CREATIVE LANDSCAPES:
EVENTS AT SITES OF ENCOUNTER

Paulina Nordström
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“The turf, that is spread over the soil; the old moss and the fern, that cover the roots of the trees; the torrents, that gush over the sloping banks of the calcareous rocks; in fine, the harmonious agreement of colours reflected by the waters, the verdure, and the sky; everything recalls to the traveller sensations, which he has already felt” (von Humboldt 1822, 160‒161).

“Landscapes are mental states, just as mental states are cartographies, both crystallized in each other, geometrized, mineralized (the torrent in L’amour it mort). The identity of brain and world is the noosphere of Je t’aime je t’aime, it can be the diabolic organization of the extermination camps, but also the cosmo-spiritual structure offers the Bibliotheque Nationale” (Deleuze 1985/1997, 206‒207).
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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I study the concept of creative landscape by exploring the concept of landscape and event philosophy side by side. I have conceptualized creative landscape as part of my dissertation process. By way of the concept, I contemplate the changes that occur in multisensory seeing. Landscape is a premise for understanding multisensory seeing, that is, a way of seeing from a certain point or as a seeing with the materialities of the environment. I write about change through the event philosophies of two contemporaries, Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze. Subsequently, two different notions about events afford an opportunity to approach the creative landscape through changes which occur 1) when a rupture introduces something previously unthought-of or 2) in small alterations in our bodies. In my dissertation, the sites of encounter I refer to are situations which have sparked reflection about creativity as change. The sites of encounter range from the theatre and research cooperation, to installation art, glass architecture, and urban photography.

The methodological work is experimental and art is intrinsic to the process. Firstly, I have looked at the relation between art, geography, and landscape. The many ways in which land, people, and processes have been framed in geography and related disciplines can be seen as the art of framing. Furthermore, art has been crucial for landscape since its early days, and still is. However, the role of art in the concept of landscape varies. Geographers have created art works and studied the works of others for the purpose of conceptual creation. The relationship between art, landscape, and geography begins with Strabo’s and Ptolemy’s writings, and extends to von Humboldt’s and Granö’s creative landscape practices at the very edge of landscape science, and to humanistic landscape autobiographies, studies in the ruling ways of seeing found in landscape paintings, contemporary interest in various forms of art, and the creative explorations of philosophy into writing with the landscape. My work continues these critical and creative studies with the landscape concept.

Secondly, I have participated in both artistic processes and art work. Keiller’s installation art is a site where it is possible to question the way in which some landscapes seem to be more restrictive by ordering our seeing by the use of a predetermined path. To understand radical ruptures when thinking about our ordinary worlds, I have turned to Badiou’s two theatres. With this methodological framework, I was able to detach myself from the categorical way of seeing as it appears in the representational politics of multiculturalism. Subsequently, I move beyond categorical thinking per se with Deleuze’s surface event of sense. Chimeric point clouds and glass architecture function as sites to understand how the body is affected by sensations near and far, and how the present is mobile - oriented simultaneously to the past and future. Furthermore, I claim that through the sensuous urban photography project my body became artist like.

My work is eccentric for its way of combining geographical thinking, art, and philosophy. It restores the relationship between art, landscape, and philosophy. The landscape concept has a long-term relationship with art: it reaches from the classical period to the present day. This remarkable relationship can be extended with ideas from event philosophies. If art brings nuances to geographical research, philosophy leads us to consider what it is “to be in exception, in the sense of event, to keep one’s distance from power” (Badiou 2005/2009, 13). With this work, I have moved beyond landscapes as phenomena and expanded the discussion about our uncertain and unfinished terrains of seeing to the chance encounters which rupture our worlds and immanently alter our worlds to come.
TIIVISTELMÄ


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The Department of Geography and Geology is an excellent host for a researcher who aspires to follow an individual path. Even if I have never grown to be a full-blooded scientist, I have been a geographer for quite a while. Some occasions might affect our destinies in unexpected ways. One of these occasions was when, at the age of three, I lost my stone collection on the shores of Lake Turkana. Without this tiny accident I might have become a geologist although this was far from my thoughts at the time. Little did I know then that I had just started on the road to becoming a geographer. Instead of paying too much attention to objects and their properties as they appear, I started exploring possible worlds. An approach of altering the purpose of many things and playing with aleatory combinations started to develop. Through this approach, it became possible to travel everywhere in a caravan made of sheets of A4 paper placed one after another on the floor. During my bachelor’s and master’s degrees, there was one particular person who planted the seeds for later investigations in geographical thought, far beyond anything I could ever have imagined. But I will save the name for a little later … During the doctoral research process, I got lost in the terrains of art and philosophy. It has been a masochistic pleasure to explore unfamiliar thoughts and write this thesis. However, surviving PhD life, could not have been possible without many dear people whom I would like to thank with all my heart.

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To my parents Virva and Egon, and my sisters Annamaria and Elina, I am deeply grateful for the support you all gave me during the years. Our gatherings (we + Eilamummu + Matti, Lotta, Lina + Ossi + Tiina) in Skräbböle with our families are a
pleasure which also involved, of course, much cooking together. Annamaria and Elina, presence counts more than words. Thank you mum for being the most honest general manager who takes care of countless things. Thank you, Dad, for our good-humoured before-work badminton games. Finally, finishing this thesis would not have not been possible without Tiina. When I struggled most, you overhauled my workload and re-structured it on an A3 with a pink highlighter pen: it was a turning point! Thank you Tiina for your love, support and patience.

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LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS


V  (photo-book) Nordström, P. (manuscript). All is it: the materialities of River Aura
1. INTRO

1.1. Teaser

*I receive a tiny bottle from a narcotic prince, I do not dare to open it, if it is a used plaster, and not a message. Should I open the bottle in the toilet? I am a midst of fairytale creatures from the stories of brothers Grimm. I recognize some, others I am not sure who they are. I aimlessly choose to follow some which simultaneously hides from me the actions of the others. Few minutes before, I have arrived in an industrial warehouse in Vallila, Helsinki Finland. Before we entered the room in two groups from two different entrances by the selective gesture of the hand, we are told “the more you dare, the more you experience”. Rooms are rooms like a bedroom, bathroom, drawing room, kitchen, but also not room, a bewitched forest, tiny cottage, ballroom, and bar. The warehouse is not only packed with fairytale creatures and spectators, but a mess of objects including cakes to eat and powders to smell, fabrics and furniture, dresses hanging from the ballroom roof. Everything can be touched expect the fairytale creatures, unless they touch you. I have entered a fucked up fairytale, and immersive theatre play, where it is impossible to grasp everything. At regular intervals, a bell rings and music starts which collects all the creatures to the ballroom. After a while the creatures disperse, and small stories launch from the beginning. But every time the story is slightly different.*

1.2. The aim of the work

My dear friend and colleague has taught me about the drunken city. The drunken city is a peculiar space detached from the ordinary rhythms of life, e.g. to wake up, to have breakfast, to go to work, to work, to come home, to wash laundry and so on. It is not only about drinking but also wandering through the streets and alleys or sitting in the front bench of a double-decker. We could also describe the drunken city as a landscape of crossing and parallel movements. Movement refers to the body and the surrounding material environment which are both mobile in a way that the borders of the body and other objects are permeable. The change of the body happens in a zone of indeterminacy where everything swirls when one body affects another. Although the drunken city is joyful, and does not pay attention to the destructive side of alcohol, to let oneself go or to lose oneself can also be painful which leads us to the theme of this book. According to the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1991/1994, 172) the world of artists, and also philosophers, are often dreadful in a way that they have encountered something too hard to bear: “breathless and with bloodshot eyes…they have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, too much for themselves, and that has put on them the quiet mark of death”.

I am not suggesting that we should become alcoholics or some other type of addict. Instead, I am seeking a complementary approach to the field in our own work. I want
to argue for the creative potential that lies in losing the grip of one’s body. Irving Singer (2011, 1) has appositely defined “creativity as a means of coping with the sense of dread and often desperation that resides generically in the human condition, and that the joyful access to creativity is capable of overcoming”. However, to touch creativity we first need to let ourselves go: “Only by tentatively letting-go, riding what carries us rather than fighting it can we grasp new movements, new thoughts, with greater finesse” (Bissell 2011, 2663). In other words, we cannot through conscious thinking and rational argumentation alone discuss the creativity of the artists, artistic inputs, or lives of the living in our research. As Deleuze (1969/1990, 157–158) relevantly asks:

“What is left for the abstract thinker once she has given advice of wisdom and distinction? Well then, are we to speak always about Bousquet’s wound, about Fitzgerald’s and Lowry’s alcoholism, Nietzsche’s and Artaud’s madness while remaining on the shore? Are we to become the professionals who give talks on these topics? Are we to wish only that those who have been struck down do not abuse themselves too much? Are we to take up collections and create special journal issues? Or should we go a short way further to see ourselves, be a little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little of guerrilla – just enough to extend the crack, but not enough to deepen it irretrievably?”

My work continues the discussion about creativity through reading it from a post-phenomenological perspective in relation to the landscape concept, art and event philosophy. I have studied creativity with the landscape concept through Alain Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event philosophies at the sites of encounter that vary from theatre and research cooperation, installation art, glass architecture and urban photography to laser scanned chimeric point clouds. To think with philosophy but remember to emerge from its words is how this book functions. I will look closely at the events in Badiou and Deleuze, and what the concept can bring to the notion of creative landscapes. I

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1 However, as James Ash and Paul Simpson (2016, 63) claim “post-phenomenology is not about abandoning the key insights of phenomenology. Instead it is about refiguring and expanding phenomenology’s analytic and conceptual boundaries”. Whereas phenomenology is puzzled over e.g. direct experience and embodiment (e.g. Husserl 1900/2001, 1901/2001; Merleau-Ponty 1942/1962), and in geography it has been applied to discuss and conceptualise e.g. lifeworld (Buttimer 1976), place-ballet (Seamon 1980) and place (Tuan 1977; Relph 1976). Phenomenology is naturally more complicated than this (Moran 2000) and has seen numerous other studies in geography (e.g. Malpas 2006; Simonsen 2013, 2005; Cresswell 2003; Wylie 2002a, b, 2005). By post-phenomenology I mean a way of considering different logics of worlds beyond actual positions and relations in a world (cf. McCormack 2017; Ash & Simpson 2016; Simpson 2009; Rose & Wylie 2006). What I am interested in in post-phenomenology is looking beyond the experiencing subject (e.g. Wylie 2006a, 521) and embodiment which is conceptualised further in my work. Moreover, change and chance are taken more seriously by a focus on the potentiality. To study these topics, Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event philosophies are worth visiting in depth. I am aware of the risks of using the prefix ‘post’. Nevertheless, for the moment I have not found a better equivalent. I could have placed the prefix inside parentheses, because Badiou for example speaks of an ‘objective phenomenology’. However, Badiou’s ideas do not hint at an experiencing subject but the fact that objects have an existence independent of human perception (see also Meillassoux 2008; Harman 2002) which is another perspective to post-phenomenology (see also Ash & Simpson 2016, 49). For the reason of this intricacy and the many (post)phenomenologies, I will not be filling up the pages with the word post-phenomenology. It will only appear when it is necessary.
have two claims depending on which path, Badiou’s (B) or Deleuze’s (D) one chooses to follow:

B: The creative landscape is a rupture in seeing which happens through seeing with the intense elements of a mobile landscape.

D: The creative landscape is the surface event of sense as a mobile present which connects the non-representable sensations.

In this study, I am in search of the creative thought concerned with both the rupturing of previous ways of seeing and the metamorphose of thinking through seeing-with. However, at this very site of both lies an ontological problem. Can our seeing simultaneously be fixed and fluid? Although fluid geographies have proposed a world of constant flux and change (Thrift 2006, 141), the process of thinking is troubled by the notion that there seems to be things that keep repeating themselves. According to Key MacFarlane (2017, 302) “process ontology remains blind to the mechanisms of social reproduction, to the means by which our worlds are created and structured”. Peter Merriman (2016, 559) relevantly asks: “what happens to the social, cultural, political and economic geographies of different senses of movement and stillness if we assert that everything is in motion?” (cf. Braun 2014). I do not have an answer, but I wish to elaborate on this controversy about the movement of change by two different notions of the event: the event as a rare cut and the event as continuous differentiation.

The two event philosophies make up the first part of the research material of this methodological study. In turn, the sites of encounter refer to the constellations of material relations which have provoked thinking, and function as the second type of research material. I follow the notion of a site where the emphasis is on “the immanent, material connection between bodies and unfolding, situated practices” (Woodward et al. 2010, 273). The sites of encounter function as places of learning where thoughts are generated through the coming together of elements of different times. In my work, the encounters have provoked methodological ideas expressed both through words and photographs. This approach is vividly touched by Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994):

“If the mental objects of philosophy, art, and science (that is to say, vital ideas) have a place, it will be in the deepest of the synaptic fissures, in the hiatuses, intervals, and meantimes of a non-objectifiable brain, in a place where to go in search of them will be to create. It will be a bit like tuning a television screen whose intensities would bring out that which escapes the power of objective definition” (ibid., 209).

To become interweaven with the geographies of creative thinking has not been a choice made for planned research, but more like an accident – or a chance encounter. As accidents tend to be, this one has also been devastating. I have been captured, sometimes even constrained by the problematics, lost in the depths of thinking. From
the depth, I have returned to the surface. To live is to be at the surface. Or as Deleuze (1969/1990, 103) borrows from Paul Valerý a beautiful expression: “The deepest is the skin”.

1.3. Research questions

This book that experiments with creative thinking as a mode of critical thinking and the concept of landscape begins with a general question about the tradition between landscape theory and landscape art. I ask:

1. What is the relation between the concept of art and landscape in geography?

Then I move towards more specific questions. Through discussing event philosophies I ask:

2. What kind of understandings do Badiou and Deleuze present about movement and rest in their event philosophies? What do these notions reveal about creativity?

3. How can Badiou’s and Deleuze’s events discussed at the sites of encounter be applied to conceptualize creative landscapes?

The answers I give will not be straightforward. Instead, I wish the reader to apply the capacity to read at different speeds in order to discover if the ideas presented resonate or not, if the words create new thinking or if they are dead ends. To borrow the words of Giuliana Bruno (2014, 9): “The articulation is rather braided, interlaced, and layered. Threads are interwoven to be traced throughout the book”.

1.4. Defining the key concepts

1.4.1. Creativity

For a long time, creativity meant the work of gods or an individual genius which has now been exhaustively critiqued (e.g. Tatarkiewicz 2012; Singer 2011). The transcendental notion of creativity was originated from the classical period and was strong in the Romantic period. For Plato creativity was a virtue of the activity of the gods in us. A poet, for example, required inspiration to be able to compose. In turn, Kant (2000/1790, 307–309) interpreted creativity as something not susceptible to natural interpretation because it was the domain of a genius who was not able to know from which source he received ideas. Nowadays, creativity is a topic in various fields such as psychology, philosophy, geography, sociology, and economics. In these fields, the definition of creativity is both agreed and disputed. Creativity is commonly defined as something that takes place in various fields: art, craft, business, science, technology, everyday life, and organizational life. As Simonton (2000) claims, all fields of human
activity are creative. Moreover, creativity can be approached from the perspectives of the author, product, or process. Although many scholars share the view that creativity has to do with the concepts of originality and value, they dispute the role of the author (see Gaut 2010, 1039). In addition, the environment where the creative process takes place has received emerging attention (see cf. Hautala 2017; Meusburger 2009; Günzel 2009).

Geographer Harriet Hawkins (2017) has argued for a geography of creativity of multiple meanings which includes 1) creativity of socio-spatial practices as potential for world-making, 2) the political potential of creative practices or 3) the tensions between creative economies and creativity as resistance, and 4) creativity as a force. My interest is in creativity as the potential for difference. I refer with creativity to the potential that is caused by (chance) encounters and which changes the ways of seeing (cf. Wilson 2017, 464–465). I continue the discussion about how creativity works in practice (cf. Bærenholdt 2017, 335). However, here it means looking beyond the practices and paying attention to the incompleteness of processes, or as already Allan Pred (1979, 234–235) wrote: “everything is part of an unbroken chain of creation and destruction, everything is in perpetual transition, and we are all, human beings as well as stone, irresistibly part of the flow of emergence and withering away”.

I focus on creative thought that occurs through what I call passive creativity without value. By this I mean that novelty and change happen to us without our purposefully striving for it. In the midst of encounters the previous ways of thinking might be ruptured or our bodies differentiate in relation to the materialities they encounter. The encounters that change us cannot be said to be absolute good or evil because we never know in advance how a relation will affect us in the future. Following the event philosophies of Badiou and Deleuze, I study what creativity discussions in philosophy can introduce to geography and vice versa (cf. Günzel 2009). Before engaging with these ideas of Badiou and Deleuze, the concept of creativity needs to be put into context from the perspectives of agency and environment.

In the active agency interpretation creativity is seen as a property of human agents. This interpretation has recently been put forward by two philosophers who draw their ideas from philosophy and psychology. Dustin Stokes (2011) has formulated the concept of ‘a minimally creative thought’ with which he aims to identify and clarify the fundamental features of creativity. Consequently, Stokes defines creative thought as follows: “Some thought x is minimally creative if, for some agent A, x is the non-accidental result of agency; x is psychologically novel; and x could not have been tokened by A before the time when it actually was tokened by A” (ibid., 659). In turn, Berys Gaut (2010, 1040) defines creativity as “the capacity to produce original and valuable items by flair”. For Gaut, creative actions, thus, exhibit a relevant purpose, some degree of understanding, a degree of judgement and an evaluative ability directed to the task at hand. In other words, creative actions are neither purely accidental nor can occur through merely mechanical procedures. Moreover, a creative actor must know
how to apply a rule of a certain procedure if one is involved. From these two conceptualizations, we can find four ways in which creative agency can be understood: creativity as rational versus unconscious activity, teleological versus accidental creativity, the originality of the idea/item and value in terms of goodness of the idea/item. I will briefly discuss the four premises of the creative agency in relation to my concerns.

The first disputed theme regarding creative agency is whether creativity is a rational activity or the work of the unconscious. Drawing from art and aesthetics, Jon Elster (2000, 175–178) claims that creativity should be seen as rational activity because artists “make works that are good as works of art”, that is, maximize artistic value by coping with constrains. Both Stokes and Gaut are on the side of rational creativity which does not allow accidental performances of creativity. For Stokes (2011, 662) agency involves intention, and thus, creative thoughts, actions and results must be non-accidental consequences of agency. Consequently, Stokes (ibid., 663) claims that agents are non-accidentally responsible for their creative actions and results. This leads us to Gaut (2010, 1041) who claims that creativity is the property of an agent that has certain capacities. Moreover, Stokes (2011, 674) considers the cognitive profile of an individual to have at least some effect on cognitive breakthroughs. Here, we also see the importance of time because the specific creative action was not possible before a certain moment in the development of the individual’s cognitive profile.

Hawkins (2017, 338) claims that on contrary to creativity merely understood as “a practice of skilled learning and bodily habituation” it is as well “unconscious in the moment act of improvisation or just part of what it means to be in the world”. In a report on his mathematical creation, Henri Poincaré (1910) pondered the importance of the unconscious moments:

“Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illumination, a manifest sign of long, unconscious prior work. The role of this unconscious work in mathematical invention appears to me incontestable, and traces of it would found in other cases where it is less evident. Often when one works at a hard question, nothing good is accomplished at the first attack. Then one takes a rest, longer or shorter, and sits down anew to the work. During the first hour, as before, nothing is found, and then all of a sudden the decisive idea presents itself to the mind. It might said that the conscious work has been more fruitful cause it has been interrupted and the rest has given to the mind its force and freshness. But it is more able that this rest has been filled out with unconscious work and that the result of this work has afterward revealed itself to the geometer just as in the cases I have cited; only the revelation instead of coming during walk or a journey, has happened during a period of conscious work, but independently of this work which plays at most a role of excitant, as if it were the goad stimulating the results already reached during rest, but remaining unconscious, to assume the conscious form” (ibid., 328–329).
The rationality of creative actors has also been studied by psychologists who have discussed the connections between creativity and psychological disorder (Ludwig 1995; Eysenck 1995). Some of these findings show that members of artistic professions suffer more often from different mental illnesses than members of other professions (Ludwig 1995, 4). However, severe and persisting mental difficulties tend to negatively affect the artistic output (Ludwig 1995, 8). Moreover, the artistic output only becomes important related to other attributes and circumstances, and thus, mental illness can never solely explain creativity (ibid., 11). In addition, psychological studies have found that creative people “tend to be more open to new experiences, less conventional and less conscientious” (Feist 1999, 290).

Creativity as an actor’s goal oriented rational activity is traditionally described as consisting of different stages. I will shortly revisit Joakim Funke’s (2009, 14–16) and Peter Meusburger’s (2009, 108–110) summary views of the five stages of creative thinking: preparation, incubation, insight, evaluation and elaboration. In first stage, preparation is conscious action where a problem is defined. In the second stage, incubation is latent where the problem can be temporarily abandoned from active problem solving but the brain, however, continues to work. This is complicated terrain where the individual is unaware of what happens but research has shown that intuitive information-processing occurs. In the third stage, insight is the moment of the creative product coming to mind through passing the threshold of consciousness. The fourth stage, evaluation, is the moment of critically considering the value of the idea regarding norms. The fifth stage, is the final product of the creative idea. Considerable effort is required to reach the fifth stage.

Some argue that a creative item or thought needs to be valuable (Gaut & Livingstone 2003, 10). Traditionally, value in the context of creativity has meant two issues. Firstly, value means that the new product is more valuable than mundane creativity (Stokes 2011, 26). In other words, it is a radical breakthrough in some particular field. However, Stokes (2011) questions this assumption by claiming that his concept of a minimally creative thought broadens the scope to mundane cognitive changes such as an agent applying new skills or learning to solve some simple problems in one’s environment. Secondly, David Novitz (1999) claims that creative acts need to have real value for some people by being beneficial (e.g. either do or can increase enjoyment of life, enhance security, health, prosperity). Novitz acknowledges the problematics in this definition. Although an evil act of harm does not seem beneficial, the inventor himself might be delighted by the malevolent act, and thus, it has value for at least one person. Novitz (ibid., 78), however, continues and argues that the intention of a creative act must be good, and thus evil acts are not creative. The definition of creativity commonly includes a moral imperative, and another concern is whether or not a creative product or thought must be morally acceptable (Gaut 2010, 1040; Novitz 1999, 78).

When creative actions aim at a certain state of affairs, they are teleological events. The creative process then clarifies the goal and leads to an expected end such as a poem,
painting or building (Gaut 2010, 1040–1041). Economic geography, for example, shares an interest in the creative processes orientated towards an expected end – the knowledge being created (e.g. Ibert et. al. 2015; Hautala 2015; Ejermo & Hansen 2015; Grabher & Thiel 2015; Brinks & Ibert 2015). If in economic terms creativity and growth are seen as interrelated (Jones & Warren 2016, 289), in my work, creativity is neither understood as growth nor as something that can be planned and implemented by creative economies, creative cities or the instrumentalization of art means (Laundry 2012; Florida 2005; cf. Edensor et al. 2010; Peck 2005).

Instead, I focus on the creative process from an anti-teleological point of view where the event is something unexpected in the situation. When the event is the unexpected, creativity is not always concerned with working with artistic or other means to solve a predetermined problem. It is possible to some extent to predict the unpredictable by for example generating catastrophic or apocalyptic feelings through which thinking about the future can be governed (Anderson 2014, 131). Here, it is rather that the problem itself is the unexpected in the situation which introduces uncertainty and chance as constitutive in the making of our worlds. If economic geographical studies seldom question the wider framework, Colin McFarlane’s (2011, 374) arguments about the city as a machine for critical urban learning of “questioning and antagonising existing urban knowledges and formulations, learning alternatives in participatory collectives and proposing alternative formulations” has echoes in my work. Or as Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt (2017, 340) claims “the urban is about the subversive, the vulnerable and the uncertain, all of which play significant roles in the creativity of making things happen” (cf. Mould 2015). In my work, the city is the broader framework for methodological explorations, and creativity is an experimental and performative orientation to the world (Wylie 2010a; Gibson-Graham 2008).

For the aim of this work, the question of originality can be understood by stating that one can think what one was not able to think before. This is loosely related to Donald Campbell’s (1960, 381) application of blindness to discoveries – where blindness means “going beyond the limits of foresight or prescience”. However, as Campbell’s conceptualization is related to the word discover not creativity, the formulation above is more current (see also Gaut 2010, 1037). Regarding originality both Gaut and Stokes cite Margaret Boden (2004) who defines creativity in two terms: psychological creativity and historical creativity. Of these, the latter refers to an occurrence of an idea which is new to an individual, but may have been obtained by others before. In turn, the former is explained as an idea that is original in a way that no-one else has had it before. Both of these are based on the notion that there is an agent capable of producing something new.

According to Boden (2009, 237–238), novelty can emerge from three types of creativity or mental processes: combinatorial, exploratory, and transformational. The first, “combinatorial creativity involves the generation of unfamiliar (and interesting) juxtapositions of familiar ideas”. The second, exploratory creativity means an action
where “the existing stylistic rules or conventions are used to generate novel structures (ideas), whose possibility may or may not have been realized before the exploration took place”. The third, transformational creativity means that “some defining dimension of the style or conceptual space is altered so that one can generate structures that could not be generated before.” Moreover, creative thinking has also been described as predominantly divergent, that is “characterized by unusual associations, a shift of perspectives, and the enlargement of the horizon” (Funke 2009, 16 cit. Guilford 1967).

The post-phenomenologist approach, that is the focus of my work, suggests neither a completely conscious and rational agent (Stokes 2011; Gaut 2010) nor a subliminal self who is capable of finding beautiful combinations through the work of the unconscious (Poincaré 1910, 330). For instance, an actor does not enter a creative process as a subject but is an individuating body whose habit of doing is evolving, and who is performing in relation to the materialities and thoughts encountered (cf. Bissell 2015; Dewsbury & Bissell 2015). If the newness of a thought does not arise from an act but is given a spark by an encounter, it allows us to take into account the passive sides of creativity. By recognizing the risk of stepping into environmental determinism, I will consider how the influence of the environment, and more aptly the milieu has been viewed with regard to creativity. My aim is to move from the environment towards the notion of creative landscape as potential for change. This requires attention to the concepts of creative milieu and environment in creativity studies.

In an edited collection, *Milieus of creativity: The role of places, environments, and spatial contexts*, Peter Meusburger and others (2009) describe the importance of the forerunners of the interactional and environmental study of creativity. The influence of the environment as regards creativity was first recognized by Ostwald in 1909, and gained preliminary attention in the 1950s (Barker 1968; Osborn 1953; Stein 1953; Stallknecht 1941) and has been increasingly studied from the 1980s onward (Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Amabile 1983). Since then it has been widely acknowledged that “creative individuals are embedded in particular environments capable of either fostering or hindering their creativity and that cognitive processes are guided not only by personal capabilities or intrinsic motivation but also by interactions with and influences of the environment” (Meusburger et al. 2009, 2–3). The interest has been in the phenomenon of creativity which results from interaction between what Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 325–326) defined as social institutions or fields, stable cultural domains and the individual. If the field selects, and the domain preserves the ideas, then the individual’s task is to bring change which is seen as creative by the field. The importance of the environment for the person is also supported by the notion that challenging experiences can increase the creative abilities of an individual (Simonton 1994).

Taking into consideration the passivity of creativity leads us to pay attention to what Stephan Günzel (2009) calls the creative milieu. Günzel (ibid., 269) claims that the word milieu is more appropriate than environment because we are in an environment
surrounded by nature or the social world, but using milieu, which literally means “middle” or “medium”, suggests that “there is no outside and, hence, no inside”. In other words, a milieu admits an unfinished and uncertain relation between human bodies and other materialities. It means looking beyond an autonomous subject that takes action. Günzel (ibid., 269), however, acknowledges that the concept of a creative milieu is tautological because “a milieu per se allows for things to be created and for changes to take place”.

According to Günzel, in social analysis the fallacy can be avoided by implying that at certain points in time and space we are not creative or that all milieus that exist are not creative. Considering how philosophy emerged from the creative milieu of the classical era, Günzel argues further “creative milieus therefore have to be conceived of not as a result of space but rather as something that must coalesce in space or exist in a certain place in order to be operant” (ibid., 275). In this work, I have found the concept of landscape as a compelling and germinating companion to the exploration of creativity from a post-phenomenological perspective in geography.

1.4.2. Landscape

“A landscape is a visible distant environment, or distant field of vision… Our definition of landscape includes both the combination of visual phenomena and the complex objects perceivable through these visual phenomena, and it remains for the researcher worker to decide which viewpoint is the most viable in end case” (Granö 1929/1997, 49–50).

As the words by the Finnish geographer J. G. Granö implicate, and Richard Hartshorne (1939, 153) later aptly claimed: the definition of landscape varies according to what we think geography should study. Landscape is a concept of multiple entries circulating between science, philosophy, and art. Landscape is concerned with matter and memory and an order of the visible as a vast field of seers and seen. Landscape is an attempt to capture matter into forms but also an encounter with forces and turbulent materialities. It is a relation of both earth and sky. In other words, landscape has been conceptualized as e.g. a natural area, a cultural landscape (e.g. Antrop 2006; Mitchell 2003; Sauer 1925; Granö 1929/1997) or a regional landscape as an interplay between the human and the non-human (Matless 2014), a subjective feeling (e.g. Karjalainen 1987; Meinig 1983; Hoskins 1955), a way of seeing (e.g. Cosgrove & Daniels 1988; Duncan & Duncan 1988; Cosgrove 1985), a gaze (e.g. Nash 1996; Rose 1993), a reflection of societal relations (e.g. Schein 2006; Mitchell 1996, 1994), an embodied relation to land (e.g. della Dora 2008; Ingold 2004; Tilley 2004), that which names the materialities with which we see (Wylie 2006), a tension between absence and presence (Wylie & Rose 2006) and distance (Wylie 2017; see also Granö 1929/1997).

In this work, I follow the notion that landscape is both human and non-human, but without the human there is only land (della Dora 2015; Mitchell 1996). Land is there
regardless of any human perception but landscape is construed in relation to the hu-
man. We might speak of natural landscapes but without the act of framing there would
be only earthly and cosmological processes. Consequently, landscape per se is under-
stood through the many ways land is framed in geography and related fields. It is a
concept that works differently depending how it is applied. The different framings will
be discussed with relation to art in more detail in Chapter 3 (cf. Wylie 2007). Before
that some words about landscape as a critical concept versus a practical tool.

Besides a conceptual tool in research, landscape is a policy tool defined in e.g. The
European Landscape Convention which guides the protection, management, and
planning of historical layers of the environment for the well-being of citizens (Council
of Europe 2000). The convention defines landscape as material and perceptual, that
is, “an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and
interaction of natural and/or human factors” (Council of Europe 2008; 2000). The
convention is based on an idea of a common heritage to be protected, and landscape
as a value to be shared by different cultures and as a foundation of their identity
(Council of Europe 2017). Consequently, the convention is in line with the Council of
Europe’s objective of a territorial unit that has human rights and democracy in its
priorities. The convention emphasizes public involvement where the different sensory
and diverse emotional environmental perceptions are “essential for the respect and
safeguarding of the identity of the population itself and for individual enrichment and
that of society as a whole” (Council of Europe 2008).

The landscape convention is based on landscape science and phenomenology, which
in some occasions overlap and in others cases are contradictory. As the landscape ap-
proach has travelled with researchers to many sites, it is crucial to remember not only
the concepts’ roots in the ancient Greco-Roman period, but also to pay attention to
how a predetermined definition or seeing is founded on logical differences or categor-
ical thinking of, in many ways, non-logical world(s). Kenneth Olwig (2016, 256) who
studied the etymological roots of the landscape concept argues that, the historical con-
cept of landscape in the Germanic languages as a polity and substantive sense of place
“refers largely to lands ‘scaped’ or shaped according to customary law as adjudicated
by representative legal assemblies”. In turn, the scenic landscape conception origi-
nates from the Euclidean mapping technologies applied through the linear perspective
(Cosgrove 1985).

Without undervaluing the aims and intentions of the convention to promote sustain-
able living environments, I apply landscape as a critical concept which “involves
modes of thinking and feeling that chafe against invocations of homeland as a site of
existential inhabitation, as a locus of sentiment and attachment, and a wellspring of
identity” (Wylie 2016, 408). According to Wylie a certain equation between landscape
and homeland occurs in the landscape convention. Landscape has deep but not very
old roots in homeland thinking, for example, in Finland geographers participated in
constructing the nation state and nationality “by developing research and representational methods, which have turned the spatial complexity of the state into governable, controllable, and hierarchical regionalities” (Linkola 2013, 4). In turn, the German geographers Banse and Passarge were strongly aligned to National Socialism (Michel 2016). Framing land through national or European Union policies needs to be a cautious action, because landscape cannot be a homeland as is sometimes presented – there is neither a homeland to be inhabited nor are there original inhabitants (Wylie 2016, 414; see also see Tuan 2002, xii).

