TURUN
YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY
OF TURKU

AMONG FRIENDS AND STRANGERS

The Influence of Residential Context on Attitudes and Deliberation on Immigration

Mikko Leino

TURUN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA – ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS TURKUENSIS
SARJA – SER. B OSA – TOM. 566 | HUMANIORA | TURKU 2021

TURUN
YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY
OF TURKU

AMONG FRIENDS AND STRANGERS

The Influence of Residential Context on Attitudes and Deliberation on Immigration

Mikko Leino

TURUN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA – ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS TURKUENSIS
SARJA – SER. B OSA – TOM. B 566 | HUMANIORA | TURKU 2021

University of Turku

Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
Political Science
Doctoral Programme of Social and Behavioral Sciences

Supervised by

Maija Setälä
Professor of Political Science
University of Turku

Henri Vogt
Professor of Political Science
University of Turku

Reviewed by

Hanna Wass
Docent
University of Helsinki

Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen
Associate Professor
University of Tampere

Opponent

Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen
Associate Professor
University of Tampere

The originality of this publication has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service.

ISBN 978-951-29-8700-9 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-8701-6 (PDF)
ISSN 0082-6987 (Print)
ISSN 2343-3191 (Online)
Painosalama, Turku, Finland 2021

UNIVERSITY OF TURKU
Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
Political Science
MIKKO LEINO: Among Friends and Strangers. The Influence of Residential Context on Attitudes and Deliberation on Immigration
Doctoral Dissertation, 185 pp.
Doctoral Programme of Social and Behavioral Sciences
November 2021

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes how living environment influences the majority population's attitudes toward immigration and the way they deliberate on the issue in small groups. It examines the potential of established theories of inter-group threat and inter-group contact in explaining individuals' attitudes, and also tests the significance of an alternate explanation, one that is based on in-group consolidation and theories of group polarization. Also, it maps the central themes and arguments people bring forth when asked to discuss in immigration in small group deliberations, where both proponents and opponents of immigration are present.

The introductory chapter in this dissertation presents the theoretical background as well as the research framework and data that are used in the analysis. Through the introduction of relevant theories and reflection of past research, it aims to shed light on the complicated relationship between the individual and the social context they habit. Its main purpose is to argue that our perceptions and views about societal matters, including immigration, are shaped by our living environment in different ways depending on the individual. Therefore, none of the theories can be seen as universal, while all of them can play a significant role in explaining sentiments concerning immigration in some cases.

The first article shows the complexity of analyzing the links between social context and opinion formation. It finds that attitudes do in fact vary between different parts of the same urban area. Even though attitudes measured in some individual neighborhoods indicate that the residents' attitudes can be explained by local ethnic diversity, the relationship between them is not linear. Instead, it seems that for the city as a whole, the clustering of people with similar life situations and backgrounds into same areas and coming into contact with shared views better explain differences in opinion.

The second article finds that while degrees of inter-group social distance vary between different residential areas, these differences cannot be explained with either theories of inter-group threat or contact. There are, still, some noteworthy differences in how individual level characteristics interact with different contextual variables. For example, in neighborhoods with a large share of foreign speakers, women are more accepting of immigrants to enter the country than men. Also, young people are more likely to accept an immigrant into their family than older people in ethnically

homogeneous neighborhoods, while no difference between age groups' attitudes can be observed in ethnically more heterogeneous neighborhoods.

The third articles aims to measure to what extent in-group consolidation polarizes attitudes toward immigrants. It finds that attitude polarization does indeed take place, but only for a limited group of the general population. The results indicate that while young people are considerably influenced by the general sentiment in their living area, the neighborhood effect becomes less significant as people age.

The fourth article finds that immigration debate in small groups is heavily influenced by broad, international narratives and national level themes and topics, while local level implications are mostly left out. The narratives people use when discussing immigration are in many ways adopted from national news coverage and political rhetoric.

KEYWORDS: immigration, attitudes, residential segregation, deliberation, polarization.

TURUN YLIOPISTO
Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta
Filosofian, poliittisen historian ja valtio-opin laitos
Valtio-oppi
Mikko Leino: Among Friends and Strangers. The Influence of Residential Context on Attitudes and Deliberation on Immigration
Väitöskirja, 185 s.
Yhteiskunta- ja käyttäytymistieteiden tohtoriohjelma
Marraskuu 2021

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämän väitöskirjan tarkoituksena on analysoida asuinalueen vaikutusta enemmistön maahanmuuttoasenteisiin sekä aiheesta käytävään keskusteluun. Se tutkii missä määrin vakiintuneet uhka- ja kohtaamisteoriat selittävät yksilöiden asenteita. Lisäksi se selvittää saman mielisten kohtaamisen sekä ryhmäpolarisaation teorioiden mahdollisuuksia selittää eroja maahanmuuttoasenteissa saman kaupungin eri osien välillä. Väitöskirjassa kartoitetaan myös teemoja sekä argumentteja, joita keskustelijat – niin maahanmuuttoon myönteisesti kuin kielteisesti suhtautuvat – omaehtoisesti nostavat esiin, kun heitä pyydetään keskustelemaan maahanmuutosta pienryhmissä.

Johdanto-osio esittelee työn teoreettisen taustan sekä tutkimuksen analyysikehikon ja aineiston. Perehdyttämällä lukijan olemassa oleviin teorioihin sekä heijastelemalla aiempien tutkimustuloksia se pyrkii valaisemaan yksilön sekä hänen asuttamansa sosiaalisen ympäristön välistä monimutkaista suhdetta. Sen tärkeimpänä päämääränä on esittää, että elinympäristön vaikutus riippuu paljon yksilöstä sekä tilanteesta. Siksi mitään teoriaa tai yksittäistä selitystä ei tule pitää universaalina; päinvastoin kaikilla niillä on oma huomattava tapauskohtainen painoarvonsa.

Väitöskirjan ensimmäinen artikkeli osoittaa, kuinka monimutkainen suhde sosiaalisen ympäristön sekä yksilön mielipiteenmuodostuksen välillä vallitsee. Sen keskeisenä löydöksenä voidaan pitää sitä, että asenteet todellakin vaihtelevat huomattavasti saman kaupungin eri osien välillä. Yksittäisten asuinalueiden asenteita voidaan selittää alueen väestön etnisen koostumuksen perusteella, mutta koko kaupunkia tarkastellessa uhka- ja kohtaamisteorioiden selitysvoima on rajallinen. Koko kaupungin laajuisessa tarkastelussa samankaltaisten ihmisten hakeutuminen asumaan samoille alueille sekä heidän välisensä kohtaamisensa selittävät yksilöiden asenteita parhaiten.

Toinen artikkeli havaitsee, että vaikka eri ryhmien väliset sosiaalisen välimatkan kokemukset vaihtelevat eri pienalueiden välillä, näitäkään eroja ei voida systemaattisesti selittää uhka- tai kohtaamisteorian avulla. Analyysi löytää kuitenkin mielenkiintoisia eroavaisuuksia siinä, miten yksilö- ja aluetason muuttujat ovat vuorovaikutuksessa keskenään. Esimerkiksi alueilla, joissa vieraskielisen väestön osuus on suuri, naiset ovat selvästi miehiä avoimempia laajamittaisempaan maahanmuuttoon. Toiseksi, etnisesti homogeenisilla alueilla nuoret ovat selvästi

vanhempia ikäluokkia valmiimpia ottamaan maahanmuuttajan perheenjäsenekseen. Etnisesti heterogeenisemmilla alueilla eroa ikäryhmien välillä ei puolestaan ole.

Väitöksen kolmas artikkeli tarkastelee sitä, missä määrin mielipiteet vahvistuvat saman mielisten asuttamilla alueilla. Tulokset osoittavat, että tämän tyyppistä asenteiden lujittumista tapahtuu, mutta vain rajatun väestöryhmän joukossa. Analyysin valossa näyttää siltä, että samalla kun nuorten asenteet saavat vahvasti vaikutteita asuinalueensa yleisestä ilmapiiristä, naapurustoefekti heikkenee ihmisten ikääntyessä.

Viimeinen artikkeli kuvailee maahanmuutosta käytävän pienryhmäkeskustelun teemoja, aiheita, politiikkasuosituksia sekä niissä esiintyviä kertomuksia. Se havaitsee keskusteluiden olevan vahvasti laajojen, kansainvälisten narratiivien sekä kansallisen tason aiheiden hallitsemaa. Paikallisilla teemoilla tai asuinalueen ominaispiirteillä ei ole merkittävää asemaa maahanmuuttokeskustelussa, vaan maahanmuutto koetaan vahvasti kansallisen tason aiheeksi. Keskustelijoiden narratiivit suomalaisuudesta, maahanmuutosta sekä maahanmuuttajista ovat saaneet vahvasti vaikutteita kansallisesta uutisoinnista sekä poliittisesta retoriikasta.

ASIASANAT: maahanmuutto, asenteet, asuinalueiden eriytyminen, puntarointi, polarisaatio.

Table of Contents

List of Original Publications **10**

Acknowledgements **11**

Part One: Introductory Chapter **15**

1 Introduction **17**

2 Theory: Understanding attitudes toward immigration **25**
2.1 What are attitudes toward immigration about? 27
2.1.1 Perceived economic impacts of immigration 30
2.1.2 Perceived social impacts 32
2.2 Contextual-level determinants of attitudes toward immigration 34
2.2.1 Residential segregation 37
2.2.2 In-group consolidation 39
2.2.3 Threat theory 42
2.2.4 Contact theory 44
2.2.5 Interlinked theories 45
2.3 Individual-level determinants of attitudes toward immigration 47
2.3.1 Individual-level determinants used in this study 48
2.3.2 Social distance and personal inter-group interaction 49
2.3.3 Other important variables: political ideology, party identification and economic circumstances 52
2.4 Arguing for and against immigration 53
2.4.1 Immigration debate as a narrative 53
2.4.2 The content and form of the immigration narratives 55
2.5 Summary 57

3 Empirical research design **59**
3.1 Case: Deliberation within and across enclaves 59
3.1.1 Deliberative mini-publics 60
3.1.2 Recruitment of participants 63
3.1.3 The event 65
3.2 Data and methods 66
3.2.1 The survey data 66
3.2.2 Register data from Turku 68
3.2.3 Discussion data 69

3.2.4 Methods 70

4 Article summary 77
4.1 Does the neighborhood context explain attitudes toward immigration? A study of opinions on immigration in the city of Turku, Finland (Article I) 77
4.2 How context shapes acceptance of immigrants? The link between affective social distance and locational distance (Article II) 78
4.3 Does in-group consolidation polarize attitudes toward immigrants? (Article III) 80
4.4 Discourse of immigration in mini-publics (Article IV) 81

5 Conclusions 83
5.1 Reflections on the results 84
5.2 Suggestions for further research 89
5.3 Conclusion 91

List of References 93

Part Two: Original Publications 103

Tables

Table 1. Key theories and variables used in the analysis concerning immigration attitudes.. 58
Table 2. Summary of main findings regarding immigration attitudes. 84

Figure

Figure 1. Recruitment of participants. 64

List of Original Publications

This dissertation is based on the following original publications, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals:

I Himmelroos, Staffan and Leino, Mikko. 2015. Does the neighborhood context explain attitudes toward immigration? A study of opinions on immigration in the city of Turku, Finland, *Research on Finnish Society* Vol. (2015): 33–45.

II Leino, Mikko and Himmelroos, Staffan. 2019. How context shapes acceptance of immigrants: the link between affective social distance and locational distance, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 43(10): 1890–1908.

III Leino, Mikko and Ylisalo, Juha. 2021. Does In-Group Consolidation Polarize Attitudes Toward Immigrants? *Political Studies* (online first), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321721998929.

IV Leino, Mikko and Mickelsson, Rauli. 2017. Maahanmuuttodiskurssi pienryhmäkeskusteluissa, *Politiikka*. 3/2017: 203–221.

Acknowledgements

Some might view academic research as a lonely occupation, one where the researchers confine themselves to the privacy of their office, laboratory or corner of the archive, only to emerge from their solitude when the time to publish their results comes. One of the first – and perhaps the most important – lesson I have learned during my somewhat short academic career is that research is hardly ever solely an individual effort or process. This dissertation would not have been started nor finished without the constant encouragement, support and guidance of countless individuals. To all of them, I owe greatly.

I have been fortunate to have two inspiring, committed and most of all patient supervisors, who were both as influential at the start of my research journey, as they are now when this process nears its end. I want to thank Maija Setälä for all the encouragement, guidance and secure funding she has provided me with during the past years, as well as for all the helpful feedback I have received at every stage of the process. It is safe to say that most of what I know concerning academic research I have learned while working with Maija on several projects. Henri Vogt, I thank you for the inspiration you provided years ago when I decided to pursue a doctoral degree in the first place, and for all the discussions we have had over the years.

I want to extend my gratitude to the two reviewers, Hanna Wass and Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen, whose insightful and constructive remarks helped me finish this dissertation. An especially warm thanks goes to Elina for agreeing to act as an opponent in the public examination.

I am grateful to all the staff and colleagues at the Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science. Thank you for welcoming me to your community, for helpful counsel and especially for all the everyday talks at the coffee room. I am especially grateful to Auli Kultanen-Leino, Marja Heinonen, Hanna-Mari Salonen, Katri Tammelin and many others in the university's administration, who have remained friendly and composed despite my silly questions about numerous administrative procedures. I also wish to thank all the senior colleagues at the Political science research unit. Mikael Mattlin, Rauli Mickelsson, Heino Nyyssönen, Antti Pajala, Juha Vuori, Matti Wiberg and many others have always shown their interest in my research, provided assistance when asked and guided me through

changing positions at the Department. I am especially thankful to all the participants at the regular political science research seminar for the endless peer-support, highly appreciated feedback and great jokes both during and after the seminars. So, I want to offer my thanks to Hannu Autto, Saila Heinikoski, Maija Jäske, Johanna Ketola, Katariina Kulha, Annina Kärkkäinen, Elias Laitinen, Kimmo Makkonen, Marjaana Mäenpää, Sakari Nieminen, Sami Pirkkala, Aappo Pukarinen, Teemu Rantanen, Mila Seppälä, Ville Sinkkonen, Sami Torssonen, Milla Vaha, Leena Vastapuu, Juha Ylisalo and everyone else who have been part of seminar over the years.

I have been fortunate to be part of other excellent research communities as well. Most importantly, The Social Science Research Institute Samforsk at Åbo Akademi University and all the individuals there have been influential in shaping my path in the academia and in formation of my research interests. Thank you Kimmo Grönlund, Staffan Himmelroos, Maria Bäck, Henrik Serup Christensen, Marina Lindell, Lauri Rapeli, Inga Saikkonen, Kim Strandberg and everyone else for your valuable support and for the change to work and write with such excellent researchers. Another important institution for me is The Centre for Parliamentary Studies at University of Turku. I want to thank Markku Jokisipilä, Kimmo Elo, Niko Hatakka, Mona Mannevuo, Juho Ovaska, Annu Perälä, Sini Ruohonen, Erkka Railo and Matti Välimäki for being first-rate collegues and for welcoming me as part of the group at a precarious point of time during this journey. Lastly, the group of researchers and other individuals brought together by the PALO project have been influential throughout the lifespan of the process. I would especially like to thank Kaisa Herne and Vesa Koskimaa for all the lively discussions I have had with them, Lyydia Aarninsalo for her help with the Figure 1 in this dissertation and Mari Taskinen for her valuable and tireless counsel and support in all research related matters.

This work would not have been possible without the funding provided to me by the Finnish Cultural Foundation's Varsinais-Suomi Regional Fund, The Turku Urban Research Programme and The Foundation for Municipal Development. I am also grateful for the Academy of Finland projects ‘Democratic Reasoning’ (grant number 274305) and “Preparing for the Next Waves” (decision number 335690) and Strategic Research Council project ‘Participation in Long-Term Decision-Making (decision number 312671) for funding this project.

I wish to thank all my friends, especially Eero, Ilkka and Joni, for every laugh, joke, game and the occasional beer we have enjoyed together over the years. I also want to thank my parents for encouraging me every step of the way, for teaching me to wonder the world and for emphasizing the value of reading and listening to others. For the role model you have provided me with, I cannot thank you enough. My sister Maiju, with your endless courage and persistence, thank you for being an inspiration to me. For my parents-in-law, Tuula and Lippo, I am deeply grateful for showing

interest in my work and for excellent childcare assistance. Completing the dissertation would not have been possible without you.

The greatest debt I owe is to my wife Tiina. Thank you for helping me realize my dreams both at work and in other aspects of life. Thank you for your understanding, compassion and warm smiles, that continue to encourage and support me. Tiina, Emma and Nooa, it is because of you that I have a place to call home, a thing more valuable than any academic achievement.

Turku, November 2021
Mikko Leino

Part One:
Introductory Chapter

1 Introduction

Migration, the movement of people from one place to another to take up residence, is a phenomenon that shapes both individual lives and entire societies. For the individual, it can mean, for example, new opportunities related to studies and employment, reunion with family, or safety from harm and persecution. The magnitude of migration is such that it can influence entire nations and societies. Globally, there were around 272 million international migrants in 2019 (IOM, 2020), more than the population of Philippines, the world's fourth largest country. Practically no nation is unaffected by migration these days, nor is there a national government that does not need to at least somehow account for immigration in its policies. According to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), international migration has profoundly transformed the demographics of many developed countries during recent decades. Even in a country like Finland, which has mostly been geographically distant from the largest immigration flows of the world, immigration to the country has been growing (Martikainen et al., 2013).

Immigration can be described as the action of moving to live permanently in a country other than that or those in which the individual originally held citizenship. While *migration* can happen between different regions within a single country, immigration always involves crossing borders into a foreign country. Even though immigration is mostly perceived as a global phenomenon, and its implications on the receiving countries are usually observed and handled at the national level, many of its practical impacts are local. Immigrants enter a new country, where they become parts of local communities, interacting with the population already residing there. They live, study and work just like the rest of the population, adapting to their new community and altering it in the process. When it comes to social integration and multicultural policies, and their success, it is key that the majority population in a receiving country expresses approval of the newcomers and is open to new influences immigrants bring. If the people already residing in the area are less welcoming of immigration, successful coexistence is not as likely. Therefore, it becomes important to discover how attitudes about immigration form and change as a result of the differences in social contexts people inhabit. This dissertation provides

new information on how to explain immigration attitudes based on the majority population's living environment.

Immigration has become a significant topic in politics across Western democracies (Castles & Miller, 2013; Eberl et al., 2018). As a political topic, immigration has both grown in the frequency, length and depth that it is debated, but also in the significance it has on electoral outcomes. There is ample evidence that immigration as a topic, and immigration attitudes among the electorate, have affected electoral results and the outcomes of referenda in many countries (see for example Borg et al., 2020; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos, 2020). For example, both in the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 2016 US presidential election, immigration was a major part of the debates prior to voting, and immigration attitudes had a significant influence on the results (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Reny et al., 2019). In Finland, immigration as a policy area has not lacked importance either. The populist right-wing Finns Party won its first notable victory in the parliamentary elections of 2011, with the party's electoral campaign centered heavily on discourse around (anti)immigration and demands of stricter immigration policies (Välimäki, 2012). After these elections, immigration has become an even more notable part of the political agenda, political discourse and a recurring topic in election campaigns in Finland (Borg et al., 2020; Grönlund & Wass, 2016). Borg (2020) found that, in the parliamentary elections of 2019, those who voted for The Finns Party were very different from voters of all other parties regarding questions on immigration and immigration policies. The fact that they hold strong prejudices and are strictly against admitting a further inflow of immigrants into Finland visibly set them apart from voters of other parties, indicating the importance of the topic of immigration in shaping vote choices and electoral results. The same kind of patterns regarding radical right-wing parties and their voters can be found elsewhere, suggesting that immigration widely emerges as one of the main socio-cultural conflicts that shape and determine electoral results (Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos (2020).

Its significance as a political topic and its ability to shift established political power structures makes *immigration attitudes* a topic worthy of study. Another strong reason in favor of more rigorous analysis of immigration attitudes is the division and polarization they can induce among the public. It is essential to stress that views concerning immigration have developed in a more positive direction among the public at large, i.e., more in favor of immigration, both in Finland (Haavisto, 2019; Jaakkola, 2009) and in other parts of the world (Sanderson et al., 2021; Stockemer et al., 2020). This means that, during recent decades, the general sentiment among the public has become more open to immigrants, more in favor of immigration and less prejudiced about minorities in general. To my knowledge, no analysis has been conducted in Finland or abroad that would claim a contrasting long-term development. Therefore, the reason for the growing importance of

immigration as a political topic is not found in more pro-immigration views among voters as a whole, but in the segregation and polarization of attitudes among them. Sanderson et al. (2021) found that, while there has been a clear long-term decline in prejudice and anti-immigration views among the US electorate, increasing division certainly exists along party lines. While those identifying themselves as Democrats are becoming increasingly more cosmopolitan in their orientation over time, this development is much less noteworthy among Republican voters. Therefore, Sanderson et al. suggest that immigration as a political topic is one of the major points of ideological polarization and a clear sign of a divided and "steadily polarizing American society." Even though not all political cultures — or whole societies thereof — are as polarized as the current US context (for debate on the United States as a polarized nation, see for example Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Fiorina, 2006), signs of immigration as a highly polarizing topic, one that at least has the potential to induce this kind of societal polarization, are noticeable elsewhere also (see Borg, 2020; Isotalo et al., 2020; Kriesi & Schulte-Cloos, 2020).

In recent times, immigration and immigration attitudes have also become important academic topics. There are countless individual studies and papers, several dedicated and established academic journals and numerous schools and theories dedicated to the subject. Even though all single elements of this huge collective can certainly be regarded as valuable, as a researcher, one still must be aware what their work can offer for the study of immigration attitudes as a whole. My modest contribution to the academic field is provided in this dissertation, which explores *how living environment influences the majority's attitudes toward immigration and the way they discuss immigration*. I address three main research questions in the following chapters. The first two are answered in the first three of four individual articles (I – III), while the third question is dealt with in the fourth article (IV). The first two research questions deal with immigration attitudes and living environment directly:

i.) Do attitudes concerning immigration vary between neighborhoods?

ii.) If so, a) what kind of contextual characteristics explain these differences in individual attitudes, and b) are different individuals similarly affected by this neighborhood-level effect, or does the result change according to demographics?

The third research question approaches the influence of living environment through another, equally important concept, narratives concerning immigration. If we expect context to shape public opinion on immigration, we should also view it as an important factor in discussions concerning immigration. Even though numerous studies focusing on immigration narratives in public debate or news coverage (see, for example Berry et al., 2016; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Eberl et al., 2018; Hopkins,

2011; Perälä & Niemi, 2018) have been carried out, it is not clear to what extent immigration discourse between lay citizens includes themes and topics attributable to the local context. Analysis focusing on local implications of immigration in discussions concerning the topic allows us to approach the contextual effects using two different sources: survey questions and discussions. The third research question asks:

iii.) How do people discuss immigration in facilitated small group discussions, and how are local matters related to living environment present in these discussions?

My interest in the influence of living environment stems from the fact that, while many individual-level predictors of immigration attitudes are fairly established and not overly contested, there is a long and ongoing academic debate about the impact of context on individuals' attitudes. To illustrate my point, I will give an example. Researchers have established that young age and female gender are notable predictors of cosmopolitan attitudes, meaning that, on average, young people are more pro-immigration in their views than older people, and women have generally been shown to be more tolerant than men. There is very little dispute over this finding, and it holds true when moving from one context to another. This means that, within a single context, for example a city or a country, individual characteristics have meaningful explanatory power. However, at the same time, it is true that while women in, say Country A, are indeed more tolerant than the men living there, women living in Country B may be even more tolerant than women living in Country A. The reason for this difference is something that individual characteristics cannot explain, and we must look for answers elsewhere. Because of this, many believe that there are also factors in the surroundings of individuals that influence their views and can act as independent variables in explaining differences in these attitudes. This belief has led to the development of numerous theories that try to capture this contextual effect, and a lively debate between them. The literature on contextual effects is large and constantly growing, and analyses have been carried out on different geographic scales, for example, between countries, cities and rural areas, or municipalities.

Here, the analysis is of the immediate living environment, neighborhoods, and their influence on immigration attitudes and the way people discuss immigration. The concept at the center of the analysis, immigration attitudes, has been chosen for a clear reason: its encompassing nature. While in theory, and in single survey or interview questions, the phenomenon called immigration, immigrants as a group and immigration policies in Finland can be distinguished from one another, these often blend together in academic literature, public debate and media coverage. Therefore, the focus here is on all of them simultaneously, i.e., the dependent variables are either indexes that include single items concerning one or more of these aspects at the same

time (see p. 66-67 and 73-74 for details) or multiple single items are analyzed at the same time, and discourse analyses cover all the aspects at once.

