CONTEMPORARY MUSIC FESTIVALS AS MICRONATIONAL SPACES

Articulations of National Identity in Serbia’s Exit and Guča Trumpet Festivals in the Post-Milošević Era

Jelena Gligorijević
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Cover Image 1: Giacomo Vesprini, Guca Trumpet Festival 2016
Cover Image 2: Marko Edge Obradović, EXIT photo team 2018

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Abstract

In this study, I address issues of national identity articulations in post-Milošević Serbia (i.e. from 2000 onwards) using two major Serbian music festivals as case studies – the Exit and Guča trumpet festivals. The Exit and Guča festivals are particularly instructive for this line of inquiry because of fundamental aesthetic and ideological differences they are said to embody; namely, the two festivals are often narrated domestically as representing Two Serbias, thereby evoking the recurring West-East hermeneutic and its familiar taxonomy of binaries.

The study first documents in detail the various ways in which Exit and Guča both reflect and construct the perceived schisms in Serbia’s national identity imaginary. Second, the study challenges the polarized representations of Exit and Guča by pointing to internal contradictions inherent in each festival. To achieve both objectives, I develop a new approach to festival research on national identity – one which arises from the idea of contemporary music festivals as micronational spaces. Informed by the larger framework of critical cultural theory and using rich research material from a wide variety of sources (including ethnographic evidence), the study ultimately illuminates the discursive practices underpinning the social production of Exit and Guča as particular types of micronational spaces, specifically, as a counter- and as an organic space respectively. Of special analytical interest is also the perception of each festival, both native and foreign, within the symbolic geographies of Serbia and the world beyond.

The study concludes with a discussion on the transformation of Exit and Guča into (national) brandscapes and the effects this conceptual change has produced on the local perception of each festival as well as of the interrelated fields of popular music and national identity more generally. The final argument of the study is that the branding talk in two Serbian festivals ultimately recasts the earlier Balkanist discourse on Serbia’s indeterminate position between the West and the East, but in a way which provides little hope for alternative visions of the nation’s future. One solution to this problem is arguably the key concept of the study – specifically, the ideas of the festival microcitizenship and coming
community – which may be used as an alternative perspective for exploring the political function of music festivals as much in Serbia as elsewhere.

**Keywords:** cultural study of music, national identity, music festivals, music geography, symbolic geography, Balkanism, Exit Festival, Guća Trumpet Festival, Post-Milošević’s Serbia, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, micronationalism, microcitizenship, micropolitics, nation branding.
Tiivistelmä


Analyyttisen huomion kohteena ovat niin ikään kotimaiset ja ulkomaiset mielikuvat ja käsitykset kyseisistä festivaaleista osina Serbian symbolista maantiedettä sekä muuta maailmaa.

Tutkimuksen perusteella Exit- ja Guča-festivaalien voidaan todeta muodon tunteen (kansallisiksi) brändikokonaisuuksiksi (brandscape) ja että tämä käsitetellinen muutos on vaikuttanut paikallisiin mielikuviiin molemmista festivaaleista sekä yleisemmin populaarimusikin ja kansallisidentiteetin kytköksiin. Tutkimuksen johtopäätös on, että kahden festivaalin brändäyspuhe toistaa aiempaa balkanistista diskurssia Serbian häilyvästä positiosta lännin ja idän välillä, mutta tekee sen tavalla, joka ei tarjoa vaihtoehtoisia näkemyksiä maan
tulevaisuudesta. Yhtenä ratkaisuna tutkimus esittää, että siinä kehitettyjä keskeisiä teoreettisia käsitteitä, festivaalien mikrokansalaisuutta ja yhteisöksi tulemista, on mahdollista käyttää vaihtoehtoisina lähestymistapoina musiikki-festivaalien poliittisten funktioiden tutkimisessa sekä Serbiaassa että muualla maailmassa.

**Avainsanat:** kulttuurinen musiikintutkimus, kansallinen identiteetti, musiikkifestivaalit, musiikkimaantiede, symbolinen maantiede, Balkanismi, Exit-festivaali, Guča Trumpet-festivaali, Miloševićin jälkeinen Serbia, kosmopolitanismi, mikronationalismi, mikrokansalaisuus, mikropoliitikka, kansallisen imagon rakennus.
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Notes on Transliteration, Pronunciation, and Translation

Serbo-Croatian is a South Slavic language with four mutually intelligible national standards: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin (Kordić 2010). It is also a language using two scripts: Serbian Cyrillic and Gaj’s Latin alphabet. The Serbo-Croatian expressions that appear in this study were written with the Latin alphabet, largely for practical reasons. The only exception to this was a single citation (in Chapter 5) which was presented in its original Serbian Cyrillic form to visually corroborate the argument at hand. Either way, the transliteration and pronunciation of Serbo-Croatian words in the present study invariably adhered to the established norms of the linguistic standard. What may suffice as a general guidance for international readers is that both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets follow phonemic principles and consist of the following upper and lowercase letters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin script</th>
<th>Cyrillic script</th>
<th>English approximation</th>
<th>Latin script</th>
<th>Cyrillic script</th>
<th>English approximation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A, a</td>
<td>А, а</td>
<td>calm</td>
<td>L, l</td>
<td>Л, л</td>
<td>please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B, b</td>
<td>Б, б</td>
<td>book</td>
<td>Lj, lj</td>
<td>Љ, љ</td>
<td>roughly battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C, Ć, Ć</td>
<td>Ц, ц</td>
<td>blitz</td>
<td>M, m</td>
<td>М, м</td>
<td>man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D, đ</td>
<td>Д, đ</td>
<td>daddy</td>
<td>Nj, nj</td>
<td>Њ, њ</td>
<td>news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dž, dž</td>
<td>Џ, ђ</td>
<td>roughly eject</td>
<td>O, o</td>
<td>О, о</td>
<td>loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, Ė, Ė</td>
<td>Е, е</td>
<td>fantasy</td>
<td>Š, š</td>
<td>Ш, ш</td>
<td>sharp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G, г</td>
<td>Г, г</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>T, t</td>
<td>Т, т</td>
<td>toy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H, ĥ</td>
<td>Х, х</td>
<td>ham</td>
<td>U, u</td>
<td>У, у</td>
<td>full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I, i</td>
<td>И, и</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>V, v</td>
<td>В, в</td>
<td>voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J, Ј</td>
<td>Ј, Ј</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Z, з</td>
<td>З, з</td>
<td>zoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K, Š, Ž</td>
<td>К, к</td>
<td>skin</td>
<td>Ž, Ž</td>
<td>Ж, ж</td>
<td>seizure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note also that many Serbo-Croatian words used throughout the study were not transliterated into Serbian whenever their English version enjoys wide currency (e.g. it is commonly accepted to use Belgrade rather than Beograd, however, Guća is more appropriate than Gucha). In addition, all in-text references and quotations that are originally rendered in Serbo-Croatian were directly translated into English by me. Whether or not this was the case can easily be determined based on the reference list at the end of the study, where all sources are cited in their original format.
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This dissertation was a long and uncompromising effort to produce the very best piece of work I could, and that would not have been possible without the generous support of many wonderful people and organizations.

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It is also important to mention that my doctoral dissertation would not have been completed without the substantial financial and institutional support from Finland’s two national doctoral programs, one in Popular Cultural Studies (PPCS), the other in Music Studies (MuTo). Admittedly, these four years were the most productive and carefree years of my PhD research, and for that I owe a huge debt of gratitude to many individuals, in particular to the program coordinators, the amazingly supportive Kimi Kärki and Kaarina Kilpiö respectively, and a great number of supervisors and fellow students affiliated to either program: Kaj Ahlsved, Salli Anttonen, Heidi Hakkarainen, Tuomas Järvenpää, Helmi Järviluoma, Juho Kaitajärvi-Tiekso, Veli-Matti Karhulahti, Katja Kontturi, Johannes Koski, Raine Koskimaa, Meri Kytö, Grisell Macdonel, Siboné Oroza, Ljiljana Radošević, Kim Ramstedt, Tarja Rautiainnen-Keskustalo, Heli Reimann, Hannu Salmi, Aino Tormulainen, Heikki Uimonen, and Juhana Venäläinen.

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On a more existential level, the completion of my doctoral studies was possible thanks to the additional support from the Open Society Foundations’ (OSF) Global Supplementary Grant Program, Turku University Foundation, the Finnish state welfare system, and my parents, Perica and Ljiljana, whose occasional financial injections and unconditional emotional support provided the necessary means to continue with my research.

Operationally speaking, this research project owes much to all these individuals who helped me create as diverse pool of data as possible – for example, people from such organizations as the Belgrade and Guća public libraries, Belgrade-based cultural institutions and NGOs that took part in, or were associated with, the Exit and Guća festivals (e.g. World Music Association of Serbia, World Music Museum, Peščanik / ‘Sandglass’), festival PR people, festival documentary makers (both do-
mestic and international), Serbian journalists, scholars, or simply individuals selling relevant material online. Special thanks however are owed to all my festival informants, in particular to those with whom I was able to share and discuss the festival experience at a deeper level, among whom I wish to include the Exit festival visitor Martin Schlegel. It was specifically in the dancing area of HappyNoviSad Stage in the early morning hours of Friday, July 13, 2012, when I spontaneously hooked up with this gorgeous Swiss man. What began there as an innocent festival romance has turned into a profound, long-term, and long-distance relationship, which, against all odds, continues to flourish. I wish to thank Martin for his continual and unselfish love, support, and understanding that made the hard and seemingly everlasting work on my thesis a lot easier and a lot more meaningful. The same applies to the core members of my networks of family and friends: Ana, Beba, Čedo, Dušica, Mary, Nena, Staša, Thomas, Vesko, and Živa. My heartfelt thanks to you all!

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Jelena Gligorijević
1 Introduction

As someone living in Belgrade back in the noughties, I was truly fascinated by the scope and pervasiveness of fierce public debates in which Serbia’s two major music festivals – Exit and Guča – were pitted against one another as representatives of two different cultures and two opposed visions of postsocialist Serbian society: a liberal and a conservative one. Perhaps the best case in point in this regard was the TV mini-interview series Dvougao [Double Angle], an independent production broadcast between 2007 and 2014 on several domestic TV channels (namely, former TV B92, former TV Avala, and RTV1 Vojvodina). In this five-minute format of a staged TV duel, two public figures from various domains of Serbian public life were interviewed in parallel on a number of Serbia’s pressing political, economic, societal, and cultural issues. During the period between 2007 and mid-2009, the guests of Double Angle were regularly confronted with the question ‘Exit or Guča?’ thereby consolidating the ‘either-or’ fallacy behind the commonly held view of Serbian society as split in two halves – modern and traditional, cosmopolitan and nationalist, Western and Eastern, and other simplistic binaries.

The main aim of the present study is accordingly twofold. The first is to evidence in detail the various ways in which Exit and Guča both reflect and construct the perceived schisms in Serbia’s national identity imaginary. The second aim is to challenge the polarized representations of Exit and Guča by pointing to internal contradictions inherent in each festival. To achieve both objectives, the study offers a novel approach to festival research on national identity, one which arises from the idea of contemporary music festivals as micronational spaces. Informed by the larger framework of critical cultural theory and using rich research material from a wide variety of sources (including ethnographic evidence), the study ultimately seeks to illuminate the discursive practices underpinning the social production of Exit and Guča as particular types of micronational spaces, specifically, as a counter- and as an organic space respectively. Of special analytical interest is also the perception of each festival, both internal and external, within the symbolic geographies of Serbia and the world beyond.

The present inquiry is both particular and general in its scope, context, and significance. On a more specific level, the study provides the most detailed analysis of
Exit and Guča that has ever been undertaken from a national identity perspective, eliciting thereby political realities in Serbia and other countries facing similar challenges of the postsocialist/postcolonial predicament. At the same time, the study addresses more general issues surrounding contemporary culture and politics, specifically (1) growing nationalist sentiment in Europe and elsewhere, and (2) the seemingly unprecedented commodification of (festival) culture. In doing so, this work contributes to the field of festival/cultural studies in several crucial ways. First, it makes a strong case for the continuing salience of national identity issues in contemporary music festivals, and thus runs against the grain of much recent theorizing on their predominantly cosmopolitan character. Second, it proposes a new research approach to this problematic, one which is based on the Lefebvrian theorization of space production and the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of micropolitics. Combined together, these two conceptual frameworks are crucial to understanding how the idea of the micronational is employed in this work and how it ultimately leads to the introduction of new theoretical concepts – those of festival micro-citizenship and the coming community – into the discourse on politics in contemporary music festivals. This brings us to the third and last contribution of this work: discussion on politics with a capital ‘P’. Indeed, by bringing issues of national identity back into the limelight, the study raises the big political questions about what kind of society we (want to) live in, contesting thereby the taken-for-granted discourse of neoliberal global capitalism that underpins a good deal of public debate, both academic and quotidian, about music festival practice today.

1.1 Background and Main Assumptions of the Study

The exponential growth and diversification of festivals and festival audiences the world over, especially from the 1990s onwards, is something that has been acknowledged and duly documented by many festival studies scholars (e.g. Anderton 2006; Arnautović 2014; Bennett et al. eds. 2014; Gibson and Connell 2012; McKay ed. 2015). This fact alone points to the increasingly important role that festivals play in generating substantial revenue as well as in mediating and giving shape to much of our cultural experience today. This in turn explains why festivals operate so successfully today at the intersection of music/culture/event industries, the tourism and leisure sector, and all sorts of regeneration and cultural policies.1

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1 One example of the last of these is the so-called Arts Festivals’ Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue, issued by the European Festivals Association (EFA) on the occasion of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008 (see Arnautović 2014). Another example is the use of Singapore’s key annual festivities with the aim of developing a national cultural policy that would appeal to international tourists and simultaneously foster a sense of national identity among its citizens – one which is based on a ‘sanitized’ and commoditized fusion of...
There are many factors that are specifically accountable for the ongoing boom in the music festival industry. To begin with, the increased market demand for pop festivals can be explained by a parallel increase in consumerism and disposable income of the global middle class over the past few decades, notwithstanding stagnation of middle classes in advanced economies following the Great Recession (see Milanović 2016). The enduring popularity of pop festivals is also owing to the fact that the music festival market has reached its maturity stage. As a result, music festivals have diversified their lineups and cultural programs, and become more professional in their management and services (see Anderton 2006; Stone 2009). Another corollary to all these processes is the increasingly commercial orientation of postmillennial pop festivals, which is also reflected in their endorsement of place branding initiatives and corporate sponsorships. Moreover, pop festivals have long developed into brands in their own right.

There is in addition much practical reasoning behind the growing interest in music festival attendance. As Pham (2015) points out, ‘[w]ith artist lineups numbering in the dozens for each major festival, they [are] (...) seen as providing a bigger bang for the buck when compared to traditional stadium concerts for one or two bands’. Let me finally mention that the music festival boom reflects wider social changes brought about by information technologies. One result of this all-encompassing digital shift was that live music, as a core part of the festival program, began to carry ever greater currency in the economy of popular music industry. The other was that the immediacy of music festival experience could apparently compensate for a lack of face-to-face social interactions in everyday life (see McKay 2015). Alongside this longing for belonging, festivalgoers seem to be longing also for the Event, defined by Alain Badiou (in Reynolds 2011: 54) as a rupture in the space-time continuum with the promise of a future that is radically different from the past.

In any event, the global expansion of festivals and their ever-growing influence in the socioeconomic and cultural spheres of contemporary life have turned them into a ubiquitous planetary phenomenon which different scholars sought to theorize in different ways. Lukić-Krstanović (2008), for instance, proposes the term ‘the festival order’ to capture the complexity of functions that (music) festivals and their various networks currently perform, ranging from aesthetic and cultural, to bureaucratic, political, and economic. Roche (2011), on the other hand, explains the remarkable influence of festivals on their host societies in terms of festivalization processes. He defines the latter as a set of ‘traditions, institutions and genres of cultural performance’ that make a tremendous mark on ‘collective understandings and practices of the West and the East (see Foley et al. 2007). Finally, Sandle et al. (2007) examine the political and cultural effects of a contemporary visual arts festival in Leeds on the status of arts, artists, and the local public realm by looking into the complex dynamic between a variety of festival actors and city policy-makers.
space, time and agency’ (ibid., 127–128). Several other writers have sought to complement Roche’s formulation of festivalization by placing it into the prevailing economic discourse of culture within which ‘culture no longer simply serves as a realm of legitimation, but, rather, must itself be legitimated on the basis of its explicit social and economic utility’ (Papastergiadis and Martin 2011: 45). Chalcraft and Magaudda (2011: 174–175), for instance, point to the strategy of place branding as an additional ingredient to festivalization processes, whereas Richards (2007, in Taylor 2014: 33) critically assesses the phenomenon of festivalization, viewing it in light of the increasing processes of commodification, but also as a move away from the cultural needs of local communities towards systematic attempts at reaching out to global audiences and markets. Lastly, following Appadurai’s (1990) theoretical schema of globalization comprising five distinct but interlinked ‘-scapes’ (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes), Chalcraft and Magaudda (2011) not only view contemporary festivals as sites where such varieties of ‘-scapes’ come into play, but they also set forth the idea of festivalscapes as a distinct category in its own right. Specifically,

Festivalscapes are a set of cultural, material and social flows, at both local and global levels, both concrete and imagined, both deliberate and unintended, which emerge and are established during a specific festival. In this sense, festivals can be seen and analysed as terrains where different cultural, aesthetic and political patterns and values temporarily converge and clash, constantly creating, stabilizing, and redefining the setting of festival interaction, and in so doing stressing the problems raised by the multiple articulation of global cultural flows, local life and spatiality. (Ibid., 174.)

The concept of festivalscapes clearly depicts contemporary festivals as truly ‘glocalized’ spaces (Robertson 1995). As such, it seems to be in line with the consensus view among festival researchers that a majority of ‘festivals [today] balance the needs of representing the local within a broader context of rapid social change’ (Sassatelli 2008, in Bennett and Woodward 2014: 18). Another consensus opinion among both the older (e.g. Bakhtin 1984; Falassi 1987; Turner 1969; 1982) and the younger (e.g. Aitchison and Pritchard eds. 2007; Bennett et al. eds. 2014; Karlsen 2007) generations of festival scholars is also achieved with respect to the ultimate significance of contemporary festival sites for the identity work of both festivalgoers and host locations in which festivals are staged. Note, however, that within this strand of festival scholarship, issues of national identity are only sporadically addressed and explored in their own right. The main reason for that lies in a more or less explicitly stated assumption (pervading the discursive space of academia, festival promotion, and official cultural policies) that contemporary festivals are key sites that shape and
are shaped by cosmopolitan relationships, thus marking a move towards postnational imaginings of community.

While acknowledging the relevance of such insights, the present study asserts that contemporary music festivals continue to be configured as important public arenas for staging, performing, negotiating, and representing national identities, despite (or rather: precisely because of) the purported processes of globalization, pluralization, decentralization, and fragmentation of contemporary sociocultural life. But to understand fully why the question of national identity still matters in contemporary festivalscapes, one must acknowledge first that nations and national identities remain discursive constructs of great real and symbolic significance in today’s world.

1.1.1 Why National Identities Matter in a Global Age

It is a truism that in the post-Fordist age of digital information, flexible accumulation, mass consumerism, and competitive individualism, multifold connections and flows within the space-time continuum keep on challenging bounded notions of the nation. To claim, however, that all such processes have undermined the general importance of nations can be countered on a number of fronts.

First, it is worth noting that in contemporary theories of nations and nationalism, there is a general agreement on ‘the power, even primacy, of national loyalties and identities over those of (...) class, gender, and race’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 4; see also Anderson 2006). For Edensor (2002: 29, 35), national identity is likewise considered ‘a common-sense framework’ for mapping out the world and ‘the pre-eminent source of belonging’ with a power to subsume other markings of identity (such as age, gender, class, race, ethnicity, etc.) into its overriding structure. As Nussbaum (2013) explains, following Mazzini, it is precisely through the nation’s concreteness and vividness, both the spectacularity and the banality of its multiple expressions, and the reality of its past and present, that people come to develop profound attachments to it. She further argues that attachments at local levels may be valuable, but they are still informed by the values shared by the nation. The nation is at the same time ‘a fulcrum on which we can leverage universal sentiment’ (ibid., 56), since the notion of humanity seems too abstract and too vague to relate to. Whether this ‘universal sentiment’ is used then as a force for good or evil in the world is an entirely different question. Depending on external and internal geographies of political relations at particular times and places, as well as on the core assumptions of the national idea, the political ideology of nationalism can equally be utilized as a means of emancipation and autonomy (as in anticolonial struggles), or as a means of tyranny and exclusion (as in inter- and intraethnic, racial, and religious conflicts all around the world).
Second, and relatedly, it is a simple fact of life that we do live in a world of nations, despite the multiple faces of globalization which all point to the emergence of a postnational world. The nation is indeed a political category of great ethical importance, given the key role it played in the historical formation and development of modern societies. In fact, the nation effectively remains the largest political unit to this date which informs people’s sense of values and through which they give themselves laws of their own choosing (see Edensor 2002; or Nussbaum 2013). This is, however, not to deny the possibility of identifications and alliances that go beyond national borders (as in the European Union [EU] or in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]); nor is it to gloss over internal struggles over what constitutes national interests and national identity of any given society at any given time in history (as exemplified recently by the case of Brexit).

Third and last, the continuing salience of national identity has also something to do with ‘an anxious age of identity’ we are living in (cf. Bhabha 1996: 59). There are many factors contributing to a general sense of insecurity in people’s everyday lives, namely, widening income inequality across the globe (Milanović 2016), the resurgence of populist nationalism in all corners of the world and the attendant growth of racism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic strife, and separatist movements (Beary 2008; Rachman 2014), the persisting threat of terrorism of all kinds (e.g. ideological terrorism, religious terrorism, cyberterrorism, ecoterrorism), the rapidity of technological and socioeconomic changes, migrations, growing mobility, and the perceived dissolution of spatial, cultural, and identity boundaries. It goes without saying that the fluidity and uncertainty in today’s world only reinforce the people’s desire for a sense of situatedness and rootedness. Long established as a significant source of identification, national identity readily offers itself for coming to terms with the prevailing feeling of disorientation and instability in the contemporary world.

It should be noted that this line of reasoning is very much consistent with the commonly held view in academia that ‘nations and ethnicities can be regarded as necessary functions and expressions of “globality”’ (Pieterse 1995, in O’Flynn 2007: 21). Thus, drawing once again on Edensor’s (2002) comprehensive study on national identity, popular culture, and everyday life, it is safe to conclude that the ever-growing complexity and fluidity of connections across the globe have not abolished the power of national identity. Rather, the global condition has only recast the existing points of convergence that foreground national identity into the new ones, rendering its manifold expressions less authoritative and increasingly heterogeneous and contested. The field of national identity has clearly evolved into an ever more complex entity, along with the changing world, and needs to be revisited – which is precisely one of the tasks the present study intends to accomplish through the proposed concept of festival micronational spaces.
1.1.2 Why the Question of National Identity Matters in Festival Studies

While there is consensus that the ideas of nations and nationalism remain a relevant point of reference in festival research (e.g. Chalcraft et al. 2014; English 2011; Fabiani 2011), only a few studies consider the category of national identity as a study object in its own right (e.g. Chappel and Loades 2006; Kifleyesus 2007; Mudford 2015; Puderbaugh 2006; Thompson et al. 2006). The main focus is rather on exploring various other aspects of festival experience and practice within the predominantly cosmopolitan and/or localized framework of analysis (see e.g. Bennett et al. eds. 2014; Delanty et al. eds. 2011; McKay ed. 2015).

Contrary to these research trends in the festival scholarship, the present study brings issues of national identity back into its limelight with the aim of raising big questions about what kind of society we (want to) live in. Namely, if we agree that nation is a political incarnation of ‘the community-society metaphor’ (Agnew, in Withers 2009: 644), then any cultural study of national identity might confront us with more general questions about our society’s present and future. The question of national identity, in other words, can politicize the discourse on festival imagery in a way which goes beyond prevailing concerns with lifestyle and cultural differences. Not only is national identity an overarching category that cuts across the particularities of people’s multiple cultural affiliations. It is also a political concept that invites reflection on power asymmetries on a larger scale. As English (2011) points out, festivals exert great influence on the global economy of cultural prestige, constituting thereby a specific geography of symbolic power across the globe. He clarifies in addition that:

From the standpoint of the national government, the festival is a doubly useful symbolic event: on the domestic front, it helps to secure nationalist sentiment across lines of internal division, cementing the fragile bonds of ‘imagined community’; no less importantly, on the field of international relations, it serves to project a depth and richness of national heritage together with the administrative competence of a properly modern state apparatus. It assists the nation in improving its symbolic position among the many nations of the world. (Ibid., 66.)

In addition to the said function of festivals to participate in accruing, deploying, and displaying the (sub)cultural capital in both intra- and international contexts, another is to serve as ‘a forum for the exchange of ideas and the construction of reasoned consensus about art and society’ (ibid., 64) – a process which also takes shape in a dialectical interplay between insider and outsider perspectives. Note, however, that the insistence on the national dimension here is not necessarily inconsistent with the suggestions on how to deal with the world’s impending crises given by such present-
day thinkers as Buden, Harari, Horvat, Varoufakis, or Žižek. In their view, the challenges of the contemporary world (e.g. issues concerning ecology, biotechnology, intellectual property, the future of capitalism and state), as well as the very possibility for social change, require transnational forms of political organization and collective action. Nonetheless, I claim that in the discursive practices surrounding contemporary (festival) culture, the nation may figure as a conceptual and strategic tool to address the larger political concerns of today’s world.

Another assertion of the present study is that the political potential of festivals might be realized to the fullest in the distinctive environment of music festivals. The reasons for that are largely historical. Most music festival scholars do agree that the familiar historical link between countercultural musical practices and emancipatory politics surrounding the hippie movement of the 1960s was articulated and fortified through the institution of the music festival (see Bennett and Woodward 2014: 13). It goes without saying that the 1969 Woodstock Music and Arts Fair established itself as the mythical place of origin in the popular music festival tradition as we know it today. Such historical baggage explains well why music festivals of the present day strive so often to keep up with the countercultural image and rhetoric of their forerunners.

What renders music festivals additionally suitable for all kinds of political engagement and identity work (national identifications included) are arguably certain discourses about the music itself and its relation to the outer world. One telling example here is the popular myth of music’s universality, passionately shared by music practitioners, commentators, and fans alike. The same myth is also deeply seated in the discursive landscape of music festivals. DJ Loco Dice (Tomorrowland, MTV, 2014), for example, makes explicit reference to the title of Funkadelic’s famous studio album One Nation Under a Groove (United Sound Studio, 1978) to describe Belgium’s Tomorrowland EDM festival as a place ‘bring[ing] all [nations] under one groove’. If this belief in music’s ability to transcend national borders and extend beyond cultural differences due to its perceived metaphysical properties and affective power is an expression of wishful thinking, then ‘music’s potential for sociality and community’ is at least an undeniable fact (see Hesmondhalgh 2014: 85). Or put more poetically, music constitutes a ‘mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the “We”, which is at the foundation of all possible communication’ (Schutz 1951, in Hesmondhalgh 2014: 116).

The capacity of music to afford a sense of belonging to a like-minded community is typically invoked in popular accounts of music festival experience. However, such an insight fails to address the flip side of music’s relation to sociality and collectivity, specifically, music’s involvement and compliance in erecting boundaries and maintaining sociocultural divisions (see Johnson and Cloonan 2009; Stokes 1994a). The underlying assumption here is clearly that the ‘We’ identity can be recognized
as such only through its relation to an Other, that is, through its difference to the ‘They’ identity, to use Schutz’s terminology (see Hall 1996).

The Janus-faced and mercenary nature of music has also been acknowledged and theorized with respect to music’s role in the construction of place and identity. For instance, Connell and Gibson (2003: 17) suggest that the notions of fixity and fluidity encapsulate the dynamic processes by which music ‘moves across, while becoming embedded in, the materiality of localities and social relations’. Radano and Bohlman (2000) likewise describe music’s dual function in terms of a dynamic between the points of stability and exchange. At the former end of this continuum, music gives shape to ‘native expression’, unleashing ‘the imagination of racial difference’. At the latter end, music ‘fills in the spaces between racial distinctiveness’, thus constantly undergoing the processes of transmission and hybridity. Closely tied to Radano and Bohlman’s views are also those which regard the intersection between music and national identity as resulting in ‘a relatively bounded yet “porous” field of meaning that is inextricably linked to the increasingly “transnational flow” of musical identities’ (O’Flynn 2007: 22). Or put simply, the musical production of any nation arises from the complex interplay between global musical influences and the preservation of musical elements that are deemed culturally unique. Thus, the profile of any country’s music-national correlations depends invariably on ‘where any specific music lies in a “continuum” of insider-outsider perspectives’ (Folkestad 2002, in O’Flynn 2007: 23).

As will become clear in the following section, the idea of music’s double-edged character also underpins the proposed concept of festival micronational spaces. But grasping this truth is not the only motivation for developing a brand new approach to the study of national identity and music festivals. There are, of course, many other competing theoretical models that could serve the same ends. However, a critical review of the relevant festival studies literature in the next chapter will demonstrate that the problematic of national identity and related spatial identities (be they local, regional, or transnational/diasporic) is largely confined to analyses that take a heritage and a cultural memory perspective as their main conceptual frameworks. On the other hand, the studies focused on other-than-national forms of cultural identities and practices do offer valuable but insufficiently comprehensive and politicized (in the sense articulated above) theorizations of space. It is upon these grounds that I claim that both fields of national identity and festival socio-spatial practice should undergo a more systematic and politically critical investigation using the proposed concept of music festivals as micronational spaces. While this assertion is fully corroborated in the next chapter, here I explain the basic idea standing behind the concept in question.
1.2 Key Concept of the Study

The idea of music festivals as micronational spaces figures in the present study as a fully-fledged conceptual and analytical framework for the analysis of national identity articulations in Serbia’s two major music festivals. This is clearly a two-part concept that merges a humanist account of space, as articulated in the work of Lefebvre (2009), Massey (2005), and Soja (1996), and the revisited notion of national identity, as emphasized through the use of the ‘micronational’ terminology. Let me briefly discuss the core assumptions underpinning each aspect of this two-part concept.

The adoption of a spatial theoretical perspective can be justified on multiple grounds. To begin with, I maintain that both national identities and (music) festivals are profoundly marked by the spatial dimension. In a nutshell, nations and national identities are territorialized entities producing a complex geography of sites, places, pathways, and constellations that all frame a particular way of being in the world (see Edensor 2002). At the same time, nations are entangled in the geography of social relations and practices that go well beyond the nation-state’s borders through their various links to the outside world, especially to their diaspora communities and former colonies. These extended relations and practices in turn continue to de-territorialize and re-territorialize articulations of national identity materially, discursively, and performatively. (Music) festivals too are invariably embedded in, and constituted by, the materiality of places in which they are staged, while simultaneously exceeding these material constraints through their visionary potential and through their connectedness with wider networks.

National identities and festivals, respectively, not only have a profound grounding in space. I also argue that it is through their joint examination from a spatial perspective that a number of crucial insights can be gained and enhanced. The first amounts to a potentially deeper understanding of the complexity of social relations and material practices coming from both endogenous and exogenous sources and intersecting in music festivalscapes. The second gain from a spatially guided analysis of national identity arises from the possibility of tackling some widely exploited misconceptions associated with the global-local and modern-traditional dichotomies, as well as with the related notions of cultural heritage and cultural difference. Spatial theories may not only thus create possibilities for understanding these kinds of binary oppositions in discourses of national identity in a more nuanced way. They may also serve as an invaluable discursive source for a perspective that challenges the current form of global market capitalism—a contextual framework which appears to be taken for granted in a majority of recent festival studies. And last but not least, spatial theories provide suitable conceptual tools for a multilayered analysis of the national dimension, for example, in light of ‘the multiplicity of spaces’ that music festivals instantiate (Lefebvre 2009: 27). As will be exemplified by the comprehensive analysis of Serbian national identity articulations in Exit and Guća, Lefebvre’s concepts of
counter-space (i.e. a type of space transformed to serve an alternative political function) and organic space (i.e. a type of space, whose self-understanding in terms of bodily parts gives rise to an ‘organic’ conception of nationhood) are indeed key to answering the main research questions of this study (see 1.5).

The use of the term ‘micronational’ in the present work is likewise driven by several factors. The first is to underscore awareness that contemporary music festivals, in all aspects of their sociocultural significance and practice, are just a small piece within the larger system of national identity representation. Secondly and relatedly, the use of micronational terminology calls attention to the complexity of national identity phenomena by focusing largely on the micropolitical level of its formation. At stake here is thus a bottom-up approach to the cultural study of national identity, which acknowledges that political power involved in its (re)production not only arises from the macro level instances of institutionalized power but also from everyday life practices, in which music festivals play a part. Two implications follow from this. One is that any cultural study of national identity must necessarily be selective in its endeavors to handle an invariably vast spectrum of national expressions and meanings – and so is the present study in its focus on issues of Serbian national identity articulations in Exit and Guča. The other is that any cultural study that approaches music festivals as micronational instances must take into consideration their material embeddedness in the geography of pre-existing locations in which selected festivals are held, but in a way which stretches out across all spatial levels, from communal to global.

Furthermore, the use of the micronational trope in the festival promotional discourse can be said to reflect the increasingly diversified and fragmented character of contemporary cultural practice. With this in mind, the concept of micronationality performs arguably a double function in the festival world – marketing and ideological. When used as a marketing tool (i.e. for festival branding in terms of symbolic microstates), the concept is expected to maximize the festivals’ prospects of survival within the conditions of their hyperproduction at the global scale. When used as an ideological tool, the concept assists festivals in promulgating a set of distinct values, worldviews, and agendas. It is this latter use of micronationality that emphasizes the potentially creative capacity of festivals to envision and actualize the worlds of their own.

This brings me to the main point of the study. As mentioned above, the theorization of music festivals as micronational spaces is based on a dialectic of fixity and fluidity. I specifically argue that music festivals are conceived and staged as symbolic microstates operating in their own right, while simultaneously adhering to the existing policies and dominant regimes of truth within actual nation-states that host them. Or put more elaborately, music festivals are real places embedded in the geography of pre-existing locations and their wider networks, national, transnational,
and otherwise. Therefore, they invariably draw on the experience of a given locality and actively participate in the (re)construction of space-based identities, including nation-building projects. At the same time, a majority of music festivals attempt to surpass the constraints of locality and the given conditions of global power geometry. They function as self-contained worlds, very often envisioned as one-of-a-kind fantasy worlds, or as ‘sacred’ places that ‘festival-pilgrims’ around the globe prepare themselves to visit each year. As I intend to showcase on the following pages, in this aspect of their management and experience, music festivals act perhaps most strikingly as symbolic micronations, largely promoting the ideals of egalitarianism, universality, love, peace, and happiness. As such, they recommend themselves as utopian places, predominantly defined by a certain type of attitude, feeling, spirituality, and state of mind. They typically seek to annihilate a sense of space in favor of the experience that foregrounds ‘the “time based” identity (contemporary-ness) of cosmopolitanism’ (Massey 1994, in Simić 2009: 144). Or as Fabiani (2011: 93) puts it, they aspire ‘to develop a post-national form of cultural citizenship’.

In short, by conceptualizing festivals as micronational spaces, the present study ultimately seeks to revisit both notions of national identity and festival spatiality, and thereby set them anew in the academic field of festival / cultural studies. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed concept in a concrete music festival analysis, I turn to two selected festival case studies within the context of post-Milošević Serbia as a major focus of my study. Provided next are accordingly major details regarding two selected Serbian music festivals and the main criteria for their selection.

1.3 Exit and Guča as Case Studies

The Exit and Guča trumpet festivals are two major music festivals in post-Milošević Serbia but very different in their origin, aesthetic form, and conceptual underpinnings. Exit is a promoter of so-called global pop and is based in Novi Sad, capital city of Serbia’s northern province Vojvodina. It was launched in 2000 as a lengthy youth protest against the Milošević regime and has, since then, evolved into a highly acclaimed pop spectacle in South East Europe. The Guča trumpet festival was, on the other hand, established in 1961 in the village of Guča in the Dragačevo region of western Serbia with the aim of reviving the vanishing Serbian brass band tradition. Hence its main focus and appeal reside in the brass band competition part of the program, which includes a range of awards with the First Trumpet, First Band, and Golden Trumpet being the most prestigious ones. Nowadays Guča Festival draws around half a million visitors every year, and from 2010 onwards, when the category of international competition was introduced into the festival program, organizers immodestly called it ‘the trumpet capital of the world’ (Tadić et al. 2010).
Being fundamentally different in their musico-ideological orientations, Exit and Guča are often narrated domestically as representatives of two diametrically opposed value systems and thus of two dominant cultural models at work in postsocialist Serbian society: a liberal and a conservative one. In academic literature, the said dichotomy is alternatively articulated as the tension between Serbia’s cosmopolitan and nationalist models of culture (see Čolović 2002, in Malešević 2011: 26). The former treats culture as a dynamic space of ‘intercultural communication’ within which new forms of culture emerge, whereas the latter centers on ‘the symbols of national identity, “return to the roots”, religion, language, tradition, and the exclusion of “foreign” elements from the native customs, habits and lifestyles’ (ibid., 26). The apparent polarization of Serbian society – or what Naumović (2009: 162) calls ‘the political construction of [Serbia’s] quasi-ethnic identity schism’ – feeds in turn into the widely exploited narrative of Two Serbias.

The discourse of Two Serbias emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, although its geneses can be tracked down earlier in the history of the modern Serbian nation-state (see Perović 2002, in Naumović 2009: 201). Specifically, the said discourse began to take shape when a group of Belgrade intellectuals joined together to oppose the militant nationalism and autocracy of Serbia’s notorious leader Slobodan Milošević. It was, thus, through the joint oppositional activity of the anti-Milošević camp that the term ‘Second Serbia’ (with the meaning of ‘alternative’ or ‘an-other’) came to be coined first.2 The self-identification of Second Serbia automatically set in motion the discursive construction of First Serbia as its opposite pole, or in Hall’s (1996) terminology, as its ‘constitutive outside’. Thus, if First Serbia stood for ethnic wars waged across the former Yugoslav region in the 1990s3, as well as for a general sense of intolerance, violence, poverty, isolation, and moral decline experienced at the time, then the notion of Second Serbia was associated with the antiwar agenda and the cosmopolitan and urban values of civil society.4

Note, however, that there was more to the concept of Two Serbias than its use might have initially suggested. The discursive scope of the concept expanded fast enough to spill over from the political domain into the spheres of culture and every-

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2 To be exact, Second Serbia is a term that was taken from the same-titled collection of public talks (Čolović and Mimica eds. 1992) directed against the Milošević regime.


4 Civil society is defined here in terms of ‘the elements such as freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, etc., that make up a democratic society’ (see ‘Civil Society’, Collins English Dictionary Online).
day life. Within the latter, the rise of the nouveau riche representing First Serbia was embodied in the hypermasculine, mafioso figure of so-called dizelaš [Diesel Man] and his female bimbo equivalent, a scantily-clad woman in high heels and thickly applied make-up, pejoratively called sponzoruša [Sponsor-Seeker]. Certain markers of their style (e.g. branded clothes, mobile phones, jewelry) were expensive but nonetheless detested by Second Serbia supporters due to their ‘inappropriate’ cultural value (cf. Jansen 2005a; and Simić 2009). So far as this argument goes, dizelaš and sponzoruša were held responsible for creating, and being created by, the so-called turbo-folk (TF) culture dominating the Serbian public space of the 1990s. In the mind of Second Serbia supporters, TF was strongly implicated in the country’s spectacular fall from grace (in the 1990s), including the concomitant decline of what was perceived as urban cultural forms, above all rock music.

More to the point, to designate these two main evaluative orientations in Serbia’s recent cultural memory, Kuljić (2006b) introduces the terms ‘antifascism’ and ‘Hilandar’ (a Serbian Orthodox monastery in Greece). In his words, ‘[a]ntifascism is a mark of rationalism, multiculturalism, brotherhood and unity, left[ist] position and anticonservatism. Hilandar is a mark of religion and national exclusivity and conservatism and the right[-wing] values’ (ibid., 220). Kuljić’s interpretation clearly corresponds well with an Orientalist model of the West-East divide and a long list of binary oppositions associated with it. When applied to Exit and Guča, all such dichotomies point towards a clear demarcation line between the festivals’ respective meanings and representations, situating them as extremes on a continuum (see Table 2 below). And as mentioned above, the present study likewise uses the Lefebvrian terminology of space production to consider the Exit-Guča opposition on yet another level – as distinguishing between a counter- and an organic space. (For more about each concept, see the following chapters.)

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5 The term ‘dizelaš’ was used to describe a 1990s Serbian version of the male British chav. His visual appearance was built around a set of distinctive stylistic features, specifically, Diesel jeans (hence the name for the entire social group) or tracksuit bottoms completed with a top tucked into them, sneakers (in particular Nike Air Max), shaved skull or short hairstyle parted on one side and gelled down into little rows, muscular body, and thick golden chains, very often combined with cross pendants as a flashing symbol of the dizelaš affiliation to Orthodox Christianity and Serbianhood.

6 Turbo-folk is a Serbian hybrid music genre that combines techno rhythms and nasal oriental singing. Its emergence at the beginning of the 1990s coincided with the rising wave of militant nationalism in the country, which made it a controversial target of criticism (largely over its oriental elements) by different politico-cultural groups. More about Serbia’s public reception of TF in Chapter 3.
Table 2. Binary oppositions associated with Exit and Guča

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exit Festival</th>
<th>Guča Festival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>The Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock culture</td>
<td>Neo-folk culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Hungarian heritage</td>
<td>Ottoman heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antifascism</td>
<td>Hilandar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At any rate, what seems to drive the binary logic behind Serbia’s national identity narratives, including those that pertain to the Exit-Guča debate, is a diametrically opposite approach to the concept of tradition. As Naumović (2009: 162) explains, at the heart of most Serbian public debates on the national identity question lies ‘tradition, in which participants see either key values expressing the core of national identity, or a collection of vestiges preventing the fulfillment of a desired “modern”, “civilized” and “European” identity’.

Thus, for proponents of the former approach (i.e. First Serbia supporters), the focus is placed on the rediscovery of Serbian ethnicity through return to the roots, supposedly held in check under the socialist rule. The roots are sought accordingly in various expressions of ‘authentic’ Serbian tradition (comprising historico-military, religious, and folk-peasant discursive practices), all of which premised on deeply patriarchal values. Promulgated here is in particular the idea of the Serbian peasantry as the only true embodiment of the nation’s ‘essence’ – a view reified in the actual support of the country’s latest ‘national cause’ by the rural population (see Jansen 2005b; Naumović 2009; Simić 2009). It goes without saying that the Guča organic space thrives on the rhetoric of Serbia’s national revival of the 1990s, which is something I reflect upon fully in Chapters 4 and 5.

At the opposite end are those (Second Serbia supporters) for whom ‘people’s return to the roots’ amounts to the ruralization of the country’s urban spaces and the concomitant relapse into barbarism, primitivism, and depravity. From their perspective, the processes of Serbia’s re-traditionalization are tightly linked to the rise of military nationalism in the region and all detrimental effects it generated (e.g. wars,
poverty, isolation, influx of refugees, moral decline). In contrast to other postsocialist Eastern European (EE) countries, where the predicament of transition was largely experienced as a return to pre-modernity (clearly against the discursive backdrop of socialist modernization), the ‘chaos of the 1990s’ in Serbia was rather described as specifically ‘Balkan’ (see Simić 2009: 81, 105). As Simić notes, following Green (2005), “[h]ere ‘Balkan’ was taken to mean the opposite of “modernity and Enlightenment” or “economic and technological progress” embodied in the “West”. When “modernization” failed, what was left was the truly Balkan character of the country.’ (Ibid., 105.) Thus, it was partly through the demonization of a Balkanized Other within that the modern, urban, and pro-European self-image of Second Serbia came to be created and maintained. Serbia’s Balkanized Semi-Other stands thereby in a constitutive opposition to Serbia’s Occidental-Self. As I will show in Chapters 3 and 5, the urban, liberal, and cosmopolitan profile of Exit counter-space is likewise carved out in opposition to the disparaged notions of nationalism, authoritarianism, traditionalism, rurality, and Balkanization.7

The traditional-modern distinction and all its derivatives (e.g. urban-rural, national-cosmopolitan, European-Balkan) on which the polarized view of two festivals and, by extension, of Serbian national identity rests, clearly feed each other through the discursive practices of mutual exclusion. Note, however, that the Exit-Guča dichotomy is here approached mainly as a point of departure from which to delve into the problematic of Serbian national identity representation in all its complexity. The national identity narrative of Two Serbias in fact no longer dominates Serbian public discourse, but competes instead, side by side, with few others in a never-ending struggle over national identity politics. Thus, to fully grasp the contingency, fluidity, and ambiguity with which Exit and Guča are ultimately perceived as extensions of the national self-imagery, I need to first place the entire inquiry into a historical perspective.

1.4 Contextualizing the Study

The selected time framework for the study is the period following the downfall of Milošević’s rule, the latter being crowned with a mass demonstration in Belgrade on October 5, 2000. From a largely native perspective, this time frame is typically understood as ‘a period of recovery’ standing in sharp contrast to two previous eras, specifically, (1) of the 1990s as ‘a period of suspended normality’, ‘a non-time, or a rupture’ (Simić 2009: 17, 38, 82); and if we go further back in history, (2) of the socialist era as a period of prosperity, modernization, peace, and stability (especially

7 The term ‘Balkanization’ was in prominent use during the recent ex-Yugoslav wars, serving as a metonym for the brutal disintegration of nation-states into smaller units along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines.
during the 1960s and 1970s). Even if the primary focus of analysis here are social changes occurring in post-Milošević Serbia, it seems impossible to make any meaningful discussion of national identity (in Exit and Guča) without occasional incursions into the Serbian/Yugoslav past.

On a broader scale, people’s understanding of postsocialist realities in Serbia and other EE countries is largely informed by the overriding discourse of transition and its close cousins, Europeanization and globalization. The term ‘transition’ typically refers to the process of transformation that postsocialist societies must undergo along two axes: political (from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies) and economic (from state owned and regulated economies to free markets). Defined this way, the notion of transition is highly problematic in both its ideological implications and its concrete ramifications and has accordingly received much criticism in academia. For instance, not only is the term dismissed for suggesting the idea of linear progress, but also because it openly favors and advances the hegemonic idea of Europeanness / Westernness (see Simić 2009). Moreover, the implementation of the transition project has left a majority of postsocialist societies in a state of dependency, both politically and economically, on their Western counterparts (see Nakarada 2004 and Švob-Đokić 2000, in Janković 2006), as well as in ‘a state of inadequacy’ resulting from the experience of increasing social inequality and insecurity (Znepolski 1997, in Kaneva 2012a: 7). And as a final point, it is also worth posing a more philosophical question: are not all things, both living and dead, in some sort of permanent transition, which is to say, in the permanent state of flux? The political use of the term ‘transition’ seems to suggest otherwise – that it is only postsocialist countries that are undergoing change, as if this change was taking place in some sort of trans-historical and geographical vacuum.

Notwithstanding such criticism, there are still strong arguments for keeping the term ‘transition’ within the overall conceptual framework of the study. The term specifically works as a commonsense point of reference in all kinds of discourses, commonly reinforcing Fukuyama’s (1989: 3) familiar thesis about ‘the end of history’ brought about the imposition of Western liberal democracy as the world’s ‘final form of human government’ after the fall of communism. In connection to that, the term is also useful precisely because of its ideological baggage that brings forth the question of power struggles over the interpretation of the communist past and the vision of the democratic capitalist future, which are at the same time always part of power struggles over national identity politics (cf. Burawoy and Verdery 1999, in Kaneva 2012a: 6). Within this perspective, Kaneva (2012a) suggests that the emergence of nation-branding talk has provided a discursive means by which to resolve the crisis of national identity representation in postsocialist countries. In that respect, as Kaneva points out, nation branding has established itself as ‘a central area of contestation’ in postsocialist debates on ‘what kind of identities [should be] marked as “shameful”'
or as “desired” (ibid., 7). At the same time, the adoption of (nation) branding discourse across the postsocialist region has in turn consolidated the Fukuyamian view of the new world order.

Furthermore, it might also be worth holding onto the notion of transition insofar as its use is meant to foreground the processual nature of any identity work, including that of national identity; and relatedly, insofar as its use is meant to correlate with Williams’s (1977: 121) understanding of culture as being formed through ‘the dynamic interrelations, at every point in the process, of historically varied and variable elements’. What is at stake in both cases is the idea of a paradigm shift as involving a complex and dynamic interplay of what Williams designates as dominant, residual, and emergent cultural forms. According to his theory, every society is characterized by the simultaneous coexistence of: (1) residual cultural elements (inherited from the past but still alive, active, relevant, and incorporated into the present socio-spatial practice), and (2) emerging ones (anticipating the formation of a new cultural paradigm, which is either alternative, oppositional, or conventional in relation to the prevailing order of truth), constituting together (3) the dominant culture, or what Gramsci calls cultural hegemony.

Following this model, I posit that the narrative of Two Serbias, set largely against a historical backdrop spanning Yugoslav socialism and Serbian nationalism of the 1990s, lies at the heart of Serbia’s dominant culture between the 1990s and mid-to-late 2000s. As Omaljev (2013) explains, the post-2000 narrative on Two Serbias has yielded additional differentiations within each camp. Followers of First Serbia divided between those supporting “good” (patriotic) and “bad” (radical) nationalism, whereas in the camp of Second Serbia, ‘hardliners encouraged a radical break with the ideological heritage of Milošević, while soft liberals accepted the politics of “cohabitation” with “First” Serbia’ (ibid., 212–213). In my view, the narrative of Two Serbias has continued to fuel public debates on national identity politics until the present day, but in the form of Serbian residual or anachronistic culture.

Arguably, the narrative’s core power has begun to dissipate especially since 2008, when two significant political events took place. First, the coalition government was formed at the national level between First and Second Serbia representatives. The coalition was verified symbolically in the Declaration on National Conciliation signed by two key political parties: Democratic Party, led by then Serbian president Boris Tadić, and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), inherited from Slobodan Milošević and still led by Ivica Dačić. Two far-reaching consequences resulted from this political move: on the one hand, the SPS was largely amnestied for their dark political past, whereas, on the other, the longstanding tension between two political camps (i.e. Two Serbias) was considerably defused. Second, soon after the said coalition government was inaugurated, the largest right-wing party, Serbian Radical Party, split into two fractions, apparently due to the opposite stance that some of its
key members held towards the EU accession process. The remaining segment of the original party continued to be committed to ultra-nationalist views and was temporarily squeezed out from the Serbian parliament and political life in general, whereas the newly-formed political party, Serbian Progressive Party, rose to power after the 2012 parliamentary elections, growing steadily in size and popularity thereafter.

There is no doubt that these events contributed significantly to the pacification of the overall political climate in the country, whose pro-European orientation now became predominant. I suggest that it is precisely the said changes that decisively paved the way for the rise of two additional discursive trends during the noughties. One such trend amounts to the narrative of Third Serbia, perhaps formulated most succinctly in the slogan ‘Both EU and Kosovo’ by the coalition of pro-European Serbian political parties as part of their 2008 election campaign. And the other goes under the name of nation-branding talk. The growing influence of both trends was paralleled in the production of a culture that shifted from emergent to dominant.

An emerging variety of Third Serbia constructs began to penetrate the Serbian political discourse in ca. 2005. According to Spasić and Petrović (2012), the main focus of the Third Serbia narrative is not only on bridging ‘constitutive asymmetries’ between First and Second Serbia, as well as on moralizing over their respective extremes, but also on recommending a middle ground as the most productive and truthful path for the society’s future. The most tangible effect of Third Serbia discourse is perhaps the political party of the same name, which was formed in the autumn 2013 as a result of another split within the right-wing political movement Dveri srpske [Serbian Gate], initially an NGO, later to become a political party. This occurrence seems to support Spasić and Petrović’s (2012: 38) thesis that the main function of the Third Serbia construct was to give First Serbia a makeover in a way that allows the Self of its identity to finally be represented in positive terms – in contrast to the 1990s when the First Serbia construct served simply as a counterpoint to the construction of Second Serbia’s cosmopolitan and civil self-identity.

Occurring concurrently with the popularization of the Third Serbia narrative was a gradual shift in understanding the nation in commercial terms – a process which began to receive increasing media attention since ca. 2006. In Serbia, just as in other EE countries, the reconceptualization of the nation as brand has also opened up another vista for alternative interpretations of Exit and Guča and their role in ongoing national identity narratives. More accurately, the festivals’ gradual integration into the transnational music industry and cultural tourism markets, as well as the moderate consolidation of Serbia’s national political scene through the disintegration and marginalization of the most hard-core nationalist political parties, contributed to a more unified view of Exit and Guča as national brands having much in common, above all, promoting a positive image of the country.
There is arguably no coherent emergent discursive formation on the horizon ever since the discourses of Third Serbia and nation branding established themselves as two main frameworks for articulations of Serbia’s dominant culture (in ca. 2008). Note, however, that the narrative of Third Serbia has, especially since 2012, mutated into what Milanović (2017) calls *multi-party kleptocracy*. According to him, in ‘this new breed of quasi-democratic regimes’, a multi-party system and antiliberal values (but also, if I may add, a pragmatic combination of both liberal and antiliberal values as is currently the case in Vučić’s Serbia) are primarily deployed as a smoke screen behind which lurks the actual rule of a single party and blatant misuse of state power for the private gain of its members and affiliates. In Milanović’s words,

the rule of the game is that only one party can win, and that the others, in function of their ‘pliability’ and closeness to the ‘party of power’, are allowed to participate in the division of the spoils. (...) [T]he real objective of the party of power is to control the state in order to steal, either directly (from overcharged public works or state-owned enterprises) or indirectly (through private sector corruption and laws and regulations that are for sale). (Ibid.)

One result of all these developments is a widespread communal apathy among a majority of the Serb population. This is perhaps the only point where the notion of transition ultimately fails to grasp this general sense of resignation in and towards Serbian society. Here I adopt instead the term ‘situation’ as potentially more applicable and helpful for the discussion at hand. This term was put forward by Simić (2009) in her ethnographic study of Serbian young to middle-aged urbanites from Novi Sad, and the discursive strategies by which they sought to construct themselves as ‘European’ cosmopolitans on the terrain of travelling, music, and consumption. In encounters with her informants, the term was specifically used to describe:

the state of affairs as it is, which applied not only to the circumstances of the Serbian state (corruption or inefficiency, for example) that people found themselves in, but also denotes a certain ‘state of mind’ and ‘moral and cultural degradation’, as my informants called it, that developed during the 1990s. Thus, *situacija* is a generic term that implies more the feeling of being trapped in some corrupted ‘situation’, than that of moving. (Ibid., 37.)

Thus, while the notion of transition implies an understanding of history based on a sense of movement and direction towards a recognizable endpoint, the notion of situation invites interpretations of history ‘where all kinds of movements [are] suspended and irregular’ due to the experience of rupture and crisis (ibid., 105). The concept of situation ultimately feeds back into the larger narrative of Serbia / the Balkans as
‘a place of specific liminality’ (Jansen 2005a: 99), which is ‘the state of being neither here nor there – neither completely inside nor outside a given situation, structure, or mindset’ (Madison 2005: 158); or put in geographical terms, a place neither Western nor Eastern but something in between (see Bjelić and Savić eds. 2005; Buchanan ed. 2007; Fleming 2000; Lazić 2003; Živković 2001); or using the language of postmodern spatial theories, a heterotopian place or Thirdspace (Lazarević Radak 2014). One of the aims of the present study is precisely to capture the sense of ‘situation’, ‘non-movement’, or ‘liminality’ as it has been played out in the discursive practices surrounding Exit and Guća. Specifying the main research questions, concerns, and objectives of the study is indeed something that requires further elaboration.

