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Mannerheim in the Twenty-first Century: Finnish National Symbol, Aesthetics, and Media Strategies

Abstract:

This article analyses media discussions around three film projects of the 2000s and 2010s, interpreting the figure of field marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim from the point of view of Bourdieuan social aesthetics and civil religion. Mannerheim is a central part of Finnish civil religious concentration of symbols—that is symbols associated to the Finnish nation. This article analyses different actors' strategies of classification, legitimisation, de-legitimisation, and evaluation in relation to the three film projects. These socio-aesthetic strategies reflect the positions and competitive environment of the Finnish media field. Civil religious concentration of symbols and their connected aesthetic practices work as resources for media power and for classificatory power, and media competition creates a new kind of visibility for these civil religious symbols.

Keywords: Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim; civil religion; mediatisation; field theory; aesthetics; strategies

1. Mannerheim and Art Controversies in Finnish Media

> The problem with, or on the other hand, the blessing of Mannerheim's figure is that there is enough of him for everyone, like from Jesus' five loaves and two fish. You are allowed to adore him without control and hate him without limits. He is the savior of Finland and the executioner of the Finnish working class. After all this he succeeds in being the great unifier of the Finnish people. [...] Inside Mannerheim's armour there seems to be a hollow space, where one may pour anything.[1]

Hannu Raittila's description of the figure of field marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867–1951) in his novel *Marsalkka* ("The Marshal", 2010) raises the duality of his figure: there is the public side (the "armour"—Mannerheim as a central symbol of Finnish civil religion) and the

[1] Hannu Raittila, *Marsalkka* (Helsinki: Siltala, 2010), 285 and 287. All translations from Finnish by Jere Kyyrö.

private side (the "hollow space"), which is an object of continuing re-interpretations in the field of Finnish cultural production.[2]

I define civil religion as a pool of symbols, myths, and rituals connected to the nation, which can be used more or less successfully as a means of legitimisation or de-legitimisation. There is a social aesthetic side to this that is connected to discussions of the right ways of representing these civil religious items. In this work, I re-read theorisations on civil religion, originating from Robert N. Bellah through Pierre Bourdieu's ideas about social aesthetics, fields, and strategies of classification.[3] Tiina Mahlamäki's notions on civil religion and Nick Couldry's ideas on media and social theory work as catalysts to my reading of Bellah and Bourdieu.[4]

Especially in the 2000s and 2010s Mannerheim has been very prominent in Finnish media, often through art controversies. An apparent feature in these controversies has been the struggle for audiences between the public service broadcasting company Yle (abbreviation of Yleisradio, until 2012 also YLE) and privately funded media houses (SanomaWSOY and Alma Media).[5] Re-interpreting and defending national (or civil religious) symbols, such as

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[2] I am not making the case that Mannerheim should be considered a civil religious or national symbol; on the contrary, he can be both. My use of the concept of civil religion is heuristic, and, by using it, I wish to connect to and comment on certain discussions in the study of religion.

[3] Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," in: Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones (eds.), *American Civil Religion* (New York: Harper & Row. 1974), 21–44; Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*, ed. and intro. Randal Johnson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).

[4] Tiina Mahlamäki, *Naisia kansalaisuuden kynnyksellä: Eeva Joenpellon Lohja-sarjan tulkinta* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005), 210; Nick Couldry, *Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).

[5] Yle was funded by television license payments until 2013, and after that by the so-called Yle-tax.

Mannerheim, are useful resources for competing actors in the fields of media and cultural production at large, to gain audiences and to improve their positions in these fields. Mediatised environment creates a certain kind of civil religion. I analyse this phenomenon by tracing the aesthetic strategies, which relate to the three film projects interpreting Mannerheim. These film projects are used by different actors in the media field (journalism, news, television, and film productions of Yle, SanomaWSOY, and AlmaMedia) to enhance or defend their positions. The data consists of articles in three newspapers (SanomaWSOY's *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat* and Alma Media's *Iltalehti*), Yle's television programs, and the film projects' webpages.

Since 2001, the most prominent project concerning Mannerheim has been an international film production of the field marshal's life, created by Markus Selin and Renny Harlin and produced by Selin's company Solar Films. The project's working title was *Mannerheim*. It was thought that the film would become the most expensive one ever made in Finland. The media represented the project in a mostly positive light, and the main issues were its funding and casting. Media coverage started to gain scandalous tones only after the project ended in bankruptcy in 2013.

In 2008, a stop-motion puppet animation, *Uralin perhonen* ("The Butterfly from Ural") directed by Katariina Lillqvist, portrayed a person quite reminiscent of Mannerheim executing Reds during the Finnish Civil War and in a homosexual act with his Kyrgyz servant.[6] The latter

[6] Mannerheim's name was not mentioned, but the puppet was dressed in something resembling Mannerheim's Chevalier Guards' uniform. According to Lillqvist, the depictions of Mannerheim and his servant were based on folklore from Pispala, traditionally a worker's district in the city of Tampere. See *Ilta-Sanomat*, 23 February 2008, "Mannerheim on elokuvassa homo." The city was also the place of the biggest battle in the Finnish Civil War, in

issue especially led to controversy in media and even to discussion in Parliament about the role of Yle and of one of the funders of the film. However, the film also gained positive evaluations from critics.

Yle's 2012 cross-media project, *The Marshal of Finland* (*Suomen marsalkka*), treated the figure of Mannerheim rather as a symbol of unification, than division of the nation. This project included a film about Mannerheim's life (also entitled *The Marshal of Finland*), created by a Kenyan production team and directed by Gilbert Lukalia.[7] The film was based on background material collected by a Finnish–Estonian production team, which also produced a documentary series *Operaatio Mannerheim* ("Operation Mannerheim") about the making of the film and launched a campaign called "Updating Heroism" on the cross-media project's website. The tabloid press reacted strongly when they discovered that Telley Savalas Otieno, a black Kenyan actor, portrayed Mannerheim.[8]

Notably, the second and third film projects interpreting Mannerheim that are analysed here caused significantly negative attention in the media as the information about their contents came out. Yle's participation in them was heavily scrutinised by tabloid press (*Ilta-Sanomat* and

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which the defeat of the Reds by the Whites commanded by Mannerheim was sealed. The aftermath of the battle was depicted in the film. The animation was based on a radio drama with the same name, written by Lillqvist together with Hannu Salama in 2004.

[7] By '*The Marshal of Finland*' I refer to the whole cross-media production, unless otherwise specified. The film's languages were Swahili and English, while *Operation Mannerheim* and the website were in Finnish.

[8] For a more comprehensive analysis of the strategies of ritualisation and othering in *The Marshal of Finland* and its media reception see Jere Kyyrö, "Mannerheim toisin silmin: Toiseus, ritualisaatio, symbolit ja yhteisö *Suomen marsalkka*-mediakiistassa," *Lähikuva* 3–4 (2014), 8–21.

Iltalehti), while Finland's biggest newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, remained more neutral and distant. Selin–Harlin's *Mannerheim* was treated positively in the tabloids.