The academic contribution of this dissertation can be described as threefold. First, the study is an effort to combine three distinct and rarely interlinked research traditions. The first tradition concerns the contextual explanations of differences in individual immigration attitudes: one explanation concentrates on how local ethnic diversity and the other on how inter-group contact shapes immigration attitudes of individuals (see, for example, Allport, 1953, Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Hewstone & Swart, 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The second part of the combination is based on electoral geography, where residential segregation and the result of individuals living with people like themselves are seen to influence individual political opinion (see, for example, Huckfeldt, 1979; Pattie & Johnston, 2000; 2016; Walks, 2004). The third research tradition is concentrated on the polarization of opinions in enclaves, groups of like-minded people, and how coming into contact with shared views can both unite and divide individuals (see, for example, Sunstein, 2009; Schkade et al., 2010). The key aspect driving group polarization is expected to be spatially concentrated information in networks of like-minded people, and therefore, this tradition is connected to studies concerning homophily in sociology (see McPherson et al., 2001).

Through this combination of research traditions, my aim is to offer a more complete picture of the ways social relations and interaction in one's personal living environment can potentially affect an individual's attitudes. The guiding hypothesis though this dissertation and all its individual articles is that the living neighborhood is not solely a composition of different people, nor is it just a proxy for inter-group relations. I argue that, as according to the "neighborhood effect" proposed by Miller (1977), people are both very selective of their living environment and also influenced by their day-to-day surroundings. Further, because of residential segregation, this "inescapable stimulus" (Huckfeldt, 1979) cast on individuals by their own home neighborhood varies considerably from person to person. This stimulus and significance of the neighborhood characteristics naturally vary between contexts and individuals; in some places and for some members of the majority, it is ethnic diversity and visible minority groups that trigger prejudiced thinking, while for other people in other parts of the same town, it is talking with neighbors over the garden fence that shapes their thinking. Therefore, the goal is not to determine which theory is the right one; instead, I aim to introduce a range of potential stimuli the living environment offers.

The second noteworthy contribution this study makes is the introduction of neighborhood-level data, which has not often been used to analyze the effects of living environment on public opinion. Most analyses on contextual effects shaping immigration opinion have been carried out on comparably large geographic scales,

i.e., they aim at measuring and explaining differences in immigration attitudes between quite large areas, for example, between urban and suburban areas, or between different postal code areas, census tracts or regions. However, these large geographical areas include a large number of different smaller units, like neighborhoods, and therefore have stronger variance within them when it comes to experiences of actually living there. Therefore, large-scale analyses are not ideal in determining how context influences individual attitudes, and some researchers have called for analyses to be carried out on a smaller spatial scale (see, for example, Abrams & Fiorina, 2012). I suggest that neighborhoods, even though they vary considerably in form and size both spatially and in population, are suitably small to hypothesize that people living within one neighborhood have somewhat similar experiences of their living environment and can be in frequent and meaningful contact with each other in their living environment. At the same time, due to residential segregation, neighborhoods are sufficiently different from each other to allow for a reasonable comparison between different contexts.

The data used in this dissertation was collected by the research team at Samforsk, a Social Science Research Institute at Åbo Akademi University, in the spring of 2012. The research team organized a deliberative mini-public organized by the project Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves (see Grönlund et al., 2015; 2017) in Turku to measure chances in attitudes in an event, where over 200 people deliberated on a highly controversial and topical issue in small groups consisting either of people with like-minded or mixed opinions. The topic of the deliberation was immigration in Finland. In order to recruit participants to the mini-public, the research team sent a letter to a large random sample of residents in the Turku region, with which they were invited to take part in the research project: to fill in surveys and participate in the actual event. The majority of the data utilized in this dissertation is based on the initial recruitment survey, which had a comparably high response rate, and because of its regional focus, provided an ideal chance to explore differences in immigration attitudes at a local level. All the Turku-based respondents were coded according to their respective neighborhoods by hand based on their addresses, which were provided by the Population Register Centre (now named The Digital and Population Data Services Agency). This recruitment survey data consisting of answers to the rather short survey was combined with contextual data collected by Statistics Finland in December 2012 for the City of Turku, which in turn provided the researcher with the data. In the fourth article (IV) of this dissertation, transcribed discussion data from the small group discussions are utilized.

The third contribution of this dissertation is to the study of immigration attitudes and discourse in Finland in general. So far, even though the importance of immigration as a topic in Finnish politics and electoral outcomes is recognized (see, for example, Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Borg et al., 2020; Grönlund &

Wass, 2016; Isotalo et al., 2020), the research on attitudes toward immigration in Finland has been quite fragmented. There is research on racism in Finland (Puuronen, 2011) and on right-wing rhetoric and welfare-chauvinism (Keskinen, 2016; Pyrhönen, 2015), as well as on The Finns Party as an anti-immigration party (Hatakka et al., 2018), but peer-reviewed, more general analyses on Finnish attitudes toward immigrants and their determinants remain scarce. To this day, the work of Magdalena Jaakkola (1989; 1995; 1999; 2005; 2009) is still the most notable contribution in this field. To my knowledge, there are no analyses concentrating on the role of immediate living environment in shaping Finnish attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, this dissertation marks the first time this type of analysis is carried out in Finland.

The dissertation begins by focusing on attitudes toward immigration and public debate on the topic. Here, I first outline what is meant by attitudes toward immigration. This is followed by a literature review about ways the majority can perceive impacts of immigration on themselves and the receiving country. These can be divided into two overall categories: perceived economic impacts of immigration and observed societal effects of immigration to the receiving country, which are mostly concentrated on issues of national identity. These perceptions are interlinked; that is, individual attitudes, whether positive or negative, are mostly a result of more than one perceived impact.

The next chapters in the dissertation focus on the determinants of individual attitudes, both contextual and individual. First, the main theories used in this dissertation are introduced in more detail. I provide an overview of the concept of residential segregation as well as theories focusing on contextual effects on differences in individual attitudes concerning immigration. This is followed by an overview of research literature concerning important individual-level variables explaining differences in attitudes. I mostly focus on the variables utilized in this study, but also introduce some other noteworthy ones. Then, the dissertation includes an overview of how I understand narratives, and how they are linked to national debates concerning immigration and local experiences. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the content and form of the immigration debate carried out in most of Western Europe, including Finland.

Chapter 3 of this dissertation covers the deliberative mini-public, from which the data used here originates, as well as introduces the data and methods utilized in this study. This chapter begins with a short introduction to common features and principles of deliberative mini-publics. This is followed by an overview of the event itself: its purpose, design and recruitment of participants. Then, I describe the data collected from this event, the surveys and the single items included in them, the transcribed discussions, and the register data used to complement the survey data. The second part concludes with a section, where I present the main methods used in

the research articles. Because the data, methods and individual models used vary between single articles, and they are explained more in-depth in the articles themselves, this section is kept rather short. However, there are some important methodological questions that need to be addressed in order to situate this dissertation within the academic field of political science and to clarify some key aspects of each article. The dissertation ends with a separate concluding chapter, in which I provide summaries of the articles included in this dissertation and go over the main findings of this dissertation as a whole in relation to the main research questions presented earlier. In addition, I propose possible directions for future research and reflect on what the results means for the public debate concerning immigration in Finland as well as for the decision-makers dealing with issues related to, for example, immigration assimilation, multiculturalism and urban planning.

2 Theory: Understanding attitudes toward immigration

In this chapter, I introduce the analysis of immigration attitudes. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus is on contextual characteristics explaining differences in immigration attitudes. There are, however, a few clarifications that need to be made before diving into the relevant theories. Therefore, this chapter begins with a rather lengthy preface to the topic. I maintain that in order to understand the way theories related to the influence of spatial context on individuals' attitudes work and how they are tested in this dissertation, one must first know what is meant by immigration attitudes. Therefore, I first define the attitudes and toward whom are they directed. Then, I illustrate the different themes and topics immigration attitudes encapsulate. This is done through the introduction of theories related to pure prejudice, economic self-interest and societal effects of immigration on receiving countries (see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). These theories are introduced for three reasons. First, they serve as an irreplaceable introduction to the numerous and complicated ways an individual can view immigration, how these attitudes are formed and how they change, and what connotations are attached to the term. Further, these theories constitute a basis for deliberation concerning immigration, as they reflect the way immigration is handled in the public debate (see Citrin & Sides, 2008). Thirdly, the individual items in the survey data used in this dissertation to measure attitudes toward immigration of the majority focus on these issues.

The literature review on the study of immigration attitudes is followed by an introduction to the main theories of interest in this dissertation. I present the three theoretical traditions mentioned previously, which include explanations based on local ethnic diversity and inter-group contact, the neighborhood effect, and group polarization. In this section, I also explore how these three research traditions can be connected and how their assumptions and hypotheses are, in many ways, linked. This section focusing on contextual theories is followed by a presentation of several individual-level determinants of immigration attitudes, some of which are utilized in this study and some which are presented because they have been shown to be too influential in the past to be left out completely. In Section 2.4, I outline how people argue in favor of or against immigration and describe the content and form of the

public debate on immigration. This is done mostly by focusing on immigration narratives within the debate. The second chapter of the dissertation ends with a short summary on relevant theories and factors predicting immigration attitudes.

What has to be made clear — right here at the beginning — is that *attitude* is not action, but rather a tendency or an underlying disposition, which can, however, be interpreted as a premonition concerning an action (Ajzen, 2005, 3). In most cases, and at most times, attitudes are not visible. They can indeed be indirectly derived from individual actions, for example, if one is openly hostile toward immigrants in a casual conversation with their friend or neighbor, it can be deducted that they most likely are against immigration in their views. However, beyond these kinds of occasions, purely observing citizens is hardly a trustworthy way to measure and explain attitudes. For example, it can be that a person with anti-immigration views is not openly hostile toward immigrants or vocal about their opinions, yet they still withdraw from collective life that includes members of the outgroup. It is much harder to derive attitudes from this kind of inaction than it is from clear cases of action. Measuring and explaining attitudes is therefore usually carried out through specifically prepared surveys or interviews (Ajzen, 2005, 3–12). These methods have their problems as well. The most notable issue is the so-called social desirability bias (see, for example, Grimm, 2010), where the respondent, instead of responding according to their true feelings, gives answers that they think are socially desirable, or at least answers that they think the researchers will like. Despite these challenges, and keeping in mind that social desirability bias is not as severe with surveys as it is with interviews because the researcher is not present at the time of answering, surveys remain the standard way of measuring individual attitudes.

The aim of this study is to explain differences in attitudes of individuals, not communities. This means, first, that when it comes to attitudes, the results of the dissertation must be interpreted as measuring attitudes of single persons, and therefore they do not directly tell us how residents of single neighborhoods feel about immigration. Importantly, despite the large number of observations (n=3,350), the data is not representative at neighborhood level. Second, the same logic can be applied to explaining differences in these attitudes: the differences explained are between individuals living in different parts of the city and the aim is to form associations between neighborhood characteristics and individual attitude formation. This should not be confused with comparisons between differences in attitudes between different parts of the city, i.e., why is the general sentiment in some neighborhoods more restrictive than in others.

Attitudes are formed and reformed through a wide range of stimuli originating from the everyday life of citizens — stimuli that people may or may not be aware of (Crano & Gardikiotis, 2015). This means that attitudes form and change through daily observations and interactions that take place, for example, in one's living

environment, school, workplace and pastime activities. Attitudes are not fixed, stored memories, but rather are constantly influenced by one's surroundings (Crano & Gardikiotis, 2015). They are, however, somewhat stable, and drastic changes in views are rare. As Ajzen (2005, 6) describes, "[a]lthough attitudes and traits are both assumed to be relatively stable […] attitudes are typically viewed as more malleable than personality traits." Regarding immigration attitudes specifically, Kustov et al. (2021) describe them as being stable and not easily swayed by single events or other shocks.

A significant question is therefore: toward whom are attitudes about immigration directed? An immigrant is an individual who has moved from their home country to another, meaning that the "birth" of an immigrant is the moment they arrive in the new country. As a general term, it is neutral, it has no association or connotation that can be automatically understood as either positive or negative. All such connotations are instead related to the attitude of those using the term; and because of these attitudes, the word immigration is rarely used or confronted in a purely neutral way. Instead, immigrants are in many cases viewed as "strangers", ones who arrive from outside to stay, and are often understood as members of the receiving country while still being somewhat distant from groups already residing there (Karakayali, 2009; Simmel, 1950).

Even though defining an immigrant is easy in principle, with the numerous connotations an individual can attach to the term, it actually becomes quite hard to accurately specify toward whom immigration attitudes are directed. Even though immigrants are generally a highly heterogeneous group, a rough distinction is often made between work-related immigrants and refugees. For this study, native language is the best available indication of immigration available. Using this measure, in this study all non-Finnish, non-Swedish, non-Sami speaking people are categorized as being immigrants in Finland. It is true, however, that all of these people might not have migrated anywhere, for example, in cases of so-called second-generation immigrants. Therefore, the use of foreign language as a proxy for being an immigrant is hardly ideal, but due to limitations in data, this is unavoidable. This limitation and reasons for choosing native language to capture the size of the immigrant population are covered in more detail in Section 3.2.2. of this dissertation (see p. 68-69).

2.1 What are attitudes toward immigration about?

When it comes to attitudes toward immigration, individual attitudes can range from very welcoming to very restrictive. Between these two opposites, there lies a wide variety of moderate attitudes, some more positive and some more inclined toward negativity. Positive, welcoming attitudes are often termed *cosmopolitan*. At the core of a cosmopolitan ethical outlook lies the view that humans are one community

(Beck & Grande, 2007; Maxwell, 2020) and therefore individuals' responsibility, openness and compassion should be extended to "strangers" also (Appiah, 2006). According to Maxwell (2020, 2062) "[c]osmopolitans are open to transnational connections and support immigration, multiculturalism, and robust international institutions." Cosmopolitans view the world and its people as being interconnected in different ways (Laughland-Booÿ et al., 2015), and they possess the necessary skills to understand the "cultural diversity, hybridity and otherness" of the world (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007, 734). Therefore, a cosmopolitan outlook sees that it is both useful and necessary to relate to other countries and other societies and cooperate with them whenever possible. This strengthening of international ties, including immigration, is seen as leading to beneficial development in societies. When it comes to immigration, a person with a cosmopolitan outlook sees that an intake of immigrants can lead to, for example, economic gains and a richer culture. Usually, cosmopolitans are also more open to frequent and close contact with immigrants. Furthermore, they see that free movement of people across borders is just, on the basis of social equality between people. Cosmopolitans oppose any kind of discrimination based on ethnicity and support policies that promote equality between different ethnic groups.

On the other "end", *anti-cosmopolitans* oppose the agenda promoted by cosmopolitans. Instead, they advocate for national sovereignty and maintain historical national traditions while preferring national institutions to international ones. In general, anti-immigration narratives highlight symbolic boundaries and divisions between the national population and immigrants in order to justify reserved attitudes and exclusionary actions (Laughland- Booÿ et al., 2015). Anti-cosmopolitans support stricter immigration policies, often due to, for example, supposed economic strains brought by growing immigrant populations or observed cultural threats posed by the minority (see Citrin & Sides, 2008; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Demands for stricter immigration policy can be related to, for example, public support for restrictive admission policies or denial of equal political, civic, social or other kinds of rights to immigrants. People with anti-cosmopolitan orientation are also seen as most prone to innumeracy, that is, an overestimation of the share that immigrants constitute of the general population (Herda, 2010; Sigelman & Niemi, 2001). Anti-cosmopolitans can also openly support discriminatory policies and even carry out discriminating acts themselves. These kinds of actions can either be carried out to favor one's own in-group at the expense of other groups or to discriminate against others (Goldberg, 1982), resulting in unequal inter-group treatment. Discrimination can further be divided into differential treatment of groups and a disparate impact of rules and procedures. Differential treatment means unequal treatment of individuals based on ethnicity, while disparate impact means equal treatment of individuals according to given rules and

procedures, while these rules or procedures favour members of one group over another (Pager & Shepherd, 2008).

Reasons for supporting discriminatory actions and policies can be complex. Theories that base immigration attitudes in pure prejudice point out that it is important to note that a person with anti-cosmopolitan views is not necessarily xenophobic or racist, even though persons belonging to the latter groups are automatically anti-cosmopolitan (see Rydgren, 2008). The reserved sentiments anti-cosmopolitans feel can be due to rational and thorough weighing of pros and cons of immigration to the receiving country, and due to extensive personal experiences of being in contact with ethnic minorities. However, sometimes anti-cosmopolitanism and discriminatory actions are only based on pure prejudice, as in the case of xenophobes and racists.

Xenophobia can be characterized as believing that it is "natural" for people to live among others of "their own kind." This is accompanied by prejudice and hostility toward people of "another" kind. It should be noted that this hostility is not directed at "the other" from far away but only manifests when distance — actual or social — becomes less. Simply put, xenophobia is a fear of "unwanted strangers," who are then met with hostility. *Racism*, on the other hand, is an ideology, which claims that there is a fundamental inequality and hierarchical order of different biologically defined "races." Classic racism is seen as rarer nowadays, but it has been replaced with "racisme culturelle," where the hierarchical order is not based on biology, but rather on culture (Rydgren, 2008, 740-743; see also Siebers & Dennisen, 2014). This kind of racist ideology sees the coexistence of different cultures as impossible, and prefers single cultures to stay intact and not to take influences from others. Another form of present-day racism is recognized as taking a more passive form. This is what Bobo (1999, 465) termed as "laissez-faire racism," which proposes that many whites in the US context view present day disadvantages of minorities as a legacy of historical structures and old societal processes. This view, in part at least, legitimizes the persistence of those same disadvantages even today.

Both xenophobic attitudes and racism are caused by deeply rooted and pervasive *prejudice* (Rydgren, 2008). Prejudice mainly involves two components: negative stereotypes concerning immigrants and the desire for inter-group social distance. Negative stereotypes are beliefs concerning the outgroup; an attribute of an individual in the outgroup is often generalized to represent the entire group, and that attribute is used to differentiate the outgroup from the in-group (Markaki & Longhi, 2012). Because of these negative stereotypes, the majority tends to favor more social distance to the minority, i.e., they are reluctant to engage in constant, close and meaningful contact with the outgroup. This absence of inter-group contact means that the members of the majority can only base their evaluations of immigration on the negative stereotypes they already possess, while no closer acquaintances can help

alleviate any pre-existing beliefs. While there is evidence that the country of origin of immigrants is important when it comes to attitudes and prejudice (see, for example, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 233; Markaki & Longhi, 2012), Sniderman et al. (2004, 56) describe prejudice in general as being "blind in a deep sense." According to them, it "reflects a dislike not of a particular minority but of minorities in general," meaning that if a person is prejudiced against a certain minority, they are likely prejudiced against other minority groups also.

When not based on pure prejudice, at the individual level, there are multiple reasons for adopting positive or negative sentiments toward immigration, and arguably these reasons often contribute to each other (see, for example, Gorodzeisky, 2013). For example, if a person is against immigration, it can be due to the fact that they think it is bad for the national economy to increase the inflow of immigrants to the country, but at the same time, they can maintain that the current immigration population is not integrated to the new country and its national culture to a sufficient extent. On the other hand, a person, while holding strong cosmopolitan values, may adopt favorable views toward immigration because they think a considerable addition to the work force is needed because the host country is suffering from work force shortage. In the next subsection, I introduce two distinct explanations related to immigration attitudes: one based on economic consequences of immigration and another based on social and cultural impacts.

2.1.1 Perceived economic impacts of immigration

Immigration has a profound economic effect on both individuals and societies. One of the most common themes in the immigration debate and analyses of attitudes toward immigration is based on the effects — real or supposed — immigration has on individuals' own economic well-being. This can further be divided into two distinct, but often interlinked, categories: a presumed increase in the labor market and social services system competition, and growing fiscal burden. All in all, *economic self-interest-based* explanations (see, for example, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) suggest that personal economic circumstances, created by occupation, income and vulnerability to shifts in the job market, are the main bases for individual attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, socioeconomically more vulnerable — that is low educated or less skilled or unemployed — members of the majority are generally seen as more likely to express negative attitudes toward immigration (Billiet et al., 2014; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Semyonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2008) and more likely to object to allowing immigrants with similar skillsets as themselves to enter the country. This is because they are more likely to view themselves as being in competition over seemingly scarce resources, like jobs and social security, with immigrant groups since they hold similar social positions

and are therefore more intimidated by the growing immigrant population (Blalock, 1967). Also, in addition to taking away jobs from natives, newcomers can also be perceived to depress wages or disturb the job market some other way.

In a welfare state like Finland, this competition over scarce resources is also linked to welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism proposes that immigrants are attracted to a country because of its generous welfare benefits, while they themselves do not pay taxes. At the same time, they abuse the health care, the education system and other public services. Based on these accusations, it is argued that welfare benefits should only be allocated to members of the native population because it is exactly the native people — even though not necessarily those people currently enjoying the benefits — that have "built" the welfare state (Keskinen, 2016; Korsgaard, 2006). This shows that, for some at least, ethnic diversity and solidarity seem difficult to combine.

Fiscal burden hypothesis (see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Hanson et al., 2007) proposes that the majority can view the growing immigrant population as being a strain on a national economy and a source of budgetary deficits due to, for example, growing social benefit costs. If this were the case, the majority would have to provide for the budget deficits by paying more taxes. Tax-hikes are expected to be frowned upon the most by the people with higher incomes, and therefore, their attitudes would become more negative toward immigration (see, for example, Hanson et al., 2007). Also, this interpretation of the economic impacts of immigration would lead the majority to view large scale immigration of less educated people in negative terms. A highly educated immigrant population with a wide skillset would, on the other hand, have the adverse effect. There is, however, considerable disagreement about the fiscal impact of immigration (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 230), and therefore, impacts of immigration on national economies might not be viewed solely as a "burden" by the majority population. Rather, there are those of the opinion that an intake of immigrants is imperative to economic growth and vital for the functioning of the labor market, to relieve the work force shortage and the strain that an aging population has on the national economy, regardless of the skill set immigrants possess (see, for example, Citrin & Sides, 2008; Haavisto, 2019). This interpretation would lead to more favorable views concerning immigration and a more welcoming attitude toward an influx of a new workforce, because, in stark contrast to the first interpretation, without immigration the tax burden of the majority population would rise.

Some perceived economic impacts of immigration are not directly linked to the individual, but to the national economy. There is evidence (see Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Citrin et al., 1997) that members of the majority population can base their attitudes toward immigration, at least in part, on their perception of the impact of immigration on the *performance of the national economy*. If one sees

immigration as having a positive impact on national economic performance, they can start to view immigration in positive terms, regardless of the way they think it will affect their own economic situation. Negative sentiments can, in turn, be a result of reverse expectations concerning the national economic impact of immigration.

Another national economy-related explanation is based on fiscal cycles and economic downturns, predicting that when a national economy faces hardships or even financial crisis, the majority population becomes more critical of immigration. Studies show that more negative attitudes toward immigration correlate with more dire economic times, such as recessions. On the other hand, better national economic conditions correlate with a more positive outlook toward immigration. (Lapinski et al., 1997; Wilkes et al., 2008; see also Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 231.) Evidence also shows that the connection between anti-immigration attitudes and current national economic performance is stronger in countries with a smaller GDP per capita (Billiet et al., 2014; Sides & Citrin, 2007, 499), which can be interpreted as linking this explanation to the hypothesis concerning competition over scarce resources. The rationale here is clearly that when there is less to share with an increasing number of people, people become less sympathetic to admitting more people to have their share.

2.1.2 Perceived social impacts

Immigration has societal impacts that are related to non-economic factors as well. The social impacts can be related to a wide scope of entities such as preferences concerning uniform national culture (Norris & Inglehart, 2018), perceived symbolic threat to national identity (Hopkins et al., 2014), fear of political mobilization of immigrant groups to upset the majority's dominant position (Blalock, 1967), increased insecurity through rising crime rates (Rydgren, 2008), or even all these at the same time. One of the most prominent themes in the perceived effects of immigration is linked to a threat to *national identity and culture* (Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Siebers & Denisen, 2014). Here, *threat* means that values, culture and behavior of immigrant groups are seen as being "foreign," and therefore incompatible with the assumed uniform national culture currently in existence (see, for example, Laughland-Booÿ et al., 2015). If these incompatible cultural influences would be adopted, this would irreversibly change the country's culture and national identity of its people. Therefore, this presumed incompatibility results in exclusionary attitudes, where external cultural influences are seen as undesirable, and even xenophobia, where people fear outsiders with "strange" ways of life.

