silti sanoa, että etenkin kirkko, mutta eräillä alueilla myös armeijat koulivat ihmisiä sellaisiin organisaatiokäsityksiin – esimerkiksi johdon auktoriteettiin – jolle sittemmin myös teolliset organisaatiot tulivat laskemaan toimintansa.

\* \* \* \* \*

Viime vuosisadan vaihde näki ajatuksellisia läpimurtoja, jotka johtivat siihen, mitä nyt pidämme modernin organisaatioteorian alkuna. Asian taustalla voidaan nähdä kolme toisiinsa kietoutunutta ilmiöryhmää. Ensinnäkin, oli syntynyt suurteollisuutta, ja sen myötä aivan uudenlaisia organisatorisia ongelmia ja niille ratkaisuja, joista syntyi tilaus uudenlaiseen tilanteeseen sopivalle organisaatioteorialle. Toiseksi, luonnontieteiden suurten saavutusten seurauksena alettiin vaatia luonnontieteelliseen ajattelun soveltamista myös organisatoristen ilmiöiden tutkimiseen ja organisaatioiden johtamiseen. Ja kolmanneksi, ihmisten – aivan tavallisten ihmisten – arvostukset taittuivat niin, että hengellisten arvojen ja autuaan köyhyyden rinnalle ja sijaankin ryhdyttiin vaatimaan materiaalista hyvinvointia. Kaikki tämä johti siihen, että tarvittiin teolliseen yhteiskuntaan sopiva organisaatiokäsitys.

Nähin aikoihin myös termi management vakiintui nykyiseen kunnialliseen liikkeenjohtoa tarkoittavaan merkitykseensä, kun sen kantasana (ital. maneggiare) tarkoitti 16. vuosisadalla hevosten kasvatusta, ja vielä viime vuosisadan alkupuolella managementia käytettiin merkityksessä petkutus ja juonittelua.

Frederick Winslow Taylor on saanut maineen tieteellisen johtamisteorian isänä. Hänen vuosina 1903, 1911 ja 1912 julkaistut kirjoituksesta ja hänen sitä ennen suorittamansa laajamittainen käytännön työ pyrkivät soveltamaan luonnontieteellistä ajattelua ja metodiikkaa organisaatioihin ja johtamiseen. Myöhemmin julkaistulla Max Weberin byrokratiakonseptiolla on ollut samantapainen vaikutus hallinto-organisaatiolle. Sekä Taylorin että Weberin ajattelusta sen mekaanisimmat piirteet ovat jääneet vaikuttavimmiksi vuosisatamme organisaatioajatteluun ja organisaatiotodellisuuteen. Heistä tuli tietämättään – luultavasti tahtomattaankin – mekaanisen organisaatioajattelun suuria teoreetikkoja.

Mekaanisen organisaatioajattelun ihanneorganisaatiot tai ideaalityypit tavataan kuvata hyvin rasvatun koneen tai koneiston kaltaiseksi. Siinä kaikella on paikkansa – mutta siinä ei ole paikkaa kaikille. Organisaation osatekijät, ihmiset mukaan lukien, ovat koneiston vaihtokeloisia osia niin, että tehokas organisaatio nähdään ihmillisistä heikkouksista riippumattomana ja haavoittumattomana. Vertikaalisen ja horisontaalisen työnjaon mekaanisuus

takaa sen lujuuden ja toimivuuden. Johtajat johtavat, suorittavat henkilöt toteuttavat, valmistus valmistaa ja myyti myy. Virkamies pysyköön lestissään – älköönkä ainakaan ylittäkö toimivaltaansa. Koneiston osana jokainen voi jauhaa materiaalisia palkkioita vastikkeekseen.

Mekaanista organisaatioajattelua on kritikoitu, muokattu, pehmennetty – ja taas kritikoitu. On tullut ihmissehdekkoulukuntaa, ihmilleisten resurssien johtamista, järjestelmäteoriaa, tilanneteoriaa. Mekaanisissa organisaatioissa on harjoitettu OD:ta ja YD:tä, on rakennettu henkilöstöhallintoa ja laatupiirejä. Silti mekaanisen ajattelun ydinpiirteitä on helppo havaita tämän päivän teollisuudessa, kaupassa ja hallinnossa. Kriitikoidenkin on ollut myönnettävä niiden ennennäkemätön tehokkuus niiden omimmilla toiminta-alueilla.

\* \* \* \* \*

Meillä on nyt aikaa seuraavaan vuosituhanteen saman verran kuin on kulunut ensimmäisestä liiketaloustieteenvallinnon professuurista maassamme. Nämä viisitoistavuotisjaksoit näyttäisivät alkavan varsin erilaisista tilanteista ainakin tämän päivän tarkastelijan silmissä, olkoonkin että sittenkin kuuluvat samaan tieteellis-teknilliseen jaksoon vuosituhansia kattaneessa tarkastelussamme.

Olemme nyt kokemassa aikaisempia ajatuksia horjuttavia epäjatkuvuuksia elinkeinoelämämmekin rakenteessa, tieteen filosofiassa ja ihmisten arvostuksissa – siis juuri niissä kolmessa ilmiöryhmässä, jotka synnyttivät teollisen ja hallinnollisen organisaatioajattelun 1900-luvun ensimmäisinä vuosikymmeninä. Teollinen yhteiskunta on taittumassa tietoyhteiskunnaksi. Tieteen filosofiassa on mekanikkalaan perustuvien ja positivististen käsitysten rinnalle noussut luonnontieteissä suhteellisuusteoriaan ja kvantiteoriaan pohjaavia käsityksiä ja ihmisen- ja yhteiskuntatieteissä teon teoriaan perustuvia tutkimustapoja. Ja ihmisten arvostuksissa on materiaalisten arvojen rinnalle kohoamassa uusia arvokonstellaatioita, jotka jäytyvät mekaanismaterialistisen organisaatioajattelun perusteita.

Kun organisaation raaka-aineena on tietoa, jota organisaatio osaamisellaan jalostaa tietotuotteiksi tai palveluiksi, eivät teolliset johtamis- ja organisointitavat tahdo oikein toimia. Teollisessa tavaratuotannossa on ollut mahdollista suorittaa vain vähän kiinnostavaa työtä materiaalista korvausta vastaan. Mutta tehokasta tietotuotantoa ja luovaa työtä ei saa aikaan vailla toteutettavan subjektin omaehitoista ja sisäistettyä asiassa mukanaoloa. Myös työnjaon perusteet muuttuvat tietotuotannossa. Niinpä kommunikaatio alhaalta ylös – siis sieltä missä on tuote- ja asiakasaosaamista sinne missä on kokonaivastuu organisaation tuloksesta – tulee ainakin yhtä tärkeäksi kuin pystysuora komentoketju ylhäältä alas. Vaakasuorassa työnjaossa saadaan tuloksia paremmin henkilökohtaisella vuorovaikutuksella kuin hyvin

organisoidulla mekaanisella osastojaolla. Jopa organisaation ulkorajat häilyvät, koska monipuolisilla ulkoyhteyksillä ja vuorovaikutusverkostolla on luotavissa kriittistä massaa muiden organisaatioiden ja yksiköiden kesken: tietohan ei – toisin kuin tavara – vaihdannassa häviää keneltäkään, vaan jää kaikkien vaihtoon osallistuvien omaisuudeksi. Uuden tieto-organisaation perustamiseksi tarvitaan enemmän omaa päätä kuin pääomaa, ja siksikään organisaatioiden ote jäsenistään ei voi olla yhtä sitova kuin se on ennen ollut.

Kaiken kaikkiaan, on siis nähtävissä, että joudumme ajattelemaan organisaatiokysymykset taas kerran uudesti. Vielä ei ole nähtävissä tämän prosessin kulkua, sen tuloksia eikä sen yhteyksiä organisaatioajattelun perintöömme.





**OSA I:**

ESSEITÄ JOHTAMIS- JA  
ORGANISAATIOUTKIMUKSEN YMPÄRILTÄ



# ORGANISAATIO-TUTKIMUKSEN LÄHESTYMISTAPOJA<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

Knowledge about organizations is disorganized. A review of its state cannot bring up an internally consistent view. The different approaches do not fit into a common frame.

In the present paper the following approaches are reviewed: 1) Classical management thinking attempts to reach universal norms and prescriptions for good management. 2) Empiricism attempts to find out how organizations actually behave. 3) The German school is characterized by its emphasis on conceptual rigour and synthesis. 4) The systems view regards organizations as holistic entities made up of parts and their interrelationships. 5) The behavioural school describes organizations in terms of individuals and groups. 6) Hermeneutics emphasizes the understanding of organizations from the inside instead of their explanation from the outside. 7) Quantitative formalizations provide a promise, but as yet they have had little influence. 8) Microeconomic theory has not utilized its potential in organizational research. 9) Marxist school has been most prominent in criticizing other approaches.

There is no easy way to integrate a field as diverse as this. An assessment of the approaches depends on the definition of what organizational research is. What is scientific in organizational analyses? The answer depends on academic conventions rather than on formal or substantial criteria.

## 1 Johdanto

Ensimmäiset dokumentoidut tiedot ilmiöistä, jotka nyt tavataan lukea organisaatiotutkimuksen piiriin, ovat egyptiläisiltä liki 6000 vuoden takaa, ja seuraavien vuosituhanter aikana ala kehittyi ongelmia kuvalevana ja niitten

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<sup>1</sup> Esitelmä ja julkaisu Tieteenfilosofian seminaarissa 1979, Kyläheiko, K. (1979). Turun kauppakorkeakoulun julkaisuja, A – 6. s. 211 – 225.

ratkaisuja etsivänä organisaatio-oppina (Khandwalla, 1977, 170 – 174). Mutta 1800-luvulta alkoi kehkeytyä näkemys, jonka mukaan kuvalevan ja normatiivisen organisaatio-opin sijaan tarvitaan ihan organisaatiotiede, joka edistyneempien tieteiden tapaan pystyisi selittämään tutkimuskohdettaan ja jonka päämäääränä olisi organisaatioteoria. Myös teollisen vallankumouksen synnyttämät organisaatiot olivat kokonaan uudentyyppisiä, ja siksikin siihenastinen organisaatio-oppi alkoi joutua vaikeuksiin.

Kaiken kaikkiaan yhtäällä tieteellisessä ajattelussa, toisaalta itse tutkimuskohteessa tapahtuneitten murroksien seurausensa suhteellisen yhtenäinen organisaatio-oppi alkoi repeillä, entiset yksinkertaiset ongelmat ja selkeät ratkaisut väistyivät monimutkaisempien ja keskenään kiistelevien ajattelutapojen tieltä.

Jo valmiaksi luultu organisaatio-oppi onkin nyt rikkirevitti koulukunniksi, oppisuunniksi, metodologisiksi kuppikunniaksi, toisiinsa vaikeasti yhdistettäviksi sisällöllisiksi osa-alueiksi. Mutta taas tähän päivään tultaessa synteesin tarve alkaa olla yksimielisesti koettu asia, ja myös pyrkimykset sen suuntaan ovat lisääntyneet. Itse asiassa monet uusimmat lähestymistavat kilipailevatkin eri tavoista integroida pirstoutunutta kenttää taas yhteen. On myös hyvin selvästi havaittavissa lisääntyvää keskustelunhalua (Driggers, 1977) ja keskusteluyhteyttä eri lähestymistapojen kesken, ja lukkiutuneitten koulukuntien aika näyttäisi olevan takana.

Seuraava lähestymistapojen luokittelua ei tietenkään ole ainoa mahdollinen (esim. Arbnor & Bjerke, 1977; Khandwalla, 1977, 41 – 259; ja etenkin Behling, 1978, voidaan käsittää vaihtoehtoisiksi luokitteluiksi) saati kaiken kattava, eivätkä lähestymistapoja erotkaan ole selvät tai läpäisemättömät. Sikälakin luokittelussa tehdään väkivaltaa, että yhteen on nipputettu epäyhtenäisiä aineksia laajan ja abstraktin yhteisen nimikkeen alle. Silloin lähestymistapoja koskevat luonnehdinnat ovat paikoin huitaisevia yleistyksiä, joihin varmaankaan oman tutkimustapansa erityispiirteitä korostavat tutkijat eivät voi yhtyä.

Tietoisena tämäkaltaisen väkivallan vaaroista esityksen toivotaan kuitenkin palvelevan erästä yleismielenkiintoista tavoitetta. Kun jo näittenkin hyvin yleislontoisten lähestymistapojen tavoitteema organisaatioteoria on perin erilainen, niin mitä oikeastaan on tieteellinen organisaatioteoria? Kun sanotaan, että korkeakoulutuksen tulee olla tieteellistä, mitä tämä tieteellisyys tällä alalla itse teossa tarkoittaa? Ovatko vain jotkut seuraavassa käsiteltävät koulukunnat tieteellisiä, ja muut siis epätieteellisinä akateemisisissä keskusteluissa sivuuttavia tai jopa tuomittavia? Vai onko tieteellisydelle annettava niin laaja sisältö, että se sulkee sisäänsä kaikki käsiteltävät lähestymistavat ja vielä vaikka ”totuudellisen” (mitä se sitten taas tarkoittaakin) tutkivan journalismin tai esseistisen organisaatiokirjoittelun?

## 2 Management-ajattelu

Tämä lähestymistapa pyrkii liikkeenjohdon tiedolliseen, normatiiviseen, jopa reseptologiseenkin palveluun eli tuottamaan tietoa liikkeenjohdon mahdollisimman välittömään kulutukseen. Tässä lähestymistapa on epäilemättä onnistunutkin, ja se on vaikuttanut liikkeenjohdon käytäntöihin, koulutukseen ja kehittämiseen eritoten paketoitujen tuotteittena (tavoitejohtaminen, organisaation kehittämisojelmat, jne.) välityksellä. Ehkäpä lähestymistapaa voi pitää vuosituhantien organisaatio-oppien perillisenä, ja sellaisena se on druckereineen, humbleineen, ym. edelleenkin voimakas (esim. Drucker, 1964 ja 1977, 145 – 184; Humble, 1968; Bittel, 1972).

Lähestymistapa nojaa varsinaisen empiirisen tutkimuksen sijasta tekijöittensä henkilökohtaiselle johtamis- ja konsulttikokemukselle sekä eräänlaiselle perinneviisaudelle. Esityksissä journalistinen lennokkuus on vähintään yhtä tärkeällä sijalla kuin loogisuus ja systemaattisuus. Lähestymistapaa on helppo arvostella akateemisen eleganssin ja arvokkuuden puutteesta, mutta se näyttää iskevän oleellisimpiin liikkeenjohdon kysymyksiin ja tarjoavan tämän tiedon käyttäjille jotakin käyttökelpoista. "The proof of pudding is eating".

## 3 Empirismi

Empirismi pyrkii normatiivisen perinneviisauden sijaan kuvaamaan minkälaisista organisaatioiden toiminta ja käyttäytyminen todella on. "Olemme iät ja ajat koettaneet selvittää minkälaisista sen pitäisi olla, ja nyt on korkea aika selvittää, millaista se todella on" voisi kuulua lähestymistavan iskulause (kts. Carlson, 1969, 21). Tämä sotienjälkeisen sosiologisävyisen yhteiskuntatutkimuksen valtavirta on tullut liiketaloustieteellisen organisaatiotutkimuksen kenttään jälkjättöisesti, Suomessa oikeastaan vasta 1970-luvulla. Syynä hitauteen eivät liene niinkään olleet filosofissävyiset epäilyt kuin vaikeudet saada relevanttia tietoa liikkeenjohdon arkaluontoisina pitämistäasioista.

Mutta aivan viime vuosina empiristinen tutkimusote on voimistunut – laajimpina esimerkkinä on Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulun Yrityshallinnon peruskartoitus (Voutilainen, 1978), jossa pyritään antamaan seikkaperäinen tilastollinen läpileikkaus siitä, minkälaisista yrityshallintoa Suomessa 1970-luvulla on. Samaan aikaan on kuitenkin myös positivismiin kohdistunut kriitikki sattunut tähän tutkimusotteeseen (esim. Tuomela & Patoluoto, 1975; Giddens, 1976, 132 – 137; Susman & Evered, 1978), ja samoin on kasvanut

yritysten vastenmielisyys antaa tietoja (kts. Sitra, 1979). Empirismi ei puhjennekaan samaan hehkuun organisaatiotutkimuksessa enää 1970-luvulla kuin eräillä naapurialueilla jo aiemmin.

Empirististen tutkimusten suhde teoriaan on ollut ongelmallinen organisaatiotutkimuksessa – tutkimustuloksia on ollut vaikeaa liittää teoriaan. Tämä tosin johtuu myös teorioiden puutteista, erikoisesti niiden heikosta koeteltavuudesta. Empiristit näkevätkin niin, että nyt on aika koota empiirisä teorioiden peruspilareita, joiden varaan sitten voidaan rakentaa lujasti todellisuudelle perustettu teoria (kts. Carlson, 1969, 15 – 17).

Joka tapauksessa empiristisellä otteella on sen vaikeudetkin tietäen vakiintunut sija organisaatiotutkimuksessa. Edelleenkin pitää paikkansa, että tietomme siitä, miten organisaatiot todella toimivat, on liian niukkaa. Ja aivan varmaan empiiriset tiedot ovat organisaatioteorialle välittämättömiä rakennuspuita. Lisäksi tutkimusotteeseen koulutettavuus, sen muita eksplisiittimäät pelisäännöt ja se seikka, että tutkimusote vuorenvarmasti tuottaa joitakin uudentuntuisia tuloksia, tekevät lähestymistavasta monia muita helpommin hallittavan ja riskittömän – seikka joka on ilmeinen etu etenkin opinnäytetutkimuksissa.

#### 4 Saksalainen koulukunta

Saksalainen koulukunta on nimenomaan liikelaloustieteellisen organisaatiotutkimuksen klassikkoja ja uranuurtajia (esim. Kosiol, 1961 ja 1962). Suuntauksella on myös ollut suomalaiseen liikelaloustiede: hallintoon vahva vaikutus (Tuominen, 1969), joka tosin viimeisen kymmenen vuoden aikana on ollut heikkenemään päin.

Saksalaiset organisaatiotutkijat ovat pyrkineet laajoihin käsitteellisiin synteeseihin ja selittämään kulloistakin tutkimuskohdettaan erilaisista koko kenttää kattavista teorioista käsin. Filosofia on ollut tälle koulukunnalle keskeinen naapuritiede, ei vain oleellisesti metodologisena aputieteenä, vaan myös itse substanssia koskevia selityksiä etsitään filosofeiltä (kts. Grochla, 1979). Koulukunta on ollut epäempiiristä, mutta viime aikoina empiirinen ote on ollut tunkeutumassa kenttään. Loogisuuden ja käsitteellisen täsmällisyyden vaatimukset ovat ankarat. Myös saksalaisen työntutkimuksen piirissä ja REFA:n (Reichausshus für Arbeitszeitermittlung) ympärillä on tehty organisaatiotoreettisesti merkittävää työtä (esim. Endruweit, 1977 ja Hackstein, 1978).

Koulukuntaa on vailla kosketusta empiriaan uhannut nuivuus, ”vanhojen luitten kasasta toiseen siirtely”. Vahvimmillaan suuntaus on synteettisenä irrallisista ilmiöitä toisiinsa sitovien käsitteellisten järjestelmien kokoajana. Ja

juuri nyt kun muut tutkimusotteet ovat pirstoneet kentää ja heränneet havaitsemaan yhteisen keskustelun ja integroinnin tarpeen, saksalaisella koulukunnalla on syntetisoinnissa edessään hedelmällistä työsarkaa.

## 5 Järjestelmänäkemys

Systeemiteoria on organisaatiotutkimuksessa vaikuttanut yleisenä järjestelmänäkemyksenä, kokonaisvaltaisena hahmokatsomuksena, funktionalismina, osasten ja niitten välisten yhteyksien kuvaamistapana. Organisaatio tuntuu, prima facie, erityisen luontevalta järjestelmäkuvaukseen kohteelta – onhan se juuri yksikköjen, osastojen, henkilöiden ja näitten välisten vaikutusverkostojen monimutkainen kokonaisuus.

Järjestelmänäkemys vastustaa empirististä ilmiöiden tilastollista, kokonaisuudestaan irrotettua kuvausta, vaikkakaan näkemys ei periaatteessa ole epäempiriinen. Organisaatiotutkimuksessa kokonaisjärjestelmien empiirinen tutkiminen on vain käytännössä siksi hankala, että järjestelmääjattelu on ollut empiirisille töille pikemmin avara taustanäkemys ja viitekehys kuin sovelias koettelemiseen tai ennustamiseen (kts. vaikkapa Seilerin, 1967 antologiaa; Kast & Rosenzweigin, 1970, tai Pfohlin, 1978, katsauta).

Järjestelmänäkemys on vaikuttanut yli ja ohi organisaatiotutkimuksen suoraan yrityshallinnollisiin menettelyihin. Hallinnon ja sen osa-alueiden järjestelmiä on sinänsä alettu pitää hyvän liikkeenjohdon merkinä. Yrityksen yksittäistä osatekijää usein arvioidaan sen mukaan, miten se toimii funktioaaliseksi osana laajempaa järjestelmää. Yrityksen suunnittelutoimintaan järjestelmänäkemys on vaikuttanut voimakkaasti (esim. Rhenman, 1964; Emery, 1969; tai Gerwin, 1976, joka luo järjestelmäkehikkoa nimenomaan organisaatioluunnittelulle). Järjestelmänäkemyksen kautta on myös tultu tilannejoustokorosteiseen kontingenssiajatteluun, jolle oleellista on kulloisenkin tilanteen vaikutus hallinnollisiin menettelyihin (esim. Kast & Rosenzweig, 1973; Lorsch, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Järjestelmänäkemys organisaatiotutkimuksessa on vaihdellut muodikkaista hokemista kunnianhimoisiin yrityksiin rakentaa yleinen organisaatioteoria järjestelmäteorian varaan, ja sitä kautta liittää organisaatiotutkimus muihin tutkimusalueisiin ja tieteisiin. Järjestelmäteorian mahdollisuudet ja rajat organisaatiotutkimuksen kentässä jäävät vielä nähtäviksi.

## 6 Käyttäytymistieteellinen lähestymistapa

Käyttäytymistieteellinen lähestymistapa korostaa organisaatiota yksilön ja ryhmien vuorovaikutusjärjestelmänä. Lähestymistapa on erityisesti kritisoinut rationaalisuuden olettamusta, homo economicusta (esim. voimakkaasti vaikuttanut Argyris, 1962), ja on sen sijaan vaatinut ihmistä tuhansien tarpeiden tihentymänä organisaatiotutkimuksen kohteeksi. Rajatuilla alueilla – etenkin motivaatio- (kts. Steers & Porter, 1975) ja johtajuustutkimuksissa (esim. Likertin klassilliset tutkimukset, 1961) – suunta on porautunut syvälle, mutta synteesiin tällä tiellä ei ole edetty. Tämä johtuu myös suunnan läheisestä yhteydestä empiiriseen tutkimustapaan, joskin käyttäytymistieteellisen lähestymistavan kannattajat ovat löytäneet myös järjestelmänäkemyksen ja hermeneuttis-kliinisen lähestymistavan (Huse & Bowditch, 1977, 309). Käyttäytymistieteellisillä näkemyksillä on ollut kiistaton vaikutus liikkeenjohdon koulutuksen ja organisaationkehittämisteknologian välityksellä (esim. Beckhard, 1969).

Käyttäytymistieteellinen näkemys on ollut viime aikoina voimakkaan pioneeriaudun jälkeen suvannossa. Kun se on aiemmin esiintynyt vain eräillä organisaatiotutkimuksen osa-alueilla, se nyt on ilmeisesti pyrkimässä tunkeutumaan ja osin sulautumaan muihin lähestymistapoihin.

## 7 Hermeneutiikka

Hermeneutiikka hylkää luonnontieteelliset (scientific) tutkimuksen arviointikriteerit ja asettaa niitten sijaan ihmistä tutkivalle organisaatiotutkimukselle humanistiseen (arts) tutkimusperinteeseen liittyvät kriteerit. Hermeneutikkojen mukaan luonnontieteelliset kriteerit johtavat organisaatiotutkimuksen muotokauniiseen, mutta tutkittavien ilmiöiden erikoisluonnetta huomioonottamattomaan tai merkityksettömään tietoon. Sen sijaan suunta pyrkii kuvaamaan organisaatioita niitten itsensä kielellä, niitä sisältäväin ymmärtäen: "Luontoa selitätme, ihmistä ymmärrämme".

Hermeneuttinen kysymys on kyllä ollut yhteiskuntatieteissä keskustelun kohtena ainakin koko 1900-luvun (Giddens, 1976, 55 – 69), mutta ymmärtävät suuntautumistavat ikään kuin jäivät positivismin määrellisen paljouden jalkoihin joskus 1950-luvulla. Nyt kuitenkin paradigmaattisen keskustelun aktivoiduttua on hermeneuttinen perusote tullut uudella tavalla ajankohtaiseksi. Onko organisaatiotutkimusta suoritettava luonnontieteellisten kriteerien ohjaamana tilastollis-empiriisin tekniikoin painotettuna, onko organisaatiotutkimus sen sijaan esteettinen 'art', vai pitäisikö alueelle laatia sillen oma tai muiden naapuritieteenvaarojen kanssa yhteinen kieli ja

arvointikriteerit? Jälkimmäisissä hermeneuttisissa tapauksissa tuloksena olisi tottuista eleganssivaatimuksista piittaamatonta, mutta ongelmia-alueelle relevanttia tietoa.

Organisaatiotutkimuksen alalla on kylläkin hermeneuttista lähestymistapaa käytetty useinkin muunlaisten lähestymistapojen yhteydessä (esim. Normann, 1976; Ahlstedt, 1978). Niinpä ilmiön ymmärtäminen voi tapahtua suhteessa siihen järjestelmään, johon ilmiö kuuluu, ja siksi hermeneutiikka on luontevasti yhdistettävässä järjestelmänäkemykkeen. Voi olla niinkin, että jonkinasteinen ymmärtäminen hermeneuttisessa mielessä on välttämätöntä objektiivisten tiedonkeruumenetelmien käytön ohjaajana ja vaikeasti välttäävässä vallankaan silloin, kun tutkija on itse osana tutkimaansa organisaatiota (Susman & Evered, 1978; Tainio, 1978, 51 – 52). Toisaalta taas puhtaasti hermeneuttista organisaatiotutkimuksia tuskin onkaan, ja yleensä ”ymmärtäminen” on tutkimusta täydentävä näkökulmana.

Varmasti on tärkeätä olla tietoinen siitä erosta, mikä hermeneuttisella ymmärtämisellä ja luonnontieteellisellä selittämisellä on – tätä eroa ei ole organisaatiotutkimussa aina riittävästi ekspliroitu. On myös tärkeää ymmärtää luonnontieteellisen objektiivisuuden rajalliset mahdollisuudet, joiden yli hermeneuttisella otteella voidaan päästää. Yhtä tärkeää on tietenkin tuntea hermeneuttisen subjektiivisuuden karikot. Näitä kaikkia tähden tässään hermeneutiikka on terästäänyt organisaatiotutkimuksen itsetiedostusta. Viime kädessä hermeneuttisen kysymyksen ratkaisu on sitoutunut koko yhteiskuntatieteen kohtalonkysymykseen: mitä oikeastaan on yhteiskuntatieteellisyys? Onko se pyrkimystä luonnontieteellisen mallin noudattamiseen, vaiko yhteiskunnallisille ilmiöille relevantimman tieteellisyyden mallin rakentamiseen?

## 8 Kvantitatiivinen formalisointi

Kvantitatiiviset suuntaukset ovat vaikuttaneet hyvinkin voimakkaasti organisaatiotutkimussa empiirisii analysointimenetelmiin, mutta varsinainen tiedon teoriatasoinen formalisointi on antanut odottaa itsäään. Yritelmiä ja kehitelmiä toki on, mutta vain rajatuilla alueilla (esim. Ross & Harary, 1955; Rainio, 1960, ja Schüler, 1978). Näyttää myös siltä, että eleganteimmat formalisoinnit ovat jääneet sisällöltään köyhänpuoleisiksi, kun taas keskeisimmät sisällölliset ongelmat ovat osoittautuneet vaikeasti kvantifioitaviksi (Müller & Tilanus, 1978, ja Pidd, 1979). Luultavasti ongelmia on ollut isolta osalta henkilökysymyskin: organisaatiospesialisteilla on ollut ainakin puutteellinen kvantitatiivinen koulutus tai suorastaan vastaanhakkaava

ennakkosenne kvantitatiivisuutta kohtaan. Matemaatikot taas eivät taida nähdä organisaatiotutkimusta yhtä mielenkiintoisena kuin esimerkiksi laskentatointia ja markkinointia, joissa kvantifiointi näyttää luontevammalta. Liekö kuvaavaa, että sellaiset alkujaan matemaatikot kuin Ansoff ja Kosiol ovat itse asiassa varsin vähän kvantitatiivisia liikkeenjohdon ja organisaatioteorian kysymyksiä käsitellessään? Oli miten oli, kvantitatiivinen lähestymistapa on selvästikin vielä näyttämättä leijonankynsiään organisaatiotutkimuksen kentässä.

## 9 Mikrotalousteoreettinen lähestymistapa

Organisaatiotutkimuksissa tavataan todeta organisaatioiden taloudelliset toimintaehdot. Organisaatiotutkimus luetaan liiketaloustiede: hallinnon ydinalueeseen. Silti mikrotalousteorian suoranainen vaikutus organisaatiotutkimukseen on ollut vähäisempää kuin muilla liiketaloustieteen osa-alueilla (vrt. Leibenstein, 1976; Hopwood, 1978). Tämän tilanteen seurauksena tietomme organisaatoristen ja (liike)taloudellisten ilmiöiden riippuvuudesta on niukkaa. On tosin yksittäisiä tutkimuksia markkinamuodon, suhdanteitten ja yrityksen kustannusrakenteen vaikutuksista organisaatiorakenteeseen, koordinointimenettelyihin, suunnittelun aikajänteeseen ja keskitys vs. hajautukseen (Marris, 1971; Simon, Norton & Lonergan, 1979).

Lähestymistapa on ollut organisaatiotutkimuksen kentässä käsiteanalyyttisesti painottunut. Myös kvantitatiivista formalisointipyrkimystä on esiintynyt. Empiirisen tiedon tarve tunnustetaan, mutta sen saaminen keskeisimmistä ongelmista on vaikeaa.

Mikrotalousteoreettisella organisaatiotutkimuksella on mahdollisuus perustua ainakin muodollisilta ominaisuuksiltaan muuta yrityshallinnon teoriaa ylivertaisesti kehittyneempään teoriataustaan. Näin se voi tarjota mallin pirstoutuneen organisaatioteorian integroinnille ja sen edelleen liittämiselle laajempaan taloustieteelliseen teorianmuodostukseen.

## 10 Marxilainen organisaatiotutkimus

Marxilainen lähestymistapa on ollut terävimmillään kritisoidessaan muita tutkimustapoja ja länsimaisen organisaatiotutkimuksen ja sen sovellutusten yksipuolisuutta ja sidonnaisuutta kapitalistiseen talousjärjestelmään (Goldman & van Houten, 1977). On olemassa jokunen marxilaissävyinen empiirinen tutkimus, tutkivaa journalismia (Mikkola, 1971) ja Gvishiania (1972) on luettu

myös länsimaissa. Sosialistisissa maissa tehtyä organisaatiotutkimusta tunnetaan vähän. Vaikkakin marxilaiset ovat makrotason tutkimuksissa painottaneet vallankäytön analyysiä, mikrotasolla ei tätä koskevia tutkimuksia juurikaan ole. Marxilainen suunta on siis ollut vain suhteellisin vähän ja etupäässä muita suuntia kritisoidessaan näkyvä organisaatiotutkimuksen alueella, mutta viime aikoina on julkaistu marxilaisia organisaatiotutkimusohjelmia, jotka lupaavat tämän suunnan näkyvämpää esiin marssia (esim. Goldman & van Houten, 1977). On myös pyritty integroimaan marxilaista ja klassista teoriaa (Zwerman, 1970).

## 11 Lopuksi

Läpikäyty kirjava kavalkadi osoittanee ainakin hajanaisuudessaan organisaatiotutkimuksen tilaa. Lähestymistavat ovat kuin lukuja eri sarjoista, ja siksi niistä on ylivoimaisen vaikeata muodostaa yhtenäistä kuvaa. Vai ovatko ne sittenkin jollakin lailla komplementaarisia, toisiaan täydentäviä? Ovatko ne jollakin viisasten kivellä integroitavissa yhtenäiseksi organisaatioteoriaksi?

On lähestymistapoja, jotka ainakin kapeilla osa-alueilla ovat päätyneet ja varmaan jatkossakin lupaavat perinteisten tieteellisten kriteerien mukaisia, kauniita saavutuksia – toiset taas ovat lausuneet tärkeältä tuntuvistaasioista tärkeältä tuntuvia asioita. Jotkut etenevät analyyttisesti yhä edemmäs yhä kapeammalle, toiset pyrkivät syntetisoimaan. On julkinormatiivisia, piilonnormatiivisia ja normatiivisuutta vastaan taistelevia näkemyksiä. Jotkut ovat majoittuneet korkea-akateemisiuteen – toiset ovat sekoittuneet kaikkeen liikkeenjohtoon ja täyttävät organisaatiot. Ovatko tieteellisempä ne, jotka pyrkivät noudattamaan formaalisia tutkimuksen kriteerejä? Ovatko totuudellisempia ne, jotka pyrkivät kuvaamaan organisaatioita niitten itsensä ehdoilla?

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# A NOTE ON SAMPLES AND GENERALIZABILITY IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS<sup>1</sup>

## 1 Introduction

We have been taught that the research problem determines the population of the research, and that a representative sample of the population is drawn applying the standard sampling procedures. But this kind of an ideal sample is not always available or even obtainable. Accordingly, the researcher must content himself with more or less unsatisfactory material. Consequently, the researcher tries to "clean away" the errors by statistical means afterwards or often just to judge the effects of errors on conclusions.

It is not unusual either that a researcher has obtained an interesting, maybe unique material that arouses in him questions to which the material seems to give answers. Even then the generalizability must be challenged: of what kind of a population the material could be a sample? Is the material a meaningful sample as such? To what population can the results be generalized?

It has been chronically difficult to obtain empirical material about business economics at least in Finland, and it is seldom possible to have an ideal sample. In this situation the researchers must assess the nature of their samples carefully in order to be able to judge the generalizability of their observations.

The present paper is an attempt to analyze some frequently used types of empirical material in studies of business economics and the problems of generalizability met in them.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was made for the visit of the Researchers of Turku School of Economics and Business Administration to European Institute of Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels, 1978.

## 2 The population of individuals

Statistical thinking and sampling theory were first introduced in biometrics in the study of individuals that are independent of each other and distribute normally regarding the studied variables. In social science the Gallup type studies of the people of a nation, electorate, etc. are another example of this type of a population. And in business economics e.g. consumers or potential consumers of a given product are typical of this category.

As all individuals have the same weight in relation to the problem, a representative sample of the population is obtained by random sampling where every individual has the same probability of getting selected. Generalization from the sample is then a matter of statistical inference by means of e.g. statistical tests of significance. In principle, sampling and generalization do not pose great problems in this type of research.

## 3 Individuals within a company as the unit of analysis

Even in this case individuals are the units of analysis. But as members of an organization they are not independent of each other. They belong to a company, they belong to a system. In this system they have different positions and their status in relation to the research problem may be different, too. This type of research has grown in number in personnel research and in studies of job satisfaction and attitude and motivation to work.

Random sampling is a possibility in these studies and technically an easy one to draw, because of the finite and known personnel of the company. It may sometimes be advisable to stratify the sample on departments or other subgroupings of the personnel. Again, generalization is basically a matter of statistical inference.

In small companies it is often practicable to include the whole personnel in the exercise. Drawing a sample may be more laborious than the additional material of a total study. There is a chance that the grapevine interpretation of exclusions from the sample does not acknowledge randomness, while a total study gives a sense of participation to all. In the case of a total study the observations describe the personnel as such, and the problem of generalizability within the company does not arise. The use of statistical test is unnecessary and even senseless.

The individuals of a company have different positions in relation to certain research problems. Then, the interview of key persons or key groups gives more valuable information with less effort than a statistical sample or a total study. So, in studies of financing few persons from the top management

qualify as a sample. And in studies of work safety the operative personnel are the most competent. This kind of a purposive sample or the weighing of personnel according to their positions is in many cases recommendable instead of large samples that do not differentiate the positions of the persons. There is no problem of generalizability within the company in this case either as the most relevant positions in relation to the problem are represented in the sample.

But the real problem is met in attempts to generalize from studies within a company to other companies or to any other population of individuals. Can a population be described by selecting a typical company to represent the population? Is the personnel of a company a representative sample of any larger population worth studying?

It is the interdependence of personnel and the network of their positions in the system of the company that make each personnel of a company *sui generis*. Even individually the personnel of a firm is selective on the basis of demands and characteristics peculiar to the positions. The assumption of normal distribution is warranted for few variables. But basically it is the system nature of the personnel with all its interdependencies unique to the company that does not allow simple comparability between companies. In all, statistical generalizability over the borderlines of a company personnel system is meaningless. The problem of generalizability from personnel studies is reducible to the problems of case studies that will be dealt with in their own paragraph.

#### 4 Companies as the unit of analysis

By definition of business economics companies are the central unit of analysis of the discipline. As it has turned out to be difficult to obtain proper empirical material from companies, the researchers must be content with inadequate materials. For this reason alone generalizability and reliability at large must be considered carefully.

In the case of companies the assumption of normal distribution is seldom warranted. E.g. company size has a very skew distribution with a few big companies and many small ones. A random sample of this distribution reflects characteristics of small companies. But it may be advantageous to concentrate on the few big companies due to their economic importance or due to the fact that many management problems or methods manifest themselves only after a threshold size. (There may, of course, be equally good reasons for concentrating on small companies).

The use of statistics to describe a sample of companies is not without problems. An “average company” or corresponding statistics of a typical company’ are apt to remain statistical artefacts without a substantial interpretations, if the statistics are counted from a number of qualitatively different companies. To take an obvious example, the figures of turnover in commerce and manufacturing cannot be related to each other. For this reason, there is an especially great danger of statistical blindness in this type of research. The researcher must make sure that the statistical describing a set of companies have a conceptual interpretation (like, e.g. branch growth in Hajba, 1978, 70).

