

BERICHTE UND KRITIK

GAUS ON IDEAL JUSTICE*

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I. Introduction

This paper is inspired by Gerald Gaus's book, *The Tyranny of the Ideal* (2016), but my aim is not to review the book. Instead, I will present two inter-related remarks that are closely connected to the central themes of the book. The first remark concerns the distinction between ideal theories (that bypass the existence of the so-called bad facts) and non-ideal theories (that accept that bad facts are real). I aim to show that the distinction between the two can be clarified. The distinction between the claims that do not take all bad facts (or any bad fact) as given and the claims that take all bad facts as given should not be confused with the distinction between the claims that guide decision-making in the ideal circumstances and the claims that guide decision-making in the real world. The second remark concerns the fact that pursuit of gradual improvements in justice and chase of more ambitious ideal goals can be conflicting strategies. I will argue that sometimes the conflict is merely apparent. Although it may look as if we must make a choice, we can actually *both* try to make gradual improvements *and* pursue ideal goals that would remove bad facts from the scene. Gaus's book criticizes ideals; I will try to say something in their defense.

II. The Thesis

In his analytical, rich, and provocative book *The Tyranny of the Ideal* Gerald Gaus argues that we “often must choose between relatively certain (perhaps large) local improvements in justice and pursuit of a considerably less certain ideal, which would yield optimal justice”.¹ This claim sounds correct and it is hard to imagine that anyone interested in social ideals would like to

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¹ *Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society*, Princeton 2016, p. 82. Gaus argues that the choice is “inherent in the project of ideal theory”, p. 83.

deny it. Gaus also argues that political philosophers should concentrate on concrete social improvements rather than on ideals of justice, at least, if they want to bring about anything useful. A “political philosophy that is unable to describe any but the top, ideal social state, is of little use in helping us sort through the options for justice that confront us”.² This latter claim is controversial – many of us think that ideals should and do guide action – but surely the claim has many supporters. Furthermore, the “ideal social states” that Gaus often seems to have in mind are infamous ideologies from the twentieth century, and those ideals are certainly useless for the daily political decisions of democratic and diverse societies.³

In recent decades, one of the central questions in political philosophy has been the question of how we should theorize about justice and what the task of political philosophy is. The substantive questions (concerning taxation, health care, privacy, war, and so on) have still gathered attention from political theorists, but quite many contributions have been made by social scientists rather than philosophers. Perhaps we could talk about a metaphilosophical turn in political philosophy. Gaus’s book is interesting as it also aims to contribute, at least to some degree, to a topic that one might expect political philosophers to deal with: the content of justice. Although Gaus writes about methodological issues (such as feasibility, second-best options, measuring similarity), he does not limit his discussion to these but defends the principles of a truly open and pluralistic society. In those societies people have diverse opinions about optimal justice, and an acceptable theory of justice is based on that fact and builds on it. In general, we should proceed cautiously when striving for a just world.⁴

The aim of this paper is not to review Gaus’s book that will certainly receive a plenty of attention that it definitely deserves. Instead, I will present two interrelated remarks that are closely connected to some of the central themes of the book. This explains the title of this paper. The first remark concerns the distinction between ideal theories (that bypass the existence of the so-called bad facts) and non-ideal theories (that accept that bad facts are real). I aim to show that the distinction between the two can be clarified, but the point is not to say that Gaus would be unaware of the muddy nature of the distinction. He makes it clear at the start that the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories can be drawn in various ways. The second remark concerns the observation that we must often choose between local improvement and more ambitious goals, ideal states. I will argue that while this claim is true, it also holds that very often the “necessary choice” between these two is really not necessary. Instead, very often we can *both* try to make local improvements

² Ibid., p. 12.

³ Cf. *Dave Estlund*, *The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo: Gaus on the Uses of Justice*, in: *Ethics* 127 (2017), pp. 912–928, 920.

⁴ For a discussion, see e.g. *A. John Simmons*, *Ideal and Nonideal Theory*, in: *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 28 (2010), pp. 5–36, 21; *Juha Räikkä*, *Social Justice in Practice*, Heidelberg 2014, Ch. 2, “The Dilemma of Conservative Justice”.

and pursue ideal goals that would remove bad facts from the scene. No doubt, this is somewhat obvious, but I try to clarify why the “non-ideal” recommendations (that take a particular fault as given) and the “ideal” recommendations (that do not take that fault as given) may sometimes *seem* to have an uneasy relation with each other, although they are ultimately compatible.