2. Developments in Mannerheim's Figure and Finnish Fields of Culture and Media

Before going into the theoretical background of this article and the analysis of the particular cases, it is necessary to shed light on certain developments of Mannerheim's figure and contextualise the three cases by reflecting on these developments in terms of Finnish history and recent developments in the Finnish media field.

Mannerheim was born in 1867 into a Swedish-speaking aristocratic family living in southwestern Finland, which was then an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. He entered Finnish public life at the end of 1917, after a successful career in the Imperial Army and a failed marriage. Mannerheim was discharged from the army during the revolution, and he returned to Finland, which declared independence in December 1917.[9]

In the beginning of 1918, the Finnish Civil War between the Reds and Whites broke out, and Mannerheim became the commander of the White Army, which won the war with the help of German intervention. Both sides were accused of acts of terror, and, after the war, thousands

[9] See Jonathan Clements, *Mannerheim: President, Soldier, Spy* (London: Haus Publishing, 2009), 9–206. Mannerheim was married to Anastasia née Arapova (1872–1936) from 1892 to 1919, and they had two daughters, Anastasie (1893–1978) and Sophie (1895–1963).

of Reds died of malnutrition and were executed in prison camps.[10] Consequently, the Reds coined terms such as "Butcher-in-Chief" and "White Devil" to refer to Mannerheim.[11]

After the war, Mannerheim acted shortly as a regent, and, although a monarchist, was also a candidate in the first presidential elections, but lost. Mannerheim held great prestige among the Defense Forces and planned an intervention against Russian Bolsheviks, but could not gain support for his plans.[12] After losing the elections, he did not hold a public office until the mid-1930s, when he was nominated as the commander of the Defense Forces and promoted to the rank of field marshal.[13] In the wars against the Soviet Union (1939–1940 and 1941–1944) and Germany (1944–1945), Mannerheim acted as commander-in-chief and became a symbol of Finnish re-unification against a common enemy. In 1942, he was given the unique honorary title of Marshal of Finland. German military aid helped the Finns to repel the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944, but, nevertheless, Finland sought to sign a separate peace agreement with the Soviet Union. Mannerheim was voted by the electors as president in August 1944 because he held enough prestige to gain people's support for an armistice and was not tied to agreements made with Germans as his predecessor Risto Ryti. He resigned in 1946 due to health problems. Mannerheim moved to a sanatorium in Lausanne, Switzerland, to write his memoirs. He died in 1951, and the memoirs were published posthumously.[14]

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[10] See J. E. O. Screen, *Mannerheim: The Finnish Years* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 1–42; Clements, *Mannerheim,* 191–206.

[11] Clements, *Mannerheim,* 200.

[12] Clements, *Mannerheim,* 207–235; Screen, *Mannerheim,* 43–73.

[13] Clements, *Mannerheim,* 230–235; Screen, *Mannerheim,* 74–136.

[14] Clements, *Mannerheim,* 255–272; Screen, *Mannerheim,* 177–254.

Mannerheim maintained strict control of his public image, but, already at the end of the civil war, there were two versions of the Mannerheim image: the White general—the public hero of Finland—and the butcher and blood general, which circulated in nonofficial discourses of the working class. This folklore included songs parodying Mannerheim's appearance and anecdotes of his poor skills in the Finnish language.[15] After his death, his figure remained a target of public controversy. For example, building statues of him in different towns gained both support and resistance from the newspapers.[16] His statues have been sites of expressions of public opinion relating to different concerns.[17] Usually, the division between the people's ways of relating to Mannerheim has been along the lines of the political left and right.[18] Despite these controversies, in 2004 Mannerheim was voted as the greatest Finn in a competition arranged by Yle. Mannerheim gained 104,244 votes, 28.7% of the votes given.[19]

The developments of the figure of Mannerheim can be interpreted in light of Pertti Alasuutari's periodisation of the history of independent Finland. Mannerheim became a public figure along with Finnish independence, and his significance grew until the end of the period of the "First Republic" (1917–1946), which was characterised, on the one hand, as the juxtaposition

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[15] Ulla-Maija Peltonen, "Yhdistävä ja erottava sankaruus," in: Ulla-Maija Peltonen & Ilona Kemppainen (eds.), *Kirjoituksia sankaruudesta* (Helsinki: SKS), 91 and 100–106.

[16] Peltonen, "Yhdistävä," 94–96.

[17] Mannerheim's statue in Tampere, for example, has been painted with words such as "Butcher" several times, often on independence days. See *Yle.fi* 7 December 2004 "Mannerheimin patsas sai punaista maalia Tampereella," http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-5194669 [accessed 18 November 2015].

[18] Screen, *Mannereheim,* 264–267.

[19] *Yle.fi* 2004, "Suuret suomalaiset." http://yle.fi/vintti/yle.fi/suuretsuomalaiset/tulosseuranta/index.html (accessed 18 November 2015).

between the winners and losers of the Civil War, and, on the other hand, as maintaining the democracy. The end of the First Republic came after the war as the Finnish geopolitical situation changed (Finland remained independent and neutral, but signed the *Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance* with the Soviet Union) and the state's significance grew. The "Second Republic" (1946–1994) developed from a state-led system to a competition economy and ended as Finland became a member of the European Union, echoing the dismantling of a national system in terms of economical control.[20] The book wars and cultural clashes of the 1960s made space for the inclusion of the political left in the public sphere and loosened the elite's control over popular culture.[21]

However, Mannerheim remained as a central symbol of Finnish unification in the Second Republic and after, and he has gained new visibility since the beginning of the 2000s, a period characterised by media convergence and a struggle between cultural policies emphasising neoliberal de-regulative tendencies, and maintaining of the state control over the media.

According to Juha Herkman, the public service Yleisradio controlled the economic, material, cultural, and social capitals of the media field until the 1990s, when its status changed as the media markets were de-regulated, and it had to compete with commercial radio and television channels. Thus, its economic capital diminished and its cultural and social capitals were challenged, but not lost, as commercial channels concentrated on making economic gains.[22]

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[20] Pertti Alasuutari, *Toinen tasavalta: Suomi 1946–1994* (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1999), 11–12, 104–121, and 268.

[21] Alasuutari, *Toinen*, 10, 230.

[22] Juha Herkman, *Kaupallisen television ja iltapäivälehtien avoliitto: Median markkinoituminen ja televisioituminen* (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2005), 58–59.

In the 2000s, there has been a concentration and convergence of print and electronic media. In 1993, MTV [Mainostelevisio, "Advertisement Television"] was made into a television franchise, and it was able to operate independently from Yleisradio's two channels. In 1996, the second commercial television channel Nelonen, which was partially owned by Sanoma Ltd.'s partner company Helsinki Media, was also made into a franchise. This multi-lateralised the duopoly of Yleisradio and MTV, and it was the first time that a significant newspaper company and television channel were part of the same corporation. In 1997, MTV and Aamulehti Ltd. merged to form Alma Media, and the same year a book publishing company, WSOY, merged with Sanoma Ltd., and Helsinki Media to form SanomaWSOY. Thus, *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat* are owned by SanomaWSOY, which also owns the Nelonen television channel. *Iltalehti* is part of the Alma Media conglomerate, owner of MTV3 channel, which sold its broadcasting functions to Bonnier and Proventus in 2005. In this environment of media competition, the public service broadcasting company Yle also started to function according to market logics.[23] This competition between particular commercial media and Yle forms the context of the discussion around the three works concerning Mannerheim.