I discuss landscape as a critical concept from the framework of landscape theory’s close connection to art. I claim that art and landscape together have potential to make us more sensitive to events. However, the relation between art and landscape have varied over the course of time. This relation reaches from von Humboldt’s (1844/1997, 1849, 1850) fascination with sublime landscape paintings and Francis Younghusband’s (1920) with the beauty of the Earth, to the linear perspective paintings (Cosgrove 1985) and pre-linear landscape murals and mosaics (della Dora 2013), and (post)modern landscape art of various media (Rich 2017; Vasudevan 2015; della Dora 2015; Warren 2012). Moreover, humanist, and (post)phenomenological landscape theory’s interest in the research practice of creative landscape writing is the anchor for this research (e.g. Wylie 2005; Karjalainen 1989; Meinig 1983; Hoskins 1955). Sublime art and linear perspective art captured nature in frames (von Humboldt, 1849). Studies of Renaissance art have critically considered the distancing and objectifying linear perspective (Cosgrove 1984/1998; 1985). In turn, humanistic poetic landscape autobiographies (Bunkšė 2007) and some recent research on the art of the Classical period (della Dora 2013) have brought the question of multidimensional time into the discussion. In addition, the non-representational/post-phenomenological studies of the landscape concept have offered valuable insights, for instance by pondering on absences and distances (e.g. Dewsbury 2015; Wylie 2012, 2009). I continue with artistic examples and move towards artistic research with the question of the rupturing and renewing our seeing for which the concept of landscape is an eminent companion.

1.5. Structure of the work

After briefly presenting the four articles (I, II, III, IV) and a photo-book (V), in the second chapter, I will introduce my research methodology which is a combination of (1) philosophy, (2) participation in artistic processes and (3) art work, and (4) artistic research. In this research, art is not a supplementary element but immanent in this work as a process. Previously, Hawkins (2013a) has asked what the work of art can do with respect to a different future. One answer to this question is that we need “to understand better the work creative methods can do in the world in terms of enabling us to research and to live differently” (Hawkins 2015, 247). However, art alone does not
do anything but rather artistic work and production offer a particular site and a set of practices which encourage us to pay attention to the forces of matter and things (Hawkins et. al. 2015, 331).

I have applied interactive research with art which focus on the processes, the materiality of the corporeal body, and the role of the author in the artistic process (Katve-Kontturi & Tiainen 2007, 14). In addition, I have practiced artistic research which refers to communicating conceptual issues with the means of art. In this research, my body has participated in the artistic process, encountered art works and become an artist by making installation art and urban photography. As creative geographies have become appealing to geographers, the need to pay attention to the political implications of the practices has increased (Marston & de Leeuw 2013; Article II). With regard to this concern, I will also focus on the role of art in participatory research as part of a wider participatory turn in society.

In the third chapter, I will discuss the different landscape framings and readings which function as the geographical framework for this research (RQ 1). As the tradition of landscape theory and research is immense, I will concentrate on the work of geographers and the fields close to geography that have resonated with my work. Although I am most concerned with landscape phenomenology and post-phenomenology, I do not underestimate the various other approaches to landscape. To this end, I have encountered the art of geography: how geographers have framed land, people and processes and how has this happened in relation to landscape art. The material consists of geographical and related field texts, through which the materiality and visuality of landscapes have been explored.

I will present a constellation and approach the different landscape framings which haunt the present landscape definitions and actions. I will pay special attention to the relationship between art, geography, and landscape.

In the fourth chapter, I will look at how some landscapes appear restrictive with an example from art. The aim is to lead towards the themes that I will unpack with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s ideas. The example comes from Article I, where I studied the techniques applied in The Robinson Institute installation. Installation art prompts reflection on the spectator’s role which can be applied to an understanding of participatory processes in general. This installation functions as a reconstruction where the fictional institute researchers explain demonstrate the destructive relation between capitalism and environmental destruction by means of a story map. In turn, the way the fictional scholar Robinson himself encounters landscapes hints beyond the restrictive pattern. In other words, for Robinson the encounters give rise to problems and questions which the researchers try to communicate to the spectator by fabricating gloomy feelings with the possibility of catharsis at the end.

In the fifth and sixth chapters, I will explore how the concepts of movement and rest appear in Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event philosophies through the sites of encounter
which are something beyond empirical findings, and more like companions in con-
versation (RQ 2). My aim is to ponder on what the notions of movement and rest
reveal about creativity. Furthermore, my aim with this discussion is to formulate
the concept of the creative landscape with the event(s) at the sites of encounter (RQ 3). I
apply examples from Articles II, III and IV, and I discuss the photo book (V) made by
the urban photography method. The discussion about the creative landscape goes
beyond actual, lived and experienced mobilities (cf. Dewsbury & Bissell 2015; Bissell
2015; Adey et al. 2014; Cresswell 2006). I first contemplate theatre and research work-
shops with Badiou’s event in order to understand how sudden ruptures in thinking
emerge and how these can make us take a critical distance to our previous ways of
seeing. After which, with Deleuze, I then pay attention the small alterations which
changed my body at the sites of laser scanning and urban photography. Before con-
cluding, I formulate the concept of a fabulative landscape which I claim comes close
to doing geography as artistic research. In the concluding words, I return to the two
arguments presented about creative landscapes.

1.6. Original articles and a photo-book

I. Stepping inside The Robinson Institute: Following the story map of Robinson’s
journey

In Article I, the site of encounter is the film-maker, artist and writer Patrick Keiller’s
The Robinson Institute installation art. By participating in the installation, I found that
The Robinson Institute is constructed as a story map by combining the practices of
mapping and storytelling. I claim that the story map has the capacity to narrate inter-
related events through time and space. The Robinson Institute installation is con-
structed of objects which together make the landscape of the southern English ‘coun-
tryside’. The landscape is depicted through the route of the fictional scholar Robinson.
The route is comprised of seven parts which consist of more than 120 varying land-
scape objects: footages and stills from the film Robinson in Ruins, books, drawings,
films, maps, meteorites, music, paintings, and photographs. In addition, readings were
put on display in a horizontal showcase of glass and a large screen showed images of
biophilia.

Conceptually the focus in on the restrictive landscape. The Robinson Institute, func-
tioning as a story map, guides the spectator to a predetermined path through a route
clearly marked by numbers, labels and objects related by means of representational
techniques. Stepping along the intended path the spectator learns about the destruc-
tive relationship between global capitalism and environmental destruction. I claim, as
the spectator is not left with much space other feelings, The Robinson Institute is a
restrictive landscape where the constellations orient the audience to a morally right
stance towards global capitalism.
II. The creative landscape of theatre-research cooperation: a case from Turku, Finland

Conceptually, the focus here is on the creative landscape that I developed through discussing landscape theory in relation to Alain Badiou’s two theatres. Badiou’s first theatre is a theatre of static elements. In contrast, in the second theatre the elements of a constellation are vividly seen and the theatre is capable of rupturing the prevailing order. The research material for the article was gathered from a theatre-research workshop that is understood as a vivid constellation or a mobile landscape. The landscape in motion means the tension between the elements of the theatre and the research project in relation to the state of the situation and my own position as a researcher in the project. My main argument is that theatre-research cooperation, understood as a landscape in motion, has the capacity to bring about creative landscapes. Consequently, the creative landscape refers to the break in the way of seeing which occurs through the process of seeing with the elements in motion.

In Article II, the site of encounter is the first phase of the Yes in my backyard! -workshop (Joo mun takapihalle!) conducted in 2010 in a multicultural neighborhood in Turku, Finland. This project was implemented as a cooperation between researchers, artists, and policy makers (Ympäristöministeriö, The Ministry of the Environment). The project aimed to test whether art, in the form of theatre in particular, could operate as a tool to enhance participatory urban planning practices in the context of the Finnish urban planning system. My initial research interest was particularly concerned with multicultural participation. The focus of the article is on the changes that occurred in my way of seeing from an initial voyeur, to an activist wanting to participate in the discussion about inter-culturalism in the housing area, and finally to a spectator wanting to leave my seat.

III. Through laser scanned point clouds to techno-sight and a landscape on the move

In Article III, I formulate the concept of landscape on the move through close reading of phenomenological and post-phenomenological landscape theory in relation with Deleuze’s notion of the surface event of sense. I ask: How does the visual technology and digital environment influence my landscape sight at non-immediate sites of encounter when the body is no longer in contact with them? How is it possible to conceptualise a passage from a past site of encounter to a future site of encounter? In my article, I exemplify the passage from a past site of encounter to a future site through the relation of the laser scanner, the digital environment, and my body. My main argument is that the surface event introduces what I call the landscape on the move.

My focus is the point clouds produced by the laser scanning technology. The point clouds are extraordinary kinds of images: commonly a combination of the laser beams’ journey between the scanner and the materialities of a site, and the photographs. My specific interests were the laser scanned moving objects which appear as
point clouds which do not resemble the objects the laser beam has touched. I call the result of the laser scanned moving objects chimeric point clouds. The chimeric point clouds function as a site where we can consider the surface event of sense in Deleuze’s thinking. The chimeric point cloud as a figure without resemblance is oriented both to past and future. Consequently, a chimeric point cloud directs us towards a sense which is always haunted by sensations of the past and open to the future through generating new ones. Drawing from the surface event of sense, I claim that landscape sight or seeing with landscape is always on the move. I exemplify the landscape on the move through the passages where the laser scanning technology affected my seeing with the landscape at non-immediate sites of encounter. By this I mean, that after laser scanning and post-processing intensively, my landscape sight became a techno-sight which metamorphosed with relation to present materialities outdoors.

IV. Glass architecture as a site for encountering the surface aesthetics of urban photography

In Article IV, I bring the interplay of Dionysian and Apollonian artistic impulses, and the encounter between Dionysus with Ariadne at the site of glass architecture to discuss the surface aesthetics of urban photography. I argue that surface aesthetics reveals the creative potential in urban photography. The creative potential is the capacity to disrupt ways of seeing and open up fabulative landscapes that are not entirely material. The site for the methodological investigation was glass architecture, or more specifically reflective and clear glass surfaces. The encounter with glass architecture is discussed with relation to Friedrich Nietzsche’s Dionysian and Apollonian artistic impulses presented in the book *The Birth of Tragedy* and Deleuze’s writings about an affective encounter, as well as the encounter between Dionysos and Ariadne. In addition to glass architecture and theoretical writings, the research material in this article is an urban photography project *The Drawing Onto Sky* made during the autumn of 2013, when I attended Goldsmiths Urban Photography Summer School in London.

The reflective glass walls refer to the Apollonian way of seeing, that is, the representational landscapes of common sense where objects find their position with the assistance of the categorical tools of opposition, similitude, analogy, and identity. At the site of clear glass, light plays tricks with surrounding materialities and inner and outer movements mesh on the glass surface. At this point, the constantly changing representation is read through the relation between Apollonian and Dionysus which challenges the idea of stable identities (or individuals). In other words, the Apollonian is the embodiment of the restless Dionysian, an unsatisfied feeling or phenomenon without individualization. In turn, approaching the clear glass surface through Ariadne and Dionysus, we come to the affectual encounter, where the past never returns as it once was, but the unbounded virtual objects from the pure past fold into a constellation with the present sensation. If an affectual encounter is still present, the landscape of fabulation is a sign of art simultaneously originating and breaking free from
material relationships. In my example, the landscape of fabulation emerged from the affective relationship between my body, a camera, and the city materialities. Consequently, I claim that through the concept of the landscape of fabulation, urban photography presents itself as more than a representational practice.

V. All is it - The materialities of River Aura

_All is it_ is a photo-book about the materialities of the River Aura, and how they affect human bodies that go along its banks, travel in it with boats or other vehicles, or occasionally plunge into the river. By the materialities of the river, I mean both people and the concrete things along the river such as the benches, daffodils, a forgotten mitten, the mud, the riverside boat restaurants, and the materiality as a vivid passage from one bodily state to another. The second, more complex understanding about materiality is an understanding of matter as open and interrogative.

I encountered human and non-human bodies along the River Aura during year 2015. These encounters are restored in portraits and words. I asked people for their permission to make portraits of them and the river. The non-human bodies, various objects, birds, and trees, that I encountered with the camera – I can only hope gave me silent permission to make their portraits. I asked the people two questions: How does the river affect your life or is present in it? What is the most extraordinary or memorable thing that has happened to you or you have seen along the river bank or in the river? _All is it_ is a constellation of the photographs and the words. The photographs are presented as such, the words are molded from the short interviews to convey the tangibility of the materialities of the River Aura.
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2.1. Encounter with Badiou and Deleuze in the midst of research

I have engaged with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event philosophies with the aim of looking at the creative landscape from different angles. The creative landscape is a concept I apply to the exploration, from a methodological perspective, of how our lives and thinking evolve and are radically altered. What connects the two contemporaries is the concept of an event as something unthinkable in a situation, which presents the new. When the event as change is understood from Deleuze’s perspective, it is processual, that is, repetition seen as a difference. This means that the becoming of worlds is a constant process where the elements of the world are differentiated in a way that nothing returns as the same. When difference-in-itself is thought, it provides a site for “imagining new strategies to challenge representation without ignoring the continuing violences incited under representational modes of politics” (Cockayne et al., 2017, 583). In turn, for Badiou a major event breaks the representational order or state of a situation. The events take place as exceptions to what is already there in a situation, and rupture the constellation of a world.

Despite their differences, Badiou and Deleuze partly share a common ground in their conceptualisation about the event. James Williamson (2009) has found five similarities: (1) the event does not have a well-defined spatio-temporal location, (2) the event does not happen to things or to persons, but rather happens through them, (3) the events are politically and ethically of the highest significance, (4) relations between events are not causal and (5) the concept of genesis is central to the concept of the event. I focus particularly on the fifth similarity. Furthermore, both apply mathematics in their conceptualization: Badiou relies on algebra and a post-Cantorian set theory, Deleuze on differential calculus and Riemannian manifolds. Although a relevant critique of the mathematical thinking of an event in Badiou and Deleuze has been presented (see Joronen 2016; Elden 2008), I claim that their thoughts are worth visiting as an experiment with thought, and does not necessarily require an in-depth discussion on the mathematics. I acknowledge the dependency on mathematics but focus on the potentiality of Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event(s) beyond mathematics.

In some papers, Badiou’s and Deleuze’s philosophies have been discussed in relation to each other (e.g. Saldanha 2010; Shaw 2010 a, 2012), by some geographers the ideas of the two thinkers have also been pondered over in separate texts (e.g. Woodward 2016, 2014a; Dewsbury 2007, 2000; Saldanha 2017, 2007; Saldanha & Adams 2013). As I have been troubled by with the problem of how one can be interested in both Badiou and Deleuze, I was glad to notice that others struggle too: “Each theory (Badiou and Deleuze) is both too big and too small for the other theory. Each theory both subsumes and is subsumed by the other. We are left with an aporia that has been
one of the defining events in Continental philosophy for the past fifteen years” (Adkins 2012, 514). Nevertheless, I found this aporia exciting because it offers a site for thinking about different ways of seeing the logics of the world(s):

“To know oneself, to learn to think, to act as if nothing were self-evident—wondering, “wondering that there is being”—these, and many other determinations of philosophy create interesting attitudes, however tiresome they may be in the long run, but even from a pedagogical point of view they do not constitute a well-defined occupation or precise activity” (Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 7).

2.1.1. Badiou and love

In the early stage of the research, I was inspired by the thinking of Badiou (2001/1998), whom I had encountered through his critique on culturalism in the Ethics – An essay on the understanding the evil. I encountered Badiou after the short and intensive applied research project Yes in my backyard! Suburbs of experimental participation, where our aim was to introduce participatory planning to those not familiar with it, and to test if the means of applied drama would attract new stakeholders to planning. During the workshop period, I was troubled because I was not familiar enough with the Finnish urban planning system and more importantly with the local context of the multicultural suburban of Varissuo, where we were implementing the pilot project. The situation was complicated by the fact that some of the workshop participants were well aware of the planning situation in their housing area. Another issue was that as I was interested in inter-cultural relations in planning, I felt that I was trying to put the cultural (and the suburban) Other on a stage. After the workshop period, Badiou’s ideas resonated with those inconveniences that I had felt.

As I grew more familiar with Badiou, I became acquainted with his conceptualization of events taking place in the realms of art, love, politics and science. I could not resist his words. How could one resist, when someone writes about love? I encountered Badiou’s thoughts in the articles published in the Lacanian ink -journal. If the journal articles were inspiring and thought evoking, challenging to read in the beginning, his books did not rouse the same response. In Being and event especially, but also in many part of the Logics of the world, the event theory is written through mathematics. If I had found love for the love in Badiou’s writings, mathematics did not resonate with my thinking. However, the event as a cut was somehow intriguing. As I recalled Badiou’s event, I could see scissors flying in the air cutting paper in pieces - and once these papers were cut into pieces, they would never be the same. Despite the complexity, Badiou’s event philosophy carries ideas concerning the disruptive potential which has resonated in the field of human geography as well as other social sciences (Dewsbury 2007; Saldanha 2010; Shaw 2010a, b, 2012; Prozorov 2014). In other words, through an event it becomes possible to understand the radical changes taking place
(Shaw 2012, 622). In addition, reading Badiou offers criticism as regards the limits of thinking space (and landscape) with Deleuze (Saldanha 2017, 6).

The collision between the research aims and practice, as part of wider societal framework, caused an inconvenience i.e. the non-representability of the situation, from which both the work of art (Nordström 2011b and the research output emerged (Article II). I first made an art installation through which I presented the participatory ethos of our time through playful pieces that together made the installation “Always remember…” (Nordström 2011; Figure 1). The name of the installation refers to a Finnish educational song that reminds children of the dangers of traffic and teaches them how to walk safely in the city. In turn, the journal article (Article II) was a long process; from an initial non-representational polemic, through the critique of relational art (Bishop 2013) to an article arguing for the use of Badiou’s (2008) writings and landscape theory as a framework. As the work of art did not require contextualization, I was thus capable of working out the anxiety without constraints; the journal article presents a detailed study of the potentiality of Badiou’s thinking for approaching small events taking place e.g. during research.

FIGURE 1. The installation *Always remember* consisted of participatory art works (Nordström 2011). This particular work was titled “Qualitative self-service research”. The audience was encouraged to step inside the box and make a video of their experiences in urban planning and post-it on a Facebook-page created for the installation. (Source: Marjaana Lehtonen 2011)
2.1.2. How to encounter Deleuze?

On the other hand, I was troubled by the idea of an event as a cut because things seem to change in other ways than as rare and total changes. Moreover, I pondered on how we end up with a cut. I did not find saturation in the dialectics for the question of how a way of thinking is ruptured or how we become other in the midst of doing something. Although Badiou acknowledges that the transcendental truths find their worldly appearances through a process where a body is constructed, he does not sufficiently touch on the relation between different worlds, and what escapes these encountering worlds. In addition, Badiou’s body does not refer to a material constellation such as human body or some other object. Thus, Badiou’s ideas lack tangible materiality. To understand this, we need to turn to Deleuze and the affectivity of life. Deleuze is the thinker of encounters which always extend the present to the past and the future. Furthermore, Deleuze succeeds in describing small changes through a processual approach to movement, exemplified by Claire Colebrook (2002, 40) who claims that walking is not about combining two steps, but more elastic because if the walker only combined two steps, s/he would fall.

Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is characterized by the focus on “the excess of life over and above the categories that seek to contain it” (Shaw 2012, 615). Geographers have already for some time been influenced by Deleuze’s thinking, especially those who have written about non-representational theory (Dewsbury 2000; Thrift 2008), assemblages (Müller 2015), and topology (Dixon & Jones 2015; Martin & Secor 2014; Woodward et al. 2010). Deleuze’s ideas have also influenced the critique e.g. of race (Saldanha 2012a), gender (Hickey-Moody & Laurie 2015) and narrative (Woodward 2016; Dittmer & Latham 2015). The richness of Deleuze’s (together with Félix Guattari) thinking for the concept of space has also been realized (Saldanha 2017). However, if we only apply the concepts to our empirical work we are far from their emphasis on conceptual creation. In this work, I am halfway. It is a study in Deleuze’s thinking with a conceptual creation that is still frail. Throughout the philosophy of creation Deleuze and Guattari take pieces from the work of others in different fields, and collide these pieces to create an output of their own. Thus, the philosophy of Deleuze (and Guattari) is better when it is applied as a co-creator, not something to be filled with meanings and examples from the world. This gives freedom and responsibility to geographers whose task then is to find their own ways of expression and conceptual creation (see Wylie 2010b).

I first encountered Deleuze through two joint works, Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia (1972/2004) and A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia (1987/2011), these are volumes of a bastard philosophy which speaks of flying anuses, rhizomes, bodies without organs etc. (cf. Saldanha 2017). These volumes were confusing to read. I must also say that I hated the first volume, whereas I found the second one intriguing and still do. The joint work of Deleuze and Guattari can be approached
in different ways. One can read them as sources of inspiration which trigger new outputs, or try to follow the conceptual thinking proposed in the two volumes. To choose to follow the conceptualization requires time and careful reading of the philosophy of difference outlined by Deleuze before cooperation with Guattari. Moreover, the joint work has been influenced by scientists, such as the geographers and geologist of the time (see Woodward 2017; Saldanha 2017; Günzel 2009; Bonta & Protevi 2004). The interdependence is hinted at in the first lines of the Thousand Plateaus through the following expression: “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987/2011, 3). Moreover, the expression reveals how Deleuze and Guattari see that one is already many, that is, influenced by previous encounters and many relationships.

What lay behind Deleuze’s thinking, even before the work with Guattari, was a party of philosophers (e.g. Bergson, Hume, Kant, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Peirce, Spinoza, Whitehead), painters (e.g. Bacon, Cezanne, Klee), novelists (e.g. Beckett, Carroll, Fitzgerald, Kafka), cinema directors (e.g. Eisenstein, Godard, Rossellini, Resnais, Antonioni), some supportive mathematicians (Riemann), and of course Antonio Artaud and Samuel Beckett from the field of theatre. Although Deleuze is sometimes accused of being a pseudo-scientist, he carefully studied his predecessor, both those he agreed with and those with whom he was out of tune, before writing his own philosophy, that is, the new conceptualizations. Thus, to read the volumes of Difference and repetition, and The logic of sense requires that attention to be paid to those who have inspired Deleuze, and those who he hold in opposition (e.g. Hegel, Kant). However, to thoroughly discuss the influence of the colourful party behind Deleuze is outside the scope of this work in geography. Thus, some of Deleuze’s ghosts receive more attention than others. Moreover, we need to understand that we cannot say that a concept, such as the much discussed affect, is not directly borrowed from someone, and influenced by many.

In the book What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) put forward the notion of art, philosophy, and science as capable of taking us to the virtuality of life, pushing face to face with difference in itself or chaos. Virtuality is the realm where human thought, embodiment, and action dissolve, and where the potentiality for change rests. How the different fields of art, philosophy, and science battle with the chaos of virtuality is intriguing. According to Deleuze and Guattari art, philosophy, and science cast planes over the chaos, which is different from an umbrella of opinion protecting us from chaos. Nevertheless art, philosophy, and science cope differently with chaos. The three different realities produced by the planes cutting through the chaos – variations in philosophy, variables in science and varieties in art – are called Chaoids, which are forms of thought or creation (ibid., 208):

“What the philosopher brings back from the chaos are variations that are still infinite but that have become inseparable on the absolute surfaces or in the absolute volumes that layout a secant [secant] plane of immanence: these are not
associations of distinct ideas, but reconnections through a zone of indistinction in a concept. The scientist brings back from the chaos *variables* that have become independent by slowing down, that is to say, by the elimination of whatever other variabilities are liable to interfere, so that the variables that are retained enter into determinable relations in a function: they are no longer links of properties in things, but finite coordinates on a secant plane of reference that go from local probabilities to a global cosmology. The artist brings back from the chaos *varieties* that no longer constitute a reproduction of a sensory in the organ but set up a being of the sensory, a being of sensation, on an organic plane of composition that is able to restore the infinite” (ibid., 202–203).

2.2. Sites of encounter as research material

2.2.1. Patrik Keiller’s Robinson Institute

The research material for Article I consists of Patrik Keiller’s installation art *The Robinson Institute*. The research material was collected through participating in the installation in May and September 2012. The first visit was only a quick viewing of the installation; whereas, the second encounter was more systematic. In September 2012, I spent five working days studying The Robinson Institute. I recorded all the parts and objects of the installation with a documentary photography method.

2.2.2. Yes in my backyard!

The research material for Article II consists of the applied theatre and research project *Yes in My backyard! (Joo mun takapihalle!)* conducted in the housing area of Varissuo, Turku (Finland) in 2010. The research material consists of a three-week period of applied theatre workshops that were photographed and filmed using a stationary film camera. After the workshop period, a theatre show was arranged in a local theatre, and this event was also filmed. Moreover, interviews were conducted with the participants before and after the workshop period. There was a group interview with the elderly women, and other participants were interviewed separately. In addition, I made a video interview with a local cafe owner who was interested in the workshops but was too occupied with his work to attend them. The main area of discussion in Article I relies on Badiou’s (2008) writing *Rhapsody for the theatre: a short philosophical treatise*.

2.2.3. Chimeric point clouds

The research material for Article III consists of over 800 scans along the River Aura, Turku (Finland). Each scan is a measurement from a site which contains the laser scanned point clouds and photographs taken in five different directions. The total area scanned was approximately seven kilometres in length. The material was collected in

2.2.4. Glass architecture and urban photography

The research material for Article IV consists of architectural glass surfaces and two main photography materials: 1800 mobile phone photographs and an urban photography project *Drawing OntoSky*. The first set of photographs were made during a research visit to London from February-April in 2012. The second set of material is the urban photography project conducted during an urban photography summer school in London in 2013. There were also photographic walks with an unnumbered amount of photographs in 2012 and 2014. The discussion in Article III considered the Apollonian and Dionysian artistic impulses in Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1995) book *The birth of tragedy* together with Deleuze’s (2002) findings about Ariadne as an affirmative impulse in relation to Deleuze (1970/1988) commentary on Baruch Spinoza’s affect, and notions about good and common sense in the book *Difference and repetition* (1968/1994).

2.2.5. All is it

The material for the photo-book consists of altogether 229 short interview texts, and photographs made along the River Aura, Turku (Finland). Not all the interviewees wanted to be photographed. The number of photographs is unspecified because I took several photographs of each person. In addition to which I also photographed other materialities along the River Aura. For the final photo-book 80 photographs and 56 texts were selected. The photographs were post-processed with Adobe Lightroom. Subsequently, the interviews were translated into English and categorized under playful titles. The titles are: (I) An oasis, Wild West, (II) Horses, mice, moose, cows, dogs, (III) Eiders, swans, seagulls, (IV) Beer, wine (glasses, cans, trails of beer and cafés), (V) Lungs, heart, spine, head in the mud, (VI) Angels and a warthog, (VII) Inflatable boats, rafts, other shallow creatures of the river surface, a rollator, (VIII) Archived, framed, laminated, (IX) Lamps, mirrors, lilies, sausage kiosk, (X) Boots, Converse shoes, sneakers, ice rink and (XI) Salmon and other fish-like creatures. To elaborate further the photo-book project and the movements of my body and the photographs, and Deleuze’s book *Cinema 1: Movement-image* (1983/1997) are used to discuss the topic in Chapter 6.
2.3. Art and research on common ground

2.3.1. Controversies in participatory art

“The ‘work of art’ itself has more or less disappeared by gradual stages. The artist has taken upon himself new functions which are more like those of an intermediary than a creator, and has begun to enunciate open-ended environmental propositions and hypotheses. Finally the spectator has been impelled to intervene in the aesthetic process in an unprecedented way” (Popper 1975, 11).

Frank Popper highlighted, in his 1975 book *Art, action and participation*, the problematic relationship between an art work as an object and art as a process where spectators are seen as participators. Thereafter, the processual and participatory aspects of art have been approached from varying perspectives that include the capacity of art to facilitate communication among diverse communities (Kester 2004), the engagement of the spectator in physical or conceptual ways in the art work (Deuzeuze 2010, 2014), the relation between participatory art and neoliberalism (Harvie 2011, 2013), the critique of the participatory turn in art (Bishop 2013, 2004), the entrance of participatory work in the institutional realm of museums (Frielign 2016) and the role of grass-root art practices in urban place-making (Courage 2017).

In brief, participatory art engages those who are not artists in varying art means with different artistic or and socio-political aims. What many participatory art projects aim to do is to use art as a means of cultivating social change in the participant’s lifeworld. According to Deuzeuze (2010, 15) participatory works are believed to carry the capacity to “encourage individuals and groups to take control of their own social and political existence. This can be effected in two ways in the do-it-yourself artwork: by offering alternative models for social or political interaction, and by acting as means to empower participants.”

Participatory art is not the same as but shares something in common with relational aesthetics (Bourriaard 1998/2002). Both believe “in empowering creativity of collective action and shared ideas” (Bishop 2006, 179). Relational aesthetics is a term for “a set of practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space” (ibid., 113). In relational aesthetics, the artist is the facilitator and the people with whom the artist works are the material of the art work (Bourriaard 2006). Relational aesthetics have been critiqued for merely concentrating on social relations and not taking into account the context (Morgan 2003, 25), and thus, creating laboratory like situations (Bishop 2006). Participatory art differs from relational art in the way that it is not so much interested in the aesthetics than in the outcomes of the collaborative action or more often with the process itself (Bishop 2006, 179). In other words, if relational aesthetics produces works, participatory art is made through workshops.
and performance conveying social events. The social events or engagements fostered “might be as simple as exploring, playing or eating together” (Harvie 2011, 113). Moreover, in participatory art, an artist is a collaborative producer of situations and the audience is seen as participants or co-producers (Bishop 2013, 2).

Although participatory art is considered a global phenomenon, the public funding of art makes it a strongly European (Bishop 2013, 2). What has taken place after the 1990s, is an instrumentalisation of art in European cultural policies (ibid., 5). However, the rise of participatory art has occurred in parallel with the dismantling of the welfare state where the social contract between individuals and the state has been increasingly damaged, and the public good is being transferred into private capital (Ladkin et al. 2016, 7). Consequently, participatory art projects are often more complicated than they seem. They seem to hang somewhere between the welfare state aim of social well-being and the neoliberal era ideal of a strong individual. This controversy is my main concern when applying art as part of research and urban planning; this is the focus of next two sections.

To open up this problematic, I compare participatory art both to a sticking plaster and a gentle lash. By this I mean, that art is not an organic part of societal processes but something that is implemented from the outside in the form of various projects. The plaster refers to cases where participatory art is applied in deprived areas without paying attention to the overall conditions causing the oppression. In turn, the gentle lash refers to applying art to empower citizens to become self-sufficient individuals. In both cases, art has an instrumental value. In the first case, art means are applied for the social well-being of the participants. In the second case, the social well-being is not the primary value as economic goals lurk in the background. In reality these two mix. To complicate the issue further, in some cases there might be interests hoping to agitate the overall situation.

According to Bishop (2013, 13–14; 2006, 180), socially engaged participatory art has been used as a means of inclusive policies of New Labour in Britain, and a similar trend is going on in Northern Europe where creativity is valued for the means of economic development and innovation creation. In Finland, the instrumentalisation of art is part of a wider framework of neo-liberalism. The Finnish cultural policy strategy for the year 2020 includes strengthening the principles of a good life through the means of culture, and boosting the economics of culture, entrepreneurialism and cultural export (Ministry of Education 2009, 11). In addition, the cultural policy strategy states that the aim is to enhance creativity, multiplicity/diversity, and participation at every societal level. Associated with creativity are the characteristics of being entrepreneurial, embracing risks, looking after one’s own interests, performing one’s own brand, and self-exploitation, that is, to live and work like an artist (ibid., 16). In this context, different programs have been established where art means are encouraged. Participatory art is used as a means to empower people to be individuals who together to make a strong collective, e.g. a competitive and cohesive housing area (Article II; see also Bishop 2013, 13–14).
In the ruins of the welfare state a certain ideal of community exists which conflicts with the new standard of the creative and self-sufficient individual. Bishop (2013, 14) aptly claims that the social inclusion agenda is “less about repairing the social bond than a mission to enable all members of society to be self-administering fully functioning consumers who do not rely on the welfare state and who can cope with a deregulates, privatized worlds”. Bishop’s words resonate with my focus on urban planning, where city officials approach citizens as customers to whom services are provided. In the context of global neoliberal capitalism, Jen Harvie (2013, 4) has suggested that participatory art could “preserve fairness, constructive social relations and individual agency, while diminishing inequality and individualism”. That is to say, participatory art would enhance fairness “despite the massive power and insidious spread of global neoliberal capitalism” (ibid., 4). Taking into account the neoliberal state where everything is a preserve of profit making and the ontological violence against openness, such fairness seems distant and unreachable (cf. Joronen 2013).

Art is applied only to affirm “the ostensible values of our times, even as those values shield the realities of capital, of employment, of debt—those values which do not care for the lives on which they remain parasitical” (Ladkin et al. 2016, 3). However, some projects also have more ethical concerns; they aim at changing the situation. In other words, art receives its use value through ethical judgement or criteria, e.g. art is good if it works with the social relations, gives insight into other people’s lives including cultural and political histories of social justice (Bishops 2013, 23–25). In participatory social art projects, there is often a concern to fulfill the project aim instead of allowing something unexpected to emerge through collaboration (Bishop 2006, 180). Although Bishop (ibid., 26) criticizes the intrumentalisation of art for the sake of ethical judgements, her world is not dual: “this is not to say that ethics are unimportant in a work of art, nor irrelevant to politics, only that they do not always have to be announced and performed in such a direct and saintly fashion”.

2.3.2. Participatory research in geography, art and the unexpected

In geography, participatory research is a common means to study the embodied everyday realities of participants (e.g. Askins 2017; Kindon 2016, 2003; Pain 2004). If the researcher takes an active role, then we are dealing with participant action research where the aims are to empower the participants by working together with them on their everyday conditions and how they are represented by others (e.g. Brambilla 2012; Kindon et al. 2010; Blake 2007). In practice this means that the researcher participates in the activities of the community (Blake 2007). However, the line is not that definite because the researcher is in one way or another affecting the lives of the participants and activism can burst out from the situation. Participatory research is sometimes supported by different creative means from the field of art such as applied theatre (Richardson 2015; Pratt & Johnston 2013; Mattingly 2001), drawing (Béneker et. al. 2010), film making (Garrett 2011; Parr 2007; Kindon 2016, 2003), photography (Pyyry
2015) and sound-based methods (Stevenson & Holloway 2017). According to Kye Askins and Rachel Pain (2011) the materiality of art or the tools within participatory practices can contribute to a space where interactions might take place.