There are instances when a good sample consists of a purposely selected number of internally homogenous companies. Then such companies are selected that are pertinent to the research problem and are comparable among themselves. The researcher of industrial democracy had better restrict himself or herself to the companies that have experimented with industrial democracy (Suominen, 1977). The population is now defined on the basis some events or measures taken by the company.

One more useful alternative in this research category is to investigate each individual company separately without statistical combining or statistical generalizing. If the same pattern, trend, process, or so on is found in each company separately, each case will bring additional support to the generalization. Ruuhela (1972) and Majala (1975) have used this type of analysis in Finland.

## 5 One company as a unit of analysis (the case study)

Case study is a classical bone of contention of generalizability. A case is selected on the basis of its interest value and availability; it could not be selected on statistical basis. The material may originally come from a source other than that of research - planning, training, and consulting assignments bring along material that is very rich in detail but awkward to analyze and generalize. It is the richness of the material and the possibility to investigate one case intensively that is the great advantage of the case study, while the extensive studies of a great number of companies bring forth material better adaptable to statistical treatment and inferences. There are signs of a renaissance of case study (Normann, 1976, especially 233-251), which may to some extent be satiety to the positivistic, statistical mode of research, but also the system approach has given a new impetus on clinical case study.

According to the system approach the company is regarded as an integral whole consisting of the parts and relations between the parts and the whole

system. The relationships between the parts (or the subsystems) within the totality are the interesting objects of study in this approach. Now, if one tries to find out how the subsystems (say, production and marketing) interact within the totality of the company, it is possible to investigate the matter only within the context or system common to the two subsystems, - i.e. within one company. Average statistics – be they correlations, differences, or others – from different companies do not describe the functioning of the living system, let alone the interaction of the subsystems within a system. (Moreover, marketing and production are likely to be in different companies so different in quality that the statistics are hard to interpret.) The point is that the subsystems can be studied only within the context of the common system of the subsystems, and, then, the study of the common system levels the road for a case study.

Is it possible to generalize from a single case at all? Some textbooks promote the stand that it is not possible to generalize from a single case, but the obtained result must always be tested against new cases which give or fail to give support to the original observation, hypothesis, or whatever the case might have presented (e.g. Sellitz, Jahoda, Deutsch & Cook, 1966, 60-65). Yet, the system approach and the model thinking open another viewpoint to the topic. A system model is a system of concepts that is in an isomorphic relation with the real system, i.e. the relations within the system of concepts are isomorphic with the relations within the system of the real world. Then, the model can be tested by confronting the whole model with the whole corresponding real system, or – a case (cf. Normann, 1973, 50). As the case hereby is utilized for testing of a model, interesting conclusions about generalizability are reached.

If there is a discrepancy between the model and the real world, in principle this one case alone is enough to challenge the generalizability of the model; in other words, the model must be corrected so as to explain the new case, too, (cf. Popper, 1974, 13-17). If in contrast, the case is in line with the model, the case supports the model. The case is no longer an incidental one, but a part of the systematic knowledge condensed in the model.

The problem usually lies in the fact that it is difficult to find the case for testing of a model (or a model that an obtainable case would test). Yet, without connection to a model a case remains a loose observation. However, even descriptive cases of the latter type may have a limited utility for giving ideas or even hypotheses for other studies to test.

## 6 Expert sample

The use of experts as a sample is perhaps best-known from the Delphi-method, but also in panel-studies, cost-benefit analyses, and organizational surveys experts are used frequently. In a way, literature reviews likewise represent the consultation of experts' writings.

The selection of experts may be problematic. The criteria of selection must be explicated in every study (see e.g. Mäkinen, 1976, 22-36). The biases of the selection distort the results immediately.

The reason for using experts as a sample is the contention that their views approximate the "truth". If there is just one truth, the dispersion of the experts can be used as a measure of the generality of the view. But sometimes the two or more modes of distribution reflect the fact that there is more than one truth; whether this is the characteristic of the sample or the studied phenomenon, is a problem. Nonetheless the generalizability of results in the usual meaning of the term is not the problem, if the selection of the experts is beyond reproach, as there is no intention to generalize outside the responses of the experts.

Often the expert samples are used for several repeated measurements to find out time-trends or to minimize the dispersion. This is apt to increase the number of refusals. Those who refuse are likely to be different in many crucial respects from those who remain in the sample (Nicosia, 1965, 255). Refusals create a problem of generalizability. Its affect on conclusions is not easy to judge, but an attempt can be made on the basis of the characteristics and earlier responses of the drop-outs.

## 7 Summary

The present paper is concerned with the problem of sampling and its reflection in generalizability. The paper has arisen from the difficulties to apply orthodox statistical sampling theory in the diverse and often by necessity incomplete materials of empirical studies in business economics. Five different types of research from the viewpoint of samples and generalizability are discussed.

1) The population consists of individuals that are in principle independent of each other and distribute randomly. This is the case for random sampling and generalizability of observations can be concluded statistically.

2) Individuals within a company are the population (personnel studies). Now the individuals make up a system in which different persons have different positions. Therefore, it is often convenient to pick up some few key persons instead of a large sample. When sampling is used it is advisable to stratify the sample on the relevant subgroupings of the company. Sometimes it

is possible and even economic to conduct the total study of the personnel instead of sampling. Then there is, of course, no problem of generalizability within the company.

On the other hand, the assumption that the personnel of a given company is representative of some larger population is not valid because of the selection of the personnel for their positions and the larger interdependent system nature of the personnel.

3) The sample is a number of companies. The assumption of normal distribution is seldom warranted. Because of the system nature of a company it is often arbitrary to pick a variable from different companies for statistical comparison as the value of the variable can be understood only within the context of the system of its proper company. A "typical company" is often just a statistical artefact, which cannot be given a substantial interpretation. Consequently, statistical analysis over a number of companies is cautioned, unless the parameters can be given a substantial interpretation. Another possibility is to study many companies distinctly, and try to find out, whether the same point applies over them. Also the selection of internally homogenous companies where it is known that the studied problem is pertinent is often a case in point.

4) Case studies are most controversial from the viewpoint of generalizability. The present paper maintains the position that is possible to generalize from a single case provided that the case confronts an empirical real system intensively with a conceptual system or a model. The discrepancy between the case and the model, then, challenges the generalizability of the model, while if the case and the model coincide, the case can be conceived as an instance of the general proposition of the model.

5) Experts as a sample are used in Delfoi-studies, panel studies, etc. It is not easy to define and find out the experts, but if they have been found out and can be maintained throughout the study, and if they remain unanimous, the classical problem of generalizability does not occur, as the results are claimed to represent the best informed opinion.

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## POSTSCRIPT

At the time of writing this paper I had troubles to find my way as a researcher of organizations and management. My earlier research background was statistical research on behavioural science. After it, I had worked for five years as a full-time management consultant in an international management consulting company doing clinical analyses of organizations and designing and implementing development programmes for their development. On my return to the Academia, I had lots of rich material from companies, but I could not apply my earlier research paradigm to the material. By hindsight, I can see how this paper served to heal the schizophrenia that I suffered.

Case research was not, however, at that time as popular as it is now. Now case research has become the mainstream of organization studies in Finland and many other countries as well.

I could not yet, on writing this paper, formulate the crucial difference of generalization in extensive statistical studies and intensive case studies. If case studies have academic value, they have to say something beyond the studied case organizations. This can be done by conceptual anchorage of the case material. Case studies can generate this kind of knowledge by way of conceptual abstraction. Concepts describe phenomena on a more general level

than descriptive language. Abstraction takes the discussion on a more general level than the description of concrete empirical detail. Case studies, then, can develop conceptual language or theory that applies to organizations that were not studied as empirical cases. Conceptual abstraction in case studies is the counterpart of statistical generalization from samples.

Getting case material from companies is not always easy - it is downright difficult, when delicate issues are at stake. This reminds me of Napoleon, when he was asked, how he selected women. His answer was: I have just one criterion: availability. This often holds true with the selection of case organizations as well.

# CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF ORGANIZATIONS - METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS<sup>1</sup>

## I THE DILEMMA OF CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF ORGANIZATIONS

*"every culture be understood in its own terms; every institution be seen as the product of the culture within which it is developed. It follows from this that a crosscultural comparison of institutions is essentially a false enterprise, for we are comparing incomparables"* (Goldschmidt's, 1966, 78, the Malinowskian dilemma).

1. Organizations are regarded as systems that are in a contingent interplay with their environment (culture). Departments are subsystems within the totality of the organization.

The parts of organizations (individuals, departments, federal units) are explained in terms of the organization as a system. Organizations are explained in terms of the environmental (cultural) system of which the organizations are subsystems. Now, how are we to compare two organizations that belong to two different environmental systems? Can we compare at all subsystems that belong to two different environmental systems? It does not make sense to compare a production department of a car manufacturer to the marketing department of a pharmaceutical company. How can we then compare an English organization with a French one? Is comparing organizations cross-culturally basically a senseless effort?

Malinowski gives one answer in the citation above. Malinowski was a classic of anthropology and functionalism. It is easy to see the similarity of

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<sup>1</sup> Based on the presentation in the Conference on Social responsibility in Marketing, Turku, 29.5.1980.

functionalism and systems thinking. It is tempting to paraphrase Malinowski's claim: Culture is a systems concept, and it is possible to analyze the organizations only within the context of their proper cultural system.

2. Culture can be defined in dozens of ways, referring to values, beliefs, programmes of the mind, institutions, etc. But irrespective of the definition one adopts, culture is considered a systemic concept so far that its parts make up a whole, pattern, totality, force field, network, configuration, holistic entity, integrated circle, quantum state, process, synthetic quality. These all underline that culture can be understood by the interplay of its elements, and these elements can be understood only recognizing their interplay with the whole of culture. The development of an organization is an interaction process over time with culture. Ideally cross-cultural organization research should compare the dynamic interplay of organizations (subsystems) with the cultural system at large. This kind of research is not abundant. Cross-sectional studies cannot catch this interplay that extends itself over time.

3. It is no wonder that empirical, cross-cultural comparisons of organizations have not been prolific. Roberts (1970) is bold enough to conclude: "The increment of knowledge seems minimal and possibly not worth all the effort thus far placed in cross-cultural work". Later reviewers (e.g., Negandhi, 1974, and Hofstede 1978a) do not essentially refute Roberts's conclusion, though they are able to draw some general conclusions as well.

4. Is it legitimate to make cross-cultural comparisons on the organizational level at all? Is it possible to find a common system of the two respective cultures and ease the comparison? Or should we just push theoretical and methodological considerations aside and simply go on collecting data?

It is with this kind of problems that this paper is concerned with. Having presented the problem in general terms, let me have a look over difficulties in established methodological canons as regards cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. Then, I try to put forward some disconnected thoughts about how to get out of the dilemma.

The paper does not give definite answers. Indeed, I doubt, whether there are any. But it is very opportune to discuss the problem with this wise collection of men and women from different cultures all versed in the subject matter. This could, I hope, level the way for agreeable solutions about how to compare organizations cross-culturally.

## II CLASSICAL METHODOLOGICAL CANONS AND CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF ORGANIZATIONS

1. In a classic empirical design a number of independent factors are held constant and independent factors are varied one by one in order that the effect of independent variables on the dependent one can be inferred.

The conditions of the scientific ideal of this *ex ante* experimental or quasiexperimental control are not easily met in cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. According to the canon we should keep constant such organizational independent variables as branch, size, etc. to isolate the effects of cultural variables or vary them one by one to find their interaction with culture. We cannot match organizations over cultures at our will. The natural organizations vary in regard to a whole host of variables which all in turn influence a number of variables. Even the nearest approximations to matched groups of organizations are short of the scientific rigour of the classical quasiexperimental design.

Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the possibilities that approximations to the quasiexperimental design can provide. If there is a chance to keep some key variables of comparable organizations at least roughly constant, this would ease the interpretation of the differences of the comparable organizations to a bearable extent.

2. Another canon of empirical comparisons attempts to replace the experimental *ex ante* control by *post facto* statistical control. For obvious reasons this canon is more frequently followed in the social sciences than the former one. But cross-cultural comparisons of organizations pose some peculiar problems that do not render themselves easily to statistical control either. Sampling is a major problem that can never be conducted in a textbook fashion. Organizations do not distribute normally.

In the simple case that we have only two cultures to compare (I cannot see any sense in sampling cultures statistically) we should have a big number of statistically representative organizations from the two cultures, and, then, the statistical differences of the organizational parameters would indicate cultural differences and similarities

Statistical thinking and sampling theory were first introduced in biometrics in the study of individuals that are independent of each other and distribute normally as regards the studied variables. These conditions are not normally met, when organizations are the units of analyses. Besides, the use of statistics to describe a sample of companies are not without problems. What is an

average company really? Companies avoid being average - rather they attempt to be exceptional in their own niches and competitive advantages.

It is, of course, possible to count averages, dispersion measures, correlations and so forth, but if they are derived from qualitatively different companies, they remain statistical artifacts, whose interpretation remains ambiguous. Besides, none of the statistics would stand the test of time: when there is a change in the environment, the averages et alia would change as well. I am not saying that statistical studies could not be conducted sensibly - all I am saying is that they must be interpreted by use of conceptual instruments instead of basing conclusions on statistical generalizability.

The ideal of statistical control can at best be only approximated. It could be possible within a limited and clearly defined population. If the companies are e.g. in the same branch, the interpretation of the statistics is not overwhelmingly difficult. Or we could also compare a managerial phenomenon (e.g. participation, delegating, reengineering) in a number of companies cross-culturally, and, then, we can interpret the statistics in the language of the management phenomenon we study. All in all, conclusions must be based on interpretation and knowledgeable understanding of the sample instead of a mechanical statistical treatise. Eventually, statistical comparisons over cultures run the risk of comparing the incomparables to an extraordinarily great extent.

3. A mix of the ex ante control and post facto control is a possibility in cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. It may be practical to limit the population to a smaller number of organizations that are roughly constant as regards critical independent variables (say, branch and size). Because of the truncated dispersion and restricted qualitative differences even the smaller number of organizations might render sufficient differences that could be interpreted with a fair confidence. Despite problems of generalization and measurement valuable insights could be gained. This design is not an easy one to conduct either. It is a laborious one to carry through. Observations must be interpreted with caution and against the background of the researcher's comprehensive understanding of his or her material. Statistical analyses can be a useful ingredient in this design provided that the statistics can be given a substantially interesting interpretation.

4. Case methodology has its inherent possibilities and its inherent difficulties. In the case method organizations are compared one by one over culture. The number of organizations may be more than one a culture; the point is that the organizations are not combined statistically nor otherwise. Inspecting organizations one by one is in accordance with the functional (or systems)

theoretical view so far that every organization is understood in its own terms within its systems context. But this is the very reason why functionalistic dilemma of cross-cultural comparisons arises. There are good reasons to argue that any attempt to compare cases cross-culturally is to compare incomparables.

A more permissive attitude might find room for comparisons. Obviously, the comparisons must be based rather on a thorough and comprehensive understanding from the inside than on the strict applications of the scientific canons presented above. The understanding and the cross-cultural interpretation of differences prerequisites that the comparable organizations should be similar in as much as possible except their cultural surroundings. This condition is all but easy to meet. It is very difficult to find even approximately similar organizations. Even if ones could be found, it is not sure that a relationship needed for case research could be established with them. The more there is room for interpretation, the more difficult it is to avoid the ethnocentric bias of the researcher: i.e., the researcher is tempted to interpret the foreign case with the concepts fit for one's own culture. The latter bias could be diminished by using researchers from both comparable cultures.

The point remains that the similarity of comparable cases in two cultures can at best be only reasonably approximated, and the more there are dissimilarities between the cases apart from the cultural ones, the more awkward is the interpretation of the differences. The differences between British Rail and Finnair are paramount but much too cumbersome to be interpreted in terms of cultural differences. But again the possibilities of a sensitive interpretation should not be undermined either.

Is it possible to generalize from case studies at all? Some textbooks promote the stand that this is not possible, but the obtained results must always be tested against new cases, which support or fail to support the original observation, hypothesis or whatever knowledge. Yet, statistical generalization is not the only way to obtain knowledge that is general or applies beyond the original empirical material. It can be asserted that conceptual abstraction is at least quite as important a way to obtain knowledge that applies to a wide area of empirical world and stands the test of time longer than any statistics do. Case studies are a most heuristic means to generate concepts from the material that are more abstract than the measured observations.

It is true, however, that cross-cultural organization studies have not been characterized by such a conceptual development that would have unified the field enough for the purpose. Ideally, if there would be a solid conceptual framework, case studies could test it. In principle, even one case, if discrepant with this kind of a conceptual theory, would be enough to challenge the theory and give an impetus for its correction or further development - the theory

should be corrected so that it could explain the new case, too. If in contrast, the case would be in agreement with the theory, the case would support the theory. The case would no longer be an incidental one, but a part of the systematic, conceptual knowledge of a theory.

The problem usually lies in the fact that it is difficult to find a case to test a theory or even more usually that there is no theory applicable for the available case. Or to put it more straightforwardly, there is no working conceptual representation or a theory for the purpose of empirical cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. Nonetheless, case studies have potential for generating conceptual ideas and language that would lay foundations for grounded theories. Actually, I see this as a most promising way for increased understand of cross-cultural differences and similarities of organizations.

5. We obviously need not be - and at least cannot be - absolute and ascetic in applying classical canons of science in the cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. With a more permissive attitude and loosening requirements of scientific strictness we can obtain valuable insights. This means, no doubt, decreasing scientific precision for substantial relevance and an increasing tolerance of the hermeneutic ambiguity, or giving up the scientific explanation for interpretative understanding of the functioning of the organization in its cultural context. It is highly questionable, whether cross-cultural comparisons of organizations can ever be or even should be strictly scientific in the original meaning of the term (natural) science.

In the study of culture there is also a well founded historical tradition which explicitly considers itself a subject of arts instead of that of science (Spengler, 1921). Cross-cultural comparisons of organizations are at the cross-roads of humanistic and social science research traditions, and problems and possibilities of the two are encountered in discussing the methodological options of the field.

### III SOME FRAGMENTARY SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF ORGANIZATIONS

1. There are good approximations of applications of the classical social science canons for the cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. The "Aston Group," (Pugh, 1975) is a notable illustration of a rigorous statistical social science approach to comparative studies of the organizations, which has

been applied to cross-cultural comparisons as well. Hofstede's (1978) famous dimensions were derived by factor analyses, even though his research can also be considered a case study, as it was conducted in one multinational corporation (Hermes or IBM), which had units all over the world. As IBM is a company known for its corporate culture that is promoted even in its national units, Hofstede's results are likely to have smaller standard deviations, cross-national differences and correlations than a random sample of organizations would have.

2. Case studies have potential for conceptual development towards a cross-cultural organization theory. As Hofstede showed, statistical methods can be used within one corporation and the demarcation line with statistical and a case study can be overcome. But even the pure case studies with their rich material for interpretation provide excellent possibilities for a mind trained and keen in qualitative case analyses. The interpretation would be eased, if the cases are as much as possible similar except their nationality. This ideal can at best be only approximated. But, for instance, a dock in Gdansk and one in Newcastle could be similar in size, technology, and a number of other variables. Their comparison, though by no means simple, could be very instructive as regards their functioning in their respective cultures.

Communications industry could open promising opportunities in the respect that their line of operation could be matched. So the comparison of SAS and Finnair operations between Stockholm and Helsinki, the comparison of British and French ferries over the Channel (or indeed, studying the British-French joint-venture for the Chunnel operation) or corresponding telecommunications operations between America and Europe would be eased by the similar operations of the company, by their overlapping potential market and other factors typical of their business. Even in these cases there would be needed interpretation at least as much as measurement, but, yet, it would be possible to learn an important lesson.

3. Multinational corporations provide an interesting frame for cross-cultural comparisons. One possibility is to compare their units in different countries. The industry can be held constant, but it is also possible to consider industry as an independent variable in diversified multinational corporations. The (more or less) constant management system of the national units of the multinational corporation can constitute a convenient frame for comparisons of the units in different cultures. It would be of a particular interest to compare the parent companies of two cultures both operating in their own and in the other one's culture (Pascale, 1978 has utilized this kind of a design). It would be good to have researchers from the comparable cultures to reduce the

ethnocentric bias. Finding available companies is the first tough difficulty in the implementation of this kind of a research design. Also statistical comparisons of multinational and indigenous companies operating in one culture, is a possibility (Imoisili, 1978).

4. Comparisons of individuals from different cultures are often conducted for comparative purposes. When the individuals are attached to organizations as managers, workers, clients, etc., differences in organizational behaviour may be dealt with. The comparisons are not without problems, however.

The very dilemma of the systems (or functional) view is most pertinent in this design. It turns out well to explain the individuals with reference to their organizations and to explain the organizations with reference to their culture, but crossing the system boundaries on the individual level for cross-cultural comparisons can be considered arbitrary. It is possible to obtain useful data in this way, but their interpretation is not simple.

Technically speaking the same measure may have different meanings for individuals from different cultures. When differences between two populations are found, it may be much too hard to spell out which portion of them is due to cultural factors. On the other hand, the very fact that managers in different countries react differently to the same question may be as such revealing of deeper cultural differences. And even if there are found valid differences between individuals from two cultures, it is not legitimate to infer corresponding aggregate differences (Hofstede, 1978b, gives an illuminating account of the fallacy of levels in cross-cultural comparisons). Sampling is a hard problem in cross-cultural comparisons of individuals related to organizations. Should we sample companies first and then take individuals from the selected companies, or should we take random samples from national registers (if there are any) of managers? Often managers attending to conferences or seminars are conveniently available, but the selection mechanisms of the participants produce a bias. There is, however, no way to avoid biases in the material - the point is to be aware of them and take them into account in the interpretation.

Despite the manifold and difficult problems it is naturally possible to gain knowledge from the cross-cultural comparisons of organizations, but the processing of the knowledge to cross-cultural analyses of organizations is simply just not observations on the individual level.

5. The macro level comparisons present difficulties of the same kind. Even though the indices of the performance of a nation reflect the performance of organizations, it is impossible to figure out the role of organizational factors. Besides, the same indices in different cultures indicate different qualities. The

weight of organizations is different in different stages of the development of national economy. All in all, it is hard to tell from the macro level comparisons cross-cultural comparisons of organizations.

6. It is not uncommon that management practices or management systems are compared cross-culturally. Then the system to be compared is that of management instead of that of organization as such (e.g. Tannenbaum et alia, 1974). If it is possible to identify the same basic management system in the comparable cultures, this system makes up a frame of the comparisons (e.g. Negandhi & Prasad, 1975 compared in this way the management functions cross-culturally). Comparisons of participation systems or industrial democracy have abounded (e.g., de Vall & King, 1973; Laaksonen et alia, 1979). Convergence theorists (see Hofstede, 1978a) have shown interest to test a management system of one country against that of another.

All management systems are, of course, functional to the organization, which, in turn, operates in its functional context. The risk of comparing incomparables is no less in comparing management systems than in comparing organizations as a whole. The empirical and technical problems are not easier either. However, cross-cultural comparisons of management systems guided by sensitive and sensible interpretations can add to our understanding of the interaction of management and culture.

7. Another mode of cultural explanation of organizations is based on analyses within a culture, i.e., a particular organizational pattern is explained with reference to the cultural (often historical) characteristics of the culture. Japan seems to have aroused a particular interest of this kind (e.g. Matsuda, 1978 and Ouchi & Price, 1978). Bernthal's (1978) interpretation of the German Harzburg management model is another illuminating example of within culture analyses.

Idiographic research of organizations within their cultural context does not even aim at cross-cultural comparisons. This methodology is more of historical than of social science nature. But often the interpretative scheme of the researcher may have explicit or implicit features of his indigenous (usually western) organizational or management thinking.

There is no doubt that this kind of studies has increased our understanding of the cultural margins of organizations. But they seem to be difficult to combine with a comparative scheme beyond noticing casual cross-cultural similarities and differences. There is an analogous situation in the study of history. It is possible to understand that certain phenomena in two cultures are related to a more universal trend in the world history. But there is no theory to account for cultural differences and similarities.

8. There are well known cross-cultural comparisons of the travel report type. It is equally well known that superficial impressions of a traveller may lead to misleading, even prejudiced interpretations as a traveller may have a tendency to interpret his observations in terms of his own culture without realizing their function in the totality of their appropriate culture.

The possibilities of a scientifically trained eye should not be undermined, however. A gamut of important anthropological material has been collected by means of the direct observation of human senses. There are examples in organization studies as well: By systematically observing and interviewing (e.g., Granick, 1975), by living and working a longer period in the comparable cultures (e.g. Namboudiri, & Saiyadain, 1978), and by means of an appropriate conceptual apparatus of comparison (e.g. Laaksonen, 1975) it has been possible to obtain valuable insights in the culturebound differences of organization.

This kind of, if I may say so, journalistic method of data collection requires great skill of interpretation and an inoculation against biases and prejudices. The flexibility of recording is both an asset and a problem of the method.

#### IV CONCLUSION

The cross-cultural comparisons of organizations pose considerable practical and theoretical difficulties. The empirical results of the field have grown prolific, but conceptual and theoretical developments remain scattered and scarce. The methodological difficulties are of such a nature that the classical social science canons cannot deal with them easily.

The present paper tries to outline some sketchy designs for cross-cultural comparisons of organizations. None of the suggestions promises an easy way out. They are all emphasizing that scientific measurement and theory building must be supplemented or even replaced by sensitive interpretation and understanding of the problems in their cultural context.

I am not trying to discourage cross-cultural research. Rather the contrary: There is a growing academic and practical need for it amidst the integration and disintegration of economies. Academic people and business people need to understand better differences and similarities in business practices, management and organizations in different parts of the world. Instead of sticking in the name of scientific rigour to what is precise and methodical, we should use the kind of knowledge that is available and interpret it with our

understanding of the nature of the knowledge about the culture at large. By this understanding we can avoid the Scylla of anything goes -attitude and the Charybdis of sticking to what textbooks of methodology prescribe. The latter were never written for the practicing cross-cultural researcher of organizations in mind. Despite the difficulties of the field, research in the area is growing and along it the understanding of organizations in different cultures. Even in this field the proof of the pudding is eating.

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# SELITYSTYYPIT JA JOHTAMISKÄYTÄNTÖ<sup>1</sup>

## 1 Yleistä

Organisaatio- ja johtamistutkimuksessa käytetyt selitystyyppit on kätevää jakaa Everedin (1976) tavoin 1) niihin, joissa selittävät tekijät ovat selittäviin tekijöihin nähden menneisyydessä, 2) niihin, joissa selittävät ja selittävät tekijät vaikuttavat samanaikaisesti sekä 3) niihin, joissa selittävät tekijät ovat selittäviin tekijöihin nähden tulevaisuudessa. Kutsun näitä kolmea selitystyyppejä jatkossa asiaa tietoisesti vähän yksinkertaistaen 1) historiallisiksi selityksiksi, 2) kenttäselityksiksi ja 3) teleologisiksi selityksiksi. Selostan niitä kutakin ensin erikseen ja sitten koetamme päättyä alustavaan yhteenvetoon ja vertailuun eri selitystapojen käytännöllisyysaspekteista.

## 2 Historialliset selitykset

Yrityksen nykytilaa tai jotakin sen havaittavaa piirrettä voidaan selittää menneisyydestä käsin. Tämä selitystyyppi on siinä mielessä historiallinen, että organisaation tästä päivää selitetään sen menneisyydellä eli historialla. Historian tutkimus käyttää myös kahta muuta selitystyyppiä (Renvall, 1965, 24-48). Luonnonlajeesta peräisin oleva kausaaliset selitykset ovat tässä mielessä historiallisia, samoin historiaan perustuvat ja syvyyspsykologiset selitykset. Menneisyyden merkitys tulee erityisen hyvin näkyviin yrityksen muutosprosessien yhteydessä: liian rohkeat ja yrityksen traditioita murtavat muutosaikeet ovat helposti takaisin lyöviä ja organisaatiolla on vahva sisäänrakennettu taipumus palata entisille raiteilleen (McFarland, 1979, 383-403). Ylipäätään yrityksen tästä päivää on hyvin vaikea tajuta tuntematta sen menneisyyttä, josta löytyvät tämän päivän tilanteen aihot ja juonteet. Niinpä

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<sup>1</sup> Teoksesta Nurmi, R. (1983). Yrityshallinnon tutkimus ja käytäntö. Turun kaupporkeakoulun julkaisuja A2.

yritysten strategiassa ja toimintapolitiikassa yleensä näkyy niitten perustamisideologia jopa siihen mittaan asti, että perustamisideologia voi olla niitten strategian keskeinen käyttövoima (osuustoimintaideologia, säästämäsideologia säästöpankeissa) tai myös pahin este yritytessä strategiamuutoksia (esimerkiksi kansainvälityksen vaatessa toisenlaista strategiaa kuin se mihin on kotimarkkinoilla toimittaessa urauduttu). Tarvitsematta olettaa kausaalista selitystäsmällisyttä menneisyys on hyvin käypä selittäjä, jopa niin että yrityksen historiaa tuntematta emme voi oikein ymmärtää sen tätökään päivää.

Menneisyydestä saatavat selitykset ovat sikäli tutkijan kannalta otollisimpia, että niistä on saatavissa empiiristä tietoa ainakin periaatteessa ja hankalutena ovat vain tutkimusteknilliset rajoitukset. Menneisyydestä on olemassa ja opittavissa kokemuksia. Mutta praktikolle menneisyys on sikäli vähemmän kiintoisaa, että siihen ei enää voi vaikuttaa. Tästä juontuu päätöksentekijän luontainen penseys ”jälkiviisaudelle”. Jos menneisyydestä olisi johdettavissa kausaalisia lakeja siitä, mitkä toimenpiteet vaikuttaisivat mitenkin, olisivat tällaiset lait luonnollisesti mitä välittömimmin käytännöllisiä (ks. Ketosen esitystä kausaaliisen ennustamisen kaavioista, 1981). Kun tällaisia johtamisen vaikutuksia koskevia lakeja ei kuitenkaan ole, on tyydyttävä vain useinkin henkilökohtaisen kokemuksen perusteella ymmärtämään menneisyyden vaikutukset. Tässä mielessä historian opetukset voivat olla hyvin hyödyllisiä, mutta nekin ovat harvoin yksiselitteisiä tai toisenlaisiin uusiin kokonaistilanteisiin soveltuivia muutoin kuin kasvattamalla päätöksentekijän silmää ja harkintakykyä (Knuutila, 1978). Kuitenkin historiallisten tekijöiden ymmärtäminen on tärkeää kaikessa päätöksenteossa sikäli, että organisaation historiallinen ydin tulee otetuksi huomioon sekä tulevaisuuden mahdollisuuksiin että voitettavia vaikeuksia luovana tosiasiallisena tekijäryhmänä.

### 3 Kenttäselitykset

Järjestelmäteoria tai järjestelmänäkemys (erikoisesti Katzin & Kahnin, 1966, versio on tässä yhteydessä merkittävä) lienee tunnetuin ja voimakkaimmin vaikuttava selitystavoista, joissa selitetään ilmiötä selitetään sitä samanaikaisesti ympäröivän laajemman kokonaisuuden osana. Kenttäteoria (Lewin, 1951, lainasi käsitteen alkuaan fysiikasta, ks. Fuchs, 1965, 35-64) ja hahmoteoria (Köhler, 1947; Mintzberg, 1973) ovat kaksi muuta esimerkkiä tästä selitystyyppistä. Kun puhutaan ”kokonaisvaltaisen näkemyksen tarpeesta,” tarkoitetaan tavallisesti juuri pyrkimystä nähdä jokin yksityiskohta osana isompaa voimakenttää. Pyritään siis selittämään ilmiö viittaamalla siihen

laajempaan järjestelmään, kenttään, hahmoon tai muunlaiseen kokonaisuuteen, josta selitettävä ilmiö on osa ja johon se elimellisesti kuuluu. Tässä selitystavassa samakin yksityinen ilmiö nähdään aivan erilaatusena eri tavalla miellettyjen kokonaisuuksien osana ollessaan. Esimerkiksi henkilöstötoimi työvaltaisessa yrityksessä ja pääomavaltaisessa yrityksessä eivät ole keskenään vertailukelpoisia, vaan selitettävissä kumpikin osina oman yrityksen kokonaisuutta. Tässä selitystavassa kokonaisuus on sillä tavalla primaaria, ettei se ole jäännöksettä analysoitavissa osiinsa. Kokonaisuudella on synteettinen ominaislaatuunsa.

Tälle selitystavalle on organisaatiotutkimuksessa luontevia perusteluita. Yritys sinäsä on helppo nähdä (funktioalisena) kokonaisuutena, jossa sen toiminnot, osastot, yksilöt, tehtävät ja muut havaintoyksiköt palvelevat yrityskokonaisuutta. Yrityksen henkilöstötoimi on selitettävissä relevantimmin yrityksen luonteesta käsin kuin erilaatusille yrityksille yhteisten henkilöstötoimen piirteiden perusteella. Emme voi verrata kahden eri yrityksen markkinointistrategiaa ellemme, ota huomioon yritysten tuotteita, asiakaskuntaa, tuotantotapaa ym. yrityskohtaisia ominaisuuksia. Emme voi verrata kahdessa eri maassa toimivaa yritystä ottamatta huomioon niiden laajempaa kulttuuritaustaa (Nurmi, 1982). Tällaisia esimerkkejä ei ole vaikeata keksiä. Myös tätä selitystyyppiä käyttävien teorioiden yleisyys osoittaa sen luontumista organisatorisiin ilmiöihin.

Kun selitettävänä tekijänä on ilmiöitä ympäröivä ja ajallisesti läsnäoleva kenttä, on se praktikon kannalta jo astetta helpommin manipuloitavissa ja vaikuttavissa kuin menneisyys. Niinpä organisaatorakenne on muutettavissa (tässä ei ole nyt tarpeen puuttua organisaatiomuutosten sinäsä moniin toteutusvaikeuksiin), ja organisaation rakennemuutoksella voidaan vaikuttaa tämän kokonaisuuden osasiin kuten toimiin ja niiden haltijoihin tehokkaammin kuin niitä kutakin yksittäin muuttamalla. Yritys pyrkii myös parantamaan omaa asemaansa omaan ympäristöön osin vaikuttaen, osin sopeutuen. Yritysten johtamis-, hallitsemis- ja suunnittelujärjestelmät pyritään yleensä rakentamaan jollakin tavalla hierarkkisesti kokonaisuudesta osiin päin, siis kenttäteorian periaatetta implisiittisesti noudattaen.

Kenttäselitysten käytännöllisyys on ainakin siinä, että ne osoittavat halutun muutos-, kehitys- tai parannuskohteen yhteyksiä niiden periaatteessa manipuloitavissa olevaan kokonaiskenttään, jota muuttamalla voidaan myös sen yksittäistä osasta muuttaa. Muuttamalla kokonaisuutta saadaan myös sen osaset todellisemmin ja kokonaisuutta palvelevammin muutetuksi kuin koettamalla muuttaa yhtä osasta, joka joka tapauksessa on sidoksissa kokonaisuutensa kenttäominaisuuksin. Henkilöön voidaan vaikuttaa muuttamalla hänen tointaan, toimeen voidaan vaikuttaa muuttamalla organisaatiota, organisaatioon voidaan vaikuttaa muuttamalla johtamista tai

sen kontingenttia ympäristöä, yksittäiseen menettelyyn voidaan vaikuttaa muuttamalla koko järjestelmää jne., jne.. Näiden yhteyksien yksityiskohtainen selvittely onkin siksi hyvin hyödyllistä. Mutta kun ympäröivän kentän dynaamiset muuttujakonstellaatiot ovat hyvin moninaiset ja kokonaisvaltaiset, niin yksittäisten mekaanisten riippuvuuksien varaan ei voi soveltamista perustaa.

Tärkeätä kenttäselitysten soveltamisajatuksessa on se seikka, että kaikkia päätöksiä tehtäessä ja toteutettaessa on otettava huomioon päätöskohteen kenttäsidonnaisuudet: päätökset ja muutokset potkaisevat takaisin, jos koetetaan muuttaa ilmiötä irrotettuna niistä kenttätekijöistä, joihin ilmiö on kytketty. Esimerkiksi henkilöstökoulutukseen vaikea organisatorinen hyödyntävyys (Marx, 1982) johtuu varmaan usein siitä, että muu organisaatio ei muutu sillä tavalla, että se mahdollistaisi koulutuksen soveltamisen työssä.

#### 4 Teleologiset selitykset

Teleologisissa selityksissä viitataan selitettävän ilmiön tarkoitukseen, tavoitteeseen, tarpeeseen, motiiviin tai muuhun tulevaisuudesta täytyymystään hakevan selitysperusteeseen. Erityisesti kaikessa suunnittelussa tällaiset selitykset ovat luontevia; onhan suunnittelu tietoisesti tulevaisuuteen tähtäävä toimintaa. Mutta kun koko yritystä pidetään tavoitehakuisena järjestelmänä, koko yrityksenkin teoriaa voidaan rakentaa teleologisesti. Avoimen järjestelmän teoriaa voidaan siksi pitää myös teleologisena teorian. Teleologisen teorian ja selitystavan suuri oppi-isä on ollut Aristoteles, (metafysiikka II, 88-98), ja teleologinen ajattelu vallitsi newtonilaisen ja baconlaisen luonnontieteen läpimurroksessa. Kausaalinen, luonnontieteellinen ajattelu saattoi teleologisen miltein unohduksiin. Nyttemmin teleologinen selitystyyppi on kuitenkin noussut ihmistieteiden metodologiasta käytävässä keskustelussa uudelleen esille (Gerholm & Magnusson, 1966). Ihmisten käyttäytymistä selitetään motiiveilla. Samoin toimijanäkemystä puoltavissa kannanotoissa aktorin tarkoitukset, tavoitteet ja motiivit ovat näkemykseen sisäänrakentunutta selitysperustaa (Mäkinen, 1980). Myös historiallisissa selityksissä päätöksentekijän motiivit ja tavoitteet ovat usein käytetty selitysperusta (Suolahti, 1979).

Yrityskäytäntö on täynnä teleologista kielenkäyttöä. Toiminta-ajatus, strategiat, päämäärät, tarkoitus, tavoitteet, suunnitelmat ja budgetit ovat tyypillisesti tulevaisuuteen viittaavia termejä, jotka vaikuttavat yrityksen ja sen henkilöiden käyttäytymiseen. Myös oppi- ja opaskirjat viljelevät tällaista terminologiaa. Suunnittelua on toki tutkittukin, kylläkin enemmänkin suunnitelmienviennistä kuin suunnitteluintentiointia.