III. Bad Facts, Policy Claims, and Removal Claims

Let us start with the first remark. The crucial concept here is that of “bad fact”. Bad facts are facts about our behavior and institutions. They are bad because they are facts about real-world moral deficiencies. They are social defects that have a human origin. Racist discrimination, domestic violence, school bullying, and the threat of being spied upon by state authorities are examples of bad facts. Arguably, in a morally perfect world, there would be no bad facts.⁵

Political philosophers can take bad facts as given.⁶ John Rawls, for example, argued that although social and economic inequalities are *prima facie* unacceptable and bad, “liberty and opportunity, income and wealth” may be distributed unequally, if such unequal distribution “is to everyone’s advantage”.⁷ According to Rawls an unequal distribution of goods can thus be just, as such a distribution benefits everyone in the world where people are sometimes unwilling to work on behalf of others’ wellbeing without special rewards.⁸ Many others have argued that incorporating bad facts into one’s conception of justice is a mistaken move. G. A. Cohen writes that we should not misidentify the question “What is Justice?” with the question “What principles should we adopt to regulate our affairs?”⁹ Dave Estlund argues that *prime justice* deals with the question of what ought the social basic structure

⁵ Bad facts were discussed by Dave Estlund in his paper on “Bad Facts”, Melbourne, August 2012.

⁶ An example of a bad fact is, possibly, the fact that people are sometimes unwilling to work very hard on behalf of others’ wellbeing if they do not receive a special reward for their work. The fact that people lack sufficient motivation to work on behalf of the wellbeing of others seems bad if we make a couple of assumptions. The fact seems bad if we assume, among other things, that (1) some people would be in a worse situation than they easily could be if we do not allow special rewards to some others; that (2) it would be bad if some people would be in a worse situation than they easily could be; that (3) special rewards result in social and economic inequalities; and that (4) social and economic inequalities are bad.

⁷ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford 1971, p. 62.

⁸ Cf. Jan Narveson, Rawls on Equal Distribution of Wealth, in: *Philosophia* 7 (1978), pp. 281–292. See also Sem de Maagt, In Defence of Fact-Dependency, in: *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 44 (2014), pp. 443–462, 456: “Unfortunately, Rawls does not provide any criteria to distinguish between the general facts of human nature and those aspects of our nature that are malleable.”

⁹ G. A. Cohen, Facts and Principles, in: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 31 (2003), pp. 211–245, 244.

to be like given that nothing is going morally wrong.¹⁰ According to Estlund, “it is a mistake to think that principles of justice must identify conditions that it is appropriate to set as practical goals”.¹¹ In his view, it is a “philosophical mistake to evaluate the truth of a theory of justice according to whether its principles could be put to certain practical uses”.¹² Gaus seems to disagree with Cohen and Estlund, at least to a degree, as he argues that “to think about justice is to think about where we should move”.¹³ In his view, political philosophy primarily concerns action.

Fortunately, for the present purposes, we can skip the debate on the task(s) of political philosophy, and turn to the distinction between ideal theories and non-ideal theories, or *ideal claims* and *policy claims*, as I will call them. It is commonplace to distinguish between considerations that aim to characterize just and morally appropriate actions in ideal circumstances (where nothing is going morally wrong) and considerations that aim to characterize just and morally appropriate actions in real world circumstances (where many things are going morally wrong).¹⁴ The considerations that aim to characterize just and morally appropriate actions in ideal circumstances are “ideal claims”, and the considerations that aim to characterize just and morally appropriate actions in real world circumstances are “policy claims”. The ideal claims idealize bad facts away and, in order to do so, they must tell which facts are bad. When we know which facts are bad facts, then we know which kinds of circumstances are ideal circumstances, and we can ask which kinds of actions justice and morality would require us to undertake in those circumstances. The policy claims are action-guiding claims that should take all the relevant facts into account in order to provide appropriate guidance. Some of the relevant facts that policy claims should take into account are bad facts. An understanding of what is good and bad, or just and unjust, is a precondition of policy claims. Without such an understanding, one could not compare the moral desirability of competing policy claims, nor could one choose between them when the claims seem equally feasible.