In participatory research the focus is often on the uneven conditions. Participatory research projects are often connected by an ethically responsible orientation towards the research participants, and the aim of less hierarchical engagements between the researcher and the participants. Nevertheless, the power relations and reflexivity of the researcher’s position need attention also in participatory research (Grove & Puth 2015; Bachmann 2011; Sultana 2007). In addition, we need to take into account the wider context and values that the research promotes. Regarding the constitutive power of affective relations, participatory approaches can roughly be characterized as modernist or performative participation. Art and research collaborations differ from participatory art in the way that they do not straightforwardly use people as their medium or material for the work. Nevertheless, there are some interesting affinities between participatory art and art-research collaborations. While research might help the participants, the participants also help the researcher to fulfill institutional and professional goals (Mattingly 2001, 455).

The various art and research collaborative projects have aimed e.g. to study the everyday lives of the participants through a performative approach to participant’s narratives (Richardson 2015), to empower socially vulnerable or oppressed participants and change the self-representations of the marginalized individuals/groups (Johnston & Bajrange 2013; Mattingly 2001), to create public debate about socio-political issues (Pratt & Johnston 2013), to test art as a means for urban planning (Article II; Rannila & Loivaranta 2015), to contribute to the policy (Askins & Pain 2011) and to change legislation (Pratt & Johnston 2007). Besides revealing important notions about the everyday socio-spatial practices of often overlapping categories of, for instance, the young, immigrants, mental health patients, and oppressed women, researchers have paid attention to a common ground being formed between artists, researchers, and participants, in order to share and work out problems (Brickell & Garrett 2015; Carte & Torres 2013; Bushin & White 2010; Cahill 2010; Parr 2007).

There are many advantages but also concerns that need to be taken notice of in art and research collaborations. The positive aspects of collaborations are that applying art can make the research participants and the researcher more sensitive, and thus, open up paths to the affective and emotional aspects of the participants’ lives. In addition, participatory projects have the capacity to empower people in harsh social conditions. Despite the many cherished aspects of art and research collaborations, the research goals, the artistic ambitions, the power relations between the different actors and the overall socio-political situation also need attention. Askins and Pain (2011, 812), for example, encountered tension between the need from the artists’ side for professional artwork, and the research goal of co-produced knowledge where the process of participation was understood as art. Moreover, we cannot define everything
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beforehand, and thus, working with art can disrupt the taken for granted representational situation (Article II), or what Jacques Rancière (2004) calls the distribution of the sensible, in unexpected ways.

There is no ideal way for art and geography to collaborate (Foster & Lorimer 2007, 426). However, I would agree with artist Katie Foster and Jamie Lorimer that there is a need for a relationship organically formed through a shared interest and a practice consisting of spending time together and learning about differing patterns of work. When there are participants other than an artist and a geographer, the question of time becomes important for two more reasons. First, as in any qualitative research project, a relation of trust must be formed. Despite an attempt to create a safe space for sharing narratives (cf. Richardson 2015), divisive social relations may be present (Askins & Pain 2011, 811). Secondly, besides the researcher the participants need to get acquainted with the art means they are working with. Although many geographers have succeeded in long term projects from several months to several years (e.g. Mattingly 2001, Parr 2007, Askins & Pain 2011), we could question whether a long time period is a value per se? Although time should not be a value itself, we need to be careful with social and emotional relationships being formed in intensive art and research projects.

Furthermore, the different art means applied in participatory art and research cooperation have varying effects. Askins and Pain (2011, 813) noticed positive outcomes when working with paper, paint, pencils and paint tubes in direct contact with different parts of the body. These tactile materials functioned as crucial objects in enabling encounters and generating verbal communication between research participants where the use of the objects demanded some interaction which affected positively the racial relations of the group. As with the different tactile materials, theatre can bring participants into intimate emotional and physical contact, and thus, open up a space for dialogue (Johnston & Bajrange 2013, 474). However, the emotions generated might not always be pleasant. Theatre creates a sphere where anxieties and uncomfortable issues can also arise (ibid., 467). Moreover, when working by means of theatre there is a possibility that the participants can “gain access to the embodied understandings of different trajectories of meaning making…” (Rannila & Loivaranta 2015, 788).

There are a few more concerns about participatory art and research cooperation. Firstly, giving voice to people does not necessarily make their lives better in relation to the institutional context (Mattingly 2001, 457). Secondly, although one aim in art and research collaboration has been the participant empowerment, often some participants just want their stories to be heard (Richardson 2015, 6) or as I would argue some participants just desire meaningful action in their lives. Regarding empowerment, Parr (2007, 117) has aptly argued, “mutual benefit might be achieved in ways that try to avoid practices of top-down empowerment.” Thirdly, the messiness of an
art and research project should not be an object of dread, as often the tensions might introduce something new in the situation.

Empirical research is often presumed to be systematic including the stages of writing a detailed research plan, conducting the research inside the planned time-frame, going through the data collected and writing an article with one or two clear arguments. However, reality is much messier, as many art and research collaborations have revealed. Some like Askins and Pain (2011, 809) have acknowledged their roles within the messy contact zone which is complex, irresolvable, and consisting of unforeseeable encounters. They have argued that “Although we try to read some order through the mess here, our conclusions remain tentative and emergent” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the messiness in particular often creates the potentiality. As Parr (2007, 130) writes: “In the messy realities of participative encounter, perhaps especially those with creativity at their core, powerful capacities for change are evoked in unexpected and often personal ways amongst all actors, and hence continue to disrupt the myth of the objective and purely observant social scientist.”

Despite the initial aims, many have found unexpected outcomes due to the specialties of art and research collaboration. By this I mean that people from different backgrounds e.g. working cultures encounter each other in the midst of implementing a project (Article II; Richardson 2015; Pratt & Johnston 2007; Parr 2007; Mattingly 2001). When forum theatre has been applied, it has been acknowledged that the aim of the method is to disrupt the existing authority structures: “In forum theatre, audience members claim the authority of actors and scriptwriters. With multiple actors improvising within the same role, the grip of the original script is loosened and a world of multiplicity and possibility is enacted” (Pratt & Johnston 2007, 106). Thus, the project reached beyond the initial aim of highlighting the agonistic politics of the forum theatre experiences (ibid., 109). In turn, Hester Parr (2007, 117), who worked as a researcher in a film-making project about people with severe mental health problems, has argued that film-making as an art practice disrupts social distance, expertise, and authority.

In addition to the different actors, participants, researchers, and artists coming together, I claim that the artistic way of seeing is more nuanced than the empirical research framework allows. Bishop (2013, 16) describes the artistic practice as having:

“… an element of critical negation and an ability to sustain contradiction that cannot be reconciled with the quantifiable imperatives of positivist economies. Artists and works of art can operate in a space of antagonism or negation vis-à-vis society, a tension that the ideological discourse of creativity reduces to a unified context and instrumentalises for more efficacious profiteering”.
As the afterlives of a project cannot be measured with impact (Mattingly 2001, 456, Richardson 2015, 14–15), art and research projects as communication processes “require a shift in our understanding of the work of art – a redefinition of aesthetic experience as durational rather than immediate” (Kester 2004, 12).

2.3.3. Applied theatre

Applied theatre is defined by Dani Snyder-Young (2013, 4) as an umbrella term with a focus on theatre as live, performative, and collaborative storytelling. The aim of applied theatre is to empower participants to become active subjects who take responsibility over issues affecting their lives. Drama is a communication device to make participants’ stories heard and to empower participants. Furthermore, occasionally drama is applied with the aim of altering the prevailing situation in a more radical manner. The communication preconditions that participants work together to detect problems and find solutions through the creative means of drama. As a live and performative storytelling practice, drama has the capacity to raise emotions, passions, and voices not heard in an ordinary conversation. Although the situation is conveyed and there might be some ideas about the specific problems, problem finding and solving are dependent on the participants and conveyers involved.

The roots of applied theatre are in Augusto Boal’s (1979/2008) Theatre of the Oppressed where he defines theatre as a language for all rather than a spectacle. Boal himself worked as an artistic director for the Arena Theatre in Rio de Janeiro in the 1950s and 1960s. During this time, Boal extended theatre beyond the stage to the streets and other places of the favelas. Boal’s work draws upon Paulo Freire’s (1972) pedagogical principles of social justice where the aim is to change the situation through collaborative action. When these ideas where brought together, Boal (1979/2008, 1998) developed the different means of forum theatre, invisible theatre, and legislative theatre. In these forum theatres there is a practice which presents the problems of a community. In the forum theatre, actors present the problems of the community and these actors are then replaced by the community members who step onto the stage to act a solution. The term spect-actor refers to the audience members who are both observers and actors. Invisible theatre is an intriguing practice of taking the plays to the street or other environments outside the theatre building. In invisible theatre, the problems are acted in these mundane environments and those watching do not know they are watching a play. In turn, legislative theatre aims to intervene in law making; thus, it is an extension from the participant’s problems to the repressing legislative conditions. Furthermore, legislative theatre does not have the Aristotelian practice of catharsis, but aims to produce a desire for change and to promote the change desired (Boal 1998, 16).

Boal’s teachings have travelled to different places where it has functioned as a means for participatory democracy in order to influence problems resulting from cuts in the
welfare system (Howe 2009; Pratt & Johnston 2007), for critical pedagogy to improve the everyday lives of youngsters at risk, often in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods (Snyder-Young 2011; Conrad 2004; Mattingly 2001), for enacting and re-working criminalized political subjectivities in the post-colonial moment (Johnston & Bajrange 2013) and for changing behavioural models (Balfour 2009) to name just a few. In geographical research and theatre cooperation, drama has also been applied beyond Boal e.g. for performing inter-generational narratives (Richardson 2015) and for consciousness-raising about migrant domestic workers (Pratt & Johnston 2017, 2013). In our research, we tested drama as a means for urban participatory planning (Rannila & Loivaranta 2015; Article II)

Applied theatre as a participatory and performative research method presents alternative ways to engage participants in research practice (Rogers 2012; Conrad 2004; Denzin 2003). Each project is dependent on the facilitator and the participants with their individual concerns. It has to be kept in mind that though activities are planned to be accessible, the drama means are more feasible for some than others (Howe 2009, 248). When drama is applied in research, a safe place for the stories to be told should be created because often participants come from vulnerable situations (Richardson 2015). At best, theatre works as a facilitator for genuine dialogue where problematic issues are raised and resolved through the means of drama (Snyder-Young 2011). In practice this means storytelling or interviewing about issues of concern, improvisation, playing out solutions for the problems, scripting scenes, and constellating a theatre play. Furthermore, dialogue can foster radical change in thought: “Dialogue is always dangerous, because it creates discontinuity between one thought and another, between two opinions, or two possibilities – and between them infinity installs itself; so that all opinions are possible, all thoughts permitted” (Boal 1979/2008, xvi).

It is important to pay attention to power relations in the applied theatre situation. First, there are the relations between the director/facilitator and the participants. In theatre and research cooperation, the researcher is also involved in the mixture of relations. Although unexpected outcomes cannot be avoided, it is important that the roles between the director and researcher are discussed beforehand. The one directing the discussion or storytelling has potential to shape the knowledge produced in the applied theatre workshops (Howe 2009, 250). Secondly, there are relationships between the participants which might involve issues of individual temperament, talkativeness, and prejudices towards the unknown. There is not one answer to how to manage power relations, but in focus group interviews the facilitator can encourage silent voices to speak and attempt to contain the loudest voices. Another possible problem is the prejudices that can be highlighted through the means of theatre.

What connects many applied theatre projects is an urge to improve uneven conditions and to bring positive social change. This includes relationship building, the healing of the psychological scars of conflict, raising a voice for change and striving for social justice (Etherton & Prentki 2006, 142–143). Applied theatre projects differ in how
radical they aim to be. The aspect of rehearsal for revolution in Boal is a complicated issue, as the applied theatre projects ran inside the representational framework Boal himself worked in after the fall of the military dictatorship in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this turning point in society, Boal aimed to work on the problems the citizens faced and also tackled the issues of law. Regarding the prevailing situation of the applied theatre projects, Snyder-Young (2011, 42) asks two relevant questions: “What does it mean to ‘rehearse for revolution’ in globalised, late capitalist, democratic societies in which group identities are complex and oppression is slippery? Who gets to decide what ‘oppression’ means and what ‘revolution’ looks like in these complex landscapes?”

Although all projects do not aim for a revolution, the common, now contested, belief is that action will lead to a fairer world. Despite the good intentions, we are not automatically oriented towards social justice by the work initiated and the choices made by the participants (Snyder-Young 2011, 29). Although applied theatre can generate the “space of exploration, of creativity, and of risk-taking”, it can also reinforce dominant discourses (ibid., 42). Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the idea behind rehearsal for revolution: “to push audiences to reflect, to feel and to take action… what can be imagined and rehearsed in theatre can enter directly into the (re)making of the world” (Johnston & Bajrange 2013, 474).

Moreover, the outcomes of a project cannot be predicted. In other words, when we apply theatre, we are jugglers of contradictions whose practices may impact in other ways than those that we anticipate or desire (Etherton & Prentki 2006, 141). Geraldine Pratt and Caleb Johnston (2007, 109) who cooperated in a legislative project which sought creative responses to the fallout from neo-liberal economics, noticed that the aim of changing the law was the least successful outcome. Although the recommendations suggested by the participants where not implemented, the legislative theatre project “put the idea of practicing democracy differently into the minds of those who participated in it” (ibid., 109). Moreover, according to Michael Balfour (2009, 357) “applied practice might more readily encounter the accidental, and acknowledge that what applied is not always linear, rational and conclusive in its outcomes, but is more often messy, incomplete, complex and tentative”.

2.4. Artistic research

2.4.1. Experimental approach

Experimental is understood either as a means to an end or experiment as an end in itself (Last 2012, 707). In this research, experimental has meant both. In the participatory workshops, we used the term experimental for testing theatre in urban planning. After the theatre and research workshops things became weird, and thus, the latter
part of the research has been an experimental in the second meaning of the term, “not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as an act the outcome of which is unknown” (Dezeuze 2010, 9, cite Cage). I agree with Trevor Paglen (2008, 31) about experimenting as an inherent part of creating geographies, not merely studying geographies. Experimentation is critical thinking which generates affective responses (McCormack 2014, 2010). Consequently, the potential in experimental research is a specific sensibility to engage in the world(s) more receptively (Thrift 2008, 4).

My experiments occurred in the second part of the research through encounters with glass architecture, point clouds, urban photography, city materialities and an intensified interest in the event philosophy of Deleuze. Moreover, my body became artist like along the way. The plunge into art was an urge to express the encounters with theory and urban ephemeralities. My primary aim has not been to make art and the context of the artistic work has not been an established art institution or an experimental laboratory (e.g. Studio Olafur Eliasson). However, through the experiments and creating an installation in XL Art Space art gallery and making urban photography, I became embroiled in the realm of art (Nordström 2011; Article IV; cf. Hawkins 2013b).

In artistic research, the sensuous and the bodily are as valid sources of research as the readings of laboratory instruments or the results of a survey (Hannula et al. 2014, 21). Instead of an intellectual encounter with the world, research through the body allows attention to be paid to all the senses – auditory, olfactory, tactile, taste and visual. Body is the primary tool through which all interactions and emotions filter (see Longhurst et al. 2008, 208). Letting the body be affected at varying sites fosters the materialities of past and present to intertwine in an embodied encounter. In geography, sensuous bodily research has been applied in interaction with art works. In an encounter with an installation, Hawkins (2010b, 335) noticed that the viewer shared in and dialogically performed in the space of the art work. In other words, the art work influences subjectivation and vice versa “the lived body becomes the site of production of art”. The use of the body as an instrument offers different modes of writing where the researcher does not write about the art work but with it (Hawkins 2010b, 324). A similar approach is relevant when encountering theoretical ideas.

Although geography is not an artistic (research) practice, the actions of geographers have included making art through different means such as poetry and essays (e.g. de Leeuw 2017, 2015, 2012; Cresswell 2013), installation art (Nordström 2011), photography (Hunt 2016a) and collage art in the form of art books (Hawkins & Lovejoy 2009). In addition, geographers have acted as curators (e.g. Cutler 2013; Yusoff 2008, 2007; deSilvey 2007). The different experimental and creative research projects test the intellectual boundaries of the discipline (Peters 2017; cf. cultural geographies in practice). When art is implemented in geography there is also the risk that art becomes merely a component of the research ‘impact agenda’ (Tolia-Kelly 2012). If value must be found, art is a means to communicate when we do not want to produce a closed
circle of interpretation. In other words, when the material is not deadened to meanings but constellated together in another manner to provoke thinking (e.g. Wylie 2010b; Lorimer 2005; Thrift & Dewsbury 2000). However, there is a line between art and geography which has to be taken into account when a geographer aims to produce art. In other words, “creative works must be judged in part within and by the traditions and legacies of practice of which they are a part, calling on geographers working with creative expression to gain some fluency in creative disciplines” (Marston & De Leeuw 2013).

What is specific for artistic research is that it takes place “on a site and in a situation that never is a priori but is always in great need of being articulated, formed, discussed, maintained and renewed” (Hannula et al. 2014, 5). Artistic research is not only about writing but also about other means of expression, though writing poetry or other narrative can in itself be an artistic practice and a creative means of expression (e.g. Cresswell 2014a; Springer 2016; Ståhl 2016). In artistic research, it is common that an artist studies conceptual issues through an art practice. During the artistic process a work is created that functions as a record of the issue the artist researcher wants to communicate (Hannula et al. 2014, 16). However, practice and theory are not two exclusive parts but can occur simultaneously. In other words:

“Often the artistic process is motivated by an intuition that arises from some theoretical considerations. Often the process also contains outright theoretical and conceptual interventions. Likewise, the contextualizing and conceptualizing part is creative: often one finds out how one thinks about something only by and after writing it up. Or to put it another way, writing is a way of thinking and discovering things” (Hannula et al. 2014, 17).

Despite the experimental character of this artistic research, the practice should be contextualised. Contextualisation refers to situating research in the traditions of a particular field which include ways of conceptualising, conducting, and expressing research. When the research is articulated in a research forum, the artistic material functions as the means of presenting an argument and showing it in a more nuanced way. The ways of communicating artistic research are somewhat similar to humanistic autobiographies, postmodern writing methods such as literary montage (Pred 1985) and non-representational polemical and poetical interventions (Dewsbury 2015; Lorimer & Wylie 2010b). Moreover, how Hawkins understands writing with an art work is also relevant in artistic research where it is equivalent to passing “a given artistic experience in a fruitful and illuminative way in a way that does not emulate that particular artistic experience in its sensuous or bodily qualities” (Hannula et. al. 2015, 25).

2.4.2. Urban photography as a visual technology

Photography is an indisputable part of geography’s visual culture history that reaches from maps and descriptive words to augmented realities (see also Tolia-Kelly 2012;
Besides photographs and photography being widely discussed in geography, geographers and research participants have made photographs as part of their research (Pyyry 2015; Hunt 2016b, 2014; Kymäläinen & Nordström 2010; Latham 2003). My focus is on how this geographical practice intertwines with photography as art. I follow the footsteps of the early 20th century Finnish geographer J. G. Granö (1919-1921/1993), who made art photography as a by-product of his research in Altai (Eskola 2002), and later conducted aesthetic experiments with visual technologies (Hunt 2014; Garrett 2010). According to the photograph theorist Liz Wells (2015, 293), the artist is the one “offering a unique perspective on or insight into people, places, objects, relationships, circumstances”. In my research, I have practiced urban photography (Article IV; photo-book V) which is a method of both art and research. Moreover, I have conceptually discussed urban photography in relation to glass architecture (Article IV) and will elaborate further on this in Chapter 6. As the interpretation of photography depends on a theoretical framework, I will briefly review the critical approaches to visuality and photography, and also introduce the concept of urban photography.

Geographers have occasionally approached photography (e.g. Larsen & Urry 2011; Haldrup & Larsen 2003; Crang 1997; Nash 1996) and other visual technologies (Koskela 2000) through the concept of gaze. The definition of gaze outlines how visuality is understood. Paul Knox and Steven Pinch (2010, 326) define gaze as “the surveillance, scrutiny and analysis of peoples and places by observers (traditionally men). Often linked to the idea that these observers can provide a privileged, objective, value-free description of the world. Known as imperial gaze when linked with colonialism”. This description partly describes gaze but also hides the nuances of the concept. Gaze has its roots in the philosophies of Sartre and Foucault and the psychoanalysis of both Freud and Lacan. Sartre detached the look from the eye and formulated visuality as a field, where the spectator is not only a spectator but there is the possibility that s/he can be looked at (Seppänen 2006, 70; cf. Sartre 1992, 346).

Foucault’s gaze has been discussed by John Urry (1992, 184) who argued that touristic gaze creates a panopticon kind of control. The touristic gaze refers to a socio-culturally learnt consumption of space and configuration of important sights and markers. In turn, psychoanalysis is a tool to understand how the spectator is differentially empowered and affected depending on the subjectivity of the viewing body (Rose 2016, 148-151). However, the gaze is not specific in psychoanalysis, and thus application of the concept varies (e.g. Rose 1993; Silverman 1992, b; Mulvey 1979). Concepts from psychoanalysis have been applied to an understanding of the visual sense’s capacity to take possessions of bodies and environments, and furthermore, also to interpret why seeing is an unstable relation between a spectator and an object in the vast field of visuality. In the most straightforward understanding, the subject of the photograph becomes the object of the spectator’s gaze through the photographer’s distant control. The problem in Freud’s gaze is that it focuses on merely (hetero)sexual differences,
and othering as a consequence of the castration complex. As Rose (1995, 779) comments, “phallocentric space is structured by ‘symbolic castration’ - as well as by its fear of the apparently castrated feminine. There is always a lack which striates every effort to attain a coherent, plenitudinous subjectivity”.

Mike Crang (1997, 362, 366) promoted the notion of the gaze, arguing that because “technologies of seeing form ways of grasping the world” geographers need to pay attention how these technologies are “embedded in particular space-time configurations of observation that complicate simple models of subject and object, representation and reality, image and process”. In geography, there is a critical interest in the way photography is applied both as evidence and as producing certain effects (e.g. Rose 2007; 1997). Rose (2009, 47), for example, explored the production in British newspapers of normatively human and inhuman bodies in the aftermath of the London bombs. Following Edward Said’s (1995, 49–73) imaginative geographies, John Urry and Jonas Larsen (2011) have argued that photographs partly create rather than just mirror or represents realities.

Photography is also understood as performative practice embedded in the social relations and affected by the materialities of the site. Larsen (2005, 416) interprets tourist photography as a highly embodied performative practice which is both choreographed and experimental. According to Larsen (2005, 425) the landscape picture must be complemented with a ‘landscape as stage’ which has “a dense materiality of coulisses, set pieces, and so on that crucially not only signify and stir the imagination but enable things and enactments to happen”. Thus, ‘landscape as stage’ refers to a practiced landscape where people play, act, and pose. Consequently, the tourist as a photographer is not gazing from a distance position but engages bodily, sensuously, and expressively through his/her own materiality and affordances. Nevertheless, Larsen (ibid., 429) does not reject the concept of the gaze entirely but he formulates ‘family gaze’ that refers to the act of choreographing the desired united family into the photograph. Despite the culturally scripted roles, family tourist photography also creates an ambivalent space which allows for improvisation. In another study, Haldrup and Larsen (2003) appositely claimed that tourist photography is “a theatre of life where people in concert perform places, scripts and roles to and for themselves”.

In addition to post-structural, psychoanalytic, and performative approaches to photography, the materiality of photographs has gained growing attention in the context of the new materialist research framework (e.g. Rose & Tolia-Kelly 2012; cf. Anderson & Wylie 2009; Whatmore 2006). The affective potential of photographs and other images has been acknowledged (Pyry, 2015; Levin, 2009; Latham & McCormack 2009). Roland Barthes (1980/1981) and W. J. T. Mitchell (1996) indisputable writings on what photographs are capable of doing by communicating as signs and symbols or by generating emotions in the viewer subject. In geography, Rose (2003, 2004) has discussed Barthes’ concepts ‘punctum’ and ‘studium’ in depth (see also Nordström 2013). In contrast to punctum, as a prick that emotionally evokes the viewer, James
Elkins (2011) is concerned with the materiality of the photograph from an entirely non-human aspect. The photography theorist Harri Laakso (2003), in turn, has suggested that some photographs have a materiality which can evoke a touch of the gaze.

Geographers have studied the materialities of photographs made by others. Alexander Vasudevan (2007, 563), who analysed how everyday capitalism appears in Jeff Wall’s (landscape) photography, touched the materialities of Walls photographic practice, the large scale figurative photographs mounted in lightboxes. According to Vasudevan (ibid., 565). Wall’s photographs wove together historical materialism and artefactual materiality. With regard to artefactual materiality, Vasudevan (ibid., 569) claims that “the industrially made lightbox – possesses its own volume as a material image body and through this obdurate presencing is able to penetrate the real space of exhibition”. However, Hawkins, (2010a, 807) argues that Richard Wentworth’s rubbish aesthetic builds poetics and politics which “lies not in interventionists actions, that promote new ways of being in the city” but rather that, “his work points to critical occupations of urban space already in existence”. In other words, Wenthworth’s photography highlights an already existing urban phenomenon.

Geographers have also touched on the materiality of cities by applying separately and sometimes intertwined the visual methods of photo-essay and urban photography. Even though geographers are familiar with the photo-essay, which is a method combining text with photographs (Rose 2016, 340), urban photography is still a rarely applied practice (Hunt 2014). According to Rose (2016, 341), a photo-essay can be applied either to analyse something or to evoke sensory experiences. Benjamin F. Coles (2014, 522 who explored London’s Borough Market describes photo-essay as topography which can create a perspective to a place. Whereas a photo-essay is a way of presenting findings, urban photography is a practice where the researcher indulges in photography in an artistic manner with some visual aim. In other words, the researcher photographer is held both by an aesthetic and a research aim.

Some practices, such as Tim Edensor’s cooperation with professional photographers in a photo-essay about The London Olympics and the Lea Valley, resonate with urban photography. This poetic essay conveys a sense of forthcoming loss and touches on the site through its various and alternative material uses in the urban wasteland before London Olympics development (Edensor et al. 2008). Edensor (2008) has also himself taken photographs that convey the materiality of industrial ruins. Mia Hunt (2014), in her turn, studied the materiality of London ad hoc shops with a pin hole camera. According to Hunt (ibid., 157) through manually operating and opening the shutter time for a number of seconds, blurry and unpredictable photographs emerge which capture the animation of things and spaces. Hunt (ibid., 157) describes this vivid pin-hole camera image-making as bringing “softness to the characteristic linearity and shininess of the brands I capture; the camera literally takes the edge off, melting brands into the texture of the city”.


Urban photography belongs to the fields of both art and research. It has been defined as a research practice that borrows from the best practices of urban documentary photography and street photography (Hunt 2014). The city itself has long tradition of being depicted both in painting and later through the camera lens (Clarke 1997, 75–99). The practice of photographing the urban environment in a documentary way has its origins in the early years of the discovery of photography. Some of the early photographers focused on the panorama landscapes of the city and the iconic urbanism, others photographed the harsh social conditions as part of a wider societal concern. According to Clarke (1997, 76), the skyscraper became an icon of a modern city and visual experience in the period 1900-1940. Whereas the focus on the street level meant an engagement “with the clutter of the city, its chaos and process” (ibid., 78). If the documentary lens aims to capture the invisible, such as repressive social conditions or power relations and to influence the visual order, the practice called street photography differs from the documentary way of seeing. Street photographers cherish the passing moment and present urban life in a poetic and occasionally also humorous way (Howarth & McLaren 2010; Scott 2007). In other words, “These are often pictures that have a casual air, but prize the representation of moment sealed in time from the everyday confusion of the street. They are ordinary people, although they may be pictured in at an extraordinary moment in their lives” (Wells 2015, 118).

Urban photography is a practice of visual urbanism which is “an interdisciplinary field of practice drawing on a wide range of approaches to representing and evoking urban spaces”. What connects the various practices (e.g. documentary, fine art, design, architecture, ethnography or social science) is “an intention to make sense of, research and interact with urban life through lens-based media or other forms of visualisation” (iAVU 2017). In recent years, urban photography has been taught as a research practice by Goldsmiths’ Sociology Department who are responsible for the international MA in Photography and Urban Cultures, University of London, and the International Urban Photography Summer School (iUPPS 2017) in collaboration e.g. with the Association of Visual Urbanists (iAVU 2017) and the Urban Photographers Association (2016). Hunt (2014, 151) who has attended the urban photography course, claims that the practice has much to offer geographers. According to her, “photography may help evoke the feeling of place and its material richness. By focusing on urban microgeographies and by opening work to ambiguity and chance, geographers may create new space for interpretation”. In the Chapters 5 and 6, I will continue with the concept of urban photography by exploring the movements of my photographing body. Through experiments in urban photography, I also ask whether a researcher can become akin to an artist, and additionally, how can an artistic image emerge from an encounter where the body of the researcher becomes other.
3. LANDSCAPE FRAMINGS AND ART

3.1. Early landscape framings

Landscape research in geography has a close connection to art. Geographers both research landscape art and create landscape (as) art themselves. In recent years, this connection with art has been restored, although the bond, established in the classical Greco-Roman period, never entirely broke. Geographer’s connection to art reaches back to Strabo’s *Geographica* which is known for its narrative geography. As Strabo’s sources were often poets and playwrights (Cosgrove 2008 7), *Geographica* contains vivid descriptions of the parts of the world known to Greeks and Romans. Moreover, Strabo (Jones 1917, 55–59) argued that poetry has to instruct by using morally beneficial views. The other influential geographer of the Greco-Roman was Ptolemy whose writings along with Strabo’s have influenced the landscape concept.

Ptolemy made a distinction between geography as a science of the earth and its parts, and chorography as an art. Whereas Ptolemy’s geography was concerned with the celestial geometrical order of the world measured with scale, chorography dealt with the appearance of the places of the earth and the fabrication of truthful descriptions of these places (Olwig 2008, 1847). According to Olwig (ibid., 1843), the way Ptolemy’s chorography was interpreted in Renaissance influenced “the development of landscape as a form of spatial representation”. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the study of chorography also influenced the formation of the landscape concept in the Germanic language family. In this tradition, landscape was similar to chorography, and concerned with the shape of the land as a place (Olwig 2008, 1848). Olwig (2002, 220) further argues that through the combination of the visual and material understanding of landscape it became possible to socially define people’s place in the political landscape. With the perspective techniques, developed by Filippo Brunelleschi and formalised by Leon Battista Alberti, a theatrical space which mirrored the central place of a town was created (Olwig 2002, 34, 217). Through this the Renaissance public space was incorporated “into the geometric space of perspective scenery and under the control of a ruling hierarchy” (ibid., 217). This relationship was transformed into scenic landscape practices and further to the political landscape of the imagined community of a nation state (ibid., 220).

During the colonial and imperial expeditions visual and literary representational art practices were applied for the production of geographical knowledge. The European atlases and cosmographies were made of both pictorial landscape representations and maps. Denis Cosgrove (2008, 7) has described the cosmographic wall maps containing images, diagrams and descriptive words, as “geographical Gesamtkustwerken (total artworks) from an age obsessed with wonders and with the mysteries and possibilities
of light and vision”. According to Olwig (2008, 1847) by linking geography and chorography to painting a shared platform for the two fields was created. However, Olwig also points out that chorography’s roots are in Plato’s *chora* meaning place in a specific non-representable manner, and thus landscape paintings and also perspectival theatre scenery were through chorography trying to represent the non-representable. While in early geography art was applied for geographical representations, my focus in this work in the following chapters is the very potential in art to touch on the non-representable.

In the mid-1900th century, Alexander von Humboldt’s geographical practice was between science and art. He used narrative descriptions together with the maps, and his work also included naturalistic painted and sketched representations of landscapes, plants, animals, birds, insects and people (Buttimer 2010; Bunkšé 1981). In his thinking, von Humboldt was torn between the sublime landscape of Romanticism and the ideals of scientific reason of Enlightenment (Minca, 2007a, 185). The sublime is a word from Latin origin meaning ‘set or raised aloft, high up’. In philosophy, Edmund Burke (1757) first articulated the sublime as the strongest emotion – pain – that a human was capable of feeling, which from a certain distance could, however, be delightful. Further, Burke formulated the sublime of nature as meaning a certain passion of astonishment to the natural forces, as “that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror”. The sublime idea as a human response to the horrors of nature was applied by the romantic landscape painters who in their paintings presented the thrill of towering mountain ranges, storming skies and seas, volcanic eruptions, etc. In a similar manner, von Humboldt followed Burke’s ideas of the sensations triggered by nature.

However, if Burke found perception as the minds response to the natural stimuli, von Humboldt interpreted the sensation as mutual and subtle interaction between mind and matter (Bunkšé 1981, 140). As von Humboldt (1844/1997, 27) wrote in *Cosmos I*:

“It may seem a rash attempt to endeavor to separate, into its different element, the magic power exercised upon our minds by the physical world, since the character of the landscape, and every imposing scene in nature, depends so materially upon the mutual relation of the ideas and sentiments simultaneously excited in the mind of the observer”.