According to Sen (2006, 2) "[t]he sense of identity can make an important contribution to the strength and the warmth of our relations with others, such as

neighbors, or members of the same community, or fellow citizens." But identities can divide as well as unite. In fact, according to Laughland-Booÿ et al. (2015, 2), "[e]xclusion is an integral component of group identity and boundary maintenance." This suggests that, in the construction of group identity, it is important to identify those belonging to the same group as oneself, and also to recognize those that do not. The identity of a group — that of the majority and that of the minority — within a country can be formed around numerous different characteristics. The differentiating factors can be ethnic background, language, or religion, which are highly correlated to, but not limited to, specific countries and regions of origin of the immigrants. Other factors may be citizenship and nationality directly. Especially in the Nordic context, identity has been heavily linked to the successful building of the welfare state and being part of the welfare project (Korsgaard, 2006, 158).

Even though this list is far from exhaustive, it is sufficient to illustrate how differently group identities can unite and divide individuals. These individual differences, in the way a person can build boundaries between groups, are important in determining the way facing a "foreign" identity or culture influences immigration attitudes and feelings of social distance. There are at least two important factors in play. First, the level of overlapping between different identities a person "allows" themselves to simultaneously combine is important. This is often called identity complexity (see Garcia-Faroldi, 2017; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Second, the way that an individual "ranks" different competing identities can have a significant impact in shaping immigration attitudes.

Identities are *complex*, meaning that people, both knowingly and unknowingly, combine multiple in-group identities. When a person perceives a small overlapping membership between two distinct identities, the boundaries of each in-group are defined in such a way that they include members who do not share the initial identity that the in-group was based on in the first place. Therefore, combined group identities are larger and more inclusive than any of the in-groups alone (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). According to Garcia-Faroldi (2017, 17), "individuals who feel themselves to be members of broader groups — for example, belonging to the European group identity — tend to accept diverse social groups such as immigrants more readily and are more open to intercultural dialogue." In contrast, if an individual's identity complexity is low, that is, they prefer small groups with little overlap to other identity groups, they tend to hold more reserved attitudes toward immigrants.

These complex identities are in competition with each other; that is, some predominant identity, for example, one based on religion, culture, nation or class, can drown other affiliations, while strengthening in-group solidarity. The predominance of one identity also reduces sympathy toward "outsiders," increases distance between groups and can lead to conflict and violence. At the same time,

distinctions between local cultures and other smaller differences are given less attention or even forgotten altogether because people are identified strongly by the predominant identity. This is why, for example, second or third generation "immigrants" can be characterized as an outgroup based on ethnicity, language or religion, even if they are, in fact, born citizens of the country (Sen, 2006).

When it comes immigration attitudes, an individual can *rank* identities in many different ways. If one has an ethno-cultural view of national identity, and believes that ethnic background, language and religion are the most important parts of national identity, they are more prejudiced and oppose immigration more vigorously than people who emphasize civic conceptions of identity, such as citizenship (Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). As an example, if one considers that a person has to be born in Finland, speak Finnish and be Christian to be considered Finnish, they are more likely to hold anti-immigration views than people who maintain that citizenship is the most important indicator of being Finnish.

Changes in feelings of threat to physical safety can also influence attitudes toward immigration. According to Rydgren (2008), anti-immigration parties often present immigration, not as leading to peaceful coexistence, but as a source of increasing criminality and social unrest. In some cases, immigrants, especially asylum seekers, can even be seen as potential terrorists or other extremists, who threaten to cause severe damage to the majority population (Laughland-Booÿ et al., 2015). If one perceives this to be true, increasing immigration can lead to a decreased sense of safety and more reserved attitudes (Homola & Tavits, 2017). Overestimating the share immigrants constitute of the general population is also associated with feelings of threat posed by immigrants (Herda, 2010), i.e., those who feel more physically threatened by immigrants also tend to overestimate the size of ethnic minority groups.

2.2 Contextual-level determinants of attitudes toward immigration

After the introduction to studying immigration attitudes, I turn to the main topic of this dissertation: living environments' influence on public opinion. Social context has been shown to be a key factor in predicting public opinion on various issues and political action, including voting (Gravelle, 2016; Huckfeldt, 1979; Pattie & Johnston, 2000; 2016; Walks, 2004). When it comes to attitudes toward immigration, researchers began to notice that similar patterns regarding individual determinants within different contexts persevered, while differences in measured attitudes remained. For example, an analysis could show that more educated people view immigration in a more positive way in contrast to less educated people in both

context A and context B, but at the same time, show that the same highly educated people are more pro-immigration in context A than in context B. This has led researchers to focus on variables beyond the individual when explaining their attitudes. It must be made clear that people with different values, views and policy preferences naturally live in each context; however, the share of people holding different attitudes differs when moving from one place to another. Analyses on the significance of residential context mostly point to a clear conclusion: people living in larger cities are in general more pro-immigration than people living in smaller municipalities (see Jaakkola, 2009; Maxwell, 2020).

These results regarding the size of the municipality in determining immigration attitudes likely reflect numerous different underlying tendencies and societal patterns. For example, cosmopolitan orientations are most present in large cities and anti-cosmopolitanism is strongest in small towns, villages, and the countryside (Cramer, 2016; Lichter & Ziliak, 2017). This suggests that people living in large cities can be more open to change and are more likely to welcome new influences from cultures other than their own, while people living in the countryside are in general keener to preserve national culture and are warier of profound changes to their traditional lifestyles. One explanation could be that a larger city offers numerous and diverse contacts, exposure to unfamiliar ways of life and different cultures, while the influences in a municipality with a smaller population are likely to be fewer in number, more homogeneous and more familiar.

This urban–rural divide can also be reflection of socio-economic differences between different contexts. For example, some studies (see Jaakkola, 2009; Maxwell, 2019; 2020) have found that the population composition of large cities and small municipalities differs significantly; with young, highly educated people and immigrant groups becoming increasingly likely to reside in urban areas, while rural areas are characterized by an aging and ethnically more homogeneous population. Therefore, it is possible that the observed differences in immigration attitudes between residents of large cities and smaller towns and villages are mainly a byproduct of much larger societal changes, which result in different population groups becoming increasingly segregated.

This debate regarding the explanatory power of residential context and population composition is an important one, but not the main focus of the research problem proposed here. Here, the two concepts work as useful illustrations of the ways context can be interpreted in analyses concerning attitudes toward immigration. However, in fact, the distinction between the two is not necessary for analysis, as they are both incorporated into the concept of the neighborhood effect. Before moving on to a definition for this, I first turn to the importance of carrying out analysis on a smaller spatial scale, compared to the urban–rural divide mentioned above.

In addition to the urban–rural divide, analysis concerning the significance of residential area and living environment in explaining immigration attitudes can be carried out on many different geographical scales. Past studies have focused on larger geographical units, for example, comparison between countries, regions, census tracts, postal code areas, electoral districts or municipalities, and also on smaller, more local levels, such as neighborhoods or prison wards (see Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Goldman & Hopkins, 2020; Gravelle, 2016; Ha, 2010; Maxwell, 2019; 2020; Taylor, 1998). Of these, the ones concentrating on larger areas have been more numerous, which has raised some criticism. According to Abrams and Fiorina (2012), a focus on large geographical units actually impedes the ability to analyze the significance of one's surroundings in their opinion formation. The root of the shortcoming of these analyses can be drawn from Walter Tobler's (1970, 236) first law of geography: "everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things." What this means for opinion formation is that, even though things happening in the distance, for example, somewhat far away from one's place of living but still within one's home country or province, matter, things happening nearby, like in one's own neighborhood, matter even more. Also, people are more likely to have contact with those who are geographically closer than with those who are distant (see McPherson et al., 2001). Even though advances in technology have reduced the effect of physical distance, they have not eliminated it. Therefore, when it comes to either the compositional or contextual effect — or both — the living environment has on the development of public opinion, more emphasis should be put on the immediate surroundings than on the wider context. Local-level data and analysis allows for the drawing of more valid conclusions than analysis focusing on differences between larger geographical areas, which automatically includes more diverse living environments within single units.

The neighborhood effect (see Miller, 1977; Sampson et al., 2002.) comprises of two interlinked processes. First, studies have found that people with similar life situations, backgrounds and economic circumstances tend to — both knowingly and unknowingly — move into the same kinds of areas (see Cox, 1969; Miller 1977; Pattie & Johnston, 2000; 2016). This development results in *residential segregation*, an uneven distribution of different social groups in separate parts of the same city. The segregation happens in numerous overlapping social and economic levels (Young, 2000). The second process linked to the neighborhood effect is that the context itself influences the attitudes, views and political actions of those living in the same area. It has been found that living environments can influence political views on different issues, party preferences, voting choices, relationships with other groups and also the probability to engage in other forms of political participation (Gravelle, 2016; Huckfeldt, 1979; McPherson et al., 2001; Pattie & Johnston, 2000; 2016; Walks, 2004).

Here, the focus is a particular set of political opinions, attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, I maintain that the neighborhood effect can work in three different — but not necessarily exclusive — ways that have a contextual dimension as well as a compositional dimension, although to different extent. First, a person's views can be affected by interacting with other people living in their neighborhood. As a result of deepening residential segregation, these interactions are mostly among like-minded people, which in turn increases in-group consolidation, and even triggers reserved sentiments toward out-groups. This view is mostly adopted from electoral and political geographers (see Pattie & Johnston, 2016). Two other ways that living environment can influence immigration attitudes are more specific to this field of study in particular. Regarding the influence of different living environments on attitudes toward immigration, studies have largely focused on ethnic diversity. This has led to two influential but often contrasting theories on how the ethnic diversity of a neighborhood can affect public opinion on immigration: the contact and threat theories (see Allport, 1954; Bobo, 1999; Hopkins et al., 2014; Key, 1949). Beyond the influence on what is understood in this study as attitudes toward immigration, theories of inter-group contact and threat also contribute to how actual geometric distance, that is, how far apart groups live from each other, influences feelings of social distance toward "others", and how that may maintain as well as exacerbate residential segregation. This is discussed further in later parts of this chapter. Before I present these three theories in turn, there is a need to discuss the root cause of all of these theories, i.e., residential segregation, in more detail.

2.2.1 Residential segregation

Residential segregation gives social meaning to urban space. It happens when people cluster together according to differences in various affinities, like wealth, religion, ethnic background, culture, or way of life. This results in the overrepresentation of some demographic groups in one residential area, while other groups are underrepresented (Gottdiener & Hutchinson, 2011; Rasinkangas, 2013; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Young, 2000). Racial segregation is heavily associated with North American cities, but the phenomenon is not isolated to that region. The same has been observed in other parts of the world: New Zealand, Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden (Young, 2000), and in Finnish cities as well (Kauppinen & Vaalavuo, 2017; Rasinkangas 2013; 2014).

There is one important note to be mentioned concerning residential segregation and demographic characteristics. Even if some residential areas are highly dominated by certain groups and have an identity based on these dominant groups, i.e., Jewish, African American, gay, senior, etc., the areas can still, statistically speaking, be hybrids. That is, a neighborhood identity based on a certain characteristic does not

mean that the area cannot be demographically heterogeneous. This is because people naturally have numerous parallel group identities; for example, a senior member of the population can be from a different social, economic and ethnic background than other members. Therefore, describing a neighborhood as segregated by just one group identity, for example, that it is dominated by elderly people, is, for one, a bit misleading, but also, not a social problem. What is concerning, however, is that in many cases an appearance of one group identity is often accompanied with another; that is, many residential characteristics are correlated. Therefore, for example, residential segregation among ethnic lines is often followed by economic and social segregation (Young, 2000).

Residential segregation is both a *result* of social and economic segregation and inequality, but also a *cause* of such. Throughout history, there have been instances where residential segregation has been planned and carried out forcibly by the governing authorities, like in the case of clustering of people of Jewish religion in certain parts of cities and preventing them from fully interacting with the rest of the population. In liberal societies, however, residential segregation is not enforced, but created by countless "innocuous or self-deceiving acts" happening at the same time (Young, 2000, 227). According to several studies (see Cox, 1969; Miller, 1977; Müller et al., 2018; Walks, 2006), most people are quite selective when choosing where to take up residence. People's choice of living environment is affected by their life situation, values, personal preferences regarding pastimes, and economic circumstances, such as education, occupation and income. In addition, many also prefer to live in areas that are populated by others like themselves, whether ethnically, economically or socially, or actively seek to live near their families or friends. People tend to end up living in areas dominated by people with similar backgrounds, life situations and other characteristics. Therefore, residential segregation can be seen partly as a voluntary phenomenon, originating from a huge number of seemingly unimportant individual choices made within individual economic limits, which can together lead to huge differences at the population level.

Still, there are other informal reasons for residential segregation. According to Young (2000, 199–200), ethnic segregation cannot be solely explained by economic factors or freedom of choice when choosing where to settle. Instead, segregation in the US is produced and maintained by legal and illegal discrimination by landlords, homeowners, real estate agents and banks, but also by those looking for a new place of residence. These are pervasive structural factors, and although Young (2000; see also Pager & Shepherd, 2008) attributes these to the US context, there is little reason to believe that the processes in question are confined solely within its borders. For example, Ahmed et al. (2010) have made similar findings regarding discrimination by landlords in the housing market in Sweden, while in their analysis concerning ethnic avoidance in Sweden, Müller et al. (2018) found that people are ethnically

selective when choosing a neighborhood to move into. They show that the majority population tends to avoid ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, and therefore, most newcomers to these areas are other immigrants. There is also a considerable amount of literature concerning ethnic flight, selective out-migration of white people from ethnically more heterogeneous neighborhoods, when it comes to causes of residential segregation (see, for example, Krysan, 2002). However, in terms of the neighborhood effect, the separation between ethnic avoidance and ethnic flight is an unimportant one, as they can be seen as a result of the same phenomenon, i.e., prejudiced attitudes, and as contributing to the same process, that is, residential segregation.

Residential segregation also maintains and amplifies existing inequalities. Partly these are a continuation of economic differences, as many immigrant groups have been found to not share living environments with the wealthiest segments of the majority population (Semyonov & Glikman, 2009), but there are other developments as well. Residential segregation can be linked to, uneven development in infrastructure and unequal access to job markets and education. Regarding education, even in a country like Finland, where basically all children go to public schools, there can be notable differences in the way these schools operate and perform. Further, because the elementary school a child is sent to is mostly determined by the neighborhood in which they reside, residential segregation has a significant impact on the education children receive. If these developments extending to almost all aspects of social life escalate, they can lead to amplification and reproduction of social inequalities and problems, such as concentrated poverty and increased violence and other forms of crime (Müller et al., 2018; Sampson et al., 2002.). Residential segregation has negative consequences that are linked to social cohesion, the principle of equality and freedom of societal participation. Residential segregation can produce and reinforce structures of privilege and disadvantage, but also obscure the privilege that some enjoy from the very ones that have it (Young, 2000). Because residential segregation can also create as well as maintain social distance between groups (Fossett, 2006), it impedes political communication and makes addressing the wrongs of segregation through democratic political action difficult (Young, 2000).

2.2.2 In-group consolidation

The first way a segregated living environment can influence individual attitudes toward immigration explored here is through in-group consolidation. The way this concept is used in this study derives in part from theories regarding group polarization (see, for example, Schkade et al., 2010; Sunstein, 2002, 2009) in the field of deliberative democracy as well as from the work of political and electoral

geographers (see, for example, Pattie & Johnston, 2000; 2016) and the concept of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). To my knowledge, there seems to be very little explicit linkage between these strands of research literature. It is true that their focus differs to some extent; while theories of group polarization aim to explain how speaking with like-minded connects in-group members and places barriers between groups, political geographers account for how and why people who talk together, act together in politics and social life. In the end, however, both analyze the same topic: opinion change due to interacting with other people living close by and occupying the same, often homogeneous, networks.

By *in-group consolidation*, I mean being in frequent contact with like-minded people, while being less exposed to views from "the other side." This kind of in-group interaction, happening in enclaves of like-minded people, can result in group polarization of attitudes (Sunstein, 2009). The core assumption presented here is that people generally have a habit of interacting with people like themselves (Mutz, 2008), which is why contact with similar people is more likely than with dissimilar people (McPherson et al., 2001). This principle is known as *homophily*. Likewise, people favor arguments and evidence that support their existing views, while placing less weight on those that contradict them (Homola & Tavits, 2017). According to McPherson et al. (2001, 415-416), "by interacting only with others who are like ourselves, anything that we experience as a result of our position gets reinforced." It can be expected that when common worldviews, skewed information, like policy preferences and shared attitudes come together on a regular basis, individual attitudes are shaped accordingly. For example, if a person holding at least somewhat positive sentiments concerning immigration spends their days in an environment where the majority of other people hold cosmopolitan views, and interacts with other people in that area, their opinion is likely to change in an even more positive direction. Similarly, a person holding a negative attitude toward immigration, in an area where the dominant attitude is anti-cosmopolitan, would likely develop a more negative attitude themselves. This can result in *group polarization*, which happens when as a group people hold more extreme positions than any of them would as an individual (Sunstein, 2009).

According to Sunstein (2002, 2009) group polarization is related to several problems of enclave deliberation. In groups of like-minded people, presented arguments and information are biased in one direction. Also, arguments are often voiced in a setting that is characterized by social acceptance-seeking within the group and group pressure from other members. This results in changes in factual beliefs, and significant misconceptions may develop because of the absence of contrary evidence. Furthermore, this causes attitudes to further shift into more extreme positions, though the general view concerning the matter rarely changes. The influence of the dominant attitudes goes beyond the like-minded. If the pressure

from the majority view is strong enough, it can encourage certain forms of thinking and action while discouraging others, which can cause the ideological minority to convert to the dominant view (Pattie & Johnston, 2000).

As a result of developments leading to residential segregation, information networks are at least partly localized (McPherson et al., 2001). Coming into contact with a constant and inescapable circulation of spatially defined and often skewed information creates pressure toward group polarization. Even though analyses of causal processes have been in part restricted by available data (see Maxwell, 2020), the neighborhood can influence people's attitudes and preferences through several intertwined processes (Books & Prysby, 1991; see also Pattie & Johnston, 2016; Walks, 2006). People can gain information through personal observation and experiences. This means that, as people live their daily lives, they observe what is happening in their surroundings and naturally start to shape an image of how it is like to live in the given environment. They form opinions on, for example, what they like and do not like about their home neighborhood, or what changes are taking place? Second, people engage in informal interpersonal interaction with their friends, neighbors, family members and others living in the same area. Through this interaction, information and sentiments about the home neighborhood can be exchanged. For example, one can complain about the increased noisiness and suspicious activity taking place in the neighborhood, which has caused them to feel insecure, while another can praise the liveliness of the very same area. These are mundane, everyday bits of small talk, but when combined together, they can offer cues that shape attitudes and action.

The same kind of interpersonal interaction can also take place in voluntary associations. This kind of organization-based and structured interaction can happen in places that usually have spatially defined membership or attendance, for example, clubs, sports activities, religious communities, schools, kindergartens, etc. The importance of these organizations depends on the context. In some living environments, it can be that a church, synagogue or mosque forms the main meeting place for residents in the area, while in some places, the same role can fall on the school, which can become a meeting point for the parents living in the neighborhood as well as the children. Finally, people can obtain local information and political cues from the media, both traditional and social. For example, many newspapers and radio networks with spatially defined circulation frequently report on local happenings. Also, if a local event gets a lot of national coverage, it can be the talk of the neighborhood for a long time. Even though social media can, in many cases, be an accessible, easy and cheap way to obtain a lot of information about distant things, it offers many additional ways to follow local news and rumors, and opportunities to take part in different kinds of events. Neighborhoods, even single apartment buildings and organizations with spatially concentrated membership, often have their

own social media channels, where people can share their experiences, worries and views about the local area and its happenings. (Books & Prysby, 1991; Pattie & Johnston, 2016; Walks, 2006.)

2.2.3 Threat theory

Studies on the effects of living environment on the majority's attitudes toward immigration have largely focused on *ethnic diversity*. Ethnic diversity can be conceptualized both broadly and narrowly: as a concentration or polarization of ethnic groups and other things related to ethnic composition in different settings, or just as fractionalization of different ethnic groups (Dinesen et al., 2019, 2; see also Hewstone, 2015). Here, I adopt the first conception, maintaining that residential segregation in ethnic terms means that different minority groups are more likely reside in neighborhoods with a large concentration of people from the same ethnic origin or from other ethnic origins. Therefore, it is not the number of different ethnic groups that is important; rather, it is the proportion of the population that the immigrant groups constitute that determines ethnic diversity. The larger the share of "strangers" in a neighborhood, the more ethnically diverse it is conceived as being. It has been suggested, however, that attitudes are actually influenced more by the *perceived* size of the immigrant groups than actual numbers (Steele & Perkins, 2019). This perceived size is subjective, and estimations about these numbers have been found to be greater among people with anti-immigration views than people with more welcoming attitudes toward immigrants (Herda, 2010; Sides & Citrin, 2007, 494), which makes it a hard variable to measure. Because of this, most studies are based on actual numbers to portray ethnic diversity.

The focus on ethnic diversity in nearby living environment has led to the development of *theory of inter-group threat* (see Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999). In general, socio-psychology has demonstrated that trust and solidarity prosper in a homogenous environment, while more heterogeneity reduces trust, capacity for cooperation and support for collective action (Stolle et al., 2008, 71). A high level of ethnic diversity in an area can have negative short-term effects on social capital and decrease the will to cooperate, the levels of trust, adoption of civic virtues and support needed for collective action concerning welfare programs among the majority population (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002; Costa & Kahn, 2003: Putnam, 2007). It must be made clear that reduced trust or lack of support for collective actions does not necessarily mean open hostility between groups. Rather, it just means withdrawing from collective life: less volunteering and participation in common matters, giving less to charity, having less faith in one's ability to make a difference, and generally more distrust between neighbors (Putnam, 2007). This kind of distrust

is, however, reflected in general the atmosphere, and it contributes to the formation of attitudes toward immigration.

As Enos (2014) has demonstrated, negative attitudes toward immigration can arise even if the demographic change is quite minor, if it is still visible enough to be perceived. In general, however, attitudes of the majority population are expected to become even more prejudiced and exclusionary toward immigrants if the demographic change is profound. As outlined in Section 2.1, there are numerous reasons why an ethnically more diverse environment can result in more reserved attitudes toward immigration. These can be related to both the perceived economic and social impacts of immigration. The group threat theory proposes that an implicit or explicit challenge from the immigrants to the dominant group's position acts as a catalyst for prejudice and negative attitudes. The challenge can come in economic form, for example, in competition over scarce resources like jobs or social security (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958), or in cultural form, for example, in the case of perceived threat to national identity (Gorodzeisky, 2013, Hopkins et al., 2016). It is also proposed that a more sizeable and visible minority can be seen as a more severe opponent, politically. The rationale here is that if the immigrant population becomes larger in size, they constitute a more potential electoral force, which could impact the political and societal development of the receiving country through the democratic process (Blalock, 1967). In some cases, it can be that a more ethnically diverse living environment results in a decreased sense of safety and amplified fear concerning rising crime rates (Homola & Tavits, 2017).

In addition, a more ethnically heterogeneous living environment has been linked to increased innumeracy, that is, an overestimation of the immigrant population (Sigelman & Niemi, 2001). This suggests that in neighborhoods where the probability and frequency of encountering ethnic minorities is higher, residents tend to think that their own living area — and also the country as a whole — is more ethnically diverse than it actually is. This is especially true for the segments of the majority population who view immigrants as more of a threat (see Herda, 2010; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Therefore, innumeracy as a larger phenomenon is not random, nor is it simply caused by "innocent mistakes" or a lack of knowledge. Rather, it is highly associated with immigration attitudes in general. This proposes a potentially interesting development, where high ethnic diversity in local environment amplifies innumeracy, which in turn affects perceptions about the size of minorities both at the local level and the national level. This, in turn, can even strengthen feelings of inter-group threat. The exploration of this development is, however, not carried out here as the dissertation's analyses are based on actual size of minority groups, not perceived size.

2.2.4 Contact theory

Even though *theory based on inter-group contact* is often viewed as a contrast to threat theory, at its core, it is not focused on ethnic diversity, but rather on inter-group relations. These relations, however, are not as easily measured as residential composition or ethnic diversity. Therefore, when operationalized, demographic composition has become the established and most utilized proxy for inter-group contact (see, for example, Hewstone & Schmid, 2014; Lieberson, 1981; Martinovic, 2013). While it is true that the diversity measured might not reflect the actual experiences of people living in an area (Stolle et al., 2008) there is some evidence that an increase in minority size leads to more inter-group contact (Hewstone & Schmid, 2014). Therefore, ethnic diversity is often interpreted as a measure of the probability of inter-group interaction, meaning that interaction between different ethnic groups is more likely in more ethnically heterogeneous living environments. When testing for the theory of inter-group threat in this study, I adopt the same position.