1.5 Research Questions, Reflections, and Objectives

Taking all above into consideration, the main research questions of the study can be formulated as follows: What specific kinds of micronational spaces are Serbia’s Exit and Guća trumpet festivals? And: What does this tell us about articulations of Serbian national identity in the post-Milošević era? More specifically, I ask: What are the elements of national identity discourse that constitute the Exit ‘counter-space’, and what are those participating in the (re)production of Guća ‘organic space’? What are exactly the binaries and contradictions that underpin the articulations of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guća when these two seemingly different festival spaces are directly opposed to one another and analyzed across multiple spatial layers that cut across the symbolic geography of Serbia and the world beyond?

The questions that I additionally discuss in the epilogue of the study include the following: In what ways has nation branding assisted and led to the gradual transformation of Exit and Guća into ‘brandscapes’, and how has this conceptual change in turn affected the national self-narration in each of them? What is the political potential of Exit and Guća in all multiplicity of their spatial representations to date? Do they offer and actualize alternative visions of (Serbian) society? More generally: In what ways are music festivals around the globe politically meaningful in current times? And more theoretically: How can the key concept of the study advance thinking about contemporary festivals as sites that may revive political imagination and ignite mass political action?

To answer all above questions, the study employs the concept of festival micronational spaces as a key hermeneutic tool, or as what Mieke Bal (2002: 5) calls ‘a concept-based methodology’. Two major implications follow from this. The first is that the proposed concept provides a necessary theoretical link between the discursive formation of national identity, on the one hand, and its heterogenous expressions in the Exit and Guća real, imagined, and lived spaces, on the other (more about this in Chapter 2). By the second implication, the concept threads throughout the fabric
of the entire study, serving as its overarching conceptual and analytical framework. While the structure of any study based on the imposition of some theoretical model over more specific levels of data analysis immediately calls to mind a ‘top-down’ approach typically associated with social sciences, I am inclined to claim that this is a wrong way to think about the present study. At stake here is rather a constant two-way dynamic between different structural levels of analysis. Specifically, just as in much qualitative research the interaction between different components of research design (comprising data gathering, literature overview, data analysis, etc.) unfolds in overlapping circles (see Warren and Karner 2005), so too the key concept here gives shape to and is simultaneously shaped by the analysis of ethnographic evidence and media-derived data, or by concomitant theoretical discussions. One might therefore say that the ‘top-bottom’ and ‘bottom-up’ research approaches rather complement than preclude each other in the present inquiry.

It should also be noted that the said approach does not single out any mode of festival spatiality (‘real’, ‘imagined’, or ‘lived’), nor any point in the festival life cycle (festival production, promotion, or consumption) as a determining instance in the analysis of Serbia’s national identity forms and meanings. It is instead that a variety of themes pertinent to the problematic of national identity serve here as a guiding principle in the analytical ordering of collected data, regardless of the mode of festival spatiality they are associated with.

Another crucial point is that the collected data are never approached in this work as the objects of quantitative assessment leading to the production of factual truths. Rather, they are understood as the representations of claims, beliefs, agendas, desires, emotions, and gestures coming from various festival actors. It goes without saying that these representations are in turn considered to simultaneously reflect and constitute a larger field of discursive practices and regimes of truth at work in post-socialist Serbian society and wider contexts.

The present study is accordingly grounded in the methodology of Foucauldian discourse analysis within the broadly understood neo-Marxist and postmodern frameworks of cultural studies (see 1.6 below). Using the above approaches, I conduct the analysis with reference to such eclectic sources as the festival fieldnotes and interview transcripts produced mainly over the years 2012 and 2013, as well as a great variety of media-generated data on Exit and Guča, specifically, popular publications, documentaries, TV and radio shows, media reports, blogs, and online forums.

Considering all the above, it is the aspiration of the present study to achieve the following objectives:

1. To show that contemporary music festivals are still highly relevant sites for staging, performing, negotiating, and representing national identity. The aim is in particular to investigate how national identity is constructed in Serbia’s
Exit and Guča trumpet festivals after Milošević, thereby contributing to a wider discussion of national identity in Serbia and elsewhere.

2. To propose a new conceptual and analytical framework for the study of national identity and music festivals based on the revisited notions of national identity and (festival) spatiality, and then to demonstrate its applicability to the concrete analysis of Exit and Guča.

3. To explore and point to multiple benefits from the employment of a spatially guided approach to the study of national identity and music festivals, specifically that such an approach (a) develops a more profound and politically sensitive understanding of the complexity of social relations and material practices involved in the construction of national identity in music festivalscapes; and that it (b) highlights the importance of symbolic geography in the hierarchical ordering of nations and (festival) places around the globe.

4. To showcase that the proposed concept of festival micronational spaces not only assists in illuminating the multiple and often contradictory articulations of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guča, but that it can also reinvigorate and theoretically advance a discussion (academic and otherwise) on the political potential of contemporary music festivals both in Serbia and in the world beyond.

Attempts at reconsidering national identity and/or space are by no means a novelty in festival/cultural studies; and neither are more comprehensive and politically engaged analyses of (music) festival practice. Here I specifically have in mind those studies (see e.g. Azara and Crouch 2006; Chalcraft and Magaudda 2011; Chalcraft et al. 2014; English 2011; Hofman 2014; Picard 2006) that explore and explain how festivals, as events staged at particular places and times, come to be socially produced; how spaces, cultural practices, and identities – each being simultaneously a medium (determinant) and a product (embodiment) of a respective set of social relations and material practices – construct each other; and what is at stake in ‘the geography of those relations of construction, as well as (...) [in] the politics of those geographies and (...) our relationship to and responsibility to them’ (cf. Massey 2005: 10).

While acknowledging all such contributions to the festival scholarship, the present study brings together the themes of national identity and music festivals in new ways. Using the abovementioned concept-based methodology, the study specifically sheds light on the post-2000 sociopolitical realities in Serbia and similar countries. Perhaps more importantly, the study also shows how such an approach can yield a more productive form of criticism against increasingly depoliticized forms of contemporary festival practice – in other words, a form of criticism that aspires not only to counteract but also to suggest alternatives to the taken-for-granted discourse of
global neoliberalism in academic and popular considerations of festival practice today.

1.6 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

Presented next is the study’s interdisciplinary framework as well as the conceptual implications of its positioning along the selected disciplinary spectrum – first in broad strokes (see The Cultural Study of Music in 1.6.1), and then on a more specific level (see Music Geography in 1.6.2, Festival Studies in 1.6.3, Symbolic Geography and Balkanism in 1.6.4.2). A corollary to these discussions is a consideration of the underlying assumptions informing the key phenomena under study, specifically, those of national identity (1.6.2) and place/space (1.6.4.1). Zooming out anew, in the photographic sense, is the next necessary step to comprehend the larger (neo-Marxist and postmodern) tradition to which the present study is attuned (1.6.5). The overview concludes with reflections on two methodological approaches central to this research: discourse analysis (1.6.6) and ethnographic methods (1.6.7).

1.6.1 The Cultural Study of Music

The closely intertwined notions of music, place, and identity have increasingly been explored within the broadly defined framework of cultural studies (see e.g., Bennett 2000; Connell and Gibson 2003; Leyshon et al. eds. 1998; Whiteley et al. eds. 2004). There are in fact two strong reasons to insist on using the label ‘the cultural study of music’ more than any other. First, to emphasize the increasingly porous boundaries between musicology, ethnomusicology, and related subdisciplines (such as popular music studies, sociology of music, or music geography) vis-à-vis their respective objects of study as well as the theoretico-methodological bases underpinning that study. Specifically, in both disciplines, a partial shift from ‘classical’ and ‘traditional’ music, respectively, to ‘popular’ music has been documented alongside the shift in interest towards ‘music as culture’ in place of ‘music as an object’. If the recent developments in musicology are marked by ‘the move to ethnography’, providing ‘the specific details of lived cultural-musical realities’ (Shepherd 2003: 75), contemporary ethnomusicology is, at least in one line of ethnomusicological inquiry, constituted by the fieldwork itself and defined as ‘the study of people making and/or experiencing music’ (Titon 2008: 29; see also Barz and Cooley eds. 1997; 2008). In consequence, both disciplines are increasingly being engaged in studying and understanding music as lived experience, and thus epistemologically grounded in experiential, participatory, dialogic, reflexive, non-objectivist and experimental scholarship. Last but not least, what both contemporary musicology and ethnomusicology have in common is their preoccupation with ‘the theorization of music and identity
and, by implication, difference’ (Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000, in Shepherd 2003: 76).

The second reason for opting for the label ‘the cultural study of music’ in this work is to avoid confusion brought about by the proliferation of such neologisms as New, Critical, Popular, or Cultural Musicology and New or Critical Ethnomusicology, retrospectively, coined in academia since the 1990s (see Kramer 2003; Madison 2005; Scott 2009). I rather align myself with the camp of music scholars hypothesizing about an emerging paradigm for the all-inclusive cultural study of music (see e.g. Barz and Cooley eds. 2008; or Clayton et al. eds. 2003). In light of the latter, the cultural study of music should be understood as an umbrella term for the totality of academic endeavors across the humanities and social sciences committed to broadening and advancing musical knowledge from a cultural perspective.

Within the larger framework of the postmodern constructivist paradigm on which this study rests, there is apparently not much difference between musicology and ethnomusicology either. As Šuvaković (2004: n.p.) explains, such a positioning implies ‘an interpretative model according to which society does not precede music, but rather music and society are in a complex interconstitutive relationship’. Understood as one of the society’s ‘ideological apparatuses’ or as ‘one of the technologies of performing subjects/bodies’, music as a study object brings musicology and ethnomusicology close to one another. In Šuvaković’s words,

musicology and ethnomusicology (...) no longer contemplate and study different incomparable music systems but perform culture-centred models of interpretation of the heterogeneous field of (...) [the] musical as social practices. Artistic, ritually religious, ceremonially political, mass media or everyday popular music[s] are different systems for heterogeneously instrumenting the articulation of [the] body/subject in [the] field of multiple social identifications (from racial and ethnic to class and gender, generational and professional). (Ibid., n.p.)

The present study likewise generates knowledge about music festivals through considerations of the festival experience in its totality, whereby the lived experience and discourse of music represent but one part of festival-related discussions on Serbian national identity. In other words, the main question here is how music is perceived and lived out in the experience of those who listen and dance to it, comment on it, manage it, make and play it within the context of two Serbian festivals.

Another point worth making is that the present study is almost completely uninterested in documenting and analyzing structural elements of music performed at the festivals. Explored only sporadically are the ways in which pertinent musical elements reveal something crucial about the prevailing feeling in Serbian postsocialist society, or about enduring tensions between different social groups under study. Of
much greater interest here are rather verbal accounts of Exit and Guča participants, in which musical sounds and structures are typically described by means of their association with specific feelings, images, symbols, spaces, discourses, practices, and memories. But just to make it clear, I do sympathize with Grenier’s (1990: 43) warnings of the deficiency of approaches to music that are focused on the symbolic capacity of music to both represent and constitute social reality, but that simultaneously fail to acknowledge ‘the way in which musical devices transform and represent thought and ideology and infer, on this basis, music’s specificity’. Still, the minimal exploration of music in its sonic specificity and aesthetic nature in the analysis below can be defended on two grounds: first, music is but one among many aspects of festival practice that pertain to the question of national identity articulations; and second, even when considered as a topic in its own right, music is analyzed primarily through a focus on connotation which is, according to Born and Hesmondhalgh (2000, in Shepherd 2003: 77), ‘the dominant mode of musical signification’. In so defined priorities, the present study seems to come closest to the field of popular music studies, which is generally seen here as belonging to the province of cultural studies.

1.6.2 Music Geography: Music, Place, and National Identity

On a more specific level of disciplinary categorizations, it is music geography – or more accurately, ‘the cultural geography of popular music’ (Lashua et al. 2014: 3) – that delineates topical and theoretical concerns of the present study more narrowly than a broadly defined disciplinary framework of the cultural study of music. Historically, it was the work of American ethnomusicologists, folklorists, and cultural geographers in the 1960s and early 1970s that laid the groundwork for music geography as a distinct subdiscipline. At this early stage, the main focus was on establishing analogies between sounds and places across the globe in a largely cartographic, descriptive, and quantitative fashion (see Anderton 2006: 16–17). However, it was not until the so-called cultural turn within the social sciences and humanities in the late 1980s and 1990s that the mutually generative relations of music, place, and identity began to be acknowledged and duly explored (see Anderton 2006: 17–22; or Withers 2009: 641). According to Hudson (2006), there are three additional factors that rendered music an increasingly significant topic in the work of human geographers since the 1990s. Specifically,

there has been a growing emphasis upon performance and practice. [Then], there has also been a growing sensitivity to the importance of senses other than sight. [Finally], one can point to a much greater acknowledgement of the importance of affect and emotion in shaping behavior. (Ibid., 627.)
All these thematic and conceptual shifts within the field resulted in the proliferation of studies using and developing a variety of spatial concepts with which to scrutinize, both aesthetically and politically, the double logic inherent in the currently dominant academic discourse on music and place/space. Namely, just as space is both productive and produced, so too music/sound ‘both fill[s] space and … [is] filled by spaces into which it is projected’ (Hofman 2014: 74). Or in the words of Leyshon et al. (1998: 4), ‘[t]o consider the place of music is not to reduce music to its location, to ground it down into some geographical baseline, but to allow a purchase on the rich aesthetic, cultural, economic and political geographies of musical language’.

I fully concur with Lashua et al. (2014: 3) when they single out Connell and Gibson’s (2003) Sound Tracks, Leyshon, Matless, and Revill’s (1998) The Place of Music, and Swiss, Sloop, and Herman’s (1998) Mapping the Beat as the ground-breaking texts in the cultural geography of popular music. My work is not only indebted to them, but also to many other studies from music geography and related disciplines that have proliferated during the last couple of decades (see e.g. Biddle and Knight eds. 2007; Heinonen 2005; Stokes ed. 1994; Whiteley et al. 2004). In all of them, the notions of nation and national identity are typically considered along the lines of what Anderson (2006) famously theorized as an ‘imagined political community’, and Hobsbawm (2000) – as ‘the invention of (national) tradition’. Within this approach, which might broadly be called postmodern (see Bakić 2006: 246–249), the emphasis is clearly on deconstructing national discourses to be found in a variety of cultural texts and practices with a view to pointing to the constructivist and contingent nature of national (identity) formations.

However, this is not to deny the contributions of other theoretical approaches in Western academia to ethnicities, nations, and nationalism (for their systematic review, see Bakić 2006). In one such approach, nations are considered the ancient, naturally given, and ethnic-based entities that have existed from the very beginning of human history (as primordialists claim) or across many centuries (as perennialists would have it). Alternatively, nations are theorized as the products of modernization processes (such as print capitalism and industrialization), combined with elements of previously existing proto-national or ethnic formations. However, while for ethnosymbolists these elements are apparently crucial in the process of nation-building, for modernists and interactionists, they are considered merely instrumental to nationalist projects. Note in addition that for interactionists, ‘[e]thnicities are to be understood in terms of the construction, maintenance and negotiation of boundaries’ (Stokes 1994a: 6).

At any rate, what lies beneath all these academic approaches is a distinction between two major meanings of the nation, both of which are inextricably interwoven into the fabric of the present study. These two meanings have been theorized in various ways, with different terminologies used to describe the phenomenon in ques-
tion. For Brennan (1990: 45), for example, ‘the “nation” … is both historically determined and general. As a term, it refers both to the modern nation-state and to something more ancient and nebulous – the “natio” – a local community, domicile, family, condition of belonging’. Renan (1990: 19), for his part, defines the nation as ‘a spiritual principle’, comprising two elements – ‘a rich heritage of memories’ and ‘present-day consent, the desire to live together’. Not far from either of two above definitions is also that which differentiates between nation and state. While the nation is a category of largely sociocultural and emotional significance – or in Tsaaior’s (2015: 56) words, ‘a union of people with shared experiences that comprise a common ancestry, history, language, and culture’ – the state is primarily defined in legal and political terms. As Tsaaior specifies,

[the state] is merely an agglomeration of populations with a defined territory, government organs / political structure, a system of enforceable laws and the capacity to cultivate relationships with others on sovereign terms. This tension between the terms nation and state and the need to reconcile them to meet the needs of modernity necessitate their conflation to form the oxymoron called the ‘nation-state’. (Ibid., 56.)

This need to reconcile two opposed tendencies within the national field – i.e. the universality of the sovereign nation-state model vs. the particularity of its content – is arguably echoed in the way the music-national associations have traditionally been forged in European countries, Serbia included. Institutionally, the focus in musical representations of the national has always tended to be on canonized repertoires comprising ‘international’ art music, on the one hand, and ‘native’ musical traditions, on the other (Gellner 1983, in O’Flynn 2007: 23; see also Bohlman 2011: xxiv; or Folkestad 2002). At yet another level, the ambiguous position of the national in the globalized cultural networks is typically conceptualized in music-cultural studies as a tension between ‘inward-looking’ versus ‘outward-looking’ articulations of place and identity (Pieterse 1995, in Biddle and Knight 2007: 5); that is, as an interplay between two opposite tendencies – one which views identities as being rooted ‘in ethnicity, race, linguistic communities, the local and so on’ (a tendency that goes under the label new traditionalism) versus the other which celebrates the postmodern plurality and hybridity of globalized (musical) cultures (see Biddle and Knight 2007: 5). Lastly, one more way to conceptualize the notion of national identity is to ‘[locate] it at the nexus of the abstract and the everyday’ (Bellamy 2003: 24) – which is very much in line with new and revisited approaches to national identity formation, advocated by such writers as Billig (1995), Mallki (1995), Radcliffe and Westwood (1996), or James (1997) (all cited and reviewed in Bellamy 2003: 20–28). This op-
position might be in turn construed as a tension between institutional and everyday forms of music practice.

In addition to the said dynamic between universal and particular, global and local, or abstract and everyday, there are two more assumptions that the present study takes into account when considering the process of Serbia’s music-national formations. One is that the discursive field of national identity and music-culture is constituted at the meeting point of symbolic and material. Or as O’Flynn (2007: 37) puts it:

Music-national identifications are discursive constructs, articulated through specific material and symbolic conditions. These include the sonic and structural properties of music and the social contexts in which it is sounded or heard, the mediating influence of national and non-national agencies, and the sets of values with which individuals or groups experience music.

The other assumption here is the same that Bohlman (2011) proposes in his book on nationalism and music – namely,

that we can experience nationalism in any music at any time. (…) Nationalism has many different shades, and by considering many different genres, repertoires, and practices of music we attune ourselves to those shades. (Ibid., xxv.)

Nationalism [thus] no longer enters music only from the top, that is, from state institutions and ideologies, but may build its path into music from just about any angle, as long as there are musicians and audiences willing to mobilize cultural movement from those angles. (Ibid., 5.)

Bohlman’s approach to the study of nationalism and music calls to mind Goffman’s (1961) concept of framing, whereby it is precisely the national dimension that shapes and inflects the interpretation of all analytical data. Or to put it in Goffman’s terms, it is the ‘nation-ness’ that ‘determin[es] the type of “sense” that will be accorded to everything within the frame’ (ibid., 20). However, what renders certain articulations of national identity in music more plausible than others boils down to wider socio-political contexts in which they occur. Specifically, the ways in which particular connections and interpretations are made out of ‘disparate cultural and ideological elements’ constituting the music-national field are contingent on ‘an articulating principle or set of central values’ guiding the society in question at any time of its historical development (cf. Wade 1998, in O’Flynn 2007: 27–28). In the present study, the narratives such as those of Two Serbia, Third Serbia, transition, or situation (see 1.4 above) provide the necessary link between hegemonic imaginings of Serbia’s nation-
al identity at any given moment of its postsocialist history, on the one hand, and various music-cultural discourses and practices surrounding Exit and Guća, on the other.

Under this view, which essentially invokes the Gramscian concept of hegemony, music is also seen as a site of permanent politico-ideological struggle between different social factions. This is especially true for postsocialist and post-/neocolonial societies such as those located in the Balkans/former Yugoslavia. It is arguably the peripheral status of these countries, as well as the controversial character of their previous and current political regimes, that magnifies the political dimension in their music-cultural practices. The main focus of Balkan/ex-Yugoslav music geographies is accordingly on the relationship of state politics and music, but also on musical projections of a desired national image within the wider context of shifting global power-geometries. The following list of studies pertinent to the present research is far from exhaustive but gives a general idea of the type of analysis that follows below. Considered therein is largely the politics of folk and/or popular music in the Balkans of both past and present, specifically, in Bulgaria (Buchanan 2006; Kurkela 2007; Levy 2004), Romania (Beissinger 2007), Albania (Sugarman 2007), and the former Yugoslavia (Baker 2006; Longinović 2000; Lukić-Krstanović 2010), with special focus on post-Milošević Serbia (Lazar et al. 2004; Lukić-Krstanović 2005; 2006; 2008; 2011; Malešević 2011; Simić 2006; 2009). Of great analytical interest here are also studies on rock music, either in ex-Yugoslavia (Mišina 2013; Ramet 1994; Žabeva-Papazova 2012) or in 1990s Serbia (Collin 2001; Mijatović 2008), as well as those on traditional and neo-folk music of both Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav times, in particular controversies surrounding Yugoslav neo-folk music (Dragićević-Šešić 1994; Vidić Rasmussen 1995; 2002; 2006) and Serbian traditional, TF, ethno, or World Music (Čolović 2006a; 2006b; Ćirjaković 2004; Dimitrijević 2002; Đurković 2002; 2004; Kronja 2001; Lukić-Krstanović 2006; 2011; Marković 2013; Milojević 2004; n.d.; Nenić 2006a; 2010; Stojanović 2012; Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović 2012; Zakić and Nenić 2012).

But to reiterate again, considerations of Serbian national identity in the present study go well beyond the field of music, since the latter makes but one segment of cultural signification within the totality of music festival practice. To explore thus the national identity phenomenon in contemporary music festivals may be considered especially fruitful, not least because each of these areas alone lies at ‘the intersection of multiple meanings and mobilities’ (cf. Bærenholdt et al. 2004, in Anderton 2006: 34). A vast cultural matrix of national identity signifiers, objects, discourses, practices, and spaces is, in other words, commensurable with the complexity of functions that music festivals currently perform, spanning them from aesthetic and cultural, to political, economic, and bureaucratic. The next chapter not only specifies the nodal points of intersection between these two discursive fields (music festivals and national identities) by proposing a working definition of music festivals specifically
tailored for the stated purpose of the study. Chapter 2 also offers a detailed critical review of recent festival studies, whose analytical focuses are relevant to the considerations of either national identity, or spatiality, or both. In doing so, it points to the conceptual gaps in the previous research and proposes the concept of festival micro-national spaces as one way to fill them. At this point, however, it will suffice to situate my work along one particular line of festival scholarship, and upon those grounds specify the main theoretical premises behind such a positioning. In the following, I therefore navigate the increasingly diversified field of recent festival studies, in particular those focusing too on Exit and Guča as selected case studies.

1.6.3 (Music) Festival Studies

As mentioned above in passing, the Exit and Guča trumpet festivals have been only sporadically discussed in academia as part of Serbian national identity discourses, but never with sufficient depth or as a research topic in its own right (see e.g. Lukić-Krstanović 2008; 2010; Mijatović 2012; Simić 2006; Spasić and Petrović 2012; or Vuksanović 2007). Otherwise, various studies of Exit and/or Guča follow two major research trends that also dominate the field of recent festival studies as a whole (cf. Ali-Knight et al. 2009; Giorgi and Sassatelli 2011; Picard and Robinson 2006).

The first of them can be dubbed the socio-anthropological school of thought, given that its foundations and subsequent development are laid upon the work of Bakhtin (1984), Becker (1984), Bourdieu (1984; 1993), Durkheim (1972; 1995), Falassi (1987), Simmel (1971; 1991), Turner (1969; 1982), and others alike. Regardless of the perspective assumed (e.g. historical, anthropological, ethnomusicological, psychological, etc.), all festival scholars building upon theories of the school’s founding fathers (such as, Bennett et al. eds. 2014; Delanty et al. eds. 2011; Hofman 2014; Karlsen 2007; Lukić-Krstanović 2008; 2010; McKay ed. 2015; van Elderen 1997, to name but a few) seem to have in common a distinctive approach to modern-day festivals. In their inquiry, festivals are typically examined as a series of staged ritual performances, or as a contested field of manifold social relations / power struggles, through which a variety of agendas, identities, lifestyles, and experiences come to be articulated, embodied, performed, and negotiated within the context of increasingly commodified, fragmented, mobile, and interconnected lifeworlds.

Examples from this strand of festival research using Serbia’s Exit and Guča as case studies are plentiful. Lukić-Krstanović (2006; 2007; 2008; 2010; 2011), for instance, deploys critical theories of spectacle and music folklore paradigm so as to

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8 A possible exception to this is Lukić-Krstanović’s (2006) study on multifaceted instances of power struggle in the management of Serbian folklore / brass band heritage in Guča, not only for commercial purposes, but also as part of the politics of national identity representation.
develop a fully-fledged methodology for her politico-historical, socio-anthropological, and aesthetico-cultural considerations of ex-Yugoslav/Serbian music festivals on the ground, with special focus on Exit and Guča. Arnautović (2014), for her part, explores the idea of contemporary music festivals as sites of intercultural dialogue by looking into the ways in which different types of culture in general, and different types of ethnic/national cultures in particular, come to encounter each other at four Serbian music festivals, including Exit and Guča. A similar point of departure informs also Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić’s (2012) joint analysis of Guča trumpet festival, but in a way which reflects typically ethnomusicological concerns with the changing profile of Serbian brass band tradition in the wider context of globalization. Let me finally mention Timotijević’s (2005) pioneering study of Guča Festival which provides an invaluable contribution to cultural history, or rather to the history of mentalités. The study includes an overview of selected media reports on the festival, printed between 1961 and 2004, and based on that insight gives a critical assessment of Serb people’s worldviews, beliefs, desires, cultural habits and needs throughout the festival’s long history. Exit Festival is, on the other hand, approached as a site where Novi Sad self-identified urbanites seek to reaffirm their cosmopolitan outlook and exercise a sense of aesthetico-ethical superiority to what they pigeonhole as the ‘rurban’ segment of the native population (see Simić 2009). Explored are additionally aesthetico-ideological orientations of the domestic Exit audience from the largely obsolete perspective of subcultural theory (see Lazar et al. 2004).

The other prominent research paradigm in recent festival studies is, conversely, concerned with festival management issues, as well as with so-called ‘impact’ analyses of festivals, the scope of which is defined and evaluated in economic, socio-cultural, and/or environmental terms. The aim of these and similar studies is thus to examine the role that festivals play in local, regional, national, and/or transnational economies, but also to propose the strategies by which their management, cultural production, and attendance may be enhanced (see e.g. Correia and Rebelo 2007; Gibson and Connell 2012; Janković 2006; Lourenço-Gomes and Rodrigues 2007). Given that these kinds of themes and analyses proliferate mainly in the Event Management, Tourist Studies, and Festival Marketing and Branding literature, it is only appropriate to refer to this research paradigm as the economic, managerial, and tourist school of thought (cf. Anderton 2006: 30).

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9 For similar discussions on the status of Serbian brass band tradition within Serbia’s overall folk music production, see also Dević 1986 and Golemović 1997.
10 For a more detailed literature review of this strand of festival studies, see Anderton (2006: 30–33) and Karlsen (2007: 17–21).
11 Picard and Robinson (2006: 4) justly call attention to the prevailing neoliberal capitalist contexts and discourses from which this strand of festival research emanates. In light of this, nor does it come as a surprise that the EFA has sponsored many research projects designed to carry out similar agendas within its interdisciplinary research platform named European
Exit and Guča figure too in this line of festival research as the study objects. Anon (2008), for example, describes and critically assesses the existing models of organization and work in Exit, whereas Stamenković et al. (2013) scrutinize the effectiveness of Guča festival marketing and branding strategies from visitors’ point of view. Bjeljac and Lović’s (2011) research likewise focuses on festivalgoers, but from a tourism market perspective. The study specifically looks into motivations and consumption habits of foreign Exit visitors. There are, finally, two additional contributions to tourism studies also concentrating on Exit Festival. The first (Zakić 2006) examines the festival’s potential for the promotion and development of youth tourism in the city of Novi Sad, whereas the second (Jovanov 2009) places emphasis on the enormous and as yet not fully realized potential of the Exit and Novi Sad cooperation for city tourism and cultural life.

The dividing line between two prevailing schools of thought in recent festival scholarship is sometimes clear-cut, paralleling to some extent the enduring distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches to academic research (see e.g. Correia and Rebelo 2007 and Lukić-Krstanović 2010 as the ideal types of each respective approach). However, just as the quantitative-qualitative distinction has proven inadequate in recounting the theoretico-methodological background of many academic studies, so is the attempt at drawing a clear demarcation line between two research paradigms in the growing body of festival scholarship. Indeed, the aspects of both paradigms are sometimes combined within a single study (see, for example, Cummings et al. 2011) – a truism owing to the fact that they both tend to draw on a similar set of analytical tools and theoretical assumptions (cf. Anderton 2006: 24).

While bearing this in mind, even so I find the established distinction between two major strands of festival studies to be both useful and valid. It is useful because it provides a good orientation within the substantial body of festival studies literature, especially to those who seek to obtain a preliminary grip on such a highly diversified field. And it is valid because, despite possible ambiguities, every festival study tends to gravitate towards one of two research paradigms under consideration, depending of course on what line of argumentation it follows, what methods and points of analysis it favors, and what objectives it is determined to accomplish. The affiliation of the present study with the socio-anthropological school of thought is likewise unambiguous, given its primary concern with issues of national identity in two Serbian music festivals and the questions of how they come to be framed, negotiated, and represented as such, by whom, and to what ends. What makes such an affiliation additionally clear is also a selected set of spatial theories and approaches on which this work draws precisely because of their great potential for advancing our understand-

Festival Research Projects (EFRP). For a detailed report on research activities of the EFRP, see Arnautović (2014: 16–17).
ing of contemporary discourses of Serbian national identity. I now expand further on what kinds of spatial concepts and theories are employed in this study.

1.6.4 Spatial Theories and Approaches

This subsection opens with a clarification of the position assumed here in the ongoing ‘place vs. space’ academic debate. I then discuss the fields of studies whose spatial approach is especially relevant to the conceptual framework of this research.

1.6.4.1 Place Vs. Space

Cresswell (2004, in Withers 2009: 643) distinguishes between three main approaches to place in geographical research: (1) descriptive, (2) phenomenological, and (3) social constructivist. Notwithstanding their differences, all three of them seem to share the same basic assumption about place and space – namely, that ‘place is (...) the location of phenomena, a particular positioning in regard to that other larger epistemological referent, space’, as Withers (2009: 657) put it. Within the so-called ‘relational’ perspective, which is especially prominent in the work of such writers as David Harvey and Doreen Massey, and which currently dominates academic (social constructivist) ways of thinking about place and space within geography and other disciplines, place is specifically understood as a meeting point of linear intersection across space – ‘a moment constituted through spatial flow and movement’ (Malpas 2012: n.p.; see also Massey 2005 in Chapter 2). The notions of place and space likewise collapse into one another in the phenomenological theorizations advocated and advanced by Yi-Fu Tuan, Anne Buttimer, David Seamon, and Edward Relph, to name a few. According to Relph (1976, in Seamon and Sowers 2008: 44), for example, the two concepts are ‘dialectically structured in human environmental experience, since our understanding of space is related to the places we inhabit, which in turn derive meaning from their spatial context’. Thus, the difference between descriptive, phenomenological, and social constructivist approaches to place and space is largely in their respective research emphases. Descriptionists apparently classify places across the globe on the basis of their particularity, social constructivists scrutinize social processes underlying them, whereas phenomenologists are predominantly interested in human experiences of places constituting one’s sense of being in the world.

The choice of the social constructivist approach in the present study can be justified on two accounts. First, such an approach seems to incorporate the first two (approaches), as it will become clear from the further theorization of different modes of festival spatiality in Chapter 2. And second, at the core of social constructivist research are the projects of reimagining the spatial as political, which falls in line with
the inherently political nature of any (cultural) study of national identity, this one included. Note, however, that for some writers, such as Jeff Malpas (2012: n.p.; emphases in original), it is precisely the said focus on ‘a theorization of spatial rhetoric and of spatial imaginings as this forms the core of a spatial politics’ that highlights the main pitfall of the social constructivist approach. In his opinion, prioritizing the political at the expense of fundamental conceptual concerns with the understanding of place/space as such, may turn the geographical discourse into pure propaganda. Even worse, Malpas accuses social constructivists for misconstruing the underlying ideas about basic phenomena that human geography explores, which adds not only to ‘intellectual confusion’, but also results in the misidentification of the subject matter and objectives of the discipline itself. Proposed as a corrective is an ontological approach to place and space. Specifically, Malpas uses the closely intertwined concepts of boundedness, openness, and emergence to show that place and space (as well as time) are two distinct although interrelated phenomena. (For further clarification of this theoretical position and the terminology used, see Malpas 2012.)

There is no doubt that many of Malpas’s critical points ring true. However, it remains unclear why questions of ontology in human geography would yield more politically productive outcomes, as Malpas suggests, than those of locally specific power struggles and identity politics that occupy a central position in the work of social constructivists. Contrary to this view, the present study claims that the politicization of thinking is highly desirable and much needed within the social constructivist paradigm, precisely because the latter is often criticized for epistemological and moral relativism (see e.g. Bakić 2006: 247–248; Kuljić 2006a: 83–141; Lafrance 2002: 7; Nanda 1997). Besides, the highly politicized discourse of social constructivist geography suits best the topic and purposes of the present study (something I will elaborate on in Chapter 2). Apart from the political imperatives they serve, selected constructivist theories of socially produced space have also proven invaluable in the conceptual and analytical organization of this work, as well as in boosting its theoretical creativity.

1.6.4.2 Symbolic Geography and Related Fields of Studies

Central to any discussion of national identity (the Self) is the notion of difference (the Other) as its ‘constitutive outside’ (cf. Hall 1996: 4). The questions of how difference / Otherness is represented, by whom, and to what ends, become pertinent in post-Second World War academia across ‘soft’ disciplines (namely, comparative literature, history, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, etc.), resulting in such fields of studies as imagiology, history of mentalités, symbolic geography, Orientalism, and eventually Balkanism (see Lazarević Radak 2014; Marković 2002: 8–9; Živković 2001: 74–76). Within the larger framework of postcolonial studies, out-
lined by such pivotal writers as Bhabha (1996), Fanon (2008), Said (2003), and Spivak (1999), symbolic geography interrogates both intra- and transnational hierarchies of geopolitical images and relations between the First and Third World, between West and East, colonizer and colonized, center and periphery, Us and Them.

To illustrate how this ‘mental mapping’ and hierarchical organization of places and peoples around the globe works at the meta-level, Marković (2002) compares a number of selected sociological and anthropological taxonomies of human societies throughout their evolution. His analysis shows that at the core of each of these taxonomies lies the same binary pattern reproducing what Marković (2002: 14) designates as one common proto-stereotype. This proto-stereotype, so the argument goes, takes the form of a binary opposition between ‘the civilized’ and ‘the barbarian/primitive’, that is, between ‘the enlightened’ and ‘the benighted’ (cf. Robins 1996: 62). And when projected onto the world’s geographical map, such a division translates into the familiar discursive trope ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992b) and its Orientalist cousin, ‘the West vs. the East/Orient’ (Said 2003).

Within the horizon of discussion on Serbian national identity that the present study seeks to advance, it is important to call attention to two interrelated politico-historical occurrences that marked a significant shift in the way the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ came to be recast. The first is historically linked to the ending of the Cold War era, which caused the political and ideological underpinnings behind the previous polarization of the world to be superseded by the new ones – namely, by the emergence of a new brand of racism, designated in academic literature either as differentialist racism (Taguieff 2001), or as cultural racism (Hesmondhalgh 2014), or as the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993). On the soil of the New Europe, this recently assumed form of ‘racism without race’ resulted in the cultural distancing of ‘Europe proper’ from its Eastern counterpart (see Longinović 2000; or Marković 2002). The same power dynamic and racist undertones can be discerned in the abovementioned discourses of transition and (nation) branding, still operating as the prevailing regimes of truth in the New Europe and the world beyond (see 1.4 above).

The second occurrence follows from the first one and refers to the explosion of national memory in all EE countries, with the Gulag marking a new negative ‘place of memory’ directed against the Soviet repression (see Kuljić 2011: 20). Graham et al. (2000, cited in Smith 2009: 66) likewise note that the EE countries readily embraced ‘nationalism as the primary mode of identity and national heritage as a principal means of delineating and representing that identity’ alongside the process of their respective EU accession. The question of national identity continues to be, arguably, of particular significance in the discursive space of South East Europe given the turbulent history of the region. This applies particularly to the case of former Yu-

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12 For ambiguous discursive meanings and effects surrounding the political sanitization of the term ‘Balkans’ via its reformulation into ‘South East Europe’, see Bechev 2004.
gosloviana and the tragic outcomes of its dissolution on ethnic basis after the fall of the Wall.

Of special interest here is also the larger question of how the everchanging national self-narration and identity politics within the ex-Yugoslav region as a whole, and Serbia in particular, relate to its symbolic geography, both internally and within wider transnational contexts. This is something that will be discussed in more detail throughout the study. Suffice it to say for now that the symbolic geographies of the post-Yugoslav space, and corresponding national identity discourses, mainly revolve around the distinction between Europe and the Balkans (see Jansen 2001; or Simić 2009). Specifically, Europe, in all variety of its incarnations, represents here the region / Serbia’s most Significant Other, in relation to whom members of the Balkan / Serb population variously position in their efforts to deal with the Balkan / Serbian stigma (cf. Goffman 1968). The emergence of a new branch of Balkan studies during the 1990s, called Balkanism, not only corroborates this claim, but it also lays substantial conceptual groundwork for this study.

1.6.4.3 Orientalism Vs. Balkanism

Balkanism can be understood as the sister field of Orientalism, not least in regard to several ways in which the term is used – namely, as an academic field, as ‘a style of thought’, and as a discourse which is based on differentiating, both ontologically and epistemologically, between ‘the Occident/Europe’ and ‘the Orient/Balkans’ (cf. Said 2003: 2–3). Common to both Orientalism and Balkanism is thus the asymmetrical relationship between two poles of the West-East equation, which only attests to the positional superiority of the Western discourse throughout the modern era and its power to (re)produce a corresponding system of knowledge about the Orient / Balkans. Another commonality is an approach to their respective objects of study as ‘a system of representations’ rather than as a system of truths about the Orient / Balkans as such – unless we accept, in the Derridean style, that the truth itself cannot be accessed outside of a system of representation.

This common thread notwithstanding, Balkanism should still be acknowledged as an academic field in its own right that both differs from and overlaps with Orientalism. It differs from it in at least three respects. First, the specific geopolitical position and sociohistorical development of the Balkan Peninsula, above all its exclusion from the European colonization project, makes it incommensurate with what has been understood as the Orient’s history and culture. Second, the Balkans bear no traces of the former grandiose Eastern civilizations that could serve as a counterbalance and a redeeming antidote to the hegemony of Western discourse. Unlike Oriental studies, Balkanism cannot therefore boast of having the long and influential history of academic research (Fleming 2000). Third, and perhaps most importantly,
Orientalism is an oppositional discourse that constructs the Orient as Europe’s imputed Otherness (Todorova 1997: 17), or as ‘the Other without’ (Buchanan 2007: xviii). Balkanism is, by contrast, a relational discourse that feeds off the ‘imputed ambiguity’ of the region’s interstitial location (Todorova 1997: 17). More specifically, it is a discourse that depicts the Balkan Peninsula as ‘a contaminated kingdom of repressed European demons’ (Kiossev 2005: 180), as ‘the Other within’ (Buchanan 2007: xviii), or in Fleming’s (2000: 1229) phrasing, ‘as Europe’s resident alien, an internal other that is an affront and challenge by virtue of its claim to be part of the West, as well as by its apparent ability to dramatically affect Western history’.  

To encapsulate this distinctively Balkan type of in-betweenness, Balkanists typically employ the concept of liminality in both its real and imagined configurations. This concept is further theorized using the metaphor of border or Bhabha’s (1996) notion of hybridity. In either case, the readings of the Balkans are both positively and negatively loaded. Specifically, the idea of ‘the Balkans as a border’ bears positive meanings when Balkan liminality is said to afford the region a sort of centrality rather than marginality (see e.g. Bjelić 2005; or Fleming 2000). Then again, the same idea is negatively evaluated when the territory’s geographically, historically, politically, and culturally ambiguous position between continents and empires / blocs induces an atmosphere of fear and mistrust in the Western world (see Buchanan 2007; Todorova 1997). Similar value judgments apply, too, to the related concept of hybridity. When positively framed, this concept engenders the image of the Balkans as a place of cultural diversity and cosmopolitan tolerance. A good example of such reading is the volume on Balkan popular music practices, edited by Buchanan (2007). The volume provides evidence for the reemergence of the so-called Balkan / Ottoman ecumene, understood here as a historically cosmopolitan space of music-culture sharing across national and religious boundaries. Balkan hybridity is alternatively discussed in terms of mongrelization or mixed salad – a label originally introduced by early European and American travelers to the Balkan Peninsula referring to the multicultural makeup of its people. On the one hand, this phenomenon is celebrated as the desired cultural model for contemporary Western metropolises. On the other, the idea of Balkan hybridity continues to underpin the negative depictions of the Balkans as a place of violence, torn apart by continual ethnic, political, religious, and cultural conflicts. This explains the long-lasting perception of the region through such Western constructs as the powder keg of Europe, or Balkanization (see e.g. Lazarević Radak 2014; or Todorova 1997).

On the other hand, Balkanism simultaneously overlaps with Orientalism in at least two ways. First, when the Western colonization of the Balkans is interpreted in symbolic terms, as emphasized, for example, by the very title of Goldsworthy’s (1998)

13 Note that Eastern Europe occupies a similar position of ‘imputed ambiguity’ in the symbolic geography of Europe since the eighteenth century (see Wolff 1994).
book, *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination*. In this work, Goldsworthy showcases how various aspects of the Balkan imagery came to be exploited for the commercial and creative benefits of Western literature and entertainment industry throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In another way, the application of the Orientalist model to the Balkans takes the form of what Milica Bakić-Hayden (1995) and Robert M. Hayden (1992) famously called *nesting Orientalisms*. Using the case of former Yugoslavia as an example, they illustrated that the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism remains equally powerful in the non-/postcolonial context of the Balkans. Moreover, they provided strong evidence that the Orientalist rhetoric operates beyond geographical locations to which it was initially attached, thus incorporating itself within both West and East. In any case, the ‘Oriental/Eastern/Balkan’ continues to function as a label for a marginal, inferiorized Other. Or as Bjelić (2005: 4) succinctly interprets Bakić-Hayden and Hayden’s Oriental model of Balkanism:

*Orientalism is a subjectivational practice* by which all ethnic groups define ‘the other’ as the ‘East’ of them; in so doing, they not only orientalize the ‘other’, but also occidentalize themselves as the ‘West’ of the ‘other’. (Emphases in original.)

Balkanism is thus a set of recursive discursive strategies that ‘[meander] between Orientalism and Occidentalism’ (Bjelić 2005: 5; emphases in original), depending, of course, on the political perspective from which one speaks. It is ultimately ‘a stigmatizing discourse’ (Kiossev 2005: 180; see also Ditchev 2005; and Lazarević Radak 2014), which in turn sustains the reproduction of what Goffman (1968) calls *spoiled identity* (cf. Simić 2009). At any rate, what Balkanism is, and how exactly it works when applied to the Serbian case, will become clear through analysis of Exit and Guča in Chapters 3–6.

1.6.5 In the Tradition of Neo-Marxist, Postmodernist, and Poststructuralist Scholarship

Not only can postcolonial theory, presented here by academic writings in symbolic geography, Orientalism and Balkanism, be considered a subset of the broader critical tradition of neo-/post-Marxist, postmodern, and poststructuralist thought. The same also applies to all other disciplines and fields of studies discussed above, alongside the underlying theoretical assumptions and key concepts around which they are organized (e.g. those of nation, identity, place, space, hybridity, globalization, etc.). On the other hand, the mutual relationships between neo-/post-Marxism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism seem to follow a similar recursive logic. Namely, just
as poststructuralism should be understood as part of the postmodern universe (see e.g. Best and Kellner 1991) – although there are, of course, interpretations viewing them as two distinct phenomena (see e.g. Caterino 2008) – so, too, postmodernism should be situated in the longer tradition of neo-/post-Marxist scholarship. The primary task here is therefore to present in broad strokes those strands of neo-Marxist theory that resonate most strongly with the line of reasoning set out in this study.

To begin with, the very understanding of culture in the materialist rather than idealist terms, on which this work is built, originates from the philosophy of Karl Marx (see Best 2008). This is clearly an approach to culture that acknowledges its material groundedness and historical contingency; or to use Marx’s vocabulary, where the ‘base’ of society (comprising production, economics, technology) is seen as standing in a dialectical relationship with its ‘superstructure’ (comprising culture, politics, law, philosophy). And more than that, some post-Marxist writers (e.g. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; or Lash and Lury 2007) have gone so far as to point to the ubiquity of culture in the global era as a sure sign of its incorporation and eventually transformation into the economic structure itself.

Secondly, the present work falls back on the tradition of so-called Western or Cultural Marxism, which was launched during the interwar period by the Frankfurt School and its forerunners (such as Gramsci, Lukács, and Korsch), and then continued in the post-Second World War period by the Birmingham School of cultural studies. Common to both schools was a groundbreaking line of research that introduced, for the first time, questions of ideology, subjectivity, and culture/arts into the framework of traditional Marxist debate. Representatives of both schools explored specifically the links between the capitalist economy, technology, and culture in a highly critical and interdisciplinary fashion (hence such creolized theories as Freudo-Marxism, Marxist-feminism, or Marxist-existentialism), while remaining committed to the basic tenets of Marxist theory and its ultimate ideal of human emancipation from the forces of domination and exploitation. However, despite many shared premises, the emphases in each school’s research tradition were diametrically different. The Frankfurt School, as has often been pointed out, insisted mainly on the determinist power of political economy and hegemonic order in the cultural sphere, and was politically suspicious of all cultural forms and practices other than those falling within modern art and the avant-garde. The Birmingham School, by contrast, over-emphasized the power of agency granted to marginalized and oppressed social groups in their efforts to oppose, subvert, or negate the hegemonic culture through their everyday cultural practices (see Best 2008; or Storey 2012).

The present study takes a middle-of-the-road stance on many issues stirred by the ‘Frankfurt vs. Birmingham School’ debate, specifically those centered on ‘determinism vs. agency’, ‘elitism vs. populism’, or ‘high vs. low culture/art’. It combines, in other words, the most valuable insights from each tradition by recognizing, for ex-
ample, that the cultural field is universally dictated by capitalist imperatives regardless of its high-low stratification; that individuals and groups are simultaneously the products of and the producers of culture and ideology; that their strategies of resistance have rather limited effects within a larger context of capitalist exploitation; and that there is therefore a pressing need for substantial social change which requires mass political action (cf. Best 2008; Chibber 2017; Lafrance 2002).

This work is also indebted to the neo-Marxist work of French sociologists and philosophers, such as Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Debord, de Certeau, Baudrillard and others, elaborating on the interrelationships between subjectivity, spatiality, and cultural practices in the increasingly mediated and consumption-oriented society (see Best 2008). Of special relevance here are, however, those French and American thinkers (e.g. Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Laclau, Mouffe, Jameson, Foster, Harvey, Lash), whose intellectual contributions gave rise to the emergence of two overlapping paradigms – poststructuralism and postmodernism. There are arguably two major points where two paradigms converge. One is a joint critique of modernism, specifically its confidence in the rationality, objectivity, and totality of official forms of knowledge (or ‘master narratives’ in Lyotard’s terms), as well as in the ideas of progress and unified, rational subjectivity. The other is a focus on developing new theoretical models for thinking about reality, subjectivity, ethics, and politics.

These commonalities notwithstanding, postmodernism demonstrates a much broader and more inclusive outlook than poststructuralism, not only in terms of the diversity and extent of issues and theoretical fields it covers, but also in terms of the scope of its definition. Specifically, while poststructuralists are largely concerned with locating ‘cracks’ in established systems of knowledge and beliefs, postmodernists tend to provide more comprehensive accounts of crucial changes that took place in the postwar period in such areas as history, society, politics, culture, arts, and philosophy. By the same token, while poststructuralism refers to the school of thought that arose in reaction to the perceived conceptual limitations of the structuralist movement which paved its way in 1950s and 1960s France, ‘[p]ostmodernism is as much a sensibility or cultural mood as a specific doctrine’ (Caterino 2008). The term postmodernism and its derivatives (e.g. postmodernity or postmodern) are used to denote the epoch which arguably superseded modernism and established its own set of distinct philosophical ideas, cultural trends, movements, sensibilities, objects, and practices. Also, the term has long spilt over into other discursive domains such as science and popular culture (see Best and Kellner 1991).

More to the point, since the political program of postmodernism is not coherent, it is worth highlighting that the present work engages with its oppositional (and) neo-Marxist strand. Here it is perhaps helpful to draw on Foster’s (1983: xii) distinction between ‘a postmodernism of reaction’ and ‘a postmodernism of resistance’. The former is apolitical or postpolitical in a sense that it has no sense of direction for the
future, either because its interpretations of present realities are defeatist and nihilistic (think, for example, of Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality), or because its celebration of premodern traditions obfuscate the heterogeneity of the present. This study aligns itself rather with the affirmative attitude of ‘a postmodernism of resistance’ towards critical and politically progressive forms of postmodern art, theory, and practice. Of special interest here are those postmodern theories that acknowledge the enduring relevance of Marxism (see e.g. Carah 2010; Jameson 1984; Kaneva 2012a; Klein 2000; Lash and Lury 2007), in contrast to those that repudiate it as obsolete or totalitarian in its universalist aspirations (see e.g. Baudrillard 1983; or Lyotard 1984). To situate this work properly at the nexus of postmodern theories, it is hence of essential importance to bear in mind the above differentiation between neo- and post-Marxist positions.

Moreover, the present study endorses and further discusses several forms of political postmodernism. The first focuses on the micropolitical level, thus targeting ‘a type of political regulation involved in shaping the preferences, attitudes, and perceptions of individual subjects’ (Scherer 2007: 564). As pointed out above, the ubiquity, diversity, and complexity of (music) festival practices provide fertile ground for micropolitical articulations of national identity. The second political form reflects the postmodern obsession with cultural difference at the expense of unity and common vision. One clear indicator of this shift in political thinking is the array of pervasive discourses of identity politics and multiculturalism. Such political projects mainly aim at documenting, honoring, and advancing distinct cultures and political struggles of marginalized and oppressed groups. The present study is partly driven by the same concerns, given the inherent power of national identity to subsume other markers of identity into its overarching structure. Part of the following discussion on Serbian national identity concerns specifically issues of ethnicity, race, class, religion, locality, age, gender, sexuality, and taste culture.

On the other hand, some forms of postmodern politics actually seek to resuscitate a sense of commonality that reaches across cultural divisions. In one such formulation, a politics for the common good paradoxically draws on the poststructuralist notions of difference, relationality, and processuality as the basis of both subjectivity and community. For example, Sullivan (2003: 146–148) follows the logic of Secomb’s (2000) fractured community when defining the corresponding idea of queer community as ‘a fracturing process [rather than a collection of individuals with a common sexuality] that enables difference and diversity and the radical unknowability of such’. Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) concept of radical democracy likewise favors difference and dissent rather than consensus. The same seems to apply to Spivak’s strategic essentialism – a pivotal concept in postcolonial theory that approves of essentializing the points of difference around which inequity has been built so that an otherwise fractured community can formulate its political goals. At any rate, it is
the related concepts of *singularity* and *coming community* by Agamben (1993) and Grossberg (1996), respectively, that inspire some of my own theorization in this study, specifically, the idea of *festival coming community* (see Chapter 6). Emphasized in each is the importance of collective political action that goes beyond definitions of individual and group identities in strictly cultural terms. Alternatively, a sense of commonality is evoked through conventional forms of political postmodernism known as ‘anti-’ or ‘alterglobalization’ movements (born in the 1990s). It goes without saying that the present work is highly sympathetic with the political agenda of such movements, specifically, with their call for the creation of new kinds of alliances in a joint fight against the detrimental impact of economic globalization on the environment, social justice, freedom, and human rights (see e.g. Best 2008; Chibber 2014; Klein 2000; St John 2008; Žižek 2012).

To sum up, then, the present study highlights the importance of structural inequalities without losing sight of other human rights, including ‘rights to difference / culture’ (cf. Brah 1996; Chibber 2017; Žižek 2015). In fact, it does so, conceptually, by grounding the possibility of collective resistance in the very idea of singularity / difference. By the same token, the study endorses the discourse of identity politics, seeing it as part of a larger debate on national identity, but is simultaneously critical of its apparently harmful effects on a common fight against human exploitation and domination caused by capitalism and class struggle. By acknowledging issues of both representation and structural inequalities, the study fosters and works with two definitions of politics. In the first, politics is seen as a form of moral advocacy, and in the other – as an operative category that requires mass political action against the existing centers of power (cf. Chibber 2017).

### 1.6.6 Discourse Analysis

It should have become clear by now that the key concepts in this work – space/place, music, and national identity – are approached in a way that fits into the prevailing research paradigm of social constructionism (SC). This paradigm underpins a good deal of postmodern and poststructuralist writing and comprises in turn a highly fluid and inconsistent corpus of theories and methods across a variety of disciplines including linguistics, sociology, psychology, and cultural studies (see Burr 2003; Nikander 2006). The distinct feature of SC is a profoundly antiessentialist approach to the phenomena at hand, asserting that ‘[t]here are no “essences” inside things and people’ (Burr 2003: 6). There are instead only different constructions of the world that are inevitably biased and context-dependent. Importantly, however, these constructions have real effects on people’s lives despite their discursive and historically contingent nature. The present study adopts, in principle, the basic tenets of SC while expressing serious reservation about its ethical relativist implications (as demonstrat-
ed above through the endorsement of universal ideals of social justice and human emancipation from domination). In addition, the primacy which is given to the concept of discourse within the SC paradigm deserves further attention. Specified next is therefore the way in which discourse is understood in this study and the type of discourse analysis that serves best its goals.

Fairclough’s theorization of discourse appears to be a good starting point for explaining the selected analytical method here. In one of the formulations that he puts forward, discourse is approached as ‘a form of social practice’ which relates to social realities in a dual way – as ‘a mode of representation’ and simultaneously as ‘a mode of action’ (1992: 63). Discourse is, in other words, a practice that actively constitutes our social world, while being simultaneously constrained and enabled by that world.14 This is, by extension, another way of saying that the festival-related discourses of Serbian national identity, in all varieties of their forms and practices, are shaped by and in turn shape Serbian material realities with which they are entwined. Note that the same dialectic between discourse and social structure is implicated in the key concept of the study (see 1.2), as well as in the adopted definition of music-national identifications (see 1.6.2).

More to the point, the fact that national identity is a complex phenomenon, both in itself and in relation to music (and) festival practices, has several practical implications for how discourse is theorized and analytically operationalized in this study. First, the analysis here is based on a multimodal understanding of discourse. This is an approach to discourse which takes into consideration also systems of signification other than language (cf. Blommaert 2005: 3; or Heinonen 2005: 141). The present study specifically looks into how pertinent speech, images, sounds, symbolic objects, and embodied practices surrounding Exit and Guća convey certain ideas about Serbian national identity, as well as how they set certain limits to the ways in which the latter can be experienced and thought of. Another point of inquiry here is how these multimodal discursive practices create subject positions for national identifications, and, relatedly, how the discursive constructions of competing social identities, social relations, and ideologies at two festivals set the scene for making sense of Serbia’s national self-narration.