The aim of artistic work was to depict nature’s sublime beauty by tracing an image reflected in the mind; “at one time filling the dreamy land of physical myths with forms of grace and beauty, and at another developing the noble germ of artistic creation” (von Humboldt, 1849, 371). Moreover, von Humboldt claimed that landscape painting as imitative art has a specific material basis and earthly tendency: “The grander style of heroic landscape painting is *the combined result of a profound appreciation of nature and of this inward process of the mind*” (von Humboldt 1850, 347).
According to Edmunds Bunkše (1981, 146), by “his conscious embracement of art and science, Humboldt demonstrated that art could be an integral part of the scientist’s world view”. Despite his appreciation of art, von Humboldt nevertheless transferred the concept of landscape from merely aesthetic to the path leading to a scientific conception of geography (Farinelli 2003, 44). von Humboldt’s landscape was a compromise between the Romanticism ideals and the scientific reason that came to describe “the haze of the world” (Minca, 2007a, 180), which Farinelli (2003, 48 cit. in Minca 2007a, 183) interprets not only as an effect of natural forces but also cultural and political:

“In every landscape view (that is, every time we look at the world from a landscape perspective), (Humboldt) discerns certain brume (haze) on the horizon, a progressive loss of clearness and transparency as the distance increases. It is not, however, a simple atmospheric effect, linked to particular climatic conditions, as one might be tempted to think; it is rather, a cultural and political effect”.

3.2. Oscillations between art and science

It was not until the German landscape theory (Passarge, 1919–1921) and French regional science (Vidal de la Blanche 1903, 1917), that the landscape concept was detached from the realm of art and transformed to the use of science (Minca, 2007b, 435). What took place was the abandoning of an experiencing and cognitive subject and an orientation towards a landscape existing as a collection of objects. This development occurred in relation to the new bourgeois nation-state that required geographical knowledge should be able to reduce “each and every place into (cartographic) space, oblivious of any distinction between geographical ‘objects’ and their respective representations” (Minca, 2007b, 436). Although art was for the most part superseded by the scientific conceptualisation followed by distanced observations and categorical research outcomes, there were exceptions.

At the beginning of the 20th century many scholars across the western world were attracted by the landscape concept based either on the perceptual and/or on the material approach. Willy Hellpach (1911, 230; trans. Hartshorne 1939, 152), for example, wrote about Landschaft as “the total impression aroused in us by a piece of earth surface and the corresponding section of sky”. The relation between earth and sky was also present in Leo Waibels’ (1933) definition of the Landschaft as “the section of the earth surface and the sky that lies in our fuel of vision as seen in perspective from particular point” (cit. Hartshorne 1939, 152). In France, Jean Brunhes (1910) defined landscape as visual, and the study of geography as a practice of opening eyes and seeing. Others moved from the relation between man and the environment to landscape as the visual field without the human perception (Penck 1928).
If landscape had for some meant visual sensations caused by the objects, an opposite understanding of the landscape as the objects causing the sensation began to take a firmer grip in the discussion (Hartshorne 1939, 152). At this time a systematic approach was developed to study the plentiful observations of the landscape objects (Passarge 1919–1921). However, the exact focus of the landscape research divided opinions. Whereas for some scholars, human beings were seen as landscape objects (Schlüter 1906), others claimed that only the man-made forms were landscape objects (Passarge 1919–1921; Penck 1928). Moreover, distance was a disputed theme. According to Passarge, landscape was the immediate surroundings, whereas Johan Gabriel Granö claimed that landscape began from not until two hundred metres. The areas closer than that were named lähiö, a word which did not exist before Granö and was later taken to mean the new forestry housing estates constructed in Finland from the 1960s onwards.

The systematic landscape tradition was adopted and taken towards a more categorical approach by e.g. Carl Sauer’s landscape morphology and Granö’s (1929/1997) *Pure geography*. For Granö (ibid., 50) the aim of landscape science was “to examine, describe, and interpret landscapes on the earth’s surface and regional entities that are coherent in terms of their landscapes, that is, distant fields of vision bound to the observer and spatially bound regions that are coherent in terms of their properties in the distant field of vision”. Across the Atlantic, Sauer (1925) developed resonating ideas of the landscape as the material reality of objects which was to be studied through scientific observation and fieldwork. This led to interpreting landscape not as a scene to be viewed by the observer, but consisting of two interrelated halves, a site and cultural expression, and the work of man on the constantly altering site (ibid., 303). Additionally, the understanding of the landscape as being both visual and material persisted. J. O. M. Broek (1938, 104) described landscape both as “the observable features of any arbitrary part of the earth’s surface” and “a region with a certain homogeneity in its morphology”. The two were linked in a way that “The former is the earth’s surface as raw material for observation, the latter the unit for geographic synthesis” (ibid., 104). The visual became the means to capture the materiality of the landscape.

Although some found value in artistic geography and argued that how we as geographers portray this was the most important part of the discipline (Younghusband 1920; Banse 1922, 1920); thus, a systematical approach to the subject of geographical study gained momentum. Geographers like von Humboldt relied on philosophy to interpret that which could not be explained by the means of science. Younghusband (1920, 3) asserted an artistic vision as the “a true eye for country – a seeing eye; an eye that can see into the very heart and, through all the thronging details, single out the one essential quality; an eye which can not only observe but can make discoveries”. From the late 1920s the three – art, geography (as science) and philosophy – were separated (Hartshorne 1939, 60). Nevertheless, the line between scientific geography and the
two other fields was not as fixed as it seemed. The Finnish geographer Granö’s intellectual work between landscape science, phenomenology and art shows a continuance, which I will discuss in more detail in the next section.

Landscape as a perceived or/and a material area of the earth captured by the means of cartography or writing is connected to the act of framing. Landscape framing is an intriguing thought to play with. We can see Sauer, making observations in the field carrying the frames on his shoulder, and back in his sanctum reconstructing the land captured inside the frame. Granö (1929/1997), in his turn, made a detailed classification of how to represent landscape forms and presented his findings with maps and photographs. In a similar manner, modern landscape science and landscape ecology rely on remote sensing, aerial photos and and/or laser scanning measurements in order to produce the typological and chronological classification of landscapes (Wu 2013; Antrop 2000). In other words, the aim is to organise landscapes through patterns defined by their structural components (e.g. shape, size and spatial arrangement), and landscape shaping processes, that is, what happens between landscape objects (Pitkänen 2016; Shao & Wu 2008; Wu & Hobbs 2002). In contrast to the researcher as the carrier of frames, at least an assistant role is given to the different image technologies. The computer based GIS analysis of landscape patterns produces a representation consisting of raster pixels, points, linear networks, continuous surfaces or categorical patches. If we rely on geometrical forms and Boolean logical operations, we follow the Ptolemaic cosmography and cosmology based on Platon’s idea, where “nature is bifurcated into an upper, ideal, geometric cosmic nature and a lower, terrestrial nature” (Olwig 2008, 1848).

3.3. From Granö’s artistic practice to the humanist landscape tradition as the art of geography

Granö’s practice as a creative writer resembles the humanistic geography as the art of geography. Although Granö saw himself as a scientist, his Altai travel descriptions have a resemblance to humanistic geography (Granö & Paasi 1997), and his landscape and portraiture photographs made in the Altai Mountains have been interpreted as art (Eskola 2002). In his practice, Granö was influenced both by scientific reasoning and the phenomenological thinking. Granö (1919, 1921/1993) described what he had perceived in the Altai region but did not reflect on his own role. Moreover, although Granö’s (1929/1997, 18–19, 50) landscape conception referred to a visual perception starting from a distance, he acknowledged other senses and the nearness of materialities to a body in a formation of an environmental experience:

“The daily interpretation of our environment, which is familiar to everybody, is tied to movement and – if we may say so – to the use of time. We move
from one place to another, making observations from various points, on various sides and at different times. Our field of vision is bounded by the horizon or by closer objects on the surface of the earth, but the celestial bodies in immeasurable space shine their light on our environment from huge distances. We hear different voices from varying distances, and olfactory and tactile perceptions often complement our concept of the environment in a significant manner” (ibid., 34).

Before the dawn of humanistic geography, many others also wrote picturesque landscape descriptions (Hoskins 1955). In the English-speaking-world, literary landscape writings were published. W. G. Hoskins’ (1955) book about the historical formation of English, mostly rural, landscapes was both an academic and popular success (Wylie 2007, 35). In addition to a detailed history of landscape forms, Hoskins (1955) followed romantic tradition through the imaginative description of facts which convey a feeling of loss and a sense of the temporality of landscape. An extract from the chapter discussing the parliamentary enclosure exemplifies feeling towards loss:

“A villager who had played in the open fields as a boy, or watched the sheep in the common pastures, would have lived to see the modern landscape of his parish completed and matured, the roads all made, the hedgerow trees full grown, and new farmhouses built out in the fields where none had ever been before. Everything was different: hardly a landmark of the old parish would have remained. Perhaps here and there the old man would have found some evidences of the former world: the windmill of his younger days still standing in the corner of a new field, through now derelict and forlorn, or the traces of the former strips in the ridge-and-furrow of the new pastures, but not much else” (ibid., 139).

Landscape research following the humanistic tradition (e.g. Tuan 1977; 1974; Buttmer 1976) has produced both vivid descriptions where the researcher’s voice is audible in the lines and conceptual inquiries. The relation to art was restored by humanistic geographers who, according to D. W. Meinig (1983, 323), used art in a search for the meanings of some phenomenon. Meinig’s (1983, 323) example is Henry Glassie’s book Passing the time in Ballymenone where the aim was to find the meaning of the small place of Ballymenone by portraying and analysing the ordinary landscapes of the individuals and of the community.

As Meinig (1983, 321) also acknowledged the instability of meaning, the art of geography became to refer to creative outputs that would mediate an experience. The shift from science to art referred to the creative acts of producing personal statements, and a social practice invoking a dynamic relationship with others (ibid., 324). According to Meinig, a geographer cannot become an artist by imitation or learning a craft. Instead, “one only becomes truly an artist by the inner feeling, by conviction, by compelling need to share those feelings and insights and literally imagine them into such
forms as to make effective connection with the lives of others. He must find his own voice and make it understood; style must arise from purpose and personality” (ibid., 321).

In Finnish geography, there is an art-related humanistic landscape tradition both in theory and practice. In a conceptual academic dissertation, *Geodiversity as a lived world: On the geography of existence*, Pauli Tapani Karjalainen (1986, 141) claimed that “as a humanistic focus landscape description illuminates an aspect of artefactual geodiversity in which the artefactualness … is assigned to the lived character of geodiversity. Landscape, thus, reveals an aspect of human subjectivity”. Moreover, Karjalainen found a relevant link between art and geography which according to him springs from the same source. According to Karjalainen (ibid., 59) art is important not “as a source of information, nor as a means of decoration, but because of its ability to articulate man’s primordial being in the world…”. Consequently, Karjalainen argued that humanistic landscape descriptions can be close to artistic expression (ibid., 141).

The landscape that Karjalainen defined was primarily a landscape of the mind. In other words, landscape is real only by the act of conscious thinking. Through the subjective notion of landscape, it became possible to attach meanings, a set of positive and negative feelings, to the landscape. The discussion about the landscape of the mind was continued by Sirpa Tani (1997) who nevertheless approached it from another perspective. In a study about Helsinki films, Tani (ibid., 34) derived the concept mindscape (mielen maisema) from Porteou’s (1990) concept landscape of the mind. Tani’s (1997) aim was to understand how the fictional spaces of cinema, already attached with meanings or the mindscape of the film-maker, acquire new subjective meanings when the cinematic places become the viewer’s mindscape. Tani’s (ibid., 66) research was humanistic not only conceptually but also in the way she stepped inside the life-worlds of characters and acknowledged that the world where she lives influences the interpretation of the film.

The researcher’s voice is even stronger in autobiographical writings, where Bunkše (2007) traces the harmony between the inner and the outer landscapes through an eloquently narrated individual sensory-memory path. The individual path described by Bunkše was the change that he had experienced in his feeling about Nevada desert landscape. Bunkše describes how he had an idea of a beautiful landscape derived from his childhood in Latvia that determined the landscape of his mind, and how in relation to this inner landscape, the Nevada landscape first appeared ugly to him, but through a sensory-memory path gradually changed into a landscape of affection. The change in feeling was affected by the scent of a branch of sagebrush, a memory object he took with him from Nevada. In a second encounter with Nevada, the outer landscape, the scent of sagebrush in rain, absorbed through all the senses, gave an impetus to a change in the way the landscape was felt. Consequently, the vivid autobiography of Bunkše conceptualised landscape as being in the world affected by traces of the past.
3.4. Critical eye

A partly similar relation to frames as used in landscape science appears in the Marxist materialist, post-colonial and historical approaches to landscape in the mid 90s (Matless 1998; Olwig 1996; Mitchell 1996, 1994; W. J. T, Mitchell 1994). There is also a hidden legacy of Sauer’s material and cultural landscape and Jackson’s (1984) symbolical and vernacular landscape. To recall Sauer’s words: “[c]ulture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape is the result”. Contrary to Sauer’s ideas, culture as the fixed entity was challenged (Mitchell 1995). The focus shifted towards the changing characters of landscape through production and how the material affects identity formation. Instead of only framing land, a two-way relation between land and human was acknowledged. This relation is about the materialities of the landscape and not exactly being able to determine an area with borders.

What Wylie (2007) calls the “cultures of landscape” approach has seen studies in varying topics e.g. urban residential areas (Schein 1997), race and racialisation (Tolia-Kelly 2010, 2004; Schein 2006), national identity (Noguè & Vicente 2004), urban sprawl (Qviström 2012), agriculture (Mitchell 1996, 1994), experimental ecology (Kirsch 2007), and forestry (Robbins & Fraser 2003; Cline-Cole 1998). Cultures of landscape was a reaction against the landscape as a way of seeing or gaze, which I will presently discuss as another way of framing. For the moment, however, I want to pay attention to the Marxists, and Foucaultian influences through a set of writings. Although these are very familiar, I aim to contribute by looking at the act of framing and the role of a researcher. In the culture of the landscape approach, the frames are used to capture the material and visible landscape, but simultaneously the interest is in that which remains outside the depicted, that is, the underlying forces or (power) relations. Contrary to the objectivism of landscape science, a critical geographer often takes a standpoint and is guided by questions of social justice with the aim of exposing the exploitative and unequal relationships between human beings within capitalist systems.

Following Foucault, David Matless (1998) successfully “linked landscape, subjectivity and citizenship indelibly together, thus revealing both the production of new subjectivities via landscape practices and the concomitant production and mobilisation of landscape, both material and symbolic, within discourses of health, identity, authenticity and citizenship” (Wylie 2007, 116–117). Taking another, Marxist perspective to production Don Mitchell (1998, 94) described landscape as “both a work (it is the product of human labour and thus encapsulates the dreams, desires and all the injustices of the social systems that make it), and as something that does work (it acts as a social agent in the further development of a place)”. Mitchell’s formulation presumed the paying of attention to the invisible, which had already been articulated by Broek (1938, 104) from another perspective: “an abstract landscape free from time bounds and place bounds of the observer and supplemented by invisible, but, nevertheless significant data”. Instead of natural forces or a culture as a changing entity shaping

In a historical and conceptual study, Olwig (2002, 1996) returned to landscape as a material unit by tracing the concept’s roots in e.g. German (Landschaft), Dutch (landschap) and older forms of English (see also Tuan, 1974, 133). According to Olwig (2002, xxv), before the 16th century landscape referred to an area and meant much the same as country, that is, “The landscape/country as a physical space was thus the manifestation of the polity’s local custom and common law” (ibid., 214). Thus, the landscape is more complicated than only a physical landscape. Although the use of body shaping land or practices are recognised, landscape refers to “a nested world of places, which although they had a physical expression, primarily represented the social place of people in a polity” (ibid., 215). It was the representative political body which “gave a common legal form to the customs of the landscape polity”.

The materiality of landscape has also been approached with regard to memories. In a study about diverse landscapes of British Asian women living in London, Divya P. Tolia-Kelly (2004) found that the women’s memories were woven into the present landscapes. Different material textures are interpreted as connecting points between home and past landscapes, about Asian history and landscapes. As Tolia-Kelly (ibid., 287) writes: “In the testimonies of the women, certain plants, trees and textures reoccur – papaya, guava, mango, palms, bougainvilleas, jasmine, gardenias and hibiscus flowers and the colour of the soil are particular landscape icons which are metonyms for other continental ecologies”. By cultivating species from their past in England the women of Tolia-Kelly’s research also form roots in the present territory or land.

3.5. Frame as the focus itself: landscape as a way of seeing and gaze

Landscape is also understood as a visual means to appropriate and use land where the researcher does not take the frames to the study field but the frames become the focus in themselves. This has meant landscape as a way of seeing (Cosgrove 1985) and as a gaze which both help “to make sense of a particular relationship between society and land” (Rose 1993, 87). If von Humboldt’s landscape conceptualisation was influenced by the sublime landscape, and the humanist geography occasionally produced artful autobiographies, the new cultural geography focused on the research of artistic representations from the classical period to modernity (Vasudevan 2015, 2007; della Dora 2015, 2013; Nash 1996; Cosgrove 1985, 1984/1998).

Cosgrove found the landscape idea with its roots in the artistic and literary representation of the visible world between the early 15th century and the late 19th century. Cosgrove (1984/1998, 9) argued that when the landscape was natural or human made scenery viewed by a spectator it “implied particular sensibility, a way of experiencing and expressing feelings towards the external world”, and thus it became possible to
paint the scene. Cosgrove traced the construction of modern vision through the development of linear landscape painting in Renaissance art. However, Cosgrove was not only affected by Renaissance art but also by contemporary art theory, especially John Berger’s (1972, 8) ‘ways of seeing’, a sentence originally found in Erwin Panofsky’s work, that referred to the way things are seen affected by previous knowledge or beliefs. Following Berger, Cosgrove (1985, 55) presented landscape as a composition and way of seeing land and the world by an individual spectator. Control and order over land was an illusion offered through the arrangement of space according to the principles of geometry.

The control was achieved in painting through the linear perspective that created an illusion of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface. The illusion was produced with the assistance of visual triangles constructed using the concepts of a vanishing point, a distance point and an intersecting plane (Cosgrove 1985, 48). Cosgrove (ibid., 48) described the work of a realist painter: “The artist, through perspective establishes the arrangement or composition, and thus the specific time, of the events described, determines – in both senses – ‘the point of view’ to be taken by the observer, and controls through framing the scope of reality revealed”. Consequently, what is common to both landscape painting and landscape science is the position of the viewer as a spectator, looking at the image or the scene. The spectator is not a participant in the world but instead the world is an object to be appropriated by the subject.

According to Cosgrove (1984/1998, 1, 39–40) landscape as a specific way of seeing or idea emerged as a dimension of European elite consciousness at a period of transition between a feudal and capital mode of production at a varying pace in different geographical contexts. Thus, the landscape idea developed alongside a transformation in which the human relation to land changed from an insider to an outsider, when the use value of land developed into an exchange value as land became a commodity (ibid., 62–63, 64). In this context, Cosgrove (1985, 46) interpreted landscape paintings and garden design as the visual and ideological counterparts to the practical activities of survey map making and ordnance as both aimed at “the control and domination over space as an absolute, objective entity, its transformation into the property of individual or state”.

Others have defined landscape as a gaze of a dominant identity group such as the coloniser, the men or the tourist (Crang 1997; Nash 1996; Urry 1992, 1990). These studies unfold the questions of voyeurism, and a gaze towards an incomplete “other”. This has been the case in feminist landscape studies where nature is interpreted as the female body, or women’s bodies seen as terrains, conquered by masculine powers by the means of exploitation (Rose 1993, 98–99). Rose (1993), for example, argued that landscape should be understood as a voyeuristic gaze following the psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and especially Jacques Lacan (1977), and the film theorist Laura Mulvey (1979, 1989).
Although Rose (1993) acknowledged the notions of the landscape as a learnt way of seeing, she claimed that the landscape as a way of seeing is a gendered practice, a particular masculine visual gaze. In other words, both women and nature are visualised through masculinist fantasies (ibid., 99). Moreover, as Rose has reminded us, in scientific geographical discourse there is an inherent pleasure in the landscape which is problematic. It is the way the disembodied male observer is in the field positioned with relation to the beautiful feminine landscape. Rose finds a similar problem in the textual approach to landscape: “landscape textualized renders geographer’s knowledge exhaustive” (ibid., 101).

Catherine Nash (1996) reversed the feminist interpretation of the gaze. According to Nash (ibid., 154) the study of landscape and visual pleasure was entrapped in the logics of the male gaze, which could be dismantled with women’s images of the male body, and the male body as landscape. However, Nash argued, as the image of a male body might offer pleasure to other than heterosexual women, the gaze was not fixed to a polarized sexual identity, and thus the image was open to multiple readings. Consequently, the feminist interpretation altered the way of seeing from a stable position towards shifting positions, and thus movement between different ways of seeing. Artistic work was now seen as powerful not because of it creating dominance over land or the other, but because of it playing upon existing representational traditions (Nash 1996, 159).

3.6. Landscape as image and text

By following, for example, the cultural Marxist writings of Raymond Williams (1973), Panofsky’s (1939, 1955) iconology and John Ruskin’s art historical writings about landscape, Daniels and Cosgrove (1988) further developed landscape into a cultural imagery or a symbol veiling the repressive material conditions. Although previous iconographical writings also influenced the new cultural landscape theory, Panofsky’s (1955) iconography and iconology were the most influential (Daniels & Cosgrove 1988). Panofsky (1955, 40) himself divided the study of art works into three parts: pre-iconographical description, iconographical analysis, and iconological interpretation. Of these, the first was concerned with the factual and expressional that constitute the world of artistic motifs; the second with the subject matter forming the world of images, stories and allegories; and the third with the intrinsic meaning comprised of the world of symbolical values.

Following Panofsky’s ideas, Daniels and Cosgrove (1988) formulated the iconography of landscape where “Landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings… Landscapes may be represented in a variety of materials and on many surfaces – in paint on canvas, in writing on paper, in earth, stone, water and vegetation on the ground” (ibid., 1). The task of the researcher
developed into an unravelling the situated meanings of the landscape as a cultural image through the research of visual symbols and representations, such as paintings, poems and landscape parks. Moreover, critical image interpretation was seen in relation to the historical development of a representational tradition of a genre (Nash, 1996, 151). However, the focus was not only on the deeper meanings of a layered landscape but from a post-modern perspective also on the landscape as “a flickering text displayed on the word-processor screen whose meaning can be created, extended, altered, elaborated and finally obliterated by the merest touch of button” (Daniels & Cosgrove 1988, 8).

Daniels (1993) widened the notion of landscape to the urban environment and monuments. According to Daniels, landscapes are visible shapes which depict the nation and function as models of moral order and aesthetic harmony. Some landscapes are given the status of national icons. By unpacking the meanings in landscape representations, Daniels studied the relation between landscape imageries and national identity by showing how landscape imageries compress social relations and forms of knowledge. Daniels (ibid., 3) claimed that a nation as an ‘imagined community’ was given shape by a symbolic activation of time and space which consist of “stories of golden ages, enduring traditions, heroic deeds and dramatic destinies, located in ancient or promised home-lands with hallowed sites and scenery”.

Besides analysing the content of the images, Daniels acknowledged the context where the image was made and how it was influencing the present conditions of his study in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. One chapter deals with J. M. W. Turner’s landscape paintings that Daniel’s approached as representations of the industrial Britain. The textile mill and railroad landscapes of two paintings are analysed in detail as the icons of national pride. In another context, the work of the same artist can be differently interpreted. Daniels also explains how Turner’s paintings have often been placed within the impressionist style. To make my point clear about the context, I remember my first encounter taking place in a Tate exhibition entitled Turner Colour and Line: Turner’s Experiments that presents “the changes in Turner’s watercolour palette as he travelled across Europe, responding to different light effects, and using newly-developed colours and paints” (Tate 2017). This particular exhibition conveyed a different story about Turner.

Landscape has also been conceptualised as text referring to a narrative created by individuals or groups and waiting to be written down and read by the researcher (Duncan & Duncan 1988). James Duncan and Nancy Duncan (2004, 28), in a study about privileged New York city suburban landscapes, argued that landscapes both embody social relations, and are crucial in identity formation through the aesthetic values people attach to them when they enjoy the picturesque landscape. When Duncan and Duncan (2003, 94–95, 98) examined the problematics of the aesthetic discourse of American suburb, they found that Latino immigrants, whose labour maintained the beauty of landscape through their gardening employment, where seen as a threat to the visual landscape of another suburb while waiting to be recruited in the street.
The critical textual or narrative and visual approach have been applied to study varying topics in different parts of the world, such as postmodern gentrified landscapes in Vancouver (Mills 1988), planning dispute over the production of new landscapes around Lexington, Kentucky (McCann 1997), the modern city landscapes of Istanbul (Mills 2005), the gated community landscapes in Australia’s Sovereign Islands (Rofe 2006), the nationalist landscape architecture in Israel (Egoz 2008), the aestheticisation of new middle-class landscapes in Shanghai (Pow 2009), the postcolonial suburban landscapes in Dar es Salaam (Mercer 2017), the amenity landscapes in the waterfront second-home settings in the provinces of Ontario and Québec (Luka 2017) and the wind energy landscapes in Ontario (Fast et al. 2015). New approaches, occasionally, include combining the landscape as a cultural text with the concept of assemblage (Luka 2017, 257–258, 271), referring to ‘mode[s] of ordering heterogeneous entities so that they work together for a certain time’ (Müller 2015, 28). Moreover, cinematic landscapes have been studied through the representational lenses of visual codes and symbols with an aim to uncover broader historical and political themes (Gandy 2003).

In Finnish landscape research, the post-second world landscapes of eastern Finland, especially the Karelian landscape have caught researcher’s attention (e.g. Raivo 1997, 2002; Häyrynen 2004) most likely because of the loss of this territory - it remained behind the Russian border after the Winter War. As Karelia was important for Finnish nation building from the 19th century, its heritage continued to influence after the new borderline was established. In research about the post-war landscapes of the Finnish Orthodox Church, Petri Raivo (2002) found that after the war the former Finnish Karelia symbolic landscapes, people and heritage shifted westwards. The reproduced symbolic landscape consisted of rebuilt monasteries and sacred sites. Maunu Häyrynen (2004) in his research has studied the representations of Karelia as a periphery of Finnish national landscape. According to Häyrynen, the ideological roles of the Karelian landscape have varied from the didactic landscape of nationalism, to post-Soviet revival and to a nostalgic construction that transfers a liminal zone outside history. Häyrynen’s approached the Karelian landscape as an imagined periphery of the nation state that has lived on as the lost area “in a ghost imagery of memory, frozen to its pre-war state” (ibid., 31).

3.7. Inside and beyond the frame: from phenomenological towards post-phenomenological landscape writings

In the phenomenological landscape conceptualisations, the act of framing changes (Ingold 1993, 2000, 2004; Wylie 2002a, b, 2005; Tilley 2004). The frames are no longer on the shoulder of the geographer or a gaze through which the land is framed but the corporeal body becomes the focus. In landscape phenomenology, particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1942/1962, 1961/1968) writings have been applied. Landscape here becomes bodily participation in/with the world, and writing is the act of conceptualising
this participation, often through one’s own body. That is to say, phenomenological approaches focus on landscape as the relation between a body and the world from the perspective of actualisation. In other words, it is concerned with the lived experience that is always changing in space and time. This means that how the body is embedded in the world and how it sees the world alters with the constantly changing world and self.

The humanistic geographers had already explored phenomenology in the conceptualisations of lifeworld (Seamon 1979; Tuan 1977, 1974; Buttimer 1976). I find resonance in landscape phenomenology with David Seamon’s (1979) ideas on place-boundness through the habits of a body-subject. However, the temporal aspect is different. Whereas Seamon’s focus is on habitual movement and rest through human attachment to a place, in the phenomenological writings landscape appears as ongoing dwelling or situated perception (Tilley 2004; Ingold 2000). Seamon’s (1979, 56–57) formulation of the relations between body ballets and time-space routines in the context of physical environment is a rich conceptualisation influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Seamon (1980, 148) found value in everyday bodily movements, such as driving home or reaching for scissors in a drawer, which he understood as phenomena in the lifeworld. Through the notion of a specific sensibility of a body, Seamon (1980, 155) argued for a body-subject as “the inherent capacity of the body to direct behaviors of the person intelligently, and thus function as a special kind of subject which expresses itself in a preconscious way usually described by such words as ‘automatic,’ ‘habitual,’ ‘involuntary,’ and ‘mechanical’.”

Consequently, according to Seamon (1980, 156) a body is active, and thus, it has the capacity to transform different bodily needs to behaviours. Furthermore, Seamon presented the concept of body-ballet as manual labour or artistic sensibility that refers to “a set of integrated behaviors which sustain a particular task or aim”. Time is crucial to the relation between the body-subject and environment. When certain habitual bodily behaviours extend through a considerable portion of time, we are concerned with space-time routines. Seamon’s (ibid., 163) focus was on a place ballet as the “fusion of many time-space routines and body-ballets in terms of place” as “an environment synergy in which human and material parts unintentionally foster a larger whole with its own special rhythm and character”. However, the question of change which is the focus of my work was left untouched.

In phenomenological approaches, the landscape refers to the relation between the body and land. In these understandings, the body embodies the material world and the result of this is landscape. According to Ingold (2000, 193), a creature is through its body present in the world and, thus, landscape is the world of its being-in. For Ingold (ibid., 193) it is essential that landscape forms are not there in advance for human or other creatures to occupy but exist through embodied action. Tilley (2004, 25), on the other hand, describes landscapes as embodied and perceived connections between places. Consequently, landscapes structure “human feeling, emotion, dwelling,
movement and practical activity within a geographical region” (ibid., 25). Furthermore, for Tilley (ibid., 25) landscape is a medium for socialisation and knowledge because “for to know a landscape is to know who you are, how to go on and where you belong”. However, Tilley does not present a stagnant view of landscape because a landscape can extend beyond topographic boundaries and be related to many places. Moreover, the boundary itself is artificial.

In his earlier writings, Wylie (2002a, 445) reworked the landscape vision by following Merleau-Ponty’s visual order where one is both seeing and seen. These abstract thoughts were elaborated on through a vivid description of an embodied process of ascending Glastonbury Tor (England). In the paper, Wylie (ibid., 454) argued that Glastonbury Tor is neither an object for a gaze, nor a viewpoint but “a modulation of the visible world which lets there be a gaze to behold things open and hidden” (see also Heidegger 1996). This means that for the climber the surrounding landscape is revealed and conducted through the altering elevation. In another study, Wylie (2002b) constructed a tangible narrative about Robert Falcon Scott and Roald Amundsen’s voyages with an aim of conveying the sense of concreteness and the sensuous contexts of practice and performance of these. The narrative triggers senses with the different use of the materials and speeds of writing. In addition, the narrative indirectly disseminates the notion of chance:

“Both the Terra Nova and the Fram must pass through this pack ice. They must learn to love the sensuality of its drift, to catch the sudden opening of ‘leads’, to avoid the currents which cause it to grip like a vice. They must be on the lookout, constantly, to find the signs reflected by the ice in the atmosphere: the glinting ‘ice-blink’ warning of a perilous fastness ahead, the darker ‘water sky’ holding the promise of open The Terra Nova spends three weeks enclosed by this ice: unlucky, perhaps, to catch the pack at its heaviest. But the Fram takes four days to complete its passage” (ibid., 253–254).

If phenomenological writings have brought valuable notions about the actual and present bodily experiences, non-representational or post-phenomenological landscape theory has conceptualised absences and tensions (Waterton 2013; MacPherson 2010; Wylie 2006a; M. Rose 2002). Affected by non-representational theories (e.g. Anderson & Harrison, 2010; Wylie 2010; McCormack 2010, 2003; Dewsbury 2010, 2000; Thrift 2008, 2004 a, b; Thrift & Dewsbury 2000), the landscape researcher stepped inside the frame, and put the frame on like a hula hoop. Whereas in the phenomenological oriented approach to landscape, body and landscape could be tied together: “through living in it, landscape becomes a part of us, just as we are a part of it” (Ingold, 1993, 154), in the hula hoop swing, materialities encounter turbulence and entwine with the body. Even a temporally ready landscape became an illusion because landscape was now interpreted as tension or passage.
3.8. Creative (and) conceptual ways of touching the non-representable with the post-phenomenological landscape concept

The post-phenomenological landscape theory contradicts the perceiving subject, who, according to Wylie (2006a, 521) as a “lived body possesses ‘natural’ capacities to synthesise, polarise, and organise the perceptual field”. Post-phenomenologists, in contrast, introduce a sense of individuality which emerges from the body’s situated encounter with the landscape (see Dewsbury 2015, 40). This means that in seeing or touching something, one does not acquire a total understanding or assimilate the whole, but the encounter transcends one’s apprehension (Wylie 2006a, 526). Regardless of the various different theoretical backgrounds, the notion of landscape is broadened from the embodied practices to an openness to be affected (Dewsbury & Cloke 2009, 696). I will briefly review some of the creative and/or conceptual writings which have influenced my work, and establish the course of how I aim to continue the discussion with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s events.

Rose (2006, 2002) has depicted landscape as a labyrinth and as ‘dreams of presence’. I find these compelling and thought-provoking metaphors. The first metaphor, a labyrinth is borrowed from George Bataille and applied to landscape as “coming to matter through the operations of labyrinth”, as a space in an unfinished creation (Rose 2002, 462). This means that landscape is all the potential and various practices through which “it is called forth and put to task” (ibid., 462–463). The second ‘dreams of presence’ is an idea borrowed from Derrida who conceptualised ‘landscape as dreams of presence’. It refers to landscape as “intimate collections of material sensations where other dreams of presence (dreams of who we are, of where we belong and of how we get on with life) are consigned” (Rose 2006, 539). A dreams of presence landscape affects the emergence of subjectivity. Both of the metaphors hint at a landscape that is never finished and a goal we are trying to reach.