3. Fields, Strategies, and Aesthetics

[23] Herkman, *Kaupallisen*, 60–61.

I approach the antagonism between media actors with the concepts of strategy and aesthetics, as Bourdieu used them in his field theory to analyse the developments of French fields of art and literature, as well as journalism.[24]

For Bourdieu, fields are simultaneously 'fields of forces' and 'fields of struggles' of transformation and conservation of the former. As such, he separates the notion of positions from position-takings. Bourdieu identifies position-takings with the 'strategies' that the occupants of different positions take in their struggles to improve or defend their position.[25]

The space of the position-takings is "the structured set of the manifestations of the social agents in the field," and the social agents to be analysed can be works of art, but also "political acts or pronouncements, manifestos or polemics, etc." The space of positions is defined by the distribution of specific capital (in the fields of art or literature, such as recognition or prestige, for example), and positions are defined by the possession of this capital. The autonomy of a certain field depends on its ability to develop its own type of capital. Thus, in Bourdieu's example, the field of literature is autonomous from the field of economy, if it has its own symbolic capital, distinctive of economic capital (money).[26]

It is also necessary to take into account the specifics of the field of media. Bourdieu himself noted the media's ability not just to record but to create reality or, in other words, produce belief.[27] A widely debated mediatisation thesis points out the expansion of media logics

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[24] Bourdieu, *The Field*; Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television,* trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (New York: New Press, 1998).

[25] Bourdieu, *The Field*, 30.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Bourdieu, *On Television*, 18 and 21.

to other social and cultural fields. This means that the media's *modus operandi* extends to other cultural fields, but also that media actors become independent by their own right.[28] Couldry delineates an approach that accounts for mediatisation in terms of Bourdieuian field theory: similar to the state and the field of power in Bourdieu's theory, media is capable of regulating other fields and the exchange of capital between them.[29] Media-related capital is meta-capital, which, in the context of politics, is equated with media coverage.[30] Couldry underlines the importance of studying how "capital, authority, and power are being transformed by media in particular sites."[31]

In the controversies built around Mannerheim, the right ways of portraying Mannerheim are prominently discussed. According to Bourdieu:

> Specifically aesthetic conflicts about the legitimate vision of the world—in the last resort, about what deserves to be represented and the right way to represent it—are political conflicts (appearing in their most euphemized form) for the power to impose the dominant definition of reality, and social reality in particular.[32]

Bourdieu's approach associates aesthetics with politics and different visions of the world. In my approach, I connect aesthetics with strategies in the struggles of different fields. Thus, aesthetics are not universal, but socially constructed phenomena. I define aesthetics as the ways of classifying and valuing representation, that also affect the different methods of representation.

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[28] Stig Hjarvard, *The Mediatization of Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2013), 17.

[29] Couldry, *Media,* 133–143.

[30] Ibid., 144–145.

[31] Ibid., 155.

[32] Bourdieu, *The Field*, 101–102.

Thus, ways of representing and talking about representation are aesthetic strategies. Aesthetic strategies are ways of imposing visions of the world mentioned by Bourdieu.

Strategies can be aesthetic if they represent something in a certain way or if they comment on the ways of representing something in a certain way. This way of seeing aesthetics has some similarities with the view developed by Birgit Meyer, who sees "aesthetic formation" as an alternative to Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities." For Meyer, aesthetics are the styles in which communities are imagined. Aesthetics do not concern only the arts but the total sensory experience and sensitive knowledge of the world. She emphasises the materialisations of imagination and the performativity and fluidity of the communities.[33] Basically, aesthetic strategies make up aesthetic formations. Although, in my approach, I emphasise the classificatory aspect of the aesthetics rather than the experiential and material, the community is, indeed, also seen in a performative way, as an intended and unintended result of the strategies. In emphasising the classificatory aspect of the strategies, the approach comes close to Jacques Rancière's idea that aesthetics are not universal, but rather constitute a system of recognising and thinking about art.[34] What counts as art, or what is good or bad art, depends on the aesthetic strategies.

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[33] Birgit Meyer, "Introduction: From Imagined Communities to Aesthetic Formations. Religious Mediations, Sensational Forms, and Styles of Binding," in: Birgit Meyer (ed.), *Aesthetic Formations. Media, Religion, and the Senses* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 5–11; Birgit Meyer & Jojada Verrips, "Aesthetics," in: David Morgan (ed.), *Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 20–30, at 21.

[34] Jacques Ranciére, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London: Continuum, 2004).

4. Civil Religion: A Pool of Myths, Rituals, Symbols, and Beliefs

Since its adoption into the vocabulary of the sociology of religion in Bellah's essay in 1967, the existence and composition of the referent(s) of the term "civil religion" has been widely debated.[35] Bellah analysed speeches of American presidents, which included references to God and biblical archetypes. This, however, was not Christianity according to Bellah, but American civil religion, thus religion of the public sphere that exists apart from denominations, which can be studied like any other religion and can be found in other nations as well.[36] Scholars have disagreed on the importance of the reference to God as a legitimisation of the nation to Bellah's definition of civil religion. Gordon Lynch sees it as a defining characteristic, though Jeffrey C. Alexander sees that civil religion is religious due to the sacredness (in a Durkheimian sense, as separate from the profane) of its symbols and the rituals it commands.[37] Anyway, the concept has been used to study also secular phenomena. For example, John A. Coleman classifies civil religion according to its dependence on church and state. The form that is independent of the church(es) and dependent on the nation is called secular nationalism.[38]

Finnish scholars have used the concept mainly to analyse the Finnish evangelical Lutheran church's relation to society and have discovered that Finnish civil religion is latent and

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[35] Bellah, "Civil Religion."

[36] Ibid.

[37] Gordon Lynch, *The Sacred in the Modern World: A Cultural Sociological Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37; Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Introduction: Durkheimian Sociology and Cultural Studies Today," in: Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 7.

[38] John A. Coleman, "Civil Religion," *Sociological Analysis* 31/2 (1970), 67–77.

is gaining prominence in celebrative occasions and times of crisis.[39] Juha Meriläinen argues that there exists no civil religion in Finland in the Bellahian sense because, after World War II, figures of the Finnish independence movement, who legitimised their nationalism with divine authority, have been replaced with a pantheon of war heroes.[40] I have argued elsewhere that Finnish civil religion's connection to evangelical Lutheranism is contingent, contextual, and should not be assumed *a priori*. Thus, my definition of civil religion also includes the non-divine pantheon of war heroes.[41]

I follow the line taken by Tiina Mahlamäki, who defines civil religion as a:

> culturally construed value system, that generates commitment towards the nation by sacralizing conceptions about nation's meaning, goals and values shared by the majority of its members, and can be observed through myths, beliefs, symbols, and rituals experienced as shared by the majority of its members.[42]

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[39] Tapio Lampinen, "Preaching of the State—Civil Religion in the Proclamation of Church and State in Finland," in: Béla Harmati (ed.), *The Church and Civil Religion in the Nordic Countries of Europe: Report of an International Consultation Held in Ilkko-Tampere, Finland October 3–7, 1983* (Geneva: Department of Studies, the Lutheran World Federation, 1984), 41–48; Mahlamäki, *Naisia*, 210; Susan Sundback, "Medlemskapet i de lutherska kyrkorna i Norden," in: Göran Gustafsson & Thorleif Pettersson (eds.), *Folkkyrkor och religiös pluralism—den nordiska religiösa modellen* (Stockholm: Verbum, 2000), 34–73.