Second, national identity is an essentially political category, and so is the discourse that shapes it. Discourse (of national identity) is therefore both ‘a site and object of struggle where different groups strive for hegemony and the production of

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14 Within the SC paradigm, the relationship between discourse and material reality is typically framed by the so-called ‘realism vs. relativism’ debate. For relativists, reality, even if it exists, is in any case accessible only through discourse, whereas for realists, ‘reality does not determine knowledge, [but] it lays down important restrictions on the variety of ways open to us to “construct” the world’ (Parker 1992; Barnes 1997; both cited in Burr 2003: 60). It is clear that the present study, following Fairclough, takes a realist position in this debate.
meaning and ideology’ (Best and Kellner 1991: 26). In the discourse analysis that follows, ideology is not only understood in the narrow sense of ‘national ideology’, but rather as broadly as ‘sets of ideas, values or assumptions’ with which the discourse of national identity in Exit and Guća is imbued (cf. Green 1999: 5). Furthermore, power struggle in articulations of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guća is analyzed from both macro (institutionalized) and micro (everyday) instances of socio-spatial practice and across a variety of cultural resources from which it is constructed and experienced in two festivals. When discussed as a site of power struggle, the discourse of national identity is constituted by those festival-related discursive practices that perpetuate the already existing hierarchies and ideologies in articulations of Serbian national identity. The discourse of national identity as a stake in power struggle point, by contrast, to those festival-related discursive practices that signal a shift in the very understanding of what constitutes Serbian national identity within the festival context and beyond (cf. Fairclough 1992: 67).

Indeed, it is in the epilogue of this study (see 6.2) where I showcase how various festival-related discourses combine under the global and post-Fordist conditions of Serbia’s transition to produce a new discourse of Serbian national identity, specifically, the nation branding discourse. To do so, I draw on Fairclough’s method for ‘multidimensional’, ‘multifunctional’, ‘historical’, and ‘critical’ analysis of social change (1992: 8–9), in particular, on three major tendencies that he identifies within the new global order of discourse – the democratization, commodification, and technologization of discourse (ibid., 200). Note, however, that the analysis below does not adhere to the proposed sequence of Fairclough’s step-by-step methodology but is rather utilized as an explanatory framework for understanding the rationale behind the (nation) branding discourse as the presently dominant regime of truth in Serbia and elsewhere.

By the same token, Fairclough’s concerns with the social dimension of language use at the level of its microstructures have no relevance to the present study. At the heart of the analysis are instead the Foucauldian elements of Fairclough’s methodology, i.e. those that center on the social nature and hierarchical implications of discourse. At the same time, the present study cautions against the determinism of Foucault’s approach, which apparently leaves little room for active social agency, the contestation of hegemony, and thus the possibility of change (see Foucault 1977; 1980a; or Fairclough 1992).

With all this in mind, it seems that the main approach to discourse analysis here is essentially Foucauldian in that it intends to elicit the social basis of the discursive construction of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guća. The central concerns of such an approach are specifically different subject positions that different actors assume within the larger discourse of Serbian national identity, as well as the implicit meanings, hidden agendas, and power relations that these positions allow and pre-
suppose (cf. Foucault 1972; or Silverman 2011: 74). Another benefit of the Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis is that ‘there aren’t really any conceptual tools to guide the analysis’ (Burr 2003: 171; see also Nikander 2006: 416), which leaves researchers more liberty to engage in a playful dialogue with other theories and analytical methods. This explains why the type of discourse analysis adopted here can also be linked to the Derridean method of deconstruction. More specifically, the ‘deconstruction’ of festival-related discourses in this study amounts to breaking them down into their component parts and going behind their surface form in order to show how they come to present us with a particular vision of Serbian society, what they repress or exclude from their purview, and what incongruities and hierarchies they conceal and presuppose. According to Jordan (2004: 58–59), there are two key strategies for deconstructing a text / discourse. The first is to identify the binary oppositions on which it rests, and the second is to disclose the rhetorical devices (such as key words, motifs, metaphors) that yield the supposed premise of its argument. It goes without saying that the present study makes use of both strategies, along with a general questioning of any items that are claimed to be original, natural, or self-evident’ (cf. Jordan 2004: 59).

1.6.7 Ethnographic Approach and Experience

Ethnographic methods provided an additional way to obtain data and generate knowledge in this work. However, their use should be seen as supportive rather than central to the research process presented here. Ethnographic evidence was indeed one among many sources from which research data had been compiled, such as popular publications, documentaries, media reports, or online forums on the music festivals in question. For Best (2008), this is in fact the ideal way to conduct research. In his view, a study with a wide range of texts is more likely to yield a rich approach to cultural studies and a more compelling argument than a study with less diverse data. At any rate, it is worth emphasizing that the ethnographic evidence used in this research is subjected to the same principles of critical discourse analysis and the same ethical concerns with social justice and human emancipation described above (cf. Fairclough 1992; Madison 2005).

The scope and type of fieldwork undertaken in this study adhere to the traditional definition of the former. According to it, fieldwork amounts to ‘the observational and experiential portion of the ethnographic process during which the [ethnographer] engages living individuals as a means toward learning about a given music-cultural practice’ (Cooley and Barz 2008: 4). In light of this definition, it is clear that the Exit and Guča trumpet festivals represented the core sites of my fieldwork activities, such as participant observation and interactions with festivalgoers, festival participants (e.g. Romani trumpet players in Guča, or in situ members of Exit and Guča labor
force), and residents of both host locations. What also falls under the narrowly defined category of fieldwork are a number of in-depth interviews that I carried out in Belgrade and Novi Sad between 2011 and 2014, specifically, with two Exit team members (former Exit CEO Bojan Bošković and Exit artist, media, and marketing coordinator Ilija Milošević), with former Boban and Marko Marković’s manager Bojan Đorđević, with Tourist Organization of Serbia representative Ljiljana Čerović, with ethnomusicologist Iva Nenić, and with several other actors involved in the festivals in one capacity or another (e.g. president of Serbia’s Movement for European Cultural Cooperation (PEKS) Vlade Radulović, Novi Sad music event organizer Vlada and Novi Sad-based Exit-goer Marija).

In the following summary of my Exit and Guča fieldwork experience over the summers 2012 and 2013, let me begin by pointing out that music festivals are special research environments that require special fieldwork strategies. Here I fully concur with O’Grady’s (2013: 25, 35) view that music festivals as ‘spaces of play’ and ‘liminal zones’ might make festivalgoers (i.e. ‘people at play’) reluctant to cooperate with the ethnographer on accomplishing her tasks. One way to go about this issue, as O’Grady (2013) further suggests, is to embrace play itself as part of research methodology – which in turn causes the ethnographer to pay special attention to her own bodily experience of the event in question. Thus, following in O’Grady’s footsteps as well as in the footsteps of other performance studies scholars (e.g. Buckland 2002; Schechner 2002), I was likewise playing along with my fellow Exit- and Guča-goers, letting myself immerse in festival multisensory surroundings and experience ‘first hand sensations of thrill, excitement, risk, transcience, flow, connectivity, unity and so on’ (cf. O’Grady 2013: 23). All these built a solid foundation for gaining empirical insights not only into what was going on in Exit and Guča spaces (i.e. what cultural practices and behaviors were characteristic of each festival), but also into what it meant to live it out bodily, emotionally, spiritually, and intellectually. Moreover, being at play also helped me establish common ground with my festival interlocutors whenever we would end up sharing and analyzing our festival impressions and experiences (cf. Briggs et al. 2015).

Indeed, for embodied knowledge to become useful, it must, according to Nelson (2006, in O’Grady 2013: 34), ‘be brought into dynamic dialogue with other forms of knowledge that arise from critical reflection on the practice and its conceptual framework’. But just as Kisliuk (2008: 202) pointed out that fieldwork and the space of writing are inextricably linked, so I claim that there is no neat division of field research into work and play. In other words, not only was my festival fieldwork characterized by constant shifting between playing and direct engagement, on the one hand (e.g. through ‘musicking’ and playful encounters), and observation and (self-)reflection, on the other (e.g. through writing and discussions). Equally importantly, I also
worked when I was playing, and I was playful when I was working. The two processes thus infuse each other (cf. O’Grady 2013: 34).

With this in mind, I focus now on describing the working part of my festival fieldwork, as if it were a completely independent activity. Furthermore, if we are to provisionally break down fieldwork into observational and writing tasks, then such work might be said to alternate between what Buckland (2002: 9) designates as ‘[zooming] in on what (...) social actors do and zoom[ing] out to explore its effects’. My fieldwork at Exit and Guća was governed by the same processes. To be exact, observing was always accompanied with taking jotted notes in situ using mobile phone. While this activity conveyed a sense of adventure and excitement of being on the threshold of discovering something new, the subsequent act of writing (i.e. of conversing jotted notes into a coherent, detailed narrative) felt to some extent like its necessary drudgery (cf. Warren and Karner 2005: 97). At any rate, writing a fieldwork diary in the tradition of Geertz’s (1973) thick description was ultimately a good move, considering that some of the insights that emerged at the later stages of research were precisely based on the diary’s more obscure details.

In contrast to Anderton (2006: 82–83), another festival fieldworker whose approach to the festival crowd during the recruitment phase was rather formal (namely, he emphasized his status as a festival researcher by wearing a nametag), my role as a fieldworker in Exit and Guća was largely covert throughout the duration of each festival. Two things should be noted here. First, passive deception is not only an ethically approved but also the only practically feasible form of ethnographic research that is conducted in public or semi-public places, festivals included (see Warren and Karner 2005: 42–43). Why would indeed my research intentions be of any value to those Exit- and Guća-goers whose contacts with me were reduced to transient encounters, either superficial verbal exchanges, or collective participation in music-related activities!?15 Second, and relatedly, my researcher identity was of course re-

15 That said, it is perhaps still necessary to question whether the ethics of covert observation is appropriate in settings where people tend to be intoxicated (the researcher included), as well as how valid the obtained research material and insights may be when the ingestion of alcohol and other substances is potentially involved. These and similar objections can be countered on a number of grounds. First, there is nothing controversial or compromising about observing or interacting with drunken people in the settings like open-air music festivals where inebriation is an accepted or even desirable form of behavior, that is, ‘a practice in which relations develop and evolve between the individual and a group, and a group culture is negotiated and enacted’ (Briggs et al. 2015: 172). Arguably, it is also a type of practice which may sharpen understanding of commonly held values of the festival community in question, insofar as we consider festivals to be secular rituals of modern times (see Turner 1974) and thus social mirrors and potential agents of social change (see Kerner Furman 1981). [Which brings us back to the departure point of this study – that contemporary festivals are still relevant sites of national identity formation.] Second, Briggs et al. (2015) provide strong evidence that a non-judgmental attitude and a great deal of flexibility are required of
vealed to those fellow festivalgoers with whom I built deeper relationships. The main strategy during my fieldwork was in fact to focus on a selected group of people rather than on ‘doing the crowd’, as my supervisor John Richardson put it once. Hanging out in the ‘field’ on a daily basis with a selected few (i.e. participating in the same festival activities, sharing our festival stories and impressions) set the stage for spontaneous rapport-building interactions. Once a sense of mutual trust, affinity and comradeship was established, it felt easy and natural to formalize it through extensive, in-depth interviews. Typically, these interviews were scheduled towards the end of festivities, since I wanted to allow my interlocutors enough time to process and articulate their Exit and Guča experience. I specifically conducted quite a few individual interviews, three dyads, and a couple of focus groups (see the list at the end of the study), all of them in a semi-structured or a standardized open-ended style. (For a typology of research interviews, see Patton 1990: 288–289.)

Note in addition that the selection of key interlocutors during my Exit and Guča fieldwork could not be carefully planned in advance for two main reasons. First, I went out in the ‘field’ without being entirely sure in what ways the notion of national identity could be operationalized in music festivals like Exit and Guča. I was rather inclined to adopt a ‘bottom-up’ approach, whereby the fieldwork material guides the analysis and theoretical discussion. And second, any ethnographic enterprise invariably generates partial truths – biased and incomplete – based on ‘an open-ended series of contingent, power-laden encounters’ (Clifford 1986: 8). My choice of festival interlocutors was likewise partly circumstantial, partly determined by my gender, social skills and sensibility. The ‘truth’ that I was able to produce in the process is accordingly one among many. But now with hindsight, I cannot help but think that many contingencies did work in my favor. For example, my key interlocutors at Exit 2012 – two savvy American urbanites, Jesse and Gab – happened to be my next-door neighbors at the Novi Sad student dormitory ‘Slobodan Bajić’, where we were renting a bed. At Guča 2013, I was equally lucky to rent a room in the same family house as Slaviša and Novica, two Bosnian Serbs from Vienna, with both of whom I spent a great deal of time in quality discussions as much at the house as at various festival sites. In fact, the same family hosted me both times I was doing my festival fieldwork in Guča, which turned out to be yet another stroke of luck for a number of reasons – their house was conveniently located near the very core of festivities, they treated me as a family member, sharing generously with me their food, refreshments, and

ethnographers doing their research in environments associated with all types of transgression, including inebriation. This specifically means that playing along with the dominant social codes of conduct (in this case alcohol drinking) is part of the rapport building with the study participants, and as such may be a necessary way of securing one’s ‘research credibility and access to the internal group communication’ (ibid., 169). Third, and perhaps most important, the ethnographic evidence used in this study is largely based on the in-depth interviews and observations conducted during the daytime and in full sobriety (see below).
unavoidable Serbian Turkish-style coffee, their personal stories and their vast knowledge of the festival, village, and local affairs more generally. However, the greatest example of contingency at work was my re-encounter with Bibiana and David at Guča 2013, Belgian-Spanish siblings whom I met a month earlier on a Serbian minibus on my way from Finland to Serbia. Our spontaneous reunion at the festival took place early enough so that they could introduce me to the rest of their Belgian crew. All the fun and bonding moments we had together in Guča, in conjunction with all marvelous and well-substantiated insights they shared with me, is something that filled up some of the most glorious pages in my fieldwork history.

A majority of my interviewees, either enumerated above or quoted in the analysis below, allowed me to use their real names. It goes without saying that such permission was not necessary when my interviewees spoke in their official capacity (e.g. as a festival CEO, brass band manager, and so on). When it comes to the ethics of publishing original screen (nick)names of online commentators, I am fully aware that there are arguments both for and against in the digital research methods literature (see e.g. Tuikka et al. 2017). With this in mind, I nonetheless opted to use them as originally published online, because: (1) screen names are meant to be public; (2) they tend to be fake anyway; and (3) the online quotes used in this work are not delicate content-wise and therefore have no actual power to harm or interfere with the commentators’ private affairs. Note, finally, that selected excerpts from my festival fieldwork diary are incorporated verbatim into the main body of the study.

Apart from the abovementioned ethical concerns that the present study raises – such as those related to ‘overt vs. covert’ role in the field, or to building relations of mutual trust, respect, equality, and confidentiality with interlocutors – there is one more that goes under the heading of an insider-outsider dilemma. What is at stake here are complex processes of the researcher’s positioning in relation to her interlocutors as well as to the location under study. In the context of this research, I consider myself to be both an insider and an outsider. This claim can be considered at two levels: (1) at the meta-level of anthropological discourse on its own disciplinary profile; and (2) at the factual level. In the first case, it is worth pointing out that

processes of othering and alterity and formation of counterparts … were central for the constitution of the discipline from its very beginning, regardless of the particular national tradition of its practicing, i.e. othering being made on the principle of class and race, such was the case in Eastern European and Latin American anthropology, or on the colonial distance as it was in Britain and France. (Simić 2010: 30; emphases in original.)

Other ethnographers (see e.g. Noll 1997; Stock and Chiener 2008) emphasized likewise that the insider-outsider distinction obfuscates the fact that other elements of
the researcher identity are equally involved in the processes of ‘othering’ in one’s ethnographic research at home. As Tsuda (2015: 14) clarifies, ‘[b]oth types of anthropologists [native and non-native] are partial outsiders who are positioned at a relative distance from those they study in the field’. This also resonates well with a more traditional view in anthropology and related disciplines that the native ethnographer should aspire to take the ‘objective’ and ‘disinterested’ perspective of an outsider (see Nettl 2005: 159; or Pian 1992, in Stock and Chiener 2008: 108). Thus, from the viewpoint of anthropological insider-outsider debates, it seems that even if I can be considered a member of ex-Yugoslav/Serbian culture that I study here, I am inevitably a partial Other to it, not only by the traditional imperatives of ethnographic research, but also due to the idiosyncrasies of my identity structure. Perhaps the most notable example of the latter was a curious situation during my festival fieldwork in Guča, where local residents or vendors would initially address me in English rather than in Serbian. There was apparently something ‘strange’ about my physical appearance or attitude that came across as ‘not from here’.

Now, at the factual level, I am undoubtedly someone who floats between two or more cultures, given the international trajectory of my life path (I have been living abroad since 2007). I am, in short, an ‘in-between’ and so is Simić (2009; 2010) who did her research on various aspects of Serbian everyday culture in the lives of Novi Sad urbanites as a doctoral student of anthropology overseas. Since our respective research projects show some degree of commonality, I feel it is worth comparing her insider-outsider dilemma with my own.

In our interactions with the locals, both of us were specifically confronted with the repertoire of familiar Occidentalist, Orientalist, and Balkanist ideas that our interlocutors assumed we share simply by being members of the same ‘tribe’. However, while in Simić’s (2010: 36) fieldwork experience, ‘[a]sking questions like someone who is an outsider’ often brought about tensions in the relationship with her interlocutors, I never really encountered any of these issues during my fieldwork. Simić suspects that her interlocutors felt uncomfortable with her taken-for-granted questions for two reasons: first, because this type of questioning reminded them of the social hierarchies that the colonial relationship between anthropologist and research subject presupposes; and second, because it made her look like a ‘fake outsider’ in their eyes, that is, as someone ‘pretending not to be “native” anymore and not to understand “the [Serbian] situation” now [she] had “exited”, while the idea of “exit” from the country was one of the key issues for [her] informants’ (ibid., 36).

In contrast to Simić’s testimony, my in-between status seemed to be nothing but beneficial for the quality of social interactions I had in situ with my festival interlocutors. On the one hand, I felt that a shared sense of ‘cultural intimacy’ (see Herzfeld 2005) encouraged native Exit- and Guča-goers to confide in me what they really thought about each festival and their respective affairs. On the other hand, my im-
pression was that my foreign festival interlocutors could also easily relate to me, presumably because of my international status and cosmopolitan attitude. It should go without saying that the said differences in Simić’s and my fieldwork observations largely owed to such factors as different research focuses, different fieldwork settings, and thus different types of relationships established in the field. While Simić’s focus was solely on a selected group of local resident population, with whose members she interacted in everyday settings for an extended period of time (i.e. young to middle-aged Novi Sad urbanites at different venues across the city over the years 2005 and 2006), I could indeed take advantage of the transiency and liminality of the music festival environment in which people tend to be more easygoing, broadminded, and cooperative than usual. In fact, the best way to grasp the insider-outsider dialectic in my fieldwork experience is to refer to Todorov’s (1994: 91–92) notion of *double exteriority* – the position of eternal stranger to both native and foreign cultures that provides a vantage point from which to survey the world as an ethnologist, or in my case, as a music (festival) fieldworker.

From all the above, it can be finally concluded that despite all its play, fun, and other personal gains, festival fieldwork is ultimately hard work. For me, working in huge festive environments such as Exit and Guča, with a highly condensed and time-limited program, was in general so stressful and overwhelming that it occasionally took a toll on my overall wellbeing. At the same time, doing festival fieldwork was an incredibly rewarding experience because of all the relationships that were forged in the process, as well as all the invaluable insights gained from them.

1.7 Chapters Overview

The present study comprises six chapters (including this Introduction) that can roughly be divided into two groups: theoretical and analytical. Chapter 2 specifically seeks to fulfill two objectives, both of which are largely theoretical in nature. The first is to look for the intersecting points between the fields of music festivals and national identity, outlining thereby the discursive framework for the upcoming analysis of national identity articulations in Serbia’s Exit and Guča. The second aim is to bring those nodal points of the debate into a more theoretically coherent structure by setting forth the idea of contemporary music festivals as micronational spaces.

Chapters 3–5 are mainly analytical in their orientation, both corroborating and challenging the initial hypothesis about Exit and Guča as the representatives of Two Serbias. In more detail, Chapter 3 explores a variety of cultural resources (with a special emphasis on music), from which national identity comes to be represented and experienced in Exit as part of Serbia’s counter-spatial practice. Chapter 4 complements the previous chapter by focusing on the myriad ways in which Guča Festival functions as Serbia’s organic micronational space. In Chapter 5, Exit and Guča
are pitted against one another along four spatial dimensions: global-local, urban-rural, North-South, and West-East.

It should be noted here that the reasons for discussing Exit (the counter-space) before Guća (the organic space, representing the traditions that Exit might be counter to) are several. First, the discourses of interest to this study only gained ground in response to Exit. Second, Guća carved out a more dominant presence both in the international festival market and in the official politics of national identity representation later than Exit (i.e. after 2004). The third reason for covering Guća second is structural. Due to a greater number of relevant insights that I could tease out of the Guća-related research material, it seemed only reasonable to begin with the analysis of Exit Festival, and then include in it some more general overviews of the topics pertinent to both festivals (e.g. Serbian language and script in 3.2.3, or Serbia’s popular music in 3.2.5).

Lastly, the concluding chapter (6) ends with a summary and an epilogue. While the former obviously provides a recapitulation of the main research findings, the latter discusses the nation branding discourse in relation to two festivals and its ideological implications on the Serbian self-narration. In addition to this, the epilogue also turns back to the key concept of the study in order to offer new theoretical terms for imagining music festival collectivities and thus the very possibility of social change in today’s world.

As should be clear by now, just as in any other attempts at making clear divisions, the suggested differentiation between theoretical and analytical chapters in this study is strictly provisional. For example, Chapter 2 already delves into the analysis of Exit and Guća as micronational spaces (see 2.6), whereas a part of the epilogue is likewise devoted to the analysis of multiple instances of (nation) branding practice in Exit and Guća (see 6.2.). With this in mind, the focus of the following chapter is on the details of the theoretical background of the study.
2 Contemporary Music Festivals as Micronational Spaces

The aim of the present chapter is to engage further in conversation with human geographers, mainly Lefebvre and Massey, so as to propose a fully-fledged conceptual and analytical framework for the study of national identity and music festivals. However, to achieve this goal, it is necessary to take a step back and identify first the intersecting points between the discursive fields of music festivals and national identity. In the following, such an inquiry unfolds along two separate but crisscrossing paths. The first (in 2.1) seeks to unpack a set of assumptions underpinning the socio-anthropological festival research paradigm to which the present study belongs – specifically, assumptions that pertain to the questions of what contemporary festivals are about, what constitutes them, and what functions they perform. A discussion of this kind clearly lays the groundwork for developing a definition of contemporary music festivals on which this study draws. The second path of inquiry (in 2.2) aims to focus on the existing approaches to national identity and/or space within the relevant corpus of recent festival studies that this work is associated with. Summarized are initially (in 2.2.1) the most common approaches to issues of national identity in the field, with a view to pointing out some of the ways in which a spatial perspective could tighten up and politically engage such analyses. The following subsection (2.2.2) is a critical overview of the selected body of festival studies literature whose main research focus is on other-than-national forms of cultural identity, but whose conceptualizations of festival space/spatiality are nonetheless pertinent to analytical considerations in this study. Not only are the necessary connections thereby made between the notion of national identity and the existing spatial approaches in festival studies. Provided also is a compelling justification for the development of a new concept in the study of national identity and music festivals – that of contemporary music festivals as micronational spaces.
2.1 Specifying Terms for the Definition of Contemporary Music Festivals in the Study

The festival studies literature abounds in a variety of definitions applied to the interchangeable terms *festival* and *festivity*. That these terms have no agreed meaning among festival scholars comes as no surprise, given the intrinsic complexity of the festival phenomenon and the concomitant diversity of approaches to its analysis. The meanings of the terms are additionally obscured by their prominent usage in vernacular discourse, where they ‘[cover] a constellation of very different events, sacred and profane, private and public, sanctioning tradition and introducing innovation’ (Falassi 1987: 1). What adds to the great semantic richness of the labels *festival* and *festivity* are also efforts of some scholars to explore their etymology and/or to examine their changing role and significance throughout the (Western) European history, all the way from ancient times up until the present day (see e.g. Falassi 1987; Lukić-Krstanović 2010; Picard and Robinson 2006).

Despite the proliferation of the meanings ascribed to the festival phenomenon, it is arguably still possible to differentiate between two main ways in which it has been defined in recent festival studies. In the first approach, which constitutes the group of what can be called *descriptive definitions*, the main objective is to give an account of festivals as they appear on the ground. Such definitions specifically seek to describe the present forms of festivals in all their diversity, taking into account many of their formal features, such as the spatio-temporal framework, content / character, format, purpose, target audiences, and size / scope. This is typically accomplished in an informal fashion (see Arnaoutović 2014; Falassi 1987; McKay 2015), whereas attempts at the systematic categorization of festivals can also be found, albeit rarely (see Paleo and Wijnberg 2006, in Stone 2009: 206–207).

In the second group of definitions, which can be characterized as *stipulative or theoretical*, festivals are posited as objects of evaluative judgments and theoretical propositions about the particular functions they perform (from aesthetico-ideological to socioeconomic) for host localities, festivalgoers, culture industries, and societies at large, as well as about the multiple relationships they are said to forge among all these across a variety of spatial scales (from communal to global). To this group belongs, for instance, the definition of festivals as formulated by Gibson and Connell (2012). In their words, ‘[m]ost festivals create (...) a time and space of celebration, a site of convergence separate from everyday routines, experiences and meanings – ephemeral communities in place and time’ (ibid., 4). Another one, proposed by Paleo and Wijnberg (2006, in Stone 2009: 206), puts forward the idea of music festivals ‘as intermediaries between producers of live performances and consumers’, thus reducing their role to that of ‘distributors and retailers’. In any event, instead of adopting any of the existing approaches to contemporary (music) festivals, this study de-
develops a (stipulative) definition of its own, one which is better tailored to its goals. The way in which this is accomplished does not differ much from Falassi’s (1987: 3–6) proposal of the so-called morphology of festivals, whose ‘minimal units’, or ‘building blocks’, are classified into ten types of ‘rites’. Additionally, a theoretical model which is followed here even more closely in terms of its objectives and design is that of Picard and Robinson’s (2006). These two scholars browse the socio-anthropological field of festival studies in order to postulate a set of festive practices that are commonly explored therein. The ultimate goal of their joint endeavor is to set up the theoretical framework for understanding festivals in relation to the problematic their research centers on, namely, the relationship between festivals, tourism, and social change.

The present study likewise draws on the same strand of festival studies, tracing those threads that can be deemed most relevant to the problematic of (Serbian) national identity. Distinguished in the process are several key elements constituting music festival practice as we know it today. These elements can at the same time be understood as the analytical points of conjunction between the discursive field of festival practice and that of national identity. Arguably, these are: (1) music / sound; (2) a(n) (un)bounded time-space framework; (3) the processual, performative, ritual-based; (4) a wide spectrum of sociocultural and politico-ideological implications of meaning production; (5) the economic-managerial-bureaucratic sphere of operation; and (6) the question of power. I now elaborate on each in turn.

First and most obviously, music festivals take the category of music as a focal point in their programming. The content of music festivals is indeed largely based on a series of music performances, both on and off stage, as well as on other music-related activities such as dancing, music retail, music-related workshops and discussions, or music organizations ranging from music media outlets to music managerial agencies. It goes without saying that music cannot be separated from other art media and content forms, not only within performing arts but, just as importantly, within visual arts and digital media (e.g. installation art, VJing, interactive screens) that are increasingly an integral part of contemporary music festival programs. In fact, festivals of the present day are multimedia events; however, it is still legitimate and helpful to categorize them in line with their major program orientations.

Second, contemporary music festivals take place within a strictly circumscribed time-space framework. This aspect of festivities is, on the one hand, considered the very precondition for the uniqueness of festival experience and routinely described as ‘time out of time’ (Falassi 1987), or as ‘a liminal time-space’ (Luckman 2014; Turner 1969; 1982). On the other hand, a given time-space frame of contemporary music festivals should also be conceived more broadly than the totality of social practices, relations, and experiences alike that come to crisscross within their bounded spatio-temporal contexts. The overall pool of festival meanings is in fact gathered
from the movement along both spatial and temporal axes. It draws simultaneously from the festivals’ embeddedness in locality and their connectedness to wider contexts; it captures successive moments of the present while selecting the ‘truths’ of accumulated pasts and projecting future visions.

Third, the spatio-temporal boundedness of music festival experience points at the same time to the performative, processional, and processual nature of these events. The processuality and performativity of the festival format and experience are manifest on both its macro and micro levels. The former refers to the sequence of established rites that each festival follows more or less closely (see Falassi 1987; Regev 2011), whereas the form which the processuality and performativity of festival experience take on the microlevel can be theorized in terms of drama. Following Willis (1993), Anderton (2006: 43) defines ‘drama’ in contemporary music festivals as ‘the manner in which communication is achieved through dancing, story-telling, body language and so on: the “roles, rituals, and performances that we produce with others.”’ All this in turn foregrounds the fact that festivals are always in the process of becoming and are therefore always, in a sense, unfinished, undetermined, and open-ended in their meaning.

Fourth, contemporary music festivals serve also as the time-spaces of intense and meaningful social connectivity and interaction among their participants. Depending on their scope, format, politico-ideological agenda, and genre orientation, music festivals draw into their orbit specifically profiled audiences, engendering a sense of community among their members. Irrespective of identification sources they afford to their audiences (whether this interpellation be organized along the lines of race, nationality, age, gender, sexuality, locality, cultural affiliation, or, most likely, through the various combinations of all these), music festivals are significant (re)occurrences during which a great diversity of identities and lifestyles come to be (re)affirmed and celebrated across a range of spatial scales and cultural practices. Apart from a communal feeling which they tend to induce in crowds of their supporters, music festivals are also venues that enable and set in motion a great variety of sociality and experiences, either in real- or virtual time-spaces, for all actors involved.

More specifically, the proliferation of identities, lifestyles, and worldviews that are being projected, staged, performed, and lived out at music festival sites, posits a broad spectrum of aesthetico-ideological meanings, whose expressions can be said to occur between two poles. At one end of the spectrum, the meaning is constructed through cognitive / reflexive processes, thus operating at the level of the discursive, representational, symbolic. From the viewpoint of festival production, the intended ‘truths’ are being diffused to the audience through a carefully selected and orchestrated set of utterances, rituals, performances, objects, spaces, and images. From the standpoint of festival consumption, the ‘truths’ pertaining to festival meanings and experiences do not necessarily match the ‘truths’ promulgated from above. They are
likewise constituted and circulated by and among audience members through reflections, all sorts of social interactions, clothing and hairstyles, displayed objects, bodily gestures, and a variety of other symbolic activities. The other end of the semantic spectrum appeals to the level of the performative, embodied, affective, sensual, subconscious, unreflexive. What is at stake here is a particular quality of music festival experience which is in its immediacy, intensity, transcendence, and ecstasy comparable to that of Barthes’s (1976) *jouissance* or Turner’s (1974; 1982) *flow*. At the core of such an experience is thus a sense of uncontrollable exaltation and ego dissolution achieved through the bodily and sensory immersion into the here-and-now moment.

Note, however, that there are considerable overlappings between these two poles of the festival semantic field. The reason for that is that so-called ‘non-representational’ cultural practices and experiences (such as performances, embodiments, or affects) enter the world of representations once they come to be recognized as part of a culture and thus imbued with a plethora of symbolic meanings. Besides, as Edensor (2002: 141) reminds us, ‘representation is (always) embodied and embodying, performed and conveying of performance, spatialised and spatialising, and objective and subjective’. The established distinction between two modes of meaning construction is therefore not intended to reproduce this somewhat misleading differentiation between *representation* and *non-representation*. What is at issue here is rather a possibility of shifting between two modes of knowing and experiencing (festival) reality – one which perhaps parallels Barthes’s distinction between *plaisir* (as a form of pleasure, coming from reflections and verbalizations) and *jouissance* (as a feeling of bliss, whose immediacy and intensity goes beyond the possibility of verbal articulation); or one which Lash and Lury (2007) describe as a shift in the audience approach to cultural objects and events from a *reader* to a *player*, that is, from the realm of epistemology (i.e. knowing reality ‘from its outside’ on the grounds of their ‘appearances’) to the realm of ontology (i.e. knowing reality ‘from its inside’ by delving into the world of objects).

Fifth, it is also important to recognize that contemporary music festivals are very complex entities, whose successful production depends on the consideration and coordination of multiple activities and relations operating in the sphere of economics, marketing, management, public relations, law, politics, bureaucracy, communication technologies, tourism, human resources, and creative/culture/music/event industries. All these domains of social productivity are significantly entwined and should be subsumed, for the purpose of a more operational analysis, under a joint category dubbed, for example, as *the economic-managerial-bureaucratic sphere of music festival business*. What exactly each constituent part of the proposed analytical category means when considered in its own right, can be summarized as follows: the economic affairs surrounding music festival production revolve around activities such as fund
raising, sponsorships, branding initiatives, music (event) industry deals, cost-benefit calculations, supply and sale of goods, touristic offers, and associated development of transport, hospitality, leisure, and commercial infrastructures. The managerial field of operation is concerned with organizing and coordinating all points of festival production and dissemination. The managerial practices are therefore grounded in a multitude of relations with all parties involved, be they internal (that is, occurring within the festival organization itself and its multiple sectors of labor division) or external (that is, occurring between festival organizers and a great variety of institutions, groups, and individuals – both government and non-government, public and private, domestic and foreign – across a wide range of professional and interest fields). The bureaucratic side of festival business centers on activities such as bookkeeping, as well as documenting and enforcing various external and internal policies, regulations, licenses, contracts, and the like (cf. e.g. Gibson and Connell 2012; Lukić-Krstanović 2010; 2011; Picard and Robinson 2006). In any case, the meanings emerging from the intersection of manifold social relations and practices involved in the music festival (re)production constitute and are constituted as a highly contested field of public debate – hence their significance for issues of (Serbian) national identity.

Sixth, and lastly, the question of power is of central importance to an understanding of how music festival spaces come to be socially produced. Here the subject of consideration is not only the physical topography of music festival spaces/places (which are undoubtedly hierarchically arranged) and a host of connotations arising from the festival groundedness in an actual locality (for instance, its power position within both real and symbolic geographies across various spatial levels). The workings of power are also heavily imbricated in all social relations and material practices that constitute these music festival spaces/places, and that render the meaning production, occurring at the points of intersection between music-cultural practice, social identity, and space/place, a continually contested field of negotiation. Hence, exploring the social relations and material practices of music festival spaces, as well as the meanings surrounding them, is always a deeply political matter. An analysis capable of disclosing the workings of power on both macro and micro levels of the festival space production would simultaneously contribute to shedding light on a politics of meaning-management from within, and advance an understanding of the contexts, actors, relations, and agendas involved in its creation. Moreover, as argued throughout the entire study, it is through critical reflections on the processes of festival space production that alternative and more politically productive socio-spatial realities can be imagined and proposed for a further discussion.

In conclusion, then, just as any analytical procedure involved in the drafting of a theoretical proposal is inevitably contrived, selective, and incomplete in its premises and intended scope, so is the definition of contemporary music festivals discussed.
above. Even so, the proposed definition should be considered one of the necessary tools in the conceptual and analytical arsenal required for this research. It is carefully formed to delineate the frames of the discursive field within which the meanings of (Serbian) national identity may be shaped and articulated. As will become clear from the analysis below, the proposed constituent elements of contemporary music festivals – namely, their music-cultural / multimedia content, specific spatio-temporal frames, performativity, a broad range of social relations, experiences, and practices whose meanings come to be negotiated and played out in various power struggles, and the economic-managerial-bureaucratic field of operation – are not only commensurate with a vast cultural matrix of national identity signifiers, objects, spaces, discourses, and practices. They also encapsulate neatly several key areas around which the forthcoming discourse analysis of Serbian national identity unfolds.

One final point to make here relates to the spatial dimension, which, as pointed out in Chapter 1, represents a crucial common denominator between music festivals and national identities. Arguably, it is through a spatial perspective that a more fruitful and innovative understanding of national identity vis-à-vis music festivals can be accomplished. It is therefore the relationship between national identity and space that I turn to in the following critical overview of the socio-anthropological work in recent festival studies.

2.2 Placing (Music) Festivals and National Identities in Spatial Perspective

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is not much research conducted in recent festival studies that commits itself to the problematic of national identity as a topic in its own right (see Chapter 1). Notwithstanding this scarcity, it is still worth painting in broad strokes the discursive boundaries of the said body of work, first, by identifying what I think is the common ground in their approach to the notion of national identity, and then, by critically evaluating the implications of such an approach from a spatial perspective. What follows next is thus a critical review of the socio-anthropological school of recent festival studies as a whole, but insofar as their fields of interest are relevant to the considerations of both national identity and spatiality. The ultimate goal of the entire section is to point to the theoretical concepts and approaches that are of great significance to the present study, as well as to cast light on the gaps in the field which this study seeks to fill.

2.2.1 Festivals as Sites of Heritage Work

What all festival studies centered on issues of national identity (e.g. Chappel and Loades 2006; Foley et al. 2007; Kifleyesus 2007; Puderbaugh 2006; Thompson et
and its local / regional (e.g. McCabe 2006; Misetić and Sabotić 2006; Picard 2006), indigenous (e.g. Mathews-Salazar 2006; Slater 2014), or transnational / diasporic expressions (e.g. Carnegie and Smith 2006; Brown and Chappel 2007; Di Domenico and Di Domenico 2007; Girit Heck 2011) have in common is an approach to festivals as sites of heritage work. Either scrutinized discursively (as a cluster of diffused ‘truths’) or performatively (as a set of rites), either considered in its locally embedded or dislocated contexts, either articulated in cultural terms (as both tangible and intangible expressions of culture) or, more broadly, in historical terms (as collective understandings of the past), the notion of heritage is thus inherent and central to all of them. Specifically, the exploration of heritage is largely carried out within a cultural memory perspective, given the main focus of such festival studies on the ways in which traditions have been reinvented (see e.g. Chappel and Loades 2006; Kifleyesus 2007; Mathews-Salazar 2006; McCabe 2006; Mudford 2015; Picard 2006), or simply invented ex novo (Misetić and Sabotić 2006), to express and match the imageries, practices, and needs of contemporary contexts. In some festival studies, heritage work is posited as a field of tension between a state-created ideology (‘top-down’ approach) and forms of so-called banal nationalism (‘bottom-up’ approach), that is, between older (i.e. official, traditional) and more contemporary (i.e. popular, informal) imaginations of the nation (see Hofman 2014; Merkel and Ok 2015; Misetić and Sabotić 2006; Mudford 2015); or presented as a discursive field of contestation and negotiation, within which a different set of meanings and agendas is produced and enacted by different groups of festival participants (see e.g. Azara and Crouch 2006; Hofman 2014). In others, the notion of heritage is simply treated, more or less critically, as a vehicle in forging a singular and thus unproblematic representation of national identity, as envisioned by the state policy-makers and in light of their aspiration to, on the one hand, infuse a sense of cohesion among the nation-state members, and, on the other, to respond to the emergent demands of the globalized tourist market (see e.g. Foley et al. 2007; Kifleyesus 2007; Thompson et al. 2006). In any case, discussions on this topic are largely situated within the discursive

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16 Note that the notion of cultural heritage is implicated in any identity work, regardless of the aspect of identity structure that is taken as a frame of reference in given sociocultural analyses. See, for instance, how ‘heritage work’ operates in reference to race, ethnicity, sex, gender, locality, and/or cultural affiliation in the following corpus of festival studies literature: Anderton 2006; Bennett ed. 2004b; Dowd 2014; Hughes 2006; Marschall 2006; Mathews-Salazar 2006; Picard 2006.

17 Cultural memory can be defined as a collective understanding of the past in a given cultural context of the present (Friedman 1992). Cultural memory thus works as a reservoir of knowledge through which every society continues to reconstruct its self-image and to reshape its rules of conduct according to present-day needs (Assmann 1995). In other words, cultural memory is not concerned with the truth-value of history and past, but it seeks to consolidate the identity of the group in question by using, reshaping, and reorganizing the past (Kuljić 2006a).
frame of a familiar set of dichotomies such as those between cultural diversity and homogenization, authenticity and commercialization, communitarianism and ‘touristification’ (see, for instance, Burr 2006; Carnegie and Smith 2006; Everett and Aitchison 2007; Sandle et al. 2007).

There is no doubt that each of these festival studies offers valuable insights into the question of varied articulations of specifically spatial identities (be they local, regional, national, or transnational) in the face of a rapidly changing world. Even though they all look into the social processes, discourses, and practices involved in the (national) identity construction, in a majority of cases the interconnection of such processes with space is not always made explicit and elaborated in sufficient detail – except through a simple reference to the locale and spatial sets within which the observed festivals are staged; or through a familiar mode of address evoking the spatial concepts and relations of mobility, diaspora, and globality. This habitual tendency in the academic festival writing may be explained by Lefebvre’s (2009: 38) claim that ‘[t]he spatial practice of society secrets that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it’ (emphasis added).

Thus, following those festival scholars whose concerns with the spatiality as much as with the temporality of festival events, practices, and experiences parallel mine (such as Azara and Crouch 2006; Chalcraft and Magaudda 2011; English 2011; Hofman 2014), I argue that only through the explicit reconceptualization of space as both medium and product of social relations and material practices that a more comprehensive and politically engaged analysis of festivals may be accomplished. To make this point more intelligible, I refer once again to the selected body of festival studies literature to illustrate what contributions a fully-fledged spatial perspective (adopted from human geography) can make to discussions on two topics: (1) a dynamic between the local (standing here also for the national) and the global, and (2) cultural heritage.

It has become a common place in recent festival studies literature to acknowledge the co-constitutive relationship between local and global. More specifically, many of these writings (e.g. Azara and Crouch 2006; Foley et al. 2007; Hofman 2014; Picard 2006) show how the global condition (understood in terms of transnational flows of people, culture, technologies, institutional practices, economic patterns, etc.) has created both a possibility and a need for the recreation of all kinds of local / ethnic / national cultural practices, as well as for the profusion of what is perceived as global cultural forms, in festivals across the globe. This in turn has positioned festivals not only as an increasingly important ‘cog’ perpetuating the ‘machine’ of global capitalist reproduction, but also as a powerful generator of heterogeneous meanings and practices from within the host locations where festivals are staged and where different social actors and groups of festival participants have their
say. However, in some cases (see e.g. Burr 2006; Carnegie and Smith 2006; Everett and Aitchison 2007; Kifleyesus 2007; McCabe 2006; Thompson et al. 2006), a discussion on local / ethnic / national identity falls back into a form of spatial fetishism whereby the local is presented as a vulnerable entity under attack by all-pervading global forces that have already been set in motion from somewhere else. Or in most other cases, when the mutuality of the global and the local is not occluded by the discursive trope of ‘the defense of place’, the analyses of festival spaces/places are rarely ever situated within the wider network of geopolitical power relations; or, even more prominently, the current form of globalization (i.e. neo-liberal capitalism) ‘is taken to be the one and only form’, an inevitability, ‘a discursive manoeuvre which at a stroke obscures the possibility of seeing alternative forms’ (cf. Massey 2005: 83). By implication, it seems that much academic festival research still fails to recognize the full scope and potential of festival analyses from a critical spatial perspective. Here I primarily have in mind the full recognition and understanding of the local production of the global – certainly not in a sense of a one-way, sweeping movement of flows invading space from capitalist centers of power, but rather in a sense that festival spaces / places arise from ‘criss-crossings [of multiple social relations and practices] in the wider power-geometries that constitute both themselves and “the global”’ (see Massey 2005: 101). As Massey explicates further:

On this view local places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor are they always politically defensible redoubts against the global. Understanding space as the constant open production of the topologies of power points to the fact that different ‘places’ will stand in contrasting relations to the global. They are differentially located within the wider power-geometries. Mali and Chad, most certainly, may be understood as occupying positions of relative powerlessness. But London, or the USA, or the UK? These are the places in and through which globalisation is produced: the moments through which the global is constituted, invented, coordinated. They are ‘agents’ in globalisation. This is not to say that ‘whole places’ are somehow actors … but it is to urge a politics which takes account of, and addresses, the local production of the neoliberal capitalist global. (Ibid.; emphases in original.)

By the same token, it is worth suggesting that a theory of socially produced space may also assist in demystifying and possibly in doing away with some misconceptions underlying ongoing discussions on cultural heritage in recent festival studies. Despite the widely agreed view among festival scholars on the notion of intangible heritage as inextricably entangled in the fabric of everyday life practices and experiences (see e.g. Di Domenico and Di Domenico 2007; Everett and Aitchison 2007; Hofman 2014; Picard 2006), such an understanding is not always consistent with the
proposed discursive frame of the debate. For instance, in some festival studies (e.g. Kifleyesus 2007; Thompson et al. 2006), the notion of cultural heritage follows the simple logic of ownership accredited to given regions / ethnic groups / nations; in others (e.g. Carnegie and Smith 2006; Everett and Aitchison 2007), anxieties are expressed over the perceived dilution of local / ethnic / national identities. In both cases, however, the argument I wish to put forward is not against the right to ownership of any given cultural heritage, nor is it a denial of the existence of various regional / ethnic / national cultures. Rather, what is at stake here is the line of reasoning which employs a spatial perspective to recognize and deconstruct the very modernist imagination of space as having always been divided up into regions and nation-states – an imagination that has naturalized popular, and often academic, preconceptions about spaces / places and societies / nations / cultures as the entities which are mapped onto each other. I follow again Massey (2005: 66), who in turn draws on Gupta and Ferguson (1992), in her proposition of two antidotes to ‘the assumed isomorphism of space, place and culture’. One is to ‘abandon ... “the premise of discontinuity” (that is, taking as one’s starting point an imagination of space as divided up)’, and the other is to “re-think ... difference through connection” (ibid.). Thus, a more productive way of thinking about space is one which conjures it up in relational terms – specifically,

as an emergent product of relations, including those relations which establish boundaries, and where ‘place’ in consequence is necessarily meeting place, where the ‘difference’ of a place must be conceptualised more in the ineffable sense of the constant emergence of uniqueness out of (and within) the specific constellations of interrelations within which that place is set (...) and of what is made of that constellation. (Massey 2005: 68; emphases in original.)

Closely tied to the ongoing debates on cultural heritage in recent festival studies (and beyond) are also those revolving around the notion of cultural difference and the discursive strategies of (self-)exoticization involved in its representation (see e.g. Azara and Crouch 2006; Carnegie and Smith 2006; Foley et al. 2007; Girit Heck 2011; Hofman 2014). Even though such studies have duly acknowledged the historically contingent and politically sensitive nature of decision-making processes regarding the representation of cultural difference, only a few of them (such as Girit Heck 2011; and Slater 2014) have expanded on this problematic by questioning the assumptions behind the modern-traditional dichotomy as a common discursive frame to such discussions. In so doing, Girit Heck (2011) used a theory of multiple modernities to unearth the modern-traditional distinction upon which the ambiguous representations of Turkish-American identity in Chicago’s Turkish festivals rest, whereas Slater (2014) looked at Australian Indigenous cultural festivals from a phenomenological
point of view to highlight the embeddedness of native traditional cultural practice into the contemporary lifeworlds, that is, into the social relations and practices dominated by settler liberal (post)modernity. While agreeing with the points that both these scholars have made, I still assert that a critical spatial perspective might yield a more comprehensive insight into the political implications of the modern-traditional binary associated with the notion of culture heritage / cultural difference.

Indeed, what lies behind the discursive coupling of the notions of cultural difference and the traditional can be formulated as an attempt at convening space into a singular temporality – which was earlier the unilinear narrative of progress (as a grand narrative of modernity), and today are the irrevocable processes of globalization (as a grand narrative of postmodernity) (cf. Massey 2005). The political effects of this discursive practice are manifold: by imagining certain nations / ethnic groups / cultures as traditional, premodern, backward, timeless, authentic, and the like, not only are they inexorably relegated to the past, but they also come to be abstracted from the discursive and material practices of their embedded living worlds and robbed thereby of their histories as they unfold into the here-and-now moment. Also, by subjugating them to the mantra of globalization discourse, as Massey (2005: 82) notes, these nations / countries are left with no space (…) to tell different stories, to follow another path. They are dragooned into line behind those who designed the queue. Moreover, not only is their future thus supposedly foretold but even this is not true, for precisely their entanglement within the unequal relations of capitalist globalisation ensures that they do not ‘follow’. … [T]his turning [of contemporaneous geographical differences] … into a story of ‘catching up’ occludes present-day relations and practices and their relentless production (…) of increasing inequality. It occludes the power-geometries within the contemporaneity of today’s form of globalization. (Emphases in original.)

Thus, it is only through the reconceptualization of space as relational, heterogeneous, and open that the truly antiessentialist understandings and articulations of national identity can be endorsed, that the totalizing views of Western (post)modernity can be confronted, and that a political practice envisioning the future as radically open can be fostered.

2.2.2 Festivals as Sites of Multiplicity

Critically reviewed below are some of the recent festival writings whose theoretical concerns with spatiality and/or other aspects of contemporary festival practice and experience are pertinent to the aims of the present study. The fact that their research
focus is not on national identity issues is of secondary importance here, knowing that (1) concerns with other markers of identity can be part of the discussion on national identity articulations (see Chapter 1); and (2) that festival writings focusing on any identity issues seem to all fall back on the same assumption about festivals ‘as sites of cultural pilgrimage, a practice that emphasizes the functioning of festivals as collective gatherings of people sharing a common creed’ (Regev 2011: 113; see also Dowd 2014; Gibson and Connell 2012; Taylor 2014).

Highly relevant to the present study is the volume on different types of arts festivals and the cultural public sphere, edited by Delanty et al. (2011), which maintains that present-day festivals are political in one way or another. Specifically, drawing on McGuigan’s (2005, in Giorgi and Sassatelli 2011: 4) concept of a cultural public sphere, understood as a contested site for ‘the articulation of politics, public and personal, (...) through affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes of communication’, this volume considers modern festivals as actively participating in the formation of political opinions and identities on the grounds of their high-ranking position within the current structure of the cultural public sphere. The implications of such an approach for the formation of national identity in and through festivals have been discussed in the opening chapter (see English 2011).

Other contributors to the volume are largely concerned with the ‘glocalities’ of festival spaces, as suggested by the neologism festivalscapes, coined by Chalcraft and Magaudda (and also mentioned in Chapter 1) to highlight the significance of contemporary festivals in the global cultural economy. What lies at the heart of the local-global discussion in all these writings is an assumption that the local uniqueness of festival settings mainly functions as a tool for forging and fostering cosmopolitan identities and sensibilities. Departing from this basic assumption, different writers (also beyond the presently reviewed volume) have cast light on different aspects of cosmopolitan experience and cosmopolitan spatial imagination in contemporary festivals. For instance, Bennett and Woodward (2014: 17–18) apply Kendall et al.’s (2009) concept of cosmoscapes – as ‘a zone structured by particular spatial and social characteristics, which afford and indeed encourage cosmopolitan socialization’ – to the festival context, taking the World of Music Arts and Dance Festival (WOMAD) and its collage-like display of different musical cultures as a case in point. Arnautović (2014) likewise explores contemporary music festivals as sites of intercultural dialogue. And Cummings et al. (2011) put forward the idea of music festivals as green spaces, whose concerns with ecological issues and sustainable lifestyles are viewed as political tools for the promotion and expression of a sense of global citizenship.

While acknowledging the fact that the notion of cosmopolitanism is predicated upon that of nationalism (see Chalcraft et al. 2014; Fabiani 2011), or, more generally, upon a sense of place (see Chalcraft and Magaudda 2011; Delanty 2011; Sassatelli 2011;
2011), none of these festival studies seems to believe that the category of the national still holds any currency in present-day festival practice. There is specifically a suggestion that the national dimension has been superseded by postnational forms of cultural identity, along with the perceived change in a politics of contemporary arts festivals and their apparent focus on the mediation of aesthetic cosmopolitanism (see also Regev 2011). This proposal is somewhat dubious considering a consensus opinion among scholars (see e.g. Chalcraft et al. 2014; Karlsen 2007; Locke 2009) that festival communities associated with the category of so-called cosmopolitan omnivores typically come from ‘the upper middle and professional classes’ (Kendall et al. 2009, in Regev 2011: 109). If so, the said proposition is undemocratic at its core, since it appears to legitimize and thus naturalize the power position of privileged classes to stake a claim to the representation of national identity, excluding thereby all other (especially marginalized) social groups from the negotiation process. At any rate, a move away from the discourse of nationalism towards that of cosmopolitanism in recent festival studies – which is a somewhat peculiar discursive shift in the age of rising nationalisms – plays down not only the continuing significance of arts festivals for national self-narration, but also the very complexity of national identity articulations in the contemporary world. Clearly, a more sophisticated approach needs to be developed, one which will bring both lines of thought under one roof. It goes without saying that a new concept-based methodology for festival research on national identity proposed in this study seeks to achieve this goal.

Another important strand of the festival scholarship that informs the present study centers on the idea of contemporary festivals as zones of spectacle. At the extreme end of such writings are the interpretations of festivals as non-places (Augé 1995, in MacLeod 2006: 223–224), or global parties (Ravenscroft and Matteucci 2003, in MacLeod 2006: 229), where spectacle robs places and identities of any meaning and authenticity, offering instead a highly mediated, standardized, and commodified series of images and experiences in the pervasive environment of simulacra and hyperreality. In contrast to this tunnel vision of spectacularization processes at work in contemporary festivals, which Finkel (2004, in Sassatelli 2011: 20) also calls McFestivalization, and which reduce the political effects of festivals to the Foucauldian panoptic system of disciplinary power, this work aligns itself with a middle-of-the-road approach to festival spectacle – one which leaves room for agency on the part of festivalgoers and host localities (see e.g. Azara and Crouch 2006; Lukić-Krstanović 2010; McCabe 2006; Robertson 2006). Within this body of work, the spectacularity of festivals is, on the one hand, understood as constitutive of certain authentic expressions of place and identity. The focus here is therefore on the embeddedness of festivals in particular localities and on practices of engagement producing them. On the other hand, as MacLeod (2006: 235) aptly points out:
The processes that have contributed to a disarticulation between ideas of identity and place have produced an approach to festival development and promotion that increasingly depends for its appeal on a new type of transnationalised festivity rather than local meanings, traditions and social practice. These processes can be approached through the globalisation of communications network and the expanding international tourism market. In this context, communities and community festivals are no longer considered as unique and interesting emanations of local culture but as opportunities for convivial consumption in an international ‘placeless’ atmosphere. In analogy to the culture of the airport lounge or the hotel cocktail bar, festival formats may now be replicated in a series of international venues throughout the world.

The authenticity of festival experience is explored in this study along both lines of festival research assuming a spectacle angle – that is, as part of both ‘in-placed’ and ‘dis-placed’ social constellations.

In the same vein, Chalcraft et al. (2014) explore the ways in which cosmopolitan values, attitudes, and social relations are being manifest and performed in arts festivals. Despite some of its conceptual and analytical pitfalls, this festival study corresponds closely with mine in that it, following Massey (2005), also recognizes the importance of relational conceptualizations of cultural practice, social identity, and space/place, thereby bypassing the placedness-placelessness dichotomy and providing a valuable guidance for more nuanced analyses of national identity and sociality as these are played out in present-day arts festivals.