Consider the question: Which kinds of protest demonstrations should be allowed, given that some of them are likely to lead to racist violence? If we make an ideal claim that the threat of racist violence is a bad fact, and thus assume that there is no threat of racist violence in ideal circumstances, then it is clear that the question is not a suitable object of considerations that aim to charac-

¹⁰ Dave Estlund, Prime Justice, in: M. Weber/K. Vallier (eds.), *Political Utopias: Contemporary Debate*, Oxford 2017, pp. 35–55, 36. Presented also in Copenhagen Facts & Norms II workshop, August 2015.

¹¹ Dave Estlund, Utopophobia, in: *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 42 (2014), pp. 113–134, 130.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Gaus, *The Tyranny of the Ideal* (note 1), p. 61.

¹⁴ See e.g. Holly Lawford-Smith, Review of Social Justice in Practice, in: *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 50 (2014), pp. 473–478, 476: “Whether” a political theorist wants to make an unconditional, ‘ideal’ claim, or a conditional, ‘feasibility-constrained’ claim, depends on the kind of project she is interested in.”

terize just and morally appropriate action in ideal circumstances.¹⁵ However, the question is certainly a suitable object of considerations that aim to characterize just and morally appropriate actions in real world circumstances. Obviously, the threat of racist violence is a fact that should be taken into account in choosing between policy options. Seen in this way, the traditional distinction between ideal claims and policy claims is a distinction between

- a) the claims that do not take a particular bad fact (such as a threat of racist violence) as given, and guide decision-making in the world that lacks that fact, and
- b) the claims that take that bad fact as given and consider it as a necessary evil – at least for the time being – and guide decision-making in the real world.

The distinction is informative.¹⁶ However, it is important to notice that there are also claims that do not take a particular bad fact (such as a threat of racist violence) as given, although they guide decision-making in the real world. Call them *removal claims*. They are claims that are meant to solve the problem of how to *remove* a particular bad fact, say, a threat of racist violence. Removal claims have a close connection to the ideal claims, as the aim of the removal claims is to guide our way to the ideal circumstances. When we make a removal claim we do not consider a particular bad fact as a necessary evil but fight against it. We are “idealists”. However, the removal claims also resemble policy claims. Both the removal claims and the policy claims should take into account the existing circumstances, as they aim to guide decision-making in the real world. When we make a removal claim in order to fight against a particular bad fact (such as a threat of racist violence), then we usually need to take the *other* facts as given. Some of them are bad.

Removal claims are particular kinds of reactions against bad facts, that is, reactions that aim to tell how we should act in order to remove a particular bad fact. However, bad facts can also lead to other kinds of reactions. We may want to modify the behavior that is considered bad and thereby make it less bad, or we may want to provide morally appropriate solutions to the situations that are caused by bad behavior. The claims that concern such issues are not removal claims. They are policy claims, and their proponents do not demand that we try to change the world so that it would resemble ideal circumstances. The proponents would be content with something less, at least

¹⁵ Why would anyone protest in the ideal circumstances? After all, there are no moral deficiencies that one could oppose. But perhaps people could still *think* that there is something to oppose. False beliefs need not be moral flaws.

¹⁶ The distinction reflects the fact that political philosophy has many tasks. Cf. *Dave Estlund*, Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, in: *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 39 (2011), pp. 207–237, 208. Estlund argues that human nature “is a constraint on *some tasks in political philosophy* but not on others”. Italics added. For a recent work on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, see e.g. *Laura Valentini*, On the Messy ‘Utopophobia vs. Factophobia’ Controversy: A Systematization and Assessment, in: Weber/Vallier (note 10), pp. 11–33.

for the time being. All reactions against bad facts presuppose a judgment that indicates which facts are bad facts.¹⁷

Because both the removal claims and the policy claims address real world problems and aim to define our practical goals and the appropriate means to achieve them, these two classes of claims should not be treated as independent of each other. Both the removal claims and the policy claims imply *norms*.¹⁸ We could say that the removal claims imply removal norms and that the policy claims imply policy norms. It is clear that all the norms should have an appropriate relation with each other.

