

Reports from the Department of Philosophy
University of Turku

Metaphilosophical Themes

Naturalism, Rationalism and the Conceptions of Philosophy

Henri Pettersson



Reports from the Department of Philosophy
Vol. 41

METAPHILOSOPHICAL THEMES

Naturalism, Rationalism and the Conceptions of Philosophy

Henri Pettersson



Copyright © 2019 Henri Pettersson

SERIES EDITORS:

Olli Koistinen
Juha Räikkä

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
University of Turku
FI-20014 Turku
Finland

ISSN 1457-9332
ISBN 978-951-29-7615-7 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-7616-4 (PDF)

Grano Oy, Turku 2019

Written by

LicSocSc Henri Pettersson

Doctoral Programme of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Turku, Finland

Supervised by

Professor Jussi Haukioja

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

University of Trondheim, Norway

Professor Olli Koistinen

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science

University of Turku, Finland

Reviewed by

Professor Daniel Cohnitz

Department for Philosophy and Religious Studies

Utrecht University, Netherlands

Professor Bjørn Ramberg

Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas

University of Oslo, Norway

Opponent

Professor Daniel Cohnitz

Department for Philosophy and Religious Studies

Utrecht University, Netherlands

Chairperson (custos)

Professor Jussi Haukioja

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

University of Trondheim, Norway

The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service.

ABSTRACT

This study belongs firmly to the genre of metaphilosophy, as it reflects on topics pertaining to the subject matter, method and aim of philosophy itself by using philosophy's own usual tools and approaches. The contents of this study are divided into four main chapters, which have their own specific topics and goals.

In the first chapter the various manifestations of philosophy's multifaceted identity are under focus. We can clarify the diversity evident in philosophy by introducing the notion of conception of philosophy. These are sets of philosophical theses, which present us with their distinctive takes on philosophy's topics, methods and purposes. Conceptions of philosophy must, however, be strictly separated from other related phenomena (such as schools, traditions and movements), which are in their own ways involved in creating the pluralism existing in philosophy. To close the chapter I argue for the importance of these themes.

The second chapter examines the distinctive point of view and aim of metaphilosophical reflection and chronicles its past. I also defend the value of this inquiry. Although metaphilosophising as a form of philosophical research has a long past, it has only recently emerged as its own distinct branch in philosophy. Thus philosophers still use this name in numerous different ways, and there has not previously been many in-depth overviews of the nature of metaphilosophical reflection itself. To remedy this situation, I clarify the nature of metaphilosophy as a "philosophy of philosophy" of sorts, which is best viewed as an internal enterprise operating within the bounds of philosophy proper. I also examine the potential problematics inherent in this arrangement.

The third chapter presents as a metaphilosophical case study the so-called naturalism-question. This issue pertains to the way how to properly construe the role, province and stature of philosophy in relation to the undertakings of empirical special sciences. However, in the discussions between naturalists and anti-naturalists (who are in this work represented by advocates of the view known as metaphilosophical rationalism), there exists misunderstandings and toxic forms of rhetoric. I point out these aspects in hopes of making them more apparent. At the chapter's end I also consider the significance of the naturalism-question for the near future of philosophy.

The fourth chapter studies the methodology of the so-called armchair philosophy, that is, intuitions and the thought experiments which are used to elicit and articulate such intuitions. Despite the attention these methods have received in the recent metaphilosophical literature, there still exists confusions and disagreements in this topic. I hope to set at least few of these issues straight with my metaphilosophical examination of these themes.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tutkimus kuuluu yleisesti metafilosofian lajityyppiin, sillä siinä tarkastellaan filosofoinnin kohteisiin, menetelmiin ja tavoitteisiin liittyviä aiheita käyttäen tässä apuna filosofian omia näkökulmia. Työn tarkempi sisältö jakautuu neljään päälukuun, joilla on omat tavoitteensa. Niinpä tutkielman kysymyksenasettelut voidaan esittää parhaiten tätä rakennetta peilaten.

Ensimmäisessä pääluvussa tutkitaan filosofian moniäänisen identiteetin erilaisia ilmenemismuotoja. Filosofiasia esiintyvää rikkonaisuutta voidaan selvittää filosofiakäsitysten ajatuksen avulla, millä tarkoitetaan sellaisia filosofoinnin aiheisiin, menetelmiin ja tavoitteisiin eri tavoin kantaa ottavia kokonaiskuvia, jotka näin tehdessään ehdottavat omat filosofisesti rakentuneet vastauksensa siihen, mistä filosofiasia lopulta oikein on kyse. Filosofiakäsitykset tulee kuitenkin erottaa muista filosofian hajanaiseen profilliin vaikuttavista ilmiöistä, kuten koulukunnista ja virtauksista. Pääluvun päätteeksi puolustetaan filosofiakäsitysten välisten keskustelujen tärkeyttä.

Toinen pääluku esittelee metafilosofisen pohdinnan näkökulmaa, tavoitteita ja historiaa sekä puolustaa sen tarpeellisuutta. Vaikka metafilosofialla on ilmiönä pitkä historia filosofiasia, on se vasta hiljattain eriytynyt omaksi filosofian osa-alueekseen. Niinpä filosofit käyttävät tätä nimeä eri tavoin, eikä metafilosofisen reflektion lähtökohdista ole aiemmin tarjottu montaa systemaattista kokonaisuutena. Selvennän metafilosofisen pohdinnan luonnetta eräänlaisena filosofian sisäisenä ”filosofian filosofiana” ja tarkastelen siihen liittyviä potentiaalisia ongelmallisuuksia.

Kolmas pääluku esittelee metafilosofisena tapaustutkimuksena niin kutsutun naturalismi-kysymyksen, joka koskee sitä, miten filosofian työnkuva, reviiiri ja arvovalta ymmärretään suhteessa kokemuseräisiin luonnontieteisiin. Naturalistien ja antinaturalistien tässä työssä edustavien rationalistien kyseisestä aiheesta käymissä metafilosofisissa keskusteluissa esiintyy kuitenkin paljon väärinkäsityksiä ja ennakkoluuloja, joita pyrin omalla tarkastelullani oikomaan. Pääluvun kuluessa arvioidaan myös naturalismi-kysymyksen painoarvoa filosofian lähitulevaisuuden kannalta.

Neljäs pääluku tarkastelee niin kutsutun nojatuolifilosofian tutkimusmenetelmiä, joista naturalistit ja rationalistit ovat eri linjoilla. Näitä tutkimusmenetelmiä ovat intuitiot sekä niitä elähdyttävät ja artikuloivat ajatuskokeet. Näiden ilmiöiden osakseen saamasta huomiosta huolimatta aihepiirissä esiintyy edelleen paljon erimielisyyttä ja sekaannuksia koskien niiden luonnetta ja alkuperää, mitä tilannetta korjaan omilla tarkennuksillani.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I did not choose philosophy, philosophy chose me. Or, at least Jussi Haukioja did when he employed me at the end of the summer 2006 to work as a research assistant in his project. I owe my academic career to him. I must also thank him for the Zen-like patience he has shown as the primary supervisor of this study—despite its ever-changing timetables and topical refocuses. It took me awhile, but now it's here. I wish to thank my other supervisor, Olli Koistinen, for being a role model in the way how to approach philosophy as a profession: To tackle philosophical questions as if they were at once the most important thing in the whole world, and yet also the source of great joy. Learning this delicate balance between seriousness and boyish playfulness was important for me especially in the early parts of my academic career, when I tended at times to take the job and its occasional hardships all too personally.

I am grateful to professors Daniel Cohnitz and Bjørn Ramberg for finding the time in their busy schedules to review my lengthy and rambling manuscript. They were much more forgiving in their assessments than I would have been myself! I also want to express my gratitude to professor Cohnitz for making the trip to Turku and acting as the opponent in my public defense of this thesis. I hope the weather is sunny and warm. Dr. Juho Ritola and dr. Panu Raatikainen reviewed this text back in late 2014 when it was first examined as my licenciate thesis. Their perceptive criticism and words of encouragement pushed me to finish this project as a doctoral dissertation, for which I am indebted to them.

I wish to thank collectively all the people who have throughout the years worked in the Department of Philosophy (it was still named so when I started there before the administrative reforms necessitated later re-namings). In my time there, it was always a congenial and supportive environment. I am deeply grateful for the following persons in particular, who all have—in one way or another—helped the writing of my thesis and shaped its contents over the years: Valtteri Arstila, Jani Hakkarainen, Esa Itkonen, Jussi Jylkkä, Timo Kajamies, Anssi Korhonen, Tapio Korte, Hemmo Laiho, Mikael Melan, Rosa Rantanen, Arto Repo, Hanna-Mari Salonen, Helena Siipi, Jani Sinokki, Susanne Uusitalo and Valtteri Viljanen. At this point I feel I must single out the *Great* and *Esteemed* Markku Keinänen specifically, as he was always a great source of philosophical witticism and anecdotes in our times working together there. We shared similar eccentric preferences for working hours (late nights and weekends!) and the two of us were thus often the only people present at the office. Moving to more recent times, I thank my new colleagues at the University of Oulu for the warm welcome. Marion Lupu proofread and enhanced my English, saving me from

what could have been several embarrassing blunders. All responsibility for the possible remaining mistakes and oddities in syntax and semantics is mine.

This dissertation was worked on as a part of two projects funded by the Academy of Finland: *Externalism about Meaning and Mental Content* (project number: 214088) and *Intuitions in Philosophy* (project number: 26000061). Moreover, my work was financially aided by the The Finnish Cultural Foundation (Varsinais-Suomi Regional Fund), The Turku Finnish University Society (Valto Takala trust) and the University of Turku's Faculty of Social Sciences. The Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science picked up the bill for the proof-reading services. I thank all these institutions for making it possible for me to work on this undertaking full-time without disruptions.

Shout-out to my homeboys from various circles of life: Mika Harju, Timo Jokinen, Kimmo Karjalainen, Juha Nieminen, Timo Koivisto, Tuomas Koivisto, Juho-Aleksi Lepistö, Erkki Mäntymäki, Matias Ollila, Antti Rantala, Hannu Ruoho, Lauri Seppälä, Heikki Stenius, Kalle Suomela, Lasse Toikkanen and Juuso Tuomi. If you're reading this and see that I forgot your name, sorry! Feel free to add it here: _____. I thank my colleagues at various schools (in Halikko, Lieto and Pori) where I worked between the years 2013–18.

In Finnish: Kiitän vanhempiani Kirsti ja Lars Petterssonia kaikesta rakkaudesta ja herkeämättömästä kannustuksesta. Uravalintani ei ollut se helpoin tai rationaalisin, mutta arvostelun sijaan sain aina tukea ja myötätuntoa (kenties ohje "mieti nyt vielä!" olisi joka tapauksessa kääntynyt aloittelevalla filosofille suunnattuna tarkoituksiaan vastaan?). Kähäri 20300, nyt ja aina.

All my love to my wife-to-be Kaisa and three godchildren Jarmilla, Mio and Antti.

I've always had the kind of love-hate relationship with the school system which could perhaps be best described by borrowing a phrase from the world of Facebook: "It's complicated." As a rebelling guitar-playing teenager, I simply hated all the boring subjects and "do-as-you're-told" authoritarianism involved with the experience. What, then, have I done in my life (besides guitar playing)? Studying and teaching, mostly. So as I'm now (fingers crossed!) getting the highest school degree possible in Finland, I feel I have to address this paradox with an appropriate piece of lyric from my rock & roll hero, Bruce Springsteen:

*We busted out of class
had to get away from those fools
We learned more from a three minute record
than we ever learned in school*

Turku, April Fools' Day 2019
Henri Pettersson

Kaisalle

Contents

INTRODUCTION	13
1. ON PHILOSOPHY	23
1.1. Conceptions of Philosophy	25
1.2. Philosophical Schools, Traditions and Movements	54
1.3. The Factors Behind the Disunity of Philosophy	81
1.4. Defining Philosophy	97
1.5. Philosophy, Schmilosophy, Who Cares?	106
2. ON METAPHILOSOPHY	111
2.1. The Position and Viewpoint of Metaphilosophy	112
2.2. Is Metaphilosophy Circular?	119
2.3. Creating Metaphilosophy from Philosophy	121
2.4. The Limits of Metaphilosophy	127
2.5. Alternative Conceptions of Metaphilosophy	131
2.6. The Current State of Metaphilosophy	138
3. THE NATURALISM-QUESTION AS A METAPHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM	147
3.1. The Two Main Alternatives in the Naturalism-Question	148
3.2. The Significance and Prospects of the Naturalism-Question	175
3.3. Forms of Metaphilosophical Anti-Naturalism	188
3.4. Naturalism and Rationalism in Metaphilosophy	198
3.5. Naturalism in Contemporary Metaphilosophy	200
3.6. Rationalism in Contemporary Metaphilosophy	215
3.7. Other Neighbouring Philosophical Issues and Debates	227
4. THE METHODOLOGY OF ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY	239
4.1. Philosophical Intuitions	240
4.2. Philosophical Thought Experiments	249
4.3. The Role of Intuitions in the Dialectic of Armchair Philosophy	253
4.4. The Pre-History of Armchair Philosophy	263
CONCLUSION: METAPHILOSOPHICAL THEMES	281
BIBLIOGRAPHY	289

Social occasions, such as family get-togethers, high school reunions and so on, regularly provide me with opportunities to catch up with old relatives and friends, who often do not seem to have the faintest idea of what academic philosophy in practice is. Thus, when I mention that I am presently working in a philosophy department, I am routinely faced with the same bemused reaction: “Well, what is it that you philosophers really *do*?” Although this remark might at first blush sound like a mere ignorance on my friend’s part, it is by no means a superficial question or a reason for mockery. The basically identical question has throughout the millennia evoked lively and at times even rather passionate discussion within the community of philosophers as well. Philosophy—perhaps even to a greater degree than any other discipline in academia—has always maintained critical discussion about its own distinctive methods, topics and aspirations. An upshot of these discussions is that even today there can exist countless alternative conceptions of what philosophers really do—or, what they perhaps *ought* to do. Therefore, the simplistic question “What is it that philosophers do?” does not need to sound purely rhetorical even when voiced in a lecture given to an audience composed of professional philosophers, as these audience members might all have their own strongly opinionated views on the matter.

In one slightly narrower form, this problem is also pursued within the pages of this thesis. The pair of opposing philosophical positions called naturalism and rationalism, which play the two “leading roles” in my thesis, present us with their contending interpretations on the ideal nature of philosophy. The decisive disagreement, to be a bit more exact, between these two positions is directed on the issue of how philosophy’s role and place are to be defined in relation to the undertakings of the various empirical sciences—physics, chemistry, biology, experimental psychology and so on. In the view of the naturalists, philosophy works in a close and reciprocal co-operation with these sciences, whose results then in turn motivate, inform and guide the further work of philosophers in the various branches of philosophy. Rationalism, on the other hand, is one notable subspecies of the more general anti-naturalism, since it maintains that philosophy as a discipline possesses a distinctive quality when we consider its methods, subject matter and aims. This exceptionality also requires us to set it apart as an autonomous enterprise divorced from all empirical forms of inquiry.

The debate between naturalists and rationalists regarding the nature of the interaction between philosophy and empirical sciences has been brought up in every branch of philosophy, and it has become more and more acute over the past fifty-plus years as philosophers now often pursue an active role in multi-disciplinary projects (such as cognitive science), which frequently combine various theoretical and empirical methods and viewpoints. In situations such as these it is urgent to determine the proper job description, place and possibilities of philosophy in relation to the other fields which study these same topics side by side with philosophy. Indeed, the question of whether we should embrace naturalism or alternatively one of the many forms of anti-naturalism has turned into one of the most divisive issues in the philosophy of our time. Certain recent prognoses of philosophy's future have predicted the possibilities of such a dramatic turn of events, where the disagreements between naturalists and anti-naturalists could in the not-too-distant future even escalate to parallel the earlier schism between the movements of analytic and continental philosophy, which overshadowed large parts of the twentieth century philosophy and split the philosophical world into two separate blocs at odds with each other both philosophically and sociologically.

But in addition to this debate between naturalists and rationalists, an equally significant portion of this thesis has to do with philosophical questions pertaining to the more general matter of just *what kind of a problem* the question of philosophy's open nature exactly is, and how the study of this issue can be approached within the developing sub-discipline of philosophy now known as metaphilosophy. The various particulars of the naturalism/rationalism clash are then analysed as an illustrative case study which exemplifies many of the ideas first established earlier along the way in this thesis pertaining to the multi-faceted profile of philosophy and the metaphilosophical investigation assigned to understanding this puzzling phenomenon.

In this introduction I next present a concise summary of the contents of this study, give reason for my choice of topic(s) and in addition make some clarifying remarks on my methodology and notation.

THE CONTENTS OF THIS STUDY

Spelled out in a bit more detail, the titular metaphilosophical themes of this study can be sorted into the following four sub-groups, which also mirrors the general structure of this thesis as it is divided in the same way into four main chapters:

1) *The fragmented identity of philosophy*: As was suggested above, philosophy seems to be an unusual field among the long-tenured academic disciplines in that even in the present day there remain persistent disagreements about its proper method, subject matter and aims. These differing views about the nature and purpose of philosophy can be named as conceptions of philosophy. In the first chapter I elucidate the nature of conceptions of philosophy and examine the ways and contexts in which their diversity becomes apparent. Conceptions of philosophy themselves as a legitimate philosophical topic have not been a focus of scholarship in the previous literature, so in the course of this chapter I outline my novel account of what type of positions conceptions of philosophy are, what kind of issues they take a stance on and how the large variety of conceptions of philosophy differs from certain other forms of pluralism evident in philosophy, such as the tapestry of philosophical schools, traditions and movements—which, I contend, when compared to the conceptions of philosophy, seem to have somewhat more sociological underpinnings. Additionally, I say a few words about the way in which during the past century the processes of specialisation and professionalization have diversified the plurality brewing at the core of philosophy even further. At the conclusion of this chapter I examine how the fragmented identity of philosophy leads to the outcome that it is next to impossible to define philosophy in a short yet informative manner. Although philosophers do not always tend to take this matter all that seriously, I argue how it is actually in itself a consequential philosophical issue, which can have far-reaching ramifications for the practice of philosophy and for the position and public perception of philosophy within the larger cultural and social context.

2) *The nature of metaphilosophy*. The nascent branch of philosophy which engages with the disunity of philosophy is nowadays called metaphilosophy. But as this name is still a relatively new entry in the glossary of philosophy, there exists no clear established usage for it in the literature. To improve this situation, in this chapter I outline the viewpoint, aims and (pre)history of metaphilosophy in the hopes of making its nature well-defined. Perhaps the most important thing to recognise about metaphilosophy right away is that it is in its viewpoints a kind of “philosophy of philosophy”, which is practised within the confines of philosophy itself and by employing standard philosophical methods and viewpoints—just as happens in “ordinary” philosophical studies we are most likely already acquainted with. I clarify the nature of this situation and evaluate the potential problems of partiality and circularity inherent in it. Moreover, I explore

some proposed ways to alternatively orient the method, subject matter and aim of metaphilosophical inquiry.

3) *The question of naturalism as a metaphilosophical problem.* In the third chapter I clarify the starting points of the metaphilosophical problem concerning naturalism and survey the main naturalistic and anti-naturalistic alternatives to this matter. I also review the historical development of this issue and estimate its future importance. I then chart the different philosophical roots from which the anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy can be cultivated. However, I single out from among the larger group of anti-naturalists a view known as metaphilosophical rationalism, which in my view can be regarded as being the closest philosophical alternative to the standard forms of contemporary naturalism. I survey the various representatives of naturalism and rationalism in their own sub-chapters. At the end of this chapter I examine what kinds of links and ramifications this metaphilosophical issue potentially has for more general discussions in the theoretical field of philosophy of science, where philosophers debate about the explanatory power and objectivity of the natural sciences and their proper place in our larger worldview.

4) *The Methodology of the so-called armchair philosophy.* The metaphilosophical debates between naturalists and rationalists concern specifically a certain sub-genre of philosophising, which routinely employs the methods of intuitions and thought experiments (or, at least *appears* to do so). This methodology is now commonly referred to as “armchair philosophy” in the relevant literature. Although these issues are presently highly popular topics among metaphilosophers, there exists no consensus about them even on the basic level of the preliminary starting points. To this end, I illuminate the nature of armchair philosophy and the methods involved with it from a non-aligned perspective in the hope that we can thereby get a firmer grip of the actual topic at hand. I also look in a separate section the prospective historical precedents and role models for the current methodology of armchair philosophy.

I have placed a somewhat more detailed section-by-section summaries at the beginning of each of the four main chapters. This thesis is quite lengthy (my sincere apologies!) and it also covers quite a bit of philosophical territory, so I thought it would be helpful to provide signposting along the way to re-orient the reader. As this thesis is written in the monograph format, I will re-capitulate and analyse my original conclusions after the main chapters in a separate afterword (instead of doing it right here, as a thesis comprised of independently

published articles would conventionally do). Within this recap I also ponder on the potential worth that my conclusions might have for the philosophical follow-up work on these themes in the future.

SUBJECT MATTER

Truth be told, I must confess in the name of academic honesty that in its finalised form this thesis is a result of serendipity, not planning. I did not set out to write so extensively about the features of conceptions of philosophy or on the nature of metaphilosophical reflection. My initial choice for the topic was much more conventionally focused, as my early working title “A Critical Analysis of George Bealer’s Metaphilosophical Rationalism” reveals. The final result displayed here began its life as a brief introductory chapter to this original project on Bealer’s rationalistic conception of philosophy. Then my manuscript under this “brief” introductory chapter eventually outgrew both in length—and also qualitatively in its amount of original philosophical ideas—my planned analysis of Bealer’s rationalism. Halfway the writing process I thus made the painful yet liberating decision to concentrate my time and energy into this more fruitful direction, and ultimately there remains very few traces of my planned criticism of Bealer in the text. After all is said and done, I believe, however, that the chapters in this work stand fully on their own as a self-contained piece of philosophising, even if they originated as an introductory material to something else which ultimately never materialised.

What led me to pursue this topical refocus was more specifically the observation I made that the various topics and themes in this philosophical territory—the features of conceptions of philosophy, the intricacies of philosophical schools and traditions, the nature of metaphilosophy and so forth—remained at the time to my mind seriously under-researched and thus offered plenty of fresh ground for conducting pioneering research. When I commenced the initial preparatory work for this PhD thesis roughly ten years ago (time flies!), I first tried to find a useful summary of the metaphilosophical approach from the existing literature, which I could have then referenced as the underlying methodological framework for my own thesis too. I quickly found, however, that there was hardly any research of the kind which would explicate the nature of metaphilosophical viewpoint (akin to the way I have ended up doing within the pages of this dissertation). This lacuna in the literature is partly explained by the fact that ‘metaphilosophy’ is still a relatively recent addition to the vocabulary of philosophy, and it does not yet have any one established use—at least not to the

extent that, for example, ‘metaphysics’ and ‘epistemology’ have as widely used names for well-known branches of philosophy.

It caught my eye that the few available accounts regarding the nature and starting parameters of the metaphilosophical viewpoint were typically brief and unsystematic, and the potential implications hidden within these remarks were not explicated to their full potential. On the other hand, I noticed that philosophers were often prone to voicing disparaging and misguided views on the value and place of metaphilosophy. So, when it seemed that I could not locate a suitable reference text for my purposes, I wound up writing one myself pretty much from the scratch (this is obviously not to say that I would not have benefited from the prior literature on this subject!). I quickly realised this project now offered me a great opportunity to propose various new observations and distinctions in a previously uncharted philosophical ground. Page by page it felt as though this material was basically writing itself and what was intended to be a short sub-section amounting to few paragraphs grew to be a full-fledged chapter in its own right, which now forms the heart of this thesis.

The longest introductory texts to the topic of metaphilosophy which I could find at the start of my research were the two overall surveys written by Nicholas Joll and Yuri Cath, respectively. Joll’s “Contemporary Metaphilosophy” (2010) can be accessed in the digital resource *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (edited by Fieser & Dowden). Cath’s (2011) contribution “Metaphilosophy” is similarly a digital publication, and it has been released as a part of the compendium with the name *Oxford Bibliography Online* (edited by Pritchard). Even within these texts the lion’s share of Joll’s entry describes notable metaphilosophical positions instead of metaphilosophy *per se*, whereas Cath predominantly lists and summarises metaphilosophically relevant literature. Cath also seconds my observation that there has not yet been a systematic and detailed examination of metaphilosophy, even while the amount of metaphilosophical research has increased at a growing rate. Shorter overviews of metaphilosophy are provided by Moser (1995), Glock (1996: 244–5), Bunnin & Yu (2004), Priest (2005: 589) and Marsoobian (2008). Of the philosophical works that can be classified as belonging to the category of metaphilosophy, Timothy Williamson’s *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (2007) does not—despite its promising title—include detailed elucidation of the nature of the metaphilosophical approach itself. Instead, it basically offers Williamson’s favoured views on several currently popular metaphilosophical topics. Similar description can be applied to Morris Lazerowitz’s book *Studies in Metaphilosophy* (1964), Heikki J. Koskinen’s PhD thesis *From a Metaphilosophical Point of View* (2004) and the ninth volume of Nicholas Reschers’ collected works entitled *Studies in Metaphilosophy*

(2006). The editors of the journal *Metaphilosophy* decided also to leave this name purposefully undefined in the debut issue of their new publication. Their reasoning behind this editorial decision was that they wanted to leave the issue of metaphilosophy's nature open for the different interpretations preferred by the future writers and readers of their journal (Bunym & Reese 1970).

However, during the lengthy writing process of this thesis the situation has become markedly improved. Cambridge University Press published the first textbook on metaphilosophy under the title of *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy* (authored by Søren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert and Stephen Burwood in 2013), whereas the other leading academic publishing house, Oxford University Press, has released *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology* in 2016 (edited by Cappelen, Hawthorne & Gendler). I had mixed reactions to these releases since, on the positive side, they seemed to confirm my initial feeling that there was a philosophical topic worthy of attention here. But then, on the negative side, I worried that these works would manage to beat me to my original views pertaining to the features of metaphilosophy. Luckily, my anxieties turned out to be unfounded and my work still remains very much original (for better or worse!). And for what it is worth, if I am allowed a moment of blatant self-promotion here, in 2012 I managed to publish my central insights in a pair of articles, although in Finnish only.¹ Then in 2014 I submitted my licentiate thesis for the standard external review process and public defence. The present PhD dissertation is just about a word for word translation of that Finnish text, which was completed already five years ago (including the title of this work and the headings of all its individual chapters and sections), as my examinees Juho Ritola and Panu Raatikainen advised after their very helpful and encouraging assessment of my work. During these intervening five years I managed to labour on the translation only sporadically (mostly during the summer months), as I was employed outside of academia as a school teacher. I have added an odd paragraph or footnote here and there, but for the most part the changes to the text are purely cosmetic necessitated by the linguistic conversion process from Finnish to English.

I believe that suffices about the background of this work and its focus on metaphilosophy. But we are not quite done yet with this section I am afraid. The latter half of my thesis focuses on the metaphilosophical juxtaposition between

¹ Published as "Filosofisen argumentaation autonomisuus" [= "The Autonomy of Philosophical Argumentation", see Pettersson (2012a)] and "Metafilosofia ja filosofian itseymmärrys" [= "Metaphilosophy and the Self-Understanding of Philosophy", see Pettersson (2012b)]. I also taught an introductory course on metaphilosophy (based on my work in progress) at the University of Turku during the spring term of 2012.

two contending conceptions of philosophy, namely naturalism and rationalism. In addition to these conceptions of philosophy, I also examine the set of methods they embrace in their philosophising. My aim in this thesis, however, is not to ambitiously solve the quarrel between naturalists and rationalists once and for all, and I will not propose any novel arguments in any of its philosophical sub-themes. Neither will I simply present new naturalistic or anti-naturalistic philosophy within the purview of certain branch of philosophy, such as in ethics or metaphysics, for example. Instead, my work clarifies in several *metaphilosophical* ways the starting points and assumptions of the debate itself. In my estimate, there is a need for a clarifying study of this kind, since there seems to be a lot of preconceptions, pigeonholing, loaded stereotypes and just plain toxic rhetoric in the language coming from both sides of the debate which can, for example, question the ulterior motives or philosophical acumen of the opposing side. All these factors make it increasingly harder to conduct a civilised philosophical dialogue across the metaphilosophical party-lines. My central aim is to point out these kinds of misunderstandings and offer tools as to how we can make the discussions about the question of naturalism clearer for everyone involved. Moreover, I aim to raise questions of various kinds, which can hopefully lead to a deeper understanding of the relevant issues. Full disclosure: I must come clean on the fact that my initial sympathies (or, more accurately, instinctive “gut-feelings”) have since the beginning of my philosophy studies been on the side of the naturalists in these debates, and this might be evident in some of my remarks and emphases—although I have strived to generally maintain a neutral and balanced tone in my assessments.

Certain sections of this work are more assertive in tenor and style while others provide exposition on the pertinent background matters (especially in the third and fourth chapters). It is generally expected of PhD dissertations that the candidate demonstrates familiarity with the relevant literature in the field, and I have tried to do just that (which may explain certain expository passages and verbose footnotes). Moreover, I am a teacher by my education (and by my intellectual temperament too I guess), and this personal character trait might display itself at times in “textbookish” writing style where I at the same time introduce the reader to the matter at hand and provide my insights to these particular issues.

METHODOLOGY

As is suggested by its title, this dissertation belongs decisively to the philosophical sub-discipline of metaphilosophy. I feel that no lengthy explanations or defences regarding the exact nature of the metaphilosophical approach are warranted here in the context of this introduction, as I shall delve into the methods, subject matter and aims of metaphilosophy quite amply in the pages to come (methodological self-consciousness is maintained throughout the text). For those readers who have the time and energy only to skim over the first few pages of this work, I can summarise the gist of this approach by noting that metaphilosophy is basically equal to the philosophy of philosophy in its basic orientation. Metaphilosophy thus considers basic questions pertaining to the nature of philosophy (and other closely related issues) by employing philosophy's own standard standpoints and evidential sources. This self-referential characterisation is not particularly enlightening, since we still need to understand what philosophy itself is. I examine these questions in the first two main chapters of my thesis. As was already stated, when I discuss the nature of the debate concerning the naturalism-question (in the third chapter) and the methodology of the armchair philosophy (in the fourth chapter), I aim to clarify metaphilosophically the starting parameters of these debates without taking sides in these matters or offering novel arguments in these debates.

Speaking generally, I believe that much of my research here follows the metaphilosophical view which sees philosophising as mapping out the space of reasons. What this poetic metaphor means is that the aim in philosophising is not to ambitiously prove or disprove philosophical views conclusively, but rather to phrase the relevant issues in a clear and distinct way, to see what kind of considerations and arguments speak for and against the competing philosophical views in this territory, to assess the costs and values of holding a particular view in this topic and so forth, and by so doing *hopefully* further the discussions about these matters in a way, which can be acceptable to other philosophers as well. I do not know if this description can or should be extended to cover all philosophising, but I think it fits perfectly to what I have strived to do regarding the nature of conceptions of philosophy, metaphilosophical inquiry and many other themes covered in the pages of this dissertation. In many places I have tried to say the first words on some topic, not the last. In the likely event where someone comes up with a better way to approach these issues or draws different conclusions from the same initial considerations, this would be, to my

mind, a highly welcome development for the field of philosophy and then my work would have served its modest purpose.

REGARDING NOTATIONS, TRANSLATIONS AND REFERENCES

‘Single quotes’ are used when referring to terms and phrases from the natural languages. Small caps are used to refer to concepts and propositions. Italics are used for emphasis. In citations I have preserved the conventions employed in the original text (even in the cases where they clash with the style of the main text).

I have given the references in accordance with the so-called Harvard system (Author-date form), comprised of a bracketed in-text citation and a corresponding bibliography entry at the very end of the text. However, in the case of certain classic sources (which might now have been reprinted in dozens and dozens of later editions and translations), I give the original year of publication in square brackets instead, for example, Kant [1781/1787]. The actual edition (and possible translation) I have used is then specified in the bibliography. This usage is chosen in order to display a chronological order of events, as my work aims at certain points to paint a historical narrative of particular developments in philosophy. In the cases where there exists an established convention to refer to a classic text, I have adhered to these customary guidelines (for example, in the case of Plato’s dialogues all references follow the so-called Stephanus-pagination included in most academic editions of Plato’s works).

In linguistic matters, I have chosen to follow the British form of English spelling.

On the face of it, the puzzle, “What is philosophy?” ought to be easy to resolve. It certainly sounds like the innocent questions often voiced by curious children eager to be taught the meanings of unfamiliar words from the language of adults. The expectation is, accordingly, that one can answer this seemingly simplistic challenge in a straightforward manner by summarising the set of distinctive features which together characterise philosophy and set it apart from all other activities deemed as “non-philosophy”. Yet in this case, the outward appearance of simplicity is deceiving. For as will be demonstrated in the pages of this chapter, reflections on philosophy’s identity differ both in *depth* and in *difficulty* from comparable self-examinations entertained within the confines of other long-tenured disciplines in the academia. How come? As the very nature of philosophy itself is philosophically contentious and open for discussion, there can co-exist a wide variety of different visions about what philosophy really is, how it functions and what it ultimately aspires to achieve. “Philosophy, perhaps more than any other discipline, has been plagued by debates about what the discipline is or ought to be”, as Leiter (2004: 1) states. The upshot of all this is that the quarrels about these matters continue to spark vigorous debates among philosophers even today and splinter them into countless disagreeing factions. In Critchley’s (2010) bold estimate “[t]here are as many definitions of philosophy as there are philosophers—perhaps there are even more.” I am sure Critchley did not mean this hyperbolic remark to be taken literally, but its basic sentiment seems to be on the right track.

We can get a much firmer grip of the nature of these disagreements by bringing in the special term of conceptions of philosophy. In brief, conceptions of philosophy are sets of philosophical theses about the underlying nature and purpose of philosophy itself. In this form, they put forward their approaches on what philosophy’s subject matter, methods and aims ultimately are. The general nature and theoretical structure of conceptions of philosophy as kinds of philosophical doctrines are elaborated more closely next in Section 1.1. After the necessary groundwork, this theme is then pursued further in Section 1.2, where the links and divergences between conceptions of philosophy and wide array of philosophical schools, traditions and movements—together with the names, epithets, banners, labels and other designations which are customarily used to denote these phenomena in various philosophical discussions—are taken under scrutiny. I argue that it is important to separate conceptions of philosophy, *qua*

philosophical positions, from philosophical schools and similar intellectual communities formed by individual philosophers, which, when contrasted with conceptions of philosophy, are at least partly bound together by the sociological ties existing between their members, whereas conceptions of philosophy should be thought of as abstract philosophical positions independent of their actual advocates. These differences notwithstanding, the various kinds of social networks formed by philosophers nevertheless frequently influence the attitudes and actions of the thinkers affiliated with them—including the ways in which conceptions of philosophy are discussed and how conceptions of philosophy are advocated by philosophers in debates: Most importantly, there are toxic forms of biases and loaded rhetoric, which can come into play here and threaten to disrupt any constructive dialogue between representatives of contesting conceptions of philosophy. Thus, I argue, it is wise not to completely disregard what might be happening on the sociological stratum of schools, traditions and movements when we talk about the conflicts between contending conceptions of philosophy—even if conceptions of philosophy themselves are philosophically construed abstract positions and assessments of their merits should ideally be conducted in purely philosophical terms. After these considerations Section 1.3 searches for factors—both historical and present-day—behind philosophy’s unusual internal disunity. This inspection reveals the relevant aspects deep down in philosophy’s own nature which, in general, enable the multifaceted nature of philosophy to emerge in the first place. One striking symptom of philosophy’s pluralistic identity is that it is frustratingly difficult to define philosophy in a concise yet informative way. This difficulty is manifest in many introductory courses and textbooks on philosophy, as they typically sidestep the complexities involved in discussing the nature and purpose of philosophy at the length and depth it truly calls for. I explore this predicament together with some illustrative examples in Section 1.4. To close this chapter, I argue in the fifth section that the question of philosophy’s nature is in itself a substantial philosophical problem in need of a well-thought and reasoned answer. Moreover, our favoured answer to this issue can have surprisingly far-reaching consequences for the praxis, status and public perception of academic philosophy in the larger social and cultural context. These issues are thus not to be simply brushed off only as tiresome and inconsequential self-reflections with no relevance whatsoever to “real” philosophising. Moreover, thinking about these issues is not always a waste of valuable time and energy which would be much better spent by getting *real* philosophy done, as certain philosophers have derivatively opined.

1.1 CONCEPTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

Before we get this section truly off the ground, a few quick qualifications are in order. First, it should be stressed that within the pages of this treatise my attention is exclusively on Western philosophy as it now taught and studied at universities, colleges and other comparable institutions of higher learning and research. Thus, when I referenced the multifaceted identity of philosophy a moment ago, I was describing specifically the discrepancies present within the family tree of Western philosophy, rather than contrasting the respective peculiarities of the major philosophical traditions produced by the different cultures at different geographic regions around the world—Africa, the Middle East, Australia, India, East Asia, Mediterranean coastal areas and so on.¹ On the other hand, the specific reference to *academic* philosophy is meant to exclude here the various alternative uses and connotations which the word ‘philosophy’ together with its cognates and antonyms have in casual everyday language. In this regard philosophy differs from the majority of other academic disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, whose names sound more exclusively “academic” and do not carry alternative meanings or convey confusing over-tones in the way ‘philosophy’ unfortunately can do (Leiter 2004a: 1).

In the everyday vernacular ‘philosophy’ is habitually used to mean an overarching vision or a guiding principle behind some kind of a deliberate action or behaviour. To give a few examples, in this colloquial sense parents can raise their children following a certain “philosophy”, or an ice hockey coach can have a unique “philosophy” about the way his team should pass the puck on the power play. More broadly, in the eyes of the non-academic audience, almost any thought perceived as sufficiently deep or cryptic enough can be regarded as “philosophical” (and correspondingly persons disposed to such thoughts are

¹ Such assessments of the large-scale philosophical traditions originating from all around the world belong to the so-called “comparative (meta)philosophy” (see Wong 2001/2014; for a critical discussion, see Weber 2013). These issues are certainly intriguing and, in some ways, even relevant to the central issues of this chapter. However, for reasons of space (and also for the lack of any in-depth familiarity with these non-Western philosophical traditions), I must limit my study solely to the various movements and sub-traditions of the Western philosophy—which, on the other hand, is by no means a self-contained tradition, as it has always exercised fruitful cultural exchange with philosophical traditions from the non-Western cultures (for example, the Greek philosophers were influenced by wisdom from North Africa and Mesopotamia etc.), so the notion of ‘Western’ philosophy is at its outermost boundaries vague (nowadays philosophers belonging to the movement of analytic philosophy sometimes replace the term of ‘Western’ philosophy with the label of ‘Anglo-American philosophy’ which thus has even more restricted scope). Nevertheless, I trust the basic connotation of the label ‘Western philosophy’ is well-understood.

often deemed to have a “philosophical” temperament or outlook—which is not always meant as a compliment, as it can also suggest the personality traits of absentmindedness and pretentiousness). In these connotations philosophy and its practitioners are often seen as crafting aphorisms, pieces of fortune cookie wisdom, oracular pronouncements, and other similarly brief proverbs, which convey some profound insight about life, death, love, happiness, art, sadness, suffering, success, humanity, redemption, God, universe, or some other equally lofty topic. Sometimes philosophy is taken to mean a specific mental frame of mind, which can be demonstrated as stoic calmness in the face of adversities and misfortunes, such as serious illness or nearing death. It was then in this sense that philosophy was referenced when the twentieth century American baseball star Lou Gehrig proclaimed near the end of his life (see Eig 2005: 3–4): “I intend to hold on as long as possible and then if the inevitable comes, I will accept it philosophically and hope for the best.”

Just to give one rather tangible example, such everyday (mis-)associations can regularly be encountered at the bookshelves assigned to “philosophical” literature in libraries and book stores. These might offer, along with the usual discourses of Plato, Descartes and Kant, various kinds of self-help manuals and guidebooks of life coaching, anthologies of collected aphorisms and proverbs, spiritual New Age literature, pseudo-psychology, arcane wisdom, outright humbug and just about everything in between—as many friends of academic philosophy have probably at some point had to their irritation notice.² The commonness of these everyday misconceptions is one of the reasons why professional philosophers can sometimes find it awkward—or even outright embarrassing—to tell new people in social situations what they do for a living: speaking from a history of personal experience here, using the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ in self-introduction are prone to create awkward misunderstandings and rouse unwanted follow-up questions. Ayer (1969: 1), too, reports having had some familiarity with such reactions:

² For example, the proprietary *Dewey Decimal Classification* system, which is the most prominent method to catalogue and arrange library books on the basis of their subject matter, includes under the main class of “100 Philosophy and psychology” a division on “130 Parapsychology and occultism” (between the neighbouring divisions on “120 Epistemology” and “140 Philosophical schools of thought”). The system was originally devised by the American librarian Melvin Dewey in the 1870s. Many of the alternative classification systems used in libraries around the world at least to some extent derived from the Dewey system, and feature similar proximity between philosophy and pseudo-scientific topics. Thus, books from these fields can be found next to each other in many libraries even today. See Berman ed. (2001).

“What do you do?”; people sometimes ask me. “I am a philosopher.” If I am lucky, the conversation ends there, but often it continues: “Well, I suppose we are all of us philosophers in our different ways; I mean we all have our own ideas about the purpose of life. Now what I think ...” Or else: “A philosopher: I envy you in these difficult times. To be able to take things calmly, to rise above the petty vexations that trouble us ordinary men.” Or again: “That must be fascinating: really to understand people, to be able to reach their souls. I am sure you could give me some good advice.” Or, worst of all: “What is philosophy?”

Blackburn (1999: 1–2) shares a similar sentiment about having to out himself as a philosopher to strangers:

The word ‘philosophy’ carries unfortunate connotations: impractical, unworldly, weird. I suspect that all philosophers and philosophy students share that moment of silent embarrassment when someone innocently asks us what we do. I would prefer to introduce myself as doing conceptual engineering. For just as the engineer studies the structure of material things, so the philosopher studies the structure of thought.

The introductory courses and textbooks on philosophy, which aim to present philosophy to a new audience, sometimes distinguish the academic philosophy of universities sharply from these other “less academic” meanings of the word ‘philosophy’. McGinn (2012) has even proposed tongue-in-cheek that to avoid these tarnishing confusions academic philosophy should re-brand itself with a completely novel name. It should be noted, however, that as the running argument of this main chapter goes, there are considerable variations of opinion about the nature of philosophy even *within* the academic philosophy. Thus, it is imaginable, that some views concerning the nature and purpose of philosophy reside closer to the sphere of the aforementioned everyday meanings of the word ‘philosophy’ than certain others. Then the need for making an explicit and stark contrast between academic and non-academic “folk philosophy” can *in some cases* be a less pressing matter. I suspect that for those philosophers who received their formative philosophical education within the tradition of analytic philosophy and who are now working on one or another of the core areas of so-called theoretical philosophy — epistemology, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, historiography of philosophy — this contrast between the everyday and academic meanings of ‘philosophy’ will be more glaring. Speaking on a general level and applicable to all cases, the most obvious difference between academic and non-academic forms of folk philosophy is

probably the degree of professionalism involved – that is to say, academic philosophy is in comparison done more systematically and goal-orientedly, expressed by using more technical language and style, published in specialised journals and so forth.

With these necessary preliminaries out of the way we can now proceed to examine in greater detail some of the circumstances in which the philosophy's internal diversity manifests itself to us. It is perhaps appropriate to begin by contrasting philosophy's atypical condition to those of other common academic disciplines. In general, an established field of inquiry can be demarcated from other branches of learning by referencing the specific subject matter (or, in the cases where we might think that the discipline's subject matter is actually reducible to certain more fundamental subject matter, then the level of explanation used to approach that subject matter) which belongs to this field as its scholarly responsibility.³ The standard pattern here is that this characteristic, which helps to anchor the identity of a discipline, is already spelled out clearly in this discipline's name together with a suitable Greek suffix (-ology, -onomy, -tics etc.) or along some other convention customarily used to christen new scientific

³ Well, at least *approximately*. My brief account in the main text inevitably streamlines these matters to a certain degree. In reality overlaps and ambiguities obviously exist within the boundaries of established disciplines, too. Additionally, we can also note that within certain academic fields, such as psychology and educational science, which incorporate diverse methodological approaches and types of data, there can in practice exist wide gulfs among the scholars of this field, such as between the practitioners of qualitative and quantitative research, for example (Elmes, Kantowitz & Roedinger 2011: 47–8). And then we have fields such as economics and linguistics, where there exists sectarianism not unlike the situation in philosophy, so that the disagreements between the rival schools of thought in these fields can in extreme cases reach even to the foundational questions of how the subject matter, method and aim of that discipline should be properly understood.

Furthermore, if we move on to consider the underpinnings of pretty much any special science we can find deep issues which are open to different philosophical interpretations (such as the alternatives of Platonism, constructivism, fictionalism and so on found in the philosophy of mathematics). For instance, the question regarding the nature of the relationship between philosophy and sciences (which is, of course, examined quite thoroughly in this dissertation) is by no means unique to philosophy, as similar problems have come up in the fields of formal sciences and humanities too (see Section 3.7). With that being said, it still feels that philosophy's identity crisis is only one of its kind when we consider its all-encompassing and chronic nature. Smart (1975: 60), for example, compares philosophy on this aspect to natural sciences: "The trouble about philosophy is not that we get disagreement about fundamental issues. Such disagreement occurs healthily in science. It is that we get something like *total* disagreement or even total incomprehension." I hope that the unique character of philosophy's open identity will become evident through the various observations highlighted in the course of this main chapter.

fields and sub-fields in the standard academic nomenclature (such as the instances of the templates ‘S studies’ and ‘S science’, where the placeholder S can be replaced with the relevant subject matter).

With this general template in mind, we can note that physicists study the behaviour of matter and energy, Ancient Greek *phusiké* meaning “knowledge of nature”. Similarly, biologists—after the Ancient Greek word for life, *bios*—take on the aspects, evolutionary history and taxonomic classification of living organisms. Finally, geologists—the operative root word being the Ancient Greek name for the Earth, *Geo*—examine our planet, its natural history and the processes which continue to transform it even now. The specific domains and the identities of these disciplines are thus nailed down firmly. All graduates from these fields hailing around the world have probably received similar basic training during their formative education, which has prepared them to apply the methods of their respective disciplines in novel research. They are also most likely up-to-date with the received theories and frontlines of their particular focus areas, so they know what problems they are presently attempting to solve. Mutually shared background factors such as these unite scholars of an academic field and create the beneficial cohesion and the camaraderie in their ranks (Kuhn [1962]: 176–7). Consider the cases of multidisciplinary research projects, such as the science studies, futurology or gender studies, for example. In such undertakings researchers from several fields come together under one big umbrella to study a specific phenomenon with diverse methodologies and approaches. If two scholars with similar backgrounds, in biology for instance, take part in such a multidisciplinary research project, they can easily find aspects which unite them and help to distinguish them from the other researchers—physicists, historians, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and what have you—who are also in their own ways contributing to that same effort.⁴

Breaking with this mould, in philosophy—even after over two millennia since those halcyon days of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who are commonly revered as the philosophy’s three most important founding fathers—there still exists no conclusive agreement about philosophy’s subject matter, method or job description. The minimal consensus, which philosophers *do* share about the nature of their subject, is short and susceptible to incompatible interpretations (this issue will come up again in better detail some pages later in Section 1.4).

⁴ I do not mean to downplay the fact that the researchers working within the special sciences too have their own narrow niches of specialisation and distinct methods used to investigate them (and the scale of this phenomenon has increased at an accelerating rate in recent times when scientists are working more and more to establish their own unique research, see Section 1.3).

As is well documented by the literature, philosophers tend to disagree fervently about practically every possible (and impossible) philosophical topic. As Glock (2008a: 8) writes: “There is literally no position on vaguely philosophical issues that has not been adopted by someone who is generally regarded as philosopher.” To humorously illustrate this curious plurality Coope (2009: 199) paraphrases the old Jewish saying “Two Jews, three opinions” with the slight modification that two philosophers can in fact hold between them *four* distinct philosophical views.⁵

The questions about the nature and purpose of philosophy itself are no exceptions here, and they too are included in the scope of these disagreements. As a result, if two random philosophers happen to lend their abilities to a multidisciplinary research project of some kind, their proposed contributions can differ greatly from each other. This follows from the fact that it is possible for them to have different—perhaps even directly conflicting—views about what fruitful philosophising actually is, and how it can best aid other sciences. In other words, their views diverge already at the earliest stage, namely, on the issue of how the very nature and purpose of their field should be conceived—and not merely on some of philosophy’s newest theoretical developments or intellectual fashions.

The following scenario is thus plausible, perhaps even relatable to many philosophers from their personal experiences: Two previously unacquainted philosophers happen to meet for the first time under the auspices of a large philosophical gathering, such as the *World Congress of Philosophy* for example. After introducing themselves and their particular scholarly topics of interest, they do their best to keep the philosophical small talk going. They quickly realise, however, that they do not even understand each other’s philosophising or the driving impulses motivating it. And it is not simply the case that they have a too limited background knowledge of each other’s specific topics to be conversant in them (which might very well happen also in the case of two biologists or physicists, who work in special areas too far apart), but rather that they have even after sincere attempts lingering difficulties to find common ground between their philosophical efforts. It might even turn out that the first philosopher’s thoughts about the nature of philosophy directly contradict and undermine the theses which are the most foundational assumptions in the other philosopher’s point of view. Then if one of these philosophers tries to point out some related piece of evidence, which in her assessment bears clearly on their disagreement, the other philosopher might not come to recognise the legitimacy

⁵ Much more exact and research-based data of the extent of these disagreements is provided by the survey of Bourget & Chalmers (2014).

or relevance of this piece of evidence in philosophical debates. In situations such as these, it is understandably laborious for these philosophers to see how their philosophical endeavours can constructively be part of the same grand project which would be driven by a collectively shared aim. One such an encounter is recounted by A.J. Ayer (1977: 288), a British representative of the school of logical empiricism, who in his autobiography recalls his informal socialising with the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty:

[I]t might have been expected that Merleau-Ponty and I should find some common ground for discussion. We did indeed attempt it on several occasions, but never got very far before we began to wrangle over some point of principle, on which neither of us would yield. Since these arguments tended to become acrimonious, we tacitly agreed to drop them and meet on a purely social level, which still left us quite enough to talk about.

When compared with other similar long-tenured disciplines, there is also something else which is a bit eccentric in the case of philosophy's identity. Broadly speaking, the agreement about the underlying issues concerning a certain field increases with time among the representatives of this field. The nonconformists who wander too far-off from the mainstream are typically exiled from their scientific communities. However, in philosophy, the disagreements about the defining issues of this field have paradoxically only *magnified* the closer we get to the present day (this thought is examined in the Section 1.3). It is striking, that several prominent philosophers—by no means marginalised fringe figures—have even during recent times thoroughly challenged certain time-honoured views related to how philosophy has been understood in the past. Thus, for example, Wittgenstein and Heidegger—in their own respective spheres of influence indisputably the two most celebrated philosophers of the previous century—discarded the greater part of the work done by their predecessors, including the whole of such established branches of philosophy as metaphysics and ethics. Both philosophers, in fact, had at some point even visions of *supplanting* the traditional philosophy entirely with their new kind of inquiry (see Glock 2008a: 178; Philipse 2009: 172).

Glock (2008a: 7) describes philosophy's idiosyncratic condition in the following fashion:

The natural sciences have to establish their own fields and methods no less than philosophy. However, at least since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, they have done so in ways which have been increasingly less controversial, with the result that disputes about the nature of the subject

no longer play a significant role. Even in times of scientific revolutions, scientific debates do not usually concern questions such as what astronomy is. And an introduction to that subject will not be a survey of warring schools on this issue—as it might well be in philosophy.

The alternative responses to the question “What is philosophy?” can be called *conceptions of philosophy*.⁶ A conception of philosophy offers an outlook regarding the proper function, status and methodology of philosophy together, perhaps, with explicit reasons and arguments in favour of these philosophical views. There exists some previous literature on this topic, but I would argue that my treatment here and in the following sections is the most systematic and richest available, whereas the previous theorising on the subject is mostly limited to scattered and unsystematic observations, which are moreover typically expressed in the narrower context of examining a specific conception of philosophy, and therefore these observations can have a constrained bearing on only particular sub-type of conceptions of philosophy.⁷ In what follows, I aspire to suggest novel notions, analyses and distinctions in this area, which can then

⁶ This piece of philosophical terminology has already become somewhat established in the literature on this topic, although some philosophers speak alternatively of ‘visions’, ‘pictures’, ‘perspectives’ and the like about the nature and purpose of philosophy. For example, Cooper (2009) writes in Wittgensteinian vein of “images of philosophy”, since, following Wittgenstein, he thinks that these images cannot be proven or disproven from the “outside”, theoretically speaking. The reason for this is that these pictures *themselves* set the rules for what their proof or disproof would ultimately mean. Double (1996: 4) writes of the same phenomenon with the name of ‘metaphilosophy’: “By a *metaphilosophy* I mean a view of what philosophy is, what philosophy can do, and, especially, what philosophy is for” (see also Morrow & Sula 2011; Horwich 2012; Talisse 2017; etc.). This is a fitting choice because it connects the contents of conceptions of philosophy and their philosophical investigation (see the next main chapter) closely together. However, despite being terminologically economical, the choice of putting these two separate phenomena under the same noun can also create unneeded confusion, and for this reason I prefer to talk of conceptions of philosophy—although I use the adjectival form of the word ‘metaphilosophy’ (that is, ‘metaphilosophical’) to tag individual conceptions of philosophy (that is, *metaphilosophical* naturalism and *metaphilosophical* rationalism) and to differentiate them from “ordinary” philosophical positions, schools, movements, traditions, and so on in the cases where their names come close to each other (that is, *epistemological* naturalism and *epistemological* rationalism).

⁷ For literature on conceptions of philosophy, see the previous footnote. It would be interesting to compare my ideas of conceptions of philosophy with the notions of *normal science* (Kuhn [1961]), *research programmes* (Lakatos 1970) and *research traditions* (Laudan 1977) suggested within the more general philosophy of science. A subject, perhaps, for a different day. Certain similarities between these phenomena are, however, surveyed in the next section.

hopefully sow seeds for future philosophising touching on the ultimate nature of philosophy. But let us now continue onwards with the main issue at hand.

It is imperative to note right away that the conceptions of philosophy are not in any way overly complex theoretical positions of the kind which would remain in some manner completely divorced and distant from the grassroots level of general philosophising. On the contrary, it is not exceedingly laborious to come across with instances of conceptions of philosophy in the literature. The straightforward reason for this is the unavoidable fact that philosophy is by definition always practiced from the viewpoint of one conception of philosophy or another, so in practice every philosopher has already adopted some sort of an outlook to the issues of what philosophy is, how it is practised and to what end—even if the specifics of this outlook are not really expressed *explicitly* anywhere in her philosophising (similar point is raised by Pettit 2004: 305; on metametaphysics, see Tahko 2015: 2). Indeed, conceptions of philosophy can remain unarticulated and unargued even to their adherents so that the foundational theses and theoretical background commitments and suppositions of their philosophising are conveyed only implicitly somewhere between the lines and without the backing of premeditated arguments (a conception of philosophy might thus in a way simply encapsulate tacit knowledge regarding the practice of philosophy, which the philosopher has absorbed from her teachers and textbooks during her formative training without having at any time been explicitly told that this indeed is the correct way of philosophising). For this reason a conception of philosophy can very well in closer scrutiny turn out to be inherently inconsistent or otherwise contradictory group of theses. Such failures can understandably be inviting targets for criticism in philosophical debates. Even in the cases where a philosopher has expressed her thoughts about the nature of philosophy explicitly, her thoughts can differ from her actual philosophical practice—at least in the eyes of her critics, who can then in debates raise critical suggestions that the target of their criticism should follow to the code of “practise what you preach”. (This can happen, for example, in the cases where a philosopher makes use of a kind of evidence or form of argumentation, which she explicitly claims to reject in her conception of philosophy).

There is another recurrent line of thinking often invoked in discussions related to conceptions of philosophy which is useful to introduce early on. We can name this phenomenon as the *hermeneutic dimension of conceptions of philosophy*. As we shall witness in the course of this study, when philosophers put forward their preferred accounts of philosophy’s nature and purpose, they often contend to correctly describe not only their own philosophical work, but the true underlying character of the best philosophising done by their peers as well. Their

claim is then, that these other philosophers in question—who might be our contemporaries or perhaps even already long since deceased and buried figures now canonised in the annals of philosophy—have misunderstood what they are really trying to accomplish with their philosophy, and thus a proper reconstruction can set this record straight and steer future philosophising based on their foundational work in the correct direction. The benefit of such a line of thinking is that we then do not need to dismiss the philosophical contributions of these other philosophers as utter failures or meaningless nonsense, and we can instead show that they were simply mistaken and confused in their self-image regarding what they were really trying to achieve. So, if we rectify these misunderstandings, we can put their efforts into proper context where they can still be used as a footing for new philosophising. But I will leave this topic for now and return to it in further detail in the Section 2.5.

After these general introductory thoughts on the subject, we can move on to look in greater detail just what kind of a positions conceptions of philosophy themselves are. Here I propose, that it is best to see conceptions of philosophy as providing their distinctive responses to these closely intertwined three topics:

- What is philosophy about (the subject matter of philosophy)?
- How should philosophy be pursued (the method of philosophy)?
- Why is philosophy practised (the aim of philosophy)?

It is my assessment that this triad can be regarded as “the key questions” for conceptions of philosophy on the account of their centrality. With this centrality I mean that we can derive countless more focused and closely defined follow-up questions from the above three questions, whereas in comparison these key questions seem more universal in their spirit and they cannot be subsumed under some more general philosophical question—other than perhaps simply “What is philosophy?” An analogous proposal regarding the main issues for conceptions of philosophy is put forward by Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013: 11) who write:

It is helpful, we think, to divide the central metaphilosophical questions into three large groups: *What* is philosophy? *How* should we do it? and *Why* should we do it? It is important not to misunderstand this suggestion. We do not mean to deny the obvious fact that the three questions are closely related in many ways.⁸

⁸ Moreover, Cath (2011) suggests a similar view in slightly different terms: “[T]hree very general metaphilosophical questions are (1) What is philosophy? (2) What is, or what should be,

Together with their centrality another thing which makes these three questions so crucial is that all conceptions of philosophy have answered them at least in one form or another in order to actually do philosophy of any kind. If a philosopher does not have the slightest idea of what, how or why she is philosophising in the first place, the result will in all likelihood be just easily criticisable sub-par philosophy. However, it is best at this time to not limit in advance what kind of a reply qualifies as a potential answer to one of the three questions. That would lead us, to state the obvious, to the contentious topic of where the precise outer boundaries of philosophy's essence lie: When we specify the outer bounds of acceptable answers, we also limit what philosophy might be and shut out certain conceptions of philosophy. So, for now, at least, it is best to remain as liberal as possible on the issue and allow some leeway for varied conceptions of philosophy — this initial liberalism does not preclude us from narrowing our focus later on. More importantly, it should not be read as an endorsement of “anything goes” relativism regarding these issues on my part.⁹

In addition to the three central “A-questions” listed above, it is possible to compose a host of supplementary “B-questions” for conceptions of philosophy to respond to. These responses can then help us to better flesh out the distinctive characters of individual conceptions of philosophy and also render the full range of potential views about the nature and purpose of philosophy. Below is a list of some examples of such B-questions arranged under the following sub-topics: 1) The problems of philosophy; 2) The motivation for philosophising; 3) The methods of philosophising and sources of knowledge which philosophy uses to approach its tasks; 4) The praxis of philosophy; 5) Questions concerning the role normative values play in philosophising and its pronouncements; 6) The relationship between philosophy and its history; 7) Philosophy's external liaisons with neighbouring intellectual pursuits, artistic activities, crafts and social phenomena. I will next simply spell out these examples without going into their subtleties and without sketching any of the possible responses to these questions (it should still be recognised that in most of the cases listed here this realm of possible answers includes the firm “no” and the possibility of wanting

the point of philosophy? (3) How should one do philosophy? Those questions resolve into a host of more specific meta-philosophical conundra[.]”

⁹ Although the three central questions for conceptions of philosophy seem to already commit us to a specific view in which all conceptions of philosophy regard philosophy as an activity of some sort (and this activity has a target, method and purpose). A mere idle daydreaming about nothing in particular (and for no particular reason) does thus not count *ab initio* as a potential conception of philosophy. I guess some philosopher might have an issue with this pre-condition and find it too restrictive, but I do not really see what we should answer to these people as their view of ‘philosophy’ is so far removed from the standard understanding(s).

to abstain from answering in any way, if that particular issue is deemed to be totally irrelevant by a conception of philosophy).

Firstly, starting with the problems of philosophy, conceptions of philosophy might have a say on issues such as the following: Does philosophy have its own open problems distinct from those of mathematics and sciences? What are they? What is their exact nature? Among the philosophical problems, what are the most pressing issues right now and where does the current frontline of philosophical research lie? If we could attain answers to every open problem of empirical sciences, would there still remain philosophical problems to answer—for example in ethics, aesthetics or philosophy of mind? Does the purported scientific all-encompassing “theory of everything” also contain philosophical elements and contributions from philosophers? How should the problems of philosophy best be phrased into open research questions? If we consider our collection of philosophical problems, has its specific constitution—to wit, the fact that it is *precisely these* issues which are now the problems of philosophy—been shaped by the more or less incidental development history of the Western philosophy, or have the philosophical problems we have now been in some way “unavoidable” obstacles in the evolution of human culture and society? If there exists extra-terrestrial intelligent life somewhere in the universe, what kind of philosophy could these alien beings have—perhaps similar to ours? What are the sub-fields of philosophy, what are the connections between them, and is one of these sub-fields perhaps primary in its status when compared to others (in other words, is there a so-called “first philosophy” within the parent discipline of philosophy proper)? In certain universities, notably in Sweden and Finland, there is a sharp division of philosophical courses and degrees into theoretical and practical philosophy (inspired historically by Aristotle’s categorisation of scientific pursuits). Does this division signify a deeper philosophical difference between these two separate branches of philosophy, or does it simply serve the administrative needs of academic institutions by helping us to organise philosophy majors into two study programmes?

When we move on to the next topic and consider what exactly philosophy should do with its problems, we notice that this subject, too, is contested ground from the start: Is philosophy entirely problem-oriented, or can philosophising be driven by some other kinds of interests as well? Is the existence of philosophical problems a crucial prerequisite for the existence of philosophy itself, or does the thought of philosophy without any philosophical problems in need of a solution make any sense? Is the prevailing *modus operandi* of philosophy to attempt to put forward true assertions and theories as answers to its problems? If so, what *kind* of phenomena are these philosophical theories and what do they do

(that is, do they provide explanations of some sort, give projective predictions about the behaviour of certain phenomenon or is it perhaps so that they do something completely else altogether)? On what grounds we can assess the relative merits of two rival philosophical theories head-to-head? What kind of connections do philosophical theories have to truth and reality (and then if that question does not sound big enough already on its own: what truth and reality *themselves* are ultimately)? How strong is the modal character of philosophical truths (and, if they are necessarily true, as is often suggested, what is the basis of their necessity)? Can we speak of somekind of cumulative or linear progress in philosophy? Does philosophy as an on-going project somehow correct itself and constantly find better and better answers to its problems? Has philosophy already progressed and, if so, in what way and where exactly? Is there a certain philosophical body of knowledge? Is there consilience between the results of philosophy and the sciences? Should the proper ambition of philosophers be to craft large-scale philosophical systems, in which the various component parts from different branches of philosophy intertwine seamlessly together to form larger totalities, or should philosophy be approached in a piece-meal fashion by focusing on small closely defined problems just one at a time? What is the role and importance of conceptual definitions and linguistic analyses in philosophy? What about formal axioms and theorems? If philosophy does not pursue philosophical knowledge or formulate its own theories, then what is its alternative non-cognitive mission? Is it some kind of a performative or manufactural art?

The next bunch of questions concerns the starting points, from which philosophy begins to approach its problems. Here we can raise, for example, the following open issues: Does there exist some form of *sui generis* philosophical way to come to know truths, or are philosophical views grounded on certain more general form of knowledge, such as empirical knowledge? What type of intellectual skills, abilities and mental faculties does philosophical competence involve? Do professional philosophers possess a special expertise, which would grant them some authority over amateurs in philosophical matters? What kind of role should our pre-theoretic beliefs and intuitions be given in philosophising? What about personal emotional reactions and religious experiences? How do language and linguistic competence influence philosophising? Do speakers of different languages create different kinds of philosophies? Is a certain natural language more suitable or conducive for philosophical thinking compared to others? Is the dichotomy between natural and artificial languages in some way significant for philosophy? In what way and to what extent should philosophy utilise formal tools such as first-order predicate logic and set theory? Should philosophers be able to assume some premises, basic axioms, postulates and

pre-suppositions as given in their theory-building, or should we expect them to be able to argue independently and in a strictly non-circular fashion for all their constituent theses and individual theoretical building blocks?

Fourthly, we can round up a range of topics which relate to the various facets of actually getting philosophy done: What is the nature of the relationship between philosophy and the particular individuals who practise it? Does philosophy progress through the combined effort of all philosophers, or does each philosopher labour on furthering her own personal philosophy? Is philosophising and its end results in some sense more *personal*—namely, tied to the person who actually expressed them—than what academic research on the average is? Should philosophy also be a way of living for its practitioners? What kind of a style and form should we employ when we speak and write about philosophical topics (how should philosophy be communicated)? What, for example, is the significance of conducting active dialogues for the genesis and development of philosophical thoughts? Do the philosopher's personal background factors such as gender, age, first language, temperament, neurotypicality, ethnicity and so forth in some way affect the content of her work? Do different nationalities and cultures produce disparate types of philosophy, which reflect their "collective unconscious" or deep "national psyche"? Why is the curriculum of philosophy dominantly male-centric (or, a gentlemen-only club of "dead white guys", as it is sometimes derided)? Has there been implicit gender bias or even in some way institutionalised discrimination in philosophy, perhaps continuing to this day? Should we actively strive to advance diversity in philosophy? Is the style of philosophising, both on paper and in live-settings, more adversarial and pugilistic than in other sciences (philosophy is at times described as an "academic blood sport", where winning the argument is everything¹⁰)? Who deserves to be called a philosopher? Does this mantle represent some authority and call for certain special achievements or scholarly merits from aspiring philosophers (say, you cannot be considered a *true* philosopher until the publication of your first peer-reviewed article, PhD dissertation or some similar criterion for passing the test)? Or, can anyone freely promote herself in public as a professional philosopher? Are the roles of 'philosopher' and 'researcher of philosophy' distinguishable from each other in some respect—perhaps analogously to the way in which the two roles of "writer" and "literary theorist" are distinct occupations, so that the latter study what the former do (and contrasting to the case of 'physicist' and 'researcher of physics', where these job titles are practically interchangeable)? Have the forms of doing philosophical work (say, the ways of getting writings

¹⁰ The origins of this characterization are in Norman Swartz' essay "Philosophy as a Blood Sport", available at: https://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/blood_sport.htm (accessed at 18.8.2018).

published and circulated), institutional frameworks (say, the emergence of universities together with the other forms of higher education and arrangements of allocating research funding) and other professional practices (say, the practice of peer reviewing) in some way influenced the actual content of philosophical views and theories? Has the advent of social media affected philosophising (as a great deal of philosophical conversations happen now on the platforms of social media)? What is the significance of rhetorical devices and debating skills in philosophical argumentation? How should philosophy be taught? Are there any special details to take into consideration when we talk about teaching philosophy at different school levels and at university? Does, for example, the philosophy taught at the upper secondary school level in Finland differ in some fundamental way from the philosophy practised and taught in the universities—or from the philosophy sometimes taught to young children in the various “philosophy for children” programmes (and if so, then why)? What kind of criteria do we employ when we review and rate philosophical student theses, such as PhD theses?

Another group of contentious topics concerns the values, norms, principles and duties of philosophy: Is there any kind of normativity, to wit, obligations or prohibitions to act in a certain way, connected to philosophical views and theories? Is this normativity limited to a specific area of philosophy, or is it a hallmark of all philosophy—being, perhaps, one of the distinguishing features of philosophy which separates it from several other forms of academic inquiry, such as the natural sciences? What intellectual virtues does good philosophical thinking display? Can philosophy have value in and of itself independent from all our other aims and appraisals, or should the ultimate value of philosophy be measured in terms of its instrumental usefulness (for example, how can philosophy best be of help for individuals and societies)? Do professional philosophers have, on the account of their expertise and skills, obligations to actively partake in public discussions of the day in their local societies and communities? Is there a specific moral code related to the profession of philosophy?

Moving onwards, another topic which leads to a host of diverse attitudes and approaches concern the relationship between philosophy and its past: Is the basic knowledge of the history of philosophy an essential prerequisite for being able to do good and fresh philosophy? What kind of merits should we take into consideration when we measure the accomplishments of past philosophers? What is the rationale of the distinction between the historiography of philosophy and the more general history of ideas? Do they study philosophy’s past in completely different ways, or do their distinctive ways of looking at these things complement each other? How is it that philosophical texts written perhaps even

a two millennia ago do not seem to become outdated in the same way as the writings of natural sciences do, so that it can still be meaningful for the new generations of philosophers to closely read and study original works such as *The Republic* or *The Critique of the Pure Reason* (whereas in the sciences *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* or *The Origin of Species* are no longer in the same way relevant reading for new students in these fields). What value does reading primary sources have over consulting just secondary sources?

In the final batch of themes we can arrange those questions which concern the external relations or “foreign affairs”, if you will, of philosophy: What kind of ties and connections does philosophy have to other areas of inquiry—and note that this question can be posed separately in slightly differing forms from the point of view of various natural sciences, formal sciences, social sciences and fields of humanities. When we examine the relationship of philosophy and the sciences, is philosophy in this big scheme the under-labourer or the queen of sciences (or perhaps something completely different altogether)? How actively should philosophers follow the up-to-date research carried out by the sciences? What kind of connections does philosophising have with forms of art, such as poetry and literature? And what kind of interaction does philosophy have with different kinds of world views, religions and political creeds, which can contain philosophically informed cognitive and normative postulates?

This narrow selection of examples certainly did not aspire to cover every thinkable topic in these territories. Indeed, even with a modest imagination the list could have been extended for pages and pages longer.¹¹ Yet even a quick sampler such as this is sufficient enough to illustrate just how deep and wide-ranging the disagreements between conceptions of philosophy can in extreme cases grow to be. Moreover, the issues from the previous list can be used as helpful reference-points when we draw divisive lines between different kinds of conceptions of philosophy and arrange them accordingly into contrasting sub-groups. Here, however, I will take up only one of such divisive lines, and it pertains to the aims of philosophy—that is, to the second category in the list above. On this particular topic the visions regarding philosophy’s nature can be broadly split into *cognitive* and *non-cognitive* conceptions of philosophy on the basis of how they orient the mission of philosophy in relation to philosophical knowledge (or lack thereof).¹²

¹¹ See, for example, Peter Suber’s stimulating list of metaphilosophical topics on his website: <http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm> (accessed at 16.8.2018).

¹² The terminology invoked for this pair of positions evokes natural connotations with the discussions from several sub-fields of philosophy related to the truth-aptness of declarative sentences on some philosophical topic or another. In such discussions the two main opposing

I will introduce the basics of this division here because it seems to be one of the most fundamental contrasts we can make between different manifestations of philosophy, because the philosophical distances between contending conceptions of philosophy often grow greatest here in the topic of philosophy's aims and purposes. Moreover, a quality which makes the cognitivism versus non-cognitivism division a special case is that all conceptions of philosophy can be aligned, at least *approximately*, somewhere on the same spectrum between its two opposite extremes. The same cannot be said for other suggested large-scale classifications of conceptions of philosophy, which either require us to group conceptions of philosophy into more than two main categories or alternatively apply only to some limited fraction of conceptions of philosophy while leaving others out.¹³ It is thus hard to find dividing metaphilosophical issues, on which all conceptions of philosophy would simply answer conclusively either "yes" or "no".

Cognitivist conceptions of philosophy view philosophising as a means to attain new knowledge (Latin: *cognition, cognitionis*, 'knowledge') about philosophically relevant matters. The exact nature of this philosophical knowledge can still be left unspecified in this provisional characterisation, since the issue is controversial and open to clashing interpretations among the cognitivists. In any case, the crucial point in the mind-set of cognitivism is the general idea that

positions are customarily named cognitivism and non-cognitivism. With this specific intent, the forms of non-cognitivism were first developed in the branch of meta-ethics as stances opposing cognitivism (which is often viewed as the default position regarding the functioning of our moral statements), and inspired by this usage, similar expressions of non-cognitivism have since then been advocated *mutatis mutandis* in other branches of philosophy as well (see van Roojen 2004/2009: §1.1).

Certain analogous divisions in this same theoretical territory are for example Habermas' ([1968]) classification of interests of knowledge, where the various pursuits of knowledge are classified into *technical, practical* or *emancipatory* disciplines on the basis the underlying human interest which motivate in distinct ways these undertakings. Rorty (1991), on the other hand, divides conceptions of philosophy into *scientific, poetic* and *political* conceptions of philosophy. In more recent literature Pettit (2004: 305) describes with the name of "existentialism" a type of conception of philosophy, which, if successful, transforms its author or her community (as actual examples of this kind of existentialism Pettit mentions the names of Kierkegaard, Marx, Sartre and the Frankfurt school). Finally, we have Cooper (2009), who divides views regarding the nature of philosophy into *theoretical* and *practical* conceptions of philosophy. In his view the theoretical conceptions of philosophy are "truth-oriented" and they typically venture to build grand metaphysical systems. The practical conceptions of philosophy, in contrast, are oriented towards the goal of "good".

¹³ This is true, for instance, regarding the naturalism-question, which cannot be used to divide all conceptions of philosophy tidily into two diametrically opposing factions (see the section 3.2. regarding the third possible stance in this topic labeled as non-naturalism).

we can, at least in principle, assign truth-conditions for philosophical claims and theories, which then makes it possible for us to assess the merits of two directly competing views in philosophical discussions on this basis. For cognitivists, when philosophising is pursued successfully, it unveils new truths or corrects mistaken old views. In slogan form, philosophical inquiry is therefore primarily concerned with “getting it right”. More specifically, philosophy as a cognitive field aspires to describe truthfully some philosophically interesting region or plane of reality (whatever that might ultimately mean). For cognitivists, philosophy thus looks like a list of open problems in need of an answer. As a type of an activity, the closest reference group for philosophy is formed by various sciences, which pursue truth and knowledge guided by similar cognitive ethos. And just as what happens in these special sciences with their sub-fields, we can organise the various sub-fields of philosophy on the basis of their more specific subject matters within the boundaries of the parent discipline (epistemology studies knowledge, metaphysics studies being, and so on).

This criterion of truth-aptness, which cognitivists place on philosophical claims, can be explicated in the following way: Firstly, it means that we are speaking specifically of *propositional knowledge* here, which is expressed through declarative sentences. Thus, for example, the conceptions of philosophy which maintain that the purpose of philosophising is to develop and perform some kind of procedural *know-how* are not classified as cognitivist conceptions of philosophy—even if they might speak metaphorically of pursuing somekind of philosophical “knowledge” or “wisdom”. Another important clarification here is the point that the idea of truth-aptness of philosophical claims and theories does not necessarily mean that philosophy *itself* (or philosophy *alone*) would confirm and refute the claims it puts forward. We can thus recognise as forms of cognitivism also those conceptions of philosophy, which see philosophy as working productively in concert with some other cognitivist enterprise (such as the natural sciences, or mathematics). The minimal requirement for cognitivism is simply the distinctive idea that philosophers should actively take part in *some* cognitivist undertaking in which we seek systematically and in a truth-oriented way best answers to our philosophical problems.

It might perhaps feel instinctive to cite the pursuit of truth and knowledge as one of the defining features of philosophy, common to all conceptions of philosophy across the board. Blackburn (2004: xv), for instance, claims, that if some trait can be considered “essential” for the identity of philosophy, it must surely be its “truth-seeking aspirations”. In a similar tone, Hacker (2009: 129) takes cognitivism as having been the prevailing outlook on this matter in the philosophy’s past:

Throughout its history philosophy has been thought to be a member of a community of intellectual disciplines united by their common pursuit of knowledge. It has sometimes been thought to be the queen of the sciences, at other times merely their under-labourer. But irrespective of its social status, it was held to be a participant in the quest for knowledge—a cognitive discipline.

In Hacker's grand narrative the one ingenious game changer on this issue was Wittgenstein, who challenged the long-tenured cognitivist orthodoxy with his non-cognitivist conception(s) of philosophy.¹⁴ The claims cited above regarding the essential character of cognitivism and its historical dominance nevertheless threaten to simplify things too much. Here a contrasting view is provided by Skolimowski (1967: 8), for example, when he notes that the cognitivism/non-cognitivism divide was already present in the philosophical activities and points of interests of those ancient philosophers and schools who immediately followed Socrates. Tanesini (2017) takes this claim one step further and suggests that Socrates himself, in fact, is the father of non-cognitivism concerning the aims of philosophy.¹⁵

Be that as it may, for non-cognitivists philosophising is thought to have a distinct function, which does not, at least directly, have to do with pursuing truth or coming up with novel cognitive theories. Instead, for non-cognitivists philosophy serves primarily some other end. Beyond this initial notion of rejecting cognitivism various non-cognitivists can have widely differing views about the more specific job description of philosophy. However, the numerous forms of non-cognitivism can be further divided into two main branches on the basis of the issue of who (or what) philosophy is in fact benefiting: Is philosophy meant to subjectively do good to the individual herself who is practising philosophy, or does philosophy's utility have a more expansive recipient, such as a certain community of humans—or perhaps even more broadly the human-kind itself? In the former option, the practice of philosophising can have some kind of psychiatric, emotional, aesthetic, transformative, empowering, spiritual,

¹⁴ In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Wittgenstein ([1921]: §4.112) articulates his non-cognitivist conception of philosophy as follows: "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries."

¹⁵ An in-depth historical scholarship of the forms of non-cognitivism during the Greco-Roman times is provided by Hadot (1995).

meditative, or other comparable beneficial effect to its practitioner. For example, in certain schools of Hellenistic philosophy, notably Epicureanism, Pyrrhonism, and Stoicism, the aim of our philosophising was to achieve the tranquil state of *ataraxia*. Then on the other hand, in the latter kind of non-cognitivist philosophy philosophising can aim to further a political agenda (animal rights, suffrage, climate awareness, and so on), appear as a sub-genre of *belles lettres*, untangle confusions created by careless uses of language, function as a Socratic gadfly in modern society, deepen our understanding of a particular topic, express post-modern irony, attempt to enlarge social liberty in emancipatory spirit (racial justice, class consciousness, and so on), offer tools of social planning for political agents, give pedagogical suggestions for teachers, and so forth. This mind-set is apparent in Marx's [1845] oft-quoted epigrammatic clarion call: "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." It should be noted, that in addition to the societal or therapeutic purposes mentioned briefly above, in one notable kind of conception of philosophy non-cognitivist philosophising might seek to benefit the sciences by systematising the results of special sciences or by clarifying the syntax of the language used in scientific contexts—even if philosophy itself is not to be regarded as a science and it does not yield distinctive philosophical knowledge. It is thus possible to pursue non-cognitivist philosophising within scientific ethos as well, granting that the most "exotic" (and thus perhaps most intriguing) examples of non-cognitivist philosophising come from such contexts, which could perhaps be characterised as being "non-academic" in their character.