Originally advanced by Allport (1954), inter-group contact theory proposes that relations between different ethnic groups are a way to both reduce prejudices among individuals and lessen ethnic conflict among groups. Inter-group contact is defined as ‘‘face-to-face interaction between members of clearly defined groups” (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 754). If one expects this kind of contact to reduce prejudice, negative stereotyping, social distance between the majority population and immigrants, and conflict between these two groups, the contact must involve equal status, common goals and cooperation between parties, and have institutional support (Allport, 1954, Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In addition, the contact must be meaningful, frequent, and close, developing into what Rydgren (2008, 756-757) calls “true acquaintance.” In fact, shallow and casual contact can have an adverse effect, where negative stereotypes are reinforced instead of dissolved (Hjerm, 2009, 49). When the probability and frequency of inter-group contact is operationalized through ethnic diversity, contact theory supposes that, in time, attitudes would become more positive in more ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, while remaining negative — or developing in a more prejudiced direction — in areas that are ethnically homogeneous.

Even though this view, where local ethnic diversity is utilized as a proxy for inter-group interaction, forms the basis for the analyses carried out in the original publications, and this is justifiable based on other similar research designs, it is still necessary to maintain that this approach is not unproblematic. A meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) highlights the importance of meeting the conditions for ideal contact first outlined by Allport. They conclude that studies in which measured contact met these optimal terms of equal status, common goals and will for cooperation, “achieved a markedly higher mean effect size” in terms of reduced

prejudice through inter-group contact. Therefore, even though optimal conditions are not necessary for the reduction of prejudice altogether, and favorable attitudes toward immigration can develop even without them, they seem to have an amplifying role.

2.2.5 Interlinked theories

As can be seen from the two previous subsections, both theories of inter-group threat and contact have received much attention and notable support for their assumptions. The debate between the two is both old and ongoing. As mentioned previously, at first glance the theories seem to be in contrast with each other, because in their very basic form they hypothesize different results for an increase in local ethnic diversity when it comes to attitudes toward immigration and feelings of social distance between groups. This is not, however, the case, as the two theories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they exhaustive when it comes explaining how immigration attitudes are influenced by local context.

It can be that both threat and contact theory are verified at the same time, but on different geographical scopes. Kaufman and Harris (2015; see also Ha, 2010; Kaufman & Goodwin, 2018) present that the research literature on the subject so far seems to indicate that prejudice is lessened in smaller geographical units, like neighborhoods or wards, when ethnic diversity increases. However, the adverse is true in larger areas, for example, at the municipal level or above. Although this is not a complete meta-analysis, the proposed pattern is visible. A possible explanation for this is the increased likelihood of prejudice reducing contact at the local level, while meaningful inter-group interaction at larger levels is quite impossible. Or can one explain what face-to-face contact at the national level even means? It is certainly not personal or close, unless happening online, which basically removes the whole spatial dimension from the analysis. Therefore, contact theorists claim that only smaller geographic scales offer opportunities for inter-ethnic contact to reduce perceptions of threat found in the majority population. For example, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) provide an encompassing meta-analysis that confirms the causal relationship from contact to favorable inter-group attitudes. If we take this causal relationship into account, the extensions of inter-group contact theory mean that an increase in local outgroup size also increases local opportunities for inter-group contact, which in turn lead to more favorable attitudes in areas with more immigrants. When it comes to the heightened prejudice observed in larger geographical areas when ethnic diversity increases, it seems that the shallow contacts or complete lack of interaction can even further fuel anti-immigration sentiments and feelings of increasing social distance between groups. Across larger distances, it is harder to form friendships or deeper acquaintances that would create inter-group

trust and group-bonding social capital (see, for example, Mutz, 2006; Putnam, 2000; 2007), while the negative effects of immigration on receiving countries and the symbolic or economic threat can still be observed, for example, through media and political debate.

Also, it can be that both theories are true on the same geographical scope, but at different periods and in different time frames. Hopkins (2011, 523) found "that contextual effects are influenced by the national political environment." Therefore, if anti-immigration rhetoric is common in the public debate of the day on a national level, growing ethnic diversity in local environment can be seen as more of a threat. In the absence of such anti-immigration rhetoric, the result could be different. It can also be that trust and support for collective action are reduced and attitudes become more reserved in the short run due to the growing threat felt by the majority as the size of immigrant population increases. However, in time, as people have more meaningful and frequent contact with members from other groups, this development can reverse itself (Putnam, 2000; 2007; Rydgren, 2008).

Third, both theories can be true in similar time frames and the same spatial scale, but for different individuals. It is possible that within the same spatial context some members of the majority are threatened by a growing local immigrant population and develop very anti-immigration views, while others, due to the additional chances for doing so, engage in meaningful contact with the immigrants, and as a result, their prejudices are alleviated (Homola & Tavits, 2017; Pichler, 2010). For example, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 764) propose that inter-group interactions come more naturally and easily for members of the majority who are more open to change, for example, students. Following this logic, forming friendships or other meaningful relations with immigrants can be harder for the elderly, due to various reasons. This can be because, for example, older people have narrower language skills, they do not spend time in the same places as immigrants, and in general, they lack interaction opportunities provided by schools, universities and workplaces.

When it comes to competition over scarce resources, like jobs, it has been argued that more educated people and women are less threatened by a growing local immigrant group than men, less educated and unemployed people, because of their less vulnerable position in the labor market (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Hjerm, 2009). Political orientation and party preferences also play a role. It has been found that contact with immigrants reduces immigration-related fears and feelings of threat among leftist voters, while there is no such effect among rightist voters (Homola & Tavits, 2017). Elsewhere, it has been found that those on the political right are more likely to react negatively to perceived local inter-group threat (Hopkins, 2014). There is also evidence that one's own ethnic background is associated with how one reacts to an ethnically heterogeneous or homogeneous living environment (Ha, 2010). This list of examples is far from exhaustive, but it helps illustrate that personal

circumstances matter considerably when it comes to confronting the immigrant population in a local context, and how it shapes individual attitudes.

Lastly, it is possible that both theories are true at the same time and in the same geographical area, but for different outgroups. For example, Markaki and Longhi (2012) found that people hold more reserved attitudes for non-EU immigrants than immigrants from within the EU, and are most strongly opposed to immigrants with low qualifications in the job market. On the other hand, Citrin and Sides (2008, 50) found that the rise in proportion of non-Western immigrants does not result in more prejudiced attitudes, although they also found a weak link between increasing ethnic diversity and anti-immigration views. Still, several studies report findings highlighting the significance of outgroups (see Ha, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, 233), which suggests that even though prejudices can be "blind" (see Sniderman et al., 2004), they may not be blind to the same extent.

Even though theories regarding group polarization have not been a part of this debate between threat and contact theory, they fit in "naturally" to compliment these two. Theories of group polarization and in-group consolidation suggest that other effects, whether compositional or contextual, can be amplified as a result of coming into contact with skewed information and political cues that are slanted toward one direction at the expense of contrary views. Therefore, with the spatial differences in information, residential segregation can lead to creation of "echo chambers" that, in turn, form clusters or "pockets" of individuals with similar attitudes. Incorporating these theories together has an advantage of giving us a more complete picture about the ways living environment can influence individual attitudes.

2.3 Individual-level determinants of attitudes toward immigration

In this section, I outline the main individual-level determinants of attitudes toward immigration used in this study as well as some of the most notable ones used elsewhere. These determinants are not to be mistaken for explanations for individual attitudes; for example, no one views immigration positively just because they are of a young age. Rather, these patterns help us understand how attitudes vary between different individuals and groups, and therefore, they should be interpreted more as propositions or population-level relationships between attitudes and different characteristics. So, the assumption could be that young people are, in general, for various reasons, more open to immigrants and supportive of cosmopolitan values and views than old people. The second important clarification that needs to be made is that these patterns only describe public attitudes in general, so, even though young people on average view immigration more positively, than older people, there are considerable variations in attitudes inside both groups.

2.3.1 Individual-level determinants used in this study

Among all the predictors of positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in general, young age is one of the most commonly observed (see, for example, Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Clawson & Oxley, 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pichler, 2010). Studies have shown that young adults tend to be more tolerant of immigration and are more willing to engage in personal and frequent contact with immigrants than older people. This can be for numerous reasons: perhaps closer social contact comes more naturally to young people, as Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 764) propose, or it can be that the "perception of threat to national identity is more prevalent among […] older people," as Gorodzeisky (2013, 808) found. Nevertheless, this pattern raises the question of whether the effect of young age is because of the age itself — proposing that while young people might be more cosmopolitan in their orientation in general, this trend can be reversed when the person ages — or because of differences between generations. No conclusive answer to this question is found in the literature, as longitudinal analysis remains rare, but there is some recent evidence to support the latter option. For example, Goldman and Hopkins (2020) suggest that when it comes to attitude formation, it is especially the experiences and influences obtained in youth and adolescence that matter, indicating that drastic changes in attitudes are unlikely to happen later in life. Elsewhere, Maxwell (2019) claims that differences between immigration attitudes are mostly caused by deep demographic divides that are noticeable quite early in a person's life, and that these attitudes do not necessarily change all that much when the person grows older. These results seem to highlight the importance of the so-called formative years, when people are most impressionable in attitude formation. Even though this evidence is far from conclusive, it is evident that, according to most studies, young age is a common predictor of pro-immigration attitudes in Western democracies, although this effect has not been observed in Eastern Europe to the same extent (see, for example, O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006).

The same can be said about gender, in that, while women have widely been observed as being more tolerant than men (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Hjerm, 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002), research is inconclusive to what the causal mechanism behind this result is. Hjerm (2009) suggests that this can be because women possess a less threatened position in the labor market in terms of competition over manual work-related jobs. Alternatively, it has been observed that men in general possess high levels of social dominance orientation, a desire for one's own group to possess a dominant position in the society, compared to women, which in turn is reflected in more restrictive attitudes toward minorities (see, for example, Bobo, 1999).

The evidence regarding education possesses similar patterns. First, numerous studies (Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Hjerm, 2009; Jaakkola, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pichler,

2010; Scheepers et al., 2002) have shown that high education, especially possessing a university degree, is a powerful predictor of pro-immigration attitudes. Second, as was the case with the two previously mentioned variables, the causal mechanism behind this finding remains unclear. It has been commonly proposed that the more reserved attitudes of less educated individuals are due to their more vulnerable position in the job market and due to the fact that they work in similar — mainly blue-collar — occupations to those of the main immigrant groups (see, for example, O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). However, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) found that people with higher levels of education are more positive toward immigration regardless of the skill sets or education levels of immigrants. This suggests that their sentiments toward immigration would not be negative even if the immigrants would pose a more serious challenge to them in the job market. Based on this finding, and the limited influence economic self-interest has been observed to have on individual attitudes concerning immigrants (see, for example, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), it would seem that higher education levels instead capture other aspects, linked to, for example, more openness to change and cosmopolitan ideology, which results in reduced prejudice and increased willingness to have more personal, frequent and close contact with minorities. There are even proposals that this finding, instead of capturing real sentiments of highly educated respondents, is due to the abstract nature of the questions presented to the respondents (Jackman, 1978) or higher social desirability bias among highly educated individuals (An, 2015).

2.3.2 Social distance and personal inter-group interaction

Personal inter-group contact can have significant influence on individual attitudes toward immigration. Several studies (see, for example, Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018; Jaakkola, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) show that personally knowing an immigrant is a significant determinant of pro-immigration attitudes. The closer the acquaintance, the more likely it results in favorable views concerning immigration. For example, if one has an immigrant as member of one's family, that person is more likely to have more positive views than those who have an immigrant as a coworker, who in turn are expected to have more favorable views than those who have no relationship at all with a member of an outgroup. In theory, this idea of interaction is often transmitted through the idea of social distance. There is an important note to be made in regard to how social distance is covered in this dissertation. Because there is no direct measure of interaction between the majority population and immigrants available in the data, social distance is not used as an independent variable. Therefore, it could have been grouped with all the other notable variables listed in the previous chapter. However, because the concept is

used as a dependent variable in one of the articles of this dissertation, it is explored a bit in more detail here, for the lack of better place.

The idea of *social distance*, first introduced by philosopher Georg Simmel (1950; see also Garcia & Murphy, 2015), proposes that the social interactions between two groups determine the social distance between them. Put on a scale, the social distance can vary from nonexistent to the point of assimilation between the groups. When social distance is small, there is a feeling of common identity, closeness, and shared experiences. Also, according to Putnam (2007, 159) "[s]ocial psychologists and sociologists have taught us that people find it easier to trust one another and cooperate when the social distance between them is less." When social distance between groups increases, relationships tend to lose their affective content or negative affections start to dominate the relationship. When social distance becomes great, people perceive and treat the other as belonging to a different "category" than their own (see, for example, Alba & Nee 2003, 32). When it comes to the institutional level, history shows that increased inter-group social distance has resulted more in the creation of barriers between groups, or even legitimized segregation and racial prejudices, than in the removing of barriers between groups, quelling intolerance or maintaining peaceful and equal coexistence of different social classes or ethnic groups (Garcia & Murphy, 2015).

In classic literature, it is suggested that there is a linear relation between distance and affectivity, and therefore social distance is treated more or less identical to affective distance (Bogardus, 1941). However, nowadays, social distance is seen to work in many interrelated dimensions simultaneously (see, for example, Karakayali, 2009, 540–543). First, social distance can be seen in a classic way, as affective distance. This conception proposes that those who are socially close to us are those we feel close to, and vice versa. This conception treats social distance essentially as a subjective category. This conception is adopted by, for example, Emory Bogardus, who continued much of the pioneer work carried out by Simmel. Bogardus promoted the meaning of mutual understanding and affectivity in decreasing social distance, i.e., "where sympathetic understanding is great, nearness exists'' (Bogardus, 1941, 106).

The rest of the dimensions of social distance can be interpreted more as being attributed to distance between groups rather than individuals. The second dimension interprets social distance as normative distance. According to this dimension of the idea, a social distance system can be seen as a set of collectively recognized norms about membership status in a group. These norms are then used to differentiate between ''us'' and ''them"' and to specify what are seen as acceptable relations with people belonging to either group. These divisions between groups can be based on the nature of the norms used to distinguish the groups from each other, and can be either clear-cut or muddled and contested, but either way, they affect the

relationships between individuals belonging to each group. Third, social distance can also capture interactive distance, that is, the frequency of the groups coming into contact with each other. Finally, social distance can be seen as cultural and habitual distance. This dimension focuses on cultural similarities and, for example, use of national, religious or cultural symbols. The goal is to map social groups on a multidimensional social space on the basis of the "capital" they possess (Karakayali, 2009). In practice, those groups that display common or at least somewhat like symbols, possess similar habits and perform rituals that are familiar to each other, and are mapped as being socially close, while those groups with different, unfamiliar or even strange sets of characteristics are judged as being more distant.

As I mentioned previously, social distance between two groups can vary between a complete lack of interaction to complete assimilation. When it comes to measuring social distance, the two extreme ends of this imagined scale are hardly important, as it seems unimportant to measure inter-group distance of two groups completely isolated from each other, or two groups that are perfectly assimilated to the point of becoming a single group. Between these two extreme ends, lie the interesting interactions, for example, working with members from other groups and forming inter-group friendships or family ties, or active avoidance of coworkers from groups perceived as being distant and "flight" from neighborhoods where ethnic diversity increases.

Emory Bogardus developed the first scale, namely the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, to provide measurable terms for the concept of social distance. Even today, the Bogardus scale (see Bogardus, 1925) remains the most used measure of inter-group social distance (Garcia & Murphy, 2015; Karakayali, 2009), and it is used as a base for measuring social distance in this study as well (see Section 3.2.4 and 4.2 for details). The scale includes a series of questions meant to measure the willingness of a person from one social group to have social contact with a person from a specified group different from the one to which they themselves belong. The original questionnaire consists of seven questions, which are treated as different levels of social contact, starting from more intimate relationship and ending with more distant contact. In the questionnaire, the respondent is asked whether they would be willing to interact with the members of outgroup in different ways: whether they would (i.) marry or accept as kin; (ii.) befriend; (iii.) live next door to or have as a neighbor; (iv.) accept as a coworker; (v.) permit as a co-citizen; (vi.) accept as a visitor in their country; or (vii.) not accept at all within the borders their country. The Bogardus Social Distance Scale is constructed to be "cumulative." This means that if a respondent answers ''yes'' to a question on any of the levels, this means that they will very likely answer "yes" to all questions that follow. For example, if one is willing to marry or accept as kin a person from the specified outgroup, they would be willing to also have a member from that same group as a friend, neighbor,

coworker and so on. Later, questions included in surveys measuring the Bogardus Scale have been revised and expanded (Ethington, 1997).

Social distance can be seen as being linked to both residential segregation and individuals' tendency to most likely connect with people like themselves. Although the relationship between social distance and geographic distance is complicated (see Bogardus, 1925; Ethington, 1997; Karakayali, 2009; Park, 1950), there are reasons to believe that spatial distance between groups can influence feelings of closeness between them. According to Ethington (1997), each of the seven response items in the original Bogardus Scale describes a distance that is both social and geographic, and in addition, the "cumulative" pattern of the scale applies to both these distances. For example, just like the social distance between a married couple is expected to be less than distance between friends, neighbors and co-workers, the same is true for actual spatial distance. Also, McPherson and others (2001, 418) found in their review of research concerning different relationships that "in general the patterns of homophily are remarkably robust over these widely varying types of relations." This means that spatial proximity as well as sharing similar networks heavily influence formation of interpersonal ties.

2.3.3 Other important variables: political ideology, party identification and economic circumstances

There are several other noteworthy variables that have been identified as influential in explaining differences in attitudes toward immigrants. While they cannot be included in this study, due to limitations in collected data, I still briefly mention them here. First, political orientation has been shown to influence attitudes toward immigration. In short, leftist political views are seen to make one more favorable toward immigration (Citrin & Sides, 2008; Homola & Tavits, 2017). The same is true for party identification. For example, Sanderson et al. (2021; see also Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014) found that, in the US, the gap between the attitudes of Democrat and Republican voters is widening; while the former are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, the same development is not noticeable among the latter. In Finland, those voting for the Finns Party have been shown to hold the most anti-cosmopolitan views among all voters (Borg, 2020).

Personal economic circumstances are an often-utilized individual-level factor in explaining differences in immigration attitudes. Especially feelings of economic insecurity have been seen to lead to more restrictive attitudes (Citrin & Sides, 2008). Especially unemployed citizens and people in traditional blue-collar jobs, both who can be perceived as being in direct competition with immigrants in the labor market, have been observed to harbor anti-immigration sentiments (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Semyonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2008). There is, however, considerable

disagreement about the extent that economic self-interest drives individual attitudes (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

This list is not an exhaustive one, as there are certainly other variables that have been used to explain differences in attitudes. Nevertheless, exercising caution is always advisable when interpreting the results of any analysis employing a mix of individual-level variables while excluding some. It is possible that some variables capture effects of variables that have actually been excluded. For example, in Finland men have been observed to constitute the main voter cohort of the anti-immigration party, the Finns Party (Borg 2011; 2020). The Finns Party is also popular among those whose level of income and education is relatively low, and among unemployed people (Westinen, 2016). Therefore, the statistical associations between independent variables like gender, education and personal economic circumstances, and the dependent variable, attitudes, could in part reflect the association between party affiliation and attitudes. This is just one example, but it helps to illustrate that it is possible that the connections chosen independent variables have on the dependent variable are indirect, transmitted by something that has actually been excluded, rather than direct.

2.4 Arguing for and against immigration

In this section, I move from immigration attitudes to immigration debate, and more specifically, *narratives* within that debate. It must be made clear that these two concepts are linked; that is, individual attitudes are considerably influenced by narratives people hear, and attitudes, in turn, determine which narratives an individual adopts and transmits further. Therefore, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (p. 19), theories concerning immigration attitudes reflect the content of the public debate on immigration. This section begins with a short introduction to narratives and why they are key to understanding how people experience the world around them. Then, I move to outline both the contents and "narrators" of the immigration narrative.

2.4.1 Immigration debate as a narrative

As previously mentioned, immigration is nowadays one of the most significant topics in the political agenda throughout Western Europe and North America. This is not coincidental, as the opportunity to frame the issue in a specific way, to introduce the themes and perspectives included in the debate concerning immigration and to present the alternatives available to deal with the issue are examples of discursive power. Framing the issue from a certain viewpoint, that is, selecting legitimate concepts and courses of action while discarding others

altogether, or emphasizing some perspectives or experiences at the expense of others, can have significant power over public opinion and electoral outcomes (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Narratives of immigration, therefore, are not produced, maintained or transmitted by chance. Instead, they are introduced to the public to politicize the issue from a selected point of view, and to influence individuals' views and action.

Using narratives as frames to approach an issue such as immigration can be seen as somewhat logical. Immigration as a concept, that is, a vast number of people moving from one place to another while crossing borders, is as old as the tradition of erecting those borders. Nobody invented or developed immigration as it is today; rather it is emergent, a product of countless linked functions, laws and principles, in addition to centuries of actions by hordes of actors in millions of seemingly separate events. When dealing with topics this vast, some form of interpretation and representation, but also simplification and selection, needs to happen. These histories usually take the form of a narrative, a coherent story with a beginning, middle and an end. Stone (1979, 13) describes that a narrative is constructed when material is organized chronologically, forming a single coherent story with a clear focus, theme and an argument. Reality does not itself possess a narrative (White, 1990), rather a narrative is a way to represent that reality. For example, when it comes to the physical world, people leave a country behind, for various reasons, and take residence in a new country, but in the human narrative we call this immigration. This is where we begin to see the differences between the mere sequences of events unfolding in the physical world and how they are experienced by humans (Carr, 1986).

Narratives help us to understand thought, ideas and discourse of spatially or temporally distant cultures. Barthes and Duisit (1975, 268-269) argue that narratives are translatable and reducible "without fundamental damage," in a way that a lyrical poem or a philosophical discourse is not (see also White, 1987). This means that narratives are easier to understand than original documents or ongoing discourses, which usually require context and issue-specific, nuanced knowledge. So, for example, it is simpler to understand a narrative about immigrants arriving on, say, a Greek island, the way the newcomers affect the people living there and what this means for the immigrants themselves, than to actually witness this whole process personally. The translatability and reducibility of narratives means that narratives can "travel" to far off locations and be understood there. However, even though there might not be "fundamental damage" inflicted, narratives and their transfer always involve some simplification in the complexity of real life. Single narratives, like particular descriptions and observations regarding immigration, are brought together to form a metanarrative: a grand story that covers long periods of time and wide, although mainly Western, themes. It is a narrative about narratives, giving a

structured story to human history by combining a massive number of single cases of thought, experience and human interaction. However, a metanarrative is no more than a form of (re)presentation and (re)description, a book about other books and a story that has already been told elsewhere. It is translated and reduced to the point that all context-specific nuances and peculiarities are removed from it. This results in simple, understandable and, in many cases, universal metanarratives dealing with the topic in a very general and broad manner. A metanarrative of this type can be, for example, that immigrants take job opportunities away from locals, or that they are a vital new workforce for the functioning of the labor market. These are just a few examples, but clearly illustrate that metanarratives are practically universal, i.e., they can be transferred to any particular context in the world.

Because of the narrative nature of immigration debate, immigration in practice is always encountered with some connotation, prejudice and background information. Therefore, the contents of immigration narratives are important, as public attitudes are heavily affected by elite discourse and partisan cues as well as by news coverage (Berry et al., 2016; Brader et al., 2008; Branton et al., 2011; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Herda, 2010; Hopkins, 2011). This means that people do not form their opinions concerning immigrants or their preferences concerning immigration policy purely from their own perspective, i.e., their own experiences and personal contact with others or their own position in the society and the job market, but to a great extent by listening to political leaders, experts and other individuals in positions of influence, and by following both local and national happenings through various news outlets.