However, the study that comes closest to the spirit of my work is that of Anderton (2006). Drawing on Soja’s (1996) trialectics of space comprising historicality, spatiality, and sociality, Anderton challenges the established views in the festival scholarship on the histories, political potential, forms of sociality, and current character of British greenfield music festivals. On the grounds of several festival case studies, he also develops a theory of contemporary music festivals as cyclical places – ones that

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18 That is, the conclusions of the study largely remain in the sphere of discourse analysis (i.e. are grounded in the declarative views of various festival actors) and thus provide no ethnographic details about how cosmopolitanism comes to be embodied in the interactions of festival participants on the ground. The study also takes no notice of the potential segregations of social groups at international festival sites along the language line (not every festival participant can, or bothers to, speak English as a lingua franca!), which is something I have observed in my festival fieldwork. Lastly, the study does not consider the situations of potential cultural misunderstanding and consolidation of stereotypes about particular sociocultural/ethnic groups, which is something that Stokes (1994b) has brilliantly grasped in his ethnographic observations of the interaction between host (Irish) and guest (Turkish) musicians and their live performances in the Irish pub setting.
complement rather than challenge a unique sense of place of their host locations. In his words:

The place-image of a cyclic place [such as festivals] is relatively stable and necessarily mediated, for this mediation helps to create long-lasting stereotypes that reinforce its uniqueness [its history, landmarks, atmosphere], and that influence the attitudes and behaviours of people both towards it, and within it. Finally, a cyclic place is characterised (...) by a mix of continuity and change. With regard to festivals, this provides a means to avoid stagnation, as it allows organisers to adapt to legal, musical and audience developments without compromising an event’s unique sense of place. (Ibid., 323.)

In addition, Anderton argues against the prevailing countercultural and overtly politicized accounts of British music festival histories by making a historical link to certain types of festivals (such as charitable, municipal, and entrepreneurial) that have operated largely on a commercial basis since the nineteenth century. Anderton likewise contests the dominant narrative in festival studies focusing on the liminal, marginal, temporary, and transgressive nature of festival socio-spatial experience, arguing that the latter does not work beyond the norms of mainstream society, nor against the pre-existing meanings of the festival’s host location. In terms of greenfield festival sociality, Anderton builds upon Turner’s *communitas* and Maffesoli’s (1996) and Hetherington’s (1998) ideas of *neo-tribes* to propose in their place an overarching concept of *meta-sociality* – namely,

a shared enthusiasm [of festivalgoers] with a coherent and broadly held adherence to a particular place- and event-image. This shared imaginary allows an event to be annually reconstructed in its own social and ambient image – its own unique atmosphere – as well as in its own material image [consolidating and naturalizing in turn the associated set of festival behaviors, meanings, beliefs, and desires]. (Ibid., 342.)

Lastly, in his examination of the current character of British greenfield music festivals, Anderton posits that their primary role is that of *cultural intermediaries*, that is, to serve as the outlets for music performance and promotion. At the same time, he acknowledges that this overtly commercial orientation of festivals often intersects with certain countercultural and folk elements also to be found therein.

It is in this last point that my disagreement with Anderton is most striking. This is not to deny the increasingly commercial character of many present-day festivals, but rather to point towards a complete lack of criticism on the topic at hand. By endorsing the current trends in the festival development, Anderton’s study leaves no
room for politics. Moreover, if we agree with Massey (2005) and Soja (1996) that the spatial is to be political, then Anderton’s theorization of festival spatiality closes up the very possibility of spatial imagination of festivals which would exceed the limits of neoliberal capitalist realities, or where the right to difference could be voiced and pursued within the context of both immediate and wider power struggles.

One way to reinvigorate such discussions, that is, to rethink festival spatiality in political terms, is to bring issues of national identity into the focus of festival research – an endeavor which is highly political in itself, given a sheer variety of groups and interests involved in the nation-building projects, as well as the high stakes that are typically attached to them (i.e. the lives and prospects of nation-state members). Another one is to build upon a corpus of festival studies literature which is concerned with an exploration of contemporary festivals as alternative democratic spaces. At issue here is specifically the potential of some festivals to either raise the visibility and rights to difference of various marginalized groups, or to disclose the complex processes of meaning negotiation that a dialectic between workings of power and resistance sets in motion. This line of academic festival research can also be revealing in national identity matters insofar as we, following Edensor (2002), accept that national identity works as a sort of supra-category. Thus, the analytic approach to festivals as spaces of (broadly defined) resistance, as well as to attendant issues of handling difference, can surely reveal the ways in which any one society mirrors itself and (re)creates its self-image in various details of festival cyclical (re)production.

The scope of topics and concerns within the latter strand of recent festival research is indeed very broad, ranging from the considerations of festivals as protestivals, or as part of new social movements (see e.g. Martin 2014; Robertson 2006; St John 2008); through to the conceptualizations of festivals as queer / gay spaces (see e.g. Hughes 2006; Taylor 2014), or as sources of gender and / or indigenous / racial pride (see Bartleet 2014; Marschall 2006; Mathews-Salazar 2006; Slater 2014); to the idea of festivals as interactive spaces (Morey et al. 2014) afforded by new online technologies, where not only is the notion of the bounded spatio-temporality of festival experience challenged, but where also festivalgoers come to participate actively in the production of festival meanings, the reaffirmation of self-identities, and a competitive display of their (sub)cultural capital.

Here should finally be included those festival studies that take the concept of liminality as a point of departure in their analyses of potentially transformative aspects of festival experience. Conceptualized either as Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1991), or as spaces of play, masquerade, and collective ritual (O’Grady 2013; 2015), or as expressions of secular liminal culture (Luckman 2014), where the focus of festivalgoers might shift between hedonistic pursuits and ecological agendas (St John 2014), or as affective spaces, where emotional and bodily responses to a variety of festival sensory stimuli create a sense of subjecthood and belonging (Duffy 2014) –
all such contributions to the recent festival scholarship place an emphasis on alternative forms of self-expression and social organization in festivals. Despite well-justified skepticism about the actual political effects that some festivals are said to have in their countercultural agendas and activities (see Anderton 2006; Picard and Robinson 2006), I argue that the political potential of festival spaces should not be dismissed either. Perhaps it is precisely through contemporary festival practice that some sort of organized collective resistance based on radically new ideas of citizenship might well succeed in filling a glaring ideological vacuum left after the end of the Cold War era (see Chapter 6).

Considering all the above, it can be concluded that the reviewed festival studies contribute, each with its own particular conceptualization of festival spatiality, to shedding light on different aspects of national identity. For that reason, the present study takes pertinent elements from each of them and then incorporates them into a new concept-based methodology for analysis of contemporary music festivals as micronational spaces. Indeed, by merging two notions into one (that of ‘micronational’ and that of ‘space’), the proposed concept clearly necessitates an elaboration which attends to each of its constituent parts in turn. Accordingly, the next round of discussion in this chapter is committed to advancing a theoretical approach to spatiality in contemporary music festivals.

2.3 Key Concept of the Study: Understanding the ‘Space’ Component

As highlighted above, the following theorization of music festival spatiality is largely informed by Lefebvre’s (2009) theory of socially produced space. The choice of Lefebvre is not solely made to underline the fact that he was the first to offer the most comprehensive spatial theory, thereby laying the groundwork for all other human geographers following in his footsteps. More importantly, Lefebvre’s theoretical model allows for a context-sensitive and multidimensional analysis of (Serbian) national identity articulations in light of ‘the multiplicity of spaces’ that contemporary music festivals may instantiate, Serbia’s Exit and Guča included.

To start with, music festivals can be said to perform the function of what Lefebvre calls consumed spaces. In his definition, these are unproductive forms of ‘the consumption of space’, which serve as a counterpoint to the production-based ‘space of consumption’, or ‘the space of the market’, in which flows of capital and goods come to be facilitated, quantified, circulated, and accumulated. In contrast to the latter spaces, the growing interest in festival consumption, assisted by the globally distributed channels of tourism, leisure, and event industries, seems to reflect people’s nostalgic search ‘for a certain “quality of space”’, incorporating such elements as sun, snow, sea, festivity, fantasy, antiquity, and the like (Lefebvre 2009: 353).
However, the consumption of festival spaces is not univocal in its meaning, insofar as such spaces display the potential of being transformed into *counter-spaces* by means of ‘diversion’ (i.e. by having the original space’s function put to an alternative use); or into *utopian spaces* by means of domination of the symbolic and the imaginary (i.e. by having the original space appropriated by the work of symbols); or into *organic spaces* by ‘looking upon [themselves] and presenting [themselves] as a body’ (ibid., 274); or into *masculine spaces* by means of demonstration of phallic power, and so on. Clearly, the multifaceted uses of space, as demonstrated in Lefebvre’s analytical insights into the workings of spatial practice in the modern world, resonate profoundly with the ways in which music festival spaces, too, are typically constituted, experienced, and interpreted. And how all these pertain to national identity concerns in Serbia’s Exit and Guča is precisely one of the key questions I seek to answer in the analytical chapters below.

Furthermore, what lies at the core of Lefebvre’s theory of space production and is equally significant for understanding spatiality in contemporary music festivals, is its tripartite concept comprising: (1) *spatial practice*, (2) *representations of space*, and (3) *spaces of representation*. Before I start elaborating how each of these spatial levels operates in the social production of music festival spaces, two important points need to be made. First, it is crucial to emphasize that all three modes of spatial thinking that Lefebvre refers to stand in relation of interdependency and are actualized at once in the process of space production. Or as Soja (1996: 64–65) puts it aptly in his interpretation of Lefebvre’s trialectics of spatiality, ‘each mode of thinking about space, each “field” of human spatiality – the physical, mental, social – [should] be seen as simultaneously real and imagined, concrete and abstract, material and metaphorical’. Thus, the continuing insistence on the differentiation between three spatial levels in the present theoretical model of music festival spatiality is likewise determined by the nature of the analytical procedure itself. And second, since Anderton (2006) is another music festival scholar whose geographical study of British greenfield music festivals engages in a dialogue with Lefebvre, in the following analytical summary I refer regularly to his uses of Lefebvre’s tripartite concept so as to underline the points of divergence between our interpretations.

### 2.3.1 Spatial Practice in Contemporary Music Festivals

According to Anderton (2006: 320–321), spatial practice in British greenfield music festivals reveals itself in the ‘material existence and routines’ of festival places, as well as in the impacts these have on the behavior of festivalgoers in situ. This view stays well in line with Lefebvre’s formulation of spatial practice as both condition and product of human activity – an idea firmly grounded in the assumption that space produces while it is simultaneously being produced; or more to the point: that spatial
meanings surrounding music festivals are not simply constructed by users of festival space, but that users of festival space themselves are simultaneously constructed by and through their relationship to the specificity of festival places.

Anderton is indeed minutely attentive in describing the materiality of three greenfield festivals he selected as his case studies – their layout, habitual practices, and management policies, the spatial sets / stages where music is performed, and the like. However, once he begins to link all these ethnographic details to Lefebvre’s notion of spatial practice, his theorization becomes fairly sparse. Following next is thus an expanded theoretical account of spatial practice in contemporary music festivals, which seeks to refine Anderton’s main line of argumentation.

Of relevance here is a more clearly articulated acknowledgment of the sensory nature inherent to all material forms of social spatiality which spatial practice in music festivals is said to produce. To illustrate what elements might possibly constitute a sensory experience of music festival space, it is instructive to turn to Luckman’s (2014) study of Australian outdoor doof music festivals. Even if her primary interest lies in depicting the ways in which spatiality in contemporary dance music practice is experienced through the body, her account is in fact applicable to a variety of other performative music spaces. In her words:

Be indoors or out, themed or generic, contemporary dance spaces are conceptualized in terms of sound quality, lighting and light shows, props, sets, visuals (computer-generated graphics, edited video and film), games and other stimuli, separate ‘rooms’ (including chill-out spaces), smell, smoke and even bubbles. (Ibid., 197.)

Moreover, Luckman makes another significant point by referring to Hemment’s (1996) study of rave and dance parties – that in dance music events, music itself is an environment. This argument can also be extended to encompass any other music genres, performative spaces, and listening practices, and should be therefore foregrounded as a defining feature of spatial practice in music events of all kinds. Moreover, that music creates a space of its own follows the same dual logic to be found in Lefebvre’s spatial thinking. Namely, just as space is both productive and produced, so too music / sound ‘both fill[s] space and … [is] filled by spaces into which it is projected’ (Hofman 2014: 74).

There is arguably more to the notion of spatial practice in music festivals than the materiality of their layouts, scripts, rituals, and experiences. By analogy with Lefebvre’s formulation, spatial practice refers as well to the embeddedness of music festivals in particular historical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural contexts (i.e. in the geography of pre-existing locations where music festivals are staged), as well as in the geography of external relations (i.e. across the spatial levels other than commu-
nal, such as regional, national, and transnational). All these are the analytical points that Anderton (2006) largely covers in his geographical study of British greenfield music festivals – specifically, by looking into the histories and characteristics of selected festival sites and locations in which they are held, the relationship between the two, the historical development of British festivals as a whole, dominant narratives in historiographical accounts of post-Second World War greenfield music festivals, the impact of global market capitalism on the outlook, character, and meanings of contemporary British greenfield festivals, and the processes of their integration into the tourism, leisure, and event industries. What, however, precludes Anderton from making an explicit link between all these levels of analysis and the notion of spatial practice is his initially narrow interpretation of the latter in relation to contemporary music festivals.

2.3.2 Representations of Space and Spaces of Representation in Contemporary Music Festivals

The reason for a joint consideration of two other modes of spatial imagery in Lefebvre’s tripartite conceptualization of space is the ‘constitutive duality’ of their relation to spatial practice, or to what is in the Lefebvrian theory also called perceived, physical, or real space. What is exactly meant by this – that spatial practice is constituted by the duality of its representations – is, in Lefebvre’s (2009: 228) words, that such space is ‘at once lived and represented, at once the expression and the foundation of a practice, at once stimulating and constraining, and so on – with each of these “aspects” depending on ... its counterpart’. How this constitutive duality of representations works when applied to the realm of music festival spatiality is the question to which I immediately attend.

Representations of space amount specifically to representations of hegemonic ideology and power associated with spatial practice and the social relations of (re-)production in which this practice is grounded. They constitute, thus, the dominant (public) space in any society by means of control over the production of knowledge, concepts, codes, signs, and discourses – in short, ‘over the means of deciphering spatial practice’ (Soja 1996: 67). The sources of knowledge from which this conceived or mental space (to borrow Lefebvre’s terminology again) is constructed in music festivals, Anderton (2006) identifies in festival site planning, maps, official rules and regulations exercised on the ground, marketing material, media coverage – thus, in all the information, produced and distributed from above, that shape a particular image and understanding of any given music festival. Besides festival marketing campaigns, of central importance here are also festival mission statements coming from relevant social agents involved in festival organization, support, and participation – something that Anderton does not address and deal with in his festival study explic-
itly enough. This point is, however, worth stressing, for it is through such discourses that music festivals come to be articulated as ‘the primary space of utopian thought and vision’ (cf. Soja 1996: 67).

Another link which is important to make here, and which slips again under Anderton’s radar, is that between dominant representations of music festival space and the wider regime of truth harbored and promulgated by and in every society. Put differently, in order to understand where music festivals stand politically and ideologically to the prevailing systems of power and along what binary lines they profile their identity, it is necessary to posit them in relation to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 203) call the molar line – ‘the line on which the world is divided into binary oppositions: man/woman, adult/child, public/private, white/black [or West/East;] (...) also the line that organizes society in segments, strata and separate “institutes”’ (Pisters 2001: 11).

Spaces of representation are, by contrast, spaces controlled by the epistemological power of conceived space. They are replete with the affective, bodily, experiential, imaginary, symbolic, and as such, they give shape to the dominated (private) sphere of everyday life. Social space is another label that Lefebvre uses to designate and theorize about spaces of representation. When doing so, he deliberately leaves the term open to ambiguous interpretations. Thus, social space can be, on the one hand, thought of as a spatial category distinct from the other two (i.e. from perceived and conceived spaces). In this case, the term is either used to highlight the opposition between dominant and dominated (i.e. between controlling and controlled) spaces, or to challenge, if not overthrow, a way of spatial thinking that is fixated solely on materialist (i.e. physical space) and/or idealist (i.e. mental space) interpretations. Alternatively, social space can be conceived of as an all-inclusive category, encompassing not only the other two modes of spatial thinking but also the third-as-Other ‘mode of defining the limitlessly expandable scope of the spatial imagination’ (Soja 1996: 65; emphasis added).

Lived spaces of representation in music festivals appear to be intrinsically configured by a complex grid of symbols, images, and signs, given the primary focus of festivals on live music performances in an often highly aestheticized environment of their various sites. Such spaces are also linked to the festival experiences of liminality, induced in their users (festival participants) by the very uniqueness of music festivals’ design, content, and purpose (i.e. by affording the possibility of concentrated music activity and social engagement within a limited spatio-temporal frame). Social space seems to be reserved, too, for minor voices, both within and outside actual festival sites, seeking to project into given festivals their own beliefs, desires, agendas, and workings of imagination. All these, in turn, render festival lived spaces a fertile ground for the proliferation and display of a great variety of worldviews, fantasies, behaviors, socialities, experiences, and, in some instances, creative and critical inter-
ventions that may throw new light on society and initiate a process of social change. In the latter case, festivals can be said to produce *counterspaces* — that is, ‘spaces of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized positioning’ (Soja 1996: 68).

Anderton (2006) does not seem to find any instances of counterspatial production in his festival case studies. In fact, his findings show that uses of social space in British greenfield music festivals lead rather to flattening than inversion of social hierarchies. For Anderton, what is thus primarily at stake in his consideration of festival lived spaces — spaces whose symbolic richness and elusiveness he rightly acknowledges, interpreting them as ‘a mix of personal, social and collective history’ (ibid., 323) — are the commonalities to be found in the types of socialities, motivations, and experiences of festival audiences that persist between and within given festival events. I purposely insist on the details of Anderton’s interpretation of Lefebvre’s social space vis-à-vis music festivals, because I intend to complement it in two ways: first, by elaborating in greater detail on the theoretical implications of the said concept for the analysis of concrete festival case studies; and second, by challenging a simple equation that Anderton makes between the notion of festival lived spaces and the perspective of festivalgoers. In order to make my argument more persuasive, I turn again to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) theory of three political lines shaping the complex field of overall political activity in modern societies.

Apart from the molar line of political engagement addressed above, Deleuze and Guattari additionally differentiate between the molecular line and the line of flight. The former is largely congruent with Lefebvre’s formulation of spaces of representation, thus pertaining to the sphere of private thought, desire, imagination, and emotion about different social structures and phenomena. The micropolitical movements within this fairly obscure but fundamental sphere of society’s ‘desires’ and ‘beliefs’ work in a way which constantly reveals inconsistencies and fissures in the system of the molar line. The line of flight is said to be occurring when the cracks in the system reach the critical point and eventually bring about its collapse.

Just as society’s political lines relate to one another in a dialectical fashion, so too micropolitical fluctuations in festival lived spaces feed into the binary distributions of society’s various segments operating at its macropolitical level, and vice versa. Music festivals clearly perform here a mediating role, finding themselves ‘at the point of intersection between the visible segments of a macro level and the uncontrollable, less obvious lines of flight of a micro level’ (cf. Busk 2001: 114). Thus, the notion of Lefebvre’s lived spaces in music festivals is much more complex than Anderton presents in his festival study, where he confines it to the analysis of social imaginaries and symbolic meanings associated with material and discursive practices of festivalgoers. The analysis of festival social space should rather be extended further to include the articulation and enactment of the imaginaries, beliefs, desires,
practices, and experiences not only of audience members, but also of all festival actors involved, such as performers, various guests, commentators, employees, volunteers, locals, and the like. Note additionally that the engagement of the latter group may either reinforce the prevailing systems of power or point to their cracks along several lines: (1) in relation to hegemonic ideologies and meanings surrounding individual music festivals, which are largely constructed and promulgated by the media and festival production teams (i.e. in relation to festival conceived space); (2) in relation to dominant views about structural patterns and sociocultural meanings of music festivals as globally operating institutions; and (3) in relation to the prevailing regime of truth in societies in which music festivals are staged (and beyond).

In short, it is through this dialectic between macro and micro levels of music festival spatiality that the question of national identity arises. However, to understand how the idea of contemporary music festivals as micronational entities relates to all aforementioned festival spaces of Lefebvre’s triad, and how these interrelations may in turn be implicated in the analysis of national identity articulations in music festivals such as Exit and Guča, the very notion of micronationalism needs to be scrutinized and explained first.

2.4 Key Concept of the Study: Understanding the ‘Micronational’ Component

As summarized in Chapter 1, there are many reasons for employing the term ‘micronational’ in the present study. One account, for instance, emerges from the awareness that contemporary music festivals constitute just a tiny segment of a larger whole, that is, of the total compendia of cultural resources from which national identity comes to be articulated and experienced. By analogy, if we are to differentiate between ‘ethnic, civic and economic constructs of nationality’ (Smith 1991 and McCrone 1998, both in O’Flynn 2007: 23) and their equivalents in the domain of music – which roughly translates into a division between traditional/folk, classical, and popular music – then it seems self-evident that festival musical offerings comprise only a small portion of the totality of the music-national field. This is exactly where the term ‘micronational’ is useful.

Other reasons for insisting on the micronational terminology in this work have also been pointed out in the opening chapter. To reiterate in brief, the first is to emphasize the centrality of the micropolitical level of national identity considerations in the present study, which precisely incorporates such cultural phenomena as popular music festivals. The second is to show that the micronational discourse seems to help music festivals enhance their profile, commercial value, and thus survival on the increasingly competitive festival market, both nationally and transnationally. And
the third reason for using the idea of micronationality is to stress the relative autonomy and creative capacity of music festivals to project alternative worlds.

In this last meaning of the word, what comes to mind are those interpretations of music festivals that describe them as an experimental version of society at large (cf. Vučinić 2008, in Arnautović 2014: 116), ‘seeking new futures in an idealized elsewhere’ (Chalcraft and Magaudda 2011: 186). Moreover, the way in which many music festivals emphasize their visionary function and cultural distinction from the larger entities which incorporate them (such as nation-states), can be said to parallel the growing aspiration of individuals and groups across the world to pursue a DIY sort of projects in developing their own ministates, also known as model nations or micronations (see Latts 2005; or Sellars 2011). By the same token, there is arguably an emergent tendency in music festivals to lay claim to ‘statehood’, that is, to promote themselves in marketing campaigns, or to be characterized in the media coverage, as symbolic states operating in their own right during the festival days within (or despite) the actual state’s borders. What all such cases have in common with various instances of micronationalism is to ‘behave in a fashion deliberately imitative of a “true” state – they have governments, citizens, laws, territorial “claims”, etc.’ (Rasmussen, n.d.). The use of micronational trope is indeed very common in the current discursive practices of festival marketing campaigns and media reports, and the selected examples of its occurrence are documented aptly in a separate section below (see 2.6).

However, of major interest right now is the question of why the idea of festival micronations is increasingly used as part of (self-)narrativizing strategies in some music festivals. There are several hypothetical answers to this question. First, the idea of micronationality may function as a powerful discursive means with which to create a sense of festival community. As Trouillou (2001, in Simić 2009: 113) explains, identification is precisely one of the state’s corollary, assisting ‘the atomized subjectivities [to realign] along collective lines within which individuals recognize themselves as the same’. Second, the concept of micronationality may perhaps help music festivals articulate and consolidate their cultural profile and ideological agenda more effectively, thus constituting themselves as sites whose symbolic significance appeals to a particular type of the festival crowd. In other words, the festival micronational

borders are also imagined to enclose a particular and separate culture, a notion which is articulated by hegemonic ways of differentiating and classifying cultural differences. It is not that different cultures cannot exist within any [micro]nation, but that they are subordinate to the [micro]nation, and conceived as part of [micro]national cultural variety. (Cf. Edensor 2002: 37.)
In the case of contemporary music festivals, the machinery of hegemonic power is most visible in the domain of festival music programming, whereby a selection of certain musical styles and acts is presented as part of the distinct cultural identity of the festival micronation in question. Of relevance here is the familiar political discourse of unity-in-diversity, which music festival micronations are also inclined to appropriate and readily put to use. This is not only evident in their offerings of selected music genres and styles (usually allocated to differently designed venues/stages across the festival area), which in turn appeal to different segments of the festival audience. Also, in the case of music festivals with a highly international profile, the festival experience is typically articulated in the language of ‘unity-in-diversity’ ideology, as DJ David Guetta’s speech at Belgium’s massive EDM festival Tomorrowland illustrates aptly:

Tomorrowland! Each year it’s getting bigger and bigger, and there’s more people coming from everywhere in the world. I see flags from Christian countries, Jewish countries [sic], Muslim countries, and we are all together. This is the most beautiful thing in the world, it makes me really shiver. So everybody, if we all feel like one, raise your hands in the air. Everybody! (MTV documentary, 2014.)

There is arguably one more parallel between nations and music festival micronations. Namely, nations cultivate and recreate their self-image and identity through selected iconic sites. These, on the one hand, serve as evidence of their past cultures, ‘glorious’ histories, but also modernity, and on the other, provide individuals with sacred centers ‘of congregation (...) worthy of a visit during a lifetime’ (see Edensor 2002: 66). Music festivals likewise cherish and draw on their history and cultural capital to construct themselves as sites of cultural and spiritual pilgrimage for like-minded crowds, offering them a unique and intensified experience of music, place, and community as part of the broader phenomenon of life tourism.

Lastly, the rise of festival micronations should be discussed in connection with the corresponding phenomenon of micronations, since both occurrences can be interpreted as products and agents of the same cultural processes. To be precise, the last thirty years or so have witnessed a frenetic bustle of micro-trends, micro-genres, and micro-labels, apparently incomparable to larger movements and mega-genres of the previous eras in the history of popular culture (see Reynolds 2011). Postmodern theory likewise deploys the notion of microculture (see e.g. Branch 2007; Spilková and Radová 2011) – or, alternatively, that of post-subculture or neo-tribe (see Bennett 1999; 2004a) – in place of subculture, in an attempt to supersede the idea of fixed and homogeneous group identities implied by the latter concept. What is arguably at stake behind all these developments are the ongoing processes of fragmentation and
decentralization of culture as a whole in today’s globalized and consumer-oriented society.

The phenomenon of *micronations*, despite its real-word incarnations which pre-date postmodern times and whose roots run deep in the fetishistic fixation of modern thought on statehood combined with the rich legacy of Western utopian movements, has also seen a rapid growth, especially since the advent of the Internet (see Lattas 2005; Taglioni 2011). The latter indeed gave rise to the emergence of hundreds of virtual micronations or *cybernations*, eclipsing to some extent the traditional model of micronation-building based on territorial claims – be those claims laid over physical space such as a piece of land (e.g. *Principality of Hutt River* in Western Australia; or *Akhzivland* on Israel’s northern coastline), island (e.g. *Naminara Republic* in South Korea’s Chuncheon), town’s district (e.g. *Freetown Christiania* within Copenhagen’s neighborhood of Christianshavn), abandoned military offshore platform (e.g. *Principality of Sealand* in the North Sea off the coast of Britain), one’s house (e.g. *Republic of Kugelmugel* in Vienna), backyard (e.g. *Empire of Atlantium* in Australia’s New South Wales), or bedroom (e.g. *Kingdom of Talossa* in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States).

Either real or virtual, micronations have very little in common other than the guiding principle of their formation, which is to simulate the structure, practice, regalia, and rhetoric of existing nation-states but largely without making any sovereignty claims under the roof of the United Nations. The motives behind their creation are indeed various. Some micronations are played for fun and experimenting purposes, either as a hobby or as part of artistic projects, often with a satirical touch. Others develop an overtly political agenda as a response to some instances of oppression or negligence in the surrounding world; or arise from a political dispute with the authorities; or are driven by commercial interests (such as tourism boosting), sometimes even on the illegal bases. The list of possible motives for founding a

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19 Even though the written accounts of imagined utopian communities can be traced back to ancient times (e.g. Plato’s *The Republic*), it was in the nineteenth century in which such thinking began to take on an institutional form (for the American history of utopian communities, see Jones 2003). More to the point, the concept of micronation saw its rise to cultural prominence over the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure credited for its popularization is apparently Leicester Hemingway (a younger brother of the famous American writer Ernest) who anchored in 1964 a bamboo raft to the floor of the Caribbean Sea and declared it *Republic of New Atlantis* (Johanson 2015).

20 For instance, Montreal-based *Aerican Empire* (since 1987), whose name is clearly an ironic comment on the expression American Empire, is widely known for its tongue-in-cheek interplanetary land claims, smiley-faced flag, and widespread activity of gaming. Both *Republic of Kugelmugel* (Vienna, since 1984) and *Ladonia* (Sweden’s nature reserve Kullaberg, since 1996) are art projects (namely, a ball-shaped house and two sculptures respectively), whose status of micronations emerged from a dispute with respective local authorities over the rights of the artists to launch them (in the first case) and preserve them (in the second
micronation is certainly not meant to be exhaustive here. It rather seeks to be illustrative of the micronational phenomenon overall, as well as to point to the discursive ambiguity of its incarnations. As Lattas (2005: 1) notes in her study of Australian micronations:

> Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between the serious and the tongue-in-cheek, as people enjoy the fantastic nature of the project and all the titles and regalia that go along with it, such as the designing of stamps and flags and the writing of constitutions. Sometimes it is also hard to distinguish between serious political enterprises and opportunistic schemes. This is not just because the people behind them are so good at disguising their interests and being taken for real. Rather, it is because so many of the projects occupy a space that is ambiguous, or which allows them to mean different things to the different people who get involved in them.

At any rate, micronations should be understood as instances of postmodern cultural praxis insofar as their agendas and activities are deemed indicative of ‘the failure of political action [in the age of globalization] to ignite the mass imagination’ (Sellars 2011: 237). This void is consequently filled with a growing number of alternative microworlds, in which it is the individual, ‘not the state or even the people as a polity socially contracted to the state’, that is posited as the chief source of political sovereignty (Lattas 2005: 4). Considering a sheer diversity of micronational projects worldwide, it comes as no surprise that the course of political action propagated in them is articulated from both ends of the political spectrum.

At one end of the political spectrum of micronational responses to globalization are thus ‘left wing’ projects based on ‘the ideal of de-territorialised [global] citizenship’ (Lattas 2005: 4). Such micronations seek to do away with both material and symbolic boundaries drawn in the previous era, such as those of nation-states and, more generally, of the binary system privileging old powers (i.e. whites, Europeans, Gay and Lesbian Kingdom of the Coral Sea Islands (Queensland, Australia, since 2004) is an independent queer microstate, which initially began as a political protest against the unequal treatment of the LGBTQ population in Australia, in particular against the government’s refusal of the rights to same-sex marriages. Likewise, Glacier Republic (the disputed region at the Chile-Argentinian border, since 2014) is a micronation, set up and run by a group of Greenpeace activists to raise awareness of the environmental issues in the area. Both New Zealand’s Whangamomona Republic (a small, rural town of the same name, since 1989) and Quebec’s L’Anse-Saint-Jean micronation (a small township, since 1997) were launched to promote tourism in their areas. Finally, micronation Dominion of Melchizedek (comprising several territories across the world, since 1990) is infamous for its illegal transnational activities in the banking sector.
males, heterosexuals, etc.).\textsuperscript{21} Opposed to them are ‘right wing’ micronational projects, which in response to the totalizing forces of globalization invest their imagined territories with the old regime of powers, embodied in the exclusivist idea of a purified, ‘true’ nation.\textsuperscript{22}

As will become especially clear from the forthcoming analysis Exit and Guča, the conceptual and ideological similarities between micronational projects and festival micronations are indeed uncanny. Now, however, it is necessary to give a final shape to the key concept of the study by casting light on the relationship of the micronational idea to the Lefebvrian theorization of music festival spatiality presented above, and thus, implicitly, to the discursive field of national identity.

2.5 (Music) Festival Spatiality, Micronationalism, and Microcitizenship

This section specifically discusses how the micronational idea feeds into the trialetics of music festival spatiality using the Foucauldian and Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of micropolitics. But to get to this point requires a brief recapitulation of micropolitical theory introduced above.

In brief, then, contemporary music festivals can be understood as spaces mediating society’s ‘molar’ and ‘molecular lines’ of political activity. When translated into the Lefebvrian terminology of space production, this means that festival spatial practice is embedded in the materiality of the festival locale and the prevailing regimes of truth specific for that locale (the Deleuzo-Guattarian equivalent here is the molar line of society’s political activity). At the same time, music festivals operate as micropolitical forms of power, capable of regulating, articulating, and accommodating society’s beliefs and desires (i.e. the molecular line of its political activity) in and through their conceived (imagined) and lived (social) spaces. And it is precisely through such exercises of power that music festivals tend to constitute and promote themselves publicly as microstates or micronations.

Specifically, the use of the micronational trope in the festival discursive practice apparently produces double effects on festival audiences. On the one hand, it shapes the images and meanings that festival communities associate with the music festival

\textsuperscript{21} One telling example here is a virtual micronation founded in 1992 by Slovenian art collective Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK) under the name NSK State in Time, which ‘confers the status of a state not to territory but to mind, whose borders are in a state of flux, in accordance with the movements and changes of its symbolic and physical collective body’ (‘The NSK State’, NSK, n.d.). The NSK State in Time also aspires to create a new type of society in the aftermath of socialism’s collapse – namely, ‘a global community based on aesthetic and ethical principles’ (‘NSK from Kapital to Capital’, The NSK Times, 2015).

\textsuperscript{22} See, for instance, the right-wing rhetoric of Australian micronation Ponderosa in Lattas 2005: 4.
in question. This is clearly the level of festival disciplinary power pertaining to a discourse politics as one component of Foucauldian micropolitics. On the other hand, the idea of micronations also affects the ways in which music festival crowds behave in situ. In this case, the manifestations of festival disciplinary power make inroads into the sphere of biopolitics as the other component of Foucauldian micropolitics (cf. Foucault 1980b).

Either way, it is important to point out that music festivals as micronational spaces do not instill in their publics only the hegemonic modes of thinking and being-in-the-world, but also resistant ones. Because of this duality (i.e. the hegemony-resistance binary) inherent to their discursive and performative repertories, music festivals can be said to produce spatial practice whose expressions move along the spectrum, on one end of which there are representational spaces (embodied in the mechanisms of festival disciplinary power) and, on the other, spaces of representation (revealed in festivals’ symbolic appropriations and uses of space, in their extraordinary body performances, and in their occasional promotion of counterhegemonic viewpoints). No definite line can thus be drawn between these two instances of festival spatiality, for festivals’ utopian projects – such as those of micronations – are simultaneously conceived and lived out, resulting in some cases in the political ‘line of flight’ (i.e. initiating a social change).

Theorized so far, the concept of festival micronational spaces clearly places too much weight on the perspective of festival production and promotion, leaving little room for contestation and agency on the part of the festival publics. As such, it plays down the fact that ‘much of the festival experience is created by the audience and the crowd itself’ (Getz 1991, in Anderton 2006: 32), and so it occludes the sheer complexity and elusiveness of festival lived spaces, above all, a great variety of beliefs, behaviors, experiences, and desires of its actual users (i.e. music festivalgoers). A highly contested way in which festival micronational spaces are constructed, cutting across a host of interests, values, and expectations that different segments of the festival publics invest in them, is comparable once again to the workings of national identity. As Edensor (2002: 25), following Hall (1992), teaches us, ‘national identity is in reality “cross-cut by deep internal divisions and differences, and “unified” only through the exercise of different forms of cultural power” to provide an illusion of commonality’. If the term micronationalism has likewise been used to describe these ‘different forms of cultural power’ that music festivals exercise to create a sense of shared cultural identity, then the new term needs to be introduced to emphasize ‘internal divisions and differences’ undermining the preferable readings of festival meaning-making. The term microcitizenship can arguably serve such purpose, insofar as we define it as a form of micronational belonging or micronation’s membership based on the principle of universality and the political sovereignty of its individual members. It is precisely this formal and civic nature of relationship to the micro-
nation that in the comparable case of festival micronations underlines the following: not all festival participants necessarily affiliate themselves with the values of imagined micronations promulgated in festival promotional discourses. Understood this way, the notion of microcitizenship also opens up an alternative vista for considering festival social collectivities in political rather than cultural terms. This is a relevant point, to which I turn in the concluding chapter when discussing the political function of music festivals in the contemporary world.

2.6 The Micronational Trope in Promotional Discourses of Contemporary Music Festivals

The idea of music festivals as self-contained worlds, capable of projecting alternative visions of society (and hence of nation as its political incarnation), seems to have haunted the popular imagination ever since the first modern pop music festivals were instituted (in the mid to late 1960s). The best-known case in point here is, of course, the 1969 Woodstock Music and Arts Fair, whose cultural significance and impact was so profound across the world that the expression *Woodstock nation*, among many others, came out of it (see Bennett ed. 2004b). Moreover, in recent festival studies, the conceptualization of contemporary music festivals as ministates has been put up for discussion but yet never really explored and developed further, perhaps as a result of the persisting disregard for national identity issues. For example, Luckman (2014) acknowledges that the promotional language used in Australian outdoor doof festivals, specifically in the Earthcore large-scale events, tries to appeal to their visitors by inducing a sense of citizenship in them; whereas St John (2015: 11–12) in his investigation of EDM festivals and their transformational potential, poses the question whether these events facilitate transformations in personal, social and cultural conditions according to the passage rite model in which these festivals typically invest, or are they more akin to transitional worlds, parallel cultural universes and liminal mini-states to which event-goers and raving liminars repeatedly return? (Emphasis added.)

Not only does the present study put forward a similar question, but it also develops the concept of festival micronational spaces, by use of which the ‘either-or’ logic in the quote above can be elegantly circumvented and substituted by a dialectical mode of thinking. Notwithstanding the constitutive duality of representations associated with music festival spatiality (see 2.3.2), the present section nonetheless focuses on only one aspect of the micronational idea – that which approaches festivals as ‘parallel cultural universes’, to reuse St John’s phrase from the quote above. In doing so, it commits itself to the task of exploring the micronational trope at greater length
than has been the case so far, especially noting that the festival-related discourses of statehood and citizenship have recently been on the rise. To put flesh on the latter point, this section considers a selected number of music festival examples and their media coverage, first in a larger (European) context, and then in relation to the Serbian festivalscapes, with a special emphasis on Exit and Guča.

2.6.1 The Micronational Trope in European Music Festivals

Let me exemplify first how such expressions as *mini-state*, *micro-society*, *another country*, and the like, have become part of the common vocabulary used in public commentaries on even such major music festivals as England’s Glastonbury Festival and Denmark’s Roskilde Festival. Dee (2015), for instance, writes about the former festival in the following way:

> It’s like going to another country, a hip and thrilling Brigadoon that appears every year or so. Coming to Glastonbury involves a fair amount of travel, and probably a queue to get in but, when you get past these impediments, you enter a huge tented city, a *mini-state* under canvas. British law still applies, but the rules of society are a bit different, a little bit freer. (Emphases added.)

For Hallberg (2012), the Roskilde Festival is likewise ‘much more than music. It is also (...) a micro-society where the premises of everyday life are put on hold and other modes of being activated’ (emphasis added). The use of micronational terminology can also be found in Jensen’s (2009) review of the festival, although in a diluted form. This commentator specifically describes Roskilde as ‘a somewhat Dionysian mini-version of the modern Scandinavian welfare states, where comfort is God, and safety trumps everything’ (ibid.; emphasis added).

The idea of music festivals as micronations carries even greater weight when used as part of festival marketing campaigns, but also as a tool for formulating the ideological framework of the festival in question. The first example worth considering here is the UK’s *Sunrise Celebration* music festival, operating since 2005 on several greenfield sites across England due to the recurring events of flash flooding caused by heavy rains. In 2013, the festival organizers launched a new promotional campaign for the Sunrise Celebration production of the same year, declaring the festival ‘the first ever festival micro-nation’, and renaming it accordingly into *Sunrise*:

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23 Brigadoon is ‘[a] place that is idyllic, unaffected by time, or remote from reality’. The word originates from the stage musical of the same name (written by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Loewe in 1947), referring to the magical village that comes to life for one day every hundred years (see Webber and Feinsilber 1999: 83–84).
Another World (Hawkes 2013). As Alex Lepingwell (in Gethin 2013), a co-director of Sunrise: Another World, explained at the time:

A Micronation is an unofficial independent state, as yet unrecognised by world governments or major international organisations. The ethos and principles of our new Sunrise free nation are directly translated into the delivery of our festival. We are committed to best environmental practice, to the free expression of creativity, to self-responsibility and non-violent communication and to celebrating our commitment to changing our world into a fairer, better and more just place for everyone.

Like all nations, the Sunrise Micronation has the right to issue passports, currency, honours and operate an embassy. Like other nations, it can and will produce its own bill of rights, pass its own laws and create its own form of government.

Hungary’s Sziget Festival, founded in 1993 and held on Budapest’s Óbudai-sziget [Old Buda Island] ever since, can serve as yet another example of music festival self-promotion in micronational terms. Namely, the festival marketers describe it as ‘the Island of Freedom that could also be regarded as an independent state’ (‘Sziget Festival 2014’, The Beat Manifesto, n.d.; emphasis added), or as The Sziget Festival Republic, to quote the festival CEO Károly Gerendai (in Dezse 2015). Furthermore, in 2013 and 2014, festival organizers took the festival main motto ‘Island of Freedom’ to a higher level by converting it into the concept of a unique Sziget Festival nation during the time the festival was on. A material representation of this idea took on the form of vividly designed Sziget passports, which were delivered to festival visitors upon their entrance to the festival site, and which contained a comprehensive pack of information on the festival acts, sites, and services. The only condition for qualifying as a Sziget citizen (or szitizen) was to collect stamps from twenty four stages (out of fifty four altogether) as a proof that one attended them all. Once collected, festivalgoers could exchange them for a Sziget green card (which was in fact a bandana-gift with the Sziget Festival logo on it) at so-called Sziget Immigration Office (see Dezse 2014). In addition, in 2014 the festivals organizers also introduced the practice of selecting the Sziget Festival nation’s anthem, represented each year by a different Hungarian song (‘Together!’, Sziget Festival News, 2014).

The third and last example here is that of Ukraine’s kaZantip summer festival, also known as ‘Z’, or as kaZantip Party Land. Located in the village of Popovka

24 ‘Sunrise: Another World is the first UK music festival to use a smart grid site-wide to generate a renewable power supply for the event. The new smart grid integrated power system for Sunrise combines high-spec battery technology with more traditional waste vegetable oil generators and a combination of solar and wind power, to create a site-wide power system that is energy efficient and low impact.’ (Life Arts Media, 2013.)
along the Black Sea coast on the Crimean Peninsula, this two-to-three-week-long EDM and X-sports festival promotes itself as a *paradizable state*, whose ‘citizens’ (so-called *paradizers*) are seemingly offered more than a simple ‘resort of almost 100,000 m²’, and more than an exquisitely designed and well-equipped ‘holiday complex’. Rather, once festivalgoers purchase their *vīzas* (another name for the festival entrance tickets), they automatically become the *paradizers* of kāZantip Republic, whose tongue-in-cheek principles are issued on the festival official website (under the rubric *Constitution*) and apparently lived out on the festival ground. The kāZantip state defines itself as ‘an imaginary place’ and has no territorial claims accordingly. One probable reason is that the festival has been forced into moving across space (successfully to Anaklia, Georgia, in 2014, and unsuccessfully to the Koh Puos Island in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, in 2015) due to Ukraine’s unsettled political situation. The festival Constitution covers a wide range of references typically associated with the national discourse. The kāZantip Republic has, for example, its own hierarchical structures of power, constitutional rights and responsibilities, national clothes, food, drinks, language, religion, anthem, holiday days, sports, resources, symbols and fetishes – with orange and black stripes, or polka-dotted materials in orange and black, being particularly glorified as part of the kāZantip republic iconography (see kāZantip.com).25

Finally, it is notable that even a London-based music marketing company, specialized in the promotion and production of music festivals across Europe (including such renowned rock spectacles as the Reading and Leeds Festivals, Berlin Festival, Ireland’s Electric Picnic, or Norway’s Hove), opted for the name *Festival Republic* (see festivalrepublic.com).

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The micronational idea holds its grip on the Serbian festival imagination, too. However, before showing how this idea relates to Serbia’s music festivalscapes, notably to Exit and Guča, several observations need to be made about possible correlations between the concept of micronations, in both its original and adapted (festival) forms, and the place of its implementation.

It might be the case that the phenomenon of micronations was initially associated with projects ‘of ordinary people (however quirky), [residing] in long-established democracies’, as Lattas (2005: 2) asserts. However, it is also clear from the evidence above that this phenomenon has in the meantime spread to other recently ‘democratized’ parts of the world, above all, to Eastern Europe (EE). Examples here include,

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25 A strong liberal culture in kāZantip founded on the ideals of love, peace, harmony, and happiness gives us a reason to interpret the festival’s orange-black iconography as the possible appropriation of Russia’s same colored ribbon of Saint George, which in Ukraine is used as a symbol of pro-Russian and separatist orientation.
in addition to Sziget Festival and kaZantip, East Germany’s **Bunte Republik Neustadt** (BRN) [**Colorful Republic of Neustadt**], set up in Dresden’s district Dresden-Neustadt (1990–1993)\(^\text{26}\); Lithuania’s **Republic of Užupis** within Vilnius’s Old Town (since 1997); the Czech Republic’s **Other World Kingdom** (OWK) ruled by women in a BDSM fashion on the grounds of an old château near Černá Hora, a small town in the South Moravian Region of the country (since 1996).

The ex-Yugoslav region has likewise proven a fertile ground for various micro-national experiments. Apart from the virtual, arty, and globally oriented **NSK State in Time**, initiated in 2001 by the **Neue Slowenische Kunst** (NSK) art collective (see footnote 21, p. 97), there is also **Cyber Yugoslavia** (CY) as another virtual and transnational micronation, founded in 1999 and intended for the individuals, mainly from ex-Yugoslavia, opposing recent violent history and nationalist politics of the region (see juga.com; Mihm 2000; Petrović 2007). At the other end of the micronational spectrum are those regional projects that are bounded by clearly demarcated territorial borders. One of them is the **Fourth Yugoslavia** (since 2003), an individual restoration project of mini-Yugoslavia erected by Blaško Gabrić on his own piece of land near Subotica, Serbia’s northernmost city (see Petrović 2007: 269). Three additional micronations – namely, **Ecological Danubian Principality of Ongal** (since 2014), **Free Republic of Liberland** (since 2015), and **Kingdom of Enclava** (since 2015)\(^\text{27}\) – emerged in the tiny pockets of disputed territories along the Danube river at the Croatia-Serbia border, and are governed by the individuals coming from other EE countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland respectively). The fourth one, **The Hajduk Republic of Mijat Tomić** (since 2002)\(^\text{28}\), lies in the middle of Herzegovina’s Nature Park Blidinje, and it came into existence as a form of protest against the local authorities from three surrounding cantons, when each of them refused to take responsibility for solving the electricity problem which the Republic’s founder and sole ruler, the late Croat Vinko Vukoja Lastvić, encountered in his daily hospitality business. Finally, **Republic of Peščenica** (1992–2010), based in the

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\(^{26}\) The project of the BRN micronation was clearly short-lived, but it is worth mentioning that a three-day street festival that was organized in the honor of the Republic’s foundation in June 1991 has continued to exist until the present day (see ‘The History of Colorful Republic of Neustadt’, BRN-Dresden.de, n.d.).

\(^{27}\) For more information on the listed micronations, see ‘Ecological Danubian Principality of Ongal...’, EuroChicago.com, 2015; liberland.org; and enclava.org.

\(^{28}\) The term ‘hajduk’ refers to outlaws, brigands, and freedom fighters in the areas of the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman rule (i.e. from the end of the sixteenth century through to the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples). As Buchanan (2006: 299) clarifies in addition, ‘[s]ongs frequently portray these figures as heroic saviors who represent, perhaps, the people’s only recourse against continued aggression’. The Hajduk Republic is obviously named after one such figure, the hajduk leader Mijat Tomić, who apparently used to hide in the seventeenth century in the nearby cave (‘The Hajduk Republic’, Hajdučke Vrleti, n.d.).
working-class neighborhood of the same name in Croatia’s capital Zagreb, was a satirical project, deeply political in its content, commenting on various aspects of contemporary Croatian public life. The Republic was instituted and ‘ruled’ by the self-proclaimed ‘dictator’ Željko Malnar, a well-known Croatian traveling reporter, and its existence was closely linked to a crude TV program *Nightmare Stage*, broadcast on several local TV channels (*OTV*, *Z1*, and *HRT* respectively), as well as to its reader’s digest version of the same title (also written by Malnar) appearing weekly in Zagreb’s magazine *Globus*. *Nightmare Stage* hosted a great number of public personae (largely from Croatia), and featured alongside a curious collection of freakish characters, picked up from the Peščenica streets and assigned specific roles in the Republic’s ‘government’.

Arguably, micronational phenomena across EE countries (former Yugoslavia included) can be understood in light of post-1989 political changes as symbolic adaptations to the new socio-political realities. There is strong evidence to support this claim. First of all, micronational projects across EE can be said to reveal attempts at adjusting to the new rules of market economy and global competitiveness, where a capacity to attract media attention increases the prospects of income. Second of all, such projects may also indicate people’s desire to explore the recently won freedom of expression. And third, given people’s disappointed expectations of the postsocialist era, the micronational idea perhaps reflects their longing for restored faith in ‘a fantasy of the state’. As Simić (2009: 94) argues in the representative case of Serbia:

The visible dissolution of the state made people want to believe in the state and the idea of progress connected to it, as if somehow the state’s dissolution created the belief itself. It was as if people suddenly realised the fantastic nature of the state – although, paradoxically, they knew it was a fantasy all along – and wanted the fantasy back.

### 2.6.2 The Micronational Trope in Serbian (Music) Festivals: Exit and Guča

The proliferation of micronational projects and rhetoric across the western Balkans for the last twenty years has affected the Serbian festivalscapes, too. One example here is Belgrade’s Mikser Festival, which was founded in 2009 by the cultural organization of the same name and promoted as a regional cultural hub bringing contemporary visual and performance arts, creative industries, and social activism together (see [www.festival.mikser.rs](http://www.festival.mikser.rs)). The festival’s move to the deteriorated inner-city district of Savamala (in 2012), whose urban cultural regeneration is still a work in progress, prompted the festival CEO, Ivan Lalić (in Trminić 2014), to speak publicly about the festival territory in micronational terms:
We have fought for the last three years (this is the third year of Mikser in Sava-
mala) to really position this territory as a territory of creativity, design... as one, how should I put it, special ministate, where the rules frustrating us every time we try to discuss some cultural policies as well as these ordinary, everyday poli-
cies, do not apply. (Emphasis added.)

*Pesnička Republika* [Republic of Poets] is certainly a more illustrative example of Serbian festivals incorporating the micronational trope into their representational and marketing strategies. Organized by Banat Cultural Center (BKC) in the north-
eastern Serbian village of Novo Miloševo since 2016, Republic of Poets functions as an annual gathering of poets coming from different parts of the world to read their songs in their mother tongue. Members of this ‘symbolic state of poets’ are not only the participating poets with state-issued ‘passports’, but also all poetry lovers supporting the event. According to BKC director and author of the Republic’s Constitution Radovan Vlahović (in Šegrt 2016), in Republic of Poets,

poetry represents a place of mutual tolerance and creative cooperation. Our re-
public will symbolically have all necessary attributes of the state of poets (consti-
tution, anthem, president, government, ambassadors, honorary consuls for cer-
tain regions, cities, settlements...) which should show people that poetry has a universally human character. The founding of Republic of Poets strengthens, supports and affirms the idea of decentralization and demetropolization of cultural events.

Admittedly, though, Serbia’s Exit and Guča trumpet festivals have invented them-
theselves as micronations – specifically, as *State of Exit* and as *Trubačka Republika* [Trumpet Republic] respectively – in a more consistent way than any other Serbian festival. Both microstates have launched their own flags and emblems, along with the anthem ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara / From Ovčar and Kablar Mountains’ in the case of the latter festival. I explain now in more detail how they came into existence and what symbolic meanings they have sought to convey through their regalia.

The State of Exit was born in 2003 at Novi Sad’s Petrovaradin Fortress as a result of the marketing campaign for the festival production of the same year. The cam-
paign’s aim was to depict the festival as ‘a meta-state’ of all people of good will and

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29 Ovčar and Kablar are the mountains situated in the western-central part of Serbia, stretching across the northern side of the Dragačevo region. The Ovčar-Kablar Gorge is not only well-known as a Serbian ‘holy’ center of Orthodox clergy activity from the period of Ottoman occupation, but, more importantly, it is also referred to as a common trope in national songs celebrating different periods of Serbian national history (see Đoković 1990). More on this in Chapter 4.
vast optimism; as a zone of freedom, love, tolerance and peace, whose founders and supporters alike were determined to put up fierce resistance to visa restrictions, drug abuse, and the society’s various instances of corruption, violence, and intolerance (Gruhonjić ed. 2003: n.p.). In the same year, every Exit festivalgoer was automatically considered the State’s ‘citizen’, the material proof of which was a purchased ticket, designed as a passport and an ID card (see Figures 1 and 2).

Figures 1 and 2. The State of Exit passport and ID card
That the idea of State of Exit has, however, gone well beyond the commercial scope of one short-lived advertising campaign can be illustrated by the way in which festival co-founder Miloš Ignjatović reflects on Exit Festival in hindsight: ‘Every festival [production] was a campaign. Exit (...) is more than a festival, not only for us, [but also] for all visitors, because it’s a statement, it’s a state of mind, *it’s the State of Exit actually*’ (*The States of Exit*, 2012; emphasis added). The label ‘State of Exit’ is nowadays likely to appear in the festival self-promotional discourse, where, for example, the Exit employees and volunteers are declared ‘honorary citizens of Exit, a country with the youngest population in the world’ (*Open contest for...*, *Exit News*, 2012). Otherwise, the label is additionally associated with the State of Exit Foundation, which was established in 2010 with the mission ‘to position itself as a leader in the mobilization of public opinion and as a decision-maker in the field of youth development, creative industries, and place branding’ (see [www.exitfondacijja.org](http://www.exitfondacijja.org)). Finally, the label can also be linked to the title of the Dutch documentary on Exit Festival, *The States of Exit* (2012), where the plural form of the word ‘state’ is meant to suggest an astonishing growth and diversification of the festival’s initial organizational infrastructure and activity.
Conversely, the label ‘Trumpet Republic’ was possibly coined by Serbian poet Miladin M. Vuksavljević, who used it in his ode to the trumpet at Guča 1964 (Tadić et al. 2010: 134). What, however, contributed most effectively to the popularization of the expression and its further consolidation in public discourse was, arguably, the Italian documentary of the same name: Trumpets’ Republic (2006). The documentary title is owed in turn to festival co-founder Nikola Stojić and the original video footage of the Guča 2002 press conference in which he said: ‘These days you are in a special republic – during the festival, Dragačevo becomes the Trumpet Republic’ (Trumpets’ Republic, 2006). Thus, even though Trumpet Republic chiefly designates the region to which Guča belongs, it can also refer, although much less commonly, to the southeastern part of Serbia. For example, in Broughton’s (2011) report on the renowned Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra, this region is described as ‘the heart-land of Serbian Gypsy brass’.

In contrast to State of Exit which in 2003 issued passports and ID cards to all its visitors, Trumpet Republic has granted just a few of them to its most appreciated members. It was specifically in 2000 when seven copies of the Republic’s passport were printed out and delivered within the ceremonial program of the fortieth festival production (by Joviša M. Slavković, then-appointed director of Guča Culture House) to ‘the personae of significance to the presentation and improvement of the festival’ (Tadić et al. 2010: 310). Trumpet Republic has also had World Ambassador since 2007, when it conferred this title on Boban Marković (Tadić et al. 2010: 350).