However, lumping all non-cognitivists together under common umbrella threatens to over-simplify certain important nuances and blur the significant dissimilarities between different expressions of the non-cognitivists' main idea. It is true that one breed of non-cognitivists adopt a directly antagonistic attitude toward the notion at the very heart of cognitivism, namely, that philosophical claims are truth-apt. These non-cognitivists think that we should not assess philosophical claims by using the pair of exhaustive alternatives true-or-false, and philosophical claims in fact perform some completely other type of function (say, aesthetic, spiritual, therapeutic, emotional, prescriptive, transformative or some other similar aim). Nevertheless, it should be stressed here that we do not necessarily need to commit non-cognitivists to a strict view like this, where this position desires to challenge the line of thought behind cognitivism head on. Instead, even non-cognitivists can flexibly accept that philosophical claims are truth-apt and that we might also from time to time assess them in philosophical discussions from this point of view. The defining mind-set to the outlook of non-cognitivism is the notion that philosophy is not regarded as *a cognitive project*

which is occupied with building theories upon the philosophical truths it uncovers. The non-cognitivists might simply think that the resources of philosophy should be allocated to other more fruitful ends, in place of philosophical theorising—regardless of what these non-cognitivists actually happen to think about the truth-aptness of philosophical claims (Fischer 2008: 54).¹⁶ In these cases non-cognitivism can be motivated by, for example, some kind of a sceptical doubt or pessimistic feeling about the purposefulness of philosophy's cognitive ambitions. Therefore, it is not really worthwhile to try to answer philosophical questions directly.

Non-cognitivists can on this issue have to offer their specific diagnoses of the genesis of philosophical problems, which reveals them to be no more than illusory pseudo-problems. Accordingly, we should not attempt to resolve them, but rather to free ourselves from their spellbinding grip. In similar fashion, a non-cognitivist can develop her conception of philosophy motivated by a form of metaphysical antirealism in certain domain of philosophy, and thus think that the philosophical claims therein do not actually track or represent any substantial part of reality—*pace* what the cognitivists working in these same philosophical quarters suppose. In such cases the non-cognitivist has first in her mind some specific picture of the inner mechanisms of cognitivist philosophising, and she then reacts against this particular conception—such as the model of philosophy as an *a priori* metaphysical system building. However, it is not necessary for the non-cognitivist to adopt any critical stances directly against the cognitivist conceptions of philosophy, because she can very well develop her own conception of philosophy outside the dialectic of cognitivism and non-cognitivism without giving a serious thought for what the cognitivists think or do.

One considerable sub-topic within the juxtaposition of cognitivism and non-cognitivism concerns the nature and veracity of *philosophical progress*. Here a problematic observation for the cognitive conceptions of philosophy—and at the same time conversely a source of non-direct support for the forms of non-cognitivism (Hacker 2009)¹⁷—is the somewhat embarrassing reality that we

¹⁶ In other words (and I think this point bears repeating): The crux of the disagreement between cognitivism and non-cognitivism is about the *aims of philosophy*, and not about the *truth-aptness of philosophical claims*, although a negative view about the latter issue can naturally be used to undermine cognitivism regarding the aims of philosophy. Making this distinction is important because there can exist a form of non-cognitivism about the aims of philosophy which does not adhere to non-cognitivism about the truth-aptness of philosophical claims—either because it deems this question irrelevant, or alternatively the non-cognitivist about the aims of philosophy actually agrees that (some) philosophical claims are in fact truth-apt.

¹⁷ Chalmers (2015: 11) opines that abandoning the cognitive aims of philosophy in response to the lack of philosophical advances would mean “lowering the sights”, namely, conceding the

have actually very few uncontested examples of enduring philosophical results or cases of successful theory-building from philosophy's core areas, namely, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. On this matter Russell ([1912]: 90) notes how the cognitive achievements of philosophy pale in comparison with those of the sciences:

Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences.

Van Inwagen (2004: 332) agrees, and remarks that the few uncontested philosophical successes we *do* have, usually take the form of negative conclusions:

Disagreement in philosophy is pervasive and irresoluble. There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philosophers agree. If there is any philosophical thesis that all or most philosophers affirm, it is a negative thesis: that formalism is not the right philosophy of mathematics, for example, or that knowledge is not (simply) justified, true belief.

The challenge for the cognitivists, then, becomes to explain convincingly, how philosophy, which by their own admission aims at knowledge and truth, has not to this day been able to provide us with uncontroversial philosophical results, and there has not been much convergence on truth among philosophers.

defeat and aiming for something less ambitious than what we originally set out to achieve in philosophy. There is some truth to the observation that many non-cognitive conceptions of philosophy have been developed as responses to the lack of success developed by the cognitive conceptions of philosophy, but this does not go for *all* types of non-cognitivism, as it is possible to flesh out a form of non-cognitivism which is not inspired by the alleged failures of cognitive conceptions of philosophy.

This absence of indisputable positive results can then fuel scepticism towards philosophy as a whole (Cappelen 2017).¹⁸

As was noted by van Inwagen, the cognitivist can retort here on a general level that we do have at least certain theses on which most of the philosophers agree, even if they are predominantly negative in character. Chalmers (2015: 14n4) expands on van Inwagen's idea and lists the following examples as potential instances of philosophy's cognitive findings during its long existence of approximately 2,500 years.

[C]andidates included the forcible-organ donation argument against simple versions of utilitarianism, Kripke's argument that necessity comes apart from apriority, Gödel's argument against versions of mathematical formalism, the argument from evil against theism, the model-theoretic argument against global descriptivism, the perfect actor argument against logical behaviorism, the multiple-realizability argument against the identity theory, Goodman's argument against purely formal inductive logic, arguments from relativity against presentism, Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, Hart's argument against Austin's command theory of laws, Russell's refutation of Frege's Basic Law V, Moore's open question argument against analytic naturalism, Putnam's argument for externalism about meaning, Descartes' *cogito*, and many others.

In addition, when we list the ways in which philosophy has affected the world, we can highlight the influence the various cognitive and non-cognitive forms of philosophising have had on the Western culture and society at large (even if these influences are not based on uncontested philosophical truths or theories). For starters, within the tradition of *Christian theology* we can point out several lines of influence from philosophy to theology, and from there on to the practical level to directly affect the lives of billions of people worldwide even today: Plato and Plotinus inspired the Church Father Augustine in his dualistic views, and later in the medieval period Aristotle inspired Thomas of Aquinas, whose thinking became the official philosophy of the Catholic Church under the name of Thomism. Secondly, from the perspective of *political philosophy*, Locke—who is often heralded as the originator of liberalism—inspired the English so-called

¹⁸ There is also a silver lining of sorts in the absence of philosophical results, as we can say that although philosophy has not produced confirmed theories or hypotheses, it has not produced *disconfirmed* theories or hypotheses, either. If certain substantial suggestions coming from philosophers had been disproven conclusively by a piece of evidence, philosophy would have surely by now followed the fate of mesmerism, phrenology or alchemy, and disappeared from the academic map as an unsuccessful pseudo-science.

Glorious Revolution of 1688 and then later on the founding fathers of the United States, when they composed their *Declaration of Independence* (1776) and codified the central American values. In political philosophy we also have the case of Rousseau, whose thoughts influenced the so-called Jacobin phase of the French Revolution (from 1779 to 1789) and the Age of Enlightenment more generally. From a more regional Finnish point of view, Hegel directly inspired the national philosopher of Finland, the statesman, journalist and professor, J.V. Snellman, and through him had an important effect on the development of the nascent Finnish political culture in the nineteenth century and beyond. And in this context, we cannot leave out the names of Marx and Engels, whose dialectic materialism gave the philosophical basis for the political movements of Communism and Socialism, which continue—for better or worse—to serve as the ideological basis for many countries around the world to this today. The political thinking of von Clausewitz has since the nineteenth century inspired statesmanship in international politics and even certain tactics of warfare. Shifting the topic a bit, in *philosophy of education* Dewey's progressive pragmatism influenced the twentieth century American school system, both in theory and in practice. Then from the side which envisions philosophy as an *art of living*, we can mention how movements such as Stoicism and existentialism have reached large masses of laypeople and guided them in their everyday living. Finally, when we turn our attention towards the larger cultural and political lines of development, we can point out how philosophy flowed behind the ideals of enlightenment and has during the twentieth century aided in various emancipatory campaigns (for example, in defending the moral and legal rights of animals and sexual minorities). The previous list did not aim to be exhaustive, and it only highlights certain diverse ways in which philosophy might have benefited humankind. (For a similar list, see Quinton 2005c.)

From a slightly different way of looking at these things, we can bring up the defensive argument that even if philosophy has not been able to show progression comparable to the natural sciences, it has nevertheless become more and more sophisticated through the centuries, so philosophy has certainly not simply been at a standstill from the time of Plato to the present-day—philosophy took great leaps on many fields during the twentieth century alone, and the textbooks in these fields written in the year 2019 look vastly different from the way in which the textbooks written in 1919 look (Williamson 2007: 279–81; Glock 2008a: 244; Moran 2008a: 1, 8). To paraphrase Newton's words, today's philosophers can see further than their predecessors precisely because they are standing on the shoulders of giants.

In any case, as Chalmers (2015) argues, the community of philosophers has not demonstrated “large collective convergence” towards truth on any of the “Big Questions” of philosophy, such as “What is the relationship between mind and body? How do we know about the external world? What are the fundamental principles of morality? Is there a God? Do we have free will?” The English *Wikipedia* provides separate up-to-date listings of “unsolved problems” in various fields of inquiry, such as physics, mathematics, biology and so on. Somewhat amusingly, there is one for philosophy, too, and it features many perennial classics such as the mind-body problem, the Theseus paradox, the problem of induction, the problem of universals, the problem of realism and so on.

The discussion concerning the progress of philosophy has become a popular topic during the past decade.¹⁹ There are numerous noteworthy threads in these discussions. Firstly, it should be noted that there exists more than one model of scientific progress (to wit, the rather unsophisticated cumulative account, where the new wisdom is simply piled atop the old one), so the comparison between the accomplishments of philosophy and the sciences is not a straightforward or linear affair as it is sometimes made out to be (Niiniluoto 2002/2015). So, even if philosophy has not accumulated a huge pile of truths, it might have progressed in other important ways. Secondly, it has been suggested that the success of philosophy should not really be measured against the progress demonstrated by the hard sciences (mathematics and the natural sciences), but rather to those demonstrated by the social sciences and humanities, such as political science, sociology and economics (Cappelen 2017). In this company the oddness philosophy does not stand out as much. Thirdly, it could be that the lack of “large collective convergence” within the philosophical community towards undisputed philosophical truths informs us merely what is happening on the *sociological* level. In other words, it might indeed be true that the circle of philosophers has not been able to reach internal agreement on philosophical issues, but this observation does not yet conclusively demonstrate that there are no philosophical truths at all (or even that we have not already found them), but rather that philosophers have simply been too unintelligent or too belligerent by nature to recognise these truths for what they are (*ibid.*).

The representatives of various formulations of cognitivism—such as naturalism and rationalism—each have their own preferred answers to these challenges. Often the general line of thinking seems to be that if we truly want philosophy to be a prolific cognitive enterprise which provides progressively better

¹⁹ Accessible at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_philosophy. Accessed at 14.8.2018.

¹⁹ See, for example, Chalmers (2015), Cappelen (2017) and Stoljar (2017).

and better new results, we must refashion it by explicating some kind of a new and more mature conception of philosophy with the *right* idea about the subject matter and or method of philosophy. Indeed, such a goal has driven some of the most revered thinkers in the canon of Western philosophy, such as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Comte and Husserl when they formulated their novel conceptions of philosophy (Hacker 2009; Philipse 2009: 161–3).²⁰

I will now leave this short detour of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist divide behind and return to the topic of foundational questions of conceptions of philosophy. On the issue of how conceptions of philosophy might approach the questions about the methods, subject matter and aims of philosophy, it should be recognised that there is no need for such conceptions to be strictly *monistic* set of views, so that they would hold single-mindedly that philosophy can be done only in just one correct fashion. In contrast, it is possible for these conceptions to maintain a *pluralistic* attitude towards philosophising, so that they can categorise certain philosophical questions to be of one type, whereas some others require us to use a different kind of an approach (as long as these two approaches are not directly at odds with each other theoretically or logically). For example, it feels reasonable—although perhaps not entirely uncontroversial—that philosophical logic, ethics and history of philosophy should all be treated on their own particular terms. Conceding this point does not need to mean that we now require two distinct conceptions of philosophy for two separate areas of philosophy. Certain philosophers have even opined, that it would be a mistake to search for a unified one-size-fits-all picture of philosophising, which would be applicable as it is to all sub-disciplines of philosophy (see, for example, Cappelen 2012: 21). Instead, it sounds reasonable that any sensible conception of philosophy must recognise the deep-seated dissimilarities between different branches of philosophical inquiry and adjust its views accordingly.

On the other hand, a conception of philosophy can maintain that in order to gain a comprehensive picture of a certain philosophical topic or problem, we need to employ simultaneously a multitude of methods, that is to say, that we approach this particular topic with an array of different theories, ways of thinking and evidential sources (see Hansson 2010). This can happen, for example, when we combine different knowledge-sources and data-types in our philosophising. In a similar way, pertaining to the aims of philosophy, cognitivism and non-cognitivism need not to be mutually excluding alternatives even in one and

²⁰ Such optimism is displayed, for example, by Russell in the opening words to his book *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914: 3): “Philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results, than any other branch of learning. [...] I believe that the time has now arrived when this unsatisfactory state of affairs can be brought to an end.”

the same sub-field of philosophy. Instead, a conception of philosophy can deem that the provisional cognitive theorising first builds the bedrock, on which the non-cognitive aims of philosophy can be best furthered (for example, advocating a certain normative program of social action can build on a prior normative theorising in ethics and political philosophy).

Converse situations are likewise conceivable, where two conceptions of philosophy have—at least, to a certain point—agreement about the right subject matter, method and aim of philosophy, but they differ from each other on the issue of how the epistemological, ontological and semantical underpinnings of these theses should ultimately be understood. Thus, conceptions of philosophy are not automatically identifiable one-to-one with a corresponding method, which would then be used by that specific conception of philosophy and by it alone, for instance. Here is a case in point: If we would simply group together all those conceptions of philosophy, which avow to pursue conceptual analysis as their goal in philosophising, we would by so doing blur the important underlying fact that diverse conceptual analysts have vastly different interpretations about the epistemological origins, semantical basis and the ontological status of concepts. This point was already touched on briefly above on a general level, when I mentioned that the distinctive theses which a conception of philosophy puts forward, can aspire to describe correctly besides the philosophising of their advocator also the work done by other philosophers as well—in this case, the philosophising of other users of conceptual analysis. Recognising this detail is important because later in this dissertation we see that in many places the debate between naturalists and rationalists follows just this formula, as the opposing philosophers can agree on at least on certain broad lines, and thus they focus their disagreements on interpretative issues regarding how and on what terms the underlying nature and ramifications of philosophy's methodology should ultimately be explicated.

One final issue for this Section: What *kind* of entities are conceptions of philosophy exactly? This is obviously a very profound philosophical question, to which we should not expect any easy or uncontentious solutions. In short, my two cents on this matter is that conceptions of philosophy are a set of inter-related propositions, which in most cases are truth-apt and should be assessed accordingly by standard philosophical means (here again, keeping with my tone, I want to remain quite liberal as to what can count as a valid conception of philosophy). It is however possible that we can have various formulations of the constituent theses of a certain conception of philosophy, which can then be seen as different variations of this particular conception of philosophy—some permutations are stronger and push the distinctive ideas further, while certain

other variants remain in comparison more moderate with their pronouncements. But do conceptions of philosophy possess a *correct* or *intrinsic* meaning, independently of how we understand and employ them in philosophical discussions? Is there a right way to define them in a way which would carve philosophical space at its joints (to paraphrase Plato)? Is one conception of philosophy *the Truth*, while all others are more or less false? What basis does this Truth have? I discuss some alternative responses to these challenges in Section 1.4 (however, without really committing to any of these views myself). In actual practice, such as the debates examined in this dissertation, conceptions of philosophy—naturalism, rationalism and so forth—can be regarded as useful fictions or idealisations, which are introduced in conversations for pragmatic purposes. They thus exist just in the sense that the standard entities of social ontology generally do (even if there is really no consensus view in social epistemology either). They come into being because we need a convenient way to refer to philosophical views which we advocate or criticise, and so we must utilise these abstract formulations, which in actual practice are often just rough composites created from the actual views of several philosophers. It is then always possible to ask to what extent does this summarised composite image do justice to the actual views of the philosophers in question. For example, has our exaggerated caricature already become a case of straw man fallacy without a corresponding basis in reality? Or, have we maybe already distorted the differences between the thoughts of two distinct philosophers excessively when we read them both as instances of a certain conception of philosophy, so that it would in the end be actually better to view them as representatives of two separate views regarding the nature of philosophy? Are matters like these just practical difficulties with little or no importance, or is there an underlying philosophical Truth about the conceptions of philosophy, which we are approximating with our crude representations?

I will not try beyond these rather sketchy ideas to outline any further universal features or structures shared by *all* conceptions of philosophy across the board. It is exceedingly difficult to state something illuminating, which would be applicable to *all* potential views regarding the nature of philosophy. In fact, trying to attain some kind of a universal vantage point independent of all conceptions of philosophy can be for unavoidable philosophical reasons destined to fail right from the start (see Section 2.4). The basic model, which I outlined above, is despite its possible shortcomings sufficient for the needs of this thesis. More thorough discussions on conceptions of philosophy must continue elsewhere (as I hope).

Moreover, I am slightly hesitant at this point (and in the following sections, too) to give detailed examples of specific conceptions of philosophy, since I do not wish to commit to a particular interpretation regarding a philosophical figure, view or school, which would then draw inevitable criticism and divert the focus away from my main line of thought in the text. Besides, doing case studies of conceptions of philosophy with appropriate seriousness requires more pages than I can spare here—such a task should be carried out either meticulously or not at all, I think. I rely on the hope that a lettered reader can independently connect my rather general level suggestions to actual specimens of philosophy. By and large, I agree wholeheartedly with the sentiment that good methodological theorising should always be grounded in actual cases of philosophy. This goes for our theories regarding conceptions of philosophy, too (see Section 2.3). If the previous, rather abstract, remarks let the reader wanting for actual examples, I can assure that I aim to do just that in the third main chapter of this thesis, which includes more particularised considerations on the naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy.

However, it is still necessary to say something on a general level regarding the links and ties which conceptions of philosophy *qua* abstract philosophical positions can have to various social forms of philosophising, schools, traditions, movements and to the names, epithets, banners, labels and other designations which are customarily used to denote these phenomena in philosophical texts and discussions. Issues related to these matters play a major role later in the latter part of this thesis and affect directly how we should really think and talk about the question which is pursued in this thesis: How are conceptions of philosophy individuated? Do the contours of rival conceptions of philosophy follow some established battle lines which are already recognised in the philosophical language and practice? When and why can we classify a certain philosopher as a representative of a particular conception of philosophy? How do the schools, traditions and movements affect the actions and attitudes of philosophers, for example, in the disagreements between conflicting conceptions of philosophy? Do these labels and epithets contain negative connotations of the kind, which would recommend us against employing them in philosophical language? I answer questions such as these in the following section. It is my conviction that these issues are not recognised enough in the literature on conceptions of philosophy, and if we remain oblivious to the existence of these complications, it can result in disrupting any constructive dialogue we might want to attempt regarding different conceptions of philosophy. I try to steer clear of

these perils in my thesis, even if my main problem is built around the confrontation of two competing conceptions of philosophy and is thus directly vulnerable to the aforementioned troubles.

1.2 PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS, TRADITIONS AND MOVEMENTS

Suppose a new student is freshly introduced to philosophy and its course books. In all likelihood, her eyes will quickly notice a certain salient feature of philosophical writing. Namely, the way in which the language of philosophical texts is permeated with an array of -isms and similar designations. This trait is observable in just about any introductory work on philosophy, where philosophers and their ideas are customarily bracketed into contrasting groups and sub-groups with such tags: No matter which area or era of philosophy we put under scrutiny, we quickly encounter talk of *A-*, *B-* and *C-*ists, who advocate distinctive views and styles in philosophical conversations. The history of philosophy, likewise, is often chronicled as a narrative of rival schools, movements and traditions.²¹ For their part, present-day philosophers continue this practice by constantly coming up with new names, epithets, labels and banners for the positions they endorse and oppose, in so doing continuously expanding the philosophical nomenclature *ad nauseam*. With this feature in mind if one needs a sure-fire conversation starter for a small talk with a philosopher, it is not at all silly to first ask her which philosophical school she represents, or which label she would use to describe her views (for example, what are her thoughts on the great schism between the forms of analytic and continental philosophy?). Based on her answer, she can then be located from the philosophical map and be connected to her correct reference group among her fellow philosophers (Ryle 1937: 317).²²

²¹ This practice has a long and established history in philosophy, as it had already begun with the Ancients. Early doxographers, notably Hippobotus and his much more famous epigone, Diogenes Laertius (1950), catalogued the prior philosophy by arranging it into schools (*hairesis*) and chains of teachers and students (*diadokhai*). As Adamson (2014: 38) notes, many of these teacher-student links were not however based on actual historical facts and they were instead invented later on by historians who wanted to link famous philosophers together and form a seamless narrative of philosophy's development from one figure to another. After the classical times the practice of writing "narrative sect-based doxography" as the dominant style of historiography of philosophy was continued by Stanley and Horn in their respective accounts of the history of philosophy, authored in the seventeenth century (Garrett 2004: 70).

²² In addition to the practices of Western philosophy, sectarianism is present in similar manner also in the major philosophical traditions of the other regions around the world. A notable example is provided by the tradition of Asian philosophy, in which the "three big" schools of

These remarks appear to echo once again the motif of philosophy's internal diversity, which was already explored in the previous section—the only apparent difference is that here this diversity is described by mentioning schools, traditions, movements (and the names used to denote them) as the basic components of this disunity, whereas in the foregoing pages this role was reserved solely for conceptions of philosophy. A question arises: what is the relationship between these two sets of phenomena? Is one in some way more fundamental compared to the other? In fact, I would say that in the minds of many people, it is probably these philosophical schools, traditions and movements which dominate any preconceptions they might possess about the topic of philosophy's internal disunity: if an audience at a philosophy conference is informed that they will next be given a presentation on the multifaceted nature of academic philosophy, their expectations will in all likelihood be that they will soon get to hear an account of the warring schools and traditions of philosophy—analytic philosophy, American pragmatism, Marxism, neo-Thomism, continental philosophy and so forth.

Conceptions of philosophy, in stark contrast, are a much less discussed topic. But could it be that we are simply talking about the same things here, albeit with slightly dissimilar names, or is there in fact a deeper than a cosmetic difference between conceptions of philosophy and philosophical schools, traditions and movements? The short answer to this is that the relations between conceptions of philosophy on the one hand and schools, traditions and movements on the other are more convoluted than one would perhaps expect, although these phenomena are all in their own ways involved in creating the diverse profile of philosophy. The next task on my agenda is therefore to investigate just *what kinds of diversity* all these distinct phenomena bring to the table,

Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism have flourished side by side. The golden age of Chinese philosophy is sometimes even styled as “the era of hundred schools” (see Collins 1998: 64). In addition to philosophy, schools and movements exist in certain human and social sciences, such as historiography and economics. Outside of the academia, schools and teacher–student chains can be encountered in certain arts, sports and handicrafts. At times, one and the same group has involved both philosophical and artistic activities, such as the Bloomsbury group and the Parisian existentialists. On the other hand, Marxism and Thomism are here illustrative examples of philosophical movements, which have close connections with practice-oriented political and religious causes. Although these phenomena differ from philosophical schools in terms of their contents, we can still find in them and their inner mechanisms many kinds of parallels with philosophical schools (see Glock 2008a: 220; 2013: 35). Finally, schisms and sectarianism are of course present in many religions, such as Christianity. These parallels do philosophy no good, as they can be used to undermine its credibility as an academic subject.

and to identify the ways how they possibly influence and incite each other. Furthermore, the following observations give us tools to better understand later what kind of phenomena naturalism and rationalism truly are, in one sense as philosophical views and secondly as groups of likeminded philosophers—to wit, *naturalists* and *rationalists*—who actually wear the colours of these views in contemporary philosophical discussions.

I will have to begin by first explicating the subtle distinctions between the various ways there are to categorise philosophers and/or their views under collective names, epithets or labels. Alas, the existing manners in which schools, traditions, movements, positions, creeds, ideologies and so on are talked about in philosophical literature are often imprecise and lack consistency from one label to another. Even within one and the same source text a certain group of philosophers can be referred to with more than one of these tags—as if they were completely interchangeable with each other without any small nuances in their meanings (Glock 2008a: 220). However, certain immediate complications await us here. Although the names, epithets and labels for schools, traditions and movements might superficially resemble each other in their linguistic aspects, under closer scrutiny they actually have different kinds of underpinnings. These foundations have a crucial significance regarding the issue of how these groupings and labels are correctly demarcated and then deployed in philosophical discussions. Therefore, before we can accurately evaluate the nature of the two-way relationship between conceptions of philosophy and these various social clusters of philosophers, we must first properly understand what we are dealing with here. I aim to remedy this situation by carefully looking at the different sociological and philosophical factors, which influence how different communities of philosophers are originally formed. These sociological factors concern the nature and the strength of the interactional ties between individual philosophers, and they enable us to link members of a given school together. Philosophical factors in contrast, pertain to the distinctive philosophical ideas and doctrines which form the basis for the philosophical activities carried out by the school.

From a sociological point of view, the behaviour of philosophers seems to be influenced by a kind of psychological-cum-social force we can call *centripetal tendency*: philosophers are by their natures instinctively driven to establish connections with other thinkers who have common *interests* (which, however, does not necessarily mean the same as common *opinions*; Rescher 2005a: 24). On this basis philosophers tend to form their own communities and collaborative networks of various kinds. For now, we can use the blanket term ‘school’ liberally to cover all these diverse forms of social philosophising. On this issue Collins

(1998: 64–5, see also Morrow & Sula 2011: 301) categorises schools further into four subtypes by using the criterion of how tangible and spatiotemporally localised the interaction between the members of the school actually is.

The first of these subtypes covers those group of philosophers, where we can in the original meaning of this word speak literally of *philosophical schools*, meaning that these philosophers came initially together around a school or a similar institution, which provided teaching for its participants. We can locate numerous instances of this school-type in the history of philosophy – they were prevalent especially during the period of classical philosophy, but there have also been notable examples in later times too (Quinton 2005b).²³ Schools, which have successfully maintained their existence over several generations of philosophers, can be regarded as *traditions*. In these cases, a school did not wither away after the deaths of its founder(s) and original members, but rather managed to re-vitalise itself through new generations of philosophers, who matured within the school ranks from novices and acolytes to become the new reformers of the tradition (Glock 2008a: 221).²⁴

In Collins' second category we shift to speak of "schools" already more figuratively, since these groups of philosophers are bound together merely by the interactive ties between their members. These ties can be further divided into *horizontal* (collaboration between two or more philosophers and related

²³ The obvious pair of examples here are Plato's *Academy* and Aristotle's *Lyceum*, but even before them philosophers, mathematicians and rhetoricians such as Pythagoras, Antisthenes and Isocrates had had their own schools. In Hamlyn's (1992: 27) assessment membership in a school was practically a mandatory prerequisite for doing successful philosophy during the period of classical philosophy, since only a school could provide the spiritual (that is, interlocutors) and material (that is, libraries) resources needed for productive philosophising. Although the logistical and technological possibilities for interaction between philosophers advanced in leaps and bounds in the following two and a half thousand years, philosophical schools which are converged around a certain "geographical hotbed" are not a thing of the past. When we look at the history of philosophy, we can notice several notable groups of philosophers, who have been identified through the name of their home place (which in modern times usually means an academic or cultural institution, where at least some of the members are employed): Marburg Kantians, St. Louis Hegelians, the Vienna Circle, Oxford ordinary language philosophy, The Metaphysical Club at Harvard, Swansea Wittgensteinians, Cornell realists, Kyoto school, Stanford philosophers of science, Canberra planners, Pittsburgh idealists, Edinburgh sociologists of science, West Coast semanticists and the Frankfurt school (in philosophy and social sciences) – just to name few examples.

²⁴ Additionally, there can exist various post- and neo- resurgences of schools, where the new generation has been influenced by the thinking done by the original members of the school and now aim to revive their ideas, but they nonetheless add in their own fresh ideas and improvements to the school's distinctive ethos (such as their solutions to the notable criticism aimed at the ideas of the original school).

symmetrical contacts) and *vertical* (tutelage between a teacher and a student) ties. An illustrative case of the horizontal ties would be the circumstances during the early modern period, when the learned individuals of the time had their own circles of correspondence, through which they exchanged ideas and exercised an early form of peer-review (Hamlyn 1992: 45–6). Vertical ties on the other hand enable us to identify “family trees” of philosophers and track the transmission of philosophical ideas from one generation to another through teaching and guidance. In any case, the most important things here are the direct and personal contacts between philosophers, which link them together in some way as a network. If there is no such a link to be found, then the philosopher simply does not belong in this network. The crucial difference between the first and second categories of schools is that these vertical and horizontal ties bind philosophers slightly more loosely and informally together, so philosophical schools of this second type are not spatiotemporally as localised phenomena existing in a certain place at a certain time.

Of the Collins’ four categories, the final two have even more relaxed underpinnings. The members of these schools cannot be connected to one another neither through direct collaboration nor mentoring between successive generations of members. In place of such sociological ties, the connecting links now come in the form of shared philosophical views, styles and scholarly interests. The difference between the school-types number three and four is that in the third case we can still point out a connecting lineage of “philosophical influences” of some kind, which binds these fellow school members together—even though they might not have had any direct personal contact with each other. In Collins’ assessment, schools of these types are studied by scholars of history of ideas, when they try to trace the transmission of a certain idea from one philosopher to another.

In Collins’ fourth and final type of school we abandon even the minimal requirement of locating an actual chain of influence between two philosophers counted as members of the same school. What is enough to form a school in this fourth sense is that the would-be members of a school simply *think similarly enough* about some philosophical issue. In radical cases the members of such schools have lived and worked thousands of years apart from each other. It does not even matter if these thinkers are not actually aware of the ideas advocated by those philosophers who are supposed to be their fellow school members, it simply suffices that their philosophical thinking share certain similarities.

Per Collins, these kinds of schools are delineated *ad hoc* for taxonomic purposes, when a group of philosophers who think alike are bracketed together

under a common label.²⁵ In this fourth type of schools, the introduction and usage of their names are thus purely stipulated, whereas the first three types are based on some kind of genetic-cum-historical ties, so that the correct usage of a label requires right kind of genetic ties to certain persons, places, works, ideas or events—either direct contacts or at bare minimum some detectable traces of transmission of ideas from one philosopher to another (Glock 2008a: 220).

It should be noted, however, that philosophical schools can exist in whole range of different sizes, so that the larger ones can under a more detailed analysis encompass numerous smaller sub-schools and sub-traditions within their bounds. Glock (2008a: 220–1) refers to such larger schools as *movements*. Movements are comprised of several concurrently grown and functioning schools and traditions, which are themselves groups and chains of philosophers bound together by different kinds of interactive ties in the sense of Collins' first two types of schools. Even if the sub-schools all belong to the same broad movement, it is not always possible to connect a philosopher from sub-school *A* to another philosopher from sub-school *B* in the same sense we can connect fellow school members directly to one another. Due to their broadness, movements are thus looser and more vague phenomena than schools and traditions. Nevertheless, all representatives of a movement share some distinctive ideas, styles, principles, influences and other similar connecting things, which connect these philosophers together, although there can also be differences of opinion and even spirited internal disagreements (both in diachronic and synchronic dimensions) between members of the same movement. The chief example of a movement which Glock uses is the case of analytic philosophy, whose history consists of the efforts of several smaller and sociologically tighter groups like the Vienna Circle and the Oxford ordinary language philosophy, whose members worked concurrently in different countries and philosophical cultures making analytic philosophy an unprecedented international movement (see Sluga 1998: 112–3). Similarly, we can delineate different successive development-phases from analytic philosophy's long and storied history, as the latter-day philosophers and schools have reacted critically to the theses advocated by the earlier schools and have even ended up supporting diametrically opposing answers on philosophical issues high on the agenda list of this school.

²⁵ As a clarifying statement we can note that Collins' own academic interest in this topic is first and foremost *sociological*, which means that he is motivated primarily to locate causal connections from the interaction between philosophers and schools, which could provide empirical data for creating sociological generalisations about the rise and fall of philosophical views. Hence only the first two types of schools can be used as a starting point for such sociological research, as the latter two are in comparison more artificial and open for interpretation.

But let us return to these matters in a moment. Before we do that, we can improve Collins' four category system by complementing it with another kind of categorisation in this same ballpark. Whereas Collins' four-type system focused primarily on the sociological issues pertaining to different kinds of philosophical schools, this second categorisation focuses now on the nature of the *philosophical doctrines*, which serve as the doctrinal pillars of schools. Here in Hansson's (2006a) twofold categorisation schools can be built on either the example set by a leading figure or on a key philosophical idea.²⁶ As the names given to philosophical schools typically follow the patterns of either 'P-ism', 'P-ics' or just something else in the form of 'P-blah', we can see that in the person-centric schools the school is typically named after its "master", whereas in the case of idea-centric schools their names usually refer to the key idea underlying the philosophical work of this school.

There is certainly some overlap between these two types of schools in that the person-centric schools also base their work on a philosophical idea, namely, the philosophising of the founding figure.²⁷ Hansson contends that the crucial difference between these two types of schools is located in the fact that the philosophising carried out within person-centric schools aims to develop and preserve the spiritual heritage of its master, whereas idea-centric schools apply their characteristic insight into different philosophical problems by several school members working at the same time, so that they can together cover larger philosophical ground than they could simply working all on their own (in Hansson's view these idea-centric schools are akin to the notion of scientific research programmes, so that the philosophers working under the auspices of these schools attempt to solve as many philosophical problems as they can within the

²⁶ Hansson states that his point of departure for this categorisation comes from the definition provided for the word 'school' in the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

²⁷ In practice a philosophical idea or doctrine is often named after its first (or most famous) advocate, so that realism about abstract entities is known as Platonism, nominalism is in the same way labelled as Aristotelianism, transcendental philosophy is sometimes referred to as Kantianism and so forth.

The naming conventions for philosophical schools and movements were already an interest of Diogenes Laertius (1950: 19), as this extensive summary demonstrates: "Some schools took their name from cities, as the Elians and the Megarians, the Eretrians and the Cyrenaics; others from localities, as the Academics and the Stoics; others from incidental circumstances, as the Peripatetics; others again from derisive nicknames, as the Cynics; others from their temperaments, as the Eudaemonists or Happiness School; others from a conceit they entertained, as Truthlovers, Refutationists, and Reasoners from Analogy; others again from their teachers, as Socratics, Epicureans, and the like; some take the name of Physicists from their investigation of nature, others that of Moralists because they discuss morals; while those who are occupied with verbal jugglery are styled Dialecticians."

parameters provided by their central idea). For now, this distinction will work as it is, but I will complement and revamp Hansson's descriptions shortly with certain thoughts.

The above criteria for identifying and isolating different kinds of groups of philosophers appear simple enough on paper but applying them to actual philosophical schools is a less simple affair.²⁸ In practice, overviews about particular philosophical schools typically quickly acknowledge in their opening words that it is hard to find such common denominators, which would make it possible to write an universal and informative analytic definition consisting of certain necessary and sufficient conditions, which would not merely succeed in encapsulating the central tenets of that group, but also help us to separate its members from other philosophers and schools.²⁹ Therefore these tasks must always be approached with subtler tactics and on a case-by-case basis.

Since the optimistic expectation that we could somehow uncover objective real definitions for philosophical schools is implausible, we must in terms of methodology instead turn to a kind of ordinary language philosophy. We can begin our task by looking at the ways in which the particular name for the school now under our review is commonly used in the established philosophical parlance (this includes writings, lectures, talks, informal conversations between philosophers, blog entries, activities in social media and so forth) and other institutional practices (this includes journals, periodicals, conferences, societies, organisations and so forth)—basically anywhere schools are mentioned and talked about. This established use incorporates some kind of indetermi-

²⁸ I base the following observations largely on the work of Glock (2008a: §1.2, §8; 2013) and to the critical responses it has received (see especially Pincock 2013; Raatikainen 2013)—although I have added my own thoughts in the mix.

²⁹ According to Meyer's (1908: 326) oft-varied quip "There are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists". This statement is paraphrased, among countless others, by Glock (2008a: 137), who writes regarding naturalism and naturalists: "There are almost as many definitions of naturalism as there are proponents."

A representative example of the difficulties pertaining to the task of defining a philosophical school is provided by Zahavi (2008: 661) as he recounts what phenomenology is: "Husserl is the founding father of phenomenology but it has often been claimed that virtually all post-Husserlian phenomenologists ended up distancing themselves from most aspects of his original program. Thus, according to a second competing view, phenomenology is a tradition in name only. It has no common method and research program. It has even been suggested that Husserl was not only the founder of phenomenology, but also its sole true practitioner."

nate—perhaps even contradictory or in some way inconsistent—initial conception of the paradigmatic members of the school in question, which nails the nucleus of its extension down for us.³⁰

The second step is then to consider carefully which common philosophical factors might be shared by these paradigmatic representatives. The results of this examination give us the basic guidelines to extend the boundaries of the schools further outside the initial nucleus of paradigmatic instances. This, then, is the deciding criterion, which we use to measure the proposed definitions for a school (whether they succeed or not). Therefore, it is imperative to understand from the beginning, what type of a school or a movement we are talking about. As we learned earlier, in the first two types of Collins' four categories, what ultimately matters are the relevant genetic links and chains of influence between the would-be members of a school. In Collins' third case, these links are more abstract in nature, as they relate to transmittal of philosophical influences between philosophers (so it is still possible to connect the members of the school together in some way).

Although pointing out these genetic links and chains of influence might seem like a ready-made and a one-dimensional criteria, in actual practice we still end up in situations where we must judge carefully case by case at what point the chain should be cut (especially so in the case of Collins' third school-type). Otherwise the links between philosophers can be extended almost endlessly from the core nucleus of the school, both backwards and forwards in time. And the bigger the school, the bigger this problem tends to become. Another notable problem is the fact that the genetic links and chains of influence often exist between philosophers also across presumed school-lines, which makes philosophers often selectively downplay these disconcerting links between two philosophers from the opposite sides of the battle lines who according to our official narrative should not have had influenced each other (Raatikainen 2013: 15ff).

To avoid these shortcomings, we must also invoke in our definitions—at least to some degree—some additional criteria which refer to specific *philosoph-*

³⁰ In addition to particular philosophers, we can also nominate as paradigmatic instances the works, journals, associations, doctrines, sub-traditions and the like associated with that school. Unfortunately, there can also be conflicting views concerning the paradigmatic representatives of a school, so that according to one view a certain philosopher is the most central figure of that school, whereas from the opposite view the same philosopher ought to be thought of as only a marginal character or an early influence at best. For instance, there have been precisely such discussions about the philosophers considered as the paradigmatic members of analytic philosophy (Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein and Quine) and American pragmatism (Peirce, James and Dewey).

ical issues, namely, to the philosophical tenets which are shared by the members of the school (such a criterion is used in Collins' fourth type of school). Even then we can face the problem that the members of a certain school might not all share one particular philosophical doctrine, since especially in bigger and looser schools there might co-exist even diametrically opposite views regarding a philosophical issue. Thus, when we want to delineate philosophical views in schools we must use the Wittgensteinian idea of *family resemblance* (Wittgenstein [1953]: §§65–71), so that there are several concurrent and partly overlapping threads flowing through a school without all members being committed to one singular thread. For example, after thoroughly examining the question of “What is analytic philosophy?” Glock (2008a: 205) has by using this strategy reached the conclusion as per which “analytic philosophy is a tradition, held together *both* by ties of mutual influence *and* by family resemblances.” Even then we face complications especially with long-lived traditions and movements, because they might have shed their “philosophical skins” several times during their lifespan, so that the later phases of that school might have come even to directly oppose the ideas which were near and dear to its original members, although at the same time we can see how various conflicts, ties of influence and family resemblances still bind philosophers from consecutive generations together within this school. At some point we must thus raise the inevitable question of whether it serves any actual practical purpose to continue to speak of a school or a movement, if this school is in no way true to the philosophical thinking of its founding generation.

At this juncture a reasonable question arises: What do the previous—all in all very interesting—remarks really have to do with conceptions of philosophy? As was speculated in the introduction of this section, in popular imagination the topic of philosophy's internal diversity is often associated primarily with the stratum of schools, traditions and movements. But do these sociological and genetic phenomena have interesting relations with the level of conceptions of philosophy, which is the actual type of philosophy's internal disunity which this thesis is really trying to figure out? On first thought, pointing out such lines of influence from schools, traditions and movements to conceptions of philosophy would seem to be quite a straightforward affair: The views regarding the ultimate nature of philosophy—pertaining to its correct methods, subject matter and aims—evoke impassioned opinions among philosophers, on which basis it is natural to expect philosophers to surround themselves with a group of like-minded philosophers to share these ideas with and to pursue philosophising in similar manner. From the opposite direction we can also speculate that when

philosophers come to develop their own communities due to geographical, linguistic and social factors, it is expectable that they begin to produce in their midst new localised and idiosyncratic forms of thinking regarding the true nature and purpose of philosophy.

These initial impressions are further supported by the ways in which the actual inner mechanisms of philosophical schools are described in the literature: When we consider the different varieties of philosophical foundations which schools can endorse in Hansson's view, it seems that the members of an idea-centric school have adopted a research program of some kind as their shared starting point. This research programme provides the starting parameters and general guidelines for the philosophising undertaken in this school's name. Hansson describes idea-centric schools as being focused around one *positive* insight, but as Nolan (2007: 5–7) suggests writing on this same theme³¹, the orienting tenet can just as well be a *prohibition*, such as the critical view that a certain branch of philosophy is meaningless pseudo-philosophy, or a *negative* result, such as a decisive counter-argument against certain older philosophical doctrine, which now motivates the school's search for a new and improved philosophical replacement. Moreover, Nolan notes, *pace* Hansson's view, that the members of idea-centric schools do not necessarily follow just *one singular* idea at a time. Instead, the bond between the fellow school members can be built upon a more general philosophical attitude or spirit, which then makes those philosophers prioritise a certain branch of philosophy or a set of questions as the most pressing area for philosophical study right now. These philosophers can also share a vague understanding about the decisive criteria used in their philosophical assessments on this problem—in other words, what it would take for a proposed theory to be acceptable. Although the members of these schools are thus not necessarily united by strict adherence to a certain philosophical doctrine, they can nevertheless have convergent ideas on the issues of what the noteworthy philosophical problems are, what currently are the main competing alternatives to these problems, how the suggested answers to these problems should be assessed and so on.

In Hansson's second type of school, the work of a school is in some way based on the thinking of a seminal figure, who gets the honour of serving as this school's eponymous role-model. In Nolan's (2007: 3–4) analysis, in actual philosophical practice this also means that the followers of the school's hero figure emulate his or her way of doing philosophy and follow its overall spirit now in

³¹ In his article, Nolan actually limits his remarks to the schools and traditions existing in metaphysics, but insofar as I can tell, his observations can be extended *mutatis mutandis* to other branches of philosophy as well.

their own philosophical undertakings. To put this in other words, they do not necessarily endorse uncritically the actual answers that their master has put forward to this or that philosophical issue, but rather want to develop their own original responses to the same philosophical problems, which their master once found noteworthy, and evaluate their success by using the similar theoretical criteria which their role model had also followed. Nolan (2007: 4) provides an illustration from the scene of current metaphysics, in which there are even now many disciples of David K. Lewis, and these philosophers can collectively be called adherents of “Lewisian metaphysics”. These Lewisian metaphysicians, however, might not accept even the majority of Lewis’ views in actual metaphysical questions. Instead, they seek in a critical spirit better alternatives to Lewis’ positions in the overall ethos of Lewis’ philosophy.³²

Now after these further elucidations, the two main types of philosophical schools as described by Hansson begin to sound like an intellectual setting in which we can say that the philosophers in these schools have adopted uniting views and guidelines about the appropriate methods, principal challenges and general aims of philosophising, and then continue their own individual philosophising onwards from there. They do not thus necessarily agree on a certain finished viewpoint or a theory, but rather approach philosophising in the same manner and with similar pre-suppositions together with the criteria for what it would actually mean for a proposed view to be successful. This conception of philosophy, which orients the philosophising of fellow school members, is not necessarily a premeditated or explicit doctrine, but rather an implicit theoretic framework which steers the school’s philosophical activities in the background into a certain distinctive direction. One special case where the conception of philosophy at the foundation of a school often becomes conscious and explicitly articulated is a situation where a school wants to be regarded as a revolutionary movement, which departs in some radical fashion from the (supposedly) established way of philosophising. Then these revolutionary schools have in mind a certain picture of the old philosophical practice, against which they react. At times this attitude can even result in a manifesto, a public declaration of the school’s distinctive ideals for future philosophical research.

³² In Nolan’s (2007: 3–4) view contemporary metaphysical scene has several schools of this kind, which have formed around followers of, among others, Saul Kripke, Michael Dummett and Peter Strawson. He adds, that these metaphysical schools can be classified further on different levels of generality, so that for example the followers of W.V. Quine can be grouped as Quineans, which includes Lewisian, Davidsonian and Putnamian philosophers (among others), who have all then developed their initial Quinean influences into different—even conflicting—directions.

However, the names for philosophical schools, traditions and movements commonly used in the established language of philosophical texts, journals, presentations and so on, do not necessarily track the corresponding outlines of individual conceptions of philosophy. Accordingly, conceptions of philosophy should not be identified one-to-one with the different kinds of schools which have been examined in this section (that is, one conception of philosophy for each separate school and *vice versa*). In a nutshell: one school can incorporate several conflicting conceptions of philosophy, while one particular conception might resurface in several distinct schools. This is a corollary of the fact that, as we saw above, the schools of the first two types in Collins' fourfold categorisation have been initially formed and subsequently shaped by what we might call "extra-philosophical" factors, such as various kinds of sociological and environmental factors. These sociological and environmental factors, which bind the members of a school together, can then outweigh the philosophical views about the ideal nature and purpose of philosophising. In other words, the internal disagreements within a school can potentially extend even to the constitutive issues pertaining to conceptions of philosophy—even if these same disagreeing philosophers get along socially just fine under the same "school roof". For this reason, philosophers sometimes criticise the significance which is placed on schools in the big mappings of the philosophical landscape (as I mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section, both the past and the present of philosophy is often construed as a narrative of contrasting schools, movements and traditions). The outlines of schools do not correlate with any deep doctrinal fault lines, so if they are used to map philosophical positions, these maps will always be more or less idealised versions of the underlying reality. If we desire to understand conflicts between competing philosophical views, we must look "deeper" than the level of philosophical schools and add "epicycles" to the generalisations provided by the taxonomy of philosophical schools. Hintikka (2006: 34), for example, notes that philosophical schools are at best only a sociologically interesting phenomenon devoid of any real philosophical significance:

I have never understood the importance that many people associate with the different 'schools' or 'movements.' Such terms make sense only when the philosophers and/or scientists in question actually interact, as for instance in the Vienna Circle, but such an interaction does not imply very much by way of shared doctrines or other shared philosophical views.³³

³³ In earlier times, the existence of warring schools in philosophy was considered to be strange already by Hobbes ([1651]: Ch. 46): "From this it was that the place where any of them taught and disputed was called *schola*, which in their tongue signifieth leisure; and their disputations,

But why then is there so much internal disagreement within philosophical schools? This condition becomes understandable after a few observations about the typical tone that philosophising acquires in social settings.

First and foremost, in practice philosophising does not (at least in many cases) amount to a simple one-way “preaching to the choir”, or—to go from one extreme to another—trying to achieve good-natured compromises between two conflicting views, so that everyone involved can go home happy afterwards. Instead, philosophising in actual practice consists of argumentative dialogue and dialectical debates, where philosophers challenge each other’s theses and try to defend their own.³⁴ This competitive dynamic is also present in the inner mechanisms of schools. For example, if a “teamwork” occurs within fellow school members, it relatively rarely takes the form of direct collaboration, which would result in co-authored articles and books (at least when compared to many other disciplines within the natural and social sciences, where this form of academic working can in fact be the norm). In philosophy the one great advantage that being a member in a school can provide a philosopher is the fact that through this social network a philosopher can receive critical peer-reviews for her ideas from her close associates (Quinton 2005b: 706; Nolan 2007: 6–7). Philosophical schools can have their own discussion circles, conferences, workshops, societies, networks for conducting correspondence and so on. The ideas submitted for review by school members can be criticised ruthlessly with destructive counter-arguments coming from their peers. Therefore, when we look at the chains of influence which bind members of philosophical schools together, we must in addition to this positive influence also take into account the cases of *negative* influence. Put in other words, philosopher *A* can have received influences from philosopher *B* in the sense that *A* responds *critically* to the ideas of *B* (Glock 2008a: 222).

diatribae, that is to say, passing of the time. Also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects, some of them, from these their schools: for they that followed Plato’s doctrine were called Academics; the followers of Aristotle, Peripatetics, from the walk he taught in; and those that Zeno taught, Stoics, from the Stoa: as if we should denominate men from More-fields, from Paul’s Church, and from the Exchange, because they meet there often to prate and loiter.”

³⁴ In the modern era of academic philosophy this dialectic has an additional institutional twist, as Cappelen (2017: 66) writes: “As a matter of fact, philosophy departments don’t tend to hire just people who agree with each other. We hire people who fundamentally disagree. We also educate and supervise students who fundamentally disagree with us. There’s no doctrinal or methodological entry-ticket to becoming a professional philosopher.”

When we move on to consider the broader movements, we note that here too there can co-exist liberally side by side several smaller schools and traditions within a single movement, so that these constitutive sub-schools can actually have more problematic philosophical relationships with each other, than what they do with those philosophers and schools coming from the “outside” of the movement. Indeed, in Nolan’s (2007: 4–5) view, the outlines of a school can best be identified by picking out the philosophers who outspokenly *disagree* with each other in print. This is one consequence of the fact that the philosophical arguments are usually conducted most actively within the boundaries of a school, whereas the ideas of those philosophers who exist somewhere beyond the school’s borders are not even seen as worth the time and effort it would take to study them—they are given no attention and they are not responded to in any way (Glock 2013: 39). In many cases the fiercest and, at the same time, most constructive critique for the school’s doctrines comes from within its own bounds or perhaps from the “official opposition party” close to it—a school might eventually die by “its own hands” when it is its own members who present the decisive self-criticism, and not unknown outsiders (Soames 2003: xii–xiii). To borrow Collins’ (1998: 28) recapitulation of the inner mechanisms of schools: belonging to a philosophical school often means primarily a continuity of a debate, rather than being committed to some unquestionable philosophical doctrine or thesis.

Thirdly, when we look at some of the most famous teacher/apprentice-pairings and chains of tradition in the history of philosophy, we can notice also here that many of the philosophers who later become great thinkers themselves were at first constructive critics of the ideas of their teachers rather than simply devout followers of their master’s philosophical doctrines. “*Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*”, as Aristotle reputedly said of Plato and his Academy (if we believe the story, as the origins of this famous quotation are actually dubious). In most cases what the protégé learned from her master was a certain notion of what interesting philosophy is, and tacit knowledge regarding how it should be pursued—and not a set of unquestionable theses and doctrines.

Therefore, in practice there can exist large disagreements and even philosophical “civil wars” within schools (of all types) about the kinds of constitutive philosophical issues which help to define the methodological and topical foundations for conceptions of philosophy. An excellent illustration of such a situation is provided by the case of the Viennese circle, where the thinkers working under this banner even penned their own manifesto, a philosophical pamphlet which name-checked the true members of this school (Neurath et al. [1929]). Members of this group were also generally conscious and strict of the matter

that the group's outward public image should appear as uniform as possible to the outsiders and that the works done by the individual members should be associated with their collective brand of "The Viennese circle". Despite all these facts, in reality the views of the Viennese circle's core figures split into a "left" and a "right wing" on numerous issues, such as the question of what should be the proper attitude towards Wittgenstein, what is the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences, political issues (socialism, to be precise), and so on (Uebel 2006). Thus, there exists no "philosophy of logical positivism" in singular form.

To reiterate: The moral lesson of these remarks is that it is possible to use the labels and names, which appear in philosophical contexts, as initial pointers when we want to identify conceptions of philosophy. A strong view about the ideal subject matter, method and aim of philosophy can be a significant creator of camaraderie within a school which unites likeminded thinkers. When we name conceptions of philosophy, we typically borrow the names of the existing person and idea-centric schools, so that we speak of, for example, the 'Kantian conception of philosophy' or the 'rationalist conception of philosophy'. On the other hand, if we follow these labels too uncritically we can be led seriously astray. As was noted earlier, when we identify philosophical schools, issues pertaining to sociological facts, genetic links and trails of influence can take priority over any philosophical agreements regarding philosophy's true nature and purpose. Now from the opposite direction it is also entirely possible that two distinct schools, which are otherwise engaged in intense philosophical disagreements, can nevertheless share similar overall visions regarding philosophy—in other words, the factors which separate them are of some non-philosophical origins (such as sociological, cultural or linguistic barriers). Thus, when we speak of the fragmented and "many-faced" identity of philosophy, the *philosophical* level of conceptions of philosophy must be separated from the mere *sociological* level of schools, traditions and movements. Indeed, when I examine the debate between naturalists and rationalists later in this work, my scholarly interests are first and foremost focused on conceptions of philosophy, that is, philosophical positions, and not sociologically or genetically defined groups of philosophers, namely, schools, traditions and movements under the names of naturalism and rationalism.

I will bring up just one final example here, which plainly illustrates all of the above major themes and difficulties from the foregoing paragraphs, and this example is about the predominant situation of twentieth century philosophy. As is well known, the most consequential development of contemporary philosophy was the process, whose seeds were first planted during the latter half

of the nineteenth century, and which then really came into full bloom from 1930s onwards, resulting in the philosophical world being split into analytic and continental branches (not to overlook certain the schools and traditions such as Marxism, neo-Thomism, pragmatism and so on, which are a bit problematic to subsume under these two main options). During the coldest years of this “philosophical cold war” there was very little constructive bridge-building between their respective representatives.³⁵ It is therefore perhaps natural to expect that we could pinpoint a some kind of one-dimensional contrast regarding the ideal nature of philosophy behind this rift—a direct disagreement about a method, subject matter or purpose of philosophy, where the analytic and continental philosophers would think in different ways, resulting in two different kinds of philosophising. However, despite these expectations this juxtaposition does not really tell us anything enlightening in terms of the conceptions of philosophy embraces by these two distinct branches of philosophy, because both analytic and continental philosophy have during the past hundred years encompassed countless different kinds of thinkers and conceptions of philosophy.

Analytical philosophy, for instance, has during its lifespan of more than a century contained a host of alternative and even mutually incompatible views about the exact nature, target and purpose of the analytical method—and, more dramatically, even some antithetical views questioning the viability of analysis altogether. On the other hand, stressing analysis as the distinguishing method of analytic philosophy is not sufficient to tell it apart from the other forms of philosophy which preceded it historically or have developed concurrently with it: The analytical approach has a long and storied history in Western philosophy even before the self-proclaimed “analytic philosophy” (see Beaney 2003/2009). Comparable remarks can be made about the side of continental philosophy too, which has not been a unified movement in terms of a conception of philosophy, so that we could find a clear consensus about the subject methods, matter and aims of philosophy from the philosophical activity of its diverse schools and members. According to Leiter (2004a: 12), continental philosophy in fact consists of seven to nine distinct—partly overlapping—sub-traditions with their own views and emphases: German idealism, German materialism, Marxism, Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism and post-structuralism (and each of these branches can then be divided further into myriad permutations).

³⁵ For recent literature regarding this topic, see Rosen (1998), Glock (2008a; 2013), Critchley (2001), Soames (2003), Raatikainen (2013) and Beaney (2017).

In any case, we reach a natural transition point from this mid-conclusion to the second main theme of this section: Previously, I considered how conceptions of philosophy can influence the genesis, development and flourishing of philosophical schools. Now the interplay between these two phenomena can be reviewed from the opposite angle, so that the focus is on the question of how philosophical schools can in turn influence the activities, attitudes and habits of philosophers—including the ways in which they approach the topic of conceptions of philosophy in conversations, especially in more relaxed social settings outside of the contexts of “official” philosophy, when they do not have to watch their words so closely (Glock 2008a: 10).

When philosophers subscribe to a school—or basically just any kind of a philosophical view in general—and then actively defend this school or view in philosophical debates, they can be prone to certain kinds of unwarranted partisan tendencies and attitudes pertaining to the merits of their own philosophising and the merits of the school they represent. A closely related negative twist of these tendencies and attitudes is the way in which philosophers see the merits of the philosophising of their opponents and the schools to which they belong. Sometimes these partisan attitudes become manifested on the verbal level in the names, epithets, banners, tags and labels that philosophers use for philosophical schools and views. We can discern certain repeating patterns from these partisan tendencies, which come up again and again in the contexts of different philosophical discussions. Often these partisan tendencies are toxic in that they can disrupt our attempts at constructive dialogue over school lines. I present here a selection of these patterns which have caught my eye in the literature and other activities of philosophers.

However, before we can continue to the actual examples I must stress that in what follows my impressions are *not* results of a detailed analysis based on extensive case studies or any other kind of systematically collected data. Such a research is nowadays done within the sub-discipline known as the *sociology of philosophy* (see Heidegren & Lundberg 2010). Indeed, I would say that there is a demand for this kind of a specialised sociological research concerning philosophy and its various practices, because it feels to me that philosophising is too often thought by default to be a purely rational activity, which is not swayed by extra-philosophical influences of any kind, such as the psychological rationales or motives of the actual human beings who are developing and espousing these philosophical views, or the more sweeping social and cultural forces imposed upon us by the surroundings (time and place) where the philosophising is being

done.³⁶ Sociology of philosophy takes these factors into consideration and paints a perhaps somewhat more realistic picture of what doing philosophy *actually* is. But as I have already remarked, my remarks here belong to a considerably less ambitious genre of “armchair sociology” (see Nolan 2007: 2), which intends as a preparatory groundwork to mark the potential targets in this territory for possible subsequent scholarship, one which is based on more systematic amassing and analysing of data. So, please take the following considerations for what they are. A potential pitfall for this kind of an armchair sociology is that it can easily lapse into putting too big emphasis on random pieces of anecdotal evidence, so that the particular examples are cherry-picked to serve a certain pre-determined agenda. Nevertheless, I try to document my observations with actual examples from the literature even if they provide only my impressionistic take on these matters.

The first item on my list of typical behaviour-patterns aggravated by the factionalism in philosophy is the antagonistic “us-versus-them” attitudes which opposing schools so easily trigger in philosophers: We philosophers tend to

³⁶ The sociology of philosophy adopts a theory-based approach to empirically researchable data, which pertains in some way to philosophy or philosophising. In addition to the “official” philosophical publications and texts, the basic data in sociological research can consist of, *inter alia*, memoirs and private diaries of philosophers, correspondence between thinkers, minutes from meetings of philosophical societies, unpublished manuscripts, and so forth. The conclusions of this research can be arranged and presented in the form of quantitative statistics and visualisations. What is central to many practitioners of sociology of philosophy is the idea that philosophising is an activity carried out by actual human beings who are working within the frameworks of normal social life and its established institutions. Therefore, when we paint a picture of philosophising, these sociological background factors should not be brushed off in favour of some kind of an overt “rationalisation”, where the genesis and development of philosophical views and schools are explained within a framework of objective and a-historical rationality (see Morrow & Sula 2011).

The controversial question, however, arises, of *how much* of philosophy and its results we can succumb to these sociological considerations. A strong answer to this challenge is the position known as *sociologism*, which sees philosophy as having been shaped to a considerable degree by sociological factors. Sociological examinations of philosophy are sometimes scorned among philosophers for the reason that it is feared that if we acknowledge the factors of this sociological level it would inevitably lead to a reduction of philosophy into sociology as the rise and fall of philosophical views are “explained away” by external influences (Mundt 1989: 79).

Some precursors of the viewpoint and methodology of the sociology of philosophy were already made by nineteenth century scholars such as Marx and Wundt, but this kind of investigation became its own field of inquiry only during the 1990s. Important pioneers in this field have been Kusch (1995), Collins (1998) and Gross (2004). There exists some disagreement among philosophers about the issue of whether we should see this sub-discipline as a part of philosophy or sociology (Heidegren & Lundberg 2010: 16n1).

have a kind of instinctive knee-jerk reaction to any rival schools, so that we view them as being hostile threats against which it is best just to dig deeper into the safety of our pre-existing foxholes. At its worst, communication from one camp of philosophers to another happens in the style of polarising rhetoric, which just keeps on repeating unwarranted pre-conceptions and oversimplifications of the contending lines of thought. A consequence of this is that the contrasts and confrontations between opposing philosophical schools often get exaggerated disproportionately in relation to the real *philosophical* disagreement at hand. It is easier to recognise and emphasise the differences between two views rather than to recognise the points which unite them. As the strawmen-generalisations and prejudices get stronger and the quality of the discussions devolves further still, little by little the combatants create a predicament of prolonged trench warfare, which does not leave much wiggle room for real changes of opinion as both sides can be too stubbornly set in their established ways of thinking.

One facet of this pattern is the illusion, in which schools often appear much more philosophically homogeneous to the eyes of outsiders than what they really are internally (Glock 2008a: 115).³⁷ Here is a quote from Hamlyn (1992: 109) as he illustrates this illusion through a couple of examples:

[T]hings may look very different outside a movement from how they look inside. In the heyday of linguistic philosophy, it was common for those outside Oxford to speak of Oxford philosophers as providing a more or less unified front, while it looked very different inside Oxford; what seemed to Oxonians to be large differences were thought of as mere incidentals outside Oxford. That kind of phenomenon still exists, and is likely to continue to do so wherever there is an organization with a large number of philosophers belonging to it. For example, for a long time continental philosophers tended to be regarded by British philosophers as all of a piece.

So, in practice when schools and their members' philosophies are characterised by outsiders, these views often get forced into a certain mould, which does not do enough justice to the actual internal diversity of the school in question. Often a starting point for such characterisations is a certain radical proponent of that

³⁷ One variation of this illusion pertains to the historiography of philosophy and manifests itself in the way in which a group of individual thinkers who happen to precede a certain revolutionary period are easily bracketed together under a common banner, which does not do justice to the individuality and originality of these philosophers. Such banners are for example "scholastics" (Lagerlund 2012) and "pre-Socratics" (Warren 2007: 1–2, 185n1), where the philosophers subsumed under these collective labels might not have much else in common philosophically beyond their particular place in terms of the chronology of philosophy.

view in question, which is then used as a suitable “blueprint” to extrapolate the exaggerated caricature description, from which all sophisticated nuances and moderate elements have conveniently been left out. The next step is then to abuse this caricature as an easy punching bag for criticism and even ridicule.

At its very worst, caricatures regarding the content and style of the kind of philosophising practiced by other schools can create an “otherness”, which is portrayed as the negative mirror image of the “good” and “true” philosophy. All the grave philosophical vices and weaknesses—irrationalism, dogmatism and so on—are projected into this caricature, while our own preferred view in contrast is thought to be the true paragon of all the central philosophical virtues: rigour, clarity, rationality, truth and theory. So we do not really have a contrast between two schools of philosophising, *A* and *B*, but rather a contrast between *good* philosophy and *bad* philosophy (Rosen 1998). In Glendinning’s (2002: 205) view the negative stereotypes which during the classical times were highlighted in the contrasts between philosophy and sophistry have recently reappeared in the juxtaposition between the forms of analytic and continental philosophy:

The basic view I have is that continental philosophy represents, for analytic philosophy, proper philosophy’s own other. Historically, that position has been represented under the title of sophistry. So you have a contrast between philosophy and sophistry. I think most of the rhetoric of analytic philosophy’s representation of the division deploys the kinds of evaluative distinctions you find when we talk about the distinction between philosophy and sophistry.

As we shall see, similar lines of thinking have made their appearances in the debates between the naturalists and anti-naturalists, as well.

An extension of this illusion is the way in which the labels denoting schools and doctrines are first coined and then used as a part of the standard rhetoric in the philosophical debates. Philosophers are on average far more enthusiastic to classify other philosophers as belonging to specific schools than to publicly out themselves as proud card-carrying members of a school—an exception which proves the rule here is given by the honourable cases where the philosopher is acknowledged as the founder or leader of his or her school (Nolan 2007: 4). This mindset is reflected in the fact that the names and labels used in philosophy have often begun their lives as pejorative exonyms³⁸, that is, they were initially given by the opponents outside of the school—although sometimes the targets

³⁸ In ethnolinguistics an endonym is a kind of name which an ethnic group has used to name itself, while an exonym in contrast is a kind of name given to them by outsiders, and often has pejorative connotations.

of this attempted “shaming” have since then proudly appropriated these tags into their own use. Such a turnabout has occurred, *inter alia*, with the cases of ‘continental philosophy’ (Glendinning 2002: 206; see however Moran 2008a: 13–4), ‘Canberra-planners’ (Braddon-Mitchell & Nola 2009: 1) and ‘Oxford natural language philosophy’ (Hamlyn 1992: 109; Hacker 1996b: 228–9; Glock 2008a: 115). When we look further back in history a similar origin story is behind the name of the Cynics in the Hellenistic period (Diogenes Laertius 1950: 19).³⁹

When the ring of a certain label has been successfully stained with negative overtones, it can then be used in debates—in lieu of actual philosophical reasons and arguments—as a convenient way to casually brand any opposed view as disreputable by subsuming them under this demonised name. Glock (2008a: 5–6; see also Passmore 1970: 2) calls these philosophical smear words “dismissal-phrases”. Even if the names and labels repeated in philosophical discussions might appear outwardly to function as purely neutral and simple descriptive expressions, they can nevertheless be laden with negative connotations behind their innocent looks. Consider the case of ‘scholasticism’, which is often used as an adjective to imply a pedantic style of philosophising, which allegedly falls victim to the habit of drawing unnecessarily sharp-cut divisions, or ruminating on inconsequential questions of the type “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?”. Another great example is provided by the history of the name ‘psychologism’. Frege and Husserl managed through their critical work in the latter part of the nineteenth century to give this term a highly negative spin, to the point where ‘psychologism’ was widely seen as kind of a fallacy, to which philosophy fell victim when it erroneously “conflated” psychological and philosophical issues together (Kusch 1995: 3–7). A somewhat similar term in current discussions seems to be ‘scientism’, which is used almost without exceptions in negative sense to mean uncritical—and thus *unphilosophica*—blind faith in the natural sciences. Therefore, very few philosophers want willingly to be known as supporters of this outlook (well, not at least under this particular name). The name ‘positivism’ has in the same vein a bad reputation these days, especially within the humanities, although Comte originally chose this name for his views because it has positive connotations in all major European languages (Hacking 2012: xxxiv, n42).⁴⁰ As an aside, similar ploy is used by the “Brights”, that is,

³⁹ This phenomenon is by no means limited to philosophy. For example, among the branches of Christianity, the names of Quakers and Methodists had similar beginnings (Baggini & Fosl 2010: 58).

⁴⁰ These ways of using and abusing different labels are present outside of philosophy too. Consider the political labels of ‘fascism’, ‘Cultural Marxism’ and ‘populism’, for example, as very few politicians would probably want to be associated with these political smear words.

members of the international movement of modern atheist activists who find the traditional label of 'atheism' too negatively-laden and have therefore come up with a new positive designation for themselves.

Relatedly, philosophers can attempt to glamorise their preferred position to sound like a middle-of-the-road between two radical extremes, so that it would sound like an odd move for anyone to oppose it. One way to do this is to name the position in question as the "moderate" variation of that view, in stark contrast to the "naive", "brute", "ersatz", "ostrich" and "extreme" versions of the same idea also available on the market (Glock 2008a: 211). Moreover, if a certain name or label has already gained a positive echo around it, it can then be expanded to accommodate all kinds of prestigious thinkers and views from both the past and the present. This has also occurred with 'naturalism', since this name has in present philosophical circles gained such a positive buzz, that very few contemporary philosophers want to be stigmatised with the badge of 'anti-naturalist' if they get a say in the matter (Papineau 1993: 1). To avoid such a "horrible" fate, philosophers simply attempt to relax the criteria for naturalism loose enough so that it can also be used to cover their philosophical views. For this reason when we are trying to figure out the exact philosophical tenets and commitments of naturalism, it is perhaps not wise to accept the words of every *soi-disant* naturalist as our conclusive guidance.⁴¹ In Hobbs' biblical allusion the name 'naturalism' has in current philosophy started to function as a *shibboleth*, so that by uttering this code word in the right situation and at the right time a philosopher can identify himself as a respectable member of the philosophical community (Horst 2009: 221).⁴² These issues become apparent later on when I examine the naturalistic conception of philosophy in better detail (see Section 3.5).

⁴¹ Chalmers (1996: 128) for example, has called his view in the philosophy of mind "naturalistic dualism", which already sounds somewhat like an oxymoron. As an another illustration we can mention McDowell (1996), who is known as a vocal critic of naturalism, but who nevertheless has described his theory as a "better naturalism" (Papineau 2007:n2; Glock 2008a: 144). In similar vein Bealer (1998c: 270–1), who advocates Platonism in the ontology of concepts, has described his theory of concepts as "naturalistic". See also Koskinen (2004: 60) who mentions the two philosophers Dennett and McGinn, who have presented opposing views in the same discussion, but who both still want to be regarded as naturalists in their field.

⁴² On the other hand, it must be noted that in certain recent remarks there has also been visible traces of a certain kind of "I am not a naturalist, but ..." rhetoric when philosophers do not always desire to be associated with the problematic label of naturalism. Williamson (2007), for example, calls his conception of philosophy, which in many crucial respects resembles naturalism, "anti-exceptionalism". For Williamson's thoughts on the label of 'naturalism' (and the reason why he is hesitant to apply it to his views), see Williamson (2011a; 2011b).

The second harmful tendency pertaining to the factionalism in philosophy is the prejudices, which philosophers can have about the intellectual motivations of their opponents. When speaking about rival schools, philosophers often voice their suspicion, that the real reason why the members of a rival school continue to stay together is some kind of a cult-like dogmatic adherence to the tenets of this school, and this loyalty can then override rational considerations and philosophical arguments, which normally would have convinced any sane critically thinking person otherwise already long time ago.⁴³ In particular, it is easy to diagnose these flaws as affecting our rival philosophers, and use these alleged failings to conveniently explain why these philosophers can still hold stubbornly onto their views in face of the (putative) counterarguments voiced by their critics. As we shall see later in this dissertation, in the debates between naturalists and rationalists there have also been suspicions and even outright accusations that the hidden *ulterior motive* for a certain naturalist or rationalist to advocate her philosophical views is provided by certain extra-philosophical allegiance. In the naturalists' case, the accusation typically mentions the "glory-hunting" desire to hop on to the bandwagon of natural sciences, whereas rationalists are thought to be guilty of pre-philosophical religious convictions, which then distort their views on the nature of philosophy.⁴⁴

One variation of this prejudice targets person-centric schools in particular, as it is easy to presume the members of these schools as being under the spell of some kind of a "genius cult" or blind devotion to a philosophical authority, so that these philosophers are not actually interested in pursuing genuinely critical philosophical scholarship, but rather are occupied with finding out what their master has thought and written about philosophical topics (Hansson 2006a: 2; Nolan 2007: 11). This mental imagery can be deployed as a rhetorical weapon if we name a certain position by its supposed intellectual originator, so that when we are discussing the merits of this view it sounds as though we are not really talking about a "living" and still evolving philosophical view here, but rather of devotees of a doctrine set in stone. For example, naturalism might in reference

⁴³ In addition to this charge of dogmatism, critics have suggested that philosophical schools tend to involve "cronyism" and "academic inbreeding", which in actual practice means that members of a school predominantly cite their colleagues' publications and shun external references (Leiter 2004a: 20–1; Nolan 2007: 5; McCucumber 2013).

⁴⁴ On this partisan tendency an interesting case is provided by Mitroff's (1979) sociological research on the scientific "counter-norms", which shows that researchers tend to take their work and theories very personally. For example, when they comment on competing theories they cannot refrain from commenting on the advocates of these rival theories as persons. They are thought to be irrationally in love with their views, which explains why they will not change their minds in the face of the overwhelming counter-evidence.

to W.V. Quine be named as *quineism*, even though numerous contemporary naturalists have highly dismissive attitudes towards many of Quine's core ideas (and moreover, Quine was not really the first naturalist in the history of philosophy either—we will get back to this matter later).⁴⁵

Furthermore, if we happen to hold these kinds of preconceptions and even biases about our philosophical opposition, it is deceptively easy to think that the burden of proof in philosophical discussions must lie on their side. If this challenge is not met, it is merely a further affirmation for our initial suspicion that these philosophers are simply acting unprofessionally when they doggedly continue to cling to their dogmatic doctrines (Glock 2008a: 249–51). Conversely, it is easy for philosophers to stay in their comfort zones and study only the kind of new literature which happens to corroborate their favoured kind of philosophising—and by so doing they succumb to a philosophical variety of the well-known confirmation bias (Morrow & Sula 2011). On this issue, Cohen (2000: 18) has reminisced as how during the 1960s students and scholars had completely different attitudes regarding analyticity based on whether they had happened to receive their formative philosophical education in Harvard or in Oxford.

Moreover, even lovers of wisdom are not, alas, always above the low level of promoting national stereotypes and the associated prejudices. These attitudes can influence the extent of how responsive philosophers are to new viewpoints coming from the other side of a particular cultural border and, on the other hand, how certain “alien” ways of thinking are easily explained away as simple manifestations of a particular national pre-disposition. To illustrate, the history of European philosophy has a long tradition of contrasts between British and Continental forms of philosophising, which have reappeared in different times in numerous philosophical, scientific and cultural disputes (British empiricism versus continental rationalism; Newton versus Leibnitz as the first discover of calculus; British scientism versus German romanticism; analytic philosophy versus continental philosophy and so on; Glock 2008a: 70–1). One philosophical view in particular, which has received its fair share of cultural preconceptions is pragmatism, as it has sometimes been regarded by the inhabitants of the Old Continent to be just a cheap attempt to legitimate philosophically the ethos of American capitalism, which stresses entrepreneurship and practicality (Rescher

⁴⁵ Outside of philosophy, this phenomenon is visible, for example, in discussions regarding evolutionary biology, where the discontents of the theory of evolution sometimes choose to speak of ‘Darwinism’. By so doing they enforce an idea that this doctrine entails the ism-like adherence to the thoughts of Charles Darwin, that is, a scientist who lived in the nineteenth century, rather than a bundle of closely related contemporary theories which have developed (and continue to be transformed still) through extensive critical discussion within the scientific community (see Scott & Branch 2009).

2005a: 750). As ridiculous as they might sound, some of these old cultural and national prejudices and preconceptions are still alive in the present day, as the quarrel of naturalism and rationalism can in certain ways be seen as continuing these earlier contrasts between American and British types of philosophising (Leiter 2004a: 2n8; Glock 2008a: 71, 253). And it is still true today, that the actual physical distance between representatives of two opposing views can easily create a mental image of that foreign philosophy, which is practised “out there someplace else”.⁴⁶

In the worst possible outcome, the hostile antagonism between schools eventually lead to an unhealthy conclusion, where these different schools have their disjointed spheres of intellectual life: associations, conferences, journals, cherished hero figures, specific research programmes, textbooks to philosophy, newsletters, technical vocabularies and so on, which in their own way continue to build intellectual walls on philosophical maps and thwart constructive dialogue across school-lines. To use an actual example, the twentieth century rift between analytic and continental forms of philosophy developed ultimately into a “philosophical cold war” of sorts, where the representatives of these two rival schools felt like they were already practitioners of two different subjects (Dummett 1993: 193; Glock 2008a: 10).

Schools and their labels have been criticised also for the reason that they can divert our attention away from the *genuine* philosophical issues. Placing too big an emphasis on definitions and membership-criteria of schools is a mistake, since these labels and names have no intrinsic value independent from us and our way of using these tags (Glock 2008a: 11–2). Papineau (1993: 1) writes:

The important question is which philosophical positions are right, not what to call them. [...] The moral is that we should address the substantial philosophical issues first, and worry about the terminology afterwards.

Stroud (2009: 157, emphasis in the original) has given the balanced principle regarding the same issue:

⁴⁶ On the level of nations and their cultures, there still seems to exist a kind of intellectual “protectionism” in academic circles, so that philosophers often get defensive about preserving indigenous philosophical traditions and, on the other hand, are also xenophobic about alien influences coming across the cultural border. One aspect of this issue can even be the question of which language we should use in philosophising, since in France and Germany there have been critical discussions of the growing status of English as the *lingua franca* of contemporary philosophy, and the possible negative effect this state of affairs can have to the French and German philosophical cultures (Glock 2008a: 252–5).

If you hold or endorse or look with favor on a certain doctrine or theory or method or policy in philosophy, I think you should *state* that doctrine or policy, say what it is or what it says, and not just *name* it. Once you state it, the name you give it doesn't matter, and the merits of the doctrine or policy can be assessed on their own.

The bottom line here is *not* that we should now give up the practice of applying philosophical labels for different kinds of schools and conceptions of philosophy *entirely*. Instead, we should just keep in mind certain provisos about their usage. After all, it would be very hard to philosophise without referring to some kind of labels and names as they are a convenient form of shorthand when we want to refer to philosophical positions. Quine (1995b: 251) sums these conflicting sentiments about labels as follows:

Names of philosophical positions are a necessary evil. They are necessary because we need to refer to a stated position or doctrine from time to time, and it would be tiresome to keep restating it. They are evil in that they come to be conceived as designating schools of thought, objects of loyalty from within and objects of obloquy from without, and hence obstacles, within and without, to the pursuit of truth.

Despite all these perils and harmful shortcomings associated with them, labels still continue to serve their purpose when they are used properly in our appropriate taxonomic and doxographic classificatory practices, because these kinds of classifications and juxtapositions are necessary for clear and efficient communication (Glock 2008a: 6, 8). We must thereby acknowledge the fact that labels are an integral feature of philosophical rhetoric and argumentation. However, when we are making use of these labels, we must nevertheless remain vigilant for their possible toxic aspects (some of which were sketched briefly above). Most importantly, these labels and names should not be used to simply dismiss rival philosophical view-points without considering their individual merits in their proper contexts. In actual practice, if we aim to criticise a certain conception of philosophy, for example, it would be optimal to respond to a specific formulation of this view represented by an actual philosopher, rather than going after a caricatured version summarised from the thinking of several different authors. It might be harder to associate the preconceptions and biases regarding, for example, ulterior motives of philosophising to a single individual than it is to a mere "faceless" abstraction.

What then comes to definitions and demarcations of conceptions of philosophy, one must not hope for any unambiguous or uncontentious solutions to

these complicated matters. This is because conceptions of philosophy are not really independent entities existing in and of themselves, but rather summaries and crystallisations of the views which philosophers have given of the nature of philosophy. Therefore one should not expect objective irrefutable definitions for them—although a supporter of a certain conception of philosophy might think, that it is precisely *her* conception of philosophy (and hers only), which reflects the essential nature of philosophy, in relation to which all other conceptions are false.