The lesson is that those who strive for ideal justice by supporting removal norms can be fairly practical and clear-minded people. It would be unfair to think that only those who are interested in policy norms and local improvements are sensible people. Of course, Gaus's campaign against ideals is not a campaign against removal claims.¹⁹ My point here is only that having ambitious moral goals does not mean that one closes one's eyes to the facts.

IV. The Unnecessity of the Choice

Let us now turn to my second remark. Gaus argues that we “often must choose between relatively certain (perhaps large) local improvements in justice and pursuit of a considerably less certain ideal, which would yield optimal justice”.²⁰ He has in mind extensive ideals and theories defended by political philosophers (such as Plato and Rawls), but the point applies to rather earthly ideals as well. Pretty often we must choose whether we want to attempt to *relieve* the adverse effects of certain unjust social practices or whether we try to *eradicate* those practices altogether.²¹ However, it is important to keep in mind that in *most* cases it is reasonable to deal with bad facts with two different strategies. On the one hand, one should try to get rid of bad facts and adopt the most effective (morally acceptable) means to fight against them. One should rely on appropriate removal norms. On the other hand, one should confess the existence of bad facts and try to develop and follow the (morally)

¹⁷ Ideal claims, policy claims and removal claims may all be based on similar values.

¹⁸ For instance, the policy claim that “it is not advisable to allow protest demonstrations without appropriate security measures, given the threat of racist violence” would ground the norm that “the relevant authorities ought not to allow protest demonstrations in the absence of appropriate security measures”. The policy claim that “it is not advisable to allow protest demonstrations without appropriate security measures, given the threat of racist violence” aims to reduce the threat of racist violence and make racist violence less likely, but it does not aim to *remove* the fact that there is a threat of racist violence.

¹⁹ It is not clear that Gaus opposes all ideals. See *Estlund*, The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo (note 3), p. 912.

²⁰ *Gaus*, The Tyranny of the Ideal (note 1), p. 82.

²¹ Removal claims aim to remove particular bad facts. The “grand theories” that Gaus opposes aim to reduce *all* bad facts. *Gaus*, The Tyranny of the Ideal (note 1), pp. 143f.

best practices given that certain unfortunate things will remain in place, in a form or another. One should rely on appropriate policy norms. In some cases it may *seem* that these two strategies are not compatible and that we must make a choice (perhaps by comparing the feasibility of the strategies), but very often their incompatibility is merely apparent.²² Consider three (slightly artificial) scenarios. In all three cases the action-guiding implications of a removal claim and the action-guiding implications of a policy claim have an uneasy relation, but in all cases there is a relatively easy solution to the problem.

Case 1 (resources): Suppose that there is a serious bullying problem at a particular school. The principal of the school easily realizes two things: first, that school bullying is a bad phenomenon that should be eradicated as quickly as possible; and second, that it is highly unlikely that she will be able to eradicate it in the near future and that she should find morally appropriate ways to settle the issues that will inevitably arise.²³ The principal has some resources for these kinds of situations. She nominates two committees that consist of psychologists, teachers, school bullying experts, and parents. The aim of the first committee is to recommend how school bullying can be eradicated. In the ideal world it is eradicated. The second committee tries to define the best practices for the settlement of school bullying issues. However, as it happens, the principal's resources are limited. She cannot pay very much for the experts and the others, and soon she notices that the meetings of the committees are surprisingly expensive. As a result, both committees have a chance to meet only a few times, and neither of them achieves its goals.²⁴ The principal's removal claim that there should be a committee that aims to find means to eradicate school bullying and her policy claim that there should also be a committee that aims to define the best practices for the settlement of school bullying issues did not have an appropriate relation with each other. The two claims came into conflict – not because of logic, but because of the world.²⁵

²² The notion of feasibility has gathered a lot of attention from among philosophers. When a choice between two or more strategies is necessary, feasibility considerations become important. However, it is unclear how often a choice is really necessary. It may be that, quite often, it merely seems necessary. Recent work on feasibility, see e.g. *Alan Hamlin*, Feasibility Four Ways, in: *Social Philosophy and Policy* 34 (2017), pp. 209–232; *David Wiens*, Political Ideals and the Feasibility Frontier, in: *Economics and Philosophy* 31 (2015), pp. 447–477.

²³ Here I assume that there is usually a side that is morally responsible for bullying in schools but I do not suggest that it is necessarily the bullies who are responsible. Perhaps their parents are responsible, or perhaps the politicians who have decided not to support families are responsible, or someone else. In any case, the fact that bullying in schools exists is a fact about real-world moral deficiencies.