Käytännön ihmiselle tulevaisuus on tärkeää. Dynaaminen johtajuus ja yritysjyys lähtee tulevaisuudesta, tulevaisuuden mahdollisuksista ja halusta vaikuttaa tulevaisuuteen haluttuun suuntaan. Tulevaisuuden muokkaaminen on, toisin kuin menneisyden kohdalla, mahdollista. Johtaminen on intentionaalista toimintaa tulevaisuuden muokkaamiseksi. Yrittämiselle on ominaista rohkea ja vaikeuksia pelkäämätön asennoituminen tulevaisuuteen. Tulevaisuus on täynnä mahdollisuksia ja mahdollisuuksiksi käännettävissä olevia uhkia. Tulevaisuus on vaihtoehtoisista selitystapojaen aikauottuvuuksista se, johon on helppointa vaikuttaa ja jota koskeva tieto olisi siksi hyödyllisintä. Tulevaisuutta koskeva tieto ei kuitenkaan voi olla vain nykytilanteen ehdoilla ennustettavaa tietoa. Tulevaisuutta ei voi ymmärtää ottamatta lukuun tulevaisuutta muokkaavien toimivien ihmisten intentioita eli juuri teleologisia selitysperusteita. Organisaation tulevaisuus ei kehkeydy passiivisesti, vaan sitä tietoisesti koskevia päätöksiä tehdään joka hetki. Aristotelinen praksiksen määritelmä ja sen yhteydessä käsitellyt johtamisen määritelmät ovat teleologista toimintaa olosuhteiden muuttamiseksi.

Tulevaisuutta koskevan, praktikolle välittömästi hyödyllisen tiedon tuottaminen on kuitenkin ongelmallinen tieteellinen tehtävä. Tulevaisuudesta ei voi olla empiiristä tietoa, joskin erilaisia tosiasiallisesti vallitsevia intentioita, voidaan empiirisesti kartoittaa ja koettaa niistä käsin ennustaa tulevaisuutta. Luultavasti kuitenkin yritysjohtajien intentiot ovat verraten herkästi muuttuvia ympäristömuutosten puristuksessa kuten esim. järjestelmänäkemyksen equifinality – periaate toteaa (Bertalanffy, 1969, 52). Organisaation eloon jääminen on pysyvä päämäärä, mutta ne intentiot, joilla eloonaamiseen pyritään ovat monet ja alati vaihtelevat. Intentioiden asettaminen on aina arvojen asettamista. Siksi tutkimus ei ole auttanut johtajia kovin pitkälle tulevaisuuden strategoiden ja tavoitteiden asettelussa.

Näyttäisi siltä, että tiede voisi selittää tämän päivän tilanteita toimijain pyrkimysten perusteella ja ehkä niistä ennustaa tulevaisuuttakin. Sen sijaan tutkimus on likipitääen voimaton avustamaan toimijoita intentioiden asettamisessa, vaikkakin ennusteilla voidaan kartoittaa realistisille tavoitteille raja-arvoja ja myös osoittamalla vallitsevan tilanteen ja trendien seuraamuksia, pakottaa niitä muuttuviihin tavoiteasetteluihin. Näitä tärkeämpänä mahdollisuutena voidaan kuitenkin nähdä se teorian antama hyöty, että teoria etsiessään todellisuudesta oleellisia seikkoja ja niiden välistä suhteita, voi auttaa praktikkoa hänen suunnistautuessaan tulevaisuutta kohti sellaisella tavalla, että hän kiinnittää huomiota oleellisimpiin seikkoihin ja niiden keskinäisiin riippuvuuksiin. Tuntemalla muutosprosessin dynamiikkaa voidaan muutoksia ohjata intentioiden suuntaan. Tulevaisuuden tutkimus on lupaava yritys sikäli, että se näyttäisi voivan tarjota tien yritysjohdolle käytännöllisemmän tiedon tarjontaan. Se ei ole kuitenkaan vielä ehtinyt

paljoakaan vaikuttaa yritysten tutkimusten piirissä, vaikka alkuja siihen suuntaan on jo hahmoteltu (Perlmutter, 1982).

## 5 Yhteenveto selitystyyppiestä

Selitystyyppiestä ja niiden aikaperspektiivistä seuraa eräs tutkimuksen ja käytännön välinen dilemma. Tutkimus kuvaaa ja selittää, kun taas yrityskäytännössä pyritään aktiivisesti vaikuttamaan.

Tutkija on vahvoilla menneisyydessä sekä tässä päivässä, joista hänellä on empiiriisiä tietoja ja joita hän voi selittää ilmiöiden yhteyksillä havaittuihin kokonaisuuksiin. Hän voi myös selittää nykyisyyttä aktorien tulevaisuutta koskeville aikomuksilla sekä laatia tulevaisuutta koskevia ennusteita, mutta itse tulevaisuuteen intentioita ei voi tieteellisesti asettaa. Yritysjohtajaa kiinnostaa ensisijaisesti tulevaisuus, jota hän voi muokata ja pyrkii muokkaamaan pyrkimystensä mukaiseksi. Tätä päivää hän voi muuttaa vaikuttamalla vallitsevaan kokonaistilanteeseen tulevaisuuden pyrkimystensä suuntainen. Menneisyyteen ei enää voi vaikuttaa, mutta se on kaikessa päätöksenteossa varteenotettava annettu tekijä.

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# ON PARTICLE PHYSICS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

Concepts of particle physics can serve as metaphors for organizational phenomena. The strategic factors are regarded as the nucleus of the organization. The departments and persons revolve as particles around the nucleus. From the dual interpretation of matter parallels with organization theory are suggested. Organization is described as a force field of interactions. Its part(icle)s are interacting around the nucleus of the organization. The location of a part is defined as a probability. Some problems in using natural science metaphors in organization theory are taken up.

## 1 Introduction

Physics has often been considered a model for other sciences. Newtonian mechanics did not only mean a revolution in physics. It brought forth also a new philosophy of science. As it conquered new areas, it was taken as a model for scientific thought. Other branches of science and even art began to respect physics as the most advanced area of human knowledge. It was considered the science that less advanced areas should follow. Lewin's (1951) work serves as an example of an attempt to apply ideas of physics to organization theory. More recently, chaos theory seems to have aroused interest among writers on strategic management (e.g. Stacey, 1991, Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998 and Tetenbaum, 1998), and Thiétart & Forgues (1995) have delineated a chaos theoretical approach to organization theory. Likewise, the application of

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<sup>1</sup> Published in Auer-Rizzi, W., Szabo, E. & Innreiter-Moser, C. (Hrsg.): (2002). Management in einer Welt der Globalisierung und Diversität. Europäische und nordamerikanische Sichtweisen. Festschrift für Professor Dr. h.c. mult. Gerhard Reber zum 65. Geburtstag. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag. 471-480.

complexity theory to organization theory (Anderson, 1999 and the whole issue 10, 3 of *Organization Science* on the subject) has one of its roots in physics.

Yet, there are good reasons to assume a cautious attitude in regard to the utilization of physics as a model for organization theory. Model thinking implies isomorphism between the model and what it represents. It assumes an invariance of the relationships of the elements in the model and in the real world (see Arbnor & Bjerke, 1997, 69-70). The intentionality of human action in management and organizations can be seen as a crucial difference from the "non-intentionality" of the physical world. The conception of matter as being a wave as well as the statistical interpretation in particle physics have challenged the deterministic and mechanistic thinking of classical physics. Yet, they have not presented intentionality as being a property of matter. This is a major argument against knowledge being ecumenical.

It is true though that physical reductionism asserts that intentionality (or free will and consciousness for that matter) could be explained in physical terms, only the initial conditions and the principles that determine motion (development and emergence) would be known better than they are for the time being (Weinberg, 1993, Feynman, 1998). This is a most intriguing possibility for scientific explanations and predictions and rejects the post-modernist (see e.g. Cooper & Burrell, 1988; Berg, 1989; Alvesson, 1995) and even more moderate cultural interpretations (Alvesson, 1993) of organizational and other social phenomena. Even if this reductionist view would be accepted, it would not make organizational research nor organization theory futile, as we need even then a language more relevant to organizational context and meaning than any theory formulated in physical terms could provide us with. Even if organizational phenomena could be considered emergent from physical phenomena, the former have qualitative properties that the latter cannot tackle.

In this article concepts borrowed from nuclear physics (see e.g. Weinberg, 1993; Feynman, 1995; Tipler & Llewellyn, 1999) are applied to organization theory. The purpose is not to build a model, less lay a foundation for the purpose. Physics is here used as a heuristic metaphor or a source of ideas (cf. Morgan, 1997). There is no pretension to an isomorphism between the two areas. Reducing organization theory to rules of physics would be even more unrealistic an attempt.

Why then, considering this, concepts of nuclear physics are seen here useful for the description of organizations? Experimenting, sketching and even speculating with strange and rare concepts is a valuable method in scholarly discussion (see Folger & Turillo, 1999). This kind of a discussion can shake habitual thinking patterns and show the relativity of well-established

approaches. It can also serve as an excuse to take up predicaments in organization theory, and its relation to theories in natural science.

## 2 The Bohr-model as an analogy of organization

The particle model is probably the best-known description of the atom. Its clearness and ease of illustration has, no doubt, added to its popularity. The model is often named after Niels Bohr and (1855-1962) and the Copenhagen interpretation.

It is very tempting to describe organization using the analogy of the Bohr-model (see figure 1.) An organization has a nucleus, around which all its activities revolve. The nucleus may be the *raison d'etre* of its establishment, its strategy, its business idea or the will of its owners or executives. The demand for profitability can be seen as a nuclear idea that defines allowed orbits (cf. Nurmi & Darling, 1997).




Figure 1: An organizational nucleus with its operational orbits.

The departments and persons as their incarnations would be in this model organizational counterparts of the electrons. The orbits around the nucleus are regulated by job descriptions, objectives and other control procedures of the organization.

The analogy seems to fit with organizations quite well. It is a clear way of presenting, and it seems to show properly the relationship of the nuclear steering principles of the organization to its parts. It is a simple description, perhaps too simple, and it leaves many questions unanswered.

### 3 Organizational analogies of later developments in particle physics

From the 1920's on it turned out that the particle model did not explain the atom adequately. The work of Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schrödinger and Niels Bohr brought out the revolutionary idea that the particles have properties of a wave: the wave model that had explained light and sound so successfully could be used as a description of matter as well. From this followed a number of novel ideas: The place of an electron at a given moment in a given place is given by a probability distribution. In this description, it is not possible to say where precisely an electron is at a given moment - one can only tell relative probabilities of finding the electron at various locations.

The wave model has not refuted the particle model. The two views are complementary, and they are both needed for an adequate description and explanation of matter.

Quantum theory is another development of modern nuclear physics. According to it, the total energy of an atom can change only by bursts or in packets. Their amount is a constant or a multiple of the constant.

Probabilistic thinking as such is more relevant to organizational phenomena than the deterministic and mechanistic thinking of classical physics. Indeed, organization studies and social sciences in general, have applied statistical thinking for a long time. The question remains whether the indeterminacy is a property of the subject (organizations or matter) or rather due to the inexactness of observations and measurements.

The idea of complementarity is in the same vein, most appropriate to organization studies. No single theory by itself can explain organizational phenomena adequately. Hence, complementary, albeit mutually exclusive, theories are needed. So, strategic choice emphasizing managerial action (Child, 1972) vs. contingency theory emphasizing environmental determinism (reviewed by Donaldson, 1995), organizational ecology emphasizing selection (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) vs. institutional theory emphasizing adaptation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and organizational economics emphasizing competition (Williamson, 1979,) vs. organization culture emphasizing cooperation (Schein, 1985) can be seen as complementary perspectives in organization theory. They are related to the old and ever-persistent philosophical tension between determinism and free will and, whether, accordingly, research should be conducted as a scientific *Naturwissenschaft* or a scholarly *Geisteswissenschaft*. Organization studies are at crossroads of these ontological and epistemological debates.

Neither the stochastic interpretation nor the idea of complementarity means that physics approached organization theory. The difference in the formality

and exactness of the areas continues to be very wide. But the above remarks are important in order to show that monistic and deterministic views cannot be defended using the natural science model as a basis. Even physicists in search of a "final theory" consider many possible ways to this end. Most organizational theorists would agree that complementary perspectives, representations, theories and paradigms are not only acceptable, but even illustrative of the nature of the field (Clegg & Handy, 1999 and the articles in it) reflecting the tensions and dualities of organizations (Janssens & Steyaert, 1999). Postmodernists even argue that we should deconstruct all arguments about truth and ask who benefit from the "truths" and emphasize the fragmentary nature of all that goes on in organizations (Hatch, 1997, 46). Yet, the earth *is* round and human beings *have* intentions, and few would regard these notions basically as social constructions.

The concepts of wave and quantum are not quite easy to apply in organization studies. They imply a structural stability that organizations do not show. The latter are open (or in the language of physics: decoherent) systems and they always reflect their contingent environment. The idea of quantization of energy has been adopted in organization studies: Miller & Friesen (1984) suggest that the change of an organization cannot take place steadily, but only by way of discontinuous jumps from one quantum state to another. Institutional theory has the same idea in a grosser terminology.

The dual interpretation of matter as a particle and as a wave cannot be illustrated as easily as in Bohr's model. Mathematical language is needed for its description. Figure 2 shows, however, a property of the new conception, viz. the electron appears somewhere in the "cloudy" area around the nucleus.




Figure 2: An analogy based on Heisenberg's description of atom where "subordinates" surround the nucleus

The interpretation of organizational nucleus need not change from what it was in the analogy of Bohr's model. The part(icles)s around the nucleus - the departments and the persons - are now somewhere in the cloudy area around the nucleus. Their precise place is not known, but their location is given by a probability function (figure 3). The description is in accordance with organizational reality. Management can try to define the jobs and functions in a determined way, but the departments and persons have intentions of their own, and they move somewhere around the nucleus and near the orbits, where they should be. Their location can be described only in probabilistic terms. (see figure 3 and 4).




Figure 3: The appearance of subordinates around the nucleus presented as a probability distribution.  $r$  = distance from the nucleus,  $p$  = probability

Classical physics was based on mechanics, and it searched for the ultimate building blocks of matter and solid particles. Now, matter is considered a process and a dynamic field of interaction. This, of course, reminds of the process view of organizations (e.g. Nurmi 1997 and 1998). Organization is more of a process and a dynamic field of interaction than the solid structure described by conventional organization charts.




Figure 4: An atomistic description of organization

The classical physics assumed that its object of study is independent of the observer. This has been a basic assumption of all science. A relativistic view, however, has now emerged: theories are regarded not only as objective descriptions of nature, but also abstractions and creations of the human mind (Jones, 1983). Capra (1981) goes as far as to assert that nuclear physics is here breaching the western tradition of linear, analytical thinking and bringing forth a world view that stresses the unity of universe in the same way as the Eastern religions do. This remains debatable, to say the least.

In organization theory the linear way of thinking has been prevalent at least since the times of Antique (Nurmi, 1984), and it has led us to regard organizations analytically as divisions and subdivisions of a total. Organizations do not exist independently of their subjects. They are not objectively observable parts of nature. Instead, they are reflections of human intentions and without understanding this, one cannot arrive at an adequate explanation of organizations. Even nuclear physics has been ready to challenge the subject-object dichotomy. For organization theorists there are much, much better grounds to do the same.

#### 4 Concluding remarks

It is my hope that this article shows that nuclear physics can be of a heuristic interest to organization theory. The language of nuclear physics is much more abstract than the language of organization theory. Indeed, it is so abstract that a profound knowledge of it cannot be acquired without the very abstract language of mathematics. Abstractness adds to the potential area of application, while it decreases the exactness of prediction in an individual case. The latter has often been seen as an ideal in organization theory in the name of practicality. Nevertheless, nuclear physics has shown its practical influence to the extent that it has made it possible for man to extinguish life on earth before he has become aware of ethical dangers that increasing knowledge of organizations might give rise for.

What is the use of the language of particle physics in organization theory? How can it be utilized in empirical studies? How should it be evaluated on theoretical grounds? These questions cannot be answered for the time being. The basic idea of the article should be processed further in order to find out its possibilities and limitations.

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## **TRADITIOT JA UUDISTUSMIELI - MIKSI KORKEAKOULUT OVAT NIIN HYVIÄ!<sup>1</sup>**

Korkeakouluilla instituutiona on pitkät traditiot. Jo ainakin antiikin Kreikassa oli akateemista toimintaa. Sana akatemia tulee attikalaisesta sankarista, Akademoksesta, jolle omistetussa puistossa Platon esitti filosofiaansa 300 luvulla ennen ajanlaskumme alkua. Bolognan yliopistoa pidetään ensimmäisenä yliopistona. Se muodostui ja organisoitui tuhatkunta vuotta sitten opinhaluisten vapaaksi yhteenliittymäksi, joka valitsi keskuudestaan opettajansa. Latinankielinen ilmaus *Universitas* oppineitten yhteisöä tarkoittavana on edelleen useimmissa läntisissä kielissä suomenkielen yliopiston merkityksessä. Maailman yliopistot luettelevan kirjan nimi on *The World of Learning*, ja siinä on sama kaunis yhdessä oppimisen ajatus. Sehän korostaa sitä, että kaikki tässä yhteisössä ensimmäisen vuosikurssin opiskelijasta aina senioreimpaan professoriin asti ovat siellä oppiakseen yhdessä ja toinen toisiltaan.

Eivät Suomenkaan korkeakoululaitoksen traditiot ohuet ole. Kuninkaallinen Turun Akatemia perustettiin 1640 Ruotsin kolmanneksi ja maailman viidenneksikymmenenneksi yliopistoksi, joten noviiseja emme näissä asioissa ole. Nimitys Akatemia muuttui Keisarilliseksi Turun Yliopistoksi Suomen siirrytyä Venäjän yhteyteen jo ennen kuin 1827 koko instituutio siirrettiin Turusta Helsinkiin uuden suuriruhtinaskunnan maallisen ja kirkollisen vallan naapurustoon. Vuotta myöhemmin nimikin muutettiin Keisarilliseksi Aleksanterin yliopistoksi. Nämä myös nimitys akatemia muuttui yliopistoksi.

Aikaamme säilyneistä instituutiosta vain kirkot ja armeijat voivat yleillä pidemmällä traditioilla kuin yliopistot. Niiden asemat ovat perustuneet uskon ja aseiden auktoriteetteihin. Yliopistot olivat etenkin keskiajan lopusta vahvasti teologiaan ja teologikoulutukseen sidonnaisia. Teologia on edelleen olennainen osa korkeakouluja. Vielä nykyään armeijat, voimakkaimmat niistä etenkin, perustavat voimaansa yliopistojen perustutkimuksesta suodattuneeseen tekniikkaan ja osaamiseen. Mutta viime kädessä yliopistojen

<sup>1</sup> Lyhennelmä tästä artikkelista on ilmestynyt Turun kauppakorkeakoulun tiedotuslehdestä Mercurius, 1, 2005.

asema ja arvonanto perustuvat enemmän kriittisyyteen kuin auktoriteetteihin. Tähän tarvitaan traditoiden jatkuva kyseenalaistamista ja ravistelua.

Traditoiden vastapainoksi ja onneksi korkeakoulun oppilaskanta uudistuu nopeasti. Niinpä Turun kauppakorkeakoulun perustutkinto-oppilaista liki viidennes uusiutuu kokonaan vuosittain. Näin nopea kiertonopeus on harvinaista vertasipa sitä mihin muuhun instituutioon tahansa. Ylioppilaskunta, jonka sanalla on korkeakoulun monissa asioissa melkoista painoa, uudistuu sekkin niin, että sen aktiivit ja toimihenkilökaaderi vaihtuvat kokonaan kolmessa, neljässä vuodessa. Jatko-opiskelijoiden, siis varsinaisten tutkimuksen ja tieteentekemisen uudistajien, kiertonopeus ei ole paljoa hitaampaa. Täydennyskoulutusopiskelijoista tulee vuosittain uusi kerrostuma, joka tuo muassaan sen, mitä on hiljan työelämässä kokenut. Tällaisella kiertonopeudella täytyy olla merkittävä vaikutus korkeakoulun toimintaan ja uudistumiseen. Luulenpa sen olevan merkittävämpää kuin tulemme arkityössämme huomanneksi. Uudet rekryytit opettavat huomaamattamme ja tarkoittamattaan opettajia ja näin estävät heitä kangistumasta vanhoihin kaavoihinsa. Tällainen uudistuminen on korkeakoululle valtava voimavara ja kehitysimpulssi.

Tämänkin päivän yliopistolaitoksessa näkyy traditoiden ja niiden kyseenalaistamisen, teesien ja antiteesien, milloin rauhallisempi, milloin kiivaampi dialektiikka. Traditiot näkyvät monissa muodoissa, seremonioissa ja riitinomaisissa menettelytavoissa. Vanhemmat tieteenharjoittajat ovat taipuvaisia hellimään niitä muotoja, menettelytapoja ja traditioita, jotka läpikäyneinä he ovat itse senioriteettinsa saavuttaneet ja säilyttäneet.

Eri aikoina tämä traditoiden ja uudistumisen jännite purkautuu eri tavoin. Olemme viime vuosina eläneet tässä suhteessa rauhallisia aikoja. Ilmeisesti kauppakorkeakoulun opiskelijat ovat keskimääräistä konservatiivisempia, mutta liekö totta sekkin, että opiskelijat on aika tehokkaasti kanavoitu ja kammitsoitu osaksi korkeakouluhallintoa ja -byrokratiaa, kun heidät on lahjottu hiljaisiksi edustuksillaan erilaisiin korkeakoulun hallintoelimiin ja hallintomenettelyihin. Joskus Ylioppilaskuntien lehdistä näyttäisi pilkottavan se edustukselliseen demokratiaan yleisemminkin liitetty pettymyksen tunne, että jäsenkunta passivoituu saadessaan nauttia osallistumisen onesta edustajiensa välityksellä. Mutta on ollut myös opiskelijaradikalismin aikojen, jotka ovat muuttaneet korkeakoulun toimintaa paljonkin.

Niin tai näin, yksi syy siihen, miksi korkeakoulut ovat niin hyviä, piilee siinä, että ne ovat jollakin tavoin osanneet yhdistää ikivanhat traditiot ja nuorekkaan uudistusmielen. Niissä kohtaavat länsimaisen kulttuurin vanhimmat perinteet ja uusien sukupolvien uusimmat ajatuksset ja ennakkoluuloton kokemusmaailma. Tällä tavoin tradition pitkä linja on pitänyt

ja korjaantunut sen siihen kulloisenkin sukupolven tuomista pahimmista vääristymistä uuden sukupolven traditiota arvostellessa. Näin tehdessään se taas tuo uusia tradition vääristymiä ja ylilyöntejä seuraavan sukupolven oiottavaksi. Ajan oloon tämä vain vahvistaa tradition pitkää linjaa.

Korkeakoululaitoksen asema yhteiskunnan, instituutioiden ja kulttuurin ketässä on vaihdellut vuosisatain aikana. Suomessa tietoa, koulutusta, opintietä on arvostettu. Kun kansakuntien myyttien, legendojen ja kansalliseeposten sankarit ovat yleensä olleet aseissa ansioituneita sotasankareita, niin Väinämöinenpä on **tietäjä** iänikuinen. Hän ei voittanut vastustajiaan aseilla kuten skandinavisten Sagojen sankarit vaan aggressiivisimmillaan **lauloi** Joukahaisen suohon.

Snellman kirjoitti Tukholmasta Fredrik Cygnaeuselle vuonna 1840: "Suomi ei voi saada väkivallalla mitään aikaan, sivistyksen voima on sen ainoa pelastus". Tämä opetus on säilynyt sukupolven takaraivossa siksi, että se oli kansallisen identiteetin synnyssä, muodostumisessa ja säilyttämisessä kansakunnalle eloonjäämiskysymys. Mutta, kas kummaa, tämä sanoma on aktualisoitunut uudella tavalla vuosituhanneenvaihteen taloudessa. Suomen kansantalous ja suomalaisen yritysten kilpailukyky maapalloistuvassa kilpailussa eivät näet oikeastaan voi perustua mihinkään muuhun kuin siihen, että olemme osaavampia kuin muut. Joka alalla emme voi olla maailman parhaita, emmekä edes maailman parhaiden tuntumassa, mutta strateginen osaaminen on juuri sitä, että osaamme valita ja kehittää sellaisia vahvuusalueita, joilla olemme maailman parhaita.

Kyllä tässä myös kansallisus on yhäti tärkeätä; se ei häviää vaan vahvistuu kansainvälisessä vaihdossa. Jean Sibelius on varmaankin maailmallakin tunnetuin suomalainen – ja kuitenkaan tuskin kukaan on luonut syvemmin kansallisia teemoja kuin juuri hän. Samalla tavoin myös taloudellisessa toiminnassa kansalliset juureemme ovat kestävä ponnistuspohja kansainväliselle panokselleemme. Nokian menestys on noussut suomalaisesta infrastruktuurista. Emme ole rikkaita luonnonvaroista, emme voi röyhystellä väkimäärellämme, emme voi asein menestyä maailman suuria vastaan. Kun vielä rajat madaltuvat ja liukenevatkin niin, että kauppa, tavarat, pääoma ja ihmiset kulkeutuvat sinne, mikä on niille attraktiivisin paikka toimia, silloin likipitääni ainoa, mihin voimme kansallisilla päätöksillämme vaikuttaa, on koulutuksen infrastruktuuri ja osaamisedellytyksistä huolehtiminen. Vain jos siinä onnistumme, voimme viedä maailmaan omaa osaamistamme ja työtämme sekä myös houkuttaa Suomeen sellaista liike- ja muutakin toimintaa, joka on kansakunnalleemme siunaukseksi.

Ilmeiseksi on käynytkin, että syynä siihen, että olemme selviytyneet niinkin hyvin kuin olemme, voittaneet pienuuden, etäisyyden, epäsuotuisen

sääolojen, korkeitten kustannusten vastukset täällä kolmen koon - kaukaisuuden, koillisuuden, kylmyyden - maassa on perustunut ratkaisevasti laajalle ulottuneeseen koulutukseen. Tämän huomaa jokainen melkein missä vain ulkomailta työskentelevä – suomalaiselle on yllättävä olla maassa, jossa sihteeri ei tunne maailman maantietoa, taksikuski maansa historiaa, putkimies oman maansa valtiollista johtajaa. Suomalainen kansansivistys on tehnyt suuriarvoista työtä, ja se on yksi syy siihen, miksi olemme vastuksista huolimatta selviytyneet niin hyvin kuin olemme.

Mutta älkäämme tästä ylpistykö. Kaikki menestys on menestystä toistaiseksi. Tämä tähänastinen menestysresepti on käymässä riittämättömäksi. Korkeakoululaitos on ollut keskeinen osa tästä menestysreseptiä tarjotessaan huomattavan suurelle osalle kansakunnasta korkean asteen koulutusväylän. Sillä on ollut hintansa kuten kaikella menestyksellä. Korkeakouluopetuksen massoittumisen yksi hinta on ollut laadullisen kehityksen jäaminen jalkoihin. Kustannusjohtajuus ja kustannustehokkuus ovat peräti huonoja korkeakoulun kilpailustrategioiksi. Ne johtavat tutkimusanoreksiaan, josta toipuminen kestää pidempään ja tulee monin verroin kalliimmaksi kuin kustannustehokkuudella hankitut säästöt. Korkeakoulun kannattavuus on sen osaamisessa, korkeakoulun investointien tuottoaste on sen osaamisen kasvussa. En sano, että massoittuminen ja kustannustehokkuus näkyisivät opetuksen, tutkinnon tai arvostelujen löystymisessä – sellaista en ole havainnut. Sen sijaan se näkyy sellaisissa perinteisissä korkeakouluelämän laatuun kuuluvissa seikoissa kuin hallinnon ja muunkin vuorovaikutuksen byrokratisoitumisessa, opiskelijoiden ja opettajien vähentyneessä henkilökohtaisessa vuorovaikutuksessa, opiskelijoiden passivoitumisessa (mikä on väistämätön massaopetuksen seuraus) ja myös akateemisen keskustelun väljähymisessä henkilökunnan kesken.

Tämä kaikki on heijastumaa humboldtlaisen vapaan intellektuaalisen tutkimuksen aseman heikkenemisestä. Korkeakoulu menettää tärkeän akateemisen privilegionsa, jos se ei pysty suorittamaan vapaata hetkelliseen sovelliukiin ja/tai välittömiin meritointitarkoituksiin pyrkimätöntä tutkimustyötä. Sellainen edelleenkin synnyttää ajanoloon pitävämpiä ja pätevämpiä käytäntöjä kuin hetkeen ja tilanteeseen sidottu tutkimustulos. Teorian ja abstrahoinnin eli viisauden käytännöllisyys on juuri siinä, että se kantaa muuttuvissa olosuhteissa pidemmälle kuin hetken hyötyjä tavoitteleva tutkimus.

Juuri tässä onkin nyt korkeakoulun suuri haaste. Turun kauppakorkeakoulun perustutkinto on hyvä ja markkinoilla arvostettu. Sitä voidaan rakenteellisesti ja sisällöllisesti viilata, mutta strategisesti nämä parannukset ovat marginaalisia. Tohtorikoulutus on korkeakoulussamme edennyt jättiharppauksin. Täydennyskoulutus on avannut korkeakoululle uusia

ovia, ja se on asiakkaitensa arvostamaa. Yritystoiminnan tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus on ylittänyt volyyymiodotuksensa – perustutkimuksen suhteen se ei ole odotuksiaan täyttänyt, mutta se ei luultavasti olekaan oikea paikka tähän tarkoitukseen. Näissä kaikissa Turun kauppakorkeakoulu voi olla saavutuksistaan tyytyväinen, ylpeäkin.

Korkeakoululaitoksen kaksi perinteistä tuoteryhmää ovat olleet tutkimus ja opetus. Jokin säädös sanoo että korkeakoulu antaa tutkimukseen perustuvaa opetusta. Huonompiakin säädöksiä on olemassa. Korkeakoulu erottuu muista koulutusinstituutioista – ammattikorkeakouluista, opistoista, kaupallisista koulutusyrityksistä ym. - juuri ja vain siinä, että sillä on omakohtaiseen tiedon luontiin, tutkimukseen perustuva opetus. Korkeakoulu ei voi olla yhtä nopea kuin kaupalliset koulutuslaitokset omaksumaan uusinta uutta (usein myös nopeimmin unohdettua) muotia ja tuontioppia, ja siksi juuri tutkimukseen perustuva osaaminen on sille viisas strateginen valinta. Ajatus tässä on, että tutkimus kehittää harjoittajaansa, ja akateeminen opetus perustuu juuri tähän opettajan omakohtaisessa tutkimustyössä kehittyneeseen viisauteen. Parasta olisikin, että tutkimus kuului erottamattomana osana jokaiselle opettajalle, ei tutkimusvelvollisuutena vaan tutkimusoikeutena ja -mahdollisuutena. Tämä on oikeastaan ikivanha yliopistojen peruspilari, jonka murtumisessa luonnonlain varmuudella murtuu sitäkin, mitä peruspilari kannattaa.

Kun perustutkinto, tohtorikoulutus, ja täydennyskoulutus ovat niinkin hyvin hoidettuja kuin ne nyt ovat, niin perustutkimus on jäänyt pahasti tämän kehityksen jalkoihin. Tämä on sitäkin kummallisempaa, kun tohtoriohjelmamme on tuottanut hyviä tutkijoita, juuri sellaisia, jotka koulutuksellaan ja osaamisellaan ovat luoneet valmiuksia vaikka Nobel-palkinnon arvoiseen tutkimustyöhön. Osa on lähtenyt oitis yrityselämään vehreimmille laitumille. Se on hyväkin, hyväähän on että liike-elämä tohtoristuu sekä oman osaamisen kannalta mutta myös siksi, että sielläkin tohtorit kasvattavat ymmärrystä ja kiinnostusta tutkimuksen eteenpäinviemiseksi. Mutta osa heistä olisi kyllä ollut hyväksi kiinnittää tutkimuspostiin suomalaisen tutkimuksen nostamiseksi.

Pätkäprojekteista ei ole tähän avuksi: niihin kiinnitetty oppivat nopeasti vilkuilemaan nille vehreämmille laitumille. Se osa taas, joka kiinnittyy ja pätevöityy niihin harvoihin vakinaisiin akateemisiin virkoihin, joita korkeakoulu voi tohtoreilleen tarjota, aika nopeasti taantuu hallinnollisiin ja edustuksellisiin ruttiineihin. Aivan vakavissani sanon, että on koko paljon todennäköistä, että tässä on menetetty suomalaisen kauppatieteen mahdollisuus ensimmäiseen Nobel-palkintoonsa. Perustan käsitykseni siihen, että olen nähty, miten tutkimuksen eturintamassa nämä ihmiset ovat väitöskirjatyössään olleet, ja siihen turhautumiseen, että heille ei ole ollut

työhönsä jatkomahdollsuuksia juuri silloin kun he kannuksensa ansainneina olisivat valmiita suuriin tehtäviin.

Kuitenkin korkeakoulu viime kädessä menestyy nimenomaisesti tutkimuksensa varassa. Jos halutaan, että korkeakoulu on maailman taikka vaikka Euroopan johtavien korkeakoulujen joukossa, se voi perustua ainoastaan tutkimukseen. Vaikka opetuksessa puhuisimme enkelten kielin, se tuskin kantautuu Harvardiin, INSEADIin, Henley'iin sen enempää kuin General Electricille, Coca-Colalle tai edes Nokialle. Enpä usko että MBA-ohjelmaakaan vetää suuresti maailmallisia osallistujia puoleensa. Vain hyvät tutkijat voivat sen tehdä. Ja mikä tärkeintä, hyvät tutkijat vetävät myös nimillänsä oppilaita erityyppisiin opintoihimme. Korkeakoulu voi suorittaa kolmatta tehtäväalueettaan, yhteiskunnallista palvelua, kunnialla vain siinä määrin kuin se on hyvä kahdessa perinteisessä tehtäväalueessaan, nimittäin opetuksessa ja siihen perustuvassa tutkimuksessa. Olemme jossain vaiheessa panostaneet tohtoriohjelmaan – hyvin tuloksin, samoin Yritystoiminnan tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskukseen. Nyt olisi aika panostaa perustutkimukseen.

## LÄHTEET

Snellman, J.V. (1931) *Kootut teokset XII: Kirjeitä*. Koonnut ja suomentanut Heikki Lehmusto. Porvoo: WSOY.





**OSA II:**  
JOTAKIN JOHTAMISESTA



## JOHTAMISEN PELASTUSOPIT<sup>1</sup>

On kiistanalaista kuka on management-oppien kaikkien aikojen suurin nimi. Hyvä ehdokas kumminkin on Peter Drucker.

Jazz, elokuva, Suomen itsenäisyys ja management ovat vuosisatamme tuotteita ja sen historiaa. Niin kuin Louis Armstrong oli jazzin historiaa, Chaplin elokuvan historiaa, Mannerheim itsenäisen Suomen historiaa, yhtä oleellisesti Drucker on elossa oleva osa managementin historiaa. Tämä Wienin koulun kasvatti, Saksasta 1930-luvulla Yhdysvaltoihin siirtynyt historioitsija ja taloustieteilijä, perehdyti liikkenjohtoon tutkiessaan General Motorsin organisaatioita, jolloin hän alkoi puhua tulosityksikköorganisaatiosta. Alfred Chandler puhui samasta asiasta divisioonarakenteena. Keskustelu federalismista on muunnelma samasta teemasta. Tuikiteteellisimmille Drucker ei ole oikein koskaan kelvannut – hänessä on näet aimo annos julistajan vikaa.

Drucker ei ole tullut tunnetuksi luomalla omaa –ismiään tai trendikästä tuotemerkejään. Hän ei rekisteröinyt itselleen tulosityksikköorganisaatioita, tavoitejohtamista, tietoyhteiskuntaa tai visiointia, vaikka olisin näiden asioiden ensimmäisiä puolestapuhujia. Ne tulivat vain ikään kuin hänen ydinajatustensa oheisina. Sen sijaan hän jaksoi tolkuttaa johtamisen perusasioista. Kun monet guruilijat ovat myyneet johmisasioille uusia uljaita iskusanoja, Drucker on jaksanut korostaa johtamisen ikuisia peruskysymyksiä, joita hetken muotioikut tahtovat unohduttaa. Iskulauseena druckerismin voisi sanoa: *Back to Basics*. Druckerin klassikkokirjan nimi on kuvaava: *The Practice of Management*. Johtaminen on siis praktiikkaa. Johtaminen ei ole professio sillä tavalla kuin juristi, lääkäri tai tilintarkastaja ovat virkaansa päteviä tutkintonsa perusteella.

Johtamiskoulutuskaan ei pätevöitä johtajaksi antamalla koulutettaville uusimman johtamistiedon, kaavan tai aukene-sanan. Tällaiseen luuloon perustuessaan koulumme opetus olisi itselleen epärehellistä. Me emme pysty eikä meidän tarvitsekaan pystyä kilpialemaan kaupallisten yrittäjien kanssa

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<sup>1</sup> 1julkaistu lehdessä Mercurius, 2, 1998

uusimman johtamisratkaisuteknikaan maahantuontinopeudesta. Turun kauppankorkeakoulu on kouluttanut ja voi kouluttaa myös tulevia johtajia antamalla yleissivistystä, perustietoja, taitoja ja välineitä, niin ettei kaikkien tarvitse oppia kaikkea kovan kokemuksen kautta.

Hyvä teoriahan on sillä tavalla käytännöllistä, että se ajan ilmiötä paremmin ja yleisimmin pääsee erilaisissa tilanteissa ja ajankin myllerryksissä. Omakohtaiseen tutkimukseen perustuvana osaamisemme on tällä tavoin kilpailuetu myös ammattikorkeakouluihin ja muihin oppilaitoksiin verrattuna. Hellikäämme tätä omakohtaiseen tutkimukseen perustuvaa, meiltä vaikeasti kloonattavaaa ydinpätevyyttämme lähtemättä juoksemaan päivän lööppien perään.

Johtamisterminologiasta ja liiketaloudellisesta terminologiasta on tullut muotia, ja sitä usein käytetään ymmärtämättä sitä kontekstia, johon se kuuluu. Ei johtamistapoja voi muuttaa antamalla niille julistuksenomaisesti uutta nimeä. Asia on valitettavasti paljon vaikeampi. Emmemekään voi antaa tuotemerkiä tai diplomia, joka pätevöittäisi johtajaksi.