1.3 THE FACTORS BEHIND THE DISUNITY OF PHILOSOPHY

One strikingly atypical feature of philosophy as a long-tenured academic discipline was already alluded to fleetingly at the outset of this chapter: namely, that the disagreements concerning the nature and purpose of philosophy have only become more intense and wide-ranging with the passage of time, whereas the opposite is usually the expected norm in the academic world. Indeed, several recent assessments suggest that philosophy has become more and more diverse specifically within the past two centuries or so. Moran (2008a: 1), for example, notes in his overview of 21st century philosophy that “[t]he sheer range and diversity of the philosophical contribution is surely one of the century’s most singular characteristics.” Shand (2006: 1) concurs: “If one true observation about late-twentieth-century may be made, it is perhaps only trite one of its diversity.” Leiter (2004a: 1) describes the philosophical landscape of our time in similar fashion when he pronounces that “[p]hilosophy today—especially, though not only, in the English-speaking countries—is not a monolith, but a pluralism of methods and topics.” The philosophical developments of this timespan defy a cohesive and linearly progressing account, and it is frustratingly challenging to write a unified overview of this era—it seems best to approach such a task by treating its notable thinkers and achievements as splintering into several self-contained smaller narratives (Soames 2003: 464). To give one case in point, it is strenuous to try to present the lifeworks of Wittgenstein and Heidegger within the same framework due to the considerable differences in their philosophical approaches and interests, to say nothing about those of their respective followers (Moran 2008a: 23).

In this section I single out several factors which play a part in the growing fragmentation taking place in the world of philosophy. I also consider from a somewhat more speculative standpoint which underlying aspects in the nature of philosophy enable this disunity to emerge in the first place. These reflections

locate a host of additional causes and after-effects for the disunity of philosophy, of which the multitude of different conceptions of philosophy is also one visible part. By doing this analysis we hopefully gain more clarity to this main chapter's overarching topic of philosophy's internal diversity, as we notice how different things and trends are contributing in their distinct ways to the amplification of this philosophical plurality. We also gain a more complete understanding of this phenomenon's philosophical roots. Speaking for myself, when I first started to wonder about the plurality of conceptions of philosophy, schools, movements, traditions, topics, methods and aims evident in the discipline of philosophy, I had to figure out the specific roles they play in creating this multifaceted nature of philosophy. Maybe the similarities and differences between these phenomena are more obvious to other readers from the start. In any case, in this section—and the one preceding it—I replay my thought process on these matters as I try to separate the sub-forms of philosophy's pluralism from one another. In the previous section I mentioned several socio-cultural and geographical factors (together with other related forces) which can divide philosophers into different schools, traditions and movements along the lines of the notorious case of the analytic–continental divide. In addition to these above-mentioned issues pertaining to the multitude of philosophical schools, the fragmentation of contemporary philosophy has been amplified by certain megatrends, which have transformed the academic world more generally beyond just philosophical circles (see Moran 2008a; Soames 2003: xv; for discussion of these same themes in the context of the natural sciences; see Hobsbawm 1995: §18).

First of these megatrends can be called *specialisation*, and it is diversifying philosophy at an accelerating rate. What is meant here is that the problems and topics targeted by philosophers are becoming more and more meticulously defined, which partitions the field of philosophy into increasingly smaller ecological niches. These increasingly smaller niches can then have their own specialised methods, terminologies, general introductions, essential readings, experts and so on. This naturally heightens the learning curve for outsiders to follow these discussions and actively partake in them. This exclusion does not affect merely professional philosophers, who are specialised in some different area of philosophy, as it can also impact representatives of other disciplines (and lay-people) who might want to keep up to date to date with the latest turns of the current philosophical scene.

It is possible to point out several factors which have escalated the rate of specialisation. The first of these is the understandable phenomenon that philosophers aspire to stand out among the crowd of their peers. As Rescher (2005b: 24; see also Castañeda 1989: 41) notes, philosophers typically have the urge to

find a hitherto untouched, or at least under-researched, subject from the range of philosophical topics, which enables them to do original and perhaps even ground-breaking work. This phenomenon, which Rescher names *centrifugal tendency*, scatters philosophers out to even the furthest unexamined corners of the philosophical map which is expanding at its edges akin to the fractal structure of a Mandelbrot set. In addition to the philosophers' thirst for personal glory, this phenomenon is fuelled by the prevalent science policy and the allocation of research funds, as the expectation is for philosophers to produce original results in exchange for the continued financial support (the so-called rule of "publish or perish")—especially so for the graduate students, post-docs and other untenured junior members of philosophy departments. Doing such a pioneering work is often easier in the frontline of some completely fresh topic, in where every potential viewpoint and competing position has not been already been sucked out of the last drop of originality (and where there is not already decades worth of must-read literature to catch up with)—I can for my own part confess here that this was one major reason which led me to examine the aspects of metaphilosophy when I was considering a suitable topic for my PhD. In terms of academic visibility and long-term career-planning, it can be better to be a big fish in a little pond than the other way around. (Soames 2003: 463–4.)

The rate of specialisation has been accelerated—at least on the analytic side of the philosophical world—by two recent changes in the philosophers' attitudes: First, in contrast to the rather Spartan climate prevalent during the first half of the twentieth century, no sub-discipline of philosophy has during the past four-odd decades been banished outside of the sphere of legitimate philosophy. Specifically, within the various schools and traditions belonging to analytic philosophy, genuine philosophy was for some time understood to encompass only certain core parts of theoretic philosophy, namely, formal logic, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, meta-ethics and philosophy of science—and even in these cases the proper subject matters and methodologies of these sub-disciplines were sometimes interpreted in exclusionary spirit rather narrow-mindedly.

The neglected parts of philosophy have since then experienced exoneration and returned one-by-one to the mainstream of philosophy as active topics.⁴⁷ For example, metaphysics has made a flourishing comeback in analytic philosophy after the "metaphysical turn" roughly from 1950s onwards (Glock 2008a: §2.6). The "retrospective turn", which returned the appreciation for historical study

⁴⁷ A comparable relaxation about the acceptable research methods has taken place within the humanities and social sciences too, as the ideal of quantitative research advocated by behaviourism and positivism has given way to various methods and subjects of qualitative research.

of philosophy's past, followed a decade later (*ibid.*: 92; Garrett 2004), as did the rehabilitation of ethics, political philosophy and aesthetics (Glock 2008a: 146–7, 182–9). Correspondingly, no historical philosopher—the names of Hegel and Nietzsche in particular—is a *persona non grata* for contemporary analytic philosophy, in a way so that engaging with the thinking of such a figure would be a total *faux pas* (Castañeda 1989).⁴⁸

One significant by-product of specialisation has been the way in which several traditional clusters of philosophical issues have evolved and expanded to become their own semi-independent sub-disciplines within the parent discipline. These sub-disciplines often have their own societies, academic positions, conferences, workshops, publications and so on. To illustrate this point we can mention, *inter alia*, the cases of aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, meta-ethics, philosophy of religion, historiography of philosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, philosophy of education, argumentation theory, so-called experimental philosophy and... yes, metaphilosophy as well. Within the traditional branches of philosophy there have also opened new substantial sub-topics, as illustrated by the examples of social epistemology, modal logic, bioethics and countless others.

In addition to this “Balkanisation” of general philosophy, there have also opened completely new avenues for philosophical specialisation outside of the traditional ways of thought. One of the peculiar features of philosophy is the way in which it often takes the form of second-order study, which can be applied to virtually anything. Philosophers have in the name of “applied philosophy” turned their attention to pretty much everything from A to Z: if there is a thing or a phenomenon *x*, there exists in all likelihood also “the philosophy of *x*”—as the philosophical examinations of sports, media, education, animal rights, environment, gender and gender identification, law, love, economy, sexuality, cinema, corporate leadership, business and numerous other examples so colourfully attest (Glock 2008a: 148; Hamlyn 1992: 132–3).⁴⁹ Generally speaking,

⁴⁸ In addition to the fact that many previously marginalised thinkers are currently scrutinised thoroughly in the historical study of philosophy, many less well known “minor” works of the giants of philosophy are now studied meticulously, so the specialisation in the history of philosophy has extended also into this direction (Garrett 2008: 54–5).

⁴⁹ Thus we also have a deluge of books which mix philosophy and popular culture in the name of applied philosophy and are aimed for the popular audience, such as *Star Wars and Philosophy: More Powerful Than You Can Possibly Imagine* (edited by Decker & Eberl 2005) and *Game of Thrones and Philosophy: Logic Cuts Deeper Than Swords* (edited by Jacoby 2012)—just to name a few examples here (there are literally dozens and dozens similar titles related to music artists, TV-shows, comic books, forms of sports, movies and so on).

the antagonism between low and high cultures has waned considerably in academia, and attitudes have become more liberal on the issue of what kinds of things and phenomena can be chosen as subjects of a “serious academic scholarship”. Finally, comparative philosophy has introduced the philosophical traditions, thinkers and themes from non-Western canons to the discussions of Western philosophy.

Concurrent with these changes, philosophers have also gained unlimited new prospects inside the academic world to engage in multi-disciplinary cooperation with scientists and scholars representing all types of inquiries from the neighbouring natural sciences, humanities, jurisprudence, social sciences and so on (Castañeda 1989: 38–9). Moreover, philosophy itself has, at least in certain cases, become more open to multi-disciplinary teamwork, and philosophers these days are often well-informed about the scientific discussions which are relevant to the problems they pursue. At times they can even make their own original contributions in these fields: philosophers working in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language can also have a “side career” in psychology, cognitive science or linguistics, logicians can find something to say about mathematics, computer science and artificial intelligence studies, bioethicists work closely with representatives of medical and social sciences, philosophers working in the historiography of philosophy can find something to say in the history of ideas and so forth (Garrett 2008: 54; Leiter 2004: 27–8). This trend is also encouraged by the science policy of our times, which values connections and active collaboration between different academic disciplines. In any case, through these links philosophy potentially gains, in addition to its own usual topics, all the problems and discussions from neighbouring sciences, to which philosophers can find their ways to contribute.

As stated above, one consequence of the specialisation taking place in philosophy is the way in which non-philosophers can have a tough time trying to follow the up-to-date conversations in philosophy or partake in them, because understanding such discussions can require a deep knowledge about a very narrow topic—and at the same time the people actually preoccupied with these issues have devoted their working lives to studying the relevant literature and learning to use the technical lingo needed to communicate convincingly about these issues. As was suggested in connection with the multidisciplinary character of modern scholarship, pursuing a topic can require expert-level knowledge even from outside of philosophy, which can elevate this bar even higher (Wray 2013). This takes place, for example, in the case of applied philosophy, which requires a philosopher to be familiar with a particular sphere of life, to which

he intends to apply his philosophising into. In turn, in metaphysics and philosophy of science it is nowadays typical that the topics and problems are connected to specific sciences instead of talking about scientific issues on a general and abstract level—for example, the philosophy of biology is in this regard currently a growing field of study. On the other hand, a high-level study of ancient philosophy can require from the prospective researcher of this field, *inter alia*, mastery of classic languages, a trained philological eye, knowledge of the methods of literature studies and so on (Annas 2004: 41). Philosophers of language, on the other hand, must be aware of the current theories of theoretical linguistics; philosophers of mind need to follow what is happening in psychology and cognitive science; philosophers of law are usually acquainted with the letter of the law, and so on (Leiter 2004: 27). Similar examples could be identified from practically every quarter of philosophy, although it is true that this development has affected certain branches of philosophy more significantly than others (for a study based on the pointers given by the *PhilPapers* database, see Wray 2013).⁵⁰

Moreover, it might not be only the case that philosophers must learn the relevant *facts* from these exotic fields, since there is also a *methodological* dimension involved in specialisation—different branches of philosophy usually have their own sophisticated methods and styles of argumentation, which can also have their own proficient professionals. This methodological specialisation has been a consequence of the development where during the past five decades philosophers have become more knowledgeable of the methods that are put to use in different branches of philosophy (Annas 2004: 35). Sometimes we can even have two philosophers who appear outwardly to be working in the same field and on similar questions, but who nevertheless on closer scrutiny actually have divergent viewpoints and research interests to the same subject matter—a good example here being the historiography of philosophy, where philosophers can choose from a multitude of highly sophisticated methods and approaches to the scholarship of philosophy's past (Castañeda 1989: 37–8; Garrett 2008).

In the comments which philosophers have voiced about specialisation, this process has been viewed as both a possibility and a threat. Here I will highlight certain commonplace reactions found in the literature without actually assessing their accuracy or conclusions (some of these reactions seem to be pulling in different directions, so they are not supposed to create a unified picture of the

⁵⁰ As a footnote to the general line of argument in the main text we can add that certain celebrated contemporary philosophers, notably David Lewis and Richard Rorty, managed to produce highly influential first-rate philosophical work on several unconnected sub-fields of philosophy even in the era of specialisation.

ramifications of specialisation). As a representative case of the more positive sentiment we can name Castañeda (1989: 43), who welcomes the current plurality of philosophical topics and methods as a positive development. In his view, the state of (analytic) philosophy is in this regard currently much healthier than it was in the middle part of the last century, when the topics of “acceptable” scholarship were regulated with various restrictions and exclusions. “In brief, philosophy nowadays enjoys an unlimited topical freedom”, as he states (*ibid.*: 39). For current philosophers the only limits for what they can or cannot study is set by the outer boundaries of their imagination. Mundt (1989: 79) notes that in addition to this topical dimension the current philosophy has become more relaxed also in regard to its institutional practices and academic events. For example, many of the largest professional organisations in the field, such as the *American Philosophical Association* (APA), have opened themselves to such schools and traditions, which might have once been rejected from partaking in the conferences and publications.⁵¹ This same trend is also evident in the practices of academic book publishers and journals, which publish these days more broadly different kinds of new philosophical literature.

When the topic of specialisation is considered from another and more critical standpoint, we can also recognise the perils of excessive specialisation, which ensues if this trend is allowed to run rampant. If individual philosophers engage exclusively with their own narrowly restricted niches, this provincialism can make it harder for them to visualise the current big picture of their field and their particular place in it. It is also important for philosophers to be able to keep touch on the reality of how some piece of philosophising might be interrelated with philosophising from some neighbouring areas of philosophy, and what similarities there might actually be under the surface of philosophical studies carried out on separate topics and issues. For example, problems and dilemmas which are at their core identical can often arise in various different areas of philosophy, albeit maybe in slightly different terms. Another worry is that if philosophers are unable to understand the philosophising of their colleagues, they cannot truly assess the potential import these discussions might impinge on their own scholarship. It is sensible to expect, that if we want philosophy to progress (in one way or another), then philosophers should be able to take advantage of the old scholarship and use it as a constructive basis for their own further work. This tenet is threatened if philosophers cannot even recognise how the earlier research might be relevant for their current studies

⁵¹ Behind the APA, the second largest philosophical association in the America is *Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, which was founded in 1962 by philosophers who felt that their style of philosophising was not appreciated under the auspices of the APA.

(Garrett 2004: 63–4). This difficulty is heightened by the fact that philosophers are often keen to introduce their own specialised terminologies and conceptual distinctions, which makes it hard to build bridges in philosophy or to bring two separate pieces of scholarship into dialogue, if they do not “speak” the same language. An additional problem of specialisation is that as new students of philosophy are beginning to concentrate earlier and earlier in their studies on their own limited interests, then as a consequence their academic education can become more limited in their scope—faculty members in philosophy departments obviously want to teach courses based on their own work in their specialised areas of expertise, and this is reflected in the curricula (Cottingham 2009: 246; Hamlyn 1992: 107–8).

As indicated previously, if we consider the effects of specialisation from the perspective of non-philosophers, we can see that specialisation threatens to distance philosophy both from other academic disciplines and also from the general public. These outsiders can find it laborious to follow the discussions of academic philosophy, which can in this day and age require both factual and formal proficiency, such as understanding the notation of logic (Soames 2003: 466; Leiter 2004a: 18–21; Glock 2008a: 246–7; Stanley 2008: 382). This distance between philosophy and the world at large is prone to create counter-reactions and misgivings of academic philosophy practised in secluded “ivory towers”, namely, questions of whether philosophy can have any relevance and importance to contemporary society and culture instead of being written only for the sake of other professional philosophers.

McCucumber (2013) sees the disunity of philosophy as becoming a disadvantage especially in times when the value and place of philosophy are challenged, such as when philosophy departments are facing funding cuts. In these situations, the disunity of philosophical scene and internal quarrelling between philosophers can act as a hindrance for philosophers, so that they cannot rise to defend the importance of philosophy as a unified front. Indeed, there is some sad irony in the fact that the complaints which philosophers direct against the value of philosophising done by their peers who happen to represent rival conceptions of philosophy can be precisely the same kind of criticism which are used by outsiders when they question the value of philosophy *simpliciter*. So, in this sense when philosophers criticise the value and relevance of the work done by their colleagues they can at the same time indirectly saw off their own branch. Hence it would be better for philosophers to stick together irrespective of their deep disagreements about the nature of their discipline. An old maxim of the American political life is that partisan politics must stop at the water’s edge, and I believe this mind-set would be good for philosophy, too.

The increasing specialisation has also had consequences for the way in which philosophers do new research. Philosophers are these days often hesitant to wander outside of their own comfort zones and engage in discussions from other corners of philosophical map. A good illustration of this problem is given by the case of historiography of philosophy. One persistent complaint about contemporary analytic philosophy is that members of this movement approach philosophical problems from an “ahistoristic” point of view and by so doing ignore the earlier stages and precursors of the issues they are now studying. Usually this negligence is explained by referring to the belittling attitude that analytic philosophers maintain towards the historiography of philosophy, but there is a possible alternative explanation too: In the course of the twentieth century the historiography of philosophy has become its own semi-independent sub-discipline of philosophy, which now has its own specialists and outlets for publication. Many philosophers who are primarily focused on contemporary philosophy can be intimidated with this heightened level of professionalism in the historiography of philosophy and, as a consequence, do not easily dare to comment on the classics of philosophy for fear that their interpretations would somehow be considered as naive or superficial. (Glock 2008a: §4; Moran 2008a: 8.)

Besides specialisation, another megatrend which has diversified the face of contemporary philosophy is the *professionalisation* of philosophy (or, alternatively the *academisation* of philosophy, as it happened concurrently with the birth of modern research-universities, where philosophers found their new home after making their living as soldiers, physicians, aristocrats, librarians, diplomats, historians, lens-grinders, private tutors and such during the early modern period). The first steps of this development were taken already in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it has thereafter advanced and expanded at slightly varying paces separately in various cultural regions and countries—Scotland, England, Germany, France and the United States—due to the distinctive natures and developments of their local university systems. In any case, when we are reading historical overviews of the Western philosophy and reach the pages covering the twentieth century thought, there is a noticeable change in how these books now begin to talk of “universities” and “professors of philosophy” when they introduce the life and works of these modern-day philosophers.⁵² In Hamlyn’s (1992: 138) estimate this development has now

⁵² On this matter, figures such as Christian Wolff (1676–1754) and Thomas Reid (1710–1796) were slightly ahead of their times, as they carried out their philosophical work in the roles of professors. The first real archetype of an “academic philosopher” occupied at a university was Kant, whose daily working routines were filled with various academic tasks, such as teaching.

reached the point where it is impossible to imagine how impactful philosophising could be done purely as a “hobby” outside the institutions of higher education.⁵³ One part of the professionalization of philosophy has also been the ascendancy of institutional forms of philosophising, such as philosophical organisations,⁵⁴ peer-reviewed journals⁵⁵, periodicals and conferences, which provide “official” structures for practising philosophy (Hamlyn 1992: 80–1; Campbell 2006: 33–5; Moran 2008a: 7–8; Heidegren & Lundberg 2010: 5–6). There is also a dimension of *credentialism* involved in professionalisation so that a PhD dissertation is in practice a necessary prerequisite for any aspiring philosopher—even

In addition, Kant and his compatriots Fichte (the first rector in the new Humboldt University of Berlin) and Hegel also took an active part in discussions of academic policy pertaining to the academic role of philosophy in the developing Prussian universities. However, during the same transitional period of the nineteenth century there were still also many prominent philosophers, who worked completely outside of the academic world (for example, Comte, Mill, Marx, Kierkegaard and Peirce) and on the other hand philosophers, who did take some part in the academic lives of their times, but nevertheless wrote their most significant philosophical works independently in non-academic milieus (for example, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche). Despite these rare exceptions, the general trend was clearly progressing in the opposite direction. The two important anomalies of the twentieth century were Russell and Wittgenstein, who might not have been academics in the usual sense, but whose work was nevertheless more or less dependent of academic institutions; and their ideas were circulated as a result of the commentaries written about them by other academic philosophers. In France, Sartre never held an academic position, but there the local intellectual culture worked under slightly idiosyncratic conventions anyway. (Hamlyn 1992; Kenny 2010: 501, 527.)

⁵³ If we try to think of philosophers who have worked completely outside academia in the twentieth century we can mention the names of Ayn Rand and Robert M. Pirsig, who have expressed their philosophical ideas in their literary works written for the general public (indeed, it is controversial whether they should be really regarded as “genuine” philosophers, even if they are often called as such in the media). In a certain sense, the academisation of philosophy has narrowed the sphere of legitimate philosophy, as it is hard to think how figures such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard or even Wittgenstein could exist in the philosophical culture of the 21st century. On the other hand, it is also true, that we are currently living in a golden age of public philosophy. The emergence of social media and novel digital platforms (blogs, podcasts, Twitter-accounts, YouTube-videos, Facebook-groups, and so on) has enabled new forms of public philosophising, sometimes done by philosophy enthusiasts with no active academic affiliation.

⁵⁴ As an illustration: *The Finnish Philosophical Association* (1873), *Aristotelian Society* (1880), *The Western Philosophical Association* (1900) and *American Philosophical Association* (1900).

⁵⁵ As an illustration: *Mind* (1876), *Revue Philosophique* (1876), *The Monist* (1888), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1888), *The International Journal of Ethics* (1890), *The Philosophical Review* (1892), *Kant-Studien* (1896) and *The Journal of Philosophy* (1904). As noted above, this development has progressed concurrently and hand in hand with the specialisation of philosophy, which encourages philosophers to publish their thoughts as short journal articles instead of lengthy monographs. (Quinton 2005e.)

Wittgenstein had to go through the formal process of obtaining a PhD degree in order to continue his academic career after having already published *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Hamlyn 1992; Quinton 2005d; Rescher 2005a: 22–3.)

In the professional age of philosophy new generations of philosophy students can get better and more systematic basic training in their field, which prepares them, hopefully, to become one day better researchers than their teachers were (Castañeda 1989: 39). Moreover, the institutional forms of philosophising have made it possible to produce philosophy of a higher quality: Various technological innovations from the days of Gutenberg to the present with regard to book printing and binding have made publishing philosophical works easier; and, specifically in recent times, digitalisation has made it possible to spread old and new material cost-effectively in “non-material” form. For example, various digital libraries (such as *JSTOR*), web resources (such as *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*) and handbooks with search functions enable us to access greater amount of data faster than before and almost anywhere we want (Garrett 2008: 53).

From another point of view professionalisation, like specialisation, has increased the distance between professional philosophers and the general public. As philosophy has become a practice carried out exclusively within academic milieu, philosophers have begun to see their colleagues as their prime target audience (Hamlyn 1992: 1–2). In Russell’s view an influential figure in this process was Kant. In pre-Kantian philosophy the French and British “gentlemen scholars” had written their studies in the standard language of their times, which were basically comprehensible to any literate person. Breaking with this practice Kant used specific technical terminology in his main philosophical works (Caygill 1995). Another way in which professionalisation has amplified the disunity inherent in the philosophical world is the fact that as the academic environment has now fragmented into various special societies, associations and journals, this encourages philosophers to seek the company of other philosophers with similar interests, instead of writing their texts for more general audiences within their discipline (Heidegren & Lundberg 2010: 6).

Besides the specialisation and professionalisation, the third megatrend which has diversified the field of contemporary philosophy is the *expansion* of philosophy, namely the fact that there are simply more philosophers today than in the past. This is of course tied to the rapid growth of the higher education system itself, as the number of universities and colleges increased exponentially after the Second World War (Trow 2007). In Moran’s (2008a: 2) bold words, “there probably has never been a time when there have been so many professional philosophers at work in universities across the world.” Castañeda (1989:

39) is even bolder in his estimate, since he speculates that “probably there are nowadays more philosophers than there have been from the dark beginnings of history up to 1900.”⁵⁶ We can get a more concrete feel of these numbers by consulting the statistical data of philosophical activity, such as those compiled by the *Philosophy Documentation Center*. Of the two big publications issued by this organisation the *Directory of American Philosophy* surveys the situation on the North American continent whereas its companion volume *International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers* does the same for African, Asian, Australian, South-American and European philosophical scenes. I have compiled the numbers given by these works from the beginning of the 21st century in the following table (Cormier *et al.* (eds.) 2005; Bahm & Michon (eds.) 2006):

	North America	Other Places
Universities and colleges	1, 801	1 217
Centres and institutes	131	255
Organisations	173	303
Journals	281	696
Publishers	191	584
Philosophers	over 13, 800	over 14, 000

The repercussions of this expansion become clear when we consider the equation that *the more* there are philosophers working in the universities, *the more* they will produce new research—and in these numbers we should also accommodate the post-graduate students working on their PhDs, as these students can often be prolific authors of new philosophical research.⁵⁷ Indeed, the number of philosophical publications has multiplied even more rapidly than the number of philosophers. With regard to the general level of all scientific publishing, the quantity of scientific research grows currently on an exponential

⁵⁶ This assessment resembles the similar and frequently made—albeit erroneous—claim, which states that the total number of humans living presently exceeds that of *all* the people who have lived and died during the history of humankind combined. However, the pioneer of sociology of science, Solla Price (1963) states on a general level that we now have among us roughly 80–90% of the researchers who have ever lived, which is still quite a high number.

⁵⁷ Young researchers produce a relatively large amount of the new research, since they have pressure to prove themselves during the critical “publish or perish” period of their careers. On the other hand, for example in Finland the basis for quality control of institutes of higher education comes from the number of doctorates these institutions produce annually, which motivates universities to seek out more and more thesis writers (the number of doctorates has been increasing greatly in Finland since the last quarter of the twentieth century).

rate, where the duplication age is around fifteen years.⁵⁸ For example, the American philosophers alone publish over four thousand books and articles each year, including hundreds of PhD theses (Leiter 2005: 27–8; Rescher 2005b: 23). This outpouring is channelled into an ever more diverse group of journals, periodicals, conferences and societies, which have ever more focused target audiences. This kind of growth of information flow divides philosophy even further, because philosophers simply do not have enough time to follow the research done outside of their own field of expertise—even if they possibly wanted to do so. Now it is exceptional for a philosopher to master even all of the problems and topical issues of that particular branch of philosophy where she is working herself (Soames 2003: 463).

In addition to there being today more philosophers than in earlier times, these philosophers are also more spread out geographically over the globe. In the old world order of the pre-1914 turmoil, the cutting edge of philosophy was found almost exclusively on the turf of the major European powers: Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Great Britain and France (Moran 2008a: 27). Ever since the mid-twentieth century other countries and continents—on this issue Australia is a great example—have added their voices to these discussions, and they no longer need to play only the role of passive recipients of external influences from the major powers. Concurrently the epicentre of philosophy has shifted across the Atlantic from the old continent to the new, and America has become an unequalled “superpower” of philosophy (Rescher 2005a: 23). This is reflected, among others, in the various top-10 listings of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century,⁵⁹ or when departments of philosophy are ranked.⁶⁰ As the English has become the *lingua franca* of philosophy, it is easier for scholars around the world to exchange ideas in a common language (Garrett 2004: 54). Additionally, the profiles of philosophers have diversified also in the regard that there are more and more women and non-Caucasians among phi-

⁵⁸ This oft-repeated estimate originates from Derek J. de Solla Price’s classic work *Little Science, Big Science* (1963), and it has in the light of subsequent development proven to be accurate. The field of inquiry which studies the exponential growth of scientific literature by using quantitative methods is called *bibliometrics* (alternatively known also as *scientometrics*).

⁵⁹ See, for example, the blog post at Leiter’s blog (accessed at 16.8.2018): <http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/03/lets-settle-this-once-and-for-all-who-really-was-the-greatest-philosopher-of-the-20thcentury.html>

⁶⁰ In the listing of Bourget & Chalmers (2014: 468), the top 99 departments of philosophy “included 62 departments in the US, 18 in the UK, 7 in Europe outside the UK, 7 in Canada, and 5 in Australasia.”

losophers, although these minorities continue to be markedly under-represented—the number of women philosophers is especially noticeably low compared to other humanities (Moran 2008a: 3–4).

Following this preparatory exposition, we can now move on to consider how these three megatrends relate to conceptions of philosophy. There are natural connections as these processes splinter philosophers into smaller communities and networks, which are oriented around shared research interests and subject matters. The members of these networks communicate with one another in their own journals and conference meetings. It is helpful to view these networks as a contemporary form of school in the second type of Collins' fourfold categorisation. And as happens within philosophical schools, these networks can similarly create their own "localised norms" of what good and desirable philosophy is (Mundt 1989: 89–98). In other words, different groups of philosophers come to disagree with one another on which questions are pivotal, how they should be approached and what kind of theoretical assumptions are acceptable starting parameters for philosophising (Glock 2008a: 249–50). Thus, a process such as specialisation can split philosophy even more deeply than other disciplines. And as was mentioned in the previous chapter in relation to philosophical schools, it is possible also in these circumstances that philosophers may suspect that the philosophising pursued by other research groups is simply redundant boondoggle or based on non-philosophical and irrational ulterior motives (Glock 2008a: 244–5, 249–50; Leiter 2004a: 19–20). This can create a vicious circle, where philosophers grow apart but, at the same time, are not even willing to attempt to close this growing distance between them. The outcome is that the multitude of divergent conceptions of philosophy keeps on expanding.

On the practical level the plurality of contemporary philosophy is apparent in larger departments of philosophy, which can fill their open positions by recruiting a specialist in a very specific field if needed. This can result in a situation where the philosophers working under the same roof do not come to build a camaraderie in their ranks, as they might not understand each other's research interests or their value (Hamlyn 1992: 105–6). Similarly the big meetings which summon a large group of philosophers together, such as the *World Congress of Philosophy* held every five years and the tri-annual *European Society for Analytic Philosophy* (ECAP) conferences, have become all-embracing events for philosophers primarily in a "social" sense, and the actual philosophical presentations at these proceedings display a wide array of research interests, methods, aims and so on without a common thread running through them—they have "tended to become a matter of form rather than spirit", as Hamlyn (*ibid.*: 109) notes. It is in situations such as these when philosophers can step outside of their bubbles

and comfort zones and realise just how heterogeneous and fragmented phenomenon philosophy currently is. This plurality of philosophical landscape can easily be forgotten when philosophers concentrate on working around their own finely grained divisions of labour and read texts predominantly from other like-minded thinkers who partake in such discussions.

With this being said, it is nonetheless imperative to recognise the deep-rooted fact that although the internal disunity of philosophy has been amplified by these megatrends and their side-effects within the timeframe of the past two centuries or so, this phenomenon does not exist exclusively in the world of contemporary philosophy: We can locate comparable disunity between divergent conceptions of philosophy already in all the previous eras of Western philosophy. This makes answering the question “What is philosophy?” problematic also in these more restricted contexts. A case in point, the division into cognitive and non-cognitive conceptions of philosophy is manifest already in the movements of ancient philosophy. It would seem against this backdrop that the contemporaneous megatrends have only *magnified* and *expanded* the internal disunity, which has always been present in philosophy, rather than created it out of thin air only recently.

From this conclusion we can naturally move next to consider from where the multifaceted identity of philosophy has originated, and what kind of factors have later on taken it further. If we look at the circumstances surrounding the dawn of philosophy and the way in which the name of ‘philosophy’ has subsequently been applied throughout the centuries, we can see that the rather metaphorical Greek name ‘*philosophia*’ (love of wisdom) was originally used as a kind of a blanket term for all sorts of proto-scientific, socio-political and moral pursuits. The contemporary special sciences have since then grown apart from philosophy one by one after their distinct subject matters and methods became better understood. Some of these special sciences left philosophy already thousands of years ago, but economics and psychology, for example, did so relatively late, approximately a hundred-plus years ago (and even now some present branches of philosophy might gain independence in the near future, such as the cases of logic and argumentation theory; von Wright 1994). This development history has left the motley mix of problems and approaches still deemed to be “philosophical” under the original name of philosophy.⁶¹

⁶¹ This background is also evident on the institutional level, since as philosophy was hierarchically the common name for all proto-scientific endeavours, the faculty of philosophy was correspondingly the central unit in medieval universities, where all new students first began their studies. This tradition lives to this day in the names of academic degrees in natural sciences and humanities.

Against this historical background one way to define philosophy is then negatively through academic immaturity, so that any discipline “remains philosophical as long as its concepts are unclarified and its methods are controversial”, as Kenny (2010: x–xi) suggests.⁶² Similarly, Cappelen (2012: 21) takes a retrospective look at the history of philosophy from a somewhat more general viewpoint, and concludes that the activities which are nowadays grouped together as “philosophical” belong together only by series of contingent historical and institutional happenstances:

The various activities that get classified together as ‘philosophy’ today are so classified as the result of complex historical and institutional contingencies, not because philosophy has an essence that ties it all together as a natural kind. There are, of course, partially overlapping questions, methods, and interests, but there is no reason to think that a philosopher working on the semantics of quotation is more closely intellectually aligned with someone working on interpreting Plato’s *Protagoras* or the ethics of eating meat, than to someone working in computer science or formal semantics.

In this regard the notion that philosophy would constitute a unified monolith which has been consciously congregated around a common essence is mistaken. Thus trying to answer the question of “What is philosophy?” amounts to looking for answers in a place where such answers have never existed to begin with—at worst, it only gives life to ambitious yet misguided projects of trying to pinpoint a common subject matter, methodological approach or kind of evidence for all philosophy.⁶³

Another direction, from which we can try to locate an explanation for the exceptional internal disunity of philosophy, is the unrestricted nature of philosophy’s critical point of view: when philosophy examines—and continuously critically re-examines—foundational topics and phenomena such as

⁶² We must qualify this claim by noting that not *all* special sciences have come into the existence by parting from philosophy, as the historical cases of mathematics and astronomy attest. Then in modern time we have cases such as the specialised fields of engineering, which have evolved from practical interests.

⁶³ In addition to the challenges which we meet when we try to answer the questions regarding the identity of philosophy, this historical background can be potentially referred to when we explain the lack of conclusive philosophical results, since as soon as philosophising attains some answers to its questions, these examinations evolve into a new special science and depart from philosophy. In this way philosophy is trying to play a game, which it cannot win. For criticism aimed at this suggestion see Hacker (2009).

knowledge, reality, rationality, certainty, consistency, justice, warrant, explanation, meaning, understanding, evidence, necessity, possibility, argumentative validity, and coherence, it is inevitable that these examinations turn in their conclusions to impinge also upon philosophy itself, as the job description and inner mechanisms of philosophy are defined through these same notions (Rescher 1978). As Kim (2003: 83; see also Cohen 1986: 1) has noted, in this sense, "Philosophers seem fated to be self-conscious about their own work." Since the phenomena listed here are open to widely divergent interpretations, as a consequence, the nature of philosophy itself is chronically open to similar divergences. Thus, it is very hard to present any one-size-fits-all insight regarding the nature of philosophy which would be acceptable to every competing interest group in the philosophical field. This idea is explicated and pursued further in the following section.

1.4. DEFINING PHILOSOPHY

Referring all the way back to the first words of this main chapter, the question "What is philosophy?" can at first blush give the appearance of a trivial challenge. The instinctive reaction to this puzzle is that it can be dealt swiftly with a short and concise answer detailing the core subject matters, methods and aims of philosophy. As the foregoing sections have hopefully begun to suggest, this task is quite not that easy, after all. It is devilishly hard, if not outright impossible, to devise a *short* yet adequately *informative* all-purpose description, which would contain the smallest common denominator shared by *all* conceptions of philosophy regarding the universal nature of philosophy. As Quinton (2005: 702) notes, "[m]ost definitions of philosophy are fairly controversial, particularly if they aim to be at all interesting or profound." Each definition for philosophy can be thought as a distinct conception of philosophy, and each conception of philosophy has its own (perhaps implicit) definition for philosophy.

A natural starting point for formulating a (non-stipulative) definition here is that we have in our minds a rough pre-theoretic and unarticulated *prima facie* notion of what canonical topics, methods, targets, philosophers, traditions and so on belong to the extension of the concept philosophy, and then any suggested definition can be evaluated against the criteria provided by this *prima facie* notion. The proposed general-level definitions for philosophy fail because they are either a) too *inclusive*, so that the would-be definition does describe a feature, which is indeed shared by all conception of philosophy, but at the same time

this suggestion also counts as philosophy certain other *prima facie* non-philosophical activities; or they are b) too *exclusive*, so that the would-be definition captures sharply the spirit of a certain conception of philosophy (or perhaps even some specific sub-group of conceptions of philosophy) but, at the same time, it also excludes *ab initio* activities outside of philosophy, which are nevertheless regarded as philosophy in our *prima facie* notion so that, in the end, this suggestion does not do enough justice to the pluralism in philosophy.

Let us begin with an illustration of a failure of the first kind. Here we can use the reasonable idea according to which all philosophy aims to be rational and critical thinking conducted in a dialectical manner with arguments and counter-arguments. As Plato expressed in *Republic* (1959: bk 9, 582d), “[a]rgument is a philosopher’s instrument most of all.” Although this description might indeed describe the nature of all philosophising (in contrast to, for instance, mere sophistry, religions and dogmatic ideologies) as it is, it is still too minimal a criterion to successfully single out philosophy from all other expressions of rational and critical thinking—which include pretty much all other scientific disciplines too.⁶⁴ And as Audi (1995: xxv) adds, this suggestion does not really tell us anything about the subject matter or methods of philosophy.

Perhaps a great many philosophers (though certainly not all of them) would agree that philosophy is roughly the critical, normally systematic, study of an unlimited range of ideas and issues; but this characterization says nothing about what sorts of ideas and issues are central in philosophy or about its distinctive methods of studying them.

Moreover, the notion of rationality can give rise to whole different set of problems. On this particular issue Glock (2008a: 174–8) categorises certain conceptions of philosophy into a sub-category, which he dubs *rationalism*.⁶⁵ Within Glock’s rationalism is to be included “any position which stresses that our beliefs should be subject to critical scrutiny and supported by arguments, no matter whether these invoke reason or experience” (*ibid.*: 174n4). The opposing positions for Glock’s rationalism are thus provided by the *irrational* and *arational* conceptions of philosophy, which do not approach philosophy in a discursive and rational spirit—whatever this might mean in actual practice. Numerous

⁶⁴ And as Adamson (2014: 6) notes on Thomas Aquinas, even theology can be pursued in highly rational and argumentative manner.

⁶⁵ Note that Glock’s rationalism as it is described here should not be confused with the more specific position of *metaphilosophical rationalism*, which is examined later in this work.

well-known philosophers—such as Heraclitus, Diogenes of Sinope, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, the latter Wittgenstein and Derrida—have for their own reasons had sceptical or even critical thoughts about the power and purposefulness of rational argumentation, which has then been reflected in their work (Baggini & Fosl 2010: 2–3). Moreover, this description of philosophy as a rational enterprise seems to suppose that rationality could be understood neutrally whereas in actual practice different philosophers and conceptions of philosophy have had conflicting interpretations concerning the precise nature and contents of rationality.

In turn, the failure of exclusionary approaches occurs, for example, if we retort to the more specific proposal in which philosophy is characterised as rational enterprise which aims to arrive at *new knowledge*. As was already noted during the exposition on the cognitivism/non-cognitivism division, there exists stark differences of opinion between conceptions of philosophy even on a fundamental issue such as this. Mentioning the pursuit of truth and knowledge as a trait shared by all conceptions of philosophy will thus not be without controversy.

The upshot of all this is that it is almost impossible to define philosophy in a way which would satisfy even the slight majority of philosophers and which would at the same time give a sufficient sketch of the character of philosophy to outsiders. If we dared to attempt to cover as many of the current forms of philosophy in our short description as we can, the result could perhaps take the form of something like the following: “philosophy [aims] to address a wide variety of philosophical issues through careful distinctions and rigorous argumentation drawing on any relevant epistemic resources” (Garrett 2004: 51). Quinton (2005: 702) opines, that an “uncontroversial comprehensive” definition of philosophy could be the following: “Philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind about the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and and the conduct of life (ethics or theory of value).” I am not sure whether I agree here with Quinton that this suggestion is entirely “uncontroversial” or even “comprehensive”, since it is open to philosophical interpretation what we mean with rational critical thinking and, on the other hand, it is not clear if all areas of philosophy can really be subsumed under these three core areas (philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, logic, aesthetics and so forth).

The complexity of trying to define philosophy becomes manifest in situations in which professional philosophers have been asked to provide their attempts at a short definition of philosophy. A common response is to cite some

well-known existing quotations on this matter. One such popular choice is Sellars' (1962: 37) description, according to which "[t]he aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term."⁶⁶ Another widespread quip comes from Russell, who once [1918: 20] remarked that the "the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it." These quotations might, in their own amusing ways, relate us certain tropes—the unrestrictedly wide point of view and the all-encompassing questioning spirit—commonly associated with philosophy but, in all seriousness, they cannot really be taken as characterisations of the nature and content of philosophy as it is practised and taught in academic circles.

The concept of philosophy seems to be a promising candidate to be a case of problematic type of concepts, which Gallie (1956) refers to as *essentially contested concepts*. It is a typical trait of these concepts that it is difficult to provide definitions for them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This is because they involve fervent differences of opinion even at the first step of this process, which is manifested in conflicts regarding their *prima facie* extensions (Gallie's examples were the concepts of art and justice; his ideas were first embraced in the philosophy of art). Arguments in which an essentially contested concept plays a central role can easily reach an impasse, because the discussants are simply talking past one another about different things. Under these starting parameters, providing a definition for an essentially contested concept is tantamount to taking a stance in favour of one or another view regarding the correct extension of that concept—as often happens with definitions given for philosophy, as different conceptions of philosophy have conflicting views on these matters.

In a similar manner, many of our other views in the field of philosophy of language can affect the way in which we think what it would mean for a definition of philosophy to be successful (see Blackburn 2004: xiii; Glock 2008a: 9–16). Consider the following range of issues: Are we searching for a *real* or a *nominal* definition for philosophy? Is philosophy a proper name picking out a historically unique phenomenon, or does it function more liberally as a general term for any activity which simply fills certain criteria? Instead of necessary and suf-

⁶⁶ In the recent literature Sellars' remark is referred to by, among others, Tim Crane, Raymond Tallis (quoted in Edmonds & Warburton 2010: xvi, xxiii) and Ruth Millikan (quoted in Pyke 2011: 137). For documentation on the plurality of philosophers' different definitions for philosophy, consult these two collections referenced here.

ficient conditions, do we perhaps need to use the Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance or some sort of disjunctive approach when we catalogue the distinctive features of philosophy? Is the border between philosophy and its close “non-philosophical” cousins—such as other academic disciplines and forms of art—perhaps fuzzy, so that we cannot always ascertain where philosophy ends, and some non-philosophical activity begins? Are the conditions for using philosophy possibly context-sensitive, so that the question should always be understood in relation to some specific situation? Is philosophy simply indefinable? As we notice, we are promptly faced with similarly deep problems regarding the nature of philosophy which were listed earlier in Section 1.1 as divisive topics for conceptions of philosophy.

One response to these problems is to shrug off the notion that philosophy has an essence, which is eternal and has remained unchanged for over two millennia. If there is no such a thing, it becomes understandable why our definitions cannot succeed in capturing it, and it is rendered useless to try to do so. An alternative anti-essentialist approach is to accept in a more pluralistic attitude that the multitude of characterisations given of philosophy—that is to say, *conceptions of philosophy*—can be contradictory with one another and yet all equally true and provide us with their partial glimpses at the nature of philosophy (Mandt 1989: 85). From a historical point of view, we can then accept that when we now consider the long and storied history of philosophy in hindsight, the concept of philosophy has experienced several meaningful shifts during its lifespan, so that the prototype and extension of philosophy have been different in the times of Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and so forth. Moreover, it is probable, that philosophy continues to shed its skin in the future (or are the most dramatic changes of philosophy’s identity perhaps now already behind us?).

Cohen and Dascal (1989: xii) suggest along these anti-essentialist lines, that the simplest and least controversial definition of philosophy would be *institutional*: under this conception philosophy is everything that is and has been done at the departments of philosophy, is practised socially at the conferences of philosophy, gets published in philosophical journals and books and so on.⁶⁷ Moreover, philosophy can also be defined anti-essentially in a *historical-cum-genetic*

⁶⁷ According to one oft-repeated anecdote (which is, of course, most certainly apocryphal, but let us not let the truth get in the way of a good story), when G.E. Moore was once asked what philosophy is, he replied by pointing to the books on the shelf of his study and replied: “Philosophy is what those are about.” Cohen & Dascal (1989: xii) express (but not endorse) this idea in the following way: “Philosophers are individuals employed by philosophy departments at reputable higher learning institutions, who read (and eventually publish in) prestigious philosophical journals, participate in philosophical conventions and so forth. Similarly, a

way, so that this concept would pick up a certain group or chain of philosophers from history in a manner of a proper noun (Bontempo & Odell 1975: 10).⁶⁸ Indeed, philosophy seems to be more dependent on its canon than other forms of academic inquiry, and in this respect it is more akin to the arts than natural sciences (Kenny 2010: xi-xii). The use of the title 'philosopher' is thus in practice more honorific than anything, as it is not anchored in any underlying deep essence (Mundt 1989: 85).

However, philosophers who adhere to the essentialist line of thinking on this issue deem these institutional and historical-cum-genetic definitions to be too artificial, as they make the identity and contents of philosophy contingently shaped. For example, the institutional definition does not manage to exclude the possibilities that we come to include in philosophy's extension also unacceptable instances of non-philosophy, if they just happen to be practised within the social sphere of philosophy. In their view, the identity of philosophy should not be dependent on its actual practitioners. Cohen & Dascal (1989: xii) summarise this pro-essentialism sentiment:

Though academic philosophy certainly has institutional features, these features are contingent for the very *idea* of philosophy. In itself, philosophy is *not* a social institution, the way the institution of, say, the American presidency is.

From the essentialists' viewpoint, the historical-cum-genetic definition is in similar manner too arbitrary, and it does not allow the concept of philosophy to be applied to potential instances outside of the tradition we have used as a basis for our definition. Historical-cum-genetic definition is a good approach when

philosophical text is a piece of discourse produced qua exercise of one of the institutionally acknowledged forms of philosophizing, or else a piece not so produced but recognized as of philosophical value by philosophers."

⁶⁸ This kind of approach is illustrated (but not endorsed) by Warburton (2004: 1): "What is philosophy? This is a notoriously difficult question. One of the easiest ways of answering it is to say that philosophy is what philosophers do, and then point to the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Russell, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and other famous philosophers. However, this answer is unlikely to be of much use to you if you are just beginning the subject, as you probably won't have read anything by these writers. Even if you have, it may still be difficult to say what they have in common, if indeed there is a relevant characteristic which they all share." Rorty, for example, has suggested: "Just as poetry in English is a conversation between Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Yeats, and the rest, so philosophy in the West is a conversation between Parmenides, Plato, Augustine, Hume, Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the rest. To be a philosopher in our part of the world is to get in on that conversation." Quoted in Pyke (2011: 155).

we are trying to define an individual artistic movement, such as English poetry, or a particular school within general philosophy (such as analytic philosophy, see Section 1.2), but when we extend this strategy to the very heart of the identity of philosophy it becomes problematic to accept for essentialists. Is philosophy really so closely dependent on its past practitioners? Moreover, this approach does not really clarify the plurality of conflicting conceptions of philosophy, but instead embraces it within the tradition of philosophy, so we are no closer to understanding what philosophy is after this definition than where we started.

The point of these remarks was not to argue in this matter one way or another. What these considerations show is just how convoluted and contentious even these issues can become in practice, since philosophers can create problems from even the slightest issues pertaining to the task of defining philosophy (one humorous characterisation of philosophy states that philosophers have a problem for every solution, and that sardonic piece of wisdom seems to apply here as well). These frustrating difficulties and controversies become apparent in situations where we need some kind of a short and informative definition for philosophy. We have already seen how philosophers can in these situations refer to some existing quip about the nature and viewpoint of philosophy, but there are other noteworthy illustrations, too. One instance, for example, is the way in which the introductory books and courses on philosophy do not usually spend too much time or energy on trying to answer the question of which common traits different expressions of philosophy have in a broad and non-committal manner. If these works refer to the problem of philosophy's own identity at all, they usually just mention in passing that there is also too much discord between different philosophers regarding the nature and aim of philosophising so that it is consequently impossible to give a "non-denominational" exposition on this topic in such a short space without overwhelming the student right from the start with a plethora of conflicting descriptions and the cognitive dissonance they evoke (philosophy can be this, it can be that and so forth *ad nauseam*). Lawless (2005: ix) provides a case in point here.

A reader who, quite reasonably, expects this text to begin with a clear and concise definition of philosophy will be disappointed. The first chapter is instead dedicated to justifying my inability to offer such a definition. Not all philosophers will approve of such dilatory tactics, but anything else would be inconsistent with my fundamental premise, which is that there is no widespread agreement about what philosophy is or what it can achieve.

Moreover, in the field of philosophy there are not many methodological handbooks, from which new students could simply pick up the standard methods of good philosophising (this lacuna in the literature is especially strange considering the fact that philosophers have always had a penchant for theorising on the methodologies of other fields of inquiry).⁶⁹

In practice it is not unusual for a general introduction to philosophy to be supplied by an anthology of philosophical texts, so that these selections illustrate through their examples what philosophising has actually been. Philosophy is often demonstrated in these introductory works and courses through the thinking of the great figures in the philosophical pantheon, who provide us with their canonised examples of what the Western philosophical tradition is.⁷⁰ An alternative strategy is to jump right onto the paradigmatic philosophical problems, and suppose that the student absorbs the spirit of philosophy via these problems and the principal possible answers suggested to them.⁷¹ This approach is described perfectly by Rosenberg (1984: vii): “Like most practicing philosophers, I learned my philosophical techniques the way that those quaint villagers learned their native folk dances, by joining in and stumbling about until I got the hang of it” (here Rosenberg sees to echoing the sentiment of Nietzsche [1889: 7.7]: “Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned”).

Nevertheless, introductory works and courses such as these are usually in their premises already partial to one conception of philosophy or another, so that we might in extreme cases have two introductory books on philosophy, written from completely different points of view.⁷² As a consequence, in philo-

⁶⁹ One early exception is provided by Rosenberg (1984). More recent examples of books which aim to introduce the basics of philosophical methodology are Baggini & Fosl (2010), Daly (2010) and Williamson (2018).

⁷⁰ For thoughts on the pros and cons of this approach, see Bontempo & Odell (1975: 7–14).

⁷¹ For thoughts on the pros and cons of this approach, see Bontempo & Odell (1975: 21–25).

⁷² Additionally, the philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias published by the major publishers do not usually include an entry for philosophy itself (this issue has also been observed by Capaldi 2009: 93n2). For example, this is true of the works published by the Routledge, Blackwell and Cambridge University presses (similarly, the leading digital reference work, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, does not, at least not at the time of writing, contain such a text; *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* currently lists “philosophy” as one of its top-100 most desired new entries). However, Blackwell’s book does contain separate articles for Kant’s, logical positivists’, Ryle’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of philosophy whereas the preface in the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Audi 1995: xxv) offers the apology: “Some readers might be surprised to find that there is no entry simply on philosophy itself. This is partly because no short definition is adequate.” Blackburn’s *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*,

sophy, unlike in physics and other natural sciences, the introductory works can be stimulating reading for advanced readers as well.⁷³ Here is how Rey (1997: xiii) introduces his naturalistically tinted introductory textbook to the philosophy of mind:

This book is intended as an introduction both to recent work in the philosophy of mind, and to the foundations of the newly evolving field of cognitive science, which is—appropriately, I believe—replacing parts of the older topic. I am piously hoping that it will be accessible to anyone with an interest in the issues, but I suspect that its likely audience will be people with some background in basic “analytic” philosophy, for example, upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in most Anglophone universities. The treatment aspires to be continuous with science, not literature, and so would probably prove frustrating for those who prefer philosophy in the latter form.

And for contrast, here is how Lowe (2000: xi) introduces his book on the same topic:

At a time when many introductory books on the philosophy of mind are available, it would be fair to ask me why I have written another one. I have at least two answers to this question. One is that some of the most recent introductions to this subject have been rather narrow in their focus, tending to concentrate upon the many different ‘isms’ that have emerged of late—reductionism, functionalism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, non-reductive physicalism and so forth, all of them divisible into further sub-varieties. Another is that I am disturbed by the growing tendency to present the subject in a quasi-scientific way, as though the only proper role for philosophers of mind is to act as junior partners within the wider community of ‘cognitive scientists’. It may

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. Honderich 2005) and the *MacMillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Borchert 2005) serve as the positive exceptions to the rule. Nevertheless, of these the short description of the nature of philosophy included in Blackburn’s book is really focused on only describing a certain limited type of conception of philosophy without doing sufficient justice to the actual plurality of conceptions of this topic. Therefore, if I were given the task of recommending further reading on this topic, I would mention Quinton’s (2005a) entry in the *Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, and Audi’s (2005) excellent overview in MacMillan’s book. A special mention must be given to the 306 pages long(!) list of different meanings for the word ‘*Philosophie*’ which is compiled by diverse authors and included in the *Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (ed. Ritter & Gründer 1989: 573–879).

⁷³ In fact, as Sinclair (2008: 2) notes, many of the most celebrated names in Western philosophy—for example, Kant, Russell, and Sartre—have authored their own philosophically valuable introductions to philosophy.

be true that philosophers of the earlier generation were unduly dismissive—and, indeed, ignorant—of empirical psychology and neuroscience, but now there is a danger that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction.

To sum up, offering an all-encompassing definition for philosophy is a devilishly challenging task. Indeed, one can often hear it said that the question “What is philosophy?” is in itself an open philosophical question and in need of some kind of an answer.⁷⁴ But even if this problem exists in *theory*, does it have any real significance in *actual practice*? Why should we worry that the (supposed) eternal nature of philosophy cannot be defined or bounded, if philosophical inquiry works just fine in practice? I take up these kinds of challenges in the next section, where it turns out what kind of far-reaching ramifications our ideas about the identity of philosophy can have for the practice, standing and public perceptions of philosophy.

1.5. PHILOSOPHY, SCHMILOSOPHY, WHO CARES?

Professional philosophers themselves too have expressed highly dismissive attitudes about the need for a general definition of philosophy. Fodor (2008: 76), for instance, deems the relevance of this task to be practically insignificant, if we just recognise the reality that the fluid identity of philosophy is changing constantly (during chaotic times perhaps even rapidly so): “By the way, who cares what gets *called* philosophy? It’s my impression that most of what happened in philosophy before 1950 wouldn’t qualify according to the present usage.” In Popper’s (1968: 66) view, the primary assignment of philosophers is to solve real philosophical problems, and not to waste valuable time and energy on mere navel-gazing which is, in his view, unlikely to yield interesting and uncontroversial results. Therefore, in Popper’s judgment, any honest and straightforward attempt to do *actual* philosophy is more beneficial than the less valuable efforts of trying to settle conclusively what philosophy might be. Cohen (1986: 1) voices a similar attitude: “So among the fundamental issues that require philosophical resolution is the nature of philosophical enquiry itself. Of course, excessive attention to this issue, as to any other methodological issue, may impede the progress of substantive enquiry.”

What should we then make of these sentiments? Philosophy–schmilosophy, who cares, right? I tend to agree—well, at least to a *certain* degree. First, it

⁷⁴ For example, Kim (2003: 83) and Audi (2005: 325).

is certainly reasonable that a philosopher's prowess to give a universal definition for philosophy should not be regarded as a prerequisite for actually doing successful philosophical work; it is enough that philosophers remain aware of what their own approximate conception of philosophy is when they are doing philosophy. Secondly, in practical situations when we are discussing topics pertaining to the nature of philosophy, it is sufficient for successful communication that the speaker and his audience understand this concept more or less in similar manner—they do not need to settle this issue before they can carry out a philosophical dialogue.

A general definition of philosophy is often of secondary importance also on an institutional level since it is in the end insignificant whether some interesting research is carried out as “philosophy” within the department of philosophy or perhaps housed under the roof of some other department. Thus, for example, in Quine's (1974: 228) view banners such as ‘philosophy’ and ‘mathematics’ are mostly practical tools for university bureaucrats and librarians, who have to carry out these kinds of classifications in their administrative bookkeeping.

Moreover, the usage of the title “philosopher” is not formally regulated by any instance or protected by the law, as is the case with the esteemed professions of psychologists, lawyers, physicians and so forth, where we want to differentiate properly trained and licensed professionals from mere money-hungry quacks (thus it is pointless to try to scan the eye-catching headlines of newspapers in the hopes of finding a shocking case of a fraud philosopher being uncovered by the authorities—as does happen from time to time with individuals, who have falsified their diplomas and other credentials in order to pass as qualified physicians).⁷⁵ In Finland, having a degree in philosophy from a university does not formally qualify a person for any other profession besides a teacher of philosophy at the Finnish school system. As an academic discipline, philosophy does not hold similar epistemic authority as the scientific fields do, so the name

⁷⁵ During the past few decades certain philosophers—or, philosophically predisposed individuals—have begun to practice various forms of philosophical counselling. These entrepreneurs offer certain kind of remedial therapy and general life-coaching based on their philosophical knowledge and abilities (whatever these things might ultimately mean). The world's first philosophical practice was founded in Cologne in 1981 by Gerd Aschenbach and since then, similar practitioners of philosophical counselling have inaugurated their businesses elsewhere too, Finland included. As a parallel development we can mention the cases where philosophers provide consultation services for actors in the business sector. Philosopher-therapists have their own organisations, such as *The American Philosophical Practitioners Association* (APPA), which accredits would-be practitioners in the field and publishes different kinds of ethical manuals for responsible professional conduct in the field (Coope 2009: 117–8).

of philosophy is not easily misused for economical or ideological gains. “Philosophically tested” and “nine out of ten philosophers recommend” are not really efficient catchphrases for aspiring snake-oil salesmen. For this reason marking the difference between philosophy and “pseudo-philosophy” is not as pressing a problem or socially significant as the more general demarcation problem between science and pseudo-science is. However, one exception here is that professional philosophers can be heard as sources of expert knowledge in certain ethical discussions and law-making processes, so in these instances it can be important to know which of the quarrelling philosophers we can really trust to provide us with the best counsel on the matter at hand. Moreover, the title of a ‘philosopher’ might not be valued in our society as such, but if a professor of philosophy speaks in the media with the general title of professor, say against the status of gay marriage, her words are surely by default given at least some *prima facie* authority on the matter.

So here we had certain viewpoints which seem to support the idea that a universal definition for philosophy should not be a pressing concern for philosophers. As a counterpoint to these remarks we can note that not too far behind the innocent question of “What is it that philosophers really do?” comes the related question of “Just why do we really *need* philosophers anyway?” When the actual meaning of philosophy remains incomprehensible, it is understandable if laypeople have confused and even negative prejudices concerning the purposes of academic philosophy. The most dramatic outlets for these attitudes are the situations where the value and need of philosophy are questioned completely. Russell ([1912]: 89) writes:

Having now come to the end of our brief and very incomplete review of the problems of philosophy, it will be well to consider, in conclusion, what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.

The value of philosophy and the general need for philosophy are therefore not automatically self-evident, even if some philosophers themselves would like to think so. The mythical “honest taxpayer” can always ask: Why should a publicly-funded national university have its own philosophy department with its highly-paid specialists, when our tax-money could be better spent elsewhere? On what grounds should research funding be allocated to philosophers, when

it could be used in anti-cancer medical research, for example? What positive contributions can philosophy provide to other disciplines and contemporary society? Why should a private sector corporation hire a person with a philosophy degree? What can realistically be expected from philosophy? Questions such as these are not merely hypothetical, but rather more and more common in the current zeitgeist of neo-liberal social policies and its overarching ideology of New Public Management. For example, in 2015 the American senator and presidential candidate Marco Rubio ranked the pressing needs of our times by saying: “We need more welders and less philosophers.”⁷⁶ What can friends of philosophy answer to this challenge? In addition to budget cuts, philosophers have been pushed on defence on other fronts too. For example, in the Finnish discussions pertaining to the education policy, there have been serious suggestions that philosophy should perhaps be removed from the list of mandatory school subjects in the curriculum of Finnish secondary education. And in addition to the honest taxpayers and neo-liberal politicians, philosophy can be targeted by other members of the academia, too. Phelps (1940: xi) recounts how the American social scientist, William Graham Sumner, working at the university of Yale reacted at a faculty meeting when the topic of filling the vacant chair of philosophy came up:

Years later, when I was a member of the Faculty, I was sitting directly behind Sumner, when the calling of a new professor of philosophy was the subject under discussion. In his customary downright manner, Sumner addressed the meeting. “Philosophy is in every way as bad as astrology. It is a complete fake. Yale has a great opportunity now to announce that she will take the lead and banish the study of philosophy from the curriculum on the ground that it is unworthy of serious consideration. It is an anachronism. We might just as well have professors of alchemy or fortune-telling or palmistry.

Alas, as we shall see later in Section 3.1, accusations of this kind are commonplace even today, when certain natural scientists have voiced their opinion that philosophy has become obsolete in the modern world. If philosophy is to convincingly defend itself in hostile discussions like these, philosophers should have the required self-understanding and capability to articulate philosophy’s

⁷⁶ “Sorry, Marco Rubio. Philosophy majors actually make way more than welders”, *Washington Post*, November 10, 2015. Accessible at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/10/actually-philosophy-majors-make-way-more-than-welders-marco-rubio/> (accessed at 16.8.2018).

own special place, mission and value—at least in the context of their own conception of philosophy.

An advocate of a certain conception of philosophy can now become convinced that the poor reputation which philosophy enjoys among the laypeople and scholars of other disciplines is due to the fact that philosophy gets represented in the various outlets of media by the representatives of completely wrong kinds of conceptions of philosophy. This gives philosophy collectively a bad name, including the “correct” conception of philosophy preferred by the individual now making this complaint. Indeed, questions about the right definition of philosophy can evoke strong emotions especially when the public perception of philosophy is on the line.

In addition, the practical ramifications of the question “What is philosophy?” can be considered in relation to the internal conflicts and clashes of different conceptions of philosophy. The co-existence of conceptions of philosophy does not always happen in peaceful terms, since in philosophical and academic power struggles their representatives can often discredit competing forms of philosophising and desire to cast them outside of philosophy proper as unfruitful or even heretic “pseudo-philosophy”.⁷⁷ Therefore the questions about the identity of philosophy are not mere curiosities or over-theoretic musings, since the determination of *which kind* of philosophy gets research funding, academic positions, publications in top-tier peer-reviewed journals and so forth, happens through themes such as these. I do not think that we can find universal and uncontentious truths about the purported timeless and pre-given essence of philosophy, but philosophers should maintain on-going reflection on the nature, aims and value of philosophy—even if it happens in the more restricted context of specific conceptions of philosophy. In its own modest ways, my work in this dissertation aims to do just that.

⁷⁷ As Schofield (2006: 8, footnote removed) recounts, such power struggles were already present in the times of classical philosophy, when various groups made their claims for the rightful use of the label of philosophy: “‘Philosophy’, ‘philosopher’ and ‘philosophize’ were words which had only recently achieved any significant currency by Plato’s time. The evidence suggests that intellectual practitioners with different agenda (Plato included) were appropriating them for their own distinctive purposes, not least in the attempt to define and legitimise their own activities against those of their competitors. ‘I deny’, writes Plato’s rival, Isocrates, ‘that the thing called “philosophy” by certain people is in fact philosophy.’”

Now that we have established the idiosyncrasies of the philosophy's multifaceted identity of philosophy, straightened out various matters related to the nature of conceptions of philosophy and also acknowledged the general importance of these topics, the next item on my agenda is to survey the special sub-discipline of philosophy which is assigned to the study of all these issues. This activity is nowadays known as metaphilosophy, and its specific features are scrutinised here in a total of six sections. Taken together, these sections portray the viewpoint, aims and history of metaphilosophy and, in addition, make a case for its importance *pace* certain common misconceptions and misguided accusations which have been hurled at it in the literature.

I begin with an account of metaphilosophy's place within the parent discipline and an explication of the metaphilosophical viewpoint in Section 2.1. In brief, metaphilosophy is a form of philosophising, with questions pertaining to the subject matter, methods and aims of philosophy. In this sense, metaphilosophy might just as well be called a philosophy of philosophy—a term, which is perhaps slightly more self-explanatory than the somewhat bombastic name of 'metaphilosophy'. In any case, metaphilosophy belongs inseparably to the general discipline of philosophy and operates within its boundaries. However, this close interaction between philosophy and metaphilosophy raises the worry that metaphilosophy is a circular activity and unable to carry out its distinctive tasks. I consider this challenge in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, I illustrate metaphilosophy in action with a set of examples demonstrating how the metaphilosophical topics and the solutions suggested to particular metaphilosophical problems often emerge from "ordinary" and well-known first-level philosophical disputes. The question of the possibility of reaching a consensus in metaphilosophical debates is the focus of Section 2.4. This is an important issue, because it is tempting to view metaphilosophy as an impartial authority in philosophical disputes, which could then act as some kind of a "United Nations of philosophy", namely, a neutral referee judging the quarrels between conceptions of philosophy, schools and movements and setting them straight. The preceding statement about the position of metaphilosophy as an internal operation relative to the general philosophy proper—and thus always coming from the viewpoint of one conception of philosophy or another—quickly puts an end to any hope we might harbour regarding the neutrality of metaphilosophy. We cannot escape philosophy itself

to metaphilosophise on a higher plane of abstraction outside and above philosophy. In Section 2.5 I broaden the description given of metaphilosophy up to this point to include now other kinds of investigation which have been styled “metaphilosophy” or “philosophy studies” in the literature. The sixth and final Section 2.6 examines and explains the rise of metaphilosophy’s popularity in the past twenty-plus years.

2.1 THE POSITION AND VIEWPOINT OF METAPHILOSOPHY

The most crucial thing to note about metaphilosophy right away is that it is a form of philosophical reflection which tackles some of the issues related to the *nature of philosophy*. In other words, the identity of metaphilosophy is fixed by its distinct subject matter, that is, philosophy’s self-image. This simple definition sounds quite straightforward, but we can find alternative proposals regarding even our first step in the definition of metaphilosophy. *Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy* (Bunnin & Yu 2004: 427) for example describes a view in which “[f]or those who believe that philosophy comes to an end, metaphilosophy refers to the theoretical activities after the death of philosophy.” Thus described, metaphilosophy is then conflated with some kind of a “post-philosophy” acting as the replacement of the “old philosophy” which it has now dramatically superseded. Post-philosophy of this kind does not necessarily need to occupy itself with topics pertaining to the self-understanding of philosophy, so I would not call it exactly metaphilosophising. It is nevertheless possible to connect the post-philosophy of this kind with metaphilosophy in the sense that post-philosophy can be thought of as a possible *metaphilosophical position*, as it offers a clear and ambitious conclusion about the nature and standing of philosophy, which has probably been reached through metaphilosophical reflection and argumentation. Be that as it may, I would not use the name ‘metaphilosophy’ for this conception of philosophy, as the phenomenon in question can be described more accurately with a separate label thereby avoiding any unnecessary overlapping and confusions in our terminology.

The failure to differentiate metaphilosophy from post-philosophy is propagated on a linguistic level by the fact that the Greek prefix *μετά* can be used—in addition to numerous other rarer usages—to refer to both spatial relation (behind) and also temporal order (after).¹ Of these two options the latter is employed often in the nomenclature of biosciences (for instance, ‘metastasis’),

¹ A similar mix-up can be seen in the origins of the term ‘metaphysics’ (gr. *τά μετά τὰ φυσικά*): As the well-known story relates, this label allegedly meant originally those works in the *Corpus*

whereas the former is more common generally speaking, and it is used when there is a need to make a distinction between a phenomenon on one hand and the conscious self-reflection focusing on that phenomenon on the other—as happens here with philosophy and metaphilosophy. An influential antecedent for this usage comes from the mathematician, David Hilbert, who in the beginning of the twentieth century introduced the idea of “metamathematics” which studies the foundations of mathematics by formulating mathematical theories about *other* mathematical theories (see Moser 1995; Brutian 2012: 294–7).

Another likely source for these misunderstandings comes from the controversial neo-pragmatist, Richard Rorty, who perhaps more than any other contemporary philosopher has propagated explicit metaphilosophising known in the philosophical circles.² Especially influential of Rorty’s metaphilosophical works has been the anthology *Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method* (1967), which collects several seminal texts of the early analytic philosophy together with a metaphilosophical preface penned by Rorty (which, among other things, popularised the now widely-used term “linguistic turn”). On a tangible level, Rorty’s fingerprints are visible, for example, in the journal *Metaphilosophy*. Terrell W. Bynum, the founder of this journal, has recounted how he got the idea to start this journal after becoming familiar with the metaphilosophical type of thinking via Rorty’s seminars at Princeton in the 1960s.³

On the other hand, Rorty proposed in his widely read metaphilosophical texts that we substitute the traditional “systematic” philosophy with a new “edifying” philosophy. In his vision, the traditional systematic philosophy has

Aristotelicum, which were later arranged by Aristotle’s successors to come *after* his writings on physics. Since then, the meaning of this name has shifted to refer to the ontological questions *behind* or *beyond* the physical reality. Thus, the name has subsequently gained a more metaphorical ring, which tries to represent the spirit and viewpoint of the topics and questions, which are assigned under this label. (Adamson 2014: 37.)

² Although Rorty played a central role in making metaphilosophy—both the name and the activity itself—known, he did not truly come up with metaphilosophy—the name *or* the activity—all by himself, as the sometime misconception holds. Rorty’s biographer, Neill Gross (2008: 149–50), recounts: “Rorty did not invent metaphilosophy. A half-dozen prominent articles on the topic were published in the 1960s, and a book titled *Studies in Metaphilosophy* by Morriz Lazerowitz, a philosopher at Smith College, was published in 1964. Rorty sought to jump onto this intellectual bandwagon.” Nevertheless, from very early on in his career Rorty wanted to establish his academic reputation distinctively as a metaphilosophers (and succeeded at that quite well, too).

³ The first issue of *Metaphilosophy* was published in January of 1970. For historical details see Bynum (2011).

over-emphasised epistemological themes as the principal occupation of philosophy whereas the new edifying philosophy now gives up on the systematic philosophy's underlying ideal of objective and transcendent truths just waiting "out there" to be revealed by scientific and philosophical inquiry.⁴ Rorty wrote about the coming age of edifying philosophy also as a time of "post-philosophical culture", where philosophers are tasked with a new job description in place of the sincere pursuit of knowledge, which had had a central part in the agenda of the systematic philosophy. In short, edifying philosophers become public intellectuals in their societies, who maintain a playfully ironic and detached mindset with regard to their convictions and undertakings. In place of metaphysical system-building and epistemological truth-seeking, the task of philosophers is to push public debates forward by coming up with redescriptions and new "vocabularies", while philosophical writing itself becomes a subgenre of essay literature.

Let us return now to Rorty and his impact on the way in which metaphilosophy appears in the public perception of philosophers. What happens here is that we have two separate elements which can easily get jumbled together. First, we have the immense notoriety which Rorty's subversive views have gathered among philosophers, as the relativistic and constructivistic undercurrents of these views are in many places antithetical to the mainstream of analytic (and pragmatist) philosophy. Moreover, it did not exactly help that Rorty showed admiration towards figures such as Heidegger, who were then viewed as anti-heroes within analytic philosophy. These aspects of Rorty's thinking have led to unfair "demonising" misinterpretations of his work where Rorty has been painted as a "Judas of analytic philosophy", betraying it from within.⁵ On the other hand we have Rorty's central role in popularising metaphilosophical problems, approaches and themes. As a combination of these two facts, for many philosophers probably the first (and only?) context where these philosophers have heard of practically *any kind* of explicit metaphilosophising or the name 'metaphilosophy' itself is Rorty and his works. Furthermore, it is also likely that numerous philosophers have practised metaphilosophising themselves for the first time while criticising something provocative that Rorty has said about the nature and future of philosophy in his writings. Thus, after having been familiarised with Rorty's radical and reformist views, they might have been left with the impression that metaphilosophical thinking *always* acts in the

⁴ For Rorty's conception of philosophy see especially his books *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989) and the introduction in his anthology *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982).

⁵ For criticism of these demonising readings, see Ramberg (2009).

service of efforts to overthrow traditional philosophy and bring about the new age of post-philosophy. From here it is easy to begin to think that these two negatively-laden terms 'metaphilosophy' and 'post-philosophy' can be used interchangeably, and so the unfortunate confusion is completed.⁶

Hacking (1980: 579), for example, while summing the contents of Rorty's main work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, writes that "Richard Rorty's book is unabashedly metaphilosophical. He wants to undermine our confidence in philosophy, knowledge, and the mind[.]" Or consider the way in which metaphilosophy is defined in the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Blackburn 2005: 231):

Metaphilosophy: Writing or thinking whose subject is philosophy itself; often large-scale descriptions of the 'death of philosophy' and prophecies of a world in which its place is occupied by poetry, music or dance. *See also* Rorty.

Besides Rorty's actions, another potential source of confusion here is Morris Lazerowitz, who was later given the honour of introducing the word 'metaphilosophy' into the vocabulary of philosophy in the 1940s. Lazerowitz (1970: 91) later recalled his reasons for coining this neologism:

The editors of *Metaphilosophy* have asked me to write an account of the word which they have adopted as the name of their journal. The word has a brief history. It was coined by me in 1940 so as to enable me to refer unambiguously to a special kind of investigation which Wittgenstein had described as one of the "heirs" of philosophy.⁷

⁶ In his early text, "Recent Metaphilosophy" Rorty (1961a: 301) speaks more directly about *replacing* the traditional philosophy, which focuses on themes from metaphysics, epistemology and axiology, with a new kind of metaphilosophical investigation (although he does not commit to such a view himself). For Rorty's early work in metaphilosophy see Gross (2008: 149–52).

⁷ Compare Glock (1996: 244–5 & 2008a: 178). For Lazerowitz's other characterisations about the viewpoint and aims of metaphilosophy see Lazerowitz (1964; 1971 & 1977). It should be noted that Lazerowitz was not consistent between his different characterisations of metaphilosophy (even within the confines of one and the same text). At times, he seems to think that metaphilosophy is the post-philosophical successor of traditional philosophy whereas elsewhere he says that metaphilosophy consists of some kind of psychological investigation of philosophy (see Bambrough 1967: 543). It is therefore hard to say conclusively what kind of inquiry he had in mind regarding metaphilosophy. One of his (Lazerowitz 1970: 91) straightforward characterisations of metaphilosophy and its mission goes like this: "Metaphilosophy is the investigation of the nature of philosophy, with the central aim of

The various aspects of Rorty's metaphilosophical heritage will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. It is important to distance the metaphilosophy practised and promoted in this doctoral dissertation—and metaphilosophy more generally, I think—from certain misconceptions and plain antipathy caused by the close historical associations between Rorty's name and metaphilosophical reflection. In any case, I stress once again that the metaphilosophy practised in this thesis is not Rortyan—or any other kind, for that matter—post-philosophy or iconoclastic attempt to push philosophy towards such an apocalyptic endgame. Put simply, the main task of metaphilosophy is to reflect on philosophy's nature without necessarily trying to end or replace current philosophy.

After making this general point clear, it now becomes imperative to specify the nature of the viewpoint from which metaphilosophy approaches its subject matter. The most important thing to recognise about this arrangement is that in its relation to the parent discipline metaphilosophy is not in any shape or form a separate “second-order” enterprise, which would investigate issues pertaining to philosophy with its own peculiar—and in some unspecified sense “non-philosophical”—methods from somewhere “outside” of philosophy. Consequently metaphilosophical investigation does not mean, for example, compiling statistics of how philosophy majors have settled on the job market after their graduation—even if such information answer in a literal sense the question of what philosophers do.⁸

What metaphilosophy actually does is that it reflects systematically on the nature of philosophy by using philosophy's conventional methods. In this sense, metaphilosophy “is just more philosophy, turned on philosophy itself”, as Williamson (2007: 5–6) has summarised. Williamson's encapsulation is not in any way uncommon in the philosophical literature, and similar descriptions of metaphilosophy's vocation have been offered by other authors as well. Thus Glock (2008a: 6) writes: “Although the investigation of the proper aims and methods of philosophy is nowadays known as ‘metaphilosophy’, it is not a distinct higher-order discipline but an integral part of philosophy itself[.]” Niiniluoto (1984: 16) has expressed a similar view: “[T]he clarification of the foundations of philosophy is a *philosophical* task. Theses about the aims or the possibility of philosophy are themselves philosophical (epistemological) claims.” Thirdly, Rescher (2006a: 1) has encapsulated his view in the following manner:

arriving at a satisfactory explanation of the absence of uncontested philosophical claims and arguments.”

⁸ This issue, however, will be re-evaluated in a slightly more liberal mood in Section 2.3.

“Metaphilosophy is the philosophical examination of the practice of philosophizing itself. Its definitive aim is to study the methods of the field in an endeavor to illuminate its promise and prospects.” A fourth instance is provided by Cath (2011: §1): “Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as ‘metaphilosophy’.” What this array of quotations show is that there is at least a beginning of a consensus among philosophers regarding the nature of metaphilosophy so we are on to a good start in our project of establishing this activity on the philosophical map.

Such a view concerning the nature of metaphilosophy is also present in Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* [1953: §121] when he writes:

One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word “philosophy” there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word “orthography” among others without then being second-order.⁹

In this regard, metaphilosophy appears to be an exceptional case among the group of meta-level activities, since it operates within philosophy itself and by using standard philosophical methods. This approach differs from the second-order studies of other academic disciplines, which examine similar foundational issues pertaining to their subject’s identity, such as “what X itself is” (where the X stands for the name of the discipline under scrutiny). In this sense, metaphilosophy is essentially *recursive*, both in its definition and in its nature.

In slightly different terms, this point can be phrased by saying that the metaphilosophical question “What is philosophy?” is in itself already a noteworthy philosophical problem, unlike the questions about the foundations of, say, biology or physics, where answering this matter does not require us to carry out more of actual biological or physical research, but philosophy of biology and philosophy of physics respectively instead (Lazerowitz 1977). Here we return to the remark made in the previous chapter, namely that philosophy is, in a peculiar way, a chronically self-conscious enterprise, because among its central research topics are also the kind of issues (truth, knowledge, meaning and so forth) which help to articulate our foundational views about the methods, subject matter and aims of philosophy itself. Philosophical views are in this sense exceptionally self-reflective, as they often end up having a say also about their own deep-seated nature.

⁹ For different interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thoughts here, see Glock (1996: 244–5).

To sidestep these potential misunderstandings about the character of metaphilosophy, some philosophers, such as Williamson who was already mentioned above, have decided to use the name *philosophy of philosophy* in lieu of metaphilosophy. Indeed, this choice brings out more clearly the fact that “[t]he philosophy of philosophy is automatically part of philosophy, just as the philosophy of anything else is, whereas metaphilosophy sounds as though it might try to look down on philosophy from above, or beyond.” (Williamson 2007: ix). Thus the philosophy of philosophy described by Williamson is akin to the other “philosophy of *X*” investigations, which present themselves in relation to various special sciences, such as “the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of economics [and] the philosophy of history” (Williamson 2007: 6). The only unusual element in this arrangement is that the special science now under philosophical scrutiny is philosophy itself.¹⁰ Besides its descriptive virtues, this terminology has the added benefit of avoiding the Rortyan baggage of “post-philosophical” connotations. Be that as it may, I still prefer the shorter and more practical ‘metaphilosophy’ (following the same reasoning I would pick ‘metaphysics’ over ‘philosophy of being’ and ‘epistemology’ over ‘philosophy of knowledge’, even if these shorter alternatives are more abstract and in need of an elucidation). And for better or for worse, ‘metaphilosophy’ has also already become an established part of the philosophical terminology. As Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood (2013: 10) write, “‘Metaphilosophy’ [...] is simply the term most widely used for this particular part of philosophy.”¹¹ I believe that it is better to dispel

¹⁰ As the question of whether philosophy is a science or not is a contentious issue within the community of philosophers, not all philosophers would readily accept the description of metaphilosophy as “the philosophy of science of philosophy itself”. As I see it, this complication is nevertheless of minimal importance, since even these philosophers can still accept the formal structure underlying this relationship, where metaphilosophy is understood to reflect the activities of philosophy in philosophical manner (even if that philosophical reflection does not purport to be “scientific” in its methods or aims). Cohen & Dascal (1989: xi) have remarked in a similar way that although philosophers are divided on many issues, the division between first-level and meta-level is formal in nature, and all philosophers can accept it whatever their other ideas about philosophy might be. The definition given to metaphilosophy here aims to be as ecumenical as possible for all kinds of conceptions of philosophy.