Furthermore, Trumpet Republic has from the very beginning been administered by the so-called Assembly Government. (The ‘assembly’ refers here to the festival’s original name, The Dragačevo Assembly of (Folk) Trumpet Players, which increasingly began to disappear from public discourse in the late 1980s under a rising tide of the more effective Guča Trumpet Festival or simply Guča.) This regulatory body was initially composed of nine festival founders-coordinators, later to be succeeded by many other individuals coming and going one after another. Nowadays the ‘assembly government’ can be heard only sporadically in Serbian public discourse, in contrast to another expression, sounding more technical and bureaucratic, that was introduced in 2003 – namely, the Assembly Board (see Bojanić 2002: 5–6; Tadić et al. 2010: 79). Conversely, State of Exit has never sought to characterize or advertise its core decision-making body by analogy with the state government.

In addition, the State of Exit emblem takes the UN logo as its reference point, having a disco ball in place of the world map resting between two olive branches (see Figures 1, 2, and 3 above). The values embraced by this symbolic comparison are self-evidently those of cosmopolitanism, freedom, tolerance, and peace, as being expressed through music and dance. State of Exit also has a four-colored flag (see Figure 3 above), with red standing for love, orange – for optimism, blue – for tolerance and harmony, and green – for an appreciation for nature (Kolar, in Gruhonjić
Note, however, that State of Exit is nowadays more recognizable by its rectangular logo with the festival name spelled out across it in white-painted block letters against the red background (see Figure 4 above). The new logo is apparently comparable to international emergency exit signs displayed, for instance, in airplanes, which perhaps symbolizes the festival’s shift to the primarily corporate (and thus impersonal) basis of its operation.

By contrast, central to the corpus of Trumpet Republic’s regalia is a circular emblem of several different two-color combinations, which is also featured in the Republic’s light blue flag (see Figures 5 and 6 below). In the middle of the emblem there is a childlike depiction of the trumpet image (possibly a reference to the peasant origins of Serbian naïve art), surrounded by the caption Sabor trubača / Assembly of Trumpet Players, Guča in the gently embellished Serbian Cyrillic block letters. The emblem includes several other traditional ethnic markers in addition to the references to Serbian folk art and Cyrillic alphabet – specifically, two grains of wheat (as the symbols of Serbia’s rurality and agricultural foundation), opanci (traditional Serbian footwear), and the image of people’s unity (possibly referring to the myth of Serbian dis/unity) as being accomplished through traditional trumpet music and kolo (a Serbian circle dance).

As illustrated above, there is strong evidence for considering Serbia’s Exit and Guča trumpet festivals as micronational phenomena in their own right. More broadly, there are several factors that render the micronational idea especially prominent in Serbia. First, the Serbian obsession with the state has historical foundations. According to Stojanović (2010), the greatest concentration of power in Serbia has traditionally lain in the hands of national political elites, whose overall interests have always been firmly tied to the state. Thus, having no counterweight in other sectors of society (economic, administrative, academic, cultural, etc.), they have never really felt inclined
to loosen their grip on the resources and powers of the state. As a result, all relations in the Serbian society, from socioeconomic to private, still tend to be determined by the politics. Second, it should be reiterated that many people in Serbia feel stuck in a limbo between two state formations, or as Simić (2009: 94) put it, ‘that there was not enough of the state actually in existence, or if there was, then it was not working properly’. This feeling has arguably made ‘a fantasy of the state’ even more pronounced in their imagination. Given such a situation, it is plausible to assert that the envisioned statehood of Exit and Guča (and all other Serbian micronational projects discussed above) fulfills two main functions. On the one hand, it serves as a compensatory remedy for the failure of the actual Serbian state to accommodate the basic public needs of its citizens. On the other hand, it performs a nostalgic function in relation to the former Yugoslav experience, specifically, to the loss of Yugoslavia’s once large territory, freedom of movement, and common (supraethnic) identity (see Petrović 2007).

Now, after setting out the micronational elements of Exit and Guča, the study can proceed with showcasing how each of these two festivals has been constituted as a particular type of micronational space. It begins with the analysis of Exit counter-space.
3 Exit as Micronational Counter-Space

In this chapter I analyze Exit Festival using Lefebvre’s (2009: 349) concept of counter-space. I argue specifically that the Exit micronational counter-space came about when a group of Novi Sad students appropriated a piece of public space and reworked it in a way which offered a utopian alternative to the then existing Serbian sociopolitical reality. However, it should be noted that the Exit subsequent ‘diversions’ of real space have over time lost their initial political power and significance due to the rapid and overlapping processes of festival institutionalization, commercialization, and internationalization. With that said, I illustrate below that the discursive effects of Exit counter-spatial production are still traceable in Serbia’s national self-narration.

The following analysis distinguishes two main discursive frames through which the Exit counter-space arguably continues to (re)produce and to be (re)produced. The first is based on the idea of a radical break or discontinuity with the prior sociopolitical order and as such underpins the national identity construction in oppositional terms. The second emerges from a dialectic between continuity and discontinuity, generating thereby a qualitative shift in the projections of the Serb nation’s present and future. Since these two discursive frames of Exit counter-spatial practice complement each other in significant ways, it is not tenable to treat them separately in the forthcoming analysis. This is the reason why the analytical implications of each discursive frame alone are grouped below under the joint heading ‘The countercultural, urban, and cosmopolitan production of Exit counter-space’.

An additional note here is that the overall structure of the present chapter cuts across several closely intertwined levels of analysis. Taken into consideration are specifically the following aspects of Exit counter-spatial practice: (1) aesthetic – which involves the experience and narration of the festival’s various audiovisual contents, with a special focus on music; (2) spatial – which refers to the experience and narration of both the Exit embeddedness in locality and its connectedness to wider contexts; (3) performative – which discusses the festival opening ritual as well as its diverse programs and practices, including those that are not defined in primarily aesthetic terms; and (4) discursive – pertaining to issues of the festival name and language use, but also to reflexive views on the politico-ideological and aesthetico-ethi-
cal functions of the festival more generally. It goes without saying that all these elements of Exit counter-spatial practice intersect in the analysis below, not least because the process of meaning production occurs simultaneously between two poles of the semantic spectrum – cognitive and corporeal (see 2.1). At any rate, to grasp the full complexity of Exit counter-spatial practice, it is necessary to place it first in the given historical context. Following next is thus a brief account of the Exit historical background and development until the present day.

3.1 Exit Counter-Space in Historical Perspective

Exit Festival was founded in Novi Sad in the summer 2000 with the aim of envisioning and actively participating in the establishment of a new political order. The idea of diverting the real space into a counter-space was initiated by a group of students from Novi Sad’s newly launched wing of the Student Union of the Faculty of Technical Sciences after they had been expelled from its original headquarters in 1998. Under their leadership, an almost hundred-day-long event was organized with the rich multimedia program comprising a series of concerts, theater performances, movie screenings, workshops, and discussion panels. The festival’s closing night was intentionally held two days before the country’s general elections and was symbolically named *Exit System Virus 2000: He (It) is over!*, clearly referring to the end of Milošević’s rule.

Also worth mentioning here is the history of politico-cultural activities that paved the way for the production of Exit Festival in 2000 as a counter-space. According to the official festival magazine *Exit News* (‘The History of Exit’, 2001: 6–11), the story of Exit began with the anti-Milošević 1996–97 student protests in which the key Exit people (then university freshmen) took a politically active role for the first time. The said group of students came to be in the meantime associated with the Vojvodina civic resistance movement *Otpor!* [Resistance!] and its non-violent tactics of political confrontation through creative cultural activities. Among a series of politically engaged concerts and multimedia events which they organized at the time, the two are said to have stood out as the ideational precursors for the Exit festival production. One was *Noise Spring Party* held in 1998 in Spens (the largest hall of the Sports and Business Center Vojvodina), which was remembered for the strong symbolism of on-stage breaking of the ‘wall’ in parallel with the rising noise of drumming. The other event *Šakom u glavu* [Punch in the Face] was organized in October 1999 and its anti-Milošević agenda was conveyed through a politically engaged theater performance, rock songs, and a video screening summarizing disastrous effects of Milošević’s politics.

It is clear, then, that the Exit 2000 counter-space emerged through the cumulative effect of several other counter-spatial activities organized previously by the same...
group of youth rebels. What is also important to emphasize here is the special quality of Exit counter-space in its founding year – a quality which would inevitably change in the following (post-2000) festival productions. I argue that this initial uniqueness of Exit counter-space was produced using at least two interrelated symbolic gestures. The first drew on the familiar counterhegemonic connotations of the concept of noise as a powerful ‘vehicle for critique and change’ (Leyshon et al. 1998: 3). In the Exit counter-space, the subversive power of ‘noise’ was largely embodied in the festival program orientation towards rock sound, with the latter having already been established as a distinctive sonic emblem of resistance to Milošević’s regime. The festival’s aspiration to produce one hundred days of performative noise was underlined in addition by the festival name itself: Exit – Noise Summer Fest, as well as by its initial idea to motivate young people to move away from apathy into active political resistance.

The festival’s second move drew its symbolic power from the idea of unbounded space, at the heart of which Exit was taking place. The festival program was performed on two improvised stages – one in the so-called Woods, and the other on the so-called River – both of which were located in the green area of Novi Sad’s student campus adjacent to the Danube river bank. What added to the symbolic production of Exit as a space of freedom was the festival’s actual spatial layout without fences, walls, or any other barriers, including financial ones.30 The idea of creative political rebellion in such a liberated and liberating space was initially intended for other local fellow students, but in the end the festival drew around 20.000 like-minded people from across Vojvodina and Belgrade (see ‘The History of Exit’, Exit News, 2001: 6–11).

The year of 2001 already marked the beginning of the immediate processes of the festival’s institutionalization, commercialization, and internationalization. In retrospect, the overall historical development of Exit is viewed by Lukić-Krstanović (2007: 320) as ‘a trajectory from the festival subversion to the festival establishment’; or in her more detailed account (2007: 293–294), as a three-phase pathway, switching from (1) Exit as a political concept (in 2000), through to (2) Exit as a music institution (since 2001), to (3) Exit as a profitable model of music spectacle (since 2003).

The institutionalization of Exit Festival began with its registration at the Republic of Serbia’s Intellectual Property Office in July 2001. The names of key Exit management people (namely, Dušan Kovačević, Ivan Milivojev, Bojan Bošković, Dorijan Petrić, and PR Aleksandra Kolar) were also officially recorded, the festival legal entities specified (namely, Student Union, Exit Association and Exit Media), and the official festival headquarters opened within the building of Novi Sad’s Serbian Na-

30 The entire event was free of charge thanks to the generous donations by ‘USAid, other foreign agencies and oppositional parties’ (Simić 2009: 204).
tional Theatre (see Lukić-Krstanović 2007: 288–289). What was additionally indicative of the festival’s integration into institutional channels was a series of protocol signings with various authorities (from municipality to higher governmental levels), by means of which substantial funds for the festival organization were secured. Another aspect of the Exit institutionalization was manifest in the participation of selected VIPs from the spheres of politics, culture, and sports in the festival opening ceremony. An important note here is that the public personae involved in these ceremonies were all representatives of what was perceived as (Second) Serbia’s pro-European elite.

The Exit commercial shift in 2003 was tightly linked to significant conceptual changes that were made in the festival production of the same year. The festival time frame shortened from nine days (as in Exit 2001 and 2002) to four days, and the festival program did away with open-air cinema and theater, consolidating thereby the Exit profile and future development as a music festival. Such conceptual changes allowed for the rationalization of the festival budget and so resulted in a highly concentrated music program featuring some of the most acclaimed Western (predominantly Anglophone) acts. The festival conceptual makeover was also accompanied by the advanced marketing campaign giving life to the State of Exit (see 2.6.2), increased ticket prices, and ‘the aggressive advertising presence’ (‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.). In short, Exit 2003 laid the groundwork for the festival’s commercial model of operation.

Following next was the general expansion of the festival, paralleled in a growing number of Exit on-site stages. Let me note for the sake of comparison that Exit 2003 featured 7 stages and around 400 performers, whereas Exit 2006 set up the standard with 22 stages and more than 600 performers in total. As an example, included below is the Exit 2012 map (see Figure 7 below), containing the list of 21 stages and their spatial arrangement. Other indicators of the Exit growth were also reflected in the proliferation of competencies required for professional festival management and other festival-related sociocultural activities; then, in the continual development of new marketing strategies and business models; and in the steady pace of festival far-

31 For example, Exit organizers signed two ‘cooperation protocols’ in a row (in 2005 and in 2006) with Novi Sad mayor Maja Gojković stipulating the city’s one-to-three-year financial commitment to the festival. Furthermore, ‘[o]n November 9, 2006, Exit organizers and Serbian Ministry of Finance signed a support protocol ensuring the Ministry’s minimum commitment of 30 million dinars (around €380,000) in each of the next four years (2007–2010) towards the festival’s annual operating costs’ (see ‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.).

32 For instance, Exit 2001 was opened by Vojvodina provincial assembly president Nenad Čanak and Novi Sad mayor Borislav Novaković; Exit 2002 – by famous Serbian basketball player Aleksandar Đorđević; Exit 2004 – by Serbian actor Zoran Cvijanović and Belgrade-based Montenegrin drummer Dragoljub Đuričić. Note, however, that this type of opening ceremony has been abandoned altogether since the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn’s opening speech on the liberalization of the EU’s visa regime in 2006.
reaching internationalization. Of importance to all such processes were, for example, the Exit membership in the Association of European Festivals Yourope (see www.yourope.org) and in the Central Eastern European Talent Exchange Program (CEE TEP 2010–2015; see www.etep.nl); or the bilateral cooperation with other similar European music festivals since 2001, notably with Roskilde and Sziget Festivals (Kovačević and Petrić, in Milović Buha 2008).

Figure 7. The Exit 2012 map

The Exit international profile also relies significantly on foreign artists, music agencies, media companies (not least MTV and BBC Radio 1), volunteers, and festival-goers. The presence of the latter began to exponentially grow since 2004, arriving at one third of the total number of festival-goers in 2006, and hitting the record score in the following years with around 50% of foreign visitors (including those from the region) within the overall festival audience demographics (see ‘Evaluation of the festival...’, TIM Centar, 2006–2011). The efforts of Exit organizers to develop the festival into a globally acclaimed music event resulted in a number of international awards, among which the awards Best Summer Music Festival in Europe (granted in 2016 by the influential travel portal European Best Destinations in cooperation with the European Commission), Best Major Festival (granted in 2013 by the European Festival Awards), and Best European Festival (granted in 2007 by the UK Festival Awards) stood out the most. In addition, many renowned media companies such as
The Guardian, The Sun, CNN and Euronews ranked Exit among top ten festivals in the world.

It should be noted, too, that a decisive momentum to the festival expansion was in the first place charted spatially. The Exit transition from a protest event to a music institution was accompanied by the festival relocation in 2001 from the free space of the student campus area to the city’s iconic and enclosed space of Petrovaradin Fortress (see Figure 8).

**Figure 8. Petrovaradin Fortress in Novi Sad**

Once encircled with the fortress walls, the festival space not only became accessible solely to those willing to purchase a festival ticket, but it also turned into a highly regulated and monitored site. The monitoring of the festival space continues to take on several forms. It is: (1) *physical* – marked by the abundant presence of public and undercover security forces; (2) *political* – rendering Exit, on the one hand, a site of political struggle among different political groups, and making it, on the other, dependent upon local authorities, without whose approval and financial and/or technical support the festival cannot operate and thrive; and (3) *micropolitical* – drawing on the great capacity of the panoptic music spectacle machinery to impose the standardized patterns of festival behavior, expectations, beliefs, and desires in Exit consumers.

Despite all the changes that Exit Festival has undergone since its foundation, it has arguably remained a highly politicized event, not least because of its heavy political baggage and the continuing importance it holds in struggles over national identity politics. The connection between politics and music-culture operates at some level in every single society. But it is a truism that such a connection becomes especially visible in the societies, such as Serbia, with a turbulent political past and present. And it is through this connection, as will be illustrated shortly, that Exit Festival has preserved the aura of counter-space.
3.2 The Countercultural, Urban, and Cosmopolitan Production of Exit Counter-Space

The Exit counter-space is perhaps at its most politically charged when under attack by the festival’s politico-ideological opponents. For the sake of analytical clarity, these attacks are classified into two distinct categories. Those falling in the first category amount to concrete political actions carried out either directly or through the media (3.2.1). The second category of attacks relates to moral panics and anxious narratives of national identity loss surrounding the festival (3.2.2). But as suggested above, unfavorable views of Exit Festival complement and feed into favorable ones and, so, are inextricably interwoven throughout most sections of the chapter. Moreover, it is through this dialectical logic of Exit counter-spatial practice that the festival’s countercultural, urban, and cosmopolitan profile surfaces in its most exemplary form.

3.2.1 Performing Democracy, Reconquering Spaces of Freedom

Exit will win! We’ll defend Exit!

Exit member Rajko Božić for the media after the arrest of four Exit organizers (The State of Exit, 2004)

Throughout the festival history, the resuscitation of Exit counter-space would occur each time it was targeted by Serbia’s right-wing political structures. This especially came to the fore in the midst of the Exit 2004 production when four festival organizers (namely, Dejana Gligorić, Ivana Gligorić, Bojan Bošković, and Dušan Kovačević) were arrested for embezzlement (see The State of Exit, 2004). The charges were denied in public and attributed to the politically motivated anti-Exit campaign led by the city’s right-wing Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Since the temporary prison detention of Bošković and Kovačević coincided with the country’s presidential elections, an analogy was immediately drawn between the political climate surrounding Exit 2000 and that which was building up around Exit 2004. Once again, the chief choice was to be made between a populist (coded as ‘anti-Western’) and a democratic (coded as ‘pro-Western’) candidate (i.e. between Tomislav Nikolić and Boris Tadić), and thus between First and Second Serbia. And once again, Exit organizers actively participated in inviting Serbia’s youth and so-called ‘democratic public’ to vote for the latter option.

The Exit 2004 followed immediately after the victory of Serbia’s newly elected pro-EU president Tadić. This only enhanced the celebratory atmosphere of the festi-
tival, additionally stirred up by the presence of the president himself. What was perceived as the reclaimed right to spaces of democracy and freedom was also performed on the Exit Main Stage within the festival’s opening ceremony protocol. The restored Exit counter-space was echoing with the famous Serbian actor Zoran Cvičjanović’s frenzied shouting ‘Everybody to Exit! We don’t give up on Exit!’ before a raucous crowd. The ceremony ended with the live music performance, whose Balkan flavored combination of the trumpet, violin, and drumming sound provided a direct link to the soundtrack of the 1996–97 student protests.

A similar resurgence of Exit counter-space (but with less dramatic overtones) was staged on two more occasions. In 2005 and 2013 respectively, the festival was under a serious threat of termination when Serbia’s populist parties came into power and put the availability of public funds for the festival production on the line. Specifically, in 2005 the Municipality of Novi Sad was overtaken by Serbia’s ultranationalist party (Serbian Radical Party), and in 2013 the branched off and democratically reformed fraction of the same party (Serbian Progressive Party) took over the lead on both municipal and republic levels.

Other attacks against Exit were mounted by Serbia’s far right political groups in the form of both on-site and media-based activism. For instance, the Exit 2003 campaign ‘Opening to Europe’, which was promoted in the city center before the beginning of the festival, was disrupted by a group of young militant men who expressed their national feelings by setting the Exit stalls on fire (Ješić 2003, in Lukić-Krstanović 2007: 322). Furthermore, several activists of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) displayed a huge banner on Novi Sad’s Varadin bridge on the opening day of Exit 2013. The message ‘EU, go home – Šešelj, come home’ was clearly directed against Exit supporters, perceived as the threats to Serbian national interests and traditional values. The location where the banner was placed on view was also carefully chosen. Connecting, on the one hand, the Petrovaradin town and Fortress (as the epicenter of Exit happening) and, on the other, the main part of Novi Sad (as a regular location for the Exit Village campsite), the Varadin bridge operates as one of the central Exit ‘communitas zones’ – that is, ‘the places of gathering for potential actors in Exit spectacle’ (Lukić-Krstanović 2007: 299).

The severe media attacks against Exit by activists of the Serbian National Movement Naši [SNM ‘Ours’] can serve yet as another manifestation of the disfavor in which the festival was held by the representatives of First Serbia. The SNM Naši ac-

33 This is all the more so as the protagonist of this instrumental ensemble was Dragoljub Đuričić, a Belgrade-based Montenegrin rock drummer, famous for having led a group of thirty drummers during the said protests.

34 Vojislav Šešelj is the founder and president of the SRS, first acquitted and then convicted by the Hague International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against Croats, Muslims, and other non-Serbs during the 1990s wars in Croatia and Bosnia.
cused festival organizers of acting in the capacity of ‘foreign agents’ against the ‘national Thing’ (‘SNM Ours once again calls...’, *Novi Magazin*, 2013). The national Thing is a recurring concept in nationalist discourse. It has been most famously formulated by Žižek (1993) as a ‘fantasy space’ which nationalists constantly recreate in their fear of the Other who is believed to threaten to take their Thing away from them. The national Thing, as the argument goes, should be primarily understood in terms of the systemic organization of society’s enjoyment, which the Other seemingly continues to usurp – ‘our’ food, ‘our’ women, ‘our’ jobs, and eventually the Thing itself, symbolizing the haunting fear of castration. What nationalists, thus, ultimately seek to accomplish is a ‘space of fullness’, which is based on their unattainable vision of a desired nation, and into which their individual Self can dissolve. In Serbia’s case, the national Thing is often related to the ideology of Greater Serbia, persisting in various forms throughout the entire history of the modern Serbian nation-state. In sum, the idea of Greater Serbia is central to various Serbian irredentist political projects, whose goal is to unite all territories on which Serbs live or used to live in the past. It comes as no surprise, then, that the SNM *Naši* viewed some other Exit-related cultural activities, too, as promoting ‘the pseudo-state of Kosovo’ (see Mitkovski 2012).

Note that the same line of reasoning is replicated in the vernacular discourse of Exit social space users. The online comment below is telling in that respect:

Exit and B92[35] [are] the two worst things in Serbia. Probably funded from the same [foreign] sources, they synchronously endorse everything that is to the detriment of the Serb nation. I hope that the Serbs from Serbia will recognize this and shut down both anti-Serbian organizations. (Milentije, ‘Exit expects to...’, *B92* [comments], 2012.)

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[35] B92 is a Serbian Belgrade-based media company comprising radio, television, Internet, publishing, and cultural production. The comment above refers mainly to the oppositional (anti-Milošević) activity of Radio B92 throughout the 1990s, on the grounds of which this media company even received the *MTV Free Your Mind* award in 1998. Radio B92 was back then followed by a relatively closed group of self-identified Belgrade urbanites and cosmopolitans. [Namely, the radio station, broadcasting on the frequency of 92.5 FM, could service only people living in Belgrade; hence the name B92.] Its major role was to put up resistance to Milošević’s regime in times of Serbia’s isolation and media blackout by providing Western news and information, by stirring up active and peaceful political resistance among a mainly younger generation of Belgraders, and by playing pro-Western popular music, then equated with European modernity and urbanity (see Collin 2001). In the post-2000 period, B92 has seen a considerable increase in the commercial entertainment media content and, in parallel, a dramatic decline of critical and research-oriented journalism, reaching its nadir in 2014 when the company management shut down many of its cult political programs offering to their authors a timeslot within the rarely watched cable channel B92 Info.
What is at stake in all the above cases is thus an ethnonational understanding of patriotism. In its most radical form, this strand of patriotism fantasizes about the purification of national space from the presence of the Other that Exit is said to personify or advocate for. In sharp contrast to such formulations of patriotism stand reclamations of the term by Exit members and supporters alike. In their view, it is actually through Exit Festival that patriotism can reveal itself at its best. The following statement by Exit co-founder and former CEO Bošković (in Milović Buha 2009) illustrates this clearly: ‘We consider Exit the greatest patriotic act we could possibly do for our country. (...) We don’t see Serbia [from the perspective of those] with tattooed four [Cyrillic] S’s and whatnot, but [we see it] in Europe’. Another Exit member, Ivan Lalić (in Uzelac 2005), gives in addition more specific content to the type of patriotism that Exit apparently promotes. Discussing a great number of people that Exit hires, he concludes that ‘the supreme patriotism nowadays is about hiring people’.

Considered more broadly, the understanding of patriotism in Exit-related discourses corresponds very closely with the conceptualization of the same notion in the intellectual narratives of Second Serbia. As Petrović-Trifunović and Spasić’s (2014) discourse analysis of the latter shows, the concept of patriotism therein does away with the nationalist ideas of purified space and the corresponding task of safeguarding the state’s territorial integrity and Serbian ethno-religious supremacy. Instead, the main premise in Second Serbia’s construct of patriotism is that the state is not a pregiven entity but rather something to be developed into a democratic society serving the public needs of its citizens. And what is seen as the most effective way to accomplish this goal are the integration processes with the EU and the rest of the ‘civilized world’. In Petrović-Trifunović and Spasić’s (2014: 183) words, ‘[i]ntegration of the Serbian society with the world is [specifically] seen as a way to its recovery and moral healing. Hence genuine patriotism is actually cosmopolitanism’.

3.2.2 Moral Panics and Anxious Narratives of National Identity Loss

Another factor contributing to the reproduction of Exit counter-space can be linked to moral panics surrounding the festival. The views of Exit as an occasion generating antisocial behavior and so disrupting the norms of proper society are typically voiced in public by the conservative portion of the country. The statement by Dejan Mikačica (in Sejdinović 2002a: n.p.), then board president of the nationally-minded DSS in

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36 Four Cyrillic S’s (‘С’ on the Serbian cross is a Serbian nationalist symbol standing for the unity of Serbs, as expressed in the popular slogan *Samo sloga Srbina spasava* [Only Unity Saves the Serbs]. It is mentioned here as a reference to the context of postsocialist Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s, when the symbol was heavily used to imply the Serbianhood.
Novi Sad, exemplifies this strikingly well. According to him, Exit Festival promotes ‘the spirit of degeneration’ and represents ‘a defile of drug-dealers, junkies and criminals’. The same type of criticism against Exit circulates also in Serbian vernacular discourse, where the description of the festival as ‘the revel of drug-addicts’ appears most frequently. Alternatively, the festival is portrayed as ‘debauched Rome’ and ‘Sodom’, where Exit-goers do nothing else but indulge themselves in drug abuse and extensive sexual activity (Jovanović, in Sejdinović 2002a: n.p.); or as Serbian neofolk singer Lela Andrić put it in a popular Serbian politico-cultural TV show (Uzelac 2005), ‘AIDS constantly floats in the [Exit] air. Everyone can feel it and see it.’

Importantly, Exit members do not deny the allegations of drug abuse on the festival grounds, but approach it as a wider social problem which only becomes visible during the festival (see e.g. Lalić in Uzelac 2005). A somewhat different observation is made by Lukić-Krstanović (2007: 316–317) on the basis of her ethnographic research into Exit 2002. She views issues of on-site drug ingestion not as a result of Exit spectacle, but rather as ‘part of their representation in a hypertrophic form’. To corroborate this claim, Lukić-Krstanović conducted a survey on the types and patterns of drug consumption among Exit-goers during the festival. Curiously enough, as many as 30% of the survey participants asserted that they refrain from drug intake altogether. The survey showed as well that a majority of other festivalgoers opt for beer, wine, and/or marihuana, whereas a minority of them ingest other types of drug stimuli, either alone or in combination with more common narcotics.

More to the point, Lalić (in Uzelac 2005), an Exit development project director from 2004 to 2008, also emphasizes that Exit in fact ‘seeks to address [drug issues] publicly and help people shift to a healthy way of living’. The festival regularly welcomes on-site activities of various NGOs and humanitarian organizations, educating Exit visitors not only about devastating effects of drugs, but also about different STDs, human trafficking, legal rights, and suicide prevention (Miletić 2004: 9). In her festival analysis from a cultural management perspective, Dušica Dragin (2011: 358) also praises the socially responsible role that Exit decided to take by banning on-site advertising and sale of tobacco products; by withdrawing all alcohol drinks from the festival sale except for beer; and by campaigning for safe driving. What Dragin claims is, however, true-to-life only in part. All these antidrug, antismoking and similar Exit campaigns are invariably fraught with contradictions. This will become crystal clear in the concluding chapter (6.2), where I show that the production of Exit branded space is inevitably subjected to paradoxes of the corporate culture we are living in. But in what follows, the analysis turns to discussing the oppositional nature of Exit counter-spatial practice.

Closely related to the Exit-related discourses of moral panics are anxiety narratives about the festival as posing both a material and a symbolic threat to the preservation of what is regarded to be the Serbian tradition and cultural identity. This type
of discourse falls back on a larger pool of conservative ideas about society as being able to regenerate and thrive only through its re-traditionalization. When applied to the case of Serbia, such discourses continue to re-inscribe the dividing line between Two Serbias, fortifying in turn the perception of Exit as a counter-space. More specifically, Exit is not only said to corrupt and degenerate the Serbian youth by affording them a space for day-and-night intoxication and fornication. Exit is also accused of brainwashing them through the ideological and cultural work it is claimed to endorse and perform. As Vučenović (2006) explains, Exit represents nothing more than a means by which global centers of power exert control over the local young(ish) population, turning them eventually in ‘Janissaries’ of globalization and ‘a bunch of obedient consumers of the neoliberal order’. Thus, by promoting values of global cultural industries, Exit participates in the process of ‘postmodern occupation of Serbia’, robbing young people of their local heritage and future perspective. And what exactly comprises those values that Vučenović associates with Exit, is worth reporting verbatim:

Organizations such as Exit (...) offer ‘their’ system of (otherwise very debatable) values, based on modern superstition that everything new and contemporary is progressive and good, and everything old and traditional is outdated and backward; that a young person must be his own boss and ‘freed’ from anything; hedonism as a supreme meaning of life; unhealthy individualism that negates any sense of collectivity and solidarity. (Ibid.)

In the middle to long run, Exit is therefore said to produce ‘uprooted individuals’ with no respect whatsoever for ‘their autochthonous [Orthodox] religion, tradition and family values’ (ibid). And with the loss of national cultural identity, the survival of the Serb people as a whole is put at risk, as the familiar nationalist mantra ‘no roots, no future for the people’ encapsulates it succinctly. Not far from Vučenović’s line of reasoning is arguably the politics of such oppressive regimes as Mugabe’s (in Zimbabwe) or Boko Haram’s (in Nigeria), whose fierce opposition to different forms of Western liberalism (in these particular cases, to LGBTQ rights and women’s rights respectively) is justified through their anticolonial and anticapitalist struggle (see Žižek 2015).

Another corpus of anxious narratives surrounding Exit revolves around the Novi Sad Petrovaradin Fortress. Such narratives help create the image of the Fortress as a recurring site of political struggle between those who approve and those who disap-

37 The term ‘Janissaries’ is used here metaphorically to refer to the loyalty of indigenous people to their foreign conquerors and rulers. Historically, Janissaries used to be those Balkan Christians (and other non-Muslims) who were enslaved as boys by the Ottoman Empire army and converted into the greatest military servants of the Sultan.
prove its usage for the festival purposes. However, before I address the core issues driving this debate, let me first shed light on how the Fortress, as the focal site of the festival happening, consolidates the desired image of Exit as a micronational counter-space.

Historically, this more than three-century-old citadel, described in Serbia Travel Guide as 'a genuine masterpiece of Baroque military architecture' (Discover Serbia, n.d.), has lost some of its military associations by attaining the status of the city’s historical and cultural monument in the mid-twentieth century. Although originally coded as masculine space, the Fortress has largely been pacified through the appropriation of its originally military function for archival, artistic, scientific, educational, cultural, and touristic purposes, not to mention the overall makeover of the Fortress during the Exit festival days with its ‘wonderland’ effects, as my American interlocutor Jessie put it (interview, July 2012). In like manner, Bojanović (in ‘Novi Sad’, Exit News, 2001: 58–59) wrote for the Novi Sad daily newspaper Dnevnik: ‘It seems that [the Fortress] was built for EXIT, not for wars and bombings...’

It is precisely through such ‘feminization’ of the Fortress in and by the Exit counter-space that the ditches within which smaller festival stages are installed come to be experienced as something resembling sonic wombs (see Figure 9 below). And the same sensation is afforded, but on a much larger scale, in and by the widely known electronic music party space of so-called Dance Arena – definitely the most colossal and spectacular ‘uterine’ space (cf. Lefebvre 2009: 410) to be found on the festival ground (see Figure 10 below).

The feminization of the Fortress space is also carried out through the symbolic work of the festival’s most iconic object and at the same time one of the major landmarks of Novi Sad – the peculiar mid-eighteenth-century clock-tower known as Sa- hat-Kula (see Figure 11 below). The object is often called the ‘drunken clock’ because of its unreliability in showing time accurately. On the very top of the tower, with the gilded globe, four cardinal directions and wind vane sitting on one another, there is an upside-down figure of the heart as a symbol of love (Lukači, in Jelić 2013) (see Figure 12 below). In general, the symbolic images deployed in the Exit spatial representation seem to fit neatly into the countercultural neo-hippie ideology of tolerance, harmony, peace, and love to be found in many contemporary pop festivals (see Figure 13 below). This in turn enhances the common perception of Exit counter-space not only as generally feminine but also as primarily aligned with its Western counterparts – an argument that I develop later in this chapter.

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38 In the definition proposed by Gottdiener and Budd (2005: 81), ‘[p]laces that can be characterized as “masculine space” facilitate the expression of male-biased activities and power.’
Figure 9. Explosive Stage

Figure 10. Dance Arena

Figure 11. Sahat-Kula Petrovaradin

Figure 12. Upside down heart on the top of the tower
But more to the point, in various narratives discussing the relationship between Exit and Petrovaradin Fortress, the latter is often constructed as a political battlefield that centers on the questions of how this historico-cultural site should be used and maintained, by whom, and for what purposes (see e.g. ‘Does the Fortress come apart…’, RTV1, 2014; ‘First steps towards…’, RTV1, 2014; or Šovljanski 2011). On the one hand are those accusing Exit organizers of misusing the Fortress space for the promotion of cheap fun, or simply for their own benefit, financial, self-promotional, and otherwise. Here is an example of such reasoning:

Let Exit be terminated. We need no such a promotion – enclosing people with a wire fence and letting them taking drugs as they please all the way along, and the worst of all, demolishing Petrovaradin Fortress which is of historical importance for all [Serbian] citizens. (Novosađanka koja voli svoj grad / Female resident of Novi Sad that loves her city, ‘Exit will survive nonetheless?’, B92 [comments], 2012.)

According to this and similar views, Exit should be thus relocated from Petrovaradin Fortress to somewhere else. If not, so the argument goes, the festival will continue to devastate the Fortress by ‘forceful vibrations’, by ‘the piss and vomit of drunken visitors’, by ‘the foreign invasion’, and by the heavy traffic of too many people, vehicles, equipment, goods and whatnot descending on the Fortress at once. What is believed to physically destroy the Fortress falls exactly into the same group of elements (specifically, noise, garbage, alien elements, heavy load) that remain sym-
bolically outside ‘the fantasy space’ of national identity construction the way neo-traditionalists would see it fit. Above are already explained the counter-hegemonic meanings of ‘noise’ that Exit incorporates in its sociopolitical and music-cultural agendas. Similarly, the descriptor ‘garbage’ is typically used by the conservative section of the host community not only for disqualifying the musico-stylistic output and liberal orientation of Exit supporters, but also quite literally for anathematizing large quantities of waste accumulation during the festival. ‘Alien elements’ do not refer here simply to the omnipresence of foreigners (visitors, artists, and other professionals) and international music sound in the festival space. There is also a more general perception that the festival is ideologically, culturally, and aesthetically at odds with the environment of the Fortress and Serbian national space as a whole. Finally, the accusations against the Exit involvement in swamping the Fortress with too much load may be understood on another level as the ‘heavy load’ of the Serbian past and present that Exit seeks to tackle within its various programs and activities. The festival is well-known for stirring up debates on a wide range of political and societal issues (such as criminal war past, systemic corruption, human rights, brain drain, etc.) that make the rhetoric of Serbian populists and self-proclaimed patriots sound hollow. Ultimately, then, it is through the same elements listed above that the symbolic boundaries of Exit micronational counter-space are actually reinforced.

Moreover, the causal link posited here between the urgency of national cultural heritage preservation (‘roots’) and the survival of the Serb people (‘future’) exemplifies par excellence what Handler (1988) calls ‘an objectifying logic’ of nationalist thought. By this logic, national culture is to be defined ‘as property, and the nation as a property-owning “collective individual”’ (ibid.; 141). The objectifying logic applied here allows [therefore] any aspect of human life to be imagined as an object, that is, bounded in time and space, or (amounting to the same thing) associated as property with a particular group, which is imagined as territorially and historically bounded. Moreover, possession of a heritage, of culture, is considered a crucial proof of national existence. (Ibid.; 141–142.)

From this perspective, Exit is accused of showing no concern for the well-being of the Fortress and, by extension, of the Serb nation. This is precisely why the Exit appropriation of the Fortress space continues to fuel public anxieties about Serbia’s weakening, degradation, and ultimately loss of national identity.39

39 It perhaps goes without saying that not all anxiety narratives about Exit and Petrovaradin Fortress are nationalist in their tone. Some of them are simply critical towards the poor ranking of culture in the state’s overall policy making, not least in relation to issues of cultural heritage preservation. However, due to the limited space, I consciously chose to focus on the
On the other side of the debate are those supporting the production of the Exit festival on Petrovaradin Fortress. At the core of their concerns is not the question of the survival of the Fortress but rather the bleak prospects for the festival future in case of its removal from the Fortress. Such anxieties are partly grounded in the recognition that much of the festival success is owed to the fabulous surroundings of the Fortress, and partly on the reversed approach to the traditionalist line of reasoning about what constitutes national priorities. Namely, the logic here is that if Exit ceases to exist, then not only will Novi Sad be removed from the world map as an attractive cultural and tourist location, but the country itself will lose a powerful instrument (i.e. Exit Festival) in its international self-promotion as an open, modern, progressive, and European nation-state.

Exit supporters additionally believe that it was in fact the festival that brought Petrovaradin Fortress to life and let it shine in all its glory. As noted in an online discussion, ‘prior to Exit, the Fortress didn’t have the promenade and was neglected’ (BudiOnoŠtoJesi / BeWhatYouAre, ‘200.000 people…’, B92 [comments], 2013). Other Exit followers likewise maintain that the purported allegations against Exit are ungrounded. My Novi Sad interlocutor Vlada (interview, July 2012) ponders this issue in the following way:

There’re experts, there’s folks, and there’s Exit. And there’s terribly poor communication between each of them. Nobody actually knows [whether Exit devastates the Fortress]. You see, there is no single study that has been conducted and made available for public discussion to prove or disprove these allegations.

Importantly, Exit organizers also showed sensitivity to this kind of public criticism and shouldered what they thought was their share of responsibility for the protection of Petrovaradin Fortress. Hence Exit 2013 lasted for a day longer and the revenue generated by this extension (up to 9,160 €) was intended for the Fortress renewal in addition to another Exit donation of half a million dinars (up to 4,140 €). However, as reported by Radio Television of Vojvodina 1 (RTV1), the financial aid generated from the festival has not yet been put to use. Instead, Exit made the following announcement to the public:

most extreme views on the subject matter in order to illustrate the ways in which conservative nationalist discourses assist in the reproduction of Exit counter-space. I was specifically able to classify certain discourses as nationalist, and others as not, on the basis of their respective attitudes towards the festival itself. While it was common in both groups of discourses to display anxieties about the preservation of the Fortress, the former tended to portray Exit Festival in a negative light, and the latter in a positive. In any case, I show in great detail in Section 4.5.4 how Serbian discourses on cultural heritage preservation cut across conventional ideological divides in the case of Guća Festival.
In order to have these funds invested in the best possible way, we proposed to the liable departments in City Administration a systemic solution that would provide an even greater influx of funds for the reconstruction of this great historical monument, and came up with the idea to establish a foundation through which we would register, together with the authorities of City Administration, at European and other foundations involved in the protection of cultural heritage, and attempt thereby to raise significant funds which could in the long run ensure the protection of Petrovaradin Fortress. (‘Does the Fortress come apart...’, RTV1, 2014.)

The Exit promise already came through on 30 June 2014, when the joint project FORT (an acronym for the Fond za obnovu i razvoj tvrđave / Fund for the Reconstruction and Development of the Fortress, and simultaneously an English term for a fortified enclosure) between the Municipality of Novi Sad and Exit Foundation was presented to the Serbian public (see ‘First steps towards...’, RTV1, 2014). Specified within the FORT agreement was also a total sum of the money that Exit would begin to set aside from its ticket sales for the revitalization and reconstruction of the Fortress (‘The Foundation for the Restoration...’, Blic, 2014). Besides that, the FORT also invited selected local experts and representatives of City Administration as well as of other responsible institutions to take part in the first public debate on Petrovaradin Fortress, organized in Novi Sad in the fall 2014 (see the website of the Institute for Protection of Cultural Monuments of Novi Sad, 2014). According to Exit CEO Dušan Kovačević (in ‘The Foundation for...’, Blic, 2014), the objectives of the FORT are twofold. One is, as emphasized above, to raise funds for the renovation and development of the Fortress; and the other is to turn the Fortress into one of the most visited historico-cultural sites in Europe.

At one level of discussion, more important than the question whether the FORT initiative can make any difference to the status quo is what it can tell us about the world we are living in by way of its association with the hegemonic discourse of corporate social responsibility (more about it in Chapter 6). At yet another level, the fact remains that, in hindsight, very little has been done to maintain, let alone repair, Petrovaradin Fortress. Either controversial plans (see Šovljanski 2011) or no strategic plans at all have been put in place at the communal level for how to go about these issues; nor has the reconstruction of the Fortress been anything but minor and incomplete (‘Does the Fortress come...’, RTV1, 2014). Considering that the Municipality of Novi Sad has been administered by all major Serbian parties at some point since 2000, it is somewhat ironic that at least those advocating the nationalist rhetoric ‘no roots, no future’ showed little or no interest in rescuing the Fortress and, thus, the ‘lost Serbian soul’. Viewed in this light, the anxious narratives surrounding Exit and Petrovaradin Fortress (at least in their radicalized form) may be therefore best un-
derstood as being reproduced for mainly political purposes. They seem to serve as a ready-made rhetorical weapon for recreating divisions in society along the fault line between Two Serbias, as well as for vilifying political opponents embodied in Exit institutions and supporters.

3.2.3 What’s in a Name? Issues of Language, Script, and Semantics Surrounding Exit

It bothers me in particular that EXIT has in its name a letter [‘x’] which doesn’t exist in the Serbian script.

Nikola Tesla nije išao na Egzit / Nikola Tesla didn’t go to Exit
(‘Exit will survive nonetheless?’, B92 [comments], 2012)

The quote above identifies but one controversy surrounding the name of Exit Festival. What agitates the public mind here is not simply the decision of festival founders to adopt an English word (Exit) for the festival’s name. This word is also spelled out in its original form rather than ‘serbified’ according to the highly phonemic rules of the Serbian orthographic system, whereby Exit should be transcribed as Egzit. At any rate, there are other issues of language, script, and semantics surrounding Exit that require further analytical attention as they promise insights into linguistic aspects of Exit counter-spatial practice.

Let me start by saying that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not only accompanied by terrible bloodshed but also by symbolic wars waged among rival ex-Yugoslav nations over language and script (Cyrillic or Latin). On the wave of militant nationalism in the 1990s, what was once accepted and shared as a common language heritage (i.e. Serbo-Croatian written in both scripts) turned into the heated question of national identity for all parties involved. In the continuing exercises of nation-building across the region, the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet has been established as a salient marker of Serbian national identity, all the more so when competing with the Latin script used in Croatian and Bosnian languages (see e.g. Longinović 2000).

It is, thus, the ‘Cyrillification’ of Serbian national space that provides context for the present analysis of Exit counter-spatial activity. Notwithstanding a variety of

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40 From a linguistic point of view, Serbo-Croatian, which came to be recognized and standardized as such since mid-nineteenth century, is classified as a polycentric language with Serbia and Croatia outlining the border zones of its usage. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croatian has been further codified into four separate but mutually intelligible language standards, labeled after the ethnic names Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin (see Kordić 2010).

41 The Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet have been proclaimed an official language and an official script respectively by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia since 2006,
ideological meanings surrounding two competing scripts in Serbian language (see Bojić 2011), of relevance for the reproduction of Exit counter-space is the association of Serbian Latin alphabet with anti-nationalism and cosmopolitanism contrary to the perceived traditionalism and nationalism of the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet. By opting solely for the former script in its promotion and representation, Exit Festival apparently reaffirms its oppositional stance towards what it perceives as inward projections of Serbian national identity. For Serbian right-wingers, on the other hand, the Exit use of Latin-script letters is a good enough reason to denounce the festival altogether. At Exit 2002, Ćirilica [The Cyrillic Alphabet], the association for the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet preservation, was for example distributing flyers to Exit visitors, warning them about the supposed dangers of the Latin alphabet usage for the Serbian national being (see Sejdinović 2002a: n.p.).

At another level of its promotion and representation, Exit Festival explicitly endorses English as a lingua franca, thus targeting international and local audiences with a cosmopolitan attitude. Examples here include the very name of the festival and its promotional slogans (e.g. Life is What You Make in 2005, I Want to Live Green & Clean in 2009, I’m EXIT in 2013); the names of the stages and other festival spaces (e.g. Main Stage, DJ Arena, Fusion Stage, Foodland, Chill Out Zones, etc.); the program and all other information (practical, tourist, and otherwise) on the festival and its location; but also the use of English-based urban jargon by festival members. What adds to the cosmopolitan imagination of Exit counter-space is also evidence of full English proficiency, as demonstrated by key Exit people in their routine interactions with numerous transnational media representatives. It goes without saying that within the existing global power structures, there is an immediate correlation to be made between a good command of English language and a series of prestigious qualities such as high education, familiarity with cutting-edge technologies and world trends, and cosmopolitanism (see Kordić, in Stanković 2014).

In addition to the Serbian Latin alphabet and English language, another way of authenticating the Exit counter-space is through recourse to the very name of the festival and a rich web of semantic meanings in which it is enmeshed. After analyzing a number of statements by Exit producers as well as by selected representatives of Serbia’s academic, political, and cultural elites (see e.g. Dragin 2011: 356; Svilanović 2007: 56), one can discern that the key ideas through which the correlation between Exit Festival and its name is typically invoked are those of freedom, resistance, hope, change, Europe, normality, and cosmopolitanism. Exit is specifically said to symbolize a point of ‘exit’ from the heavy political reality of Serbia’s past and present towards brighter projections of the country’s future. It is interpreted as ‘an entry into the world, a window to normality, and a more beautiful side of Serbia’ whereas the official use of other languages and scripts (above all the Latin alphabet) has been regulated by the law.
which is to say, as a progressive, pro-European project with a view to outreaching to the world beyond the confines of its own locality. And more, it is the project with a mission to reinvent the whole country in its own image, as stated in one of Exit brochures (Gruhonjić ed. 2003: n.p.).

However, not all interpretations of the festival ethos vis-à-vis its name are so far-reaching in their scope. For instance, when popular Serbian actor Sergej Trifunović (2007: 80) comments on Exit in the form of the question: ‘Is there any better exit [way out] than music?’, he actually alludes to what many music-based festivities have in common — namely, to afford ‘a permissible rupture of hegemony’ and ‘orchestrated moments of “counter-sublimation”’ to their crowds (Eagleton 1981; and Stallybrass and White 1986; both in Picard and Robinson 2006: 7). Such a viewpoint is clearly based on the assumption that festivals are ‘bounded by the processes, patterns and actions of social change, rather than driving change’ (Picard and Robinson 2006: 8). According to this, the capacity of Exit counter-space to make a difference in the surrounding world is minimal to non-existent.

If this interpretation dulls the political edge of Exit counter-space, the comments coming from the Serbian political right sharpen it once again. As suggested above, for Vučenović (2006), Exit does not offer to the Serbian youth an ‘exit’ to a brighter future, but rather ‘a dead end in the postmodern labyrinth of meaninglessness’. Furthermore, the Exit counter-space gains ever greater currency when contrasted directly with the nationalist premises of Guća organic space. As the bard of Serbian nationalism and the host at Guća 2002, Matija Bećković (in Todorović 2002), put it in the rhymed pun, ‘svi znaju da je izlaz u Guči i da u originalu bolje zvuči’ [everybody knows that the exit is in Guča and that it rings better in the original sound] (emphasis added). This is clearly another way to express the same sort of anxieties over a loss of national identity in case Serbia moves away from its perceived roots. What both Vučenović and Bećković have in common is thus the same firm belief in the imposibility of imagining the nation’s survival on the world map ‘without our [Serbian] melodies, colors, [and] in particular, without our name and memories’ (Bećković, in Todorović 2002), which Guća is claimed to preserve, and Exit to obliterate.

3.2.4 The Exit Mission: On the Road to the West / Europe with Counterculture

I ideology is essential, because without it there would be no festival.

Rajko Božić (The States of Exit, 2012)

That ‘ideology is essential’ to the Exit micronational project has already become clear in the prior analysis of several semantic layers contained in the festival name. The
task at hand is thus to delve deeper into the complexities of festival ideological discourse and identify a cluster of key signifiers giving shape and meaning to the Exit counter-space. Of analytical relevance here are specifically the questions of who are claimed to be the carriers of the Exit mission, what are the goals on their agenda, and by what means are these to be achieved. The ultimate purpose of the subsequent analysis is not simply to give answers to all these questions, but rather to scratch beneath their surface and point towards a set of beliefs that drive them.

To begin with, one of the key terms used in the ideological representation of Exit counter-space is that of youth. In the festival self-narration, the role of the Serbian youth is repeatedly emphasized as crucial for having made the festival happen and for having changed things in Serbia for the better. The discursive construction of youth as a carrier of change, progress, and vision is illustrated below by a couple of excerpts from relevant Exit-produced sources:

Exit emerged from a desire of one young generation to catch up on everything that one insane politics had stolen from us during the 1990s. (Exit co-founder Dušan Kovačević, in Dragan 2011: 359.)

Youth is the prime embodiment of energy (...), and the nucleus of what the future might bring. A longing for the new and the better is always inherent in youth. Only youth believes, naively and without reserve, in the possibility and certainty of change. (...) What makes EXIT special is the VISION. The clear vision of Yugoslavia42 as a stable, modern, and democratic European country, world- and world values-oriented, the country whose system institutions serve the citizens, in which minorities have all the rights they need, the country which is worth working and studying in. (‘The Mission of Exit’, Exit News, 2001: 12–13; capital letters in original.)

The glorification of youth in Exit ideological narratives clearly works as a discursive device for the identification of the festival target audience as well as for the self-identification of the festival initial organizational structure comprising in 2001, for example, ‘over six hundred young people [then] activists of EXIT youth movement’ (‘Intro’, Exit News, 2001: 2). Furthermore, the celebratory discourse of youth is simultaneously a way to lay claim to the authenticity of Exit counterhegemonic project since it was ‘one generation alone [that] managed to fulfill their own need for such a festival’ (Jovanović, one of the student leaders of the 1996–97 protests and now a politician, in Gruhonjić ed. 2003: n.p.). What feeds this narrative about youth as a positive force for social change is arguably a popular belief grounded in the historical

42 At the time of this publication, Serbia still formed a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, together with the Republic of Montenegro.
experience of countercultural youth movements such as those of hippiedom or 1968 student protests. That a hope for the future of the world rests on the youth is also a point of view pertinent to the discourse of subcultural studies. As Hollows and Milestone (1998: 84) note, ‘the romance and radicalism attributed to youth subcultures was compounded by the way in which subcultural theorists privileged notions of progress, change, and the new, never quite freeing themselves from the association between “youth” and “the future”’.

The production of Exit micronational counter-space rests on the very same constellation of ideas. For instance, the production of Exit 2002 was entirely dedicated to the theme of the future, consolidating the view of the festival as ‘a triumph of Serbia looking towards the future’ (‘Exit History’, Blic Extra, 2007: 6). The promotional green posters depicting a little girl (see Figure 14 below) were intended to visually convey the image of Exit Festival ‘as future and a fairytale at the same time’ (Exit chief designer Joler, in ‘To Exit before school’, Exit News, 2002: n.p.). And attached to such visuals was the corresponding motto of the festival 2002 campaign saying: ‘Serbia, are you ready for the future?’ (see Figure 15 below).

Another link to ‘youth’ in the ideological production of Exit counter-space is created through the notion of counterculture which the festival is said to embody on the ground. In the words of then Exit CEO Bojan Bošković (The States of Exit, 2012), ‘Exit is not a mainstream thing. It’s a counterculture. And this counterculture is now becoming vaster and vaster in numbers’. Not only are countercultural phenomena Western in their origins. More importantly, Western music and, in general, cultural values of Western liberal democracies that Exit promotes, are deemed essentially minoritarian in Serbia’s socio-spatial practice. All my Serbian interlocutors agreed with this assessment while simultaneously expressing cynicism about the Exit claims to the status of counterculture, given the festival’s overtly commercial orientation and music profile combining both mainstream and alternative acts.

In addition, when Bošković asserts that the Exit counterculture ‘is becoming vaster and vaster in numbers’, he does not simply refer to the growing popularity of the festival, both locally and internationally. Rather, his statement suggests a moderately optimistic evaluation of Serbia’s gradual systemic change on its rocky road to Europe. Specifically, implied here is the fact that Serbia opened to the world after the fall of Milošević, which made travelling and cultural exchange with the West/Europe more accessible. However, despite improvements in all spheres of Serbian life after 2000, the country’s political system has remained essentially unreformed and largely consistent with the politics of the 1990s. As Serbian sociologist and politician Vesna

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43 It is important to note that the Exit focus on youth as a progressive force in society is also comparable to that of the former European communist states, Yugoslavia included. As Simić (2016: 162) and Spaskovska (2011: 358) explain, Yugoslavian youth was seen as an important vehicle for the promotion of socialist ideas and supraethnic identity.

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Pešić (2012) argues, there are three main reasons preventing Serbian society from moving forward with the process of modernization. These are: (1) the ideology of Serbian nationalism, whose insistence on the centuries-long question of Serbian statehood (i.e. Serbia’s borders) obstructs the process of the country’s transformation into a modern and legal state; then (2) partocracy (i.e. a party state), in which the national political elites continually usurp the state power, property, and public sector in general; and (3) the untransformed state apparatus, in particular the security service, whose criminogenic structures remain intact. With all these considered, it comes as no surprise that ‘people in Serbia, in some way, still live in the previous regime’s fragmented construction of reality’ (Jarić 2005, in Simić 2009: 91). And it is precisely against this backdrop that the Exit counter-space positions itself as a political, ideological, cultural, and aesthetic alternative.

**Figure 14. The Exit 2002 poster**

![The Exit 2002 poster](image)

**Figure 15. The Exit 2002 motto displayed beneath Main Stage**

![The Exit 2002 motto displayed beneath Main Stage](image)
It is worth noting that the professed counterhegemonic status of Exit micronational space is a viewpoint promulgated not solely by Exit producers but also by its supporters among both the intellectual elite and the ‘common people’. For instance, Serbian journalist Pančić (in Bizjak et al. eds. 2005: 22) speaks about Exit as ‘a hard-core underground’ and as ‘a subculture and a sort of free territory’ in Serbian society. Similar sentiments are expressed by Exit festivalgoers. To quote one of them: ‘To many of us Exit is the only haven and a getaway from the grim realities of life in Serbia. At least for these four days you feel like you’ve gone to a nicer and better place.’ (Cyberjack, ‘Exit expects to welcome about...’, B92 [comments], 2011.)

However, there is more to the notion of counterculture in Exit-related discourses than the illustrations of its oppositional politico-cultural practice so far have brought out. The intended meaning behind the term is perhaps captured most accurately in the catchline of the Dutch documentary The States of Exit (2012): ‘Counterculture as a means of progress in [Serbian] society’. The documentary suggests accordingly that the festival major mission is not simply to economically and culturally animate Serbian society, with a special focus on the local youth population, but also to modernize it in its entirety. The latter belief stands firmly in line with the Exit mission statement from the festival’s early period, which was to ‘[project] its vision ... on the entire society’ (‘The Mission of Exit’, Exit News, 2001: 12) – or put differently, to rebuild it in the image of the so-called ‘civilized world’. Since the ‘civilized world’ is coded here as the Western developed world, to modernize Serbian society also means to civilize it. The Exit commitment to the task of modernizing the country is therefore analyzed further in terms of the Exit civilizing mission.