Vapautusta omakohtaisesta järjen käytöstä ja vastuusta eivät johtamisopinkappaleet suo. *Management by cloning around* ei toimi. Johtamisen itse teossa ei liioin ole tiedettä sillä tavoin kuin fysiikka, biologia tai historian tutkimus ovat, vaikka sitä voi tutkia kuten mitä tahansa reaalimaailman aluetta. Tiede ja tutkimuskaan eivät anna yksinkertaisia vastauksia johtamistilanteisiin, vaikka voivat auttaa ymmärtämään johtamista syvällisemmin kuin päiväkohtaisessa johtamishälinässä useinkaan on mahdollista.

Johtaminen on oppimisen ja kokemuksen tuottamaa taitoa ja sosiaalista luovuutta. Nämä (visio, jos niin halutaan sanoa) siilautuu johtajan omaksumasta tieteellisestä ja muusta tiedosta ja omasta kokemuksesta. Kaikki johtaminen on tulevaisuutta muokkaavaa. Nämä näkyvät kyllä tarvitsevat ja omaavatkin kaikki ihmiset eivätkä vain johtajat. Mutta koulutuksen keinoin tai uusinta mantraa hokien sitä ei voi toiseen ihmiseen kaataa. Johtajana kehittymiseen ei ole oikoteitä.

Elämä on monimutkaista. Sille ei ole yksioikoisia tienviittoja. Ihmisillä on siksi taipumusta hakea lohtua ja johdatusta kuka mistäkin uskonkappaleesta. Helpottaahan se. Johtamisenkin on monimutkaista ja vaikeaa. Johtamistakin on koetettu helpottaa tarjoamalla erilaisia pelastusoppeja: resurssijohtamista, laatujohtamista, visionääristä leadershipiä, YD:tä ja OD:tä, Tajua ja Tujuua, taulukkolaskentaa ja dicision support-systeemejä. Mikä lienee uusin trendi? Kaikissa niissä on osa asiasta, mutta oppiminen ja kokemus ovat johtamiselle

parempia matkasauvoja kuin usko mihinkään yhteen taikasanaan. Uskoakin johtamisessa tarvitaan, mutta koko lailla isompiin asioihin kuin uusimpaan johtamisen pelastusoppiin.

Johtaminen ei ole vain näkemistä, ennalta kulkemista, joukon kärjessä näkymistä. Johtaminen on myös vastuuta, reagoimista, siihen kuuluu paljon rutiineja, inhottavienkin asioiden käsittelyä.

Voidaan johtamista ylipäättää opettaa? Johtamisen pohjaksi on olemassa tietoja ja taitoja ja välineitä, joita voi oppia koulumme monista eri aineista. Tämä kaikki on erinomaista rakennusainetta visionääriselle johtajuudelle, johon lukeneisuuden lisäksi tarvitaan kokeneisuutta, luonnetta, sivistystä ja jatkuvaa oppimista vaikkapa koulumme JOKO:sta ja muista MBA-moduleista.

Visionäärijohtajuus ei ole johtamisessa uusi ulottuvuus. Sillä on hyvinkin vankka empiirinen tutkimusperinne. Se on ainesosana strategisessa johtamisessa, organisoinnissa, ihmisten johtamisessa, kompetenssien rakentamisessa ja niin edelleen. Irrotettuna johtamiskokonaisuudesta se toimii yhtä huonosti kuin upeimmatkaan markkinointisuunnitelmat vailla niitä toteuttavaa myyntitoimintaa. Yhden johtamisen ainesosan erottaminen omaksi laatikokseen olisi yhtä onnetonta kuin kansainvälistymisen omiminen omaksi eksklusiiviseksi aineekseen. On kyllä ikuisuuskysymyksen luontoinen, mitä johtamisen osa-alueita tulisi opettaa omana aineenaan, mitä läpäisyperiaatteella, mutta kohtuullinen päallekkäisyys ja erilaiset näkökulmat ovat varmasti paljon parempia kuin oleellisesti yhteen kuuluvien asioiden erottaminen toisistaan.

Johtamisopeissa on alituista liikettä. Voisi vaikka ihmetellä, eikö organisatorisen keskittämisen ja hajauttamisen välillä ole vihdoinkin saavutettu optimia, kun vuosikymmeniä on tehty vuoroon kumpaakin. Mutta itse liike kuuluu todellisuuteen ja estää meitä jämähtämästä siihen, mitä luulimme totuudeksi.

On siksi tavattoman hyvä asia, että johtajuuden ja johtamisen ytimestä purkautuu jatkuvasti protuberansseja valaisemaan osaltaan johtamisen koko koloristiikkaa.

# ARISTOTLE AND MANAGEMENT<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

In this article Aristotle's writings are scrutinized from the viewpoint of management. The influence that Aristotle has had on research in general extends to management research as well. In his teleological thinking, in his emphasis on action, choice and responsibility, and in his treatises on virtue and constitutions, Aristotle presents views that are relevant to management practice. His treatise on household-management comes nearest to what is today called management. Aristotle's conception of the tasks of management is not contradictory to modern formulations of management functions. Although there is not enough evidence to show that Aristotle wrote deliberately about management his writings are relevant to what we now call management.

## 1 Introduction

Aristotle is considered a classic in many branches of modern science and even art. Indeed, he may be regarded as one of the most influential founding fathers of Western civilization. Yet, he is not mentioned as a classic of management in recent reviews of the history and prehistory of management (e.g. George, 1972; Khandwalla, 1977; Deitzer, Shiliff & Jucius, 1979; Bracker, 1980). Here we discuss Aristotle from the viewpoint of management. First, his life and work are briefly introduced. Secondly, some of his metaphysical, ethical and political ideas relevant to management are reviewed. Thirdly, Aristotle's management principles are presented.

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<sup>1</sup> Published in Scandinavian Journal of Management Studies 1984.

## 1.1 Aristotle and Aristotelianism

Aristotle was born in Stagira in 384 B.C. as a son of a Ionian doctor Nicomachus. At the age of 17 he went to Athens, to the Academy. There he studied and worked as a pupil and friend of Plato for 20 years. With the death of Plato began Aristotle's *Wanderjahre*: he studied and taught at Assus, on Lesbos and at Pella in the court of Macedonia as a teacher of Alexander. At the age of 49 Aristotle returned to Athens to head the Peripatetic School in the Lyceum until he retired to Chalcis. There he died in 322 B.C., at the age of 62.

Aristotle did not have a great influence during the next centuries after his death. As a matter of fact, his works were lost, then found and conserved, more or less accidentally, during the first century B.C. However, toward the Middle Ages the works of Aristotle came to be regarded as a body of complete knowledge – a position that Aristotle himself had most probably not valued at all when taken into account his canons of scientific enquiry and doubt presented in many of his works. The status of Aristotle as “the philosopher” grew further till about 1200 A.D. and only the historical events regarded as milestones between the Middle Ages and the Modern Times began to weaken his status as “the master of those who know”. The Italian Renaissance, the German Reformation and finally the beginnings of modern science treated Aristotle with a criticism inherent in the intellectual revolution against “the dark ages”. However, a new interest in Aristotle is developing in our century. His empirical method, his philosophy of evolution and growth as well as his methodology for studying human action seems to appeal to the modern man of science and art.

## 1.2 Some Perils of Interpretation

Aristotle is for many a “particularly attractive philosopher from another age” (Ackrill, 1973). Many researchers in various branches of science have probably come across Aristotle as an early classic of many research subjects. There are, however, also notable difficulties in trying to interpret Aristotle considering the distance of more than two thousand years. Some of the difficulties are discussed below with the hope that an awareness of the perils of interpretation will enable one to avoid similar problems.

As many of Aristotle's ideas look familiar, one is easily tempted to consider him modern or to modernize his original thoughts by transforming their content into modern vocabulary. It is true that abstract ideas can maintain their validity over long periods of history, and it was abstract ideas Aristotle worked with. Besides, the questions Aristotle raised remain of interest, even

though his answers may have turned out to be obsolete. There is also a danger involved here. Even the ideas that sound very familiar were generated in a cultural, social and physical context which the present day interpreter may not be able to take into account to the appropriate degree. Indeed, our understanding of Aristotle may be misled by our present context. Aristotelianism or Aristotle's canonization in the Middle Ages cast long shadows over his original work. Again, the beginnings of modern science pigeon-holed Aristotle in a place that was convenient for the period. It may be difficult for us to judge, which part of the present interest in Aristotle is due to his original work, which part reflects what is convenient for our time, and where the two meet.

The problem created by historical context may very easily occur in the realm of management studies, when we consider that the micro-organizations of today are quite different from those of Antiquity. Present day companies operate in national states, whereas in ancient Athens there were "companies" organized around households operating in city-states. The relevance of Aristotle to management can be studied from relatively few collections viz. from his *Metaphysics*, *Politics*, *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is relevant to management studies, while his work on ethics and politics are more relevant to management practice. *Metaphysics* is a treatise on "first philosophy"; in *Metaphysics* he regards ethics and politics as "practical sciences" whose purpose is to study the desirable and how to attain the desirable. *Eudemian Ethics*, so called after its first editor and a pupil of Aristotle, Eudemus, is said to date from earlier period than *Nicomachean Ethics*, so called after Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle. *Politics* is a treatise on the State and also includes suggestions on micro-level management. In addition to Aristotle's works Hardie (1968), Lloyd (1968), Ackrill (1973) and Ackrill (1981) have guided me in Aristotle's life and philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle's treatises are fragmentary and rather a compilation of notes than coherent presentations. Indeed, they were originally a collection of lecture notes, which Aristotle himself corrected. Later editors of the works must also have made insertions in them for editing purposes. This leaves a margin to all the interpretations of Aristotle. Aristotle is not difficult to read, neither in terms of content nor presentation. As to content, the present day reader is

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<sup>2</sup> Many researchers of Aristotle have pointed out that Aristotle should best be studied in the original language or Greek. I have not been able to follow this advice. However, I have had a chance to check some key terms with the friendly advice of Dr. Raimo Tuomi.

frequently delighted by a familiar idea or phrase; this shows the penetrating influence Aristotle has had on our civilization. His way of presentation is, despite the fragmentary nature of the works, systematic, and his method of dividing and subdividing his themes makes his thoughts easy to follow.

## 2 Aristotle's Relevance to Management Studies

### 2.1 Did Aristotle write on management?

It is debatable whether Aristotle intentionally wrote about management, though it is obvious that both his metaphysics and his characterizations of politics and ethics have a bearing on what we nowadays call management. The division of sciences by Aristotle includes practical studies whose objective is to “issue commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not ought to be done” (Nicomachean Ethics: 1143 a 5-10). Practical wisdom was, for Aristotle, normative. The aim of theoretical disciplines is to understand, while the aim of practical disciplines is action (see Nicomachean Ethics: 1096 b – 1097 a). The Greek word *praxis* has many meanings, and Lobkowicz (1967:4) presents “I manage” as one meaning of the verb derived from *praxis*. To assert from this that Aristotle wrote on management in all his treatises on practical sciences is doubtful, to say the least. Politics and Ethics were practical sciences to Aristotle. Irrespective of the semantics of the term *praxis*, Aristotle’s studies on politics and ethics are relevant to management as well.

### 2.2 Aristotle and Management Research

Some of the practical wisdom of Aristotle may be characteristic of present day management studies as well. Aristotle asserts that reasoning upon practical matters cannot be scientifically exact. It can only be tentative or approximate (Nicomachean Ethics 1103 b 25 – 1104), and it must always admit dispute. Practical rules always admit exception (Nicomachean Ethics: 1094 a – 1095 a). How can we judge practical wisdom? According to Aristotle practical wisdom can be judged only on the basis of the choices made upon the wisdom (Nicomachean Ethics: 1139 a 20 – 11396 b 10). This instrumental conception of knowledge has later been discussed e.g. by pragmatists (particularly, Dewey, see Scheffler, 1974: 240-255) in debates on the nature of theory.

Aristotle's basic model of conducting research serves almost as a standard for research reports in management studies and in other fields of enquiry today: Aristotle begins his studies with a survey of previous ideas. On the basis of the survey he formulates the problem and identifies the difficulties in his predecessors' conceptions. He attacks the problem by two means: by theoretical arguments and by empirical evidence. He presents theoretically possible alternatives, whose amount he reduces by way of logical argumentation. Frequently the argumentation takes a dialectic form, i.e., argumentation of thesis against its antithesis (see, e.g. Metaphysics: B.2.996 a 18 – 5.1002 b 5). Aristotle is also notable for his great reliance on and appeal to empirical material: "...we must trust the evidence of senses rather than theories, and theories as well as their results agree with what is observed" could be borrowed from a 20<sup>th</sup> century book on methodology, but it is a citation from Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium* (Lloyd, 1968: 288). Aristotle uses a considerable amount of empirical material in his treatises on politics, and ethics, too. The observations are particular instances or individual cases instead of extensive surveys. This condition is likely to be related to the technical problems of collecting existing observations in the olden times, but it is without doubt that "the case method" is also congruent with Aristotle's emphasis on action and the teleological nature of practical wisdom.

## 2.3 Aristotle and Management Practice

The teleological nature means for Aristotle that "movement, - which may be action or instrument - is aimed an end" (Metaphysics: 291-292). In human endeavour "the good is what all things aim at. The ends are either activities or results. The result is superior to the activity." The above sentences from Nicomachean ethics (1094 a – 1094 b) could be – replacing the term good with the term effectiveness – taken from a recent book on Management By Objectives or Management By Results. Teleological thinking was for Aristotle a form of causation (Metaphysics: 291-292). Teleological thinking is flourishing today in planning, budgeting, programming and all other management practices aiming at the future. Aristotle's emphases on action, choice and responsibility of human agents (Nicomachean Ethics: 113 a-114 b) are likewise assumptions that modern management literature agrees with (Drucker, 1977: 11-14; Ansoff, 1979: 9).

Aristotle's account on virtues (Nicomachean Ethics: 105 b 20 – 1154 b) can be seen as an introduction to the discussion on the characteristics of good managers – this discussion has abounded since then (see Barrow, 1977). Aristotle's conception of virtue as a mean between extremes (Nicomachean

Ethics: 1106 a – 1108b 10) could be considered a general prerequisite for good managers – and the same principle is discussed today in terms of the mature and integrated personality as a precondition of good management (McKain, 1975). ”... it is proper to consider not only what is the best... but also what is the one possible of achievement and likewise also what is the one that is easier and more generally shared by all” (Politics: Book 4, 1) is a statement that is now called “satisficing strategy” (Ackoff, 1970).

In discussing different ways of managing in different constitutions Aristotle introduces three basic ways, which can be applied for better or for worse. The rule of a single man can be good in monarchy and perverted in tyranny. The rule of a few may be good in aristocracy but perverted in oligarchy, while the rule of many is good in constitutional government and perverted in democracy (Nicomachean Ethics: Book 8, Chapter 12)<sup>3</sup>. These Aristotle’s basic varieties of constitutions describe city-states instead of micro-organizations. But – interestingly enough – *formally* they bear resemblance to recent formulations of situational management theory, where a basic management style can be applied effectively or ineffectively depending on contextual fit (Fiedler, 1976; Reddin, 1970).

## 2.4 Aristotle’s Principles of Household Management

It is in Aristotle’s treatise on household management where he comes closest to what is today called management. The English translation by Rackham uses the word (household-) management as a translation of the Greek word *oikonomia*, root word of economy (Politics: Book I, II).

Quite evidently household was for Aristotle a place for love and friendship (Nicomachean Ethics: Book 8, Chapter 1, Welldon’s edition), but it was also a place for business, for acquiring wealth, for trade and commerce and for work to be managed and carried out (Politics: Book 1, II-V). The household in the Antiquity had similar functions to the present day company and its volume of operations in terms of transactions and “personnel” required management to the extent that “yet perhaps one’s own good cannot exist without household management” (Nicomachean Ethics: 1142 a 5-10). Aristotle even presented a treatise on trade as a household function, (Politics: Book 1, IV), which might

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<sup>3</sup> Book 8 is not included in the edition of Ackrill, whose notations are otherwise followed in this report. Book 8 can be found in Welldon’s edition of Nicomachean Ethics.

be interesting material for a business historian to study. The following description of Aristotle's "management model" is based on *Politics*: Book I, II and V.

The manager or master of household had three kinds of subordinate relationships viz. his relationship to slaves, paternal relation to children and conjugal relation. In addition, artisans and manual workers were used, but they were not as naturally linked to the household management as the above three divisions. The household manager's duty is to direct all his subordinates. Subordination was for Aristotle a principle of nature which manifested in musical scales, living organisms and management. Nature for Aristotle was the essence of things or end-state of all movement (Kiernan, 1962: 358-361). Thus subordination was a natural distinction between master and slave, man and woman and child and adult. It was simply good for the slaves, women and children to be ruled. A slave was the property of the master, his tool and a live instrument commensurate with other (mechanical) tools, a live article of property and an instrument of production. It was the task of the slave to execute the directives of the master.




Figure 1: Aristotle's household organization (Based on *Politics*: Book 1, V)

For children and women, the man was a king. Man was superior to woman and better fitted to command. It was the task of women to maintain what men acquired. "...but who has failed therein shall be changed into woman's nature at the second birth" is a teaching of Plato (*Timaeus*: 42, B-C) that may have to do with Aristotle's conception of woman's role in the household management. Ideal household management for Aristotle was monarchy, governed by a single ruler, free man, master and manager.

What then were the tasks of a household manager? Aristotle gives quite long catalogue of them. The master of household had to acquire wealth, including slaves. He had to own and direct his subordinates. But the master had to give away all execution in order to be able to dedicate himself to his most important duties: politics and philosophical contemplation.

Aristotle is a classic in many fields, but he is definitely not a classic in industrial democracy or feminism. Aristotle is a proponent of authoritarian management style. He does not present his views incidentally or casually, but as a result of an earnest study of opposing views. He is ready to make some admissions: there is conventional slavery in addition to the natural one; he defends the slaves' rights to reason; he admits that the master's different relationships require different kinds of command and that a good master does not rely on command only.

Aristotle's management principles have been cited as an example of the fact that even the greatest of philosophers are conditioned by the institutions of their time and that Aristotle provided philosophical justifications for the maladies of his time (Lloyd, 1968: 251, 264-267). True as this may be, there is analogous or at least comparable modern management thinking.

Directing is considered a management function even today. Planning and thinking strategic issues (Aristotle's contemplation) and representing his company in the outside environment (Aristotle's politics) are considered duties of the top management (see e.g. Hicks & Gullett, 1976: 254-258, 448-449). Both Aristotle and present management writers emphasize the delegation of execution to subordinates.

The distinction between strategic and operative layers of organization forms a similar distinction as Aristotle's master and his tools. The nature of operations and personnel has changed, but the essentials of management may differ less than the dismally dissimilar terminology. For Aristotle the work of a manager is to contemplate, participate in politics, get wealth, acquire, own and direct slaves, and delegate execution to his subordinates. For writers on management functions the work of a manager is to plan, organize, staff, direct, co-ordinate, budget and delegate the execution of all this to subordinates (see Dale & Michelon, 1971: 11-23). There is a basic similarity in thinking

involved in the two conceptions in spite of differences in terminology, staff, operations, and contextual factors in the different times.

### 3 Summary and Concluding Remarks

Whether Aristotle intentionally wrote on management remains debatable. The answer depends to a great extent whether concepts like praxis and household management can be accepted to denote what we mean by management today.

Nevertheless, it remains safe to conclude that Aristotle's thinking is relevant to management whether he intended it or not. His metaphysical and methodological works have influenced the way research, including management research, has been conducted ever since. His teleological thinking, his emphasis on action and choice are akin to prevalent conceptions of management. His conceptions of virtue and good constitution bear resemblance to good management practice as described quite recently.

Of all his writings Aristotle's treatise on household management has the most direct bearing on management. He can be considered a proponent of the authoritarian management style. Even though authoritarian methods are not promoted in the management literature of today, they are, after all, followed in many organizations. The undivided nature of responsibility and authority is widely cherished doctrine of management (see Hicks & Gullett, 1976: 204 – 312). Democratic business management may even today be more of a myth than a fact. Aristotle's conception of the vertical division of the work between the master and his subordinates does reflect the historical context of his works. But there are good reasons to argue that some of his basic ideas live on in the management practice of today.

There is, however, a notable difference between Aristotle's conception and the modern one: today nobody considers subordination as an order of nature in the Aristotelian sense. To Aristotle a slave was a slave and remained so. Two thousand years later Napoleon declared that every soldier carries in his cartridge-pouch the baton of a marshal. Today a subordinate, man or woman, can be promoted to a management position. There may be social barriers, but the distinction is not regarded as an order of nature.

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## **SNELLMAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS<sup>1</sup>**

The 19<sup>th</sup> century Finnish philosopher J.V. Snellman laid in many respects the spiritual foundation of Finnish nationalism more than a century ago. He taught us that a small country cannot compete with bigger countries with material resources, but it can and it must invest in spiritual, i.e. in human resources. As a consequence, Finland was among the very first countries in the world to implement a programme of primary education for all her people. Even today the formal educational standard of the Finns remains among the highest in the world. There is no doubt that this has been a major factor in the development of the Finnish economy.

To what extent is this nationalistic educational philosophy appropriate for the realities of today's world when economies and companies have to develop and defend their segments in the international market place?

On the face of it, it might seem that today's requirements make Snellman's thoughts much too idealistic and even obsolete. It rather seems that major competitors are striving for competitive advantage especially by means of cost-competitiveness including cost-cutting, re-engineering and downsizing rather than by educational means or other means that could be called strategic human resource management. Human resource management has gone through a transformation from an earlier emphasis on recruitment, education and training to axing of staff and organizational layers to rotating people between jobs and from permanent to temporary employment contracts. Many personnel managers have been working fulltime outplacing people, and, having completed this job, they may find themselves outplaced. (By the way, people are no longer sacked; they are just outplaced). Tough times go with tough personnel management.

In Finland unemployment is close to 20% of the labour force.<sup>2</sup> But Finland is not alone in this. Unemployment is increasing and spreading like a disease

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<sup>1</sup> Opening address in the Twelfth Workshop on Strategic Human Resource Management organized by European Institute of Advanced Studies in Management in Turku, Finland , 24.3.1997.

throughout Europe. The prescriptions and medications that used to work now seem increasingly less effective. In a country with a highly educated population many of the most important resources are neither used nor developed.

In this situation, we could benefit from reconsidering the role of education. Education has been considered an investment from the viewpoint of the nation, firms and individuals. Clearly, the return has become much less than what would be required from a feasible investment. As a matter of fact, an increasing amount of education is – or at least works as – consumption rather than an investment. This is particularly the case for the unemployed people. It may be better to have the unemployed spend time in courses than totally displaced from the world of work and its social significance – not to mention violence and crime that so often are concomitants of a high level of unemployment. Education is better for the people and for the conscience of the government than letting the long-term unemployed people to be left out entirely. But the direct economic return on this kind of training is likely to be minimal.

We must consider whether we can afford to be as proud of our educational system as we used to be. It has turned out to be formalized, bureaucratized and stretched beyond the limits of its resources. It has become rigid, it has been better at producing passive adapters of knowledge than independent thinkers, entrepreneurs and creative innovators. I do think that young people would learn more by alternating periods of education, work, fun and seeing the world rather than by going through the formal educational tube from the age of seven to the age of twenty-five. I know that by saying so I am sawing the branch I am sitting on, but I would prefer to see the tree growing and become lush and green than sitting on a branch that is bending under the weight of its burden.

It is not all that bad, however. The emphasis in personnel matters has moved from personnel departments to responsibility for persons in the line management. This is a good trend provided that line managers have necessary resources (like time and training) to carry out their new responsibilities. Streamlining by cutting administration, unnecessary layers of management and organizational fat may make the core of the business more visible and facilitate investments in the people in the core business. These investments in

<sup>2</sup> Unemployment rate is 9% in 2005. Even though it has halved from the top figure, it is historically high, and it seems to be structural. Despite a fair growth and the scarcity of labour in the growing sectors, the unemployed people seem to be unemployable.

people are strategic, and they, supposedly, will provide a better return than less focused development efforts.

The business objective is to remain competitive in the short term survival battle by streamlining administration and cutting organizational fat – and, at the same time, by maintaining the core competence of the company, the tacit human and social knowledge that is needed to get out from the predicaments of today, and by exploiting the opportunities that lurk around the corner.

Core competence is created at the point where the know-how inside the organization and the changing needs of the customers outside the company meet. This kind of core competence cannot be imitated and, hence, constitutes a basis for relatively enduring competitive advantage – that is if anything will be enduring in the years to come. Some people say that this kind of organizational learning is the only way to gain competitive advantage in the future. Core competence is vested in the people in many tacit, individual and social ways. The way people work together in the company and with customers is the breeding ground for superior core competence. It goes without saying that core competence takes time and patience to develop. Unfortunately, it is very easy to lose the core competence by unskillful cutting of core resources. And once this damage has been done it takes even more time, patience and money to get it back.

Let me return to my point of departure. If J.V. Snellman would be here with us today, he might probably say something along the following lines: In a knowledge intensive era we cannot base business advantage on material superiority alone. We must build our competitive advantage by enhancing core competence and organizational learning. Or as Peter Drucker once put it: Working harder must be replaced by working smarter. National educational efforts must be complemented, to some extent even replaced, by developing people where they work. This enhances the core competence of their companies operating in the international marketplace.

I had a Finnish perspective in this address, but I do believe that this is not alien to our fellow Europeans or to our fellow scholars from other continents. In the international world of the 1990's companies have spearheaded the lowering of borders and the nation states have followed suit. Also education and training people takes place increasingly in companies as an inseparable part of the daily work. This means that the role of strategic human resource management must be different from that of the booming eighties. It is important that we act on this role with a sense of urgency for the future of Europe, for her tapestry of regions and nations, for European companies and for individual people as well.

Ladies and gentlemen! I am honoured to declare open the Twelfth Workshop on Strategic Human Resource Management focusing on “The Learning Organization Responding to Change”. You are all very welcome!

# KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE FIRMS<sup>1</sup>

## 1 Background

Today we are living in the middle of the shift from the industrial society to the information society. Knowledge begins to be generally accepted as the fourth factor of production. Even though in terms of volume (the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, the turnover of companies), industrial mass production exceeds the volume of knowledge intensive business, the latter has a greater potential in terms of further development, high value, quality, and employment. Actually, even industrial manufacturing has become increasingly knowledge intensive and it provides a lever for knowledge intensive business.

The shift to the information era and globalisation are parallel processes and they reinforce each other. The European slump of the early 1990's can be interpreted from the perspective that knowledge business was not able to take the place of the "black hole" of smokestack industries. This is why the slump cannot be managed by the old means and legacies of the industrial era. Such means would just slow down the necessary changes, but they would not prevent them from happening. Indeed, as a consequence of protectionistic measures, the shift will eventually hit harder. This is not to say that the information era would promise easier times (see e.g. the early critique by Touraine, 1969).

The forces working against the development are more of a macropolitical than microeconomic nature. From the microeconomic point of view, the crux of the matter is: How do knowledge intensive firms differ from traditional industrial manufacturing firms? This is precisely the issue that the Research Unit of Knowledge Organisations (RUKO) at the Turku School of Economics and Business Administration has been working on for more than half a decade.

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<sup>1</sup> Based on an article in Cortada, J. W. & Woods, J. A. (1999). The knowledge management yearbook 1999 – 2000. Boston: Butterworth Heinemann. 168 – 178.

We have produced, and are in the process of producing academic reports (e.g. Nurmi,1986; Nurmi, Kontkanen, Lehtimäki & Viitanen 1992; Lehtimäki, Kontkanen & Nurmi, 1991; Kontkanen,1994; Kirjavainen,1995), doctoral dissertations (Lehtimäki,1993; Kirjavainen,1997), a book of articles (Lehtimäki, 1996) and we have preached the subject in business magazines, by teaching in and out of academia, as well as consulted companies on the subject. This paper tries to condense some of our main conclusions.

Knowledge is to us something that is acted upon, something that has an effect on the way things are. We are not interested in information that lies passive on shelves, in files, or archives. A knowledge business is created when the know-how within the firm and the needs of customers outside the firm meet. Intentional development of market know-why can bring these two together. Knowledge intensive firms process knowledge into knowledge products and services for their customers. Knowledge intensive firms include companies in areas of consulting, training, education, research, audit, edp, architecture, and planning to mention a few. The list cannot be exhaustive. But knowledge-intensive firms have in common the feature that they are less capital intensive than manufacturing industry and more knowledge intensive than other service industries. Scientific research can be considered the primary production of knowledge, which is processed into know-how services that are sold and distributed via different channels to organisations and consumers. In this chain there are a lot of people from Nobel-prize winners to money-hungry salespeople.

Within the species of knowledge intensive firms, there are wide range of differences. RUKO has, however, focused on similarities rather than on differences. This allows us to cut a few corners to emphasize our case in a particular way and to clarify the difference between industrial manufacturing and knowledge business. There are different kinds of knowledge intensive firms (see the typology by Nurmi,R., Kontkanen,L., Lehtimäki,J. & Viitanen, 1992), and it makes a difference, whether the knowledge product is software or hardware, whether the customer is a firm or a consumer and so on. This summary ignores differences but tries to abstract similarities between knowledge intensive firms in relation to firms in other branches of industry. For a more analytical treatise on different kinds of knowledge firms, the reader is advised to consult other publications from the RUKO-project - these present their case firms in their specific contexts (Lehtimäki,1993; Viitanen,1993; Kirjavainen,1996; Kontkanen,1994). The rest of the paper presents characteristics of knowledge intensive firms in terms of the nature of knowledge work and knowledge products, the production of knowledge services, organising, management, and strategy of this type of firm.

It is not by chance that the sequence is from the bottom to the top, or from operations to strategy. The strategy of knowledge intensive firms emerges from knowledge workers (cf. Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) who in their daily work encounter the strategic interfaces of both products and customers (Viitanen, 1993). Indeed, the dividing line between strategy and operations is most fluid in knowledge intensive firms. The distinction between the subjects in the following paragraphs cannot be more clear-cut. The division serves the purpose of the presentation only. The world is chaotic, but we need classifications in order to be able to write, to talk, and to discuss it.

## 2 Knowledge work and knowledge as a product

How can knowledge work be characterised? How does it differ from industrial work, and other work in the service sector? Even though all work has become more and more knowledge intensive (see Davis & Botkin, 1994), work that processes data into information, knowledge, and wisdom has its distinctive characteristics.

The world abounds with knowledge that is not acted upon. This may be due to the fact that much knowledge is created without attention to its commercial use. *L'art pour l'art*, or sheer human curiosity is not an uncommon motivation for the collection of knowledge, for instance (and in particular) in research. But it is still as true that much useful knowledge remains useless due to organisational blocks, and due to an inability to sell it to potential customers. As all consultants know, organisations abound with ideas that are not adopted by a firm due to organisational barriers - this is precisely where the usefulness of process consulting arises.<sup>2</sup>

And yet knowledge is enhanced when it is applied and fades away, if it is not used. When a firm sells a physical good to a customer, the good is moved from the supplier to the buyer. When a firm sells know-how, the know-how remains the property of both partners even after the transaction or, in fact, the know-how of both has increased after the transaction. In selling knowledge both the supplier and buyer learn.

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<sup>2</sup> This reminds me of the definition of an organization development consultant: A consultant is a person who borrows his or her customer's watch to tell the customer what time it is, after which the consultant puts the watch in his or her pocket and sends the bill to the customer.

The professional skill component is another factor that makes a difference from blue-collar work (cf. Benveniste, 1987). Knowledge workers may have unions just like industrial workers, but the formal and informal professional contacts and associations tend to weigh more. These are usually more important than the firm they are working for. Knowledge workers' loyalty to their professional group and the professional ethic may be greater than loyalty to the firm. Motivation is of at least as much consequence as the capacity of professionals to set limits to their contribution to the firm. A knowledge-intensive firm therefore tends to be resource based, and supreme knowledge has the potential to create its markets or produce customer value that the customer could not even imagine without the supplier.

Raw-material for knowledge processing is practically inexhaustible, the cost of the raw-material is considerably lower than the price of the high value end-product, and most of the difference between the two is value-added of the firm. Pollution is much less of a problem than in manufacturing industries. Transferring knowledge is easier and cheaper than transporting physical goods, so that from a logistic point of view even a small knowledge intensive firm can operate globally, provided that it has the marketing power to reach customers all over the world. Consequently, only the sky is the limit to an innovative and entrepreneurial mind.

### 3 Production of knowledge

Industrial work is planned and scheduled in a Tayloristic way, cost-effectively and to seize the economies of scale. Automation has increased the productivity of manufacturing immensely. As the lion's share of the costs of an industrial firm are in the manufacturing department, it is important to keep costs per unit to a minimum. Deviations add to costs, and they disturb the planned and scheduled flow of processing of raw-material into standardised products. Even minor variations cause a disproportionate increase in the costs of manufacturing. "Cars can be of any colour people want - as long as it's black" was the phrase coined by Henry Ford. Even services for manufacturing like maintenance, production planning, work measurement, quality control etc. are usually separated from the production line so that the big train of manufacturing can be kept on course along its prelaid rails as uninterrupted, cleansed and cost-effectively as is humanly (sometimes even inhumanely) possible.

There are knowledge intensive firms where manufacturing has taken the industrial mode of manufacturing as its model. This mode of organising work has been so efficient that even many service industries have adopted it. It is

also true that there have been successful consulting companies that sell a standardised product. The Managerial Grid by Blake and Mouton (1964) may have been the most successful of them. Mass customisation has increased even in industrial manufacturing, and this has allowed to seize simultaneously cost-effectiveness and a certain amount of product differentiation. Although such knowledge products can be multiplied or even cloned, the interaction between the producer and the customer remains the key to the core competence of the knowledge intensive firm. This core competence is unique and it cannot be imitated. Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Hamel & Prahalad, 1993; Hamel, 1994 introduced the concept of core competence referring to technological know-how that goes beyond the structural borders of the firm. Kirjavainen (1995) showed its special relevance to knowledge intensive firms.

In knowledge intensive business, the manufacturing model has inherent limits. Measurement of quantity per time unit or by piece does not make sense. A knowledge product, whose development may have taken years without any being sold, can return its costs many times over after it has been successfully launched on the market. Creativity instead of automation is the key to productivity. Working smarter is more important than working harder (Which does not, unfortunately, mean that hard work could be avoided in the knowledge business.) Quality is more important than quantity such as number of words spoken per minute or pages written.<sup>3</sup> Quality is intrinsic to the work of the knowledge worker, it is not separate as in a quality control department. A high value-added knowledge product provides returns not only for the company, but for the whole economy and humankind. Think of Gutenberg: his return from his invention was minuscule compared with the return for mankind.

Knowledge as a product adds value to customers, and, then costs and investments can be priced to match the high-value of the product. Of course costs must be controlled and there has to be a return on investments, but the competitive advantage of a knowledge-intensive firm lies in differentiation rather than cost-effectiveness (cf. Porter, 1980). Knowledge production cannot be departmentalised from other functions in the way that is customary in industrial manufacturing. The person who developed a knowledge service is often the best producer of the service and even the best at selling it to the customer. As a matter of fact, a customer may contribute and usually does in

<sup>3</sup> Strangely, some versions of Management by Objectives as applied in public research and educational organizations are based on this kind of "effectiveness".

one way or another to the development and production of the service. Think of the case of hairdresser: You would not expect to buy a standardised, though cost-effective haircut, but you would expect that your personal style would be considered and the haircut tailored accordingly.

#### 4 Organising a knowledge intensive firm

Organisation of a firm is traditionally regarded as a structure in two dimensions. Vertically it consists of layers between management and operations. Horizontally it is divided into functions, departments or units, each of which specialises in the area of its expertise. This structural view is not appropriate in knowledge intensive firms.

The vertical dimension is dealt with in the following paragraph concerning the management of knowledge intensive firms, but suffice it to say here that knowledge intensive firms are much less layered than manufacturing firms. As all middle layers would just filter the flow between management and operations, the organisation is flat with few and penetrable layers and a wide span. Formal administration should be kept to a minimum, and it works best when unnoticed.

Horizontally, a knowledge intensive firm cannot be strictly departmentalised, because interpersonal interaction goes beyond departmental lines. A person, who has developed a knowledge-intensive service, is often the best producer of the service, and he or she is the best customer contact. Personal interaction stimulates ideas and creativity, and, no doubt, conflicts as well. These interactions can grow into networks inside and outside the firm. The organisation can be characterised as a culture supporting shared values and beliefs. An even better metaphor is a market place of knowledge and learning, where individuals gather to exchange their expertise with other people whom they appreciate inside or outside the firm. The organisational boundaries of the firm are no more clear-cut than those within the firm, but customers, outside partners, subcontractors, even competitors make up a network that is in a continuous state of change. Organisation is a short-lived, loose, labile, virtual, adhocratic, even disposable force field of interactions and an ever-changing network of relationships.

Such an organisation is necessarily conflict prone, but the conflicts are rather between persons than in the employer-employee contract. Conflicts serve, all the same, a constructive end, only they are managed properly (see Nurmi,1996; Nurmi & Darling,1997). Conflicts are concomitants of creativity, and if they are suffocated, creative development is likely to be subdued.

Knowledge workers tend to feel that the organisation is for them to springboard their learning, whereas in traditional types of organisation, the individual is for the organisation and tied to it by job descriptions and other formal means. When a successful knowledge worker leaves a firm, he or she takes services, customers, a part of its core competence along probably to a competitor or a potential competitor that can be established by leaving. Extrinsic rewards are, relatively speaking, of less consequence to a knowledge worker in comparison with the intrinsic motivation, and the drive for results and end products for the customer. Such an organisation requires from its members a high tolerance of ambiguity, conflict, even anarchy, because the organisational support from plans, routines and other formal procedures is only minor. In a way, every knowledge-worker is a profit-centre, despite working and learning together with colleagues and customers. This creates co-ordination problems, and formal co-ordination is of little avail in a knowledge-intensive firm. Communication from the bottom to the top, i.e. from where the core competence emerges to where the co-ordination of the firm is supposed to take place, is much more important than the flow of information from top to bottom.

Neither formal co-ordination mechanisms nor directives *von oben* work well in a situation where the level of complexity is very high both within the firm and in the outside environment. In such a case only human beings are flexible enough to create a fit between the resources of the firm and changes in the environment. Every knowledge worker can be in liaison with the environment and with other people in the firm with few structural rules to direct co-operation. When the output of each person may be the input of anyone else, loose organisational coupling (Orton & Weick,1990; Kontkanen,1994), mutual adjustment (Løwendahl & Revang,1995) and reciprocal co-ordination (Thompson,1967) create the necessary fit between the ever-changing firm and the ever-changing environment. March & Simon (1958) argued that the greater the efficiency of communication within an organisation, the greater is the tolerance of independence. People in a knowledge-intensive firm are highly independent. Hence, a very high level of communication is needed to ensure a minimum amount of co-ordination that will maintain the firm as an integrated entity.