¹¹ Terrell W. Bunym (2011: 187–8), who founded the journal *Metaphilosophy* in 1970, has later recalled his reasoning for choosing the name ‘metaphilosophy’ over ‘philosophy of philosophy’: “At first I thought, perhaps, *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, but this seemed to me to be rather clumsy and inelegant. In addition, it also seemed too narrow, since I had a very broad purview in mind. Finally, I made up the word ‘metaphilosophy’ as a name for something ‘above and beyond’ philosophy, which can describe it, analyze it, and explain how it relates to other areas of thought.”

any remaining confusion about the nature and viewpoint of metaphilosophy through active educational work so that in time this term will be understood in approximately the same way throughout the philosophical community (or rather, understood as unambiguously as the terms for philosophy's sub-disciplines generally are understood — there will surely always be different views on these matters as long as philosophy continues to exist, but such is life for us who have chosen philosophy as our vocation).

2.2 IS METAPHILOSOPHY CIRCULAR?

A noteworthy issue about the definition given to metaphilosophy in the previous section is that when it describes metaphilosophy as being the same as philosophy of philosophy in its basic orientation, it seems to commit us to some kind of a *circularity*: we are told that metaphilosophy reflects the nature of philosophy but, at the same time, metaphilosophy's own identity is supposed to be defined in turn by the nature of philosophy. This self-referential relationship between the natures of philosophy and metaphilosophy can be deemed troublesome in (at least) two ways.

Of these two worries, the lesser one is that the above description of metaphilosophy is not particularly revealing in terms of its information value. Suppose a person, who is not familiar with the specifics of philosophy, is now told that metaphilosophy is basically just equivalent to "philosophy of philosophy". The recipient of this revelation will probably feel this definition rather frustrating (if not outright mocking). If one does not already know what philosophy is (approximately, at least), she will not consequently get a better grip of metaphilosophy either. Should all descriptions of metaphilosophy therefore begin with some sort of a definition of philosophy, which would help us to anchor the full content behind the nature of metaphilosophy?

So it seems that we have here a potential case of *circulus in definiendo* in our hands. This predicament is analogous to that of the science studies. The general subject matter of this interdisciplinary research is the various *special sciences*, and science studies study them *scientifically* by utilising the methods of the very same sciences which it seeks to study. Although this description seems to be built atop a pre-theoretical understanding of what science is, science studies cannot begin with a finished and unchallengeable definition of science, which would apply across the board for every past, present and future activity deemed as science. Instead, the proposed alternative definitions and criteria for science are one of the chief topics for debates in science studies. This same observation

applies *mutatis mutandis* to the case of metaphilosophy. As the previous definition for metaphilosophy shows, the two questions “What is philosophy?” and “What is metaphilosophy?” are dynamically intertwined, so our opinions about the nature of philosophy influence concurrently our way of seeing the nature and behaviour of metaphilosophy.

When we do not count the frustration felt by the people who are not already familiar with philosophy (I somehow suspect that such people are not even interested in hearing lectures about the nature of metaphilosophy in the first place), this kind of interdependence between the definitions of philosophy and metaphilosophy is not seriously problematic. This is because this circle of self-understanding is exactly what metaphilosophy is all about: philosophy is attempting to better understand itself. In this sense the worry about the circularity between philosophy and metaphilosophy probably stems from a misconception, where it is thought that metaphilosophy is its own autonomous project and clearly distinct from philosophy, for which we should be able to give a separate definition standing on its own legs. But when we give up this mistaken way of looking at the relationship between philosophy and metaphilosophy the circularity will be revealed as a misunderstanding. For the same reason we do not require a comical series of regression, where the nature of metaphilosophy is studied independently by the even more abstract ‘metametaphilosophy’ (and whose nature would then be studied by the even more abstract ‘metametameta-philosophy’ and so on *ad infinitum*).

However, the circularity between philosophy and metaphilosophy can also be approached from another direction. Then the concern is that we can question whether metaphilosophy is even capable of carrying out its distinctive job description successfully, that is to say, to critically reflect the nature of philosophy. This concern is triggered by the observation that because in metaphilosophy’s case the subject matter and the phenomenon studying it are by definition the same. This close relationship raises suspicions of serious conflicts of interests. If the metaphilosophical reflection and defence of a certain conception of philosophy happens always inside the framework of this particular metaphilosophical view and by using its own argumentative and evidential standards, it easy to doubt how critical and successful this scrutiny can be.

To use a real example: if we are trying to argue that apriority (and consequently all philosophising which builds theories guided by this knowledge) is epistemically trustworthy, and we do the relevant metaphilosophical argumentation through *a priori* premises, are we not already trusting the very source of evidence which we should be examining critically? Should not this sort of defence come from a neutral source outside of the conception of philosophy in

question? For example, Cummins (1998) deems *a priori* intuitions a dubious source of philosophical premises, since the defenders of intuitions are not able to provide them with such an impartial “calibration”, which would confirm their philosophical accuracy independently.¹²

Viewed in this way, this circularity seems to be one instance of the more general problem of epistemic circularity (*circulus in demonstrando*), and it should obviously be taken with the appropriate seriousness. I will not ponder this problem on a general level since I believe its detailed examination should always happen in actual philosophical contexts. It is fruitless to speculate this issue on an abstract level since there is no all-encompassing solution to it which would work as a rule in every individual case. Nevertheless, I mention this metaphilosophical problem here because it comes up often in metaphilosophical discussions and can be routinely used to criticise conceptions of philosophy and their epistemological underpinnings.¹³

2.3 CREATING METAPHILOSOPHY FROM PHILOSOPHY

So far I have suggested the following two premises about the distinctive subject matter and viewpoint of metaphilosophy: The task of metaphilosophy is to reflect on issues pertaining to the nature of philosophy. In this reflection, metaphilosophy applies philosophy’s own standard methods, sources of evidence and forms of argumentation. As a combination of these two claims, metaphilosophy can be thought of as consisting of all those philosophical issues—whether they come from epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mind and so on—whose answers bear in some fashion also on conceptions of philosophy themselves. In this sense metaphilosophical conclusions and theories always *supervene* on philosophical views and

¹² For discussion on Cummins argument, see Pust (2000).

¹³ In one of Rorty’s formulations the task of metaphilosophy is to defuse problematic situations which philosophy gets to when it refers to itself (see Rorty 1961b). As an example, we can use the logical positivists’ verification criteria for meaningful language use, which is nevertheless hard to apply to verification criteria itself. To avoid problematic self-referential situations such as these, we need in philosophy a division between “internal” and “external” language use (Rorty’s terminology here is reminiscent of Carnap’s famous divide in metametaphysics). This solution leads to separating metaphilosophy from philosophy as its own meta-level of inquiry (Rorty speaks of “the ethereal plane of metaphilosophy”). In another of his texts from the same time period Rorty (1962) speaks of dialectic circularity, which is created when philosophers “base their metaphilosophy on their epistemology.”

there cannot by definition even be metaphilosophy without some prior philosophising. In practice, the difference between philosophical and metaphilosophical theses lies largely in the detail of how explicitly we want to draw the metaphilosophical conclusions from the relevant first-level philosophical discussions. This scheme allows that metaphilosophical conclusions are often devised indirectly as a by-product of our philosophising, and a metaphilosophically interesting implication can remain dormant in philosophical discussions until its ramifications for conceptions of philosophy are made purposely evident.

Recognising these qualitative similarities between philosophy and metaphilosophy is revealing because now we can set certain misconceptions about metaphilosophy straight. It is possible, for instance, to hear certain philosophers comment in belittling tones how metaphilosophical reflections are in some way “boring” and “uneventful”. Take, for example, Armstrong’s (1981: 19) words: “The philosophy of philosophy is perhaps a somewhat joyless and unrewarding subject for reflection.” Williams (2006: 169) has similarly remarked how “philosophy is not at its most interesting when it is talking about itself”. Presumably the problem here is that the meta-level reflections about philosophy are likened to something like talking about sex: why waste our valuable time and energy to mull over *theoretical* questions about the fundamental nature of philosophy, when it is much more rewarding to *practise* philosophy in action?

It goes without saying that what we find to be boring philosophically is in the eye of the beholder (after teaching philosophy for high school students, I feel that for quite many people *all* philosophy is equally boring). For some it is formal logic, for others it is meta-ethics and so on. So, I have no objective retort to this kind of subjective criticism. But if we understand these worries in the form where the adjective ‘theoretical’ is equated universally with the quality of being boring, while ‘practical’ is conversely same as being stimulating, I believe it becomes possible to offer counter-criticism. This kind of a theory-versus-practice mentality seems to underlie Pirsig’s (1992: 370–1) thinking, when he describes under the name of “philosophology” a certain type of philosophising, which in his view has come to dominate the philosophy pursued and taught in the modern institutions of higher education. Pirsig writes:

Philosophology is to philosophy as musicology is to music, or as art history and art appreciation are to art, or as literary criticism is to creative writing. It’s a derivative, secondary field, a sometimes parasitic growth that likes to think it controls its host by analyzing and intellectualizing its host’s behavior.

In Pirsig's (*ibid.*) criticism, one cannot truly become a great philosopher by doing only this kind of second-rate "philosophology":

You can imagine the ridiculousness of an art historian taking his students to museums, having them write a thesis on some historical or technical aspect of what they see there, and after a few years of this giving them degrees that say they are accomplished artists. They've never held a brush or a mallet and chisel in their hands. All they know is art history.

Pirsig's analogies are, at least if one attempts to apply them to the relationship between philosophy and metaphilosophy, off target. The reason for this is that whereas talking about painting and actually doing some painting are clearly qualitatively different activities, the same does not apply in the case of philosophy and metaphilosophy. Therefore, by doing metaphilosophy one *can* become an adept, perhaps an even first-rate, philosopher, whose work generates new philosophical discussions and breakthroughs. There exists no difference between philosophers and "metaphilosophers" in the way which would imply that the former practise actual philosophy whereas the latter "merely talk about it."

For the same reason the worries about metaphilosophy's unbearable boringness would seem to be unwarranted: since there is no significant qualitative difference between philosophy and metaphilosophy, and talking *about* philosophy *is* already in itself philosophy, we should not have any worries that metaphilosophy is boring—or, at least, more boring than what philosophy usually is. Therefore, the time "wasted" on metaphilosophy is not in any way reduced from our time of pursuing "actual" philosophy.

However, the concerns regarding metaphilosophy's excessive abstractness or remoteness in relation to "real philosophy" can also be seen from another, and perhaps somewhat more reasonable, angle. Then these concerns can be seen as raising the issue that if we concentrate solely on our meta-level theorising about the fundamental details of getting philosophy done, we face the risk of losing the connections these meta-theories are supposed to have with actual philosophical practice. Our metaphilosophical views become irrelevant, if they do not do justice to the way in which philosophy is actually practiced (or could be practiced, at least). At worst, we end up creating an embellished and glamorised caricature of philosophy with no counterpart in reality (Gutting 2009: 2). In this regard, Jackson (1998: vii) is undoubtedly right when he writes that "an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems." This is a reasonable rule of thumb in all

metaphilosophising and it would seem to advise us against trying to make sweeping metaphilosophical generalisations regarding at once the subject matter or the methodology of *all* branches of philosophy (see Cappelen 2012: 21).

But let us now return from these vindications of metaphilosophy back to the question of how metaphilosophical themes and problems can emerge from the first-order philosophy. As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, philosophy often examines profound topics, which can also directly impact the way we understand the subject matter, method and aims of philosophy itself. Indeed, views about such philosophical issues often serve as central building-blocks in conceptions of philosophy. The previously mentioned examples of such philosophical topics were knowledge, truth, reality, rationality, certainty, consistency, justification, explanation, understanding, meaning, evidence, necessity, possibility, argumentative validity and coherence, but this list does not by any means attempt to be exhaustive.

As another detailed illustration we can mention the debate concerning the existence of substantial *a priori* knowledge (as we shall see in the course of this thesis, this is the very philosophical issue which divides metaphilosophical naturalists and rationalists). Although this epistemological theme is certainly worth our attention in and of itself, it gains even more weight when we notice the significant metaphilosophical implications it has for our understanding of the nature of philosophical knowledge. Peacocke (2005a: 739) expresses this close connection between apriority and philosophy's self-image as follows:

The existence and nature of the *a priori* are defining issues for philosophy. A philosopher's attitude to the *a priori* is a touchstone for his whole approach to the subject. Sometimes, as in Kant's critical philosophy, or in Quine's epistemology, a major new position emerges from reflection on questions that explicitly involve the notions of the *a priori* or the empirical. But even when no explicit use is made of the notion of the *a priori* in the questions addressed, a philosopher's methodology, the range of considerations to which the philosopher is open, his conception of the goals of the subject, his idea of what is involved in justification—all of these cannot fail to involve commitments about the nature and the existence of the *a priori*. So understanding the *a priori* is not only of interest in itself. It is also essential for self-understanding, if we are to understand ourselves as philosophers.

Besides apriority, other similar topics which raise important metaphilosophical ramifications are for example the *theories of truth* (how we understand the nature of philosophical truths), *theories of concepts* (how we understand the semantic

and ontological nature of concepts), *argumentation theory* (how we understand the rules of successful philosophical argumentation) and so on.

When we look at these illustrations it should be noted that although the previous examples came from the confines of the so-called theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy too can harbour numerous metaphilosophically impactful themes, such as issues pertaining to philosophy's research ethics or the possible civic duties philosophers have as public intellectuals in their communities (see Hepburn 2005).¹⁴ But it must still be said that, at least for the naturalist-rationalist debate surveyed in this thesis, the most consequential philosophical-cum-metaphilosophical topics come from the general direction of theoretical philosophy. Therefore that emphasis is present in this thesis as well.

It is hopeless to even attempt to write a complete list of all potential philosophy-cum-metaphilosophical questions in advance. This is because there are new bridges from philosophical topics to metaphilosophical conclusions found all the time, and in this regard the field of metaphilosophy evolves constantly. The roster of metaphilosophical topics varies also in the more dramatic sense that, as noted above, the content of metaphilosophy depends crucially on the nature of the conception of philosophy which is used as the basis of metaphilosophy. Thus the metaphilosophy produced by two distinct conceptions of philosophy can differ on the account of what they regard as important metaphilosophical questions (or more generally how they see the aims of metaphilosophising). Hence there is no singular Metaphilosophy speaking with a univocal voice, but rather as many "metaphilosophies" as there are individual conceptions of philosophy. In addition, the metaphilosophies proposed by exponents of different conceptions of philosophy will necessarily not actively engage with each other, so the field of metaphilosophy is ultimately just as diverse as philosophy itself. As we will see in the next section, this fact restricts metaphilosophy's ambitions and prospects.

¹⁴ I will not strive to defend this claim here, but when we are crafting conceptions of philosophy from the ground up, it feels as though the problems of metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic and epistemology are of greater importance compared to the problems of practical philosophy: it is these core branches of theoretical philosophy which help us to define what philosophy studies (ontology and philosophy of language) and how it does it (epistemology and logic). For what it is worth: in the taxonomy used by the internet database philpapers.org (curated by Bourget and Chalmers) the sub-category of metaphilosophy is categorised under the main category of metaphysics and epistemology. On the other hand, from the opposing side we can note that the questions regarding the aims of philosophy seem to be normatively laden, and thus perhaps metaphilosophically prior to the questions about the right method of philosophy as we have to know what we want from philosophy before we can estimate the success of the methods we make use of to that end.

Before we continue onwards to the next section, I will take a brief moment to examine two alternative descriptions about the relationship of philosophy and metaphilosophy, which have been suggested over the years in the literature on metaphilosophy. According to first of these descriptions, the responsibilities of metaphilosophy consist of special tasks pertaining to the systematising and organising of philosophical knowledge into a unified big picture. Phrased slightly more metaphorically, metaphilosophy is tasked with keeping an eye on the jigsaw puzzle created by all the various sub-fields of philosophy when they contribute their distinctive pieces to the whole. Perhaps metaphilosophy could in this role act as an opposing force against overt specialisation (as was discussed in Section 1.3) and connect separate areas of philosophy together by pointing out deep-seated issues which are common to them. In this model, metaphilosophy operates on a higher level than philosophy proper, and acts as philosophy's internal bookkeeper of sorts – which is perhaps somewhat ironic, since these same metaphors are often used to describe the tasks of philosophy in relation to the special sciences (that is, philosophy reviews the pre-suppositions and ramifications of the scientific worldview and monitors how diverse scientific pursuits are ultimately connected in the grand scheme of things).

In the second alternative model which is sometimes suggested in the literature, metaphilosophy consists of the second-order “meta-discourses” of the individual sub-disciplines of philosophy. Metaphilosophical topics can thus be organised into smaller groups mirroring the established borderlines between the branches of philosophy (see Moser 1995: 487). For instance, following this view we can think that where philosophical ethics ponders normative questions about right and wrong, meta-ethics as a part of metaphilosophy in turn elucidates the fundamental nature of these ethical questions and scrutinises the background assumptions and inner mechanisms of the ethical inquiry itself. Important meta-ethical topics can then be, for example, the question of whether normative claims are objectively truth-apt and what kind of ontological and epistemological assumptions they involve (Miller 2003). Similar division of labour happens then *mutatis mutandis* with other parts of philosophy too, as the cases of *metaepistemology* (see Fumerton 1995) and *metametaphysics* (see Tahko 2015) illustrate.

This proposal is not without its merits, one of them being terminological parsimony, as this model makes use of certain already established pieces of philosophical terminology, especially in the case of ethics and meta-ethics. However, it should not be taken as an accurate description of metaphilosophy as a whole. Here it is important to remember that the dominion of metaphilosophy

includes also those large-scale assessments pertaining to conceptions of philosophy, which can transcend the borders of the various branches of philosophy (which, it must be said, are themselves often in practice fluid, as philosophers move freely from the problems of one sub-field to another—for example, there are metaphysical issues in epistemology and *vice versa*).

As examples we can once again list the already mentioned core questions of all conceptions of philosophy: *what* philosophy is about, *how* philosophy should be practiced and *why* philosophy should be practiced. Thus describing metaphilosophy as the collection of meta-discourses of all branches of philosophy does not exhaust the full range of metaphilosophical topics—in fact, it seems to leave out the most important deep questions, whose answers form the foundation stones for conceptions of philosophy. Moreover, this model of metaphilosophy is not a particularly informative description of the metaphilosophising practised within this dissertation, either (in other words, this dissertation is not purely about metaepistemology or metametaphysics, for example).

2.4 THE LIMITS OF METAPHILOSOPHY

The hope that metaphilosophy could act as an impartial tribunal in philosophical disputes above the legion of quarrelling conceptions of philosophy, schools and movements, is understandable. Perhaps metaphilosophy could from this putative high position of a supreme arbiter akin to the “United Nations of philosophy” also appraise the respective merits and failures of individual philosophical doctrines and theories and, on this basis, then create a uniform synthesis of all the best parts of these conflicting views? Maybe this process of metaphilosophical synthesising could result in profound generalisations regarding the deep essence of philosophy, common to all conceptions of philosophy, which would then finally tell us what philosophy is *really* all about? This kind of a bold ambition, where metaphilosophy is seen as a weaver of large-scale syntheses, seems to be present in certain early metaphilosophical writings of Rorty (see Rorty 1962; Gross 2008: 149–50). For example, Rorty’s driving interest in some of his initial work was to build bridges between analytic and continental philosophy, and also to facilitate a dialogue between particular views and schools which have become estranged in the philosophical world. The value of this kind of metaphilosophical reflection is that it can (supposedly) reveal shared points of interest and other hidden similarities behind philosophical

views, which are generally thought to exist miles apart in the field of philosophy.¹⁵

Alas, when we recognise the nature and contents of metaphilosophy as being in practice tantamount to *philosophy* of philosophy—and thus as always emerging from the confines of one conception of philosophy or another—these hopes turn out to be hollow. Considering the fact that two conceptions of philosophy, *CP1* and *CP2*, can in *extreme cases* be incommensurable at the level of their first-order philosophising, they are consequently incommensurable also in the forms of metaphilosophical reflections, *MP1* and *MP2*, which they generate. Such an outcome can occur especially in the cases where these two conceptions of philosophy have too disparate standards regarding the starting points of philosophical argumentation (what are truth, rationality, logical validity, and so on about) and about the nature of the evidence, which is invoked in such argumentation. Therefore elevating the discussion to the metaphilosophical level is not an all-absolving move for the disagreements between conceptions of philosophy, since the same deep divergences regarding the commitments and foundations of philosophising displayed by different conceptions of philosophy will continue to be present likewise in their metaphilosophical reflections.

Philosophical disputes between two deeply antithetical views can end up in a frustrating impasse, since these views do not disagree on just what particular claims are supported by evidence in their debate, but also more fundamentally on what in fact counts as an evidence and how that evidence should be assessed—Williamson (2007: 210) elaborates this theme under the name of *evidence neutrality*.¹⁶ For example, in certain discussions within philosophy of religion, theists and atheists disagree crucially on the issue of what sort of evidence has a bearing on their debate. For a fideist it could be personal religious experiences, whereas an atheist remains unconvinced in the face of such personal experiences. Or take the case of phenomenal consciousness, where the radical opponent of this notion flatly denies that qualia exist, while a proponent of this

¹⁵ Bunym (2011: 177), the founder of the journal *Metaphilosophy*, recalls how Rorty was an important role model for him especially in the way in which Rorty attempted to assess philosophy “from a distance” and from above the various warring schools and their disagreements.

¹⁶ Williamson (2007: 210) introduces this idea as follows: “As far as possible, we want evidence to play the role of a neutral arbiter between rival theories. Although the complete elimination and confusions is virtually impossible, we might hope that whether a proposition constitutes as evidence is in principle decidable, in the sense that a community of inquirers can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry. Call that idea Evidence Neutrality. Thus in debate over a hypothesis *h*, proponents and opponents of *h* should be able to agree whether some claim *p* constitutes evidence without first having to settle their differences over *h* itself.”

idea wants to deploy our first-person knowledge of our phenomenal states as her point of departure in philosophical theorising. Rorty (1989) has raised a similar point about the viability of debates between relativists and objectivists, where the exponents of these two views do not see eye-to-eye in regards to truth and knowledge, so neither side can prove anything substantial to the other in their discussions.

The depth and full extent of these challenges can be exposed with the help of few illustrations provided by Lewis (1982: 434–5): It is often of no use for us to try to argue with another philosopher, who upholds radical philosophical views such as global scepticism or a form of non-classical logic. The reason for this is that such extreme views call so much into question regarding the rules of argumentation or the evidence used in it, that we are not left with enough common ground on which to carry out our discussions concerning the issues now under review. Our interlocutors can always counter our argumentative moves by invoking their idiosyncratic philosophical notions.¹⁷

In metaphilosophical literature, several philosophers have offered their pessimistic takes on the potential incommensurability between divergent conceptions of philosophy. Notable expressions of this sentiment are given by Rorty (1961a), Rescher (1978; 1993) and Double (1998). Rorty calls out attention to the fact that the dialectic between conflicting conceptions of philosophy is like a game of sports where the participants can change the rules and conditions for winning at whim. As a consequence, the game cannot be objectively won or lost (see also Rorty 1982: xli). Double's train of thought which leads to this kind of conclusion begins with the notion that all conceptions of philosophy include within them as a crucial component an inherently normative "desire for philosophy", namely, a view regarding what we expect from our philosophising. In

¹⁷ Here is the relevant quote from Lewis (1982: 434–5): "The radical case for relevance [that is, dialethism] should be dismissed just because the hypothesis it requires us to entertain is inconsistent. That may seem dogmatic. And it is: I am affirming the very thesis that Routley and Priest [that is, champions of dialethism] have called into question and—contrary to the rules of debate—I decline to defend it. Further, I concede that it is indefensible against their challenge. They have called so much into question that I have no foothold on undisputed ground. So much the worse for the demand that philosophers always must be ready to defend their theses under the rules of debate." When Lewis was later asked to contribute to an anthology on debates about the law of contradiction, he replied to the editors in a letter (Lewis 2004: 176): "I'm sorry; I decline to contribute to your proposed book about the 'debate' over the law of non-contradiction. My feeling is that since this debate instantly reaches deadlock, there's really nothing much to say about it. To conduct a debate, one needs common ground; principles in dispute cannot of course fairly be used as common ground; and in this case, the principles *not* in dispute are so very much less certain than non-contradiction itself that it matters little whether or not a successful defense of non-contradiction could be based on them."

Double's analysis, these normative views lack truth-values, because they cannot be assessed objectively from the outside. As a consequence, we cannot determine which specific metaphilosophical view out of the multitude of conceptions of philosophy is the most rational. Rescher, on the other hand, calls his metaphilosophical outlook *orientational pluralism*. This view states that the special nature of philosophy makes it improbable that we could ever reach a consensus about the one true conception of philosophy.

These worries of metaphilosophical incommensurability are too large and deep to be resolved here and now. It is, however, necessary to ponder the ramifications this issue has for the possibilities of metaphilosophical reflection. When metaphilosophy is envisioned in the foregoing manner as a pluralistic enterprise, which is limited by the disagreements of conflicting conceptions of philosophy, we face the worry that metaphilosophy turns out to be nothing more than a self-congratulatory navel gazing, which allows a conception of philosophy to pat itself in the back without sufficiently self-critical stance. According to Gutting (2009: 2), metaphilosophy's low reputation among philosophers is partly caused by the fact that the philosophising done under metaphilosophy's banner often gives the impression of mere dogmatic sermonising, where complete large-scale conceptions of philosophy are derived from a certain set of uncriticised starting points (such as in the case of idealism, Gutting opines).

In my view this worry of metaphilosophy's excessive dogmatism is, however, unfounded. Even if it is impossible to view all conceptions of philosophy from a synoptic viewpoint and from that Archimedean position create some kind of a synthesis of philosophy's fundamental nature, a more *restricted* critical and constructive dialogue between conceptions of philosophy is still possible in the cases where there exists enough common ground in the mutually shared foundational assumptions of these particular conceptions of philosophy to conduct their debate on (as also happens with every first-order philosophical discussion where the competing views have to have in the similar vein enough common ground for their debate to go anywhere). Moreover, I do not wish to sound here as if I were endorsing a relativistic view in which representatives of contrasting conceptions of philosophy would in some radical sense "live in completely different worlds" (see Kuhn [1962]) without the means to get their point across the dividing line between their conceptions of philosophy. When conducting a metaphilosophical dialogue or debate, philosophers can take extra measures to make their arguments acceptable to their audience by working within common metaphilosophical framework. Here, for example, is how Bealer (1992: 99) preambles his anti-empiricist argumentation:

Unlike the standard anti-empiricist arguments, which usually strike empiricists as question-begging, these arguments are designed to lay bare difficulties *internal* to their view. Our purpose is to present arguments that are designed to have persuasive force even for people already under the spell of empiricism.

Moreover, it must be said about the possibilities of comparative metaphilosophy, that a synthesising viewpoint is indeed possible when the schools, traditions, movements and conceptions of philosophy under review have enough common ground, so that it is possible to bring them into dialogue. Then one of the advantages of metaphilosophy is precisely that it can find in Rortyan spirit unifying themes between different manifestations of philosophy, which would otherwise have remained unnoticed due to prejudices and misconceptions between philosophers.

2.5 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF METAPHILOSOPHY

In the previous four sections, metaphilosophy has been described as a branch of philosophy which reflects questions pertaining to conceptions of philosophy by using philosophy's standard methods and viewpoints. This description captures the general idea of the metaphilosophical investigation which is practised in this dissertation as well. However, in the literature there have also been different descriptions regarding the nature and aims of metaphilosophy and these divergent suggestions do not seem to adhere to the simple conception of metaphilosophy as the "philosophy of philosophy". In this section I examine in slightly more liberal mood these alternative ways to understand the nature of metaphilosophical reflection and see what exactly they amount to. As there is much good in these alternative portrayals of metaphilosophy, some ideas from them can actually be seen as expanding and elucidating my initial characterisation of metaphilosophy's nature and purpose.

One divisive line which is often drawn in the literature splits metaphilosophical investigations into the two branches of *descriptive* and *prescriptive* metaphilosophy on the basis of how metaphilosophy actually approaches philosophy as its subject matter (see Glock 2008a: 3; 2013: 35–6; compare with Nolan

2007: 3; Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood 2013: 12).¹⁸ I use this division as the initial point of entry for the rest of this section, but it is also developed further, interpreted in new ways and — on certain points — problematised.

Descriptive metaphilosophy, as depicted by Glock, can *inter alia* approach in doxographical intent questions pertaining to philosophical schools, traditions and movements (such as analytic and continental philosophy). If metaphilosophy is understood in this way, it aims first to document the individual historical developments of these social-cum-philosophical phenomena and then, on this basis, to articulate acceptable definitions for them. The methodological toolkit of this kind of descriptive metaphilosophical inquiry consists of methods, viewpoints and sources similar to those of sociology and history of ideas. This array of methods is used to pin down the chosen target of investigation, after which the various proposed definitions are evaluated in terms of some kind of conceptual analysis (this kind of methodology was actually introduced and utilised already in Section 1.2 pertaining to the different types of schools, traditions and movements).

In addition to this type of doxographical study which has also some affinities with sociology and history of ideas, many other kinds of extra-philosophical investigations can also be regarded as analogous forms of descriptive metaphilosophy. However, the only common denominator between them is really the fact that they all come from somewhere “outside” of philosophy — wherever those outer boundaries might actually lie — and that they, in one way or another, adopt philosophy or some quarter of it as their subject matter. We have already encountered within these pages the idea of sociology of philosophy, which is a form of cultural sociology examining various issues pertaining to the social practice of philosophy and its institutions (see Section 1.2). Unlike typical philosophy, the sociology of philosophy has a theory-based approach to a set of data which is then studied empirically, and it can present its results in the form

¹⁸ It is natural to contrast this division between descriptive and prescriptive metaphilosophy with the comparable division found in the science studies, which divides this interdisciplinary research area further into descriptive and normative forms. During the last five decades the viewpoints of science studies have shifted more and more toward descriptive research, where the primary intent is to describe the actual practices and functioning of science, and not to change it normatively into something new and better. This trend can be seen as a counter-reaction to the projects undertaken in the first half of the twentieth century by logical positivists, where the new tools of formal logic were used to create an ideal reconstruction of how the scientific explanation idealistically works. To this end, logical positivists were not interested to investigate historical case studies of how science has actually been done by individual scientists — which was then later highlighted as one of the main blind spots of the theorising of logical positivists.

of quantitative statistics and visualisations (Heidegren & Lundberg 2010: 14).¹⁹ Another similar project is the *psychology of philosophy*, which can, for instance, study the cognitive abilities and skills needed in philosophising, or estimate from the standpoint of personality psychology the possible influence that the philosophers' psychological temperaments might have to their philosophical views.²⁰ Additionally, the philosophical instantiations of the various cognitive biases (see Tversky & Kahneman 1974) is one potential subject matter for the psychology of philosophy, as it can shed light on the nature of philosophical heuristics and disagreement. A third example could be the various philological and stylometric analyses of philosophical texts, where we can for example consider the possible true authorship of Plato's "Seventh letter" (as its authenticity has been called in question), but the list of potential examples of types of inquiries which could fall under the label of descriptive metaphilosophy are endless.

As it is described by Glock, the distinctive quality in the attitude of descriptive metaphilosophy is that it is not judgmental about what actually is good or bad philosophy. Instead, the practitioners of descriptive metaphilosophy remain as neutral spectators outside philosophical disagreements and focus on describing philosophy as it really functions—or has functioned during its history—warts and all.

In stark contrast to this kind of descriptive metaphilosophy, prescriptive metaphilosophy on the contrary *does* actively take sides in philosophical arguments and it often argues for a particular conception of philosophy. Following Cohen (1989: 1–2) prescriptive metaphilosophy can be divided more specifically into *aggressive* and *defensive* metaphilosophy. In Cohen's view, a model exemplar of aggressive metaphilosophy is Rorty, because this kind of metaphilosophising wants to build a new conception of philosophy, which aims to challenge the old order and revolutionise philosophy in some serious way. Therefore aggressive metaphilosophy often contains harsh criticism of rival conceptions of philosophy—aimed perhaps against some kind of supposed "default" or "traditional" conception of philosophy. This aggressiveness can in extreme cases

¹⁹ Morrow & Sula (2011) call such an empirical study of philosophy *naturalised metaphilosophy*.

²⁰ For example, Jung (1973: 331–2) speculated that the future philosophy would include a separate sub-discipline under the name of psychopathology of philosophy, which would examine how the deviances in philosophers' mental lives might be reflected in their philosophical views. Similar ideas were earlier sketched by James [1907: §1] in his dichotomy between the two temperament-styles of tough-minded empiricists (sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic and sceptical) and tender-minded rationalists (who are intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic and dogmatic). On this basis James states that "[t]he history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments."

lead to abandoning a certain philosophical method or branch of philosophy—or even the whole philosophy entirely. Defensive metaphilosophy, as its name implies, is more sympathetic to the existing philosophy it studies. One notable sub-species of defensive metaphilosophy can be named *hermeneutic metaphilosophy*, as it focuses on a particular type of philosophising, and tries to understand the relevant epistemological, ontological and semantic commitments underlying the methods, topics, purposes and results of this kind of philosophising. In the cases where we have two (or more) contending lines of interpretation about an issue pertaining to these questions regarding certain method, topic, purpose and/or result we can think of these different interpretations as being separate conceptions of philosophy, which the hermeneutic metaphilosophising has produced.

An illustrative (and, at the time of writing, highly fashionable) example of a debate in the style of hermeneutic metaphilosophy is the issue of how the epistemological nature of philosophical intuitions—and thought experiments, which is another related methodological phenomenon in the same territory—should really be understood. In this dispute the two main opposing views are rationalism and naturalism. Despite their considerable differences, most rationalists and naturalists agree however on what the actual issues under dispute are, and moreover what the chief results that these methods have delivered are. Hence they can concentrate on arguing about how these methods and their exact metaphilosophical ramifications should be understood in terms of their deeper theoretical commitments. They are thus not trying to introduce completely new methods into philosophy or distance themselves altogether from the recent history of the analytic philosophy (Cappelen 2012: 14).

Since it seems by default that the intuitions and thought experiments used by philosophers differ from the standard empirical methods used by sciences, the onus is on naturalists to explain how this philosophical methodology can really be retained as a part of a credible naturalist conception of philosophy. The preferred solution for many naturalists is not to abandon intuitions and thought experiments completely, but rather to construe the epistemological commitments of these methods in a way which is compatible with the naturalistic outlook. As a first illustration of this kind of attitude we can mention Papineau (2009: 2), a naturalist:

I do not intend these claims in a revisionary spirit. I am not recommending that philosophers start doing something different. Here I diverge from other philosophers in the methodologically naturalist camp who take their position to require a shift in philosophical method—philosophers should get out of

their armchairs and become more involved with active scientific research. This is not my view. When I say that philosophical investigation is akin to scientific investigation, I am not urging philosophers to change their ways. I think that most philosophy is just fine as it is, including philosophy that sticks to traditional methods of abstract theorizing, argument, and reflection on possible cases. My aim is to show that philosophy of this kind is already akin to science, not that it needs reforming in order to become so.

In a similar tone, another naturalist Kornblith (2002: 5) writes about the initial challenges of his naturalistic conception of philosophy:

Even we [naturalists], however, must acknowledge not only that the method of appeal to intuitions plays an important role in actual philosophical practice, but also that it has been used to achieve some substantial insights in a wide range of fields. We need an account of how it is that this method may achieve such results.

Furthermore, a third notable naturalist, who has been outspoken explicitly about the hermeneutic intentions of his naturalism is Devitt (1996: 75):

Thought experiments [...] are the characteristic “armchair” method of philosophy, a famous example of which is “the analysis of knowledge.” So what I am proposing here amounts to a naturalistic account of that method.²¹

The hermeneutic tone of the debate between naturalists and rationalists is apparent also in the way in which both teams claim in their rhetoric that the other side has gravely misunderstood the nature of their philosophising. For example, rationalist Jackson (1998: vii) has in reference to the inconsistency displayed by naturalists teasingly noted that there are numerous “closeted conceptual analysts” in contemporary philosophy. From the opposite side of this quarrel the naturalist Papineau (2011b: 85) has voiced similar accusations regarding the rationalists and their interest in conceptual analysis:

²¹ In contrast to these hermeneutic naturalists on the topic of intuition we can quote Cummins (1998: 117–8), who has a comparatively more revisionary view on the matter: “We can give up on intuitions about the nature of space and time and ask instead what sort of beasts space and time must be if current physical theory is to be true and explanatory. We can give up on intuitions about representational content and ask instead what representation must be if current cognitive theory is to be true and explanatory.”

I know that there are plenty of serious philosophers who *say* that they are analysing concepts. But their claims about their own practice do not stand up to examination. When we look closely at what they actually do (or indeed look closely at what they actually say they do) it turns out, unsurprisingly, that they are really interested in theories about the nature of reality, and not in the concepts used to frame those theories.

In the game plan of rationalists, the charge that naturalists are guilty of “closet rationalism” is at the same time an important way to defend their own conception of philosophy indirectly, since if they can show that in its foundational theoretical underpinnings naturalism actually does turn out to contain inherent rationalist elements, this obviously works as an argument in favour of rationalism. For example, rationalist Bealer (1992: 105) notes that in contrary to their overall empiricist spirit naturalists rely on intuitions in their philosophising:

Indeed, there is a special irony, here, for in their actual practice empiricists typically make use of a wide range of intuitions. For example, what does and does not count as an observation or experience? Why count sense perception as observation? Why not count memory as observation? Or why not count certain high-level theoretical judgments as sense experiences? Indeed, why not count intuitions as sense experiences? [...] The fact is that empiricists arrive at answers to these questions by using as *prima facie* evidence their intuitions about what does and does not count as experience, observation, theory, justified, explanation, simple. In their actual practice, empiricists use such intuitions as evidence to support their theories and to persuade others of them. However, such use of intuitions contradicts the principle of empiricism, which includes only experiences and/or observations as *prima facie* evidence. So in their actual practice, empiricists are not faithful to their principles.

The actual debate between naturalists and rationalists takes centre stage in the third main chapter of this work, so I will return to these themes on that occasion.

As the end of this section draws near, we can now challenge to some extent these divisions between different kinds of metaphilosophy. First, it should be noted that despite the first impression given above of hermeneutic metaphilosophy, this inquiry is not necessarily limited to only passively interpreting or defending the species of philosophy it has placed under its microscope. Instead, it can also provide us with recommendations regarding how philosophising can be practised even better in the future. Noting this feature is important, because otherwise metaphilosophical disputes—such as those between naturalists and

rationalists regarding intuitions—can understandably feel like pointless quibbling if our views in these metaphilosophical matters cannot influence the way how we actually practice philosophy. And if these discussions have no practical import whatsoever, then what really is supposed to be the radical difference between the rationalist and naturalist conceptions of philosophy?

Another point I want to raise here concerns the division between aggressive and defensive metaphilosophy. It sometimes feels that certain philosophers emphasise the moderateness of their metaphilosophical aims to too great an extent. As was noted above, metaphilosophy is often associated with aggressive metaphilosophy which, in its extreme forms, ends by challenging the purpose of whole philosophy (as has been discussed within this chapter, one philosopher, who is especially accountable for the formation of this association between metaphilosophy and post-philosophical intentions is Rorty). I am certainly no mind-reader, but maybe it is these associations which are in the thoughts of philosophers when they specifically emphasise that they will in their metaphilosophical reflections merely try to understand philosophy as it actually functions—at least in the case of Cohen (1989: 1–2). As he explains, he introduced the division into aggressive and defensive metaphilosophy so that he could create some distance to Rorty’s metaphilosophical views. Another example here is Williamson (2007: ix), who compares the basic orientation of his metaphilosophical investigations to those of the descriptive philosophy of science:

The primary task of the philosophy of science is to understand science, not to give scientists advice. Likewise, the primary task of the philosophy of philosophy is to understand philosophy, not to give philosophers advice—although I have not rigorously abstained from the latter.²²

However, comparisons such as these between philosophy of science and metaphilosophy are misguided in the sense that unlike philosophers of science, who might not have a background in the particular field of science which they study (as philosophers, they are “outsiders”), practitioners of philosophy of philosophy are themselves philosophers working within one conception of philosophy or another, and are thus in a different position to offer their educated advice to other philosophers. Williamson’s comparison seems to find a better fit with the extra-philosophical projects of doxography, psychology of philosophy and sociology of philosophy—none of which Williamson’s book, however, does contain (but rather hermeneutic metaphilosophy in the spirit I described above).

²² As a side note, Williamson certainly did not abstain from giving philosophers advice, as the concluding chapter of his book is titled “Must do better”.

In any case, I think metaphilosophers should not be hesitant about taking a stand in philosophical matters, even if their primary intentions are hermeneutic and defensive. We can certainly combine these research interests within a specific metaphilosophical inquiry, as Nolan (2007: 2) does when he first sets out to describe what schools and traditions are in contemporary scene of metaphysics, and then goes to argue prescriptively for their good and bad aspects. In this sense the two halves of metaphilosophical inquiry can fruitfully support and complement each other.

A final observation here is that the distinction between the “philosophical” metaphilosophy which comes from within philosophy proper, and the “non-philosophical” metaphilosophy – sociology of philosophy, psychology of philosophy and so forth – is not necessarily clear-cut (Cohen & Dascal 1989: xi–xii). How seriously we take this division is influenced crucially by certain views in our conception of philosophy, namely, how we understand philosophy’s relation to other fields of study. Certain philosophers want to hold on to philosophy’s autonomy in unconditional terms whereas for other philosophers fruitful philosophising often requires philosophers to work in unison with the scientists. This is of course precisely the metaphilosophical issue, which is examined in this thesis.²³ All things considered, this observation demonstrates nicely in practice how the nature of metaphilosophy is dynamically tied to the nature of philosophy itself, so our conception of philosophy will influence our attitude in the question of how much do the results of sociology of philosophy or psychology of philosophy impinge on actual philosophical practice.

2.6 THE CURRENT STATE OF METAPHILOSOPHY

It seems that metaphilosophy as a sub-discipline of philosophy has come of age during the past three decades or so, and metaphilosophising has become increasingly more outspoken and straightforward. Nowadays there are even specialised philosophers, research projects, conferences, journals and so on committed to metaphilosophical topics and discussions. Throughout this same timeframe, the *amount* of metaphilosophy has also increased, if we consider the number of philosophical articles and books which can be categorised as being metaphilosophical in their overall orientation. The label ‘metaphilosophy’ (together with ‘philosophy of philosophy’ and ‘philosophical methodology’) can

²³ There has been similar discussion about the relationship of the philosophy of science and the science studies.

be seen more and more often in the titles and keywords of philosophical publications. In this regard the manner in which metaphilosophy has gradually developed to become its own accepted sub-discipline within the bounds of the parent discipline serves as one case example of the process of specialisation taking place in contemporary philosophy (as was examined earlier in Section 1.3).²⁴

If we look at these things from an outsider's perspective it might be tempting to link this recent growth of metaphilosophy with the current of postmodernism, as it has touched various quarters of contemporary culture—certain branches and movements of philosophy included. We can better understand where this thought is coming from when we recognise that one of the central characteristics of the postmodern age is often taken to be a prominent higher-level self-consciousness and reflectiveness, which are evoked in the arts in the form of intertextual references, ironic toying with the established conventions and tropes of storytelling, blurring the lines between fact and fiction and so forth (see Waugh 1984; Woods 2009). Against this wider cultural backdrop it might now seem as though the philosophers' newfound "metaphilosophical" mirror-glancing is just basically extending this same self-conscious mind-set to the field of philosophy too.²⁵

Another recurrent line of thinking, which is often linked with the ethos of postmodernism, is a general suspicion towards the "canonised great narratives" (*grandes histoires*), which chronicle the development of the human culture in a linear and progressive fashion all the way from its dark primordial beginnings to our present-day enlightened society epitomised by the free and democratic Western countries (see Lyotard 1979). In place of these canonised male and Euro-centric "metanarratives" postmodernists often emphasise in *anti-foundational* spirit the contingency and plurality of historical development and, in the same breath, criticise the optimistic faith in the eventual triumph of the natural sciences (and the related objectivistic conceptions of truth and rationality, which are the philosophical tenets underlying this scientism). Such postmodernist critical ways to approach history open up interesting new possibilities to read the history of Western philosophy, which is close to the certain readings which

²⁴ However, at the time of writing (20.8.2018) the PhilPapers-database lists 5,691 articles in the category of "metaphilosophy", which is still below the minor categories of "philosophy of probability" (7,691) and "philosophy of Americas" (8,896), to say nothing of the more central categories of "meta-ethics" (11,562), "epistemology" (35,936) and "metaphysics" (41,800). Of course, we should not read too much into these numbers, since the categorisation of philosophical articles in this database is not an exact science with objective standards.

²⁵ For example, Cohen & Dascal (1989: xiv–xv) suggest that the growth of metaphilosophy can be expected in the era of postmodernism, when it is fashionable to proclaim the end of all kinds of cultural institutions and even time itself.

Rorty (1979; 1989) has given of philosophy's past in his metaphilosophical works.

What then should we make of these prospective connections between post-modernism and metaphilosophy? Taking into account the fact that metaphilosophy is a vast and diverse enterprise, which is practised by countless independent philosophers with countless different intentions, it is then completely possible, that for *some* metaphilosophers—such as Rorty and his followers—the inspiration for *their* work comes from postmodern circles.²⁶ Be that as it may, this explanation should not be applied offhandedly to *all* metaphilosophy at once, since with a little effort we can suggest other possible rationales for the recent growth of metaphilosophy.

The motivating factors behind the metaphilosophical debate of naturalists and rationalists are considered elsewhere in this work, but at this point we can briefly mention two additional general-level explanations for the recent surge of metaphilosophy. First of these is the observation that as the Western philosophy has diversified at different levels—both in terms of the number of competing philosophical schools (Section 1.2) and the number of specialised topics philosophers pursue (Section 1.3)—this trend has moved philosophers to reflect on the identity of their discipline.²⁷ One exemplification of this kind of metaphilosophical self-reflection is the recent increase in the interest shown towards the split between the analytic and continental forms of philosophy.²⁸ As we have

²⁶ It would be natural to approach this issue in terms of the juxtaposition between the forms of analytic and continental philosophy, and study how the metaphilosophy pursued within the parts of these movements possibly differ from one another. Many of the central figures in the tradition of continental philosophy, such as Foucault, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Ricoeur and Derrida are often mentioned as important names in the development of postmodern philosophy too. In Rorty's (1991: 21) interpretation, metaphilosophical activity is one of the major differences between the analytic and the continental philosophers: "Analytic philosophers are not much interested in either defining or defending the presuppositions of their work. Indeed, the gap between 'analytic' and 'non-analytic' philosophy nowadays coincides pretty closely with the division between philosophers who are not interested in historico-metaphilosophical reflections on their own activity and philosophers who are." In similar manner Rosen (1998: 665) has suggested that one of the characteristic traits of continental philosophy has been its penchant for metaphilosophical reflections regarding the nature of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences. I must admit that I am not sufficiently well-versed with the representatives of continental philosophy or their views to comment on these claims.

²⁷ See Marsoobian (2007: 501). As Cohen & Dascal (1989: xiii) note, this issue has also an institutional dimension, since as philosophers lack a commonly shared view of the nature of philosophical investigation, they are consequently driven to reflect the possible causes of this state of affairs.

²⁸ See for example Rosen (1998), Glock (2008a; 2013), Critchley (2001), Soames (2003), Raatikainen (2013) and Beaney (2017).

now gained some historical distance to the golden ages of these movements, new generations of philosophers have tried to trace the development histories of these schools and find out just what kind of issues actually put them at odds philosophically, culturally and sociologically.

On the other hand, as Wallgren (2006: xii–xiii) has suggested, another possible cause for the rising popularity of metaphilosophy can be found from the tumultuous changes the philosophical climate has experienced as of late. In the 1950s and 60s new philosophy students arrived at such environments—such as the universities of Harvard and Oxford—where there was a strong collective understanding regarding the true identity of philosophy and corresponding faith that it would be this conception of philosophy which would now finally steer philosophising in the fruit-bearing direction. With such self-confidence on their side philosophers did not feel it necessary to pause their actual philosophical work to mull over the esoteric issues related to the foundation of philosophy itself. Later, as the initial excitement and philosophical confidence faded in these centres of revolution, the intellectual conditions became once again much more responsive for metaphilosophical self-reflection.

The final promising explanation for the expansion of metaphilosophy is the fact that many of the most widely-read and influential thinkers of the past century—Husserl, Russell, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Heidegger among others—took up explicitly metaphilosophical themes and questions in their writings. This then had stimulating effect on their followers, who have continued to pursue similar topics further in their own work.

One potential erroneous belief related to the rise of metaphilosophy is the supposition that metaphilosophy is a completely new thing, which has become a part of philosophy only during the twentieth century. Again, the explanation here can be searched from the direction of Rorty, who brought metaphilosophy into larger awareness during the latter part of the past century. The actual name ‘metaphilosophy’ itself is also a neologism, as the honour of introducing it to philosophical lexicon is given to Morris Lazerowitz, who first used it in literature in 1942 (see Lazerowitz 1942).²⁹ Merely couple of decades later it had already found its place in the philosophical parlance—as the name of the journal *Metaphilosophy*, for instance. But although this name and metaphilosophy as a separate and semi-independent branch of philosophy are perhaps new phenomena, there is nothing particularly new about the practice of *metaphilosophising* itself. Questions pertaining to the nature of philosophy itself have been pondered by numerous philosophers throughout the history of philosophy.

²⁹ Lazerowitz liked to emphasise in his own remarks regarding the nature of metaphilosophy that this is “a new field” (see, for example, Lazerowitz 1970: 3).

In fact, many of the most revered classics from the canon of Western philosophy contain explicit metaphilosophising, even if these texts have not been clearly labelled as such at the time. As examples we can mention Descartes' *Meditations on the First Philosophy* [1641], Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* [1739–40], Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* [1781/1787] and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807]. All of these express noteworthy thoughts regarding the way in which their authors saw the tasks and aims of philosophy (Hacker 2011). Talisse (2017: 229) agrees:

Enduring movements in the history of philosophy often owe their influence not to their core doctrines, but rather to the distinctive vision of philosophy they embody. Indeed, one might say of such movements—think of the varied traditions associated with the Stoics, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, the positivists, the existentialists, and beyond—that they are *primarily* conceptions of *what philosophy is*.

Similar examples can also be pinpointed from the more recent history of philosophy. According to an oft-repeated assessment, two of the most influential individual philosophical articles of the twentieth century were Russell's "On Denoting" [1905] and Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [1951]. It is not patently unreasonable to suggest that in addition to the original philosophical arguments contained in these writings, their influence has been based in a large degree to the fact that they contained far-reaching metaphilosophical innovations, which have subsequently gained a host of philosophical epigones.

Alas, in spite of the current rise of metaphilosophy, not all philosophers value this branch of philosophy highly. Gutting (2009: 2), for example, writes apologetically in the preface of his book *What Philosophers Know?* that his "discussion belongs to the disdained and marginalized domain of *metaphilosophy*", after which he makes a conscious effort to assure the reader that he, too, dislikes it. In his view, the disdain which philosophers show towards metaphilosophy arises from the disappointment felt by philosophers, when they notice that metaphilosophy cannot provide them with conclusive and easy answers to their questions regarding the nature of philosophy (for example, they might want to find an outsider's blessing for the style of philosophising which they practise in the form of firm metaphilosophical foundations). The absence of conclusive metaphilosophical truths is surely a depressing fact, but the expectation that metaphilosophy should provide us with these kinds of higher truths is unreasonable if similar expectation is not placed on "normal" philosophy too.

The shunning of metaphilosophy is manifested one way in the fact that although philosophers can hold passionately strong views about the nature of ideal philosophy, they are not nearly as often willing to reflect critically the background assumptions of their own conceptions of philosophy. Kim (2003: 84) notes that many philosophers act in this regard just like scientists, namely, that they continue with their everyday-research without at any point really pausing to think what they are in fact doing and why—even though one of the most distinctive traits of philosophy is often thought to be the critical orientation where philosophers actively challenge our pre-suppositions which might otherwise go unchallenged. On this very issue, Moore (2009: 116) wonders how it can be so that philosophers are often eager to analyse the foundations of other disciplines in the name of philosophy of science, epistemology, logic and metaphysics but, at the same time, this same attitude is not extended to analysing philosophy's own foundations. Williamson (2007: 215) makes a related point, when he notes that although adherents of the analytic philosophy like to tout clarity and exactness as the dominant virtues of this style of philosophising, they too have for the most part neglected metaphilosophical self-examinations.

Moreover, philosophy study programmes do not usually include separate introductory courses on philosophical methodology for those majoring in philosophy (excluding the usual courses on logic and argumentation theory), whereas such courses on scientific methodology are standardly given to graduate students of science programmes—oftentimes by philosophers, no less. Furthermore, philosophical dissertations and theses do not generally speaking contain explication of the methodology and theoretical framework utilised in that work in the way scientific dissertations and theses often do (the one exception here are the dissertations belonging to the genre of historiography of philosophy). So, in philosophical practice, many important principles pertaining to conceptions of philosophy are sadly simply taken as given. I suspect one potential explanation for this lack of metaphilosophising could be sought from the fact that philosophy is these days written and published in the short article-format, which does not leave much room for metaphilosophical theorising before a philosopher has to get to the main point of her text. Moreover, if these articles are published in specialised journals and periodicals, the prospective audience is likely to share these pre-suppositions behind the philosophising in the article.

One rule of thumb is that the fact *how little* metaphilosophical reflection is practised within some conception of philosophy reveals *how deeply* rooted that conception of philosophy has become in the field of philosophy (in other words, its background suppositions have already become in some sense self-evident truisms to its practitioners, so it is not deemed worthwhile to actively question

them). Currently this criticism applies, *inter alia*, to the debate of rationalists and naturalists, wherein specific metaphilosophical issues like apriority, intuitions, the possibility of conceptual truths and so forth, seem to be self-evident one way or another, depending on the philosopher from whom we ask her opinion. In Williamson's (2007: ix–x) slightly cynical view the lack of metaphilosophising has kept several subpar conceptions of philosophy alive past their expiration date because their core assumptions have not been (self-) criticised thoroughly.

Let me be clear here though, that the previous remarks did not intend to demand unreasonably that even the shortest philosophical articles and presentations should always include a separate section dedicated to arguing for the relevant metaphilosophical assumptions behind that particular kind of philosophising, or that each and every philosopher should personally work out even the smallest details of the conception of philosophy that she uses as the metaphilosophical framework for her philosophising. Nolan (2009: 297–8) writes on this same issue and notes that we cannot realistically expect every piece of philosophical writing to be a metaphilosophical text at the same time, because if we make such a demand, then the author has to justify her particular methodological starting parameters *in addition* to her actual first-level philosophical arguments. This will then create a case of infinite regress (every individual starting assumption has to be backed by arguments, and the starting assumptions of these arguments have to be backed by separate arguments *ad infinitum*) and in the end we will not get any actual philosophical work done. Moreover, I would add that often the relevant metaphilosophical issues can really be reflected only in hindsight on the basis of the philosophy we have already done. It is then desirable that *at least some* representative of a conception of philosophy will assume the metaphilosophical reflection as her duty. What is proposed here, then, is a kind of metaphilosophical division of labour amongst the professional philosophers, so that we have specialists who focus on topics pertaining to philosophy's methods, subject matter and aims.

What factors could cause philosophers to shun metaphilosophy? In the previous section I tried to set right certain persistent misconceptions about the viewpoint and content of metaphilosophy, which can lead to negative attitudes towards this particular branch of philosophy. To be slightly more specific, I examined views which stated that metaphilosophy is bound to be a boring and/or unfruitful endeavour. Continuing on this theme, we can think that the philosophers' aversion towards metaphilosophy can in extreme cases arise from such an idea, which holds that excessive metaphilosophising could even be *harmful* for philosophical practice. As Körner (1973: 20) notes with an amusing metaphor, it would seem that these philosophers think themselves to be akin to the

millipede from the children's story, that can walk around normally just fine, but as soon as it begins to wonder what it is actually doing with its legs, it loses its rhythm and stumbles over its own feet. This condescending attitude, which certain philosophes show towards metaphilosophy,³⁰ can ironically be seen as mirroring the arrogance, which many scientists who do "real" research show towards "over-theoretical" philosophers of science (this attitude is documented in the quote—most likely apocryphal—attributed to physicist Feynman, which states that philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds; see Kitcher 1998: 32).

As an actual analogy, the Körner's clumsy millipede would seem to find a better fit from the world of arts, where a detailed and self-conscious analysis of the various dimensions involved in a creative process can ruin the artistry of an aspiring artist if she becomes jaded and cynical with the conventions involved in the creation of her art: consider for example, a songwriter who has only ever during her whole life composed songs by ear, but who is now suddenly taught what kind of rules of musical theory she has unknowingly been following—scales and modes, keys, time signatures and so on—she is not able to write heartfelt music anymore in the same instinctive way that she used to before her lessons in music theory. Nevertheless, here in the context of philosophical research this idea sounds too romanticised (however, in this case some conceptions of philosophy can again think that philosophising as an activity is more akin to certain forms of creative arts than rigorous natural sciences). And what comes to the anti-theoretic attitude, we can just quote the psychologist Kurt Lewin, who once said that nothing is as practical as a good theory.³¹ Along similar lines Williamson (2007: 8) notes that "[p]hilosophizing is not like riding a bicycle, best done without thinking about it—or rather: the best cyclists surely *do* think about what they are doing." And I would suspect that many threatened bird species would be happy—if they only were capable to display such forms of higher cognitions—for the observations of ornithologists regarding bird populations, which have subsequently led to active conservation policies. In sum, such crude anti-theoretic sentiments are best left simply unnoticed, as they rightly deserve.

30 Ryle (2009: 331), for example, thinks that "preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run, as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet."

31 Quoted in Stam (1996: 31).

3. THE NATURALISM-QUESTION AS A METAPHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

In the metaphilosophical discussions of the past five or so decades, one of the most vigorous and contentious themes has been the question of how we should properly construe the role, province and stature of philosophy in relation to the undertakings of empirical special sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, experimental psychology and so forth. This issue can be named as the *naturalism-question*¹, and on the most general level, the conceptions of philosophy which react to it can be split into *naturalistic* and *anti-naturalistic* outlooks. The former positions stress the close affinities between philosophy and the empirical sciences, whereas the latter contrariwise contest this notion and see philosophy as having an exceptional identity in terms of its subject matter, methods and/or aims, on which account we must enclose philosophy as a tightly autonomous territory in the field of scholarly pursuits of knowledge. For some anti-naturalists, the authority of this autonomous philosophy can even outrank the sciences should their views come into a conflict.

The following six sections act as an introduction to both the naturalism-question itself and also more specifically to the debate between the naturalistic and numerous anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy concerning this metaphilosophical topic. In Section 3.1 I explore the naturalism-question in better detail through the constituent core theses of naturalism and anti-naturalism.

¹ The quasi-technical name used here (that is, 'the naturalism-question') is not as such established in the literature, and often philosophers talk more generally about the problem of autonomy of philosophy—even when only the more focused debate of naturalists and anti-naturalists is clearly meant (see, for example, Stoothoff 1966). However, this practice is somewhat imprecise, since the question of the autonomy of philosophy has become a point of contention in addition to the empirical sciences also in relation to certain other forms of knowledge, religion and arts. A notable historical case is the relationship between philosophy and Christian theology, which loomed large during the Middle Ages. Later in the twentieth century there were discussions within neo-Nietzschean circles (represented by thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams) of supplementing the discussions of moral philosophy with other modes of discourse, drawn from the social and history sciences, and perhaps more broadly from various fronts of art (Glock 2008b: 98). These clarifications notwithstanding, it is still true that the naturalism-question is the most prominent of the philosophical discussions related to the autonomy of philosophy, so in this regard the dangers of confusion and misunderstanding are not grave.

Furthermore, this section contains (pre)historical considerations about the evolution of the naturalism-question as a metaphilosophical topic. At the end of this section I also evaluate certain views which suggest that anti-naturalism should be thought of as a “traditional” or a “default” conception of philosophy. In Section 3.2 I consider whether the dialectic between naturalists and anti-naturalists could in near future escalate to equal (and perhaps even come to replace) the existing large-scale dichotomy between the analytic and continental movements. This examination provides a good junction to add a third possible response to the naturalism-question in the form of *non-naturalism*. In this context I also weight the importance of this issue in the sense that I try to assess just how widely and deeply the topic of naturalism-question actually concerns philosophy and its different sub-disciplines. After this, Section 3.3 canvasses certain philosophical issues and phenomena, which can function as fertile soil for anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy to grow out from. For the purposes of this thesis I have selected from the large family of anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy the position known as metaphilosophical rationalism to act as the main counterpoint for naturalists. The basic issues of the contest between naturalism and rationalism are surveyed in Section 3.4. After these preliminaries, Sections 3.5 and 3.6 portray noteworthy contemporary expressions of naturalism and rationalism, respectively. The concluding Section 3.7 paints a larger picture of the philosophical terrain surrounding the metaphilosophical problem of the naturalism-question. In addition, this final section explores what kinds of links and consequences this metaphilosophical topic can potentially have to such broader issues in philosophy of science, which consider the explanatory power, objectivity and societal role of the sciences.

3.1. THE TWO MAIN ALTERNATIVES IN THE NATURALISM-QUESTION

Among the general-level accounts given of the responsibilities of philosophy there is, for instance, one old and popular view which states that philosophy — or at least *certain parts* of it — can be seen as a kind of a “meta-science” or a “meta-discipline” (*scientia scientiarum*), which reflects on the undertakings of the special sciences on its more fundamental level of abstraction. Audi (2005: 332) elaborates this vision in the following manner:

There are many other disciplines [besides philosophy], and here it is possible only to indicate how philosophy is related to some of the major ones. The place to begin is with the idea that philosophy is in a sense the metadiscipline,

the one whose proper business includes accounting for the structure, methodology, and, indeed, the implicit metaphysics and epistemology, of the other disciplines. For understanding other disciplines, philosophy is indispensable. Many important questions about a field, such as the nature of its concepts and its relation to other disciplines, do not belong to that discipline, are not usually pursued in it, and are philosophical in nature. [...] Philosophy is, moreover, essential in assessing the various standards of evidence used by other disciplines. Since all fields of knowledge employ reasoning and must set standards of evidence, logic and epistemology have a general bearing on all of these fields.

According to this picture, philosophers can assist the special sciences in different stages of empirical theory-construction. *Prior* to the actual empirical investigation philosophers can analyse the relevant background pre-assumptions underlying this kind of research, such as the concepts, methods and kinds of evidence employed in scientific theorising. On the other hand, in this vision the responsibilities of philosophy include the examinations coming *following* the empirical research as well, so that it is expected that philosophers create a cohesive synthesis of the particular findings provided by the diverse special sciences from their distinct fields of research. Moreover, philosophy can reflect upon the broader implications and latent interconnections of these results.

But when this general-level conception envisions philosophy and the sciences as having close affinities with each other, it becomes imperative to define the more specific rules of engagement governing this relationship. For example, are philosophical claims in some way independent from the contents of scientific research and results, or should philosophy too be understood as an integral part of the scientific theorising, just like any other? If philosophy is meant to assess and perhaps also to justify the endeavours of science, can philosophy then employ the empirical findings of sciences as an aid in its tasks or is this empirical knowledge irrelevant for philosophy? Is philosophy bound by the same constraints which regulate the scientific research more generally, or is philosophy perhaps an authoritative partner in this collaboration somewhere over or beyond the sphere of empirical sciences? It is precisely questions like these regarding the intricacies of the relationship between philosophy and science, which give rise to the metaphilosophical problem of the naturalism-question. Naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy have then their own set of preferred answers to give to this challenge. I begin my summary with the naturalists.

The naturalists' metaphilosophical model is customarily illustrated in overviews by using certain rather poetic metaphors, which leave us merely with

a superficial first impression of the naturalism's distinctive outlook.² In these vague metaphors we are told that there exists no stark "qualitative contrast" between the claims put forward by philosophy and the empirical special sciences. Instead, the cognitive results achieved by philosophers and scientists in their separate quarters weave a *holistic "web"*, where the contributions arriving from different sources intertwine seamlessly together as parts of the larger totality of knowledge. Indeed, in this totality of knowledge it is in practice often hard to determine where one discipline actually ends and another begins. Thus the established demarcations between various sciences—philosophy included—do not signify any actual deep fault lines which would separate disciplines, and the names used for distinct branches of learning are basically just divisions of academic labour done on pragmatic grounds because we have institutional needs and historical precedents to organise and label the work undertaken in universities in a certain way.

As a consequence of this cognitive unity between philosophy and the sciences, for naturalists philosophy will often be most fruitful in situations where specialists from different disciplines come together to study a certain phenomenon in close and reciprocal collaboration, where the aims of this inquiry reflect the mutually shared research interests of philosophers and scientists alike. For many naturalists, the epitome of this kind of multi-disciplinary project, which successfully combines the contributions of both philosophers and scientists, is the case of modern cognitive science, and the theories and findings achieved in its name can be seen as touching upon multiple issues related to knowledge, perception, emotions, language and consciousness, which have during the past centuries been concerns of numerous earlier philosophers, as well. The rapid methodological and theoretical progress within empirical psychology during the last two hundred years has now made it possible to study these questions in light of empirical data provided by systematic experimental research, which was not possible for the philosophers of the early modern period (even if having this kind of empirical knowledge would have interested them in principle). Although the naturalists still hold that the philosophical questions differ in many significant ways from the questions of psychology, they also think that the empirical data provided by psychology has an instructive, corroborative, corrective and also falsifying relevance for the philosophical considerations espoused in this subject matter.

² Regarding the philosophers' frequent usage of metaphors to illustrate their epistemological and metaphilosophical models, see Thagar & Beam (2004).

Thus for naturalists philosophy lives in a symbiotic relationship with the special sciences, where it can help scientists in their undertakings, but is also itself an equally receptive member in this partnership without any extra privileges. This receptiveness can even be a vital condition for progress in philosophy, so philosophers must keep their eyes and ears open to the direction of sciences: In the view of naturalists, it is hard — if not *outright impossible* — to practice successful philosophy without being at least to some degree informed about the up-to-date findings of empirical investigation and the philosophical implications contained therein. However, these empirical results do not merely encourage new philosophical theories in a constructive spirit, as they can just as well demonstrate where the thoughts suggested by philosophers have gone astray: scientific inquiry is a constantly self-repairing process, and in the view of naturalists, the scope of this mind-set extends equally to philosophical claims and theories as well.

These naturalists' basic ideas about the close bonds between philosophy and empirical sciences should not, however, be misunderstood — as sometimes unfortunately happens in the superficial misconceptions, which want to dismiss naturalism immediately without any better-informed second thoughts. Indeed, in the conceptions of its discontents, naturalism is sometimes portrayed as an outlet for a crude form of *scientific imperialism*, against which it would be wisest for loyalist philosophers to rise in a unified front to secure the future existence of their discipline and to defend the millennia-old autocracy philosophy has (allegedly) traditionally enjoyed. It must be said, however, that when we look for possible explanations for these misconceptions, naturalists themselves are at least partly to blame here, since they often use needlessly provocative rhetoric in expressing their views, which then motivates the genesis of these misconceptions regarding the alleged revolutionary spirit of naturalism (although it is also true that certain naturalists *do harbour* these kinds of strong reformist ideas but, in this regard, they constitute the more radical wing of naturalism, so that we should not make any sweeping generalisations regarding *all* naturalistic conceptions of philosophy based on their specific metaphilosophical views). On the other hand, frequently the condescending — sometimes even openly contemptuous — remarks about the value and usefulness of philosophy are actually from the pens of scientists, not naturalistic philosophers.³ These provocative remarks

³ For example, physicists Hawking and Mlodinow (2010: 5) begin their recent book by posing a number of cosmological questions regarding the origins and fundamental nature of the universe, after which they state: "Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly phys-

can nevertheless create the false impression that naturalists too would hold similar disparaging attitude towards their own parent discipline.

Naturalistic philosophy can also trigger a related suspicion, that this kind of a conception of philosophy demotes philosophy only to a secondary role of “synthesising science journalism”, where philosophers create simple summaries of the most recent achievements of contemporary science. Blackburn (2004: xv), for example, writes provokingly that philosophers who support naturalism are merely “cheerleaders” in the scientific world without having their own truly constructive effort to give to these scientific undertakings:

A different response [to the lack of philosophical results] is to try to tuck behind ongoing science shouting encouragement at its departing rear. And just as campuses were once full of middle-aged and high-salaried professors identifying themselves with the Third World or the proletariat, so now they are full of philosophers carrying piles of texts on quantum physics or biology, hoping that their abilities as cheerleaders will disguise the fact that they do not actually do science themselves, nor necessarily offer any more insightful interpretations of science than those that science writers and journalists manage for themselves[.]

These threats of scientific imperialism, however, are highly spurious. The central idea of naturalists is not “anti-philosophically” to simply delegate philosophical questions hereafter to the desks of scientists, while philosophers themselves become out of work as they have nothing more to contribute in the academic world. Instead, philosophy can still have its own fruitful role on a more ambitious level beyond mere “science journalism” and “cheerleading”.

Moreover, naturalists do not mean even in a somewhat less radical mindset that the ideal philosophising should from now on simply imitate—poorly—in its methodological procedures and in other practices the functioning of some empirical discipline or another (such as using experimental designs in direct

ics. Scientists have become the bearers of torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.” Similar comments have been expressed by other notable scientists too. For example physicist Lawrence M. Krauss (2012: xiii) reflects in his work on the cosmological question of why there is anything. In his view even if this topic “is usually framed as a philosophical or religious question, it is first and foremost a question about the natural world, and so the appropriate place to try and resolve it, first and foremost, is with science.”

testing of old philosophical hypotheses).⁴ Naturalists, too, can think that empirical methods are not always a miraculous one-size-fits-all solution to every problem we have. The notion of unity of philosophy and the sciences, to which naturalists adhere to, is based on the qualitative similarity there exists deep down at the theoretical level between the cornerstones of these enterprises (as opposed to mere unsophisticated *methodological monism* or imperialistic *scientism*): The crucial thing here is that the fundamental answers we give to the questions regarding the epistemological and ontological issues pertaining to the nature and subject matter of philosophical knowledge do not refer to any *sui generis* phenomena, viewpoints, sources of evidence or ultimate aims, which are not already present (or, could potentially be present) in the philosophical explanations given of the inner mechanisms of the sciences. Therefore even in the cases where philosophers ruminate on philosophical topics with their philosophical methods, naturalists take these investigations to be conducted in the “overall spirit” of the empirical sciences and within a jointly shared “meta-scientific” framework with the sciences. Outside of this framework there is no alternative path to knowledge or enlightened source of “higher wisdom”, which philosophers could employ to approach their topics. According to one crystallisation, naturalism means simply committing to a rather moderate thesis, which states that when the natural sciences speak in unison in favour of some views, philosophers should either accept these conclusions or present *scientifically compelling* reasoning for their rejection (Burgess & Rosen 1997: 65). In this regard then, naturalism is not necessarily a particularly revolutionary metaphilosophical position, which would require us to undertake massive changes to the established practices of philosophy (naturalists can, however, have constructive suggestions how philosophy could be done even better *from now on*, but even then the initial template for these modifications is the present way of practicing philosophy, and not something completely different).

It is possible to regard philosophy as a unique discipline also in the metaphilosophical model of naturalists, so that when we compare it with typical empirical sciences, philosophy is a *generalistic* endeavour in terms of its viewpoints and methods. Philosophy does not have a particular subject matter of its

⁴ Just as naturalists do not require mathematics to be transformed into psychological research about the concrete instantiations of real numbers. Although here we must take note of naturalism’s internal diversity that certain naturalists *do* have more radical aims about augmenting the methodological toolkit of philosophers. As a notable example we can mention the movement of *experimental philosophy*, which has gained popularity during the past few decades and introduced methods such as questionnaires and statistical data-analyses to philosophy (see Knobe & Nichols 2007).

own, but rather operates on a higher level of abstraction compared to the empirical special sciences. If we return here to the above naturalistic metaphor of the web formed by all scientific knowledge, we can note that philosophy's designated sector in this web of knowledge is to concentrate on the central nexus-points interwoven close to the heart of the web, as it is these nexus-points which govern the way in which the web is built outwards from the centre, whereas special sciences work at the outer edges of the web dealing with more hands-on issues pertaining to the way in which the web is connected to empirical reality. Of course, on this issue we can recognise more nuanced variation between diverse philosophical topics, so that a certain part of philosophy can be more "theoretical" in its viewpoints and thus lie closer to centre of the web, whereas some other philosophical problems are conversely in closer vicinity to the outer edges of the web (similar variance in the level of abstractness exists between the research questions of empirical sciences too, since not all scientific research is about systematically testing the empirical hypotheses suggested by theories in a laboratory environment surrounded by test tubes and expensive pieces of research equipment—there is actually much propaedeutic conceptual and speculative investigation done also within the various empirical sciences). In any case, the crucial thing for all philosophers, no matter what they are working on, is to maintain a constant impression on how the research problems they investigate connect in the larger picture to the other research in the proximity.

Characterised in slightly more substantial terms, the distinctive responsibility of philosophers can be, for example, to clarify the conceptual preliminaries and theoretical background assumptions of scientific topics by analytic means, on which basis philosophising can also prepare and—to certain extent—also orient the subsequent empirical investigation in the matter in question. Philosophy, conceived in naturalistic terms, can also be of help *after* the empirical investigation by creating a coherent general picture from the individual results provided by separate special sciences and by considering the ramifications these results have. Obviously, these general descriptions regarding the job description of naturalistic philosophy repeat here many of the notions which have traditionally been associated with philosophy, as was already noted at the outset of this section.

For naturalists, however, philosophy is in these tasks an "under-labourer" of sorts at the scientific worksite—to borrow Locke's ([1690] 1975: 9–10) vivid metaphor⁵—and not a private contractor working on its own terms. The crucial

⁵ The context in which Locke [1690] makes his metaphor is in the introduction ("Epistle to Reader") to his work *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*: "The commonwealth of learn-

thing about naturalism is that the instances of philosophical under-labouring need to always ultimately connect to empirical investigation and to the scientific web it creates, so that the end products of philosophising will not remain as separate islets, which involve their own cognitive standards and criteria. Thus for naturalists philosophical views are on the same line with empirical theories on their central feature, that they are always potentially corrigible and falsifiable by new empirical evidence about the matter under investigation.

On this basis naturalists tend to have a wary stance towards the metaphilosophical model common to anti-naturalists, where philosophy is divorced under a special mandate of some sort from the other fields investigating reality — perhaps even to a some prior or fundamental plane in relation to sciences, from which direction philosophy then investigates as an unquestionable authority its very own philosophical problems, and makes its own claims ignorant of empirical evidence. Contrasting with the naturalistic picture, for anti-naturalists no empirical findings about the sensible reality can revise or overturn philosophical claims, since such an evidence is irrelevant for the assessment of philosophical propositions. In the related vision of certain more radical anti-naturalists, philosophy's qualitative exceptionality has even stronger implications regarding the correct marching order between philosophy and sciences. For these anti-naturalists philosophy is not an exceptional case among the family of sciences based on its autonomy alone, but it can also claim the role of a some kind of first philosophy (*prima philosophia*) or queen of sciences (*regina scientiarum*), so that philosophy possesses at least some amount of authority over sciences. Anti-naturalistic philosophy can deploy this authority when it comments and criticises the investigations undertaken by sciences from its "Archimedean point", which is external in relation to the sciences, and, to some extent, also epistemologically more secure. Certain anti-naturalists see philosophy as a *foundational* discipline, which structures from the outside of individual special sciences the foundations for their central concepts, forms of argumentation and varieties of evidence. Such an authoritative aim, however, does not need to be an essential constituent thesis of anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy. In any case, anti-naturalistic philosophising sets its own objectives and also independently evaluates its own performance in relation to these objectives.

ing is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity; but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters, as the great—Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge[.]”

Before we make any further generalisations regarding the anti-naturalists, we must note that different anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy possess widely differing philosophical-cum-metaphilosophical reasons and motives to divorce philosophy and sciences from one another. Moreover, different anti-naturalists differ from one another also in the particular way how they envision the methods, subject matters and aims of anti-naturalistic philosophy, and for this reason they might not understand the autonomous and authoritative role of philosophy in the same way. Thus in closer examination the label of “anti-naturalism” actually appears to form a catch-all taxon, where the smallest common denominator between the members of this grouping is simply the rejection of metaphilosophical naturalism and the emphasis of philosophy’s idiosyncratic nature. Anti-naturalism is thus defined from the start as a *negation* of naturalism without a detailed positive view regarding the philosophy’s nature, since different anti-naturalists have their own positive views to give.⁶ For this reason anti-naturalists do not constitute a single unified front against naturalism, and if we vision the group of anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy and their earlier historical permutations as forming a big family tree of anti-naturalism, the separate branches of this tree do not trace back to a common root, so that the current expressions of anti-naturalistic thinking could be said to be modern offshoots of the original *Ur*-anti-naturalism—although it is of course possible to identify influential figures from the history of philosophy as originators of certain repeating doctrines within various forms of anti-naturalistic thinking, but there is no single thread running through them all.

In general, anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy have their individual development histories, so they should not be simply conflated in brief overviews such as this one. The internal plurality of the anti-naturalistic faction becomes apparent, for instance, in the situations where we have a philosophical conference or some anthology of essays, which have collected together critiques of naturalism without any other uniting (meta)philosophical theses. Then these critiques can, despite their shared target, be on other points based on conflicting starting assumptions, and pursue different philosophical paths so that they compete with each other as intensely—maybe even more intensely—than they do with naturalists.⁷ There is thus no single argument against naturalism which

6 This fact is already present in the name ‘anti-naturalism’, which is clearly formed to function as an antonym for the name ‘naturalism’, and thus these two labels exist as a contrasting pair.

7 See, for example, writings in the following anthologies: *Naturalism—A Critical Appraisal* (eds. Wagner & Warner 1993), *Naturalism—A Critical Analysis* (eds. Craig & Moreland 2000), *Physicalism and Its Discontents* (eds. Gillett & Loewer 2001), *Naturalism in Question* (eds. De Caro & Macarthur 2004a), *Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism* (eds. Corradini, Galvan & Lowe 2006), *How Successful is Naturalism?* (ed. Casser 2007), *Naturalism and Normativity*

would work in favour of all forms of anti-naturalism. Anti-naturalists can disagree, for example, on which of the sub-disciplines of philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language and so on—is the most significant in terms of philosophy’s authority. These rich disagreements between different expressions of anti-naturalism are illustrated later through case examples, when I examine the kinds of first-level philosophical topics from which the anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy can naturally emerge from.