Another reason for insisting on the term ‘civilizing’ rather than ‘modernizing’ is once again ideological similarities that connect Exit producers to Second Serbia intellectuals, pejoratively called ‘the missionary intelligentsia’ by the opposite political camp. As Petrović-Trifunović and Spasić explain (2014: 172), ‘the term [“missionary intelligentsia”] refers to dogmatic, exclusivist and rigid “civilizers” who do not think well of their own people and, by their irrational [and negative] fixation on nationalism, obstruct the modernization of society’. Notwithstanding the disputes between Serbia’s two opposite intellectual camps – namely, between Indigenists and Westerners (cf. Ditchev 2005: 242) – what interests me here is rather the very raison d’être behind the Exit fascination with the West/Europe, clearly originating from the overly simplified equation between modernization/civilization and Westernization/Europeanization. I will turn to this question towards the end of the chapter after having illustrated various instances of the Exit appropriation of Westernness as the basis of its counter-spatial practice.

More to the point, to understand how the Exit missionary role is (to be) carried out in practice, I look now into what the notion of festival counterculture ‘as a means of progress in society’ exactly entails. According to Exit News (‘Intro’, 2001: 2), ‘Ex-
it represents a combination of extremely rich academic and cultural program of high quality’. Regarding the latter, the way in which Bošković feels that excellence in culture is to be defined and pursued is very much consistent with the desired image of the festival as the ‘civilizer’ of Serbian society. As he put it to me in the interview (Sep 2014):

The quality in culture is not defined by the majority, but rather by a small number of people understanding what’s at stake. In the country like Serbia one must enforce culture [upon the people]. This cannot be [negotiated as] a matter of survey and what the majority wants. It is the enlightened minority that must push things forward.

That Exit is (or should be) constituted as the site where the enlightened few can exercise their refined cultural taste and aesthetically guide the rest, is a point of view supported additionally by Serbia’s West-oriented elites. For example, Pankov (2002:74) writes about the responsibility of Exit, as an emerging ‘cult manifestation’, for molding public taste, opinion, and behavior in the right direction. Or in the view of then Novi Sad mayor Novaković (in Kolundžija 2002b: n.p.), Exit should and will ‘form a new cultural sensibility and advance criteria in the cultural sphere’. Likewise, Exit Development Project Director Lalić (in Uzelac 2005) uses the countercultural terminology and its revolutionary baggage to underscore the Exit civilizing mission in culture. In his words,

it’s really exciting [to see] to what extent Exit receives publicity on the RTS [Serbia’s public broadcasting service], also in the sense of broadcasting the [festival music] program all night long. I think this is the right way to make that mini-cultural revolution [in Serbia] actually happen. (Ibid.; emphasis added.)

The Exit-related idea of distinction authorizing those with adequate cultural capital to set up a standard of taste (cf. Bourdieu 1984) can be meaningful only if contextualized within the broader sociocultural dynamics of discriminatory practices originating in the ex-Yugoslav discourses of modernization and urbanization but reaching their peak in the Serbian socio-spatial practice of the 1990s. As indicated in Chapter 1, back in the 1990s, the ascendancy of kitsch aesthetics over cultural forms designated as urban, progressive, alternative, even elite, resulted in the severe segregation of the local population along the urban-rural divide and its derivatives (such as modern-traditional, progressive-conservative, etc.). Those positioning themselves at the superior pole of the divide (i.e. Serbia’s self-identified urbanites) deemed their ‘rural brethren’ a constitutive Orientalized / Balkanized Other of their Occidentalized-Self. According to Jansen (2001; 2005a; 2005b), what ultimately lies behind this discu-
sive mechanism of internal Balkanization is the concept of *kultura* [culturedness] incorporating such qualities as high education, urbanity, sophisticated taste, and civilized behavior. The *kultura* in turn grants self-identified urbanites, as people with adequate cultural competencies, a ‘civilizational right’ to make ‘universal’ aesthetic value judgments. For all these reasons, the Exit missionary task of pursuing excellence in culture amounts primarily to that of ‘urbanizing’ the Serbian cultural space.

Besides its major focus on culture, the Exit counter-space carries out its missionary role in the sociopolitical sphere, too. As Bošković points out, ‘[w]e are always five, ten, or twenty years ahead of our government’ (*The States of Exit*, 2012); or in another interview (Jakobi 2010: 63):

we’ve realized that it’s not a bad idea to have someone leading ahead the politicians and tackling difficult issues, because some decisions have to be made no matter how difficult it is. So we’ve tried to spot problems in our society and see what we could do about it. We’ve been focused on various problems, [ranging] from human trafficking, at times when Serbia neither drafted nor implemented a law in that domain, through to the [Schengen-]visa abolition, actively lobbying that our citizens, especially the youth, can freely travel around. In the previous years, we were concentrated on ecology and environmental protection...

Let me add the following to the list of Exit sociopolitical concerns: issues of tolerance, human rights (regarding LGBTQ population, handicapped people, and other minority groups), the EU integration, the recent criminal war past, corruption, brain drain, unemployment, military service, among others. Special focus is also placed on various educational programs for youth, including such activities as campaigning for healthy lifestyles, raising funds for student exchange programs, creating volunteering and work opportunities, opening calls for a variety of competitions (mainly in the fields of tourism and creative industries), teaching and discussing new technologies and social media usage, and so on. Note that many of youth-specific activities listed above are shared between Exit Festival and State of Exit Foundation. The main reason for launching the latter organization (in 2010) was apparently to engage more intensely in social activism related to issues that Serbia’s young people face today (see www.exitfondacija.org).

Apart from education, the festival also shows a great interest in the promotion of science and, by extension, the scientific rather than religious worldview. As Svišlanović, chairing then-Working Table for Democratization and Human Rights of the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SEE), writes for *Blic Extra* (2007: 56), ‘[t]his time, Exit 2007 intends to merge music and science. Janez Potočnik, an EU Commissioner for science, paying us a visit. We’ll talk about programs for scientific development that the EU has prepared for the youth in Serbia and SEE.’ Furthermore,
during my Exit fieldwork in 2013, I observed a peculiar site at the Fortress, the so-called *mt:s: Recharge Zone*, clearly named after the Mobile Telephony of Serbia as its sponsor (along with Huawei). The Zone visitors could indeed recharge their portable electronic devices using an environmentally friendly pedal-powered generator. Installed at the center of this glowing red contraption were several spinning bikes, arranged in a circle and complete with the big screen (showing the actual level of electric energy production) and side shelves with plug sockets (see Figures 16 and 17 below). For all pedalers of Exit Recharge Zone willing to ‘[f]eel the power, share the energy and reveal the experience!’, as the slogan of the Zone would have it, there was a keychain flashlight (with sponsor’s logo) prepared as a reward for the efforts made. The people in charge of the Zone and promo-gifts distribution were students from the Novi Sad Faculty of Technical Sciences, whose white lab attire was presumably a way of bolstering the scientific credibility of the entire Zone experience.

*Figures 16 and 17. mt:s: Recharge Zone and its Recharge Wall*
In fact, the main idea behind the so-called Exit R:Evolution production in 2013 was to pay a tribute to Nikola Tesla, the world renowned scientist of Serbian origin, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of his death. Serving that purpose was, for example, Tesla’s Corner, a spot reserved within the State of Exit Zone (on the top of the Fortress) for young researchers and public presentation of their experiments (see the State of Exit Foundation annual report, 2013). Tesla was also the main theme of the Exit opening ceremony. Specifically, the festival opened with a theatrical performance on Main Stage, featuring, on the one hand, a group of costumed Indians as an incarnation of evil⁴⁴, and on the other, several stilt walkers in extravagant garments representing Stars, Guardian Angels, and Tesla aka the Knight of the Light and Pure Energy as the forces of good (see Figure 18). The familiar story about a never-ending battle between good and evil was narrated in a sonorous and deep male voiceover (in Serbian), with the synchronized script (in English) set against the animated galaxy footage and projected onto the stage screens. Used as a special effect during the show was a Tesla coil (see Figure 19), an electrical resonant transformer facing the stage and producing lightning-like discharges in the middle of the festival crowd. The show ended with a traditionally spectacular fireworks following the appearance of the big sign ‘Welcome to Exit’ on the stage screens.

Figure 18 (upper left). The Exit 2013 opening ceremony
Figure 19 (to the right). Tesla’s coil with a dancer on it

A more attentive analysis of the Exit 2013 opening ceremony can also tell us something about the festival’s attitude towards religion. Namely, the welcome play narrat-

⁴⁴ This was obviously a politically incorrect choice for the representation of evil, which was most likely made unintentionally considering the festival’s pro-human rights politics.
ed about ‘the soul of the universe’, which, having escaped many traps of evil, was about to unite and become one with the souls of Exit-goers. These ideas were arguably informed by Tesla’s philosophical and religious views on the nature of the universe. Tesla believed, indeed, that there is some sort of nucleus in cosmic space (he compared to light) which holds us all together and replenishes our strength, creativity, grace, beauty, sympathy, harmony, and peace (see Abramović, n.d.). Tesla’s holistic approach to divinity, in which all humanity and non-humanity participates, resonates all too well with the New Age spiritual quest for enlightenment within oneself through unity and oneness with others and the universe. The close connection between Tesla and New Age spirituality in the Exit opening ceremony was also made manifest in sound. Included in the welcome play was the performance of the cover version of Era’s hit song *Ameno* by the Belgrade-based choir Viva Vox. Belonging to what is classified as a New Age music genre (see Era’s Facebook page), *Ameno* suitably underlined the spiritual undertones of the play by employing the pseudo-Latin lyrics and the meditative sound resembling Gregorian chant.

The openness of Exit counter-space to New Age spiritual practices and beliefs should be understood as part of the festival’s general pro-Western orientation. Alternatively, the Exit counter-space endorses an atheistic approach to the world, currently shared by a tiny minority of the Serbian population. The fact that the latter group has found itself in a disadvantaged position compared to the presently dominant group of Serbia’s Orthodox Christian believers, points to a larger political and socio-cultural phenomenon observed in all postsocialist European countries. The endorsement of religion as a cornerstone in their respective nation-rebuilding projects was largely justified through the simplified equation between atheism and communism. In the case of Serbia, according to Stojković (2010), the adoption of Serbian Orthodox religion ‘as the state ideology’ has similarly put ‘secular values and democracy’ at risk.

Viewed in this light, the Exit immunity to a great influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in all spheres of national life, growing proportionally with the increasing desecularization of the country from 2000 onwards, represents in itself a form of counterspatial activity. However, that the festival is also more directly engaged in the promotion of atheism can be supported by ethnographic evidence I collected during my festival fieldwork in 2013. Having had extensive on-site interaction with a representative of the civil Association ‘Atheists of Serbia’, I learnt that his attempts to communicate atheist views in open public debates on national newspaper websites were censored more than once. On top of that, I was also granted the so-called Non-Baptism Certificate, designed clearly as a parodic equivalent to the corresponding official document issued by the SOC. Below is the image of the received
Certificate (Figure 20 below), confirming hereby that I have never been baptized ‘thanks to the common sense and the strength of critical thinking’.\textsuperscript{45}

The promotion of atheism at Petrovaradin Fortress within the Exit NGOs Fair is arguably not intended to undermine the authority of the SOC across the country; nor is it aimed at promulgating mere disbelief in God. I am rather inclined to interpret the Exit endorsement of atheism as a corollary of the modern rationalist worldview, without which the Exit secularist Weltanschauung and attendant Enlightenment mission would make no sense.

\textbf{Figure 20. My Non-Baptism Certificate}

(issued by the Association ‘Atheists of Serbia’, Exit Festival, 11 July 2013)

I have thus come full circle in examining the festival ideological narratives and their relation to the production of Exit counter-space. The previous analysis of the Exit civilizing mission sought to distinguish the ways in which the discourses of youth, future, change, and progress are premised on the appropriation of the Westernness and reified on the ground through a variety of ‘countercultural’ practices. As showcased above, it is precisely through the specificities of the festival’s local geography that the Western notion of counterculture is utilized idiosyncratically in and by the Exit counter-space. For the production of the latter, it suffices, as it were, to have

\textsuperscript{45} In a similarly witty manner, the Association also issues so-called Disbaptism Certificates to those who are baptized but wish to disaffiliate from the SOC.
music-cultural programs and accompanying activities on the ground (pertaining to such themes as sociopolitical engagement, education, science, and religion) imbued with Western values and attitudes. Since such values tend to be perceived nationally as minoritarian and often at variance with the prevailing sociocultural norm, the pro-Western orientation of Exit Festival becomes automatically subsumed under the notion of counterculture.

The Exit enchantment with the West/Europe indeed deserves a closer look. The present chapter therefore concludes with a more general discussion on the historical and ideological construction of the West/Europe as a metonymic signifier for modernity, and the relevance of this for the production of Exit micronational counter-space. Considerations of more immediate urgency pertain, however, to the question of how the construct of the West/Europe reveals itself in the countercultural and cosmopolitan musical imaginings of Exit counter-space.

3.2.5 What’s in Music? Countercultural and Cosmopolitan Musical Projections of Exit Counter-Space

The use of the label global pop to characterize the type of music promoted in and by Exit Festival is contingent on two assumptions. First, that the label functions as an umbrella term for a vast number of Western-produced or Western-influenced popular music styles and genres such as pop, rock, metal, soul, reggae, electronica, World Music, and the like. And second, that we are still stuck in what Toynbee (2014) calls ‘the post-rock era’ – the period of the Western music industry development since the mid-1980s in which popular music has lost capacity to make any other difference than that within its own referential system. That said, owing to the historical and geopolitical specificities of the Balkan region, the field of popular music in ex-Yugoslavia / Serbia would serve, up until the mid-2000s at least, as a very potent discursive device for constituting the country’s social dynamic, internally, and desired self-image, externally. With this in mind, I illustrate below the countercultural and cosmopolitan production of Exit counter-space in music.

What immediately links Exit to the notions of counterculture and youth is rock music-culture which used to play a special role in the festival’s early days. Back then, it was partly the discourse of rock heritage, based on the familiar story of a generational clash, that set the stage for thinking about the festival as central to instituting ‘the music of new generation’ (cf. Ramet 1994: 7). Hence the repeated views of Exit Festival as being ‘about a new generation that thinks in a completely different way’ (Dunderski 2002: n.p.; emphasis added). Furthermore, from the early days of its inception, rock has been celebrated and used as music of rebellion, resistance, and revolution all around the world, notably in such sociohistorical contexts as the former Eastern Bloc in which was often politically charged and prosecuted (see Ramet ed.
The case of the former Yugoslavia can be considered, though, as an exception to this. Specifically, the unique system of Yugoslav self-management was (especially since the 1960s) characterized by a significant degree of political and economic decentralization and liberalization, including here the policy of ‘greater cultural integration with the West’ (Vidić Rasmussen 1995: 245). This facilitated in turn the genuine democratization of popular cultural practices across the country. Alongside these processes, Yugoslavia’s massive economic and technological developments from the 1960s to mid-1980s (i.e. a rising living standard, the advent of mass media, the growing use of audio and audiovisual technology in private households) gave rise to the expansion of the state-owned but market-oriented record industry, whose system of production and promotion of popular music was comparable to that in the West.

In such a context, rock established itself as part of mainstream Yugoslav youth culture. What this means is that Yugoslav rock (sub)cultures used to be well supported institutionally by a fully-fledged network of state-run facilities. Furthermore, the Yugoslav rock scene was, up until the late 1980s, covering five regional markets – Slovenian, Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian and Vojvodinian, each of which with its own musical focuses and preferences. But on the whole, Yugoslav rock production used to be very much in tune with the latest musical trends in the West (from punk and new wave, through to heavy metal, to breakdance and rap), its sound technology, and promotional media (see Janjatović 1999; 2007; Ramet 1994; 2002). Although some ex-Yugoslav rock bands did occasionally encounter censorship or experience offensive treatment in the press, neither, as Ramet (2002: 132) notes, had ‘practical significance for the rock scene and no party forum ever undertook to campaign against rock or to obstruct the holding of large rock concerts’ (see also Laušević 1996).

Arguably, there are two main reasons that Serbian rock musicians are nostalgic nowadays about what they perceive as the Golden Age of Yugoslav rock. In their view, as Simić (2009: 194) points out, the burgeoning YU rock scene was, on the one hand, ‘a proof, that “we” were [as] good as the “West” (or more accurately, belonged to the same world of aesthetic appreciation)’. On the other hand, the nostalgic sentiment arises from a sense of loss of a ‘properly working’ state. To quote Simić (2009: 196) again, ‘[Serbian rockers] believe that the “chaos” of the 1990s ena-

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46 Note, however, that the relationship of rockers and state across many Soviet Bloc countries during the Cold War era was largely ambiguous, involving combined strategies of compliance and resistance at the same time (Ramet ed. 1994; see also Ryback 1990, and Wicke and Shepherd 1993, both in Simić 2009: 193).

47 For instance, Slovenia used to be famous for its hard-core punk scene, while Bosnia developed a unique strand of folk-rock (see Ramet 1994: 103–132).
bled the popularization of kitsch and left no space for what was understood as an alternative to it’. By the same token, the rememberings and restagings of ex-YU rock acts in and by the Exit counter-space do not primarily evoke countercultural connotations (if any at all). They are rather indicative of nostalgic longings for (Western) European urbanity, modernity, and ‘normality’ (cf. Jansen 2005b; Simić 2009).

In contrast to Tito’s communist times, rock music proved to be a resourceful vehicle for political resistance back in Milošević’s days, thus giving decisive impetus to the foundation of Exit Festival, too. Some Serbian popular music commentators (see Raković et al., *Rock ’n’ Roll in Serbia: A Counterculture of the Nineties*, 2013) go so far as to claim that the Golden Age of Serbian rock actually arrived in the 1990s when this music genre began for the first time to fulfill its historically authentic role as a counterculture. At any rate, the fact remains that Serbian rock subcultures of the 1990s indeed ‘earned less, reached a smaller audience, and stood for more’, as Gordy (1999: 115) put it.

There are multiple factors that led to the marginalization of rock voices in the dominant public arenas of Milošević’s Serbia. Firstly, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the former rock market fell apart and rock bands lost an opportunity to promote and sell their music beyond the borders of their native republics. Apart from the unfavorable market conditions, it was also the unbearable sociopolitical situation in the country that caused many of them to flee abroad (Ramet 1994: 126), or to ‘sell out’ by turning to more commercial music markets (Dragićević-Šešić 1994: 200), or to give up on music altogether (Janjatović 1999: 42). Secondly, the ex-YU rock audience also shrank in size since a large number of rock fans (in particular, young urbanities) either migrated to Western countries, or embraced other pop music forms (such as turbo-folk and dance music) in the absence of domestic mainstream rock acts (Đurković 2002; 2004; Gordy 1999). Thirdly, once Milošević came into conflict with the West, the ruling class lost interest in supporting rock music. Note, however, that even in the days when Milošević was favored by the West as a ‘peacemaker’, domestic rock bands remained beyond the purview of the regime’s propaganda apparatus, partly because of their low commercial potential, and partly because a great majority of Serbian rockers were openly against it (see Đurković 2002). Lastly, new developments in Serbian popular music did reflect to some extent ‘the marginalization of rock discourse’ that was concurrently taking place in the West. What paved the way for the latter process was arguably the diversification and fragmentation of the global popular music market with concomitant ‘lack of a coherent youth culture’ (see Sanjek 1992).

Considering all the foregoing, the low profile of Serbian rock bands consolidated the local perception of rock as alternative and underground by definition. Indeed, Serbian rockers used to live on the same level as their fans, signing mainly to independent labels, and displaying angry or anguished attitudes in their non-commercial...
Moreover, they used to work under difficult material conditions and to act as an oppositional political force (cf. Charlton 2003: 364). The fact that Serbian rock was heralded as a soundtrack to, say, Belgrade’s antiwar demonstrations in 1992, or to the 1996–97 student protests, or to the demonstrations against the election fraud shortly before Milošević’s fall, can serve here as a good case in point. Given such a context, it is not surprising that Serbian rock of the 1990s came to signify the music of the revolution. Moreover, it is the same counterhegemonic understanding of 1990s Serbian rock culture that became incorporated into the narratives of the Exit Festival’s origins. From a current perspective, such recollections of the past do not simply serve a nostalgic function for the first generation of Exit producers and festivalgoers. Perhaps more importantly, they are also repeatedly recounted as ready-made evidence of the Exit countercultural credentials.

However, to fully comprehend countercultural musical projections of Exit counter-space, it is necessary to consider, too, a broader ideological, sociocultural, and aesthetic dynamic within Serbia’s popular music field, which was once again largely consolidated in the 1990s. Just as in any other process of identity formation, the counterhegemonic self-positioning of Serbian rock would be unattainable without the hitherto constituted hegemony of turbo-folk (henceforth TF) — a musical genre sweeping over Serbia’s media and public space throughout Milošević’s rule.

TF can be defined as a stylistically radicalized version of neo-folk or so-called novokomponovana narodna muzika [newly-composed folk music] dominating the former Yugoslav market (especially its southeast core) between the 1960s and mid-1980s. The emergence and substance of the latter genre is typically narrated in terms of hybrid developments, both socially and musically. As the common story goes, a significant spurt of industrialization and urbanization in Tito’s Yugoslavia generated a large number of newcomers migrating from rural to urban areas. To meet their cultural needs, the growing popular music industry provided a suitable musical product: neo-folk (see e.g. Jovanović 2005; Simić 2009; Vidić Rasmussen 2002; 2006). 

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48 An exception to this were a few rockers who were either primarily concerned with show-business success, or who sided with the ruling regime (such as Bora Čorba, Oliver Mandić, Tony Montano, Galića, or Viktorija).

49 ‘With the production and distribution of recordings nearly impossible and press runs down to a minimum, media access also minimal, and only a few performance venues, most of them small’ (Gordy 1999: 120–121.).

50 It goes without saying that the counterhegemonic expressions in 1990s Serbian rock were anything but coherent. As Mijatović (2008: 2) points out, the responses of Serbian rock musicians to the given political situation ‘ranged from direct provocation of the regime to personal silence’. Examples of the former include such acts as Rambo Amadeus, Direktori, Dža ili Bu, Rimtitituki, Block Out, and Partibrejkers, whereas ‘others such as Darkwood Dub, EKV, Deca Loših Mužičara, Eyesburn (...), commented on the social and political situation, but in an oblique and highly metaphoric way’. For a similar view, see also Žabeva-Papazova 2012: 101.
cally, neo-folk represented, similarly to its successor TF, a crossover between home-grown folk music traditions and contemporary European and Anglo-American pop styles. It adopted modern-day technologies of the commercial pop market, while simultaneously invoking a sense of rural ambience and nostalgia (Vidić Rasmussen 2006: 100). The latter was not conveyed only through song lyrics (deploying, for instance, the images evocative of ‘the lyricism of folk poetry’), but also by ‘the use of regionally referential [musical] “codes” (…) [in particular] ‘Macedonian rhythm, Bosnian “oriental” singing, Serbian dance-paced music and the complex of Gypsy music’ (Vidić Rasmussen 1995: 247, 249). At any rate, the distinctive fusion of new (modern) and old (traditional) aesthetico-stylistic elements in Yugoslav neo-folk culture was commonly deemed symptomatic of the urban-rural conflict residing deep in the hearts of new city dwellers as a whole.

Neo-folk occupied accordingly a socio-musical space that was invariably inferior in rank and liable to chronic contestation. On the one hand, neo-folk was officially condemned by the Yugoslav cultural elite for displaying ‘low’ aesthetico-stylistic qualities, ‘Eastern’ cultural elements, and essentially hybrid condition of ‘living in two worlds’. On the other, it was altogether endorsed by the state music industry due to its mass appeal and great commercial success. Considering, in addition, that the entire production of popular music was affected by the country’s favorable politics towards the West, neo-folk scored especially low when juxtaposed against the positive evaluation of Yugoslav rock and zabavna (pop; literally, ‘entertainment’) music. In the Serbian context of the 1990s, the inherited symbolic opposition of pop/rock and neo-folk developed further to the point of sharp sociocultural segregation. The ideological work involved in this binary construction was all the more transparent given the following facts on the ground. First, until the late 1980s the makeup of the neo-folk audience became increasingly heterogeneous, defying for the most part its earlier class associations.51 And second, following the specific trajectory of Yugoslav popular music developments, pop/rock and neo-folk came stylistically closer to one another, especially during the 1980s.52

51 The common view among Yugoslav popular music researchers (see e.g. Dragićević-Šešić 1994; Đurković 2004: 277) is that zabavna and mainstream rock musics were intended for (upper-)middle-class listeners, whereas the neo-folk audience was largely comprised of peasantry, lower-middle and working classes. However, according to Vidić Rasmussen (1995: 253), the hierarchical model of Yugoslav taste cultures, organized primarily along class lines, began to break down especially since the mid-1980s due to the growing appeal of neo-folk spectacles.

52 For instance, Vidić Rasmussen (2002: n.p.) writes about the ‘process of “folklorization” of Yugoslav mainstream zabavna (…) music’ in the course of the 1980s. Likewise, Baker (2006: 286–287) traces roots of the fusion of Croatian schlager with neo-folk elements, which subsequently made significant inroads into the national and regional markets after Croatia’s independence (in 1991), in the work of individual Yugoslav/Croatian producers (such as Tonči Huljić and Rajko Dujmić) whose experiments with the so-called ‘Eastern melos’ began al-
Musically, Serbian TF differs from its Yugoslav predecessor, neo-folk, in its preference for techno and dance beats in place of the earlier pop and rock arrangements. According to Milojević (n.d.), the very introduction of the term TF – coined in 1994 by Antonije Pušić aka Rambo Amadeus, a legendary Montenegrin-Serbian rock musician famous for his eclectic musical experiments and oratorical acrobatics – was meant to underline this difference. The prefix turbo- was, thus, borrowed from motoring vocabulary to suggest speed, force, intensity, fearlessness, and contemporariness associated with this music genre (cf. Kronja 2001: 10). However, the distinguishing stylistic feature of both TF and neo-folk are folklore motifs of different ethnic origins, notably from the Balkans (e.g. Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Greece, Turkey), and the recognizable ululation.

Then again, Serbian TF is generally not spoken about as a genre label. It is rather referred to as an umbrella term for many localized pop music forms (such as neo-folk, agitprop-folk, commercial dance and rap, and their various crossovers) other than broadly defined rock as their opposite. TF is thus primarily a value-laden category used in everyday discursive practices of social inclusions and exclusions (cf. Grujić 2006, in Baker 2007: n.p.). Deconstructing the concept of bad music in popular music discourse, Simon Frith (2004: 26) provides strong evidence that ‘aesthetic judgments are necessarily tangled up with ethical judgments’, whether the latter be grounded in arguments of the appropriate (‘good vs. bad’) system of music production, or in arguments of the appropriate (‘good vs. bad’) nature of music’s effects. Arguments like this are, of course, especially common in highly politicized societies such as Serbia, particularly back in the 1990s. Accordingly, in critical public discourse, the emergence of TF is typically associated with the conditions of Milošević’s regime. In some interpretations (see e.g. Gordy 1999; or Mijatović 2008), TF is said to have been deliberately inaugurated as the regime’s darling through its aggressive promotion in state-run and state-affiliated media at the expense of all other music genres. In others (see Đurković 2002; 2004), the swelling wave of TF music ready in the 1980s. As for the realm of Yugoslav rock, the influence of national folk music began to surface during the 1970s in selected songs of such rock bands as YU Grupa [YU Group], Smak [Endtime], Teška industrija [Heavy Industry], and most famously, Bijelo Dugme [White Button] with Goran Bregović as its leader (Raković, in Rock ‘n’ Roll in Serbia: A Rapprochement of Rock ‘n’ Roll with Pop-Folk, 2013). Yugoslav neo-folk performers began, for their part, to appropriate elements of rock music and iconography in the late 1970s. Cited regularly as the possibly first neo-folk song of that kind is Hanka Paldum’s ‘Voljela sam, voljela’ [I Loved, I Loved] (1978), originally written by Milić Vučišinović, the founder of the Yugoslav/Bosnian hard rock/heavy metal band Vatreni poljubac [Burning Kiss]. Other examples of rock-inspired neo-folk songs include ‘Putuj, putuj, srećo moja’ [Travel On, Travel, My Darling] (1985) by Halid Muslimović; or ‘Duge noge’ [Long Legs] and ‘Mile voli disko’ [Mile Likes Disco] (both songs from 1982) by most popular Yugoslav neo-folk singer in the 1980s, Fahreta Jahić-Živojinović aka Lepa Brena (see Raković and Đurković, in Rock ‘n’ Roll in Serbia: A Rapprochement of... , 2013).
is connected to the period of extensive militarization in the country (from 1991 to 1994), which witnessed a sudden lack of state regulation in the field of culture. In consequence, TF took the dominant position on the Serbian music market as the best-selling product at the time. Either way, it is indisputable that TF was both product and agent of the country’s grim sociopolitical realities of the 1990s.

There are several lines of criticism which can be distinguished in discussions on Serbian TF. The first argues that the emergence of TF should be linked to the rise of Serbian militant nationalism in the early 1990s. In this optic, TF is viewed primarily as an expressive means for carrying out the state project of national homogenization and mobilization during the war times (see Collin 2001; Dragićević-Šešić 1994; Gordy 1999; Kronja 2001; Vidić Rassmusen 1995; 2006). The second line of criticism accuses this music genre of supporting Milošević’s regime through the propagation of dubious sociocultural, aesthetic, and ethical values, such as ‘quick enrichment, conspicuous consumption, masculinity realised through violence, and femininity realised through sexual availability’ (Baker 2007: n.p.; see also Kronja 2001; Mijatović 2008; Milojević 2004; Simić 2009). Emphasized in this type of criticism are additionally strong links between female TF singers and male representatives of the criminalized political and/or financial structures in the country. The most notorious example here is a Serbian married couple, comprising Svetlana Ražnatović aka Ceca, the biggest TF star nationally and regionally, and Željko Ražnatović aka Arkan, a longstanding Balkan mafia boss, paramilitary commander in the Yugoslav wars, and indicted war criminal who never ended in the Hague ICTY because he had previously been gunned down in a Belgrade hotel in 2000 (see Mitrović 2011: 128; Simić 2006: 108–109; Simić 2009: 191).

On a related note, TF is said to epitomize an art of seductive kitsch, an escape from reality, a simulacrum of life as opposed to the cruelty of life under [international] sanctions, a pronounced eroticism making its way into almost all segments of public life and giving it the chic of the Balkan tavern with belly dancers. (Milojević, n.d.)

In this reading, TF clearly creates an illusion of happiness, offering to its audience an easy way out from the horrors of everyday life in Serbia. Ultimately, it serves as a tool of the ruling regime to tighten its grip on power by politically passivizing the masses (see also Dragićević-Šešić 1994; Gordy 1999; Kronja 2001). Once the supremacy of TF was secured, so the story goes, other popular music styles/genres, in particular rock, found themselves on the margins of Serbia’s cultural life. In such a constellation of power within the field of Serbian popular music, rock was accordingly regarded as an absent Other, signifying everything urban, progressive, modern, cosmopolitan – in a word, everything that Serbia was apparently falling short of dur-
ing the 1990s. By implication, what rock stood out decidedly against was the perceived rurality, vulgarity, trashiness, aggressiveness, parochialism, and nationalism of TF.

Even though the relevance of the rock-TF opposition has over time largely faded away, it is still possible to trace some of its ideological effects on the Exit counter-spatial reproduction. In hindsight, the power of this binary was at its peak in the Exit’s early days when the festival was seen by state officials, native academics, and self-proclaimed urbanites as a genuine alternative to TF culture (cf. Simić 2009:173). Gruhonjić (2002a: n.p.), for instance, writes for Exit News as follows, ‘Exit is an urban phenomenon par excellence’, but also a definite indicator that ‘urban lifestyle is finally showing its head from the catacombs in which it has languished for more than a decade, pushed out by turbo-folk kitsch.’ Disclosed here is, on the one hand, a belief in the countercultural potential and emancipatory energy of rock culture owing largely to its recent ‘revolutionary’ legacy in Serbia. On the other hand, recourse to the rock-TF binary only highlights the alignment of Exit supporters with the increasingly residual ideology of each music genre. Indeed, as showcased by Lazar et al. (2004: 373) in their sociological study on the structure of domestic Exit festival audience, the musical preferences of Exit-goers (at least in 2002 when the survey was undertaken) used to be mainly articulated in terms of aversion towards TF. The study inferred from this that the chief rock orientation in domestic Exit-goers primarily served the function of positive (urban and cosmopolitan) self-identification.

However, that much TF controversy inherited from the 1990s still holds some currency in present-day Serbia can be supported by evidence obtained during my Exit fieldwork in 2013. Namely, while doing the participant observation of musical and social activities at the interactive OTPevaj Karaoke Stage53, I approached its host (MC) to check if I could sing narodnjaci [domestic folksy songs]. ‘Narodnjaci are not allowed here’, he answered condescendingly. Illustrated by this attitude is thus the enduring validity of the initial Exit policy to preserve a sense of distinction by keeping a safe distance from neo-folk/TF songs and their apparently low (rural and politically controversial) cultural status. For all like-minded Exit counter-space users, recourse to ‘urban’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ rock functions accordingly as an antidote to the perceived rurality and nationalism of neo-folk/TF music. Indeed, as one Exit supporter made it clear in an online discussion:

Thank God there are still people in Serbia thinking normally, so whatever our numbers may be, together we will win over years and take control of, or convert

53 ‘OTPevaj’ is a pun using the sponsor bank name OTP with the imperative form of the Serbian verb otpevaj [sing].
[at least], those shallow brains from the army of Ceca and Lukas54! LONG LIVE EXIT!!! (Horse, ‘200,000 people at EXIT R:Evolution’, B92 [comments], 2013; capital letters in original; emphasis added.)

Thus, one aspect of the musical production of Exit counter-space clearly falls back on the counterhegemonic discourse of 1990s Serbian rock. Within this horizon, rock tends to be naturalized as a universal norm and as a symbol of normality standing in sharp opposition to the omnipresent ‘terror’ of Balkanized and debased TF. The other aspect of Exit musico-spatial production slightly differs from the first in that it places a sharper emphasis on the cosmopolitan character of the festival music program. Indeed, Exit has from the very beginning been construed as ‘a world festival of international music’ (Exit News, in Simić 2006: 121). At the core of this longstanding vision is therefore a cosmopolitan idea of sharing the world with others through the endorsement of what is understood as a universally shared culture. A closer look into the details of Exit music programming is meant to demonstrate next how the purported cosmopolitanism of Exit counter-space is conveyed musically.

The Exit festival lineup comprises various musical acts on both ‘soft’ and ‘hard-core’ ends of the popular music spectrum. The main line of division can be, however, drawn between DJ acts (covering a wide range of electronic music, from EDM and house to D’n’B and minimal techno) and rock acts (spanning all sorts of rock, metal, and punk music). In between these two musical poles are also included hip-hop, R&B, reggae, Latin American music, World Music, and, for the most part, a variety of fusion genres. Featured are, in general, both older (mostly from the 1980s) and newer (from the 2000s) acts belonging to the Western core of music industry (coming, by and large, from the U.K., then, from the U.S. and Canada, but also from other parts of Europe, notably Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Alternatively, the lineup incorporates those acts from Serbia and the former Yugoslav region that cultivate the same, or similar, aesthetics of music. One important thing they all share is thus a type of artistic sensibility coded as urban, metropolitan, and global – all these attributes being mainly used as a euphemism for Western.

To put flesh on this general outline, I provide below an illustrative list of Exit headliners featured, for example, in the years of 2003, 2006, and 2011. Specifically, using the observations above, I classify the given acts into the five following categories: (1) rock, (2) electronica, (3) crossovers and other genres, (4) domestic, and (5) regional acts. The foreign headliners falling into the first category included, for example, such acts as Arcade Fire, Bad Religion, Billy Idol, Franz Ferdinand, Grinderman, HIM, Kreator, Madball, Moonspell, Morrissey, Pulp, Suzanne Vega, The Cardigans, The Cult, and so on. Among the featured foreign DJ headliners were e.g.

54 Aleksandar Vuksanović aka Aca Lukas is a famous Serbian TF singer who started his showbiz career as a rocker.
Steve Angello, Steve Aoki, Marco Carola, Dave Clarke, Deadmau5, Darren Emerson, Groove Armada, David Guetta, Paul Kalkbrenner, Layo & Bushwacka!, Lottie, Jeff Mills, Eric Prydz, Roni Size, Tiga, Pete Tong, James Zabiela, etc. The list of the Exit foreign headliners whose musical output comes under the fusion or other generic category incorporates such acts as Beirut, House of Pain, Jamiroquai, M.I.A., Misty in Roots, Moloko, Pet Shop Boys, Portishead, Scissor Sisters, Shane MacGowan, Soul II Soul, Stereo MCs, Tricky, Underworld, etc. Those featured, finally, as the domestic and regional Exit headliners were e.g. Bad Copy (Serbian hip hop trio, since 1996), Darkwood Dub (Serbian alternative rock band, since 1988), Eyesburn (Serbian HC punk / crossover trash / reggae band, since 1994), Mizar (Macedonian gothic rock / dark folk band, since 1981), Obojeni Program (Serbian alternative rock band, since 1980), Partibrejkers (Serbian rock band, since 1982), Siddharta (Slovenian alternative rock / metal band, since 1995), The Beat Fleet (Croatian rap rock band, since 1990), and so on.

In any case, the argument here is that for domestic Exit participants, the performance and appreciation of Western popular music amount to having a share in global musical practice. The same conclusion has been reached in Simić’s (2009) ethno-graphic study on young to middle-aged Novi Sad people involved in the festival. As she explains,

people were aware that they were not ‘in the West’, where popular music is produced, but nevertheless were not simply copying its practice (…). This paradox is usually resolved by assuming that ‘Western music’ is based on some kind of universal aesthetics (of art), with other art traditions being based on other specific aesthetics. (Ibid., 216.)

I would definitely agree with Simić that in the eyes of Exit counter-space producers and users, cultural products of the Western music industry are taken to epitomize universal aesthetico-ethical values. However, it is highly disputable that domestic Exit participants approach the difference between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ music in such a simplified binary-based way. For to advocate otherwise is to obfuscate the complexity of a two-way dialectic of the universal (Western) and the particular (non-Western) in the development and global expansion of the Western music industry since the early days of its establishment (see Brusila 2003: 56–57; or Leyshon et al. 1998: 10). From that standpoint, the modernist request of Exit counter-space for universality embodied in artistic practices of the Western music industry is not at all at odds with the postmodern obsession with the particular and local, since the latter have already long been subjected to the Western gaze and integrated into the representational framework of global music production. Moreover, the ways in which the Western music industry tends to represent musical traditions other than its own
is precisely, and perhaps paradoxically, premised on ‘the [modern] search for a universal essence in “authentic” musics’ (cf. Brusila 2003: 181). With this in mind, I argue here that locally/ethnically specific musics, situated outside the Western core of music production (including musics from the Balkans), seem to be acceptable to domestic Exit counter-space users insofar as they have been hitherto authenticated, appropriated, repackaged, and redistributed within Western music circuits.

To fully capture the dialectical nature of this modern-postmodern dynamic in Exit musico-spatial imaginations, it is helpful to turn to Regev’s (2007; 2011) theory of aesthetic cosmopolitanism and ethnonational cultural uniqueness. According to his definition (2007: 125):

The production of ethnonational cultural uniqueness in late modernity, especially in the sphere of contemporary cultural forms, (...) is in fact a practice of choosing, selecting and extracting elements from the plethora of expressive components available at a global level, including the producers’ own traditions. These elements are then mixed and hybridized into recipes and products that become signifiers of current cultural uniqueness of nations and ethnicities. Once produced, such cultural products and art works become themselves part of the global repertoire available as inspiration and influence to anyone interested.

There are, of course, multiple ways in which aesthetic cosmopolitanism plays out in the musical imaginings of Exit counter-space. Beside the abovementioned performance and appreciation of a variety of popular music styles and genres coded as specifically Western, the Exit program also incidentally includes the musical forms (once again Western in their origin) blurring the line between the popular and the classical. Introduced at Exit 2005 was, for example, the Classic Stage featuring concerts of opera arias, the classically trained duo Beogradski perkusionisti [Belgrade Percussionists], and the parodic, cabaret-resembling ensemble Đorđe Miljenović & Gliseri [Đorđe Miljenović & Speedboats], playing in the rhapsodic prog-rock and acid-jazz idioms. Furthermore, Exit 2006 hosted the art project of Novi Sad pianist Branka Parlić comprising a full performance of Erik Satie’s Vexations by a great number of musicians from Serbia and the region. Each participant in the project was free to select the instrumental arrangement and music idiom in which to interpret their half-hour’s share of Satie’s gigantic piece. The only requirement for the piece performance was to keep the sound on either of two pianos brought onto the stage uninterrupted until the end of this joint marathon play – from 7 pm on the last evening of the festival until 10 am the following morning (Kranjčević 2010). Finally, as part of the Youth Fair program, Exit 2016 presented the performance of Mozart’s opera The Magic Flute by Novi Sad’s Serbian National Theater on the main city square.
Either by juxtaposing pop and classical-music idioms within the pop festival context (as in the cases of the Exit Classic Stage and public opera performance), or by fusing the elements of classical music, rock, jazz, electronica, and dance (as in the case of staging Satie’s *Vexations*), the aesthetic cosmopolitanism of Exit counter-space is in both instances typically postmodern in transgressing the traditional boundaries between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art forms. This type of Exit aesthetic cosmopolitanism therefore consciously seeks to replicate, incorporate, and build on the current, more or less transgressive musical forms of transnational culture within the specific local and national geographies of the festival’s host location. Indeed, the idea behind the Exit staging of Parlić’s art project was to promote so-called New Art Music and lay the groundwork for the local art scene within which to perform similar music pieces in the future (see Kranjčević 2010). At stake here is thus an emphasis on avant-garde artistic values and concomitant elitism of modern art projects, whose supposed autonomy, novelty, complexity, and exclusivity form part of the wider ideology of Western classical music and its request for transcendence and universality (cf. Leyshon et al. 1998: 6–9).

Another exogenous source used in cosmopolitan projections of Exit counter-space pertains to those locally specific musics that have long been considered part of the global music inventory. Characteristic examples here include the festival’s Reggae Stage (since 2001) and Latino (Dance) Stage (since 2004). Leaning more towards the innovative and elitist end of the same type of Exit music cosmopolitanism was, in addition, the Suba Stage operating on the ground from 2009 through to 2012. Named after Mitar Subotić ‘Suba’, an internationally acclaimed music producer from Novi Sad who spent the final ten years of his life in Brazil, the stage was conceptualized in an eclectic manner with the universalistic avant-garde agenda in mind. In the words of then Exit CEO Bošković (in Milović Buha 2009):

The idea behind the installation of the Suba Stage is, on the one hand, to recreate a good value system in the country by promoting Suba as someone whose work was seminal [to subsequent stylistic developments in music, and] who was originally from this area but achieved global success. Suba actually made a revolution in Brazilian music, created electro-samba, worked with [Brazilian] bands and performers who’ve sold millions of copies. This year [2009] we are bringing together his Novi Sad and Brazilian friends [fellow musicians] to present their music on this stage. On the other hand, the Suba Stage is designed as the central point of contact for all experimentalists and travelers in music. These are the people who create outside the global mainstream. (…) These are the acts [from Brazil, Portugal, the Netherlands, and other countries] signed by various agencies, but awfully specific and progressive.
This branch of Exit aesthetic cosmopolitanism clearly celebrates innovative contributions to the global popular music depository made by ‘progressive’ artists from localities and music scenes that are more or less removed from the major music centers of global capitalist power. Then again, other dimensions underscored here are a strong sense of pride in local origins (through emphasis on Suba’s place of origin) as well as the cultural significance of such music experiments for the local and national contexts. The latter only proves that a commitment to one’s own community may cut across even the most radical art forms of cosmopolitanism, as embodied in the figure of Suba (cf. Regev 2007: 129).

Closely linked to the said musical projections of Exit aesthetic cosmopolitanism are those segments of the festival program classified under the label World Music (henceforth WM). Even if the term WM has been in circulation long enough to encompass all kinds of fusions between non-Anglo-American (post)traditional sounds and global pop culture, including reggae and Latin American music (see e.g. Guilbault 2006; Đorđević 2011; Zakić and Nenić 2012), I nevertheless discuss it here as a distinct form of Exit aesthetic cosmopolitanism. I opt to do so on several accounts.

To begin with, the inauguration of WM phenomenon, as we know it today, is associated with several British independent record companies and DJs that introduced this label in 1987 so as to facilitate the emerging commercial discourse on the production, classification, and representation of non-Western musical styles to Western audiences (see e.g. Brusila 2001: 155–156, Nenić 2006b: n.p.). As mentioned above, reggae and Latin American music (e.g. tango, samba, bossa nova, merengue...) had been integrated into the Western music industry long before the commercial label WM came into being (cf. Đorđević 2011). This means that the association of these music genres with WM has been established subsequently through retrospective interpretations. Besides, reggae and Latin American music, as pointed out by Nenić (interview, Apr 2013), coexist and develop in major Serbian urban centers (and elsewhere) as autonomous scenes, each with its own separate logistics, institutional network, ideology, and audience. On the one hand, this explains the logic behind the longstanding division of Exit music stages into three main categories: (1) Reggae Stage, (2) Latino Stage, and (3) East Point: Roots & Flowers Stage (2003–2011) with its extensions World Music Stage (2006–2008) and World Chill-Inn Stage (since 2015). On the other hand, it cannot be denied either that selected fusion acts (both from abroad and at home) whose work draws significantly on elements of ska, reggae, dub, and Latin American music have also been regularly featured on all three versions of WM stages.

Notwithstanding the above, one additional reason for focusing on WM-related manifestations of Exit aesthetic cosmopolitanism in their own right lies in the spe-
cific ideology underpinning this music trans- / polygenre. Namely, the ideology of WM is tightly interwoven with another Western discourse – that of the New Age movement. What both have in common is a search for new forms of spirituality and for the universal values of humankind (cf. Brusila 2003; Buchanan 2006). Specifically, it is the grassroots basis of the WM sound that is said to induce ‘apparently authentic and universally appreciated experiences of the human soul and the world of nature’ in its listeners (Čolović 2006b). Another common ground that WM and New Age practices share is a fascination with the sound of remote, archaic, exotic, and marginal(ized) musical cultures (cf. Zakić and Nenić 2012).

These underlying assumptions of WM ideology were perhaps best captured and played out at the Exit East Point: Roots & Flowers Stage. In one festival promotional campaign (Exit News, in Simić 2006: 121–122), the stage was described as

a superior spirit of the Third World... A journey through the astonishing music of Asia, Africa, Central and South America... (…) From ancient tribal tunes to folk interventions in electronic music. An aromatic floral environment in which urban DJ sets and traditional live music played on exotic instruments, are meeting each other.

Or as written in another festival announcement (Exit Festival Facebook, 2009):

In a small corner of the fortress, somehow still intact, stands Roots & Flowers Stage. As an alternative to omnipresent rush and noise of the festival, it offers a nice, natural ambient, decorated by exotic requisites from all over the world. Of course, torches and scents are not all this stage has to offer, and that makes it unique, but there are also our artist guests, from musicians to dancers [belly dancers, as well as other exotic dance artists], DJs and of course, jugglers and clowns.

Also, the YouTube video footage of the Exit Roots & Flowers Stage, conveniently named Global Village People (2003), brings to life what the announced descriptions of the stage promise to fulfill – a musical journey in the ambient, cozy surroundings across the ‘Third World’, in this case spanning African, Caribbean, Middle-Eastern/

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55 Emphasized in the approach to WM as a transgenre is the porousness of its generic boundaries that allows it to be simultaneously classified as, say, ethno-jazz or post-traditional music. And when defined as a polygenre, WM operates as an umbrella term for a variety of very different music genres and cultures which can then merge, intersect, but also operate in separate scenes (interview with Nenić, Apr 2013).

56 The World Chill-Inn Stage, introduced in 2015 as a successor of the Exit Roots & Flowers Stage, has been conceptualized in like manner (see ‘Exit: The World-Inn Chill Stage in a new light’, Istinito, 2015).
Oriental, Balkan Gypsy, Indian, and tribal sounds. The use of such labels as *Global Village People* and *Third World* points in addition to another crucial set of ideological assumptions underlying the WM discourse. Specifically, it suggests strong links between the phenomena of WM and globalization. Further investigation of these links suggests that WM constitutes ‘the politically determined globalizing reality’ in which the Anglo-European hegemony takes a lead (Šuvaković 2004: 39). Or as Taylor (2004: 97) put it succinctly, the WM construct operates ‘as the musical analog to globalization’. And it does so in a way which only reinforces the polarized imaginings of the world divided between the West and the Rest, whereby those lumped together into the latter category are repeatedly racialized, ethnicized, exoticized, eroticized, ghettoized, and relegated to premodern times.

Apparently articulated from the Western point of view, the WM segment of the Exit musical offer in the examples above holds a special importance for the symbolic self-positioning of the festival which is not really a part of the Western world, but whose local supporters feel a strong sense of belonging to it. By internalizing the Western WM discourse – its vocabulary, viewpoints, dichotomies, and values – domestic Exit counter-space users place themselves in the position of a desired Other (i.e. Westerners), to whose ear the rest of the world (including the Balkans) is sonically constructed as an exotic Other. At issue here is also what Nenić (2009: 120), following Jansen (n.d.), describes as “the recursive idea of Eurocentrism that is central to the EU project itself”, and that makes some places “more European” and more desirable than others. By this logic, the ‘Third World’ places imagined in WM by local Exit counter-space users are clearly ranked lower down the hierarchy than Serbia within the spatial ordering of the world. That said, it is also possible to offer an alternative interpretation of the place that WM practices hold in Exit’s cosmopolitan imagination. The Exit celebration of musics removed from major centers of the global music industry, and even more so ‘a superior spirit of the Third World’ at the festival’s Roots and Flowers Stage (see my discussion above), can be said to echo the anticolonial solidarities imagined during and after Yugoslavia through the Non-Aligned Movement and its memory.

The main point, however, I wish to make is this: In forging the identification with the big Western Other, local Exit-goers can arguably step outside the confines of their own otherwise stigmatized locality and ethnicity; and equally importantly, they can exercise their competence in what Taylor (2004) calls the languages of urbanity and globalization. In his words:

> World music appeals to urbanites who tend to have a tolerance of difference, heterogeneity, and possess a cosmopolitan outlook. World music (...) also speaks a language of globalization to which urban residents are susceptible, since the centers of financial power are increasingly consolidated in urban centers. (…) Know-
ing a little world music is to possess some global informational capital. (Ibid., 93, 97; emphasis added.)

The notion of global informational capital is therefore associated with ‘familiar e-lite groups of the past’ whose sense of what constitutes the desired forms of cultural competence and knowledge has transformed alongside the changing circumstances of globalized realities (ibid., 95). Interestingly, for Serbian Exit-goers, the display of urban taste, cosmopolitan competency, and global informational capital is not only confined to their appreciation of WM forms coming from elsewhere but is also manifest in their approach to specifically Serbian / Balkan WM production. However, due to the specific trajectory of Serbian WM development and the ambiguous status some of its musical forms have in the national context, the relationship of domestic Exit counter-space users with Serbian / Balkan WM is highly complex and fraught with contradictions. To trace the roots of this unease and ambivalence, it is necessary first to provide some background information on the history of Serbian WM and the main currents of its musical development.

The Serbian WM scene started to take shape in the early 1990s. It has since evolved into a branched network of institutions and enterprises, including festivals (e.g. Ring Ring, Ethno.com, Ethno Fusion Fest, Serbia World Music Festival, Todo Mundo), radio programs (e.g. Disco 3000, Putem svile / ‘Along the Silk Road’, Rendezvu sa muzikom / ‘Rendezvous with Music’), recording companies (e.g. B92, RTS, Automatic Records), public and private schools for traditional music performance (e.g. Mokranjac in Belgrade and Kraljevo, Bojana Nikolić’s school), and the World Music Association of Serbia (WMAS, since 2000) serving as a sort of hub for all local WM-related activities, from informational and scientific, through to publishing and archiving, to promotional and organizational. For instance, the WMAS has established its own specialist magazine Etnoumlje [Ethnomind] (since 2007), record label WMAS Records (since 2007), SWM Internet radio podcast (since 2008), and the annual World Music Summit (since 2010) where various actors involved with the Serbian WM scene can exchange relevant information and experiences. All in all, the statistics show, as Đorđević (2011) points out, that there are approximately 150 groups and more than 500 artists active within the Serbian WM scene, which is, in his opinion, impressive for a country of that size.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, Serbian WM, just as its Western counterpart, seems to dwell on the outskirts of the local music industry (see Brusila 2003: 76–77; interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014). Two notable exceptions to this are: (1) so-called ethno music, a label denoting the highly commodified forms of Serbian / Balkan traditional music, whose pop appeal and considerable market success made them recognizable as a popular genre in their own right since the beginning of the new millennium; and, to a lesser extent, (2) neo-traditional Serbian / Balkan music, which over
time became integrated into the official channels of the dominant national culture (see Zakić and Nenić 2012: 170–171). However, the chiefly subaltern status of Serbian WM has prompted a number of Serbian WM musicians, promoters, and ethnomusicologists to construe it in several interrelated ways – as an ‘alternative’ to the Serbian music mainstream, especially to its most commercial and notorious forms, neo-folk and TF (Jakovljević 2011; Jovanović 2005; Nenić 2010); as an opportunity for laying the groundwork for ‘new Balkan music’ (Milenković 2007); as a means for the preservation of Serbian traditional music (Đorđević 2011); and ‘as a relatively independent and plural space’ for potentially subversive articulations of ‘unfixed’ identities that go beyond the banal imaginings of Serbian ethnicity and the commercial discourses of the pop music industry (Nenić 2006a: 119).

Disclosed by all these approaches to Serbian WM is clearly a set of specific circumstances under which this music phenomenon began to take shape. Its emergence should indeed be primarily associated with the search for ‘ethnicity’ in culture within the post-Yugoslav and postsocialist contexts (see Zakić and Nenić 2012). This is, however, not to deny evidence of a strong correlation between, on the one hand, the primary focus of Serbian WM on the restoration of local musical traditions, be they construed as ethnic (Serbian) or regional (Balkan/Byzantine), and, on the other hand, some wider concerns with ‘the question of defining the local’ – a question dominating the public imagination in both developed and developing countries across the globe since the 1990s (see Guilbault 2006). Thus, the Serbian redefinition of the local is undoubtedly informed by the continuing interest of the Western / transnational music industry in Balkan Beat / Balkan Music (the process of colonization), but also by the ideology, practices, and technologies of Western WM discourse (the process of self-colonization; see Exit-produced discourses of (Third) World Music in the analysis above). At the same time, the process of negotiating the local in Serbian WM practices is equally based on the imaginings of Serbian ethnicity ‘from within’ that generally shift between nationalist and cosmopolitan poles of the ideological spectrum.