Re-engineering and downsizing are fads of the 1990's, but also necessities for streamlining multi-layered structural inertia of industrial giants (Hammer & Champy, 1993; Darling & Nurmi,1995). Even knowledge-intensive firms have gone through the trauma of rapid decline in turnover during this decade. But they do not benefit from complicated structural organisational designs in their survival efforts; instead their efforts have been directed at individual knowledge-workers, often making their pay more directly commensurate with

their billing. It is no wonder that partnership structures have gained in popularity.

Obviously this kind of state of flux is difficult to maintain in big organisations. Growth tends to formalise networks into structures. A fair size is needed in order to have the necessary resources. But the resources can be increased without employing more permanent employees by networking with outside partners. An increase in size is not without problems in knowledge-intensive organisations. It tends to add administrative costs and at the same time diminish the returns on competence utilisation. In alliances the advantages of size can be used more flexibly, because small firms can at the same time serve as each others partners, customers, subcontractors, and even competitors. A partner can work within a firm as well as outside it.

## 5 Management of knowledge intensive firms

The line between management and operations is blurred in knowledge intensive firms. Hierarchical managerial status without leadership based on competence and credibility is counterproductive, as these qualities are mandatory for influencing personnel and customers alike. In knowledge intensive firms management participates in operations and by so doing learn and add to the learning and the core competence of the firm. Commanding from top to bottom and reporting from bottom to top are replaced by mutual learning. A managerial position can be achieved by micropolitical means, but leadership can only be maintained on the basis of competence and credibility. Esteem counts more than status, leadership more than management. Managers can best be characterised as experts who serve as part-time managers.

Operative people are not objects of management, but they are the subjects that create value-added for the customer. Knowledge workers feel that the customer is far more important than their superior. In fact the superior can say or do little against a person who brings money to the firm by creating customer satisfaction. Managers can - intentionally or unintentionally - extinguish the drive of an individual, but the drive really depends more on the knowledge worker-customer interaction.

This does not mean to say that management is unimportant in knowledge intensive firms. On the contrary, it is important but the role of management is quite different from what it is in traditional industrial firms and from what management literature tells us. Managers work as strategic brokers between the environment and the firm and even within the firm. They know where to get the best expertise, they make people meet each other, and they organise meetings, business lunches, seminars etc. for these purposes. Promoting the

company and marketing its services is a prime task of the management. These firms neither have a specialised marketing function nor a marketing manager. Instead, every knowledge worker also serves as a salesperson, and the top manager serves as the marketing director of the firm.

But managers also have internal roles. They give help when needed, and serve as senior mentors for experts in the firm. They can create a proper atmosphere and drive by setting challenges and by letting personnel create challenges for themselves by initiating, selecting, supporting, and directing processes, as well as by selecting, rewarding, directing and developing people. As knowledge intensive firms are conflict-prone, conflict management is another managerial task, not by suffocating or subduing them, but managing them in a way that channels the heat of the conflict (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991), and transforms it into driving energy without damaging the whole too much.

The operative impulses - by the impulses of the knowledge workers as well as customers - tend to pull a knowledge intensive firm in diverse directions and make it lose its focus. It is then a managerial task, to maintain and enhance the integrity of the firm, to find and add to the synergy between different projects and to promote the core competence as the comparative advantage of the firm. This leads us to the strategic aspects of a knowledge-intensive firm.

## 6 Strategic considerations in knowledge intensive firms

The line between strategy and operations is as blurred as that between management and operations in a knowledge intensive business. In a capital intensive business, paying back capital investments is a prime strategic concern, as a consequence the strategy is defined and controlled by the top management and specialists at the corporate headquarters. But in the knowledge intensive business capital is seldom a barrier of entry into the business. Indeed it is possible to establish a knowledge-intensive firm for the price of a cellular telephone. It is the human capital, know-how, and customers that count in starting such a business. In industrial manufacturing companies "delegating strategic decisions" has, time and again, meant increasing the number of layers between the corporate management and the operations of profit-centres. But in knowledge-intensive firms, strategy is intrinsic to the knowledge workers who by working with customers develop knowledge products. If Ansoff (1965) is to be believed and the strategy can be conceived as a product-market mix, then it is the knowledge workers that have the most direct access to product and market information. Accordingly, the strategy

emerges at the operative customer interface instead of formal planning or delegating from the top.

Of course, top management has a legitimate concern regarding the strategy of the firm and also wide access to the resources of the firm and environmental factors. So, in practice strategy emerges from the interplay between the firm and its environment as well as between knowledge workers and management. The role of strategic management is to nurture the development of competence, to refine strategic thinking, and to maintain the interplay between the two (Kirjavainen, 1995).

The strategy of a knowledge intensive firm can be relatively resource based (cf. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A firm with a supreme and marketable know-how, can create a need for its services. Market research is seldom useful in a knowledge intensive business, as customers may not be able to see all potential services that could add to their value added. Neither Microsoft word, nor benchmarking nor biological engineering would have come out in a survey of customers needs. These were the brainchilds of inventive people who in interacting with their potential customers began to think beyond customary lines of thought.

All in all, the strategy that works is inside the actors, and it changes in interactions with the whole network of contacts inside and outside the firm. The strategy can be written down, but the paper is obsolete the day it is printed, because organisational learning has overtaken it in the actual operations of the firm. The knowledge workers have daily access to strategic knowledge regarding the products and the markets, and the problem is often how to communicate this knowledge upwards and horizontally to make it operative in the firm. Organisational learning (cf. Argyris & Schön, 1978), that grows into strategic learning in the minds of the actors delineating priorities and discerning the important from the less important - this is how the strategy works in actual practice. Strategic systems and strategic planning are not worth a big effort in knowledge-intensive firms, but some kind of formal procedures are needed to deploy the core competencies.

The products of a knowledge-intensive firm have a relatively short life-cycle. But core competence, whilst it takes years to develop, does not become obsolete as quickly as individual products. Core competence needs nurturing and cherishing, and if it is allowed to vanish there is no way of getting it back quickly or cheaply. This often happens, when knowledge intensive firms as a result of internal conflicts, suddenly lose key persons in whom much of the tacit knowledge and the human and social capital of the firm is vested. Sustainable product development can be built on core competencies. This makes it possible for a firm to launch products that their customers could not even imagine that they need. Quality, applied research, product development

and organisational learning are competitive edges. Specific projects can be established to develop all of these, but, more importantly, they develop in the normal production process which takes place with the customers at the interface where the core competence emerges.

A strategy such as this is flexible, for better or for worse. It can be reverted much more easily than the strategy of capital intensive firms. Knowledge intensive firms can be small, quick fishes that nibble the quickly changing niches and scrape the cream of new possibilities. But the drawback of bouncing strategies are diversions and downright "organisational cancers". They may be useful for strategic learning, but they must be cut off before they jeopardise the synergy, core competence and the customer image of the firm.

Investments in people and learning are intangibles and therefore not easy to control. They may, in the end, benefit a future competitor. But neglecting them is definitely detrimental. The changing investment climate has also brought investments in people into a new light. Until 1990's investments in tangibles like offices and office buildings appeared to be less risky and gave a return higher than the rate of inflation, whilst investments in people seemed more risky. Now, however, it has turned out that investments in knowledge and key people have given a better return than investments in physical assets. In the knowledge intensive business investment in people also focuses management concern on where the core competence is, whilst investments in physical assets diverts managerial effort to what from the business point of view is a sideline.

## 7 Summary

Knowledge is, for knowledge intensive firms, raw material to be processed to a higher level of knowledge to create value-added for customers. Knowledge, unlike material goods, does not move in exchange from one partner to another, but it remains the property of both partners after the exchange. A knowledge organisation does not work properly as a structured, departmentalised, hierarchical organisation, but as a process, network, culture, market place for mutual learning and knowledge. Management is not separate from operations, it is part and parcel of them, partaking, selecting, supporting, accelerating, directing the operations-customers interface. Strategy cannot work *von oben*, but it emerges by way of strategic learning and growing into a core competence, where the know-how of the company and the needs of its customers meet.

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# FOR MANAGEMENT<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

The paper highlights two points: 1) It has been argued that there is too much of management and too little of leadership. This paper speaks for management. 2) An excursion to the linguistics of management shows that the distinction between management and leadership is not universal.

### 1 Management and leadership

Whenever I write on management subjects in Finnish or in English, I come across the predicament that the Finnish word *johtaminen* stands for both *management* and *leadership*. In Finnish you can *johtaa* (the verb) a company as well as a race. If this is confusing to an English speaker, it is quite as confusing for a Finnish speaker to understand that a conductor leads a symphony orchestra, but it is managed by someone in the back-office taking care of financial and other mundane matters. This has given me a few headaches in translating management thinking between the Finnish and English languages. I have had to study the difference in meaning of the two English words, something that is obviously self-evident to any native English-speaker. This paper is an attempt to share what I think I have learned.

First of all, let me check, if I have understood the concepts of management and leadership the same way as a native English speaker would understand them. Definitions abound in the literature, and, needless to say, they are all but in agreement. It seems as though every self-respecting scholar on the subject would have liked to leave his or her mark in the definition jungle. Instead of boring the reader by a detailed analysis of this jungle, I shall cut myself through it all and end up with the following simplified definitions:

Management is a position in an organization and a responsibility that comes with the organizational position. Managers need managerial competences like

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<sup>1</sup> Presented in the 18th Scandinavian Academy of Management Conference in Århus, 19.8.2005.

professors, lawyers, artists, carpenters and cleaners need competences in their professional or occupational fields. Leadership is a personal skill to vision, act and influence people ahead and in front of them. Leaders need personal leadership skills. Management is based on a status in a hierarchy and leadership on the personal prestige of the person. The two may go together, but it is not necessarily so.

A couple of decades ago leadership was still considered a necessary skill for supervisors or middle-managers (e.g. McFarland, 1979; Miner, Singleton & Luchsinger, 1985, 188; Kreitner, 2001, 173 - 177). It was thought that top management should work on strategic matters, and then delegate the implementation of the strategy to the lower echelons. To get the delegated strategy implemented the middle management and supervisors needed leadership skills, meaning that they should persuade the operative people to work for the wisdom invented by the top management. The generals had the brain, the soldiers were the hands, and the latter should not mess up with the generals' tasks. This vertical division of labour is deeply rooted in the Western thinking, and Aristotle was probably the first to write about it (Nurmi, 1984.) Indeed, the word *strategy* comes from Greece, and it means the office of the general. This is still a difference between the Western concept of division of labour and the Japanese collective organizational thinking (Ouchi, 1981).

This strict division between strategic planning and operations produced voluminous and sophisticated strategic papers and long range plans in many companies. It turned out that they had little influence on operations. People forgot the plans and the strategies - if they ever learned to know about them. It is not that long ago that I heard an executive say: "We had a marvellous strategy – only our personnel did not understand it". We have witnessed "The rise and fall of strategic planning" to quote the title of Mintzberg's (1994) book on the subject.

Managers, consultants, textbook-writers and management educators began to realize that planning and implementing are not two separate things; they must overlap timewise and organizationally. Leadership then came on the agenda for top management. The term strategic leadership was coined (Schendel, 1989). Strategic leadership is not just delegating the strategy from top to bottom, but it is more importantly collecting strategic impulses that emerge in the organization and at the customer interface. In this process first the difference between strategy and operations became blurred (Nurmi, 1999). Something similar may now be taking place to the difference between management and leadership.

Leadership has not only grown in importance, but it has become a doctrine. Leadership is an example of American-based leadership doctrines on what good management is. Some of it comes close to a religion. There is recent

American criticism of the concept as well (Goslin & Mintzberg, 2003; Pearce & Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2003). Leadership is not actually used in the English by the-man-in-the street as pompously as in the leadership literature.

Leadership is rooted in the history of USA, in its myths and legends of strong and charismatic individuals, who can make the world better by their will-power, talents and charisma. American democracy cherishes individual freedom and liberty. And indeed, much of the achievements of the USA are based on this kind of heroic people. American history-writing highlights individual and entrepreneurial initiative and leadership.

Europeans have experienced dictators. Therefore, Europeans see democracy as a means to prevent too much power from being concentrated on one person. Democracy is based on resentment against holders of power (Russell, 1995, 136). European history-writing has cherished cultural achievements based on Church and nation-states. When European business people, management consultants and educators talk about leadership in admiration of the American doctrine, they do not always realize that they try to apply the idea in a cultural and national ethos that differs from the origins of the leadership doctrine. This may raise difficulties, to say the least.

Let us take a short excursion to the linguistics of management. Language is a cornucopia of meanings, connotations, nuances and dialects. For all this, the following short review cannot do justice. There cannot be a neat, let alone a perfect presentation on such a subject. But even with its roughness and simplifications, it may indicate that thinking about management and leadership is neither as objective nor universal as we tend to think.

## 2       Linguistics of management<sup>2</sup>

### 2.1.   English as a tangled language

English belongs to the German group of languages, but it has strong sediments of Latin influence from the time of the Roman occupation. (Even Gaelic

<sup>2</sup> I could not have been able to write this section without the private language lessons by Michael Berry on English, Jaak Leimann on Estonian language, Kristina Lindgren on Roman languages, Margrét Halldórsdóttir on Icelandic language, Sirpa Niittymaa on Hungarian language, Satu Rintanen on Italian languages and Peter Zettinig on German languages.

influences have remained, but my Gaelic is too rusty to trace these roots here). The word management has a Latin origin. Its root is *manus* meaning hand. When Latin began to take form as Italian languages, *maneggiare* became to mean horse training. Shakespeare used management in this sense in e.g. “King Lear” (32), but it also meant trickery and deceitful contrivance for Shakespeare in “As you like it” (4) and for George Washington in his Letters (1893, 63). It was only after the industrial revolution and particularly in America (Drucker, 1997, 14) that management began to be established in its present decent meaning. Leadership on the other hand comes from Old Germanic language. Its root is the verb *laedan* (or *lithan* or *lidan*) meaning travelling, going. At that time travelling meant riding in front of a convoy.

## 2.2 Romani ducerent

Let us go back to the roots of it all or to the Latin language. Latin *ducere* (manage), *dux* (manager) and *ductus* (management) remind now Italians of Mussolini, who called himself *Il Duce*. *Ducere* comes from Latin *conducere* meaning bringing things together, and from it comes *condurre* in Italian, *conduire* in French, *conduct* in English and similar forms in just about all Indo-European languages. Italian *maneggiare* or *manediare* is currently used in a pejorative sense. Caesar would not have been pleased, had he been called a manager or *maneggiatore* in his attempt to invade Britannia. *Gestion* is the closest Latin word to the present English management. So are *gestione* in Italian languages, *gestion* in French and *gestión* in Spanish. *Dirigere* in Latin is directing, and directors abound in all Western languages though written in different ways. *Amministrare* meant originally serving, and this is what good administration should be.

## 2.3 German peoples were coming

The Romans called the peoples beyond Rhine and Danube German, Teutonic and barbaric – all these names had a scornful meaning for Romans. Vikings were one of these peoples. The present day Icelandic is remarkably similar to Old Norse, the language of the Vikings, which began to take a distinct form from Old Germanic during the first millennium. There are in Iceland today language guardians who object, if someone uses an anglo-expression where there is a proper Icelandic expression in place. This preservation of archaeology of a language is comparable to the preservation of Colosseum in Rome or Stonehenge in England. *Stjórn* is management in the Icelandic

language – from this comes *steer* in English. Without steering the Vikings could not have sailed over the Atlantic and down to the Mediterranean. The Vikings Guide to Good Business from the 13<sup>th</sup> century and the Birka Code are collections of advice and wisdom for managers (Thorlaksson, 2003).

*Leitung* and *Leiter* or *Führung* and *Führer* are words for management and leadership in the present day German language. They are actually closer to the idea of leadership than management. *Leitung* is more bureaucratic and not that often used, whereas *Führung* is more charismatic, and in this sense, closer to leadership. *Führer* is however seldom used after Hitler. Business management takes one of the prefixes *Betriebs-*, *Geschäfts-* or *Unternehmungs-* *-leitung* or *-führung*. *Unternehmungsführung* is established to mean top management. Also *Führungskraft* is used in the same meaning. But German speaking people also talk about Managers (see Kieser, Reber and Wunderer, 1995 and Szabo, & Reber, 2004). Even the word *Organisation* means roughly management (*Ordnung muss sein*). So does *Verwaltung*, literally administration, which is often considered a typical German way of management legitimised by Max Weber. In Swedish the language construction is similar to German. *Ledning* (leadership) becomes in companies *företagsledning* or management (*företag* = company).

## 2.4 Fenno-Ugric management.

Even though the Finnish *johtaminen* does not make a difference between management and leadership, the difference exists in Estonian and Hungarian. *Juhtimine* is management in Estonian, while the word *eestvedamine* (pulling in front of) is a leadership equivalent, but it is not used in as grand a way as in the leadership literature (Üksvärv, 2003). In Hungarian *intéz* refers to management, while *vezet* is leading and conveying in front.

What do we learn from this linguistic excursion? Certainly that the subject is far from simple, even though all I write here is a deliberate attempt to simplify it. The distinction between management and leadership is not universal. And I dare not say anything about the Arab, Russian, Chinese, Indian and varied African languages, and their concepts and thinking about management.

How does this archaeology of language reflect itself in the national and cultural differences in management in different parts of the world? This is an exciting question, but there are no easy answers to it. What can be said for sure, is that leadership is quintessentially an American concept and an American phenomenon – it is not such a grand thing even in Great Britain. *Organisation* and *Verwaltung* are German characteristics, and they are

recognizable in German owned companies and their subsidiaries even in other countries. Scandinavian management of today has an identity of its own that bears marks of the Viking legacy (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2003). Finns consider themselves reserved and modest – or perhaps just envious, if someone has the courage to raise his or her head an inch above others. This is probably why there has not been a leadership fever in Finland, even though the fashionable concept is often verbalised without properly understanding what it means.

Globalization is a reality of today. In this process the differences in meanings, concepts and thinking are not just a linguistic exercise, but they are conducive to daily misunderstandings between people. Making people understand each other is a very practical everyday exercise for international managers.

### 3. Speaking for management

It has been argued that there is too much of management (Parker, 2002) and too little of leadership (Nurmi & Darling, 1997). There is ample literature to speak for leadership (e.g. Bennis, 1991; Conger & Kanungo, 1985; Bennis & Nanus, 1983). Harvard Business Review warmed up the view in its January issue in 2004 by republishing Zaleznik's, Goleman's, Maccoby's and Prentice's articles in its Best of HBR –series. Also books like Grint (2000) and Ashby & Miles (2002) keep the leadership issue alive. Leadership is considered grander, more lucrative and admirable, in a word: better, than the less visible, down-to-earth, greyer management. Where shall we ever find enough of these flamboyant and excellent leaders – do they unfold by nature or by nurture? It is time to speak for management.

First of all, running a company requires down-to-earth, common, dull, trite, everyday, management. Even disgusting and repulsive things must be done to keep things going. Managers are there to take care of and be responsible for these kinds of things, even though it would be nicer to beam as a leader in front of everybody on high platforms. Management is getting things done. Churchill was celebrated as The Great Leader in Oxford Street in London in the Victory Day in 1945, but before it he had had to manage a chain of events that belongs to the cruellest in the English and European history.

Management is based on a position in an organization. The position implies power and responsibility. The two go together. They should be by and large in balance. Power without responsibility means tyranny; responsibility without power is frustrating, even suffocating. Or in the frequently cited words by Lord Acton (1887): "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts

absolutely". But leadership is based on the personal charisma and qualities of the leader. Charisma is not checked by positional accountability. When managerial power is balanced by managerial responsibility, leadership needs ethics as a balancing factor.

Just seeing a few newsreels of Hitler's speeches makes one believe in his enormous leadership skills. He created the vision of a *Reich* for a thousand years (Hitler, 1933), but in the end he destroyed his country and as a by-product much else in Europe. Martin Luther (King), Gandhi and Jesus are also considered great leaders, but history has given them a much higher ethical grade. Obviously, the leaders achieve – for better or for worse – much more than managers do. This is why ethical considerations are necessary, whenever leadership is assessed.

Clearly, leaders would benefit from managerial competence. Had Hitler learned at least the ABC of economic thinking, organizing international operations and logistics, he would have learned that conquering Stalingrad was doomed to fail. Actually, his generals, trained in management, tried to tell him so (Shirer, 1958, 423 - 439), but Hitler's leadership vision blindfolded him from seeing what did not fit with his commitment.

Jesus seems to have been more realistic a leader and a manager. Even his followers seem to have learned their lessons in marketing (see Jones, 1995). Jesus himself had a vision that has so far stood for two millennia, but he could also organize and manage his disciples, who spread the message throughout the world they knew and organized a church, whose presence is known on this day everywhere on our planet. It may be a reason of the undeniable success story of Christianity that Jesus could combine his leadership skills with managerial competence. Was Jesus a leader or a manager? Let me suggest this as a theme for a doctoral dissertation in any Learned School of Theology. I am not after a copyright or royalties here. After all, all cultural products have been more or less legal thefts until somebody invented the television formats.

A manager develops his or her organization to the extent that he makes himself or herself unnecessary. Clearly, there are cases when a new manager must be recruited from outside of the company, because leaders have been unable to develop managerial competence in their organization or downright unwilling to delegate, authorize and empower their subordinates to increase their managerial experience and competence. This is not the whole truth. There are cases when a new brush is needed to sweep or the managerial echelon has been too thin to make internal management succession possible. Or then the manager of the manager may have realized that, indeed, s/he has one unnecessary manager, and it is easier for him or her to axe the poor fellow than to promote him or her to a more demanding job, where s/he could again make himself or herself unnecessary on a higher level.

Managerial competence is based on some kind of a substance, whereas leadership is based on personal skills, assertiveness and persuasive influence. If there is no substance behind the leadership skills, there is a chance of colossal misleading. The combination of a strong belief and incompetence has produced time and again great disasters by good-willing people with good conscience. Sometimes only a cynic can correct what an ignorant idealist has done wrong (Greene, 1956).

A leader promotes him- or herself to personal greatness, heroism and glory rather than develops the organization and the maturity of the people. The great leaders may have a narcissistic syndrome (Maccoby, 2004) to increase their power, which may or may not work to the benefit of the organization. If the leader succeeds in this endeavour, and, yet, becomes for one reason or another incapacitated, the whole organization falls into a great trouble. There are examples of this, and it easily breeds the illusion that the Great Leader was irreplaceable. Another reason may be that The Leader had a distaste for mentoring his successors and did not let people share responsibility. Indeed, organizational development might have been a threat to his leadership.

The basics of management can be studied and learned, albeit it is the practice that makes a master. It eases managerial career, if all is not learned by trial and error. Managerial education alone cannot make a competent manager, but it is possible to cut the long and cumbersome way of learning everything via personal experience by learning from the experience of others. Besides a manager in an executive position cannot afford many big errors just for his or her own learning, because these errors have strong repercussions. A good managerial competence is a necessary condition in all managerial tasks. Add leadership skills, – given by nature or learned by nurture – and you have ingredients of good managerial leadership.

To learn leadership is a much more complicated matter. It is certainly difficult to become a leader by way of formal education. A high academic grade in leadership is scarcely a grant for becoming a leader. It is possible to grow in leadership skills. Will-power – a crucial characteristic of leadership – requires innate qualities, and, then an appropriate nurture can seal it. It is possible to develop will-power and leadership skills by way of exercises in character building. Boarding Schools and military education have this kind of objectives. But leadership skills can also emerge in compensation of inadequate formal education. This is true as regards Hitler. The world did not lose a great painter in him.

Leading too far from the front runs the risk of losing touch with the led, the rest of the organization, its operations and its people. Another option is to manage neither from above nor in front but in the middle. This means working

with the others and getting oneself exposed to the operations. Part-time management has increased particularly in knowledge-intensive organizations (Nurmi, 1998). In them, anyone who has promoted himself or herself to be a big boss may soon find himself or herself isolated from the organization.

In times of crises there is a quest for leadership. People are looking for a saviour to elevate them and draw out their group and a whole nation from the trouble they have seen. Clearly George W. Bush responded to this need and showed great leadership in a reaction to the terrorist attack to the World Trade Center. But national leadership becomes more and more confined at a time, when the Brussels, the New York Stock Exchange, cheap imports and the transfer of work to countries that are more attractive to companies rock nations, companies and citizens alike. Local leaders and national leadership encounter global limitations.

There may be a demand of a Churchill, Roosevelt or Reagan, but he would probably not have the same managerial margin any longer. Or then he would have to remain a figurehead, who in order to maintain his managerial position, would have to satisfy the real centres of power. This kind of a manager becomes a decoy in a golden hencoop and is castrated from all real possibilities to influence. To be a leader one must look like a leader. But if one *only* looks like leader, one stands with both feet off the ground.

There may be a difference between politics and business here. A political leader needs visibility to be re-elected, whereas a business executive is measured by his economic performance. If the company does well and the organization ticks, there is no need for the manager to make a big issue of him- or herself. Managers make things happen.

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## FOUR FACETS OF MANAGEMENT<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

Four facets of management are introduced: 1) Management *von Oben* refers to a position in an organization and the power and responsibility that go with the position. 2) Leadership is being, going and guiding people *in front* of them. 3) Being, managing and leading people *in the middle* has emerged particularly in the knowledge-intensive organizations. 4) Pushing people *from behind* is an ancient and yet a modern facet of management.

#### 1 Management von Oben.

Managers are appointed. Management is a job, an office, a position, a status and a responsibility that is visible in the title of the managerial job. Along with the appointment, the manager receives social tokens of the position: the responsibility, duty and possibility to influence his or her domain and the people in it. The responsibility does not automatically give authority, and even if it gives it, the authority must be earned and re-earned in the job. Managers can be appointed, but leadership must be earned (e.g. Miller, Catt & Carlson, 1996 and Nurmi & Darling, 1997).

Managers are expected to decide and to be responsible for decisions and achieve what has been agreed upon with the help of other people. It is not only nor essentially planning, executing and controlling nor a systematic, well-planned professional activity. Managerial work does not consist of well-defined issues that would easily render themselves to analytical techniques or systematical planning (see Mintzberg, 1973). Instead, the issues are complicated webs and jumbles: even the outline and the definition of managerial issues are far from clear-cut. It is impossible to catalogue

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<sup>1</sup>Published in Reponen, T. (ed.): (2000). Management expertise for the new millennium. In commemoration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Turku School of Economics and Business Administration. A – 1. 205-212.

managerial tasks one by one because the tasks constantly change. A manager is in charge of his job as a responsibility. This is a short and comprehensive managerial job description. It is up to a manager to decide what the responsibility demands in a given situation, and situations vary in an unforeseen and discontinuous manner.

Managers cannot have fixed working hours. If, for instance, an important client wants to see a manager after normal working hours, he cannot afford to respond that it is after his or her working hours nor even ask extra salary for the time spent overtime. Managers are not paid for the time or other personal input for the job, but for the output or the performance in the job. A manager's job security varies between poor and nonexistent. A poor performance of a manager affects so many people and things that it is better to remove the manager than let the rest suffer. Managerial work is measured by performance – the performance of other people and resources he or she is in charge of. A manager does not measure his or her own performance; it is measured by others. There are measures provided by accounting and other information technology, but it is the rapport he or she has with the others that counts in the end. The manager's superior is usually the most influential of these others.




Figure 1: Management von Oben.

Management is a position in the organization (figure 1). Position is attached to power and responsibility. This hierarchical concept is part and parcel of Western organizational and social thinking (see Nurmi, 1983). The two are ambiguous concepts, partly because they are laden with affective and political connotations (see Kotter, 1979 and Mintzberg, 1983). Power is often personified. Someone has got the power; the others have not. But in a closer scrutiny, the power of persons is attached to the position they hold. The managing director possesses more possibilities to influence, i.e. position power, than the operative people have irrespective of how skillful power

players they are as persons. The managing director can, with poor performance, drive the whole company into the red, whereas its operative persons cannot do as much harm – at least without a collective action. A managing director has little chance to do little mistakes, as his or her mistakes tend to always have larger repercussions.

There is nothing shameful in power in itself. Many good things have been left unrealized as the parent of the idea has had neither a powerful position nor the skill to influence. It is true that power has led to atrocities, but without it, good ideas cannot come true either. Power is not only struggle for positions, but also a prerequisite to influence.

On the other hand, the power of a position is attached to a corresponding responsibility. Responsibility and power go together, there cannot be one without the other. Power without responsibility means tyranny; responsibility without power is most frustrating, even suffocating. The balance between the two is seldom perfect in the imperfect world of man. But too great an imbalance has hideous consequences.

Management is endowed with power, but not as exclusively as it is oftentimes simplistically assumed. In a present-day organization, no one is able to make decisions alone, even if he or she wanted to. In implementing decisions, many people need to be involved. Therefore, a manager must listen to many people before a decision can be made, and he or she has to get the support of many people to get it implemented. All major decisions are results of this kind of negotiation processes see (Mintzberg, 1994, 9-12). The end result of the process is the responsibility of the manager, and he or she needs power and authority to get it accepted by the many people concerned. True enough, there are emergencies, when a manager has to carry through decisions, which are unpleasant and difficult for others to accept. In these emergencies, manager may be very alone, and the decision and the power are weighed only by the judge of history.

## 2 Leadership in front

A manager can be appointed. Leadership must be earned, even after appointment to a managerial position. Leadership is not based on a position or on a status, but on authority and prestige. There are even leaders without a power based on a position. This kind of leadership may come from personal enthusiasm, personal authority, credibility, knowledge, skill or charisma. It is derived from the influence that the leader has on his or her followers. Leadership is seeing first, being first, going first in front of others (figure 2).

Leadership is not easy to define unambiguously either. Customary definitions include following points: setting of values and objectives and leading people with them; having the ability to acquire and organize resources; giving feedback; giving support and trust by delegating; having the determination to reach objectives in spite of momentary adversities; taking responsibility for difficult and critical decisions; standing up for others; being able to resolve conflicts; being a father (or a mother) figure; and being able to buffer blows and disappointments (see Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kotter, 1988; Yukl, 1989; Ropo, 1989; Välikangas, 1994; Nurmi, 1996; Reber, 1996).




Figure 2: Leadership *in front*.

This list cannot be conclusive. Yet, as it stands it is very demanding, and no one can meet all of it. Nobody can nor is supposed to be all time charismatic. The point is to discern the critical situations that call for strong personal leadership. Without this discernment, management is fussing and bouncing around, and the trifles becomes a matter of prestige, while the critical is not decided on due to shortage of courage.

Here is one more way to try to catch the many sides of leadership: leadership stands above what is present and, hence, is able to discern what is crucial in the future. The vision becomes a resource in organizational learning to produce human and social capital. This vision is born, changes, shapes

itself, and is reborn in the process of organizational learning. Leadership directs this learning process. In this kind of a process, leadership does not define the objectives as clearly as in the case of executive management. The outcomes of the process are as ambiguous as the future itself. However, leadership increases the maturity of the organization to cope with the future – whatever it will be. A leader needs much more tolerance of ambiguity than “pure” management. Leadership is straining and exhausting; it asks for tenacity, and the ability to absorb shocks, more so than management, which is protected by position. But there may be a steel fist in the silk glove of a manager.

Management has power – in leadership ethics is an issue. Leadership can be misleadership. A strong leadership has caused atrocities, cruelties, world-wide catastrophes. Hitler fulfills many characteristics of leadership. Jesus and Gandhi are other kind of examples in ethical leadership. The ethic of managers and leaders has been an issue in the media, to some extent among researchers as well (e.g. Mahoney, 1994). Ethics has emerged in the curricula of business schools and management development courses all over the world.

In times of crises there seems to be an increased demand of leadership. Leaders are longed for. When Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the market replaced the Almighty Hand of God, people long for an earthly authority and leadership to show the way. But at the same time the possibilities of leadership have become more limited. A national leadership has grown more difficult, when Brussels, the Wall Street and the low-cost imports shake nations, enterprises and citizens. Local leaders and local leadership encounter global limitations.

### 3      In the middle and pushing from behind

There are managerial positions and there is influential leadership. Sometimes leadership is adored so highly that it is thought that it could replace management. This is a misunderstanding. There are effective managers who do not seem to show any gestures of leadership, but there are also managers who cannot make their organizations tick for short of leadership, when it would be needed. There are good leaders and misleaders. Management and leadership can be for better or for worse, the two do not replace each other, rather they complement each other. Different situations call for management and leadership to a different extent.

In addition to globalization, the structural changes in the economy set new demands. The capital-intensive way of managing manufacturing industries is not contingent with service industries. It is particularly unfit with knowledge-

intensive industries. Knowledge-intensive firms are flat, adhocratic organizations, their structures are most fluid. They are customer-oriented, and there is no way to manage them *von Oben*. The strategy emerges in spite of the best efforts to formulate it. These firms do have a manager, from whom leadership is required. To earn the latter the manager has to retain his or her touch with the operative work by way of remaining involved in it. The leader of a knowledge-intensive firm works best as an operative expert and a part-time manager. A knowledge-intensive firm is not managed *von Oben* nor led *in front*, but by being *in the middle* (Nurmi, 1998 and figure 3)




Figure 3: A part-time manager leading *in the middle*.

Lao Tzu wrote 500 B.C.:

"A manager is best, when people barely know that he exists. Not so good, when people obey and acclaim him. Worse, when they despise him. Fail to honour people, and they fail to honour you. But of a good manager, who talks little, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will all say: "We did this ourselves".

This seems to be the ideal of management by pushing *from behind*.

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## TIE JOHTAJAKSI<sup>1</sup>

Otsake voi tuntua vähän mahtipontiselta - sopivalta vaikka valtiollisiin muistelmiin. Tai sitten se voi herättää mielikuvan ohjeista, miten johtajaksi tullaan. Kumpaankaan tässä pikku jutussa ei ylletä. Tarkoitus on vain sanoa, että johtajaksi voidaan tulla useaa tietä, ja tulokulmalla on merkitystä, etenkin aluksi. Tässä tarkastellaan neljää tietä. Johtajaksi voi tulla organisaation ulkopuolelta, kollegoidensa joukosta, joskus myös oikaisten ja luottamushenkilöjohtajat ovat vielä oma luokkansa.

### 1 Uusi luuta lakaisee

Ulkopuolelta tulleen sekä etuna että vaikeutena on tuntemattomuus: Organisaatiossa ei tunneta häntä eikä hän liioin tunne organisaatiota. Tämä tuntemattomuus on eriasteista riippuen siitä, miten etäältä tulokas tulee. Hypyn ei tarvitse olla suuri, jos hän tulee saman yhtiön piiristä. Samalla toimialalla voi sen sijaan jo olla radikaalisti erilaisia toimintatapoja – ehkä uusi henkilö otetaankin juuri muuttamaan niitä.

Alan ulkopuolelta tullut ottaa jo isomman riskin, ja hänellä voi olla erinomaiset mahdollisuudet – hyvään ja pahaan. Ulkopuoliselta menee joka tapauksessa aluksi aikaa uuteen tehtäväensä ja tehtäväympäristöön perehtymiseen, sillä sellaista yleisjohtajuutta ei ole eikä tule, joka olisi mekaanisesti siirrettävissä mistä tahansa yrityksestä mihin tahansa yritykseen. Mutta totta on sekin, että ulkopuolin voi nähdä ongelmat kirkkaammin kuin niihin pitkään sitoutunut. Hän on aiemmista päätöksistä riippumattomampi ja – mikä voi olla hyvin tärkeää – hänellä ei ole henkilösidonnaisuuksia esteenään uusille ratkaisuille. Kaikkea tätä tarkoitetaan, kun sanotaan, että uusi luuta lakaisee.

Suuret muutokset ja pitkään jatkuneen kulkusuunnan kääntäminen luontuvatkin paremmin uudelta johtajalta kuin aiempiin vaiheisiin sisäänsinkasvaneelta. Vaikka jälkimmäinen muutostarpeen tajuaisikin, hänen

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<sup>1</sup> Ilmestynyt Yritystaloudessa 6, 1994.

saattaa olla uskottavuusvaikeuksia muutoksen vetäjänä, koska hän on leimautunut aiempaan toimintatapaan.

Saneeraajat otetaan tavallisesti ulkopuolelta, ja ehkä ammattisaneeraajista, jotka kulkevat yrityksestä toiseen. Jo yksistään heidän maineensa saa heidän uudessa työpaikassaan vipinää. Saneeraajien jäljet ovat kuitenkin usein paljastuneet lyhytkestoisiksi tai suorastaan silmänlumeeksi. Voi olla, että he ovat alaa tuntemattomina leikanneet yrityksen ydinosaamista niin, että kustannukset ovat kyllä pudonneet, mutta jatkokehitykseltä on viety samalla pohja. Ihan poistamisen lisäksi on katkottu verisuonia. Ei ole ollenkaan vaikeaa leikata kustannuksia lyhyeksi ajaksi tai työttää ongelmia maton alle toistaiseksi. Paljon vaikeampaa on käääntää yrityksen kulkusuuntaa niin, että sen ydinosaaminen säilyisi ja siirtyisi uusille urille.

## 2 Primus inter pares

Kollegoidensa keskuudesta ylennetyillä on sekä etunaan että painolastinaan johdettavakseen tulevan organisaatioportaan tuntemus. Siihen liittyy vaikeus nousta aiemman tehtävänsä ja vertaistensa yläpuolelle ja omaksua ylemmässä esimiestehävässä tarvittava asennoituminen.

On hälyttäviä kokemuksia siitä, että tehokkaasta myyjästä, joka tuo rahaa sisään tänään, voi ylennyksen seurauksena tulla huono myyntipäällikkö, joka ei jaksa oppia ajattelemaan, mistä sama tai suurempikin raha voi tulla huomenna. Sekin on nähty, että kun loistava asiantuntija ”ylennetään” esimieheksi, on saatu huono esimies ja menetetty hyvä asiantuntija. Kanadalainen kollegani Peter muotoili tämän Petterin periaatteeksi: jokainen ylennetään organisaatiossa, kunnes hän saavuttaa pätemättömyyttensä tason, josta häntä enää onkin vaikea siirtää sen enempää ylös, alas kuin sivullekaan.

Myös pääinvastaiset tapaukset ovat tietysti yleisiä. Aina kumminkin vertaistensa joukosta kohotetulla esimiehellä on alkuun uskottavuusvaikeuksia ja omakohtaisia roolivaikeuksia, joten kestää tovin ennen kuin uudet roolisuhheet toimivat luontevasti. Onkin olemassa vaara, että vertaistensa joukosta nostettu esimies – huolimatta kaikista asioiden, toimintatapojen ja ihmisten tuntemuksestaan – jäät edellisen rooliverkkonsa vangiksi eikä kykene kohottautumaan yläpuolelle asettautuvaan johtajuuteen.