2.4.2 The content and form of the immigration narratives

When it comes to immigration, there are numerous separate but interconnected narratives, all with different topics and arguments, and with different sources telling them. Still, despite the importance of immigration as a political topic and the prevalence of immigration narrative in society, it has been found that the debate concerning immigration can hardly be described as inclusive. In terms of content, however, it covers a wide variety of topics. According to Citrin and Sides (2008, 35; see also Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), the debate can be roughly separated into two distinct dimensions: economic and cultural. The economic consequences of immigration can be approached both from a collective and an individual perspective. Although immigrants can in some cases be seen as a possible solution to problems posed by aging populations and labor shortages in some economic sectors (Haavisto, 2019), immigration is usually viewed as a burden on national economies, mainly because of costs of integration and raising social benefit payments (Berry et al., 2016; Citrin & Sides, 2008). These claims often become emphasized in times of

economic downturn (Wilkes et al., 2008). In addition to national factors, immigration debates can also deal with individuals' fears of increased competition over scarce resources, such as jobs, or decreasing wage levels and distortions in the housing market (Berry et al., 2011; Citrin & Sides, 2008).

In contrast to the rather cleanly defined topics covered by the economy-leaning narratives, the cultural dimension captures a wide range of separate but often interlinked issues, such as the increasing perceived cultural threat posed by a growing outgroup, rising insecurity, intensifying criminal activity and international terrorism, and decreased community cohesion (Berry et al., 2016; Eberl et al., 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2018; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Narratives belonging to the non-economic category can also, in part, be about values and identity, both individual and collective (Sniderman et al., 2004).

Despite these seemingly varied topics, the discourse is characterized by technocratic tendencies and by elite domination. The media favors similar kinds of sources and interviewees repeatedly, reducing the chances of multiple actors and social groups to offer their perspectives and experiences, oppose or defend different views, pass off alternative courses of action or comment on policy proposals (Perälä & Niemi, 2018). Therefore, instead of having multiple voices, the debate is elite-dominated, carried out by politicians, journalists, researchers and other experts from, for example, think tanks and unions. At the same time, women, socio-economically less well-off citizens, and especially ethnic minorities themselves are underrepresented in the discourse (Balch & Balabanova, 2011; Berry et al., 2016; Eberl et al., 2018; Perälä & Niemi, 2018). Moreover, it is apparent that the metanarratives of immigration, whether focusing on the economic or cultural aspects of immigration, is much erected on confrontation, simplification, the dichotomy of "us and them" (Balch & Balabanova, 2011; Laughland-Booÿ et al., 2015; Perälä & Niemi, 2018), and the negative effects of immigration on receiving countries (Berry et al., 2016; Parker, 2015). For example, mass migration of refugees has both short-term and long-term costs and benefits, and depending on the perspective, one can stress their importance in different ways. The costs of processing the inflow of newcomers, providing food and shelter and so on appear right away, just as the benefits of saving and protecting lives of human beings. In the long-term, costs include paying either for the deportation or resettlement of refugees, while the potential can include economic, cultural, or political benefits to the receiving country. Still, these costs and benefits are hardly brought to light in a balanced manner and, in some cases, particular aspects are unintentionally or intentionally left out. The parts that are left out naturally depend on the narrator. For example, radical right-wing parties tend to frame refugees as problems because they are a threat to the national identity, a major cause of criminality and social unrest and abusers of the welfare state (Rydgren, 2008, 739). Cosmopolitan metanarratives, on the other hand,

rarely emphasize national concerns like this over the importance of human rights, a sense of responsibility and compassion toward others (see, for example, Appiah, 2006; Skrbis & Woodward, 2007).

Also, the metanarratives are heavily skewed, as they deal with refugees and asylum seekers much more than other forms of immigration (Eberl et al., 2018; Volmer & Karakayali, 2018). As discussed, immigration is merely an act of moving from one country to another, but perhaps unsurprisingly, this fact is not a central point of debates concerning immigration. Instead, public debates seem to be increasingly concentrated on some immigrant groups, for example, refugees and asylum seekers, at the expense of other forms of immigration. This can cause people to overestimate the share refugees actually constitute of the immigrant population (Sides & Citrin, 2007, 494; see also Citrin & Sides, 2008), causing confusion about directions in immigration policies and resulting in harmful generalizations about immigrants in general.

Finally, in the immigration discourse, national issues and large-scale consequences of immigration dominate at the expense of local experiences and effects (Hopkins, 2011). Even though immigration is a global phenomenon, its implication and impacts are felt in the everyday lives of ordinary people. Also, the practical work related to social integration and assimilation policies is carried out locally and takes place in the new living environment that immigrants adopt as their home. Still, even though some news stories of these local narratives emerge from time to time, mostly the grand narrative deals with impacts at the level of the nation state, whether they be economic or cultural.

Even though the focus of this dissertation is not deliberative mini-publics, and its specific research questions do not deal with the prospects of public deliberation in bringing about a more diverse and inclusive immigration debate, I discuss this possibility in brief in the conclusion. However, the point here is to illustrate that, at the current state, the public immigration debate is driven by skewed and hardly inclusive narratives, which are both recreated and maintained by elite and partisan actors. Local and ground-level voices are included, but they carry little weight. Therefore, at least to some extent, it seems that the role left for the "masses" in the immigration debate is to echo arguments, topics and views presented by the elite, which in turn can influence attitudes of the population.

2.5 Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to offer an introduction to the analysis of immigration attitudes and discussions concerning immigration. The literature review presented covers a number of individual- and contextual-level theories that try to explain immigration attitudes. Also, the most important determinants of immigration

attitudes, both contextual and individual, have been presented in this chapter. These can be summarized as follows (see Table 1 below).

Table 1. Key theories and variables used in the analysis concerning immigration attitudes.

	Individual level	**Contextual level**
Theories: why do people view immigration differently?	Xenophobic or racist tendencies Perceived impacts on individual economic situation Perceived impacts on national economy Perceived impacts to national culture and identity Perceived impacts on physical safety	**In-group consolidation** **Threat theory** **Contact theory**
Determinants: what characteristics explain differences in immigration attitudes?	Age Gender Education level Social interaction Political ideology Party identification Personal economic circumstances	**Clustering of people with similar backgrounds to same areas (compositional effect)** **Dominant attitude in the area (contextual effect)** **Ethnic diversity in residential areas**

The lists in Table 1 are not exhaustive. There are other theories related to explaining individuals' immigration attitudes and determinants used to measure and explain differences between views. However, these presented theories and variables provide ways to approach the analysis of immigration attitudes from different perspectives. The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze how context influences attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, the focus is at the contextual level, highlighted in Table 1.

The other area of interest is how people discuss immigration in facilitated small group discussions. These discussions most likely contain familiar narratives related to immigration that are touched upon in this chapter, many of which are universal in nature. The aim of the analysis is, naturally, to distinguish the most common narratives from the small group discussions. Of special interest is, however, what kind of local-level themes and experiences rise and to what extent argumentation contains context-specific, nuanced aspects. Therefore, the discussion analysis aims to separate local or national narratives attributed to the city of Turku and Finland, from the universal ones found in many other contexts. The next chapter of this dissertation presents the empirical research design, which has been utilized in the four original articles of this dissertation.

3 Empirical research design

This part of the dissertation is concerned with the empirical side of the research. Here, I introduce the data analyzed, as well as outline the methods that are used in this process. As stated previously, all survey and discussion data utilized in this dissertation originate from an experiment on deliberative democracy: Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves (see Grönlund, 2014). The first part of Section 3 delivers an overall look at deliberative mini-publics, and then moves on to describe the particular deliberative experiment that was carried out in Turku in the spring of 2012. I explain the purpose of the study, present the process that was carried out in order to recruit participants to the event and describe its program in short. I also give a short summary of how the experiment played out in terms of attitude development. Then, I introduce the reader to the survey and discussion data in more detail. Register data used in the analyses are also presented. The data were collected by Statistics Finland in 2012 for the City of Turku, and provided to the researchers by the City of Turku. This chapter ends with a methods section, in which I position this research within the field of political science and discuss some of the methodological choices that were made in the empirical analyses.

3.1 Case: Deliberation within and across enclaves

Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves was an experiment concerning deliberative democracy, and was held in Turku in the spring of 2012 (for more information on the experiment, see Grönlund et al., 2015). The aim of the experiment was to test theories of group polarization (Sunstein, 2009), i.e., how attitudes develop when discussing immigration in like-minded and mixed groups. For this reason, some changes to the standard recruitment process related to mini-publics as well as small group composition were made. However, in general, the event was organized to include many of the traditional characteristics of deliberative mini-publics. Therefore, this chapter begins with an overview of deliberative mini-publics and their central design features. Next, I present the recruitment process of mini-publics, as it is both important to the design of the experiment itself, as well to the survey data utilized in this study. Then, I summarize what happened in the actual event, from which the small group discussion data used in this dissertation originates.

3.1.1 Deliberative mini-publics

Deliberative democracy is based on the normative "ideal, in which people come together, on the basis of equal status and mutual respect, to discuss the political issues they face and, on the basis of those discussions, decide on the policies that will then affect their lives" (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 2). These discussions, which involve weighing and reflecting of issues from multiple viewpoints, are called *deliberation*, and therefore deliberative democracy can be described as "any practice of democracy that gives deliberation a central place" (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 2). Even if some principles concerning deliberation have been prevalent in democracies and theories of democracy from antiquity, public deliberation, and with it, collective will-formation and decision making, only started being considered to be an essential part of any democracy during the 20th century. Moreover, a distinct theory of deliberative democracy did not even exist until the end of the century (Elstub & McLaverty, 2004, 3–4). What started as a normative ideal has evolved into empirical research analyzing the effects of deliberation and deliberative bodies.

During the last two decades, deliberative democracy has concentrated much on *deliberative mini-publics*, which, at least currently, are seen as the best method to institutionalize deliberative democracy (Elstub, 2014). Origins of the concept go a bit further back in time, however. According to Dahl (1989, 340), there is a need for a mechanism that allows for the people to take part in making collective decisions because ageing political institutions may not always be suitable to meet the modern challenges they are faced with. He proposed an establishment of a "mini-populus", "consisting of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos." Its mission can be linked to agenda setting or alternatively to deliberation of one pre-selected issue on the agenda, about which, after a certain time period, a judgement regarding the matter is presented. In order to make an informed decision on the matter, a mini-public can hold hearings, invite specialists or administrative staff related to the issue to gather information, order research done on the subject and debate an issue. This "mini-populus" can function at any level of government, whether local, regional or national

Nowadays, there are different interpretations of this original idea, but a vast share of them include — and even highlight — the same aspects both in their definition and function. For Goodin (2008, 11), mini-publics are democratic innovations that are made up of ordinary, non-partisan, lay citizens. They are "designed to be groups small enough to be genuinely deliberative" while still being representative enough — or in case of smaller mini-public, at least demographically diverse — to be genuinely democratic and just. Ryan and Smith (2014, 20) categorize mini-publics as an "institution in which a broadly inclusive and representative sub-group of an affected population engage in structured deliberation enabled by independent facilitation." Also, a mini-public "is organized with the aim of aligning political

decision-making with the considered views of citizens." In addition, Setälä and Smith (2018, 301) stress the importance of (near) random sampling in selection of participants as a defining feature of mini-publics.

Mini-publics are usually issue-specific, with experts or information sheets providing insight into the subject and trained facilitators moderating the discussions (Grönlund et al., 2014, 1). Also, "they bypass the formal institutions of democracy" because they are not integrated into the system of representative democracy or government, they are not part of the regular political cycle in the life of a community, and "they do not involve protest, lobbying or obstruction" (Warren, 2009, 6). Deliberative norms are applied in the discussions through the enforcement of rules. These norms include respecting other people and their opinions, open-mindedness, listening and clear communication (see Smith, 2009, 86).

These attributes make them "protected" spaces that enable inclusive and representative groups of ordinary citizens to "coolly" deliberate, away from the pressures of everyday politics and influences caused by special interests (Ryan and Smith, 2014, 21). Still, mini-publics have the capacity to empower citizens because of (at least) two reasons. First, they provide an opportunity to form agendas and reflect participants' own interests, judgments and opinions in an environment that is free from pressures from daily life, such as media, family and friends. Second, due to the way experts are used in mini-publics, the forum also democratizes expertise (Smith, 2009, 88).

All of these definitions give importance to the employment of quasi-ransom sampling (Elstub, 2014; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Smith, 2009; Setälä & Smith, 2018), which resonates with Athenian democracy. The quasi-randomness means a mix between random-selection and special quotas to, on one hand, maintain legitimacy and fairness, and also to ensure inclusion of different viewpoints and a wide variety of perspectives, while still being aware of the fact that all recruitment processes are subject to some amount of self-selection. A more restrictive definition is given by Fishkin (2009), who states that only Deliberative polls® realize the democratic values of political equality and deliberation, as they come closest to "pure" randomness in sampling, and therefore they should be considered the only viable mini-public. In contrast, the most expansive definition is given by Fung (2003), who includes to the list of mini-publics examples such as traditional town hall meetings or participatory budgeting, among others, which can rely completely on self-selection in recruitment.

There are numerous different types of mini-publics (see, for example, Elstub, 2014; Setälä & Smith, 2018; Smith, 2009). Citizens' juries are numerically the smallest, typically including 12–24 participants. In a citizens' jury, participants collect and evaluate information and discuss for a period of time to come up with a collective statement regarding a subject. Consensus conferences also use external

advisors and have around the same number of participants. Contrary to citizens' juries, they are usually compromised of two separate stages: preparatory and decision making. Planning cells consist of around six to ten cells of about 25 persons. After expert-led lectures providing technical information, all the preferences across all the cells are surveyed and then compiled into a single report by the facilitators. This report then needs to be approved by all cells before being distributed to decision-makers. Deliberative polls® can hold 150–500 participants in multiple small groups. Here, the goal is not to reach a collective decision, but rather show what people think about the subject after deliberation. This considered view of the citizens is gathered through both pre-test and post-test surveys, between which there are expert briefings and small group deliberations. The last type of mini-public, a citizens' assembly, can last for a long period of time — a month or even a year. Citizens' assemblies consist of 100–160 randomly selected participants and usually include three phases: learning, consultation and deliberations in small groups. After deliberations, a vote is commonly used to decide the outcome for each group. Voting results are then passed to decision makers.

Mini-publics have been shown to effect citizens participating in them in various ways. Mini-publics can, for example, have educative effects, making people more knowledgeable about a particular topic, in addition to people learning about societal matters in general (see Fishkin, 2009; Setälä et al., 2010). Participating in a mini-public can also increase one's ability to see issues from others' perspectives and induce sympathy toward outgroups (see Grönlund et al., 2017; Luskin et al., 2014). During recent years, much of the research on deliberative mini-publics has dealt with how the internal effects of mini-publics could be expanded beyond them to the public at large, to representative institutions and the democratic system as a whole (see, for example, Bächtiger & Weggman, 2014; Niemeyer & Jennstål, 2018; Setälä, 2017).

It must be noted that when it comes to most design features, Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves can be described as a mini-public. The experiment consisted of small group discussions, in which norms of deliberation were upheld by independent facilitators trained for the task. The recruitment characteristics were according to the principles of quasi-random sampling, and participants were provided with material that included background information about immigration in Finland. There are, however, a couple of attributes of the event that can be used to define it as an experiment on group polarization, rather than a deliberative mini-public. These features are mostly linked to details of participant recruitment and small-group composition, which are presented in the following chapters.

3.1.2 Recruitment of participants

In order to recruit people to the deliberation experiment, consecutive surveys were used. In the first stage of the recruitment process (see also Grönlund et al., 2015), the initial recruitment survey (T1) in the research project was mailed out to a simple random sample of 12,000 adults in the Turku region in early 2012. A total of 8,090 of the individuals lived in the City of Turku, the rest in the surrounding municipalities. T1 was a fairly short survey, including only 14 items measuring respondents' immigration attitudes and a couple of questions related to socio-demographic characteristics. At the end, it included an item asking whether the respondent would be willing to be contacted again about the research project. At this time, there was no mention of a deliberative mini-public related to the topic. Of the Turku-based people in the sample, almost 39% (n = 3,273) responded to the survey, and nearly 70% (n=2,360) of these said that they could be contacted again. Not all of them were contacted again, however, as researchers excluded some individuals, whose views concerning immigration were too neutral to clearly posit them in either of the enclaves. In order to determine this, the answers to the 14 items in T1 were first coded onto a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 indicated the most immigration-friendly attitude. The combined index from the items therefore varied between 0 and 14. Both *pro* and *con* immigration enclaves were then formed by researchers: those whose answers' combined index value was below 6.7 constituted the con enclave, while those whose index value was over 8.3 formed the pro enclave. Moderates, whose index values were between these two cut off points were not sent the next survey (see Grönlund et al., 2015).

In the second stage, the T2 survey, which was considerably longer and more time consuming to fill out, was sent to 2,601 persons, of which 1,845 were residents of Turku. The T2 had 37 questions in total, and included questions concerning immigration views, democratic attitudes and different forms of political participation. With the survey form, the researchers included a cover letter, which informed the respondents about the discussion on immigration. Two possible dates for the discussion were given. In addition, the respondents were told that the discussion would take about five hours, it would take place in small groups and that there would be prizes for completing the research project (either a €90 gift certificate for participating in the discussion or a €15 gift certificate for sending back an additional survey, T5). The letter also explained that if they volunteered to take part, they might be, based on random selection, invited to the discussion or among the people asked to fill in an additional survey.

A total of 856 persons, of which 631 lived in Turku, responded to the T2 and only 44 and 22 of them, respectively, indicated that they would not be available to participate in the discussion. This group consisting of 812 persons was then randomized into two groups for the last stage of the recruitment: 366 were sent an

invitation to attend the discussion and the rest were assigned to the control group, from which the recipients of the T5 survey assigned for the control group would later be randomly selected. Both of these groups were divided roughly in half, into pro and con enclaves, according to their answers in T1. For example, of the invitees, 183 belonged to the pro enclave and 183 to the con enclave. Of the 366 invited persons, 309 lived in Turku. In the invitation letter, the respondents were asked to confirm whether they would participate in the event. A total of 216 confirmed their participation, and 207 persons eventually showed up at the event. From the group of actual participants, 159 were from Turku. The complete recruitment process is presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Recruitment of participants

3.1.3 The event

The event was carried out over one weekend, 31 March–1 April 2012. Even though the event lasted for two days, each participant took part either on Saturday or Sunday. The event followed the same design, procedures and timetable on both days. First, participants filled in a short quiz survey (T3), consisting of 15 items related to immigration, immigration policies and general politics in Finland. This was done in order to measure knowledge levels among the participants, as well as the changes in answers during the event. The program of the event continued with a briefing about basic information related to immigration and immigration policies in Finland. The slide-show briefing offered balanced, mostly statistically presented, information about immigration. The briefing concentrated on information that all participants, regardless of their opinions and ideology, could agree on and view as trustworthy, while politically controversial or disputed topics, which could affect the participants' attitudes or the upcoming discussions one way or the other, were left out completely.

After the briefing, deliberations in small groups began. Norms of deliberation were followed through discussion rules, which were written in a document and handed out to the participants before the small group deliberations started. The discussions in small groups were facilitated, that is, a trained moderator supervised the discussion and made sure that the rules were followed. The moderators did not interfere in the discussions unless someone overwhelmingly dominated the discussions or completely withdrew from it, or somehow broke the rules introduced in the beginning.

There was a total of 26 groups in the discussions, and each group consisted of around eight participants, who were all randomly selected from either a pro or con enclave, or a mixture from both groups was randomly selected. Of the 26 groups, ten consisted of people only from the pro-immigration enclave, and five consisted of people only from the con enclave. There were 11 mixed groups consisting of four participants from the con enclave and four from the pro enclave. These group discussions lasted for four hours, including a lunch break of 45 minutes in the middle. To start the group discussions, each participant presented themselves and then put forward a theme related to the general topic, immigration. These themes were written down on a blackboard as a reminder. The proposed themes covered a wide scope of issues, such as employment-based immigration, humanitarian-based immigration and refugees, acculturation, multiculturalism, unemployment and crime rates of minorities, security, language and education, immigration attitudes, prejudices and the costs of immigration to the receiving countries. These themes were then discussed in turn, after which the participants could continue the discussions freely.

The last task of the day was to fill in another survey (T4), which repeated the questions in T1, T2 and T3, but also included questions concerning the deliberative

event and the quality of deliberation. All participants filled in the T4 survey. The main findings (see Grönlund et al., 2015) of the experiment were that participants' attitudes developed in a more pro-immigration direction. It seems that some form of opinion polarization took place, as the deliberation in enclaves of people with favorable opinions toward immigration developed even more favorable views. However, this might not actually have happened according to the hypotheses of the theory of group polarization, as people with anti-immigrant attitudes in the con-immigration enclave did not develop more polarized views. Instead, they became more tolerant. One of the most interesting findings was that the more permissive attitudes regarding immigration developed notably among the individuals who initially were strongly against immigration, not the ones who held the more moderate views in the con enclave. On the other hand, in the pro enclave, it was the other way around as a slight shift toward polarization happened among those who were the moderates in that enclave. There were no notable differences in opinion changes between like-minded and mixed-opinion small groups. Therefore, group composition does not seem to explain the observed attitude shifts. Furthermore, even though participants' knowledge about the issue increased, according to the analysis, learning did not seem to be a key driver behind opinion change either. Based on these results, the researchers propose that deliberative norms and independent facilitation can alleviate in-group consolidation and its negative consequences.

3.2 Data and methods

As has been already established, this dissertation uses both quantitative and qualitative data, which are analyzed through mixed methods. This section offers a detailed description of the different data utilized. It concludes with a presentation of the key methodological choices and tools of analysis.

3.2.1 The survey data

The survey data used in this dissertation consisted of the recruitment survey related to the deliberative mini-public, namely T1. This survey included 14 questions that aimed to measure the respondents' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. First, there were two policy suggestions related to immigration that the respondent could answer using a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 meant that the respondent viewed the suggestion as being very bad, and 10 as being very good. The suggestions presented to the respondents are listed below:

1. Finland should take more immigrants. Do you think this a bad or a good suggestion?

2. Migration of foreigners to Finland should be restricted as long as there is unemployment in Finland. Do you think this is a bad or a good suggestion?

After this there was a single question concerning the effects of immigration on Finland. Here, respondents could answer using a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 meant that Finland would change for the worse and 10 meant that Finland would change for the better.

1. Do you think Finland will change into a better or a worse place to live when people from other countries move to Finland?

This question was followed by a set of statements. For each statement, the respondent could choose from four different alternatives: strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree. It must be noted that, due to the original intention of the survey, which was to collect enough information about individual immigration attitudes to separate those who were interested in continuing the study into two opposing enclaves, no neutral or "middle" alternative was given, nor did one state "I don't know." The statements are listed below:

1. It is good for the Finnish economy that people from other countries move to Finland.
2. Immigrants take away jobs from Finnish natives.
3. Immigrants should have the same right to social security as Finns even if they are not Finnish citizens.
4. The state and the municipalities use too much money to aid immigrants.
5. Immigration poses a serious threat to our national originality.
6. Everyone that wants to come to Finland to live and work must be allowed to do so.
7. Immigration policy should primarily favor Christians instead of other religions.
8. Generally speaking, immigrants adapt well to Finnish society.
9. I would be happy to have an immigrant as a co-worker.
10. I would accept an immigrant as a family member.
11. I would accept immigrants in my neighborhood.

Together, these 11 statements cover a wide range of topics linked to immigration, immigrants and immigration policies in Finland. For example, economic matters related to national economic performance as well as the job market are represented, in addition to the social and cultural dimensions, related to, for example, social

security, national culture and religion. Also, we can see that toward the end, there are at least three questions that are linked to experienced inter-group social distance.

Of the sample of 12,000 people, 4,681 responded to the survey and 3,350 of them were from Turku. These Turku-based respondents were then coded according to their respected home neighborhoods by hand.

3.2.2 Register data from Turku

The neighborhood-level register data was collected by Statistics Finland and provided to the researcher by the City of Turku. The data contains a great amount of contextual information regarding the composition of the city as a whole as well as its neighborhoods. It contains, for example, information regarding population size, age, native language, income, employment, building type and ownership. The data represents the situation in December 2012.

One thing needs to be mentioned concerning one of the most important contextual variables used in this study: the proportion of non-native language speakers. During 2012, Statistics Finland adopted a new origin classification, which was already in use in the other Nordic countries, and introduced a variable on ethnic background. The origin and background country are determined based on the country of birth of the person's parents. Using this origin classification, it is easy to distinguish between persons born abroad and born in Finland with a foreign background. However, even though the new classification was adopted in 2012 — the year on which this study is focused — the neighborhood-level data in use here was never converted to include this information. Therefore, only details concerning native language at the neighborhood-level are available. If we compare the total number of people with foreign background (279,616 in December 2012) and the total number of persons with a foreign native language (266,949 in December 2012) in Finland as a whole (provided by Statistics Finland, 2020), we see that the two figures are quite close to each other. This suggests that speaking a foreign language as a first language is still an acceptable measure of immigrant status, even though this is not a perfect determinant.