Wylie’s landscape conceptualisation has taken a creative path where I have found many resonating thoughts and ideas. His articles are based on philosophy and are in many cases experimentally composed. In his ongoing practice of landscape conceptualisation, Wylie has been influenced e.g. by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, Deleuze’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s writings. In his early post-phenomenological writings, Wylie’s (2006a, 529) focus was on the coming into presence of an eventful landscape where the gazing upon landscape is as an eventful actualisation of non-subjective visual percepts. With eventfulness Wylie (2006a, 522) refers to “distribution of selves and landscape through attending to the conditions of gazing – to the depths and folds of an immanent plane from which distinctive selves and landscapes arise and with which they are always intertwined”. The world is, thus, seen as processual and the subject arising by occupying anonymous gazes or perspectives of this world (ibid., 529). While the main focus remains on the moment of actualisation, I will discuss in Chapter 6
Deleuze’s notion of counter-actualisation which is only indirectly touched on in the following sentence by Wylie (ibid., 530): “this actualization is in turn conceivable only through relation with the topography of the immanent horizon”.

In another article, Wylie depicts a single day’s walk along the South West Coast Path in North Devon, England. In addition to discussing the walking experience Wylie (2005, 234) details “various affinities and distanciations of self and landscape which emerge in the course of walking a fairly wild, lonely and demanding stretch of the Path”. The main argument is that “landscape might be best described in terms of entwined materialities and sensibilities with which we act and sense” (ibid., 245). Here, Wylie (ibid., 243) makes a clear distinction from the humanist landscape: “The eyes of the gazing subject are not an exercise of judgement or a bestowal of meaning upon a passive and neutral scene. Instead these eyes arise and look in a relation with visibilities, sonorities and tangibilities that ‘organises as it proceeds’”.

Despite making this distinction from the humanists, Wylie (2005) has followed their path in creative writing. The article about a single day’s walk is special because of its fragmentary and narrational style. It can be seen as a piece of experimental art of geography: the words are woven from the encounters along the path and different theoretical texts that reflects the activity of walking and the contemporary discussion about affects and percepts. According to Wylie the travel narrative is a potential form of geographical epistemology because it offers a notion of spectrality where one is both there and not there, departing and arriving, thus presenting nothing holistic. However, the narrator is only an outcome of the walk: “Of course it is I who have chosen to assemble the paper in this particular way; it was me who experienced these things, but not as an unaffected, unaffecting atom. I am equally assembled and dispersed in this pathfinding process, I precipitate amid tones, topographies, theoretical discourses” (ibid., 245). Wylie (2006b, 465) has also poetically combined words with photographs in a Cultural Geographies in Practice section paper Smoothlands: fragments/ landscapes/ fragments where he argued that landscape is tension. By this Wylie means that landscape is a relation between presence and absence. It works through tearing things apart and threading them together again.

Furthermore, Lorimer and Wylie (2010) together have practiced the art of landscape writing. The paper Loop (a geography) is an experiment depicting their two bodies walking, mostly separately, the same route with conceptual ideas of landscape. Following Nancy, Lorimer and Wylie follow the notion that being is first and foremost being-with, thus, they argue that walking alone is different than walking separately but together. According to Lorimer and Wylie (ibid., 7) when one walks alone it is easier to lose and find oneself along the landscape as “a multiplicity of narratives and perceptions”. The words are constellated imaginatively from the encounters along the way, but Lorimer and Wylie also present theoretical findings, such as about the relation between sight and sound: “The conditioning of human being is such that you don’t engage innocently with sound. It seems bound always to be without the visual”
The main argument of the paper is that landscape becomes a homeland through the walking, the movement generates inhabitation which is different from the preoccupied inhabitation of modernity (ibid., 10).

The question of absence is discussed in detail, in Wylie’s (2009, 279, 287) study on memorial benches as examples of some kind of “impossibility of coinciding with landscape”. Wylie (ibid., 281) describes the materiality of memorial benches as the embodiment of the absent perspective of the commemorated. Consequently, as one sits on the memorial bench, one is looking with and sharing the perspective of the absent one. However, the commemorated one also becomes the scene the viewer is looking at. Dewsbury and Cloke (2009, 696) have also pondered absence through the notion of immanence of things yet not manifested, when approaching religious landscapes. They touched on the issue of the spiritual as “cutting that space between absence and presence, and manifesting itself “at the immediate, and therefore non-metaphysical level of the body” (ibid., 697).

Wylie’s later work on landscape has focused on landscape in relation to displacement and distance. Displacement is read through Tim Robinson’s books about Connemara and Aran Islands landscape, and especially by highlighting the image of a ‘good step’. Following Robinson, Wylie (2012, 365) claims that “we witness neither a nostalgic romanticism, nor a dynamic identification with landscape, nor more widely a fusion of land and life, but rather a displacement of land and life from each other”. Thus, according to Wylie the ‘goodness’ of the step means that it displaces dwelling. In other words, the good step is future oriented: “in displacing a thought of dwelling, it opens rather than encloses landscape, un-earths it, as it were, while remaining committed to grounds yet-to-come” (ibid., 375). Here, we notice a change from the earlier understanding of landscape as a homeland (Lorimer & Wylie 2010). The landscape no longer has potential for inhabitation through practice, instead the focus becomes the always open future.

With regard to distance, Wylie (2017) has recently turned to Nancy’s account of landscape as an uncanny and estranged spatiality. For Wylie, distance means something else than the visual landscape, it means keeping the world at a distance (see Granö 1929/1997, 49). Thus, distance does not refer to a metrical but a critical distance as a resistance to fusion. Moreover, the distance is positive. Through his reading of Nancy, Wylie (ibid., 5) has revisited his landscape conceptualisation and argued that “the distances of not-belonging are actually the signature elements of landscape’s distinction as a mode of experience, imagination and presentation”. In his conceptualisation, Wylie, however, remains in the worldly spatiality and does not extend it to mental elements:

“We picture with Nancy a landscape composed of distinctive, extended elements, ourselves included. These elements are, from the start, interrelated – that is, exposed to each other – but equally from the start they are separate
and distinct, distant from each other, marked in and by their emergence by a spacing, a distancing” (ibid., 25–26).

Wylie concludes by referring to the uncanny as “the moment at which the known abruptly seems unfamiliar and disturbing, the moment in which a sense being-at-home in the world is existentially unsettled” (ibid., 28).

By taking into account the incompleteness of our multi-sensory seeing, the post-phenomenological landscape theory presents the affective landscape. I claim that this discussion needs to be brought into a relation with the notions of time in Deleuze (Article III, IV). As the anthropologist Lee (2007, 89) argues, landscape is not merely “a historical layering in which the present is merely the sum of past episodes, but is also an active, present future-orientated engagement with the environment”. Moreover, post-phenomenological landscape theory is both topographical and topological: it takes into consideration the connective properties in spatial relations (see Martin & Secor 2014; Crouch 2010; Rose & Wylie, 2006). If topography is both the actuality as the state of things or embodiment and virtuality is potentiality, then topology is the border or surface which connects the two intertwined but separate halves. While the focus has been on the actualisation (e.g. Wylie 2006a), I will elaborate on the connective surface with Deleuze’s event(s). Badiou’s event subsequently provides another entry point to the questions of absence and distance. Absence can be understood as the hidden which haunts our worlds and distance as the possibility for critical distance to previous thoughts.

3.9. Contemporary interest in landscape and art

A great deal of interesting work is in progress with regard to landscape and art, such as studies on landscape representations beyond linear perspective paintings (della Dora 2013, 2011), landscape photography (della Dora 2015) and art installations in landscape (Warren 2012; Morris 2011). Moreover, experimental research with artists or with art and the landscape concept is taking place (Brettel 2016). These various studies touch on issues such as memory, experiences of light and darkness, affective encounters, and audiencing. Despite the interest in the non-touchable and the invisible, the writers share a commitment to the audience as participants in the work of art. Before moving onwards, I would like to pause and highlight some insights from these studies. The aim of this discussion is to impel us towards a form of participation which is not always active but occurs in the midst of life, when we are not consciously thinking, saying or feeling anything.

della Dora (2013) found value in the topic of memory in research about landscape before the linear perspective. In a plunge into the Roman landscape paintings, early Byzantine mosaics and Medieval Byzantine textual descriptions and icons, della Dora (ibid., 690) traced the visual history of topia which reveals a premodern tradition of
perceiving and representing the world. Topia refers to a small place and is “a word used to designate landscape paintings decorating Roman villas, as well as the vegetal sculptures obtained through special rope (also called topia) embellishing memory gardens” (ibid., 691–694). According to della Dora (ibid., 695) the visual spaces of topia were used for memorising through recollection: “As with the viewer wandering through the visual space of the topia painted in the colonnade, the listener had to place himself in the situation described and become a “spectator”. These “word-pictures” or mental images were likely to remain imprinted in memory thanks to their vividness and were thus analogous to the painted topia”. In other words, the premodern landscape art tradition redirects landscape as a way of seeing from the abstract space of linear perspective towards “the visual energeia and memorability of singular elements” (ibid., 691).

Furthermore, della Dora (2011) formulated the theory of icon’s performative geographies which challenges the linear perspective way of seeing. This is illustrated through an encounter with the icon Mother God: “My gaze does not wander through an illusionist three-dimensional space, as in Western Renaissance sacred images ruled by linear perspective; it is simply captured by the gaze of the Mother God. It is not allowed to go beyond the surface icon. But her gaze is allowed to do so – in the opposite direction. My body becomes a surface penetrated by the intensity of her gaze. I become part of the composition” (ibid., 239). That is to say, the icons “demand a personal involvement in the act of perceiving, even to the extent of being changed by what one sees or touches” (ibid., 242). Furthermore, della Dora argues that the icon’s agency is not restricted to the gaze of the holy person, but includes the capacity of inverse perspective through the icon’s compositional aspects. The inverse perspective enables a shift from the landscape as a ‘way of seeing’ to a ‘way of being’. Instead of gazing over the natural world as depicted by linear perspective paintings, the viewer is drawn to the image itself (ibid., 243).

In research on contemporary Italian landscape photography of the 1970s and 1980s, della Dora (2015, 345) argued that in Luigi Ghirri’s photographs landscape is understood both as medium for exchange between places that shapes our seeing and a physical environment. According to della Dora, Ghirri’s photographs set the spectator free from stereotypes with the aim of seeing the landscape with new eyes. To unpack clichéd images, Ghirri’s photographs are made with playful techniques (ibid., 348). In these photographs, della Dora (ibid., 360) claims, “landscape manifests itself through paradox; through temporal and geographical displacements; through unexpected encounters with forms that are at once familiar and unfamiliar; and through objects that move across space and time”. In my work, I continue the discussion about unpacking clichéd images with Deleuze’s concept of fabulation (Article IV).

In a study about a site art by James Turrell entitled Skyspace, Saskia Warren (2012, 84) found that audiences enmesh in the biography of the art work and form meaningful relationships with it. Although an audience has the freedom to interpret the work, the
experience is influenced by how one is guided through the work (ibid., 92). Warren also claims that how the art work is interpreted does not only rely on who the people are, but also the individuals they encounter during the visit to the site. Nina Morris, in her research, studied the influence of the interplay of light and dark in a landscape experience with a temporary night-time installation *The Storr: Unfolding Landscape*. The aim of Morris (ibid., 317) was to shift focus from the visual and tangible to the ephemeral, intangible or experiential in nature. Morris (ibid., 334) argues that the transition to darkness opens up a different kind of sensory corporeal connections which influence how one’s surroundings are perceived. Moreover, the perceptions vary depending on previous experiences and understanding of darkness.

Alex Vasudevan (2015, 137) studied photomontage in Beate Gütschow’s video installations *R#1* and *R#*. Both installations reconstruct a seventeenth-century Dutch artist Jacob van Ruisdael’s painting *The Jewish Cemetery* by combining video imagery from various sources filmed at different sites. According to Vasudevan (2015, 144–145) the installations present a dialectical relationship between stillness and movement, as “we are confronted with the digital reconstruction of a landscape that is itself ‘brought to life’ and set in motion as a five-minute video-installation. Nothing however, ‘happens’”. Thus, photomontage used in the installations does not direct our bodies towards action, but instead creates a landscape of relative stillness, where the slow changes happens through the movement of clouds and running water (Vasudevan 2015, 145).

The different contemporary research works into landscape art show an interest in the spectator. In della Dora’s example, we see the awakening of the spectator’s memories and an intense gaze which demands the spectator’s involvement. In his study, Warren brings insights to the management of the site of spectating art. Whereas these studies are captured by the perceiving spectator, in the study of Ghirri’s photographs, della Dora moves towards the passive way of seeing which is also instigated by Vasudevan. It is both with della Dora’s notion about the spectator disengaging from clichés and Vasudevan’s ideas about the movement of watery and cloudy that I wish to continue on a theoretical and methodological level; thus moving towards the chances happening to a spectator who is moving without necessarily shifting place.
4. RESTRICTIVE LANDSCAPE

4.1. Forewords

The first site of encounter is *The Robinson Institute*-installation. It is discussed in Article I, which is the text I wrote last. However, at the time of visiting the installation in 2012, I had not written the other three articles. The installation, thus, vaguely influenced the content of the other texts. After participating in the installation, I started to consider participation in landscape and how it is guided with narratives in general. I simply started to think about the different objects and images of the installation constructed as seven sites of the fictional scholar Robinson’s journey as frames connected through representational techniques to form a story. Moreover, with the use the installation made of frames, I started to see in images the different ways geographers have framed land, objects, and people in landscapes. Although installation art is not a real world situation, it can nevertheless reveal the logics behind day-to-day situations. In the way *The Robinson Institute* is constructed by constellating the different objects and images in relation to one another guides the spectator to sites of interest; these sites each narrate a particular event in the story.

These notions about the installation function as an introduction to the themes I will discuss with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s events. I claim that *The Robinson Institute* functions as a restrictive landscape. My aim with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s events is to look beyond what restricts our bodies and thoughts. I do not aim to build a clear connection between the study about *The Robinson Institute* and the other sites of encounter. Instead, *The Robinson Institute* is a prime mover for thinking about ruptures in the way things are commonly seen (Chapter 5) and narrations as performances to pose problems instead of giving answers and installing a position to the spectator (Chapter 6). Consequently, this chapter can be understood as loose comparison with the creative landscapes that I discuss later in this work.

4.2. The Robinson Institute as a restrictive landscape

Drawing from the findings in Article I, I aim to look at how certain landscapes seem to be more restrictive. By participating in *The Robinson Institute*, I found that it functioned as a story map (see also Caquard 2013; MacFarlane 2007) guiding the participant through Robinson’s reconstructed route. The route passes through the southern English landscape where Robinson encountered things which made him think about the relationship of global capitalism and environmental destruction. By the term story map, I refer to “the combination of mapping as a connective function and storytelling as a practice of experience fabrication which together generates circumstances for movements in time and space reconstructed” (Article II). In *The Robinson Institute*,
the practices of mapping and storytelling were combined in a way that the installation directed the spectator to experience ‘The Great Malady of Capitalism’.

In *The Robinson Institute*, the practice of mapping is applied in three different ways. Firstly, the installation includes maps, e.g. geological maps, a fuel pipeline map and a historical map. Secondly, the installation itself is laid out as a map. In other words, cartographical like techniques are imbedded in *The Robinson Institute* to make it function as a map. Although the installation does not contain non-ambiguous graphic symbols explained in a legend, it does contain ambitious figurative images, and the way the images are constellated in relation to each other does resemble cartographic techniques. The images are related by representational techniques which enables the spectator to interpret the sequence of images by reading the figures through the lenses of opposition, similitude, analogy, and identity. Thirdly, the installation works as a form of mapping which has the function of helping to solve a relational problem that is, finding the way between two different locations. In *The Robinson Institute*, the spectator is expected to follow the numbered sites in order from one to seven. Moreover, each site begins with an introductory text to the topic of the particular landscape encounter. In these seven sites, the objects, constellated in relation to each other with the assistance of the representational techniques, have a function. The spectator is transferred from one image to another with the aim of making sense of the events and the places on the map by connecting the figurative images.

The second practice of storytelling introduces the elements of time and experience to *The Robinson Institute*. With regard to experience fabrication, the installation artist is a storyteller who “has a capacity through psychological effects to integrate the story part to the listener’s experience, and to create a potentiality that the story will be repeated in future by someone else” (Article I, *no page numbers*; cf. Benjamin 1968/1992, 91). Thus, how storytelling and time relate, is the capacity to bring past events into a present moment. Here, *The Robinson Institute* is innovative in its capacity to relate many past events, where things have taken the wrong direction or when things could have proceeded differently, to the year 2008 when the scholar Robinson conducted his journey through the southern English landscape. The role of the storyteller is, however, not given to Robinson but embodied by the fictional institute researchers who have reconstructed Robinson’s landscape encounters. The spectator is, thus, directed to certain places and times by the researchers who apply the mapping means described in the previous chapter.

Consequently, *The Robinson Institute* laid out as story map functions as a restrictive landscape: it does not allow much space for free association but directs the spectator to feel in a righteous way about ‘The Great Malady of Capitalism’. Despite the installation seeming to assign a position to the spectator, art has a role beyond moral instruction which can be better understood by Robinson’s way of encountering the landscape by making painterly video footages mediating the stillness and continuation of the landscape. As I write:
“If The Robinson Institute as a whole narrates a clear message, in the film footages we can pause. However, what these reflections reveal is that perhaps the role of art is not to make better subjects by guiding us in a morally right direction but to do work through sensations, which arrive at different speeds and collide. The risk with sensations manifesting from art is that they can make our condition even worse. In spite of this, we do not need to turn into nihilists. Instead, we can understand art as a site has the potentiality to renew our thinking, not from outside, but at the surface where affective body encounters arise” (Article I).

4.1.1. Restrictive patterns of participation: where installation art and participatory planning meet

Before considering the concept of creative landscape, I want to pay attention to restrictive landscape by which I mean situations in which a spectator or a participant is directed into a determined position or pattern of action. In other words, attempt is made to make a person feel or to act in a certain manner in the world. By elaborating on the findings in Article I, I claim that installation art can indicate something about participatory processes in general. As installation art is constructed with the aim of producing certain effects on the spectator, the way installations are constructed may reveal observations about participatory processes in other fields, such as urban planning and research. In these fields it has been relevantly asked whether people should be made participants from above in the first place or should participation perhaps be made possible from below (Bäcklund et al. 2017, 7). Despite the means and aims differing, both the installation artist and the urban planner have a role of directing participation in a process, which I argue is in many cases closed affair.

I recognise that participation in planning is a problematic affair because planning is besides being controlled it is also protection from spontaneous actions of which all are not open and from below but some are aimed at maximizing profit (Rannila 2017, 197). Moreover, practices vary inside and cross public sectors (Bäcklund et al. 2017, 6), and thus, there must be different approaches to participatory planning inside the institutions as well. My aim is, thus, not to consider whether participation from below or above is better, only to ponder the logics behind patterned participation. I believe that the emancipatory potential found in installation art leads towards the promise of participatory processes in general. The emancipatory potential in installation art is described as a transitive relationship where the activated spectator becomes engaged in the social-political arena (Bishop 2005, 11). In the case of The Robinson Institute, the installation sets up a position from which the spectator can reflect on the destructiveness of late capitalism. In a similar manner as the installation art which aims to educate us to think right thoughts, participatory planning encourages people to become concerned citizens.
Installation art is a worthwhile site for geographic investigations because of the particular ways of configuring spectator bodies in relation to objects and spaces (see Hawkins 2010b, 323). There is a spatial difference between the terms ‘an installation of art’ and ‘installation art’ (Bishop 2005, 6). While an installation of art introduces the viewer to look at the objects in the space from a distance, installation art induces the viewer to participate in a multisensory way and literally with the work. In my work, I explore how the spectator is expected to participate in *The Robinson Institute*. I found that *The Robinson Institute* restricts participation by applying a numbered order, labels, informative texts and representational techniques (Article I).

In a similar manner to *The Robinson Institute*, which guides the participant in a planned order to a message, many participatory processes assign a certain role to the participant, which is to provide information for urban planning purposes, for instance. Although the aim is to provide information the formula for the participation is designed in advance. Consequently, participation follows a pre-determined pattern. This is contrary to genuine participation, which would allow surprising thoughts to arise in the encounter with the art work or a fundamental change in the planning situation which would bring participation beyond the participant’s commentary role.

Participation in installation art is a site for exploring the logics of participatory processes. Installation art exposes something relevant about the role of the spectator as participant. For the completion of the installation art the spectator is understood as an integral component (Reiss 1999, xiii). Diverse ways of participation in installation art have been recorded including directing the viewer through the space where objects are placed to be encountered, presenting the viewer with fictional landscapes, stimulating a particular sense, encouraging the spectator to perform a specific act varying from writing and recording to eating and drinking (Bishop 2005, 8; Reiss 1999, xiii). According to Bishop (2005, 10) “installation art presupposes a viewing subject who physically enters into the work to experience it, and that it is possible to categorize works of installation by the type of experience that they structure for the viewer”.

Previously, Hawkins (2010b, 327) has described an experience of a bodily encounter with Tomoko Takahashi’s installation; this is constellated from a mass of material objects as one were inside the frame instead of looking towards or into a frame. Hawkins exploration hints that here is not an activated subject as a whole but a fragmentary and an incomplete body in the process of individuating (Hawkins 2010b, 327). Despite the body being capable of being affected in many ways there might be restrictive patterns. If the installation described by Hawkins allows the body to become an insider, there are various ways of making installations. *The Robinson Institute* that I participated in consists of over 200 objects of which many are framed artworks such as paintings, drawings and photographs. Instead of the body being encouraged to immerse with the objects, the spectator is positioned in-front of the frames. Consequently, *The Robinson Institute* occasionally looks more like ‘an installation of art’ than an ‘installation art’.
What participation in a restrictive installation reveals about participatory processes in general is mainly concerned with predetermined patterns of action. This can be viewed, for example, in the participatory planning process which involves people to a certain extent. In the participatory planning process, the planner introduces master plans of a certain area to the participants. Participants, for their part, are expected to bring their local knowledge. In recent years, many new methods have been developed and applied to gather this information (Bäcklund et al. 2017; Rannila & Loivaranta 2015). Nevertheless, the pattern remains the same. Participation seldom starts from the scratch and the role of the participant is simply supportive. If the installation activated people to think and feel in a proper manner, participatory planning involves people producing information that will be filtered by the expert planner. For the purpose of considering restrictive landscapes, I have acted polemical here, although I do understand the spectrum of practices in both installation art and participatory planning is wide.
5. THE CREATIVE LANDSCAPE WITH BADIOU

5.1. Forewords

In this chapter I ask: How do movement and rest appear in Badiou’s (2005, 2009) event philosophy? What do these notions about movement and rest reveal about creativity? (RQ2) Furthermore, my aim is to formulate the creative landscape as a critical concept with Badiou’s event (RQ3) To answer these questions, I will review Badiou’s ideas and pause at points of interest by using the theatre and research cooperation (Article II) as the second site of encounter. Firstly, Badiou’s event philosophy is focused on the questions of how worlds come to exist and are sustained. Secondly, Badiou is interested in the radical change which is discussed through the concept of event, a rupture or an affirmative split which breaks a representative structure of the world also known as the state of situation. The potentiality for the event is in the non-representable void, or that which in an event surfaces to radically alter the world as it was known before.

Badiou’s event philosophy is a materialist dialectic. Badiou (2009, 4) himself claims “there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths” (ibid., 6). The theory aims to substitute democratic materialism, which according to Badiou has only the body of flesh and language in its focus. The underlying principle of the materialist dialectic is that there are many worlds and no universe: “it belongs to the essence of the world that there are several worlds, since if there were only one it would be the universe” (ibid., 102). Besides a plurality of worlds, a being co-belongs to different worlds. We humans, for example, belong to different worlds which can be understood as the situations we participate in.

Consequently, a truth exists as exceptions to the structure of worlds by interpolating itself into the continuity of the ‘there is’ (Badiou 2009, 5). This means that worlds are particular but time to time there exist truths as universals or generic multiplicities which “no linguistic predicate allows them to be discerned, no proposition can explicitly designate them” (ibid., 6). A truth originates from an event which take place in four realms: art, love, politics, and science. For Badiou, the universal truth has a singular activation procedure which is different in the four realms. What is common is the creativity of the procedure. The activation of a truth introduces a new egalitarian maxim in politics, new perceptual intensity in arts, a new existential intensity in love and new enlightenment in science (Badiou 2009, 79). To summarise, a world is ordered as a state of situation of particular knowledge. However, from time to time something ruptures making a site for an event which leaves its trace as a truth procedure to be activated.
To exemplify the potentiality of Badiou’s abstract thoughts for geography, the art and research project (Article II) is discussed further. By applying event philosophy and the landscape concept, the changing relations of the theatre and research workshop are discussed, and then the discussion is taken towards an event which ruptures the previous knowledge. Thus, landscape is applied in a wider sense than only the way of seeing land or a framed cultural and physical environment. I claim here that the particular theatre and research cooperation that tested drama as a means for urban planning is a world or mobile landscape. It can be understood through Badiou’s notion of an envelope which is a relation that connects disjuncted beings through a common element, in this case the theatre or drama.

I will in the following two sections of the next chapter, first examine the concept of movement through the logic of appearing
and then focus on the question of an event as a radical change. These sections introduce Badiou’s main concepts with an aim of setting the stage for a more detailed discussion about the event’s potential for thinking the creative landscape. Before looking at how this critical concept can be formulated and applied to understanding the changes that happen in seeing which happens through seeing with the intense elements of a mobile landscape, some words about Badiou’s ideas in general are worth recalling.

5.2. The main ideas in Badiou’s event philosophy

5.2.1. Becoming a world of the Yes in my backyard -theatre and research cooperation

With this section my aim is to look at the small changes (from Badiou’s perspective) that happen in a world which do not, however, necessarily rupture the underlying logics. This means that things remain in their relative positions. We continue life as usual; this is the becoming of a world, which is for Badiou the same as a situation without any radical change. To understand a world without a radical change, I will introduce some of Badiou’s (2009) main concepts (world, being and appearing, void/multiplicity, transcendental, relation and object) in this part which precedes the discussion about the rupturing event. I take as the starting point the Yes in my backyard! theatre and the research cooperation as a world. The aim is to look how the participants came to appear in the world and how it first seemed relatively stable. In

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2 In Badiou’s thinking the material basis of our worlds is founded on mathematical ontology and the logic of appearing, of which we need be aware of when discussing his thinking. However, I will not dwell on the mathematical ontology but examine the relation between ontology and logic in Badiou’s thinking. Badiou’s (2009) ideas enrich the discussion about what it means to look beyond actual relations (cf. Massey 2005; Anderson et al. 2012; Allen 2012) through a constitutive understanding about the difference between the ontology and the logic of appearing.
other words, it could have been a world without an event. Badiou’s ideas help to dismantle a situation into operations, which is useful for the purpose of taking a distance as a researcher to some situations.

A world for Badiou is a constellation of things that appear in relation to each other. It is a complete situation of being. A becoming of the world refers to the small changes that alter a situation. It is a process where worlds are created through this movement. A situation can be anything from a painting to a political gathering (ibid., 203–204). Or as in my example, the theatre and research workshops. In a more abstract sense, becoming of a world means that multiplicity is caught in the mathematical operation of being and the logical operation of appearing. Multiplicity which is inconsistent refers to the unpresentable void. It is the potential which is resting before it is caught in the movements of being and appearing. Void is also that which remains hidden as the unpresentable of every situation.

To understand the difference between being and appearing we can think of a human who in being receives the materiality of one’s corporeal body, and in this appearing says, acts and feels in a certain manner depending on the situation. Let me take an example from our workshops. The group of elderly women, were well aware of the urban planning procedure. However, the younger participants did not know how urban planning functions. Thus, the elderly women had to adjust their discussions in a way that the younger participants could also understand how urban planning was practiced, particularly in their neighborhood. Despite its materiality the body also has a history and an unknown future, which I claim can be understood with the underlying void.

What is crucial in Badiou’s (2009, 101–102, 118) thinking is that appearing happens on a transcendental which is nothing else than the underlying logics of a particular world. In my example, the transcendental is the operation which makes the beings part of the theatre and research cooperation as a world. The world was regulated by the logics of participatory planning/research and representational politics of multiculturalism. Badiou (ibid., 199) explains the difference between being and appearing with reference to an ontological eye which sees indistinctive multiples and a phenomenological eye which sees significant differences which locate the indistinct multiples in a world. Subsequently, how the beings appear depend on three operations: 1) minimum of appearance, 2) conjunction and 3) envelope (ibid., 103).

Defining the minimum of appearance is a categorical act where the techniques of identity and difference is applied. The first condition requires defining an identity or existence value which has to be over nil (Badiou 2009, 120). This is determined in relation to a non-apparent in a world (ibid., 105). Here, we could think about the city planners that we invited to our workshops, but who nevertheless did not participate. Moreover, identity is defined as that by which a being can be defined in relation to another being (ibid., 112–114). This condition involves that every being that appears
must be different in its identity from the others (ibid., 117). In practice, this means that if we look at a human body in its appearing, we can see that depending on the situation it can be differently constellated. What a body says, for example, depend on with whom it is speaking. Thus, something of the corporeal body remains outside the world, and in its appearing the being differs from itself (ibid. 117). We could also look at how the participants are different from one another in how they have previously experienced urban planning.

The second step of the transcendental is to define what two beings have in common so that they are related in the world they appear. Conjunction is the connectedness of appearances, in a way that it defines what two beings have in common so that they can appear in the same world. The two beings can be connected either in a way that one being is the identifying part of another being, or two beings are in a relation with a third, “which is the most evident (the ‘largest’) of that which they have a common reference to” (Badiou 2009, 125). The participants who appeared in the world of theatre and the research workshop were conjoined because they agreed to participate, they were corporeally present and shared the aim of acting solutions to the problems of the housing area. Disjoined beings were those who were not part of the theatre and research workshops. As the discussion below will show the disjoined beings were not only human bodies but also other material and immaterial things.

The third operation, the envelope has been compared to a horizon in a landscape that allows all things within to be considered together (Pluth 2013, 73). According to Badiou (2009, 132), it means that in a region of a world there is a superior appearance to all the other appearances of that world. This is due to the formulation between envelope as the synthesis, which is global and capable of infinity prevailing over conjunction as analysis, which is local and finite. The means of drama can be compared to Badiou’s notion of the envelope. In the world of the theatre and research workshop, beings also appeared who were disjoined. The disjoined beings that I am concerned with here were the stories that were told. Drama has the capacity to connect distant beings, and as I would like to claim absences. In the words of Badiou (ibid., 131), “what envelops them and turns them, for all time, into a bound moment of artistic semblance, a fascinating operatic fragment”. The stories were the absent noise which when brought to the workshops can be seen as beings of the world. Different stories were brought to the theatre and research workshop world and worked out through the scripting and playing the scene towards a solution. The research aim was to gather a group of people, participants living in the housing area and researchers not from the housing are into a clubroom. Subsequently, drama introduced means to bring the stories to life and work with what was narrated by the participants.

Accordingly, Badiou’s object is crucial for thinking about the different roles people (and other things) have inside worlds. From this perspective the interest is not in how the different corporeal bodies appear as individuals through their relationships but rather how they are grouped. This is because for Badiou (2009, 220–222) an object is
not a material thing but *the count as one* of the appearing (ibid., 211). This *count of one* is concerned with the relation between the *elements of being* (ontology) or in my example the corporeal bodies before they appear and the *components of appearing* (phenomenal) or the corporeal bodies when they appear as phenomenon in the world of the theatre and research workshops. According to Badiou, the object follows from the count where two distinct elements of a being both belong absolutely to the phenomenal component, and thus both elements are absolutely identical in the world (ibid., 214). For my example, the relevance of an object is that it helps to think of the group of participants as an unit. To detect the hard kernel of the participants, for example, we could add into the examination the group of dancing boys and the visitors who occasionally came to experience the workshop meeting. Taking into account these other ways of participating, we can see that properties like being present, sharing experiences in scripting and participating in acting are common to *the hard kernel* of participants.

In addition to the relations which situate an object in a particular world there are *intra-worldly relations* between objects. This relation is an oriented connection from an object of greater existential value towards another object. It is a tool applied to consider what happens between the objects. The concept of a *diagram of the world* is applied to discuss the logical completeness of a world through connectedness of objects and relations which are functions between the elements of two objects (Badiou 2009, 310). Here, we could look at the relations between the three objects of the world, the already mentioned participants, and the researchers and the applied drama/workshop instructor. Before the workshop period we interviewed the participants and asked about their personal histories and interest in urban planning. We also told them about the aims and content of the theatre workshop. By doing this we formed a relationship, an orientation from us to them. As a result, a triangular diagram is formed as there is a relation between two object in the world and a third object that is in relation to the first two. In our case, a relation to the director/workshop instructor was added to the initial relation between the participants and the researchers. These new relations are relations between the objects but also connected with the first relation. In our case, a relation to the director/workshop instructor was added to the initial relation between the participants and the researchers. These new relations are relations between the objects but also connected with the first relation.