## 3 Oikaisseet johtajat

Oikaisseet johtajat ovat oma lukunsa – omine mahdollisuksineen ja omine vaikeuksineen. Henkilöt, jotka esimerkiksi oman sukutaustansa vuoksi alun

perin kasvatetaan johtamistehtäviin, muodostavat tästä luokasta merkittävän osan. He vältyvät hyvässä ja pahassa uran varren kokemuksista, ja heille pitäisi olla helpompaa asettua jokapäiväisyyksien yläpuolelle kuninkaallisten tavoin. John Kennedyn aikanaan rohkeata sisäpolitiikkaa on selitetty sillä, että hänen ei ollut koskaan tarvinnut hankkia liittolaisia, ja siksi hänellä oli vapaammat kädet kuin yleensä presidentiksi valituilla. Perheyritysten perillisillä on samantapainen tilanne sillä erolla, että perheyritysten johtajuuteen ei yleensä riitä kaiken yläpuolelle asettuva keulakuvana oleminen, vaan omistajajohtajat joutuvat likaamaan kätensä myös lattiataso asioissa. Siksi heitää koulitaan usein tehtävänsä alempien tehtävien ja organisaatioportaiden kautta – seikka joka tuo omat ongelmansa, jos ei heille itselleen, niin ainakin muille.

Mutta myös urallaan kiitäävät henkilöt voivat joskus tavalla tai toisella nousta organisaatiokerrosten ohi. On tapauksia, joissa ylin johto on vasiten heittänyt yhden organisaatiotason syrjään saadakseen vanhan polven sijaan uutta verta, joka on valmiimpaa uusiin toimintatapoihin. Oikaisseet johtajat kohtaavat usein hyväksymisvaikeuksia, ja oikaisemiseen vaaditaan vissiä paksunahkaisuutta. Oikaisseiden johtajien voi olla vaikeaa saada aitoa luottamusta johdettaviltaan, heitä ehkä varotaan ja pidetään enemmän poliittisin keinoin kuin omilla ansioillaan asemaansa nousseina. He kuitenkin tarvitsisivat aivan erityisesti alaistensa luottamusta, koska heillä ei ole tästä organisaatioportaasta omakohtaista kokemusta tai tuntumaa. Aiempaan ylentämistapaansa luottaen he tosin saattavatkin kiinnittää päähuomion oma esimiehensä hoitamiseen ja pitäävät alaisiaan kilpailijoinaan.

#### 4 Luottamushenkilöjohtajat

Yhteisöillä on myös luottamushenkilöjohtajia eli johtajia, jotka äänestystuloksen perusteella on valittu johtamaan ja edustamaan organisaatiotaan määräajaksi. Järjestöissä tämä on yleistä, samoin tietysti poliitikkassa. Ammattijohtajaa valvotaan ylhäältä pään hänen tulostenla perusteella, kun taas luottamushenkilöjohtajaa valvotaan alhaaltapäin hänen jäsenkuntansa tai hänen edustajilta saamansa kannatuksen perusteella. Ammattijohtajalta odotetaan tehokkuutta, luottamushenkilöjohtajuus perustuu demokratiaan.

Historiallisesti demokratia on aika epätavallinen ilmiö. Tehokkain johtamistapa se ei missään nimessä ole, mutta demokratialla on silti vahva puolustuksensa, niin vahva, että sitä pidetään itseisarvona: on parempi että saamme päättää, kuka meitä hallitsee ja miten meitä hallitaan kuin että meitä hallitaan tehokkaan epädemokraattisesti. Demokratiaissa voidaan ilmiselvästi

välttyä diktatuureja paremmin vallan kaikkein pimeimmiltä puolilta, mielivallalta, vainoilta ja legitimoidulta väkivallalta. Sitä paitsi, jos organisaation toiminta-ajatuksena on tehokkuuden sijasta arvoluontoiset asiat, silloin kannattajamääärä onkin käypä mittä. Kaikesta tästä johtuen demokratia on niin hyvä asia, että sen vastavoimatkin tapaavat pukeutua demokratia kaapuun. Kukaan ei tunnustaudu demokratian vastustajaksi.

Luottamushenkilöjohdolta kyllä edellytetään myös tehokkuutta niiden arvojen ajamiseksi, jotka kuuluvat toiminta-ajatukseen. Tätä tehokkuutta ei ole aina helppoa yhdistää valinnan määräaikaisuuteen ja valitsijoiden suosion säilyttämiseen. Niinpä johdolla on suuri houkutus käyttää aikaansa varmistaaakseen valintansa seuraavaksi kaudeksi sen kustannuksella, että keskittyisi toiminta-ajatuksen kannalta olennaisiin kysymyksiin. Voi olla, että ratsun selässä pysyminen vie niin paljon voimia, että sitä ei enää riitää ratsun suunnan ohjaamiseen. Luottamushenkilöjohdolta vaaditaan lyhytjänteisesti äänestäjäkunnalle näkyvää ja sitä tyydyttävää toimintaa. Paljon vaikeampaa on tehdä sellaisia kipeitä ratkaisuja, joiden vaikutukset näkyvät vasta aikojen saatossa, ja silti sellaisiinkin kaikilla organisaatioilla on tarvetta.

Luottamushenkilöjohtajan täytyykin ottaa huomioon organisaatiopolitiittiset voimavirrat. Parhaiten organisoidut kliikit, taitavimmat politikot tai edes enemmistö ei ole aina oikeassa, ja voi olla, että asiantunteva vähemmistö tulee juntatuksi ulos. Kysyy vahvaa johtajuutta asettua intressien yläpuolelle tietäessään vaaleissa olevansa niiden armoilla. Eri tahojen etuhalu mitata ulos omat tavoitteensa suboptimalla kokonaisuutta ilman etujen yläpuolelle asettuvaa kokonaisjohtajuutta ja arvojohtamista on kuitenkin hyvin tavallista tällaisissa organisaatioissa. Huono esimies on sellainen, joka tärkeissäasioissa miettii vain, mitä se vaikuttaa hänen suosioonsa.

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**OSA III:**  
**MITEN MAAILMA MAKAA**



# WHAT MAKES THE WORLD GO AROUND?<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

Organizations and management are supposed to be contingent with their environment. Much attention has been paid to market changes and technological changes. Changes in the macroculture, in the *ethos* of the time, are less visible and their time span is much longer. This paper discusses these longer-term changes.

In a way, the paper is an attempt to understand where we possibly are and how we ever got there. For the purpose, four kinds of turning points are discussed: 1) Shorter and longer business cycles, 2) the turn of the industrial era into the knowledge era, 3) postmodernity and 4) cycles of civilizations.

These turning points do not encounter the daily managerial nor organizational practices. Their long time-horizon may prevent any attention from being given to them. Nonetheless, organizational researchers should be at least aware of them and their influence on organizational life.

## 1 Introduction

We who have lived through the last decade of the last millennium considered it to be a period of unforeseen and unforeseeable changes. The integration of the Western Europe and the disintegration of the Eastern Europe alone were considered epoch-making phenomena, albeit, it is true that people have always regarded their own time as especially dramatic. Even so, it belongs to the normal curiosity of any generation to ponder the nature and special characteristics of its own period even though later generations will assess it differently.

In a way the subject of this paper or the trends of the day and their breakings is just an excuse for a diagnostic and polemic attempt to confront the question: where are we now and how did we ever get wherever we are?

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<sup>1</sup> Presented in the 17<sup>th</sup> Scandinavian Academy of Management Conference in Reykjavik 15.8.2003

There are at least four kinds of trends that have been argued to be breaking contemporarily. 1) Shorter and longer business cycles end and start time and again; 2) The industrial era is turning into the knowledge era; 3) Modern Times is followed by or ended in Postmodernity; 4) and it has been argued that we are going through the decline of the Western Civilization. Let us take a closer look at each of these turning points.

## 2 Business cycles

The slump of the 1990s was the deepest that Finland has ever gone through during peacetime. It was an indication and an outcome of structural, social and economic ruptures. The loss of 25% of the export when the Soviet Union collapsed, a recession in the Western market, and the change of the rules in financial markets were among these. The 20% unemployment could not be mended by traditional means of economic policy. Clearly, politicians and business people in charge were badly prepared for this all. This accentuated the depression even more (Kiander & Vartia, 1994).

By now structures of European and global economy and trade have reshaped themselves. But our thinking and values change at a slower pace. Additionally, it is difficult for us to discern the seeds of new developments from the plethora of information that pours down on us. We have left the post-war world behind us, but we do not know how and by what this vacuum is being filled. This suggests that there is something else in the Great Slump of the early 1990s than just a normal periodic fluctuation in the rate of economic activity. What it could be is the topic of the rest of the paper.

In addition to the normal business cycles (first analyzed by Juglar in 1862) longer economic cycles have been identified. The best known of them are Kondratieff (1984)<sup>2</sup> cycles. Kontratieff collected statistics on commodity prices, interest rates, nominal wages, foreign trade turnover, production and consumption of coal and production of pig iron. This material showed a pattern of fifty years' cycles of an international character. But more important than the length of the cycle is the intrinsic dynamics of the cycles. Innovations accumulate towards the end of a cycle, and the innovations breed the beginning of the next cycle. Kontratieff identified in the middle of the 1930s two such cycles in the Western economic history and a third one that had

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<sup>2</sup> Published 1925 in Russian

begun during the last years of the 19th century. The latter cycle would then have ended during the 1940s.

Then the 1990s would have been the final and declining phase of this fourth cycle. The 1990s certainly was an intense period of innovations in information technology, and now, if this train of thought is correct, we should be in a period of growth based on these innovations. In the contemporary economy, it should be possible to seize these innovations quicker and more intensively and extensively than in the days of agricultural inventions or the Industrial Revolution. Any new cycle, of course, takes place in particular historical conditions. Even the cyclical view does not necessarily mean that the “history repeats itself”.

### 3 The knowledge era

The change of industrial era to the information era is even a longer and more fundamental change than longer business cycles. (Some futurists like Oliver (2000) suggest that we are already entering the bioage). Instead of information era terms like post-industrial era, post-Fordist era, the interaction era, the service era are used just to mention a few (e.g. Bell, 1973, Toffler, 1980). The many names indicate that we know better the era we are leaving than the era we are entering. But irrespective of how we name it, the shift as such is indisputable and irreversible. We are living in the middle of this shift. It is a part of our everyday life, structurally, technologically, economically. It is as fundamental a transformation as was the shift from the agricultural to the industrial era.

In Europe the jobs in the manufacturing industry began to decline in the 1970s (OECD 1986 and 1992). Even service industries have followed suit by automation and reducing the number of jobs. This all has taken place in spite of increases in the volume of production in agriculture, manufacturing industry and services. It is an irrevocable trend, and public measures to increase jobs have been more or less ineffective. Automation has also released people from physical toil and given them more time for self-development and human interaction.

In terms of volume (share of Gross Domestic Product, turnover of companies) industrial mass production exceeds the volume of knowledge intensive business. But value-added, qualitative development, and the growth of special niche products is in the knowledge-intensive field. Particularly, in countries with a high level of education, scarcity of raw materials and high transportation costs of bulky products, high value has more potential than high volume. Their future lies in high value-added, quality and knowledge

intensity. This also goes with a higher price per unit than mass produced industrial goods can ever have. Finland is a prime example of such a country (Nurmi, 1997, 1999). Even traditional manufacturing industries are growing more and more knowledge intensive.

Instead of information we could and had better talk about the era of knowledge or competence. Nations compete with knowledge, and only a nation competitive in competence can attract capital. Probably, the only resource that can be cherished nationally is the infrastructure for learning, education and knowledge (Reich, 1991). Whether this can reduce unemployment in developed economies remains unforeseen, but it is certainly not easy. Another possibility is that the economic growth, produced by a smaller labour force, will be divided in new ways.

Particularly, “the citizen’s pay” has been discussed in Finland. This would mean that every citizen would receive a basic pay by public funds, and then anyone could earn extra pay by means of a normal salary or fee from work. Its financing would not be an overwhelming obstacle, if it would replace the many supports and subsidies that are just hindering entrepreneurship and initiative (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). Or shall we be content with social welfare and television-series, the *panem et circenses* of our time?

Obviously there are no easy answers to these questions. This is where we need to reassess our thinking and values. This confrontation requires far greater political courage than giving support and subsidies to the institutions and practices of yesterdays. It would require political leadership instead of Gallup-democracy or politicians being influenced first and foremost by their monthly popularity ratings. It would not be a great wonder, if these changes could be implemented only as a consequence of a crisis in political thinking.

It would seem that along with globalization representational democracy needs rethinking, if we are to trust democracy at all. It is worth remembering that people who have no democratic rights are living in poor material, social and humanitarian conditions, and that they tend, if allowed, to miss democratic rights and are happy to have them until they encounter the drawbacks and foes of representational democracy. Another thing to remember is that most wars have been initiated by undemocratic rulers.

One scenario is that our concept of democracy would change from emphasizing its representational forms to more immediate forms of democracy or stressing democratic influence on the community level rather than representational democracy on national and international levels.

Another scenario is an increase in organized lobbying or the less organized way of democratic guerilla tactics meaning that some bold people or spontaneous popular movements just pass the representational organs and do

what is supported by most of the people. What is legal is not always felt to be just nor right nor proper. Saying so is, of course, a sacrilege in such a very legalistic country as Finland.

All that can be said about this for the moment is that the representational forms of democracy need serious rethinking for the people to trust it in the world going global. A democratic form that does not rely on the trust of people is an oxymoron. Are we approaching such a condition?

#### 4 Postmodernity

Postmodernism is one more idea that heralds a changing epoch. Postmodernism is an enigmatic concept and very hard to define. Let me quote a definition by one of the most authoritative writers on postmodernism. “The Postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unrepresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unrepresentable” (Lyotard, 1984, 81). This definition is from the easy end. The reader interested in more comprehensive definitions is advised to consult Jameson (1991, ix – x) or Bauman (1992, vii - xiv).

Postmodernism was originally a movement in arts and later it developed into a general philosophy of everything and a method of analysis of anything. It avoids, attacks and deconstructs coherent substance, theories and philosophies and sees them as totalizing discourses. Its rhetoric sounds often nihilistic in its attempts to declare that things are not what we think they are.

Postmodern texts make confusing reading, but as such they reflect the time we live in. They see deconstruction and difference as liberating forces and foresee indeterminacy, fragmentation, distrust of totalizing discourses, discontinuity, instability, even chaos as characteristics of the era we are entering. Is this the *Weltanschauung* of the Postmodern in the way that trust on the reason and the Enlightenment were core values of the Modern?

Postmodern or postmodernity can be taken literally in that it talks about the end of the Modern Times as a period in the Western history. Postmodernity is, then, the period *post* or after what we have called the Modern Times. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the birth of modern science and the

Enlightenment were milestones in the change of the Middle Ages to Modern Times. All this changed thinking and values and relied on trust in the human reason, knowledge, science and education.<sup>3</sup>

The progress of science and its impact on the world as we know it today has been enormous. Yet, now it is asked whether all this made people any happier or the world any better. The twentieth century witnessed unforeseen cruelty, wars, exploitation of people and environmental damage – all this was made possible by science and technology based on science. And it seems that science is of little help in the struggle against social injustice, drugs, crime and other vices of the time. Knowledge has been and is being created by man, but it has escaped his reign and become an independent machine, another Juggernaut, whose blessings and threats are under no one's control. This is, yet, just a sample to show that we begin to have enough distance from the Modern to see its illusions.

Much of new is recycled old or interpretations or even pastiches of what had been created earlier. The Faustian *angst* of knowledge has bred anomie, a vacuum of values and ignorance of what is good and what is bad. As religion and other institutional carriers of morality have eroded, what is left is the moral responsibility of the self-reflective individual (see Bauman, 1996). One consequence is escapism to entertaining and even decadent forms of information. It was a twisted slogan of the service-based economy that we make a living by washing each other's shirts. Is there any chance that we can live by entertaining each other?

Or is the postmodern jargon just a reaction of the present generation against the exaggerations of the former generation? What comes after the Postmodernity, if it is regarded as a period of history? A long period of chaos, another Renaissance of the Humanism, or a return to Faith? We are not in a position to answer these questions now. Indeed, neither Leonardo da Vinci, Isaac Newton nor Martin Luther could think of themselves as incarnations of the Modern spirit.

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<sup>3</sup> The linear periodization of history into the Antique, the Middle Ages and the Modern is in many respects arbitrary, and the polarization of the Middle Ages and the Modern serves the purpose of the present paper only. Besides modernism as an art style is of a later origin or from the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## 5 Cycles of civilizations

The above periodizations are Western, and their difference from the Islamic, African and Asian values remains wide. Fukuyama (1992) was bold enough to assert that the Western civilization is “the end of history” or the end of mankind’s ideological development, as Western liberal democracy is the final and universal form of good human government. But Huntington (1996) argued that only the fundamental nature of the conflicts has changed: While the conflicts used to be economic, ideological and between nations, now they will be clashes of cultures and groups of different civilizations. The most important of these civilizations are the Western, the Islamic and the Chinese civilization. What we know now for sure is that after the Cold War “The World Peace I” did not break out.

Oswald Spengler was the first to put the Western culture in perspective in his monumental morphology of the world history, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. It appeared after the Word War I, and the book reflects the time when it was published. Spengler described the world history in eight cultures. Each of them developed like an organism, having successive periods of growth, heyday, maturity and decline or the Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter, as Spengler chose to call them. Before death each culture becomes a civilization, which – having lost its creativity and ability to renew itself – becomes petrified and defensive to maintain its existence. In this effort, they end up in wars and, finally, to “Caesarism” or the rule of one man.

The name of Spengler’s book comes from his suggestion that the Western culture is close to its final stage of decline (*Untergang*). He might have considered the castle of Euro-, demo- and bureaucracies as well as the new American imperialism in the name of fight against terrorism as desperate death struggles to maintain what we call Western Civilization. All world-wide powers have legitimized their wars in the name of good endeavours like fights against paganism, lower races, capitalists or what have you. There has even been enough hypocrisy to prepare a world-wide war against imperialism and a war for peace!

Spengler estimated in agreement with Toynbee<sup>4</sup> that the age of a civilization is about 1500 years. It is about this time from the collapse of the

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<sup>4</sup> Toynbee with his classification of civilizations (1934, Volume II, 166 – 174) is usually mentioned along with Spengler. Toynbee is not, however, explicit about the future of what he calls the Western Christendom, and, accordingly, does not talk about the predicament or breaks of the turn of the millennium, the subject of the present paper.

Roman Empire and the baptism of Clovis making France the first daughter of the Catholic Church and starting the Christianization of Europe (Tessier, 1964). This is, for sure, much too precise an interpretation of the story called history. But, to interpret Spengler liberally, what Fukuyama called the end of history, might be just the petrifaction of the Western Civilization. Is a society that assumes that the history has ended a society whose history is about to decline, a society whose evolution and dynamics is finished?

Spengler and Huntington strangely resemble each other despite their very different material and also their very different concept of the nature of history. They share the vision about at least the relative decline of the West, and, also, about the potential threats against democracy.

Spengler discusses politics, mathematics, science and religion or what could be called high culture, while Huntington uses social science material (social, political, economic, demographical, military data). For Spengler civilizations emerge, rise and decline according to an internal necessity comparable to laws of nature, whereas Huntington argues for a social theory that predicts what will probably, but not inevitably happen to the Western as well as to other civilizations. What makes the prediction conditional is the possibility for mankind to act to make the prediction not to come true. Spengler presents a philosophy of history and his presentation is intuitive, metaphorical, morphologically describing, even poetic. Where Huntington is a political scientist, Spengler presents the fate of civilizations as the counterpart of causality in nature.

The West is now attempting to discipline the Islam by its overwhelming military might, but it is totally unable to turn the heads of True Muslims in their belief in the righteousness of their Faith and the mission based on the Faith. On the top of all, the Islam world is exploding demographically – and demography is in many ways a very valid predictor. The communitarian Far East, despite its ups and downs, is competing with, in some areas even beating, the West, where the West seemed to have its best competitive advantage, i.e. technological and economic superiority.

Is there any chance that the South could take the role of a dominant civilization? Only the West could make it happen, never by means of a development aid or any other Western support. It could happen, however, if the West in its urge for intensifying competition, wars and excess consumption of energy would destroy its own fragile economy based on the exchange and mutual dependency of actors. What could remain from the ruins of all this, could be the undamaged, agriculturally self-sustaining South.

## 6 Instead of a conclusion

What do we learn from this exercise? Probably that mankind, even though it is influenced by its history, has not learned its deepest borne lessons to understand and act upon them. Probably that all attempts to diagnose the predicaments of today are myopic and reflect what kind of knowledge is contemporarily sustained, stressed and taken in use (Foucault, 1976, 1982).

One thing that pops up is that even though the turning points discussed above refer to very different, even irreconcilable, academic discussions, there is an empirical world behind them. They are not only discourses. We have business cycles, the role of manufacturing industry is decreasing, the belief in the power of enlightenment is not what it was and we know that previous powerful civilizations have declined.

But we do not have adequate means to discern the precise nature of the turning points of history, and we are even less able to foresee what the future holds. Predictions of future have erred time and again. Indeed, there is not even an agreement about the nature of the mechanisms and dynamism of what makes the history happen. Are there laws of human history or historical necessity, does the future unfold itself deterministically, cyclically, dialectically or does the curvilinear Einsteinian concept of time (Tipler & Llewellyn, 1999) apply to human history as well? Are futures inevitable, probable, incidental or downright random? What is the role of human intentions and the free will? Can the future be controlled scientifically, as, for instance, Keynes (1935), seemed to think? Or is history just a story that can at best only be recorded without any particular sense, order or reason behind it? All answers to this kind of questions remain speculative.

Organizational researchers have talked about managerial margin: there are times and issues of wide managerial margin, when management can influence the organization greatly, while, when, the margin is narrow managers need to adapt to what is inevitable (see Nurmi & Darling, 1997). By way of an analogy – admittedly a pompous one – we could speak about the margins of mankind. Nothing can turn back the trend towards globalization, but within this process we can work for the welfare or illfare of people. Similarly, the knowledge era provides opportunities for releasing people from bonds of poverty or to an improved balance between man and his natural environment. But all this can also be used to confine people into new impenetrable castes or to increase the control by the high and mighty. Even though we cannot turn the tides of history at our will, there is a margin within which we have our opportunities for better or for worse.

Or is this just an illusory and dreamy view by an academic writer in his warm attic where the echo is not heard: brothers, it is cold outside! We have

wars, poverty and different kinds of catastrophes with which millions of people have to live every day with little chance but to dream some kind of a turning point in their predicament.

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# PROLOGOMENA TO KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE ORGANISATIONS<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

Researchers on management and organization have always recognized that their particular subject is contingent on macro-level developments. The 1990's have witnessed abrupt changes like the collapse of Soviet Union, the triumph of market economy and the lowering of international barriers. Our world view became to be built after World War II upon 1) the progress of science, 2) the industrial mode of production, 3) the political and economic *status quo* of the nations and 4) collective material values. The article argues that all these four have gone through tumultuous changes in ways that are conducive to reassessments in organization studies.

### 1 "The times, they are a'changing"

Some two decades ago organisational researchers kept repeating that a company is an open system and, as such, it exercises exchange with its environment receiving raw-material, finance, labour etc. as its inputs and giving its intended and unintended products as its outputs. Ten years ago contingency theory had its day, claiming that organisations are dependent on situational factors that reflect changes in the environment. Now we refer directly to markets (as opposed to hierarchies) and competitiveness, but the message has not changed in that organisations are seen to survive and succeed as far as they remain fit with the changing environment. Vanguard companies can affect the environment within some limits, so that others have to react to their actions. Now in the mid-1990's, it sounds trivial to say that companies are dependent on the times and environment. Yet this contingency can be formulated in different ways depending on one's theoretical bent.

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<sup>1</sup> Published in Trames. A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1997, 1, 2, 143-158.

Given that companies are contingent with their environment, and that the early 1990's seem to be a time of most abrupt and discontinuous changes, it is appropriate to ask, how do companies, organisations, management and our thinking about all these reflect the ongoing changes. At the manifest level, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the triumph of market economy, and the lowering of international trade barriers have visibly shaken the world economy, nations, companies, as well as the proverbial man in the street. Obviously we also need to challenge our established views about organisations.

The manifest changes did not appear out of the blue. There are at least four underlying trends that have corroded the thinking, order and structures that had become established during the years since World War II. Our world view became to be built upon 1) the progress of science, 2) the industrial (manufacturing) mode of production, 3) the political and economic *status quo* between nations and 4) collective material values. All four have to be reassessed. If organisations depend on their environment, they cannot help being affected by this tumult. Organisational inertia slows down their ability to react quickly; then although many organisations have gone through big shuffles, the greatest changes are likely still to come. The present paper deals with the above four environmental changes as regards their repercussions in organisations.

## **2        The shift in the philosophy of science**

Newtonian physics did not only mean a big leap forward in physics, but it was also part and parcel of the transition from the Middle Ages to Modern Times. As the mechanical world view was able to predict and explain more and more of the physical world, it began to establish itself as the model of all science. It was thought that as the most advanced science physics preceded the world view that less advanced sciences and even arts would reach by means of cumulative research and knowledge.

In research on human subjects this mechanistic-materialistic idea began to take shape about a hundred and fifty years ago. Ranke (1824:iv-viii ) as a historian and Comte (1830-1842) as a sociologist are mentioned as the first in the humanities and social sciences to have adopted this model that came to be called positivism after Comte. It is not quite easy to fix the time of its arrival in organisation studies. But certainly Frederick Taylor, whom most researchers regard as the father of the field, explicitly applied the idea of contemporary physical sciences to organisations and organising in his writings in 1903 (Shop Management), 1911 (Scientific Management) and 1912

(Testimony). Later empirical research, statistical methods and the influence of behavioural sciences established positivism as the mainstream of organisational research. There were influential exceptions, however, including Harvardian case-studies with their pragmatic and German *Betriebswirtschaftslehre* with its philosophical underpinnings.

When organisation studies turned scientific according to the positivistic model, the hegemony of mechanics in physics began to shake. It was observed in nuclear physics that matter, or its particles, had wave properties: the wave model that was used to explain light and sound could be applied to particles as well. This led to quantum theory and its revolutionary consequences in the history of ideas. Further, deterministic thinking gave way to stochastic thinking. Energy was shown to be a function of mass. From this, the force field view of matter was borne: according to this, the mechanical view had to be complemented by a process and interactionistic view, which is at the same time conflicting and complementary to the mechanical view. This was succeeded by relativistic thinking according to which objective properties of matter needed also properties of the subject for an adequate description of the physical world. Classical Newtonian mechanics became complemented - but not replaced - by an interactionistic process view (Capra 1981, Nurmi 1989).

In the social sciences positivism became to be seriously challenged towards the end of the 1960's. Kuhn's (1970) seminal book on the change of scientific paradigms in natural sciences was of paramount importance to social sciences. In organisation studies positivism was vehemently attacked and research that was loosely based on the theory of action, action research, ethnomethodology, hermeneutic *verstehen* and similar approaches began to abound. Where positivism tries to explain organisations on the basis of the invisible hand of the market and endemic laws of organisation (e.g. the iron law of oligarchy by Michels 1915), the action based view emphasises the visible hand of management and other actors and subjects of organisation, whose intentions shape organisations and their behaviour. These two views can be seen as being at the same time both conflicting and complementary. Like modern physics, the organisational reality is dualistic in the sense that properties of objects and subjects are needed for an adequate understanding. Positivistic explanations and hermeneutic understanding have their proper role in the field.

In organisational research good grounds for action research can be envisaged. Organisations are created by men for men and they reflect human intentions in all that they do. They do not obey the necessity of the laws of nature, but they are moved by decisions of human beings. Organisations are agents of goal-oriented action directed towards the future instead of only being products of the past. Organisational structures, systems and behaviour are influenced by interpretations of their subjects at least as much as objective

conditions as such. Organisation is also a political process, which implies that power differences of the subjects explain more than statistical averages or other indices of the people in the organisation. Organisations cannot be described adequately by observing them as objects from the outside only, but interpretations of its subjects must be understood as well.

The above considerations are of a special relevance to knowledge intensive organisations. Their production process is more dependent on human than physical or monetary capital compared with industrial manufacturing of goods. Knowledge organisations are created by human beings for human beings. They work to fulfil intentions of these actors instead of being predetermined by forces independent of human beings. True enough, they depend on business cycles, but even then, they are more flexible in finding new niches than industrial machineries can ever be; converting the latter into new business lines has turned out to be very time, money, and patience consuming. The margin of the subjects is contingent on environmental factors even in knowledge organisations, but it is the subjects' interpretation of the situation that mediates this effect.

Clearly there has been an identifiable change in organisation studies from a positivistic paradigm towards emphasising the subjects and actors in organisations. In other words, researchers have been more interested in what happens within the organisations than in limitations set by outside factors. Economists have traditionally been more interested in the latter, but recently organisational economics has provided conceptual instruments (Williamson 1989) for the internal description of organisation that seem to be pertinent to knowledge organisations as well (Lehtimäki 1993).

Newtonian mechanics has affected our world view for centuries and even after its influence on physics had diminished. In the same way, the breach of positivism and the march of a new and still ambiguous view in social science are likely to resonate for a long time in ways that we are not able to foresee. It would not be a big surprise, if models from biological sciences would have more to say in the organisation studies in the future (e.g. Hannan & Freeman 1977). One more possibility is that humanities will strike back to balance the world view based on natural sciences.

### 3 From the industrial to the information era

The best known author on the power shift from the industrial to the information era is, of course, Alvin Toffler (1990), though he is by no means alone in discussing the subject (see e.g. recent monographs by Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott and Trow 1994 and Stehr 1994). The

fact is that we are living in the middle of this shift. It is a part of our everyday life, structurally, technologically, economically. It is as fundamental a transformation as was the shift from the agricultural to the industrial era.

This shift is taking place at a different pace in different parts of the world. Its consequences are none the less different. The OECD-countries are setting the pace, but even their reactions display a wide range of differences. The USA has proclaimed the information highway as central to the economic policy. France subsidised Minitel for the same purpose. Yet, in most countries business has spearheaded the development. Governments have been slow to react to the shift, and they have been lured to subsidise sun-set -industries in the name of employment without envisaging the future. It is true that in terms of volume (share of the Gross Domestic Product, turnover of companies) industrial mass production exceeds the volume of knowledge intensive business. This, however, disguises what is the case with value-added, qualitative development, and the growth of special niche products - the latter development is seen even within giant corporations that have grown around mass production (Reich 1991). Particularly in countries with a high level of education, scarcity of financial resources, and high transport costs of bulky products, high-value has more potential than high-volume. Their future lies in high value-added, quality, substance value and knowledge intensity. This also goes with a higher price per unit than mass produced industrial goods can ever have.

The alarming unemployment in Europe is a substantial part of this shift. It cannot be managed by old means, legacies from the industrial era. In the OECD-countries the number of industrial jobs began to decline in the mid-1970's (OECD 1986 and 1992, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 1981). Service industries and knowledge intensive industries are labour intensive. But they have not created as many new jobs as manufacturing has released. The depression of the early 1990's has been contributing to this. It is also true that it is not easy to retrain an industrial worker into a knowledge intensive job. Transitions are not easy for people who go through them. It may be too sombre a view that it will take a new generation to adapt to the changes. But there is no return to the golden age of smokestack industries either, and their supporters are a kind of latter-day Luddites. Subsidies for declining industries are, in fact, optional costs for investments in knowledge and knowledge based entrepreneurship. This kind of protectionism can slow down the change, but it cannot prevent it from happening. Indeed, as a consequence of protectionistic measures the shift will eventually hit harder, when the time comes.

In the present paper the economic and technological shift from the industrial to the information era is dealt with only as far as organisational

imperatives are concerned. Neither the roots nor the consequences of the shift are discussed in detail. The nature of the shift is all but clear, but the shift as such is a fact. At least four kinds of organisational consequences can be listed:

In the first place, the shift affects each and every organisation by making it possible to automate production, administration, and other functions to a greater extent than was ever possible by means of mechanical automation. This is an ongoing development in all organisations.

In the second place, the information component is replacing solutions of mechanical technology even within physical products (Davis & Botkin 1994). A car and a mobile telephone are cases in point - in fact, they contain computers. Product development in knowledge-based industries implies a never-ending investment in knowledge, whereas manufacturing the products is simplified by means of automation. The information era does not, of course, mean that manufacturing industries or even agriculture will disappear, although they will employ less people. On the contrary, manufacturing provides a lever for knowledge intensive business and knowledge-based companies just as manufacturing developed by making tools and machines for agriculture.

In the third place, information technology is shaping organisational structures by allowing a wider span of control, flatness of organisations and looser structures. This, in turn, is conducive to a greater degree of decentralisation, which cuts middle layers and makes organisations flatter (cf. Gorbaxani & Whang 1991, Løwendahl and Revang 1995). Organisations are changing from structures to networks.

In the fourth place, and this is what interests us most, there is growing a particular species of knowledge intensive organisations. Their raw-material is information, their production process is refining information to knowledge or wisdom, their energy is the creativity vested in their personnel, their service is knowledge of added value for their customers. There is a wide range of knowledge organisations, and typologies have been constructed on the basis of the degree of knowledge vs. capital intensity (Nurmi, Kontkanen, Lehtimäki and Viitanen 1991). Of course, there have been knowledge companies for ages: research, education, training, books, newspapers, magazines, entertainment, audio-visual communication and many other forms of information processing have been exercised before the term information era was coined. The point though is that until recently these fields have not had the development potential that is expected from them in order to lift us into a new phase of development.

All of this has major implications regarding the nature of organisations. Manufacturing industry and commerce are providing fewer and fewer jobs, whereas knowledge intensive industries have a practically limitless potential

for employment. Jobs in this sector do not just spring up, but they must be created by human entrepreneurship. Organisation means a division of labour. In this regard knowledge organisations give rise to problems and possibilities that are peculiar to them. As a consequence of automation the division of labour in industrial manufacturing of goods becomes simpler and mechanistic<sup>2</sup>, while the managing and leading of people in knowledge organisations cannot be based on mechanistic departmentation and hierarchy in the way that traditional organisation doctrines have taught us. The human side of organisation, creativity and interpersonal interaction are keys to the success of knowledge companies in a more genuine sense than in the lip-service "people-are-our-most-important-resource". Knowledge organisations are loosely-coupled (Weick 1976), they strive to be predictable, but they are by the same token unstable and buffered against uncertainty (Kontkanen 1994). Their strategy cannot be managed from top to bottom, but it emerges as an outcome of the encounter of strategic intentions and the resource base of the organisation (Viitanen 1994). How to manage people, whose job it is to acquire, process, and sell knowledge, in such a way that goals of the organisation and those of the personnel support each other to a satisfactory degree? In knowledge organisations people are the subjects, the energy and the resource that are difficult to replace due to the tacit knowledge vested in them. They are also the greatest business risks arising from individual and organisational crises (Suominen 1994:99-104 and Lähteenmäki 1995). The perennial philosophical question about the relationship between man and organisation, between the individual and the collectivity, is a most practical managerial issue in knowledge intensive organisations.

Knowledge is an inexhaustible raw-material and its potential for processing and its value-added is practically endless. The consumption of knowledge will meet limits, and already now there are signs of information pollution. Yet, for an inventive person only the sky is the limit in knowledge business. Product know-how combined with market know-why can create and modify demand almost infinitely.

Knowledge intensive business gives a new impetus for entrepreneurship (Pinchot and Pinchot 1993). The economies of scale are not obvious in knowledge business, but it can be started with a narrow product-market mix and a small volume. Quality, customisation, fast movements, flexibility and

<sup>2</sup> The strategic management of declining industries in global competition is far from simple, however, but it does not concern us here.

uniqueness are competitive edges, and this is where small can be beautiful. Barriers of entry into knowledge business are lower than in manufacturing. Information favours new kind of entrepreneurship, part-time employment and free-lance work. Even big companies need to decentralise their knowledge processing departments into small units, and, yet, it is difficult for them to seize the core competence of the unit for the strategic advantage of the company due to interdepartmental barriers. Learning network is the proper way of organising knowledge business within companies, between companies, even the economy as a whole (Lessem 1993).

High technology calls for its counterbalance high touch in human interaction. The latter is easier now than it was in an era, when most people had to spend most of their time and energy to satisfy their material needs. As manufacturing of goods is now done by machines, people are released from physical work and have more time for self-development and human interaction. The depression in the early 1990's, the defensiveness that it rouses, old habits of thinking, and regulations belonging to the past, all of these, may prevent us from seeing that additional consumption of material goods - although it increases economic growth - does not bring along a better quality of life for most people in the developed economies of the West. The point is that to maintain and enhance its standard of living, a nation has to add to the value of the world economy.

Technological development has cut jobs, but it has created new ones, too. Still the leap from one technology to another is a painful change for many people. For instance, distance work has not advanced to the extent that technology would allow. One reason is that it does not satisfy interaction needs of many people. But the need and possibility for human interaction creates demand for new services as well. Entertainment, adult education, quality circles and many other "interaction businesses" have increased of late. Self-development seminars of different kinds have grown fast even during slumps; they are even replacing formal education. Besides, interaction is inside knowledge organisations a (or perhaps the) most important energy sparkle and instigation for individual and organisational learning. Core competence is borne out and grows where the resources of the company and the needs of the customers interact.

#### 4 International integration and division of labour

A megatrend that everybody sees with his own eyes is the internationalisation. Even those who operate in the home-market hear this trend knocking at their door. But increasingly companies are actively seeking markets outside the

national borders, as the domestic markets for their products become saturated. International and transnational corporations have grown into major players in world-wide business. This is a global development, but for the time being, it is accelerating especially rapidly in Europe. The European Union has an economic emphasis, and it was created for the express purpose of establishing a common market within its boundaries. In addition to the economic aspect, "Euro" has become a prefix and slogan for endeavours in many other fields to harmonise national policies. Despite all attempts at integration, it is and remains an insistent feature of "Euroculture" that Europe remains a tapestry of national and regional cultures that never mingle in a complete harmony. Within the European Union there is a never-ending conflict and dialogue between forces directed towards integration and forces that give prominence to national and regional identities. Both of these forces need to be recognised in order to understand the shaping of the Union. Nevertheless, the common market is working towards increased division of labour, and making national protectionism more and more difficult. It follows therefore that companies can only thrive on the basis of their competitive advantage.