In the City of Turku in 2012, approximately 8% of the population spoke a foreign language as their native language (Statistics Finland, 2019). The corresponding share for the whole country was around 5%. Therefore, Turku can be considered more multicultural than the country on average. Turku is no exception as a city, however, as Jaakkola (2009) observed that most of the immigrant population in Finland is concentrated in the largest cities: the Helsinki metropolitan area, Tampere, Turku and Oulu. The most spoken foreign languages in Turku at the time were Russian (18% of all foreign language speakers), Arabic (10%), Kurdish (9%), Estonian (8%) and Albanian (7%), which is mostly in line with the rest of the country, as Russian,

and Estonian were the most spoken foreign languages in Finland by a large margin, followed by Somali, English and Arabic (Statistics Finland, 2019).

The City of Turku is divided by the administration into 134 sub-areas or neighborhoods. These neighborhoods differ from each other quite a lot. Some of them are densely populated areas near the city center or in the major suburbs, while some are sparsely populated areas in the countryside. The most populated area housed nearly 9,000 people, and in some areas there were only about ten or twenty people living there. Some neighborhoods were solely made up of apartment buildings, while some contained mostly detached housing. When it comes to socio-economic differences, unemployment levels and average income, can be seen as good indicators of the socioeconomic segregation between neighborhoods. In case of Turku, the unemployment rates between neighborhoods varied considerably, with the lowest being 2.1%, the city average being 13.4% and the highest being 30.8%. The same went for the average annual income (lowest €12,691, average €26 156, and highest €78,808). Regarding the share of non-native language speakers, differences between areas of the city were just as stark. In the case of Turku, the share of people who did not speak Finnish or Swedish as their native language was around 8 percent. Therefore, most people in the city lived in ethnically quite homogeneous neighborhoods. However, even though there were some neighborhoods where less than 1% of the population spoke a foreign native language, in the most multicultural neighborhood in the city, around 40% of the population spoke a language other than Finnish or Swedish as their native language. The Turku neighborhood of Varissuo was – and still is -the most multi-cultural neighborhood in Finland (Rasinkangas, 2014).

3.2.3 Discussion data

All of the discussions in the 26 small groups were recorded and transcribed for future research use. The transcription was done by a native speaker and commissioned by the research team at Åbo Akademi University. In this dissertation, twelve of these groups are analyzed: four groups from the pro-immigration enclave, four groups from the con-immigration enclave and four mixed groups. Each analyzed group was chosen randomly from among the available groups of the given type. There are at least two reasons for this random selection. First, as Karjalainen and Rapeli (2015) point out, the attrition during the recruitment was considerably more substantial among the anti-cosmopolitan respondents than among those who viewed immigration more favorably. Holding anti-immigration attitudes was among the many reasons why people chose not to take part in deliberations. The sample of twelve groups, where both of the enclaves are equally represented, should give us a more balanced view of the contents of the discussions, without neither side

dominating. Second, the sample of different types of groups, consisting of both like-minded enclaves and mixed-opinion deliberation groups, should rule out the possibility that group dynamics in a single group or in a type of group developed in a way that would prohibit some themes, experiences or arguments from being presented. Although it is possible that some of the themes and main arguments brought up in the deliberation were lost because not all groups' discussions were analyzed, this sample of twelve groups can be viewed as being both balanced and encompassing in terms of participants' attitudes, and it is likely that at least most of the themes and arguments presented in the deliberation were included in the analysis. It is possible that some nuances related to immigration debate were not part of the deliberations altogether, because of the decision of organizers to leave people with moderate attitudes completely out of the event. There is, however, very little in terms of group selection that could be done to remedy this.

3.2.4 Methods

Instead of taking an active part in the methodological debate between proponents of quantitative and qualitative data and methods (see, for example, Alasuutari, 2010), the aim of this dissertation is to use both quantitative and qualitative methods as well as data to analyze how living environment influences citizens' attitudes toward immigrants and the way they discuss immigration. Therefore, this can be described as a mixed methods study. According to Tashakkori and Creswell (2007, 4), mixed methods can be "broadly defined […] as research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry." Both aspects of a mixed methods investigation, that is the data (both quantitative and qualitative) and the methodological approach (both quantitative and qualitative), that are included in this broad definition are present here. However, it must be noted that within the majority of single original publications, only one type of data (either quantitative or qualitative) or one type of research approach (either quantitative or qualitative) is utilized. Only article IV, despite its heavier emphasis on the qualitative side, can be seen to integrate these two methods to some extent. The dissertation as a whole and this introductory part in particular are based in integration of the two research approaches and findings collected from using two types of data.

Because the original articles of this dissertation use different sets of data and utilize different methods in their analyses, it is, first, important to view them in relation to the many traditions and subfields of political science. This is done by situating the study as being heavily influenced by the research tradition of comparative politics. After introducing this research tradition and discussing some

of the important questions often linked to this type of analysis, I make some important clarifications about the variables and models utilized in the original publications of this dissertation. I do not go into details about which statistical models are in use or how the themes and narratives were extracted from the discussion data, as these are explained in more detail in the articles themselves.

In order to carry out comparison between attitudes in different social contexts, the dissertation draws from the methodological tradition of comparative political research (see, for example, Lijphart, 1971; Meckstroth, 1975; Peters, 1998). There are many traditions or subfields of political science, comparative politics being one of them. As the name suggests, it can be characterized by a focus on comparison between actual political units, such as states, organizations, parties, etc. These characteristics set it apart from, for example, experimental or purely theoretical research. The comparison in question must not always include numerous cases, as the comparing can also take place between theory and observations deriving from one case study (Peters, 1998). In this dissertation, the analysis is carried out within a single city, Turku, Finland, and the comparison is done between different neighborhoods within the city. Empirical observations are compared to expectations and hypotheses derived from previous research. This kind of approach is common when it comes to comparative research. Meckstroth (1975, 134) states that comparative research must "ultimately" rely on "previously formulated concepts, propositions, and theories which may be tested, but are not themselves discovered." This is because comparative research is not suited for discovering or identifying relevant variables to the case at hand from among the almost infinite possibilities available (Meckstroth, 1975).

According to Lijphart (1971, 683), comparative research can be "regarded as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables." There are limits to establishing these relationships, however. As Meckstroth (1975) claims, these variables need to be predetermined, that is, identified and picked for the analysis on the basis of previous research findings and theories. So, in truth, empirical relationships are not necessarily "discovered" but rather verified or falsified. Therefore, the analysis can sort between those supposed relationships that do not hold against critical scrutiny and the ones that do. In this case, the units that are compared, neighborhoods within a single Finnish city, despite being heterogeneous in their composition, can be seen as at least similar enough to belong to the same "group," that being neighborhoods within a single Finnish city. Therefore, the first three articles can be described as utilizing the "most similar system design" of comparative political research (Lijphart, 1971), often termed "Mill's method of difference" (see Mill & Robson, 1978; for "the most different system design, see for example Przeworski & Teune, 1970). In an ideal setting, this method aims to compare two (or more) systems or cases that are so similar that they only differ by

one (or at most by very few) factors. In these cases, all factors that are similar can be deemed irrelevant, and focus can be directed at the ones that are dissimilar (Meckstroth, 1975). As has already been described (see Section 3.2.2) the neighborhoods differ from each other quite a lot based on the contextual variables that have been chosen. However, when it comes to the almost infinite ways different geographical units could, in theory, differ from each other, neighborhoods in Turku can be thought of as units that are in many ways similar, and therefore comparable.

This dissertation aims to form associations between individuals' attitudes, the way they discuss immigration and the social context in which they live. It includes often-used theories and predetermined variables based on past findings, and it tests whether they are relevant in the case of Turku, Finland. What is meant by association? For example, the fact that context and attitudes are associated means that they are dependent, i.e., the value of one gives information about the value of another. This should not be confused with causality, however, where one variable causes the second. The empirical analyses included in this dissertation do not establish causal links; the cross-sectional survey data and discussion data collected from a single event are not suited to do that. Instead, established association can mean, for example, that two factors have a common cause, or that they are correlated, meaning that an increasing or decreasing trend in one is also accompanied by a simultaneous or reverse trend in the other (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015). However, it must be remembered that the variables and theories used in this dissertation, and likewise the relationships that are established through this empirical analysis, are neither coincidental nor random. They are chosen for the analysis for a very good reason: they have been influential in explaining immigration attitudes in the past. Further, these theories imply the presence of causal relationships, i.e., how immigration attitudes are formed and shaped. Therefore, the associations found in this dissertation can be interpreted, at least to some extent, to verify the presence of the causal mechanisms that the established theories presented in the last chapter propose. In other words, based on the literature review presented in Chapter 2, there is a strong *a priori* assumption that immigration attitudes are indeed influenced by the different contextual factors that the chosen independent variables aim to capture.

A common problem case studies such as this often face is a lack of generalizability. If a study can verify or falsify the assumed relationship between the dependent and independent variable in one setting, how can this finding be generalized beyond the single case? At first glance, this problem is even more pronounced in the case of analyses utilizing qualitative data. When it comes to quantitative research, the large *n* in this study's data and the fact that the random sampling was utilized in the recruitment mean that the results can be used to create general propositions about the relationship between two variables (Polit & Beck, 2010). This does not make these generalizations universal, as basically no

proposition can explain circumstances in all physical locations at all times, but these kinds of analyses can still establish relationships that are verified under specific conditions (Meckstroth, 1975, 135). Where these initial conditions are met, the results can be generalized to apply.

However, when it comes to qualitative case research, the problem is different, with only a small number of observations. However, as Polit and Beck (2010, 1451) argue, "[t]he goal of most qualitative studies is not to generalize but rather to provide a rich, contextualized understanding of some aspect of human experience through the intensive study of particular cases." Still, there are ways to generalize these findings from a particular context as well. Transferability of findings from a particular inquiry into another case is one alternative (see Polit & Beck, 2010). Here, transferability means that it is up to the researcher conducting the qualitative case study to provide descriptions and details of their analysis in a way that allows readers and other researchers to generalize the findings in another setting. Given that narratives are transferable and reducible "without fundamental damage (Barthes & Duisit, 1975, 268–269), qualitative analyses based on them should be in principle generalizable to other contexts.

There are a few important clarifications, related to dependent variables and statistical models on one hand, and the choice of analytical framework in the qualitative analysis that needs to be made right away. Three of the four articles utilize statistical analysis, which focused on the recruitment survey (T1) data described previously. In two of these articles (Article I and Article III) the dependent variable, i.e., immigration attitude, is a compiled index variable based on eight or nine of the 14 items listed on p. 66-67. Eleven of these items pertain to issues related to immigration in Finland, while three of them pertain to inter-group social distance. First, the latter three were excluded from the index. As seen in T1, Questions 1–3 were presented on a scale from 0 to 10, while the rest of the questions were presented on a scale with four values: strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree. Therefore, each item was then recoded on a scale from zero to one (and reversed if needed), where zero indicated the most negative attitude toward immigration and one indicated the most positive attitude toward immigration. All 11 items loaded on a single factor (using principal components analysis), but to ensure the coherence of the index, I only included the ones with a correlation greater than 0.65. The resulting measure of attitude toward immigration is the sum of the rescaled responses to the eight or nine questions. This difference is due to the difference in the number of respondents included in the analysis in the articles (n=2977 and n=3173). In Article I, Swedish-speaking respondents were excluded from the analysis, while in Article III, all Finnish and Swedish speaking respondents were included, for reasons outlined in the articles. This is why, even though terms for the coherence of the index are the same, the first article uses an index compiled of eight individual items, and

the latter article's index was compiled using nine individual items. Thus, the measure of immigration attitudes varies between zero and eight, or zero and nine, where larger values indicate more positive attitudes. Regarding the index utilized in the first article, the mean score is 3.75, with a standard deviation of 1.83. These descriptive figures for the third article are 4.26 and 2.21 respectively. Indexes reported skewness values of -0.12 (0.05) and -0.12 (0.04) and kurtosis values of -1.00 and -0.95. The small negative skewness values indicate that the distributions are not skewed in either direction, while the negative kurtosis values show that the distributions are platykurtik, or somewhat flatter than normal with many outliers, while still being within the limit of normal distribution. The questions used in the construction of the index in both cases are listed in the articles.

In Article II, also utilizing quantitative methods, the dependent variables consist of the three individual items excluded first from the indexes in the other two articles, namely the ones related to inter-group social distance. The items are (1) Everyone that wants to come to Finland to live and work should be allowed to do so, (2) I would accept immigrants in my neighborhood and (3) I would accept an immigrant as a family member; and they are meant to represent the different steps in the Bogardus scale. These three were answered using a four-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree), where larger values indicate more openness to inter-group contact. The three items report the following mean scores and standard deviations: 2.51 (0.91), 2.78 (.080) and 2.59 (0.92). Based on the skewness [-0.06 (0.05), -0.50 (0.05) and -0.28 (0.05) respectively] and kurtosis [-0.78 (0.09), -0.05 (0.09) and -0.75 (0.09) respectively] values, all three distributions can be considered to be normal.

Regarding independent variables, both individual- and contextual-level ones, are explained in more detail in all the articles. It is crucial to note that, in general, the data is much more substantial at contextual-level than at individual-level, as age, gender and education level contribute the whole array of individual-level variables that this dissertation has access to. Simply put, these were the only individual-level variables that were inquired from the respondents in T1. Even though T2 included many other variables, the number of respondents to that survey was too small to carry out analysis at the neighborhood level. Still, according to previous research, these three individual-level variables have been identified as being very influential in predicting immigration attitudes, so they are included. At this point, it is important to note that the focus of this dissertation is on the influence of contextual variables, even though all individual-level variables available are included in all of the analyses. The most important contextual variables were identified based on the research literature (see Table 1 on p. 58 and Section 2.5.). These include, for example, proportion of non-native language speakers, proportion of young adults, proportion of highly educated and proportion of unemployed individuals. The way

these and other contextual variables are utilized in the analyses varies from one article to another, and the methods are always presented in more detail in the respective articles. Therefore, I do not provide a full list of models used or analyses carried out in this section. I do, however, outline some of the fundamentals of these analyses.

In addition to descriptive statistics, multi-level regression models (see, for example, Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012) are used in each of the three articles utilizing quantitative data. Because all respondents were nested within their own neighborhoods and were assumed to interact with and be influenced by their surroundings, multi-level models provided a way to empirically engage this relationship between the individual and the social context in which they lived. These models also have two advantages. First, since the dissertation is based on the assumption that there are differences between individual attitudes between neighborhoods, multi-level modelling allows for the analysis of all the included contextual variables simultaneously, while still controlling for the influence of individual characteristics. The second advantage is that, while the number of responses from individual neighborhoods varies considerably from a single respondent to well over a hundred, and therefore they cannot be considered to be representative of the sentiments in these areas, this large variance is not a problem for multi-level modelling. Because, based on previous literature, I have reason to believe that the influence of individual-level factors as predictors of immigration attitudes are context dependent, in two of the articles some of the models include interactions between individual-level and context-level variables. This is to determine if, how and to what extent empirical connections between individual-level attributes and attitudes are different between different contexts.

The last of the four articles (IV) included in this dissertation differs considerably from the rest because it utilizes the discussions data collected from the deliberative event, and uses qualitative methods. In the discourse analysis, special interest was placed on the themes people brought up when they were asked to discuss immigration, the narratives that were prevalent in the discussions, and whether local experiences were a notable part of these narratives. More specifically, the themes proposed and arguments made in the discussions were categorized into different sorts of assumptions: existential assumptions about the state of current affairs, propositions or policy suggestions about how these affairs should be, and value assumptions dealing with those values that propositions should be based on. This discourse analysis method follows the model by Fairclough (2004) to interpret texts and discussions dealing with contested views. This categorization is valuable in identifying the contents of the debate. There were no restrictions or a pre-determined set of questions the participants were compelled or encouraged to use, they were simply asked to propose a theme that they thought was important to address when

discussing immigration. Therefore, the analysis tries to capture the themes people themselves perceive as being an integral part of the immigration debate.

The second part of the analysis concerns narratives related to immigration. Using an analytical framework by Ricoeur (1983), several narratives concerning immigration in Finland were identified from the small group discussions. This was to determine, first, whether there was a grand narrative to be recognized at all, or if the content of the debate was very much based around individual experiences and views. Second, if there were recurring narratives in the discussions, the framework aimed to identify the most important characteristics of those narratives. Both the model concerning assumptions and the way to identify the core features of narratives are covered in more depth, with examples related to public debate on immigration, in the original publication.

4 Article summary

This chapter provides summaries of the four original publications included in this dissertation. It describes the aim and research questions of each article, and also presents a short overview of the theories that are relevant to each individual manuscript. All of these relevant theories and concepts have been defined and described in detail in the previous chapters of this introductory part. These summaries also list the main findings of these articles, as well as briefly reflect on the results.

4.1 Does the neighborhood context explain attitudes toward immigration? A study of opinions on immigration in the city of Turku, Finland (Article I)

The aim of this study is to find out if or to what extent residential context can explain attitudes toward immigration. It makes use of a large data set (n=2,977) on attitudes toward immigration in Turku collected in 2012. It analyzes how attitudes toward immigration vary within different parts of the municipality and whether neighborhood context can explain attitudes toward immigration. Regarding the main research questions of this dissertation (see p. 19-20 in the Introduction), first, this article confirms that attitudes do vary considerably between different neighborhoods of the city of Turku. There are neighborhoods with notably restrictive attitudes toward immigration, while some areas can be characterized as being cosmopolitan. Importantly, the data from the T1 survey is not representative at the neighborhood level, and therefore it is not fruitful to observe what the general attitude in a particular neighborhood was. Nevertheless, the result that *attitudes vary between neighborhoods* is clear, even when controlling for the influence of individual factors. It was also observed that, while the five most cosmopolitan neighborhoods in terms of attitudes were quite similar in their population composition, as they mainly consisted of the most notable student neighborhoods in the city, the five most anti-cosmopolitan were not. Among these latter five were some very ethnically homogeneous, sparsely populated neighborhoods, where many of the residents were highly educated elderly people with high income levels, in addition to the most

ethnically diverse neighborhood in the city, which also had a low average income level and a high unemployment rate.

The results of the analyses for the second research question are far less clear, but also more interesting. The fact that the neighborhoods with the most restrictive attitudes were diverse in population composition seems to indicate that *there are multiple different explanations for opinion formation across contexts*. For some neighborhoods, it seems that the anti-cosmopolitan views can be explained through lack of contact with immigrants, while in other living environments the growing immigrant population can be viewed as more of a threat in competition over scarce resources. When it comes to the overall debate between threat and contact theory, this article found no conclusive evidence. There is no linear, statistically significant relationship between a large proportion of non-native speakers in neighborhoods and attitudes. Instead, it founds that *there is a strong, statistically significant relationship between mean attitude in a neighborhood and individual attitudes of those living there*. This indicates that the most potent explanation related to residential context for the city as a whole is that the general sentiment toward immigration in a neighborhood strongly influences the individual residents' way of thinking.

Because theories of inter-group threat and contact are mostly developed and utilized in the US context, it is perhaps not that surprising they offer only a limited explanation of attitudes of the majority in Finland. However, some have suggested (see, for example, Steele & Perkins, 2019) that feelings of threat are based more on perception of minority group size, rather than actual numbers. This proposes a possible explanation for the limited explanatory power of theory of inter-group threat found in the analysis. In general, these results should be interpreted as showing the complexity of analyzing the links between residential segregation and opinion formation.

4.2 How context shapes acceptance of immigrants? The link between affective social distance and locational distance (Article II)

The presence of immigrants has been an important contextual variable when explaining attitudes toward immigrants. This article examines how the presence of immigrants in one's own home neighborhood is related to affective social distance, i.e., the sympathy the members of a group feel for another group. As done in the first article, a large data set (n = 2,977) on attitudes toward immigrants in 107 neighborhoods within a single municipality (Turku, Finland) was utilized to carry out the analysis. The aim of the article was to form both a theoretical and an empirical link between spatial and social distance between different groups. Theoretically, the article begins with an overview of the concept of social distance as well as the

introduction of the Bogardus social distance index scale, which is the most often employed measure of social distance. The article explores the origins of these concepts and concludes that, even though some interpretations about the relationship between spatial and social closeness are mixed, these two dimensions of distance do not need to be separated from each other. Instead, it seems that geographic and social distance are correlated, and in fact, all items in the Bogardus scale describe geometric distance in addition to social distance. Therefore, these two different interpretations of inter-group distance can be seen to operate simultaneously.

Empirically, the paper analyzes how attitudes toward immigrants vary across different neighborhoods and how the neighborhood context shapes the affective social distance to immigrants. In particular, it explores whether a larger presence of immigrants in one's own neighborhood can translate into feelings of nearness or a desire for more social distance between groups in the minds of the majority population. The main finding is that levels of felt social distance vary between people living in different parts of the city. However, at the level of the whole city, these *differences cannot be explained with either theories of inter-group threat or contact*. In addition, when looking at levels of social distance experienced by the majority, the explanatory power of ethnic diversity disappears when all other contextual and individual variables are considered. Because *the feelings concerning social distance still vary between neighborhoods, it seems that the explanations for this variation are beyond theories of inter-group threat and contact*. Instead, the findings point to a less straightforward and much more nuanced relationship between ethnic diversity and levels of inter-group social distance. There are some noteworthy differences between how individual-level characteristics unfold in neighborhoods with a large share of immigrants compared to how they unfold in other neighborhoods.

The analysis found several *interesting interactions between individual- and contextual-level factors*. For example, women living in the more ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods were found to be more willing to allow more immigrants to enter the country than men living in the same parts, while there was no significant differences between gender groups in neighborhoods lacking a notable immigrant population. This desire for less admitting immigration policies among men in the more ethnically diverse parts of the city can be due to higher economic uncertainty or more conservative attitudes related to cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart, 2018), or a mix of both. Second, young people living in areas with a substantial immigration population were more willing to accept immigrants into their family than older residents of the same parts of the city. This suggests that, for young people, who can be presumed to have more contact opportunities provided by schools, work and pastime activities, meaningful contact to reduce prejudices is also more likely to take place outside their residential area. This can reflect a more cosmopolitan outlook and values among the young in general, which lessens the

impact of the lack of social contact opportunities in their immediate living environment. Lastly, the analysis found that a large proportion of young people in an area is strongly linked to less prejudiced attitudes among the individuals living there, regardless of the size of the minority. This finding suggests that in-group consolidation might influence individuals' attitudes in some parts of the city.

4.3 Does in-group consolidation polarize attitudes toward immigrants? (Article III)

The research on the influence that social context has on individuals' attitudes has mostly concentrated on ethnic diversity, namely threat and contact theories. These theories have been developed and thoroughly tested in the US context, as well as in European countries with long histories of inflows of immigrants and sizeable, established ethnic minorities. This is a possible explanation for why the two previously summarized articles did not find a significant relationship between ethnic diversity in the living environment and public attitudes. Even though there are neighborhoods and social groups that seem to fit the assumptions of these theories, the results show that differences in attitudes between different parts of the city need alternative explanations. Therefore, this article analyses whether and to what extent in-group consolidation, i.e., coming into frequent contact with shared views, shapes individual attitudes. Previously, scholars have identified a host of individual-level and contextual factors associated with variation in people's attitudes toward immigrants. This paper argues that individual traits that are conducive to a positive or negative attitude toward immigrants tend to be more strongly connected to attitudes the larger the proportion of people with similar traits is in the individual's immediate living environment. This is because interacting with like-minded people is likely to strengthen one's pre-existing views, and because of deepening residential segregation, the likelihood of meeting somewhat similarly aligned people in one's living environment is rising.

The study tested this reasoning using data on more than 3,000 individuals nested within more than 100 neighborhoods in the city of Turku, Finland. It shows that the *neighborhood effect can result in polarized opinions, but only for a subset of the total population*. When it comes to immigration attitudes, *young adults who live in an environment which reflects openness and cosmopolitan values, develop pronouncedly more pro-immigration views as a result of coming into contact with shared views*. The adverse is true for young people with more negative attitudes living in areas where the population composition anticipates the opposite general sentiment.

Because this contextual effect is not found among the older residents of Turku, the findings seem to highlight the importance of the so-called formative years.

Attitudes, values and world views develop strongly in adolescence and early adulthood. Peer attitudes, exposure to similar views and being part of an information network that provides some political cues over others can be a major source of influence on an individual's attitude formation at this stage. Therefore, living environment seems to be a strong and constant stimulus in opinion formation, at least for young people. For older adults, whose sentiments are already quite developed, the influence of social contact is less profound. Therefore, the article seems to discover a connection between residential segregation and segregation of opinions in society.