We have now reached the half-way point of this section, and for the latter part I wish to consider the idea that besides the methodological dimension examined already above, metaphilosophical naturalism is not necessarily a particularly revolutionary conception of philosophy in historical respect, either—even if it is at times portrayed as such. I think it is worthwhile to review certain considerations pertaining to this matter so that some kind of a “traditionalism card”—that is, a fallacious appeal to tradition (*argumentum ad antiquitatem*; see Harpine 1993)—would not be played against naturalism in metaphilosophical debates. By a “traditionalism card” I mean a defensive move invoked in a conservative line of thinking which holds that naturalism constitutes an “unorthodox” approach to philosophising and it should therefore by default be regarded as a highly suspicious doctrine. Although the sentiment that “anti-naturalism must be true because that is how we have always done things” is rather silly and patently unphilosophical, there is a more sensible line of thought here too: Any full-blown revolutionary metaphilosophical position, which redefines the nature and purpose of philosophising thoroughly, can be seen as already changing the subject altogether: what connection does this brand new activity really have to the philosophy of old to warrant the continued use of this name? Does the acceptance of this kind of conception of philosophy add up to killing and replacing philosophy—as we have come to know it—with some other kind of new activity? If such a “traditionalism card” is played against naturalism, it would seem that the onus is then on the naturalists to explain how their conception of philosophy is indeed still a conception of *philosophy*. Naturalists, however, see their metaphilosophical view in a manner where it corresponds to the best and lasting ideals of good philosophy, which have been behind philosophy long before the constituent theses of metaphilosophical naturalism were first

(eds. De Caro & Macarthur 2010), *The Waning of Materialism* (eds. Koons & Bealer 2010) and *Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism* (eds. Smith & Sullivan 2011). For the record, a conception of philosophy can have other valid reasons to criticise naturalism besides the desire to establish the autonomy of philosophy, so all philosophical opposition to naturalism does not automatically amount to metaphilosophical anti-naturalism.

explicated in the philosophical literature or before the specific name of ‘naturalism’ was determinedly used for these views. Thus, in their own view, naturalists want to preserve continuity with certain pre-existing metaphilosophical standards present in the history of Western philosophy, and not instigate a radical or revolutionary movement, where the identity of philosophy is completely rethought in contrast to the practices of earlier lovers of wisdom. So which way is it: is naturalism or anti-naturalism the default view regarding the identity of philosophy?

If we begin to tackle this question from the direction of our very first superficial impressions, the picture of philosophising suggested by the anti-naturalists, where philosophy is conceived of as clearly dissimilar type of activity relative to the undertakings of the empirical sciences, seems to be rather reasonable. This metaphilosophical image seems, after all, to go well together with the manner how philosophical inquiry is *actually* done: instead of relying on intricate experimental designs and sets of empirical data, philosophising commonly has the outward appearance of thoroughly cerebral craft. Within the academia it seems to best resemble the non-empirical disciplines, such as mathematics, rather the empirical special sciences. We will not find under the roof of an ordinary philosophy department powerful telescopes or expensive particle accelerators, cages for guinea pigs, nor do philosophers embark on anthropological field excursions into the wild to study the marriage customs of indigenous tribes. And if we look retrospectively at the past of philosophy, we can see that important philosophical breakthroughs have not occurred synchronically with technological advances and invention of game-changing research instruments—telescopes, microscopes, X-rays, oscilloscopes and so on—as has happened in the history of science. In its essentials, philosophising today is not that different from the activities carried out by Plato, Descartes and Kant. We are of course now living in the digital age and have our precious computers and internet databases but, to a large extent, the lion’s share of philosophising still consists of thinking and communicating those thoughts to others in some manner or form. Indeed, typical departments of philosophy consist of rows of small work spaces furnished with computers and stacks of dusty papers and books. A typical work day for a philosopher is conducted safely from the comfort of an armchair and can be carried out without getting one’s hands dirty in the “real world”. There is an old piece of academic humour where a rector of a university complains about the high costs of maintaining a physics department. In his view mathematicians are so much efficient, since they only require paper, pen and a waste bin. Better still, philosophers do not even need the waste bin. Of course, this joke is not really an evidence or argument for anything, but it is telling of

the way how philosophy is linked with non-empirical and non-experimental methodology.

Indeed, the “non-empirical” methodology is often highlighted as one of the distinctive traits of philosophy so that deviating from this feature would amount to already stepping beyond the bounds of philosophy and thus practising some other kind of an inquiry (Glock 2008a: 96). The notion of “empirical philosophy” even sounds like an absurd oxymoron (what could it really be?). Besides these *prima facie* impressions of the typical methodology of philosophy, we can add the fact that when philosophy is frequently described as the most fundamental and general “meta-science” (*scientia scientiarum*), it is perhaps somewhat natural to think that if philosophy is to successfully carry out these special tasks of systematising and organising scientific knowledge, it requires exceptional autonomy and authority for itself: if philosophy is to be a believable science of the sciences, it needs to be in some way above its subject matter and divorced from their distorting influences.

Swayed by superficial impressions like these, it is perhaps tempting to think that philosophy and empirical sciences differ qualitatively also in some deeper way from each other, on which basis they should be seen as separate endeavours, which have their own subject matters and aims. Against this backdrop metaphilosophical anti-naturalism—in one form or another—can now look like some kind of a *default* or orthodox conception of philosophy, which encapsulates the inherent spirit and viewpoint of philosophy. Occasionally, one can even hear talk of a *traditional* conception of philosophy as well, which the “anti-traditional” and “post-philosophical” naturalists have newly challenged in revolutionary spirit from the mid-twentieth century onwards. At the same time the true motives of naturalists begin to appear in a suspicious light, since timewise the metaphilosophical popularity of naturalism seems to grow hand-in-hand with the victory march of the natural sciences and the technological miracles they have enriched our everyday lives with. Following this logic, the naturalists thus seem simply as latter-day admirers of the triumphs of natural sciences, who now want to score cheap points by linking their philosophising to the player with the current winning streak.

Then the claim is simply that the anti-naturalistic views about the autonomy and authority of philosophy have been mainstream views in the history of philosophy. For example, Bealer (1996: 1) has described the autonomy-thesis as having been “the dominant” metaphilosophical view “throughout our intellec-

tual history". In his view, "this traditional view" has been dethroned only recently during the "scientist" zeitgeist of the twentieth century.⁸ Indeed, similar thoughts are repeated so often in the philosophical literature that this line of thinking seems to be the traditional view of the traditional conception of philosophy (pardon the pun).⁹ Even the naturalist Papineau (1993: 3) characterises anti-naturalism as a "traditional attitude" towards philosophising, so that the allegations regarding naturalism's novelty have been suggested from both sides of the naturalism–anti-naturalism divide.

In contrast, certain philosophers have offered opposite opinions regarding the "traditional" conception of philosophy. In the view of these philosophers it has actually been some type of a moderate naturalism which has been the more popular metaphilosophical outlook among philosophers of yore. To support this claim, Kitcher (1992) for example, has brought up the historical fact, that many of the A-league philosophers of the modern period, such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and Mill, were not only passively aware of the scientific investigation carried out by their contemporaries in biology, physics, chemistry and psychology. Rather, they also actively interjected these scientific findings into their philosophical theories, so that their philosophical ideas would be in line with these state-of-the-art scientific theories.¹⁰ For example, Kant's views regarding the contents of synthetic *a priori* knowledge were intimately connected with the empirical suppositions of the Newtonian physics (Friedman 2004: 78–9). On this basis we can speculate that if Kant had then

⁸ Here is the relevant quotation from Bealer (1996: 1) in full: "These two theses [about the autonomy and the authority of philosophy] are hardly new: it is safe to say that throughout most of our intellectual history they have constituted the dominant view. In contemporary thought, however, this traditional view has lost ground, perhaps reflecting the general scientism prevalent in contemporary culture."

⁹ For representative instances, see BonJour (1998: 17), Katz (1998: xi), Hacker (2006: 231), Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood (2013: 10–1). We should note that philosophers often leave the scope of "traditional" unspecified, so it is hard to say how far back in time this age of traditionality is supposed to extend to. Representatives of analytic philosophy are often disparaged for their limited familiarity with philosophy's past (or for even having hostile attitude towards it), and it sometimes seems that for many analytic philosophers the history of philosophy begins only with Frege. If this is seen as the actual starting point for the claims regarding the traditionality of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism, then these interpretations start to make at least a bit more sense.

¹⁰ See also Quine (1984: 190–1), Appiah (2008) and Keil (2008: 281–2). Kornblith (1994: 49) writes: "The idea that philosophy must somehow be grounded in the sciences is not new, and indeed, has given rise to extraordinarily set of philosophical ideas. Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Marx, Reichenbach, and numerous others sought to show that their ideas comported well with the best available sciences of their times."

known how our modern physics and mathematics differ from the doctrines of Newtonian mechanisms and Euclidian geometry, he might have in response made significant changes to his philosophical theories.

Moreover, many of those philosophical problems, which these thinkers deemed to be in need of a solution, were by-products of the scientific progress. In the view of Rosenberg (2000: 8), no single other phenomenon has inspired philosophers to the extent that science has done ever since its revolutionary breakthroughs in the seventeenth century. For example, the stimulating effect of the natural philosophies of Galileo, Copernicus and Newton to the philosophers of the modern period was enormous, and later Darwin's evolution theory and the rise of experimental psychology had similar effect to the thinkers living during those periods.¹¹ In retrospect, it is now possible to see in the philosophical outputs of these figures how strongly they were products of their times, and they did not formulate their views inside some kind of an isolated "philosophical bubble". For example, Descartes, who lived right in middle of the age of scientific revolution, seemed to have concrete scientific aims in his mind even when he formulated his philosophical views. Namely, Descartes wanted through his philosophical arguments to dethrone the received teleological model of explanation, which was inaugurated by Aristotle and had an integral place in the scholastic philosophy of nature which dominated the scientific and philosophical thinking of the medieval period. Descartes sought to replace this teleological model with a new causal and mechanistic alternative (he then applied this explanatory model, among others, in his theory of animals as automata). At the same time Descartes wanted to also argue against the *hylemorphism*, which was another Aristotelean inheritance found in the scholastic philosophy of science (Aristotelean hylemorphism holds that the actions of a given object must be understood through its form and material constitution).¹² It should also be acknowledged, that the philosophers mentioned above were not narrowly trained academic specialists in the manner of today's academic culture, but rather polymaths who resembled much more closely the ideal of "Renaissance

¹¹ Garrett (2004: 65, see also Hatfield 2001: 393–4) estimates that there is still lot of uncovered ground for historiography of philosophy to study how the progressive steps undertaken by the natural sciences of that age influenced the thinking of the contemporaneous philosophers.

¹² In a letter to his friend, father Mersenne, Descartes writes about the contents and aims of his work *Meditations on the First Philosophy* ("Letter to Mersenne dated 28. January 1641", AT III: 297–8): "I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle."

man” who could in addition to forming great philosophical thoughts also produce many noteworthy scientific breakthroughs themselves (Glock 2008a: 163). These philosophers did not merely sit comfortably in their armchairs and philosophise on theoretical issues, but also carried out various kinds of experimental tests, astronomical observations, anatomical dissections and other forms of empirical research. In those times, practising numerous sciences concurrently was still a vocational possibility, because unlike today in our age of hyper-specialisation, back then it was still possible for one learned mind to be familiar with all central scientific achievements of the day and to partake actively in moving the frontline of science onwards. Although many of the philosophers of the early modern period are nowadays known in history books primarily as having been philosophers, their initial reputation might actually have been based on their achievements in the fields of mathematics and natural sciences.¹³

When the history of philosophy is now written retrospectively, the relevant scientific influences and activities of these bygone philosophers are often downplayed in philosophical narratives due to their outdated and old-fashioned nature, while the “timeless” philosophical parts are conversely emphasised as the lasting true legacy of these figures (the naive empirical theories of the past philosophers can appear to our eyes akin to the scientific naivety found in the Bible, which does not acknowledge the existence of dinosaurs or the spherical shape of our planet). Indeed, historiography of philosophy often assumes the ahistorical approach of “rational reconstruction”, where the philosophical theses and theories are reviewed without referencing their particular contexts of writing (Rorty 1984). This approach can then create a distorted and limited picture of these philosophers’ lifeworks and make them out to be more “philosophical” than they actually were, which strengthens the image of anti-naturalism’s traditional place as the default metaphilosophical position.¹⁴ In Rorty’s (1979: 132–

¹³ Alongside the fact that many of the historical figures we now remember primarily as philosophers engaged actively in scientific pursuits, we can note that the reverse is also true, as we can locate philosophical musings from the writings of the scientists of this time period (such as Newton’s reflections on the metaphysical nature of space, which reacted against Descartes’ and Leibniz’ thoughts on this matter). These scientists also conducted active dialogues with philosophers about their shared points of interests. See Janiak (2006/2014).

¹⁴ In a related way when the distinguished scientists of the early modern period – Bruno, Newton, Brahe and so on – are now portrayed in history books, their religious and pseudo-scientific motivations and undertakings, such as alchemy and astrology, are often easily left unmentioned in “rationalising” narratives regarding the logical progress of the natural sciences, as these practices appear completely irrational to most modern readers. The same goes for the inconvenient moral views (on human rights, slavery, homosexuality, racial issues, gender equality and so on) of our intellectual heroes.

3n2) view, when we compare the different historical overviews written of philosophy's past, we find a noticeable change in those books which have been written after Kant, namely, in the way how they build an anti-naturalistic narrative of philosophy's past, where this discipline has always been distinct and autonomous enterprise relative to empirical sciences. It is deceptively easy to fall into the mind-set of glamorising the past so that it fits to our present ideals of what good philosophy is or should be, and the adjective "traditional" is sometimes used rather carelessly by conceptions of philosophy to serve self-mythologising ends. (Kitcher 1992: 55; Friedman 1992: xi–xiii; Appiah 2008.)

In Kitcher's competing interpretation the anti-naturalistic notion of "the ideal of pure philosophy" was formulated in a conscious and premeditated way only in the writings of Frege during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Frege's ideas then inspired a widespread "anti-naturalistic revolution" among the influential major figures of the early analytic philosophy (notably Wittgenstein, the logical positivists and the Oxford ordinary language philosophers), and this anti-naturalistic *coup d'état* then managed to overthrow the earlier long-standing naturalistic tradition in philosophy.¹⁵ The three decades between 1930s–60s in particular were a golden age of sorts for anti-naturalism in analytic philosophy although the different anti-naturalistic thinkers and schools of this period produced divergent arguments in favour of their preferred forms anti-naturalism and saw the tasks of anti-naturalistic philosophy in differing ways (Glock 2008a: 137).

This pervasive golden age of anti-naturalism then instigated a counter-reaction from the 1960s onwards, which came in the form of a *naturalistic turn* led by the American philosopher W.V. Quine. This development now reinstated naturalism as the dominant metaphilosophical outlook—at least in the philosophical scene of the North America, as the popularity of naturalism has not risen as high on the European side of the Atlantic (Hacker 2006: 231). Kitcher (1992: 56) remarks slightly provocatively that "naturalists might see the [anti-naturalistic] movement Frege inaugurated as an odd blip in the history of philosophy, a desertion of philosophy's proper task and proper roots." Kusch (1995: 1) concurs: "As the century draws to close, naturalism seems again the

¹⁵ Kitcher (1992: 53n3), however, notes that it would of course be a gross over-simplification to state that Frege *alone* would be the sole father figure for anti-naturalism in analytic philosophy. On the other hand, a broader examination, which extends beyond mere analytic philosophy, would add Husserl as a second important background figure for the twentieth century anti-naturalism, as he inspired latter phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism. Like Frege, Husserl opposed the psychologising interpretations of logic (however, the inspiration for Husserl's anti-psychologism came directly from Frege and, in many places, Husserl's anti-psychologism simply repeats the objections raised earlier by Frege; see Keil 2008: 258).

viable option it was one hundred years ago, and thus it does not seem too pretentious to suggest that our century will perhaps one day be called 'the century of the rise and fall of antinaturalism'."

As a contrasting take to Kitcher's view we can mention Keil's (2008: 281–2) remarks, that the mere demonstration of science-sensitivity and empirical awareness are too relaxed criteria alone to be used as a yardstick for identifying a historical philosopher *post facto* as a naturalist. In that case 'naturalism' could indeed be used to cover pretty much every philosopher of the early modern period, but then 'naturalism' would also cease to be an informative metaphilosophical label, as a *total disregard* of empirical knowledge cannot be a hallmark of anti-naturalism, because in that case the only true anti-naturalists would be those philosophers who have very radical and hostile views about the nature of empirical knowledge and the value of the sciences.

In a related manner, Fumerton (1999: 21, footnote removed) warns us about the perils of extending our modern-day labels of naturalism and anti-naturalism too far into the past:

It certainly seems on the face of it that philosophy has taken a pronounced and dramatic turn away from the a priori "armchair" philosophy on which many of us in the analytic tradition were raised. One might, of course, argue that the twentieth century emphasis on philosophy as an a priori discipline was itself the aberration, a detour in the historical evolution of our field. Certainly Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Hobbes, and countless others didn't always sharply distinguish their philosophical inquiries from studies of physics, biology, sociology, and psychology. It might, however, be possible to represent more perspicuously the history of philosophy by arguing that the intellectual giants of the past were simply interested in more than one field. They weren't attempting to answer philosophical questions through scientific investigation. Rather, they were simply interested in a great many questions other than philosophical questions.

Indeed, when we want to evaluate the question of whether there has been some kind of a traditional or dominant (anti)naturalistic conception of philosophy in the historical times, we must take into consideration besides the scientific activities and interests of these philosophers also from a more "philosophical" point of view their *actual metaphilosophical thoughts* regarding the nature of philosophical knowledge, and furthermore how such a knowledge relates to other relevant forms of knowledge, especially to the empirical knowledge of the sciences. I do not wish, however, to voice an opinion here on these issues on such a general level. By my reckoning that would require a close exegetical scholarship of

the metaphilosophically relevant texts of these past philosophers, and secondly also first defining naturalism and anti-naturalism in a clear-cut way. Both of these tasks are beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, in the following pages I will highlight just a few seminal moments in the history of the naturalism-question and point out how the views of certain past philosophers have become important points of reference for later generations of naturalists and anti-naturalists.

This overview can begin with Descartes, who originated the metaphilosophically weighty idea of *first philosophy*.¹⁶ The proper role of this first philosophy is not to be simply just one discipline on a par with the various special sciences, but rather to precede all other investigations due to its rational viewpoint and uncompromising critical attitude. Its problems must be settled before we can move on to those of the special sciences. In other words, Cartesian first philosophy has its own special job description (establishing the secure foundations of sciences), method (rational thinking) and also the intellectual independence due to its sceptical viewpoint, which shields philosophy from the meddling of external religious and intellectual authorities. In these respects Descartes' conception of philosophy can thus be classified as an embryonic form of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism.

Indeed, Descartes' first philosophy has subsequently served as a template for several philosophical enterprises, whose orientation and overall spirit fit well together with the core theses of anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy. For example, in the textbooks of philosophy Descartes' arguments from *Meditations* are often framed as an epistemological theorising, which aims to answer the perennial challenge posed by scepticism. In this reading Descartes is thought to have elevated epistemology into a central place in modern philosophy, while he at the same time initiated the tradition of *Cartesian epistemology*, where the ideal characteristics of knowledge are—expressed through a list of modern technical terms—*foundationalism*, *infallibilism* and *internalism*. These are all polar opposites of the doctrines associated with the twentieth century programme of naturalistic epistemology—*holism*, *fallibilism* and *externalism* (Hamlyn 1992: 46–7). Secondly, in the field of the philosophy of mind several present-day lines of thinking, where a particular anti-materialistic conclusion regarding

¹⁶ Of course, it was already Aristotle who first used the phrase *prôtê philosophia* to refer to that part of his philosophical oeuvre, which is nowadays known as metaphysics. However, it is dubious whether Aristotle meant to imply with this expression the metaphilosophical claim that the problems of metaphysics should necessarily be solved *before* all other philosophical and scientific problems. Rather, it seems that his intention behind this name was to characterise the peculiar spirit of metaphysical problems, namely, that they seem to be of general nature and focused on first principles (Cohen 2008: §1).

the nature of the mind has been reached through *a priori* philosophising, can be seen as modern-day spiritual descendants of Descartes' original mind-body dualism. And finally in more metaphilosophical terms, the clearest twentieth century successor of Descartes' first philosophy is Carnap's ambitious project in his book *Logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928) which is in its basic orientation and aims a very Cartesian undertaking.

On the other hand, we must acknowledge that the anti-naturalistic character of Descartes' conception of philosophy should not be misunderstood since it does not, for example, contain any traces of the type of contrasting attitude, where the philosophical and scientific theorising are seen as completely separate pursuits in their overarching aims. Descartes did not enclose philosophical knowledge as its own distinct category, but rather saw all sciences—first philosophy included—as forming a seamless system, which ultimately also had one common subject matter. We can, nevertheless, point out distinct places for different disciplines in this system of sciences. Descartes writes of his hierarchical model of scientific knowledge in the preface to the French edition of his work, *Principles of Philosophy* (ATIX-2, 14,) by likening philosophy to a tree: "Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals." In these respects Descartes' metaphilosophical vision deviates from certain later forms of anti-naturalism, where philosophy is divorced more clearly from scientific inquiries by referencing philosophy's peculiar second-order viewpoint.

On the other hand, Descartes' metaphilosophical remarks should not be read as expressions of conscious "declaration of independence" for philosophy or even as giving a role model for all later philosophical reflections, since Descartes' first philosophy might have been purely a one-time-only project in the philosophy of science, which aimed to establish unquestionable foundations for the new experimental natural sciences once and for all and, secondly, to cover the backs of philosophers and scientists from the meddling of religious and intellectual authorities, who tried to control the views of philosophers and scientists. (Rorty 1979: 131–2; Maddy 2007: 16–7.)

In any case the phrase "first philosophy" has since then gained a life of its own in metaphilosophical vocabulary as a paradigmatic example of the ideal of sovereign philosophical inquiry, which the naturalists want to reject—whether this conception actually applies to historical Descartes or not. As we shall see later, the twentieth century arch-naturalist Quine often returned to this phrase when he was trying to lay down the spirit of his own naturalistic conception of

philosophy, and similar rhetoric has been repeated by latter-day naturalists, too. As a one example, we can mention Maddy (2007: 19), who describes in her book her naturalistic outlook, in conscious reference to Descartes, as “second philosophy”.

Along with Descartes, another influential hero figure and a historical reference point for numerous anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy has been Kant, whose philosophical output is permeated with metaphilosophical reflections about how to interpret the identity and proper bounds of philosophical inquiry itself. It is by no means an exaggeration to proclaim that no thinker in the history of philosophy before Kant was as intensively and explicitly focused with the task of discerning philosophy’s very own foundation and mission (Glock 1997: 287). Indeed, it is possible to read his entire project of transcendental idealism as providing us with an original anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy, which explains how philosophy can be a cognitive enterprise to be taken seriously—even if it is not a special science in the manner of the empirical sciences. On this issue the highly regarded Kant-scholar Allison (1983: 35) has remarked, that Kant’s “transcendental idealism must [...] be characterized as a metaphilosophical ‘standpoint’ rather than, as is usually done, as a metaphysical doctrine about the nature or ontological status of the objects of human cognition.”

In addition to the motivations which might be regarded as being purely philosophical (for instance, being woken from his “dogmatic slumber” by Hume and so forth), one crucial “extra-philosophical” catalyst for Kant’s metaphilosophical thinking came from the more general progression of his times, which saw scholarly pursuits being gradually institutionalised into specific professions conducted within the walls of universities, whereas previously these inquiries had been carried out largely by independent “gentlemen scholars” (as was briefly discussed in Section 1.3). As a result the academic scene now became step by step organised into individual special sciences, in which each had its own distinct subject matters and specific scholarly duties. Previously all disciplines—excluding theology, jurisprudence and medicine—went under the collective name of (natural) philosophy and there were no clear-cut divisions between them as there is today. It was during this time that William Whewell came up with the neologism “scientist” to replace the phrase of natural philosophy, although in certain English and Scottish universities physics still goes under this archaic name.

Parallel to the emergence of the modern university system was the increase in methodological debates pertaining to the foundations of the different fields of study. This also intensified the pressure on philosophy to claim its place in

the scientific family and define the nature of its relations to neighbouring disciplines. In particular, the rise of the experimental sciences and empirical physiology threatened to force philosophy into a defensive position, because they appeared to annex many of the questions pertaining to the nature of the world and human cognition, which had previously been in the hands of philosophers. In metaphilosophical terms we can phrase this predicament by saying that the naturalism-question now became a burning topic, which required philosophers to take some kind of a cogent stance on it. Kant, who lived and worked right at the early stages of these tumultuous times, formed for the first time a clear anti-naturalistic self-image about the scholarly duties of philosophy, which was then taken up by the German philosophical tradition and social movement of idealism and used as a self-defence for philosophy as an autonomous discipline.¹⁷ Rorty (1979: 131) writes:

The notion that there is an autonomous discipline called "philosophy," distinct from and sitting in judgment upon both religion and science, is of quite recent origin. [...] It was not until after Kant that our modern philosophy-science distinction took hold.

Friedman (2001: 8) agrees:

Indeed, this Kantian distinction between first-level scientific inquiries and the distinctively philosophical "transcendental" inquiry is actually the historical source for the intellectual differentiation between philosophy and the sciences which is now familiar today.

Although several pre-Kantian philosophers—Descartes, Hobbes and many others—had already made their defences of philosophy's autonomy against the threats posed by external forces, these defences were more than anything answers to theology's attempts to exert primacy over (natural) philosophy in the turmoil of the scientific revolution. These philosophers were thus not primarily interested in distinguishing philosophy from the sciences, since this problem was not yet acute—unlike the issue of (natural) philosophy's relation to religious authorities. In Rorty's view these earlier ideas about the autonomy of philosophy in relation to theology did not have far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences for philosophy's self-image or institutional standing. It was with

¹⁷ Kant's role in defining philosophy's academic identity has been discussed by, among others, Collins (1998: §4); Gutting (1998: 3–4), Moran (2008: 24), Glock (2008a: 24–6) and Stroud (2009: 160–161).

Kant and his followers when philosophy established its home within the nascent German research-universities, and the philosophy's "self-portrait" painted by Kant became part of the self-understanding for philosophy professors to guide them in their everyday academic practice.

The actual historical credibility of Rorty's interpretations has been contested, as they seem to be painted with rather broad brushstrokes and serve a certain predetermined narrative about the development of philosophy.¹⁸ However, these doubts about Rorty's account do not extend to Kant's metaphilosophical importance, which is widely acknowledged without objections in the literature. Glock (2008a: 149), for instance, simply calls the naturalism-question a "Kantian problem":

There is a more general Kantian problem, namely whether, and if so how, philosophy can be conceived as an autonomous discipline distinct from the empirical sciences. And this problem has loomed large in the work of most analytic philosophers who have engaged in metaphilosophical reflections.

In a broader categorisation, the name of Kant is sometimes conflated sweepingly with anti-naturalistic position in metaphilosophy, as if these two were simply the same thing. For example, Glendinning (2002: 214–5) speaks of "post-Kantian tradition" which opposes naturalism. From the other side of this conflict the naturalist Papineau (quoted in Glock 2008a: 258) has suggested a similar division (although instead of "post-Kantians", Papineau speaks of "neo-Kantians"):

¹⁸ For a representative criticism of Rorty's historical views, see, for example, Cohen (1986: 60). Cohen opines that Rorty construes historical facts rather liberally and in a way which makes them fit with his predetermined conclusions—rather than working the other way around and building his conclusions only *after* his historical studies. Cohen also argues that Rorty's narrative ignores important historical cases, namely the metaphilosophical thinking of Plato, as the anti-naturalistic idea of philosophy as an architectonic discipline above others was per Cohen already present in Plato's philosophy. (Plato's dualistic ontology mixed Parmenidean and Pythagorean notions about the unchanging and timeless plane of reality of ideas with Heraclitus' contrasting view about the sensible reality under constant "flux". The metaphilosophical corollary of this dualism is the division of labour between disciplines, so that empirical sciences investigate the sensible reality, whereas the rational study of the eidetic reality belongs to philosophy, mathematics and logic.) In Hatfield's (2001: 393–4) criticism Rorty does not focus enough on the interplay between philosophy and natural science in the works of early modern philosophers. As a consequence of this negligence Rorty himself writes as if philosophy had existed in some sort of an anti-naturalistic bubble all along without active interplay with the empirical sciences of the day.

[...] a new and potentially more fruitful division is emerging within English-speaking philosophy. In place of the old analytic–Continental split we now have the opposition between the naturalists and the neo-Kantians. The naturalists look to science to provide the starting point for philosophy. The neo-Kantians start with consciousness instead. But at least the two sides can understand what the other is up to.

What should we think of this terminological practice, where the names of “post”- and “neo-Kantianism” appear as unproblematic synonyms for anti-naturalism? In my view, this way of speaking is erroneous and prone to create misunderstandings. The reason for my view is that although it is an undeniable fact that Kant has been an extremely influential figure in the development of Western philosophy, it is also true that all anti-naturalists do not accept a decisively *Kantian* vision about the method, subject matter and aim of philosophy—not even if the criteria of ‘Kantianism’ are as relaxed as possible and Kant’s metaphilosophical influence is allowed to be transmitted through other anti-naturalistic philosophers. This is because some anti-naturalists take an explicitly critical stance towards Kant’s metaphilosophical ideas, and find their role models elsewhere in the history of Western philosophy. A representative example here is the tradition of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, which has gained momentum during the past few decades. In it the metaphysical topics are approached with a “pre-Kantian”, but nevertheless explicitly anti-naturalistic mentality. Tahko (2012: 1) describes the neo-Aristotelean approach as follows:

The expression ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’ suggests a commitment to the view that there is a study that is different and prior to natural science. Metaphysics is ‘first philosophy’, the core and beginning of any and all philosophical and rational inquiry into the world. The task of metaphysics is not to serve science or to clear conceptual muddles, but to study being and the fundamental structure of reality at the most general level. This view competes with recent deflationary conception about the methods and aims of metaphysics. One approach that has a strong foothold in this field could be called ‘Quinean’. According to a Quinean, ‘naturalized’ conception, metaphysics is continuous with science in its methods and aims. Questions about the nature of reality are to be answered by application of ‘regimented theory’. Philosophers such as the contributors to this volume, who in various respects may be described as ‘neo-Aristotelian’, continue to regard metaphysics as an inquiry distinct from natural science. They deploy what they regard as distinctly philosophical, often a priori, methods to discuss metaphysical concepts like essence, substance, dependence, potential, ground, and other categories of being and relations

among beings described by language that is not purely extensional. We may also contrast Aristotelian metaphysics with Kantian metaphysics: categories are central to both, but in Aristotelian metaphysics they are categories of being whereas in Kantian metaphysics they are categories of understanding.

From the opposite angle, we can also pinpoint several more or less naturalistic sub-traditions within the broader post-Kantian tradition. Therefore any simplifying talk which pits post-Kantianism and naturalism as metaphilosophically diametrically opposite rivals streamlines these finer subtleties. In any case, I do not see any pressing reason why we should wilfully want to brand anti-naturalism as some sort of Kantianism, when the simple and straightforward name 'anti-naturalism' works just fine and does not have anything philosophically or historically wrong with it.

With this being said, Kant's significance to both the naturalism question and many forms of anti-naturalism is undeniable. As is well known, Kant coined a lot of new technical vocabulary and in some cases gave new meanings to existing philosophical phrases. In so doing, he crafted the conceptual tools which are often deployed also in naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy to lay their epistemological and metaphysical foundations (apriority, alethic modalities and so on).

The philosophical work of Kant and his successors had strong institutional ramifications and established philosophy as modern academic subject. After Kant, idealism became the dominant philosophical movement in the Germanophone Europe, and it incorporated strong anti-naturalistic emphases about the vocation and standing of philosophy. These metaphilosophical views reflected on the level academic policies, and many idealist-philosophers commented on the place of philosophy in the developing research-university institution.¹⁹ This topic had been important already to Kant, but of the philosophers who came after him Fichte and Schelling in particular played big role in defending the place of philosophy as the queen of sciences against the more utilitarian visions regarding the tasks of the new university. When the Prussian Wilhelm von Humboldt founded the new university in Berlin in 1810, one of the background figures in this project was the Kantian Fichte, who acted as the first rector of this institution. When we look at the things in this light, it is not a coincidence, that many anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy became explicit during this

¹⁹ One indication of this process of professionalization of philosophy is the way how philosophical societies began to be formed during this same timeframe. For example, *The Finnish Society of Philosophy* was founded in 1873 by the then leading Finnish professor of philosophy Thiodolf Rein (Niiniluoto 2003.)

time period: as many disciplines became more professional in universities, philosophy too had to re-think its outer borders, value and purpose as a member of the academic family. Anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy had one sort of positive answer to give to this challenge (Hamlyn 1992: 71–3, 82–83, 91–92). Collins (1998: 4) sums this historical account as follows: “The Idealist movement emerged at just this time in the struggle to transform the German universities, which resulted in the autonomy of the philosophical faculty and the birth of the modern research-university.”²⁰

In addition to the anti-naturalism of Kantian idealism, there were also more naturalistic shades present in the metaphilosophical thought of the nineteenth century. Hegel developed his interpretation of German idealism into a radical direction, which generated antithetical reactions from the naturalistic side of the philosophical field. For example, on the British isles Mill continued and extended the metaphilosophical line of thinking of Hume’s empiricism, where a big role was given to our cognitive processes which guide the psychological formation of beliefs.²¹ In Mill’s rather strong form of empiricism even the knowledge of arithmetic was based on inductive generalisations (under the name of “science of numbers”), so in his thoroughly empiricist model there is really no need for *a priori* knowledge to explain the inner mechanisms of philosophy either. The developments of experimental psychology, physiology and Darwinian biology on the one hand influenced philosophers, but on the other hand they also awakened anti-naturalistic counter-reactions. An important role here was played by the late nineteenth century discussion regarding *psychologism*, that is, what relationship there is between the findings of experimental psychology and the investigations in the neighbouring branches of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of mind and logic (Kusch 1995). This discussion inspired especially Frege and Husserl to separate philosophy in Kantian

²⁰ In Pasnau’s (2011: 92–5) interpretation Descartes’ anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy had saved philosophy few centuries earlier in a similar manner. In Descartes’ times the revolution of new experimental science threatened to sweep philosophy away together with scholastics condemning them both as things of the past with no relevance in the new scientific age. These historical praises of anti-naturalism as the saviour of philosophy sound a bit like the anti-naturalistic worries in contemporary discussions where the naturalistic conception of philosophy is often regarded as tantamount to killing philosophy from the academic map. For example, for Hanna (2008: 192) the crucial question for philosophy in our times is whether it can in Kantian spirit demonstrate itself to be an autonomous field, or whether its fate is simply to be assimilated as a sub-division of special sciences in the near future.

²¹ For Hume’s (metaphilosophical) naturalism see Smith (1905), Garrett (1997) and Stroud (2009).

spirit from empirical research on the same topics. The high tide of anti-naturalism continued in the early part of the twentieth century, when eminent philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Carnap always embraced this metaphilosophical idea, even if they might have otherwise radically changed their views on philosophical matters during their careers. As a part of this development was the *linguistic turn* in philosophy, which brought the issues of language and meaning to the forefront of philosophy—including the related metaphilosophical reflection regarding the subject matter and method of philosophy itself. It was during this golden era of anti-naturalism from 1930s to 60s when the segregation of philosophy and the new special sciences was finalised on the institutional level, as experimental psychology was conclusively divorced from philosophy and its departments during this timeframe and for a while it seemed that both parties wanted to consciously distance themselves from each other as much as they could. (Hamlyn 1992: 106–7; Niiniluoto 2003: 19–20; Glock 2008a: 26.)

As was already noted, the golden age of anti-naturalism in analytic philosophy ended by the beginning of 1960s, when the “naturalistic turn” reversed the situation—especially in North-America and Australia, whereas the region of British philosophy has remained to this day more cautious towards naturalistic philosophy. It must be said, however, that this short summary threatens to oversimplify things, as the changes in metaphilosophical dominance were not this black and white in actual reality. For example, there were many (proto-)naturalists in philosophy even before the naturalistic turn of the 1960s. So the phrase “naturalistic turn” must be read in fact as reaction to the dominance of this anti-naturalistic climate prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century, and not as an overturning of some much older deep-rooted philosophical tradition going back all the way to the mythical dawn of philosophy.

Firstly: Even if the important originators of analytic philosophy such as Frege, Wittgenstein and Carnap were anti-naturalists in their metaphilosophical thinking, we can as a counterpoint to these names mention the more naturalistic-minded Russell. Moreover, although the logical positivists of the Viennese Circle and the philosophers of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy were mostly anti-naturalists in their metaphilosophical views, even these schools included within their ranks important naturalistic outliers in figures such as Neurath and Austin. Secondly, even before the occurrence of naturalistic turn there was important school of naturalism within American philosophy (particularly R.W. Sellars, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, George Santayana, Sidney Hook), and some members of this school even expressly used the label of ‘naturalism’ to describe their views (indeed, the current usage of this label actually

derives from this precedent). For some of these philosophers, such as Dewey, their naturalism was interwoven with a more general pragmatistic outlook in philosophical questions. In the form of these thinkers there was then a pre-existing naturalistic undercurrent present in the American philosophy, and this undercurrent rose to the philosophical mainstream in the same process when the epicentre point of philosophical world moved from Europe to the New World following the Second World War. The emigration of logical positivists and other middle-European philosophers due to the rise of National Socialism transplanted their strong scientific ethos with them to America, which was now infused with the established forms of local naturalism and pragmatism (indeed, thematically pragmatism and naturalism have lot in common, such as the suspicion towards all kinds of dualisms, admiration of Darwin, epistemological holism and critique of foundationalism). In Australia during the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong tradition of realism and materialism (thanks to John Anderson and his followers), which similarly provided a fertile growth base for naturalistic conception of philosophy. From the opposite standpoint we can note, that in Great Britain there was still a strong anti-naturalistic ethos in place due to the influences of Wittgenstein and Oxford ordinary language philosophy school (moreover, British philosophers had earlier harboured culture-related suspicions regarding American pragmatism, and now these earlier qualms were extended to naturalism, as well), so metaphilosophical naturalism has not to this day been able to gain as strong foothold there as it has done in North America. (Pihlström 1996: 313; Kim 2003; Papineau 2007; Glock 2008a: 38, 84–5, 135–6, 141, 253–4; O’Shea 2008: 220–2.)

Despite these rather minor reservations about the “suddenness” of the naturalistic turn we can still note that Quine’s position as the “father” of modern naturalism is wholly justified in the sense, that it was indeed him who articulated the central tenets of naturalism in their modern form—and it is to these formulations to which also the contemporary naturalists often return when they describe the theses of their naturalistic conceptions of philosophy. At the same time Quine gave the label of ‘naturalism’ the content and definition that are often referenced even today, whereas the naturalists in the beginning of the twentieth century had talked about the distinctive meaning of ‘naturalism’ in several conflicting ways (Keil 2008: 257). Besides Quine important driving figures in the rise of naturalism’s popularity were the Australian philosopher D.M. Armstrong and Quine’s pupil Hilary Putnam (though Putnam’s tenure as a card carrying naturalist was a short-lived affair as he became only few decades later disillusioned with it and now regarded naturalism as the most dangerous “intellectual tendency” of our age; Devitt 2013: 101–2).

At the same time as the popularity of naturalism has increased the naturalism-question has become more and more popular topic in metaphilosophy. Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013) regard it as *the* metaphilosophical question for our times (similar evaluation is espoused by Cappelen, Gendler & Hawthorne 2016: v). This development has been partly instigated by the recent rise of multidisciplinary projects such as cognitive science, which has again led philosophers to rethink and vindicate their roles as contributing members in these scientific undertakings. The science policy of our age, which encourages researchers to cross the borders between separate disciplines, has also for its part motivated this development.

I hope that this exposition covers the significance and meaning of the naturalism-question in sufficient detail. We can then proceed to the next item on the itinerary, which is to survey the importance of the metaphilosophical naturalism-question.

3.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PROSPECTS OF THE NATURALISM-QUESTION

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to pause for a moment to revisit one of the earlier themes from these pages, namely, that of arranging conceptions of philosophy into contrasting groups and sub-groups by referencing a divisive issue, on which conceptions of philosophy can then be seen as forming opposing teams (as was discussed briefly in Section 1.1 and illustrated through the pair of metaphilosophical cognitivism and non-cognitivism). After the foregoing exposition on the basics of the naturalism-question we can now consider a thought-provoking proposal, which suggests that the two main alternatives in this debate could help us to sort out the “metaphilosophical landscape” by categorising all conceptions of philosophy into either naturalistic or anti-naturalistic camp. This would be a welcome step forward because even if we cannot articulate a concise and unproblematic characterisation for philosophy *tout court*, at least we could now with the headings of ‘naturalism’ and ‘anti-naturalism’ describe what the two alternate *main branches* of philosophy are: one group of philosophers thinks that the philosophical problems and theories are inseparably connected to the relevant investigations carried out within the neighbouring empirical fields whereas for the second group of philosophers philosophising is an qualitatively separate and autonomous activity relative to special sciences, which can, in the further view of some of the slightly more radical anti-naturalists, even possess authority over scientific pursuits.

In addition to its promising ability to straighten out the present and future landscape of metaphilosophy, the naturalism-question could perhaps also enlighten us in our attempts to get a better grip on the recent *history* of philosophy. Namely, on this issue certain thinkers have suggested, that the naturalism–anti-naturalism partition could help us to repair retrospectively the incongruities present in the rift between the analytic and the continental philosophy. To this end Leiter (2004b: 78–9), for example, wants to rectify the antagonistic preconceptions which the philosophers have about one another across the analytic–continental divide, resulting in a total lack of constructive dialogue. This can be achieved by pointing out that naturalism is in fact more widespread metaphilosophical position than is usually recognised, and it has gained many sympathisers within both of the two major-scale twentieth century movements. In a slightly more specific fashion Leiter interprets the works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, who are commonly heralded as early vanguards in the formative phase of the continental way of thinking, from a naturalistic direction. In his reading, Leiter points out—*pace* the “moralistic” line of interpretation, which is the received view of the scholarship of this area—that these thinkers in fact had deeply naturalistic frame of minds, and that their thoughts pertaining to human nature were based on the best available empirical foundation provided by the science of their times. This naturalising reading transforms these continental names into respectable collaborators for the contemporary naturalists working within the tradition of analytic philosophy, as they can now find from the works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud interesting primers for their own views regarding moral psychology and related topics. In this manner emphasising the labels of naturalism and anti-naturalism can then in one constructive way help like-minded philosophers to find one another across the analytic–continental divide, which is metaphilosophically vacuous and can through aforementioned prejudices become a hindrance for philosophical dialogues as it blurs the potential similarities between philosophical work carried out on both sides of this rift.

This suggestion is intriguing to be sure, and despite its grand-sounding ambitions, it might not actually be patently absurd. In certain recent prognoses²² concerning the coming developments of philosophy, some thinkers have raised the possibility of such a dramatic turn of events, where the deep metaphilosophical differences between the naturalists and the anti-naturalists could eventually escalate to split philosophers into two opposite camps—not unlike the way in which the analytic/continental divide had done earlier for the better part of the nineteenth century. According to these same predictions, the metaphilosophical contrast between the naturalists and the anti-naturalists could in fact come to

²² See Glock (2008a: 257–9).

supersede the existing divisions, which have by now lost their original identities, and then assign philosophers into new teams for the future.

Continuing with this thought, the metaphilosophical rift between the naturalists and the anti-naturalists might not only *replace* the old philosophical divisions inherited from the last century but it could, at the same time, deal the *fatal blow* to them. For example, when De Caro and Macarthur (2004b: 1–2, 9, 17) consider the future prospects of analytic philosophy, they express their belief that its fate is tied closely to the escalation of the quarrels surrounding the naturalism-question. In their minds this metaphilosophical topic forms a great crossroad, in which the separate cliques of naturalists and anti-naturalists, who so far have been able to co-exist peacefully under the common umbrella of analytic philosophy, will from now on go on to their separate ways.²³ This new form of separation is tantamount to the death of analytic philosophy (at least, the death of analytic philosophy as it has been known during its lifespan of roughly one hundred years): Although analytic philosophy has from its first steps up to the present day always been an internally divided movement, which has included both in *synchronistic* dimension differing concurrent views about the nature of philosophy and in *diachronistic* dimension revolutionary reactions to earlier phases of this movement, the metaphilosophical differences of opinion will now, thanks to the naturalism-question, build up to be too big and too severe among the different sub-tribes of the analytical movement so they cannot be conveniently swept under the carpet and out of sight.

This issue is not instigated merely by the fact that analytic philosophers have divergent views regarding the precise nature of philosophising. The existence of such differences is not a threat to the inner harmony of analytic philosophy, as long as these differences do not come into direct collision course with each other. Naturalism and anti-naturalism, however, are defined as mutually

²³ Although in certain conceptions of analytic philosophy, metaphilosophical naturalism is not compatible with the original ethos of analytic philosophy, so instead of being one sub-tradition within the broader movement of analytic philosophy, naturalism must be regarded as a rejection of the original ideals of analytic philosophy and beginning of “post-analytic” era in philosophy. On the other hand, we have a recent anthology with the title of *Analytic Philosophy without Naturalism* (eds. Gorradini, Galvan & Lowe 2006), which is motivated by the question of whether there is room for anti-naturalistic analytic philosophy any more. But the questions of whether naturalism fits under the heading of analytic philosophy or not carry primarily doxographical interest for historians of ideas and other scholars who are primarily interested of the labels, and thus these questions can be ignored here. The view of the overwhelming majority of philosophers on this issue—and to which I also subscribe—regards naturalism as an important and influential strand within the tradition of analytic philosophy (see Glock 2008a: 136–7).

exclusive polar opposites on *metaphilosophical grounds*. Thus any outspoken defence of naturalism will at the same time work as a critique of anti-naturalism (and *vice versa*). This head-to-head competitive situation between these two positions can thus easily agitate a galvanised and confrontational “us-versus-them” tone in the conversations regarding this whole topic. As the number and quality of metaphilosophical discussions have increased during the past few decades, the naturalism-question has also been brought up more and more as one of the deeply divisive issues in this field. A potential consequence now is, that philosophers within the analytic movement will start to identify increasingly more frequently primarily with either naturalism or (some form of) anti-naturalism, whereas previously their feelings of pride, loyalty and camaraderie were reserved for analytic philosophy itself.

Furthermore, analytic philosophy might not be the sole philosophical movement remaining from the scene of the twentieth century which becomes moribund in the near future due to the rapidly growing significance of the naturalism-question. Although some kind of an “anti-scientism” — that is, a sceptical attitude towards natural sciences — is sometimes referenced as a common feature present in the thinking of all sub-traditions of continental philosophy,²⁴ we can nevertheless detect shades of naturalism in the views of certain leading figures of this philosophical movement, too.²⁵ Now the philosophers who have hitherto been developing these threads of naturalistic philosophising under the umbrella of continental philosophy, can perhaps come across like-minded partners for philosophical discussions from the camp of analytic philosophers. This development then starts to disintegrate gradually the movement of continental philosophy and adds yet another nail to the coffin of the now seriously outdated analytic-continental divide.

²⁴ Especially when we compare the sub-traditions of continental philosophy in this respect to the more “science-oriented” forms of analytic philosophy (see Rosen 1998; Critchley 2001: 111). However, as we shall witness in the course of this main chapter (see Section 3.7), the “scientific spirit” of analytic philosophy should not be overstated, either. It does not mean a simple advocacy of naturalistic conception of philosophy, as metaphilosophical naturalism can be seen as a noticeably more obligating view, to which all those philosophers who we might label broadly as “science-oriented” do not want to subscribe to.

²⁵ One such science-oriented continental thinker was the French structuralist, Claude Lévi-Strauss. When he was once asked in an interview, “Do you think there is a place for philosophy in today’s world?”, his reply was: “Of course, but only if it is based on the current state of scientific knowledge and achievement [...]. Philosophers cannot insulate themselves against science. Not only has it enlarged and transformed our vision of life and the universe enormously: it has also revolutionized the rules by which the intellect operates.” Quoted in Hobsbawm (1995: 500), where Hobsbawm uses this comment to illustrate the pervasive scientific spirit of the twentieth century.

If this thought experiment is pushed one step further, we can speculate that the anti-naturalists and the particular style of philosophising which they represent can evolve to embody an alien “otherness” for the naturalists (from both sides of the analytic–continental divide), so that it is hard for them to understand the contents and motivations behind this “irrational” variety of philosophising—in similar manner to the way in which the contents and motivations of the continental type of philosophising were often hard to understand for analytic philosophers (and *vice versa*). The escalating estrangement of naturalists and anti-naturalists can have additional sociological and institutional ramifications pertaining to the practice of philosophy, if naturalists and anti-naturalists hereafter retreat to their own isolated social circles, in which they can have their separate philosophical societies, associations, conferences, technical lingos, peer-reviewed journals, periodicals, mail-lists, bulletins, heroes, philosophical emphases, textbooks, writing styles, professorial chairs and so forth. A possible outcome from all this is that when the great philosophical trends of the present century are summarised in the history books in the distant year of 2119, the philosophical landscape of the 21st century appears as moulded by the metaphilosophical divides brought about by the naturalism-question.

To sum up the foregoing ideas: The polarised contrast between naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy could provide us with a metaphilosophical frame of reference, which reflects accurately the sociological trends of the “post-analytic age” we are currently undergoing in philosophy. At the same time, we could make the multifaceted nature of philosophy at least slightly more apprehensible by halving the current landscape of philosophy into two smaller blocs. One positive feature in this suggestion is the fact that when we compare it to the much more multidimensional analytic–continental divide, this new way of seeing the philosophical landscape would actually be based on a substantial *metaphilosophical* disagreement, so that we could find contrasting (meta)philosophical views from the opposite sides of this divide.

One philosopher, who has recently speculated that something like this might actually happen in the near future, is Glendinning (2002: 203–4):

There is a division within analytic philosophy between those who do and those who do not see philosophy as importantly continuous with natural science. I think that division can be seen within writings outside analytic philosophy too, and it cuts across the analytic and continental distinction, which ultimately lacks any deep philosophical significance. The crucial distinction is between those who do and those who do not see the possibility of an investigation which is both non-empirical and non-metaphysical. Heidegger described it in an essay as ‘neither metaphysics nor science’. The authors I am

most interested in are those who wish to affirm that possibility. It doesn't just so happen, but it is the case that authors working with that point of view come from both the analytic and continental camps.

He (*ibid.* 214–5) later continues on this same theme:

Perhaps the dominant kind of analytic philosophy today, at least in America, although it's growing here [that is, the Great Britain] too, is philosophical naturalism. This is the tradition of philosophy opposed to the one I see myself located in, the post-Kantian tradition which doesn't see that kind of continuity between philosophy and science. For me, and I think for many others, this is where the most fundamental issues and disputes lie today. And this is why concern with the demarcation of analytic philosophy from continental philosophy is becoming less and less significant and is being abandoned by more and more people within the profession. In that respect, even though the number of people working between the traditions is a tiny minority, the functioning of the distinction is less and less pertinent.

I think it is still premature at this point to really take a definite stand on these visions as a sociological narrative about what is currently happening—or going to happen—within the profession of philosophers worldwide. It is true that we can already see certain early warning signs of this kind of escalation, such as the changes in the rhetoric of naturalists and anti-naturalists regarding, *inter alia*, the suspicions of the ulterior motives that the members of the opposite party might have for their “irrational” and “pseudo-philosophical” style of philosophising (as we remember, eerily similar accusations have been thrown around in the conflict of analytic and continental styles of philosophising).

If it is really mandatory to predict something about the coming developments of philosophy here, I find it more plausible that the total plurality of conceptions of philosophy will continue to expand in our millennium aided by the process of specialisation and the snowballing number of new philosophical research topics. Therefore I find any type of polarised setting around just two big metaphilosophical blocs to be improbable, as it is too hard to make any clear-cut metaphilosophical generalisations regarding the current—let alone the future—plurality of philosophical methods, topics and aims (see von Wright 1994). It is much more conceivable that both analytic and continental philosophy will continue to evolve on their current paths and thus become more and more internally diverse, so that the bridge-building between the sects and sub-groups they contain becomes more and more arduous.

In general, projections of the demise of the analytic–continental divide and its replacement by the post-analytic age are premature (such visions were first suggested in the 1970s), since the contrasting labels of analytic and continental philosophy have not yet lost their practical purpose. Many nuances associated with these labels still have explanatory power when we try to understand the metaphilosophical discussions between conflicting positions, such as the naturalists and anti-naturalists, too. For example, one legacy of the twentieth century philosophy which affects us to this day is that it is still easier for naturalists and anti-naturalists philosophers, who all have analytic backgrounds, to understand each other compared to a second case where we have two philosophers talking about the intricacies of the naturalism-question, and the first philosopher has analytic background whereas the latter represents one of the sub-traditions of continental philosophy (see Glock 2008a: 259). On institutional and sociological levels analytic philosophy has in Europe its flourishing journals, roof organizations and conferences—some of which are growing still. For example, in Germany—on “enemy territory”, that is—the local society for analytic philosophy continues to gain new members (*ibid.*: 81; McCucumber; 2013: 4). We can also note that the departments of philosophy and other research centres typically continue to identify on the two choices given by the analytic–continental axis and use these tags to communicate their emphases on research and teaching. Rumours of analytic philosophy’s demise are thus greatly exaggerated.

From a slightly more metaphilosophical viewpoint the suggestion of using the contrast between naturalism and anti-naturalism to sort out the metaphilosophical landscape faces problems created by the sheer plurality and diversity of conceptions of philosophy. Thus we are challenged from the onset by the problem that, as was said above, the collection of anti-naturalists is under closer examination just as diverse on the account of their actual metaphilosophical views and background motives as the analytic and continental philosophy had evolved to become in the course of the twentieth century. Thus the divide into naturalism and anti-naturalism is not, after all, as informative metaphilosophically as it looked like on the first impression. This inflated information-value is created largely by the fact that anti-naturalism as a metaphilosophical position is defined simply as a negation of naturalism and, as it is, it thus does not have its own distinctive doctrines which would unite all anti-naturalists and enable them to collaborate on philosophical matters. Every anti-naturalist is free to interpret the anti-naturalistic role of philosophy in her own way. The outcome is that even at best we get the contrast of naturalism and *anti-naturalisms*.

In fact, the contrast between naturalism and anti-naturalism is in some way even *less* informative than the earlier analytic–continental divide since, as an

artificial categorisation, it has no historical background. Namely, we can note that despite all the philosophical and metaphilosophical differences within the respective bounds of analytic and continental philosophy, we can still nevertheless point out certain family trees based on genetic traces of influence, which bind the past and current members of these movements together. It is doubtful whether we can find anything similar behind the different expressions of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism. Pretty much all analytic philosophy can be said to branch, either directly or indirectly, from Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein and Quine and the philosophical problems they brought up—just as the continental thinkers have been thinking about the themes which go back to Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault, Habermas and others. The reason we cannot sketch anything similar for anti-naturalists is given by the fact that anti-naturalistic philosophising is not philosophical research based on the thinking of a certain master figure or philosophical issues and problems inherited from such a master figure. As was already noted, we cannot even name Kant as such a central founding father for anti-naturalism (even if he is sometimes portrayed as such).

We can challenge the metaphilosophical and sociological prognoses, which are built around the idea of escalating naturalism–anti-naturalism contrast, also more deeply with the question of whether each and every conception of philosophy (or just any bit of philosophising taken randomly from the literature) is really classifiable as a variation of either naturalism or anti-naturalism, so that this contrast could really be said to organise the philosophical landscape into two opposing halves. These comments, which are ready to elevate the naturalism-question into a position of a defining metaphilosophical watershed of our time, seem to create an unrealistically polarised picture of the scene of contemporary philosophy, in which we would be able to classify each and every philosopher, article, book, conference presentation and so forth as a representative of either naturalism or anti-naturalism—as if this topic was defining either-or touch stone for all philosophy.

It is of course understandable that in the writings of those philosophers, who have themselves taken passionate stances in the naturalism-question, this is one of the most stressing questions of our age—do not all researchers see the importance of their own research interests in such a way? But it is quite another issue to what extent the naturalism-question is really present in contemporary philosophy and what its ramifications for philosophising are. Let us therefore sacrifice a moment for a second opinion from the viewpoint of “the devil’s ad-

vocate”, which explores some objections to the alleged importance of the naturalism-question. The points which come up in this consideration reveal something crucial regarding the very nature of this metaphilosophical problem.

As our point of departure we can take the observation that the naturalism–anti-naturalism contrast—despite its undeniably broad spectrum—does not necessarily exhaust the full range of possible conceptions of philosophy since a considerable amount of contemporary philosophy belongs neither to naturalism nor to anti-naturalism. These two labels are thus not always informative when we try to understand different (meta)philosophical positions. To accommodate these thoughts, we should leave enough leeway in the possible answers to this naturalism-question for a metaphilosophical attitude, which can be called here neutrally—and for a lack of any established name²⁶—*non-naturalism*. As with the case of anti-naturalism, non-naturalism as a metaphilosophical position is defined negatively through what it is not: non-naturalism collects under its umbrella all those conceptions of philosophy, for whose philosophising the result of the naturalism-question is practically insignificant, although these non-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy might not have much else in common in their metaphilosophical outlook (the ‘naturalism’ in the name of non-naturalism thus refers to the whole discussion regarding the naturalism-question, and not only the decidedly naturalistic option in this metaphilosophical debate).

Understood in this way, a conception of philosophy can be classified as a form of non-naturalism when the philosophical interests which motivate it are not in direct contact with issues pertaining to the relationship of philosophy and empirical sciences. Therefore the naturalism-question, which ponders the metaphilosophical nature of this relationship, will not appear to non-naturalists as a metaphilosophical problem in dire need of an answer, and they can approach the debates around this topic as disinterested spectators.

How then can this kind of non-naturalism, which remains somewhere “outside” the immediate sphere of naturalism-question, work in actual philosophical practice? Staying on a general level here we can mention as potential

²⁶ One exception here, however, is given by van Inwagen (2006) who uses this name to describe a kind of philosophising, which has not clearly aligned itself with either ontological naturalism or anti-naturalism. In his estimate this kind of philosophising, which remains neutral on the issue of ontological naturalism, is much more widespread these days than what is generally thought. Moreover, van Inwagen states that many philosophical questions can be reflected adequately on a non-naturalistic level (one of the examples van Inwagen mentions is the question of whether agent-causation is a successful solution to the “control problem” in discussions concerning free will). Sometimes the label of ‘non-naturalism’ is used in the literature to simply mean the view opposite to naturalism, namely, anti-naturalism (see, for example, Glock 2008a: 258; Bourget & Chalmers 2014).

examples of non-naturalism those kinds of forms of non-cognitivism, where the non-cognitive aims of philosophy – such as igniting societal change, authoring aphoristic literature assessed on aesthetical criteria or striving for the personal growth and wellbeing of the practitioner of philosophy herself – do not come in touch with the cognitive theorising of empirical special sciences. As these enterprises happen in their own separate directions and with their own separate criteria, we do not have to remain attentive to their potential interaction or have to have a specific metaphilosophical view of the nature of this interaction. For this reason, classifying a conception of philosophy such as these as either naturalism or anti-naturalism would feel like a forced move, and the impartial name ‘non-naturalism’ offers here a neutral label which seems to describe the actual situation much more truthfully

After these candidates of non-naturalistic philosophising we are stricken with the suspicion that these examples coming from the direction of non-cognitivism are simply too far from the crucial themes of the naturalism-question, so that this metaphilosophical question does not at any point become significant for their kind of philosophising. Indeed, it would seem that the naturalism-question is a metaphilosophical topic which is incendiary especially for forms of metaphilosophical cognitivism, namely, conceptions of philosophy which see the pursuit of truth as the aim of philosophising (with perhaps the cases of formal logic and historiography of philosophy excluded). This kind of a conception of philosophy is more likely to end up in situations where we have to take a stand on the potential conflicts between philosophical and scientific theorising, when both of these phenomena want to make cognitive claims about the world. Despite this suggestion, we can notice that philosophers have had a derisive attitude towards the importance of the naturalism-question also in the context of cognitivist philosophising. Departing from the previous examples, these non-naturalists call the importance of the naturalism-question into question in a more direct manner. These philosophers think that although philosophers have promoted naturalistic and anti-naturalistic metaphilosophical pictures within some branch of philosophy, this “theoretical” dissention occurring on a metaphilosophical level does not in the end carry significant relevance for the “actual” philosophical investigation happening at a basic level of philosophising.

For instance, in his overview of contemporary metaphysics, Mumford (2008) surveys three contending conceptions regarding the nature of the relationship between metaphysics and empirical research, which have in his view been a focus of discussion in the recent metametaphysics: *realism*, *aposteriorism* and *the Canberra-plan*. The crucial differences between these three views concern

the question of how empirically informed metaphysics should strive to be. Of these alternative positions realism is a clear variant of anti-naturalism since in this view metaphysics is promoted—following the spirit allegedly present already in Aristotle—to a position of “first philosophy”. For realists, metaphysics precedes empirical theorising as it can reveal with its special *a priori* knowledge sources necessary truths about the deep structure of reality (for Mumford, a typical advocate of realism in contemporary metametaphysics is E.J. Lowe). Aposteriorism, on the other hand, is a naturalistic position, since in it the qualitative difference between metaphysical and empirical problems is seen as non-existent. For this reason the theorising of philosophical metaphysics should be informed by the *a posteriori* evidence provided by the empirical sciences (the central background figure of aposteriorism is the modern arch-naturalist, W.V. Quine). The view known as the Canberra plan is a metaphilosophical position somewhere between the two poles of realism and aposteriorism since, on the one hand, it emphasises the importance of the collaboration between philosophical conceptual analysis and empirical research but, on the other, sees these two enterprises as co-independent phases in metaphysical theorising, which needs to combine both *a priori* and empirical data (the most important flagbearers of the Canberra plan are David Lewis and Frank Jackson).²⁷

Despite these three grand views, in Mumford’s (2008: 34) estimate many current metaphysicists (himself included) have not picked their sides in the naturalism-question along the lines of these three main possibilities. Instead, in practice philosophers appear to remain diplomatically neutral as regards these metametaphysical quarrels, which I take to mean that their research is thought to be compatible with all of the three positions discussed above. This refusal to take sides does not mean that metaphysicists are ignoring metametaphysical issues or their responsibilities to keep up with the metaphilosophical debates pertaining to their field. Here Mumford wants to give a piece of advice for philosophers (which he says he has actually learned from D.M. Armstrong). According to this advice, philosophers have to currently carry out their research under such uncertain circumstances, where we presently have no real clues to the correct answers to the deep fundamental questions regarding the ultimate nature of philosophy, such as the naturalism-question. Under these uncertain circumstances, it is best for ordinary philosophers to simply carry on with their business “as usual” and abstain agnostically from taking sides in large-scale metaphilosophical issues, as these commitments might turn out to be false and thus do unnecessary collateral damage to our philosophical views. Instead, such

²⁷ All these metametaphysical views (and their advocates) will come up again later in this work.

large-scale metaphilosophical commitments can be left open in the background just in case we later get breakthroughs in them.

We can counter Mumford's considerations by stating that although they do contain much which can be accepted as reasonable, they nevertheless should not be taken as an encouragement for drawing wrong kinds of conclusions regarding the value of metaphilosophy. The first part of this reply thus concedes to the idea of non-naturalism that much of the cognitive philosophising is—besides metaphysics in other parts of philosophy as well—in the broad lines of its argumentation often outwardly neutral regarding the naturalism-question, and thus, at least as far as this issue is concerned, seems to tread somewhere in the metaphilosophical “no-mans-land”. Referring to this topic by its name or voicing a strongly opinionated comment on it should not be a necessary prerequisite for doing fruitful philosophical research in practice (we have quite a number of philosophers who practice philosophy successfully without necessarily being able to even define philosophy, for example). Another point to make here is that both naturalists and anti-naturalists can find interesting insights from the same source texts and take actively part in the constructive follow-up discussions on the philosophical issues contained therein without the naturalism-question coming up in these comments as a hindrance for their conversations.

But although these remarks might initially appear to directly undermine the practical weight of the naturalism-question, they should not be seen as dramatic revelations all out of the blue, for all what has been said in the above paragraphs is just symptomatic to the issue of *what kind of* a metaphilosophical problem the naturalism-question actually is for many of those metaphilosophers who have voiced their considered thoughts on this matter. The naturalists and rationalists who have taken differing stands on this issue often put their theories forward as proposals of hermeneutic metaphilosophy (see 2.5), which means the relatively moderate approach where they offer their interpretations of how the underlying ontological, epistemological and semantic assumptions of certain sources of evidence, methods, philosophical arguments, theories, results and so forth should actually be understood (but, I repeat again: there have also been more revolutionary views in these discussions, which express unhappiness with certain aspects of philosophy's present state). Thus in the metaphilosophical debates between naturalists and rationalists one divisive issue is precisely the question of what happens underneath the “non-naturalistic” surface of the kind of philosophising, which both parties are ready to accept as the initial target for their divergent metaphilosophical interpretations.

This is thus the important second half of my response, and the crucial point about it is now that this admission should not be abused as an excuse to downplay the importance of all metaphilosophical reflection altogether, as someone with philosophical mal-intent might now twist these Mumford's thoughts regarding the non-naturalistic position in metametaphysics. Although the metaphilosophical disagreements might not always be plainly apparent on the surface level of first-order philosophising, they nevertheless do not equal mere cheap hindsight which is given after the fact when the actual philosophical disagreements have been conclusively settled (is there ever such a time?), so that these metaphilosophical ruminations would be of interest only to the separate breed of philosophers known as metaphilosophers. This observation is true also of the naturalism-question, since even if the disagreements concerning it often begin their lives in the conservative genre of hermeneutic metaphilosophy, such disagreements nevertheless have important ramifications and after-effects also for the way how philosophy should be practiced from now on. Therefore philosophers should not start thinking nonchalantly that since the naturalism-question does not have *at the moment* any practical bearing on their particular kind of philosophising, it can be simply passed over as an inconsequential piece of metaphilosophical rambling—best left for the dedicated specialists of this boring and frustratingly unrewarding niche field.

The line of thought, according to which we are not required to pay close attention to the constituent issues of the naturalism-question in our actual philosophising, threatens to devolve—at least, from the naturalists' point of view—easily into some kind of an inattentive form of anti-naturalism, where we simply neglect the question of how the philosophical issues we are wrestling with could possibly be linked to the empirical theorising carried out on this same topic. However, such anti-naturalistic “sleepwalking” is even as an unreflected choice still a metaphilosophical standpoint of some kind, which would under ideal circumstances provide reasoned arguments in favour of its particular metaphilosophical preferences. The same goes for the fact that even if metaphilosophers do not have uncontroversial answers to large-scale metaphilosophical questions right now, this state of affairs is not a justifiable reason to simply turn a blind eye to these issues and tout metaphilosophical ignorance as a virtue.

The bottom line is, then, that non-naturalism cannot become an excuse to justify our metaphilosophical laziness or superficiality, and philosophers should remain vigilant about the potential connections which their first-order philosophising has to issues pertaining to metaphilosophical issues such as the naturalism-question. In this manner, even if we acknowledge the possibility of non-naturalistic ways of pursuing philosophy, this acknowledgement does not

amount to downplaying the practical value of the naturalism-question but, rather, it gives us a better grip on the fact just what kind of a metaphilosophical problem this issue is, and how the rivalling metaphilosophical views approach it.

Now at the conclusion of this section we can still add one final observation about the starting points of the naturalism-question. Namely, although this conundrum regarding the relationship between philosophy and special sciences might at first glance appear as quite uncomplicated and easily understandable, we must note that it too is susceptible to different kinds of philosophical readings of its key terms: What philosophising really is? Or how do we define natural sciences? How do the naturalists describe the affinities of philosophy and science beyond the poetic metaphors?

The definitive nature of the naturalism-question is shaped by the replies we give matters such as these, but there exists no easy or uncontroversial solutions to them so that all philosophers could readily accept these views. As a consequence we must admit that there is no one uncontentious way to draw the line between naturalism and anti-naturalism, since the various naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy interpret the letter of this metaphilosophical problem in different ways. Moreover, as was noted, there exist various versions of the more specific contents and requirements of naturalism too, and thus the naturalism-question is open to equally large alternative interpretations (for example, where, precisely, does the line between naturalism and anti-naturalism lie?).

3.3. FORMS OF METAPHILOSOPHICAL ANTI-NATURALISM

As was explained earlier in Section 3.1, anti-naturalists can choose from a wide variety of alternative lines of thinking to reach their preferred conclusion regarding the qualitative differences between philosophy and empirical sciences—there exists no singular anti-naturalistic “master argument”, which would be referenced by all anti-naturalists (and, conversely, which naturalists could simply target in their counter-criticism). However, when anti-naturalists are framing the exceptional domain and job description of philosophy, a typical opening move for them is to first establish a fundamental and unsurmountable boundary of some kind, which then encloses philosophy and sciences firmly into their individual perimeters in the field of cognitive pursuits. This separation can be instituted by pointing out a prominent phenomenon, source of

knowledge and/or intellectual goal, which lies integrally in the realm of philosophy, but which is either misconstrued or neglected entirely by the naturalistic philosophising working on these same matters (because naturalistic philosophy models itself after the empirical special sciences). Therefore, the method, subject matter and/or aim of philosophy must be understood differently from the way in which naturalists envision these metaphilosophical pillars in their conception of philosophy. Commonly, these three constitutive parts of anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy—method, subject matter and aim—complement and support each other philosophically. For a case in a point, if we understand the ontological domain of philosophy in an anti-naturalistic way, this line of thinking will very likely steer also our methodological thinking into similar direction, where philosophy has an unique way of coming to know this peculiar ontological phenomenon or plane of reality. We should note, however, that intense ontological views regarding the subject matter of philosophy are not a mandatory ingredient for anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy, as anti-naturalists can develop their views regarding the ultimate aim of philosophising (and perhaps the anti-naturalistic methods which best support these idiosyncratic aims) in a way which does not actually deviate from naturalism in ontological issues.

The philosophical-cum-metaphilosophical starting points for anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy exemplify the thoughts which were suggested earlier in Section 2.3 regarding the manner in which the metaphilosophical outlooks have their roots in the various issues of first-order philosophy. These issues are often the focus of intense philosophical debates in their own right in various branches of philosophy, although the dormant metaphilosophical ramifications inherit in these topics are often left unarticulated in the standard philosophising. In any case, the crucial point to note here is that the constituent metaphilosophical theses of anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy do not differ qualitatively from the theses of what might be called “standard” philosophy—they are not “higher truths” or, in some other way, instantly distinguishable from the theses of first-order philosophy.

In this section I survey *certain* quarters of the philosophical map from which anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy have been defended. I will not, however, try to ambitiously offer an exhaustive or elegantly organised taxonomical map of every possible species and sub-species of anti-naturalism, as that undertaking would require much more space and greater familiarity with philosophical discussions—both past and present—from different branches of philosophy. Instead, I here portray in broad strokes only certain main forms of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism.

Our sightseeing tour begins with metaphysical themes. Here a popular tactic in establishing an anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy is to delineate a *sui generis* ontological category, whose constituent entities or phenomena do not find a natural place in the ontological framework of naturalism. Through this peculiar ontological category, anti-naturalistic philosophising then acquires its distinctive subject matter. At this point, it is not yet necessary to specify in detail the metaphysical claims of naturalists or their lines of reasoning behind these views. Summarised with only two keywords the naturalistic conception of reality is *monistic* and *materialistic*. Naturalists will then say that both empirical sciences and philosophy ultimately investigate the one and same spatio-temporal totality, which consists of the uniform “basic stuff” and related phenomena. The conditions for belonging to this ontological totality are given by the causal interaction-chains which bind the particular entities and phenomena of reality together (with the sophisticated explanation strategies of *ontological reductionism* and *supervenience* of course acknowledged, so that certain *prima facie* problematic phenomena—such as the four *M*'s of morality, modality, mentality and mathematics—can also be accounted for within the naturalistic framework through these slightly more elaborate ways).

Now one breed of anti-naturalists advocate some sort of a *dualist* or *pluralistic* ontology in contrast to the monistic and materialistic outlook of naturalists, so that the list of existing things includes also entities and phenomena outside of our causally closed materialistic space-time. We can name several such foundations for anti-naturalistic metaphysics from the extensive history of philosophy, such as the *Platonic universals* (in contrast to the concrete individual entities located in the sensible spatio-temporal world) and several kinds of *theistic ontologies*, which contain deities, prime movers, demiurges and other rather literally *supernatural* beings which exist over and beyond the natural order, but nevertheless interact with it in some consequential way. Forthright theism as a foundation for an anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy might not be a particularly trendy move in the mainstream of metaphilosophy these days (at least outside the special questions of philosophy of religion). Platonism about abstract entities, on the other hand, is still present in various guises in present philosophical discourses when we are debating about the correct interpretation of the ontological commitments brought about by mathematical, logical, moral, semantic, metaphysical and other such discourses. Besides Platonism, another noteworthy variant of metaphysical thinking with anti-naturalistic overtones is the movement of *Aristotelian metaphysics* (in our times sometimes called as ‘neo-Aristotelian’ metaphysics). This view holds that reality and its entities have essential structures and attributes, which can be investigated properly only within

philosophical metaphysics viewed as the autonomous and authoritative first philosophy, and that the results of these metaphysical studies can qualify the findings of the empirical sciences.

What is metaphilosophically consequential here for the naturalism-question is that anti-naturalists can with the help of metaphysical doctrines such as these establish an idiosyncratic “ontological sandbox” as the distinct domain of philosophy, which it investigates exclusively on its own. In the anti-naturalistic big picture, natural adjuncts of these ontological theses are certain related *epistemological* and *modal* divisions, which help to add further details to the differences between philosophy and empirical sciences. In the history of philosophy, ontological materialism and epistemological empiricism have been a natural pair of reciprocally reinforcing views whereas the anti-naturalistic ontologies conversely often invoke a specific non-empirical source of knowledge, which helps to explain how and why we can have substantial knowledge of these non-natural entities and phenomena. Moreover, in the overall picture of the anti-naturalists the ontological dualism is often accompanied by a modal division drawn between necessary and contingent truths, so that the philosophical truths are in their modal respects stronger—they are necessarily true or in some sense essential truths—than the merely contingent facts uncovered by the empirical research. Indeed, this dividing line between necessary and contingent truths is often a crucial component in anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy, when anti-naturalists want to argue for the idea that the empirical research carried out by the special sciences cannot even in principle challenge or overturn the claims made in philosophy.

In addition to their strong modal character, the philosophical truths are often associated with a normative dimension, so that an anti-naturalist can use an argument such as *Hume’s guillotine* or Moorean *naturalist fallacy* to establish some kind of deep divide between facts and values.²⁸ After this move, we can say that many of the topics which are taken to be the responsibility of philosophy—such as *values, meanings, reasons, justifications, truth* and so forth—are in anti-naturalist’s view intertwined with normatively-laden elements, which cannot be exhausted under naturalistic explanations, as these give us only factual descriptions of the actual states of affairs. For example, according to Mackie’s (1977: 38) well known characterisation, moral properties are “queer”, as they have the prescriptive ability to somehow motive and guide our actions. Therefore these normatively-laden topics are the proper responsibility of philosophy

²⁸ Or alternatively claim in the spirit of (some kind of) *pragmatism* that the dualism between facts and values has been misguided already from the very start, since these phenomena are irreducible intertwined. See, for example, Putnam (2002).

instead of natural scientists, and the theorising about these issues requires us to use a different kind of an approach from that of the exact natural sciences. However, when we are discussing the metaphilosophical dimensions of normativity we should note that although normativity is often linked first and foremost to the topics of moral philosophy, it has been highlighted as a challenge for naturalists also in the fields of logic, epistemology and philosophy of language (and probably several other places, too). Indeed, it is possible to divide the philosophical discussions regarding normativity into *moral* and *non-moral* branches (Keil 2008: 286). Thus there is not only *one* specific discussion regarding the clash of naturalism and normativity in the field of metaphilosophy, and this basic line of anti-naturalistic attack can be advanced in a host of alternative metaphilosophical directions.²⁹ Within the fields of logic and epistemology an important anti-naturalistic tradition is *anti-psychologism*, which was initiated by Frege and Husserl in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Anti-psychologism claims that logical and epistemological concepts and principles (*quaestio iuris*) cannot be identified one-to-one with the psychological properties and processes of individual human beings (*quaestio facti*)—*pace* what Hume and Mill had earlier suggested in an empiricist-cum-naturalistic spirit in their epistemologies (Kusch 1995).

For other types of anti-naturalists the topics related to the human *mind* and *action* possess a distinctive quality so that their proper investigation requires one to employ different methods from those offered by the naturalistic research programme on these same topics. Anti-naturalists can then think, for example, that the naturalistic philosophising which has aligned itself with empirical psychology under the banner of cognitive science, restricts itself to biological-cum-physiological conception of human, where the species of *Homo sapiens* is seen basically as a “naked ape” belonging to the animal kingdom on a par with other mammals. Therefore the actions of humans can, ultimately speaking, be explained within natural nomological laws—just as explanations pertaining to any other part of the natural order. In the view of anti-naturalists, such an approach does not do sufficient justice to the unique philosophical features of human cognition and action. A cornerstone for this kind of a critique for naturalism can be the doctrine of *mind-body dualism*, which argues for the uniqueness

²⁹ One notable figure in this topic is Davidson (1990), who has proposed that the human rationality and intentionality are as phenomena essentially normative, and thus *prima facie* problematic for any naturalistic explanations in these areas. On the other hand, for the semantic normativity which guides our language-use a prominent work has been Kripke’s idiosyncratic reading of Wittgenstein presented in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982). For discussion about the conflict between naturalism and normativity, see articles in the collection *Naturalism and Normativity* (eds. De Caro & Macarthur 2010).

of human cognition on the ontological level: a human being is not only the mereological sum of his constituent atoms (such as brain cells and synapses), since the spiritual activity of humans is grounded in a non-material phenomenon separate from the corporeal body (such as mind, psyche or soul). This ontological basis can then be seen as the foundation for human thinking, desire, emotions, imagination, memory and other constitutive elements of personality. In addition to the more drastic *substance dualism*, these anti-naturalistic views can be based on the somewhat more moderate view of *property dualism*, which sees mind and matter as two distinct non-reducible properties.

The anti-naturalistic conception of humanhood can then serve as a foundation for various anti-naturalistic emphases in their conceptions of philosophy. For example, within the field of epistemology an anti-naturalist can accentuate the uniquely reflexive character of human rationality, which distinguishes human belief-formation and epistemic agency from those of lower level animals. Epistemology must approach its subject matter in an anti-naturalistic manner since the full understanding of humans does not work on the same terms as the cognitive explanation of animal actions does. Within the philosophy of action, anti-naturalistic philosophy can focus on the intentional agency, which gives human actions and desires a special nature. This special nature cannot be exhaustively understood through the same causal explanatory models which are used to explain and predict, for example, the occurrence of natural events. In their place we need a unique teleological or hermeneutic approach (see von Wright 1971; Keil 2008: 284). A third anti-naturalistic perspective into human condition takes the viewpoint of naturalistic philosophising to be too limited when it approaches humans and their experiences too superficially from the "third-person point of view". Instead of the results coming from neuro- and cognitive sciences we must employ some kind of philosophical first-person viewpoint, which is "internal" to human consciousness, and thus lets human experiences and the meanings associated with them to be properly understood on their own terms.