[40] Juha Meriläinen, "Jumala ompi Linnamme vai Linna jumalamme? Yhdysvallat, Suomi ja bellahilainen kansalaisuskonto," in: Ilkka Huhta & Juha Meriläinen (eds.), *Kirkkohistorian alueilla. Juhlakirja professori Hannu Mustakallion täyttäessä 60 vuotta.* Suomen kirkkohistoriallisen seuran toimituksia 217 (Helsinki: Suomen Kirkkohistoriallinen seura, 2011), 352–73.

[41] Jere Kyyrö, "Kansalaisuskonto," in: Kimmo Ketola, Tuomas Martikainen, & Teemu Taira (eds.), *Uskontososiologia* (forthcoming).

[42] Mahlamäki, *Naisia*, 212.

Mahlamäki's definition includes secular phenomena and points toward myths, beliefs, symbols, and rituals. I would like to continue from Mahlamäki's definition and look at how components of civil religion are used. This is where Bourdieu's field theory steps in. In this perspective, the majority's acceptance of civil religion becomes contested, and components of civil religion become resources that can be applied in strategies in different fields. Thus, civil religion is not approached here as an autonomous field, but rather as a pool of items that can be used for different ends; thus, the experience of sharedness is an effect of the successful use of these items. As noted previously, I define civil religion, for the purposes of this study, *as a pool of symbols, myths, and rituals connected to the nation, and ways of representing them, which can be used more or less successfully as a means of legitimisation or de-legitimisation for different agendas.*

In the context of media, civil religious resources can be used to gain media power and audiences. As Johanna Sumiala points out, media actors try to gain media power by drawing upon a network of symbols, thus attracting viewers to a shared social world.[43] Thus, I will closely read the different strategies concerning *Mannerheim* as a civil religious resource in the field of media and other fields of cultural production that are mediated through it, paying attention to the aesthetic aspect of these strategies. The aesthetic strategies are found from the legitimisations given to the works by their authors and supporters, attempts to remove legitimisation from the works and classifications and comparisons made by actors in the media.

[43] Johanna Sumiala, *Media and Ritual: Death, Community and Everyday Life* (London: Routledge, 2013), 64–65.

5. Distribution and Cropping of the Data

In this article, the focus is on the field of media, so other fields of cultural production will only be analysed as represented by different actors in this field. Thus, the works as such are not analysed. However, the analysis is not restricted to journalists or other media specialists. I will focus on the accounts of the artists and other agents associated with the production as well as on representatives of art and media institutions and other public figures.

As noted previously, the primary data consists of three nationally read newspapers: *Helsingin Sanomat*, which is the most widely read newspaper in Finland, *Ilta-sanomat*, and *Iltalehti*, the latter two of which are competing tabloid papers. All of these papers have dealt *with* Mannerheim, *Butterfly of Ural* and *The Marshal of Finland* in detail.

In addition I analyse television programmes (*A-talk*, *MOT*), in which the above-mentioned works have been discussed. All of them have been aired by Yle. Interestingly, the three works were not discussed on commercial TV programs, apart from short notes in news programs. Concerning *The Marshal of Finland*, I also analyse a press conference, which was posted on Yle's website, but was not shown on its television channels.

With the descriptions of the projects, I rely on the appearances of the authors in the aforementioned media, as well as the materials produced by the authors themselves, such as websites representing the works. The works themselves are not analysed in detail, but attention is paid to features of the works that are highlighted in other media.

The initial cropping of the data is based on distribution of articles concerning Mannerheim found from an online database that includes articles from *Helsingin Sanomat* and

Ilta-Sanomat.[44] *Iltalehti*'s articles are collected manually from microfilm, from periods around peaks of media attention.

Between August 2001 and March 2014, 292 newspaper articles were published in *Helsingin Sanomat* (118) and *Ilta-Sanomat* (174) which mentioned one or more of the three works. Amount of collected around the peaks articles from *Iltalehti* is 109. Looking at the chronological distribution of the articles in quarter years, I focus on six peaks (see Figure 1): 1) in the third quarter of 2001 (15 articles), when Selin and Harlin's *Mannerheim* was announced; 2) the first quarter of 2008 (58 articles), when *Uralin perhonen* was discussed; 3) the first quarter of 2009 (53 articles), when *Mannerheim*'s funding was widely debated; 4) the first quarter of 2010 (24 articles), when, along with *Mannerheim*'s funding, theatre group Rujo's play *Mannerheim, eli lapsistasi ei mitään* ("Mannerheim, or Nothing of Your Children") and Hannu Raittila's novel *Marsalkka* were discussed; 5) the year 2012 (quarterly: 13 + 10 + 92 + 15 articles), when *The Marshal of Finland* was discussed, along with *Mannerheim's* funding; and 6) the last quarter of 2013 and first quarter of 2014 (quarterly: 8 + 14 articles), when *Mannerheim*'s bankruptcy and its consequences were discussed. Thus, the analysis is narrowed down to 302 articles.

For the purposes of this article, I consider Rujo-theatre's play and Raittila's novel as commentaries on the *Mannerheim* film project. As such, they are not discussed in individual sections. The number of articles mentioning these works during this period (Rujo's *Mannerheim, eli lapsistasi ei mitään,* 16; Raittila's *Marsalkka,* 6) is also significantly smaller than the number

[44] *Sanoma arkisto.* https://yritysarkisto.sanoma.fi/login (accessed 14 November 2015).

of those mentioning *Mannerheim* (195), *Uralin perhonen* (90), and *The Marshal of Finland* (116).

(Figure 1. Distribution of Articles Mentioning *Mannerheim, Uralin perhonen,* or *The Marshal of Finland* in Quarter Years. Numbers 1–6 refer to peaks mentioned in the text.)

6. *Mannerheim*: A National Monument or a Scam?