A world is logically complete if the diagram remains commutative and therefore coherent. In other words, the logical completeness requires that a relation is ‘universally exposed’ which means that “given two distinct expositions of the same relation, there exists between the two exponents one and only one relation such that the diagram remains commutative” (Badiou 2009, 317). In our case, the problems of the housing area, which had been brought up in the interviews appeared again in the workshop, and became the common interest connecting the participants, the researchers, and the workshop instructor.
Although there is an object as a point of view from where the relations can be seen, it
does not mean a subjective position. It is only a foundation for the objective phenom-
enology. In terms of research, this would mean a certain distancing to the research
topic with the aim of looking at the categorical units and their relations. Consequently,
Badiou appears as a realist who takes into account the internal relations as well as the
external relations of the immanent opening (see also Sayer 2013). Here, Badiou’s ideas
differ from for example from the critical realism orientation which interprets relations
as always external to their terms (e.g. Manuel DeLanda 2006).

In the section above, I discussed the world the theatre and research workshop as a
world created through the modification of relations. Looking back, it first seemed that
the theatre and research cooperation was a world with no radical movement. By this I
mean, that the problems of the housing area were discussed by the means of theatre
inside the aim of testing theatre as a means for urban planning. The world of the the-
atre and research workshop can be understood as regulated by the logics of participa-
tory planning/research and representational politics of multiculturalism. The stories
that appeared in the workshop and were played out to obtain a solution altered but
did not change the logic of participatory planning. By this I mean that we were focused
on the problem and solution, but never touched the issue of the cycle of participatory
planning (see Bäcklund & Kanninen 2015; Bäcklund 2007). From this point of view
theatre and research workshop is an atonic world. Nevertheless, in what follows
and Article II, I have argued that a radical change or event took place. Thus, the world
of the theatre and research cooperation must also have been tense. It was tense with
regard to the question of representational politics of multiculturalism (e.g. Kymlicka
2012). It was a mobile landscape capable of introducing change – a creative landscape.

5.2.2. Event as a change in the world

The event is the potentiality for radical movement in Badiou’s (2009, 2005) thinking
which distances him from the realists. The event is conceptualised as a rare change
which cannot be thought, only named afterwards. It is a cut that is not the same as the
situation capable of altering through what Badiou calls modifications. The event is the
crucial movement with regard to creativity. As another kind of movement the event
requires “an exception to the laws of ontology as well as to the regulation of logical
consequences” (Badiou 2009, 360). Although Badiou’s thinking is built around the
event, there are some differences in his conceptualisations across his oeuvre. In the
Being and event first published in French in 1988 and translated into English in 2005,
the event emerges from the void at an evental site situated at the edge of the void. The
event, however, does not present something new but brings out that which was hidden
in the situation (Badiou 2003, 54). Accordingly, in the Logics of worlds published in
French in 2006 and translated into English in 2009, an event is equated with the site
itself. As a site the event “is capable of making exist in a world the proper inexistent
of the object that underlies the site” (Badiou 2009, 452). In this section, I will briefly
introduce the main facets of the event before moving forwards to the in-depth discussion about *the creative landscape* in a separate chapter.

For Badiou, the events take place in four *truth realms*: art, love, politics and science. The events are 1) love which is an encounter, 2) the scientific event is a new discovery, 3) the artistic event is avant-garde and 4) the political event a revolution. One of the main differences between the four is the number of involved bodies. While, for example, in love the event takes place between two bodies, the political event is the only one which is generic or common. The *fidelity* to an event which can be faithful, reactive or obscure defines the *subject of truth*. Badiou (2009, 4) describes truths as “incorporeal bodies, languages devoid of meaning, generic infinites, unconditioned supplements” suspended between the void and the pure event. Moreover, the *subject* is a relation between an event and a concrete body in the world; “between its composition and its effecuation” (ibid., 79). However, the *body* is not a corporeal body but “a composite element of the world fixed by the truth’s secret of the effects it produces” (ibid., 47). Although a subject is not a human experiencing subject but a set of formal operations, only humans can sustain the event.

Quentin Meillasoux (2011, 2) has summarised the rupturing nature of an event in relation to knowledge. The classification of the well-known is ruptured when “nothing in the situation allows us to classify under a list of facts”. Furthermore, Meillasoux writes that “the event is that multiple, which presenting itself, exhibits the inconsistency underlying all situations, and in flash throws into a panic, their constituted classification”. Despite the fact that Badiou and his followers concentrate on the many big and rare events, such as a political uprisings like the Paris Commune, geo-events of a hurricanes, or a meteor hit (see Shaw 2012, 613), I argue that there is space for also considering small events when we stretch ideas that are latent and hidden in Badiou’s writings (also de Vries 2016). This comes closest to the event realm of politics of/as research practice (cf. Dewsbury 2007). Consequently, my focus is on an event as a thought of the unknown. As Ling (2016, 9) who comments on Badiou writes about a real thought in action:

“while we are constantly surrounded by (and contribute to) various knowledges, it is only on very rare occasions that we experience real thought in action. For unlike knowledge, any and every instance of real thinking is, by its very nature, a fundamentally creative act – an act of invention that necessarily breaks with the status quo – and is to this effect radically subtracted from both knowledge and the state. In a word, to think and to create – truly, radically, and absolutely – are one and the same thing”.

In the workshops, a thought of the unknown ruptured the world of the theatre and research cooperation. Something previously unthought came to the surface as itself, a non-representable thought which was only afterwards named in the process of writing an academic article. According to Badiou we are dealing with an event when a mixture of
pure being and appearing take place. In other words, the multiple which usually supports
the objects comes to the surface of objectivity. Shaw (2010a, 439) explains a site’s evental
manifestation in a world as “a violation of the transcendental order: the non-represented
reveal their existence from the desert of inexistence”. In other words, the site

“… belongs to a situation but it is radically not included; hence it lies on the
edge of the void. The void is precisely that unplaceable point which rambles,
digresses, or swerves, according to the precepts of Epicurean atomic theory.
It is an unfixable point that wanders throughout the regime of representation
in a yet nonsensical form, that is, as a subtraction from the official count of
the state” (Constantinou 2009, 772).

Badiou (2009) describes the ontology of the event as a site through three properties:
the reflexivity of the multiplicity, the instantaneous revelation of the void and the figure
of the instant. The first property, the reflexivity of the site means that it is a multiplicity
that belongs to itself and has a maximal value of existence. For this to happen requires
a double role from the multiple where the multiple is first “objectivated by the tran-
scendental indexing of its elements”, and then “it (self-)objectivates, by figuring
among its own elements and by thus being caught up in the transcendental indexing
of which it is the ontological support” (ibid., 360). Secondly, the site momentarily can-
cels the “the gap between being and being-there”, and this instant reveals the void that
haunts multiplicities (ibid., 369). Consequently, the third property means that the site
is only a visitation or a figure of the instant that appears only to disappear. In the
workshop, the issue of representational politics of multiculturalism was occasionally
brought into the discussion. Nevertheless, this topic with its many tensions was not
properly solved by means of acting and scripting. Instead the problematics of repre-
sentational politics of multiculturalism circulated in the air as something ungraspable
which left a trace (of the event) as an inconvenience felt.

An event requires that a world is mobile. According to Badiou, worlds are either atonic
or tensed, though Badiou acknowledges that actually many worlds are neither-nor.
Atonic worlds refer to the worlds of democratic materialism and they lack points. The
atonic world is quiescent and homogenous in a way that “everything is organized and
everything is guaranteed” (2009, 420). This means that life is managed by curbing ex-
cesses. In contrast, the tensed worlds are worlds of points where every point is a key
moment of decision. These worlds are appearances of high intensity. The problem of
neither-nor is solved as follows: “between atony and tension, we wager our worlds,
according to opposite imperatives: to find peace within temp or to exceed, point by
point, that which in these worlds merely appear” (Badiou 2009, 424). In what follows,
I will elaborate on Badiou’s thoughts about the movement of an event which requires
that a world is tensed.

A becoming truth body depends on the points of the world. To illustrate this further,
Badiou (2009) considers Valéry’s poem, The Graveyard by the Sea as a world, a story
of an event and a creation of a body. Badiou summarises the poem as a world consisting of four objects: the sea, the sun, the dead and consciousness. Of these objects the three first are connected by relations universally exposed in the poem. This is an immobile world. In turn, the fourth is “the properly inexistent of the place” (ibid., 459). The event takes place when, “In the pure vanishing image of its ‘elusive foam’ the sea is abruptly revealed to be a site, which plunges into the furore of its own evaluation”. As a consequence of the event “the inexistent (consciousness, life) starts to exist maximally” (Badiou 2009, 459). That which turns from the in-existence to existence are the poet and the poem. Consequently, the body is a totality which the trace of the event gathers and mobilizes: “It is thus that the foam, the wave, the wind, the salt and the rocks themselves are required by the metamorphosis of the sea, the storm-event, whose trace is the vital upsurge of the poet and the poem” (ibid., 467).

What happened in the theatre and research workshop was an event that brought to the surface communication about and living with difference beyond the representational politics of multiculturalism. Here, we need to emphasise that this event happened to a corporeal body living in a nation state with a different history of migration than the major colonial powers. The inconveniences felt hardly left a trace that I articulated in Article II. After introducing Badiou’s main concepts in the two sections of this chapter, it is time to take a firmer grip on the concept of the creative landscape by elaborating on the findings in Article II.

5.3. The creative landscape with Badiou

5.3.1. Forewords

From the first perspective, the concept of creative landscape is applied in order to understand how seeing changes through seeing with a constellation of vivid elements in tension or a mobile landscape (Article II). By this I mean, that as a part of a landscape in motion a previous way of seeing can be ruptured. The illustrative example is my changing role as a researcher in the theatre and research project as part of a state of situation. In my example, the way of seeing is representational politics of multiculturalism practiced through an initial research plan. Subsequently, the constellation of vivid elements in tension was a coming together of the bodies traversed by past encounters and expectations of the unknown future. In the cooperation between theatre and research, there were the different bodies of the two researchers, the two directors, the participants - from young females with immigrant background to retired women, the research plan, methodology/methods, equipment, place and the time available. Following Badiou’s (2008, 194, 198) two theatres, it is possible to approach the elements as tensional conditions for an event taking place through the diagonal movement of the dialectic at play. In this section, the focus is on the tension of the elements,
and the dialectic of play, fostering cut in the previous knowledge, that is a *creative landscape*.

When art is part of the research constellation it has an important role in the way the research is carried out. Art as a part of a constellation has the capacity to make us more sensible to the affectivity of life. In my research, through the encounters in the world of the theatre and research workshop, I have moved towards the question of unpacking the representational politics of multiculturalism. Applying theatre as part of the constellation offers the means of scripting and playing out scripted scenes. Moreover, the means of theatre has the capacity to bring bodies in close contact (Article II; see also Rannila & Loivaranta 2015). The theatre and research workshop was a situation or a world concerned with the aim of testing drama as a means of participatory planning and whether drama could inspire those who usually do not participate in planning. In this case, the drama was tested in a pilot project as part of the wider knowledge framework of communicative planning and deliberative democracy (Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher 1999). The aim of the program in which our project belonged was to empower the inhabitants to become active participants through which the competitiveness of the neighborhood could be enhanced (Ministry of the Environment 2008, 5; Article II).

That which ordered my research choices inside this world was the representational politics of multiculturalism. In the workshops, my aim was to research the planning process through inter-cultural relations based on the representational politics of multiculturalism. I was interested in finding suburban bodies of different cultural backgrounds to perform inter-cultural relations in planning. However, my initial research interest as part of the representational state of the situation seemed to miss the nuances of life. If the bodies were brought together to manifest inter-cultural relations in urban planning, then the interviews with the participants, the scripting and acting out the solutions to the problems of the housing area, generated inconsistency with the initial aim (Article II).

The representational politics of multiculturalism manifested itself agonistically through different speech acts in the workshops. Agonistic pluralism (Mouffe 1999) in planning (Pløger 2004; Hillier 2003) has challenged deliberative democracy (Habermas 1979) based communicative planning that gathers people with the aim of producing rational argumentation leading to consensus between participants (Healey 2006; Flyvbjerg 2001). According to Habermas the aim is “an agreement that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness” (ibid., 3). In the agonistic pluralism a solution is not sought by repressing the conflictual relations through rational speech. Instead the potentially conflictual nature of the planning process is acknowledged. The solution to the inherent differing opinions is to work with contradictories through a set of respectful practices. In our theatre and
research workshops this kind of processual meaning making was recorded (Rannila & Loivaranta 2015).

Stretched to its full potential agonistic understanding highlights something more than the conflictual nature of problem solving inside a situation. In the context of an applied research project, we were working in an institutional framework with the aim of testing theatre as participatory planning method. Thus, the conflictual nature of the problem solving was eventually directed towards this aim. There also remained unsolved issues which generated a rupturing event. In the theatre and research workshop the problematics of multiculturalism was encountered in scripting but could not be solved. Moreover, the planning situation in the housing area itself was not problematised, although it was a concern of some participants. In a study about Danish regeneration project with an aim of empowering the residents, John Pløger (2004, 81) has argued that “changing processes will not change the rules of the game itself or give citizens the opportunity to question existing planning discourses, the system of power, the form of political governance or the form of democracy”.

Instead, the full potential in agonistic pluralism is concerned with the edge of the situation. As Chantal Mouffe (2005/2009, 105) claims, “An ‘agonistic’ approach acknowledges the real nature of its frontiers and the forms of exclusion that they entail, instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality”. According to Mouffe, contestation which keeps democracy alive requires making room for dissent and abandoning “the very idea that there could ever be a time in which would cease to be necessary because the society is now ‘well-ordered’” (ibid., 105). Mouffe’s words foster questions regarding the status of participatory planning. If a planning situation would be agonistic would there not be the potentiality for reconsidering the modes of the planning procedure itself? What could theatre bring if it was applied in a real participatory planning situation? Would the means of drama be merely instrumentalised to a method through a strict formula or would there be potentiality for border crossings if something unexpected occurred? As our workshop were not real planning situations, these questions about the potentials and problems of participatory planning are out of the scope of this research (see Legacy 2017). As an alternative, I have viewed the rupturing potential of theatre and research cooperation in a more detailed manner through the changes in my role as a researcher.

5.3.2. The creative landscape: from ruptures to a cut

The first approach to the creative landscape presented in this work is formulated with Badiou. I claim that the creative landscape is a rupture in seeing which happens through seeing with the intense elements of a mobile landscape. Although we purposely situate ourselves with our research subjects, it may occur that through the process, or the mobile landscape, we find ourselves in an unexpected position. With the example of the change that happened in previous knowledge as a consequence of the
inconveniences felt in the theatre and research workshops, I argue for the critical concept of the creative landscape. In the Article II, I based the claim on the mobile and the creative landscapes on a methodological discussion on Badiou’s two theatres which is worth considering as a means of seeing radical changes through seeing with. Ruptures in seeing which leads to a cut is an event in the way Badiou describes it. However, an attempt to describe the event which happened in the theatre and research workshops is impossible. There is only the vagueness of the life of the different bodies sensed without being able to situate it inside the multicultural framework.

According to Badiou, the art of theatre is closest to the realm of politics. Badiou (2008) discusses theatre’s potential in the Rhapsody for theatre that deals with two theatres, the false theatre of the state and the true theatre capable of politics. This means that in the first condition, theatre is a ritual practice, and in the second, theatre is seen as capable of rupturing the prevailing order. In the theatre, the disrupting event can happen to one body, contrary to politics which requires many bodies. Although theatre cannot change the situation, as it happens in the realm of politics, it can touch the spectator in an unexpected manner. The spectator is like the subject of politics “formed from an event that occupies a position that permits it to see from beyond the structure of the situation” (Trott 2011). Furthermore, under certain conditions “theatre makes it known to you that you will not be able innocently to remain in your place” (Badiou 2008, 199). I have applied the idea of two theatres in the discussion about the theatre and research cooperation to understand how a researcher might become a spectator wanting to leave one’s seat (Article II).

I have formulated the concept of mobile landscape with reference to the difference between the two theatres (Article II). In the first notion there are analytical elements, and in the second, these elements are in correlation with dialectic elements. In research, I have found that the analytic elements could be the researcher(s), the research participants, the research plan, the methodology/methods, the equipment, and the place and time available. When these are not only identified as elements but understood as affecting each other they are renamed as conditions (Badiou 2008, 198). Furthermore, the elements in tension form a mobile landscape which needs to be seen in correlation with the three stages of dialectic at play. These three stages are (1) theatre as an affair of state, “situation of representation”, lacks politics, and theatre as art “undoes the bonds of political desire; (2), theatre as “the ethics of play” puts value on the stage to be tested and ruptures might occur; and (3), the theatre as affecting at least one spectator (Badiou 2008, 195).

How I as a researcher changed from a voyeur to an activist and further to a spectator can be understood through the correlation of the mobile landscape and the dialectic at play. In this case, the State or the situation of representation refers to my initial research focus on the intercultural relations in the multicultural housing area. My research interest was inside a wider framework of representational multicultural politics
(Kymlicka 2012) and the academic discussion about multicultural everyday encounters (Dirksmeier et al. 2014; Lobo 2014; Wise & Velayutham 2009; Clayton 2009; List-terborn 2007; Amin 2002), living with difference (Valentine & Sadgrove 2014; Valent-ine 2008) and hospitality towards the other (Barnett 2005). With the voyeur position I mean that I entered as an outsider to a different everyday environment from my own life. When a researcher enters through a project to an unfamiliar housing area, how could one be something else than a voyeur expecting to become acquainted with the Other?

Due to this, the ethics of play or provocation of the presentation refers to the process of an attempt to script multiculturalism, and my own position in the theatre and research workshops during the three-week period. At this point, I became an activist wanting to promote good inter-cultural relations in the housing area. This happened when I produced video material outside the workshops for the final play constellated from the plays scripted and acted in the workshops (Figure 2). As we merely discussed the issue of multiculturalism in the housing area, and did not make it into a play during the workshops, I felt frustrated. As I considered an important part was left outside, I conducted an interview with a local cafe owner about the inter-cultural relations in the housing area. Moreover, I was involved in an attempt to present the neighborhood in a positive manner through an image of a participative and active immigrant. However, we need to understand that what I am describing here, is a simplification of what took place in the short and intensive workshop period.

FIGURE 2. In the workshops we were told about problems such as how it feels to meet a drunken person in the neighbourhood or how to solve disagreements in an apartment building. Solutions were sought by acting out the stories. (Source: Author)

The last part of the dialectic at play is the spectator who is the possible supporter of truth but as such can also be the site for a rupturing event (Badiou 2008, 194). If the spectator is shaken out of his/her seat, a creative thought is generated. Somewhere, after the intense workshop period, the representational politics of multiculturalism
started to rupture my thinking. Previously, I had thought that good intercultural relations could be promoted through a mutual learning from people with different cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, the aim was emphasise the two-way process of immigrant integration. The naive idea was to find what an immigrant can bring to Finnish society, and how this can improve the common ground.

What happened can only be understood in the way in which “theatre distances the State it shows because this showing is informed, put into form, on the basis of the State itself” (Badiou 2008, 205). I could have resorted to an intersectional approach where people are seen to have not only one identity but a human being is altered due to intersecting identities of e.g. race/ethnicity, gender, and age (Valentine 2007). But how could one ever divide a body into different sections, and describe an encounter between the different bodies of for example of a basket playing teenage girl attending a traditional Kosovan tea ceremony, a young Somali young woman without scarf who moved a while ago from London to Turku, a retired child minder, a retired Caribbean cruise ship worker, and a community activist with traveling sales man background, amongst others. Because I was not able to locate all the different aspects of the body, I could only see the body as a multiplicity encountering other multiplicities. Without being able to know the elements of the multiplicity, I was only able to have a vague sense of how they were constellated or appeared in the theatre and research workshops as a world.

5.3.3. The creative landscape: the possibility of an orientation in time through distancing?

The inconveniences felt can be understood with what Badiou calls the impasse of thought. According to Badiou (2008, 197) this happens when the correlation of the mobile landscape (my interpretation of the elements in tension) and the dialectic at play pronounces “itself about itself and about the world” and the examination of this double relation leads the spectator of a knot in thinking. In my example, the impasse of thought was the impossibility of locating the bodies inside the representational politics of multiculturalism. Furthermore, the inconvenience was the wider context of neoliberalism in Finland reaching its tentacles through the aim of the competitive neighbourhoods of some participative individuals (Article II; see also Hytönen 2016; Ahlqvist & Moisio 2014). The impasse of thought was both a shift beyond the situation, and a motion creating the need to say something about the situation, as well as a notion about generic humanity.

Badiou (2003, 8) compares the impasse of thought to grey black which is the possible space of all movement. The grey black of being is between multiple being, which is in-existence for language, and an existence of which it is possible to speak. It is the place of being “fictionalised as a black that is grey enough to be anti-dialectical, separated from all contradiction with light. The grey black is a black that must be grasped in its
own arrangement arid which does not form a pair with anything else” (Badiou 2003, 6). The grey black of the situation produces a sudden exception, but the problem is how to explain this awakening of thought (Badiou 2003, 59). This is due to the reason that “the one for whom there is the grey black and the unsayable presence does not stop reflecting and articulating both the localisation and its impasse” (ibid. 9).

The becoming of the spectator is a topological relation of time referring to the localising machine capable of telling us where we are in history through tying together eternity, the instant and time (Badiou 2008, 229). Badiou (2003, 2008) discusses these three with examples from theatre but these can be applied to an understanding of our ways of relating to the worlds we participate in. In theatre, eternity is the figure’s capacity to exist at any moment (Badiou 2008, 229). This refers to the generic humanity reduced to its indestructible functions of going, being and saying, based on Samuel Beckett’s methodological ascesis (Badiou 2003, 45). According to Badiou (2003, 4), the aim for Beckett was to subtract the figure of humanity from its distractions. The generic humanity is described through three functions: movement and rest which refer to movement outside the perceptible surfaces, that is, mobility indiscernible from immobility; being, that is, “what there is, the places, the appearances, as well as the vacillation of any identity whatsoever”; and language which refers to the imperative to speak presupposing the impossibility of silence (Badiou 2003, 45).

In language, the inseparability of movement and rest is “a strange mix of the deceleration of prose and the acceleration of its dispersal”. That is to say, when the prose is exhausted it returns to a point of movement (Badiou 2003, 45). I have described the representational politics of multiculturalism exhausted through the speech acts of the participants (Article 1, 6–7). The speech acts are seen as repeating the state of situation but also generating an undefinable inconvenience or tension as part of the world of the theatre and research workshop seen as a mobile landscape. The exhausted prose of multiculturalism and its acceleration in the context of the elements in motion, too much of life, stories of the past and present lives of participants, and micro gestures not touched by the situation, left more questions than gave answers.

Badiou (2008, 230) finds a solution to the impasse of thought in the instant as the moment of elucidation of the representational state of situation which orients us in time. In other words, the instant introduces “a “cut” in time, in the obscure thickness in which we are situated”. When this happens, we can distance ourselves from those things directing our actions and thoughts. The relationship between the impasse of thought and the instant resonates with David Bissell’s (2011, 2662) words about reflective thought: “in the absence of a sovereign wilful body that commands reflective thought, these modes of contemplative thinking might be better understood as the aftershocks…” In my research, the orientation in time was the need to write about the problematics of the representational politics of multiculturalism. The main problem with the representational politics of multiculturalism is the multiple reality which
is controversial with the societal ideal of a nation state (Saukkonen 2013, 12). Although the nation state accepts difference, it must be manageable.

“The nation state integrates the ethnic minorities through legal means, and ways to participate in Finnish society are taught through different projects. The controversy is that although multicultural policies have given positive rights to different minorities, as a result the minorities are marked as the other in the context of nation states” (Article 1, 13).

Thus, regardless of the chosen framework, multiculturalism presents itself as the inclusive exclusion of life (Prozorov 2014, p. 952) or as Badiou (2001, 25) claims: “Become like me and I will respect your difference”.

Despite Badiou’s rich conceptualisation about change in the world through an event that transgresses the laws of existence, it left many questions regarding the transformation of a human body and the nuances of life. The notions about the traces of bodies and the inconceivability of locating bodies inside the categories that I had encountered in the theatre and research project left me with an uncertainty as to how to proceed. In other words, I could not find any answers by continuing with sets and the logic of being-there on the transcendental. Moreover, although Badiou was able to fulfill the need to understand how something previously thought can be ruptured, his thinking did not feel sufficient with regard to the question of time in the process. In other words, as Badiou focuses on the event and its trace, he did not give any answer to how something from the past is involved in the event itself, and how this influences the future. As I could not go further with Badiou, his contemporary Deleuze became a second entry of interest. At this point, I turned from the topic of unpacking the representational politics of multiculturalism to go beyond categorical thinking per se by indulging in experimental research with visual practices.
6. THE CREATIVE LANDSCAPE WITH DELEUZE

6.1. Forewords

“A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity. We call longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and slowness, of momentum and rest, between particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between unformed elements. We call latitude the set of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous force (force for existing, capacity for being affected). In this way we construct the map of the body. The longitudes and latitudes together constitute Nature, the plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is constantly being altered, composed and recomposed by individuals and collectivities” (Deleuze 1970/1988, 127–128).

In this section I ask: How do movement and rest appear in Deleuze’s event philosophy? What do these notions about movement and rest reveal about creativity? (RQ2)? How can we formulate a creative landscape as a critical concept with Deleuze’s event (RQ3)? To answer these questions, I elucidate Deleuze’s ideas and pause at particular points of interest by using the laser scanned chimeric point clouds (Article III) and urban photography (Article IV and photo-book IV) as examples. I discuss the small alterations which change our bodies with Deleuze’s event. From the second perspective, the concept of creative landscape is applied to understand how seeing changes as the surface event of sense (as mobile present) which connects the non-representable sensations (Article III).

In Article IV, glass architecture was the site of an encounter with the representational and affective ways of seeing animated by Nietzsche’s (1995) ideas about Apollonian and Dionysian artistic impulses. By adding (see also Kingsbury & Jones 2009) Deleuze’s observations to the discussion about Dionysos and Ariadne, the daughter of King Minos, I moved towards the surface event of sense (see also Article IIII). I argued that “As Apollonian, the glass city looks at its own mirror image: perceives, separates, and classifies. Thus, the Apollonian realm of art is helpful in the process of encountering things that seem more static, or the representational landscapes of common sense” (Article IV, 274). Subsequently, Dionysus as the intoxicating music or light is ramified in all directions: “As the clear glass surface is not merely reflective but also a permeable border, we need the Dionysian impulse along with the Apollonian. At the site of glass architecture, light plays tricks with the materialities of the site, and the inner and outer movements mesh on the surface of the glass” (Article IV, 276). The Apollonian alone stands for a world of identities and the Dionysian for the unsatisfied feelings or sensations. In addition, the play of the deities, as what happens on
the glass surface when the inner and outer activities intermingle, and is a site for considering questions of the changing and relational nature of identity.

However, the second entrance of Dionysus extends the discussion to the surface event of sense which introduces individuation where identity is only the possibility. According to Deleuze (1962/2002, 188), Nietzsche’s presentation about a love affair between Dionysus and Ariadne addresses affirmation as “the enjoyment and play of its own difference”. This appears as Deleuze’s first entry, the surface event of sense, which he (see Deleuze 1969/1990) later formulates. Dionysus alone as the unsatisfied feeling is only a continuous becoming or affectivity of life. In an encounter with Apollo, Dionysus receives an identity. Whereas with Ariadne Dionysus becomes a double without resemblance: “Interpreted through glass surfaces, the things brought from a distance by the work of light reveal themselves transformed at the site of glass architecture. Thus, the things do not appear as they once were but are altered in relation to the materialities at the site” (Article IV, 278).

This leads us to the notion of a human beyond a completely rational subject or a person with an identity. Or as Dragos Simandan (2017, 504) claims “there is no immaterial, eternal ‘me’, that there is no driver in the driver’s seat” (see also Woodward 2016, 344). In other words, I am not forming relations with a significant Other but I am becoming the other. The focus is on how the human body alters in relation to material objects and materiality as an interrogative force or vibrant relation. This strand of thinking suggests that we are human bodies made of parts – brain, cells, skin – also bodies themselves. Although being a human body as a constellation of parts, we are through material connections capable of becoming other – cameras, cats and coffee machines. The human body here is not the body of a fixed class, gender or racial identity (Saldanha 2012a, b, 2006; Saldanha & Adams 2012), neither a body of shifting identities (Spivak 1999; Hall 1996; Bhabha 1994), nor a body performing its gender or other categorical identity (Butler 1993, 1990). Instead, bodies are divergent constellations. Thus, my work continues a machinic geography of bodies that focus on the “immanent connections they (bodies) forge with things and places, how they work, travel, fight, write, love – how these bodies become viscous, slow down, get into certain habits, into certain collectivities, like city, social stratum, or racial formation” (Saldanha 2006, 19).

Here, the interest is on how bodies are differentiated or that which happens beyond embodiment or an actual state of situation – when a body is not acting, conceiving, feeling, perceiving. To elaborate this, I focus on Deleuze’s event with the concepts of sensation and sense. Of these two, sensation is a problem and sense is a proposition. The problem is defined as a singular point and the proposition as an aleatory point which refers to a mobile element. Furthermore, Deleuze discusses the event with his other key terms actuality, counter-actualization, and virtuality. Actuality is an embodiment of an event. Virtuality is the event, the potentiality of a body and a constant
variation. The counter-actualization refers to sense as a surface event making virtuality and actuality two connected sides. It is also defined as crystallization or individualisation understood as a process (Deleuze 1977/1987, 150). Overall, the event refers to the creative potential of life to extend beyond what there already is, or what is thought in a given situation.

As we can see from the above, in Deleuze’s event philosophy there are actually two events: the event and the Event. The first is the singular becoming, and the second is the differential structure of life that collects and relates all the singular events. Or as Deleuze (1969/1990, 53) himself puts it: “If the singularities are veritable events, they communicate in one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformation form a history”. When this is taken into the context of the human body, history can be conceptualised as the altering film of our lives. Collins English Dictionary defines film as both a verb and a noun, as a noun it is both a sequence of images and a permeable layer. Film is a haze and a gauzy web of filaments. To understand how the film of our lives is made we need to look at what it means to live as a body that is not in the world but becomes with the world through contemplating it. The film receives its nuances from the events that traverse the body and history is made in the surface event of sense.

In what follows, I present the second approach to the creative landscape through different sites of encounters, those which trigger the play of sensations and sense as the surface event. Furthermore, the focus is now placed on how an encounter generates sensations which become objects of the virtual, and thus potentially unfolded at future sites and assembled with new sensations. Landscape is the mobile image which is never present or only present as a representation. At the artificially bordered moment of saying now it has come, the present is detached from the fluidity of life and becomes an immobile object. In other words, “if you remain with what is represented, it’s an immobile bicycle, or a mountain, it’s a car or a man, which travels through a space” (Deleuze & Muhan, 1998, 53). The creativity of a landscape refers to a future orientation which nevertheless draws from the past.

After formulating the creative landscape with Deleuze’s event philosophy (Article III), I will continue with the discussion on the body, the camera, and city materialities (Article IV) and extend it to the materialities of making a photo-book (Photo-book V) by unpacking Deleuze’s movement-image and time-image (cf. Lapworth 2016; Clarke & Doel 2007). The aim is to explore the differences between Deleuze’s two cinematic images for the purpose of thinking of urban photography as a planned action and sensuous process which gives rise to an artistic image and to my body becoming an artist. The concepts of movement-image and time-image were presented in the two volumes Cinema I and Cinema II where Deleuze studied movement with pre-and post-second world war cinematic images in relation to e.g. Henri Bergson’s and Charles Peirce’s ideas.
Following Deleuze’s cinematic images, I attempt to describe how a body of flesh and a camera function together and how this action is situated and also prone to chance (see also Haraway 1991). The questions concerning why one grabs a camera as part of a wider age of networked cameras (Lehmuskallio 2012) and how images other than photographs come into being in manifold ways are answered elsewhere (Mitchell, W. J. T. 1986, 1994b). It is not a question of total control over the equipment as a photographic gaze is (Lury 1998), but more like a situation of different movements of the body because images do not exist on a screen or in a head but happen (Belting 2005, 302–303). I will exemplify these ideas through two urban photography projects: *All is it – the materialities of River Aura* (V) and *Drawing OntoSky* (Article IV).

From the creative landscape as the surface event, I continue to the site of artistic creation which I call the *fabulative landscape*. I discuss how a creative thought crops up and finds it expression in a work of art (Article IV). If the intervention of memory touches the materiality of life, art appeals to pure thought which is an image as a collection of time-relations which introduces us to the nonmaterial signs of art (Deleuze & Muhan 1998, 53; Deleuze 1964/2000, 39-40). In practice, this means that an artistic work collects many encounters. When the encounters condensate, and an object of encounter forces us to think, a new image is generated. I have argued that this happened in the process of making the urban photography project *Drawing OntoSky* (Article IV).

6.2. How can we think of the creative landscape with Deleuze’s two events

6.2.1. The sparking sensations of affects and percepts

The event as a sensation is a change in intensity. It is also described as a singularity or a set of singularities which are “turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and joy, sickness, and health, hope and anxiety, ‘sensitive points’” (Deleuze 1969/1990, 52). The sensations as changes in intensities do not belong to the body but have the capacity to alter the body. Moreover, the event as sensation refers to both an affect and a percept. The first, an affect is described by Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994, 169) as the non-human becoming of man. Following these thinkers, Ola Ståhl (2016, 225) has appropriately claimed that “An affect is not a rare, unexpected event. It is the stuff of life”. Or as Keith Woodward (2011, 328) put it affect extends beyond the human and refers to “a general condition for material life”. This is the main distinction which differentiates Deleuze’s event from Badiou’s rare rupture or cut. The second, a percept is a-nonhuman way of seeing that might, however, influence the body of flesh into becoming other (Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 169).
The first of the two sensations, the affect is commonly understood as the combination of Spinoza’s *affectus* and *affection* (Anderson, 2006, 735), although also formulated through i.e. Neo-Darwinism and psychoanalysis (Anderson, 2014; Thrift 2004b, 2008, 175–182). According to Thrift (2008, 175) what connects different understandings of the affect is that it is defined as an indirect and a non-reflexive form of thinking. This means that the affect is an intelligence about the world which is different from representational thinking (see also Woodward 2011, 340). Furthermore, Thrift (2008, 175) claims that “previous attempts to either relegate affect to the irrational or raise it up to the level of the sublime are both equally mistaken”.