4.4 Discourse of immigration in mini-publics (Article IV)

Questions linked to immigration have been among the most polarizing topics both in public and political discussions in Finland during recent years. Article IV contains an analysis of the immigration debate, with 207 participants, held in Turku, Finland, in 2012. It explores the arguments used by people during a deliberative mini-public and traces the themes, assumptions and policy suggestions that arose. Using data from group discussions, the articles utilizes an analysis framework proposed by Norman Fairclough (2004), where arguments are categorized into assumptions, value assumptions and propositions.

In line with most of the existing research literature, the analysis found that *most of the arguments derive either from the assumptions concerning the economic consequences of immigrations, or from its impacts on the Finnish culture*. When asked to deliberate on immigration, people mostly proposed and discussed *themes concentrated on the national level*. Therefore, the Finnish citizen deliberation on immigration followed the same lines as the national public debate and international comparisons, with a small yet noticeable emphasis on welfare chauvinism. *Local implications of immigration or personal experiences are not a major part of this discourse*, nor did they contribute to narratives of immigration. It is true that no systematic analysis focusing solely on participants' home neighborhood and the role these played in the discussions was carried out. Still, given that the local context played such a small role in the discussions, even though many of the participants lived in the more multicultural parts of the city, it can be assumed that participants' living environments had no major influence on the contents of the discussions.

Further, using a narrative method based on the theory by Paul Ricoeur, the article explores the *discussants' interpretations concerning Finnish identity*. *The analysis found two contrasting archetypes of this narrative*. The first one is based on uniform Finnish culture and on constructing boundaries between the native Finns and immigrants. It highlights Finns as being the builders of the welfare state for the

Finns, and this must be protected against "the others," who are seen as usurpers. The other narrative of Finns aligns with cosmopolitanism and compassion. It sees Finland as being part of a larger and inclusive community, where the welfare state means fighting for global wellbeing and prosperity. Using the same method, the analysis also *discovered two contrasting narratives about immigrants*. The first one can be described as being anti-immigration. It emphasizes Muslims as an immigrant group, and mostly equates immigrants in Finland as belonging to this group. The largest immigrant groups in Finland, those speaking Russian or Estonian as their native language, are not a relevant part of this narrative. According to this narrative, immigrants not only represent themselves and their family, but also their culture, religion and traditions, and collectively seek to replace the Finnish way of life with their own. The second narrative about immigration, which is more pro-immigration, acknowledges the diversity of different immigrant groups, and maintains that people immigrate for their own reasons, without deliberately seeking to change the receiving country.

There are many likely explanations for these findings. One explanation is related to the way that immigration debate is carried out in many parts of Western Europe, Finland included. The public debate on immigration is heavily concentrated on national issues and in many terms very general — almost universal — narratives about the impact of immigration, and therefore it is perhaps no wonder that the immediate living environment is not a major determining factor in the way people discuss immigration. These grand narratives are so influential, that they can drown out local experiences and implications. Second, it is possible that despite growing immigrant populations in some parts of the city, the city of Turku is still too ethnically homogeneous in its composition to allow for impactful local experiences to become a meaningful part of the discussions. It may be that, while some have personal contact with immigrants and personally experience the impact of immigration in their local area, for the large majority this is not the case. In small-group discussions, the majority, who view themes concerning immigration only through narratives they have heard in the public debate, have had the chance to frame the whole discussion. Third, these findings can also have to do with the framing of the discussion by organizers. Because the participants were invited to discuss immigration in Finland, they might have taken this a sign to highlight national-level themes over local ones.

5 Conclusions

This dissertation studies the influence that living environment, namely one's own neighborhood, has on individuals' immigration attitudes and how they discuss immigration. It starts with an empirical overview of the existing academic literature, where a linkage between different sources for immigration attitudes, individual- and contextual-level characteristics used to explain variance in these attitudes, and the public debate concerning immigration was formed. In this theoretical part, key concepts such as ethnic diversity, social distance and residential segregation were defined and discussed in light of both classic and more recent empirical findings. I also present the three main theories concerning the influence of living environment, group threat theory, theory of inter-group contact and theories of group polarization due to in-group consolidation, and discussed how these three theories are linked to each other and how they can be utilized together to acquire a more complete picture about the way local contexts influence public opinion. In addition, I introduce the reader to the content and form of immigration narratives, and explain why the public debate is important in attitude formation.

Then, after a brief overview about deliberative democracy and mini-publics, I offer a description of the case and data utilized in this dissertation, as well as an explanation of the most important methodological decisions I took. The empirical analysis is presented in four published articles. The results of analyses regarding immigration attitudes are summarized in table 2 below, while the results concerning deliberation on immigration were summed up in chapter 4.4 previously.

This concluding chapter reflects upon the empirical results, i.e., what they mean for theories concerning immigration attitudes and debate, and for those dealing with the practicalities related to immigration. Lastly, it aims to provide some directions for future research.

Table 2. Summary of main findings regarding influence of residential context on immigration attitudes

	Individual level	**Contextual level**	**Main findings**
Theories: why do people view immigration differently?	Xenophobic or racist tendencies Perceived impacts on individual economic situation Perceived impacts on national economy Perceived impacts to national culture and identity Perceived impacts on physical safety	In-group consolidation Threat theory Contact theory	At the level of the whole city, in-group consolidation seems to explain differences in individual attitudes fairly well, even though there are some neighborhoods where attitudes develop according to assumptions of threat and contact theories. Regarding specific population groups, all three theories possess at least some explanatory power.
Determinants: what characteristics explain differences in immigration attitudes?	Value Age Gender Education level Social interaction Political ideology Party identification Personal economic circumstances	Clustering of people with similar backgrounds to same areas (compositional effect) Dominant attitude in the area (contextual effect) Ethnic diversity in residential areas	Ethnic diversity in residential area has limited influence on attitudes toward immigration. The differences in dominant attitudes between neighborhoods are connected to differences in individuals' attitudes. Demographic composition of living environment notably explains differences in young people's attitudes.

5.1 Reflections on the results

I see this dissertation as being a part of a global research field focusing on the influence of living environment on immigration attitudes, and more broadly, on political attitudes and action altogether. It must be acknowledged that it is empirically focused on a single city, Turku, Finland, which raises a question over the contributions of the study and the generalizability of the results. It is true that, in case of immigration as an actual phenomenon, Finland is different from many other Western-European countries. Immigration to Finland was modest in scale for a long time, and the number of immigrants in Finland is still relatively low compared to other European countries (Jaakkola, 2009; Martikainen et al., 2013). In addition, the largest immigration groups in Finland, Russian and Estonian speakers, are not as easily distinguishable from the majority population as some of the more visible ethnic minorities. Also, racial conflict is more or less non-existent when compared to the US context, for example, from which many of the theories concerning

immigration attitudes originate. These facts cannot be overlooked when estimating the significance of the findings of this dissertation.

There is, however, in my opinion at least, more pressing evidence that would suggest that these results can be generalized. First, even though the practical implications of immigration are smaller in scale than in many other countries with more sizeable minority groups, the political implications of immigration as a topic are not. As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, immigration has been an influential political topic in Finland throughout the last decade, and it has both contributed to individual voting choices and become a nationally important factor in deciding electoral outcomes. Therefore, the significance of immigration as a political topic can be viewed as more or less equal in Finland to many countries of comparison.

In addition, based on the literature review concerning the immigration debate and media coverage on the issue in Finland and elsewhere, and the empirical analysis of the dissertation, there are no notable differences between Finnish narratives and narratives elsewhere. The themes and arguments present in the Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves event strongly resemble the themes and arguments found in immigration debate taking place in other places. The lack of local themes and the minor role personal experiences play in the discussions point to the fact that the debate in Finland is very much elite-driven and mostly covers national, or even international, impacts of immigration at the expense of local ones. This suggests that both immigration attitudes and discussions about it are influenced by narratives, whether from political elite or news coverage, just like in other countries.

Lastly, residential segregation is a global phenomenon. It has been observed in multiple cities throughout the world (Young, 2000) and as Rasinkangas (2013, 2014) shows, it is increasing in Turku and Finland as well (see also Kauppinen & Vaalavuo, 2017). Most notably, ethnic segregation has developed rapidly in Turku. While the majority of neighborhoods are still very ethnically homogeneous when it comes to population, there are a few neighborhoods where the share of foreign-language speakers exceeds 20%. In the most multi-cultural neighborhood in Finland, Varissuo in Turku, the share of non-native language speakers exceeded 40% in 2012 and has only continued to grow. As described in the section in which I introduced the register data concerning Turku, neighborhoods are quite different from each other in many other characteristics as well. Therefore, I maintain that when it comes to diversity in living environment, Turku provides an interesting and generalizable case for analysis on the influence of the context on attitudes concerning immigration.

When it comes to the generalizability of the results, in addition to ‘place’, one must also consider ‘the time’ to which this study focuses on. How well do the results using a data collected in 2012 hold up today? In particular, the development that needs to be addressed is the so-called “European refugee crisis” that took place

between 2015 and 2017. There exist *a priori* assumptions that the crisis increased Europeans' anti-immigration sentiments and both strengthened and multiplied prejudiced rhetoric in national debates concerning immigration. When it comes to attitudes toward immigration, empirical analyses find little support for this expectation. In a study using data from European Social Survey between 2012 and 2016, Stockemer et al. (2020) find that not only did the crisis fail to trigger a rise in anti-immigration attitudes, the views among Europeans actually developed into a more admitting direction (see also van der Brug & Harteveld, 2021). This suggests that *in general* attitudes do develop into a slightly more cosmopolitan direction over time, and shocks such as the "European refugee crisis" do little to upset this development. Elsewhere, it has been found that immigration attitudes are "remarkably stable over time and robust to major economic and political shocks" (Kustov et al., 2021, 1478).

This general trend, however, masks several conditional developments. One is related to how the "refugee crisis" was viewed among different population groups. For example, van der Brug and Harteveld (2021) find that people sympathetic with radical right-wing parties did indeed develop more anti-immigration sentiments, but at population level this is overshadowed by the general trend towards more welcoming attitudes. Therefore, the "refugee crisis" could have acted as a shock, which further divides the electorate along party identification and socio-cultural lines (see p. 18-19). Second, "the refugee crisis" might have further increased the domination of refugees and asylum seekers at the expense of other groups in the narratives concerning immigration. Admittingly, the analyses concerning the impact of the "refugee crisis" are still few in number, and some of its impacts might be revealed only after some time has passed. The increasing inflow of immigrants does change the demographics of many countries, including Finland, and lasting consequences can take time to unfold.

In the Introduction (see p. 21), I argue that one of the main academic contributions of this dissertation is combining three distinct research traditions: analyses on threat and contact theory, research on electoral geography and theories of group polarization. I argue that this combination can provide a comprehensive picture on how living environment shapes individual attitudes. So far, the contextual explanations regarding immigration attitudes have mostly focused on ethnic diversity at the local level. While theories of inter-group threat and contact are important, and they are included in the analysis, concentrating just on residential segregation along ethnic lines provides too narrow of a picture for how living environment shapes public opinion. To underline this point and to fulfill the contribution of this dissertation to the research concerning immigration attitudes, two of the articles (Articles II and III) are aimed at both the international and domestic audience through publication in journals with large and wide readerships

from various academic fields. These articles are especially meant to contribute to all three of the separate academic traditions mentioned in the introduction; and also, to propose a way in which these three can contribute to each other. To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first attempt at utilizing all three research traditions in the same study. The first article of this dissertation was written to contribute to this goal as well, but because it is published in a journal focusing on Finnish society, it is mostly written for a Finnish or Nordic audience. This article and the last publication, published in Finnish in *Politiikka*, should therefore mainly be seen as contributions to the study of Finnish immigration attitudes and rhetoric, an area which, despite the work of Jaakkola (1989; 1994; 1999; 2004; 2009), remains somewhat under-analyzed. There are, however, other recent contributions (see, for example, Avonius & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2018) indicating that the topic might be getting the attention it deserves, based on its effect on electoral results.

The results of this dissertation bring to light some indirect consequences of residential segregation. One of them has to do with the link between residential context and feelings of social distance. There are at least two perils of note that need to be raised. First, if economic realities continue to group growing immigrant groups and young, low-educated and often unemployed men of the majority population into the same neighborhoods, the willingness for inter-group social interaction will remain low. At the same time, if the vast majority of native Finns continue to live in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods, inter-group interaction in one's own living environment becomes even more unlikely. If this lack of intergroup contact in neighborhoods is not balanced by more pronounced contact somewhere else, for example, at school or in the workplace, feelings of social distance will increase. This is especially worrying in the case of elderly people, who lack contact opportunities provided by schools and workplaces. What is more, Fossett (2006) has shown that feelings of social distance can create, as well as maintain, ethnic segregation. This seems to present us with a vicious cycle, where increasing inter-group social distance influences choice of place of residence, namely, making the majority even more likely to avoid the same living environments as immigrants. Then, the effect of living environment further adds to the growing social distance between groups. Where "nearness" between groups cannot be achieved, collective action becomes harder and even inter-group conflicts may rise. Therefore, it is evident that residential segregation can lead to difficulties in policies of social integration and multiculturalism.

Residential segregation was also proven to be linked to group polarization. The results of the analyses in this dissertation show that especially young people living with people with views similar to their own are strongly influenced by their surroundings, and group polarization may even occur. The environment in which people live in their formative years is therefore very important in the shaping of

attitudes, both for cosmopolitan- and anti-cosmopolitan-leaning people. This suggests that residential segregation can strongly contribute to the creation of deep and long-lasting demographic divides. These indirect consequences of residential segregation indicate that, by restricting residential segregation, with both administrative and political decisions, policy makers could both help improve the functioning of social integration programs and multicultural policies, and also counter political polarization.

For the most part, this dissertation treats attitudes toward immigration as being formed and reformed through personal and contextual circumstances. In literature concerning populism, researchers sometimes make a distinction between the demand and supply side of populism. Here, it is assumed that attitudes of the electorate regarding specific issues and the (often economic) current societal circumstances together generate demand for populist policies. Supply side, that is populist parties and policies, is created as a response to these demands. All parties forming the supply side have some things in common, for example elite opposition, but also unique, context specific characteristics. For example, populist parties in Southern Europe have campaigned for a guaranteed minimum income and other measures related to individual economic and social protection, because of the strict fiscal disciple, budget cuts and austerity measures demanded of them by the European Union. At the same time, populist politicians in Northern Europe often demand stricter immigration policies, protection for manufacturing industries and jobs as well as safeguarding of uniform national culture and traditions. According to Guiso et al. (2017) these differences in political orientation of populist parties can be explained by the differences in the attitudes of the disillusioned citizens in each country. This suggests that when there exists an anti-cosmopolitan leaning crowd, which is currently abstaining from voting but still large enough to influence electoral results, a populist party demanding stricter immigration policies will appear.

Even though this debate lies a bit outside the scope of this dissertation, there are reasons to believe that attitudes might not be purely endogenous, but also potentially influenced and shaped by populist demands and rhetoric. The findings concerning immigration narratives in small group citizen deliberation, in that they are dominated by national-level themes at the expense of local ones, point at the importance of public debate and news coverage in shaping how immigration is perceived in the minds of the citizens. This indicates that political cues from leaders and elite opinions are clearly influencing the themes citizens perceive as being important when it comes to immigration, but they also greatly shape people's attitudes and the way they discuss immigration with each other. This elite domination over framing of public debate concerning immigration is in line with findings by Chong and Druckman (2007), who identified elite groups as the key sources of frames in public discussion. Therefore, politicians, and the political elite in general, must take

responsibility for the state of the public debate surrounding immigration and acknowledge that their discourse carries considerable weight. This can be especially pronounced in Finland, where a huge portion of the majority still live, study and work in quite ethnically homogeneous environments. Without constant contact with minorities to reduce existing prejudices, beliefs and harmful generalizations, the majority can only form their opinions based on arguments they hear from others.

Therefore, when it comes to the formation of attitudes, frequent and strong use of anti-immigration rhetoric can have dangerous consequences. It seems that especially those in powerful positions can utilize the fact that many Finns lack close and frequent contact with minorities, and try to shape people's perceptions. This can be very beneficial to certain political forces. According to analysts of Finnish politics, the traditional "balance" in Finnish politics, constituting three large parties, the Social Democrats, the National Coalition Party and the Center Party, and a few smaller ones, has crumbled because of the success of the Finns Party. The main unifying factor between the voters of the Finns Party is that of shared anti-immigration views (see, for example, Borg, 2020). This shows that anti-immigration sentiments can be a powerful weapon in political rhetoric and a potential source of electoral support.

5.2 Suggestions for further research

This dissertation focuses on how living environment can influence opinions of individuals through different social processes: living environment can be the place where perceived inter-group threat develops due to growing ethnic diversity; it can work as a venue for inter-group contact and meaningful relations; and it can also develop into an enclave of like-minded individuals, where attitudes become strengthened through in-group consolidation. It must be noted that all these processes take place elsewhere, too, for example in work places and schools, where growing ethnic diversity can significantly affect people's sentiments concerning the social distance between groups and their views regarding immigration in general. Moreover, universities are often thought of as places where cosmopolitan ideology dominates. Therefore, they have the potential to work as "echo chambers" for people with similar views to begin with. This is but one example of something that future research should take into account to extend the study of these social processes beyond the living environment.

For researchers interested in the topic, it would be important to look at the influence of other factors, such as employment status, income and party affiliation and political ideological, on immigration attitudes. Due to restrictions in data used in this dissertation, these variables were not available, but they may still be relevant.

All of these are valuable items to explore in relation to residential context in the future.

In addition, I urge researchers working on topics such as these to try to collect and gain access to longitudinal data. The cross-sectional data used in this study, where respondents are nested within small geographical areas, allow for a detailed investigation concerning the associations between residential segregation and individual attitudes. However, with this kind of data, it is not possible to form conclusions about the causality between them. Data collected over time, like panel data, could provide an integral opportunity for the identification of these causal relationships. Nowadays, the shortage of empirical evidence of the processes through which residential context influences individuals' views and action is hindering the development of the whole field of research. Panel data could be helpful in differentiating between actual contextual effects and purely compositional effects, and would therefore allow for a more in-depth analysis of the neighborhood effect.

As argued in Section 2.4.2 (see p. 56), when it comes to representation of multiple voices and inclusion of different groups, the current narratives concerning immigration seem to offer a rather limited view concerning immigration. Even though investigating the prospects of deliberative mini-publics in giving voice to those often left unheard in the public debate concerning immigrations, that is, ordinary citizens, is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it can still be pointed out as a possible remedy to the limitations current public debate on immigration has. There are at least two reasons why this might be the case. First, because the right of mini-publics to serve as representative institutions is based on their promise of inclusion and representation of varying social perspectives (Young, 2000), they must in principle succeed in bringing together a group of people, which is, if not representative, at least demographically diverse. This would allow a reflection on the topic at hand from numerous perspectives and highlight different experiences and views on the matter. It must be taken into account that the deliberative event analyzed in this dissertation was based on research on group polarization in enclaves of like-minded people. Deliberation in like-minded groups is not ideal for bringing up diverse points of view. However, in deliberative mini-publics in general, where small groups are mixed, discussing an issue from multiple viewpoints is possible, and even likely. Furthermore, according to advocates of deliberative democracy, it is not about conflicts and competition between interests and debate between politicians chosen to support or oppose something, but rather about seeking cooperation, understanding and consensus (Bächtiger & Weggman, 2014, 119-120) and shifting the focus from voting to deliberation or talk (Grönlund et al., 2014,2). Therefore, deliberative mini-publics could also provide a venue for discussions on highly politicized subjects, like immigration, where protesting and lobbying are not involved (see Warren, 2009, 6).

This kind of setting would allow for the handling of the issue in a "cooler" manner, free from the pressures of partisan-dominated electoral politics.

If we think back at the state of the immigration debate described before, one could suggest that immigration could be an ideal topic for a deliberative mini-public, and not only to include more diverse voices. As previously described, immigration attitudes and the way people discuss immigration are greatly influenced by beliefs and prejudice, and not always based on actual personal experiences or accurate and balanced information from multiple sources. In contrast, people may form their opinions based on limited information, usually from only a few sources, and do not necessarily reflect on the related issues.

Even if the results of this dissertation suggest that people rely on national-level themes and grand narratives even in deliberative discussion concerning immigration, this does not completely rule out the potential for deliberative mini-publics to enrich immigration debate. Importantly, the mini-public in question had a very general and encompassing task for the participants. Because participants were not specifically encouraged to reflect upon their own experiences and local implications of immigration, it is perhaps no surprise that they did not do so, precisely because in the narratives that dominate the debate, immigration is viewed as a national issue. Therefore, with an assignment that urges people to move beyond these national narratives, mini-publics could act as a way to make the immigration debate more inclusive in terms of voices, and more likely to contain themes that deal with the practical implications of immigration on the receiving population in their living environments. This is something that future research on deliberative democracy could explore.

This dissertation focuses on majority's attitudes concerning immigration. Also, it can be argued that while ethnic minorities were present in the small group discussions, the narratives present were presented and reflected on mostly from majority's point of view. For the most part, the chosen research design relegates immigrants themselves to a role of objects; those who the majority reacts towards and of whom the majority narrates of. There is a growing literature on attitudes of ethnic minorities concerning other minority groups and immigration in general and on inter-group relations from the perspective of immigrants (see, for example Ha, 2010; Huber & Oberdabernig, 2016; Just & Anderson, 2015; Martinovic, 2013). Currently, these kind of analyses are lacking in Finnish - or even Nordic context.

5.3 Conclusion

Migration is a phenomenon that has profound and lasting impacts on societies. Therefore, it is no wonder that, during the last decade or so, sentiments concerning immigration have become an important political topic as well as an influential

dimension in shaping electoral results. Currently, there is no indication that this trend will be reversed, in Finland or globally. In contrast, there have been some concerns raised about the tone of the current political debate in Finland and suspicions that Finnish society might be showing symptoms of being divided ideologically (see Isotalo et al., 2020). This division can happen according to differences in attitudes on many societal questions related to, for example, immigration, rights of minorities and responses to climate change. Even though the segregation of the Finnish opinion climate and the level of partisan polarization have not equalled those seen in other parts of the world (see Reiljan, 2019), the fact that these kinds of concerns are voiced emphasizes the need to continue searching for explanations for differences in immigration attitudes and to further identify potential polarizing forces and causes. In a democracy, while people naturally disagree with each other, they must respect each other's right to differing views and be able to listen to each other. Therefore, for the functioning of our democracy, we must pay heed to even the smallest signals that hint at creation of deep divides within the society.

In conclusion, I recognize that it is also important to propose that the associations identified in this dissertation, as well as the remarks made about the nature of public debate regarding immigration, can be further developed and utilized in an analysis of attitudes regarding other divisive topics, too. If the residential context has the potential to form into a "pocket of like-minded people" and act as an echo chamber, where existing opinions are amplified, this process should not be neglected when analyzing the development of attitudes related to, for example, climate policies. Therefore, the concepts and theories utilized in this dissertation should be further introduced into Finnish electoral analysis and study of public opinion.

List of References

Abramowitz, A. & Saunders, K., 2008. Is Polarization a Myth*? The Journal of Politics*, 70(2), p. 542-555

Abrams, S. J. & Fiorina, M. P., 2012. "The big sort" that wasn't: a sceptical re-examination. *PS: Political Science & Politics 45*(2), p. 203–210.

Ahmed, A., Andersson, L. & Hammarstedt, M., 2010. Can ethnic discrimination in the housing market be reduced by increasing the information about the applicants? *Land Economics*, 86, p. 79–90.

Ajzen, I., 2005. *Attitudes, personality, and behavior*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill International.

Alasuutari, P., 2010. The rise and relevance of qualitative research, *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 13(2), p. 139-155.

Alesina, A. & Ferrara, E., 2002. "Who Trusts Others?" *Journal of Public Economics*, 85 (2), p. 207–223.

Allport, G. W., 1954. *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Altman, N. & Krzywinski, M., 2015. Points of Significance. Association, correlation and causation, *Nature Methods,* 12, p. 899-900.

An, B. P., 2015. The Role of Social Desirability Bias and Racial/Ethnic Composition on the Relation between Education and Attitude toward Immigration Restrictionism. *The Social Science Journal,* 52(4), p. 459–67.

Appiah K. A., 2006. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Avonius, M. & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E., 2018. Suomalaisten maltilliset ja kirjavat maahanmuuttoasenteet, *Yhteiskuntapolitiikka* 83(1), p. 84-95.