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, there was discussion regarding a big budget film about Mannerheim's life, coined by the media as a magnum opus before it was in production.[45] News about the project first came out in August 2001. The film was supposed to be Hollywood director Renny Harlin's first Finnish film since 1986. According to its producer Markus Selin, Harlin's friend and established producer in Finnish popular cinema, the film was planned to be an epoch drama, similar to *The English Patient*, and a portrait of Mannerheim, not an action film, which is the genre usually associated with the Harlin–Selin duo. Screenwriting was assigned to Heikki Vihinen, known for his work in theatre and his cooperation with the *Kummeli* comedy group. The Champion of Liberty Association, chaired by retired lieutenant general Ermei Kanninen (1922–2015), who had known Mannerheim personally, and vice chaired by history professor Heikki A. Reenpää (b. 1922), headed the film project. The function of the association was to

[45] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 11 August 2001, "Harlin haluaisi viedä Mannerheimin Hollywoodiin"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 13 March 2003, "Renny Harlinin Mannerheim-elokuva toistaiseksi jäissä."

control the historicity of the script.[46] The names of Jude Law and Sean Connery were mentioned during discussions of casting of the leading role.[47]

By 2006, both Harlin and Selin had made other films, and the Mannerheim film was still without sufficient funding. The starting budget of the "spectacle" had been 33.6 million euros (200 million marks), but was reduced to a budget of 12 million euros. The Champion of Liberty Association even appealed to Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen for additional funds.[48] Finally, in 2007, it seemed that enough financial support had been secured. At this point, the film was to be made mostly with Finnish money and in the Finnish language, and Mikko Nousiainen was chosen to play Mannerheim.[49] The framing and target audience of the project changed from international to national.

However, the funding base was not secure, and, in April 2009, the filmmakers decided to sell tickets in advance for 50 euros (5000 tickets were sold). Nevertheless, the filming, which was scheduled to start in the following winter, was postponed.[50] Already in 2007, the Champion of Liberty Association had sold memorial medals picturing Mannerheim to gain extra funds.[51]

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[46] *Ilta-Sanomat*, 10 August 2001, "'Englantilainen potilaskin' sai viisi Oscaria, joten meilläkin on tavoitteet aika korkealla."

[47] *Ilta-Sanomat*, 20 August 2001, "'Englantilainen potilaskin' sai viisi Oscaria, joten meilläkin on tavoitteet aika korkealla"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 15 August 2002, "Adolf Ehrnrooth kertoi Mannerheimista Rennylle."

[48] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 24 March 2006, "Mannerheim-elokuva kaatumassa rahavaikeuksiin."

[49] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 27 November 2007, "Mannerheimin saappaisiin astuu Mikko Nousiainen."

[50] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 1 April 2009, "Mannerheim-lippuja myytiin 5000 kappaletta."

[51] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 5 June 2007, "Mannerheim-elokuvan käsikirjoitusta käännetään venäjäksi." It is noteworthy that in the beginning of 1960s the most well-known monument of Mannerheim, Aimo Tukiainen's equestrian statue, had been funded with large scale fundraising. See Peltonen, "Yhdistävä," 95.

Funds were sought from several investors, and most of the news concerning the project focused on this issue.

In 2011, after continuous difficulties with the funding, Harlin decided to leave the project. Relations between Harlin and Selin fell out. Selin made it clear that the new director could not be a "left-wing artist-director."[52] Dome Karukoski was chosen as Harlin's replacement. In October 2013, *Ilta-Sanomat* reported that the production company was bankrupt due to unpaid debts of 1.5 million euros and that the project would be shut down.[53] In February 2014, Yle TV1's investigative journalism programme *MOT* reported that Harlin had earned from the project 700,000 euros; simultaneously, the costume manufacturers could not be paid. The reporting had a tone of national scandal.[54]

The Mannerheim project's aesthetic strategy relied on historical accuracy, which was guaranteed by the Champion of Liberty Association and a big budget. Well-known actors added entertainment value. In addition to history-as-accuracy, history was also presented as an obligation and something handed down by previous generations—in other words, as myth.[55] Mannerheim and wartime generations were treated with respect. For example, Harlin and Vihinen met with General Adolf Ehrnrooth (1905–2004) to discuss Mannerheim as a person and

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[52] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 6 August 2011, "Karukoski ja Gorbatšov Mannerheimin kimpussa."

[53] *Ilta-Sanomat*, 8 October 2013, "UNELMA KAATUMASSA."

[54] *MOT: Mannerheim ulosotossa*, Yle TV1, 24 February 2014.

[55] Ninian Smart points out the performativity of such utterances. Looking back to the past and evoking the heroic deeds of the past generations adds substance to the nation. See Ninian Smart, "Religion, Myth, and Nationalism," in: Peter H. Merkl & Ninian Smart (eds.), *Religion and Politics in the Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), 15–28.

as a leader.[56] Ehrnrooth, Knight of Mannerheim Cross number 162, had become in the 1990s a prototype of, and a spokesperson for Finnish veterans of war, who often emphasised the importance of defending the nation.[57] Film makers humbly listening to the general's personal stories about Mannerheim, which cannot be read from the books, was a symbolic resource providing authenticity to the project.[58] Simultaneously, the separation between Mannerheim's person (known to Ehrnrooth) and Mannerheim as a public figure (as depicted in books) was evoked. This authenticity was more than historical *accuracy*, as it connected to the emotional aspects of national narrative and to the transmission of tradition.

Media coverage of the project was mostly neutral or positive and focused primarily on the funding and, to a lesser degree, on the artistic features. Filmmaker accounts of the project and their motives were not questioned. However, as the reporting started to gain scandalous tones after it was clear that the film would not be made, the interpretive frame of "using Mannerheim" was activated. Already in 2010, a theatre play named *Mannerheim, eli lapsistasi ei mitään* commented on the way Selin and Harlin had used the figure of Mannerheim for their own economic interests.[59] Similar accounts appeared in Hannu Raittila's novel, which noted the way

[56] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 15 August 2002.

[57] The Mannerheim Cross is the most esteemed Finnish military decoration, issued by Mannerheim, which could be given to any rank of soldiers and officers.

[58] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 15 August 2002.

[59] The Rujo-theatre's (Teatteri Rujo) play premiered on 30 January 2010 in Ylioppilasteatteri. The play criticized and parodied Selin and Harlin's commercial use of Mannerheim, and displayed it along with domestic violence in modern-day Finland. The play and its director, Lauri Maijala, were heavily criticised in the tabloid press and in opinion pieces, mostly by people who had not seen the play. The name of the production is an allusion to a song named "Laulu marsalkka Mannerheimista" ("A Song about Marshal Mannerheim," from the album *Sinä päivänä*

Selin and Harlin used Mannerheim for their personal interests.[60] In the mainstream media, this frame of interpretation was mostly used with *Uralin perhonen* and *The Marshal of Finland*.

Raittila's novel was first intended to be based on Selin-Harlin's *Mannerheim*'s script, while remaining an independent work. As Raittila realised that the film would not be made, he decided to write a novel about the making of a film about Mannerheim, which worked on two different chronological levels, the first being after World War II and the second in the present. In the novel, an American intelligence organisation plans to use Mannerheim as a front man in the fight against communism by making a film of him, which is a clear allegory in line with Selin–Harlin's film production. The novel includes also a non-fictional part, an open letter from Raittila to his former co-workers.[61]

7. *Uralin perhonen:* Sexuality at Stake

In the case of *Mannerheim*, the protagonist would have been treated with respect. The other side of Mannerheim's image, the butcher-in-chief, was evoked in a 2008 puppet animation, *Uralin perhonen*, in which Mannerheim was depicted executing the Reds in the Finnish Civil War and as having a sexual relationship with his male Kyrghyz servant. Author Katariina Lillqvist based

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kun synnyin, 2001) by Finnish pop band Ultra Bra, with lyrics by Janne Saarikivi. The song comments on Mannerheim's autobiography, which describes his military ventures and horses in detail, but mention his wife Anastasia only shortly and saying nothing of his children.