Also the political order that was established in Europe during the post-war years has crumbled. West European integration and East European disintegration are simultaneous processes that are felt most intensely in the countries that were on the border between the two. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a kind of a "black hole" that was felt in the countries whose economy and politics were dependent on the Kremlin. They lost their Eastern markets, but, in their new orientation, they are handicapped by having lost competitiveness in the West during the years that they traded with the Soviet Union. On the other hand Russia and the other former communist countries have a huge demand for know-how. In knowledge intensive business, political risks are much smaller than in business where foreign direct investment is needed. Financing may require international arrangements. Germany has gained experience in this within the country (Glötz and Lodensack 1995), which facilitates operations across its border in the East.

Take Finland as an example of the above developments. The country is situated as a northern outpost of Europe and between Sweden and Russia, which is in transition from communism. Finland's best known renewable resources are forests and the high level of education, while the scarcity of finance and the long distance (meaning high transport costs of bulky products) to Central Europe are handicaps to internationalisation. The forest industry has been the leading sector in export earnings and in many other ways (Lilja, Räsänen and Tainio 1991), but the electronic, metal and chemical industries have grown in importance. The export products of the forest industry are mainly those of chemical-wood processing (pulp, paper, cardboard etc.); i.e.

they are capital intensive, they do not create employment, their transport costs are high, their value-added is low compared with the potential in mechanical and particularly biotechnological wood-processing. The Finnish currency was devalued many times, last time in 1991, and as a consequence, the exports grew favourably, company profits were high, but at the same time the unemployment rose close to 20% of the labour force. The devaluation of currency is not possible in the new Europe. New thinking in forest industry is needed to increase the value-added extracted from Finnish forests.

In the years to come the chemical wood-processing industry had better invest in manufacturing paper in Europe close to its market, and in the raw-material of the future, i.e. recycled paper. Know-how in chemical wood-processing has been developed in Finland and it can be exported with a value-added greater than that of paper. Mechanical wood-processing has an under-utilised potential for high value-added products, but capitalising on this requires a much better international market know-why than Finnish companies of the field have had in the past. Biotechnology has, however, the highest potential. Xylitol-products have set an example. There are practically limitless biotechnological possibilities for processing wood into high value products, but efforts in research and development and in international marketing - perhaps in the form of strategic alliances - are needed to boost the industry.

The point is that competitive knowledge-based and knowledge intensive business can be built on national resources and the accumulated experience gained in processing them. It must be combined with know-why of the needs of the customers. In exporting know-how and knowledge intensive products, a much better understanding of the customers' culture is needed than in exporting manufactured goods. In the latter the customer is often seen as an object of marketing operations, whereas in knowledge intensive projects the customer is an active subject in producing the final application. In the knowledge intensive business, the mutual learning and synergy between the selling and the buying partner is concomitant to success. The buyer learns product know-how, but it is as important for the exporter to learn know-why of internationalisation, which can be transferred further to other projects, customers and products. This kind of learning is a decisive competitive edge in sustaining internationalisation. Where the know-how and know-why meet, there you can create core competencies that are difficult to copy, as the core competencies are in the last analysis vested in people and they cannot be cloned.

Indeed, there are no longer "national" products, companies nor, indeed, economies. Probably, the only resource that can be cherished nationally is the infrastructure for learning, education and knowledge (see Reich 1991 for the development of this argument). A national knowledge base can attract

investors in developed economies in a healthier way than investments in cost competitive businesses. It does not make sense that OECD-countries would compete against the lesser developed economies with cheap labour and other factors of cheap production (Krugman 1994). Rather they had better develop niches of their own in the global market place. A national knowledge base that can be applied in the international arena takes decades to develop, it cannot be copied and it cannot be transferred as easily as financial and physical resources. Knowledge as a resource must be exercised for its maintenance and development, and it does not wear out in use in the way that physical resources do.

Europe cannot be a fortress, but it is and, it will remain, a partner in the international division of labour. As a matter of fact, European integration has been a reaction to the challenge from the USA and Japan. A global division of labour is taking place. While the hegemony of the manufacturing industries has moved to areas that were a few decades ago called underdeveloped, knowledge based industries provide the potential for OECD-countries. The USA is on the way to this: While many of its traditional industries have suffered from serious set-backs, knowledge based industries have mushroomed and attract considerable investment.

The shift to the information society and globalisation are parallel processes and they accelerate each other. Technologically, we can live in "real time" globally, but there are many political, institutional and individual barriers for this to come true. As the competitive advantage of manufacturing is moving to Asia and Latin America, and as the future of agricultural products could be in Africa, it would seem that there is an unprecedented potential for a global division of labour between countries and companies and within international companies. It is not, of course, as simple as that. Division of labour makes regions more vulnerable to distant catastrophes - though, by the same token, this very condition might compel them to global co-operation instead of warfare. Protectionistic measures are not so hard to understand seen from the viewpoint of national and regional advantages or the everyday life of millions of people (Ramirez 1995) who are going through these deeply influencing and painful transitions. The gulf between the affluent North and the much poorer South is well-known and acknowledged. While the iron curtain between the East and the West has been raised, the economic gulf is wide open and dividing Europe. Neither zero-sum nationalism nor neomercantilism can solve these problems. Amidst all this muddle, the trend towards globalisation is irreversible, although we do not know what kinds of processes, developments, and tumults it will bring along.

## 5 The value shift

Do people change? Biologically, human beings have not changed since the last mutations or during the time of the written history of man. Yet, the people in an agricultural society behaved differently from people in an industrial society. Today we can observe differences in the social behaviour and values in different cultures, particularly outside the Western culture. It is plausible that the shift from the industrial to the information era cannot help touching our values.

A part of these value changes are imperatives of the structural social change. People adopt them in order to survive the changing nature of work, just as they learnt to work in factories in the industrial era. But another set of changes releases men and provides them with new opportunities in the new information and interaction highways.

I wrote about this subject in 1984, and then I felt ill at ease, as values were much more difficult to treat than the scientific, economic and technological transformation - now, I feel even more confused. With hindsight, my view at that time reflected an optimism in the information era. It is apparent that values have not changed to the supposed direction. Casual observation suggest that values have settled down at the material level reflecting the industrial era rather than moved towards a post-industrial pattern. The breakthrough and power of the market economy seems, on the surface at least, rather to have highlighted material values in the OECD-countries and even more so in the former socialist countries - though it could have been thought that market economy would release material resources for a more spiritual use. Many individuals have resorted to material values due to the increased unemployment and economic insecurity - although it had been visioned that the value of work would decrease as people could get, if necessary, their subsistence by means other than working for a salary. But values under a threat tend to be crystallised.

Values have been measured by means of value inventories (e.g. Schwartz 1992 and Puohiniemi 1993, 1995), but to the author's knowledge, studies comparing values in western cultures comprehensively enough have not been conducted. The investigations that have been conducted suggest that values have changed relatively little of late (Puohiniemi 1995). The hypothesis has been put forward that values take form early in socialisation and that they do not change easily. A value shift would take place only after the age cohort that has grown into the world of the 1990's has entered in the societal arena. According to this, value differences between generations will be greater than those between nations. Value change would then be the slowest component of transformation, and values slow down structural changes. During an economic

depression many people turn defensive and stick to the values they have grown into and close their eyes to the insecure and even fearful future. Nonetheless, values cannot remain unchanged for good amidst the changes in the nature of work and the international division of labour. Perhaps, values do not change continuously, but in discrete quantum leaps. What lies ahead, when and how values will change is most difficult to foresee.

It is likely that the collective, particularly national basis of values, is breaking. This would be a parallel development to the diminishing economical weight of nation states (see Ohmae 1995 for a cogent account). And it would also be in line with post-modernism, which sees deconstruction and difference as liberating forces and foresees indeterminacy, fragmentation, distrust of totalising discourses, discontinuity, instability, self-referential structures, even chaos as characteristics of the era we are entering (see Cooper and Burrell 1988 and Berg 1989 for reviews from the perspective of organisational research). On the other hand, these are basically Western phenomena and their difference from Islamic, African and Asian values is very, very wide.

Even if the national basis of values is breaking, other collective sources may take their place. Mass media are unifying the world. People are listening to more distant drummers. But the media are also grouping people in new ways. In times of rapid changes, the generation gap between people is growing. Young people adopt values via new interactive electronic media; older people may find trouble even in learning to use them. Another dividing factor is emerging between professional groups. Even though the proletariat of the world never united the way that Marx prophesied, today's knowledge workers and brokers of symbols live, move, and interact globally sharing values with their colleagues all around the world, but growing apart from the local farmers, service personnel, and blue-collar workers of their own nation. Knowledge, knowledge business and knowledge workers also operate as carriers of values. And finally minority groups and individual experiences as sources of values may make the future value map more like a mosaic than a drawing with contours and a profile.

Carl Rogers described the person of tomorrow a decade and a half ago (1980:351-352). Let me end with a quotation from him:

*"Process persons.* They are keenly aware that the one certainty in life is change - that they are always in a process, always changing. They welcome this risk-taking way of being and are vitally alive in the way they face change.

*Anti-institutional.* These individuals have an antipathy for any highly structured, inflexible, bureaucratic institution. They believe that institutions should exist for people, not the reverse.

*The authority within.* These persons have a trust in their own experience and a profound distrust of external authority. They make their own moral judgements, even openly disobeying laws that they consider unjust.

*The unimportance of material things.* These individuals are fundamentally indifferent to material comforts and rewards. Money and material status symbols are not their goal. They can live with affluence, but it is in no way necessary to them. - - -

The winds of scientific, social and cultural change are blowing strongly. They will envelope us in this new world, this world of tomorrow, which I have tried to sketch. Central to this new world will be persons, the persons of tomorrow whom I have described".

Said Carl Rogers in 1980. Is this idealism? Perhaps. But in times ahead we need idealism void of illusions and realism void of cynicism as John F. Kennedy in one of his famous speeches declared.

## 6 Conclusion

A treatise on shift and transition is necessarily of a conditional, indefinite, and uncertain nature. Predictions of the future have erred time and again. In order to learn about social and economic development it is more instructive to learn about the mechanisms and dynamisms of change than to attempt to describe presumed states in the change process. In this paper the breakthrough of a new philosophy of science, the economic and technological transformation, globalisation and value shift are regarded as fundamental forces that are shaping the industrial societies into an information intensive era. This raises the question: How do knowledge intensive organisations differ from industrial organisations? It is the latter whose traces dominate our organisational thinking. These prolegomena do not address themselves to this question, but reference is made to other publications of the Research Unit on Knowledge Organisations of the Turku School of Economics and Business Administration (Kirjavainen 1996, Kontkanen 1994, Lehtimäki 1993, 1996, Lehtimäki, Kontkanen and Nurmi 1991, Nurmi 1986, Nurmi, Kontkanen, Lehtimäki and

Viitanen 1992, Viitanen 1992). This article delineates macro-factors that evoked the issue.

We are living through an era of economic and technological transition - there is no doubt about this. The philosophy of science has gone under such a paradigmatic shift that it is very hard to imagine a return to an earlier phase. Globalisation is proceeding step by step, sometimes taking back a step taken, but the direction of the change is irreversible. There are signs of a value shift, but it is difficult to distinguish the fads of the day from fundamental transitions - collective values seem to be the slowest change factor.

In this article it is assumed that the economic transition - including both a technological and a societal component - is primary so that it will, in due course, influence values of people. This view has been advanced by thinkers as different as Karl Marx and Alvin Toffler among many others. The link is not, however, a deterministic one. It is a dialectical process with manifold and intricate loops of feedback and interaction. People can influence the process, its content and speed, but they cannot prevent it from happening nor turn its direction very many degrees. The intentions of the subjects, the "free will" so to speak, act within the limits of economic and technological possibilities.

The economic and technological possibilities build up a kind of "reality bubble" around the values and intentions of people. The intentions can be materialised inside the bubble, outside the bubble there is the world of utopias. The size of the bubble varies at different times, and it is at its largest at times of great transformations and crises - they are like visitation periods for mankind, during which the choices that are made shape or even turn history. Looking back in history, it is not too difficult to identify this kind of periods, but it is most difficult for contemporary people - myopic in their present predicament - to distinguish manageable options from utopias.

Organisational researchers have talked about managerial margin: there are times and issues of a wide managerial margin, when management can influence the organisation greatly, while, when the margin is narrow, managers need to adapt to what is inevitable. By way of an analogy - admittedly a pompous one - we could speak about the margins of mankind. Nothing can turn back the trend towards globalisation, but within this process we can work for the welfare or illfare of people. Similarly, the information era provides opportunities for releasing people from bonds of poverty, ignorance and tyrannies or for confining people to new impenetrable castes. Knowledge intensive organisations are micro laboratories about co-operation, division of work, and management in the knowledge intensive world of the future.

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# **COMPETITION, COOPERATION, DIVISION OF LABOUR<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

Competition is high on the agenda and rhetoric of the economic discussion of the day. This is not entirely without a pretense. The present paper tries to rehabilitate cooperation and particularly its special and organized form, viz. division of labour. It is argued that the bonds born out of cooperation and division of labour are even more important than competition for the well-being of nations, companies and, in the last resort, for the man and woman of the street.

**KEYWORDS:** Competition, cooperation, division of labour

Competition increases efficiency and effectiveness, makes the world, the economies, the companies and people better. The customer is the King, as s/he can make the suppliers compete for his or her favours and choose what is the best for the customer. This is how the rhetoric for competition goes. Competitiveness has become an all-authorizing concept, a kind of a Molok's mouth, which can never be satisfied, as there are always more cost competitive countries and companies. Competition is globalized, and weak nations and companies will be swept away like many biological species have been swept away to give a living space for species that have been stronger and more adaptable to their environment. There is no end nor winners in the competition, as nothing fails like success.

It has been argued that competition is human nature. According to this view, the natural selection has made man what he is today in the Darwinistic competition for the survival of the fittest. In the beginning, man could not have survived as a species alone in his fight against nature. Now that nature is

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<sup>1</sup> Presented in the 18th Scandinavian Academy of Management Conference in Århus 18.8.2005.

tamed, submitted, even exploited by man, there is no reason for competing with nor particularly against nature. So, man's competition has turned into competition against other people or groups of people. Is this evidence of man's biological drive for competition (see Morris, 1967)?

Can anyone challenge such a powerful concept as competition? It is as axiomatic as God in Christianity or the authority of the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union. But the two turned out to be more vulnerable than anybody could think during their heyday.

Adam Smith is considered the greatest prophet of market economy and economic liberalism. He wanted freedom of economic activities instead of the mercantilist regulation. But according to him the wealth of nations would not come true by way of everyone competing against everyone else, but by way of *division of labour* and economic exchange, i.e. by way of cooperation that people would consider mutually rewarding. Freedom would make the division of labour possible, and this would increase the wealth of nations. The actors in a free economy would specialize where they would have what came to be called comparative advantage. The economic freedom would lead to a division of labour and economic integration that would increase the well-being of all concerned.

This idea has been part and parcel in the recent endeavours towards economic cooperation, integration and division of labour by the World Trade Organisation and European Union. This kind of international division of labour cannot take place without friction nor without losers. But in the long run, it will lead to a general increase in welfare. The present China, India and Mexico phenomena are manifestations of this development. In the beginning, companies move to countries with cheap labour, and unemployment will increase in the developed economies. But in the end, all this will increase the welfare in the developing countries and drive the developed countries to specialize on higher value-added production, where, instead of the price, quality and know-how make the competitive advantages. Still, it is not difficult to understand arguments for protectionist measures, as they may help the lives of millions of people for some time at least (see Ramirez, 1995). Besides, the economic globalization has not got a parallel nor a counterpart in other potential spheres of globalization (cf, Soros, 1998).

It is a kind of illusion to see the countries with cheap labour as competitors. We had better see here international division of labour. The division of labour is not a zero-sum game, but all participants can benefit from it. It also increases bonds between the concerned parties. We seldom come to think that international trade is an important peacemaker. When Germany exchanges its financial and other expertise with oil from Russia, it is much less likely that

the two countries will make war against each other. This holds true for the European Union in general, and it is much better to let the politicians disagree and quarrel in their meetings than in wars between nations.

The willingness of companies to compete is not as high in business practice as in the corporate rhetoric. In reality, companies try to avoid competition. Whenever there are two or more restaurants in the same quarters, they do not compete with the same concept but differentiate themselves from each other with their products and service concepts. As a rule, companies try to make their own niches or product-market mixes to differentiate themselves from others. Companies would be willing to agree to cultivate their common good to the extent that legal measures and controlling bodies have been needed to safeguard competition.

In everyday speech, competition means price competition or cost-effectiveness. Cost leadership as a strategic option became influential by Porter (1980), and it caught a widespread acclaim among corporate people particularly during difficult times. It is much nicer to talk about cost-effectiveness as the corporate strategy than about cutting costs and sacking people. The latter has had to be done in many companies, but it was not a deliberate strategic option but simply an operative measure compelled by recession. Porter (1996) has tried to correct misunderstandings of his earlier article. It should be self-evident that cost-effectiveness can never be a competitive advantage for Finland nor Scandinavia. These countries are handicapped by costs of distance, energy and salaries in the international market place, and these costs can be overcome only by high value-added business (conducted with due consideration of costs, of course.)

In subcontracting there is an interplay between cooperation and competition. This is usually based on the dominating power of one actor that can make its subcontractors compete. Wal-Mart has got a dominating role in the American consumer production this way, and similar developments take place in European merchandizing. One of Nokia's success factors has been its ability to make its subcontractors compete.

There may be an intense competition inside companies. There are companies where every employee competes with every other employee. There are cases where this 'dog-eat-dog' competition has been used as a crude method of downsizing. But good customers have been lost in this, customers that had appreciated and were willing to pay for long-term service. This kind of brutish competition inside a company is extremely stressing, and the kind of short-term efficiency that may come from it does not materialize in long-term effectiveness. Trust and cooperation of personnel actually make up a sustainable competitive advantage. Trust within a company is of a great importance, in customer relations it is necessary.

Increasing division of labour demands increasing trust and confidence. In customer relations it is necessary, and the loss of trust is difficult or downright impossible to correct. When we eat in a restaurant, fly by an aeroplane, or go to a dentist, we actually trust that the cook, pilot or dentist is reliable and capable and willing to supply us what we ordered. Gustafsson (2002) reports about the quintessential role of trust in long-term international projects. In the main, trust is there, and when it is lost, lots of damage will follow. So, when a Finnish telecommunications operator fired its people in customer service, there was a record fleeing of customers from the operator to its competitors. Competition belongs to the managerial rhetoric, but trust and cooperation are intangible bonds keeping the company and its customers together and they become visible in drastic ways only when they are lost.

Is an outside enemy needed for a good internal cooperation, as when internal cooperation is a competitive advantage in the market place? Some rulers of nations can use potential outside security threat to keep their popularity ratings high. This kind of unanimity tends to be temporary, unless it leads to a working division of labour. A well-developed division of labour gives appreciation and prestige to all its participants as experts in their fields. They serve their network, and they have no need to beat others for showing their superiority. Division of labour creates bonds between all in the network.

There are many suppliers even in the division of labour. If there would not be a competition between the suppliers, monopolies could arise with economic inefficiency, concentration of power, corruption and other well-recorded problems of monopolies. Even the most sophisticated division of labour does not delete competition. The argument here is just that it is improper to glorify competition as the omnipotent reason for the well-being and the wealth of nations and its citizens. Competition has its costs as well. Many of them can be overcome by division of labour. Besides, a complete competition in the markets is as much of an illusion and utopia as complete communism ever was.

Cooperative movement is an interesting mode of corporate governance to enhance, well – cooperation. There are cases when a cooperative of customers has been taken to the stock exchange with the result that the company has lost its interest in customers except for snatching short-term profits from them for the new shareholders. Cooperative companies have not been winners in the recent storms of business. Troberg (2000) showed, however, that a cooperative form may be advantageous for knowledge-intensive business by decreasing transaction costs.

Anthropologists – Mead, 1937, as the most prominent of them – have found evidence of societies, where competition has been negatively sanctioned and cooperation highly valued. This has been necessary for small communities, as nobody could manage alone in them. But for a developed division of labour a minimum size of the market is needed. Japan is not a little country, and, yet, its economy is based on internal cooperation and division of labour rather than on competitive home markets. Japanese culture cultivates minimization of competition (Benedict, 1946). This is said to derive from rice as the traditional staple food, whose cultivation demanded cooperative effort. But even today, Japan is short of all other resources except human resources, so the human resources must have been pulled together. As a result Japan has been able to compete with the West in what has been the Western strength, viz. economic and technological efficiency.

Historically, the Finnish economic growth and development has been based on cooperation, agreements, consensus, even on avoiding mutual competition (Ahvenainen, Pihkala & Rasila, 1982). So, the Finnish forest companies got internationalised by way of joined export organizations. In the labour market collective agreements have set the pace. In agriculture joint voluntary work was common e.g. in harvesting. Consensus has been a key word in politics and economic policy. These joint efforts have no doubt helped to build up a modern welfare society on the northern edge of the habitable world. Later Finns got from the West not only Coca-Cola, hamburgers and pop-idols, but also an increased competitive knack. In the European Union a small open economy has little alternatives but to adapt to this development.

The Western competitive culture easily crushes more communitarian cultures. This is what happened to many utopian experiments in the British Columbia, in South America and on the east coast of the Czar's Russia, when the 20<sup>th</sup> century was young and believed in its dreams. The experiments went under like so many other dreams and experiments of the century. One of them was an accident called communism – even it had originally also idealistic and utopian objectives about the good cooperation and peace among all the people. But the communist societies were not built on a division of labour in a free society, but on centrally planned cooperation in iron-clad command economies. It is possible to speak for freedom like Adam Smith did, and, yet, be suspicious of the blissfulness of all competition.

In team sports competition, cooperation and division of labour go together. The competition in soccer is extremely tough, but in order to succeed the team as well as their individual players need to exercise sophisticated teamwork and division of labour. Even the best player cannot achieve anything alone. It is only sophisticated team play that makes the team and its individual players succeed. Water polo is even a better example: as the ball flies in the air so

much faster than the player swims in the water, only team-play gets results. Would you prefer to be the worst player in the best team or the best player in the worst team? Well, a one-eyed person can be a king in the country of the blind. Would you prefer to be a cock on a dunghill or a member in a good society? A symphony orchestra is yet another example of how a sophisticated division of labour and gorgeous soloists can play together.

There is a strong myth that competition brings success. Kohn has (1992) reviewed the vast array of empirical studies on the subject, and it refutes this assumption conclusively. Success is achieving a desirable objective. More often than not success can be achieved by cooperation than by competition. Competition may increase the amount of the output, but very often at the cost of the quality. It is actually easy to see that the increment in the number of television channels and their competition for the higher number of viewers, the competition of a tabloid press, and music competitions have increased the supply of standard production but decreased quality and originality.

The competition between universities and their researchers may result in a similar situation. (By the way, Adam Smith had not done well in this system. He did not publish much, and he wrote his main contribution for years.) The universities reward individualistic performers and egoism rather than people good at teamwork and helping others. This selection of researchers may project their competitive culture even in what they write about the world outside. The theory of competition is more advanced than the theory of cooperation (e.g. Hunt, 2000; Virtanen, 1998). It is true though that for the economists the opposite of competition is not cooperation or division of labour but monopolies or milder forms of market dominance

Competition brings forth the best competitors. It does not necessarily bring forth the best result. The two are not identical. Would a tough and unscrupulous competition for power, say for the Presidency of a nation, bring forth the best President? There is a chance that the potentially best candidates for the job would not want even to take part in this kind of a competition. But at least the competition glorifies its winners, doesn't it? How many losers are there for each winner? Even the glory of the winners is vanishing, and the optional costs for winning tend to be high. There are numerous cases of top athletes who have had tremendous difficulties adapting to life after their glorious but short career is over.

Competition does not add to creativity. As a matter of fact, it may kill it. In cooperation we learn from others, and when many people learn from many people, new ideas are born and knowledge is created that nobody had before s/he entered the cooperation. Competition tends to increase defensiveness and unwillingness to share with others. Cooperation is more difficult than

competition in the respect that it only works when many people want and are able to cooperate. Competition is against other people, and impeding others may be a successful strategy. This is an idea in many competitive games. In books on competitive strategy barriers of entry to impede newcomers in the field are listed (e.g. Porter, 1996). Perhaps man can channel his *angst* and emptiness in competing?

There are conflicts in cooperation as well. But as long as they are seen as problems that the participants share and as such are managed properly, they contribute to learning and creativity. Only when the conflicts manifest themselves in competition about who is right, about power and prestige, only then do the conflicts become damaging.

All people do not want to compete. Those always busy, challenge- and success-oriented men (can be women as well) are more of a product of our culture than manifestations of a biological drive. Personality cannot be understood without its cultural context, from which the personality grows and by which it is moulded. Western culture reinforces competition at least from schooldays on. This is difficult for us to see, until we see our culture from the vantage point of a different culture.

Many artists and researchers try to find their own unique niche. The great innovators in arts and science have not competed on trotten paths. They have opened new paths and genres (e.g. Picasso, Chaplin, Louis Armstrong, Shostakovitsh). This allows and presupposes the piece and quiet of incubation rather than competition for fame and fortune. They may have had the latter in the end, but it was not their objective. Indeed, some of them have lost their creativity after their names appeared in the headlines.

Let me put the issue in one more way. Could we believe that the *raison d'être* of man or what makes this strange species different from all other animals, would be in his capacity to choose a communitarian way of living and learning from the cultural tradition of man?

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## WHERE DOES THE POWER RESIDE?<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

Where does power reside? Have power and leadership become less visible than they were during the twentieth century? The paper discusses political power, economic power, military power, the power of knowledge, and the changes in their relative weight. *Political power* seems to have succumbed to economic power – or, at least, it often hides behind what the Holy Markets require to be satisfied. *Economic power* has led the changes and got more steam from the integration of wide geographical areas – but it has also raised counterforces against globalization. In Europe at least, the *military power* has been behind the scenes; transformations similar to those during the first part of the 1990's have not taken place without an all-European war since the Reformation. The *power of knowledge* presents itself in professional power, in technological leadership, in intellectual power struggles but also in the capacity of men and women of letters to raise important issues for public debate. Instead of a conclusion, the paper ponders, whether the legacy of Athens remains stronger and more enduring than the legacy of Sparta.

Keywords: Power, Leadership, Management.

### 1 Introduction

Who is steering this rickety boat called the world. This has been asked since times eternal. Is it that God has become senile and obsolete, or that He simply does not have the time nor other resources to follow all that has happened since Creation? Or maybe He has died of laughter or of pain having had to witness all that people have done in His name since Adam and Eve.

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There were a number of enormously powerful people during the twentieth century. Think of Stalin who first divided Europe between Hitler and himself, and then he divided what was left from this exercise with Roosevelt and Churchill in Jalta. He was an architect of the map of Europe for most of the latter part of the twentieth century. We in Finland had presidents like Paasikivi and Kekkonen who were able to turn the heads of people and the orientation of the nation. Einstein revolutionized scientific thinking – and the whole world-view as a by-product. Business leaders like Ford and Rockefeller had a worldwide impact. We had our Raade, who established against the will of many people a still-existing energy consortium in a country short of energy but with plenty of energy consuming industry. Charles Chaplin, Louis Armstrong and Pablo Picasso were rebels who opened entirely new forms and genres of art.

Who are the leaders that shape the world today? We have idols like Bill Gates and Linus Torvalds, we have business moguls, athletes and pop stars, many of them manufactured in the most effective industrial and marketing manner. But it seems that this kind of media publicity and heroism is short-lived, and it rather surfs on the waves of publicity than changes the direction of the waves. This may, of course, be a myopic view of a present-day writer on present-day phenomena. Admittedly, a genius is an insult for his and her contemporaries, and, hence, it may be difficult for us to discern the powerful leaders among us today.

We are often asked: Who are you with, whom or which idea do you support, what are your affiliations, where is the drummer you are listening to? Shouldn't we ask instead: Where are we going and who leads us there? Or are we just drifting like pieces of wood on waves, undetermined and without a goal, taken wherever the power and direction of the fickle winds are taking the waves and us along with them?

There are more people in managerial positions than ever (see Nurmi & Darling, 1997). Where do the managers lead us or do they lead at all? Are they conscious of where they are leading people and responsible for what they manage? Or are they just too busy to stick to their own positions and have no time or energy left to lead? True enough, there are laws, big corporations, media, human envy and bureaucracy to circumscribe managerial margin (see Mintzberg, 1983, and Nurmi, 1994, for power in and around corporations). But it is just as true that the most influential leaders – be they for better or for worse – did not let these kinds of restrictions prevent them from doing what they wanted to. Hitler and Einstein, Stalin and Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Stravinsky broke prevailing rules of their game. They did not obey the rules that were set for them, but they created rules that were first fit for them

and were later accepted by others as new rules and new paradigms for the whole field of their endeavour.

The question remains: Where does the power reside now? Is it in politics, economy, military might or knowledge? Where is the playground where the rules of the worldly game are designed, moulded and changed? Or have we been able to shock-absorb all personal leadership by means of temperate administration, democracy, bureaumania, entertainment and relativistic concept of truth and knowledge? We have social welfare and television-series for what Romans called *panem et circenses*.

## 2 Political power

Traditionally, politicians and statesmen have been regarded as the people in possession of power. Their power is controlled in and by democracy, as *vestigia torrent*, i.e. the traces of uncontrolled centralized power have been disastrous, to put it mildly. The striving for power is often replete with the most sincere, good and even idealistic intentions. But when the power has been achieved, sticking to it, staying in it and increasing it tend to become obsessions to the extent of a blindness that betrays the holder of the power and, then, the maintenance of power legitimates the use of whatever Machiavellian (1532) advice is available. This is the trap of political power (or any power perhaps), and Shakespeare told it better than anyone in 1592 in Richard III. Or in the famous words by Baron Acton (1887): “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely”

Politicians have belittled their power – and power in politics is a complicated matter. Many of them, however, only deceive themselves in wriggling about their power. But, undoubtedly, recently the deepest changes of our time in Europe have not been led by politicians, parliaments nor by other administrative bodies representing democratic decision-making, but by economic and financial considerations. Politicians have been in the service of The Market Forces and they have not dared to challenge international competitiveness of national economies. Solidarity has been won by economic liberalism (except perhaps in Poland where the Solidarity introduced it).

## 3 Economic power

Economy has had an iron logic on its side: Unless economy is cared for, other sides of life – including political democracy, cultural and intellectual life – cannot be maintained. The World Bank (2001) declares this as its policy, but

Marx (1859) said it earlier (1859) by asserting that the “economic structure -- - determines (bedingt) the general process of the social, political and intellectual life”

This iron logic easily becomes a tyranny allowing no options. Then the economy has become an end rather than a precondition for a dignified life. There is no end in cutting costs, as there will always be more cost-effective companies and countries (see Porter, 1996, for the criticism of how his concept of cost-effectiveness came to be interpreted). Owning and consuming become distinctions, and a brand loyalty unites people in a more authentic way than voting for a party or social class. There are interviews about glorious people in glorious magazines sending the message that God only loves the rich and successful (e.g. Harper's Bazaar, 2001).

The credibility of business leaders has exceeded that of politicians, and companies influence politicians at least as much as politicians influence companies. In all, economy has in many ways overruled political decision-making. Tennessee Williams (1948) made his character to say it in this way: “You know, *knowledge – ZSZZZppp! Money! POWER! Wham!* That’s the cycle democracy is built on.”

#### 4 Military power

Soldiers step into the centre of power during times of crises. When guns begin to talk, other kinds of arguments become silent. It was not incidental that Mao Tse-Tung's said in 1938: “Every communist must grasp the truth, Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. In Europe we have gone through drastic transformations during the first part of the 1990's without a war encompassing all of Europe – this has not happened since the Reformation. The integration of economy diminishes the threat of war. It has been an undercurrent of the European economic integration that German economic interests are tied with European co-operation. Dr. Duisenberg, the President of European Monetary Institute, quoted Thomas Mann in his Bernard Mandeville Lecture (1998): “it is a choice between European Germany or a German Europe”.

Economic and financial competition has replaced the fight for military might in Europe. Germany and Japan have been more successful and for a longer period in this competition than during the World War II. And this has been much less destructing to the world. Modern military arms race is so expensive that it was less difficult for the Soviet Union to disintegrate than to confront the challenge of Reagan's Star Wars. Russia will be much easier to influence by financial than by military means. There are losers even in

globalization – financial globalization that is – but yet it is far less disruptive than military imperialism.

## 5 Power of knowledge

Bacon (1605) and Toffler (1980) are probably the best-known spokesmen for the power of knowledge. It has been argued that this is the case in modern knowledge-intensive business more than ever before (Nurmi, 1997 & 1998). Where does this kind of power reside? Who are its personifications?

There is power that goes with professional legitimacy. Physicians are endowed with the possibility to talk about life and death of their patients. Clinical psychologists may have a tremendous power over their patients at some phases of relationship at least. Engineers invent products that change the world. Investors construct and destruct emporia. A Leningrad tourist guide told a decade ago that there are two social classes in the city: workers and intelligentsia. We may wonder what is the class structure of Saint Petersburg today, and who has the power to describe it.

Well-known learned writers (e.g. and most notably Bourdieu, 1990) have argued that much of academic, intellectual and cultural work boils down to a fight about the leadership and power on the playing-ground: On the hidden agenda of all debate are items such as who is right, who is the *arbiter elegantiarum* or the judge of taste, who has the right and might to categorize and paradigmize and, in the end, to judge "the truth" itself. According to this view, scientific debate is more about power than about truth, arts are more about popularity and support than about estheticism. What is the top of the pops in the hit parade of intellectuals this week?

The power of knowledge was a leitmotif of the Enlightenment. Science and other achievements of Modern Times were based on this idea. But by the late twentieth century the thought has begun to gather momentum that power produces, sustains and undermines knowledge. (Foucault, 1976, 1982). This turns upside down the relationship of knowledge and power: Power is intrinsically intertwined with the availability, circulation and functions of knowledge.

Philosophers, social scientists, historians and other men and women of letters have little position power. But because of this, they can raise issues, concepts and theories, which may influence minds of people and the collective consciousness of the humankind. As they do not have the burden of being right nor knowing the truth, they can initiate debate without pretending to know where the debate is leading. This kind of debate can be influential particularly in times of great cultural upheavals. In this way the debate and its

initiators can change rules of the game of political, economic and military power. Or - - -

## 5 In place of a conclusion

Or can they? Is this just illusory and too idealistic a view? Probably this kind of a debate only results in a vacuum of power. Power vacuums tend to be filled by The Big Power, which does not look around itself nor listen to hollow intellectual debates.

It seems though that the legacy of Athens is more enduring than that of Sparta.

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## MINUN USKONI

Olen saanut uskonnollisen kasvatuksen. Äitini oli hyvin uskollinen, hän säilytti lapsenuskonsa hamaan hautaansa asti. Niinpä hän kotiäitinäkin opetti ja kasvatti minut Jumalan hyvyyteen ja armoon. Kävimme uskollisesti jumalanpalveluksissa isäni ollessa sodassa äitini tietymättömässä ”siellä jossakin”. Myös Turun Suomalaisessa Yhteiskoulussa uskonto ja luterilainen Jumala olivat monin tavoin läsnä, ei vain uskonnon ja kirkkohistorian tunneilla vaan myös joka-aamuisina aamuuhartauksina ja oppiaineitten ja opettajien opetuksissa. Sen jälkeen me kaikki koulun oppilaat olemme ja pysymme tavalla tai toisella luterilaisina, ja se asenne on varmaan auttanut meitä ankaralla elontiellä. ”Oi tartu käteen Herran ja vie perille - - -”, lauloiimme silmät kyynelissä abiturioituessamme. Jonkinlainen uskovainen lienen silloin ollut minäkin. Se ei ollut distinktio vaan osa koko sukupolven akkulturoitumista sodan jälkeiseen yhteiskunnalliseen todellisuuteen. Sen verran olen peljästynyt kaikesta tästä, että vieläkin varmuuden vuoksi kirjoitan Jumalan, Herran ja Luojan isoilla alkukirjaimilla. 1950-luvun lopussa tulivat televisio ja nuorisokulttuuri, jonka jälkeen vanhemmat ja koulu eivät enää olleet aina oikeassa. Eikä Jumalakaan.

Tänään minussa ovat uskonnollisuuden tunnusmerkit vähissä. Jos kriteerinä pidetään uskontunnustusta ”Minä uskon Jumalaan, Isään, Kaikkivaltaiseen taivaan ja maailman Luajaan - - -”, niin en voi sitä allekirjoittaa. En voi uskoa persoonalliseen Jumalaan, neitseestä sikiämiseen, johdatukseen, iankaikkiseen elämään, kristinuskon kaikkein oleellisimpiin kysymyksiin. Mitään syvempää uskonnollista kriisiä en ole koskaan kokenut sen enempää kuin yhtäkkistä käänymistä tai poisvalaistumistakaan. En ole liioin rynnännyt mihinkään muuhun uskoon. Joskus minusta tuntuu, että haluaisin uskoa, elämä olisi sillä lailla varmaan helpompaa. Mutta en pysty siihen, kun terve talonpoikaisjärki ja jokapäiväinen arkikokemus puhuvat sen puolesta, että Jumala ei kuule, armoa ei anneta eikä Jumalan sana ole tullut lihaksi maanpäällä. Usko on minulta vähitellen karissut pois kuin hilse harjatessa. Mieleeni on tullut sekin, että uskonto on huijausta ja kirkko Neuvostoliiton kaltainen, tosin paremmin organisoitu ja pystyssä pysynyt valtakeskus, josta on voitu hallita yksinkertaisia sieluja maan päällä.

Kaiketi uskonkysymykset silti minua edelleen jollain tavoin vaivaavat, kun olen kokenut tarpeelliseksi panna tuntojani asiasta paperille tällä tavoin. En

hetkeäkään kuvittele sanovani asiasta mitään uutta tai merkillistä. Esseentapaiseni puolustus on jokaisen ihmisen tarve selvittää näitäasioita ainakin itselleen, ja jos hyvin käy, päästä keskusteluun jonkun sellaisen kanssa, joka ihmisenä olemisestaan johtuen on johtunut pohdiskelemaan samanlaisiaasioita. Asian luonteeseen kuuluu, että samanmielisyys ja erimielisyysasioista ovat samanarvoisia.