Roughly speaking, there are two major musico-ideological trends that can be distinguished within the field of Serbian WM (cf. Đorđević 2012; Milojević 2004; Nenić 2010; Stojanović 2012; Zakić and Nenić 2012). The first group of Serbian WM projects can be said to come ideologically close to purist concerns of nation (re-) builders in their primary focus on the reconstruction of the ‘authentic’ Serbian / Balkan musical past. This line of Serbian WM development is accordingly considered neotraditionalist, revivalist, localized, inward-looking, and at times nationalist in its content and scope. Examples here include vocal acts such as Paganke [The Female Pagans], Moba (an old Serbian custom of neighborhood solidarity), Braća Teofilovići [The Teofilović Brothers], or vocal-instrumental ensembles such as Belo platno
The second category of Serbian WM production comprises musical projects that are infused by the flexible ideology of global WM and its (neo)liberal discourses of multi-, inter-, and trans-culturalism. The fusion acts falling into this group combine in general contemporary sounds and technologies with differently shaped and re-shaped elements of traditional, exotic, and marginal musics of Serbia, the Balkans, and other more or less distant cultures, both real and imaginary. Examples here include such acts as Arhai, Serboplov, Beogradska čalgija, Hazari, Slobodan Trkulja i Balkanopolis, Naked, Paniks, Vrelo, Kal, Institute, Shira U’tfila, and Boris Kovač. Moreover, this category of Serbian WM production is sufficiently heterogeneous and permeable that it can additionally encompass those music acts that go either under related generic labels such as ethno-jazz, folk-rock, folktronica, fusion, New Age, and the like (e.g. Mistakemistake, Rare, Vroom, Orthodox Celts, Gyass band, Pop’citelj, Marko Marković New Age Band); or under the more commercial rubric ‘ethno’ (e.g. Željko Joksimović, Jelena Tomašević, Ljubiša Stojanović ‘Luis’, Biljana Krstić i Bistrik, Sanja Ilić i Balkanika).

It perhaps goes without saying that the Exit Balkan Fusion Stage (2003–2005), Fusion Stage (since 2006), and World Music Stage (2006–2008), respectively, have hosted those Serbian and regional acts representing the latter musico-ideological line of Serbian / Balkan WM development. But to problematize it further, not only do the boundaries between two major developments of Serbian WM become at times considerably blurred by different performance contexts, by the changing poetics within the repertoires of individual Serbian WM acts, and/or by different interpelation effects that different WM numbers have on their audience members (see Nenić 2010). A similar kind of confusion also arises in the form of recurring tensions between massively consumed neo-folk / TF / ethno, on the one hand, and what Simić (2006: 121) calls ‘elite Balkan music’, on the other. Although there are theoretical

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57 The program of the festival WM Stage in 2008 is a strong case in point, incorporating such diverse fusion acts as Drum’n’Zez (from Novi Sad; ‘agro-reggae / Pannonian surf-pop’), Akos Laki & Laki Latino (from Senta, Vojvodina; Vojvodinian folk music combined with Latin and modern jazz styles), So Sabi (from Belgrade, shifting from the African traditional sound to Central American ethno-pop), Vasil Hadžimanov Band (from Belgrade; progressive Balkan jazz / fusion music), Vrelo (from Ruma, Vojvodina; ‘alternative ethno / WM’), Sopot (from Banjaluka, the Republika Srpska; Balkan Dub & Drum ‘n’ Bass), Gustafi (from Vojvodina, Croatia; World Rock Music / folk-rock), and Pannonia Allstars Ska Orchestra (from Budapest; ‘traditional ska spiced up with Hungarian motifs’).

58 One should be simultaneously reminded of the local popular music discourse that differentiates between neo-folk/TF, on the one hand, and ethno/WM, on the other. Specifically, by reconstructing the Balkans as an invaluable musical resource and as a metaphor for authenticity and ancientness, the latter category seeks to move away from its negatively connoted counterpart, neo-folk/TF (see Čolović 2006a).
interpretations using the discourses of globalization, neoliberal capitalism, multiculturalism, and/or exoticism to subsume all these local forms under the single heading of transgeneric and transnational WM phenomenon (see e.g. Dimitrijević 2002; Ćirjaković 2004; Nenić 2010; Stojanović 2006), the opinions on this subject among local Exit counter-space users appear to be highly inconsistent. As I will illustrate next, when the distinction between the two music categories is insisted upon, it recurs in the form of familiar antagonisms between universality and particularity, cosmopolitanism and nationalism, urbanity and rurality.

It was the appearance of Zvonko Bogdan at Exit 2004 that perhaps stirred up most dramatic tensions between global and local in the musical projections of Exit counter-space. Bogdan’s performance indeed generated contested views on whether his old-fashioned Vojvodina kafana59 music fits into the desired (cosmopolitan and urban) musical profile of the festival. Zvonko Bogdan is a distinguished Yugoslav Bunjevac60 singer of Vojvodina starogradske pesme [old-city songs] accompanied by tamburica [tambour] bands. It is, in fact, tamburica music that is in the popular national imagination most commonly associated with Vojvodina (but also with other countries in the region, notably Croatia). Even if tamburica music is not generally looked down upon by Serbian self-identified urbanites, it is considered problematic in the Exit context because of its essentially localized character and traditional connotations. As Bošković stated in an interview (Milović Buha 2009):

I think there is a general problem of perceiving Vojvodina through tamburica players and salaši [farmsteads]. (…) Tamburica players are great, they were and they will be. But it is contemporary urban art that we wish to push to the fore. That’s the way in which we’d like Exit to be perceived.

However, within the Exit production in 2009 (the same year Bošković gave the statement above), the separate stage dedicated entirely to tamburica music was inaugurated on the festival site ‘for all those who are in the mood for the bohemian atmosphere of Vojvodina kafanas, and for those who are curious and wish to learn something about culture of the country they have visited’ (‘Tamburica players at Exit’, Exit News, 2009).

59 The kafana is a Balkan type of male-dominated bistro of the Ottoman Turkish origins, serving grilled meat, alcoholic beverages, and so-called Turkish coffee, occasionally to a soundtrack of local folk music. In Dvorniković’s Characterology of the Yugoslavs (1939, in Longinović 2000: 629), the kafana is portrayed ‘as an “orientalized” site where men gather to vent their individual and communal frustrations by drinking plum brandy, occasionally smashing glasses on the floor to relieve their “burden” while listening to and sometimes participating in the performance of the folk song’.

60 Bunjevci are an ethnic minority group mainly populating Vojvodina.
The contradictory positions on tamburica music do not only point towards the existence of different factions within the Exit production team. Similar tensions can also be discerned in the lived spaces of Exit representation. Specifically, on one side of the debate are those (both media reporters and online forum users) praising the concert of Zvonko Bogdan at Exit either for promoting ‘our’ ethnic music in an era of globalization (see ‘What do you think of folksy songs...?’, muzicki-forum.com, 2008–2009); or for bridging the gap of urban-rural divide and thus smoothing the way into the festival program for some other local artists from ‘the other side’ of the equation, such were Yugoslav Romani neo-folk / WM musicians Esma Redžepova (Exit 2005) and Šaban Bajramović (Exit 2006 and 2007) (see Artuković 2009). Conversely, those disputing Zvonko’s performance at Exit saw his music as a close relative to neo-folk culture and its rural background (‘What do you think of...?’, ibid.); or simply as a failure – hence the slang phrase ‘you scored as poorly as Zvonko Bogdan at Exit’ (Vukajlija, 2011).

Similar schisms within the festival inner circles also arose after a performance of the late ethno singer Ljubiša Stojanović ‘Luis’ at Exit 2005. For example, Exit associate Lalić (in Uzelac 2005) endorsed Luis’s performance with the following explanation. To paraphrase, ‘the task of Exit is to propel the music genres originating from this and other subaltern regions into the European marketplace’. At the same time, Simić’s (2009: 217) interlocutor and another Exit associate, Voja, took the opposite stance on the topic, arguing that ‘the boundaries between Balkan world music and turbo-folk are not always clear and people can easily raise three fingers (a sign of Serbian nationalism) in the air and start to carouse (šenlučiti) – we don’t need that’. On another occasion, Voja spoke in a similar vein to Simić (2009: 218) about Serbian brass band music, in particular about Goran Bregović’s hit songs, despite its prominent role in the 1996–97 student protests:

[T]he student protest was a mixture of nationalists and anti-nationalists, while [we], in Exit, [need] to maintain a clear division between ‘non-ethno’ and ‘ethno’ (e.g. national) music that ... can be heard everywhere. (…) [D]on’t get me wrong, you know that I like [the Serbian brass] and listen to it myself, but Exit is not a place for that, but for more universal stuff.

Even so, two highly commercial Serbian ethno / WM acts – Dejan Petrović Big Band and Sanja Ilić and Balkanika – whose line of musicianship follows to a degree in Bregović’s footsteps, came to be subsequently included in the program of the Exit Fusion Stage in 2014 and 2016 respectively. This might seem all the more surprising given the strong ties that both acts maintain with the Guča trumpet festival: Ilić has performed already twice at Guča (in 2010 and in 2015), whereas Petrović is a winner of the so-called Master’s Letter, the most prestigious award at the Guča brass band
competition\textsuperscript{61}, and plays on a regular basis with his Big Band within the non-competitive part of the festival program since 2011.

Finally, all aforementioned antagonisms are also displayed, even if only implicitly, in the views on what sort of music-cultural value Exit Festival should ultimately produce. On this subject, the following has been stated:

In my view, it’s not a challenge for us [Serbs] to become the Latin America of Europe. (…) Let’s rather make a product that will be aesthetically packaged in such a way that when the Englishman comes around, he says in awe, ‘Wow, this is better than any festival I’ve seen’. That’s our goal. (Interview with Bošković, Sep 2014.)

[Exit] goes beyond the boundaries of the parochial and represents something different from the usual standard in ‘products’ with the label ‘Made in Serbia’. (Spajalica / Clip, ‘Exit expects to welcome…’, B92 [comments], 2011.)

What both these comments do disclose is a definite desire that the Exit counter-space secures equal participation in what is perceived as the avant-garde of transnational art and culture production (cf. Regev 2011). Moreover, it seems that the ultimate goal of Exit counter-space is to surpass its Western rivals by offering to Western visitors an even more modern, progressive, and urban festival experience (more ‘Western’ as it were) than it can currently be found in their countries of origin. On a related note, a reference to ‘cultural difference’, understood here in terms of ‘Made in Serbia’ products, not only implies criticism of the ongoing trends towards the essentialization and ‘commodification of ethnicity’ (cf. Feld 2000: 153) – the latter two being corollaries of globalization processes and a concomitant craze for the aestheticized experience of cultural diversity. More importantly, the promotion of one’s own cultural difference and all its trappings is overtly dismissed by some proponents of Exit counter-space for being parochial and possibly racist in its nature. As such, so this argument goes, it prevents one from reaching out beyond the confines of given cultural traditions and, thus, from participating in a globally shared culture. Advocated instead is what is believed to be the universal (but in fact Western) standard of contemporary urban artistic and cultural practice, along with the normative model of global civil society more generally.

A characteristic shared by all examples above is thus a visibly ambiguous approach to the musico-ideological imaginings of Exit counter-space. At one end are those individuals displaying a modernist aspiration towards the universal breaking

\footnote{The Master’s Letter is a title of honor bestowed upon (at least) triple winners of the festival competition in such prestigious categories as Best Trumpet Player (either voted by the expert jury or by the audience), Best Brass Band, and Most Authentic Performance.}
away from the particular and local. At the other end are, yet again, those favoring
the postmodernist language of globalization and the attendant fetishization of the
particular and local. Even if seemingly incompatible with one another, these two
paradigms ultimately draw from the same source – the Western type of cosmopol-
itanism. A crucial difference between them lies arguably in the different discursive
framework underpinning each.

Historically, the idea of cosmopolitanism is Western in its origins. It has re-
gained, in the last two decades, a wide currency in academic discourse as a concep-
tual tool for exploring societal change ‘based on the principle of world openness’
and the related processes of global communication and exchange (Delanty 2006: 27;
see also Simić 2009: 145, 208). Considered either in its moral, institutional, political,
or cultural aspects (see Delanty 2006; Fine and Boon 2007), cosmopolitanism always
calls for ‘an engagement with and openness to other cultures, values and experience-
es’ (Bennett and Woodward 2014: 16). In the sphere of culture, cosmopolitanism is
likewise construed as an aesthetico-cultural disposition / sensibility / competence / attitude / orientation / condition, grounded in a conscious appreciation of cultural dif-
fERENCE and a creative exchange with an-Other (see Bennett and Woodward 2014;
Chalcraft et al. 2014; Sassatelli 2011; Simić 2009). Alternatively, cosmopolitanism
is said to operate as a marker of distinction for urban middle-to-upper classes or so-
called ‘postmodernist elites’, whose cultural consumption is driven by the logic of
routes rather than roots (Friedman 2006, in Simić 2009: 218), as well as by the idea
of omnivorousness (Regev 2011).

All these definitions notwithstanding, Bennett and Woodward (2014: 17) rightly
warn against the implied universality of ‘cosmopolitan openness’ and call attention
to the importance of its ‘performative dimensions’. What this means is that cosmo-
politan openness should rather be approached as a flexible discursive frame for man-
aging meanings associated with particular settings and experiences of cultural dif-
fERENCE. Depending on the social contexts and actors involved, cosmopolitan open-
ness is exercised with varying degrees of ‘universalistic meta-rules’ and ‘reflexivity’
taxonomy of cosmopolitan relationships, the Exit counter-space is certainly inclined
to endorse such ideas as ‘world consciousness’, ‘shared normative culture’, ‘global
ethics’, and ‘global civil society’. However, within this overarching cosmopolitan
framework based on the said identification with global concerns, aesthetics, and eth-
ics, the cosmopolitanism of Exit counter-space seems to be largely constituted by the
internal schism between two different aesthetico-ideological paradigms.

The first paradigm, which continues to insist on the distinction between Balkan
WM and TF / ethno, builds on the binary assumptions of the ‘rock versus TF’ dis-
course explicated above. In summary, within this discursive horizon, an utter disdain
for TF and similar forms of Serbian/Balkan ethno/WM resides in the earlier associa-
tions forged between TF and the rise of Serbian nationalism during the 1990s. The prevailing line of thinking in this cosmopolitan formation of Exit counter-space is accordingly driven by the strong antinationalist attitude and disidentification with the given (Serbian) ethnicity/nationality. The same conclusion has been reached in Simić’s study (2006; 2009) on self-identified Serbian/Novi Sad urbanites:

Many of my informants refused to identify along national lines, claiming that their identification was primarily urban and that this implied a certain ‘level of civility’ that they sometimes consciously connected with the [middle] class. (Ibid., 2009: 213.)

The ‘urban’ and ‘civilized’ become thereby signifiers of a (non-)place, spatially unlocated but determined by a certain cultural, social and economic dynamic that exists in a similar way in any part of the world. This idea is well known; Ulf Hannerz (1996) called it cosmopolitanism, referring to a view by which the transnational (intellectual) elite occupies a social position that is not spatially rooted in a manner in which any other social tradition tends to be (for example, the Serbian peasant tradition). (Ibid., 2006: 113; emphasis in original.)

As illustrated above, it is exactly the same type of a cosmopolitan relationship that plays out in one segment of Exit musical projections. In such projections, the notions of one’s own locality and nationality are repudiated as rural, parochial, and inward-looking on the grounds of their association with TF and similar music genres. Conversely, the ideals of universality and transcendence are sought in Western popular music or, alternatively, in the Westernized, urban, and more elite appropriations of other musical cultures, including, paradoxically, the Balkan one.

The binary tensions underlying the first paradigm seem to be resolved in the second by a shift to another discursive framework. Namely, the Exit ultimate endorsement of various forms of Serbian / Balkan ethno and WM, be they coded as ‘low’ or ‘high’, should not be interpreted simply as part of the Exit business strategy directed at the festival growth, popularity, and profit maximization – resulting thus in the resolution of tensions by the logic of capital accumulation. Rather, a shift in Exit discursive practices from what Marković and Vujanović (n.d.) call the emancipatory-enlightening (elitist, reductionist, and exclusionary) to the democratic-populist (politically correct and inclusive) position should be placed within the context of wider social changes and new aesthetic standards imposed by the Western gaze. Within this paradigm shift, as Ditchev (2005: 246) notes, the earlier model of modern universality and its polarizing discourse of high-low distinctions came to be superseded by the postmodern reclamation of cultural difference and thus of identity construction based on ‘the aestheticized local resisting the impersonal global’. Since ‘the for-
eign gaze [currently] privileges all that was repressed before, namely, specificity’ (ibid., 247), then the modified attitude among Exit counter-space users can be explained by the internalization of the new paradigm.

Importantly, however, the change of a perspective in Exit discursive practices does not arguably alter the fundamental cosmopolitan framework in which they are embedded. On the contrary, it is the cosmopolitan optic that allows even the most banal and potentially nationalistic renderings of Serbian / Balkan musical traditions to be appreciated as exotic, marginal, even subversive. This type of cosmopolitan attitude is not far from an increasing trend in transnational WM practices towards what Čolović (2006b) calls ‘the internal exoticization of the ethno sound’ – that is, a growing interest in the musical traditions of major populations (and not only of ethnic minorities living) in the West. Thus, by assuming the foreign gaze and cosmopolitan outlook, local Exit counter-space users can be said to exhibit the same propensity as their Western peers to consume various musical products of their own culture as if the latter originated somewhere else.

In conclusion, then, what both first and second paradigms underpinning the cosmopolitan musical projections of Exit counter-space have in common is, arguably, the discursive strategy of a distancing from one’s own ethnonational / cultural background as a way of dealing with what Goffman (1968) calls tribal stigma and spoiled identity. However, there is a substantial difference in how this strategy of distancing is managed in each paradigm and with what outcomes. Within the first paradigm, the distance assumed towards what is seen as ‘low’ (rural, nationalistic) Serbian/Balkan music-culture, and thus as a source of shame, is maintained resolutely. Here the negative aura of the Serbian stigma seems to be internalized and dealt with “from afar” (…), from the position of someone who is not encompassed by it’ (cf. Simić 2009: 219). Conversely, within the second paradigm, the distance is still preserved but is exercised more flexibly (for instance, using the discursive strategy of internal exoticization) so that the Serbian/Balkan cultural difference can be fully enjoyed. The latter approach clearly facilitates a positive reevaluation of the Serbian stigma, but at the cost of not challenging the problematic aspects of the dominant political and cultural paradigm at work in postsocialist Serbia (cf. Marković and Vujanović, n.d.).

3.3 (De)Constructing the West / Europe in the Reproduction of Exit Counter-Space

The previous analysis has shown that the countercultural, urban, and cosmopolitan production of Exit counter-space cuts across two major discursive frames addressed at the beginning of the chapter – namely, the discourses of discontinuity and of the dialectical unity of continuity and discontinuity. What seems to be central to both is the construct of the West / Europe as a very potent metonym for modernity and the
concomitant position of power and privilege. That is why this chapter ends by discussing the hegemonic discourse that equates the notion of the West / Europe with that of modernity. Specifically, such matters are debated first within the larger representational framework of geographical power asymmetries (as articulated through the familiar discourse of the West and the Rest), and then with respect to the geographical particularities of the Western Balkans, and Serbia in particular, after the fall of the Wall.

There is no doubt that modernity and modernization are, historically speaking, the discursive inventions of Western Europe. As Škorić (2008: 13) notes, these terms are used to designate ‘a type of social change which originates in the English Industrial revolution, between 1760 and 1830, and in the French political revolution, from 1789 to 1794’. Despite the fact that the repercussions of modernity have reached a truly global scale (Giddens 1990) resulting in what Eisenstadt (2000) calls multiple modernities, the notion nonetheless continues to be coded as specifically Western due to the enduring supremacy of Western countries within the global power-geometries. Moreover, it is through the discourse of globalization (as a grand narrative of postmodernity) that the existing hierarchy of places is once again replicated along the modern-traditional divide (see Massey 2005).

Relatedly, the notion of the West/Europe also operates at the symbolic level, specifically, as an ideology ‘provid[ing] criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster’ (see Hall 1992b: 186). By this model of comparison, Serbia as a non-Western society evidently ‘lags behind’ the West/Europe and must “‘[catch] up with historical delay” in the process of modernization’ (cf. Ditchev 2005: 245). And at the core of the latter process are exactly the values of progress and liberal democracy, on which the Exit civilizing mission rests.

Furthermore, a belief that one can achieve modernity only if ‘somehow culturally “Western”, by adopting Western religions, Western languages, or at least Western technology’ (Wallerstein 1990, in Dinç 2007: 96), is based on two underlying assumptions. One concerns the presumed universality of Western culture; and the other implies ‘that only the Western civilization among all other world civilizations was capable of transforming itself [in]to modernity’ (ibid.). In like manner, the appropriation of Westernness in and by the Exit counter-space – for instance, through the adoption of English as a lingua franca, Western aesthetic, cultural, and spiritual forms of expression, Western technologies for the spectacle production, Western discourses of (neo)liberalism, secular democracy, human rights, etc. – not only reinforces and naturalizes the presupposed universality and superiority of the Western civilization. More importantly, the connection made in Exit-produced discourses between the youth, future, counterculture, change, progress, and the West/Europe boils down to one particular branch of Balkan/Serbian Occidentalism, in which the notion of the
West/Europe as the region’s/Serbia’s Significant Other is imbued solely with positive meanings (cf. Chen 1995). As indicated in the analysis above, it is the achievements of Western modernity and its concomitant institutions of civil society, liberal democracy, and knowledge economy that are foregrounded in the Exit (micro)national imagery. Hence the Exit vision of Serbia is one of ‘a stable, modern, and democratic European country’, to use the same quote from above.

At the same time, the often quoted reference to ‘Europe’ (connoting ‘the West’) in Exit-related discourses serves as a powerful means for constructing a sense of continuity in both national and personal identity narratives of those Serbian citizens (and Exit microcitizens respectively) who saw in the 1990s a period of forceful disruption and discontinuity with the previous socialist era (cf. Jansen 2001; Simić 2009). The analysis above has pointed out that there is a consensus view among Exit proponents that the 1990s in Serbia should be remembered as a period of ‘insane politics’, ‘agony’, violence, and isolation. Let me illustrate now how this view is juxtaposed with nostalgic rememberings of the Yugoslav socialist past. According to Exit News (‘The History of Exit’, 2001: 6):

The beginnings of Exit are closely connected with the circumstances and events in Yugoslavia in the last decade [of the twentieth century], a period in which people, who were living in a relatively well-developed country during the 1980s, and were used to modern European systems of values, ways of thinking, and cultural patterns, lived to see their country sink into a series of crises, general misery and poverty, long-lasting isolation, hyperinflation, general lethargy, melancholy, air raids, and were forced to live under a totalitarian regime that aimed at destroying everything new, inventive, young and progressive, since it was all justifiably considered a threat to His [Milošević’s] ruling. (Emphasis added.)

It is also worth quoting an excerpt from a so-called ‘Open letter by the silent Balkan majority’, initiated by Exit in an effort to oppose recently growing interethnic tensions and fascistoid rhetoric across the Western Balkan region (see ‘Open letter by artists and public figures’, Kurir, 2016). The letter was drafted by an informally gathered group of prominent artists and public figures from Serbia, Croatia, and

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62 This is a reference to the Yugoslav hyperinflation of 1992–1994 which was, according to Petrović et al. (1999: 335–336), ‘the second highest and the second longest episode in [world] economic history’, and deeply intertwined with such contextual factors as ‘the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the ensuing loss of monetary and fiscal control, wars in the region, and the comprehensive international economic embargo imposed on the country’.

63 A reference to the NATO bombing of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.

64 For more details on the subject of reignited interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans, see for instance Less 2016; ‘Stepinac, Barišić, a street name after Budak, swastika – what’s that all about?’, B92, 2016; Zorić 2016.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying among other things that ‘[t]he evil core of nationalism [in regional leaders] succeeded in disbanding a once affluent, happy and just society, transforming it into a Balkan jungle ruled by the law of the stronger, the more primitive, more cunning, more unsightly’ (emphasis added).

Thus, the nostalgic evocations of the former Yugoslavia as a prosperous, just, modern European country are grounded here in feelings of loss of a sense of stability, security, wealth, progress, exceptionality, and pride that the previous state was believed to have afforded. By implication, the expressed nostalgia for the good old days recognizes in the former socialist order such positive elements as: the innovative form of Yugoslav market socialism (known also as self-management) with all its benefits of welfare state, the international politics of the Non-Aligned Movement giving Yugoslavia a definite advantage of diplomatic balancing between the West and the East during the Cold War era, the Yugoslav state project of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization within the state’s multinational administrative framework, and so on. However, what is assessed in the first quote above as the general proximity of Tito’s Yugoslavia to (Western) Europe seems to owe largely to Yugoslavia’s modernist narratives of progress in both economic and cultural spheres. Viewed from this perspective, the longing for both ex-Yugoslavia and (Western) Europe in Exit-produced discourses is, more than anything else, ‘nostalgia for modernisation’ (…) based on relative expectations and resentment at their non-fulfillment’ (Jansen 2005b: 160; for similar conclusions, see also Simić 2009).

That said, it is equally important to acknowledge that there is an actual continuity between late Yugoslav youth (as represented by its rock- and punk-oriented sections) and post-Yugoslav youth (as represented by Exit supporters) when it comes to both the content and the modes of their sociopolitical visions. As Spaskovska (2011: 357; 362) documents in detail, members of progressive Yugoslav youth in late socialism were likewise using rock and punk music-culture as a forum to express their antiwar, antinationalist, anti-system and pro-Yugoslav stands, advocating such values as ‘critical thinking, cosmopolitanism, openness, and personal autonomy’, as well as ‘free elections, a market economy, individual and public accountability at all levels, a culture of dialogue, and an internally integrated Yugoslavia’.

To conclude, for the production of Exit counter-space, the construct of the West / Europe does not solely function as a major source of positive self-identification or as a nostalgic flashback to the more ‘European’ times of Tito’s Yugoslavia. It works perhaps even more powerfully as an oppositional category to what is perceived as (Western) Europe’s negative mirror-image – the Balkans. This double logic of identity construction through the relational ideas of sameness and difference especially comes to the fore when the festival mission statements are conveyed in terms of what Exit stands for and what it opposes at the same time. As written, for example, in Exit News (Kleut 2002: n.p.), ‘Exit will continue to play an important role in the promo-
tion of liberal values [positive self-definition] and the determined fight against all sorts of xenophobia, primitivism and nationalism [negative self-definition]’. Regarding the latter, in part the present chapter has demonstrated that the Exit counter-space continues to constitute itself as such through resistance to the ‘Serbian/Balkan’ (i.e. ‘xenophobic, primitive, and nationalist’) side of the West-East equation. What clearly remains to be illustrated is: (1) how Exit proponents in their Occidental self-identification use the discursive strategy of internal Balkanization, or what Bakić-Hayden (1995) calls the strategy of nesting Orientalism, to vilify and exclude Serbia’s ‘Balkanized semi-Other’, embodied in users of Guča organic space. And vice versa: (2) what are the remaining discursive tools that Guča proponents utilize for dismissing and othering Serbia’s ‘Westernized’ users of Exit counter-space. These are indeed some of the key questions that will be considered in Chapter 5. However, a more urgent topic than this is the (re)production of Guča organic space – a topic to which the next chapter (Chapter 4) is dedicated.
4 Guča as Organic Micronational Space

Given its long history (since 1961), it is not surprising that the Guča micronational space has taken several different forms contingent, of course, on the political context in which it was and still is actualized. In the broadest understanding of the politico-historical framework within which the festival has evolved, it seems possible to differentiate between two main types of Guča micronational spaces. One was instituted and maintained throughout the socialist era (1961–1989) in the form of what can be dubbed a *space of brotherhood and unity*. The other belongs to the postsocialist period (since 1989) and arguably projects itself as an *organic space*. In both cases, the Guča promotion of Serbian brass band tradition came to be fused with the symbols and rituals specific to the political system of the given time, thus fitting neatly into what Hobsbawm (2000) refers to as ‘the invention of tradition’. Notwithstanding this, the present chapter focuses on a detailed analysis of core values and expressions involved in the (re)production of Guča organic micronational space from 2000 onwards. However, since the understanding of Guča organic spatial practice is impossible without reference to the festival past, I make incursions into the latter whenever the analysis requires so.

In addition, there should be clarity as to what is meant by the proposed concept of Guča organic space. Here I turn once again to Lefebvre (2009), according to whom the discourse of organic space is typically exploited by societies which feel threatened and insecure about their own identity. Accordingly, such societies tend to explain themselves in physiological terms, by means of analogies with nature and the body. As Lefebvre explains, ‘[t]he ideological appeal to the organism is by extension an appeal to a unity, and beyond that unity (…) to an *origin* deemed to be known with absolute certainty, identified beyond any possible doubt – an origin that legitimizes and justifies’ (ibid., 274–275; emphasis in original).

A substantial segment of socio-spatial practice in the Guča trumpet festival is likewise devoted to the vision of ‘organic’ Serbianhood. Indeed, it is through the Guča organic space that the Serb nation is imagined as a static, invariable, ancient, even eternal entity with a basis in blood kinship and an ethnically ‘pure’ core. Or put into the language of physical analogies, such a concept of nation generates the image of an *organism*, whose *head* (i.e. the national elites), *soul* (i.e. the church), and *body*
(i.e. the people) operate under the assumption of social equality, unity, and harmony. Let me illustrate below in detail how each component of this organic unity functions in turn when produced in and by the Guća micronational space.

4.1 The ‘Head’ of Guća Organic Space

The Guća trumpet festival has traditionally been ‘home’ to the representatives of Serbian political, economic, and cultural elites from both ends of the political spectrum (cf. Naumović 2009: 51; or Stojanović 2000, in Bieber 2002: 103). Yet, it must not go unnoticed that key festival organizers and its most dedicated supporters (among politicians, intellectuals, and artists) are predominantly associated with Serbia’s conservative political culture. This comes as no surprise knowing that the reproduction of Guća organic space rests on the corresponding idea of the organically conceived nation. What indeed lies at the heart of the latter, as Milosavljić (2002: 38) notes, is a belief that there are ‘ideologies (and systems of governing) which are closer than others to a people’s “spirit”’ – namely, those incarnating ‘the “authentic” governing regime, composed of people, church and elite, organized within the “natural” patriarchal order’. Moreover, the visual appearance, behavior, and rhetoric of the authorities involved in the festival production are all meant to ‘naturalize’ their relationship with the people by ‘present[ing] themselves as folk culture devotees, people who are of the people and with the people’ (cf. Lukić-Krstanović 2011: 276; emphasis in original).

In the same vein, every year the Guća organic space inaugurates a host – a title of honor bestowed upon a respected member of the community, who is given the task of welcoming festival visitors at the very opening of the event and/or at the finals of the national brass band competition. The institution of the festival host clearly replicates here the relationship between the nation-state as ‘home’ and the national elite as ‘host’ (cf. Milosavljić 2002: 37), reinforcing the view of Guća Festival as

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65 The notion of social equality is used here interchangeably with the concept of aristocratic vertical structure. As Milosavljić (2002: 160–161) explains, in Serbian nationalist discourse, the idea of social equality is based on three assumptions. One is ‘the unity of Serbs’, which presupposes the unquestionable devotion of the populace to a single idea promulgated by the ‘host’ of the nation (i.e. by the national elites). The other is ‘the social unity’, which insists on freedom fighting (that is, on fighting and sacrificing for ‘higher’ national goals) as the dominant trait of the ‘national character’, occluding thereby the existence of non-ethnic nobility and the people’s serf status in their own nation-state. And the third assumption implies the ‘centralized structure of the state’, in which only one ‘head’ is granted the right to decide on national priorities and to coordinate all functions of ‘the body’.

66 The two most prominent figures participating in the festival organization – namely, Adam Tadić as Director of Guća Culture House, and Slobodan Jolović as President of the Municipality of Lučani (to which Guća belongs) and thus Chairman of Festival Administrative Board – both come from the political party originally formed by Slobodan Milošević.
a state (i.e. Trumpet Republic) in its own right. It is also worth noting that the ritual of festival hosting was introduced exactly at the time when Serbia (and other ex-Yugoslav countries) witnessed the rise of militant nationalism and when the Guča space of ‘brotherhood and unity’ converted into an organic space accordingly (in 1990). However, as Timotijević (2005: 178) documents, it was not until 2004, as the popularity of the event started to explode overseas, that Guča Festival won the official approval of authorities and was finally integrated into the representational space of national elite culture. This explains why the honor of the festival host(s) was given from 2004 through to 2011, and once again in 2015 and 2016, to the leading political figures from Serbia’s conservative populist parties.67

What forms an important part in representations of Guča organic space are also the festival welcome speeches with nationalistic undertones, delivered by selected hosts. The glorification of Festival, Trumpet, and Serbianhood therein is at times coupled with recourse to national mythology and patriotism. The main underlying assumption in each case is that the Serbian Trumpet embodies the very quintessence of the Serb nation (cf. Lukić-Krstanović 2006). An excerpt from the welcome speech by Sava Rakočević (in Tadić et al. 2010: 333), a Chicago-based Serbian painter and festival host in 2003, can serve here as a good case in point:

That power, that sound [of the freedom fighting trumpet] (...) will converge into one, the Serbian sound, ‘From Ovčar to Kablar’ [the name of the festival anthem]. From the same village of Guča, it will also spread out, if necessary, to other Serbian lands, merged with the Kosovo peonies. Thee, the trumpet of freedom fighting, the trumpet of Dragačevo, the Serbian Trumpet, You are of warrior origin, but Your God is a God of justice and You will with righteousness freeze [and] stop today, just as before, all those who wish to wither Your sound, Your unsullied word and Your anthem, in which the word of ancestors lives and so it does the spirit of Serbia on the altar of Orthodoxy. (Emphases added.)

Illustrated above is precisely an organicist approach to the Serbian Trumpet as the personification of the national being, perceived essentially as ‘freedom fighting’ in

character. That the nation is understood here as an augmented individual with a specific set of character traits is most clear in Rakočević’s use of the term ‘trumpet’ as a noun of direct address (‘thee, the trumpet’), occasionally with a capitalized ‘You’ (see the second paragraph of the quote). Rendered either in its totality (‘thee, the Serbian Trumpet’), or in the particularity of its local patriotic expression (‘thee, the trumpet of Dragačevo), the Serbian trumpet-nation is claimed to sound unmistakably Serbian.

In general, the coinage Serbian Trumpet seems to enjoy wide currency among proponents of Guča organic space. For instance, some of the popular publications on Guča Festival, promoted also in situ as part of the festival program, use this expression either in the title (as in Babić’s The Story of the Serbian Trumpet, 2004), or as the title itself (as in Milovanović and Babić’s The Serbian Trumpet, 2003). Also, one of the festival longest-serving reporters, Bogosav Marjanović ‘Boca’ (1995, in Stanković 2003: 71), asserted that ‘the trumpet is a Serbian specificum [given]; it goes with the Serbian name as an adjective’.

It seems that the national label Serbian appears equally frequently in various descriptions of Guča Festival. This can be exemplified by the view of Nikola Stojić ‘Nika’ (2006: 12), a festival co-founder and active participant in many capacities, that ‘[t]he festival must remain ours [Serbian], and only then can it be associated with the Balkans or the world’ (emphasis added). In her analysis of the media construction of Guča domestically, Lukić-Krstanović (2006: 198–199) observes, too, that the notions ‘Serbian’ and ‘Serbs’ prevail therein. Building on her argument, I suggest that the underlying media depictions of the festival as ‘a one-way interaction among the Serbs via the Serbian trumpet’ only consolidates the image of organic nationhood nurtured in and by the Guča organic space.

Historically, the proliferation of the terms such as Serbian Trumpet, Serbian Festival, and Serbian Heritage / Legacy in the representational practices of Guča organic space was premised on the discursive shift in the folklore paradigm towards ‘[t]he model of the nationalisation of folklore’ occurring during the 1990s (see Lukić-Krstanović 2011). The emergence of a new socio-spatial practice in Serbia’s Guča Festival clearly necessitated new discursive means with which to assert the nation’s ownership of the brass band tradition and through that, to foster a sense of national exclusivity, continuity, and pride. Within the processes of ethnic differentiation in the postsocialist and post-Yugoslav space, the claimed authenticity of Serbian brass brand tradition fulfills in particular ‘a need to emphasize the difference [and perhaps superiority] of “our” [Serbian] tradition in comparison to the traditions of our neighbors from whom we wish to politically disengage’ (Čolović 1992, in Malešević 2011: 61). It goes without saying that the so-called ‘myth of authenticity’ is central to all nation-building projects and so is to the reproduction of Guča organic micronational space.
The excerpt from Rakočević’s welcome speech quoted above deserves further analytical attention as it promises insights into several other discourses that crucially constitute the Guča organic space. It should be noted first that the poetic imagery of the trumpet sound as merging into one (‘the Serbian sound’) represents nothing else but a wake-up call to the unity of Serbs (see the opening sentence in the quoted excerpt). The idea that the Serb nation can prosper and become strong only if united derives its great discursive power from the popular Serbian belief in disunity and disaccord as the main reasons for ‘the tragic historical destiny of the Serbs’ (see Naumović 2005: 73). In Rakočević’s speech, however, the idea of Serbian unity is interpreted quite literally – as the unification of Serbian territories. Hence the statement that the united Serbian trumpet-nation will ‘spread out, if necessary, [from Guča] to other Serbian lands’.

There appear to be two main assumptions invoked in this line of reasoning, both of which are crucial for the reproduction of Guča organic space in its most radical form. The first assumption behind Rakočević’s vision of the unified Serbian territories recreates the core objectives of the ‘national program’ formulated by a group of Serbian intellectuals in the maelstrom of Yugoslavia’s breakup – namely, ‘all Serbs (“ethnic right”) in one great state (“historical right”), with an access to the sea (“sovereign right”)’ (Milosavljević 2002: 64; see also Dragović-Soso 2002). The second assumption here implies what Milosavljević (2002: 322) calls ‘a small-scale imperial syndrome’, which was characteristic of all Balkan nationalisms throughout the twentieth century. As she explains:

The struggle for national liberation and unification created a belief among [Balkan] intellectuals about the legitimacy of an arbitrary, that is, ‘objective’ determination of the identity of the given population, and then of the subjugation or assimilation of the weaker ones, those that are on the way to ‘appertaining’ territories or to the exit to the sea. When considering their own national ‘law’, all rational and irrational elements – language, religion, poetry, history, ‘spirit of the people’, economic, military, political necessities and interests – were included in the arguments supporting their own demands. At the same time, the similar or identical ‘rights’ of ‘others’ did not exist because in the consideration of ‘their’ case, all the irrationality of this type of arguments was quite rationally analyzed, or seen as ‘enemies’, they were denied every ‘right’, for ‘patriotism’ had always been a sufficient excuse to ‘love’ everything of one’s own and to wish only best for it, legitimately and at the expense of ‘others’. What is therefore at stake when ‘others’ are in question is neither language, nor religion, nor history, nor poetry, nor interests; they are ‘admitted’ to one’s own national state and, by assimilation, to the nation, too, only to meet the imperial principle, a ‘great’ state. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, in Rakočević’s view, the Serbian claim to the ‘lost territories’, above all to Kosovo, is morally justified by recourse to the 1389 Kosovo Battle – a defining historical event of great mythical power in Serbia’s national memory, especially since the inception of its modern nation-state in the nineteenth century (see Bieber 2002; or Naumović 2009: 148–149). To refer to this ‘foundational myth’ of Serbian nation-building (cf. Hall 1992a), Rakočević borrows the common motif of Kosovo peonies from Serbia’s twentieth-century patriotic poetry. In the symbolic language of the latter, these flowers are said to have sprouted from the blood of the fallen soldiers shed on the Kosovo battlefield.

Historically, the 1389 Kosovo Battle marked the very beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s invasion of the Serbian principalities, resulting in the death of both armies’ leaders – Prince Lazar on the Serbian side and Sultan Murad on the Ottoman side. Central to the mythical interpretation of the event is Serbia’s defeat, which is celebrated as a spiritual victory and as a guarantee of the holiness and salvation of the Serb people.68 This spiritual component of the Kosovo myth also incited the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) to start as early as the nineteenth century to commemorate Serbia’s ‘Kosovo martyrs’, in particular ‘Saint Prince Lazar’, on Vidovdan, a religious feast day venerating St. Vitus and falling on the same day as the Kosovo Battle (June 28, Gregorian Calendar) (see Đorđević 1990). Closely related to those religious connotations of the Kosovo myth is a popular national belief in the exceptionality of Serbs as a ‘heavenly people’ – a people chosen by God. This is also why in Rakočević’s projection of Guča organic space, the Serbs are believed to be safeguarded and guided by the ‘God of justice’69 via the Serbian Trumpet as a ‘God’s gift’.

Moreover, the unshaken trust in God’s providence is what seems to empower the united Serbian trumpet-nation to ‘stop … all those who wish to wither … [its] sound’. The ostensibly defensive tone in Rakočević’s statement is inbuilt in the very foundations of nationalist thinking about the historical actions of one’s own nation

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68 As Bieber (2002:96) retells the story in more detail, ‘on the eve of the battle, Knez [Prince] Lazar was offered the choice between establishing either a heavenly or an earthly kingdom. Lazar chose the former, which prevented his victory the following day but ensured the creation of a perpetual heavenly realm for the Serbian people’.

69 Note that ‘God of Justice’ is simultaneously the title of Serbia’s official anthem, restored in the postsocialist era from the times of the Kingdom of Serbia (1882–1918). According to Malešević (2011: 101–134), the God of Justice anthem is, content-wise, consistent with the national ideology of the epoch in which it was created but inappropriate to the multiethnic and secular ideals of the (Serbian) modern nation-state. Construed as a sort of prayer to Serbia’s God of Justice, it calls for unity among ethnic Serbs, both at war and peace, and glorifies the Serbian liberation war past, as well as the expansionist politics of then reestablished Serbian Kingdom. Accordingly, the main function of the new-old Serbian anthem is, in Malešević’s view, to create the illusion of continuity with the tradition which was in fact interrupted for almost a century.
as invariably righteous and benevolent. Specifically, in the nationally colored vision of history, it is always Others whose past appears to be uneventful and seamless in its flow. It is also Others whose wars are ostensibly invasive and detrimental. At the same time, the history of one’s own nation is typically portrayed as virtuous and exceptional, as ‘a sum of the destiny plans conceived by “others” with the aim of destruction’ (Milosavljević 2002: 17). Being constantly subjected to what Naumović (2005: 75) calls ‘an alleged conspiracy of the malevolent Other’, members of one’s own nation are invariably understood as victims. In the Serbian case, as Naumović (2005: 75) specifies further,

we learn of Habsburg, Vatican, Comintern, or other historical conspiracies, which all supposedly relied on the ancient strategy of divide et impera (exploiting previously existing, and deliberately inducing novel splits), as well as of more recent presumed German, British or US attempts to secure victory against the Serbs by bribing them into political divisions, or by pitting Montenegrins against Serbs from Serbia proper, and, finally, the conspiracies of the proponents of one of the two or more politically existing Serbias against the virtuous and innocent true Serbs.

This prominent sense of victimhood in the Serbian self-narration links back to the Kosovo myth as an enduring symbol of the Serb suffering and appreciation of freedom. It comes as no surprise, then, that references to the myth have persisted in Guča-related narratives throughout the festival’s entire history. For instance, Živulović (1967, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 140) sees the cause of the lost Kosovo Battle in the fact that ‘[t]he Kosovo warriors were not able to hear the Dragačevo trumpet’, whereas Marinković (2002, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 23–25) mentions epitaphs dedicated to the Serbian warriors – the so-called Kosovo avengers – whose morale was being boosted by the heroic trumpet sound in the First Balkan War (in 1912). Even the initial festival production in 1961 was opened by a speech, in which festival co-founder and president Vlastimir Vujović ‘Lale’ (in Tadić et al. 2010: 117) reminded the present crowd of the great sacrifice that the local populace gave in the Kosovo Battle:

You are having an opportunity to see Dragačevo the way it was in times of liberation struggle against Turks (...), also Dragačevo holding tight to times in which four hundred Dragačevo soldiers fell in the 1389 Kosovo Battle. At the same time, you are also having an opportunity to see new Dragačevo, which gave in 1941 the most numerous and one of the best partisan battalions. (Emphasis added.)
Illustrated in the quote above is thus the importance of the Kosovo myth for the re-production of the political culture of freedom fighting in the former Yugoslavia, too. According to Kuljić (1997), the glorification of freedom fighting culture endures in the Balkan region as a common discursive matrix. The content filling this matrix is, of course, historically contingent, shifting from one set of political interests to another, be they directed towards the society’s breakthroughs or steps backwards. Within such a discursive framework, the inclusion of the Kosovo myth into the Guča spatial representations of both the past and the present is intended to sustain what has been perceived as the exclusive character of the Yugoslav / Serb nation, embodied in such virtues as heroism, martyrdom, and freedom loving. The Kosovo myth is also utilized, both then and now, to nurture ‘the ideal of avenge [as] an ideal for rectifying a wrongdoing’ (Mitrinović 1926, in Milosavljević 2002: 147). That said, in the Guča space of brotherhood and unity, the Old Testament-like structure of the Kosovo myth, comprising the savior (Yugoslav president Tito), the victim (fallen fighters), and the traitor (king-deserter Petar II Karadorđević), was well suited for fostering patriotic feelings and loyalty among Yugoslavs to Tito and the ruling Communist Party (cf. Kuljić 1997: 158). In contrast to that, the recollection of the Kosovo myth in the Guča organic space was primarily driven by a need of Serbia’s emerging political elite to unite and mobilize nation members for the approaching interethnic and interreligious strife in the former Yugoslavia. Unsurprisingly, the celebrations of the six-hundredth anniversary of the Kosovo Battle across the country in 1989 were given special attention and so was the case with the Guča festival production of the same year. The anniversary was specifically marked by a one-off staged performance delivered by the popular Serbian actors Lazar Ristovski, Jelena and Ivana Žigon (Tadić et al. 2010: 257).

The Kosovo-related narratives which dominated the Guča organic space back then, and which continue to fuel it today but without the previous warmongering edge, are those of the historical glory and longevity of the Serb nation. The Kosovo myth apparently serves here as a reminder of the Golden Age of the Serbian Empire (ruled by Tsar Dušan in the mid-fourteenth century), just before its fall to invading Ottomans. And this, in turn, provides the necessary ‘emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition, and timelessness’ of the Serb people (cf. Hall 1992a: 294). Moreover, presented consistently ‘as the quintessential embodiment of the Serb nation’ (Bieber 2002: 98), the Kosovo myth seems to perform the same function as the Serbian Trumpet. They are both instrumentalized in and by the Guča organic space (and beyond) as symbolic vehicles for bolstering a sense of national unity and pride, as well as for living out the nation’s fantasies of medieval glory before it fell victim to its historical and cultural colonizers (cf. Longinović 2000: 626). The power of the Kosovo myth has been rekindled nationally since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia (in 2008), and since the remaining Serbs and Serbian cultural heritage in the province
came to be perpetually under the threat of violation. It is no wonder, then, that different corners of Guča lived spaces may echo with occasional chants of ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ or ‘Kosovo will always be ours [Serbian]’!, coupled with sporadic displays of similar patriotic slogans on festivalgoers’ T-shirts (Guča fieldwork diary, Aug 2012 and 2013; see also Dubin 2012 and Loshkin 2012).

Finally, the organic relationship between Orthodox Christianity and Serbianhood, that is, between religion and nation, has not only been evoked through the Kosovo myth. As pointed out by Rakočević, ‘the spirit of Serbia on the altar of Orthodoxy’ is also being conveyed through the recognizable sound of the Serbian trumpetnation. Within the bigger picture of Guča organic space production through the symbolic trinity of the nation’s head, soul, and body, it is specifically through the Serbian Orthodoxy as well as through the symbols of Serbian peasant culture (including here the brass band tradition) that Serbia’s ‘soul’ is said to reveal itself. The ways in which this relationship is forged in and by the Guča organic space is what I explore next.

4.2 The ‘Soul’ of Guča Organic Space

There are two main discursive paths along which the idea of the Serbian soul comes to life in the Guča organic space. Just as two sides of the same coin, these two paths appear to diverge from the same origin point – which is romantic nationalism – and then overlap with one another by way of circular reasoning. Specifically, the first path centers on the concept of organic unity of church and people/state, whereas the other locates the national quintessence in the people’s language, cultural expressions, customs, and mentality. Included in the latter group is also the category of people’s religion, understood here as a collection of selected religious rituals and ceremonies (see Naumović 2009: 110). The concept of people’s religion clearly comes full circle with the discursive implications of the former concern with the organic synergy between church and people. This is clearly the point where the two discursive paths meet. Let me explicate now in more detail what are the traces, both tangible and symbolic, that each of them leaves in the Guča organic space.

4.2.1 The Organic Unity of Church and People / State

Malešević (2011: 71–100) documents amply the ways in which the extensive ‘Orthodoxification’ of the Serb nation and the Serbian state began to rise on the tide of ethnonationalism in the late 1980s Yugoslavia. However, it was not until Milošević’s downfall that the continuing trend of desecularization reached its peak point, in accordance with the strong anti-communist sentiment and pro-Church attitude professed vocally by Serbia’s new political elite. Either way, after more than four decades of the marginalization of religious practice in Tito’s Yugoslavia, the SOC
and its ministry successfully regained their power position and, in no time, people’s affiliations to the SOC institutions, customs, worldviews, and accompanying elements of Orthodox Christian culture have become important sources of Serbian national identification. Moreover, Serbian writers such as Čolović (2007) and Malešević (2011) assert that the main driving force behind the mass embrace of Serbian Orthodoxy by both people and state was not primarily of religious nature. Nor could it simply, in their view, considered part of collective and individual projects of discovering one’s ‘real’ roots and traditions suppressed or discouraged by the former socialist regime. Rather, the claim here is that the Serbs turned massively to the SOC practice largely because ‘this has become an acceptable and adequate way to publicly and overtly express feelings of loyalty to [the ideas of] Serbianness and Serbianhood, to demonstrate “the unity in Serbianness”’ (Malešević 2011: 77). Timotijević (2005: 177) likewise argues that the expression of religious feelings among local Guča-gazers has nothing to do with the Christian dogma. Serbian Orthodoxy serves here rather as a loosely defined ‘framework, within which (and sometimes beyond) each individual creates their own [understanding of] religion without fear of being accused of heresy’ (ibid.).

It is, however, worth emphasizing that the understanding of Serbianness and Orthodoxy as an inextricably connected pair has been cultivated in the intellectual tradition of Serbian nationalist writing for the last hundred years or so. As Milosavljević (2002: 50) points out,

the role of the [Serbian Orthodox] church autonomy in the Ottoman era and the people’s freedom movements are so intertwined that this gave rise to a belief about their organic connection, in which the church came to be equated with the people, and the people with the church, that is, in which Orthodoxy was made the ‘epitome’ of the nation-state tradition.

Of special relevance for the organic projections of Guča micronational space is the ideology of Svetosavlje [Saint-Savaism]70, which promotes ‘not only unity of the Serbs, but also unity of nation and religion’ (Pantelić 2005). Namely, it was St. Sava71 who brought independence to the SOC (in 1219) whilst his father Stefan Ne-

70  *Svetosavlje* is a philosophico-theological movement, dating from the period of the first South Slav state (in 1918), in which Serbian nationalism was more stringently identified with the Byzantine tradition, Orthodox zealotry, and Russian Slavophilism (see Pantelić 2005).

71  St. Sava, born Rastko Nemanjić, was a Serbian Prince who obtained the name Sava when he became an Orthodox monk. It was in the latter capacity that he established the Monastery of Hilandar, the Serbian ‘Mecca’ in Mount Athos, Greece. Having founded the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219, St. Sava was also consecrated its first Archbishop. More generally, the cult of St. Sava was built on the grounds of oral tradition, religious scripts, and national epics, all of them portraying him as a protector, ‘father’, and ‘enlightener’ of the
manjić (canonized as St. Simeon) laid the groundwork for the rise of the Serbian Empire. Hence for proponents of Svetosavlje, St. Sava remains a nostalgic reminder of Serbia’s Golden (Middle) Age when church and state acted as one. He is also said to personify the national unity – a credit he earned by reconciling his brothers, Stefan and Vukan Nemanjić, fighting for the Serbian throne. Finally, by fostering strong anti-Western and anti-Muslim sentiments, the discourse of Svetosavlje celebrates St. Sava additionally as ‘a symbol (…) of resistance to foreign influences and oppression’ (Lis 2014: 162). Exempted from the latter group is only ‘a pan-Orthodox world with Russia, the new Byzantine Empire, in the vanguard’ (Pantelić 2005) – thus, a world to which the Serbs essentially belong, as the vision of Svetosavlje would have it. It is therefore not a coincidence that the Guča festival host in 2009 and 2011, respectively, was Russian Ambassador Aleksandar Konuzin (along with local businessman Milenko Kostić). On top of that, Konuzin was also named recipient of the 2011 Guča Festival Charter Award for his ‘contribution to the development, realization and international promotion’ of this music event (‘Konuzin recipient of…’, Glas javnosti, 2011).

Examples of the SOC expansion into Serbian society since the disintegration of Yugoslavia are numerous and include such various phenomena as: a growing number of Orthodox church buildings across the country, the introduction of religious education into the national curriculum (since 2001), the substantial media promotion of SOC-related individuals, events, and themes, the considerable influence of the SOC in all spheres of secular life, the omnipresence of Serbian priests in events of both public and private significance, the adherence to the traditional church calendar and its cycle of fasting and feast periods, the celebration of religious holidays with slava (literally, ‘celebration’) as a prime feast day venerating one’s family’s patron saint annually, the burgeoning production and display of Eastern Orthodox icons and crosses, etc. (see Malešević 2011: 71–100). Almost all such phenomena are visible in the Guča organic space, too. For example, the very opening of the fortieth festival anniversary featured the commemoration of two thousand years since the founding of Christianity. Likewise, from 2000 onwards, concerts of Serbian sacral music and exhibitions inspired by Orthodox religious motives have regularly been part of the festival program. The elevated status of the SOC can be witnessed, too, in its power to impinge on the festival timeframe, since the former (until 2002) coincided with the fasting period (Todorović 2003). The festival ceremonial program also frequently involves the presence of SOC representatives, some of whom would deliver dirges or blessings dedicated to the persons and events of great importance to the national history or the festival itself (see Bojanić 2002; Tadić et al. 2010; Timotijević 2005).

Serbs. St. Sava is also regarded the patron saint of Serbian schools and students and is therefore celebrated annually across the country on the day which the SOC has set as St. Sava’s Day (January 27).
Let me finally list some of the religious regalia that the Guča organic space is filled with: stalls with Orthodox icons (see Figure 21 below), images of Serbian saints embellishing a variety of products (from lighters to beverage bottles), the crosses hanging around people’s necks (see Figure 22), T-shirts with the half-joking imprints of religious-national content, such as ‘God first, then Serbs’, ‘Thank God I’m a Serb’, or ‘God protects Serbs’.

Figure 21. Stall with Orthodox icons and other religious regalia

Figure 22. Guča-goers wearing cross necklaces

That the church embodies the ‘soul’ of the Guča trumpet festival becomes also clear from both oral and written recollections of the festival’s early days, evoked by local participants. In those reminiscences, an emphasis is placed on the church as central to defining the time-space coordinates of the festival setting. The common story goes that the first Guča Festival (in 1961) was deliberately held on the feast day of the In-
tercession of the Theotokos (on October 14)\textsuperscript{72} with the aim of bringing people, religion, and folk peasant culture into one symbiotic unity. Even though the brass band competition was staged in the yard of the Guča Church only in 1961 and 1962, respectively, this nineteenth-century holy building together with tent-restaurants erected around it continue to be regarded the ‘heart’ and the ‘soul’ of the festival happening (see Stojić 2006: 25). In the Guča organic space of the present, the importance of the church as the spiritual center of festivities is additionally emphasized by the claim about the subversive role it seemed to play in the socialist times. According to festival co-founder Stojić (2006: 40), the ideological commissioners sent by the ruling party to inspect the festival happening in situ, did not hesitate to disapprove of ‘the fact that the Festival was [partly] held in the churchyard and that the church was open’ to visitors during the whole time of the festival.