Occasionally, the affect has also been described clinically as a half second delay between stimulus and action (Massumi 1995, 89). This notion is based particularly on an experiment where cortical electrodes were implemented and impulses sent to these and some points on the skin of the patients, the stimulation was felt when it lasted more than half a second (ibid., 89). The half-second delay supports the notion of an affect as the event, a sensation that is outside the conscious and linear chain of actions. To understand affect as more-than a clinical concept, Deleuze’s discussion on the affect in Spinoza must be accompanied with Deleuze’s notions of time and virtuality in Bergson, and Nietzsche’s artistic impulses. Affect in Deleuze’s meaning also draws from Gilbert Simondon’s ideas (cf. Woodward 2014b). Taking into account the various influences behind Deleuze’s event (Article III and IV), introduces new insights into the rich discussion of time, space and movement in geography (cf. Merriman 2017, 2016, 2015; Kwan & Schwanen 2016; Cresswell 2014b, 2012, 2010) with the landscape concept.

1 There is a long and rich discussion about time-space/space-time/timespace (e.g. Crang 2012; Thrift 2006; Massey 2005; May & Thrift 2001; Harvey 1996; 1982; Parkes & Thrift 1980; Hägerstrand 1989, 1982, 1970) and movement-space (e.g. Kwan & Schwanen 2016; Cresswell 2011, 2012, 2014; Merriman 2012, 2015). Time was most influentially introduced into geography by Torsten Hägerstrand whose aim was to bring people to regional science by focusing on human movements instead of locational dimension of human activities (see also Thrift 1977a,b). In his time-geography, Hägerstrand (1970, 10) brought time and space together by arguing that people form from birth to death paths in space-time. These paths consist of prisms of space-time. Hägerstrand’s time geography has influenced many, among others the behavioural geography of Pred (1981), the humanist geography of Buttertimer (1976) and the phenomenological geography of Seamon (1979). While some have reworked it to take account of gender, emotional, and mental aspects (e.g. Gadd 2016; McQuoid & Dijst 2013), others have moved towards the work of, amongst others, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis (Schwanen et al. 2012; Edensor & Holloway 2008) and Bergson’s dimensions of time, often through Deleuze’s writings (Massey 2005; Crang 2010). In my work, I have taken in to account Deleuze’s notions about Henri Bergson’s passive synthesis of time, and the two readings of time Aion and Chronos.

One influential time-geographical formulation was written by Doreen Massey (2005) who argued that space and time are interwoven. Massey’s focus was on the fundamental inter-relatedness of trajectories or stories, transforming the scale of crossing paths from local to global. In this relational understanding of time-spaces, “If time presents us with the opportunities of change and (as some would see it) the terror of death, then space presents us with the social in the widest sense: the challenge of our constitutive interrelatedness” (Massey 2005, p. 195). Massey (2005, 12) argued that space needs to conceptualized open so that the future can be open. The openness is in the relations which are not relations of a closed system where everything relates to everything else but the possibility of forming relations between entities/identities themselves as processes (2005, 11). Occasionally, movement-spaces have challenged space-time and timespace (Thrift 2004; Manning 2009; Merriman 2012). Nigel Thrift (2004) is known for the conceptualisation of the spaces of fluid forces which he approached in the context of the developments in computing power.
Deleuze himself is strict that Spinoza’s concepts of affect and affection are separate, yet interrelated. Moreover, the affect alone is two: a capacity of a body, and a zone of indeterminacy. Of the affect and affection, “L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (Massumi 2011, xvi). According to Keith Woodward (2011, 337) this means “affect not only highlights the potential openness to the world of everybody, it also reminds us of the real specificity of the limitations of each body”. “L’affection (Spinoza’s affection) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body” (ibid.). According to Thrift (2008, 178), for Spinoza the manifold psychology of the human body is con-
stantly modified by various encounters. These encounters are the potentiality for relations between the bodies being formed. The relations define how the body changes through the encounter.

In other words, the affect is an intensive passage where the body’s capacity to act changes in an encounter, that is, when the relations of a body meet the relations of another body. In practice this means,

“When I have an encounter such that the relation of the body which modifies me, which acts on me, is combined with my own relation, with the characteristic relation of my own body, what happens? I would say that my power of acting is increased; at least it is increased with regard to this particular relation. When on the contrary I have an encounter such that the characteristic relation of the body which modifies me compromises or destroys one of my relations, or my characteristic relation, I would say that my power of acting is diminished or even destroyed. We rediscover here our two fundamental affects or affectus: sadness and joy” (Deleuze 1978).

As a relation is always external to its terms, an encounter is not devoid of history. Although the affect is impersonal, it is singular and can enter into conjunctions with other affects. Consequently, an encounter that has decreased a body’s capacity to act previously, could increase the body’s capacity to act much later on in a different encounter.

What then is a percept is a more complicated and less discussed question. Nevertheless, it seems that what I am pursuing in this thesis is an understanding of the affect and the percept as equally important sensations. If the affect is that which makes the body become stronger or weaker, the percept is the landscape before man. The percept refers to the enigma of Cezanne, that is, “man absent from but entirely within the landscape” (Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 169).

“Characters can only exist, and the author can only create them, because they do not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations…Ahab really does have perceptions of the sea, but only because he has entered into a relationship with Moby Dick that makes him a becoming-whale and forms a compound of sensations that no longer needs anyone: ocean. It is Mrs. Dalloway who perceives the town—but because she has passed into the town like ‘a knife through everything’ and becomes imperceptible herself” (ibid., 169).

Nevertheless, what Deleuze together with Guattari propose, is that the percept as the landscape before man, is not a natural/cultural landscape in its traditional meaning. This means losing oneself and a possibility to see with some else’s eyes in a process of becoming-other. Or as Wylie (2005, 236) defines “a percept is a style of visibility, of
being-visible, a configuration of light and matter that exceeds, enters into, and ranges over the perceptions of a subject who sees”.

6.2.2. The creative landscape as the surface event of sense

My second approach to the creative landscape is based on the surface event of sense. While the post-Deleuzian theory has focused on the affect, sense has gained less attention. According to Claire Colebrook (2004) the emphasis on the affect omits the affirmative understanding of the sense. The relation between the affect (and the percept) and sense is that the affect reveals itself as the surface event. Consequently, I claim that the creative landscape is always the surface event of sense as a mobile present which connects the non-representable sensations. This is the ambiguity of life which resonated with the noise in my laser scanned data or the chimeric point clouds (Article III). What is special about the chimeric point clouds is that in the digital environment, where the data is post-processed, they do not make a figure resembling the laser scanned object. The chimeric point clouds can, thus, be seen as doubles without resemblance (Deleuze 1969/1990, 315). How the chimeric point cloud supports us in the exploration of the surface event in Deleuze, is through its non-representable figure which stretches the present simultaneously in the directions of the past and the future.

Sense is a proposition along with denotation, manifestation and signification (Deleuze 1969/1990, 14–16). Nevertheless, sense is different from the three which form a circle of individuated, personified and signified. To understand the particularity of sense we can first consider the three propositions in relation to the representational laser scanned point clouds of (Article III). The first, denotation refers to the relation between the proposition and an external state of affairs. In the production of the 3D visualisation, for example, the first proposition is made visible through the relatively stable objects such as buildings, benches, riverboats, and other fixed materialities. In this process, the landscape is seized through the digital environment of augmented reality.

The second proposition, manifestation, refers to personification. In my example, personification happens when the objects in the 3D visualisation are identified as landscape objects. The objects receive an identity in the digital environment. The third, signification, is the relation of the propositions to universal or general concepts. It is a form of possibility. Something which has been identified receives a purpose, a value and a direction. The point clouds personified as landscape objects, for example, receive a function. As I claim, “For example, the Aura Rivers Cultural Environment represents the values of current times, and for the purpose of developing this valued environment, the point cloud can be put into use” (Article III, 136).

In contrast to the three which form the closed circle, sense is different. The first condition is that sense does not exist outside the proposition which expresses it. A second condition is that, sense does not merge with the proposition. In the chimeric point
cloud, we see this: “The chimeric point cloud simultaneously exposes the past situation, and is, through the nonrepresentative figure, already moving forward” (Article III, 134). The sense as formulated by Deleuze (1969/1990) is, thus, somewhat similar to the being of sensation or bloc of percepts and affects conceptualised over 20 years later by Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994, 178)

“as the unity or reversibility of feeling and felt, their intimate intermingling like hands clasped together: it is the flesh that, at the same time, is freed from the lived body, the perceived world, and the intentionality of one toward the other that is still too tied to experience; whereas flesh gives us the being of sensation and bears the original opinion distinct from the judgment of experience-flesh of the world and flesh of the body that are exchanged as correlates, ideal coincidence”.

This means that an event has its own being as a surface event. This being is neither individual nor personal but unconscious where the singularities occur and “possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness” (Deleuze 1969/1990, 102). Consequently, sense as a surface event or the Event connects the singular events of sensations. It is also described as metamorphose or redistribution of singularities which form a history. It is the movement of counter-actualisation which is an art of establishing continuity or “the simultaneously participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual” (Massumi 1995, 96).

The chimeric point cloud reveals something noteworthy of the ongoing change of our worlds. Their ramifying presence in the digital environment provokes thinking about the sense as a mobile present. This can be understood with Deleuze’s (1969/1990) discussion about time with regard to two presents which were given the names of the Hellenistic deities: Aion and Chronos. Of these Aion articulates the present as a mobile element or pure operation, and Chronos the present as a temporality with the past and future as its dimensions, an incorporation (ibid., 168). Chronos as the present “measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth”, whereas Aion is “the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effect” (Deleuze 1969/1990, 61). In other words, Aion essentially refers to the sense.

What is crucial is that the two readings of time exclude each other:

“Sometimes it will be said that only the present exists; that it absorbs or contracts in itself the past and future, and that from contraction to contraction, with ever greater depth, it reaches the limits of the entire Universe and becomes a living cosmic present… Sometimes, on the other hand, it will be said
that only the past and future subsist, that they subdivide each present, ad infinitum…” (ibid., 61–62).

By this Deleuze means that Aion is both smaller than any imaginable subdivision of Chronos and bigger than any division of Chronos. When this is elaborated on with my example of the laser scanned point clouds, we see that the chimeric point cloud is an actualisation of movement in the manner of Chronos, but the points are also an impossibility to catch in movement, as Aion it both directs backwards and forwards. Although the point cloud is caught as data and presented in the digital environment, the ramifications of its performance hint towards incompleteness and continuance.

If Chronos represents the entire cycle, Aion is a line nevertheless different from linear measurable time. As Chronos, the chimeric point cloud, time is a figuration; and as Aion, the chimeric point cloud is a line. Whereas figuration is sedentary, a line always has two directions. The singular events haunt the line of Aion, and “are distributed over this line, always in relation to the aleatory point which subdivides them ad infinitum, and it cause them to communicate with each other, as it extends and stretches them out over the entire line” (Deleuze 1969/1990 64). Subsequently, when time is divided into units of Chronos it becomes possible to control and regulate space-time temporalities (Warf 2008; Schwanen et al. 2012).

In a similar manner in which the chimeric point is oriented in two directions, sense connects the virtual object of the past through a sparking sensation, and stretches towards the unknown future. The percepts and the affects which are the composite units of blocks of sensation are developed by the sense and become the virtual objects, an unlimited past as a reserve for future constellations. The sensations are never bordered objects but changes in intensity and in virtuality; they are at rest as the word reserve also suggest. As we consciously and self-expressively act in the line of linear time where presents are ordered in a sequence, we are simultaneously part of the whirlwind of the realm of intensity and recursive causality (Massumi, 1995, 90).

What sense suggests is an individuation without a subject. In other words, when “bodies and their mixtures produce sense, it is not by virtue of an individuation which would presuppose it. Individuation in bodies, the measure in their mixtures, the play of persons and concepts in their various – the entire order presupposes sense and the pre-individual and impersonal neutral fuel within which it unfolds” (Deleuze 1969/1990, 124). It is always possible that sense as a proposition enters into the circle of denotation, manifestation, and signification at the point where it is actualised. This is described by Deleuze (1969/1990, 151) as follows: “With every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, and individual, or person, the moment we designate satin “here the moment has come”. It is when a body says: I am an individual, I perceive, I feel. This is my place in my world. Or even when I do this and that, my being here is valuable.
6.2.3. *Studies in the creative landscape with visual technology*

To articulate the creative landscape, I have looked at encounters with two different visual technologies: laser scanning (Article III) and urban photography (IV). The first of the encounters is the relation between the laser scanning equipment, my body and the materialities near and far. In this case, the focus has been on how the technical device and digital environments affect our ways of seeing with the landscape when the body is no longer carrying the device or post-processing the data collected. The second encounter, is the relation between the digital camera, my body and the city materialities. By looking at these landscape encounters, I have answered the question of how we might become other in the process of living with various technical devices, software, and applications (cf. Ash & Simpson 2016, 55–56; Haraway 1991). Even if we cannot become a laser scanner collecting data to its hardware memory, or a digital camera, the relation between a human body and the technical device, software or application intensify and alter how the surrounding materialities are seen or touched by the eye, if only momentarily (cf. Ash 2013, 2012).

The first encounter is the relation between my body, and the laser scanner and the digital environment of post-processing. When my body was in a close relation with the laser scanner, I was not only the realizer of the act of laser scanning, but also the device itself affected my body. By this I mean that, “the digital environment, as well as technology, generates sensations that are the unbound virtual objects. These virtual objects have, in relation to the materialities of a site, the capacity to influence the folding of the landscape sight as a surface event” (Article III). Laser scanning generates a specific way of seeing. Firstly, the laser scanning’s beams do not penetrate objects, and thus, this creates a shadow behind the object. When laser scanning is practiced, it is important to take this into account. To get a good coverage of the area of interest the laser scanner has to be positioned in a way that makes certain a shadow from one position will be covered by the beams from another position. This kind of intense relation where one needs to focus on the scanner’s way of seeing affects the body, and a techno-sight might be folded. By this I mean that the eyes of the human continue the work of laser scanner, even if the laser scanner is not anymore present.

Furthermore, when the laser scanner data was processed to a 3D realistic representation, the digital environment took a grip of my body. Deleuze (1981/2002, 14–16) has elaborated different movements through Francis Bacon’s writing: the movement from material structure to the Figure and the movement from the Figure towards the material structure. The way of seeing that I am after here, can be approached through the first movement in Bacon’s painting in which “the material structure curls around the contour in order to imprison the Figure, which accompanies the movement of all the structure’s forces” (ibid., 14). The tense encounter with the digital environment of laser scanner data coloured with photographs and presented as a 3D point cloud was the material structure coming close to the body. This generated a sensation which later affected the way the outdoor environment was sensed as a surface event. In the surface
event that which was generated in the past opened as a specific way of seeing with the materialities of the site – not as a projection of the digital environment but a metamorphosis of the digital and the olfactory and touchable, living growing herbs, dandelions, and young willow trees.

If the laser scanning seems too far from everyday life, we can become acquainted with our relation to the land and other people by the affect of mundane technical devices, software and (social media) applications. We carry a mobile phone with us so closely that it seems the mobile phone has become part of the hand. If not always exactly in the hand, the mobile phone is always ready to hand. The mobile phone (video) camera is applied for various social media postings. Before living the moment, the media already affects us as a pre-thought. By this I mean that life with social media is haunted by the question: how can this be made into a post? Everything becomes a possible background for an image of the posing self that stands alone or with someone in front a of scene facing towards the camera eye.

The second example of an affective encounter with the landscape, is the relation between a digital camera, my body and the materialities of a site of encounter. Through urban photography an intensification of seeing with the materialities of a site can occur. Furthermore, the intensification in seeing can make the body more sensitive, and thus, give rise to questions not thinkable before the encounter. Urban photography is here understood as a research practice involved with the making of high quality photographs as part of the research. However, urban photography is also considered as a creative practice in the manner of a sensuous way of approaching the city. Nevertheless, as a sensuous creative practice there is the risk that urban photography is merely flaneuristic street photography that cherishes the aesthetics of the passing moment. Taking into account these pitfalls, I claim that urban photography is sensuous in the way it may generate new questions in the midst of making photography (Article IV).

Walking in a city with a camera tight to the body forms a specific constellation of a moving body. By this, I do not only mean that the one walking with the camera shifts position from one site to another, but an intensification in seeing. This happens through a similar to the second movement, Deleuze (1981/2002, 15) found in Bacon’s painting, that is, the movement of the Figure in the painting toward the material structure or the field of colour. In this movement, through a spasm, the Figure, and in a similar manner the body, escapes itself. Or as Deleuze (ibid., 17) writes: “it is the Figure that wants to pass through a vanishing point in the contour to dissipate into the material structure”. Although in the close relation between the body and the camera one cannot become part of the landscape, a specific relation to city materialities might be formed. As I write: “My body, as a surface, was permeable in a way that simultaneous with the taking of a photograph, and through my seeing with the materialities, I was absorbed into the city walls and pavements” (Article IV, 7–8).
If making a photograph is about framing things inside the horizontally or vertically imposed rectangle, it becomes important how the elements inside are selected and how they relate, for instance, how much sky is there if the picture is taken outdoors, how is the human body cut, and what is left outside the frame. Looking through the camera lens one might also start to see the structures of pavements, the soil, bricks or a concrete wall. Simultaneously, when one is making the image, a tangible relation with the city is formed. In other words, through seeing with the camera the sense of touch is stimulated. To summarise, it is not the photographing body that moves but the body is moved by the encounter, although it might stand still with the camera lens focused on the scene. In a similar manner, to photographs affective capacities (e.g. Elkins 2011; Latham & McCormack 2009; Laakso 2003), the image making itself is an encounter with the more-than-visual.

6.3. The movements of a photographing body explored with movement-image and time-image

6.3.1. Forewords

“Cinema always narrates what the image’s movements and times make it narrate. If the motion’s governed by a sensory-motor scheme, if it shows a character reacting to situation, then you get a story. If, on the other hand, sensory-motor scheme breaks down to leave disoriented and discordant movements, then you get other patterns, becoming rather than stories” (Deleuze 1990/1995, 58).

In this the following two sections of this chapter, I continue and conclude the discussion about the concept of movement and rest in Deleuze’s thinking. Here, the sites of encounters are the urban photography project All is it – the materialities of River Aura (IV) and the process behind the urban photography project Drawing OntoSky (Article IV). First, I approach the making of the photographs and the photo-project All is it – the materialities of River Aura from the perspective of Deleuze’s (1983/1997) discussion about the montage of movement-images. Secondly, I ponder the Drawing OntoSky in relation with time-image (Deleuze 1985/1997). Before the exploration in the urban photography, I will briefly review the main differences between the two cinematic images, and their relevance for geographic inquiries.

The movement-image and the time-image are based on different narrational techniques. In the case of movement-image the narration is classical. It proceeds with the means of representational techniques (e.g. resemblance, analogy). The separate movement-images are connected through montage. This is a sensory-motor schema with the aim of presenting actions in space. In the crystalline narration of time-image, space ceases to be an Euclidean abstract but lived and non-localisable relations are expressed...
(Deleuze 1985/1997, 129). Time-image, thus, makes possible movements in space and time without necessarily something extending to action or a shift in position. In other words, change happens through the independence of the aberrations of movement (ibid., 143), whereas in the classical narration movement-images are composed “in such a way that an indirect image of time emerges from them” (ibid., 130). This means that a story is told about something. In the crystalline narration, the relations are decomposed “in a direct time-image in such a way that all the possible movements emerge from it” (ibid., 130). This is a story of potentiality where we do not know in advance where the event(s) will take(s) us.

In _Cinema I_, Deleuze (1983/1997) writes through _movement-image_ about the cinema of actions which depicts sensory-motor situations. This means that a stimulus is followed by action in spacetime. The formulation about the montage of movement-images is based on movement in Bergson’s thinking where it is twofold: “that which happens between objects or parts” and “that which expresses the duration or the whole” (ibid., 11). The first refers to the process of dividing up the qualitatively changing duration in objects. It finds its counterpart in the movement-image. The second refers to a union in duration when objects gain depth through losing their contours. It is the whole as an open whole which is compared to montage as “a thread which traverses sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realised, of communicating with another, to infinity” (ibid., 16–17).

Both the movement-image and the montage also find their references in a living being (Deleuze 1983/1997, 10, 58). The dilemma about the living being as both a movement-image and an open whole needs to be clarified with regard to the twofold movement. The movement-images refer to the actions of a living being. These actions are the parts or objects as mobile sections and movement is the change that occurs between two actions. It can be simply a change in the posture of the body. As a result, the duration or the whole is the change that happens in the living being as the influence of separate actions. Furthermore, Deleuze (ibid., 10) compares the living being to the open whole of the universe: “For, if the living being is a whole and, therefore, comparable to the whole of the universe, this is not because it is a microcosm as closed as the whole is assumed to be, but, on the contrary, because it is on upon a world, and the world, the universe, is itself open”.

Marcus Doel and David Clarke (2007, 894) conceptualise montage as a non-representational practice indispensable to contemporary human geography. Every time a geographer, for example, makes a map or writes an empirical analysis something remains outside of the frame. By repeating the acts of map-making and writing new framings are produced but between the frames remains untouched. According to Doel and Clarke (2007, 893) when these acts are approached with the concept of montage, it reveals the workings of an optical unconscious (see also Doel 2014). This means that montage has the capacity to move us beyond the ‘the calculus of the real and the rational’ by revealing the relation of the actuality of the images to the out-of-field as a
vast field of formlessness, non-sense and eventfulness (Doel & Clarke, 899). It is the fissure which makes the outside or the changing whole tangible by exceeding matter of facts (ibid., 899, 902). Montage is indispensable to human geography as it requires that we pause and consider our actions. This generates a place of rest where the non-representability becomes more tangible or the absences or that which flees any description is recognised as potentiality.

In *Cinema II*, Deleuze (1985/1997) moves on further with the *time-image*, that is, he goes beyond actual movements and also any conscious search in the past. The proper time-image or crystal-image can be understood as counter-actualisation. This happens when the crystal-image presents time “in its double movement of making presents pass, replacing one by the next while going towards the future, but also of preserving all the past, dropping it into an obscure depth” (Deleuze 1985/1997b, 87). As the event needs a surface, through the Event or history, we resurface from the depth. The time-image as a surface event, or a crystal, lives at “the vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet” (ibid., 81). This means that we are neither resting in the potentiality of virtuality nor recollecting from a single point in space-time but metamorphosing by an orientation towards past and future. In other words, “What we see in the crystal is always the bursting forth of life, of time, in its dividing in two or differentiation” (ibid., 91). Furthermore, a crystal-image refers to an image in which the real and the imaginary become indiscernible (ibid., 127).

Previously, geographer Mike Crang (2010) has argued that Edward Burtynsky’s photographs function as time-images. The photographs bring the materiality of waste ships and transformative processes to the fore. A time-image, thus, brings together “the before and the after in the incessant passage from one state to the other” (Deleuze 1985/1997, 153). According to Crang (2010, 1099), in the waste ship photographs this generates an industrial sublime which “opens the possibility for our discomfort as well as engagement” with the global environmental problem. Crang’s observation about photography is similar to what Deleuze (1985/1997) himself calls the cinema of the seer where imaginary and real are indiscernible. In contrast to the cinema of action, seeing becomes a function of both fantasy and report, criticism and compassion; “It is a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities” (Deleuze 1986/1997b, 18).

In what follows, I will be using some of the key concepts in *Cinema I: Movement-image* and *Cinema II: Time-image* ponder two different ways of making photographs. The first is the making of a well-defined urban photography project (Photo-book IV). The second is urban photography as a process where a project is not defined in advance but a creative work emerges in the midst-of-making from the encounters with the materialities of a site and past sensations (Article IV).
6.3.2. Making of the photo-project All is it – the materialities of River Aura

In the urban photography project, *All is it – the materialities of the River Aura* (IV), my aim was to touch the materialities of the River Aura running through the City of Turku by making portraits of people and objects encountered along the river. In addition, I made short interviews with the people photographed. I was not interested how people from different categorical groups (e.g. the elderly people, the youngsters, the immigrants) use the river. In the photo-book, the short vignettes molded from the interviews are presented under playful categories. Moreover, the portraiture and short vignettes work independently, yet are interrelated. Through the lenses of the movement-image, I consider the different movements in the making of urban photography as a planned project. These include the making of the photo-book (1) as a constellation of movement-images and (2) the movement(-image)s of my photographing body.

Before we can look at the book as a constellation of movement-images, *All is it – the materialities of the River Aura* as a montage, we need to consider the making of the separate photographs with the techniques of framing and cutting. According to Deleuze (1983/1997) cinematic framing can be understood through its relation to the content, angle and the out-of-field. Framing is a relatively closed system through which the characters, props and sets are made present in the image (ibid., 12). The frame brings together or separates these elements either by itself being inseparable from the geometric verticals and the horizontals in the image, or by presenting physical gradations through degrees of shadow and light, where the parts of the set become intensive parts; the angle of the framing refers to a point of view. Furthermore, the frame’s relation to the out-of-field is important. Through the out-of-field the set produced by framing receives two relations: a relation with other sets, and a virtual relation with the whole which prevents closure (ibid., 18).

The act of framing is also evident in photography because of the shape of the viewfinder. Thus, the concept of framing seems to be most transformable to photography. In comparison to cinema, both horizontal and vertical images are possible. In the photo-project *All is it*, I have applied both, and the subject was in most cases positioned in the middle of the frame. The lines which traverse the frames of the photograph are the river, the bridges and the river banks. These lines run not only horizontally but also diagonally. Subsequently, the intensive parts can be seen through looking closely at the body, and the things and clothes it wears depending on the season. That is to say, approaching the photographed body as an intensive constellation.

Moreover, the photographic encounter is intensive when the bodies position themselves in relation to each other. In one encounter, for example, there was a couple who were in the first shots standing close to each other but when I took more photographs, the man wrapped his arm around the women (Figure 3). Furthermore, the intensity between materialities inside frame is made with both shadow and light, and through
controlling the depth of field. By controlling the depth of field the photographed bodies are close to, yet separated from the River environment. In other words, when the background of the photograph is a continuous surface the relation between the body and the environment appears more fluid.

FIGURE 3. The framing is intensive not only as a result of the small adjustments made by the photographer, but also in the way the bodies relate to each other at the site of photography. I did not instruct the people I encountered on how to pose for the camera.

The second cinematic concept is cutting which determines a shot. The shot depicts the movement between the parts of a closed system, and the relation of the shot to the movement of the whole. Of these two, the first movement is relative, and the second absolute as the affection of the whole. The shot is a movement-image if it relates movement to the changing whole. To fulfill this condition, movement must be extracted from the moving bodies or things in the image. Thus, a shot as a mobile section of movement offers a temporal perspective.

In addition to framing, cutting is essential to the body becoming a viewfinder. However, the shot in cinema and the photographic shot are different. To catch the movements, the photographing body has to sense and follow the movements of the photographed objects. According to Deleuze, the shot acts like a consciousness which he defines as a camera consciousness. In other words, the shot traces or perceives the
movement inside the frame by the camera following the movement of objects. Or in the case of the photographing body, the photographer loses grip of the fluid movements, yet remains at the surface of these in order to make the photograph. Moreover, by controlling the shutter speed one is capable of defining how fluid or still the movement appears in the photograph.

In the photographs of *All is it*, the movement seems to be stilled. I only followed the micro-movements of the body because the photographed people were standing almost still when the photograph was made. Nevertheless, the photographed body and the surrounding materialities are presented in tensious relations which become tangible when the image is viewed. A sense of touch with the eyes is generated by the materialities of the photographs. A photograph can be understood to influence the spectator as an actor or as affective in a more volatile manner. If as W. J. T. Mitchell (1986, 9) claimed that image is like an actor, “a presence or character endowed with legendary status, a history that parallels and participates in the stories we tell ourselves about our own evolution from creatures ‘made in the image’ of a creator, to creatures who make themselves and their world in their own image”, then the image seen is mobile and we are dealing with it as a material constellation, affecting in a sensible way. However, it is not Roland Barthes’ (1982) *punctum* that waits to prick the viewer with pain or other pressure, but more like a wound in photography which omits the sense of objects (Elkins 2011).

James Elkins (2011, xii) attempts to dispense with any meaning in photography by finding how photographs force “something about the world’s own deadness, its inert resistance to whatever it is we may hope or want”. Elkins (ibid., 20) has compared the act of looking into a photograph to standing on a black ice and looking down into the water beneath it: “The light of my eye is lost in the darkness on its way to the object. I can try to look through the water, and see the bottom, but it is hopeless. Or I can try to look at the water, but nothing there catches the light. There is no foothold, no certainty, no object. Even the black ice hardly catches my eye at all”.

Harri Laakso (2003) has thus argued for the affective power of photographs. Laakso (ibid., 33–34) describes how the photographer by means of colours and composition makes images that might waken up our senses in a way that the photograph is not inert but its surface becomes tangible. Moreover, the technique chosen affects the material feel of the images themselves (Hunt 2014, 2016a, b). Although in the photographs of my project, we often see a person directly looking into the camera, the micro-movements of the body orient it towards the materialities of the river, and the river environment, in turn, intertwines with the photographed body. This two-way relation is supported by the composition of the objects and colours, and the control of the depth of field.

*Montage* is another means of touching movement. Through montage the movement of bodies is extracted by means of connecting a range of shots. With montage Deleuze
refers to an assemblage or *agencement*, which is the composition of movement images. In my example, montage is the constellation of the photographs and the vignettes deduced from the short interviews, made to work together to present the River Aura as a vivid landscape (see also Dittmer & Latham 2015). The making of the photographs concerned an attending to the nuances of the photographs in which the River Aura itself as the main focus was momentarily lost. The temporal immersion with the tones and shades served the aim of finding a visual rhythm to the story being told about the River Aura.

As a montage, *All is it presents* a temporary image of the River Aura but also opens it up to other landscapes and times. It functions through the photographs of the people and the objects with relation to the river and the short vignettes. With the photo-book as a constellation my aim was to make an image of these different temporalities. In practice, *All is it* was made into a photo-book by constellating the intensive framings in an aesthetic order by ensuring that the following image finds some continuity with the colours of the previous one. In turn, the vignettes rupture the fluid rhythm of colours. In the photo-interviews at the site, the bodies opened up to the materialities of the River and some also travelled in their memories beyond the site to childhood landscapes and other cities with rivers and bridges. So the bodies reached through an encounter with the photographer far beyond the actual, the questions and the river itself stimulated some resting sensations.

From the second point of view, I interpret my photographing body as a constellation of movement-images. In *Cinema I*, Deleuze (1983/1997, 66) considers all things as movement-images which can be divided into three main sorts of images: *perception-images*, *affection-images*, and *action-images*. These are complemented with *impulse-images* and *relation-image/mental-images* 4. The movement-image derives from the idea that movement of matter is seen as an image, that is, “An atom is an image which extends to the point to which its actions and reactions extend. My body is an image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my brain, are images, parts of my body” (ibid., 58). An infinite set of all images constructs a plane of immanence. A thing or a body, for example, is understood as a plane (or a machinic assemblage) of movement-images of a changing Whole (duration or universal becoming). Furthermore, the plane of movement images is a bloc of space-time, a perspective on time which can only offer an indirect image of time. In other words, it is a temporality. In what follows, the focus is on the movements of the photographic body as a constellation of different movement-images, that is, different types of movement.

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4 Whereas affection-image and action-image are formulated with regard to Peirce’s (Houser et. al. 1998; eds.) concepts *firstness* and *secondness*, the mental-image or relation-image comes from Peirce’s *thirdness*. According to Deleuze (1983/1997, 197) thirdness “finds most adequate representation in relation; for relation is always third, being necessarily external to its terms”. Because with the mental/relation-image Deleuze takes his first step beyond movement-images, which continues on into *Cinema II: Time-image*, I will not take it into account in this section. In addition, the signs given to the separate movement-images are not relevant for my work (1983/1997, 217–218).
The *perception-image* is either objective or subjective (Deleuze 1983/1997, 71). It is objective when a thing or set is seen from an external viewpoint or an external viewer, subjective when the thing is seen by someone qualified or someone sees the set from the inside. In cinema, the subjective/objective division is complicated by the constantly altering positions. It seems that as a camera, I am both subjective and objective: I make decisions from where to shoot a person, and then capture the portrait from an external viewpoint – I let the people present themselves for the camera without controlling their bodily presence by guiding how they should stand in front of the camera. When my photographing body stands and positions the subjects inside the frame, most often in the middle of the frame, it is following a portrait tradition (e.g. Clarke 1997, 101–121)

The body becoming a viewfinder is an external viewpoint complicated by “the process of how the camera and the photographer make sense of an ambivalent and ever-changing condition” (Clarke 1997, 121). Vilhelm Flusser (1984, 10) has described the photographer as the ‘functionaire of the apparatus’ who “handles the camera, turns it around, looks into it and through it… in search of the yet undiscovered virtualities in the camera program enabling him to produce new information”. I am neither intent on the inner worlds of the individuals being represented before the camera nor their categorical position in social hierarchy, but the relations of the subjects photographed and the river. That is to say, how the bodies are constellated as temporalities at a specific site through the encounter with the river environment and the absent pasts.