Luopumiseeni, hienosti sanottuna sekularisoitumiseeni, on varmasti vaikuttanut luonnontieteellistä mallia noudattanut koulutukseni, siis sellainen käsitys, että tieto on koeteltavissa. Luotan tietoon, joka on voimassa kunnes toisin osoitetaan. Tieto, tutkimus ja tiede voivat olla väärässä, mutta tieteellinen ajattelutapa ja tieteellinen metodi korjaavat tieteen substanssia jatkuvasti epäillyllään, uusilla havainnoillaan, hypoteeseillaan ja teorioillaan, jotka ovat voimassa niin kauan, kunnes taas uudet havainnot, hypoteesit ja teoriat ne korvaavat. Kyllä tutkijoillakin on taipumusta selittää poikkeamat omista havainnoistaan, hypoteeseistaan ja teorioistaan itselleen parhain pään. Totta on sekin, että esiintyy skientismiä, tieteisuskontoa, joka uskoo, että luonnontieteentapa suhtautua maailmaan on ainoa hyväksyttävä. Mutta oleellista on, että epäily on rakennettu osaksi tutkimuksenteon filosofista infrastruktuuria, epäilyä systemaattisesti opetetaan ja siihen tieteen nuoria rekryttejä ohjataan, kun taas uskossa ja uskonnoissa epäily on synnin asemassa. En voi olla kysymäättä ”Mistä sen tietää?”, kun joku puhuu Jumalasta, tuonpuoleisesta, jälleensyntymisestä tai muista Uskolle rakentuvista käsityksistään.

Kaiken kaikkiaan olen vakuuttunut siitä, että tieto – vaikkakin aina epävarmana ja totuutta vain approksimatiivisesti lähestyvänä – on tukevampi matkasauva kuin kuuliainen ja sokea Usko. Kriittinen omilla aivoillaan ajattelu on loppujen lopuksi luotettavampaa ja vähemmän vahinkoa tuottavaa kuin fundamentalistinen usko dogmeihin ja auktoriteetteihin. Mutta tähän kaikkeen vastasi kirkonopettaja Tertullianus jo toisella vuosisadalla AD: *Credo, quia absurdum*, uskon, koska se on järjellä käsittämätöntä.

Minulle on ylivoimaisen vaikeata hyväksyä, että olisi samanaikaisesti kaikkivaltias Jumala ja kaikki se maailmallinen julmuus, paha ja epäoikeudenmukaisuus, jota joudumme elämässämme kohtaamaan. Miksi Jumala sallii sellaista, jos kerran on kaikkivaltias? Tahtooko Jumala pahaa? On parempi että Jumalaa ei ole olemassa kuin että on olemassa kaikkivaltias Jumala, joka sallii tai tuottaa pahan. Vai onko kyse siitä, että Perkele on Jumalaa voimakkaampi? Tämä teodikean nimellä tunnettu ongelma on teologian visaisimpia (kts. Huovinen, 2005), ja siihen on annettu koko joukko epätydyttäviä vastauksia. On esimerkiksi sanottu, että Jumala on hyvä, mutta

ihmisen pahuudesta seuraavat kaikki onnettamuudet. Mutta Jumalahan sanoi luovansa ihmisen kuvakseen ja vieläpä kaltaisekseenkin.

Julmuus ja epäoikeudenmukaisuus ovat maailmanlaajuisia ilmiöitä. Joku ehätti selittämään, että tsunamin kautta Jumala osoitti voimansa, se oli kosto ihmiskunnan synneistä ja näyttö Jumalan olemassaolosta. Onko Jumala siis pikkumainen, Stalinia ja Hitleriä julmempi tyranni, joka käyttää kaikkivoipaisuuttaan kostaaakseen Hänet hylänneelle ihmiskunnalle? Onko Jumala itsekkäämpi kuin ihmiset, jotka Jumalan sanotaan luoneen? Usko kaikkivaltiaan Jumalan olemassaoloon on silloin erityisesti koetteilla, kun itse joutuu pahan ja epäoikeudenmukaisen kohteeksi. Ja kukapa siltä voisi elämässään vältyä? Voi tyynemmin ottaa vastaan tuhansia ihmisiä tappaneen onnettamuuden, kun se ei kosketa itseään kuin sen, että on tullut tentissä epäoikeudenmukaisesti arvostelluksi.

Oikeastaan voi ajatella, että kysymys Jumalan olemassaolosta ei ole tärkeää eikä edes mielenkiintoinen. Jos on olemassa hyvä ja kaikkivaltias Jumala, niin miksi Hän vaatisi itseään palvottavan tai rankaisisi niitä, jotka näin eivät tee. Jos suuri konna saa armon elämänsä viimeisillä hetkillä, kunhan vain tulee silloin uskoon, mutta se, joka Jumalan palvelemisen sijasta on palvellut ihmisiä ja ihmiskuntaa, joutuu rangaistukseksi Helvettiin, tuntuu se jumalattoman epäoikeudenmukaiselta. Tällainen Jumala on luvattakin sanoen kuin pikkusieluinen valtapolitiikko, joka käännyttää ihmisiä kannattajikseen uhkauksillaan. Tai ei nyt ihan pikkupoliitikkokaan. Stalin perusti vankileirien saariston juuri väelle, jota pitäti itselleen epäluotettavana. Onko siis Jumalalla Siperiaakin kamalampi paikka, ihan iankaikkinen Helvetti kostonaan? Epäoikeudenmukaista Jumalaan on aika vaikeata sulattaa.

Uskonto vailla tietoa ja substanssia on vaarallista. Uskossaan sokeat tuottavat Jumalansa nimissä hyvällä omallatunnolla kärsimystä. Hallitsijoille uskonsodat ovat usein naamioituja valtapyyteitä, mutta kyllä Jumalallaan voi myös huijata itseään uskomaan toimiensa hyviin tarkoituksiin. Hallitsijoiden on helppo vakuuttautua valtansa jumalallisesta alkuperästä. Jos hoen itselleni ja muille, että naapuri on paha ja vihollinen ja Jumala on heitä vastaan puolellani, kuten sotilaspappien virkaan kuuluu, alan siihen pian itsekin uskoa, siinäkin tapauksessa, että hokeminen oli alkujaan tarkoituksenmukaista ja virkani pitimiksi tarvittavaa retoriikkaa. On helpompaa hyväksyä itsensä sotimaan oikean Jumalan ja oikean opin puolesta kuin julistaa, että meidän täytyy päästä hallitsemaan hupenevia energiavarajoja. Mutta mistä kummasta jotkut valaistuneet ja valitut ovat saaneet Jumalalta oikeuden puhua Hänen nimissään? Kun he sitten Jumalan nimissä tekevät pahaa, asia muuttuu vielä kummallisemmaksi. Heillä on ilmeisesti suora kännnykkäyhteys Jumalaansa, jolta he saavat näin varmistuksen tekojensa oikeudesta tarvitsematta ottaa

henkilökohtaista vastuuta tekojensa seurausista. On nähty, että Jumalaa voi käyttää lyömäaseena.

Olen nähtyn samanlaista uskonfundamentalismia läheltä pienempimuotoisena, kun minulle tärkeä henkilö tuli henkilökohtaisissa vaikeuksissaan uskoon ja näin poisselitti oman osuutensa vaikeuksistaan, julisti itsensä valaistuneeksi ja alkoi saarnata muille hyvyydestään ja muiden syntisyydestä. Uskoonsa umpeutuneeseen mieleen ei mikään vaikuta. Vai oletteko koskaan yrittäneet keskustella kiivaiden uskovaisten kanssa? Raamatussa sanotaan että Jumala loi ihmisen kuvakseen. Mutta osaavat ihmisetkin pureskella Jumalansa itsensä mittaiseksi.

Kiivasuskovaiset sokeutuvat näkemästä kaikkea, mikä sotii heidän uskoaan vastaan ja voivat laiminlyödä lähimmäisiään ja olla heille julmia omaan valaistuneisuuteensa uskoen. On helpompaa panssaroitua uskoonsa kuin koettaa rehellisesti punnita asioita, itseään, tekojaan ja motiivejaan. On autuasta vetäytyä itsensä mittaisen Jumalan taakse. On helpompaa elää tämmöisessä elämänvalheessa ja pitää yllä itsestään täydellisyyskuvaan. Tässä täytyy kuitenkin olla sillä tavoin tarkka, että ei pane Jumalan viaksi sitä, mitä häneen uskovaiset tekevät Hänen nimissään. Jumalan olemassaolo ei riipu siitä, miten ihmiset Hänen nimeään raiskaavat.

Kysymys ihmisen vapaasta tahdosta on teodikean kaltainen vaikea filosofinen ongelma. Ihmisen vapaata tahtoa rajoittavat monet kaikkien kokemat sosiaaliset seikat. Joidenkin uskovaisten mielestä heidän tahtonsa on Jumalan tahti. Ja jotkut fyysikot arvelevat, että tahtokin on vain aineen emergenti ominaisuus (kts. Enqvist, 1996). Vatupassi on käytännöllinen työkalu talonrakennuksessa, vaikka suhteellisuusteorian mukaan suoraa viivaa ei kosmisessa mielessä olekaan olemassa. Niin myös meillä on ratkaisuvaltaa, tahtoa ja vastuuta monissa arjen kosmiselta kannalta pikkuasioissamme.

Pidän rehellisempänä, että ihmisen ottaa vastuun teoistaan kuin vetäytyy Jumalansa selän taakse. Rehellisyys itseään kohtaan ei ole helppoa, ja itselle sopiva usko helpottaa pohtimasta vaikeita asioita. Se vapauttaa sekä vastuusta että järjen käytöstä. Kihloissa, juovuksissa ja uskossa on hyvä olla. Elämä on vaikeata ja kaoottista, ja ihmisen on vaikea kohdata sitä ilman jonkinlaisia huumeita.

Graham Greene kirjoitti elämäkerrallisessa teoksessaan *Ways of escape*: "Kirjoittaminen on eräs terapiamuoto. Joskus ihmettelen millä tavoin kaikki ne, jotka eivät kirjoita, sävellä tai maalaa pystyvät pääsemään pakoon siltä hulluudelta, melankolianta, pakokauhulta, joka luontaisena kuuluu ihmisenä olemiseen". Greene jatkaa siteeraamalla Audenia: "Ihminen tarvitsee pakoa samalla tavalla kuin hän tarvitsee ruokaa ja syvää unta". Usko on yksi yleinen pakenemisen muoto. Se suojaa maailman ikävyyksiltä. Se on oiva defenssi

egen suojaamiseksi. Se on varmaan vähemmän itselleen destruktioista kuin kemialliset huumeet. Mutta on myös kovia kokeneita uskontojen uhreja. Ja uskonnot antavat perusteita aggressiivisuuteen muita kohtaan. Kristinuskon sinapinsiemenvertaus ja Islamin Jihad antavat oikeutuksia henkiseen ja aseelliseenkin imperialismiin.

Ihminen on tarvinnut selitystä kaikelle sille, mitä ei ole voinut ymmärtää eikä hallita, ja Jumala on tullut hänelle tässä hyvään tarpeeseen. Tiede on kyllä koko lailla kaventanut tietämättömyytemme piiriä, mutta ei poista Jumalaa kokonaan mahdollisten maailmanselitysten virasta. Tutkimushan ei voi todistaa sellaisesta, jota se *ei* havaitse. Lainaan Valtaojaa: Planeetat kiertävät rataansa, eivät siksi että Jumalan rakkaus niitä kuljettaa, vaan siksi että  $F = GmM/R^2$ .

Amerikkalaisessa setelissä lukee: "In God we trust". Ei kuulosta likikään yhtä mahtipontiselta sanoa: "In me I trust". Ja silloin on kestettävä aikamoista turvattomuutta, siinä määrin sattumanvaraista on elämämme kulku ja itsekunkin mahdollisuus ohjata edes omaa elämäänsä saati parantaa maailmaa. Mutta jospa meillä vain maailmana heitettyinä ei ole sen vahvempaa turvaa kuin oma helposti särkyvä itsemme.

Olipa Jumala olemassa tai ei, uskonnot ovat. Uskonnot ovat hyvin tärkeitä ilmiöitä. Omaa aikaamme ei voi ymmärtää tuntematta uskontoja. Historia on paljossa uskontojen historiaa. Uskonnot vaikuttavat lukemattomien ihmisten elämään. Vaikkei uskoisi Jumalaan, uskontoihin on uskominen. Olemme ajatelleet, että tiede, valistus ja järki voisivat korvata uskonnnon, mutta näin ei näytä käyvän. Kahdeskymmenes vuosisata kävi läpi ennennäkemätöntä julmuutta, sotia, ihmisten alistamista ja ympäristövaurioita, ja kaikkea tätä edesauttoi (luonnon)tiede ja sillen perustuva tekniikka. Ja toiselta puolen tiede on jokseenkin voimaton taistelussa yhteiskunnallista epäoikeudenmukaisuutta, rikollisuutta, huumeita ja muita aikamme vitsauksia vastaan. Kaiken tämän vastapainoksi uskonnot ravitsevat lohdutusta ja eettisiä arvoja hyvästä ja pahasta, joita ihmiskunta, ihmisyhteisöt ja yksittäiset ihmiset tarvitsevat elämässä selvitäkseen. Sika elää ruualla, ihminen tarvitsee Jumalan. Ihmiset tarvitsevat ei vain leipää vaan myös kulttuurien, sivistyksen ja arvojen kokonaisuutta. Tässä kokonaisuudessa uskonnolla on ihmisten tarpeita täytyvä rooli (kts. Eskola, 1999). Islam ja Bushin fundamentalismi lepäävät suurten ihmisjoukkojen kannatuksen varassa. Ei-uskovainenkin voi hyväksyä, että Jeesuksen vuorisaarnan rakkaudensanoma on kantava ja kestävä toiminnan eettinen ohjenuora.

Usko Jumalaan ja iankaikkiseen elämään antaa monille ihmisseille heidän elämänsä merkityksen. Onko ei-uskovaisen elämä siis vailla merkitystä? Vaikkei uskoisikaan elämällä olevan uskonnollista tai kosmista merkitystä,

niin kun nyt olemme syystä tai toisesta tänne maailmaan heitettyjä (no, viime kädessä vain siksi, että isämme siitti äitimme), on mahdollista ja parempaa yrittää tehdä elämästä sellaista, että se jäisi tuleville sukupolville parempaan kuin sen edelliseltä sukupolvelta saimme. Vaikka tämä pyrkimys on eräänlaista aina alusta aloitettavaa Sisyfoksen työtä, antaa se elämälle suuren, vastuullisen ja kullekin yksilölle ainutkertaisen tarkoitukseen ja merkitykseen. Samalla tavoin voi jokainen ihminen luoda tavoittelemisen arvoisia merkityksiä itselleen. Jos minulla ei sellaisia ole, vika on minussa eikä Jumalassa.

Täytyykö olla uskovainen ollakseen hyvä ihminen? Ei kenenkään ole helppoa olla hyvä ihminen. Mutta pidän ryhdikkäämpänä sitä, joka tekee hyvää odottamatta siitä itselleen palkkiota kuin sitä, joka tekee hyviä tekoja oman taivaspaikkansa saavuttamiseksi.

Ihan kuten uskonto Kirkkokin on olemassa. Se on monin tavoin menettänyt valtaansa ihmisten mielissä. Voitiin puhua Katolisen kirkon imperiumista keskiajalla, kunnes kirkko nimitti kuninkaita, jotka ottivatkin vallan itselleen. Henrik VIII ei sietänyt katolisen kirkon puuttumista avoliittoihinsa, Kustaa Vaasa kääntyi protestantiksi, kun uusi luterilainen oppi kuiskutti hänen korvaansa, että sen mukaan kuningas kirkon sijasta omistaa maan. Mutta silti nyt, kun olemme rahan ja sen instituutioiden vallassa, olisi tärkeätä, että olisi niille vaihtoehtoisia instituutiota. Voi jospa kirkko olisi totuuden, eettisesti oikean ja rakkaudensanomansa instituutio. Meillä on ollut näissä asioissa esimerkillisiä kirkommiehiä ja –naisia. Uskonnolla ja kirkolla on ilmiselvästi tärkeitä yhteiskunnallisia tehtäviä. Mutta kirkko on myös organisorisen olomuotonsa vanki niin, että hierarkia, valta, nokkimisjärjestykset ja oligarkian rautainen laki (Michels, 1925) vievät siltä voimavarajoja sen syvimmän sanan levittämislle. Mahdollisuus edustaa Jumalan sanaa, pyhyttää ja Oikeaa Uskoa ovat valtavia kannusteita tällaisten transaktiokustannuksen lisäämiselle.

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**LOPUKSI:**  
**EMERITUS-ESITELMÄ**



## EMERITUS-ESITELMÄ<sup>1</sup>

Herra Rehtori, arvoisat kuulijat,

Olen syntynyt jatkosodan sytyyessä, Turussa Heidekenin synnytyslaitoksen pommisuojassa ankarien pommitusten aikana. Isäni sai maailmaantuloni vuoksi luvan myöhästyä muutaman päivän sodasta ja niistä taisteluista Karjalan kannaksella, joissa suuri osa hänen joukko-osastostaan tuhoutui. Äitini tapasikin sanoa, että olin syntymälläni pelastanut isäni hengen.

Samaan aikaan Turun satamaan tarkoitettu pommi osui Turun Korppolaismäessä taloon, jossa piti olla ensimmäinen kotini. Kun äitini lähti synnytyslaitoksesta hänellä oli mukanansa kaikki, mitä hän omisti, eli toisessa kainalossa minut, toisessa kaikki se, mitä oli laitokselle mukaansa ottanut. Hän ei tiennyt isäni olinpaikasta, eipä edes hänen hengissäolostaan. Jotenkin hän kuitenkin pääsi Turusta Alastarolle isäni äidin luo. Selvästikin nämä elämäni ensimmäiset ajat ovat olleet sen dramaattisimmat ja vaarallisimmat. Näistä elämäni ensimmäisistä päivistä katsoen kaikki on siitä alkaen ollut helppoa ja vain eteenpäinmenoaa.

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1940-luvulla viimeisinä vuosina kävimme usein vanhempieni kanssa sunnuntaikävelyllä Turun satamassa katsomassa ruotsinlaivoja. Joku kävi ihan Ruotsissa asti ja toi sieltä Gevalia kahvia. Se tuntui kiehtovalta ja jännittävältä, pääätahuimaavan kansainväliseltä. Muistan Ruotsissa käyneen sukulaiseni, joka kaksi päivää Tukholmassa oltuaan unohti suomen kielen. Haaveilin, että jospa joskus saisinkin valkoisen puvun takin ja pääsisin Ruotsiin. Mitään suurempaa en osannut elämältäni odottaa. Kummakin haaveeni ovat toteutuneet. Asia kuvaa aikaansa ja myös sukupolveni kansainvälyshaaveita.

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<sup>1</sup> Emeritus-esitelmä 3.5.2005.

1950-luvulla Turun Suomalaisen Yhteiskoulun kasvatus oli hyvin isänmaalliskansallista. Oihan koulu perustettu vuosisadan alussa ruotsinkielien ja venäläistämispaineiden puristuksista. Opettajilla olivat hiljan käydyt sodat ja Suomen selviäminen mielessään, ja heitä silminnähden ja korvinkuullen elähdytti tahto antaa taas sytykettä suomalaiselle sivistysperinteelle ja sodanjälkeiselle sukupolvelle.

Tämä koulutusihanne synnytti kyllä myös vastareaktionsa ja uteliaisuutta maailmaan. Radio Luxemburgia kuunneltiin. Olympialaiset olivat iso tapaus tuodessaan Suomea taas maailmankartalle, Coca-Cola ja neekereitä ihmeteltiin. Turun Tuomiokirkkosaltaa alettiin leventää, koska arveltiin ruotsinlaivoilta tulevan paljon olympiaturisteja – sillan levennys myöhästyti, mutta valmistui kyllä Melbournen Olympialaisiin. Suomen liittyminen Yhdistyneihin kansakuntiin oli vielä isompi asia. Markasta tuli vahdettava valuutta, vaikka valuuttasäännöstely säilyi pitkään. Tämä kaikki tuntui suurelta avaukselta. Olimmehan olleet Hitlerin liittolaisia, ja länsivallat tekivät Stalinin Suomea koskeville vaatimuksille vain kunniaa niin Valvontakomissiossa kuin Pariisin rauhanneuvotteluissaakin.

Silti opiskelevasta nuorisosta Suomi alkoi tuntua ummehtuneelta, ja haluttiin avata ikkunoita kaikkeen maailmaan. Kun Jörn Donner kirjoitti, että hän on sattunut syntymään Suomessa, se kohahdutti. Oihan opetettu, että suomalaiseksi syntyminen lännen etuvartioon oli kohtalo. Kansainvälistyminen onkin ollut sukupolven projektti, ja se oli silloin yksipuolisesti myönteiseksi koettu asia. Se oli aikanaan sukupolvenni tärkeää ja sitä muovaavaa, vaikka se nyt tämän päivän globaalituvasta perspektiivistä näyttää ylenmäärin vaativammalta.

YK oli erityisen tärkeää. Se oli sitä virallisessa Suomen ulkopoliitikassa heti Neuvostoliiton suhteiden jälkeen, mutta suhteita Neuvostoliittoon ei pidetty kansainvälistymisenä. Kansainvälistymisellä haettiin liikkumatalaa Neuvostoliitolta. Kansainvälistyminen oli kiertoilmaus länsimaidumiselle. Suomalaisia oli väkilukumme nähdyn ylisuhteisesti YKn tehtävissä. YKta pidettiin pienien valtioiden turvana. Oihan YKn edeltäjä Kansainliitto erottanut Neuvostoliiton jäsenyydestään sen hyökättyä Suomeen talvisodassa ja myös ratkaissut Ahvenanmaan kiistan eduksemme.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ylioppilaaksi tultuani kävin ihmettelemässä kaikkia Turun korkeakouluja, ja muistan olleeni katkera siitä, että Turussa voi opiskella kaikkia minulle edes jotakin ajateltavissa olevia aloja, koska olisin halunnut isäkapinassani opiskella ihan missä muualla tahansa kuin Turussa. Kuuntelin kaikkia mahdollisia ja mahdottomiakin opintoneuvojia, koska en oikein tiennyt, mitä

halusin. Ammatinvalinnanohjaajatuttuni suositti minulle ammatinvalinnanohjaajan uraa, mutta pelkäsin, että minusta tulisi väärällä alalla oleva ammatinvalinnanohjaaja. Oikeastaan olisin halunnut ammattijalkapalloilijaksi Englantiin, mutta lahjat eivät riittäneet niin vaativalle alalle, joten on ollut tytytyminen vähemmän pätevyyttä vaativiin tehtäviin.

Kävin myös utelemassa opintomahdollisuksista Turun kauppakorkeakoulussa, ja puhelinkeskus kertoi, että täällä opiskeluun kuuluu paljon kirjoittamista. Koko 18-vuotiaan energiallani, kaikkitietävyydelläni ja itseluottamuksellani ajattelin, että minäpä olen toiminnan enkä kirjoittamisen mies. No, olen tainnut sittemmin tulla kirjoittaneeksi koko paljon ja leijonanosan siitä Turun kauppakorkeakoulun palkeilla. Taisi ynseyteeni vaikuttaa sekin aikansa seisova vitsi lehti-ilmoituksesta, jossa haettiin palvelukseen henkilöä, joka olisi ekonomi, merkonomi tai reipas nuori mies.

\* \* \* \* \*

Kun en tiennyt mistä olin kiinnostunut, opiskelin yliopistossa ensimmäisenä vuonna kymmenenkuntaa ainetta. Päädyin ensimmäisen vuoden keväällä pääaineekseni psykologiaan. Siihen oli ainakin kaksi, ei nyt niin rationaalista syytä. Ensinnäkin aineeseen oli siihen aikaan kova karsinta. Hyväksyttyjä oli 36, karsijoita oli liki pari sataa. Liehtoihan se, että oli näin kapeasta portista selvinnyt. Toiseksi, oppikoulun psykologian opettajani ilahdutti läsnäolostani kurssillaan, ja sanoi, että olipa hyvä nähdä minua mukana. Opettajat innostavat oppilaitaan usein enemmän silloin, kun eivät yritä kuin silloin, kun sitä kovasti yrittävät.

Ylioppilaskunnan toiminnasta jäi mieleen eritoten kaksi lähetystöä silloisen yliopiston rehtorin, Tauno Nurmelan luo. Ensimmäisen kerran kävi lähetystö valittamassa Nurmelalle, että ylioppilaat ovat ymmällään, koska Yliopistossa ei ole minkäänlaista organisaatiota. Nurmela vastasi jokseenkin näin: "Nuoret ylioppilaat, Te ilahdutatte minua suuresti. Olin jo ehtinyt pelätä, että se organisaatio jotenkin tunkeutuisi tännekin pilaamaan akateemista vapautta". Lähetystö poistui nolona, enkä löytänyt vielä tällöin itsessäni uinuvaa organisaatiotutkijaa. Mutta uusi lähetystö marssi Nurmelan puheille valituksenaan opiskelun suuri keskeytysprosentti. Vahva argumentti oli, että Nurmelan omassa aineessa, romaanisessa filologiassa, keskeyttäneitä oli erityisen paljon. Jäimme silti sanattomiksi, kun Nurmela vastasi: "Nuoret ylioppilaat, Te ilahdutatte minua. Ajatelkaa, pian kaikki sihterit ja konekirjoittajaretkin ymmärtävät ranskaa!".

Kaiken kaikkiaan en ollut silloin niin ihastunut korkeakouluihin. Valmistumiseni jälkeen ensimmäinen työpaikkani oli puolustusvoimien koulutusosasto, ja sieltä jäi käteeni materiaali, josta tein Suomalaisen

Yhteiskunnan tuki –järjestön apurahan tuella väitöskirjan. Kyseiseen säätiöön suomalaiset olivat viisaudessaan siirtäneet sodan jälkeen kiellettyjen järjestöjen omaisuutta. En tiedä oliko nauttimani apuraha Lottien, Akateemisen Karjalaseuran vai Suojeluskuntajärjestön jäämistöä.

\* \* \* \*

Johduin Teknillisen korkeakoulun tuotantotalouden osaston kautta ensin projektiin, sitten totaaliseksi Oy Mec-Rastor Ab nimiseen liikkeenjohdon konsulttiyritykseen. Se oli aikanaan alan pioneeri Suomessa, puoliksi ulkomaisomisteinen, ja sen henkilökunnassa oli amerikkalaisia ja englantilaisia. Yrityksen toinen virallinen kieli oli englanti ja pääkonttori Pittsburghissa. Se oli silloin ylivoimaisesti alansa johtava yritys maassamme ja maailmassakin yksi kolmesta suuresta. Olin siellä ikävuosinani 29 – 34; ne olivat, englanninkielistä sanontaa käyttääkseni, my formative years. Tutustuin silloin suureen osaan silloista merkittävintä suomalaisista liike-elämää, ja myös yrityksemme hyvin yksinkertaiset sisäiset ohjausmenetelmät ja yksilövastuinen toiminta motivoivat minua. Meillä oli 80 operatiivista henkilöä, 6 hallintohenkilöä. En olekaan oikein koskaan sopeutunut korkeakoulun mammuttimaiseen hallintoon. Olen usein miettinyt, tuntevatko kollektiiviisiin elimiimme osallistuvat oppilaamme suurtakin poisoppimisen tuskaa joutuessaan yksilövastuuun eteen liike-elämän tehtävissään.

Vuoteni Mec-Rastorissa ja myöhemmin Rastorin kehitysjohtajana olivat elämäni opettavimmat, eivät vain nyt jo vanhentuneena substanssikokemuksena, vaan perustavammin asenteina, työskentelytapoina, tapana suunnitella ajankäyttoä ja asettaa prioriteetteja.

\* \* \* \*

Istuimme Mec-Rastorin päätneuvotteluhuoneessa, toimitusjohtaja, viisi konsulttia ja neljä henkilöä OTKn johdosta. Saalistimme yrityksemme kaikkien aikojen suurinta kauppaa: 850000 FIM oli iso konsulttisopimus AD 1973. Tilaisuus oli siis tärkeä, ja sitä paitsi yrityksessä oli sääntö, että asiakaspalavereita ei saanut häiritä. Sen kummempaa oli, kun puhelin kokoushuoneessa soi, minua pyydettiin puhelimeen, ja kaiken hallitseva sihteeriimme kertoii, että täällä on joku professori Piha, joka tulee puhelinlankoja pitkin eikä puolen tunninkaan estelyn jälkeen suostu ymmärtämään, että en ole tavoitettavissa. Kalevin asia - oikeastaan määräys - oli että minun pitää oitis hakea Turun kaupakorkeakouluun.

Olin sillä kertaa vielä Kaleville tottelemanon, mutta kun siinä haussa virkaa ei saatu täyneen, ja kun seuraavan kerran viran aukitullessa olin nähtyn jo

konsulttina vanhenemisen varjopuoliakin, pistin paperini sisään. Ajattelin että tämähän antaa minulle mahdollisuksia pudottaa parit luennot viikossa, harrastaa mukavia asioita ja kävellä Naantalin puistotiellä ja miettiä suuria ajatuksia. Vähänpä tiesin, mitä tuleman piti! Minulla oli konsulttiajaltani sen verran hyviä aineistoja, että niillä julkaisuksi väännettyinä saatoin huijata virantäytöasantuntijoita ja Opetus- ja tutkimusneuvostoa myöntämään minulle pätevyydet ja virat ensin apulaiprofessuuriin ja sitten professuuriin.

\* \* \* \* \*

Vuosistani Turun kauppakorkeakoulussa olen kokenut kolme asiaa itselleni läheisiksi: Ne ovat olleet kansainvälinen toiminta, tohtorikoulutus ja johtamiskoulutus. Kaikista niistä olen saanut oppia ja kokemusta. Kulutan vielä aikaanne sanomalla jotain niistä kustakin.

Sota-ajan lapsille siis kansainvälistyminen oli tärkeä asia, suorastaan sukupolven projektti. Olin 1970-luvulla – Turun kauppakorkeakoulusta virkavapaana - ensin Kansainvälisen työjärjestön ILOn projektissa rakentamassa Centre for Management Developmentia Nigeeriaan ja ja YKn elintarvike ja maatalousjärjestön, FAOn projektissa kouluttamassa englanninkielisten Länsi-Afrikan maiden keskuspankkien, kehityspankkien ja maatalouspankkien johtajia Sierra Leonessa. Näissä hankkeissa oli paljon idealismia, naiiviakin idealismia, ja niiden evaluoinnit ovat antaneet ristiriitaisia tuloksia. Mutta minulle ne olivat vavisuttavia kokemuksia. Jo yksistään asua ja elää Afrikassa ja työskennellä afrikkalaisten ihmisten kanssa on ravisteleva kokemus, kokemus jonka jälkeen ihminen ei ole sama ihminen kuin ennen sitä. Nän kurjuutta, sitä josta mediat kertovat, mutta näin myös ystävyyttä, sukukiinteyttä, uhrautuvaisuutta, joka länsimaiselle ihmiselle on ylivoimaista käsittää. Niistätähän media ei kerro. Kokemus kyseenalaisti monia käsityksiäni. Olin onnekkaampi kuin moni muu vastaanalaississa projekteissa toiminut siinä, että voin sekä opetuksessani että kirjoituksissani Turun kauppakorkeakoulussa käyttää tätä kokemusta hyväkseni.

\* \* \* \* \*

Lukukausi Australiassa Deakin Universityssä kuuluu elämäni valoisimpiin. Olin siellä Etä-MBA-ohjelmassa, Australiassahan on etäisyysksiä. Asiaan kuului vierailla opiskelijoiden kotikaupunkiryhmässä ympäri Australiota. Tunsin olevani kuin Herran kukkarossa. Australialaisten easy-going life-style valloittaa tiukkapipoisimmankin luterilaisen enkä vieläkään ole päässyt eroon kaipuustani Australiaan. Elämässä tapaa ja unohtaa monia ihmisiä. Sydäntäni jäi Australiaan ja pysyy siellä.

\* \* \* \* \*

Virosta on tullut likipitääen toinen kotimaani. Minulla on ollut tilaisuus vierailla Virossa 30 vuoden ajan ja nyt puolentoistakymmenen vuoden ajan säännöllisesti opettajana. Ajattelen että olen ollut erinomaisella näköalapaikalla. Vuonna 1989 Tallinna näytti rähjäiseltä neuvostokaupunkipahaselalta. Kun Viro itsenäistyi ajattelin, että tästä tulee katastrofi: miten näistä lähtökohdista rakennetaan omat instituutiot, ulkomaanedustukset, valuutta ja pankkijärjestelmä, ylimalkaan itsenäisen valtion infrastruktuuri. Mutta virolaisetpa ovat osoittaneet minun olleen perin juurin väärässä epäilyksissäni. Olen saanut olla todistamassa, miten Tallinnasta on tullut vibrantti, kehittyvä kaupunki. Olen nauttinut opetuksistani Virossa. Opiskelijat siellä ovat innokkaampia ja määräätietoisempia kuin Suomenlahden tällä puolen, luulen, ennenkaikkea siksi, että *saavat* maksaa opetuksesta. Kannan Estonian Business Schoolin kunniautohtorinviihtää ylpeydellä.

\* \* \* \* \*

Jatko-opiskelijat ovat antaneet minulle paljon ilon ja oppimisen aihetta. Tohtorikoulutuksesta tuli päätöni pitäksi aikaa. Tätä hanketta en minä valinnut, vaan se hanke valitsi minut. Myönnän tuskastuneeni, kun yhtenä syksynä jatko-opiskelijoiden määrä nousi alle kymmenestä liki viiteenkymmeneen. Mutta alkusokista selvittyäni tohtorikoulutuksesta muodostui minulle hyvin suuri oppimisen paikka. Yritän selvittää miten ja miksi.

Yksi Peter Druckerin monista kuolemattomista sanonnoista on, että johtajien pitää tehdä itsensä tarpeettomaksi. Johtajien ei tule rakentaa itselleen imperiumia, vaan kehittää organisaatiotaan niin, että se alkaa tikittää ilman johtajaansa. Tämä on kärsivällisyyttä vaativaa eikä useinkaan harrastajalleen kunniaa tuottavaa. Organisaatioilla kumminkin on semmoinen idea, että ne kehittyisivät yhteisönä, eivätkä ne ole olemassa vain edistääkseen jäsentensä itsekäitä pyrkimyksiä.

Mitä tämä kuuluu tohtorikoulutukseen? Muuttavat muuttaen, professori on hyvä, kun hän on pätevä ja jatkuvasti kehittyy omassa pätevyydessänsä. Mutta akateemisena opettajana hän on vielä menestyksekämpi silloin, kun hänen oppilaistansa tulee häntä itseensä pätevämpiä. Tästä menestyksestä olen saanut nauttia moneen kertaan.

Tässä prosessissa on kolme vaihetta. Ensin oppilaat uskovat opettajaansa, siteeraavat häntä, jotkut jopa perustelevat käsityksiään sillä, että ”kun professori sanoi näin”. Toisessa vaiheessaan oppilaat alkavat kritisoida

opettajaansa. Erityisesti muistan jatko-opiskelijaani, joka luetutti minulle papereitaan, joita parhaani mukaan kommentoin. Hän kuunteli minua suu supussa, ja muutaman päivän perästä jokaisen keskustelumme jälkeen tuli sanomaan, että ei asia nyt ainakaan niin ole kuin sanoin ja esitti loistavan paperin oman argumenttinsa puolesta. Ensin koin tämän rasittavaksi, mutta pian tokenin oivaltamaan, että kyseessä oli erinomaisen lupaava tutkijantaimi ja ymmärtämään, että itsekin opin näin suuresta, eikä ihan jokapäiväisestä vilpittömyydestä. Kolmannessa vaiheessaan jatko-opiskelijat sitten keräävät erilaista ja ristiriitaista aineistoa, sulattavat sitä ja työstävät omilla aivoillaan argumenttinsa itsenäisesti läpi.

Olen aina tuntenut ja tunnen ylpeyttä tällaisista oppilaistani, ja olen ollut onnellinen saatuani matkata tätä tietä heidän rinnallaan, ja jotain heidän oppimisestaan on joka kerta tarttunut minuun. Mutta tämä omilla aivoillaan ajattelu ei ole vain akateeminen ideaali. Se on myös demokratian kivijalka. Luotan suomalaiseen demokratiaan niin kauan, kun meillä on tällainen omilla aivoillaan ajatteleva jatkuvasti uusiutuva luonnonvara. Tästä minut on vakuuttanut myös kansainvälis-komparatiivinen intressini. Luulenpa että se on yksi hyvin ratkaiseva seikka siihen, miksi emme ole kehitysmaa, vaikka 1800-luvun tilanteemme ja monet logistis-luontaiset esteemme olivat paljon vaikeammin voitettavissa kuin nykyisille kehitysmaille.

Tästä johtuu mieleeni vanha tarina kahdesta kivenhakkaajasta, joilta kysyttiin, mitä he ovat tekemässä. Ensimmäinen vastasi, että olen hakkaamassa kiveä, toinen olen rakentamassa katedraalia. Yhteisoppimisessani jatko-opiskelijoiden kanssa olen tuntenut itseni osalliseksi katedraalinrakentamiseen, jossa parhaat akateemiset ja demokraattisen yhteiskunnan ideaalit tukevat toisiaan. Ilman tohtoriopiskelijoiden kanssa elettyä tuskaa ja iloa en olisi se ihminen, joka nyt olen. Silloin tällöin joku rekrytoija soittaa ja kysyy referenssimielipidettäni tällaisista oppilaistani. Eihän suositukseni voi olla muuta kuin ääripositiivinen, ovathan he saaneet oppilainani maailman parasta koulutusta.

\* \* \* \* \*

Muistan miten vaikeaa täydennyskoulutuksen aloittaminen oli. Minulle se on ollut tärkeä portti ja mahdollisuus oppia. Olen ollut siinä eri määrässä mukana. Milloin kritiikkittömän innostuneena, milloin kertakaikkisen turhautuneena sen yhteensopimattomuudesta korkeakoulun ylihallinnollisiin proseduureihin. JOKOsta on kasvanut MBA, ja siitä on nostettava hattua Johtamiskoulutusinstituutille. Olen aina nauttinut eri rooleissani näissä tilaisuuksissa, minusta on ollut hauskaa ja mutkatonta suunnitella ja toimia kerallanne. Johtamiskoulutus on ollut minulle hyvin tärkeä ikkuna oppia siitä,

mitä tapahtuu todella sekä kurssien osallistujilta mutta myös sen järjestäjiltä. Olen usein tuntenuut sen myös henkireikänä, silloin kun muut ja etenkin hallinnolliset tehtävät ovat minua painaneet.

\* \* \* \* \*

Herra Rehtori, arvoisat kuulijat:

Olen jotenkin johtunut tähän.  
Lihonut vähän.  
En suostu sanomaan jäähhyväistä.  
Vielä on monta hetkeä täyteläistä.

Kiitos että lainasitte minulle korvianne.

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