[60] Raittila, *Marsalkka*, 260–261, 284.

[61] Ibid., 255–303.

the story on workers' folklore from Tampere, in which the suggestions of Mannerheim's homosexuality were also based.[62] While Selin-Harlin's production was legitimised by connecting to the tradition mediated by the veterans and by presenting itself as a national project, using historical accuracy as its aesthetic strategy, *Uralin perhonen* used the working class, or more specifically the Reds, as a symbolic resource and reference group. Similar to the case of General Ehrnrooth, oral tradition supplemented the view of the history books.

On 23 February 2008, both tabloid papers reported on a film that displays Mannerheim as a homosexual.[63] Katariina Lillqvist, the director of the film, *The Buttefly from Ural*, told *Iltalehti* that Yle had agreed to show the film on the next Independence Day (6 December), which was, to Lillqvist, proof of Yle's capacity as a defender of freedom of speech.[64] As Yle's executive director Mikael Jungner was asked about the airing date, he replied that it will be shown, but not on Independence Day, as that is the day when Finland respects its heroes.[65] Both Lillqvist and Jungner implied that the film would be incompatible with the ritualised form of the Independence Day and its aesthetic conventions.

Ilta-Sanomat asked the opinions of Marshal Mannerheim's Heritage Foundation and a veteran, Pentti Iisalo, who was also a Knight of Mannerheim Cross. They did not approve the

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[62] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 23 February 2008, "Mannerheim on elokuvassa homo."

[63] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 23 February 2008, "Mannerheim on elokuvassa homo"; *Iltalehti.fi*, 23 February 2008," Homo-Mannerheim kohauttaa Ylen ohjelmassa!" http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/200802237290182_uu.shtml (accessed 18 November 2015). The article published on *Iltalehti*'s website asked whether it was appropriate to display Mannerheim as a homosexual.

[64] *Iltalehti.fi*, 23 February 2008.

[65] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 25 February 2008, "Yle ei esitä itsenäisyyspäivänä."

depiction of Mannerheim in *The Buttefly of Urals*. Iisalo labelled the film as "mockery-program" and wondered how Yleisradio could pay for such a controversial project.[66] In the case of Selin-Harlin's *Mannerheim*, the veterans of war were used as a means of legitimising to the project; in this instance, they were used to remove legitimisation. However, the homophobic tendencies of the reception also were criticised on the pages of *Ilta-Sanomat.*[67]

On 28 February, Christian Democrat MP Bjarne Kallis presented an unwritten question to Prime Minister Vanhanen, whether the government will take action towards Yle for showing *Uralin perhonen* on the prime minister's hour of inquiries. Kallis opined that government should not support projects that "insult extensive bodies of citizens." Vanhanen replied that "there does not seem to be many sacred things these days," but that the question was not political; thus, the government could not take a stance toward it.[68] One of the viewers of the film complained about the film to the attorney general, who decided that particular programmes sent by Yle may well insult certain people's worldviews, comparing them to religious programmes that may also insult someone's beliefs.[69]

On 6 March, Yle's televised discussion programme *A-talk* invited Lillqvist to have a discussion with Kallis, as well as former Chief-of-Defense General Gustaf Hägglund, who had also criticised the film, and Left Alliance MP Minna Sirnö, who defended the leftist view of Finnish history. Kallis emphasised that the film hurt the feelings of many people, including the

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[66] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 25 February 2008, "Täyttä roskaa"; "Sota Marskista."

[67] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 28 February 2008, "Homo ei saa olla sotasankari."

[68] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 29 February 2008, "Vanhanen: Vähän pyhiä asioita."

[69] *Helsingin Sanomat,* 5 July 2008, "Oikeuskansleri: Yle sai esittää Mannerheim-animaation."

veterans of war, and Hägglund stressed the heterosexuality of Mannerheim.[70] After the program, Yle received several phone calls giving negative feedback of Lillqvist's film.[71] To those insulted by the film, the issue was the displaying of Mannerheim as a homosexual, not as executioner of the Reds. The sexuality of Mannerheim was discussed in several articles, but also famous homosexuals' views on the tones of the discussion were asked.[72]

Uralin perhonen was classified by those not trying to discredit it as political art or as a work that respects the long tradition of puppet theatre.[73] More negative classifications labelled it as attention art or scandal art. It was compared to Kristian Smeds' theatre interpretation of Väinö Linna's novel *The Unknown Soldier* (1954) that premiered in 2007 and caused a wide debate and to Ulla-Maija Karttunen's photographic work *Neitsythuorakirkko* ("Virgin Whore Church") of 2008 that criticised internet teen porn culture, but led to the author being charged of the possession and distribution of child pornography.[74] These comparisons were used to classify the film as either political or scandalous.

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[70] *A-talk*, Yle TV2, 6 March 2008.

[71] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 8 March 2008, "Uralin perhosesta palautevyöry Yleen."

[72] *Iltalehti*, 7 March 2008, "Kirjalilja Leena Lander: 'Mannerheim oli metroseksuaali'"; *Helsingin Sanomat*, 15 March 2008, "Homo sapiens"; *Ilta-Sanomat,* 4 July 2008, "Mannerheim tuomitsi homot"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 28 February 2008, "Homo ei saa olla sotasankari."

[73] *Helsingin Sanomat,* 1 March 2008, "Marskin ravistaja irvii myös Marxille." The latter idea was expressed by the committee that awarded Lillqvist the prize for best Finnish animation at Tampere's international film festival. See *Ilta-Sanomat*, 10 March 2008, "Raati: Uralin perhonen on näkemys yksinäisyydestä."

[74] *Helsingin Sanomat,* 1 March 2008, "Kuvainpalvonta sai Marskin kasvot"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 1 March 2008, "Huomiotaidetta."

One article asked, whether the historical figures were fair game for artistic interpretations and proposed that artistic interpretations made in "cultural circles" should distance themselves from their real prototypes, framing the question about the right way of representing Mannerheim as a matter of good taste.[75] Those in opposition emphasised the use of taxpayers' money to create a work of art, which tried to insult and desecrate with its main objective to gain attention.[76] Attention-seeking was contrasted with beauty, which does not seek money and fame. The defenders of the film emphasised the beauty of its expression, connections to the long Czech tradition of puppetry, and the right to express the losers' point of view of the civil war and Mannerheim.[77] Thus there were two different ideas of aesthetics, the first one leaning on historical authenticity, into which Mannerheim's homosexuality did not fit, and the other one on freedom of artistic expression, even when contrary to the mainstream.