Balch, A. & Balabanova, E., 2011. A System in Chaos? Knowledge and Sense-making on Immigration Policy in Public Debates. *Media, Culture & Society*, 33(6), p. 885-904.

Beck, U. & Grande, E., 2007. *Cosmopolitan Europe*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I. & Moore, K., 2016. *Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: a content analysis of five European countries.* [Project Report]. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.html

Bhatti, Y. & Hansen, K. M., 2016. The Effect of Residential Concentration on Voter Turnout among Ethnic Minorities, *International Migration Review,* 50(4), p. 977-1004.

Billiet, J., Meuleman, B. & De Witte, H., 2014. The relationship between ethnic threat and economic insecurity in times of economic crisis: Analysis of European Social Survey data, *Migration Studies,* 2(2), p. 135-16.

Bishop, B. with R. G. Cushing, 2008. *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Blalock, H. M., 1967. *Toward a theory of minority-group relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Blumer, H., 1958. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1, p. 3–7.

Bogardus, E. S., 1925. Measuring Social Distances. *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9, p. 299–308.

Bogardus, E. S., 1941. *Sociology*. New York: Macmillan.

Books J. W. & Prysby, C. L., 1991. *Political Behavior and the Local Context*. New York: Praeger.

Borg, S., 2011. Perussuomalaiset. In S. Borg (ed), *Muutosvaalit 2011* (p. 191-210). Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

Borg, S., 2020. Asiakysymykset ja äänestäjien liikkuvuus. In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & H. Wass (eds), *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos – Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2019* (p. 240-259). Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

Borg, S., Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. & Wass, H., 2020. Johdanto: mikä politiikan ilmastonmuutos? In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & H. Wass (eds.), *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos – Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2019* (p. 45-65). Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

Brader T., Valentino, N. A. & Suhay, E., 2008. What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat. *American Journal of Political Science,* 52, p. 959–78

Branton, R., Cassese, E. C., Jones, B. S. & Westerland, C., 2011. All along the watchtower: acculturation fear, anti-Latino affect, and immigration. *Journal of Politics,* 73 (3), p. 664–79.

Bächtiger, A. & Wegmann, A., 2014. 'Scaling up' deliberation, In S. Elstub & P. McLaverty (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy. Issues and Cases* (p. 118-135). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bächtiger A., Dryzek. J., Mansbridge, J. & Warren. M., 2018. Deliberative Democracy: An Introduction. In A. Bächtiger, J. Dryzek, J. Mansbridge & M. Warren (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy* (p. 1-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carr, D., 1986. Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for Continuity, *History and Theory*, 25 (2), p. 117-131.

Castles, S. & Miller, M. J., 2013. *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world* (5th ed.). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chong, D. & Druckman, J. N., 2007. Framing Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science,* 10, p. 103–26.

Citrin, J. & Sides, J., 2008. Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States, *Political Studies,* 56, p. 33-56.

Clawson, R. A. & Oxley, Z. M., 2012. *Public Opinion: Democratic Ideals, Democratic Practice*. London: Sage.

Cox, K. R., 1969. The voting decision in a spatial context. *Progress in Geography,* 1, p. 81–117.

Cramer, K., 2016. *The politics of resentment: Rural consciousness in Wisconsin and the rise of Scott Walker*. University of Chicago Press.

Crano, W. D. & Gardikiotis, A., 2015. Attitude Formation and Change. In J. D.Wright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (p. 169–174). 2nd edition, Vol 2. Oxford: Elsevier.

Dahl, R. A., 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.

Eberl, J-M., Meltzer, C. E., Heidenreich, T., Herrero, B., Theorin, N., Lind, F., Berganza, R., Boomgaarden, H. J., Schemer C. & Strömbäck, J., 2018. The European media discourse on immigration and its effects: a literature review, *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 42 (3), p. 207-223.

Elstub, S., 2014. Mini-publics: issues and cases, In S. Elstub & P. McLaverty (eds.) *Deliberative Democracy. Issues and Cases* (p. 166-188). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Elstub, S. & McLaverty, P., 2014. Introduction: issues and cases in deliberative democracy, In S. Elstub & P. McLaverty (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy. Issues and Cases* (p. 1-16). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Enos, R., 2014. Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 111(10), p. 3699–3704.

Ethington, P. J., 1997. The Intellectual Construction of 'Social Distance': Toward a Recovery of Georg Simmel's Social Geometry, *CyberGeo: European Journal of Geography,* 30. Retrieved November 24, 2017. (https://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/227).

Fairclough, N., 2003. *Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research*. New York: Routledge.

Fetzer J. S., 2000. *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fiorina, M. P., with S. J. Abrams & J. C. Pope., 2006. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. 2nd ed. New York: Pearson Longman.

Fishkin, J. S., 2009. *When the People Speak: Deliberative democracy and public consultation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fossett, M., 2006. Ethnic Preferences, Social Distance Dynamics, and Residential Segregation: Theoretical Explorations Using Simulation Analysis, *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 30, p. 185-274.

Fung, A., 2003. Survey article: Recipes for public spheres: eight institutional design choices and their consequences, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11 (3), p. 388–67.

Garcia, J. A. & Murphy, S. 2015. Social distance, In S. Thompson (ed.), *Encyplopedia of diversity and social justice* (p. 669-670). Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield.

Glaeser, E. L. & Ward, B. A., 2006. Myths and realities of American political geography. *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* 20(2), p. 119–144.

Goldberg, M. S., 1982. Discrimination, nepotism, and long-run wage differentials. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97*(2), p. 307–319.

Goldman S. K. & Hopkins, D. J., 2020. Past place, present prejudice: the impact of adolescent racial context on white racial attitudes. *The Journal of Politics,* 82(2), p. 529–542.

Goodin, R. E., 2008. *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goodin, R. E. & Dryzek, J. S., 2006. Deliberative impacts: the macro political uptake of mini-publics, *Politics & Society,* 34 (2), p. 219-244.

Goodwin, M. & Milazzo, C., 2017. Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 19(3), p. 450–464.

Gorodzeisky, A., 2013. Mechanisms of exclusion: attitudes toward allocation of social rights to out-group population, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(5), p. 795-817.

Gottdiener, M. & Hutchinson, R., 2011. *The New Urban Sociology*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Gravelle, T., 2016, Party identification, contact, contexts, and public attitudes toward illegal immigration. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 80(1), p. 1–25.

Grimm, P., 2010. Social Desirability Bias, In *Wiley international encyclopedia of marketing,* Wiley Online Library, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444316568.wiem02057

Grönlund, K., 2014. Citizen Deliberation on Immigration: Survey Data 2012. Version 1.0 (2014-11-05). Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor]. Available at: http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:fsd:T-FSD2958.

Grönlund, K., Herne, K. & Setälä, M., 2017. Empathy in a Citizen Deliberation Experiment. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 40 (4), p. 457-480.

Grönlund, K., Setälä, M. & Herne, K., 2015. Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions? *Political Behavior,* 37, p. 995-1020.

Grönlund, K. & Wass, H., 2016. *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen. Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2015.* Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

Guiso, L., Herrera, H., Morelli, M., & Sonno, T., 2017. Demand and Supply of Populism. *Bankpedia Review* 7(1-2), p. 1-61.

Gutmann, A. & Thompson, D., 1996. *Democracy and Disagreement*, London: Harvard University Press.

Ha, S. E., 2010. The Consequences of Multiracial Contexts on Public Attitudes toward Immigration, *Political Research Quarterly,* 63 (1), p. 29-42.

Haavisto, I, 2019. *Härmä sulaa. Suomalaisten maahanmuuttoasenteet pehmenevät mutta muutos on hidas,* Helsinki: Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta.

Hagendoorn, L. & Nekuee, S., 1999. *Education and Racism: A Cross-National Inventory of Positive Effects of Education on Ethnic Tolerance.* Brookfield: Ashgate.

Hainmueller, J. & Hiscox, M., 2007. Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, *International Organization,* 61, p. 399–442.

Hainmueller, J. & Hopkins, D., 2014. Public Attitudes toward Immigration, *The Annual Review of Political Science,* 17, p. 225–249.

Hanson, G. H., Scheve, K. F. & Slaughter, M. J., 2007. Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies. *Econ. Polit.,* 19, p. 1–33

Hatakka, N., Niemi, M. K. & Välimäki, M., 2018. 'Perussuomalaiset ei ole rasistinen puolue' Näin populistipuolue vastaa rasismisyytöksiin mediassa. In M. Niemi & T. Houni (eds.) *Media ja Populismi: Työkaluja kriittiseen journalismiin* (p. 119–145). Tampere: Vastapaino.

Hello, E., Scheepers, P. & Sleegers, P., 2006. Why the more educated are less inclined to keep ethnic distance: An empirical test of four explanations, *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 29(5), p. 959-985.

Herda, D., 2010. How many immigrants? Foreign-born population innumeracy in Europe, *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 74(4), p. 674-695.

Hewstone M., 2015. Consequences of diversity for social cohesion and prejudice: The missing dimension of intergroup contact. *Journal of Social Issues,* 71(2), p. 417–38.

Hewstone, M. & Schmid, S., 2014. Neighbourhood Ethnic Diversity and Orientations Toward Muslims in Britain: The Role of Intergroup Contact, *Political Quarterly,* 85 (3), p. 320–25.

Hewstone, M. & Swart, H., 2011. Fifty-odd years of inter-group contact: From hypothesis to integrated theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology,* 50(3), p. 374-386

Hjerm, M., 2009. Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Cross-Municipal Variation in the Proportion of Immigrants**,** *Acta Sociologica,* 52(1), p. 47–62

Homola, J. & Tavits, M., 2017. Contact Reduces Immigration-Related Fears for Leftist but Not for Rightist Voters, *Comparative Political Studies,* 51 (13), p. 1789 –1820.

Hopkins, D. J., 2014. One Language, Two Meanings: Partisanship and Responses to Spanish. *Political Communication,* 31, p. 421–45.

Hopkins, D. J., Tran, V. C, & Williamson, A. F., 2014. See no Spanish: language, local context, and attitudes toward immigration, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 2 (1), p. 35-51.

Hox, J., 2010. *Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications*. New York: Routledge.

Huber, P. & Oberdabernig, D. A., 2016. The impact of welfare benefits on natives' and immigrants' attitudes toward immigration, *European Journal of Political Economy,* 44, p. 53-78.

Huckfeldt, R. R., 1979. Political participation and the neighborhood social context. *American Journal of Political Science,* 23(3), p. 579–592.

IOM., 2020. *World Migration Report 2020.* International Organization for Migration. URL: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf (Accessed 1.4.2021).

Isotalo, V., Söderlund, P. & von Scoultz, Å., 2020. Polarisoituuko politiikka Suomessa? Puolueiden äänestäjäkuntien arvosiirtymät 2003–2019, In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & H. Wass (eds), *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos – Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2019* (p. 288-306). Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

Jaakkola, M., 1989. *Suomalaisten suhtautuminen ulkomaalaisiin ja ulkomaalaispolitiikkaan*. Helsinki: Ministry of Economic Affairs and and Employment of Finland.

Jaakkola, M., 1995. *Suomalaisten kiristyvät ulkomaalaisasenteet*. Helsinki: Ministry of Economic Affairs and and Employment of Finland.

Jaakkola, M., 1999. *Maahanmuutto ja etniset asenteet: suomalaisten suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin 1987–1999*. Helsinki: Ministry of Economic Affairs and and Employment of Finland.

Jaakkola, M., 2005. *Suomalaisten suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin vuosina 1987–2003*. Työpoliittinen tutkimus 286. Helsinki: Ministry of Economic Affairs and and Employment of Finland.

Jaakkola, M., 2009. *Maahanmuuttajat suomalaisten näkökulmasta. Asennemuutokset 1987–2007*. Helsinki: City of Helsinki.

Jackman M. R., 1978. General and Applied Tolerance: Does Education Increase Commitment to Racial Integration? *American Journal of Political Science,* 22(2), p. 302–324.

Just, A. & Anderson, C. J., 2015. Dual Allegiances? Immigrants' Attitudes toward Immigration, *Journal of Politics,* 77(1), p. 188-201.

Karakayali, N., 2009. Social Distance and Affective Orientations, *Sociological Forum*, 24(3), p. 538-562.

Kaufman, E. & Harris, G., 2015. "White Flight" of Positive Contact? Local Diversity and Attitudes to Immigration in Britain, *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(12), p. 1563-1590.

Kaufmann, E. & Goodwin, M., 2018. The diversity wave: A meta-analysis of the native-born white response to ethnic diversity. *Social Science Research*, *76*, p. 120–131.

Kauppinen, J. & Vaalavuo, M., 2017. *URMI kaupunkianalyysi: Työikäisen väestön alueellinen eriytyminen synnyinmaan ja tulotason mukaan suurilla kaupunkiseuduilla*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

Keskinen, S., 2016. From welfare nationalism to welfare chauvinism: Economic rhetoric, the welfare state an changing asylum politics in Finland. *Critical Social Policy,* 36 (3), p. 352 - 370

Key, V. O., 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.

Korsgaard, O., 2006. The Danish way how to establish the nation in the hearts of the people. In J. Campbell, J. A. Hall, & O. K. Pedersen (Eds.), *National identity and the varieties of capitalism* (p. 133-158). Montreal, Quebec, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Kriesi, H. & Schulte-Cloos, J., 2020. Support for radical parties in Western Europe: Structural conflicts and political dynamics, *Electoral Studies,* 65, p. 102-138.

Krysan, M., 2002. Whites who say they flee: Who are they and why would they leave? *Demography*, 39(4), p. 675-696.

Kulin, J., Eger, M. A. & Hjerm, M., 2016. Immigration or Welfare? The Progressive's Dilemma Revisited, *Socius: Sociological Research fora Dynamic World*, 2, p. 1–15.

Kustov, A., Dillon, L. & Cassidy, R., 2021. The Stability of Immigration Attitudes: Evidence and Implication. *Journal of Politics,* 83(4), 1478-1494.

Lapinski, J. S., Peltola, P., Shaw, G. & Yang, A. 1997. Trends: Immigrants and Immigraiton, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61(2), p. 356-383.

Lichter, D. T. & Ziliak, J. P. 2017. The Rural-Urban Interface: New Pattern of Spatial Interdependence and Inequality in America, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 672, p. 6-25.

Lijphat, A., 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3), p. 682-693.

Luke, D. A., 2004. *Multilevel modeling*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Luskin, R. C., O' Flynn, I., Fishkin, J. S. & Russell, D., 2014. Deliberating across Deep Divides, *Political Studies,* 62 (2), p. 116–135.

Martikainen, T. Saukkonen, P. & Säävälä, M., 2013. Johdanto: Suomi muuttuu kun Suomeen muutetaan, In T. Martikainen, P. Saukkonen & M. Säävälä (eds.), *Muuttajat* (p. 13-19). Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Martinovic, B., 2013. The inter-ethnic contacts of immigrants and natives in the Netherlands: a two-sided perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 39(1), p. 69–85.

Maxwell, R., 2019. Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects? *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), p. 456–474.

Maxwell, R., 2020. Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism: Evidence From Switzerland, *Comparative Political Studies,* 53(13), p. 2061-2090.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. & Cook, J. M., 2001. Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, *Annual Review of Sociology,* 27, p. 415-444.

Meckstroth, T., 1975. "Most different systems" and "Most similar systems". A Study in the Logic of Comparative Inquiry, *Comparative Political Studies,* 8(2), p. 132-157.

Mill, J. S. & Robson, J. M., 1978. *Collected works of John Stuart Mill. Ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation / 7-8, A system of logic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Miller, W. L., 1977. *Electoral Dynamics in Britain Since 1918.* London: Macmillan.

Müller, T. S., Thomas, U. G. & Koskinen, J. H., 2018. Residential Segregation and "Ethnic Flight" vs. "Ethnic Avoidance" in Sweden. *European Sociological Review,* 34(3), 268–85.

Mutz, D. C., 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Newman, B. J., Hartman, T. K. & Taber, C. S., 2012. Foreign language exposure, cultural threat, and opposition to immigration. *Political Psycholoy,* 33, p. 635–657

Niemeyer, S & Jennstål, J., 2018. Scaling up Deliberative Effects – Applying lessons of mini-publics, In A. Bächtiger, J. Dryzek., J. Mansbridge & M. Warren (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy* (p. 329-347). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. & Inglehart, R., 2018. *Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Rourke, K. H. & Sinnott, R., 2006. The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. *European Journal of Political Economy,* 22, p. 838–861

Pager, D. & Shepherd, H., 2008. The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, *The Annual Review of Sociology* 2008, 34, p. 181–209.

Park, R. E., 1950. *Race and Culture*. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Parker, S., 2015. "Unwanted Invaders": The Representation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK and Australian Print Media. *Myth and Nation*, 23(1), p. 1-21.

Pattie, C. & Johnston, R., 2000. "People who talk together, vote together": an exploration of contextual effects in Great Britain, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 90 (1), p. 41–66.

Pattie, C. & Johnston, R., 2016. Talking with one voice? Conversation networks and political polarization, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 18(2), p. 482-497.

Perälä, A. & Niemi, M. K., 2018. Asylum Seekers Arrived, Elites Occupied the Air. Topics and Interviewees in YLE's Magazine Programmes During the "Asylum-Seeker Crisis", *Nordicom Review* 39, p. 79-93.

Peters, B. T., 1998. *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods,* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L., 2006. "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), p. 751–783.

Pichler, F., 2010. Foundations of Anti-immigrant Sentiment: The Variable Nature of Perceived Group Threat across Changing European Societies, 2002–2006. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 51(6), p. 445-469.

Polit, D. & Beck, C. T., 2010. Generalization in quantitative and qualitative research: Myths and strategies, *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, 47, p. 1451-1458.

Putnam, R., 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, R., 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century: The Johan Skytte Prize Lecture" *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30 (2), p. 134–167.

Puuronen, V., 2011. *Rasistinen Suomi*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Pyrhönen, N., 2015. *The True Colors of Finnish Welfare Nationalism - Consolidation of Neo-Populist Advocacy as a Resonant Collective Identity through Mobilization of Exclusionary Narratives of Blue and White Solidarity*. Helsinki: Svenska social- och kommunalhögskolan vid Helsingfors universitet.

Rabe-Hesketh, S. & Skrondal, A., 2012. *Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata* (3rd ed.). College Station: Stata Press.

Rasinkangas, J., 2013. *Sosiaalinen eriytyminen Turun kaupunkiseudulla. Tutkimus asumisen alueellisista muutoksista ja asumispreferensseistä*. Turku: Migration Institure of Finland.

Rasinkangas, J., 2014. *Maahanmuuttajien asumisen keskittyminen Turussa*. Tutkimuskatsauksia 3/14. Turku: City of Turku.

Reny T. T., Collingwood, L. & Valenzuela, A. A., 2019. Vote switching in the 2016 election: how racial and immigration attitudes, not economics, explain shifts in white voting. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 83(1), p. 91–113.

Reiljan A., 2019. 'Fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems', *European Journal of Political Research,* 59, p. 376–396. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12351.

Ricoeur, P., 1984**.** *Time and narrative, volume 2*. K. McLaughlin & D. Pellaur (trans.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Roccas, S. & Brewer, M. B., 2002. Social identity complexity*, Personality and Social Psychology*, 6, p. 88–106.

Ryan, M. & Smith, G., 2014. Defining Mini-publics, in In Grönlund, Bächtiger & Setälä (eds.), *Deliberative Mini-publics. Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process* (p. 9-26). Colchester: ECPR Press.

Rydgren, J., 2008. Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47, p. 737–765.

Sampson, R. J., Morenoff, J. D. & Gannon-Rowley, T., 2002. Assessing "neighborhood effects": social processes and new directions in research. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 28, p. 443–478.

Sanderson, M. R., Semyonov, M. & Gorodzeisky, A., 2021. Declining and splitting: Opposition to immigration in the United States, 1996–2018, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,* 80, p. 27-39

Scheepers P., Gijsberts, M. & Coenders, M., 2002. Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries. Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat. *European Sociological Review*, 18(1), p. 17–34.

Schkade, D., Sunstein, C. R., & Hastie, R., 2010. When Deliberation Produces Extremism. *Critical Review*, *22*(2–3), p. 227–252.

Semyonov, M. & Glikman, A., 2009. Ethnic residential segregation, social contacts, and anti-minority attitudes in European societies. *European Sociological Review*, 25, p. 693–708.

Sen, A., 2006. *Identity & Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*. London: Penguin Books.

Setälä, M., 2017. Connecting deliberative mini-publics to representative decision making. *European Journal of Political Research,* 56, p. 846–863. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12207

Setälä M., Grönlund K. & Herne K., 2010. Citizen Deliberation on Nuclear Power: A Comparison of Two Decision-Making Methods. *Political Studies*, 58 (4), p. 688-714.

Setälä M. & Smith G., 2018. Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy. In A. Bächtiger J. Dryzek. J. Mansbridge and M. Warren (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy* (p. 300-314). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sides, J. & Citrin, J., 2007. European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests and information. *British Journal of Political Science,* 37(3), p. 477–504.

Siebers, H. & Dennisen, M. H. J., 2014. Is It Cultural Racism? Discursive Exclusion and Oppression of Migrants in the Netherlands. *Current Sociology,* 2014, p. 1–20.

Sigelman, L. & Niemi, R. G., 2001. Innumeracy about Minority Populations: African Americans and Whites Compared. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 65 (1), p. 86–94.

Simmel, G., ed. K. H. Wolff, 1950. *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press.

Skrbis, Z. & Woodward, I., 2007. The ambivalence of ordinary cosmopolitanism: Investigating the limits of cosmopolitan openness. *The Sociological Review,* 55(4), p. 730–747.

Statistics Finland., 2012. Statistics on Turku.

Statistics Finland., 2019. Population 31.12. by Area, Sex, Year, Language and Information. *Statistics Finland's PX-Web databases*. Retrieved May 16, 2019 (http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__vrm__vaerak/statfin_vaerak_pxt_11rm.px/table/tableViewLayout1/)

Steele, L. G., & Perkins, K M., 2019. The Effects of Perceived Neighborhood Immigration Size on Preferences for Redistribution in New York City: A Pilot Study. *Frontiers in Sociology,* 4 (18), p. 1–13.

Stockemer, D., Niemann, A., Unger, D. & Speyer, J., 2020. The "refugee crisis," immigration attitudes, and euroscepticism. *International Migration Review,* 54(3): p. 883–912.

Stolle, D., Soroka, S. & Johnston, R., 2008. When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions. *Political Studies,* 56, p. 57–75.

Stone, L., 1979. "he Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History, *Past and Present*, 85, 8-24.

Sunstein, C., 2002. The law of group polarization. *Journal of Political Psychology,* 10, p. 175–195.

Sunstein, C., 2009. *Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tashakkori, A. & Creswell, J., 2007. Editorial: The New Era of Mixed Methods, *Journal of Mixed Methods Research,* 1(1), p. 3-7.

Taylor, M. C., 1998. How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count. *American Sociological Review*, 63 (4), p. 512-535.

Tobler W., 1970. A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit region. *Economic Geography*, 46(2), p. 234-240.

van der Brug, W. & Harteveld, E., 2021. The conditional effects of the refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and nationalism, *European Union Politics,* 22(2), p. 227-247.

Vollmer, B., & Karakayali, S., 2018. The volatility of the discourse on refugees in Germany. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 16 (1-2), p. 118-139.

Välimäki M., 2012. Maahanmuutto – politiikan arka aihe. In. V. Pernaa and E. Railo (eds.), *Jytky, Eduskuntavaalien 2011 mediajulkisuus* (p. 264-292). Turku: Kirja-Aurora.

Walks, A., 2004. Place of residence, party preferences, and political attitudes in Canadian cities and suburbs. *Journal of Urban Affairs,* 26 (3), p. 269–295.

Walks A., 2006. The causes of city-suburban political polarization? A Canadian case study. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 96, (2), p. 390–414.

Westinen, J., 2016. Puoluevalinta Suomessa 2000-luvulla. In K. Grönlund & H. Wass (eds.), *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen – Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2015* (p. 249–272). Helsinki: Ministry of Justice.

White, H., 1987. *The Content of Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

White, H., 1990. *Metahistory: The Imagination in Nineteenh-Century Europe*. Ithaca: The John Hopkins University Press

Wilkes, R., Guppy, N. & Farris, L., 2008. "No thanks, we're full": individual characteristics, national context, and changing attitudes toward immigration. *International Migration Review,* 42, p. 302–329.

Young, I. M., 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

TURUN
YLIOPISTO
UNIVERSITY
OF TURKU

Painosalama, Turku, Finland 2021

ISBN 978-951-29-8700-9 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-8701-6 (PDF)
ISSN 0082-6987 (Print)
ISSN 2343-3191 (Online)