The third issue mentioned here has even greater significance once we notice that it has natural connections with a certain traditional and big philosophical problem, which is as deep as they ever come (indeed, it tends to really bring out the disparities between different philosophical ways of thinking). What I am hinting at here is *the problem of realism*, namely, the question of what is the nature of the connection between human minds on one hand and reality and truth on the other. Here we can see that those anti-naturalists who reject the ontological monism of naturalism can nevertheless fully agree with naturalists on the issue that reality is fundamentally independent from human minds in accordance

with the tenets of philosophical realism, even if these anti-naturalists expand the contents and bounds of that reality further than what naturalists do. In the more radical form of anti-naturalism these anti-naturalists challenge realism thoroughly and hold that reality is at least to some degree *idealistically* dependent of the functioning of the human mind.³⁰

A typical historical point of reference for these sub-forms of anti-naturalism is the *transcendental philosophy* of Kant, in which philosophy does not probe any part of the natural (or supernatural, for that matter) reality. Instead, philosophising focuses on the human cognitive processes in a philosophical (that is, a non-psychological) sense. Although the anti-naturalists of our time do not have to adhere to Kant's metaphilosophical views regarding the aims and subject matter of philosophy word for word, there are still certain common Kantian threads interwoven in all permutations of transcendental philosophy: These conceptions of philosophy generally hold that reality is split into two levels or sides, so that the business of philosophy is to target the transcendental framework, which in some way preconditions and structures the level of our empirical sense experience — and *a fortiori* the scientific theorising built on these empirical stimuli. Therefore an anti-naturalist of this particular variety does not have to necessarily postulate a specific ontological category of entities or phenomena (such as Platonic ideas or Aristotelian essences) as the distinct domain of philosophical inquiry.

Examples, you ask? This kind of Kantian two-level metaphilosophical model can be exposed in the background of Husserl's [1913] phenomenology which, on the one hand, separates the *natural attitude*, which is behind ordinary everyday thinking and also the empirical sciences, and the *phenomenological attitude*, which is philosophy's method, on the other. By exercising the phenomenological attitude, philosophers can investigate from a *a priori* perspective how the phenomena of the world are represented in the subjective experience of an individual. To this end, we must consider how things appear to us when we suspend judgment about the presuppositions belonging to the level of the natural attitude. This phenomenological process reveals the true essences of the phenomena under our study or, in slightly different words, what things constitute them necessarily. In this way, phenomenology can be a "first philosophy"

³⁰ In Devitt's (1997) helpful analysis we can separate within ontological realism-questions the two dimensions of existence and independence. As seen in the main text, anti-naturalists can regarding the subject matter of philosophy challenge naturalists on either (or both) of these dimensions. The first dimension is about what there *is*, and the latter *how* the existing thing is. For overviews of the problem of realism see Pihlström (1996) and Niiniluoto (1999).

relative to the special sciences since the phenomenological analyses of the various entities and phenomena are more fundamental than the empirical research about these same things.³¹

An anti-naturalist proposal can also think more broadly in a Wittgensteinian vein that the social conventions and institutions upheld by human societies and cultures constitute special *forms of life*, which should not be subsumed to explanations of natural sciences. Anti-naturalistic philosophy can then have its own special tasks, which differ from the sciences, in examining this cultural level of reality.³² This kind of view might be backed ontologically by a *constructivist* conception of reality, which explains why the scientific image of the world provided by the natural sciences is not alone enough to exhaust the full spectrum of what there is.

The general two-level metaphilosophical blueprint of transcendental philosophy is also adopted by those conceptions of philosophy, which think that the fundamental framework which preconditions empirical experience is *linguistic* or *conceptual* in nature. For these philosophers, then, transcendental philosophy is not primarily about an epistemological viewpoint but, rather, a semantic mode of investigation. It should be noted, however, that the reference to language and linguistic matters here does not have to mean exclusively specific natural languages but, rather more broadly, it can include also formal languages, such as logic, and even the sphere of concepts and propositions (which is often taken to be in some way more foundational relative to the level of natural languages). What is metaphilosophically important in the attitudes of these anti-naturalists is that they want to separate the investigations conducted on the philosophical level from the investigations of the natural sciences, such as the descriptions given by psychology about the cognitive functioning of human beings. Anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy such as these were popular especially in the analytic philosophy after the linguistic turn.³³

Anti-naturalists can, furthermore, offer grounds for the separation of philosophy and science by referring to the peculiar aims of philosophy, which differ crucially from the attitude of the natural sciences. From this point of view,

³¹ Concerning the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology and naturalism see Moran (2008b). In addition to Husserlian phenomenology, a similar metaphilosophical line of thinking about the uniqueness of the human lives appears in many traditions which stem from phenomenology, such as existentialism and hermeneutics (championed by Heidegger and Gadamer, respectively).

³² See, for example, Winch [1958], Taylor (1971).

³³ For linguistic and conceptual forms of anti-naturalism see, for example, Carnap (1934), Strawson (1959) and Dummett (1978).

the reference point for anti-naturalism comes from metaphilosophical non-cognitivism, namely, the aforementioned notion (see Section 1.1) that the aim of philosophy is not to systematically build grand theoretical structures or to harvest for new truths in a cumulative aim. For instance, in this vicinity one notable metaphilosophical alternative to contemporary naturalism is formed by those anti-naturalists who have been influenced by the “therapeutic” conception of philosophy outlined in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. According to certain estimates, these Wittgensteinian anti-naturalists can even be ranked as the main metaphilosophical challenger to naturalism.³⁴

In one kind of Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical image, philosophers should not try to emulate the methods and aspirations of empirical psychology. Instead, the special preoccupation of philosophers is to untangle the linguistic muddles caused by the unfocused and misguided language-use: many of our philosophical problems (such as the misleading mind-body dichotomy) are first brought to our attention when we make the mistake of taking everyday expressions and idioms too literally. Seen from this direction the value of philosophy lies in the fact that it can free us from the confusions and illusory pseudo-problems caused by these linguistic blunders. In slogan form, philosophy does not separate true and untrue claims from each other (as a normal cognitive enterprise does), but rather *meaningful* and *meaningless* claims.

In addition to the selective collection of illustrations explored briefly here, anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy can be developed from countless different philosophical directions, and there are also many metaphilosophical combinations of the anti-naturalistic threads depicted above, so that a certain anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy can incorporate elements from both transcendentalism and normativity of philosophical claims, for example. But as I stated before, my aim here was not to attempt some kind of exhaustive inventory of forms of anti-naturalism or to assess their specific philosophical strengths and weaknesses. Instead, as a contrasting pair for naturalism I will choose from among the expressions of anti-naturalistic thinking the view known as metaphilosophical rationalism.³⁵

³⁴ For example, Arrington and Glock (1996: xiv) contend: “In our opinion, the main options that ought to be on the menu for philosophers today are the scientific conception of philosophy proposed by Quine and elucidatory or therapeutic one offered by Wittgenstein.” See also Keil (2008: 259–61). For a comparison between the thinking of Quine and Wittgenstein see Hacker (1996b).

³⁵ The representatives of metaphilosophical rationalism are sometimes referred to collectively as ‘conceptual analysts’, which indeed describes the vision of philosophy’s method and aim that these philosophers advocate. However, speaking of ‘rationalism’ can be rationalised (par-

However, too much should not be read into this choice since it is not meant as a display of disinterest towards any other kind of anti-naturalism or as a taking a stand on the comparative ranking of the importance of different forms of anti-naturalism. I can nevertheless provide two pieces of reasoning behind my choice here: Firstly, the advocates of naturalism and rationalism have recently conducted a more active two-way dialogue regarding their particular metaphilosophical issues of contention than what has happened in comparison between naturalists and representatives of some other forms of anti-naturalism. These metaphilosophical views are thus—well, at least for the time being—in contact with each other, and they do not have to be brought together artificially in overviews such as this in order to make a metaphilosophical comparison of their respective strengths and weaknesses. Related to this point, or rather as *an explanation* for it, is the fact that rationalism is in many significant ways the nearest anti-naturalistic alternative to naturalism. Indeed, the constructive thought-exchange between these positions appears to be possible largely for the reason that the combatants have—despite their undeniable differences—still enough common presuppositions about the nature of philosophical investigation that their debates do not reach a hopeless impasse right away already on the first issues on the agenda. Thus the participants of these discussions can locate enough common ground for them to conduct their debates on. From the standpoint of naturalism, a deeply problematic aspect in these debates is caused by the fact that anti-naturalists typically use already in the formation and defence of their metaphilosophical views the type of anti-naturalistic philosophising, which naturalists cannot accept as a basis of philosophical argumentation (and *vice versa*).

One of the most notable commonalities between naturalists and rationalists is that they are both sub-forms of metaphilosophical cognitivism, to wit, conceptions of philosophy which see the pursuit of truth as the proper preoccupation of philosophy—even if they then continue on their separate ways on the issue of how the particular nature and standing of philosophical insights should be understood within the confines of the larger picture of our cognitive pursuits. If we want to compress the metaphilosophical disagreement of naturalists and rationalists into one concise sentence, it can be said to be about the question of

don the pun!) with certain observations. Firstly, many of the philosophers portrayed as rationalists in this work have themselves used this very label to describe their metaphilosophical views (this label also establishes continuity with the rationalists of the early modern period, whose epistemological ideas the contemporary rationalists in many respects develop further). On the other hand, using the collective name of ‘conceptual analysts’ does not really pick out any particular group of philosophers in an informative manner, since philosophers have also advocated naturalistic and even non-cognitive forms of the method of conceptual analysis.

how we understand the connection of philosophical knowledge and theories to sensory experience and its targets. The following section portrays in further detail this first-order philosophical starting point of the metaphilosophical quarrel between the naturalists and rationalists.

3.4. NATURALISM AND RATIONALISM IN METAPHILOSOPHY

We can begin to untangle the debate between naturalists and rationalists through two questions which pertain to the practice of philosophical inquiry.

How do we form philosophical knowledge? For rationalists, philosophy is ultimately *a priori* activity in accordance with the theses of epistemological rationalism. Thus philosophy does not need to rely on the evidence provided by our senses when philosophers are justifying their claims. In the rationalists' view, the philosophical theorising resembles in its foundational aspects more closely the formal disciplines, such as mathematics and logic, than empirical natural sciences, as both philosophy and mathematics are united by the fact that they do not rely on experimental designs or collections of empirical data.

In contrast, naturalists are suspicious of the notion of *a priori* knowledge, and see no pressing reason which would require us to postulate a non-empirical source of knowledge to explain the normal functioning of philosophy. For naturalists, philosophical knowledge is—like all knowledge generally—ultimately justified by sense experience, although in the case of philosophy this justification might be indirect. What is important here, however, is the fact that philosophical knowledge is always corrigible in the face of possible new *a posteriori* evidence. We should not wander off to an anti-naturalistic tangent when we are explaining the epistemological nature and origins of philosophical knowledge just because the established methods in the toolbox of philosophy might at first blush give a non-empirical appearance.

What is the target of philosophical knowledge? In the metaphilosophical model of the rationalists, philosophical research amounts to practising conceptual analysis, so that philosophers generate as the results of their successful analyses conceptual truths, which are necessarily true. However, the conceptual truths which philosophers have uncovered through their analyses are not to be taken as trivial tautologies or mere unambitious lexicographical entries in our dictionaries, since they reveal (on the account of their deep necessity) something illuminating about the phenomena of our actual world. Although the rationalistic

conception of philosophy leaves some leeway on this issue for different rationalists to explicate their particular interpretations of conceptual analysis, the ontological status of concepts and the nature of the modality of conceptual truths.

Naturalists, on the other hand, have a sceptical attitude towards profound conceptual truths, which would remain everlastingly immune to empirical falsification, and naturalists do not see any semantic mechanism which would generate these deep conceptual truths. In the metaphilosophical alternative offered by the naturalists, philosophy aims to study ultimately the empirical world and its natural phenomena, just as the natural sciences do. These phenomena are the basis on which the philosophical subject matter is anchored. Thus, philosophical problems are in their nature no more conceptual than the problems investigated by physics or empirical psychology, for example. This attitude obviously does not imply or require total disregard for conceptual elucidations—the importance of conceptual problems is merely seen to play a smaller role than what happens in the rationalistic conception of philosophy. Even naturalists can agree that philosophers have their own special vocation which relates largely to doing conceptual analysis, although the ultimate nature of philosophical problems and their answers is based on something else than conceptual truths.

Through these two dimensions pertaining to the nature and origins of philosophical knowledge naturalists and rationalists formulate their ancillary metaphilosophical theses regarding the two-way relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences. This then gives us the view of philosophy's standing and authority in this partnership. For rationalists philosophy appears as a *sui generis* activity on the account of its idiosyncratic methodology and subject matter, which gives philosophy a special *autonomy* relative to the natural sciences. In practice, this autonomy means that natural sciences cannot refute or revise claims made in the name of philosophy. Through their non-contingent modal strength these philosophical results can even be regarded as *authoritative* relative to the theories of natural sciences in the possible conflict situations, where the views of these two enterprises seem to pull us into opposite directions.

I will next examine in their separate sections the core theses and modern representatives of both metaphilosophical naturalism and rationalism. I will keep my exposition mainly on metaphilosophical level so that I concentrate on putting an emphasis on the ideas these conceptions of philosophy have voiced regarding the true subject matter, method and role of philosophy as a member of the academia. I will thus not describe the intricacies of the particular philosophical topics—analyticity, apriority, conceptual truths, modality—nor the subsequent discussions related to these topics, upon which these naturalistic

and rationalistic conceptions of philosophy are built upon. On the other hand, I will in my exposition also leave out the more detailed arguments and purported pieces of evidence in favour of these conceptions of philosophy, since I aim to keep my account within a reasonable length, and engaging with these thoughts on the first-order level of philosophy would take my *metaphilosophical* dissertation too far afield into the realm of actual philosophical debates (which are—I think it goes without saying—important on their own right but, in the name of division of philosophical labour, I limit myself to the recognisably metaphilosophical aspects of this debate).

One final comment here (which harks back to the ideas pertaining to philosophical schools, traditions and movements explored in Section 1.2): In the following sections my main focus will be on naturalism and rationalism as conceptions of philosophy, that is, as abstract philosophical positions. If we consider what naturalists and rationalists might mean as forms of philosophical schools, we must note that these philosophical positions do not “belong” in either case to any specific groups of philosophers, who would have lived and worked in certain locations at certain times, or who would have penned a collective manifesto to codify the unquestionable dogmas of their metaphilosophical credo. Neither position has a clear founder or a master figure, whose ideas the current generation is taking further (I would say so even regarding the relationship between Quine and contemporary naturalism). So neither rationalism nor naturalism is an instantiation of a philosophical school in Collins’ first or second type, and even attempting to classify them under Collins’ third school-type would be an arduous task, since we would have to demonstrate the transmission of metaphilosophical ideas from one naturalist or rationalists to another. It is thus best to regard naturalists and rationalists as falling under Collins’ fourth category, which implies that these philosophers are grouped together simply based on the ostensible similarities in their thinking (with no sociological or genetic links between these philosophers).

3.5 NATURALISM IN CONTEMPORARY METAPHILOSOPHY

An obvious first step for any sensible overview of naturalism would be a short and concise definition of this metaphilosophical position. Unfortunately, despite its straightforward appearance, this task is easier said than done. The reason for this is, that in the philosophical texts and debates, naturalism is not really a specific clear-cut doctrine which could be easily articulated in a small set of theses, but rather more broadly a general “schema” or framework for various

possible views, all sharing some basic detectable naturalistic threads about the same themes. Perhaps the most all-purpose possible definition for naturalism is the following: Naturalism is a way of thinking, which places emphasis, in one way or another, on the close kinship between philosophy and the sciences. Read on its own, this minimal account is not particularly insightful: what exactly do naturalists mean with “the sciences”, and secondly, what is the nature of the “kinship” of philosophy and these sciences? Similarly, it remains unspecified how these views about the philosophy–science kinship affect philosophising and its results in practice. Naturalism begins to gain some flesh around its bones when these challenges are answered with more detailed philosophical views.

However, philosophers who have written on naturalism—both friends and foes of naturalism—have characterised the contents and commitments of naturalism in different, at times even conflicting, ways. Certain naturalists give a comparatively more moderate interpretation of the core theses of naturalism, while more hardnosed naturalists might think that these moderate naturalists and their watered-down views do not in fact count as “real” naturalists at all. While there exists numerous variants of naturalism in numerous branches of philosophy, they are customarily grouped into two separate main branches in the overviews given of naturalism³⁶, and these two branches are *ontological* and *metaphilosophical* naturalism.³⁷

While different writers have used their idiosyncratic terminologies in drawing this distinction, the basic idea is nevertheless always the same. Both forms of naturalism are in a way views about the kinship between philosophy and science, but they emphasise this kinship in slightly different philosophical contexts: On a general level, ontological naturalism says something regarding *how the world is*, whereas metaphilosophical naturalism comments *how the world is investigated*. There is of course a natural connection between these two forms of naturalism, since ontological naturalism can be seen as first telling us how

36 See, for example, Papineau (2007); Horst (2009); Haaparanta (1999) and Keil (2008).

37 Although sometimes epistemological naturalism is designated as the third main branch of naturalism in equal standing alongside ontological and metaphilosophical naturalism. I will not, however, discuss the various versions of epistemological naturalism here, since insofar as I can see its main doctrines are already included in metaphilosophical naturalism and they can thus be examined jointly. Secondly, the other possible ways to interpret the philosophical content behind the label of epistemological naturalism (which are not directly connected metaphilosophical naturalism), can be cast aside here as irrelevant (I have in mind here the ways of talking about ‘epistemological naturalism’ which sometime use this label as a synonym for the enterprise inaugurated by Quine in his famed article “Epistemology Naturalized”; see Quine 1969).

the world studied by philosophy is ontologically, on which basis metaphilosophical naturalism tells us the best approach to study this naturalistic reality. For this reason I present next the basic ideas of ontological naturalism before actually moving on to the naturalist conception of philosophy.

As an ontological position naturalism is a form of *metaphysical monism*. That is to say, it is a view regarding the basic structure of reality, which states that all that exists (in the only “true” sense of existing) can be subsumed under a single ontological category. This uniform category is then understood—in one way or another—with “naturalistic” criteria tied to the views of our best available scientific research. This, then, is tantamount to a form of *scientia mensura* outlook, which elevates the empirical sciences to the position of a final authority on ontological questions over philosophical speculation and religious epiphanies. This means that the philosophical discussions regarding what exists should be conducted within the framework of results provided by the contemporary science. This kind of an ontological outlook is motivated by the principle of ontological parsimony, according to which we should limit our ontologies to only absolutely indispensable entities and phenomena.

According to one influential modern variant of ontological naturalism, this view can be best approached from the direction of *physicalism* (Devitt & Sterelny 1999; Haaparanta 1999), whereas philosophers such as Armstrong (1997) like to keep these two ontological positions apart.³⁸ On its most general orientation, physicalism is basically a modernised successor of *materialism*³⁹, in which all of the phenomena existing in our reality are classified as being physical—as the name of this position might already give away. Usually this classification is articulated more precisely with the notion of physical properties, so that we first see which kind of properties are needed in an exhaustive description of reality

³⁸ For Armstrong (1997) physicalism is a more restricted thesis than ontological naturalism, and its “epistemic credibility” is also lesser than that of naturalism (in other words, Armstrong’s belief for the truth of naturalism is greater than his belief for the truth of physicalism, and he is, conversely, also more willing to admit physicalism to be false than naturalism).

³⁹ Inspiration for this name change has come from the fact that the name “materialism” can easily give the wrong kind of impression that this view would only accept the kind of concrete things exemplified by rocks and trees, which can in some figurative sense be “nailed to the wall”, whereas the post-Newtonian physics importantly speak of many non-material forces and energies such as the electric charge of atoms and gravity. The downside is that we lose some terminological continuity with the previous philosophy. David Lewis (1999: 293) has here opined that the terminological change from materialism to physicalism amounts to “a tacky marketing ploy, akin to British Rail’s decree that second-class passengers shall now be called ‘standard class passengers’.”

carried out in the physicalist spirit (Keil 2008: 264–5). Although the idea of physical properties is at least somewhat *prima facie* understandable if one knows approximately what physics is, the precise criteria of physicality are hard to phrase in words. Stoljar (2015: §11) divides the suggested ways to understand the notion of physical property into two branches, which are *the theory-based conception* and *the object-based conception*. In the theory-based conceptions (Lewis 1983b; Papineau 1993; Armstrong 1997) physical properties are defined through the nature of the properties, to which we are committed through the physical theories which we take to be true. In contrast, the object-based conception defines physical properties ostensibly through paradigmatic examples of physical objects, such as “tables, chairs, mountains and such” (Jackson 1998: 7). Both suggestions have their specific pros and cons, but I do not think it is called for to summarise them here.⁴⁰

In any case, physicalists are committed to the general idea, that in the anticipated final and complete physical description of the entire universe there are no mysterious “un-physical” properties or phenomena, which would still persistently remain unaccounted for. The challenge for all physicalists is then to explain how certain problematic phenomena (such as the four *M*'s of morality, modality, mentality and mathematics), which have been subjects of much philosophical discussion in various sub-fields of philosophy, can be located⁴¹ in this definitive physical picture.

At this early point, we must note one important point about ontological naturalism, namely, that it is on a metaphilosophical level neutral regarding the naturalism-question. In other words, metaphilosophical anti-naturalists, too, can adhere to this kind of an ontological view, since an anti-naturalistic view regarding the aims and methods of philosophy need not to be based on some kind of anti-naturalistic form of ontology – and, on the other hand, ontological naturalism can also be elaborated and defended through epistemologically anti-naturalistic arguments.

That suffices for the ontological naturalism. In its metaphilosophical guise naturalism is a conception of philosophy. In other words, it presents a natural-

⁴⁰ In short, for the theory-based analyses this means a so-called Hempel-dilemma: If the physical properties are defined through the properties described by contemporary physics, we optimistically assume that modern physics is, in certain terms, finished. On the other hand, if we invoke in our definition of physical properties some idealistic form of future physics, is this definition then based on our belief about the things which future physics will contain? (see Stoljar 2009; Nimitz & Schütte 2003).

⁴¹ This terminology is derived from Jackson (1998), who has called this issue as *the location problem*.

istically-tinged overall picture about the subject, methods and aims of philosophical investigation. Although there are notable historical antecedents and forerunners of the basic outlook of naturalism (as was noted above in the historical overview, flip back to the Section 3.1 if you missed it), the head architect of the modern form of this conception of philosophy is deservedly Quine. With his influential work, he made naturalism a movement, which present-day naturalists continue to improve further (Keil 2008: 257). For this reason, let us first see how Quine saw his conception of philosophy, and to what kind of new frontiers contemporary naturalists have pushed Quinean ideas during the past decades.

One important recurrent theme in this overview is the observation that Quine's naturalism is in many ways in fact less radical or revolutionary position than how it is often portrayed—especially by its antagonistic critics. In his autobiography, *The Time of My Life* (1985: 478), Quine himself assented that if all the misconceptions of his views were actually true, he would be the first to join the choir of his detractors. On the other hand, on this issue we should also acknowledge, that a central root of these confusions is Quine himself, who much too often in his writings uses needlessly aggressive rhetoric and misleading phrases when articulating his metaphilosophical views.

We can detect coalescent *positive* and *negative* parts from the articulations Quine gave for his naturalism in various situations, and both of these two parts reveal something elemental about the character of his metaphilosophical view (Hylton 2010: §2). Of these two viewpoints, his negative remarks aim to tell something about what philosophical investigation *is not*, and then, *vice versa*, the positive remarks outline a constructive alternative by telling us what a naturalistic conception of philosophy actually *is*.

The negative dimension of Quine's (1981: 67) naturalism is present in the way in which he describes this view to amount to "abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science". However, it is not entirely unambiguous what kind of a model of philosophy Quine wants to reject with his words since he places slightly different emphases on the idea of first philosophy in his different writings throughout his lengthy career. A natural starting point to understand this expression is, of course, the ideas of Descartes. Then Quine can be seen as arguing against the foundationalist project, where philosophers attempt to answer through unrevisable beliefs to the challenge of scepticism or build the theoretical foundations of empirical science *a priori* before any kind of actual empirical research. This Cartesian connotation of first philosophy is present in Quine's (1974: 3) following words, where he describes the distinct job description of naturalist epistemologist:

The epistemologist thus emerges as a defender or protector. He no longer dreams of a first philosophy, firmer than science, on which science can be based; he is out to defend science from within, against its self-doubts.

Although it might be instinctive to equate the phrase “first philosophy” simply just with Descartes and his grand project of Cartesian foundationalism, when Quine dismisses this notion, he can actually be read as targeting to an equal extent the contemporary successors of Kant’s two-level metaphilosophical model, where philosophy is elevated in one way or another above the first-order plane of ordinary empirical investigation, so that the anti-naturalistic “first philosophy” does not necessarily just try to establish in Cartesian spirit the secure foundations of science prior to the specific scientific inquiries, but also alternatively to explicate and clarify the philosophical and logical pre-conditions of science from its distinct second-order standpoint in Kant’s footsteps.⁴² Thus the Quinean denial of first philosophy can be seen as oscillating between these two historical targets.

Thirdly: Quine (1981: 21) rejected the viewpoint of self-sustaining first philosophy also in the realm of metaphysics when he noted that naturalism heralded “the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.” This statement finds a natural reference point with the aforementioned view of ontological naturalism and its *scientia mensura* line of thinking.

Common to all of these negative remarks made by Quine about the notion of first philosophy is the distinct naturalistic attitude that philosophy is not positioned either above or beyond the sphere of natural sciences, and in consequence philosophy possesses no privileged *a priori* viewpoint which it could employ in a self-supporting manner to comment on the undertakings of sciences or the fundamental ontological structure of the reality.

The conception of philosophy, which Quine advances as a substitute for the metaphilosophical notion (or rather, as we have just seen, several distinct *notions*) of first philosophy, is manifest in his positive remarks regarding the

⁴² As is so often the case with the original background of Quine’s views, the rejection of the notion of the first philosophy can be read as a counter-reaction to the views of Carnap, Quine’s philosophical mentor and long-time sparring partner. Indeed, in Carnap’s various philosophical endeavours there exists threads of both of the historical alternatives of anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy. From the early part of Carnap’s career, his phenomenalist *tour de force* under the title of *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928) can be regarded as a form of the Cartesian model whereas later Carnap—influenced by Wittgenstein—moved to support a linguistic interpretation of the Kantian two-level template (Maddy 2007: 14).

nature of philosophical inquiry. These remarks illustrate in two broad ways the core orientation of his naturalistic conception of philosophy. First we have the manner in which Quine envisions the borderline between philosophy and science as actually being a seamless “continuum” in nature, rather than signifying a hard-and-fast division of two poles far apart (Magee 2001: 143). The philosophical foundation for this metaphilosophical continuum-thesis is provided by Quine’s confirmation holism (known also as the Duhem-Quine thesis) concerning the nature of belief-formation and justification, according to which all beliefs can potentially affect the evaluation of any other beliefs. The metaphilosophical corollary of this view is then that we cannot have, in principle, a set of privileged philosophical truths which would be forever protected from potential scientific revision in light of contradicting empirical evidence. Naturalism gains credence from the historical observation that in many cases our preliminary beliefs regarding purported cases of *a priori* knowledge have later become overturned, such as in the case of Euclidean geometry, which was celebrated by Kant as a model case of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. A similar fate can in time await other alleged examples of apriority, as well.

The second of Quine’s (1960: 3) two positive descriptions for his naturalism is the simile drawn from Otto Neurath about a boat sailing on an endless open-sea voyage, from which this vessel cannot be navigated to the dry dock of first philosophy for repairs: “Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat.” This nautical imagery is meant to illustrate the fallibilistic and self-repairing nature of Quine’s naturalistic philosophy – in contrast to the ideal of absolute certainty which our scientific core-beliefs must possess per Cartesian foundationalism. Clear traces of both of these Quine’s positive characterisations can be seen in the verbal characterisations which the contemporary naturalists have given of their conceptions of philosophy (see, for example, Papineau 1993: 1; Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 276; Maddy 2000: 108; Kornblith 2002: 163).

An important thing to note about these positive characterisations is that they might indeed give us the right general orientation for naturalistic conception of philosophy but, in a closer examination we notice immediately that their crucial details are still left vague and open to different interpretations. In any more ambitious metaphilosophical theorising, these metaphors should be articulated in more concrete terms so that their merits can be assessed philosophically (Keil 2008: 296–7). For example, when naturalists state that there exists seamless continuity from philosophical topics to scientific ones, we must of course specify what we mean by these two cognitive enterprises – philosophy

and sciences—beyond mere poetic metaphors of Neurathian mariners and tangled webs of knowledge. Let us thus begin with the side of sciences.

Taking into account the fact that in the previous quotations Quine referred specifically to the *natural* sciences, it is instinctive to expect him to have a limited criterion for science in mind, so that he would mean only those “hard sciences”, such as physics and chemistry, which employ exact quantitative methods (this expectation is also in some way present in the name of naturalism, which seems to hint in the direction of the *natural* sciences). This interpretation is also backed by the fact that Quine often used the knowledge produced by physics as the paradigm of scientific knowledge (Hylton 2010: §2.1).

When he was talking about his view of science, Quine however noted explicitly that the intended content of this expression was in fact something more flexible and liberal than mere natural sciences. Science, for him, was the sum of *all our knowledge*, which can thus be seen as including the “soft sciences” (such as sociology, economics and history) as well, and on the far end of this spectrum also our quotidian belief-formation about the world and its phenomena—something we all do on a daily basis. Indeed, in Quine’s view the institutionally organised science should simply be understood as a more systematic and critical form of this “proto-scientific research” which is already carried out by all humans in our everyday lives when we make generalisations and predictions concerning our surroundings.

In contrast to Quine’s views, certain contemporary naturalists have been more willing to restrict the sphere of respectable sciences to encompass only the core instances of hard natural sciences and mathematics. On this issue Glock (2008a: 139) applies the pair of terms “hawks” and “doves” for two kinds of naturalists (these labels are commonly used in the American political lingo to describe the two contrasting main temperaments regarding the direction of that country’s foreign politics). Along these lines, Glock describes these strict naturalists as hawks whereas the comparatively more liberal naturalists can be described as doves. Furthermore, certain contemporary naturalists leave the more detailed criteria of science completely undefined. Maddy (2007: 1–2), for example, has suggested that naturalists should not exclude *ab initio* any prospective discipline outside the naturalistic outlook since naturalists can have a lot to gain from the contributions of all successful disciplines—whether they be mathematics, sociology, anthropology or linguistics. In Maddy’s view we should not tie naturalism already in its definition to any existing science or specific scientific doctrine since science is not a finished and clear-cut monolith but rather more akin to a constantly evolving dynamic phenomenon whose contents and bound-

aries might evolve in unimaginable ways in the future. Displaying a similar attitude, Devitt (1996) has not wanted to restrict the extension of science too much in advance. He instead recommends, that we can simply use certain paradigmatic exemplars of good scientific research to provide us with a rough yet sufficient prototype of science, and then we can go on from there.

So much for the science, now for the side of philosophical research. How do naturalists see the nature of philosophising and, secondly, what is the specific job description of philosophers as helpful crewmen aboard the Neurathian boat? The discontents of Quine's naturalism often seem to think that his conception of philosophy is tantamount to "scientific imperialism", where naturalism stabs a knife in the back of "traditional" philosophy. After the naturalistic revolution professional philosophers are sent away without mercy to report themselves to an unemployment agency while scientists march to their old offices and take over the duties which used to belong to philosophers.

It is true that in certain passages Quine indeed chooses his words in a contentious manner which can encourage these mistaken readings.⁴³ For example, when he (Quine 1969: 82–3) writes about the project of naturalising epistemology, he notes how "[e]pistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science." This statement conjures an image of how philosophy—or, in this specific case the branch of epistemology—should now shed its old skin in the naturalistic order and become something completely new altogether. The idea here seems to be as if naturalists would parade to the department of physics, point at the exact measuring equipment located there, and stipulate that philosophy must henceforth change into a kind of science like that. Under those circumstances, we could pose the reasonable question: "Is this really *philosophy* anymore?" The aim of Quinean naturalism is not, however, the suppressive scientification of philosophy, in the sense that philosophers would begin from now on to literally emulate the methods used by the empirical sciences (Koskinen 2004: 71). This is also the reason why I prefer to speak of '*metaphilosophical* naturalism' rather than of '*methodological* naturalism' (as is often done in the literature on this topic), since this view is not about radically reforming the methodology of philosophy, as that latter

⁴³ Haack (1995: §6) points out how Quine was inconsistent from text to text in the ways in which he characterised the role and prospects of philosophy as a part of the greater scientific undertaking. At times, he lets on that philosophy will eventually be replaced by a more "mature" empirical investigation whereas at other times he writes in a more moderate tone that philosophy will still continue to have its own constructive part to play in the family of sciences, which cannot simply be handed over to scientists. Against this background it is of course possible to read and cite Quine's text selectively to corroborate the preconceived interpretation of his naturalism we want to uphold.

alternative hints at. There is also the fact that metaphilosophical naturalism contains more broadly further metaphilosophical viewpoints in addition to its theses regarding the nature of philosophy's methods—it is in effect a full-scale *conception of philosophy*, which the name 'metaphilosophical naturalism' captures more accurately than the alternative of 'methodological naturalism'.⁴⁴

In his discussion with Bryan Magee (2001: 143–4), Quine commented on the place and vocation of philosophy in the following way:

Philosophy lies at the abstract and theoretical end of science. Science, in the broadest sense, is a continuum that stretches from history and engineering at one extreme to philosophy and pure mathematics at the other. Philosophy is abstract through being very general. [...] Philosophy seeks the broad outlines of the whole system of the world.

We can construe Quine's words here to mean that Quine too was disposed, generally speaking, to espouse the hermeneutic variety of naturalism, where we are not required to introduce drastic makeovers in the current practices of philosophical inquiry, and our metaphilosophical theses are aimed more at the ontological, epistemological and semantic underpinnings of philosophising. This line of interpretation is supported by a look at Quine's own philosophical output, which includes, for instance, the ingenious case of "Gavagai" and the related argument for the indeterminacy of translation (Quine 1960), conceptual analyses, thought experiments, indispensability arguments, and theorising in formal logic—all standard tools in the repertoire of analytic philosophy, rather than experimental physics (Glock 2008b: 104). On this issue Quine (and certain other naturalists) have been criticised over the issue that, despite their pretentious metaphilosophical declamations of scientific philosophy, in actual practice naturalism is exposed as a rattling empty barrel—this line of criticism is thus a bit ironic since it seems to complain that Quinean naturalism does not change philosophy *enough!*

However, this is a rather silly complaint, and it is clearly not based on sufficient knowledge of the relevant literature, where naturalists have explained their conceptions of philosophy (or practised naturalistic philosophising on actual philosophical issues). Let us for this reason look at how certain contemporary naturalists have expressed their doctrines and continued to advance

⁴⁴ In this sense methodological naturalism has been a debated topic outside of the strictly metaphilosophical contexts, too. For example, naturalism has come up in the philosophy of science of certain social sciences. In these other contexts naturalism can very well be a revolutionary thesis, which it is not that often in metaphilosophical debates.

Quine's conception of philosophy. Indeed, although we have in this section focused on Quine's metaphilosophical ideas, we should not come to the erroneous conclusion on this basis that contemporary naturalism equals *Quinean* naturalism—that is, naturalism is not a person-centric school or tradition. Instead, many contemporary naturalists have taken a suspicious and even critical stance on many of Quine's particular views on philosophical issues, such as his career-spanning unwavering support for behavioural psychology, strong semantic anti-realism and the related rejection of analyticity, Platonism in mathematics, rejection of intensional phenomena and *de re* modality in the name of extensional logic and so on. Therefore the opponents of naturalism should not make the crude mistake here that naturalists are simply "Quinean philosophers", following obediently their master's teachings on philosophical matters. Sukopp (2007: 98) voices this issue quite strongly:

Only a few naturalists—and unfortunately some more non-naturalists—still think that Quine is a standard naturalist or even its prototype. Quine's naturalised epistemology is problematic in many respects. He is incoherent, or even worse, inconsistent, cannot face normative challenges, misunderstands "empiricism" as a norm, etc.

Of the notable contemporary naturalists, Devitt and Sterelny (1999: 275–6) write slightly more specifically about the tasks of philosophy in the naturalistic big picture:

Briefly, and roughly, we can divide philosophy's role into three.

- (1) Philosophy's most basic task is to reflect upon, and integrate, the results of investigations in the particular sciences to form a coherent overall view of the universe and our place in it.
- (2) Philosophy is concerned with certain problems in particular sciences, for example, in physics, biology, psychology, and mathematics. These problems arise in the most speculative and conceptually difficult parts of the sciences.
- (3) Some sciences, or areas of sciences, are traditionally done in philosophy, in some cases, but certainly not all, because they are not mature enough to go out on their own: epistemology, logic, morals, politics, and aesthetics. (We confess to having only the dimmest of ideas about how to accommodate some these within our naturalistic viewpoint.)

This three-part description of philosophy's job description contains many long-standing and popular metaphilosophical ideas about the proper preoccupation of philosophy, which have also been espoused outside the naturalistic circles: The first point echoes the idea that philosophy weaves a cohesive synthesis of the bits of knowledge suggested by individual sciences in their distinct directions, whereas the third point refers to the historical role of philosophy as a mother of special sciences. On both of these two functions of philosophy, naturalists emphasise the close unity between the problems of philosophy and the problems of science. Similarly, the second point on the list calls attention to philosophy's role as the elucidator of the speculative and conceptual issues in science, which too is a traditional image often associated with philosophy but, here again, naturalists see philosophy as conducting this task from within the sphere of sciences.

But how then have contemporary naturalists put these tenets into practice in their actual philosophising? One notable contemporary naturalist is the epistemologist, Hilary Kornblith, who rejects in his book *Knowledge and its Place in Nature* (2002) the idea that theory of knowledge as a philosophical field should aim to do *a priori* conceptual analysis of the concepts of knowledge and justification. In place of conceptual analysis, Kornblith (2002: 11) sees "the investigation of knowledge, and philosophical investigation generally, on the model of investigations of natural kinds." Then the proper subject matter of epistemology —and philosophy more generally— is determined by the objective features of reality, which are ultimately mind- and language-independent. Knowledge, for example, is for Kornblith a certain kind of a cognitive process, whose instances are united by certain theoretical similarities (and thus a mere conceptual investigation of knowledge would remain only a partial truth of the matter, just like a pure conceptual analysis of gold would be, if it does not at any stage of the research employ the empirical methods of chemistry). The mission of epistemology is to reveal in concert with the cognitive sciences the grounds of that theoretical unity shared by all particular instantiations of knowledge. In this undertaking, philosophers can in the beginning employ intuitions and thought experiments as the first stage of our inquiry, but they should not be given too big a significance in our ultimate goal. The intuitive elucidations are used only as the initial pre-theoretical phase of the investigation to triangulate the relevant subject matter. This philosophical analysis does not generate any empirically infeasible conceptual truths or any other kind of profound *a priori* knowledge, for that matter. After this initial first phase of the inquiry, the subject matter can be

singled out as the target of the actual empirical study. At this point, as the significance of philosophical intuitions gradually diminishes, the empirical investigation in the field can take steps forward.

On the side of the philosophy of language the naturalist Michael Devitt (1996) maintains in an analogous manner that at the end of the day philosophical semantics considers factual questions, and that its close scientific neighbour, namely, linguistics, is ultimately an empirical discipline (*pace* certain Cartesian conceptions, which sees us language-users as having privileged access to the meanings of our concepts). Accordingly, the main task of philosophical semantics is to tell what meanings really are, and not to systematise our (alleged) *a priori* concepts in this subject matter. To elaborate this idea slightly further, the proper subject matter of philosophical semantics are concrete thoughts and utterances (*ibid.*: 57), which are ultimately physical phenomena (*ibid.* 66). Devitt (*ibid.*: 1) notes, that "[t]his methodology has a place for intuitions, but it is the same limited place they have elsewhere in science." Therefore we should bear in mind the methodological maxim that "[i]ntuitions in each case are *about* the subject matter that should concern the science, they are not the subject matter themselves" (*ibid.*: 49).

Like Kornblith, Devitt sees that the role of philosophical intuition is to identify our exact subject matter for the actual empirical research, so that a philosophical analysis is only the first piece of a larger puzzle, and not yet the whole picture in itself (*ibid.*: 74). The accuracy of our intuition comes from the fact that as the experts on these issues, philosophers have the best skills to identify through thought experiments and other comparable intuitive considerations the relevant subject matter and set it apart from other closely related phenomena in the vicinity (*ibid.*: 76). Thus the metaphilosophical views espoused by Kornblith and Devitt resemble each other in many important respects.

There is, however, considerable differences between various naturalists in the way how they construe the constituent philosophical theses of naturalism and their metaphilosophical ramifications in finer detail. Goldman (2007), for example, when compared here with Kornblith and Devitt, places more weight on the conceptual analysis as a self-standing form of investigation. Relatedly, unlike Kornblith and Devitt, Goldman does not see the subject matter of philosophical topics as being natural kinds (at least not in the way in which the subject matters of physics and chemistry are). On the other hand, certain contemporary naturalists have even been willing to allow the existence of some kind of an empirically conditioned apriority, although true to their basic naturalistic conviction, they do not see this weak kind of *a priori* knowledge as having far-reaching metaphilosophical significance which would enable us to place such a

priori philosophical inquiry somewhere above or beyond the natural sciences (Rey 1998; Goldman 2007; Papineau 2011a).

At the end of this section on contemporary naturalistic conceptions of philosophy, we can take up certain reservations about the ballpark figures which have been given of naturalism's dominant position as the reigning metaphilosophical outlook within the movement of analytic philosophy. For example, Kim (2003: 84) not that long ago stated, that "[i]f contemporary analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it undoubtedly is naturalism." A separate anthology of essays has even been dedicated to the question of whether there can be analytic philosophy *without* naturalism (see Corradini, Galvan & Love (eds.) 2006). Moreover, De Caro and Macarthur (2004b: 2, footnote removed) write:

An overwhelming majority of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers claim to be "naturalists" or to be offering a "naturalistic" theory of a key philosophical concept (say, knowledge) or domain (for example, ethical discourse). Naturalism has become a slogan in the name of which the vast majority of work in analytic philosophy is pursued, and its pre-eminent status can perhaps be appreciated in how little energy is spent in explicitly defining or explaining what is meant by scientific naturalism, or in defending it against possible objections.

How then do these assessments reflect actual reality in the field of analytic philosophy?

Of the main forms of naturalism (that is, ontological, epistemological and metaphilosophical naturalism), the ontological naturalism has been thought to be more widely accepted among the representatives of the analytic philosophy (more so than the larger naturalistic conception of philosophy as a metaphilosophical position). Nevertheless, we can point out that in the philosophy of mind, for example, the following twentieth century philosophers (as per the impressive listing given by Koons and Bealer 2010: ix) have "either rejected materialism or had serious and specific doubts about its ultimate viability":

Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, Nelson Goodman, Paul Grice, Stuart Hampshire, Roderick Chisholm, Benson Mates, Peter Strawson, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Jerrold Katz, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Parsons, Jaegwon Kim, George Myro, Thomas Nagel, Robert Adams, Hugh Mellor, Saul Kripke, Eli Hirsch, Ernest Sosa, Stephen Schiffer, Bas van Fraassen, John McDowell, Peter Unger, Derek Parfit, Crispin Wright, Laurence Bonjour, Michael Jubien, Nancy Cartwright, Bob Hale, Kit Fine, Tyler Burge,

Terence Horgan, Colin McGinn, Robert Brandom, Nathan Salmon, Joseph Levine, Timothy Williamson, Mark Johnston, Paul Boghossian, Stephen Yablo, Joseph Almog, Keith DeRose, Tim Crane, John Hawthorne, Richard Heck, David Chalmers.

And what comes to the actual popularity of the *metaphilosophical* form of naturalism, we must here make the important reservation that the estimates about its popularity usually come from philosophers who work in North America and therefore understandably estimate this matter from the point of view of American philosophical landscape. Naturalism has not been able to attain similar hegemony in the other heartlands of analytic philosophy, such as Great Britain. And if I am allowed to give a local perspective here, naturalism has not become the dominant metaphilosophical position in Finland either. In Niiniluoto's (2003b: 23) words: "In a small country like Finland, the work and influence of a few important individuals, possessed of personal charisma and a strong sense of purpose, can have a decisive impact on philosophical orientation." The two internationally heralded figureheads of Finnish philosophy in the twentieth century—Georg Henrik von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka—both had their reservations regarding naturalism. The thinking of von Wright was coloured by suspicion towards the scientism of the Western world in the twentieth century (inherited from his philosophical teacher and friend, Wittgenstein)⁴⁵ whereas Hintikka had a hostile relationship with Quine on many philosophical issues.

In the previous paragraphs I cited certain personal impressions about the current popularity of naturalism. It is, however, possible to get a more precise picture of this issue. In 2009, Bourget and Chalmers conducted a survey for professional philosophers and post-graduate students to find out how their views are split concerning certain philosophical issues. As a result of this poll, out of approximately one thousand replies 49.8% were in favour of naturalism; and it was opposed in some general "non-naturalistic" sense by 25.8% of the replies (Bourget & Chalmers 2014).⁴⁶ Against this background it seems that metaphilo-

⁴⁵ Although von Wright (1993: 45) did voice his opinion regarding Quine that "of contemporary philosophers he is, in my opinion, the greatest."

⁴⁶ In the other philosophical topics which reside in the close vicinity to the metaphilosophical naturalism-question 71.1% of the respondents accepted apriority, whereas 18.3% had a negative reaction to this notion. In ontological matters 39.3% of the respondents accepted Platonism, and nominalism was supported by 22.9% of philosophers. The division between analytic and synthetic truths was embraced by 64.8% of respondents and rejected by 27% of philosophers. In the philosophy of the mind, physicalism was supported by 56.4% of philosophers and rejected by 27% of philosophers. Seen in the light of these numbers, the dominance of

sophical naturalism is not as dominant as it is often made out to be in the literature. What this shows is that philosophers are fallible at judging the conditions in their field, and probably base their “quesstimates” on the philosophical scenes of their own surroundings (which of course does not need to reflect the situation in the whole field).

Two decades ago, Bonjour (1998: 23) could still write how the rationalist critics of naturalism were “persistent, but badly outnumbered”. After this assessment the metaphilosophical landscape has become somewhat more balanced, and there are nowadays quite a number of rationalists who oppose naturalism in an outspoken manner. Bealer (2002) has described this development as the “renaissance” of neo-rationalism. In the next section I will examine the representatives of contemporary metaphilosophical rationalism.

3.6 RATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY METAPHILOSOPHY

The philosophical terrain on which the recent articulations and defences of rationalist conceptions of philosophy have taken place lies at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of language. More often than not, the rationalists’ views have organic links with interrelated issues in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, too. At the heart of metaphilosophical rationalism is the doctrine of *epistemological rationalism*, which defends the existence of *a priori* knowledge and furthermore deems this knowledge in certain ways as outranking the empirical *a posteriori* knowledge.⁴⁷ If at least some non-trivial philosophical truths are included in the scope of *a priori* knowledge, we can derive auxiliary metaphilosophical conclusions from this rationalistic theory of knowledge regarding the epistemological character of philosophical inquiry itself. Moreover, when rationalists invoke semantic ideas about the nature of concepts and concept possession in their explanations for the source and origin of apriority, we get the second part of the rationalist conception of philosophy, which relates to

naturalism and its constituent first-order philosophical theses is thus not that overwhelming. (Bourget & Chalmers 2014.)

⁴⁷ During the period of modern philosophy another important thread in philosophical discussions regarding epistemological rationalism concerned the possibility of innate ideas and knowledge. In our times this debate is continued by *nativists*, who argue that we have such innate knowledge, for example, regarding a universal syntax of language (Chomsky, Fodor), whereas contemporary empiricists adhere to a modernised version of the Lockean notion of human mind as a *tabula rasa* and hold that all concepts are acquired through experience (Prinz). These issues are, however, mostly irrelevant for the modern *metaphilosophical* rationalism.

the subject matter and aim of philosophy: the specific responsibility of philosophy is to carry out conceptual analysis of certain philosophically relevant concepts. A corollary of these epistemological and semantic views is the idea that the philosophical truths are true in the strongest modal sense and are thus necessarily true. Upon the philosophical foundation provided by these rationalist doctrines we can sketch a distinctive metaphilosophical outlook regarding the nature of philosophical investigation, which separates philosophising sharply from the undertakings of empirical special sciences, as they study the contingent phenomena of the sensible reality revealed to us in *a posteriori* knowledge. Philosophy possesses autonomy and authority over these empirical special sciences in the potential situations where their views regarding some matter pull in opposite directions.

I will not elaborate on the minutiae of metaphilosophical rationalism on a general level beyond the short exposition above. I will instead exhibit certain notable articulations of this position, which will better illustrate the ways in which the individual core theses of rationalism can be formulated and defended. The forms of rationalism I will examine are provided by Christopher Peacocke, Laurence Bonjour and George Bealer. In addition to these three individual philosophers, I also present the slightly different form of rationalism known the Canberra plan, which has been championed by several different philosophers.⁴⁸

Peacocke (1992; 2000; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006) defends an ambitious form of rationalism, which he calls *generalized rationalism*. In his formulation (Peacocke 2004: 2), this view

is a form of rationalism in part because it holds that some reasons—or better, some entitlements—for making judgments are a priori, justified independently of perception. It is also a form of rationalism in part because it holds that the status of these entitlements as a priori is founded in a particular way in the network of relations between understanding, truth and entitlement. The position I develop is more specifically a generalized form of rationalism because it holds that, once the issues are properly formulated, all entitlements have a fundamentally a priori component.

The point of departure for Peacocke's thinking is provided by the notion of justified transitions, which can occur between the intentional states of a thinker.

⁴⁸ In addition to the examples covered in this section, other notable defences of metaphilosophical rationalism can be found in Sosa (1998; 2006; 2007), Katz (1998), Lowe (2005), Huemer (2005), Hanna (2006), Pust (2000) and Ichikawa & Jarvis (2016).

These justified transitions can be either *inferential* (for instance, a thinker's transition from the premises of a standard *modus ponens* inference to its logical conclusion) or *non-inferential* (for instance, a transition from a sensual observation to a corresponding belief). The justification of the transitions between intentional states can be explained through their "truth-conducivity" which, under Peacocke's (*ibid.*: 11) description, means that "the transition tends to lead to true judgements (or, in case the transition relies on premises, tends to do so when its premises are true) in a distinctive way characteristic of rational transitions."

According to the *metasemantic explanation* provided by Peacocke (*ibid.*: 52) the genesis of truth-conducivity can be explained philosophically by taking into account the specific natures of the intentional contents and states, which are related to the transition under our consideration. To be a bit more specific, this explanation is based on Peacocke's (1992) theory of concepts and concept possession, which aims to explain how a competent and rational thinker who possesses a certain concept, can use it in situations which are truth-conducive (for example, a competent user of the concept of conjunction will use it consistently in accordance with the logical introduction and elimination rules for conjunction). In this way, entitled transitions between intentional states are really brought about by our semantic skill of using and understanding concepts. On this point Peacocke sees himself as differing from certain other rationalists, such as Kurt Gödel and Roger Penrose, who Peacocke calls *faculty rationalists* (Peacocke 2004: 153). According to Peacocke, these rival rationalists postulate needlessly a supernatural source of knowledge to explain the genesis of apriority. In Peacocke's rationalist model there is no need for such a postulation, since the origins and contents of *a priori* knowledge are construed through the metasemantic explanation.

On its general orientation Peacocke's theory of concepts is Fregean, since it holds that concepts are abstract platonic entities, and they should thus not be identified with the psychological properties of actual human beings, such as our mental representations of the categories of the world. On the other hand, concepts should not be identified with the referents of these concepts situated in the actual world either. Against this Fregean backdrop it is in Peacocke's (2005b: 169) view entirely possible "that there are concepts human beings may never acquire, because of their intellectual limitations, or because the sun will expand to eradicate human life before humans reach a stage at which they can acquire these concepts."

In Peacocke's generalized rationalism all entitled transitions include a constitutive *a priori* element, and in this regard he sees his theory as differing from those of the earlier rationalists (in specific, Peacocke mentions here the names

of Leibniz, Frege and Gödel) who limited the cases of *a priori* knowledge only to those instances which are in Peacocke's (2004: 33) view "outright apriori". Moreover, Peacocke thinks that an inescapable *a priori* element plays a part also in the cases of "relative a priori", such as the cases of non-deductive abductive reasoning and in epistemic transitions from a sensual experience⁴⁹ to a corresponding belief. According to Peacocke, all entitlements must have an *a priori* component of this kind, if we want to answer the sceptical challenges about the existence of external world.

Besides Peacocke, another notable expression of the moderate rationalist programme can be located in the writings of Bonjour (1998; 2001; 2005). In these texts Bonjour's primary aim is to defend the core tenet of epistemological rationalism, that is to say, that there exists a legitimate form of *a priori* knowledge, whose instances are not limited to mere trivial tautologies or artificially stipulated definitions. In Bonjour's (1998: 102) view this kind of substantial *a priori* knowledge derives from an intellectual act he calls "*rational insight* or *rational intuition*". This act can be described as the immediate and non-inferential understanding of "the nature or structure of reality" (*ibid.*: 16, 106).

However, Bonjour (*ibid.*: 102) hastes to add, like Peacocke, that the origin of the *a priori* knowledge understood in this way does not require us to postulate a distinct and *sui generis* form of knowing in the ranks of our cognitive abilities, since nothing about apriority depends "beyond an understanding of the propositional content itself." In slightly more general terms, in Bonjour's (*ibid.*: 109) understanding our epistemic ability which makes *a priori* knowledge possible is simply our "ability to understand and think." On these grounds we can categorise Bonjour's epistemological theory, like Peacocke's, as a form of understanding-based account of *a priori* knowledge, where the *a priori* knowledge is produced through the process of conceptual understanding. In addition to this point about the origins of apriority, another noteworthy issue which makes Bonjour's rationalism moderate is the fact that in his view, this epistemological theory allows fallibilism, so that the *a priori* knowledge is fallible and in principle always susceptible to later revisions in light of better knowledge.

Bonjour's defence for apriority is to large extent indirect, and it is given through criticism aimed at the alternative epistemological theories. Moderate

⁴⁹ It is for this reason that Peacocke speaks in broader terms of transitions between intentional states (rather than more restrictedly of transitions from one *belief* to another), since the intentional states taken broadly include also our immediate representations, such as notably the instances of sensual experience, to which the subject has not committed in the traditional form of a propositional attitude.

empiricism, which would allow the existence of some kind of weak form of apriority, fails when it tries to explain the origins of this kind of knowledge via analytic claims.⁵⁰ The more radical forms of empiricism, which deny the existence of *a priori* knowledge altogether, lead inevitably to global scepticism, so that committing to a view like this is in Bonjour's view tantamount to an "intellectual suicide". Bonjour (2001: 626) has called this specific line of attack his "master argument" due to its central place in his thinking.

However, not all of Bonjour's arguments in favour of apriority are indirect. From a positive side, he thinks that what works in favour of apriority is the intuitive appearance of the instances of *a priori* knowledge. For Bonjour, this means the fact that there is abundance of examples of apriority, which already feel to us like *a priori* knowledge (1998: 107). Thus the onus is on the opponents of apriority to explain away these *prima facie* examples.

Both Peacocke and Bonjour see their epistemological views about the nature and origins of apriority as directly having additional metaphilosophical significance. Based on his own views in this topic, per Peacocke (*ibid.*: 745) philosophical investigation about the "nature of particular concepts, objects, kinds, properties, and relations" can be epistemologically *a priori*, just like the investigation in formal sciences such as logic and mathematics, it reveals metaphysically necessary truths. He mentions specifically the moral principles, which state that "that every conscious being has a *prima facie* equal moral claim" and "that causing avoidable suffering is wrong" (*ibid.*: 745).

In a similar vein, Bonjour has remarked that defending apriority is of utmost importance for the self-understanding of philosophy. He (Bonjour 1998: xi, 106) states that it is his conviction that "the need for an account of genuine and non-tautological *a priori* justification seems to [him] especially urgent for philosophy itself", since it is his "conviction [...] that philosophy is *a priori* if anything (or at least if it is anything intellectually respectable)". Bonjour's (2005: 101) view here is that the scope of *a priori* knowledge extends beyond the standard logical and mathematical instances also to philosophical quarters, such as to moral knowledge and also to metaphysical facts about the nature of space and time. Bonjour has also in his own actual philosophical practice adhered to the tenets of his rationalist conception of philosophy. For instance, in epistemology Bonjour (1998) has defended a modernised form of Cartesian foundationalism and in the field of philosophy of mind he has advocated antimaterialism through *a priori* philosophical arguments (Bonjour 2010).

⁵⁰ In Bonjour's interesting reading, Kant can also be regarded as a "Humean moderate empiricist" since for Kant the synthetic *a priori* knowledge is, in the end, limited only to the level of phenomenal reality, and so it is thus not genuinely substantial knowledge.

Besides Peacocke and Bonjour, a third major representative of modern metaphilosophical rationalism is Bealer, who has developed this view in a string of papers over several decades (see Bealer 1987; 1992; 1996; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998d; 1999; 2002; 2004; 2010). In a manner similar to that of other rationalists presented here, Bealer's conception of philosophy is built around the foundation stone provided by the epistemological defence of apriority. Bealer notes that following Kant it has been customary to characterise *a priori* knowledge in a negative manner as a form of knowledge, whose justification *is not* derived from any *a posteriori* source of justification, such as sense experience, introspection, testimony or memory. In Bealer's suggestion, however, *a priori* knowledge can be analysed positively as a kind of knowledge, whose justification *is* decisively derived from rational intuitions. In Bealer's words (2004: 12) "[i]ntuition is the source of all non-inferential *a priori* knowledge—except, of course, for that which is merely stipulative."

Nevertheless, this positive characterisation of apriority advances the explanation only one step forward, since it is still unclear what intuitions are and where they come from—it does us no good to say that apriority is grounded in intuitions, if we do not know what intuitions themselves really are. In Bealer's view this problem can be tackled with the help of *phenomenological analysis*, by which he means a sort of first person "armchair psychology", where we monitor introspectively our own thoughts and their characteristic appearances. In this sense we use phenomenological reporting when we try to describe to our friend how a strong case of migraine or *déjà vu* feels to us phenomenally.

What does Bealer think that these phenomenological analyses tell us about the phenomenal character of intuitions? The positive analysis, which Bealer gives to intuitions can be summarised as follows: intuition is an episodic *sui generis* propositional attitude, where it *seems* to us "that *p*" (Bealer alternatively refers to intuitions as *intellectual seemings*).⁵¹ In Bealer's view, intuitions are also associated with the strong feeling of necessity; for example, when we have the intuition that the subject in Gettier's example does not possess knowledge (see Section 4.3), this conclusion feels to us as though it could not in any circumstances be otherwise.

Taken on its own Bealer's characterisation for intuitions is rather terse, and it does not really enlighten us about the deeper nature of this phenomenon. Bealer, however, does not explicate this matter any further, and instead simply

⁵¹ In Bealer's (1998a: 207) own words: "When you have an intuition that A, it *seems* to you that A. [...] For example, when you first consider one of de Morgan's laws, often it neither seems true nor seems false; after a moment's reflection, however, something happens: it now just seems true."

comments that further phenomenological analyses prove that any attempt to reduce intuitions into some (supposedly) more fundamental cognitive abilities or phenomena are doomed to fail.

Bealer does acknowledge the fact that our individual intuitions can be mistaken, so that the *a priori* justification they provide is only *prima facie*—in other words, the intuitive evidence we get is true until proven otherwise by our *secunda facie* intuitions. To use an actual example from the history of philosophy, the original epistemic intuition in support of the Platonian analysis of knowledge was overturned by the more refined intuitions awakened in us by the relevant Gettier counterexamples.

The fallibility of intuitions becomes evident also in another way when we consider the case of paradoxes. It appears that we have here a set of propositions, which considered individually might all be intuitive but which, nevertheless, taken together trigger a contradiction. As a philosophically relevant illustration of such a predicament, Bealer mentions the intuitive axiom of Frege's set theory, which was—despite its initial intuitiveness—later demonstrated by Russell to lead Frege's system into a paradoxical impasse. Nevertheless, our original intuition, which we eventually noticed was erroneous, can still seem accurate to us. In this aspect intuitive paradoxes can be compared to the optical Muller-Lyer illusions for sense perception, where we know that the two arrows are of the same length, but we still cannot shake off the feeling that one of them still looks longer than the other one (Bealer 1998a: 208).

From the fallibility of intuitions we move naturally to the next issue, which concerns the supposed evidential role that rational intuitions play in philosophical contexts. A sceptical naturalist can now ask: What reasons do we have to trust rational intuitions in philosophical argumentation and theorising? Do we not need to know something about their aetiology before we can trust their relevance for philosophical inquiry? Bealer's answer to this concern comes from his ideas regarding the nature of concepts and concept possession, quite similarly to Peacocke's and Bonjour's forms of rationalism. In Bealer's semantic theory the ways a speaker can possess a concept can be classified into two ways. On the one hand we have concept possession in the *nominal sense*, which leaves room for situations where the speaker (a) has understood the concept only partially (that is, there exists gaps in the speakers thinking regarding the concept's application-conditions); or (b) she has straight-out mistaken beliefs about the concept, and she applies it incorrectly (for instance, by calling the *sister* of her parent uncle). For Bealer much more important than the concept possession in the nominal sense is concept possession in the *determinate sense*—which Bealer

states (1998b: 273) in everyday idiomatic language is called simply “understanding a concept”.⁵²

What, then, is this phenomenon all about? In simple terms this means for Bealer a kind of concept possession, which is qualitatively better than the nominal concept possession. So in other words, concept possession in a determinate sense does not display the kind of situation where the speaker commits the flaws of partial understanding and erroneous usage, which are typical for cases of nominal concept possession. Bealer thus defines determinate concept possession to large extent negatively by telling us what it is not (that is, the failures demonstrated by nominal concept possession). If we want to assess how strong a speaker’s concept possession is, we can do this by reviewing her intuitions regarding the application of this concept (Bealer 1998b: 262). In principle, this testing can be achieved by asking the speaker a number of questions related to the concept in question (for example, “Is it possible for triangle to be a polygon?”), and then watching what her answers are in *cognitively ideal circumstances* (which means that the speaker is not tired, distracted, intoxicated or in any other way incapacitated to answer these questions to the best of her abilities). For example, any speaker who answers the question “Is it possible for a triangle to be a polygon?” negatively (or alternatively cannot answer this question at all), does not clearly possess the concept of triangle in the determinate sense. In this regard the concept possession is dependable on the speaker’s subjective conceptual competence and psychological performance. Concept possession in the determinate sense is an unconditional phenomenon—a speaker either achieves this level fully or she does not. Concept possession in the nominal sense is in contrast a gradual phenomenon so there is a whole range of ways in which how a speaker can possess a concept in this sense—some do it better, others worse. When the speaker’s conceptual resources and cognitive competence improve, so does the accuracy of her intuitions.⁵³

⁵² Bealer’s reference to our everyday idioms is a bit odd here, since he later idealises concept possession in the determined sense in such uncompromising terms that it is questionable whether actual cognitively limited humans can ever achieve it. Thus it is not quite an “everyday” phenomenon.

⁵³ A notable exception in Bealer’s (1987; 1998a: 227–9) theory is caused by *semantic externalism*, which states that for certain concepts, such as the natural kind terms such as water and gold, the concept possession in determinate sense requires, in addition to our *a priori* intuitions, always additional *a posteriori* knowledge about the make-up of the actual world. Thus systematising our intuitions regarding these concepts do not yet exhaust their full meaning. In Bealer’s terminology such concepts are called *semantically unstable*. However, he does not see them as being problems for *a priori* sciences such as philosophy, mathematics and logic, which study only semantically stable concepts, and so makes them immune to worries rising from semantic

Philosophical theorising—and more generally other *a priori* disciplines, such as mathematics and logic—can be construed in Bealer’s view as ongoing dialectic processes, where we try to systematise our *a priori* intuitions about philosophically relevant concepts in the form of conceptual truths. Then the “speaker” who is carrying out this task of intuition-systematisation does not have to be one and the same individual through the whole process from start to finish but, rather, one individual speaker can play his little part in handing the baton forward to the next generation of philosophers. Although the systematisation of intuitions creates conceptual truths as its end results, Bealer (1998a: 211–2; 1998c: §6) does not think that these philosophical truths are analytic truths *per se*. His reason for thinking so is that we have an abundance of truths known *a priori* which are nevertheless hard to fit into the traditional mould of analytic truths (or then the characteristics of analyticity have to be understood so differently that this phenomenon loses its original theoretical identity). As good examples of non-analytic intuitively known truths we can mention our intuitions regarding certain properties of colours (such as their incompatibilities: “it is impossible for my bike to be both green and red at the same time”), or certain mathematical truths (such as the fact that congruence is an asymmetric relation).

Of some interest here is Bealer’s (1998a: 202–3) suggestion that actual human beings might not ever succeed in systematising our intuitions to their fullest potential, since we have non-remediable conceptual and cognitive limitations, which stop us from ever crossing the finishing line of our inquiries. He nevertheless is optimistic about philosophy’s prospects (*ibid.*: 203): “I believe that, *collectively, over historical time, undertaking philosophy as a civilization-wide project*, we can obtain authoritative answers to a wide variety of central philosophical questions.” Thus the autonomy of philosophy must really be seen as an idealised thesis about a hypothetical situation, where these limitations about

externalism. The list of examples that Bealer (1998a: 222) offers of semantically stable philosophically relevant concepts goes as follows: “Now, intuitively, it is at least possible for most of the central concepts of philosophy to be possessed determinately—substance, mind, intelligence, consciousness, sensation, perception, knowledge, wisdom, truth, identity, infinity, divinity, time, explanation, causation, freedom, purpose, goodness, duty, the virtues, love, life, happiness, and so forth. It would be entirely *ad hoc* to deny this.”

the actual human beings are not in place. It is only under these idealised circumstances where the autonomy of philosophy as an *a priori* discipline comes to pass in full extent.⁵⁴ Bealer (*ibid.*: 201) expresses his thesis in the following way:

Among the central questions of philosophy that can be answered by one standard theoretical means or another, most can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying substantively on the sciences.

Bealer (*ibid.*) complements this principle of autonomy with a stronger thesis about the authority of philosophical argumentation:

Insofar as science and philosophy purport to answer the same central philosophical questions, in most cases the support that science could in principle provide for those answers is not as strong as that which philosophy could in principle provide for its answers. So, should there be conflicts, the authority of philosophy in most cases can be greater in principle.

What, then, could be in Bealer's view a good example of the grassroots level philosophising, where the results of this activity are autonomous from the natural sciences? We do not have to look too far to find such an example since in Bealer's (1998a: 201–2; 1998b: 262–3) view his thoughts about the autonomy of philosophy fit this bill and are in themselves already intuitively established pieces of philosophical investigation in epistemology and philosophy of language. He remarks outright, that any psychological investigation about the trustfulness of intuitions or the nature of concepts are irrelevant for his philosophical conclusions. Bealer (1998a: 202) writes:

The thesis that intuitions have the indicated strong modal tie to the truth is a philosophical (conceptual) thesis not open to empirical confirmation or refutation. The defense of it is philosophical, ultimately resting on intuitions.

Perhaps the most influential—well, certainly the most discussed—contemporary articulation of metaphilosophical rationalism is the so-called *Canberra analysis*, which is “the style of philosophy influenced by David K. Lewis and Frank

⁵⁴ It should be noted that Bealer does not comment on how philosophy might be autonomous in its relationship with mathematics and logics. It seems that this issue is not metaphilosophically noteworthy in his view. Then it is perhaps possible to regard all *a priori* sciences as forming one unity.

Jackson, whose practitioners often seemed to pass through the Philosophy Programme at the Research School of Social Sciences at ANU during the 1990s”, as David Braddon-Mitchell (2009: 25) describes (the acronym ‘ANU’ mentioned in the quotation stands for the *Australian National University*, located at the Australia’s capital city of Canberra, and this connection has given the Canberra analysis its unofficial name). In addition to Lewis and Jackson mentioned here, in recent years this conception of philosophy has also been championed vigorously by David J. Chalmers (1996; 1999; 2002; 2006).

In the Canberra rationalists’ view the aim of philosophy is to analyse the contents of philosophically interesting *folk concepts*⁵⁵ as a part of two-stage analytical process.⁵⁶ The first of these stages is from start to finish the responsibility of philosophers. During this process philosophers collect and systematise “platitudes” about our subject matter, and these platitudes can be basically any descriptions and beliefs pertaining to this topic. These platitudes reveal the conditions for applying the concept in question—in other words, they tell us what kind of objects this concept is supposed to apply to in the actual world. If necessary, we can use the methodology of intuitions and thought experiments to better flesh out these platitudes regarding the folk concepts. In the typical view of Canberra analysts, the methodology of intuitions and thought experiments is independent from sensory experience, that is, it is epistemologically *a priori*.

The latter of the two stages of the analytic process is at least partly *a posteriori*, since in it we examine what phenomena in our actual world in fact satisfy the theories embedded in our folk concepts. Here we are aided by sciences such as physics, which tells us what the actual world is like in its physical composition. In cases where we cannot locate any thing or phenomenon to satisfy our folk concept, we can discard that concept as vacuous.

Canberra analysts explicate the technicalities of their metaphilosophical outlook usually with the aid of the theoretical framework of *two-dimensional semantics*.⁵⁷ In short, two-dimensional semantics is an upgraded form of the traditional possible world semantics, where the meanings of linguistic expressions

⁵⁵ Jackson (1998: 33), in fact, sees philosophical analysis as targeting words instead of concepts, but he still writes about concepts and conceptual analysis, since he wants to retain continuity with established terminology in the field.

⁵⁶ Generally this methodology is expansion on the so-called Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis analysis for theoretical terms (Lewis 1970; Jackson 1998: 38).

⁵⁷ Two-dimensional semantics was first (and before its metaphilosophical applications) developed in formal and informal semantics by philosophers such as Robert Stalnaker, David K. Lewis, David Kaplan, Martin Davies, Lloyd Humberstone and Pavel Tichy. For an extensive overview, see Chalmers (2006).

and claims can be examined as functions to possible worlds (and groups of possible worlds).⁵⁸ Jackson (1998: 47–8) introduces this framework in the following way:

We can think of the various possible particulars, situations, events, or whatever to which a term applies in two different ways, depending on whether we are considering what the term applies to under various hypotheses about which world is the *actual world*, or whether we are considering what the term applies to under various *counterfactual hypotheses*.

In actual philosophical practice this idea works in the following way: For the traditional possible world semantics it is natural to evaluate modal claims from the point of view of our own world, designated as the actual world. This dimension can be called as the dimension of traditional metaphysical necessity. Then, for example, the designations of proper names and natural kind terms are fixedly same in all possible worlds than they are in our own actual world.

But if we now examine non-actual possible worlds from their *own* point of view *as if* they were the actual world (instead of the traditional counterfactual model), we note that proper names and natural kind terms too can pick out different objects in different worlds. The type of two dimensional semantics espoused by Chalmers and Jackson can also be called *epistemological* two-dimensionality on the grounds that for them the latter dimension in this model is the dimension of epistemological necessity and connects to apriority.⁵⁹ In other words, it reveals everything we can know *a priori* without knowing what the actual world is like.⁶⁰ (Chalmers 1996: 56–65; 2002: 162–5 & 2006: 59–62; Jackson 1998: 39–41.)

When these observations are now seen against the background of the two-phased analysis, we get a theoretical explanation for the division of labour between armchair philosophy and *a posteriori* natural sciences: in the first stage of

⁵⁸ Bealer (2002: 87) criticises Chalmers and Jackson on the issue that they seem to take the ontologically difficult notion of possible worlds as an unproblematic tool in their theories. By Bealer's lights, possible worlds and the related notions of propositions, intensional entities, necessity and so on are too important to be treated casually. Indeed, Bealer (1998c; 1998d) has strived to argue in his own work for a rationalist conception of philosophy, which gives detailed account of concepts, propositions and other intensional entities. For discussion about modality and possible worlds, see Divers (2002).

⁵⁹ Chalmers (2006: 98) gives apriority the following definition: "A sentence token is a priori when it expresses an a priori thought. A thought is a priori when it can be conclusively non-experientially justified on ideal rational reflection."

⁶⁰ In their respective terminologies Chalmers has talked about primary and secondary intensions, whereas Jackson has used the terms *A* and *C*-intensions.

the analysis we chart the application conditions for a philosophically relevant folk concept through its epistemological dimension (using intuitions and thought experiments), but we ultimately need also empirical knowledge regarding the composition of the actual world to settle the issue of how that concept behaves in our world (whether it applies to something or not). Metaphilosophically crucial in this setting is now that for some concepts their two dimensions overlap, so that we can say already before any empirical investigation *a priori* how that concept necessarily operates in every possible world—including our own actual world. Chalmers (1996) has for example used the zombie-argument to show that in all worlds qualitative consciousness remains separate from its physical basis.

Indeed, the opposition of ontological materialism (and physicalism) in the philosophy of mind is one common theme, where many rationalists make use of the autonomy of philosophy for which they have argued on the metaphilosophical level (see articles in the anthology *The Waning of Materialism*, edited by Koons & Bealer 2010). But it should be remembered, that a philosopher can also be a rationalist in metaphilosophical matters yet advocate naturalism in ontological questions (like Jackson and Lewis do, for example).

3.7 OTHER NEIGHBOURING PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES AND DEBATES

Here at the ultimate section of this main chapter I wrap up my exposition on the naturalism-question by identifying a variety of connections which this metaphilosophical issue can organically come to have with certain more wide-ranging issues and debates in the adjacent philosophical terrain. These neighbouring issues and debates belong generally speaking to the branch of philosophy of science and they concern in diverse ways the function, explanatory power, objectivity and socio-cultural stature of the empirical sciences. The disagreements between the naturalists and anti-naturalists *can in some* instances extend to these more general issues and debates outside of metaphilosophy as well—and on the other hand philosophers can draw inspiration from these non-metaphilosophical directions when they are articulating their thoughts on the nature of philosophy. Be that as it may, I contend that where it is possible, the metaphilosophical debates should be conducted and assessed separately from these broader contexts without, for example, questioning the ulterior motives of our metaphilosophical opponents.

Firstly, we should emphasise that the metaphilosophical question concerning the relationship of philosophy and the empirical sciences is by no means an

exceptional topic it its overall spirit and purpose. Indeed, there exists numerous distinct “naturalism-questions” regarding the fundamental nature and cognitive role of other academic disciplines as well, and these non-metaphilosophical “naturalism-questions” follow *mutatis mutandis* the same basic formula with our metaphilosophical case. In similar manner to the metaphilosophical naturalism-question, these kindred problems weigh up the nature of the two-way relationship which a certain (*prima facie*) non-empirical discipline has with the natural sciences and their empirical theory-building. For example, several theorists have put forward their philosophically motivated interpretations of the fundamental nature and purpose of the humanities (taken liberally, so that this term covers also the various social and cultural sciences). The burning question here is whether the general theoretical model—which includes the conception of reality and the methodology used to investigate it—describing the functioning of the natural sciences can simultaneously give an account of the foundational aspects of the human sciences too. For many of those theorists who approach this subject from the direction of the humanities, the driving conviction is that when we are elucidating the philosophical underpinnings of these disciplines, we need a separate template which differs qualitatively from the one used to describe the ontological and epistemological starting parameters of the research carried out within the natural sciences.

This is now the point where the links from anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy to conceptions of humanities begin to arise: An account of human nature, a non-empirical form of theorising or a *sui generis* viewpoint articulated by a form of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism can concurrently be the springboard for derivative philosophical views, which help to establish and defend the autonomy of a particular humanistic field of study relative to the natural sciences.⁶¹ In such a broader context hermeneutics and phenomenology, for example, are influential and vital forms of anti-naturalistic thinking not only in

⁶¹ This close alignment between anti-naturalistic metaphilosophy and the philosophies of human sciences is plainly visible, for example, in the thinking of Peter Winch, whose work *The Idea of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* [1958] is a landmark defence of the unique character of the social sciences. In the first pages of his work, Winch (*ibid.*: 2–3) notes that before he can develop his main line of argument, he has to first argue in favour of a particular anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy, which has been heavily influenced by the (meta)philosophical views of Wittgenstein and Ryle. In Winch’s view, his metaphilosophical anti-naturalism lays a necessary philosophical foundation for his later conclusions concerning the *sui generis* nature of the social sciences. In Winch’s vision, philosophy and the social sciences share a similar theoretical framework, which then sets them both qualitatively apart from the natural sciences (In quick summary: for Winch when a social scientist attempts to understand other cultures and societies, this task inevitably constitutes an attempt to understand other *forms of*

metaphilosophy, but also regarding the philosophical foundations of the human sciences as they help to establish the deep-seated divergences between the scientific mode of *explanation* and the humanistic mode of *understanding*. The influence of various forms of anti-naturalism is apparent in the guidebooks of qualitative research, where one can typically find advice on the application of these philosophical viewpoints.

Indeed, from a historical point of view certain highly influential expressions of anti-naturalism have evolved side by side with the related ideas regarding the foundations of human sciences, and certain thinkers—such as Wilhelm Dilthey and R.G. Collingwood—have played an equally big part in both anti-naturalistic metaphilosophy and the philosophy of humanities. When the history of ideas is scrutinised in retrospect with this link in mind, we can note how the discussions regarding the distinctive place of the human and social sciences within the academia grew more intense during the nineteenth century concurrently as anti-naturalistic philosophers began to express more outspoken defences of their own discipline's characteristic identity and value as a genuine member of the newly-reorganising academic family (for example, consider the importance of Leopold von Ranke and Auguste Comte for the emerging disciplines of historiography and sociology, respectively).

Analogously, certain other forms of metaphilosophical anti-naturalism have profound corollaries for our conception of formal sciences, such as logic, mathematics, game theory and theoretical computer science. A good demonstration of this connection is the way in which the epistemological tenets regarding the origins and special characteristics of apriority contained in metaphilosophical rationalism extend in the texts of its typical proponents to cover besides philosophical theorising also the undertakings of mathematics and logic as well (and the same goes for the ontological nature of the subject matters of these disciplines, which are often framed in similar terms with philosophy). Moreover, the rationalists' metaphilosophical defence of philosophy's autonomy is usually meant to extend to these formal sciences as well, and grant them similar autonomous position as *a priori* sciences relative to the *a posteriori* natural sciences. And just as the case has been with the philosophical views concerning the foundations of the human sciences, the views pertaining to the philosophical foundations of mathematics and logic have often evolved side by side with the anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy: The fate of philosophy was closely intertwined with the fates of mathematics and logic already in the anti-naturalistic

life, which references the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games and the idiosyncratic cases of rule-following these language-games entail, which can give us language-game specific criteria for assessing the rationality of particular actions and customs, among other things).

thinking of Kant, and of the later philosophers who influenced flourishing traditions of anti-naturalism we can mention specifically the names of Frege and Husserl, who had both had their initial academic training in mathematics, and this intellectual background is also reflected in their metaphilosophical views as they defended the autonomy of mathematics and logic against the psychologising lines of interpretation (however, here it is necessary to add that this correlation between mathematical upbringing and anti-naturalistic tendencies in metaphilosophical matters is not entirely straightforward since from the opposite direction it is possible to bring up the names of Russell and Quine, who had had analogous formative educations and possessed similar philosophical interests with the two prominent anti-naturalists mentioned above, but who still ended up championing forms of naturalism in metaphilosophical contexts).

Indeed, these theoretical connections between anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy on the one hand and non-empirical disciplines on the other can often indicate to us what a given anti-naturalist takes to be the closest academic reference group and ally of philosophy: in other words, does that particular anti-naturalist model philosophy after the humanities or formal sciences (whereas naturalists align philosophy with the empirical special sciences). Trying to examine the naturalism-question as a purely metaphilosophical question can thus be hard, since, for example, the proponents of metaphilosophical rationalism often pick their exemplars of *a priori* knowledge from the fields of mathematics and logic, which makes it difficult to assess the merits of their theories without visiting the discussions regarding the foundations of these neighbouring fields in the same process. Naturalists can then say, that although they criticise the anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy as an *a priori* science, this criticism does not necessarily tell anything about their conception of the formal sciences (which can be thought of as *a priori* even in the view of moderate naturalists—their claim is merely that this meta-theoretical framework is not applicable to the case of philosophy).