8. *The Marshal of Finland:* Does Anyone Else Care but the Media?

The first news about *The Marshal of Finland* was announced in early 2012, when documentarist Erkko Lyytinen announced that he was making a film about Mannerheim.[78] Not much information became available, other than that parts of the film were made abroad. On 14 August,

[75] *Iltalehti,* 8 March 2008, "Historian hahmot vapaata riistaa."

[76] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 1 March 2008, "Huomiotaidetta"; *Iltalehti,* 18 March 2008, "Katsojat raivostuivat HOMO-MARSKISTA."

[77] *Helsingin Sanomat,* 1 March 2008, "Marskin ravistaja irvii myös Marxille"; *Helsingin Sanomat,* 16 March 2008, "Kaunis Uralin perhonen"; *Iltalehti,* 17 March 2008 "Huikea mestariteos."

[78] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 18 January 2012, "Yle yllätti: Mannerheim-elokuva."

Iltalehti reported that an "African-born, English-speaking man" would play Mannerheim. The next day *Helsingin Sanomat* revealed that the actor was Otieno, as mentioned previously.[79] This led to significant media attention, and the production team, together with Yle, organised a press conference which could be watched online.

Lyytinen announced that the project was about revising the Mannerheim myth and seeing Mannerheim through the eyes of another culture. The production team and Yle went on to emphasise that *The Marshal of Finland* was a multicultural project and, thus, in line with Yle's guidelines. Representatives of the tabloid newspaper *Iltalehti* accused producers and Yle of using the figure of Mannerheim to gain an audience and of hurting the feelings of veterans. In the press conference, Lyytinen also launched a campaign called "Updating Heroism." On the project's website, anyone could suggest new Finnish heroes to be recognised. There was also a collection of views on modern day heroism by Finnish celebrities and media persons.[80]

Media attention peaked after the press conference, and the tabloid press asked different experts, veterans of war, and relatives of Mannerheim for their opinions on the project.[81] Headlines emphasised that veterans were offended, but, in the body text, a veteran, who was shown a trailer of the film, was more reflective and pondered the reason why Mannerheim would

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[79] *Iltalehti,* 14 August 2012, "'Lemmenkipeä ukonparka'"; *Helsingin Sanomat,* 15 August 2012, "Yle yrittää riisua myytin."

[80] *Yle Areena*, 16 August 2012, "Kohutun Suomen Marsalkka -elokuvan tiedotustilaisuus." http://areena.yle.fi/1-1637661 (accessed 12 November 2015); *Suomen marsalkka*. http://suomenmarsalkka.fi (accessed 29 October 2013, not active).

[81] *Iltalehti,* 15 August 2012, "Mies Marski-leffan takana"; *Iltalehti,* 15 August 2008, "Veteraanit järkyttyivät"; *Ilta-Sanomat,* 16 August 2012, "Sukulainen: Onko tarkoitus häpäistä Mannerheim?"

be represented like this.[82] The veterans and their feelings were evoked as legitimisation for critique of the film, somewhat similar to the legitimisation strategies of the *Mannerheim* project. As civil religious symbols, the veterans are closely associated with the figure of Mannerheim. Yle's liberal multicultural revision of Mannerheim did not suit the tabloid papers' understanding of civil religious aesthetics.

After the film and the documentary series were shown on television, comments became much scarcer and less scandalising. Finnish media scholar Esa Väliverronen commented that the controversy was entirely construed by the media, especially tabloid press—a statement with which I agree.[83] The critical reception of the film and the documentary series was mostly negative, but Otieno won the Kenyan Film Commission's Kalasha Prize for best lead actor in 2014 for his role as Mannerheim.

Otieno's suitability for Mannerheim's role was widely debated. *Ilta-Sanomat* wrote that he was one of Kenya's best actors, and his hard life had made him a mature person.[84] On the other hand, *Iltalehti* wrote about the "protagonist's rough background" and displayed a poll stating 87% of the readers did not consider Otieno to be suitable for the role.[85] This was identical to treatment of *Uralin perhonen*, when *Iltalehti* asked whether it is suitable to portray Mannerheim as a homosexual. In the case of Otieno, however, the reason for his unsuitability

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[82] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 17 August 2012, "Mannerheimin arvo ei muutu."

[83] Esa Väliverronen, "Raivostunut kansa ja keskiäkäinen kriitikko," in: Heidi Kurvinen (ed.), *Journalismikritiikin vuosikirja 2013: Media ja viestintä 1/2013* (2013), 63–72.

[84] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 17 August 2012, "'En ole kuuluisa.'"

[85] *Iltalehti,* 16 August 2012, "Päätähden karu tausta."

was not explicitly mentioned. In the two magazines, Otieno's background was given two totally opposite meanings.

The project was compared with television shows such as the *Muppets* and *Big Brother*, and it was described (more or less seriously) as a "film about human relations," "comedy," "satire," and a "campfire story."[86] *The Marshal of Finland* was first compared with the *Mannerheim* film project, which was then treated as a "magnum opus," as the bankruptcy had not yet happened, but, as the media found out that the film was made by Kenyans, they started to compare it with *Uralin perhonen*, which was labelled as scandal art.[87] *Mannerheim* and *Uralin perhonen* had become reference points, which different strategies could relate to.[88] The attempt to shake the Mannerheim myth was considered positive, but the film did not succeed in these attempts, according to critics.[89] Compared with *Uralin perhonen*, *The Marshal of Finland* did not gain as much criticism because of its unsuitable treatment of the figure of Mannerheim, but, simultaneously, it did not receive positive evaluations from art critics as *Uralin perhonen* did.

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[86] *Iltalehti*, 15 August 2012, "Tällaista oli Marski-leffan kuvauksissa"; *Helsingin Sanomat*, 18 August 2012, "Mannerheimista tehtiin houkutin"; *Iltalehti*, 27 September 2012, "Marskista tehtiin naistenhakkaaja"; *Helsingin Sanomat*, 27 September 2012, "Mannerheim lähtee BB-taloon"; *Helsingin Sanomat*, 27 September 2012, "Afrikkalainen satu Gustavista."

[87] *Iltalehti*, 18 January 2012, "Mannerheim-farssin uusi käänne: Tekeillä kolme eri elokuvaa"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 27 January 2012, "'Tähän maahan mahtuu useampikin Mannerheim-elokuva"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 17 August 2012, "Mannerheimin arvo ei muutu"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 3 October 2012, "Marskini on bi."

[88] Cf. Couldry, *Media*, 147.

[89] *Helsingin Sanomat*, 27 September 2012, "Mannerheim lähtee BB-taloon"; *Ilta-Sanomat*, 27 September 2012, "Vaisu ja väritön Mannerheim."