²⁴ The principal did not know how expensive the meetings would be, and therefore she made a wrong decision. As far as the principal is morally responsible for her ignorance, she is also responsible for the sad consequences.

²⁵ We could say that two norms are not *inconsistent* if there is a possible world in which they both can be realized. If so, the principal's removal norm and her policy norm were not inconsistent. But obviously they conflicted. It is just that their conflict was a contingent thing. Cf. *Bernard Williams*, Ethical Consistency, in: C. W. Gowans (ed.),

Case 2 (de facto implications): Suppose that the adult members of a religious sect treat children very badly. The children would be taken into care were it not the case that their bad treatment happens under the cover of religion. Suppose also that there are two organizations that are active with regard to the situation. The first organization has an ambitious goal and it tries to criminalize the actions of the sect. They are “idealists”. The second organization shares the view that, in principle, the actions should be banned, but it has a less ambitious goal and tries to influence the practices of the sect and help the children who have suffered. To some extent, the second organization succeeds in its efforts. Unfortunately, its success has a negative influence on the prospects of the first organization. The success gets publicity, and the public pressure to criminalize the violent and rough actions of the sect decreases.²⁶ As a result, the legislators are even more confident that the actions of the sect should be protected by the freedom of religion, conceived as a fundamental human right. The second organization’s policy claim and its realization made the plan that was based on the first organization’s removal claim unlikely to succeed. In this sense, the removal claim that the violent actions of the sect should be banned and the policy claim that the sect should be forced to change its practices (and that the children who have suffered must be helped), had an uneasy relation.

Case 3 (easily removable bad facts): Suppose that an experienced trainer of a teenagers’ basketball team notices that one of her players is a pretty complicated young man who causes serious problems within the team. The trainer realizes that this is not how things should be. She asks the representatives of the sports organization to have a serious discussion with the player so that he will change his behavior, and she talks with the other team members and advises them how to live with the fact that the player is violent and arrogant in many ways. They meet a couple of times, and some of the parents participate in the meetings. Unfortunately, all this is more or less futile. When the representatives of the organization heard about the case, they decided to place the trouble-maker in one of the special groups of the sports organization, although they never informed the trainer about the decision. The failure to exchange information was due to some misunderstandings. The trainer’s policy claim (that the teammates should be advised) was problematic, because the removal claim she had originally in mind (that there should be a serious discussion) was substituted by another removal claim (that the player should be placed in another group). The action that was based on the removal claim of the representatives of the organization *removed* the bad fact. Thus there was no need for the policy claims, that is, for the claims that take a particular bad fact as given.²⁷

Moral Dilemmas, New York 1980, pp. 115–137, 118; *Ruth Marcus*, Moral Dilemmas and Consistency, in: Gowans, *ibid.*, pp. 188–204, 195.

²⁶ Some people oppose development aid on the basis that successful aid programs may decrease the public pressure to remove unjust global structures.

²⁷ The trainer took a nonexistent bad fact as given – although it was not her fault that she did so. The question was about a misunderstanding, but surely this should be

One might think that the three cases suggest that usually a choice must be made between gradual improvements and more ambitious ideal goals. If the agents do not choose, they may end up in trouble. For various reasons, the *content* of a particular removal norm can be such that, if one acts in accordance with it, then it will be impossible, or very difficult, or completely futile, to act in accordance of a particular policy norm that has a certain kind of content. Similarly, the *content* of a particular policy norm can be such that conforming to it has effects on one's chances to conform to a particular removal norm. However, it should be obvious that in all three cases there was an "easy" solution to the problem. In the first case, the principal should have been given more resources (if possible). In the second case, the organizations that oppose the religious sect should have coordinated their strategies and activities.²⁸ In the third case, the trainer and the representatives of the organization should have communicated with each other in order to prevent any misunderstanding.