In addition to these links with the topics pertaining to the foundations of other non-empirical disciplines, the metaphilosophical naturalism-question has organic connections within the broader philosophy of science with certain themes which ponder the functioning, explanatory power, objectivity and socio-cultural stature of the natural sciences. Issues stemming from these broader contexts can then lead to confused misconceptions and prejudices regarding the naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy (which should be seen first and foremost as taking a stand on the *metaphilosophical* naturalism-question, and not on these related contexts). This concern has actual signifi-

cance, for example, in the cases where the forms of anti-naturalism, which separate philosophy and empirical science from each other on metaphilosophical grounds, are stigmatised as being also in some more wide-ranging way *anti-science* and thus beyond the pale. At the same time naturalists might try to monopolise the respectful *pro-science* sentiment for themselves, so that any criticism of naturalism can thus be branded as being targeted against the sciences as a whole—as if a philosopher could not really maintain a respectful attitude towards the sciences without concurrently being a naturalist in her metaphilosophical thinking. Conversely, one expectation might now become that naturalists would always demonstrate complete and blindly uncritical reverence for the sciences and alter their philosophical views whenever a random scientist just happens to tell them to do so. These preconceptions are of course embellished for a rhetorical effect here, but, in practice, they can lead to a vicious circle where the defining criteria for naturalism get watered down to the point where this label becomes practically meaningless: As the number of philosophers who want to be labelled on purpose as being openly anti-science is quite low, philosophers try to side-step this dishonour by trying to get included in the ranks of “reasonable” naturalists by paying lip service to this view—their real anti-naturalistic tendencies notwithstanding. Thus ‘naturalism’ as a distinct metaphilosophical position can get quickly downgraded to the point where it amounts to having simple respect for the achievements of sciences or even worse: some sort of minimal awareness of what is happening within the contemporaneous sciences (as was noted earlier in Section 3.1, it is not sensible to use such a minimal criterion of simple scientific awareness to identify “naturalists” from the earlier eras of philosophy either).

Fortunately, we can avoid such perils as long as we leave anti-naturalists sufficient leeway to move in these more general discussions of philosophy of science. This becomes considerably easier when we distinguish the following three groups of topics from each other:

- 1) Anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy, which want to establish on the level of metaphilosophy the difference between philosophical and scientific research, and to this end locate a distinctive subject matter, method and/or aim for philosophy, which differs qualitatively from those underlying the activities of the empirical sciences. In anti-naturalists’ view, this qualitative difference establishes epistemological autonomy for philosophical claims relative to the undertakings of the empirical sciences.

- 2) A range of questions which belong to the philosophy of science and pertain to different *conceptions of science*: what is the hierarchy of sciences (that is, the question of how the quantitative and the qualitative research relate to each other); how scientific concepts and theories relate to the truth and reality (that is, the issue of scientific realism vs. antirealism); are the choices between rival scientific theories always done on purely rational and objective grounds, or can the actions of individual scientists be influenced by their social environments and subjective psychological factors (and more generally by the values and ideals of the contemporaneous culture); and so on.
- 3) The openly *anti-scientific* views which criticise and undermine the sciences on the one hand and the *pseudo-scientific* attempts to steal the prestige of sciences in the name of economic or ideological gains on the other.

With these clarifying distinctions at our disposal we can now perceive that a philosopher's views regarding anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy on the metaphilosophical level (1) need not to tie the said philosopher's hands in relation to her conception of science (2) in a way which would follow mechanically from her thoughts on the metaphilosophical naturalism versus anti-naturalism issue. Although the naturalism-question concerns as a metaphilosophical problem the nature of the relationship between the philosophy and the natural sciences, it does not come with ready-made and integrated interpretations regarding the nature of the other part of this relationship (that is, science), so that the only thing we would be concerned about in this equation was the nature of philosophy. Instead, it is possible to choose within both naturalism and anti-naturalism from a wide variety of distinct views pertaining to the nature of science, and this conception of science does not necessarily pair up with a specific conception of philosophy. For example, the conception of science espoused by the naturalists does not need to be a monistic or monolithic position, such as a strong form of positivism, where the only legitimate type of inquiry is modelled after physics (and perhaps certain other disciplines, which can be thought to be reducible to physical sciences). Williamson (2011b: 515), for one, has expressed displeasure with the label of 'naturalist' (although his metaphilosophical thinking comes close to naturalism in its broad lines), because this name sounds as if it would dogmatically confine our conception of science only to the hard natural sciences:

I remain reluctant to describe the general picture which we [= Williamson & Robert Stalnaker] agree as ‘philosophical naturalism’, because that label inappropriately emphasizes philosophy’s affinity to what are usually called ‘natural sciences’ over its affinities to other forms of truth-directed inquiry, such as history, linguistics, economics and mathematics. Stalnaker says ‘the general message is that philosophy is continuous with natural science and more generally with empirical inquiry’. History, linguistics and parts of economics presumably count as ‘empirical inquiry’, if not as ‘natural science’, but what sort of inquiry is ‘empirical’ supposed to exclude if not mathematics? Although philosophy continuous with natural science, it is also continuous with mathematics; neglect of that fact has made the near-absence of non-fictional experiments in philosophy look more worrying than it really is. If the term ‘natural science’ is stipulated to cover mathematics, economics, linguistics and history as well as physics and biology, what sort of inquiry is ‘natural’ supposed to exclude?

Even a naturalist can—with certain reservations—allow in her preferred conception of science a methodological pluralism, where the quantitative and qualitative research represent two distinct yet equally valid forms of cognitive inquiry. And when we think of the connection between the scientific worldview and scientific realism, we notice that all philosophers who adhere to a scientific worldview do not automatically support scientific realism, so naturalists too can approach this topic with an open mind (see Niiniluoto 1999: 7–8). From the other direction, it is also true that anti-naturalists can—despite their metaphilosophical doctrines—still maintain a positive attitude towards the natural sciences and also situate philosophy in close proximity with the sciences.⁶² Thus anti-naturalistic philosophising too can be carried out in generally “scientific spirit” and in close co-operation with the sciences in interdisciplinary enterprises such as the cognitive science, even if anti-naturalists view philosophising as a distinct form of inquiry relative to the undertakings over the empirical side of the border.

⁶² For example, see Glock (2008a: 160, 245), who suggests that naturalism must be seen within the movement of analytic philosophy as a more specific view within a broader phenomenon of “scientific ethos”. Indeed, both naturalists and certain anti-naturalists can become targets for criticism, which state that philosophers mimic excessively the procedures and styles of scientists. Bernard Williams, for example, has voiced a critical view regarding the “stylistic scientism”, which in his view has gained popularity within the texts of analytic philosophy. By this claim Williams means that the texts of analytic philosophy aim to present their problems and solve them in scientific manner. This criticism can be read as hitting both naturalists and anti-naturalists alike.

If we try to think of some actual examples of the science-oriented temperament expressed by a representative metaphilosophical anti-naturalism, there is no better case in point than the logical positivists of the Viennese circle, as it is not easy to name a philosopher or a school who could be described as being *more* science-positive than the Viennese positivists. The central ideological leaders of this movement proclaimed in their manifesto that they seek to bring about an age of unified scientific culture, where the crown jewel of the sciences is taken to be physics (in fact, the actual title of this declaration of principles is “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis”, that is, “The scientific conception of the world: The Vienna Circle” in English; see Neurath *et al.* [1929]).

Beyond their grandiloquent avowals the logical positivists strove towards this aim also in practice by organising conferences in the hopes of increasing dialogue between the distinct special sciences and the positivists also had their own specific periodical dedicated to publishing articles pertaining to these themes. Certain key members of this school were also themselves scientists by their formative academic training, while they were at the same time deeply interested in the theoretical issues in the philosophy of science and the new formal logic (such as the leader of the Viennese circle, Moritz Schlick, who was originally a physicist). One metaphilosophically significant strand in this positivists’ admiration of the science of their times was the goal of modernising existing philosophy to fit the “scientific” standards of the age. The Viennese positivists wanted to extend the exactness of scientific theorising to philosophy in the form of the formal framework made possible by the recent advances in logic. In the same process of scientification, certain traditional yet “un-scientific” elements of philosophy — metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion and so on — were to be eliminated as old-fashioned. Certain logical positivists, such as Carnap, were even of the opinion that valid philosophising should restrict itself to a kind of formal philosophy of science, where philosophy explicates and clarifies the “logical syntax” of the scientific language, and if needed, complements it with improvements (in this sense, Carnap, too, could perhaps submit to the Lockean metaphor which likens philosophy’s role to the under-labourer of sciences). The contemporaries of logical positivists, such as the philosophical establishment of the Germanophone Europe within that timeframe, thought positivists had gone well over the board in their science-worshipping. The name ‘positivism’ itself has since then been effectively demonised — especially within the human sciences — to mean crude attempts to succumb humanities to the authority of the natural sciences. (Glock 2004; Uebel 2006.)

Against this backdrop then, it is noteworthy, that we can — with few exceptions, most notably Otto Neurath — classify logical positivists as belonging to the

anti-naturalist side in the naturalism-question: For example, although Carnap constantly refined and even radically changed his views in philosophical issues, on metaphilosophical matters he always separated the nature and the role of philosophy qualitatively from those of the empirical research. The “naturalistic turn” which occurred in the analytic philosophy after the halfway point of the twentieth century was, to a large degree, a metaphilosophical counter-reaction to the earlier approaches espoused by the logical positivists in various areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of science.

The three-part clarification outlined above can also be used to clear up the point that the anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy *qua* metaphilosophical doctrines (1) do not have to be based on some ulterior anti-science motivation (3)—unless, of course, there is some actual and undisputable evidence to really think so. A typical anti-naturalist, then, does not already have a sceptical attitude towards the outputs of science right from the get-go. Moreover, the anti-naturalist is not out to actively undermine the undertakings of the sciences by challenging them with counter-arguments coming from somewhere beyond the sciences. Of course, such critical interests can be on the agenda of *some* anti-naturalists (such as the philosophical criticism of the theoretical foundations of the cognitive science, see, for example, Bennett & Hacker 2003), but even then these critical ambitions need not to be an inseparable component in their conceptions of philosophy. On the other hand, science is not a sacrosanct “holy cow” even for the naturalists, nor a seamless monolithic entity, where one either accepts it as whole or not at all. Naturalistic philosophising is sometimes suspected to be in some way inept to fulfil the critical function, which is usually expected from philosophical inquiry. Naturalists, however, need not to be solely on the receiving end in the relationship between philosophy and science, and they too can make critical observations regarding the sciences in the cases where these observations come from within the scientific framework (Giere 2008: 214). Active and relentless self-criticism is of course one of the hallmarks of science, and this virtue applies also to naturalists as members of the scientific community.

Another helpful clarification comes from the observation that the metaphilosophical disagreement between naturalists and anti-naturalists is not an extension of some more general academic debate regarding the status of the sciences. It is thus not, for example, connected to the diagnosis made by the physicist C.P. Snow in 1959 regarding the clashes of “two cultures”, namely the sciences and the humanities. Furthermore, the naturalism-question is not one strand in the “science wars”, which has since the 1990s pitted scientific realists and antirealists against each other regarding the objectivity and rationality of science (a quarrel which has had wide-ranging ramifications for the stature of

science in society, culture and education). In these debates some of the science-critical remarks came from the outspoken sympathisers of the political left (see Gross & Levitt 1994), whereas no such political divisions play a significant role in the metaphilosophical naturalism-question.

Furthermore, the motivation for the anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy does not necessarily arise from a pre-philosophical religious or political doctrine, which would be automatically on a collision course with naturalism, so that the anti-naturalistic conception of philosophy could be dismissed as a mere metaphilosophical afterthought of these non-philosophical sentiments without actual philosophical arguments in its favour.⁶³ It is of course clear that as the central tenets of naturalism are contradictory with unquestionable religious sentiments, it is consistent for theists to simply reject at least a certain part of naturalism or support one or another of its anti-naturalistic alternatives in metaphilosophical discussions (see Glock 2008a: 144–5). One of the most socially incendiary aspects of ontological naturalism is specifically the debate regarding the existence of God, which touches many individuals on a deeply personal level. In Western countries the Christian faith is the most wide-spread challenger of thorough naturalism, so it cannot be passed over without a mention here. The fact that theists are prone to espouse anti-naturalism does have the consequence, that from the naturalist's point of view it can now become tempting to link most if not *all* anti-naturalists as embracing this religious persuasion. Alas, this situation is not helped by the fact that the word 'naturalism' has in discussions of philosophy of religion close associations with atheism and post-Darwinian conception of human race, and this terminological usage can then fuel the mental images of naturalists, who support thoroughly scientific worldview, and their pious opponents in metaphilosophical contexts too. In fact, the roots of the name 'naturalism' are in theological discussions, when the Christian apologetics used this word pejoratively in the seventeenth century to designate supporters of un-Christian worldviews (Keil 2008: 255). These associations between 'naturalism' and 'atheism' (and conversely 'anti-naturalism' and 'theism') have led to the point where Chalmers (1996: xiv), for example, who criticises naturalism in the philosophy of mind, has emphasised specifically that he does not have a religious or spiritual motive for his views, and that they are instead motivated by philosophical reflection and argumentation.⁶⁴ If we begin to think that our philosophical opposition is irrational (or otherwise under the spell of an un-philosophical view), it becomes easy to think relatedly that our

⁶³ Historically, in the thinking of Mill and Comte the espousal of thorough empiricism was partly motivated by anti-authoritarian aims in political questions. See Isaacson (2004: 222).

⁶⁴ For thoughts on the tense relations between naturalism and theism see Murphy (2007).

interlocutor cannot be persuaded by philosophical arguments, no matter how convincing they are. This leads to disengagement as we do not even make the attempt to further our discussions.

We should not, however, make any sweeping generalisations regarding the religious motivations behind anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy based on the individual self-professed Christian anti-naturalists (such as Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, Robert Adams and so on). And besides, even when a certain philosopher, who criticises naturalism, happens to have religious or political convictions of these kinds, their arguments against naturalism must of course be assessed on their own merits, since by doing otherwise we would be committing a form of *ad hominem* fallacy (unless, of course, the premises of the anti-naturalistic argument *does* contain such elements, which cannot be assessed objectively). As Keil (2008: 255) observes, when we are talking about metaphilosophical questions pertaining to the nature and standing of philosophy, the counterpoint of naturalism is not formed by expressions of supernaturalism or obscurantism, but rather by philosophically argued views and positions. Metaphilosophical rationalism, too, can be described, generally speaking and with certain reservations, as “scientific” philosophy, since the exponents of this view think that the philosophical knowledge created through their philosophising can on their part help the cause of contemporary scientific research. Thus the rationalistic philosophising does not mean that philosophy should remain completely ignorant relative to what is happening in the sciences.

From the other side of this battle line, we must also specify regarding the “science-positive” outlook of naturalists that this view is not automatically tied to a technocratic or positivistic conception of science, where we accept as honourable sciences only the so-called hard natural sciences (in its stronger forms this kind of positivism would mean even reductions between distinct sciences, for example, reducing the social sciences to psychology, which then could itself be reduced to physics and so forth). Instead of these hard-line views even naturalists can appreciate more broadly the outputs provided by the human and social sciences when they work in co-operation with different scientists.

Critics of naturalism sometimes link the timing of the rise of this metaphilosophical view to the pervasive scientific zeitgeist in our culture, so that it seems that the naturalists simply try to ride on the coat-tails of science without providing actual philosophical arguments in favour of their views. Here is how van Inwagen (2006: 75) has phrased this accusation:

It is of course true that most analytical philosophers are naturalists. Perhaps it is even true that most analytical philosophers are propagandists for naturalism, team players, proselytizing enthusiasts. (As I certainly was not when I was a naturalist—if I was a naturalist.) But the explanation of these facts, if the latter suggestion attains to facthood, must be psychological or sociological or something of that order. It is certainly not logical or philosophical, not even in part.

And another rationalist, BonJour (2010: 4) has written of the related view of ontological materialism as follows:

[M]aterialism seems to be one of those unfortunate intellectual bandwagons to which philosophy, along with many other disciplines, is so susceptible—on a par with logical behaviorism, phenomenalism, the insistence that all philosophical issues pertain to language, and so many other views that were once widely held and now seem merely foolish. Such a comparison is misleading in one important respect, however: it understates the fervency with which materialist views are often held. In this respect, materialism often more closely resembles a religious conviction—and indeed, [...] defenses of materialism and especially replies to objections often have a distinctively scholastic or theological flavor.

These kinds of insinuations and outright accusations of unphilosophical motivations do this debate no good as they serve only to entrench the existing battle lines in the field and deteriorate the conditions for conducting fruitful exchange of views. Both naturalists and their various anti-naturalistic discontents should strive to carry out their disagreements in philosophical terms without unnecessary pigeonholing and doubting of opposition's ultimate motivation for their contrarian views.

4. THE METHODOLOGY OF ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY

We have now arrived at the ultimate chapter of this work. Along the way we have become acquainted with the central notion of a conception of philosophy, elaborated the ins and outs of the metaphilosophical reflection and also surveyed the basics of the metaphilosophical naturalism-question. The following four sections now take a look at the specific variety of philosophical methodology, which lies at the focal point of the current metaphilosophical debates between naturalists and rationalists, that is, the intuitions used in philosophical theory-building (Section 4.1) and the thought experiments, which are used to elicit and articulate these intuitions (Section 4.2). In a separate section, I also examine the range of methodological roles these methods can serve in philosophical theory-building (Section 4.3). In the concluding Section 4.4, I make certain observations about the recent history of these methods in (analytic) philosophy and assess from a critical perspective Hintikka's (1999; 2007) views on this subject.

In the philosophical literature this set of methods is routinely referred to by the informal name of *armchair philosophy*. This playful phrase has been used previously in other contexts as well—and it is of course reasonable to ask whether not *all* philosophy is basically armchair philosophy of one kind or another.¹ However, recently this phrase seems to have become fixed to refer rigidly to intuitions and thought-experiments due to the discussions surrounding the movement of so-called experimental philosophy (see Knobe & Nichols 2007). Therefore if the designation “armchair philosophy” appears these days in the title or keywords of a philosophical article or lecture, it signals that this piece of philosophy is almost certainly in some way related to intuitions, thought experiments, experimental philosophy and their auxiliary metaphilosophical implications.²

¹ See, for example, Rorty (1979: 139).

² Although this phrase might at first impression sound like it has a derogatory ring to it, it however does not—at least normally—involve any value-laden attitude which pits amateurs and professionals against one another, so that ‘armchair philosophers’ would mark philosophy’s own “bench athletes” (especially in American rhetoric the epithets such as ‘armchair quarterback’ and ‘armchair general’ refer to betterwiser amateurs akin to the similar phrases of ‘backseat driver’, ‘keyboard warrior’, and ‘watercooler sports fan’, for example). The expression ‘armchair philosophy’, however, is used in the metaphilosophy of our time both by naturalists and rationalists equally, and its intention is simply to communicate the (*prima facie*) non-empirical epistemological nature of this methodology. Certain hardnosed naturalists,

4.1. PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS

If it is our aim to outline a clear and universally accepted exposition regarding the epistemological nature, aetiology, justificatory power, extension and methodological role of intuitions, we must admit that this is an unattainable goal. In the literature on this topic, there is no “standard view” on this issue which one team of philosophers would advocate with their arguments while the diametrically contending party would contrariwise oppose this view with their criticism. This complicated predicament is caused by the fact that the philosophers who have written on the fundamental nature of intuitions have expressed deeply conflicting interpretations of this notion, and it seems that in the extreme cases they are already talking past each other about completely different phenomena. In this manner, intuition is in Feigl’s (1958: 1) words a “notoriously ambiguous” notion.

In addition to the verbal confusions created by philosophers themselves, some further problems are caused by the fact that this term has its own usages in the realm of everyday speech and also within the established terminologies of various sciences, such as psychology³. These extra-philosophical connotations can easily create negative prejudices and confusions which put us on a wrong path when we are speaking of *philosophical* intuitions. In everyday parlance, intuition is often taken to mean enlightened guesses, counsels of common sense, creeping premonitions or just generally instinctive gut feeling in decision-making (especially so in the world of business). A certain procedure, user interface or a suggested solution to a problem can also be deemed ‘intuitive’ in this same spirit (see Cappelen 2012: 30–3). Moreover, among certain New Age groups, ‘intuition’ can be used to refer to some kind of source of “higher” extra-sensory wisdom. These associations of course do no favours for serious academic philosophy, where we usually have in mind something epistemologically more respectable.⁴

however, have a more critical stance to this expression, such as notably the representatives of experimental philosophy, who have a catchy battle cry about “burning the armchairs”. In these contexts both metaphilosophical rationalists and the more moderate naturalists can despite their other considerable disagreements be in this fight allied on the same side defending the legitimacy of the armchair philosophy against the aggressive and revolutionary metaphilosophising of the experimental philosophers.

³ For example, in the psychological sub-field of psychology of personality the Myers-Briggs type-indicator (which in some way goes back to C.G. Jung) classifies one dimension of personality as intuitive.

⁴ It should be noted, however, that although I emphasise in the main text the crucial differences between everyday talk of intuitions and the terminology of professional philosophy, we

One quick response to this predicament would be to admit that in philosophical contexts the theorising concerning intuitions has been bogged down by an unsuccessful choice of words. Thus we can remove this problem quite simply by using a more neutral expression in its place, so that this new replacement does not evoke similar unfortunate connotations from the contexts of our everyday language. For example, the contemporary rationalist Bonjour (2013: 179) has written in his own conception of philosophy of “insights” in place of intuitions:

Though the term ‘intuition’ has often been used to refer to such insights [that is, instances of a priori knowledge], I will refer to them simply as ‘a priori insights’, thus, I hope, avoiding any confusion with the other uses of the rather slippery term ‘intuition’.

In any case it is clear that the actual philosophical matter here regarding the fundamental nature of intuitions reaches much deeper, and it cannot be resolved with a simple terminological evasive manoeuvre. No matter which new or old word we use to describe this *phenomenon*, we still need a persuading philosophical account of its nature and reliability if we are to base our philosophical work on this type of evidence.

In the debates regarding intuitions over the past four decades or so, the most significant battle line has been drawn between naturalists and rationalists. In order to fully understand what these debates are about, we must have first some sort of minimal construal of what intuitions *approximately* are in a neutral sense. The account given in this section thus aims to provide one survey of the crucial points on which the views of naturalists and rationalists diverge. As our starting point in this task we can take the way how the distinctive aspects of

should not see philosophical intuitions as a distant phenomenon from the standpoint of our everyday lives. Instead, the same kind of philosophical intuitions which philosophers use as a starting point in their theorising are present also in our quotidian activities of reasoning, categorising, imagining and so forth—for philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

intuitions and its instances have been described in certain classical⁵ and contemporary⁶ source texts.

At the heart of all characterisations for intuitions is the thought of *immediacy*, which means that the act of intuiting is an immediate apprehension or immediate understanding of something. When we examine how this immediacy has been described in the literature, we can see that there are usually three separate dimensions associated with it, which are nevertheless closely intertwined. Immediacy means firstly *spontaneity*, so that intuitions are formed “in a flash” without premeditated effort, akin to a *eureka* moment or sudden epiphany. Thus we do not arrive at our intuitions by assessing meticulously the pros and cons of a view in a certain topic and then assessing which way does the scale tip. However, this idea should not be read in a way which would suggest that our intuitions would always appear completely randomly and unconnectedly to our other actions like a lightning out of a clear sky. A right context and the “stimulus” which triggers the intuition can have a crucial consequence for the

⁵ We can already locate in the writings of Aristotle (see, for example, Aristotle 1994: 100b) a related division within the broader category of *noetic* knowledge, that is, rationality-based knowledge. This division separates the forms of immediate and demonstrative rational knowledge from each other, thus inaugurating the epistemological tradition, to which also the mainstream of the current theorising on intuitions can be traced. The name ‘intuition’ itself, however, originates from the fourteenth century, when the scholastic philosophers who wrote in Latin, such as William Ockham and John Duns Scotus, pondered in their epistemological writings the precise nature of our immediate intuitive knowledge (which, however, meant for them in its paradigmatic form the sensual experiencing of particular entities in material external world and, on the other hand, introspective monitoring of one’s private mental states). This scholastic terminology was then picked up by Descartes ([1628]: AT X 367–70), who specified the epistemological nature and argumentative role of intuitive knowledge in relation to deductive knowledge (see the main text). Descartes’ views gained a lot of attention, and they instigated counter-reactions from various rationalist and empiricist directions by, for example, Spinoza ([1677]: P40 S2), Locke ([1690]: IV, ii, 25) and Leibniz ([1704]: Ch. 2, Bk. IV). In the hands of Kant [1781/1787] this term gained idiosyncratic and more technical meaning which deviated from the earlier tradition, and it is in important role in his transcendental philosophy as the facilitator of synthetic *a priori* knowledge (in Kant’s writings the German counterpart for the Latin ‘intuition’ was ‘*Anschauung*’). After Kant the term ‘intuition’ has been used (with various idiosyncratic meanings) by, for example, Brouwer, Husserl and Bergson. For historical overviews of the term ‘intuition’ see, for example, Caygill (1995: 262–6) and Gaukroger (1995: 116–127).

⁶ During the past hundred years, intuitions have been talked about in, for example, Gödel (1947), Feigl (1958), Bealer (1992; 1998a), DePaul & Ramsey (1998), Sosa (1998; 2006; 2007: §7), Pust (2000), Audi (2003: §4; 2004), Bunnin & Yu (2004: 358–9), Williamson (2004), Blackburn (2005: 197–8), Huemer (2005: §6), Hanna (2006: 171–87), Goldman (2007), Ludwig (2007), Nagel (2007), Symons (2008), Cohnitz & Häggqvist (2009), Bengson (2010), Chudnoff (2010; 2011; 2014) and Cappelen (2012). I draw from all these sources in my account in the main text.

outcome of what particular intuition we experience in a certain situation. A central methodological role in this elicitation of intuitions is played especially by thought experiments (we get to their nature in a separate section couple of pages later). The immediacy of intuitions is taken to mean on the other hand that intuitive knowing is by its nature a form of *direct* knowledge. This epistemological characterisation means that intuition is for the person who is experiencing the particular intuition always first-hand knowledge. This can be contrasted with various forms of indirect and mediated forms of knowledge, such as the testimonies which other people can give us of their own subjective sensual experiences. The third direction, from which philosophers have characterised the immediacy of intuitions is *non-inferentiality*.⁷ The epistemic contrast for intuitive knowing is thus provided by inferential belief-formation, which is often called by the other names of *deductive*, *demonstrative* and *discursive* knowledge in the literature.

In the context of intuitions the aspect of non-inferentiality means in practice that particular intuitions are not born as a result of any conscious and purposeful contemplation on the subject now under consideration. Thus intuitions cannot be broken apart into smaller pieces, for example as a chain of premises or distinct interphases, from which the intuitive conclusion would have been clearly derived and from which it would be logically dependent. Inferential knowledge-formation can thus be thought of as a process, where we unravel the implications contained within the individual premises, which we know—perhaps intuitively—beforehand to be true. Descartes ([1628]: AT X, 369–70), for example writes of the relationship between intuition and deduction as follows:

This may raise a doubt as to our reason for having added another mode of knowledge, besides intuition, in this Rule—namely, knowledge by *deduction*. (By this term I mean any necessary conclusion from other things known with certainty.) We had to do this because many things are known although not self-evident, so long as they are deduced from principles known to be true by a continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought, with clear intuition of each point. It is in the same way that we know the last link of a long chain is connected with the first, even though we do not view in a single glance (Intuitu) all the intermediate links on which the connexion depends; we need only to have gone through the links in succession and to remember that from the first to the last each is joined to the next. Thus we distinguish at this point between intuition and certain deduction; because the latter, unlike the former,

⁷ For an opposing view see Williamson (2007: 217).

is conceived as involving a movement or succession; and is again unlike intuition in not requiring something evident at the moment, but rather, so to say, borrowing its certainty from memory. From this we may gather that when propositions are direct conclusions from first principles, they may be said to be known by intuition or by deduction, according to different ways of looking at them; but first principles themselves may be said to be known only by intuition; and remote conclusions, on the other hand, only by deduction.⁸

Through these three dimensions of immediacy intuition can naturally be contrasted with the inputs of our visual sense, which are often characterised with the same features (BonJour 2011: 285). This kinship is also insinuated by the etymological background of the word 'intuition' (Latin *intueor* = to see), and historically speaking the philosophically relevant *intellectual* intuiting has only gradually through time become divorced from the *sensual* intuiting more generally, so that it has slowly become a metaphoric expression with a specific usage in the philosophy's technical terminology.⁹ To this day the nature and function of intuitions are still described in the literature often with the aid of quasi-perceptual metaphors and words, as happens when intuitions are described as "seeing through mind's eye".¹⁰ This quasi-perceptual way of speaking is also strongly present in Locke's ([1960]: IV, ii, 25) description of intuitive knowing:

The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two and equal to one and two.

⁸ It should be noted, however, that Descartes understood deduction in slightly different terms from those of philosophers do today (Gaukroger 1995: 115). In Hanna's (2006: 174–6) opinion it can also be in one sense misleading to emphasise the non-inferential nature of intuiting, since even if intuition is not in itself an argument which could be broken apart into particular premises, a particular argument can nevertheless be a target of intuitive knowing.

⁹ The alternative term 'insight' used by BonJour (1998; 2005) is also etymologically perceptualistic. Similar tone is utilised by Bealer (1992; 1998a), as he describes intuitions as "intellectual seemings".

¹⁰ For this theme see Bengson (2010) and Chudnoff (2010; 2011).

Another shared aspect between intuitions and sense experiences, which is also present in Locke's description alongside immediacy, is the idea that both intuitions and perceptual experiences have *representational content*, namely, they *present* us with a certain state of affairs as being true (indeed, this feature is sometimes referred to as *presentationality*). On the account of this distinguishing trait, intuitions can be separated from emotions, which are emotive responses to a topic or situation which arouses emotions in us. Recognising this difference between intuitions and emotions is of importance especially within the domain of moral epistemology. (Chudnoff 2011.)

Despite these commonalities between intuitions and perceptual experience, there are also crucial differences between them which should not be left mentioned here. What is important about intuition is the fact that it comes somewhere outside of our bodily sense-organs, which thus makes it purely intellectual and somehow a mind-related phenomenon (in Descartes' words an intuition is given life exclusively by "the light of reason"¹¹). It is tempting to classify intuition—at least initially—as a non-empirical phenomenon because it is by definition not derived from the sense experience. On the other hand, although intuiting is metaphorically speaking often labelled as "mental looking", it is not usually coupled with the idea of viewing some visual mental image through the "mind's eye", as might happen in the use of imagination or various related mental exercises.¹² Therefore the comparisons to perceptual experience should not be taken *too* literally on this point

When intuitions represent a thing as true, the central consequence of having an intuition is that it creates a *prima facie* belief in us about the truth of a sentence, utterance, thought, judgement or proposition, which we are disposed to believe on the grounds of this intuition—at least as long as our intuition is not in direct conflict with another belief of ours, which we value epistemically higher than the intuition.¹³ The origins of our intuitions are not however transparent to our introspection. Talbot (2009: 161) encapsulates this issue by saying

¹¹ Descartes ([1628]: AT X, 367). In the original text "qui a sola rationis luce nascitur".

¹² For literature regarding conceivability and imaginability and their philosophical uses in the evaluation of possibility-claims see e.g., Yablo (1993) and Chalmers (2002). Bealer (2002: 76) finds the notions of 'conceivability' and 'imaginability' as only creating unwanted confusions when we are discussing the sources of evidence we have for modal claims. By his light, rational intuition is our ultimate supplier of modal knowledge.

¹³ Of course, the various irrational traits and motives of the actual person who is forming the beliefs can come in the way of objective belief-formation, for example when this person happens to support a philosophical theory which is at odds with the particular intuition she is now experiencing (compare this to the more general psychological phenomenon known as

that intuitions are in this respect “things that just strike us as true without us knowing entirely why they do.”

Intuitions also have an *authoritative* and *compelling* role in our belief-formation, so that when we get an intuition we cannot anymore wrap our minds around the idea of what this intuition’s falsehood would amount to. According to Locke ([1960]: IV, ii, 25), intuitive knowledge

is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it.

Thus one of the features often associated with intuitive beliefs is their robust modal strength, so that their truth-values feel to us as non-contingent and without possible alternatives.¹⁴ Since it has frequently been thought in the history of philosophy that there exists significant connections between necessity and apriority, intuitions have, due to their non-contingent modal appearance, been linked epistemologically with apriority. This association thus strengthens the *prima facie* non-empirical impression of intuitions even further. Philosophers who have in recent times written about intuitions however allow fallibilism, that is, the errancy of intuitions, so that intuiting is not automatically taken to be a *factive* phenomenon, where it would always come hand-in-hand with the truth of its instances. (Hanna 2006: 172.)

When intuitions are coupled with beliefs in this manner, we can categorise intuiting as a type of a *propositional attitude*. Thus intuitions are one way for a subject to have an attitude about a certain proposition *p*, analogously to believing, wishing, knowing, having a memory of something and so on. It then follows that the specific content of a particular intuitive experience is defined by the content of the relevant proposition, so that when we have two distinct intuitions we can say that they differ from each other on the account of the particular

confirmation bias, where our belief-formation is influenced by our pre-held beliefs and convictions). Another problematic case for intuitive belief-formation is posed by the philosophical paradoxes, where we have two (or more) *prima facie* equally strong intuitions pulling in different directions, and we do not know which of the conflicting intuitions to believe (Cohen 1986: 50–1)

¹⁴ This aspect of intuitive beliefs is, however, contested in the literature, see Pust (2000) and Sosa (2006: 210–1).

proposition they are about—which is what happens with the individuation of other propositional contents.¹⁵

If we tally the previous remarks together we arrive at the description according to which intuition is a kind of episodic¹⁶, but a non-sensual form of cognition, which compels us to form—and perhaps even justify—our beliefs about the truth-values of propositions. As was documented in the footnotes which complemented the main text, even this laconic characterisation is by no means uncontested among philosophers. And in addition to it not being uncontested, it also not really that informative, since it does not tell us anything about the aetiology of intuitions or argue for their alleged philosophical justificatory power: Is the epistemological justification given by intuitions *a priori* or *a posteriori*? Can intuitions be regarded as a sub-type of belief, or are intuitions clearly separate phenomena from our common or garden-variety beliefs? What is the nature of the relationship between intuitions on one hand and the psychological processes and physiological structures of the human mind on the other? Do we need to postulate a distinct intuition-sense or some other kind of special mental faculty to explain the aetiology of intuitions? If our normal perceptual experiences tell us about the things and events of the spatio-temporal world, then what entities or phenomena are intuitions, in contrast, about? Do the intuitions regarding ostensibly philosophical topics have some connection to those intuitions, which are associated with the origins of mathematical and logical knowledge? How should we defuse the potential conflicts of contradictory intuitions? What issues explain the variation in the amount and strength of intuitions between different persons? Do we have additional warranties outside of intuitions themselves, which could authenticate that the things which seem intuitive to us are indeed really true? It probably will not come as a surprise to the reader that basically any substantial account which goes beyond the minimal one sketched here is already philosophically contentious, since as was already cautioned in the opening words of this section, the views philosophers have voiced regarding the epistemological nature and evidential authority of intuitions diverge from each other to considerable extent. Since these view about in-

¹⁵ Nevertheless, in the view of certain philosophers all intuitive knowledge does not follow this propositional form, as they think we can also have direct intuitive knowledge about the abstract entities which act as the targets of our intuitions, such as prime numbers and sets. This kind of conception of intuitions goes well together with Platonic ontology. Regarding this topic see Hanna (2006: 173–4) and BonJour (2011).

¹⁶ In the view of certain philosophers intuitions should not be seen as an episodic mental state or act, but rather like a dormant mental disposition, which then actualises under right conditions (see Sosa 1998).

tutions are tightly interwoven with far-reaching metaphilosophical conclusions, there are big issues at stake in these debates. Therefore intuitions are not a minor or inconsequential theme for philosophers, which would be commented only fleetingly in a footnote—instead philosophers take these issues and their preferred views seriously (Chudnoff 2011: 625).

In fact, a notable contingent of philosophers reject even the assumption, which was taken here at face value, that intuitions are a tangible and scientifically respectable part of the psychological reality. In the diagnosis of these philosophers, the mental episodes we have mistakenly identified as intuitions do not after closer examination form its own clear-cut phenomenon separate from the motley bunch of pre-theoretic prejudices, unconsidered decisions, instinctive actions, plain superstition, products of deep-seated cultural indoctrination or counsels of common sense. According to these critics, intuitions can be associated with these phenomenon due to their highly suspicious origins, namely, that the more precise epistemic source of them all remain shrouded in mystery, even to our own personal introspection, so that we end up in deferring verbally to these “intuitions” in order to make our ordinary beliefs sound more respectable (Lewis 1983a: x; Van Inwagen 1997; Williamson 2007: §7; Cappelen 2012). On this basis the philosophical reputation of intuitions is highly questionable, and it is thus not a serviceable term when we are trying to understand the methodology of philosophy. Instead, the constant talking of intuitions only *reifies* needlessly a term belonging to the language of *folk psychology*, and as a consequence conjures a misleading appearance of the existence of a distinct and tangible mental phenomenon where there actually is none. Boghossian (2000: 231), for example, notes that, in this regard, ‘intuition’ actually “seems like a name for the mystery we are addressing, rather than a solution to it.” Van Inwagen (1997: 309) comments along similar lines that “[p]hilosophers call their philosophical beliefs intuitions because ‘intuition’ sounds more authoritative than ‘belief’.” In Symon’s (2008: 68) analysis there seem to be two polar extremes present in the philosophers’ views regarding the nature of intuitions. For the first group of philosophers, intuition is the most convincing and unflinching type of knowledge there is, and it is paradigmatically typified by the cherry-picked instances from the fields of mathematics and logic. At the other extreme, the second group of philosophers want to associate intuitions with our everyday commonsensical beliefs.

As the philosophers’ views regarding intuitions differ so much from one another at the opposite extremes, it will not come as a surprise that in these views the extensions of intuitive beliefs differ from each other as well. Therefore it is hard to give in this brief overview illustrative examples of intuitively known

philosophical claims without getting bogged down in deep metaphilosophical debates about the ultimate nature of intuitions. And of course, if we *did have* uncontroversial examples of philosophical intuitions, they would surely have already been used as the bedrocks of successful and widely-accepted philosophical theories by now — as we know, alas, that these are difficult to come by. Certain examples, which are at least *relatively* uncontentious, are that it is impossible for an object to be simultaneously thoroughly red and thoroughly green; that the full-blown moral responsibility of a subject requires free will; that two objects x and y are completely identical only when they have exactly same properties; that knowing a proposition requires subject to believe this same proposition. I discuss the epistemological case of Gettier-intuitions in a moment in Section 4.3, so this example provides a more substantial illustration of a philosophical intuition and its usage in philosophical theorising. Before that, however, I give an account of philosophical thought experiments.

4.2 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

Intuitions have a close relationship with *thought experiments* in the toolkit of the armchair philosophy. In brief, thought experiments are descriptions of hypothetical situations, which employ counterfactual “what if...” viewpoints to elicit intuitive reactions from us to be then deployed in various dialectical functions in philosophical discussions. Thought experiments, as their name suggests, are supposed to be *experiments*, on which grounds they are often compared in the literature with the experimental designs of empirical sciences. Indeed, thought experiments and scientific experiments are united by their analogous roles in theorising, namely, both scientific experiments and philosophical thought experiments are in their respective settings utilised as heuristics in our theory selection. The crucial difference between thought experiments and scientific experiments comes from the other half of the term ‘thought experiments’, since as this name suggests, these are mental processes occurring on the level of *thought* and imagination. When we are performing a thought experiment we are thus not manipulating factors or observing their inter-dependencies, as usually happens in actual scientific experiments. The only thing really needed for thought-experimenting is the mental activity of the particular experimenter (and perhaps certain external aids, such as a pen and some paper to write her thoughts down). Thus in order to execute thought experiments we do not need to subject actual lab-rats to torturous testing nor to invest in a costly particle accelerator.

This non-empirical nature can be referenced as the most characteristic feature of philosophical thought experiments, which unites all its diverse instances.

It is natural to view thought experiments as being reliant on intuitions: Whereas intuitions have an evidential role for philosophical claims and theories, thought experiments can in certain respects be regarded as a context of invention in the procedure of the armchair philosophy. Thought experiments thus help to elicit and articulate the relevant intuitive responses out of us. The notion of a thought experiment which does not elicit intuitions of any kind does not really make sense, as it would then be just a random passage of text or a string of sounds devoid of any philosophical relevance.

This initial description of the relationship between intuitions and thought experiments still leaves much room for diverse ways to take advantage of thought experiments in philosophical discourse. Here the different uses of thought experiments can be categorised into three sub-groups. Firstly, a thought experiment can be a medium for a philosopher to articulate an intuition and communicate it to her audience. In this intent, a thought experiment acts as a clear and vivid exemplification of an intuitive claim. The hypothetical situation described by the thought experiment has in these cases typically been stripped of all irrelevant factors which might otherwise divert our attention to unconnected details.¹⁷ In its second typical function, a thought experiment acts as a sort of litmus test to assess philosophical claims and theories, so that we can observe how two contending philosophical theories—say, consequentialism and deontological view in normative ethics—deal with a relevant test case in their own distinct ways. The role of the thought experiment is thus to flesh out the crucial differences and ramifications these two theories display in the hypothetical situation. An outcome of a thought experiments of this kind can also be a paradox, so that the intuitions provoked by the thought experiment pull us into opposite directions. The third general function of thought experiments is simply to elicit intuitions. In other words, a thought experiment acts as a preparatory step, akin to brainstorming, in philosophical theorising, where we canvass and gather intuitions as a raw data for subsequent philosophical theory-building in this subject area. (Jackson 2009: 101.)

However, even with this threefold categorisation at hand if we try to lump all thought experiments simply together they do not create a uniform group, of which it would be easy to make informative generalisations. In their stylistic features, thought experiments can vary between anything from a couple of brief sentences to more verbose narratives, and there are no established phrases or

¹⁷ As examples of thought experiments of these kinds we can mention Rawls' [1971] *veil of ignorance* and Putnam's (1975) *Twin Earth*.

code words to signal the crucial turning points in the typical script of thought experiments, so that we could easily teach new philosophy students in the introductory courses and methodological handbooks how to craft their own thought experiments step by step. Another salient division between different sub-types of thought experiments is created by the question of whether the situation described in the thought experiment could—at least in principle—transpire in our everyday life governed by the nomological laws of our world. Thus the imaginative leap taken by the thought experiment need not to be particularly “fantastic”. In the other sub-type of thought experiments, which is perhaps closer to the prototype of thought experiments which many people associate with the name of this method in their heads, the whole point of the thought experiment is that it extends our imagination to think of a hypothetical, yet in some way still topically relevant, state of affairs. Thus we can see that different kinds of thought experiment operate within the spheres of different kinds of modality, and this type of modality is determined by the choice of what logical, metaphysical and nomological constraints we lay down as necessary boundaries for our counterfactual reflections (for example, are we free to bend the laws of nature in our thought experimenting?).

In the metaphilosophical literature on thought experiments there has been discussion on the topic of what kind of logical syntax or formal structure they follow.¹⁸ These construals, however, have not led to any sort of widespread consensus, and it would seem that these attempts to formulate the logical form of thought experiments end up in difficulties because the methodological phenomena we call thought experiments in the philosophical literature form so heterogeneous category—there is simply no single correct formula for thought experiments as they are used in so different ways in the literature. Then a proposed formalisation applies only to a narrow selection of thought experiments. It is even questionable whether thought experiments should be seen as arguments, strictly speaking. Häggqvist (2009: 61), for example, gives the following three reasons for thinking that thought experiments are not in closer scrutiny arguments: 1) A valid argument should always lead to the same conclusion from its premises, whereas a thought experiment can at different times and in different situations give diverse conclusions for distinct experimenters (this is evident in the fact that philosophers often conduct active debates concerning the correct interpretation of a given thought experiment); 2) As the concrete experimental designs of the sciences are not considered as arguments we should

¹⁸ See, for example, Häggqvist (1996: §5), Cohnitz (2005), Williamson (2007: §6) and Ichikawa & Jarvis (2009).

not expect this from the philosophical thought experiments either; 3) Unlike arguments, thought experiments do not consist of identifiable parts with truth-values, and thus their effectiveness cannot be assessed in similar terms with arguments. Daly (2010: 110–1) adds to Häggqvist's three aspects the phenomenological criticism: when we are working on a thought experiment in our mental reflection, it just does not *feel* the same to us as working on a philosophical argument.

The fact that these remarks seem to distance thought experiments from arguments does not obviously mean that we should not pay attention to what is happening under the superficial verbal level in a thought experiment—or that we could not criticise our philosophical opponents by analysing closely their thought experiments and pointing out the exact step where we disagree with them. The point here is simply that when we are assessing the philosophical merits of a thought experiment, we are focusing primarily on the intuitions that this thought experiment has provided, and not on issues such as whether a particular premise of the thought experiment follows a specific formula.

In fact, the whole name 'thought experiment' is in certain ways misleading when it is used in connection of the methodology of the armchair philosophy. It is misleading first of all because it lets us assume that the wide variety of methodological phenomena categorised under this common name has some deep affinities with the thought experiments used in the empirical sciences, so that these distinct phenomena would also be explainable through a single methodological framework. This kinship is nevertheless contested, and certain philosophers separate the intuitive philosophical thought experiments sharply from the scientific thought experiments, which in their view have completely different epistemological basis (see, for example, Bealer 1998a: 207–8). In addition to physics, thought experiments have been used in biology (Darwin's evolutionary theory), historiography, futurology, linguistics, jurisprudence and also in formal sciences such as mathematics and logic.¹⁹

The name of 'thought experiments' can secondly be misleading because not all notable intuition-stimulating cases are found in philosophical texts or are

¹⁹ Although we must note at the connection of this claim that taken together the scientific thought experiments do not form a uniform group either, so that it is possible that *certain* scientific thought experiments can resemble *certain* philosophical thought experiments. For example, Newton's case of a *rotating bucket* reflects upon the relation of our notions of movement and rest relative to absolute space in a way which does not seem to differ radically from the metaphysical theorising of philosophers on these same subjects (at this point we again seem to come near the metaphysical questions regarding the exact relationship of philosophy and the sciences). For scientific thought experiments see Brown & Fehige (1996/2011).

outcomes of professional philosophers' use of imagination. Hansson (2006) divides the scenarios used by philosophers in their arguments into three groups. *Factual examples* refer to an actual state of affairs or past historical event.²⁰ *Literal examples* are borrowed from the area of fictive art (such as books or movies.). Hansson's third group are formed by *hypothetical examples*, which are the "what if" thought experiments discussed above. When metaphilosophers have been talking about the methodology of armchair philosophy they have typically focused on the instances of the third group. This has been, I suppose, been partly caused by the fact that many of the philosophical thought experiments are so fascinating (for which reason they are also easy to popularise in the philosophy books targeted for the general audience).²¹ However, too limited methodological discussion of *only* philosophical thought experiments threatens to cover the fact that the methodology of armchair philosophy works in much more pluralistic way, so that when we want to give a full and exhaustive account of the functioning of this methodology we have also to take into consideration these other ways to stimulate intuitions. The methodology of the armchair philosophy should thus not be tied to the mere expressing and assessing of thought experiments, and we can allow a certain liberalism in its "context of invention". In Williamson's (2007: 216) view, it is in the end insignificant whether the example presented in philosophy actually comes from the imagination or "real" life. Indeed, for these reasons it might be better suited to speak of 'method of cases' when we are discussing this part of the methodology of the armchair philosophy, as is in fact often done these days in the metaphilosophical literature on this topic.

4.3 THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN THE DIALECTIC OF ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY

Intuitions were previously characterised as a distinct form of cognition which is, by its nature, immediate and non-sensual, and whose instances can move us to form and even justify our beliefs on philosophical matters. When we need incentives for our intuitive belief-formation, we can employ thought experiments and similar scenarios typical to the method of cases, which not only articulate our intuitions but also clarify their contents and corollaries. In this section I move on to examine in greater detail the actual methodological procedure

²⁰ The upside of using a thought experiment instead of concrete cases from the real world is then the fact that thought experiments have effectively abstracted away all irrelevant factors.

²¹ See, for example, Baggini (2005).

of armchair philosophy, namely, how the intuitions elicited by thought experiments are put to good use as evidence in philosophical argumentation and theory-building.

We can take as our starting point the rather uncontroversial and time-honoured model, which views valid philosophical arguments as consisting of a conclusion and a group of premises. The function of these premises is to validate the conclusion in accordance with the rules of some system of argumentation. When we are evaluating how convincing a certain conclusion is, we can always ask the critical question of where the justification of its validating premises comes from. It is then of course possible, that the individual premises here are themselves first attained as conclusions from further arguments with their own sets of validating premises, but it is patently obvious, that such an answer only moves the issue one step onwards, and the same challenge can now be raised in turn for these arguments which are hierarchically one level down from the original argument, where we first started our assessment.

According to the standard options in the discussions regarding the nature and transfer of epistemic justification, we now have three main options from which to choose.²² The first one is to simply admit *infinite regress*, in which case the chain of premises supporting other premises goes on and on *ad infinitum*—just like in the mythological cosmologies, where the tower of turtles resting atop other turtles continue endlessly. Another alternative in this predicament is to allow *circularity* between the premises, so that the premises in the chain end up ultimately referring back to other premises, which occur somewhere earlier in the chain (akin to the Ouroboros serpent swallowing its own tail). The third and final available option is to commit to some form of *justification foundationalism* and thus steer clear from the two rocks of infinite regress and circularity. In this line of thinking the chain of premises connects ultimately to a bedrock, which serves as the final stop of justification. This bedrock is justified through some kind of immediate source of evidence, and after this initial justification it can function as the starting point for the hierarchical construction of further premises and conclusions.

In the argumentation of armchair philosophy this role of foundational bedrock is grounded ultimately in intuitions. Additionally, when two proposed philosophical views about a certain topic seem to be in conflict with each other, we can then offer as our diagnosis the observation that there are two contrasting

²² This predicament is called *Agrippa's trilemma* after the Pyrrhonist sceptic living towards the end of the first century CE, who is said to be the first to formulate it (these ideas were anticipated by Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics*; see Aristotle 1997: 72b09).

intuitions underlying the premises of these conflicting views (compare Williamson 2004: 109). It should be noted however, that any philosophising which utilises intuitions need not to tie itself into foundationalism specifically, since the links between intuitions and philosophical premises can be considered also from other standpoints. I return to these alternative models at the end of this section, so for now we can continue to assess the inner mechanisms of philosophical methodology from the viewpoint of the foundationalist model.

How then can these thoughts regarding the intuitive premises and conclusions built upon these premises be seen as workable starting points for philosophical inquiry? When philosophical theorising is seen as ultimately being about presenting arguments and counter-arguments based on intuitions, we then seem to assign intuitions to the role of raw data about the relevant subject matter at hand, to which the competing philosophical theories try to do justice the best they can. In other words, a philosophical theory tries to explain certain phenomenon, and we get our initial picture of this phenomenon by canvassing our intuitions related to it. In short: intuitiveness is virtue for a philosophical theory, and unintuitiveness is conversely a vice.

Intuitions can then be viewed as acting as arbiters in philosophical debates, which both sides partaking in these quarrels have accepted: any claim we make in the debate can be required by our interlocutor to be backed by reasons, but when we demonstrate that our claim is built upon the bedrock provided by an intuition (or intuitions), we are typically not expected to demonstrate with some other more basic kind of evidence or non-intuitive arguments in which our intuitions themselves are based in (now this claim of course does not mean that such discussions are not conducted in metaphilosophical contexts regarding the evidential status of intuitions—the claim here is that this is not usually done in standard first-order philosophical discussions).

It is illuminating to compare the process, in which we use the basis given by our intuition to systematise a more general philosophical theory, to the theory-formation as it is done within experimental sciences (compare Rawls [1971]; Pust 2000: 2–13). This is because there are some similarities between the ways how intuition is used as starting points for philosophical theories and how sense experience is used as a starting point for experimental sciences. These comparisons then continue on the methodological level the comparisons between intuitions and sense experience (especially with seeing) which were highlighted earlier in Section 4.1.

How do these comparisons then work on the level of actual philosophical practice? The empirical theory-building is often described in textbooks as a dy-

dynamic process, in which we first use inductive reasoning to form a generalisation from a limited group of sense experiences so that this generalised theory extends beyond the scope of our initial data. At the same time this theory is expected to give us some kind of a *projective* prediction about the appearances of future sense experiences. This prediction is called a hypothesis, on which basis the theory can be tested by systematically searching for fresh sense experiences which either corroborate or disprove it.

Now parallel steps cannot easily be identified from the much more liberal and much less structured process of philosophical theorising, and we must leave enough wiggle room for various rival metaphilosophical views regarding the nature of philosophical theories: Are they trying to merely describe and explain the relevant subject at hand, or do they also have normative ramifications? Which phenomena are philosophical theories ultimately about? What kind of an analysis are we actually doing in our philosophical theorising?

In any case, what is common for scientific and philosophical inquiries alike is that after we have formed the relevant generalisation from our initial data—that is, in philosophy’s case intuition—the next step is then to canvass for new evidence which either corroborates or falsifies our hypothetical theory. Falsifying a philosophical theory works by locating an intuition, which is antithetical to the original theory and its predictions, so that the theory turns out to be un-intuitive, after all (the popularity of this line of argumentation is plainly visible in the titles of philosophical articles, which often follow the pattern of “counter-example to *T*”, where *T* is a given philosophical view or a theory).

When the inner mechanisms of the armchair philosophising are fleshed out in metaphilosophical overviews, the philosophical discussion related to the constituent conditions of knowledge is often used as the canonised illustration of the different stages of the intuitive theory-building. In the first stage of this process we begin with the suggestion, which can be found in Plato’s dialogue *Theaetetus* (2001). According to this well-known view, knowing something amounts to having a justified true belief (or, as the titular character of the dialogue “recalls being told”: “true judgment with an account” *Theaetetus*: 201d). This classical analysis was accepted among philosophers without noteworthy objections for over two thousand years and for a long time it seemed as an epitome of successful philosophical analysis—well, at least until Gettier gave it two short counter-examples in his article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge” (1963). Here we then move on to the negative stage of the armchair methodology.

In short, the approach of Gettier’s counter-examples is in all simplicity that he portrays us two imagined—yet on all accounts possible even in terms of everyday life—scenarios, where the classical conditions for knowing something are

met, but where we nevertheless do not *intuitively* accept that the person possesses knowledge in the full sense. Thus the intuitive reaction awakened in us by Gettier's vignettes overturns the classical long-tenured analysis for knowledge, and our theory of knowledge's nature must now be complemented with further conditions, which recognise in one way or another the additional conflicting intuitions.

After its publication, Gettier's three-page article became an overnight sensation, and a significant contingent of the subsequent epistemological research seemed to belong to a new sub-genre of "Gettier-literature", which contains literally hundreds and hundreds of texts (a retrospective summary of this literature can be found in Shope 2002). The new research programme inspired by Gettier's work focused on finding an intuitive fourth condition to add to our original tripartite analysis. Among the early suggestions was, *inter alia*, a proposal which held that the justification given for a belief cannot be based on a false proposition, and furthermore, a view which stated that the justification cannot have potential defeaters. Another suggested strategy was to replace the original condition of justification with a wholly different external point of view, as happens in many of the proposals suggested under the umbrella of the so-called naturalised epistemology. In recent decades the popularity of Gettier-literature has diminished drastically from its peak years, as the emphasis in epistemological research has moved from the analysis of conditions of knowledge into other more fashionable subjects and topics.

A characteristic which makes Gettier's argumentation such a good example of the methodology of the armchair philosophy is the fact that after the original publication of this article, many philosophers were immediately moved to agree with the conclusions of Gettier's arguments and their ramifications. This is telling of the *prima facie* evidential weight given to Gettier's intuitions (sometimes the philosophers who lived in that era reminiscence that they witnessed the dramatic "Gettier-revolution"). Thus this debate was not only about Gettier's personal (in some sense non-intuitive) feelings or opinions regarding the nature of knowledge, which he argued for more convincingly than his philosophical competition, or was able to express so eloquently with the aid of rhetorical devices that his words managed to convince his audience too. Instead, it seemed that these same intuitions were already widely shared within the community of philosophers and all it took was someone to articulate them in the form of clear counter-examples.

Secondly, as Williamson (2007: 180) notes, the acceptance of Gettier's results was not based on Gettier's personal reputation or prestige within the profession, because at that point of his career Gettier, who had received his PhD

only two years earlier, was still an unknown name in the field—especially when we remember that his counterpoint was the tradition of the classical analysis which was over two millennia old and went back to the dialogues of Plato (moreover, Ayer and Chisholm, whom Gettier mentions in his article by name as the somewhat more immediate targets of his criticism, were then the leading epistemologists of the time). Furthermore, there were no schools, cliques or other kinds of partisanship formed around the “old theory” and the “new criticism”, which could explain from a sociological point of view why Gettier’s views became accepted so quickly. Thus we cannot reject Gettier’s arguments—at least not straightaway—by invoking an “extra-philosophical” explanation referencing the actions of the profession of the philosophers. Instead we must give the honour of kicking this revolution off primarily to the intuitions articulated by Gettier.²³

But let us now return from the case of Gettier to the ways how intuitions are used in armchair philosophising. The third way how intuitions can come to bear upon philosophical theorising pertains to *paradoxes*. Many different things are called paradoxes in the philosophical literature, and even more so outside of it. Some of these uses seem to be rather liberal, so that basically any thought which appears initially baffling from our commonsensical point of view gets described as “paradoxical” (see Quine 1966: §1). If we, however, delineate from these liberal usages a more specific sub-class of paradoxes, we can think of these instances as a set of claims, where these constituent claims can all appear intuitive when considered individually, but which nevertheless all taken together end up creating an inconsistent set of claims (such sets of claims which involve several conflicting claims are sometimes called *antinomies*). In these cases, then, a paradox cannot even come to existence without our conflicting intuition, which considered in conjunction trigger this paradoxical conclusion. Paradoxes of these kind provide philosophers with one interesting topic for discussion when they try to locate the exact point *where* the conflict between intuitive claims originates, *how* it does it and also *why*. On the other hand, it is often thought to be a disadvantage for a proposed philosophical theory if it cannot resolve a prominent paradox within its purported domain. (Cohen 1986: 50–1.)

As has been noted, the aim of this brief overview was to remain as middle-of-the-road as possible on the philosophical disagreements in this topic, and to

²³ Although the representatives of the so-called experimental philosophy have since then used questionnaires to survey just how extensively the Gettier-intuitions are represented among the lay people. The surprising results of these investigations have turned many philosophers to suspect the actual rationality of the theorising in Gettier literature. See Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001).

merely describe the connections where intuitions are used in the methodology of contemporary armchair philosophising as it actually is. However, this aspiration for briefness and neutrality can already streamline these matters too much and thus turn against its own purposes: What good is an overview if it presents us with a metaphilosophical caricature with no actual counterpart in reality? It is therefore necessary here at the end of this section to present certain crucial further clarifications and qualifications to what was just written above.

First and foremost, my intention was not to portray the methodology of contemporary armchair philosophy in such an embellished way, where the intuition-based philosophising would amount to a homogeneous phenomenon, so that *all* intuitive theorising would always slavishly follow the same methodological schemas within all sub-disciplines of philosophy. Along these lines, for example, the intuitive arguments given in metaphysics, ethics and political philosophy do not have to mimic the template given by the Gettier-literature in the field of analytic epistemology, and there can be various different ways to practise intuitive argumentation within one and the same branch of philosophy, too. So in plain English: not only do philosophers lack an uncontested view regarding the fundamental epistemological nature and aetiology of intuitions, but they also do not have only *one orthodox way* to employ intuitions in philosophising. The way we understand the methodological role of intuitions on philosophical theory-building of course hinges on the issue of how we understand *the nature of philosophical theories*. Do the successful intuitive theories have projective powers akin to the way empirical theories do? What about their normative ingredients? Do the different branches of philosophy diverge from each other in the way in which they approach their theory-building? These metaphilosophical questions are of course intimately connected to the issue of how the aim of philosophy is understood within the relevant conception of philosophy, as it affects the way we understand the nature and aspirations of philosophical theories. I find that numerous—otherwise good and recommendable—overviews of the usage of intuitions in philosophy remain rather vague on this issue in particular.

In any case, it should be stressed that the overview given here does not link intuition-based methodology with either *justification foundationalism* or unwavering *infallibilism*. Instead, the nature of the intuitive theory-building can alternatively be understood from the viewpoints of *coheretism* and *fallibilism* as a dynamic and ongoing process, where the credibility of an individual intuition can be re-assessed holistically every time we have new and more refined intuitive evidence which calls for such a re-assessment. If we think of intuitions in this way as a form of fallible and defeasible *prima facie* evidence, then the discovery of an intuitive counterexample does not always have to signify a decisive blow

for the targets of these criticisms. Defenders of the criticised theory can in these cases try to defuse the problematic intuition by exposing its illusory nature—just as in the theory-building of the empirical sciences where a *prima facie* problematic sense experience can be tried to be neutralised. An alternative line of defence is to “bite the bullet” and simply accept the unintuitive consequence as a real problem for the theory under fire. The critical intuition is thus seen as a part of the overall price we have to pay for that theory, when the theory can try to make up for with its explanatory power, internal coherence, parsimony and other theoretical virtues (see Weatherston 2003). Then intuition is just one piece of the larger picture when we determine the pros and cons together about a philosophical issue. The case of Gettier’s counterexamples was in many respects an excellent representation of the armchair philosophy’s methodology. Then again, it might be already *too exemplary* case in the sense that it fuels the wrong kind of impressions, where all intuition-based theorising would always result in similar consensus among philosophers regarding the intuitive claim. Perhaps the Gettier-case is the one exception in the field, and not the norm?

Here we are faced with various methodological questions pertaining to the nature of philosophical theories: Which kind of aspects do we want to take into consideration when we evaluate our theories? Should these criteria of evaluation place emphasis on the overall theory following a “top-down” model, or rather stress the importance of particular intuitions following a “down-up” model? Related to this latter question we can note that similar metaphilosophical “the chicken or the egg” questions have been in the forefront of meta-ethical discussions, where the two opposing positions come from the views which prefer the primacy of general moral principles on the one hand, and *casuistry*, which sees particular moral judgments as being primary to general rules, on the other (see Richardson 2003/2013).

An alternative methodological approach to the abovementioned model where we try to derive general analyses from particular intuitions is the notion of *reflective equilibrium*, which goes back to the writings of Goodman and Rawls.²⁴ There are numerous variations of the reflective equilibrium’s basic idea—a notable point of departure is especially Rawls’ division into *broad* and *narrow* forms of this approach. In any case, they all share a decisively *coherentist* viewpoint to the development and justification of philosophical theories, so that this activity can be seen as seeking the best overall balance between various facets regarding our topic in question (see Daniels 2003/2011). In this weighing we

²⁴ The method of reflective equilibrium can be viewed as a process which creates epistemic justification, or as a practical way to reach a consensus on some topic. The metaphilosophically more relevant of these two interpretations is the former.

take into consideration our particular intuitions²⁵ concerning this topic, but also all kinds of other relevant issues, such as the previous philosophical theories in this vicinity, theoretical concerns, general everyday beliefs and whatnot possibly—possibly even the empirical facts relevant to the issue at hand. An advocate of the methodology of reflective equilibrium does not need to tie herself to an optimistic supposition, which holds that we could ultimately reach an irreversible and eternal static equilibrium as the end product of this process. Instead, she can accept that our conclusions are constantly and forever being re-assessed when we gain new insights and additional evidence regarding our topic.²⁶

But even if the method of reflective equilibrium is sometimes portrayed as a methodological *alternative* to intuitive theory-building, it is in fact more constructive to interpret it as a sophisticated coherentist model regarding the dynamic interaction between particular intuitions and the generalised theory based on these individual intuitions: On the one hand, we get philosophical theories when we systematise our intuitions but, on the other, the assertiveness and evidential weight of particular intuitions can be assessed in the light of our previously held theories.

But the above descriptions are not entirely uncontroversial, however, since for other philosophers the methodology of reflective equilibrium should be regarded structure-wise as a *foundationalist* model, which uses as its fuel our particular intuitions (for this issue, see Pust 2000: 13–28). Be that as it may, the bottom line here is that *both* versions of the reflective equilibrium are ultimately driven by intuitions. This inter-reliance of intuitions and the model of reflective equilibrium is manifest in the fact that one of the frequently voiced criticisms of the methodology of reflective equilibrium is precisely its reliance on intuitions (see Daniels 2003/2011: §4.1). In any case, these questions regarding the more detailed nature of the relationship of intuitions and the reflective equilibrium can be left open here, and we do not have to associate any single “orthodox” interpretation of this method to the methodology of the armchair philosophy.

²⁵ The metaphilosophical literature on reflective equilibrium does not always use the word ‘intuitions’ when describing this point, but instead chooses to follow Rawls’s terminology of ‘considered judgments’. Insofar as I can tell, the greatest difference between ‘intuitions’ and ‘considered judgments’ exists on linguistic level, and functionally they are supposed to fill similar roles in philosophical methodology (see Rawls [1971]).

²⁶ As Rawls, known primarily for his contributions in political philosophy, has played so significant a part in the development of the reflective equilibrium’s idea, the metaphilosophical discussion regarding it has been accordingly most extensive in the field of meta-ethics (and in applied ethics, see Arras 2007). However, the methodology of reflective equilibrium has been suggested in other branches of philosophy too, such as in epistemology (see Lammenranta 1996).

Finally, we can ask the question of how big a role does intuition really have in the toolkit of philosophers? To start, it is certainly true that all cognitivist theorising in philosophy does not need to *always* and *everywhere* rely on intuition (Baggini & Fosl 2010; Daly 2010). Besides relying on our intuition, philosophers can take as the starting points for their philosophising, *inter alia*, wisdom of common sense, everyday language usage, indispensability arguments, emotional responses, empirical inputs of the sciences, religious epiphanies and dogmas, formal axioms, waving a hand *à la* G.E. Moore and so forth. Furthermore, in addition to intuitive analyses and thought experiments, we can in philosophical argumentation also employ transcendental arguments, indispensability arguments, deductions from basic axioms, methodological doubt and abductive arguments such as ontological postulation. Thirdly, when we are criticising a theory, we can evoke various accusations of circularity and inconsistency (for example, *reduction ad absurdum*). Finally, when we are weighing the merits of a philosophical hypothesis, we can measure its simplicity, parsimony, internal coherence and so forth.

Certain philosophers, however, such as the rationalist Bealer, have emphasised the centrality of intuition for *all* philosophising. These philosophers think that even the forms of argumentation and theorising, which might seem *prima facie* non-intuitive are actually deep-down constrained by numerous underlying intuitive principles and rules, such as notably the laws of logic. Thus in the view of these philosophers, intuiting is not just one method on a par with others in the toolkit of philosophers, but rather an omnipresent phenomenon which reaches into the bedrock of all philosophising.

With these qualifications in mind, it is still true that intuition-consulting happens broadly in all core sub-fields of philosophy, in both theoretical and practical quarters of the subject, and many of the most celebrated philosophical theories are built upon intuitions. Kornblith (2007: 28) has recently noted that “[a]ppeals to intuition play a foundational role in a good deal of philosophical theory construction.” Hales (2006: 10) concurs, and notes that “[t]oday it is difficult to imagine the pursuit of philosophy without the use of intuition.” Bealer (1992) has even jokingly called this method on the account of its saliency “the standard justificatory procedure” of philosophy.²⁷ Newcomers to philosophy quickly learn from the example set by philosophy’s textbooks and introductory

²⁷ The appreciation of Bealer’s pun might require some background for non-American readers here, since his words allude to the common American phrase “standard operating procedure”. This code phrase means a standardised way of doing things on certain field (such as in the armed forces).

courses a habit of creating intuitively thought experiments and counterexamples, and thus learn to imitate the existing philosophical methodology and its rhetorics (Cappelen 2012: 57–8). In certain sources the intuition-consulting is even mentioned as one of the central characteristics of philosophy itself, which separates it from other cognitive pursuits (DePaul & Ramsey 1998: vii).²⁸ (2012: 57–8).

The positive attitude towards intuitions which is typical of contemporary philosophers is evident in these oft-quoted words of Kripke (1980: 42):

Of course, some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think that it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.

But has this state of affairs always been like this or is it a more recent methodological innovation? This question can be tackled in the next section, which examines the early phases and historical influences of armchair philosophising.

4.4. THE PRE-HISTORY OF ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY

Certain assessments assert that the philosophers' methodological practice of appealing to intuitions has increased its popularity noticeably during the past fifty-odd years. Hintikka (1999: 127) for example, contends that he can pinpoint a sharp watershed moment on this matter in the recent history of analytic philosophy:

Before the early 1960s, you could scarcely find any overt references, let alone appeals, to intuitions in the pages of philosophical journals and books in the analytical tradition. After the mid-1960s, you will find intuitions playing a major role in the philosophical argumentation of virtually every article or book. Why the contrast?

Hintikka approaches his rhetorical question with a certain lead in mind since, in his view, the "timing of the great revival of intuitionist methodology gives us

²⁸ From the opposite direction we have philosophers such as Cappelen, who argues in his provocatively titled book *Philosophy without Intuitions* (2012) that this metaphilosophical picture of philosophy as an intuition-based discipline is entirely false. This mistaken picture has then created illusory metaphilosophical problems regarding, among others, the questions about the nature and aetiology of intuitions.

a clue to its causes.” On this basis he identifies the distinguished linguist, Noam Chomsky, as the inspiring role-model for analytic philosophers of that particular time period. Chomsky, who is celebrated as the originator of the research programme of modern theoretical linguistics²⁹, had through his revolutionary work in the 1950s and 60s reshaped linguistics into a mature discipline, which aspires in the vein of the empirical sciences to devise nomological explanations and projective predictions concerning its subject matter.³⁰

A (very) short recap of the Chomskyan revolution goes something like this: Prior to the mid-twentieth century the mainstream of linguistics was dominated by the research programme of *structuralism*, which was inaugurated by the Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure and then subsequently refined by the two Americans Edward Sapir and Leonard Bloomfield. Under the auspices of this paradigm, linguistics is preoccupied with describing and classifying the basic building blocks of individual natural languages, such as morphemes and phonemes. When linguists are creating their taxonomical classifications of these basic building blocks the only thing they really need to study closely is a corpus of utterances, that is, the relevant samples of the language they are trying to understand. What they do *not* need to pay attention to are the internal thought processes and feelings of the actual native speakers. So in this externalist methodological approach, which does not at any point refer to the subjective mental states (or the introspection used to monitor them), structuralist linguistics satisfied the methodological standards set by the behavioristic psychology for any cognition-related empirical investigation in the first half of the twentieth century.

Deviating from this received structuralist conception of linguistics, Chomsky (1957) set entirely new goals for his linguistic inquiry: Linguists are to chart the sub-linguistic syntactic structures shared universally by all different natural languages. This means that linguists should try to establish which kind of deep-rooted rules and patterns for acceptable language-use are repeated in similar forms from language to language. This topical reorientation required a corresponding re-assessment of linguistics methodology. When Chomsky started to do this kind of research himself, he took as his basic data the linguistic intuitions

²⁹ In the minds of those laypeople who only know this field superficially (if at all), modern linguistics *is* often simply identical with the persona of Chomsky—just as biology is identical with the persona of Darwin, or as physics is identical with the persona of Einstein (Smith 2004: 1). This equation can become problematic in the potential cases where any criticism against Chomsky and his views is seen as criticism against linguistics *itself* (see Devitt 2006).

³⁰ For introductions to Chomsky’s work in linguistics see, for example, Smith (2004) and Collins (2008). For a recount of Chomsky’s intellectual development, see Tomalin (2003).

that the competent native speakers share about grammatically correctly (and incorrectly) formed sentence structures.³¹ Chomsky (1957: 13) writes:

One way to test the adequacy of a grammar proposed for [language] L is to determine whether or not the sequences that it generates are actually grammatical, i.e., acceptable to native speakers, etc. We can take certain steps towards providing a behavioral criterion for grammaticalness so that this test of adequacy can be carried out. For the purposes of this discussion, however, suppose that we can assume intuitive knowledge of the grammatical sentences of English and ask what sort of grammar will be able to do the job of producing these in some effective and illuminating way. We thus face a familiar task of explication of some intuitive concept—in this case, the concept “grammatical in English,” and more generally, the concept “grammatical.”

So, in light of this starting point the ultimate criterion for syntactic theories becomes their intuitiveness for a native speaker, and it is to this intuitive data to which any adequate linguistic theory must do justice—if a proposed syntactic theory does not succeed in this test of intuitiveness, there must be something wrong with it. This approach places a much larger role both on linguistic intuitions and introspective reflection in the methodology of linguistics than the previous structuralist paradigm had done. In the most enthusiastic reactions this change of direction was perceived as a coming of age for linguistics. It now finally became a full-blown empirical discipline, which akin to the natural sciences crafts nomological generalisations based on real data—the crucial difference between these enterprises lies only on the issue that the theorising in the natural sciences relies ultimately on evidence given by our sense experiences, whereas linguistics builds its theories upon deliverances of linguistic intuition. This methodological realignment where intuitions are placed at the front and centre of linguistic research was a necessary move for Chomsky considering his newfound aims for linguistic inquiry, since we cannot derive the syntactically correct rules for a language simply by examining a selection of samples of that language. Instead, we need to rely in this process also on intuitions from competent speakers so that we know how to separate the syntactically correct samples from the incorrect ones.

³¹ Although in actual practice the competent native speaker is often the particular linguist herself, who is doing the research. It is then on the basis of his intuitions that the relevant theoretical generalisations can be made, so linguists need not to occupy themselves with gathering data systematically by composing long questionnaires for test subjects.

The immense success of Chomsky's intuition-based *modus operandi* had the more general side-effect where this approach became a methodological paradigm also in many neighbouring fields of inquiry which aim to understand and describe the inner mechanisms of the human cognition. Chomsky played a big part in the downfall of behavioristic psychology and the related formation of modern interdisciplinary cognitive science.³²

In Hintikka's (1999: 127) view, Chomskyan linguistics amassed epigones also within the ranks of philosophers during 1960s and 70s, and these Chomsky's philosophical imitators wanted to apply the same intuition-based approach in their own philosophical investigations. Hintikka sees this development as being motivated by a "bandwagon effect" of sorts, as philosophers wanted to have their share of Chomsky's successes and, at the same time, also to show that they were still hip and relevant in the new academic climate of post-Chomskyan revolution.

Hintikka claims that a central part during this period of change was played especially by Kripke's (1971; 1980) philosophical writings, whose theory-building concerning semantic, epistemological, metaphysical and logical themes can be read as being based in Chomskyan fashion on the intuitive bedrock, on which basis Kripke then also criticised the views presented by his predecessors in the field, such as Frege and Russell, as their theories can be seen as containing problematic claims and theoretical implications from the point of view of Kripkean intuitions.

Hintikka's assessment is certainly stimulating, and it opens whole new avenues for us to better understand the theoretical influences and methodological suppositions of certain contemporary philosophers, such as Kripke.³³ I must however respectfully disagree on some of the specific details in Hintikka's narrative, as it tends to simplify these matters a bit too much already, and, on the other hand, it turns a blind eye on certain other particulars in this area, which in fact seem to speak against Hintikka's account. Let us then look in the name of deeper metaphilosophical self-understanding to what extent Hintikka's views truly represent actual history, and furthermore what kind of alternative precedents and role models we can locate from the earlier phases of philosophy for the current methodology of armchair philosophy.

³² The neutral exposition of Chomskyan linguistics in a short space such as this is a complicated task, since there have been given many competing—even directly conflicting—interpretations of this methodology in the literature. To make matters worse, there are inconsistencies in Chomsky's own texts between what he is actually *doing* and what he *says* he is doing.

³³ Hintikka's claims are mentioned in passing by Goldman (2007: 2), Williamson (2007: 212n2) and Cappelen (2012: 22), but his views have not been examined thoroughly in the existing literature.

Let us then begin with certain viewpoints which seem to concede Hintikka's line of interpretation. When we look at the central figures who had a hand in the formative stages of analytic philosophy, notably Frege and Russell, we can see that they displayed in their writings often sceptical, even hostile, attitudes towards intuitions as a purported source of philosophical knowledge. Moreover, intuitions, and the thought experiments used to elicit them, do not have central place in the methodology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* nor in the "rational reconstruction" undertaken by Carnap (see Glock 2008a: 164). A common starting point for the philosophers mentioned here was a specific kind of research interest, which made them fixated in their philosophising on the level of formal and logical languages as opposed to the aspects of our everyday language-use. Thus, for example, the philosophical objective for Carnap in his analyses was not to provide intuitive definitions for certain expressions taken from our ordinary language, but rather to explicate the technical notions from the scientific language and to clarify this language's logical syntax (see Lutz 2009). In these undertakings we do not have to appeal directly to our intuitions as a point of departure in our philosophising, as the conditions for successful philosophical analysis come from the realm of formal and logical languages.³⁴

Many of these philosophers mentioned in the previous paragraph had even openly critical things to say about the supposed justificatory powers of intuition as a methodological starting point for philosophising. However, when are making these historical examinations we must be careful not to conflate several different usages of the notion of intuition here. The point of view from which many of these philosophers commented on the epistemological value of intuitions related actually to the epistemology of mathematics and logic. In these contexts, intuition as a form of immediate knowledge about the truth-values of theorems was usually contrasted with axiomatic-deductive proofs.³⁵

³⁴ Russell's (1957: 387) disdain towards natural language is expressed in this quotation, where he responds to the criticism he received from Strawson: "That brings me to a fundamental divergence between myself and many philosophers with whom Mr. Strawson appears to be in general agreement. They are persuaded that common speech is good enough not only for daily life, but also for philosophy. I, on the contrary, am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. Everybody admits that physics and chemistry and medicine each require a language which is not that of everyday life. I fail to see why philosophy, alone, should be forbidden to make a similar approach towards precision and accuracy."

³⁵ Applying the remarks made in these discussions to our present-day metaphilosophical contexts is thus problematic and requires always careful analysis. Otherwise the criticism towards intuitions voiced in these logical and mathematical settings can become a "red herring" of sorts (for example, the thinking of Wittgenstein is in this respect easily misleading, and we must

A similar attitude which values formal language above ordinary language is present in many of Hintikka's own logical and philosophical investigations (see Hintikka 2007: §9). For example, in epistemology Hintikka sees epistemic logic as revealing the "deep logic" which underlies our epistemic discourse. Hintikka (1969: 5) notes on the nature of this deep logic that "as the case is with theoretical models in general, it does not seem to be derivable from any number of observations concerning ordinary language. It has to be invented rather than discovered" (this remark is accompanied by a footnote, in which Hintikka refers to Chomsky by name). This kind of approach which places a preference on the formal languages can end up in situations in which we notice that our everyday use of language and actions are actually logically unclear or even erroneous. Hintikka's work on other philosophical and logical topics, such as in inductive logic, game theoretic semantics, independence-friendly logic and interrogative logic would seem to follow the same model of deductive-cum-theoretical approach which leaves no methodological role for our intuition (see Bogdan 2004).

What corroborative evidence do we then have for Hintikka's suggestion that Chomsky's work and methodology influenced philosophers in the 1960s and 70s? First of all, it is an undeniable fact that Chomsky — who has worked actively in the theoretical field intersecting linguistics and philosophy his whole career — has had an enormous stimulating effect on philosophy and philosophers. Collins (2008: 3) writes:

[C]ontemporary philosophy of language, with its preoccupations with 'knowledge of language', compositionality, logical form etc., is simply unimaginable without Chomsky. It would not be hyperbolic to say that Chomsky's work has shaped the philosophical landscape as much as that of any other thinker of the late twentieth century.