However, the treatment of Mannerheim was very different throughout *The Marshal of Finland* project than in the *Uralin perhonen.* According to the main producer Lyytinen, *The Marshal of Finland* was an attempt to look behind the so-called "Mannerheim myth" to see him as the private person, behind his polished public image.[90] In the Kenyan-made film, this was done by focusing on Mannerheim's relations with two women, his wife Anastasia and lover Kitty, and how both relationships failed as he chose to serve his country. There were no satirical or parody elements included, as there were in *Uralin perhonen.* Thus, *The Marshal of Finland* did not employ the aesthetic strategy of "lowering" or parodying the figure of Mannerheim but treated it with respect, and the idea was that it would be seen through the eyes of others. This way, Finns could gain new insights into their national hero. Lyytinen said it is important that new generations garner their own interpretations of Mannerheim.[91] This strategy was based on the idea of an existence of a Mannerheim myth, which hides the real humanity behind it. Existence of such a myth justifies the new interpretations: it is important to gain understanding of Mannerheim because he is already an important person. Reinterpreting Mannerheim brings the universal features of heroism and humanity to the front; it is also a way of taking national symbols out of the hands of the nationalists. Lyytinen contextualised the project in the political situation of national-populist Finns party's victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections.[92]

Recapturing through reinterpretation was another central strategy of *The Marshal of Finland*. Seeing Mannerheim through Kenyan eyes was a way to show how national (and nationalistic) symbols are universal. Not only were the makers of the films Kenyans, but they

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[90] Yle Areena, "Kohutun."

[91] *Suomen marsalkka*.

[92] *Radio Rock,* "Korporaatio," 11 April 2012.

also sang Jean Sibelius' *Finlandia* hymn. Furthermore, Lyytinen brought Finnish war-time iron (canteens, helmets, etc.) with him to Kenya that was reworked to crude lion medals by a local blacksmith, which were then given to new Finnish heroes as part of the Updating Heroism campaign.[93] The medals complemented the lion head medallions popular among Finnish nationalists as well as the Champion of Liberty Association's medals sold by makers of the commercial film.[94] This symbolic strategy transformed the original war-time heroism to a new one using Kenya as a medium of transformation and created a juxtaposition to exclusive nationalism and commercialisation of national symbols. Kenya was used as a source for authenticity.

In the media reactions, several strategies of de-legitimisation were used. Accusations of hurting the feelings of the veterans were mentioned earlier. In *The Marshal of Finland* and *Uralin perhonen*, the Yle was one counterpart in the controversy. As its operation was funded until the beginning of 2013 by television licenses and since then by a so-called Yle-tax, the use of money was often scrutinised by privately-owned media companies, which have to rely on paying customers and/or advertisements. Another strategy of de-legitimisation was to frame the motives of the makers of the new interpretations solely in terms of gaining attention. Tabloid

[93] Yle Areena, "Kohutun"; *Suomen marsalkka*.

[94] This strategy of taking back national symbols is similar to strategies used by the Green League in its previous election campaigns. See *Vihreät*, "Uuden Suomen manifesti," 5 December 2010. https://www.vihreat.fi/uuden-suomen-manifesti-5122010 (accessed 14 November 2015). Prior to the parliamentary elections, the party re-branded the Finnish lion coat of arms, which is typically associated with right wing nationalists, and, before the presidential elections of 2012, Sibelius's *Finlandia* hymn was used in a flash mob performance as a part of Pekka Haavisto's campaign. See YouTube, "Flashmob Finlandia," siksiPekka's channel, 3 February 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wO63xt2jWtc (accessed 14 November 2015).

paper *Iltalehti* asked several public figures for their opinions on the project; among them was politician–intellectual Jörn Donner, who had written a book and TV series about Mannerheim. Lyytinen had interviewed him as he was collecting the background material, but Donner had gotten the impression that he was being used and that Lyytinen also was using the figure of Mannerheim to gain personal interest.[95]

9. Conclusion

In discussions of the film projects the aesthetic aspect was presented in many ways, firstly in the legitimisations or appeals to certain kind of capital given by the artists and their supporters. In *Mannerheim*, the work was legitimised by historical realism as a way to reveal the real Mannerheim. In *Uralin perhonen*, the legitimisation is in giving a voice to the Red view of the civil war, thus offering an alternative to the official version of the Mannerheim figure and the version of historical authenticity-capital, which was appealed to by makers of *Mannerheim*. A less-prominent aesthetic legitimisation is the appealing to the Czech tradition of puppetry, which has shaken the established figures for centuries. *The Marshal of Finland* was legitimised via the need of having new visions of heroism that could be provided with the eyes of others and taking the national symbols away from neo-nationalists. Table 1 summarises these different strategies used by media actors.

(Table 1. Strategies of Legitimisation, Classification and Comparison)

[95] *Ilta-Sanomat,* 16 August 2012, "Jörn Donner: En olisi lähtenyt mukaan mistään hinnasta."

A prominent feature of the media discussion regarding the works was classifying the works into genres and comparing them with other works. This is the means of talking about the value of a certain method to represent things; thus, it is also aesthetical in a sense of constructing an aesthetic formation. Labelling *Mannerheim* as a "magnum opus" made with historical accuracy or a scam, *Uralin perhonen* as a beautifully made work of art or a sensation-seeking attempt, or *The Marshal of Finland* as a farce reminiscent of *Big Brother* reality are simultaneously attempts at positioning the works and position-takings on behalf of the classifier. Accusations of attention-seeking or sensationalism are strategies of de-legitimisation that are most visibly connected to mediatisation. Of course, in a mediatised environment, everybody has to play by the rules of media logics to try to gain audiences or media coverage. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to get caught doing this.

Money is also an issue widely discussed in the cases I have examined, and this money talk is also connected to classifying and valuing artwork. The use of large amounts of money worked as an indicator that *Mannerheim* would really be a film worthy of its prototype. At the same time, this led to accusations of greed toward Harlin and Selin. With *Uralin perhonen* and *The Marshal of Finland*, the issue was with using the wrong kind of license and taxpayers' money.

The recurrence of accusations of attention-seeking and money talk can be explained by the terms of Bourdieu's field theory: similar to money, media coverage as media capital is impure in relation to capitals of the specific fields (such as authenticity, artistic value, recognition, prestige, or historical accuracy). Disinterestedness is a way to demonstrate

authenticity and gain capital in a specific field.[96] Journalists have a position from where they distribute media-related capital by gearing attention toward certain issues and by commenting on the ways this capital is used.

As Stig Hjarvard points out, *newsworthiness* is the key issue in journalism on religion, and conflicts and problems are worthy news.[97] But, in addition to this, the attention created by conflicts gives different actors the possibilities to classify and value the things brought into focus. Civil religious concentration of symbols and their connected aesthetic practices work as resources for media power and for classificatory power.[98] As earlier studies have demonstrated, Finnish civil religion is latent and occurs during celebrations and times of crisis.[99] The kind of civil religion observed here is related to both forms; thus, it is also used in attempts to privilege one's position in relation to society, but, in this version, the quest for media coverage is the motivation for this construction and classification of society.

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[96] Bourdieu, *The Field*, 40.

[97] Hjarvard, *The Mediatization*, 86–88.

[98] Cf. Couldry, *Media*, 79; Sumiala, *Media and Ritual*, 64–65.

[99] Lampinen, "Preaching"; Mahlamäki, *Naisia;* Sundback, "Medlemskapet."

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