The lesson is that in earthly matters we need not always choose between gradual improvements in justice and pursuit of ideals that would remove bad facts altogether – although it may often look as if we must make a choice (or "The Choice", to use Gaus's expression). Whether the same is true regarding larger social ideals is a separate question that I leave readers to decide.²⁹

V. Concluding Remarks

I have argued that the distinction between the claims that do not take all bad facts (or any bad fact) as given and the claims that take all bad facts as given should not be confused with the distinction between the claims that guide de-

avoided, if possible at all. When policy claims guide actions they may require considerable sacrifices from many actors. Usually, it is relatively easy to check which bad facts are real and which are merely imaginary but there are cases in which the question may not be that simple. Is there a large-scale misuse of social benefits, say, in the UK, or is the claim that there is merely one of those infamous alternative facts that politicians should put aside? People disagree on these kinds of issues.

²⁸ The claims about what should be done, given that a particular bad fact will remain in place, should be formulated *together* with some of the claims that do not take that bad fact as given, namely with the claims that concern the question what should be done in order to fight *against* that bad fact. In principle, the removal claims can be formulated so that they actually *help* to act in accordance with the other demands that should guide action in the real world. Similarly, those other demands can *support* our efforts to follow the norms that are based on removal claims. However, formulating the two classes of recommendations in this way is a demanding project of institutional design.

²⁹ Steps that improve justice can sometimes conflict with steps toward much greater justice. This may mean that a choice (or "The Choice") must be made. Cf. *Estlund*, *The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo* (note 3), pp. 913, 915. See also *Simmons*, *Ideal and Nonideal Theory* (note 4), p. 24. In Gaus's view, we should take cautious and conservative steps, but perhaps we can *also* take more ambitious steps – perhaps the situations in which The Choice is necessary are surprisingly rare.

cision-making in the ideal circumstances and the claims that guide decision-making in the real world. Removal claims are meant to solve the problem of how to remove a particular bad fact, and they are claims that do not take all bad facts as given, although their purpose is to guide decision-making in the real world. I have also argued that while it is true that we must often choose between local improvement and more ambitious ideal goals, it also holds that very often the “necessary choice” between these two is really not necessary. Instead, we can usually try *both* to make local improvements *and* pursuit ideal goals that would remove bad facts, or a particular bad fact, altogether.

I have referred to Gerald Gaus’s intriguing book to put forward my own discussion. Gaus’s book criticizes ideals; I have tried to say something in their defense. However, the points I have made should not be interpreted as direct remarks against *The Tyranny of the Ideals*. The book and the discussion that have started to surround it have been merely heuristic devices that have helped me to make my own points that seem relevant for the present discussion.

Let me finish by pointing out that there are many real life cases in which we have to be careful when we formulate policy claims and removal claims. Consider an example that derives from Serena Parekh’s new book on *Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement* (2017). There are three main possibilities on how to handle the refugee issues. First, there is the option of *repatriation* and, when it works out, refugees are able to return to their home countries. Second, there is the option of *integration* where refugees are integrated into the country to which they have fled. The third option is *resettlement* in a third country, say, a country in North America. However, in her book Parekh argues that, in fact, the *de facto* solution to the refugee question is commonly that of *encampment*: people are forcibly placed in camps where they can spend very long periods of time. Although displacement is often thought to be exceptional and temporary, displacement is a fact of everyday life and it is far from being temporary.³⁰ The moral justification for encampment seems to be the idea that it helps repatriation which is conceived as preferable to integration and resettlement. But the problem is that camps limit the rights of refugees, as they have restricted freedom of movement and no right to seek employment and are almost beyond the rule of law. Furthermore, camps can be dangerous, especially for women.³¹

In terms of policy and removal claims two solutions to the problem come easily to mind. On the one hand, one can defend a policy claim that the circumstances in camps should be improved. Material conditions need considerable improvement, and refugees should also be provided with political and economic rights. Children’s rights to education should be guaranteed. On the other hand, one may want to defend an idealistic removal claim that encampment as a *de facto* solution to the refugee question should be completely rejected. It

³⁰ Serena Parekh, *Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement*, London 2017, pp. 2 f.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 32–36.

is unlikely that camps can be improved so that living there would be safe for everyone, and that people's rights would be respected. Whether these two solutions are compatible is an open question but, arguably, they may have a rather uneasy relation. Were the circumstances in camps considerably better, this could have adverse effects on the fight against encampment. Political pressure toward camps cannot be very strong, if the circumstances there are reasonable. Anyone who would like to present both policy claims and removal claims in this context should take care that her suggestions do not conflict with each other and force us to make The Choice.