Chomsky (1972: 167–8) has himself noted that his work in linguistics has significant implications for numerous philosophical questions, such as the longstanding topic of innate ideas conducted within the bounds of epistemology and philosophy of mind.

How then have these Chomskyan influences reverberated in the actual practices of philosophy, and does the intuition-based methodology count as one of these Chomskyan imports, as Hintikka suggests? Kripke, who was singled out as a central example in Hintikka's article, does not explicitly mention Chomsky by name in his writings (or otherwise comment on the contemporaneous

keep his ideas about the methodology of philosophy on the one hand and the methodology of mathematics on the other distinct; see Symons 2008: 71–2).

goings-on of Chomskyan linguistics, at least not to my knowledge), but traces of Chomsky's influence on other philosophers of that same era are more easily detectable. Putnam for instance, who worked on closely related philosophical themes with Kripke, was a fellow student with Chomsky at Harvard in the 1950s, and he also refers to Chomsky's work in his own texts (see, for example, Putnam 1970).

On the other hand, Chomsky had his own students, many of which went on to become influential philosophers in the fields of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, such as Jerry Fodor and Jerrold Katz. When we look at the work of these philosophers, Katz' early work especially, we can see an actual imitation of Chomsky's methodological approach happening, for example when Katz anchors his theses about our correct language-use to our linguistic intuitions, just as Chomsky did (see, for example, Katz 1971; for discussion on this topic see Symons 2008: 73).³⁶

In addition to the philosophers working in the philosophy of language, Chomsky's work was also noticed within certain other branches of philosophy. A notable example here is the case of political philosopher Rawls ([1971]: 41) who first encapsulates the research aims of his moral philosophical theorising in the following way:

Now one may think of moral theory at first (and I stress the provisional nature of this view) as the attempt to describe our moral capacity; or, in the present case, one may regard a theory of justice as describing our sense of justice. But such a description is not meant simply a list of the judgments on institutions and actions that we are prepared to render, accompanied with supporting reasons when these are offered. Rather, what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined with our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently. A conception of justice characterizes our moral sensibility when the everyday judgments we do make are in accordance with these principles. These principles can serve as part of the premises or an argument which arrives at the matching judgments. We do not understand our sense of justice

³⁶ Here is a representative passage from Katz (1971: 102): "Our linguistic intuition that 'unmarried bachelor' is semantically redundant and that 'He is a bachelor' is not semantically anomalous tell us that one component of this sense of 'bachelor' is the concept of being in an unmarried state. Our linguistic intuition that 'aunt', 'sister', 'mother', 'spinster', etc. differ semantically from 'uncle', 'brother', 'father', 'bachelor', etc., only with respect to the conceptual distinction between femaleness and maleness which tells us that another component of the sense of 'bachelor' is the concept of maleness."

until we know in some systematic way covering a wide range of cases what these principles are.

The moral principles which regulate our particular judgements about justice should then be required to be able to provide us with judgments about novel cases, which are still in line with our general sense of justice. In this respect the aims of moral philosophical theorising can be compared in Rawls' (*ibid.*: 41) view to those of Chomskyan linguistics:

A useful comparison here is with the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of our native language. In this case the aim is to characterize the ability to recognize well-formed sentences by formulating clearly expressed principles which make the same discriminations as the native speaker. This undertaking is known to require theoretical constructions that far outrun the ad hoc precepts of our explicit grammatical knowledge. A similar situation presumably holds in moral theory. There is no reason to assume that our sense of justice can be adequately characterized by familiar common sense precepts, or derived from the more obvious learning principles.³⁷

Indeed, many of Chomsky's linguistic theories and the methodological discussions related to them are directly relevant for intuition-based philosophising as well, such as Chomsky's division into speaker's performance and competence, which has been referenced, among others, in the discussions pertaining to the theoretical pre-suppositions of the experimental philosophy (see Kauppinen 2007).

The philosophical reactions to Chomsky's work have not been uniformly positive, however, and many philosophers have contributed to the critical discussions pertaining to Chomskyan linguistics. Here we can name as an example Hintikka himself, who has commented on the particular details of Chomsky's theories (see Hintikka 1980) and also, more broadly, on the methodological foundations of this project (see Hintikka & Sandu 1991).

What issues then seem to speak against Hintikka's assessment regarding the influence of Chomsky on philosophical intuition-talk? Can we really say that the modern analytic philosophers who refer to intuitions in their theorising

³⁷ I have removed a footnote included at the end of this quoted passage, where Rawls refers to Chomsky's book *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. For discussion on Rawls' analogue see Daniels (1978; 1998: 66–80).

have all been influenced by Chomsky (either directly or at least indirectly)? Although Hintikka restricted the scope of his claim to cover only the analytic philosophy of mid-twentieth century onwards, I will begin my examination from slightly further back in time. This is intended to show that the methodological use of intuitions in philosophising is not merely a new fad or limited to post-Kripkean analytic philosophy. As DePaul & Ramsey (1998: viii) note, “From its beginning in Greek philosophy right through to the present, intuitions have always played an extremely important role in Western philosophy.”³⁸ When we look at the methodology of contemporary armchair philosophising against this broader historical background, its particulars become more understandable.

A classic early role model for contemporary philosopher’s method of appealing to intuitions is provided by Plato’s Socratic dialogues, which are filled with decompositional conceptual analysis and searches for intuitive definitions (Beaney 2003/2009). In these Plato’s dialogues, Socrates together with his discussants seek answers to what are courage (*Laches*), justice (*Alcibiades I*, *Republic*), friendship (*Lysis*), avarice (*Menon*), moderateness (*Charmides*), piety (*Euthyphron*), knowledge (*Theaetetus*) and so on. Margolis & Lawrence (2003: 299) even speak of our “Socratic intuitions” when they are discussing our semantic knowledge of how to apply concepts.

I already gave one illustration of Plato’s method intuitive conceptual analysis in the previous section, when I discussed the epistemological research programme of analytic epistemology, which was instigated by Gettier’s counterexamples to Plato’s original analysis. Another Platonic example which is often alluded to in the metaphilosophical literature is the following passage from *Republic* (1959: 331c–d), where Socrates reflects with his discussants upon the nature of justice:

“I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly – nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state.”
 “You are right,” [Cephalus] replied. “Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received.”

³⁸ Compare this with Gutting (1998: 6): “The traditional ideal, from Platonic *noesis* through Cartesian clear and distinct perception to positivist sense data reports, has been to ground core philosophical truths in some sort of self-justifying intuitive insight.”

Here we can see how Socrates is putting forward a small thought experiment, which his interlocutor is supposed to answer in line with his intuition on the matter. After this exchange Socrates ends by rejecting a proposed view regarding the nature of justice. This same methodological formula has been then replicated by several later philosophers too, such as Locke ([1690]: Bk II, Ch 29; underlining added) in his renowned case of “The Prince and The Cobbler”.

For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same *person* with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but who would say it was the same *man*.

The underlined expressions in this passage reveal the crucial points where Locke is basing his conclusions on this topic on intuition.

When we turn to the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, we can observe that even within its contexts ‘intuitions’ were referenced even before Chomsky’s linguistic works. For example, Cohen (1976) has here examined the writings of logical empiricists in the field of philosophy of science, and he has located a transition towards a criterion of intuitiveness in the times immediately following the Second World War. Cohen states that it would seem that before this turning point no suggested principle or hypothesis in philosophy of science was supported, for example in the writings of Carnap, on the basis that this principle or hypothesis would be intuitive, and no principle or hypothesis was conversely rejected on the basis that it would be counter-intuitive. However, already in 1948 the philosophers of science Hempel and Oppenheim were already appealing explicitly to intuition when they were talking of their model of scientific explanation (*ibid.*: 360–1). In his writing Cohen documents this change quite extensively, and of some interest here is the fact that he names Hintikka’s theorising on the notion of enumerative induction as one of his examples.³⁹

It would also seem that philosophers were developing the methodological foundations of armchair philosophising even before Chomsky. For example,

³⁹ The relevant passage is this (Hintikka 1968: 216): “We have to keep in mind the possibility that some (perhaps many) of our inductive intuitions and preferences are based on our vague feeling for something like our degree of corroboration as distinguished from a degree of confirmation. If this is the case, these intuitions and preferences ought to be systematized and accounted for in terms of the former notion rather than the latter.”

Rawls (1951: 194) who was sketching his ideas on the notion of reflective equilibrium in his text “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” wrote regarding the aims of moral philosophy:

[J]ust as epistemology is best studied by considering specific instances of intuitively acceptable knowledge, ethics is most profitably pursued by examining carefully instances of what seem to be intuitively acceptable and reasonable moral decisions; and just as the instances suitable for epistemology may often be found in the theories of the well-developed sciences, so instances suitable for ethics can be found in those decisions which seem to represent a well-established result of discussion on the part of moralists, jurists, and other persons who have given thought to the question at issue.

As already noted in the previous section on the subject of the methodology of reflective equilibrium, in addition to Rawls another figure behind the early development of this method was Goodman with his book *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (1955), which examined the justification of inductive and deductive reasoning.⁴⁰ An interesting thread in this topic comes from the question of what was Goodman’s influence on Chomsky who was a student of Goodman’s at Harvard; he also took part in the lectures on which the material in Goodman’s book was based. Chomsky later emphasised the importance of his philosophical studies for his intellectual development, which led him to reject the behavioristic and ultra-empiricist methodology of structuralism (on this topic see Tomalin 2003).⁴¹

⁴⁰ Cohnitz & Rossberg (2006: 35, underlining added): “This inference is in accordance with the inference rules of predicate logic. Why is predicate logic of importance here, and not just *some* set of inference rules? It must, of course, be a system with *valid* rules, and the rules of predicate logic are valid. Why are they valid? Goodman’s answer to that question struck many as odd. According to Goodman the rules of classical predicate logic, or perhaps some alternative deductive system, are valid because they are more or less in accordance with what we accept as a valid deductive inference. On the one hand, we have certain intuitions about which deductive inferences are valid and on the other hand we have rules of inference. When we are confronted with an intuitively valid inference, we check whether it accords to the rules we have already accepted.”

⁴¹ Chomsky (quoted in Tomalin 2003: 1239): “At Harris’s suggestion I had begun to study logic, philosophy, and foundations of mathematics more seriously as a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, and later at Harvard. I was particularly impressed by Nelson Goodman’s work on constructional systems. In its general character, this work was in some ways similar to Harris’s, and seemed to me to provide the appropriate intellectual background for the investigation of taxonomic procedures that I then regarded as central to linguistic theory. But Goodman’s ongoing critique of induction seemed to point in a rather different direction, suggesting the inadequacy in principle of inductive approaches. Goodman’s investigation of

What can we then say on Kripke's case? Was the methodology of his philosophising influenced by Chomskyan linguistics? When we are talking of Kripke's argumentation we must first and foremost note that his way of appealing to intuition is not always clear and consistent, which creates its own challenges for any exegetical projects in this topic (Symons 2008: 75). In any case, the role model for Kripke's theorising did not come from Chomsky in any particular sense, but rather from the earlier school of so-called ordinary language philosophy. Kripke and these philosophers were united by their common interest towards the issue of *what we would say* under a certain described situation (see Hanfling 2000: 241–3; Symons 2008; Canfield 2009; Gutting 2009).

The crucial difference between Kripke and these philosophers of the ordinary language comes mostly from the rhetorical issue, that Kripke replaces the phrase 'what we would say' in many places — though not everywhere — with the notion of 'intuition'. On the other hand, another difference between Kripke and these earlier philosophers comes from the fact that Kripke is more explicit in his use of counterfactual evaluations to draw out our relevant intuitions.

At the same time it would seem that Kripke uses in many places intuition to signify a certain kind of common sense view belonging to "an ordinary man", which should be separated sharply from the overt abstractions of "philosophers" (Symons 2008). This way of using intuitions is present in *Naming and Necessity* for example when Kripke defends his ideas about essential properties. Kripke (1980: 41) remarks:

I don't know if some philosophers have not realized this, but at any rate it is very far from being true that this idea [that a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description] is a notion which has no intuitive content, which means nothing to the ordinary man. Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, 'That's the guy who might have lost'. Someone else says 'Oh no, if you describe him as "Nixon", then he might have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, the it is

the simplicity of systems also suggested (to me at least) possibilities for nontaxonomic approaches to linguistic theory. Quine's critique of logical empiricism also gave some reason to believe that this line of enquiry might be a plausible one. Quine argued that the principles of scientific theory are confronted with experience as a systematic complex, with adjustments possible at various points, governed by such factors as general simplicity." In the acknowledgements of his book *Syntactic Structures* Chomsky (1957: 6) admits his debt to these philosophers by writing that "in less obvious ways, perhaps, the course of this research has been influenced strongly by the work of Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine."

not true that he might have lost'. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive man? It seems to me obviously to be the second.⁴²

Here the talk of "intuitive content" means that this idea is in accordance with our everyday commonsensical way of thinking about these things whereas the philosophically motivated theories go astray in comparison. Kripke's expectation for good philosophising seems to be that philosophy cannot end up in such a stipulated and unusual conclusion, which do not correspond to our everyday thinking (Symons 2008: 77).

As noted earlier, Kripke criticised these arguments especially Frege and Russell. An explanation for the fact why these eminent philosophers could propose a semantic theory, which is so unintuitive under Kripke's examination, is provided by the fact that Frege and Russell were not primarily interested in the functioning of our ordinary language, as its predicates are too vague and its syntax is misleading from the logical point of view. Instead, these philosophers based their theorising on the internal coherence of these theories and on the explanatory power these theories demonstrated in the context of certain problem cases of philosophy of language (Kripke 1980: 5). On the other hand, Kripke had the advantage of modern modal logic, which helped to better flesh out our intuitions in counterfactual contexts.

Summing up, we can note that Kripke deviated from the philosophers he criticised in that he shifted the focus of philosophy of language towards actual language-use manifested in our everyday actions (a better comparison for Kripke's style of theorising is thus provided by J.S. Mill for example, who Kripke names as his precursor).⁴³ On the other hand, the intuitive methodology he uses in these tasks does not go back to Chomskyan linguistics but rather to the ordinary language philosophy and Moorean philosophy of common sense. The crucial difference between Kripke and these philosophical antecedents comes from the fact that Kripke was so forthright in his use of the idiom of 'intuition'. Speaking more generally, Kripke certainly was not alone in interested in those themes from philosophy of language during that timeframe, and he can be seen as continuing the work done by Ruth Barcan Marcus and Keith Donnellan, among others.

⁴² Note also Kripke (1980: 3, footnote removed): "Already when I worked on modal logic it had seemed to me, as Wiggins had said, that the Leibnitz-ian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals was as self-evident as the law of contradiction. That some philosophers could have doubted it always seemed to me bizarre. [...] The model theory made this completely clear, though it should have been clear enough on the intuitive level."

⁴³ It has also been suggested, that Kripke's view were anticipated even earlier by Locke. See Mackie (1974).

From this observation we come to the next topic, which concerns the rhetoric of philosophers namely, although the use of the idiom ‘intuition’ has become more popular, we should not reach the more radical conclusion on this basis that there would have transpired a deep-rooted revolution in the actual methodological practices of philosophers. Instead, the earlier philosophers just used different expressions and phrases when they were explicating their intuitive sentiments (“it is a *truth of the reason*, that *p*”, “it is *conceivable*, that *p*”, “it is *self-evident*, that *p*”, “it would *seem*, that *p*” and so forth). A good example of this is the passage quoted from Locke few pages earlier, where he notes that “everyone sees” what the relevant philosophical conclusion is on the basis of the described situation. On the other hand, we can acknowledge, that Gettier did not mention intuition even once when he was explicating his counter-examples to the classical analysis of knowledge (Nagel 2007), but this type of talking had nevertheless become the norm in the field of analytic epistemology a decade later.⁴⁴ Kripke himself does not always speak of intuitions in *Naming and Necessity*, but just mentions how “it seems to me that...” or “certainly there is some feeling that...” when he is putting some claim forward.

Hintikka is in his article aware of this pre-Chomskyan pre-history of the intuition-based methodology. He however finds a worrying difference between the actions of the present and past philosophers, namely, that whereas the earlier theorists—here Hintikka namechecks Aristotle, Descartes and Kant—had always tried to justify their use of intuitions within a more general (meta)philosophical framework, the contemporary philosophers have in contrast neglected the reflection on the foundations of their methodologies completely, and instead just trusted blindly the trustworthiness of intuitions. Hintikka (1999: 130) notes, frustrated:

The most amazing fact about the current fashion of appealing to intuitions is the same as the proverbial dog’s walking on two feet: not that it is done particularly well but that it is done at all. For what is supposed to be the justification of such appeals to intuition? One searches the literature in vain for a serious attempt to provide such a justification.

Chomsky did have a theoretical explanation for his methodological appeals to linguistic intuitions, since he “came out of the closet” in the 1960s as a Cartesian,

⁴⁴ Armstrong (1973: 181), for example, offers his opinion regarding a certain epistemic scenario: “The situation is a peculiar one, and my intuitions, and I would suppose other people’s, are not completely clear on the matter. But it seems, on the whole, that we ought not to speak of knowledge here[.]”

meaning that he bases his use of linguistic intuitions to the innate language-ability of the mind. This Cartesian explanation is, however, hard to swallow for many philosophers, so philosophers must give some other believable explanation for their intuition-use.⁴⁵ According to Hintikka, this they have not done. Hintikka (2007: 191) writes:

In a nutshell, what happened was that, blinded by what was perceived as the success of Chomsky's generative grammar, philosophers began to imitate what they thought of as Chomsky's intuitionistic methodology. This was a double mistake. Even if they had been right about Chomsky, contemporary philosophers would not have had the excuse that Chomsky the Cartesian linguist would have for his appeals to intuition.

Hintikka does not exactly name any single philosopher as the target for his critical words here, and he simply speaks only on very general level of "philosophers". We can nevertheless read between the lines here that of all the "philosophers" at which Hintikka's criticism is aimed, it is aimed especially at Kripke. In Kripke's case, Hintikka's accusations are at least partly on target. To be slightly more precise: although Kripke's work in the philosophy of language seems to be based crucially on the evidential value of our semantic intuitions concerning reference, essential properties and so on (even in Kripke's own words), he has not in print explicated the nature, aetiology or philosophical justification of these intuitions. This metaphilosophical negligence can be made a bit more understandable by two observations regarding Kripke's typical manner of philosophising: (1) Kripke's central texts on this philosophical topic ("*Identity and Necessity*" and *Naming and Necessity*) are in fact based on transcripts which were later made of the lectures Kripke delivered in semi-formal settings with a conversational tone, so they do not have the argumentative consistency and clarity that Hintikka would like. (2) Kripke seems to generally have a strong anti-theoretical disposition behind his philosophising, and he does not want to encapsulate his views into clear principles.⁴⁶ Moreover, he often seems

⁴⁵ It should be noted, that in the field of linguistics there have been alternative explanations for linguistic intuitions besides Chomsky's nativism, so despite all Chomsky's achievements and merits we should not equate modern linguistics with the person of Chomsky (see, for example, Itkonen 1981; Devitt 2006: 95–6).

⁴⁶ Kripke (1980: 64): "Let me state what the cluster concept theory of names is. (It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory."

to think that many of his basic notions could be understood even without technical explanations and analyses.⁴⁷

But we should not infer from the fact that Kripke did not offer detailed explanations for his intuitive methodological the hasty conclusion that there is *no* believable explanation for philosophical intuiting. As we saw earlier, Kripke's talk of intuitions was connected in many places to the earlier ordinary language philosophy and common sense philosophy. Thus Kripke would perhaps also base his trust in philosophical intuitions on these phenomenon. Thus Hintikka (2006: 33) seems to attack a kind of a straw man when he subsequently in his later writing moves on to speak of the "mysterious faculty of intuition" postulated by Kripke.

But no matter what the particular opinions and shortcomings of Kripke on these matters are, they obviously do not represent the views of the philosophical community taken as a whole. Thus neither the person of Kripke nor any his particular philosophical views should be equated with the current intuition-talk in contemporary analytic philosophy. When we look at these issues from a greater distance, we notice that there have been active discussions regarding intuitions and their epistemological trustworthiness in various branches of philosophy. One particularly important event was the conference at the University of Notre Dame in 1996, organized by Michael DePaul and William Ramsey, which resulted in an anthology (DePaul and Ramsey, eds. 1998). These discussions have not been entirely positive, as there have been important critical approaches to this topic, too. Therefore Hintikka's bleak estimate that philoso-

⁴⁷ I recall an interesting answer Kripke gave some time ago to a question posed to him after his lecture from the audience (at "Putnam at 80 conference", Dublin 12.3.2007). The audience member wanted to ask Kripke what he in fact meant by the 'intuitions' he repeatedly mentioned in his philosophising and also what their evidential basis was supposed to be. Kripke, however, did not want to explicate the nature of his intuitions any further, and simply remarked that the nature of philosophical intuitions are in some way (intuitively?) understandable without thorough analysing. Kripke added his opinion, that any philosophical attempt to analyse the nature of intuitions would probably only make this notion murkier than before. On this note we can compare Kripke's (1980: 39n11) earlier statement: "By the way, it's a common attitude in philosophy to think that one shouldn't introduce a notion until it's been rigorously defined (according to some popular notion of rigor). Here I am just dealing with an intuitive notion [of modality] and will keep on the level of an intuitive notion." So intuition was not the only theoretical notion which Kripke left undefined, as he was similarly vague regarding possible worlds, rigid designation, natural kinds and other topics. In the subsequent literature philosophers have tried to interpret these topics and Kripke's suggestions in various competing ways.

phers have somehow just started uncritically to refer to intuitions in their philosophical work does not represent the state of metaphilosophical discussion as it is at the present time.

For example, what happened within the research programme of analytic epistemology is that as the counterexamples for the proposed analyses started to become more and more outlandish, philosopher's attitudes turned gradually against the intuition-talk in this field of philosophy (see, for example, Kaplan 1985; Nagel 2007: 797). The methodological discussion about the many sides of intuition-based methodology has become even a fashionable topic during the philosophy of last three decades. One strong reason for this is the emergence of experimental philosophy and its assault towards the methodology of armchair philosophy. The jury is still out on the metaphilosophical ramifications of these discussions, and I will not attempt to discuss them here.

My dissertation was set in motion with the deceptively simple question “What is it that philosophers do?” I hope that the reader did not expect to be provided with a definite solution to this puzzle over the course of these 280-odd pages, as I have not voiced my support for any particular conception of philosophy. Instead, my primary aims have been firstly to explicate and clarify the host of issues connected to the multifaceted identity of philosophy; secondly, to characterise the nature of the metaphilosophical reflection assigned to the study of said condition; thirdly to map out the various starting points and nuances involved in the metaphilosophical debate between the naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy (with an emphasis on moderate naturalism and rationalism in particular); and fourthly, to elaborate on the methodology of the so-called armchair philosophy, embraced both by naturalism and rationalism. In this afterword I present a short summary of my original theses and conclusions related to these metaphilosophical themes. As I have in many places been treading on unbroken ground, I have often tried to say the first word on a certain topic—and not the last. So my conclusions here are tentative and, hopefully, they can inspire further discussion on these issues.

1) *The nature of conceptions of philosophy*

Although the term ‘conception of philosophy’ has been used in philosophical writings in the past, my original model of this notion is more systematic and detailed than what can be found in the literature. These instances of the earlier theorising on the subject have typically been terse and voiced in the specific context of one conception of philosophy or another, whereas I have tackled this topic on a general level.

I proposed that it is best to view all conceptions of philosophy as answering in their distinct ways the three interrelated key questions of *what* is philosophy about, *how* should philosophy be pursued and *why* is philosophy practised. Of the various ways of organising conceptions of philosophy further into contrasting sub-groups I explored the contrast between the forms of metaphilosophical cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and examined the related problem for cognitive conceptions of philosophy regarding the absence of uncontested philosophical results after two and a half millennia of philosophising.

Regarding the importance of these themes, I believe that if we recognise the plurality of diverse conceptions of philosophy and acknowledge the direct and indirect ways in which they can influence our philosophising, this recognition can benefit our self-understanding of what it is to philosophise and enable us to see how certain deep rifts between philosophical views might be the result of clashing conceptions of philosophy. It is my advice that philosophers should actively and self-critically reflect upon the tacit pre-suppositions involved in their own philosophising.

2) *Separating conceptions of philosophy from schools, traditions and movements*

The theme of conceptions of philosophy was elaborated further when I distinguished these philosophically construed abstract positions from schools, traditions and similar intellectual communities formed by philosophers, which in comparison have more sociological underpinnings. Although all these philosophical and sociological phenomena are in their own ways involved in creating the lack of unity present in the multifaceted identity of philosophy, it is my contention that these philosophical and sociological phenomena should not be conflated with one another (as I argued aided by a set of illustrations). Despite these essential differences the sociological level of schools can still influence the activities, attitudes and habits of philosophers (including the ways in which they approach conceptions of philosophy in discussions). As these influences can often be of a negative nature and hinder constructive dialogue across school-lines, it is important to recognise their potential effects on our thoughts and actions. I highlighted certain repeating patterns from these attitudes, so that we may better recognise how they can sway our thinking in matters pertaining to contending conceptions of philosophy and quarrelling schools. It is, for example, deceptively easy to suspect that our opponents' motivation for their philosophical views is based on some ulterior and unphilosophical motive, such as religious dogma, scientism, admiration of a philosophical master and so forth.

3) *The causes for the disunity in philosophy*

The current age of philosophy is described as being more pluralistic than ever before. I described the megatrends of specialisation and professionalisation, which have encouraged and amplified this development during the past two centuries. An additional factor is provided by the expansion of philosophy, meaning that there are simply more philosophers now than in earlier times, and these philosophers publish more philosophical research. These observations

notwithstanding, the ultimate reason for the lack of unity of philosophy is caused by the nature of philosophy itself: the topics which it examines and continuously re-examines—knowledge, reality, rationality, certainty, consistency, justice, warrant, explanation, meaning, understanding, evidence, necessity, possibility, argumentative validity, coherence and so on—affect the nature of philosophy itself too.

4) *How and why the proposed definitions for philosophy typically fail*

One indication of the multifaceted nature of philosophy is the difficulty of defining philosophy on a general level which would include all conceptions of philosophy. I examined this predicament through a set of illustrations and discussed several contending essentialist and anti-essentialist views regarding the task of trying to define philosophy. My suggestion was that it is best to regard philosophy as an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956), as there exists considerable disagreement regarding the correct extension of philosophy.

5) *The importance of the question "What is philosophy?"*

Although the question of philosophy's nature and definition might seem to be trivial technicalities, which are of secondary importance relative to the actual practice of *doing* philosophy, I defended the values of these themes as they can have far-reaching consequences for the practice of philosophy and for the position and public perception of philosophy within the larger cultural and social context.

6) *Defining metaphilosophy*

Despite the recent increase in metaphilosophical reflection and literature, metaphilosophy (including foundational issues pertaining to its own nature) still remains an under-researched quarter in the field of philosophical topics. When I started my writing process around ten years ago, there existed no extended treatment on the nature and role of metaphilosophical reflection. My modest contributions to these themes aspired to remedy this situation.

My general definition for metaphilosophy follows the existing brief characterisations in the literature, as it portrays metaphilosophy as a philosophy of philosophy, namely, a branch of philosophy which reflects on questions pertaining to conceptions of philosophy by using philosophy's standard methods and viewpoints. A metaphilosophically relevant topic is thus any normal first-

order philosophical issue, whether it comes from metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, ethics and so forth, which has consequences for the way in which we understand philosophising itself. For example, the epistemological questions regarding the possibility and range of *a priori* knowledge can be reframed as metaphilosophical questions regarding the epistemological nature of philosophical knowledge and methodology.

The first limitation in this definition of metaphilosophy is that as metaphilosophising always occurs within one conception of philosophy or another, we cannot expect metaphilosophy to be an impartial referee above quarrelling philosophical views and schools. Any disagreement which two radically opposing conceptions of philosophy might have about the laws of argumentation, validity of evidence and so on, will carry over to the metaphilosophical level of debate. Therefore if we aim to evaluate the relative merits of two conceptions of philosophy, we must restrict our assessment to views which are close enough in their metaphilosophical standards for this examination to be possible. On the other hand, if we wish to constructively criticise an opposing conception of philosophy, we must avoid begging the question against them in the metaphilosophical pre-suppositions deployed in our criticism. Another problem for this definition of metaphilosophy is that it seems to be circular, so that we cannot have external validation for the constituent theses of conceptions of philosophy.

7) *Various kinds of metaphilosophy*

I made several qualifying distinctions regarding the more detailed aim and purpose of philosophy. One divisive line which is often drawn in the literature on this topic splits metaphilosophical investigations into the two branches of *descriptive* and *prescriptive* metaphilosophy on the basis of how metaphilosophy actually approaches philosophy as its subject matter. In stark contrast to this kind of descriptive metaphilosophy, prescriptive metaphilosophy on the contrary *does* actively take sides in philosophical arguments and it often argues for a particular conception of philosophy. Prescriptive metaphilosophy can be divided more specifically into *aggressive* and *defensive* metaphilosophy.

I illustrated how these different approaches work in practice and demonstrated how our understanding of the possibilities of metaphilosophy are dynamically tied to our conception of philosophy: if we, for example, divorce philosophical and empirical inquiries sharply from each other, then our metaphilosophy undoubtedly will shun the forms of psychology of philosophy and sociology of philosophy.

8) *Defence of metaphilosophy*

I defended the importance of metaphilosophy against certain misconceptions and prejudices, which claim that metaphilosophy is boring, or harmful for philosophising itself. Certain misconceptions are due to metaphilosophy's close association with the radical (meta)philosophy of Rorty. Moreover, I recommended a form of metaphilosophical division of labour, so that not all philosophers need to get personally involved in metaphilosophical reflection, but these topics should be explored in the philosophical community.

9) *The nature and the history of the naturalism-question*

After introducing the preliminaries of the metaphilosophical naturalism-question I evaluated the suggestion that some form of either naturalism or anti-naturalism would have been historically speaking the "traditional" conception of philosophy. After considering the interpretations of both sides, I deemed this question to be too convoluted and big to be settled here (as they would require both historical acumen and clear-cut definitions of naturalism and anti-naturalism). Instead, I highlighted certain crucial watersheds in the historical development of both metaphilosophical naturalism and anti-naturalism. I also argued why metaphilosophical anti-naturalism should not be equated with some kind of (post-)Kantianism.

10) *The future of the naturalism-question*

In certain recent prognoses concerning the coming developments of philosophy, some thinkers have raised the possibility of such a dramatic turn of events in which the deep metaphilosophical differences between the naturalists and the anti-naturalists could eventually escalate to split philosophers into two opposite camps—not unlike the way in which an analytic/continental divide had taken place earlier for the better part of the twentieth century. I argued that this development is not likely. Moreover, in any case the faction of anti-naturalism would still remain metaphilosophically speaking as diverse internally as both continental and analytic philosophy had been during the twentieth century.

I also delineated a third metaphilosophical position in this problem area dubbed as non-naturalism. I acknowledged the existence of non-naturalism as a legitimate position relative to the naturalism question but, at the same time, I stressed that the existence of this option should not be regarded as a licence to

neglect the metaphilosophical reflection pertaining to the issues of the naturalism question.

11) *Other neighbouring debates*

I identified certain important links and ramifications which the metaphilosophical issue of naturalism can feasibly have to certain more general issues in the adjacent philosophical terrain. These neighbouring issues belong to the branch of philosophy of science and, in various ways, they concern the explanatory power, objectivity and socio-cultural stature of the empirical sciences. Understanding the links between these issues became easier when I separated from each other the s level of conceptions of philosophy, the level of conceptions of science and, thirdly, the level of anti-science sentiments. I stressed that the metaphilosophical anti-naturalism should not be associated with some kind of anti-realist conception of science or anti-science sentiment. Conversely, advocating naturalism in metaphilosophical topics does not mean that naturalists have a collective blind spot the size of natural sciences as naturalists can also have critical views about science.

12) *Describing the methodology of the armchair philosophy*

I proposed that the talk of thought experiments is a bit restricting as the things which are called 'thought experiments' by philosophers form so heterogeneous a group and, on the other hand, it does not recognise the fact that many philosophically relevant cases come from the purview of real life and fiction (prose, films and so on). Thus it would be more suitable to speak of *method of cases*.

13) *The pre-history of armchair philosophy*

Certain assessments, notably those of Hintikka (1999), assert that the methodological practice of appealing to intuitions has increased its popularity noticeably during the past fifty-odd years. In Hintikka's narrative, this development was fuelled by the philosophers' desire to get on the bandwagon of Chomskyan linguistics. Although my examination was brief and unsystematic, I demonstrated first through examples that intuitions have been used in philosophy even before the Chomskyan revolution in linguistics; secondly that Chomsky himself was influenced by the methodology of philosophers; and thirdly, that Kripke's use of intuitions was not inspired by Chomsky but by earlier philosophers (such as

the common sense philosophy of Moore and the members of the Oxford ordinary language philosophy). I conceded that Hintikka is right when he says that philosophers should be able to explain their use of intuitions, but his diagnosis is off the mark when he claims that philosophers have neglected this metaphilosophical topic entirely.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ADAMSON, P. (2014) *Classical Philosophy – A History of Philosophy without Any Gaps*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ALLISON, H.E. (1983) *Kant's Transcendental Idealism – an Interpretation and Defense*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- ANNAS, J. (2004) "Ancient Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century", in Leiter, B. (ed.) *Future for Philosophy*: 25–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- APPIAH, K.A. (2008) *Experiments in Ethics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- ARISTOTLE (1997) *Posterior Analytics*. Edited and translated by H. Tredennick & E.S. Forster. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- AMRSTRONG, D.M. (1981) "The Causal Theory of Mind", in *The Nature of Mind and Other Essays*: 17–31. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- (1997) *World of States of Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ARRAS, J.D. (2007) "The Way We Reason Now: Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics", in Steinbock, B. (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Bioethics*: 46–71. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ARRINGTON, R.L. & GLOCK, H-J. (1996) "Editor's Introduction", in Arrington, R.L. & Glock, H-J. (eds.) *Wittgenstein & Quine*: xiv–xviii. Bodmin, Cornwall: Routledge.
- AUDI, R. (ed.) (1995) *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2003) *Epistemology – A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd edition. London: Routledge.
- (2004) *The Good in the Right – A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (2005) "Philosophy", in Borchert, D.M. (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., Vol. 7: 325–337. Farmington Hills, MI: MacMillan & Thomson.
- AYER, A.J. (1969) *Metaphysics and Common Sense*. London: Macmillan.
- (1977) *Part of My Life – The Memoirs of a Philosopher*. New York: Hancourt.
- BAGGINI, J. (2005) *The Pig that Wants to be Eaten and 99 Other Thought Experiments*. Croydon: Granta.
- BAGGINI, J. & FOSL, P.S. (2010) *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods*, 2nd edition. Singapore: Wiley-Blackwell.
- BAHM, A.J. & MICHON, H.K. (eds.) (2006) *Directory of American Philosophers*, 23rd edition. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center.

- BAMBROUGH, R. (1967) "Review of Morris Lazerowitz's *Studies in Metaphilosophy*", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 76, No. 4: 531–3.
- BEALER, G. (1987) "Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism", *Philosophical Perspectives* 1: 289–365.
- (1992) "The Incoherence of Empiricism", *Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol* 66: 99–138.
- (1996) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 10: 1–34.
- (1998a) "Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy", in DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.) *Rethinking Intuition – the Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 201–40. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (1998b) "Analyticity", in Graig, C. (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: 234–9. London: Routledge.
- (1998c) "A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession", *Philosophical Issues* 9, 261–301.
- (1998d) "Propositions", *Mind*, Vol. 107, No. 425, 1–32.
- (1999) "The A Priori", in Greco, J. & Sosa, E. (eds.) *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*: 243–70. Blackwell Publishing.
- (2002) "Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance", in Gendler, T. & Hawthorne, J. (eds.) *Conceivability and Possibility*: 75–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004) "The Origins of Modal Error". *Dialectica* 58, 11–42.
- (2010) "The Self-Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content", in Koons, R.C. & Bealer, G. (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*: 137–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BEANEY, M. (2017) *Analytic Philosophy – a very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2003/2009) "Analysis", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 7.4.2003, substantive revision 4.5.2009. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/>
- BENNETT, M.R. & HACKER, P.M.S. (2003) *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- BERMAN, B. (ed.) (2001) *Library of Congress Subject Headings in Philosophy – a thesaurus*. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center.
- BLACKBURN, S. (1999) *Think – a compelling introduction to philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- (2004) "Foreword", in Carel, H. & Gamez, D. (eds.) *What is Philosophy?*: xiii–xviii. King's Lynn, UK: Continuum Publishing.

- (2005) *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2. edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BOGDAN, R.J. (2004) "What is Epistemic Discourse About?", in Kolak, D. & Symons, J. (eds.) *Quantifiers, Questions and Quantum Physics – Essays on the Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka*: 49–60. Dordrecht: Springer.
- BOGHOSIAN, P. (2000) "Knowledge of Logic", in Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (eds.) *New Essays on the A Priori*: 229–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BONTEMPO, C.J. & ODELL, S.J. (1975) "Introduction: some approaches to philosophy", in Bontempo, C.J. & Odell, S.J. (eds.) *The Owl of Minerva – philosophers on philosophy*: 1–40. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- BONJOUR, L. (1998) *In Defense of Pure Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2001) "Précis of In Defense of Pure Reason", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LXIII, No. 3: 625–31.
- (2010) "Against Materialism", in Koons, R.C. & Bealer, G. (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*: 3–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2011) "A Priori Knowledge", in Bernecker, S. & Pritchard, D. (eds.) *Routledge Companion to Epistemology*: 283–93. London: Routledge.
- (2013) "In Defense of the a Priori", in Steup, M., Turri, J. & Sosa, E. (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, 2nd edition: 177–84. Blackwell Publishing.
- BOURGET, D. & CHALMERS, D.J. (2014) "What Do Philosophers Believe?", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.: 170, No. 3: 465–500.
- BRADDON-MITCHELL, D. & NOLA, R. (2009) "Introducing the Canberra Plan", in Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Nola, R. (eds.) *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*: 1–20. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- BUNNIN, N. & YU, J. (2004) *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*. Padstow, Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing.
- BURGESS, J. & ROSEN, G. (1997) *A Subject with No Object*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BROWN, R. & FEHIGE, Y. (1996/2011) "Thought Experiments" in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 28.12.1996, substantive revision 29.7.2011. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/>
- BRUTIAN, G. (2012) "Metaphilosophy in the Systems of Metatheories", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 43, No. 3: 294–305.
- BUNYM, T.W. & REESE, W.L. (1970) "Editor's Introduction", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 1: 1.

- BUNYM, T.W. (2011) "Creating the Journal *Metaphilosophy*", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 42, No. 3: 186–90.
- CAMPBELL, J. (2006) *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association*. Open Court.
- CAMUS, A. (1991) "The Myth of Sisyphus", in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*: 1–138. Translated by J. O'Brien. New York: Vintage International.
- CANFIELD, J.V. (2009) "Back to the Rough Ground: Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language", in Glock, H-J. & Hyman, J. (eds.) *Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy – Essays for P.M.S. Hacker*: 109–32. King's Lynn, Norfolk: Oxford University Press.
- CAPALDI, N. (2009) "Philosophical Anamnesis", in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 93–128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CAPPELEN, H. (2012) *Philosophy without Intuitions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2017) "Disagreement in Philosophy – an optimistic perspective", in D'Oro, Giuseppina & Overgaard, Soren (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*: Cambridge: 56–74. Cambridge University Press.
- CAPPELEN, H., GENDLER, T. & HAWTHORNE, J. (eds.) (2016) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CARLISLE, C. & GANERI, J. (eds.) (2010) *Philosophy as Therapeia*. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Vol. 66.
- CARNAP, R. (1928) *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*. Berlin: Schlectensee.
- (1934) *Logische Syntax der Sprache*. Wien: Springer.
- CASSER, G. (ed.) (2007) *How Successful is Naturalism?* Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.
- CATH, Y. (2011) "Meta-philosophy", in Pritchard, D. (ed.) *Oxford Bibliographies Online*. Oxford University Press. Last revised in 29.6.2011.
- CATHCART, T. & KLEIN, D. (2007) *Plato and Platypus Walk into a Bar... – Understanding philosophy through jokes*. New York: Penguin Books.
- CAYGILL, H. (1995) *A Kant Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- CHALMERS, D.J. (1996) *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1999) "Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LIX, No. 2: 473–96.
- (2002) "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?", in Gendler, T.S. & Hawthorne, J. (eds.) *Conceivability and Possibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 145–200.
- (2006) "The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics", in García-Carpintero, M. & Macià, J. (eds.) *Two Dimensional Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 55–140.

- (2015) "Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy?" *Philosophy*, Vol. 90, No. 1: 3–31.
- CHOMSKY, N. (1957) *Syntactic Structures*. Hague: Mouton.
- (1972) *Language and Mind*. New York: Harcourt.
- CHUDNOFF, E. (2010) "The Nature of Intuitive Justification", *Philosophical Studies Online*, DOI:10.1007/s11098-010-9495-2.
- (2011) "What Intuitions Are Like", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 82, No.3: 625–54.
- (2014) "Rational Roles of Intuition", in Booth, A. & Rowbottom, D. (eds.) *Intuitions*. Oxford University Press.
- COHEN, L.J. (1976) "How Empirical is Contemporary Logical Empiricism", in Kasher, A. (ed.) *Language in Focus – Foundations, Methods and Systems*, essays in memory of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel: 359–376. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- (1986) *The Dialogue of Reason – An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- COHEN, G.A. (2000) *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- COHEN, S.M. (2000/2008) "Aristotle's Metaphysics", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 8.10.2000, substantive revision 9.6.2008. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>
- COHEN, A. & DASCAL, M. (1989) "Preface", in Cohen, A. & Dascal, M. eds. *The Institution of Philosophy – A Discipline in Crisis?: xi–xv*. Chicago & La Salle: Open Court.
- COHNITZ, D. (2005) *Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie*, Paderborn: Mentis.
- COHNITZ, D. & HÄGGQVIST, S. (2009) "The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy", *Studia Philosophica Estonica*, Vol. 2.2.: 1–14.
- COHNITZ, D. & ROSSBERG, M. (2006) *Nelson Goodman*. Chesham: Acumen.
- COLLINS, R. (1998) *Sociology of Philosophies – A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- COLLINS, J. (2008) *Chomsky: A Guide for the Perplexed*. Continuum.
- COOPE, C. (2009) "The Doctor of Philosophy Will See You Now", in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 177–214. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- COOPER, D.E. (2009) "Vision of Philosophy", in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- CORMIER, R., MICHON, H.K., KURTZ, P. & VARET, G. (2005) *International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers*, 14th edition. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center.
- CORRADINI, A., GALVAN, S. & LOWE, E.J. (eds.)(2006) *Analytic Philosophy without Naturalism*. London: Routledge.
- COTTINGHAM, J. (2009) "What is Humane Philosophy and Why is it At Risk?", in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 233–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CRAIG, W.L. & MORELAND, J.P. (eds.)(2000) *Naturalism – A Critical Analysis*. London: Routledge.
- CRITCHLEY, S. (2001) *Continental Philosophy – a very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2010) "What is Philosophy?", *New York Times*, May 16. 2010, accessed 10.8.2018. <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/what-is-a-philosopher/>
- CUMMINS, R. (1998) "Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium," in DePaul & Ramsey (eds.) *Rethinking Intuition – The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 113–27. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- DALY, C. (2010) *An Introduction to Philosophical Methods*. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
- DANIELS, N. (1978) "On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 37: 21–36.
- (1998) *Justice and Justification – Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2003/2011) "Reflective Equilibrium", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 28.4.2003, substantive revision 12.1.2011. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>
- DAVIDSON, D. (1980) *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DE CARO, M. & MACARTHUR, D. (eds.)(2004a) *Naturalism in Question*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (2004b) "Introduction: the Nature of Naturalism", in De Caro, M. & Macarthur, D. (eds.) *Naturalism in Question*: 1–17.
- (eds.)(2010) *Naturalism and Normativity*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- DECKER, K. & EBERL, J. (eds.)(2005) *Star Wars and Philosophy: More Powerful Than You Can Possibly Imagine*. Chicago & La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- DEPAUL, M. & RAMSEY, W. (1998) "Preface", in DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.) *Rethinking Intuition*: vii–xvi. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

- DESCARTES, R. ([1628] 1954) *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, in *Descartes: Philosophical Writings*. Original *Règles utiles et claires pour la direction de l'Esprit en la recherche de la Vérité*. Translated by Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach. Introduction by Alexander Koyre. New York, NY: Nelson.
- ([1641] 2013) *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Edited and translated from the Latin original *Meditationes de prima philosophia* by J. Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DEVITT, M. ([1984] 1997) *Realism and Truth*, 2nd edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1996) *Coming to Our Senses – A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2005) "There Is no *a Priori*", in Steup, M. & Sosa, E. (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*: 105–14. Blackwell Publishing.
- (2006) *Ignorance of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2013) "Hilary and Me – Tracking Down Putnam on the Realism Issue", in Baghramian, M. (ed.) *Reading Putnam*: 101–20. New York: Routledge.
- DEVITT, M. & STERELNY, K. (1999) *Language and Reality – an Introduction to the Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- DIOGENES LAERTIUS (1950) *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by R.D. Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- DIVERS, J. (2002) *Possible Worlds*. London: Routledge.
- DOUBLE, R. (1998) *Metaphilosophy and Free Will*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- DUMMETT, M. (1978) *Truth and Other Enigmas*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- (1993) *The Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.
- EDMONDS, D. & WARBURTON, N. (ed.)(2010) *Philosophy Bites*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- EIG, J. (2005) *Luckiest Man: The Life and Death of Lou Gehrig*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- ELMERS, D.G., KANTOWITZ, B.H. & ROEDIGER, H.L. (2011) *Research Methods in Psychology*, 9th international edition. Melbourne: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
- FEIGL, H. (1958) "Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 8, No. 1–2: 1–16.
- FISCHER, E. (2008) "Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' – Explained and Vindicated", *Synthese*, Vol. 162, No. 1: 53–84.
- FODOR, J. (2008) *LOT 2 – the language of thought revisited*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- FRIEDMAN, M. (1992) *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1997) "Philosophical Naturalism", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*: Vol. 71, No. 2: 7–21.
- (2000) "Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo-Kantian Perspective", in Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (eds.) *New Essays on the A Priori*: 367–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004) "Philosophy as Dynamic Reason – The Idea of Scientific Philosophy", in Carel, H. & Gamez, D. (eds.) *What is Philosophy?.*: 78–96. King's Lynn, UK: Continuum Publishing.
- (2006) "Carnap and Quine: Twentieth-Century Echoes of Kant and Hume", *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 34, Nos. 1 & 2.: 35–58.
- (2007) "Introduction: Carnap's Revolution in Philosophy" in Friedman, M. & Creath, R. (eds.) *Cambridge Companion to Carnap*: 1–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FUMERTON, R.A. (1995) *Metaepistemology and Skepticism*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- (1999) "A Priori Philosophy after an A Posteriori Turn", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 3, No. 11: 21–33.
- GALLIE, W.B. (1956) "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 56: 167–98.
- GARRETT, D. (1997) *Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004) "Philosophy and History in the History of Modern Philosophy", in Leiter, B. (ed.) *Future for Philosophy*: 44–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GAUKROGER, S. (1995) *Descartes – An Intellectual Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GETTIER, E. (1963) "Is Justified True Believed Knowledge?", *Analysis*, Vol. 23, No. 6: 121–3.
- GIERE, R.M. (2008) "Naturalism", in Psillos, S. & Curd, M. (ed.) *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science*: 213–23. Oxford: Routledge.
- GILLET, C. & LOEWER, B. (2001) *Physicalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GLENDINNING, S. (2002) "The Analytic and the Continental", in Baggini, J. & Stangroom, J. (eds.) *New British Philosophy – the interviews*: 201–18. London: Routledge.
- GLOCK, H-J. (1996) *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- (1997) "Kant and Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Necessity and Representation", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2: 285–305.
- (2004) "Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 35, No. 4: 419–44.
- (2008a) *What is Analytic Philosophy?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2008b) "Wittgenstein and After", in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*: 76–117. London: Routledge.
- (2013) "Replies to my Commentators", *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 35–42.
- GOLDMAN, A.I. (2007) "Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status", *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, Vol. 74, 1–26.
- GOODMAN, N. (1955) *Fact, Fiction and Forecast*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- GROSS, N. (2008) *Richard Rorty – the making of American philosopher*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- GROSS, P.R. & LEVITT, N. (1994) *Higher Superstition – The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- GUTTING, G. (1998) "Rethinking Intuition: A Historical and Metaphilosophical Introduction", in DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.) *Rethinking Intuition – the Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 3–13. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (2009) *What Philosophers Know – Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GÖDEL, K. (1947) "What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?", *American Mathematical Monthly*, Vol. 54: 515–25.
- HAACK, S. (1995) *Evidence and Inquiry – Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- HAAPARANTA, L. (1999) "On the Possibility of Naturalistic and of Pure Epistemology", *Synthese*, Vol. 118: 31–47.
- HABERMAS, J. ([1968] 1972) *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Translated from German *Erkenntnis und Interesse* by Jeremy J. Shapiro. London: Heinemann.
- HACKER, P.M.S. (1996a) *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1996b) "Wittgenstein and Quine: Proximity at Great Distance", in Arrington, R.L. & Glock, H.-J. (eds.) *Wittgenstein & Quine*: 1–38. Bodmin, Cornwall: Routledge.
- (2006) "Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: On Quine's Cul-de-Sac", *Philosophy*, Vol. 81, No. 316: 231–53.

- HACKER, P.M.S. (2009) "Philosophy: a contribution, not to human knowledge, but to human understanding", in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 219–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HACKING, I. (1980) "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 77, No. 10: 579–88.
- (2012) "Introductory Essay", in Kuhn, T. ([1962] 2012) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 50th Anniversary Edition: vii–xxxvii*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- HADOT, P. (1995) *Philosophy as a Way of Life – Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. Edited with an introduction by Arnold Davidson. Translated from French by Michael Chase. Padstow, Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing.
- HAMLIN, D.W. (1992) *Philosophy Becomes a Profession – The History of a Practice*. London: Routledge.
- HANFLING, O. (2000) *Philosophy and Ordinary Language – The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue*. London: Routledge.
- HANNA, R. (2006) *Rationality and Logic*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (2008) "Kant in the Twentieth Century", in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*: 149–203. London: Routledge.
- HANSSON, S.O. (2006a) "Philosophical Schools", *Theoria*, Vol. 72, No. 1: 1–4.
- (2006b) "Condensed Examples in Philosophy", *Theoria*, Vol. 72, No. 2: 97–9.
- (2010) "Methodological Pluralism in Philosophy", *Theoria*, Vol. 76, No. 3: 189–91.
- HALES, S. (2006) *Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- HATFIELD, G. (2001) "Epistemology and Science in the Image of Modern Philosophy: Rorty on Descartes and Locke", in Floyd, J. & Shieh, S. (eds.) *Future Pasts – The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy*: 393–414. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- HARPINE, W.D. (1993) "The Appeal to Tradition: Cultural Evolution and Logical Soundness", *Informal Logic*, Vol. 15, No. 3: 209–19.
- HAWKING, S. & MLODINOW, L. (2010) *The Grand Design*. London: Bantam Press.
- HEIDEGGER, C.-G. & LUNDBERG, H. (2010) "Towards a Sociology of Philosophy", *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 53, No.1: 3–18.
- HEPBURN, R.W. (2005) "The Ethics of Philosophical Practice", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – the new edition*: 702. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- HINTIKKA, J. (1968) "Induction by Enumeration and Induction by Elimination", in Lakatos, I. (ed.) *The Problem of Inductive Logic*: 191–231. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- (1969) *Models for Modalities – selected essays*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- (1980) "On Any-thesis and the Methodology of Linguistics", *Linguistics and Psychology*, Vol. 4: 101–22.
- (1999) "The Emperor's New Intuitions", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 96, No. 3: 127–47.
- (2006) "Intellectual Autobiography", in Auxier, R.E. & Hahn, L.E. (eds.) *The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka*, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXX: 1–84. Chicago & La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- (2007) *Socratic Epistemology – Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- HINTIKKA, J. & SANDU, G. (1991) *On the Methodology of Linguistics – A Case Study*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- HOBBS, T. ([1651] 2005) *Leviathan*. A critical edition by G.A.J. Rogers and Karl Schuhmann. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- HOBSBAWM, E. (1995) *Age of Extremes – The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*. St Ives: Abacus.
- HORST, S. (2009) "Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind", *Philosophy Compass*, Vol. 4, No. 1: 219–54.
- HORWICH, P. (2012) *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- HUEMER, M. (2005) *Ethical Intuitionism*. Chippenham & Eastbourne: Palgrave Macmillan.
- HUME, D. ([1739–1741] 2000) *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by D.F. Norton & M.J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- HUSSERL, E. ([1913] 1982) *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- HYLTON, P. (2007) *Quine*. New York: Routledge.
- (2010) "W.V. Quine", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, First published 9.4.2010, substantial revision 30.4.2010. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/>
- HÄGGQVIST, S. (1996) *Thought-Experiments*. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis – Stockholm studies in philosophy, Vol. 18., Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell international.
- ICHIKAWA, J. & JARVIS, B. (2009) "Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 142, No. 2: 221–46.

- ICHIKAWA, J. & JARVIS, B. (2016) *The Rules of Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ISAACSON, D. (2004) "Quine and Logical Positivism", in Gibson, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Quine*: 214–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ITKONEN, E. (1981) "The Concept of Linguistic Intuition", in Coulmas, F. (ed.) *A Festschrift for Native Speaker*: 127–40. Hague: Mouton.
- JACKSON, F. (1998) *From Metaphysics to Ethics – A Defence of Conceptual Analysis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (2009) "Thought Experiments and Possibilities", *Analysis*, Vol. 69, No. 1: 100–9.
- JACOBY, H. (2012) *Game of Thrones and Philosophy: Logic Cuts Deeper Than Swords*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- JAMES, W. ([1907] 1979) *Pragmatism – A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- JANIAK, A. (2006/2014) "Newton's Philosophy", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 13.10.2006, substantive revision 6.5.2014. Accessible at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/>
- JOLL, N. (2010) "Contemporary Metaphilosophy", in Fieser, J. & Dowden, B. (eds.) *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, University of Tennessee, First published: 17.10.2010, Accessible at: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/>
- JUNG, C.G. (1973) *Letters, vol. I: 1906–1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- KANT, I. ([1781/1787] 1998) *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated from German *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* by P. Guyer & A. Woods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KAPLAN, M. (1985) "It's Not What You Know that Counts", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 82: 350–63.
- KATZ, J.J. (1971) *The Underlying Reality of Language and Its Philosophical Import*. New York: Harper & Row.
- (1998) *Realistic Rationalism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- KAUPPINEN, A. (2007) "The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy", *Philosophical Explorations*, Vol. 10, No. 2: 95–118.
- KEIL, G. (2008) "Naturalism", in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy*: 254–307. London: Routledge.
- KENNY, A. (2010) *A New History of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- KIM, J. (2003) "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism", *Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century*, APA Centennial Supplement to *Journal of Philosophical Research*: 83–98.
- KITCHER, P. (1992) "The Naturalists Return", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 1: 53–114.
- (1998) "A Plea for Science Studies", in Koertge, N. (ed.) *A House Built on Sand*: 32–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KNOBE, J. & NICHOLS, S. (2007) "An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto", in Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.) *Experimental Philosophy*: 3–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KOONS, R.C. & BEALER, G. (eds.) (2010a) *The Waning of Materialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2010b) "Introduction", in Koons, R.C. & Bealer, G. (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*: ix–xxxi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KORNBLITH, H. (1994) "Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 19, No. 1: 39–52.
- (2002) *Knowledge and its Place in Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2007) "Naturalism and Intuitions", *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, Vol. 74: 27–49.
- KOSKINEN, H.J. (2004) *From a Metaphilosophical Point of View – a study of W.V. Quine's naturalism*, Acta Philosophica Fennica 74, dissertation. Helsinki: Finnish Philosophical Society.
- KRAUS, L.M. (2012) *A Universe from Nothing – Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing*. London: Free Press.
- KRIPKE, S. (1971) "Identity and Necessity", in Munitz, M.K. (ed.) *Identity and Individuation*: 135–64. New York: New York University Press.
- (1980) *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1982) *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- KUHN, T. ([1962] 2012) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 4th edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- KUSCH, M. (1995) *Psychologism – a case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- KÖRNER, S. (1973) *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.
- LAGERLUND, H. (2012) "Review of R. Pasnau's *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671*", *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. Accessible at: <http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29019-metaphysical-themes-1274-1671/>

- LAMMENRANTA, M. (1942) "Reliabilism and Circularity", *Review Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 56, No. 1: 111–24.
- LAKATOS, I. (1970) "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (eds.) *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*: 91–195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LAUDAN, L. (1977) *Progress and Its Problems – towards a theory of scientific growth*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- LAWLESS, A. (2005) *Plato's Sun – An Introduction to Philosophy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- LAZEROWITZ, M. (1942) "Review of C.J. Ducasse's *Philosophy as Science – its matter and its method*", *Mind*, Vol. 51, No. 203: 284–7.
- (1964) *Studies in Metaphilosophy*. London: Routledge & Paul, Humanities Press.
- (1970) "A Note on 'Metaphilosophy'", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 1: 91.
- (1971) "Metaphilosophy", *Critica*, Vol. 5., No. 15: 3–27.
- (1977) "On Talking about Philosophy", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 8. No. 2–3: 253–6.
- LEIBNIZ, G.W. ([1704] 1981) *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Translated and edited from the French original *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* by Peter Remnant ja Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LEITER, B. (2004a) "Introduction", in Leiter, B. (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy*: 1–24, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004b) "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche and Freud", in Leiter, B. (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy*: 74–105. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005) "American Philosophy Today", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 27–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LEWIS, D.K. (1970) "How to Define Theoretical Terms", in Lewis, D. (1983) *Philosophical Papers I*: 78–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1982) "Logic for Equivocators", *Nous*, Vol. 16, No. 3: 431–41.
- (1983a) "Introduction", in Lewis, D. *Philosophical Papers I*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1983b) "New Work for a Theory of Universals", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 61, No. 4: 343–377.
- (1991) *Parts of Classes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1999) "Reduction of Mind", in *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*: 291–324. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- (2004) "Letters to Beall and Priest", in Priest, G., Beall, J.C. & Armour-Garb, B. (ed.) *The Law of Non-Contradiction*: 176–7. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LOCKE, J. ([1690] 1975) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Introduction by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- LOWE, E.J. (2000) *Introduction to Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (2005) *An Four-Category Ontology – A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LUDWIG, K. (2007) "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 31: 128–59.
- LUTZ, S. (2009) "Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions", *Studia Philosophica Estonica*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 117–39.
- LYOTARD, J-F. (1979) *The Postmodern Condition – a report on knowledge*. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, introduction by Fredric Jameson. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MACARTHUR, D. (2008) "Quinean Naturalism in Question". *Philo*, Vol. 11, No. 1: 5–18.
- MACKIE, J.L. (1974) "Locke's anticipation of Kripke", *Analysis*, Vol. 34, No. 6: 177–80.
- (1977) *Ethics – Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- MAGEE, B. (2001) *Talking Philosophy*. First edition was published in 1978. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MADDY, P. (2000) "Naturalism and the A Priori", in Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (eds.) *New Essays on the A Priori*: 92–116. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2007) *Second Philosophy – A Naturalistic Method*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- MARSOOBAN, A.T. (2008) "Metaphilosophy", in Lachs, J. & Talisse, R.B. (ed.) *American Philosophy – an encyclopedia*: 500–1. New York: Routledge.
- MARX, K. ([1845] 1998) "Theses on Feuerbach", Marx, K. & Engels, F. *The German Ideology*. Armherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- MCCUCUMBER, J. (2013) *On Philosophy: Notes from a Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- MCDOWELL, J. (1994) *Mind and World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- MCGINN, C. (2012) "Philosophy by Other Name", *New York Times*, 4. March 2012. Accessible at: <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/philosophy-by-anothername/>
- MEYER, M. (1908) "The Exact Number of Pragmatisms", *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. 5: 321–6.
- MILLER, A. (2003) *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- MITROFF, I. (1974) "Norms and Counter-Norms in Select Group of the Apollo Moon Scientists: A Case Study of the Ambivalence of Scientists", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 39, No. 4: 579–95.
- MOORE, A.W. (2009) "Not to be Taken at Face Value", *Analysis*, Vol. 69, Nro. 1: 116–25.
- MORAN, D. (2008a) "Introduction: towards an assessment of twentieth-century philosophy", in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*: 1–40. London: Routledge.
- (2008b) "Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism", *Continental Philosophy Review*, Vol. 41, No. 4: 401–25.
- MORROW, D.R. & SULA, C.A. (2011) "Naturalized Metaphilosophy", *Synthese* Vol. 182, No. 2: 297–313.
- MOSER, P.K. (1995) "Metaphilosophy", in Audi, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*: 487. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- MUMFORD, S. (2008) "Metaphysics", in Psillos, S. & Card, M. (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science*: 26–35. London: Routledge.
- MUNDT, A.J. (1989) "The Inevitability of Pluralism: Philosophical Practice and Philosophical Excellence", in Cohen, A. & Dascal, M. (eds.) *The Institution of Philosophy – A Discipline in Crisis?*: 77–101. Chicago & La Salle: Open Court.
- MURPHY, N. (2007) "Naturalism and Theism as Competing Traditions", in Casser, G. (ed.) *How successful is naturalism?*: 49–76. Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.
- NAGEL, J. (2007) "Epistemic Intuitions", *Philosophy Compass*, Vol. 2, No. 6: 792–819.
- NEURATH, O., HAHN, H. & CARNAP, R. ([1929] 1973) "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis", an abridged English translation is included in Neurath, M. & Cohen, R.S. (eds.) *Otto Neurath – Empiricism and Sociology*: 299–318. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- NIETZSCHE, F. ([1889] 1997) *Twilight of Idols*. Translated by Richard Polt. Introduction by Tracy Strong. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
- NIINILUOTO, I. (1984) *Is Science Progressive?*, Synthese library, Vol. 177. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- (1999) *Critical Scientific Realism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- (2002/2015) “Scientific Progress”, in Zalta, E. (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 1.10.2002, substantive revision 15.7.2015. Accessible at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/>
- (2003) “Philosophy in Finland – the cultural setting”, in Haaparanta, L. & Niiniluoto, I. (eds.) *Analytic Philosophy in Finland*, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 80: 11–41. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- NIMTZ, C. & SCHÜTTE, M. (2003) “On Physicalism, Physical Properties, and Panpsychism”, *Dialectica*, Vol. 57, Nro. 4: 413–22.
- NOLAN, D. (2007) “Contemporary Metaphysicians and Their Traditions”, *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 35, No. 1–2: 1–18.
- (2009) “Platitudes and Metaphysics”, in Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Nola, R. (eds.) *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*: 267–300. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (2016) “Method in Analytic Metaphysics”, Cappelen, H., Gendler, T. & Hawthorne J. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology*: 159–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O’SHEA, J.R. (2008) “American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century”, in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy*: 204–53. London: Routledge.
- OVERGAARD, S., GILBERT, P. & BURWOOD, S. (2013) *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- PAPINEAU, D. (1993) *Philosophical Naturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (2007) “Naturalism”, in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 22.2.2007. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/>
- (2009) “Poverty of Analysis”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXXXIII*, 1–30.
- (2011a) “Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge”, in Shaffer, M.J. & Veber, M. (eds.) *What Place for the a Priori?*: 61–83. Chicago: Open Court.
- (2011b) “What is X-Phi Good For?”, *The Philosopher’s Magazine*, Issue 51, No: 1: 83–8.
- PASNAU, R. (2011) *Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- PASSMORE, J. (1970) *Philosophical Reasoning*. 2nd edition. London: Duckworth.
- PEACOCKE, C. (1992) *A Study of Concepts*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- PEACOCKE, C. (2000) "Explaining the A Priori: The Program of Moderate Rationalism", in Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C. (eds.) *New Essays on the A Priori*: 255–285. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2004) *The Realm of Reason*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (2005a) "The A Priori", in Jackson, F. & Smith, M. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*: 739–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005b) "Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts", *Noûs*, Vol. 39, Nor. 1: 167–78.
- (2006) "Rationalism, Morality, and Two Dimensions", in García-Carpintero, M. & Macià, J. (eds.) *Two-Dimensional Semantics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 220–248.
- PETTERSSON, H. (2012a) "Filosofisen argumentaation autonomisuus" [= "The Autonomy of Philosophical Argumentation"], in Ritola, J. (ed.) *Tutkimuksia argumentaatiosta*, Reports from the Department of Philosophy, Vol. 24: 67–82. Turku: University of Turku press.
- (2012b) "Metafilosofia ja filosofian itseymmärrys" [= "Metaphilosophy and the Self-Understanding of Philosophy"], in Sintonen, M., Viljanen, V. Siipi, H. (eds.) *Ymmärrys*, Reports from the Department of Philosophy, Vol. 25: 202–212. Turku: University of Turku press.
- PETTIT, P. (2004) "Existentialism, Quietism, and the Role of Philosophy", in Leiter, B. (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy*: 304–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- PHELPS, W.L. (1940) "Introduction", in Sumner, G.: *Folkways – A Study of the Sociological importance of Usages, Manners, Customs*: ix–xiii. Boston: Ginn and Company.
- PHILIPSE, H. (2009) "Can Philosophy be a Rigorous Science?" in O'Hear, A. (ed.) *Conceptions of Philosophy*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 65: 155–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- PIHLSTRÖM, S. (1996) *Structuring the World: The Issue of Realism and the Nature of Ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary Pragmatism*. Dissertation, Helsingin yliopisto. Acta philosophica Fennica vol. 59. Helsinki: Societas philosophica Fennica
- PIHLSTRÖM, S. & KOSKINEN, H.J. (2001) "Philosophical and Empirical Knowledge in the Program of Naturalism", in Kiikeri, M. & Ylikoski, P. (eds.) *Explanatory Connections: Electronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen*. Accessible at: <http://www.helsinki.fi/tint/matti/koskinen.pdf>
- PINCOCK, C. (2013) "On Hans-Johann Glock, *What is Analytic Philosophy?*", *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 6–10.
- PIRSIG, R.M. (1991) *Lila – an inquiry into morals*. New York: Bantam Books.

- PLATO (2001) *Theaetetus*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech.
- (1959) *Republic*. In *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 5 & 6, translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- POPPER, K.R. (1968) *Conjectures and Refutations*. London: Routledge.
- PRICE, D.J. DE S. (1963) *Little Science, Big Science*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- PRIEST, S. (2005) "Metaphilosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 589. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- PUST, J. (2000) *Intuitions as Evidence*. New York: Garland.
- PUTNAM, H. (1970) "Is Semantics Possible?", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 1: 187–201.
- ([1975] 1985) "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", in *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2002) *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- PYKE, S. (2011) *Philosophers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- QUINE, W.V. (1951) "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 60: 20–43.
- (1960a) *Word and Object*, Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press.
- (1966) *Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*. New York: Random House.
- (1969) "Epistemology Naturalized", in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*: 69–90. New York: Columbia University Press.
- (1974) *Roots of Reference*. Chicago & La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- (1975) "A Letter to Mr. Osterman", in Bontempo, C.J. & Odell, S.J. (eds.) *The Owl of Minerva – philosophers on philosophy*: 227–31. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- (1984) *Theories and Things*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- (1985) *The Time of My Life – an Autobiography*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- (1995a) *From Stimulus to Science*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1995b) "Naturalism; Or, Living within One's Means". *Dialectica*, Vol. 49, No. 2–4: 251–61.
- QUINE, W.V. & ULLIAN, J.S. (1978) *Web of Belief*. New York: Random House.
- QUINTON, A. (2005a) "Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 702–706. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005b) "History of Centres and Departments of Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 706–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- QUINTON, A. (2005c) "The Influence of Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 709–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005d) "Popular Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 739–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005e) "Journals of Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 462. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- RAATIKAINEN, P. (2013) "What was Analytic Philosophy", *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 2: 11–27.
- RAMBERG, B. (2009) "Rorty and the Instruments of Philosophy" in M.A. & Ghiraldelli Jr., P. (eds.) *Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and Politics*: 15–45. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- RAWLS, J. (1951) "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 60, No. 2: 177–97.
- (1971) *Theory of Justice*. London: Oxford University Press.
- RESCHER, N. (1978) "Philosophical Disagreement – an essay towards orientational pluralism in metaphilosophy", *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 32, No. 2: 217–51.
- (1993) *Pluralism – against the demand for consensus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (2005a) "American Philosophy", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy – New Edition*: 22–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2005b) "Pragmatism", in Honderich, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*: 747–51. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2006a) *Philosophical Dialectics: An Essay on Metaphilosophy*. State University of New York Press.
- N. (2006b) *Studies in Metaphilosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
- REY, G. (1997) *Contemporary Philosophy of Mind – a Contentiously Classical Approach*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- (1998) "A Naturalistic A Priori", *Philosophical Studies* 92: 25–43.
- (2003/2013) "The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 14.8.2003, substantive revision 30.8.2013. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/>
- RICHARDSON, H.S. (2003/2013) "Moral Reasoning", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 15.9.2003, substantive revision 11.2.2013. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-moral/>
- RITTER, J. & GRÜNDER, K. (1989) *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 7. Basel: Schwabe.

- RORTY, R. (1961a) "Recent Metaphilosophy", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 15, No. 2: 299–318.
- (1961b) "The Limits of Reductionism", in Lieb, I.C. (ed.) *Experience, Existence, and the Good – Essays in Honor of Paul Weiss*: 100–16. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- (1962) "Realism, Categories, and the 'Linguistic Turn'", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 2: 307–22.
- (ed.) (1967) *Linguistic Turn – recent essays in philosophical method*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1979) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- (1982) *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- (1984) "Historiography of Philosophy – Four Genres", in Rorty, R., Schneewind, J.B. & Skinner, Q. (eds.) *Philosophy in History – Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*: 49–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1989) *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1991) "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics", in *Essays on Heidegger and Others – Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2: 9–26. The essay was first published in 1986. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ROSEN, M. (1998) "Continental Philosophy from Hegel", in Grayling, A.C. (ed.), *Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject*: 663–704. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ROSENBERG, A. (2000) *Philosophy of Science – A Contemporary Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- RUSSELL, B. (1905) "On Denoting" *Mind*, Vol. 14, No. 56: 479–493.
- (1914) *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing.
- ([1912]1986) *The Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ([1918] 2010) *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. London: Routledge.
- ([1946] 2004) *History of Western Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- (1957) "Mr. Strawson on Referring", *Mind*, Vol. 66: 385–9.
- RYLE, G. (1937) "Taking Sides in Philosophy", *Philosophy*, Vol. 12, No. 47: 317–32.
- (2009) *Collected Papers, Volume 2: Collected Essays 1929–1968*. London: Routledge.
- SCHOFIELD, M. (2006) *Plato – political philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SCOTT, E.C. & BRANCH, G. (2009) "Don't Call it 'Darwinism'", *Evolution: Education and Outreach*, Vol. 2, No. 1: 90–4.

- SELLARS, W. (1962) "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man", in Colodny, R. (ed.) *Frontiers of Science and Philosophy*: 35–78. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- SHAND, J. (ed.) (2006) *The Twentieth Century: Quine And After, Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 5*. Malta: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- SHOPE, R.K. (2002) "Conditions and Analyses of Knowing", in Moser, P. K. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology*: 25–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SINCLAIR, A.J. (2008) *What is Philosophy – an introduction*. Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press.
- SKOLIMOWSKI, H. (1967) *Polish Analytical Philosophy – A Survey and Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- SLUGA, H. (1998) "What has history to do with me? Wittgenstein and analytic philosophy". *Inquiry*, Vol. 41: 99–121.
- SMART, J.J.C. (1975) "My Semantic Ascents and Descents", in Bontempo, C.J. & Odell, S.J. (eds.) *The Owl of Minerva – philosophers on philosophy*: 57–72. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- SMITH, J.W. (1988) *The Progress and Rationality of Philosophy as a Cognitive Enterprise – An Essay on Metaphilosophy*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- SMITH, N. (2004) *Chomsky – Ideas and Ideals*, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SMITH, N.K. (1905) "The Naturalisms of Hume", *Mind*, Vol. 54: 149-173, 335-347.
- SMITH, J. & SULLIVAN, P. (eds.) (2011) *Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SOAMES, S. (2003) *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1 – the dawn of analysis & Vol. 2 – the age of meaning*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- SOSA, S. (1998) "Minimal Intuition", in DePaul, M. & Ramsey, W. (eds.) *Rethinking Intuition – the Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 257–69. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (2006) "Intuition and Truth", in Greenough, P. & Lynch, M.P. (eds.) *Truth and Realism*: 208–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2007) *A Virtue Epistemology – Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SPINOZA, B. ([1677] 2000) *Ethics*. Edited and translated from the Latin original *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* by G.H.R. Parkinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- STAM, H.J. (1996) "Theory and Practice", in Tolman, C.W., Cherry, F., van Heze-
wijk, R. & Lubek, I. (eds.) *Problems of Theoretical Psychology*: 24–32. North
York, Ontario: Captus Press.
- STANLEY, J. (2008) "Philosophy of Language", in Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge
Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*: 382–437. Padstow, Cornwall:
Routledge.
- STOLJAR, D. (2001/2009/2015) "Physicalism", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy*, first published 13.2.2001, updated 9.9.2009, accessible at:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/>
——— (2017) *Philosophical Progress – In Defense of a Reasonable Optimism*. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
- STOOTHOFF, R.F. (1966) "The Autonomy of Philosophy", *Philosophical Quarterly*,
Vol. 16, No. 62: 1–22
- STRAWSON, P.F. (1959) *Individuals – An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. London:
Methuen.
- STROUD, B. (2009) "The Transparency of 'Naturalism'", The Romanell Lecture,
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 83,
No. 2.: 157–69.
- SYMONS, J. (2008) "Intuition and Philosophical Methodology", *Axiomathes* Vol.
8: 67–89.
- TAHKO, T.E. (2012a) "Introduction", in Tahko, T.E. (ed.) *Contemporary Aristote-
lian Metaphysics*: 1–7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
——— (ed.) (2012b) *Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
——— (2015) *An Introduction to Metametaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
- TALBOT, B. (2009) "Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy", *Studia
Philosophica Estonica*, Vol. 2.2.: 157–76.
- TALISSE, R.B. (2017) "Pragmatism and the Limits of Metaphilosophy", in D'Oro,
Giuseppina & Overgaard, Soren (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Philo-
sophical Methodology*: Cambridge: 229–48. Cambridge University Press.
- TANESINI, A. (2017) "Doing Philosophy", in D'Oro, Giuseppina & Overgaard,
Soren (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology*: Cam-
bridge: 13–31. Cambridge University Press.
- TAYLOR, C. (1971) "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", *Review of Metaphys-
ics*, Vol. 25: 3–51.
- THAGAR, P. & BEAM., C. "Epistemological Metaphors and the Nature of Philoso-
phy", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 35, No. 4: 504–16.

- TOMALIN, M. (2003) "Goodman, Quine, and Chomsky – From a Grammatical Point of View", *Lingua*, Vol. 113: 1223–53.
- TROW, M. (2007) "Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to Universal Access: Forms and Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies since WWII", in Forest J.J.F. & Altbach P.G. (eds.) *International Handbook of Higher Education*, Vol. 18: 243–80. Dordrecht: Springer.
- TVERSKY, A. & KAHNEMAN, D. (1974) "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", *Science*, Vol. 185: 1124–31.
- UEBEL, T. (2006) "Vienna Circle", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 28.6.2006, substantive revision 18.9.2006. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/>
- VAN INWAGEN, P. (1997) "Materialism and the psychological-continuity account of personal identity", in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 11: 305–19.
- (2004) "Freedom to break the laws", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 28: 334–50.
- (2006) "What is Naturalism? What is Analytical Philosophy?", in Corradini, A., Galvan, S., & Lowe, E. J. (eds.) (2006) *Analytic Philosophy without Naturalism*: 75–88. New York: Routledge.
- VAN ROOJEN, M. (2004/2009) "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 23.1.2004, substantive revision 7.6.2009. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/>
- VON WRIGHT, G.H. (1971) *Explanation and Understanding*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- (1993) *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays*. Leiden: Brill.
- (1994) "Logic and philosophy in the twentieth century", in Prawitz, D., Skyrms, B. & Westerståhl, D. (eds.) *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science. 9, Proceedings of the ninth international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Uppsala 1991*: 9–24. Holland: Elsevier.
- WAGNER, S.J. & WARNER, R. (eds.) (1993) *Naturalism – A Critical Appraisal*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- WALLGREN, T. (2006) *Transformative Philosophy – Socrates, Wittgenstein, and the democratic spirit of philosophy*. Lanham, MD & Oxford: Lexington Books.
- WARBURTON, N. (2004) *Philosophy – The Basics*, 3rd edition. Padstow, Cornwall: Routledge.
- WARREN, J. (2007) *Presocratics*. Stocksfield: Acumen.
- WAUGH, P. (1984) *Metafiction: the theory and practice of self-conscious fiction*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

- WEATHERSON, B. (2003) "What Good are Counterexamples", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 115, No. 1: 1–31.
- WEBER, R. (2013) "'How to Compare?'– On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy", *Philosophy Compass*, Vol.
- WEINBERG, J., NICHOLS, S. & STICH, S. (2001) "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions", *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 29: 429–60.
- WILLIAMS, B. (2006) *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*. Selected, edited, and with an introduction by: A.W. Moore. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- WILLIAMSON, T. (2004) "Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgement". *Dialectica*, Vol. 58, No. 1: 109–53.
- (2007) *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy, 2. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- (2011a) "What is Naturalism?", *New York Times*, 4.9.2011. Accessible at: <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/what-is-naturalism/>
- (2011b) "Reply to Stalnaker", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 82, No. 2: 515–523.
- (2018) *The Practice of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- WINCH, P. ([1958] 2003) *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- WITTGENSTEIN, L. ([1921] 2006) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. First published in German in 1921. Translated by D.F. Pears & B.F. Guinness. London: Routledge.
- ([1953] 2009) *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated from German *Philosophische Untersuchungen* by G.E.M. Anscombe. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- WONG, D. (2001/2009/2014) "Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western", in Zalta, E. (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. First published 31.7.2001; substantive revision 8.12.2014. Accessible at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comparphil-chiwes/>
- WOODS, T. (2009) *Beginning Postmodernism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- WRAY, K.B. (2013) "Specialization in philosophy: a preliminary study", *Scientometrics*, Vol. 98. No. 3: 1763–9.
- ZAHAVI, D. (2008) "Phenomenology", Moran, D. (ed.) *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*: 661–92. London: Routledge.

This study belongs firmly to the genre of metaphilosophy, as it reflects on topics pertaining to the subject matter, method and aim of philosophy itself by using philosophy's own usual tools and approaches. My work is set in motion with the deceptively simple question "What is it that philosophers do?" I will not, however, attempt to craft my own definite answer to this conundrum. Instead, my primary aims are firstly to explicate and clarify the host of issues connected to the multifaceted identity of philosophy; secondly, to characterise the nature of the metaphilosophical reflection assigned to the study of said condition; thirdly to map out the various starting points and nuances involved in the metaphilosophical debate between the naturalistic and anti-naturalistic conceptions of philosophy (with an emphasis on moderate naturalism and rationalism in particular); and fourthly, to elaborate on the methodology of the so-called armchair philosophy, embraced both by the naturalists and rationalists.

Reports from the Department
of Philosophy

University of Turku
COIMBRA GROUP

ISSN 1457-9332
ISBN 978-951-29-7615-7 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-7616-4 (PDF)