Nevertheless, the making of a photograph is a more vivid encounter with the world than a perception from a single point. If a perception-image can be understood through the body becoming a camera and picking up objects to be photographed, then the *affection-image* is a sensibilisation to the affective materialities of the river environment. In the cinema, affection-image refers to the close-up image which can be a face but also a thing such as the murderer Jack the Ripper’s knife (Deleuze 1983/1997, 102). However, for Deleuze the problem with the affection-image is that it is limited to the affect of fear. In turn, when an affect is not expressed in a close-up but in a medium-shot, space becomes undetermined. It is an any-space-whatever of virtual conjunction where associations can be made in numerous of ways because the space has “lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts” (ibid., 109). In other words, the movement has lost its extension and it has become expressive.

From the perspective of the affection image, the framing is more nuanced act than only a matter of placing people and things inside a frame. The eyes of the people are captured in the focus but everything else is in search of the right composition. My body becoming a camera is drawn to the colours, shades and tones. In this process, the borders of the objects lose their function, whereas the patterns and lines of different directions become the focus. That is to say, how the parts of the body are directed in relation to the river and street, or how the colours of the clothes and accessories
melt into the patterns of the river environment. Nevertheless, the making of the photograph is just chance because the site is a lively environment and not a controllable studio. The River Aura is situated 60° north latitude where the lighting conditions vary not only depending on the time of day but also the season.

The rarely discusses impulse-image is somewhere between the affection-image and the action image. It is neither an expression nor an actualised feeling or emotion, but “composed of unformed matter, sketches or fragments, crossed by non-formal, crossed by non-formal functions, acts or energy-dynamism which do not even refer to the constituted subnets” (Deleuze 1983/1997, 123). The impulse-image is restricted by a destiny related to the actualisation of a certain behaviour (ibid., 128). In photography, when everything is in its right place in the frame, or actually already before this, there is an urgent need to make the photograph. As if the body could no longer take a step back and escape its destiny of making the photograph. Nevertheless, the source of the original impulse cannot be detected (Lury 1998, 149). Celia Lury has aptly argued that “Seeing photographically can both illuminate ‘loss’ and yet not itself be lacking” (ibid., 154). Here, it would mean the urge to make a moment to a photograph before it has passed. Nevertheless, photography is always divination because one cannot re-produce the perfectly seen only make a photograph of that which is on the way.

Action-image is the image of actualisation in the state of things (Deleuze 1983/1997, 141). According to Deleuze (1983/1997, 178) there are two types of action-images, the small form and the large form, which are “ways of conceiving and seeing a subject, a story or script”. In the large form the character moves from a situation to a transformed situation via action (ibid., 155). It presents a particular space-time, where the situation is determining and determinates, and the body is the character. In the making of a photograph, actualisation would mean the moment when the shutter speed closes. When the image is stored in the camera memory it is as if the restlessness of universe has found a temporal place to rest. The photographed body has found its nest along the river, the photographer has succeed in storing the present moment which arrived in the capturing closure of the shutter speed. In the small form, the character moves from action to a situation to a transformed action. A certain fulfillment that the photograph has been made is only momentary, because the project continues and new framings wait for the photographer. In a way, my photographing body gains energy from a successful action which moves the body-camera to the next situation along the river, where I find myself asking a new potential subject: “Do you have a moment of time to spare…?”

6.3.3. Urban photography as an intensive encounter – elongated moments in the nowhere and everywhere

“Perhaps, when we read a book, watch a show, or look at a painting, and especially when we are ourselves the author, an analogous process can be triggered: we constitute
a sheet of transformation which invents a kind of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets, and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them. In this way we extract non-chronological time” (1986/1997b, 123).

The different constellations of small images (Figure 4) above are photographs with poor image quality. But do they not almost look like small aquarelle painting? However, the images are not made by brush strokes but with a Nokia 2690 non-smart phone camera. How these photographs emerged and have influenced my future photographic processes differ from the sensory-motor schema. Aquarelle like they resist stabilization. When I look back on how I encountered London with different cameras during my visits between 2012–2014 (Article IV), I believe I achieved something to do with Deleuze’s (1985/1997) time-image as detailed in the book *Cinema II*. The time-image of cinema refers to the pure optical and sound situations to which a character cannot respond; “In the city which is being demolished or rebuilt, neo-realism makes any-space-whatevers proliferate – urban cancer, undifferentiated fabrics, pieces of waste-ground – which are opposed to the determined spaces of the old realism” (Deleuze 1983/1997, 212). The potentiality of time-image is in the very moment of not-knowing how to react because it forces us to question and think beyond a pre-determined pattern. In what follows, I consider my photographing body with and as the/a time-image which happens in the elongated moments in the nowhere and everywhere. As Thrift (1993, 98) has argued “writing movement demands study in many
sites, sometimes at once; it may stimulate fractured dérive-like itineraries, it will certainly include new ways of writing” or in my case visual presentations.

During a three months stay in London in 2012, my first visit to the city, I took long walks and made site visits to understand the metropolis. How could one otherwise claim oneself as an urban geographer if one has never stayed in a metropolis? What I was initially pursuing in London were those places, like London Docklands that I as an undergraduate had learnt about in the lectures by professor Andersson, who captured the listener with his words combining urban theory with examples from the urban metropoles. What I encountered was a hectic pace and ongoing construction – new buildings, new housing and commercial areas being built, which of course could also have been found in the city plans. The Shard building was ascending towards its tremendous height, the Liverpool station area was a huge construction site, and the city was reaching out its tentacles towards the east. A clear boundary of brick on one side and glass on the other could be seen at Bishopsgate between Liverpool Street station and Shoreditch. It seems that a city can never reach a point where it would say “Now come and look at me, I am ready for your eyes”.

For the book *Walk the lines: The London underground, overground*, Mark Mason (2011) walked London underground lines from above ground and visited all the stations along the route, my walks where less systematic and restricted to inside the two first tube zones, plus occasional crossings over to zone three. Moreover, the practice of walking became secondary as I was seduced by seeing the city with aquarelle like mobile phone images (see also Wylie 2005). In a way, the practice comes close to the Susan Sontag’s comparison between a flâneur and a photographer.

> “The photographer is an armed version of the solitary walker reconnoitering, stalking, cruising the urban inferno, the voyeuristic stroller who discovers the city as a landscape of voluptuous extremes. Adept of the joys of watching, connoisseur of empathy, the flâneur finds the world ‘picturesque’” (ibid., 1979, 55).

Nevertheless, I want to argue counter to this assumption of a photographer-flâneur who only depicts the city and finds joy in the pictures. An encounter with a city is more complicated. My stay in London and simultaneously in unlimited past became ‘a fucked up’ urban course which left behind 1800 mobile phone photographs, blog entries and traces to be found in the future (Article IV). As much I wanted to see everything that was going on in London from ordinary life to the London 2012 Summer Olympics mega-construction, it became more like a weird narrative that I was scripting through the photo-walks.

Urry and Larsen (2011) have claimed that tourism is influenced by photography in a way that places are consumed through “as lightweight pre-arranged photo-scenes and
experiencing is akin to seeing, seeing reduced to glancing and picture-making to clicking” (ibid., 187). What I am formulating is a slightly different approach to photography. It is a camera-eye of many nuances, more close to how Noora Pyyry (2016, 102, 112) describes photo-walks as creative encounters where photography inspires ‘thinking with’ the mundane everyday spaces. According to Pyyry (ibid., 112) these affectual encounters with the city foster learning which happens through a messy and ongoing process in the everyday. Whereas Pyyry writes about the ongoing process as lived, I would argue that there is something like an awakening from rest happening in these creative encounters of thinking or making something new (Article IV).

When I now look back and search for answers in the mobile phone-photographs, I encounter a strange thought that has not occurred to me before. The painterly photographs are encounters with the city detached from the ordinary. It is as if I lost control in the prolonged moments of making these images. It is impossible to say where one photograph ends and another starts. I have not been making them from a fixed position and location. Whereas montage had the capacity to make the movement-image as a chronological bounded present, time-image is concerned with a present always haunted by the past and the future. In the movement-image time measures movement through the passing present. Time-image is different: “Time is no longer the measure of movement but movement is the perspective of time” (1985/1997, 22). It “gives us access to that Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space” (Deleuze 1986/1997b, 39).

If the pure optical (and sound) situations are neither produced by action nor extend to action, it might sound like an impasse to make actual photographs. Forcing this as far as possible, we see the photographs being made but not as a series of shots at different locations but as a process where one is not located in the city but becomes one with the materialities. From these encounters the photographs emerge. The moment of making a photograph can be very intense because it never happens in one place. In addition to the materialities of the site which triggers the senses, something from elsewhere pushes its way through to the photograph. The photographing body is traversed by the percepts and affects (see Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 164). It sees with the percepts and is moved by the affects. In the prolonged moment of making the photographs, I was not merely in the city but circulating somewhere between previously learnt and now encountered materialities, in a restless movement in nowhere and everywhere in an unrecognizable terrain. This resonates with the idea that “bodies move in more ways than one: yes, they move physically, but they also move affectively, kin-aesthetically, imaginatively, collectively, aesthetically, socially, culturally and politically” (McCormack 2008, 1823). As the photographic encounter leaves a trace or a quitting mark on the body, it is sensuous without being final. A photography is made but the question “Why was it made?” cannot be given an answer.
What further interests me is how the urban photography as a process extends to the Drawing OntoSky – a visual project made during the Urban Photography Summer School (Article IV). Here the focus is on making an artistic image and my body becoming an artist. This can be approached with time-image which emerges from the failure of attentive recognition and the disturbances of memory (Deleuze 1985/1997, 55). When memory is not harnessed but past encounters indirectly have an influence, we are dealing with the creation of a work of art. In other words,

“Memory plays a small part in art (even and especially in Proust). It is true that every work of art is a monument, but here the monument is not something commemorating a past, it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves and that provide the event with the compound that celebrates it. The monument’s action is not memory but fabulation. We write not with childhood memories but through blocs or childhood that are the becoming-child of the present” (ibid., 167–168).

What Deleuze and Guattari suggest is that an artistic image is truly creative because it happens at the surface or the crystalline regime which extends in all directions. The different materialities, urban forms and rapid processes encountered during my previous stay in London find their way to the photographs of the Drawing OntoSky but in an entirely different composition.

In the Drawing OntoSky -visual project, the fragments and forms, shades and tones of the photographs convey a strange sense of a city (Article IV). London appears in the photographs but not in some graspable actuality that would tell how things are regarding a chosen subject or theme. The Drawing OntoSky is constellated from the collision of the different urban materialities, building trends of glass and concrete, the symbolic and the mundane intermingling. In the photographs, the just then newly built Shard building meets a site hut, a cumulonimbus chases public housing, and a balcony in the shining colour of turquoise suddenly appears. The different materialities are something studied already in the aquarelle mobile phone photographs. Nevertheless, in the aesthetic process of the Drawing OntoSky the sensations evolve to something different. In addition, the sky, which is becoming a scarce resource in the traditionally low rise metropolis appears as a totally new visual element in the photographs. However, it is not a systematic study of the skyline, although the sky is the only element repeated from frame to frame, but something beyond. The photographs are made in real locations but their combination tell a narrative with a hint of fiction. It is not social science, but could it be artistic research?

6.4. The fabulative landscape of the Drawing OntoSky

“This is a nomadic and non-sedentary distribution of the unique and undivided cast. This is a nomadic and non-sedentary distribution, wherein each
system of singularities communicates and resonates with the others, being at once implicated by the others and implicating them in the most important cast. It is the game of problems and questions, no longer the game of the categorical and the hypothetical… If one tries to play this game other than in thought, nothing happens; and if one tries to produce a result other than the work of art, nothing is produced… In it there is nothing but victories for those who know how to play, that is, how to affirm and ramify chance, instead of dividing it in order to dominate it, in order to wager, in order to win.

This game, which can only exist in thought and which has no other result than the work of art, is also that by which thought and art are real and disturbing reality, morality, and the economy of the world” (Deleuze 1969/1990, 60).

An artistic process was set in motion in the making of the urban photography. It was an encounter with the city materialities related to past sensations. By diving into artistic research, I have worked out chaos not only by making variables but also variety. To recall Deleuze’s words: “The artist brings back from the chaos varieties that no longer constitute a reproduction of a sensory in the organ but set up a being of the sensory, a being of sensation, on an organic plane of composition that is able to restore the infinite”. The variety in my work emerged as the fabulative landscape. With the fabulative landscape I refer to an arrival and a departure, where the arrival is a combination of affects and percepts, a force which inaugurates the departure of an artistic function as in my example of the urban photography work Drawing OntoSky (Appendix 1). Or as Ståhl (2016, 224) has asked: “What configuration of affects – what increases and decreases in speed – make up an encounter capable of setting a writing machine in motion, or in other words, capable of making it function?”

When my body became the camera-eye by losing its control and making images as a combination of fact and fiction, it is close to the time-image. My photographing body was not moving from action to action but everything happened in the non-localisable nowhere and everywhere. It was a detachment from the chain of regular associations – a non-conscious search in the past with relation to surrounding materialities. In this automatic movement, an artistic image emerged “producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly” (Deleuze 1985/1997b, 156). This is vividly described by Deleuze (ibid, 209) as an event where “the internal sheets of memory and the external layers of reality will be mixed up, extended, short-circuited and form a whole moving life, which is at once that of the cosmos and of the brain, which sends out flashes from one pole to the other”. To produce an artistic work, in my case the photographs of the Drawing OntoSky, required crystallising the different sensations traversing the body.

The fabulative landscape answers the need for narratives of urbanism which through expressing the dynamism of the city, enable us to see the city anew (see also Dittmer
The incentive for fabulation is challenging and provocative. It is by blurring the boundary between fact and fiction, objective and subjective that one looks beyond any order towards life in its becoming or differentiation. The truths and realities of a Chronos like present are the conditions ordering life. These are the laws, political systems and other visible and invisible rules which order life. Many are there to make societies function, which they do. Occasionally, being too rule oriented means missing the nuances of life by ordering it from one perspective instead of asking what a certain relation is capable of causing in a particular body.

Fabulation has to do with losing one’s grip over life to the powers of life. Fabulation as a creative practice is launched from an encounter with the intolerable, most appropriately described through the artistic sensibilities (Deleuze 1995, 143). According to Deleuze, artists are closer to the vibrancy of life, the circulating powers which constantly renew the worlds, and resist stagnancy. The bodies of the artists are indicators of the capturing machines of life, or whatever threatens life and the sufferings of the artist are signs of something intimidating. In other words, the artist has seen “something in life that is too great, too unbearable also, and the mutual embrace of life with what threatens it” (Deleuze & Guattari 1991/1994, 171). How can artists be the indicators of threats to life; how can they sense which truths and realities are harmful? What can this provide for geographical thinking? These are questions worth of pondering.

In breaking loose from control there lies a chance of becoming the sensible madmen. Becoming sensible to life is living in the margins or shadows. In the context of research, it means to live the research through the forces traversing the site of the research through one’s affective body. However, to become influenced by the forces, carries a risk of being captured also by devastative visions. Fabulation is neither about artificially bordering life with too restrictive definitions circulating high above, nor becoming motionless of seeing something too harsh. Instead, fabulation is about returning to the surface from the depths with words and images. As Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994, 203) claim, an artist never begins with an empty canvas or blank page. Instead, the artist works with clichés which “it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision” (ibid. 204).

Deleuze (1985/1997, 148) found in the modern cinema a free an indirect discourse which means going beyond “the objective, indirect story from the camera’s point of view and the subjective, direct story from the character’s point of view”. The achievement of the indirect discourse was the replacement of a single truth in favour of the false which is the artistic or creative power of life. In this situation, the character is no longer coherent but the notion of “I is another” replaces Ego. In other words, the character is not grasped through an identity but the becoming-other. However, Deleuze (1985/1997) also found risks with the power of the false. It is the risk of a sick man, sick of life, who judges life from the position of exhaustion. This means that the
body is an impotent force “which no longer knows how to metamorphose itself according to the variations of what it can affect and what it can be affected by” (ibid., 140). Despite the risks, for Deleuze (ibid., 147) the power of the false is the only potentiality for the new to emerge or “the only chance for art or life…”

Through art, we can arrive at the problematics of good and common sense, and fabulation is the means for unpacking these. According to Deleuze (1968/1994, 225–226) good sense is that which reduces differences by departing from the individuation through prediction. What good sense does is make the partial truths appear absolute. It thus, makes people recognise themselves in equality as an abstract product. This can be explained, for example, in the way that in a nation state one is equal by being a citizen which makes some struggle to become equal, instead that equality would be the fundamental condition of humanity. Common sense is thus defined by the process of recognition. In common sense, objects of representation, that is, categories of opposition, similitude, analogy and identity, can be found (Deleuze 1968/1994, 131, 148). Furthermore, representation is defined by these elements: “identity with regard to concepts, opposition with regard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgement, resemblance with regard to objects” (ibid., 137). Consequently, these make the form of the Same through crucifying difference. Recognition is not only about bordering an object but also attaching values to the object (ibid., 135). Drawing from the previous example, this would mean that a person in a nation state is only valuable when s/he becomes an integrated citizen and contributes to an imaginary common good. Together good sense and common sense make common belief or popular opinion (ibid., 134). Much artist work starts with these stabilisations that order our life into predetermined positions.

Whereas the image of thought based on recognition does not disturb our thinking, disturbing images make us truly think (Deleuze 1968/1994, 138). Life goes on by attending to partial truths; however, sometimes there might be a conflict between these. It is a problem as a differential element in thought which shatters the clichés which order life (ibid., 162). However, according to Deleuze (1968/1994, 131, 148, 157) the problem cannot be recognised but only be sensed in a creative encounter, and consequently, “sense is located in the problem itself”. Or as Woodward (2016, 350) claims: “Creative work pushes the thinker past a threshold of familiar thought and into unfamiliar spaces that force speculation.” The object of a fundamental encounter “can be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred suffering”. Regardless of the tone, the object fosters sensibility with regard to a given sense which is opposed to recognition that is recalled, imagined or conceived (ibid., 139–140). According to Ronald Bogue (2016, 105) the encounter as an event is one with fabulation which is the function of the future. Fabulation as visions, becomings and powers, aim simultaneously to break a continuation of some deterministic histories or repeated stories, and make images “free of the entangling associations of conventional narratives and
open to unspecified elaboration in the construction of a new mode of collective agency” (ibid., 105–106).

If the affective transitions are influenced by the involuntary memory, and perceptual states are embodied presents, Deleuze and Guattari describe cubism as something different. In the intimidating encounter the artist sees a town, a corner of nature or some other place “along with their characters of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light, of purple or blue, which have no other object or subject than themselves” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994, 171). In other words, in cubism the process of individuation is prodded by the collective conditions. Bogue (2016, 105) contributes to the understanding of seeing the intolerable by comparing it to a clairvoyant or hallucinatory vision. In this stretching moment,

“the intolerable becomes suddenly visible, but one also that makes visible new possibilities unencumbered by the past. The hold of history, of the forces that have shaped our present, is broken, and the actual of what we are becoming surges forth. History, story, narrative, continuity, yield to the event, a disruption in causality, a gap in the orderly and regular sequence of world occurrences…”

In my example (Article IV), I have reviewed the urban photography project Drawing Onto Sky told through the eyes of an urban wanderer. The sort of cubism that can be seen is the way the constellation emerged as the fabulative landscape. As described earlier, the final project emerged somewhere and nowhere. Therefore, the character in my photographs encounters contemporary city construction materials and forms of housing and living from different periods through tiny material traces. These traces are encountered in a way that leaves space between the photographs for spectators to make their own constellation. The urban photographs address material issues and ways of seeing-with materialities, and making one’s own view of the cityscapes from different perspectives than those offered, for example, by viewing corridors in the London view management framework and the London skyline construction as following a race for the tallest building. The fabulative landscape was made through the framing of photographs. In the framings, ordinary things appear in relation to symbolic landscape objects in London. As I describe one photograph: “In another frame, the mundane is raised to the same level as the iconic by making Anish Kapoor’s ArcelorMittal Orbit viewing tower, built for the London Summer Olympics 2012, appear equal to a parasol” (Article IV, 282).

The Drawing Into Sky has imprints from the movement-image and time-image. I have combined a representational technique with the affective (Article IV). There are some representative forms and some linkages between forms from one image to another, but also the lightness and heaviness of the sky presented through the different colours
from dark grey to pale pink. Although the urban cowboy is the character of the photographs, it is not someone in action but passing through the different views. Consequently, movement does not demand the true and time is not subordinated to movement: “Movement which is fundamentally decentred becomes false movement, and time which is fundamentally liberated becomes power of the false which is now brought into effect in false movement” (Deleuze 1985/1997b, 143). In the photographs the collision of building trends, social and capitalist values crystallise to present a complicated image of London.

Whereas classical narration has one possible solution, the crystalline narration keeps the solution open. In the Drawing OntoSky, we see the urban cowboy walking through the city but never reaching a conclusion. The wanderer is at the surface of the image grabbed by an affect of sadness. By keeping the solution open, cinema has freed itself from a system of judgement, “it shatters the system of judgement because the power of the false (not error or doubt) affects the investigator and the witness as much as the person presumed guilty” (Deleuze 1985/1997, 133). This is based on replacing judgement as a transcendent value with the affect as an immanent evaluation, “of evaluating every being, every action and passion, even every value, in relation to the life which they involve” (ibid., 141). The metamorphoses of the false, “series of powers, always referring to each other and passing into one another”, replace the form of the true (ibid., 133–134). Thus, the sadness is not about the capitalism as one might assume, but more about the overall intricacy which makes it impossible to talk about absolute good or evil (cf. Nietzsche 2013).

Along with the urban cowboy by combining its visions, my body becomes other. As Deleuze (1985/1997, 150) argues that not only the character becomes other but also the film-maker changes in the process. I as a researcher turn into an artist through attending to another way of coping with intimate chaos. Nevertheless, as I become other the urban cowboy continues her own path with an unknown destination. According to Deleuze this happens when the characters of the film replace the fictions of the director by their own story-telling. Thus, the becoming other means that the character enters into the storytelling and through this “contributes to the invention of his people” (ibid., 150). By this, I understand here the affective power of images to influence people with manifold traces by those that encounter them. This keeps the Drawing OntoSky open for new interpretations.

As the analysis above reveals, fabulation is a way of constellating images and/or words to present the non-representable landscapes. In my work, I have thus, referred with the fabulative landscape to a creative process which starts with a problematic encounter and extends to the nowhere and everywhere where the work of art is made. As fabulation has its origins in a chance encounter, it is not instrumental. It is not a research method for empirical research but transcendental empirics (see Deleuze 1994, 147). My aim is not to replace systematic research in a particular topic with a wonder-
ing approach (see article IV, 282). Nevertheless, I believe in the potential of the unexpected. For research, this can have a twofold effect: we might find new research questions and we might be able to see the research situation itself with more nuances, and traversing lines of the different involved bodies. Let me finish this section with the words of Deleuze:

“For nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research: it may be that some well-known faculties – too well known – turn out to have no proper limit, no verbal adjective, because they are imposed and have an exercise only under the form of common sense. It may turn out, on the other hand, that new faculties arise, faculties which were repressed by that form of common sense…” (ibid., 144)
7. CONCLUDING WORDS

“Only by art can we emerge from ourselves, can we know what another sees of this universe that is not the same as ours and whose landscapes would have remained as unknown to us as that might be on the moon. Thanks to art, instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiply, and as many original artists as there are, so many worlds will we have at our disposal, more different from each other than those that circle in the void...” (Proust III, 895–896).

In this research, I have studied the creative landscape with Badiou’s and Deleuze’s event philosophy. The aim has been to understand how movement and rest appear in their writings, and what this can bring to the discussion about spatiality of creativity. Furthermore, my aim has been to bring the discussion about creativity in contact with the concept of landscape. The concept of landscape is crucial for the way geographers have seen and continue to see human beings and non-human in/with land, making patterns on land and being themselves made by the land, and the different natural, social, political, and economic forces shaping the land. I have taken a slightly different approach and applied landscape as a critical concept. With the concepts of the creative landscape I approach the small changes of our bodies ribbon in relation to bodies they encounter and how thinking might be radically ruptured and how new thoughts arrive with these event encounters.

I have argued that art is crucial for the concept of landscape from its early days when it appeared in geography, and it still is to today. In general, a renewed interest in art works and artistic processes has been raised by e.g. non-representational theories and practices, and different studies in art and more often with art either by following or working with practicing artists. Whereas pre-modern European landscape painting tradition offers a fertile ground for many discussions, installation art, theatre and photography enrich the landscape discussion in geography. Furthermore, what reading and discussing with Badiou and Deleuze can add to the art and geography is a sensibility to the unexpected in a research situation, and our many selves in it. Or as Ola Ståhl (2016, 226) puts it:

“An aesthetic trajectory … has to do with an experimentation with affect-constellations of different kinds; with an openness and an attentiveness to chance; with excess and transgression, or with boredom and solitude; with very low velocities, or with very high speeds; with exhilarations, or with stillness; whatever allows a writer to remain open to the unexpected, to ruptures and encounters that in some way cause her to overcome her sense of self.”

In contrast to a moral stance to our research subject enmeshed in depressive conditions, which in participatory research often leads to the need to empower the participants, criticality here means a non-biased approach. It is the potentiality to see things differently. I nevertheless acknowledge the naivety of my privileged western position
as an academic researcher. Thus, I am not saying that we should give up the fight for a better world but only that we need to see the bigger picture and many co-existing and possible worlds. It is about letting ourselves sense the nuances of the situation and stepping outside normative thinking.

The first formulation concerned the creative landscape as a rupture in seeing; this happens through seeing with the intense elements of a mobile landscape (RQ3) and was based on the discussion about movement and rest in Badiou’s event philosophy (RQ2). I found that movement refers to that which alters the situation by introducing relations which match with the transcendental of a prevailing world and the movement which breaks the world. In the first case, movement is being and appearing. In other words, inconsistent multiplicity is captured through mathematical operations into sets and further through the logical operation of appearing to being in a world. The second movement is the event which is the radical rupture in a world. For creativity this means that only the movement of an event is creative as it introduces something new. Rest, in turn, refers both to the inconsistent multiplicity or void and to an object of the world. Firstly, void as the ground for reality is the potential for the movement of being and appearing. However, the void also has a more radical role in Badiou’s thinking. When the event momentarily cancels the gap between being (ontology) and being-there (appearing), it reveals the void or the inconsistent multiplicity. That which is excluded from the world is that which in the event is suddenly revealed. Now and then an unexpected controversy ruptures what appears normal.

The second formulation about the creative landscape as the surface event of sense as mobile present which connects the non-representable sensations (RQ3) was based on the discussion about movement and rest in Deleuze’s event philosophy (RQ2). The aim has been to touch on the afterlife of a past encounter which has either increased or diminished the capacity of a body to act. Here, I would like to pause and recall von Humboldt’s words cited in the beginning:

“The turf, that is spread over the soil; the old moss and the fern, that cover the roots of the trees; the torrents, that gush over the sloping banks of the calcareous rocks; in fine, the harmonious agreement of colours reflected by the waters, the verdure, and the sky; everything recalls to the traveller sensations, which he has already felt” (Humboldt, 1818–1829 vol. 3., 160–161).

What collects and makes the sensations intertwine, is the mobile present or surface event of sense as a movement oriented towards past and future. The surface event of sense makes way for a different reading of the afterlives of sensations than von Humboldt’s words suggest. This means that the past sensation is never brought back in the original way because sensations become the objects of virtuality – resting, waiting as a potentiality for a new combination of relations. However, the virtual objects are not something we can know through their borders and substance. This is both the weak-
ness and pleasure in Deleuze which leaves us with a sense of fake-science but also introduces chance encounters, or the non-predictability of situations of several past and present relations.

Sensations as affects and percepts chance us. Affects change our bodies capacity to act. Percept are the landscapes before man, which allow our bodies to become other in many unknown ways, as the encounters with the laser scanner and camera exemplify. Percept does not refer to a hybrid where two bodies with clear borders unite, but a notion about the body capable of attending to other ways of seeing. What is important is that these virtual objects are always travelling through time and space. This abstract thought means, for example, that something which has decreased a body’s capacity to act might in some other situation make it stronger. Consequently, it becomes impossible to say in black-and-white that an encounter was bad because we never know how it will influence the future which is still unknown.

Objectivity as meaning distance to our research subjects has been understood in a negative way in much qualitative research. Participatory research especially values close engagement with research participants. Recently, Wylie (2017) has suggested that distance could also be understood more positively. According to Wylie the concept of distance is important for disengaging from ideas of landscape as a homeland. Following e.g. Nancy’s ‘uncanny landscape’, Wylie understands landscape “as withdrawal, as an absence of presence”. That is to say, that we are never entangled with the world because we are not able to conceive it and relate to it. What I have found in this research about creative landscape resonates with Wylie’s ideas about distance in positive terms.

Badiou’s event and especially its appearance in the discussion about the two theatres offers an entry to distance. The first theatre is a false theatre of the state of situation, the other true theatre is capable of expressing the state of situation. As already mentioned, Badiou claims that “theatre distances the State it shows because this showing is informed, put into form, on the basis of the State itself”. In my research, I have worked with this distancing by problematising my different positions: an initial objective gaze towards the suburban Other, a subjective activist and a spectator with critical distance to the situation of representational politics of multiculturalism. I have argued that the theatre and research workshop sparked an event leading to the researcher as spectator wanting to leave her seat, which led to a distancing from the State. The tranquil world of the representational politics of multiculturalism was put in motion and from this arouse movement of rupture and cut, or the creative landscape.

The present that never arrives offers another positive way of understanding distance in research. Acknowledging a mobile present means taking a distance to the categories and being alert for fixed ways of seeing the world. Although it might feel irritating not to be able to relate a present as it was, this is where the immense potential lies. Above
all, the mobile present reveals life in the living. That is to say, however much we want to capture something for the purpose of an analysis, it has always already left us. This is the problematics that non-representational theories still puzzle with – how to articulate the moment that flees itself. In my work, I have continued the discussion through reflecting on my urban photography projects with Deleuze’s movement-image and time-image. If the first voices more about sequenced presents, which is stepping from action to action, the second conveys the present as nowhere and everywhere. Time-image aims to communicate change that happens without something taking place as action. We become others in encounters, and it cannot be avoided. Not being able to reconstruct a moment is thus not something negative but an open the eyes to the potentiality for change which arrives with sensations.

I have also entered artistic research, a terrain I do not know if I am allowed to enter because I am not a trained artist doing a PhD in an art institution (see Elo 2009). Nevertheless, geography has a long tradition of working with artistic practices from von Humboldt to Granö, and the new collaborative projects and curations of exhibitions, poems and poetic writings are thriving in many places where geographical thinking is practiced. In my research, the artistic research was fostered by the problematic of how to react and speak about the things encountered. Thus, it was not a planned action but something that took place. Over all artistic research has meant an aesthetic orientation as another way to cope with the chaos, uncertainty, and chance that always haunts any rational endeavours. I have been involved in art in different ways, by participating in planned workshops and by starting to produce art myself.

The artistic research occurred first when I made an installation after the theatre and research workshops. I started to see what I had encountered in the form of a playful installation. It was only through many re-writings that I was able to articulate the problematics of representational politics of multiculturalism and participatory planning in an academic article. Furthermore, I made the Drawing OntoSky photography project which was constellated from previous encounters with the city seen through a mobile phone camera, the urban sky project in the Summer School and the act of making the final presentation (Appendix 1). Nevertheless, how something emerges as a work of art cannot be clearly traced and articulated because it is “the various ‘constellations’ or montage—the particular arrangements and the manner of their composition through which something stands out that could not have otherwise been shown or shown itself” (Mersch 2015, 11).

I have argued that the landscapes of fabulation are those of the artistic processes. Art occurs beyond and around material sensations. Sensations are thoughts about knowledge. Deleuze’s study of images detaches itself from the history of representational thought by looking beyond the narrative development in thought (Marks 2010, 284). These ideas have found their way into artistic research. Mersch (2015, 10), for example, insists “on the paradoxical formulation of ‘another thought’ that is simultaneously ‘other than thought’ (as concept/discourse)”. My practice finds resonance
with Mersch who claims that one is not an author in command. Instead the interest is “in the stimulation of effects or leaps rather than directional intentions or calculated efforts that follow a precise plan and aim for closure in a manner imagined at the work’s inception” (ibid., 11). Landscapes of fabulation are concerned with answering the problematics without taking action. This happens by making images and/or words that play with knowledge, clichés, and categories, and that combine the true and false which are not two poles but are themselves shifting points, complicating and making the world appear in nuances, in the grey-black.

As I arrive at the end of this work, I doubt. I do not doubt the reflections of the works of others. My attempt has been to stay truthful to these. However, I must doubt the thoughts that I have followed. With Badiou and Deleuze my aim has been to formulate a passive creativity without value. This means that through events things happen to us, and thus, we are not totally responsible for our actions. In other words, through rare and ordinary events we change, without that we could be conscious of these changes when they occur. These notions are problematic because we need actions to create a better world and the belief that we are acting morally right. However, I need to leave the doubt behind and return to creativity as potential for change. This means acknowledging that change happens whether or not we force it to happen. Moreover, we cannot judge creativity from the perspectives of morally good or bad. This is because we never know what our actions will cause, as the trace of an event reaches far beyond the next action. For us the researchers, the potentiality for change can be seen as a need to pause, and not only jump from action to action as busy scholars conducting research. In addition to the stories we tell ourselves and others, we are always coping with uncertainties and question we do not know how to answer. These are the uncontrollable chance encounters.
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REFERENCES


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APPENDIX 1. The photographs of the Drawing OntoSky urban photography project presented without an analysis (for interpretation see Article IV, 280 – 282). (Source: Author)