4.2.2 What’s in a Name? Semantic Implications of the Festival Original Name

The word \textit{sabor}, which is contained in the original name of the festival (\textit{Dragačevski sabor trubača Srbije} / Dragačevo Assembly of Serbia’s Trumpet Players), also has the evocative power of religious-national unity promoted in and by the Guča organic space. By comparison to its Bulgarian equivalent known as \textit{sŭbor}, the Yugoslav \textit{Sabor trubača} was likewise instituted as ‘a socialist-era reformulation of the turn-of-the-century fairs of the same name’ (cf. Buchanan 2006: 171). With regard to their originally religious function and significance for a given community, it was only the early productions of the Dragačevo \textit{sabor} that bore a resemblance to its forerunners. However, by its very conceptual design, based on the idea of the annual local/state brass band tournament, the Dragačevo \textit{sabor} was a socialist product par excellence.

More to the point, the idea of the organic unity of religion and people in Guča comes to the fore every time the festival original name is used concurrently with the related concept of \textit{sabornost} [conciliarity, unity]. As Đorđević (2004) explains, the main source of confusion behind various uses of the term \textit{sabornost} lies in the unwillingness to differentiate between its two semantic levels. One originates from the Gospels and refers to the idea of becoming one in faith, love, and freedom, as expressed through ‘the principle of universality of Christ’s message to the world and to the human’\textsuperscript{72}. Opposed to this universal meaning of \textit{sabornost}, there is a whole range of possible uses of the term, whose meanings vary according to the historical specificity of given theological and political debates.

\textsuperscript{72} The Intercession of the Theotokos, known in Serbian as \textit{Pokrov Presvete Bogorodice}, is one of the most important feast days in the Eastern Orthodox Church. It is dedicated to the Mother of God and her miraculous appearance in a church before praying people, whom she protected then with her veil.
In Serbia’s case, the term *sabornost* appears in right-wing political discourse where it is largely informed by the ideas of Russian Slavophile theologians from the nineteenth century. In organic projections of either Serbia’s national space or Guča’s micronational space, the discourse of *sabornost* thus consistently celebrates Serbian Orthodoxy as the one and only true faith; then, the patriarchy, rurality, and organicism of village community life (called *zadruga* among South Slavs) as an ideal model to be replicated at all levels of social organization; and also traditional values that are said to fundamentally characterize both Russian and Serbian peoples (see Đorđević 2004; or Naumović 2009: 101). The projections of all these into the Guča organic space are wide-ranging and indeed well-expected given the festival rural setting and iconography overall. What is, however, problematic about the proposed model of ‘organic collectivism’, in which all ‘true Serbs’ are inevitably Orthodox Christians, is the authoritarian logic behind its assumptions (cf. Đorđević 2004; Stojanović, in Lukić 2012). Thus, when the festival host Rakočević (in Tadić et al. 2010: 333) welcomes domestic visitors with the following call to unity: ‘Dragačevo sabor is saboran [uniting] for the entire Serbiandom’, he uses the term *sabornost* to paint an idealized image of Serbs as a one-minded people, united in their consensus view that Orthodoxy, peasantry, and tradition (each of which is equally foregrounded in the Guča organic space) are the only true values to follow. In this vision of Serbianhood, there is obviously not much space left for free expressions of political and cultural diversity inherent to any single nation.

4.2.3 Serbia’s ‘Soul’ in the Folk Peasant Language and Culture

As mentioned above, the ‘soul’ of Guča organic micronational space is also constructed through the discourse of Serbian village and peasantry. To analyze symbolic expressions of the latter in the Guča organic space, I largely follow Naumović’s (2009: 107) three-partite categorization of cultural elements of peasant origin that have recently been used in Serbian political discourse. These are, to rephrase Naumović: (1) *folk peasant language and literature*, (2) *folk peasant culture*, and (3) *folk peasant psychic traits*.

The ideal of folk peasant language to which the Guča organic space adheres seems to be cultivated through the parts of the festival program dedicated to the promotion of Serbian folk poetry and toasts. What even a brief look at the latter cat-

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73 Note that in this semantic aspect, the term is fully congruent with the ideological premises of *Svetosavlje*.

74 Staged recitations and publications of folk poetry have been part of the festival program from 1970, along with the cultural arts programs commemorating selected anniversaries in the national history. And since 1985, the event also features the competition of toastmasters (see Tadić et al. 2010).
category in one of the festival publications (Tadić et al. 2010) tends to confirm, is a type of rhetoric heavily loaded with patriarchal undertones (as in the lines ‘Thee, the host of Dragačevo, the host of the festival’, ‘let the soil and the woman exude fecundity’, or ‘let the Serbian people unite and grow in number’) and patriotic outbursts (as in ‘I toast first to the Motherland Serbia, courageous, glorious and most beloved, to the Motherland Serbia, to my homeland’). Content-wise, Guča toasts are largely tributes paid specifically to the festival, trumpet, trumpet players, and national folk tradition as a whole; or more generally, to the Serbian village, peasant life, and host culture, in particular with reference to Guča and the Dragačevo region.

Of relevance to Serbia’s folk peasant language and literature celebrated in and by the Guča organic space is the work of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1780–1864), a renowned Serbian linguist, widely celebrated for his reform of the Serbian literary language and for his collections of folk literature. The exhibition honoring his life and work, which was set up in 1987 by the Čačak National Museum as part of the festival program, can be said to bear a double significance for the reproduction of Guča organic space. First, Karadžić’s language reform cannot be separated from the early modern projects of Serbian nation-state building. Following in Herder’s footsteps and his theory of the Volksgeist, Karadžić made a vernacular dialect the basis of the Serbian literary language and elevated the folk peasant culture to the rank of national culture (see Naumović 2009: 128). The idealization of the peasantry and people’s tradition in Karadžić’s work, which was also meant to serve nationalist ends, is clearly consistent with the ideological premises of Guča organic space. Second, in Karadžić’s influential article Srbi svi i svuda / ‘Serbs all and everywhere’, all speakers using a selected dialect of the reformed Serbian language were proclaimed Serbs, regardless of their ethnicity and / or confession. This in turn provided the linguistic underpinning to the expansionist aspirations of Serbian nationalists and their claim to a greater chunk of territory in the Balkan region. Viewed in this light, it perhaps comes as no surprise that the Guča exhibition dedicated to Karadžić in 1987 coincided with the rise of ethnonationalism in the region.

Čačak is a Serbian town serving as the administrative center of Morava District to which Guča belongs.

The given interpretation cannot be, however, taken at face value knowing that the reception of Karadžić’s work in both local and regional intellectual circles has all the way been riddled with contradictions. Karadžić is, for example, considered ‘a traitor’ by some Serbian right-wingers on two opposite grounds – either because of favoring vernacular language at the expense of its literate, ‘aristocratic’ version; or because of the ‘failure’ to impose a single norm of the unified (Serbian) language, dialect, and script on all members of Western Balkan nations, harming thereby the realization of a Greater Serbia project on the linguistic grounds (see Milosavljević 2002: 169–170). Then again, for proponents of the Yugoslav idea, Karadžić’s language reform is taken to be a symbol of Serbo-Croatian unity (Naumović 2009: 107).
Other segments of the festival presentation do not seem to depart from the norm of standard Serbian. That said, listed below are a few examples proving the opposite. For instance, the festival is ritually opened and closed (by two selected MCs) with the same two rhymes emulating the spirit of folk poetry: ‘Dobro došli, dobrima došli! / Welcome, to good people you have come’, and ‘Sviraj trubo, svirala zadugo, za veselje i ni za šta drugo! / Play thee, the trumpet, play forever, for rejoicing, sadness never’, respectively. In addition, some of the Guča welcome speeches (as in Rakocević’s case illustrated above) and publications alike tend to evoke the pathos of quasi-archaic poetry. The latter can be exemplified by the following passage from a festival report (in Tadić et al. 2010: 252): ‘there was trumpet playing day and night, without stopping. And besides that, there were festivities of the people, of the Serbs, and spiritual tvoraštvo [ingenuity], and cultural podvižništvo [wholesomeness]’.

It should go without saying that the textual representations of Guča organic space intended for domestic consumption are entirely set down in the Serbian Cyrillic script. Examples include the festival logo, advertising slogans, posters, brochures, publications, and the like. The polarized meanings surrounding the Serbian Cyrillic / Latin dichotomy have already been discussed above in relation to the Exit counter-space. In light of that discussion, it is safe to assert that the Cyrillic inscription of Guča organic space only highlights the firm commitment of the latter to the ‘authentic’ origins of Serbian national culture – in this case, to the history of Serbian literacy and literary tradition that reminds us of the exclusive use of Karadžić’s Cyrillic alphabet in times predating both Yugoslavias (see Jelavich 2003). And this then in turn reaffirms the view of Cyrillic script as both the emblem and the bastion of the Serbian national being.

Significantly, the word Cyrillic carries the same semantic charge when transposed into the discursive realm of trumpet playing practice. For instance, in the anecdote from the U.S. tour with distinguished trumpet player Boban Marković, Miroslav Ilić (in Petrović 2010d: 4), a Serbian neo-folk singer of older generation, recollects how the audience (half American, half Serbian) was visibly unresponsive to the Marković brass band’s repertoire of international cover songs. As the story continues, Ilić could not help but intervene in the middle of the concert and advise Marković to ‘give [the audience] a bit of Cyrillic’. By the same token, another acclaimed Serbian trumpet player, Dejan Lazarević, confessed in an interview (Petrović 2012c: 5): ‘It comes most naturally to me to play Cyrillic’. The expression ‘to play Cyrillic’ clearly serves to designate what is commonly understood as authentic Serbian brass band tradition. Moreover, the discursive logic in both examples above follows the same chain of signification: Cyrillic = brass band tradition = authenticity and perennial origin = incarnation of the Serbian ‘soul’. Or as critically expressed by Ilić (in Pet-

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77 Originally, podvižništvo, or ‘asceticism’ in the name of Christ, is a term borrowed from the SOC discourse (see, for instance, the website svetosavlje.org).
rović 2010d: 4), ‘[o]ne must not stray away from their essence’, referring here to Marković’s apparent departure from the Serbian folk music ‘roots’.

Apart from the linguistic components of Guča organic space production, there are plenty of other art and cultural outlets within the festival’s overall offer through which the Serbian ‘soul’ may come to life. In fact, one can argue that the festival is in the totality of its spatial practice arranged as a sort of Volksmuseum, where a miscellaneous collection of objects (both material and non-material in form) is gathered to showcase the apparent richness of Serbia’s folk peasant culture. The objects put on display for the festival visitors’ gaze include, for instance, old crafts (e.g. pottery and ceramics, weaving and textiles, wood- and metal-crafts) and customs (e.g. re-enactments of traditional Dragačevo wedding ceremony and narodni višeboj / ‘popular (male) contest’), national costumes (both as part of the official program and in occasional use by festivalgoers), food (in particular, svadbarski kupus / ‘wedding cabbage’, and spit-roast suckling pig) and drink (above all, šljivovica / plum brandy commonly referred to as rakija), song and dance (performed by a great variety of folk ensembles, reminiscent of the socialist era in both composition and style)\(^78\), sculptures and paintings\(^79\) (see Figures 23 and 24 below).

When brought together in and by the Guča organic space, all these elements constitute what Ugrešić (1993, in Williams 2013: 53) calls ‘the kitsch of [Serbian] nationalism’. Kitsch is understood here in Adornoian terms ‘as a betrayal of historical situation’ (Morris 2013: 28). As elaborated in more detail in Leppert’s (2002, in Morris 2013: 28) commentary on Adorno’s theory, kitsch ‘invokes a past that is nostalgically misremembered; as such kitsch is a means to forget – but less to forget the past than the present. Kitsch offers consolation, not so as to change anything but to make the anything of the here and now slightly more tolerable’. And this is even more so in the Guča organic space, where ‘nationalist kitsch is devoted to Blut und Boden ideas of national sovereignty and exclusivity’ and used as ‘an “icing” to cover and sweeten the unsightly face of the war’s destruction’ (Ugrešić 1993, in Williams 2013: 52, 53).

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\(^{78}\) In accordance with prescriptions of Yugoslavia’s official cultural policy, the folk heritage of the country’s different ‘nations and nationalities’ was cultivated en masse (largely by amateurish associations) as ‘an important part of the modernization project and the broader ideology of “brotherhood and unity”’ (Hofman 2009: 186; see also Longinović 2000: 633). In the same vein, staged renditions of national folk dances and songs in the Guča micronational spaces of both past and present appear to be highly stylized and typified in form, reflecting regional and local differences as part of national cultural variety.

\(^{79}\) According to Tadić et al. (2010: 410), from 1961 until 2010, more than 300 painters and sculptors, either self-taught or academic, gained an opportunity to exhibit their work at the festival, either alone or as part of the associations and galleries representing them.
In addition, certain symbolic elements of Serbian peasantry, such as *opanak* (traditional footwear), *šajkača* (national cap), and *gunj* (traditional male coat), are not only deemed the emblematic trademarks of nationalist kitsch that fill the Guča micronational space. They are also recycled in Serbian political debates over the last two centuries due to their strong symbolism (see Naumović 2009: 87–88). Either way, symbolic linkage between peasantry and nation (the latter being understood in this
optic as the embodiment of ‘the People’s will / voice’) is made to seem natural on two grounds. First, being ‘the most numerous and autochthonous portion of Serbian society’ over the long term (Naumović 2009: 117), the peasantry is hailed as the economic backbone of the Serb nation. And second, the peasantry is also celebrated for the key role it played in the liberation wars and the modern nation-state formation (Timotijević 2005: 159). The latter explains well why šajkača and bridž / brieč trousers (with legs which are very tight around the calves to widen greatly above the knee) came to represent parts of national costume and national military uniform at the same time. It also explains why the politically charged symbolism of šajkača gained a powerful emotional appeal in the paradigm shift between communism and nationalism. A short excerpt from Danko Popović’s (1985) Knjiga o Milutinu [The Book about Milutin], considered one of the strongest literary expressions of Serbian ethnonationalism anticipating Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse, can serve here as an apt illustration:

That cap [šajkača] has always symbolized pertinent traits of the [Serb] people, their warrior tradition, their historical memory, their sovereignty and dignity. (…) Communists sought to obliterate šajkača, but it was worn by the Serbian peasantry notwithstanding. They knew very well that communism cannot go hand in hand with the Serbian šajkača, that’s why they sought to do away with it in all possible ways. (Cited in Naumović 2009: 82–83.)

What therefore lies at the heart of ideological representations of Guča organic space is an idealized image of the Serbian peasant-warrior, whose great deeds for the country, both at war and peace, can always be easily integrated into the celebratory narratives of the nation. Thus, the symbolism of the Serbian peasantry is deployed in and by the Guča organic space with a double mission in mind. The first is to convey the power of the people’s ‘spiritual’ aura through the discourse on, and the strategic display of, selected art and cultural objects of folk creativity. As indicated in the analysis above, it is specifically in the festival rural origins, setting, iconography, and sonorities that the nation’s ‘soul’ is to be perpetually rediscovered and recreated. In its second use in and by the Guča organic space, the notion of peasantry is associated with the very substance that the Serbian ‘organism’ is composed of. Rendered an indispensable work- and war-force for all major national projects, the peasantry thus comes to stand for the nation’s ‘body’. And how the latter idea moves away from the symbolic realm of peasantry to incorporate certain practices of local Guča-goers in situ, is yet another important question that I explore next.
4.3 The ‘Body’ of Guča Organic Space

This section first looks into how the ideal of the Serbian peasant-warrior, joined together with the military imagery of the trumpet, feeds into the dominant representation of the national past in the Guča organic space. In doing so, it revisits the phenomenon of freedom fighting culture in Guča-related discourses, this time providing a more systematic account of it. It is against this backdrop that the chapter proceeds then with the reading of local festivalgoers as constituting elements of the nation’s ‘body’. The link between these two domains needs to be acknowledged since the ways in which the Serbian historico-military tradition is understood, verbalized, visualized, sonorized, and embodied from above correlate, partly at least, with the desired image, attitude, and behavior of the local festival crowd constructed from below as the ‘body’ of the Serb nation.

4.3.1 Cultural Memory of Guča Organic Space

What in particular drives the production of Guča organic space is arguably the military origin of the trumpet and selected historico-mythological narratives of the Serb nation associated with it. A first case in point here is the festival opening rituals that evoke strong military connotations, albeit combined with ceremonial procedures inherited from the socialist times (cf. Lukić-Krstanović 2006: 190). The military character of the opening ceremony is specifically manifest in the festival flag-raising and the collective intonation of the festival anthem ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara’, played at once by Guča brass band players and accompanied intermittently with the cannon firing from the surrounding hills.

For users of Guča organic space, the moment when all trumpets join together in playing ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara’ is deemed especially meaningful. In their view, this is the moment capable of capturing and embodying the very essence of the Serb nation. Following Anderson (2006: 145), one could argue that it is through the power of unisonance that the joint intonation of the festival anthem brings the nation together and makes it sound as one united body. And more, music clearly works here to recast the nation’s past as its present, thus creating what Herzfeld (1991, in Bohlman 2011: 95) calls monumental time. What, in other words, music performs here is the memory work comparable to that of monuments. Or in Bohlman’s (2011: 95) explanation, ‘[w]hen public performance shares a monument’s space, it calibrates monumental time by drawing those experiencing music closer to the historical moment being memorialized’.

The monumental time-space evoked during the festival’s opening intonation of ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara’ does not, however, commemorate any specific moment in Serbia’s national history. Rather, it acknowledges what is understood here as the sonic projection of the nation’s image as frozen in time, spanning past, present, and
future. The monumentalization of the nation’s ‘eternal being’ through the collectively performed anthem is described accordingly as ‘the Promethean moment’\textsuperscript{80} for every true Serb. As Zoran Hristić (in Tadić et al. 2010: 195), a Serbian composer and otherwise a devoted festival supporter who coined the phrase, put it poetically, this is a moment ‘when the ground begins to shake beneath our feet, when the blood begins to burn in our veins, when our fists begin to clench to the glory of our love for freedom’.

It should be noted that the song-monument ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara’ endures the ravages of time but only when played in its instrumental version. This is the reason why it could perform the same monumentalizing function throughout the festival’s entire history (the song was indeed proclaimed the festival anthem as early as 1963). Conversely, the lyrical content of the song has been subject to constant change, ranging from depictions of Serbian military figures and events from the Ottoman-Serbian wars to the song’s longest-lived version dedicated to former Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito (see Đoković 1990). ‘Sa Ovčara i Kablara’ provides in this regard the most striking evidence not only of Serbia’s turbulent historical past, but also of Serbia’s memory culture at work. The version which is in use today tells the story of a shepherdess longing for her darling while he is away ‘parading with a military troop’. However, the fact that this version goes under the category of Serbian lyric folk songs still does not make it politically neutral. Considering the beauty of its simplicity as well as its premodern ethos, this song can be said to tacitly serve as proof of the vast creativity and longevity of the Serbian folk, which is precisely a viewpoint that feeds well into the populist rhetoric of Guča organic space producers.

Furthermore, the official festival program includes manifestations and museum exhibitions in which Serbia’s heroic national past can come to the fore. Thematically covered by such displays are mainly historical events in which the nation’s ‘exclusive pseudo-character’, above all heroism and freedom fighting (see Milosavljević 2002: 131–155), is pitted against the viciousness and feebleness of the Serb arch-enemies, namely, Turks, Austro-Hungarians, and Germans. Examples here include such events as the Kosovo Battle, the Great Migrations of the Serbs, the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, the Javor War 1876, the Goračić Upheaval, the Second World War. Alternatively, the Guča organic space pays homage to canonized figures in Serbian intellectual, religious, and cultural history such as St. Sava, Dositej Obrađović, Nikola Tesla, King Peter I of Serbia, Jovan Dučić, Dimitrije Tucović.

Notwithstanding the similarities of national historical narratives surrounding the Guča spaces of past and present, there is arguably one crucial difference in their re-

\textsuperscript{80} The figure of the Promethean hero is clearly borrowed from the Romantic-era fiction, where it symbolized ‘the suffering champion of humanity – a symbol of freedom and a deliverer whose noble ambitions had incurred the wrath of the gods’ (see ‘The Romantic Era – 19th Century’, \textit{Scribd}, n.d.).
spective approach to the past. While representations in the Guča micronational space of brotherhood and unity used to center on the communist-led resistance movement of Yugoslav Partisans with Tito as its leader, those of Guča organic space bring to the fore the rival (and controversial) Second World War royalist movement of Yugoslav Chetniks, led by General Dragoljub Mihailović ‘Draža’. That the Guča organic space actively participates in the ongoing national process of rehabilitation of the latter movement, can be corroborated by abundant evidence, ethnographic and otherwise. For example, writing for the long-running festival newspaper Dragačevo Trumpeter, Slavković (2005: 6), a prolific chronicler of the Dragačevo region and the Guča trumpet festival, maintains that Serbia’s ‘[b]oth [resistance] movements, operating also in the Dragačevo region, urged the Serb people to rise up and rebel (…) against fascist forces and domestic traitors’. Such rhetorical and ideological levelling of the Partisan and Chetnik movements clearly aims to cover up the following historical fact – that during the Second World War the Chetniks gained a notorious reputation for tactical collaborations with the Nazis, as well as for their project of a Greater Serbia, ethnically cleansed of Muslims and Croats (see Stojanović, in Lukić 2015). It is no wonder, then, that some of the Serbian paramilitary organizations founded in the wake of Yugoslavia’s bloody disintegration took for themselves the name Chetniks, considering themselves the only true successors of the Chetnik tradition.

More to the point, what came out of these revisionist incursions into the Serbian national past, manifest in the Guča organic space too, was the discourse of so-called national or Chetnik antifascism. As Kuljić (2005; 2006a; 2011) explains in detail, the legalization and subsequent integration of this discourse into Serbia’s official cultural memory began in 2004 and was informed by the ideology of anti-antifascism – the latter being commonly understood as a negation of universal antifascism and its uncompromising stance against all forms of nationalism, chauvinism, and racism. It goes without saying that the post-2000 vision of the Serbian nation-state

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81 The Chetnik is a prototype of the Serb soldier whose origins can be traced back to Serbian nationalist and monarchist paramilitary organizations from the first half of the twentieth century. They were formed as resistance movements against the Ottoman occupation in 1904 and continued to participate in two Balkan and two World Wars.

82 Specifically, according to Kuljić (2005), the rise of national anti-antifascism across Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans is closely tied to the paradigm shift from antifascism to anti-totalitarianism. Within the latter paradigm, leftist antifascism becomes demonized and ruled out as totalitarian in its nature, whereas national anti-antifascism recommends itself as the only true form of antifascism in the postsocialist rediscovery of, and search for, new-old ethnonational identities. In addition, the reasons for the waning of an antifascist memory culture should also be sought in the broader context of the changing world, specifically in ‘a general shift of the epochal consciousness [at the turn of the twenty-first century] towards the [political] right, normalization of capitalism, restoration of religion and conservativism, and demonization of socialism’ (ibid., 181).
necessitated new uses of the past, similar to those in the Croatian and Slovenian cultural memory introduced a decade earlier.\(^{83}\) The rationale behind all such instances of historical revisionism was, and still is, to make sense of ‘good nationalism’ and to stress national (in place of earlier supranational) underpinnings of antifascism. By the same token, with the endorsement of anti-antifascist ideology by the new Serbian political elite in 2004, a gap between liberals and conservatives in their joint opposition to leftist partisan antifascism was finally reached out.

The identity of Guča organic space is likewise carved out in opposition to and negation of the socialist ideology of brotherhood and unity that it used to be predicated upon. For example, it is in the present-day accounts of the festival history (see e.g. Milovanović and Babić 2003; Stojić 2006; or Timotijević 2005) that it becomes important to emphasize that the festival used to be regularly scrutinized by the Yugoslav communist party for the srbovanje [serbing around].\(^{84}\) Such claims are obviously exaggerated since there is mounting evidence that the festival was not only tolerated but also endorsed by the communist authorities altogether.\(^{85}\) Moreover, the Guča ongoing policy of distancing from the socialist past creates an aura of taboo around the communist version of the festival anthem (with Tito as its protagonist). Timotijević (2005: 104) reports on the irrational panic generated among festival organizers when this song version was played by mistake through the stage speakers in 1992. It was also on the occasion of the 2012 festival opening that Radmila Bakočević, an international opera diva of Dragačevo descent in retirement and the first

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\(^{83}\) In contrast to other national leaders from the region, Milošević remained throughout the 1990s faithful to the ideology of antifascism, not least because he was in charge of the state still called Yugoslavia. The discourse of anti-antifascism was thus a brainchild of the Serbian Opposition, who made it part of Serbia’s official cultural memory once they rose to power (after 2000) (see Kuljić 2005; 2011).

\(^{84}\) ‘To serb’, as Longinović (2005: 48) specifies, ‘denotes actions raging from celebrating the glory of one’s ethnic pain to brutally annihilating one’s ethnic others’.

\(^{85}\) Let me reiterate that the revival of Serbian brass band tradition in and through the Guča trumpet festival should be thought of as part of a larger Yugoslav project. The idea of the latter was to represent the Yugoslav national identity through selected folklore repertoire made of musical traditions of many nations and ethnic groups living under the same roof. That the festival was compliant with the ideology of brotherhood and unity can be supported by various instances of the festival production and reception during the socialist rule. Namely, the entire festival program was extensively covered by all major print media outlets across the Yugoslav Federation (Raović 2006: 9) and was saturated with references to Tito and communist ideology (especially in the 1970s and 1980s), as manifested in festival toasts, welcome speeches, brass band repertoires, various shows and rituals, including the ceremonial unveiling of a memorial monument to the fallen Dragačevo partisans (see Timotijević 2005). It is also worth noting that Serbian brass bands toured both inside and outside the Yugoslav state, and that state-owned record labels released their music on vinyl. It comes as no surprise, then, that as early as 1966 there was even a talk about the possibility of expanding the festival into a ‘Yugo-trumpet’ competition (see Tadić et al. 2010: 144).
female to fulfill the role of festival host ever, was similarly accused by a witnessing journalist of intoning the anthem to the partisan lyrics, which apparently infuriated some of the Guča organic space users and producers (see Petrović 2012a).

The changing attitude of festival organizers towards the ideology of brotherhood and unity can also be traced in the shifting content and names of the festival manifestations blatantly ideological in their character. So the show *Beauty is to Be Guarded by Beauty – ‘Comrade Tito, We Swear to You’* (1980–1987) omits the latter part of its title in the 1988–1990 festival productions to become replaced first with *A Thank-You-Note to Serbia* (1991–1992) and then with *A Word About Love and Serbia* (1993–2000). Since 2001, the show changes into a purely music event *They Won, They Deserved It*, celebrating the brass band winners from the festival’s preliminary contests of the same year. However, it is the festival’s unyielding grip on all visible and evocative trappings of Chetnik nationalism that spills over most conspicuously into the Guča social space, rendering its users the fitting ‘body’ of the organic nation. The starting point of the following inquiry is thus the question of how different elements pertinent to the Chetnik heritage and ideology are navigated discursively, visually, sonically, and corporeally in and by the Guča organic social space.

To begin with, šajkača, a national army-green hat adorned with the Chetnik cockade (see Figure 25 below), stands out as the possibly most distinctive visual marker of Chetnik identity among Guča-goers. The Chetnik cockade represents in most cases Serbia’s coat of arms rather than a skull and crossbones at the base of the cross. Both images are also emblazoned on T-shirts and flags (see Figure 26), yet it is the latter symbol which is more directly connected to the Chetnik iconography and its nationalistic undercurrents. As suggested by the accompanying slogan *Faith in God – Freedom or Death*, the ‘death’s head’ stands for the readiness of Chetnik soldiers (supposedly the only true carriers of the resurgence of the Serbian nation-state) to die for the homeland (see Matevski 2017). The connections made here between war, death and heaven immediately call to mind the Kosovo myth and its main protagonist Prince Lazar, whose martyrdom is said to have secured a heavenly kingdom for the Serbs. Glorified here are, in other words, heroism and freedom fighting, whereby patriotic death is understood as a purifying and ennobling act, comparable to Christ’s sacrifice and therefore divine in its nature.

86 And since 2006, reports on the museum exhibitions dedicated to the nation’s historico-military tradition are, admittedly, downplayed as well. What is at stake here is clearly another approach to the production of Guča micronational space to be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6.

87 Serbia’s coat of arms features the Serbian double-headed eagle topped by a royal crown, and the Serbian fire-steel cross on a red shield tied over the eagle’s chest (see Figure 26). Even though a republic by the Constitution, Serbia in 2004 reintroduced the coat of arms of the former monarchy (Kingdom of Serbia, 1882–1918), whose heraldic symbols are associated by origin with the medieval glory of the Serbian Empire.
Another potent symbol of Guča organic social space, typically flaunted on the bodies of festivalgoers as part of the festival fashion look, shows prominent figures of the Second World War Chetnik movement, above all its leader General Mihailović (see Figure 27 below) and less frequently the Chetnik vojvodas [commanders] Nikola Kalabić and Momčilo Đujić. All of them are venerated not only as Serbia’s great military leaders and heroes, but also for the national monarchical ideals underpinning their
fight. As expressed succinctly in its political slogan ‘God, King, Host’, the Serbian version of national monarchism is based on the patriarchal, patrilineal, and divine-right interpretation of Serbian tradition (see Naumović 2009: 47–48). Hence the faces of the aforesaid Chetnik leaders rarely ever appear in the Guča organic social space without the accompanying watchword ‘For King and Fatherland’, or ‘God, King, and Fatherland’. Arguably, this is precisely what makes the appearance of the Serbian dynastic family Karađorđević as the festival guests of honor especially meaningful in the context of Guča organic spatial practice. Specifically, Prince Tomislav of Yugoslavia, otherwise a great supporter of the Serb diaspora, the SOC, and the Serb military operations in Croatia and Bosnia during the Yugoslav war times, was a regular festival visitor from 199288 (Jugopetrol 1995, in Stojić et al. 2000: 87) until 1996 when his terminal illness and opposition to Milošević’s peacemaking policy (seen as a betrayal of the national Thing) made him a persona non grata in the mainstream media. His cousin, Princess Elizabeth of Yugoslavia, also attended Guča Festival twice, in 1990 and 2001 (see Timotijević 2005).

Figure 27. Guča-goer wearing T-shirt with the image of Chetnik General Mihailović

Displayed either on the Guča-goers’ bodies or on the festival stalls are, alternatively, the pictures of Serb war criminals indicted by the ICTY Hague Tribunal (see Figure 28 below). What seems to lie at the core of Serbian collective memory is indeed a deep-seated belief that these politico-military actors represent not only the genuine successors of Chetnik tradition but also the greatest national heroes of the recent his-

88 That was also the year that he permanently moved back to Serbia from his long-lasting exile in the UK.
torical past. According to Timotijević (2005: 182–183), these figures afforded new material with which to fill earlier ‘epic forms as well as the gaps created in the minds of people after decades of Communist propaganda’, in which the Yugoslav nation was portrayed as heroic in its resistance to Great Powers represented by Hitler and Stalin.

Figure 28. The image of Colonel General Ratko Mladić with the accompanying line ‘Everything for Serbianhood, Serbianhood beyond price’

In this regard, Bosnian Serb war crimes convict Ratko Mladić is somewhat of a legend among Guća organic space users (see Figure 28). For example, the continuing fugitive status of General Mladić sparked widespread rumors that he paid an illegal visit to Guća 2000 (Todorović 2000, in Timotijević 2005: 124). Furthermore, in 2004, festival president Jolović issued an invitation letter via media outlets to Ratko Mladić and several other then-prosecuted Serb war criminals, namely, Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Mišočević, and Vojislav Šešelj. In the invitation, Jolović expressly desired their presence at Guća Festival (Šaponjić 2004, in Timotijević 2005: 146). Exemplified here is not simply the stubborn and ignorant repudiation of one’s own nation’s war crimes, but possibly, too, the very workings of what Rüsen (2001, in Kuljić 2006: 295) calls de-traumatization. This concept is specifically developed to illuminate deliberate acts of minimizing war crimes that are traumas for a certain ethnic group (such as the Srebrenica massacre for Serbs) so that the latter can retain its pos-
itive self-image. The Guča organic space seems to likewise trivialize the recent Serbian war crimes by incorporating the names of then indicted Serb perpetrators into the repertoire of festival myths and marketing campaigns. 89

Admittedly, already by the time I set out for my festival fieldwork (in 2012), the festival images of Mladić and Karadžić as Serbia’s two most venerated national heroes had significantly decreased in number, not least because they had both meanwhile been extradited to The Hague. Notwithstanding this observation, the following diary entry from my second year in the ‘field’ makes a convincing case that the main values of Chetnik military nationalism still enjoy some currency among Guča organic space users:

Tue afternoon, 6 Aug 2013

My first extensive stroll around the festival market zone ends up in a curious encounter with a vigorous and somewhat pompous merchant of all sorts of Chetnik regalia. His stall is one of the last in a row on the way out of the village heading towards Lučani and Čačak. It doesn’t take long until he reveals his name and his disadvantaged socioeconomic status. Mr. Jovanović is a senior citizen struggling to make ends meet with his pension earnings alone. This is where the trade in ‘patriotic’ products, which he manufactures within his informal support network, has proven to be of existential help. Besides, Mr. Jovanović is deeply invested in his trading business, using his selling items to pass on the ‘truth’ about the historical injustices inflicted upon the Serb nation. I can’t help but notice that even his physical appearance – his rampant masculinity, tall stature, robust body built, full lush white beard, and tousled white hair partly covered with šajkača hat – conforms to every last bit of the Chetnik stereotypical image.

My focus turns back to the counter with the displayed goods, which I am about to inspect more closely while continuing to engage Mr. Jovanović in a lively conversation. The first thing that catches my eye is a black T-shirt with Šešelj’s picture on it and the tagline ‘Suck it – The Hague’, clearly a reference to the obscene language and insults that this ICTY defendant regularly hurled at court officials. I see no other familiar Serb faces from Hague Tribunal. My eyes are drawn instead towards the celebrity club of bearded Chetniks, such as Mihailović, Kalabić, Đujić – the usual suspects on T-shirts, posing with a look of grim determination. I humbly ask Mr. Jovanović to pardon a shameful

89 For a number of other strategies for coming to terms with the recent war past among ordinary members of the Serbian public, see Obradović-Wochnik 2013. It suffices to note here that the complexity of this process goes well beyond the conceptually narrow approach of Serbia’s civil society sector to ‘transitional justice where truth needs to be exposed and discussed publicly in order for reconciliation to take place’ (ibid., 215).
display of my ignorance about the Chetniks. ‘Who was, for instance, Momčilo Đujić?’, I inquire with curiosity. ‘In 1945, he saved 17,000 Serbs from Knin [a Serb-populated city situated in the Dalmatian mainland]’, Mr. Jovanović replies in a confident voice and then immediately shouts the question ‘Was it 17,000?’ at a smiling grandpa sitting on a wooden stool across the road. [Later on I learn that there are multiple sources of evidence demonstrating Đujić’s collaborations with Italian, German, and Croatian fascists alike – the latter being infamously called the ‘Ustashas’ – and his involvement in the mass killings of civilians and Partisan soldiers throughout the entire Second World War. See Radaković 1998.] ‘Oh, I didn’t know that!’, I try to hide mistrust behind a fake exclamation of surprise. Then I continue almost apologetically: ‘You see, Mr. Jovanović, I was taught differently in school and both my grandfathers fought on the Partisan side in the Second World War’. ‘Aww! Well, never mind, it’s not your fault!’ says Mr. Jovanović while giving me a look of condescending amusement. This immediately brings to mind memories of an encounter I had with a local Croat nationalist during one of my summer vacations on the Croatian seaside in the noughties. Having introduced myself, he commented in a similar vein: ‘Ah, it’s not your fault you must carry that [Serbian] family name, ok!?’. I continue browsing through the items on sale at Mr. Jovanović’s market stall. What grabs my attention is a stylized silver-looking paper knife costing thirty euros, then, a pile of cassettes with selected Chetnik / patriotic songs, and few issues of the Chetnik magazine ‘Ravna Gora’ [this is a geographical term denoting a highland in Serbia proper and the birthplace of General Mihailović’s Chetnik movement]. I buy a copy of the latter ‘to educate myself’ – as I put it courteously to please Mr. Jovanović’s ears [see Figure 29 below]. Also, displayed behind the counter is a huge map of Greater Serbia with the (in)famous Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line, thus entitling the Serbs to an absolute majority of the former Yugoslav territory. ‘Wow, I see you’ve also got there a map of Greater Serbia!?’, I note stupidly, pointing towards it with a finger. ‘Humph, that’s not a map of Greater Serbia, but, as it were, of Serbia!’, he makes it loud and clear, mildly annoyed with my question.

The Guča organic social space is not only charged with the above-described images and symbols of Chetnik nationalism, but also with a particular type of behavior and embodiment associated with it. As Timotijević (2005: 180) points out, the Chetnik iconography and demeanor manifest in the Guča trumpet festival (and beyond) are ‘in fact an integral part of the stereotypical image fabricated through earlier partisan movies, in which the soldiers of General Mihailović’s army are typically portrayed as “bad guys”’. Indeed, one might say that, image-wise, everything has remained un-
changed; only the Chetnik scraggly beard for some reason drifted out of the picture (see Figures 22, 28, and 30). Even the stereotype of the Chetniks as brutal, blood-thirsty slaughterers, running around with the blade of a knife clenched between their teeth, may sporadically be lived out within the festival social space – for instance, through simulated war-dancing within the circle of brass band players and festival onlookers (see Figure 30 below).

Figure 29 (on the left). General Mihailović on the cover page of the *Ravna Gora* magazine

![General Mihailović on the cover page of the *Ravna Gora* magazine](image1)

Figure 30. Chetnik Guća-goer dancing with the knives

![Chetnik Guća-goer dancing with the knives](image2)

If the said practice is a fairly rare sight to observe in situ, this certainly does not apply to the Serbian three-fingered salute (with the thumb, index, and middle fingers open) as another gesture evocative of Chetnik nationalism (see Figures 22 and 28). This explains why the omnipresent images of three-fingered salute in Guća go usually hand in hand with those of people’s bodies draped with the Serbian flag. Even if introduced relatively recently (in 1990 by Serbia’s then nationalist opposition leader Vuk Drašković), the three-fingered gesture contains vestiges of several semantic layers heaped upon one another with the passage of time. In her detailed genealogical analysis of this phenomenon, Malešević (2011: 135–147) distinguishes between three intertwined sets of meanings ascribed to it. On the first semantic level, the three extended fingers borrow from and lean on the concept of the Christian Trinity comprising the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. ‘The Holy Trinity’ thus works here as a symbol of Serbian Christian Orthodoxy. In its second meaning, the three-fingered salute symbolizes national liberation and sovereignty, embodied in the national figures of St. Sava, Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (a renowned Montenegrin Serb poet and philosopher, as well as a spiritual and political leader of Montenegro pursuing a union with Serbs and South Slavs), and Đorđe Petrović aka Karadorđe / Black George
(the founding father of the modern Serbia, 1804–1813). Alternatively, the salute’s implied trinity is personified by Miloš Obilić (one of the greatest national military heroes in Serbian epic poetry, eulogized for assassinating the Ottoman sultan Murad I during the 1389 Kosovo Battle), Karađorđe, and General Ratko Mladić. In the third and last reading, the three-fingered salute is paired with Serbian ethnonationalism in both its warmongering and pacified forms. There has, indeed, been a discernible shift in the discursive production of the three-fingered sign, urging its initially ultra-nationalist inflections to gradually dissipate into more benevolent proclivities. Specifically, the salute was at first used as ‘a commonly accepted visual expression of the “awakening, unity, and strength” of everything Serbian’, to become in the 2000s and 2010s an integral part of social mise-en-scène in public gatherings and celebrations (Malešević 2011: 140–141). In short, the gesture is no longer a call to arms but an appendage to collective outburst of national frenzy, usually instigated by Serbian victories in social arenas other than politics and warfare, above all in sports and music. According to Malešević (ibid.), the main idea behind the trinity symbolism is in all three instances invariably the same, and this is to foster a type of national self-narration which is essentially based on Serbian ethnonational exclusivity. It seems to me that the Serbian three-fingered salute holds a similar meaning and appeal when used in the Guća organic social space.

The embodied images of Chetnik nationalism find occasionally their sonic counterpart in the common repertoire of Serbian patriotic songs, chanted collectively in situ. Some of the titles from this music collection are, for instance, Tamo daleko [There, Far Away], Oj vojvodo Sindeliću [Hey Duke Sindelić], or Srpska se truba s Kosova čuje [The Serbian Trumpet Heard From Kosovo]. The video footage Guća trumpet festival 2010 (2011) illustrates aptly that the group incantation of such songs is part of a powerful bonding practice largely among male Guća-goers. More specifically, the footage shows a dozen of young males lying in two rows on the street, their bodies tightly clustered next to one another, while chanting together in a hug or with arms pointed emphatically towards the sky. Unsurprisingly, some of the hands put in the air are swaying with the three extended fingers. The song they are intoning is ‘Marširala kralja Petra garda / King Peter’s Guard Marched’ to be followed shortly by another patriotic hit, ‘ Ko to kaže, ko to laže Srbija je mala / Who Says, Who Lies That Serbia Is Small’. The physical proximity of the recumbent bodies and the intensity of sporadic firm handshakes and high-fives thrown by surrounding participants induce a definite sense of brotherhood-in-arms on the spot. Moreover, the entire scene is infused with a sort of national delirium that brings individual performers into one great galvanized body – the singing body of the Serb nation and of the Guća micronation respectively. The chanting trance of the (micro) nation becomes visibly amplified when a brass band walks in with other passersby and spontaneously tunes into the ongoing singing act. A supine position in which the patriotic feelings are
performed apparently represents a symbolic act of surrendering to the fantasy of national triumphalism, not far from the image of the missionary sex position in which one on the receiving end of pleasure completely surrenders themselves to their lover. The power of the described performance also lies in letting one’s ego disintegrate into and simultaneously connect to something larger and greater than any individual achievement alone. Ultimately, thus, the said act is about becoming one – the collective body of the (micro)nation – working together for the national Thing.

At any rate, my personal encounter with the phenomenon of Chetnik nationalism in the Guča lived spaces was not solely confined to the fieldwork observations of Chetnik iconography, behavior, and gathering places. I would also occasionally find myself in informal chitchats with selected exponents of this style and ideology (including the aforementioned merchant Mr. Jovanović). What kept popping up in the forefront of our conversations were familiar discursive tropes addressed above, such as those of Serbian Chetnicism, heroism, martyrdom, Orthodoxy, and so on. Let me make all these ideas more tangible by referring once again to my fieldnotes.

Sat night, 10 Aug 2013

After the concert of Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra at the Guča stadium, the festival crowd begins to dissipate. I look behind my shoulder and feel immediately drawn to the sight of a young chap in his early twenties, wearing šajkača and a black T-shirt with the overly nationalist tagline rhyme: ‘Da se Dražin barjak vije, ne bi bilo Albanije’ [If only Draža’s battle flag had kept flying, there would have never been Albania]. I approach him with the question: ‘Do you really believe in what your T-shirt says?’. Caught by surprise, the chap – Miloš turns out to be his name – responds hesitantly: ‘Hmm, so-so’. And then he goes on with greater confidence to unleash a tirade of patriotic clichés: ‘I’m a devoted patriot, you know. I’d lay down my life for this country… But the timing isn’t right for us right now. Everyone is against the Serbs’. Miloš pauses and then adds in a reassuring voice: ‘Never mind, all things will eventually fall into place with God’s help’. His last words ring in my ears like a record player trapped on repeat and fill my thought with instant sarcasm: ‘You mean, with the help of our Serbian “God of justice”!? ’ What I hear next comes as no surprise. ‘I’m a pious Orthodox believer’, Miloš declares with pride. This naturally makes me wonder whether he has difficulty reconciling in his head the internal contradiction between his piety and the carnivalesque atmosphere he is absorbed in. When asked to clarify the notion of sin in his belief system, he gives me the quick glib answer: ‘Rukoblud [an archaic and strange-sounding Slavic expression for masturbation circulating in the SOC discourses, which can be roughly translated as “hand-fornication”] and homosexuality’. After a brief discussion in which I
give my best to challenge his views on the topic, Miloš confesses that he was raised in the communist family, and that all his relatives are concerned about his ideological orientation which they feel is extreme. Admittedly, I feel the same but prefer keeping it to myself. This is all the more so considering his vocal approval of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party with Šešelj as its leader. ‘But you need to understand one thing,’ the pacifist in Miloš feels urged to point out, ‘I hold nothing against anyone... until the point those others start to mess with us, like Vojvodina’s Hungarians right now’ [a reference to then addressed request of the Hungarian minority for territorial autonomy in the northern province of Vojvodina].

The last point Miloš makes in the notes above is in fact a common way of thinking among many male Guča-goers with whom I had the pleasure to interact in situ. The patriotic sentiment underpinning such thinking was, however, captured most succinctly in the platitude ‘Voli svoje, poštuj tuđe’ [Love what’s yours, respect what’s others], which I admittedly heard more than once. This is indeed a relatively new catchphrase to be found in post-Yugoslav discourses, both official and vernacular. On the surface, the phrase is clearly intended to express the ideas of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between Us and Them. However, it may just as well operate as nationalism in disguise. In the case of Serbia, the proclaimed message of tolerance can specifically serve to obfuscate the tyranny of the Serbian Orthodox heteronormative majority over all other minorities in the country. Also, in situations of open conflict, the slogan allows its proponents to claim for themselves the moral high ground and justify thereby their hostility and violence as a natural reaction to the ‘intrusion’ of an-Other (just as in the quote above). But in the relatively peaceful and carnivalesque ambience of Guča organic social space, the saying is apparently utilized to project the image of the Serb nation as undivided in its historical, spiritual, and cultural self-understanding. Its use may also be a way to emphasize the claimed uniqueness of the nation which is ultimately seen as more spirited, honorable, and grandiose than any other.

4.3.2 The Patriarchy of Guča Organic Space: Idealized and Perverted Traditional Gender Images of the Nation’s ‘Body’

As shown above, the Guča organic space keeps the national cult of warfare alive largely through the imagery of the Serbian peasant-warrior and Chetnik brotherhood. This in turn consolidates a deeply patriarchal view of the Serb nation as ‘a strong, active male community of rural origins, dominated by men-warriors’ (Timotijević 2005: 156). In such a vision of the nation, men are thus raised to become national heroes and family hosts (including here leadership of the nation as a family writ lar-
ge), whereas women are to serve as an instrument for the accomplishment of a pure male lineage (see Iveković 2000: 13–14). Presented in the analysis below are therefore the ways in which this patriarchal ethos and a sense of organic collectivity come to the fore in both symbolic and lived dimensions of Guča micronational space.

Central to the cultivation of Serbian hero-worship in Guča are old local customs that remain a core part of the festival program. One of them is narodni višeboj – a popular contest in which men compete against each other in selected disciplines showing their physical strength and dexterity. That these attributes of manliness should become ultimately subjugated to and mobilized for the national cause, is indicated in the contest-related narratives of both past and present. On the subject of origins of this traditional custom, festival co-founder Stojić (2006: 185) specifically writes:

While the nobility trained their fighting skills at courts, the simple folk did it ‘in the mountains, by the sheep herds’. This is how young men came to learn to use the bow and arrow, and later on, the gun, but also various wrestling moves. They used to compete in the long jump as well as in the disciplines of strength sports such as stone throwing or wrestling. Through these contests, they could prepare themselves for the times of war against invaders and oppressors. (Emphasis added.)

The identical message seems to be equally relevant today, at least judging by the types of festival honors and awards that continue to be granted to contestants until the present day. Namely, the contest winner receives the title of harambaša [a Commander rank in hajduk bands; see footnote 28, p. 103] along with a cloak and a spear, whereas the consolation prizes include certificates, cups, and trophy knives (see Tadić et al. 2010: 323).

The prototype of the ideal national hero promoted in the Guča popular male contest finds its complement in the romanticized representations of female chastity and virtue in the staged reenactments of old Dragačevac wedding customs. Established as another hallmark of the festival program (since 1962), this ceremony is performed by national folk ensembles bringing to mind similar instances of folklore spectacles across the entire EE. Importantly, the wedding is in all of them apparently celebrated ‘as a symbol of collective national unity through music and dance’ (Bohlman 2011: 61).

The wedding procession in Guča comprises the groom’s and bride’s family members, best man, musicians, ende [women singing wedding songs], friends and others alike, with the groom and bride in its middle section, each riding their own horse. On the bride’s simulated journey to her new home, present men and women join in dance and song in compliance with the hierarchically structured gender roles
within the family and society at large. While men are drinking brandy from wooden flasks, firing the rifles and pistols, and carrying a spit-roasted ram with the long horns, women follow their lead in the procession and entertain wedding guests along the way (see Stojić 2006: 186–187). The bride’s chastity is symbolically emphasized by a long shawl covering her legs, as well as by the protective figure of the dever (the groom’s brother or a close male relative), leading her horse and swishing his baton to and fro to clear away a crowd of unbridled drunken male wedding guests. Before the bride enters the groom’s home, ‘she … takes a small [male] child in her arms (called nakonče), turns him round three times on all four sides, [and] kisses him in the hope of conceiving a [male] child of her own’ (Stojić 2006: 187). As Kesić (2005: 316) points out, the primary role of women within the patriarchal gender order is indeed ‘the biological reproduction of family and nation’.

The undiminished popularity of old Dragačevo wedding productions with the festival audience should be situated within the broader processes of retraditionalization accompanying Serbian wedding customs since mid-1980s. As Malešević (2011: 58–61) observes following Zlatanović’s (2003) ethnographic insights into contemporary wedding rituals in Vranje (a south Serbian town), the recent craze for weddings in Serbia is characterized by a return to and reinterpretation of old national/local customs. The wedding ritual becomes thereby ‘one of the most recurring means for public display of belonging to the national collectivity’ (ibid., 58). By the same token, the actual collective wedding ceremonies, both civil and church, have also become a standard part of the Guča trumpet festival happening (since 2004). Not only do they acquire the patina of antiquity through their immersion in the Guča organic space. More importantly, implicit in those traditional weddings is the ideal of reproductive heteronormativity as a necessary prerequisite for the continuity and vitality of the Serb nation.90

Serbian poet and festival host at Guča 2013, Dobrica Erić, likewise calls attention to the importance of reproductive activity for the survival of the Serb nation. In his welcome speech (see Dobrica Erić, Guča…, 2013; 4.50 min. onwards), Erić invites his fellow-nationals to make babies and simultaneously rebuke those feeling reluctant to participate in the project of Serbia’s rejuvenation. The nation is clearly envisioned here as an organism that can be ‘reproduced solely by means of natality and [that] exists as a “natural” product, while grounded in the century-old “traditional” ideology and religion respectively’ (cf. Milosavljević 2002: 196). Furthermore, Erić expresses serious concerns about seeing the Serbian Pride Parade (which he refers to sarcastically as the Shame Parade) march one day on the streets of Guča. It

90 That the national broadcasting company of Serbia, RTS, is also unanimously committed to the same ideal becomes crystal clear by the very names of two reality shows it airs since 2007, namely, A Forty-Eight-Hour Wedding (Emotion production; in 2011 the serial moves from RTS to TV Pink) and It’s Time for Babies (Nira F.T.C. and RTS production).
almost goes without saying that the dominant coding of homosexuality as a ‘national threat’ is a commonplace in nationalist discourse. There are three equally valid explanations for this expression of anxiety. The first takes recourse to psychoanalytic theories, the second follows the reason and logic of a patriarchal gender order, whereas the third links a widespread view of homosexuality as pathology to Serbian representations of the Occident with their corollary of hate, paranoia, envy, and defiance.

Specifically, Arsić (2005) discerns in the homophobic discourse of Serbian right-wingers the symptoms of what she calls the psychotic interpellation. Those so interpellated, as she explains further, do not exist as ‘I’ but connect to the imagined Serbian ‘We’ understood as

the spectral collectivity that speaks through [each of them] and says: the family exists only as the existence of national identity which is spiritual; the family exists as negation of the body, as pure spirit which is the spirit of the race: identity is always and only the identity of the bodiless spirit of the race. (...) [W]e are excluding homosexuality because we are excluding sexuality as such; sexuality is possible only as homosexuality; by insisting on so-called heterosexuality we are actually insisting on the pure, bodiless life of the spirit. (Ibid., 261.)

In the second interpretation, homosexuality is not only seen as a disease posing a direct threat to the biological reproduction of the nation and the moral purity of its bodiless spirit. Homosexuality is also commonly coded as male (lesbianism being virtually invisible or incorporated into heterosexual male fantasy) and frowned upon as a grotesque inversion of the heroic and hypermasculine image of Serbian patriots. Thirdly and lastly, homosexuality is presumed to have its place of origin in ‘a decadent capitalist West’ and is therefore treated as a specifically Western phenomenon (see Bjelić and Cole 2005). In consequence, Serbia’s right-wing narratives on homosexuality conflate the language of sexual pathology with that of Western liberal democracy, rendering homosexuality also “a life-destroying force,” directly related to the visible centers of globalizing power such as the U.S. or NATO’ (Maljković 1999, in Bjelić and Cole 2005: 298). Within such a perspective, homosexuals become the ‘enemies of Serbia’ and are said to ‘contaminate’ the Serbian national space as part of a broader Western control over and conspiracy against the Serbs.

In addition, the patrilineal nature of Guča organic space is perhaps best reflected in the view of its producers that the festival bears witness to the succession of fathers to sons ‘as much among trumpet players as among festivalgoers and caterers’ (Tadić et al. 2010: 323). The Serbian brass band tradition is likewise conceptualized as a ‘family manufacture’ (Bojanić 2002: 177), which is male by definition and thus passed on from father to son. One of the main reasons for the pronounced patri-
lineality of Serbian brass band practice certainly lies in the fact that the trumpet itself is traditionally coded as a masculine instrument, not least because of its military origins. As Järvi louma et al. (2003: 88–89) note, following Sachs (1968), Öhström (1987), and Järvi louma (1986), the trumpet is

one of the most masculine of all instruments in the world – in some cultures a woman can be killed after touching the exclusively male trumpet. In Western countries the education of a bourgeois girl is aimed at ‘pleasantness’ and blowing a trumpet did not fit this ideal.

Renowned Serbian trumpeter Dejan Petrović, otherwise the winner of the World’s First Trumpet award in Guća, followed the same line of thought when asked to comment on his baby girl Jovana’s undiminished interest in blowing a trumpet: ‘God forbid that a female plays trumpet! It’s too hard a work, too arduous. I hope my Jovana rather grows fond of the piano. That’s more appropriate for girls.’ (Milojković 2010b.)

It is against this backdrop that the arrival of female trumpeter Danijela Veselinović from Arilje (Serbia proper) on the Guća festival stage is received in domestic public with suspicion and surprise. Being the first and only Serbian woman performer and competitor at the festival since 2003, Daniela’s story bears a strong resemblance to the earlier (and perhaps present) experience of female musicians in the masculinist world of rock. To start with, the media coverage of her appearance in Guća clearly shows that women playing trumpet are understood as an ‘anomaly’ within the exclusively male field. The media headlines, such as ‘Danijela Veselinović, a lady with a trumpet’ (Top Srbija, 2013), or ‘For the first time a lady in the contest for the Golden Trumpet in Guća’ (Blic online, 2014) [both emphases added], only underline Danijela’s otherness to the masculine space of Serbian brass. Specifically, the implications here are that the trumpet is something alien to women, and, to rephrase Coates’s (1997: 61) interpretation of the expression ‘women in rock’, that ‘ladies’ appear to be related to the Guća brass world only ‘by being allowed “in”’. Another similarity that Danijela shares with women rock pioneers can be observed in the way she navigates her identity as a female trumpeter in relation to the masculine brass band discourse. For instance, her trumpet playing is based on a very modest display of affective and bodily involvement. A firm and still body posture all the way through her musical delivery conveys a reserved but domineering on-stage attitude, nor far from that of macha (cf. Reynolds and Press 1995). What adds to the latter image is Danijela’s plain and trousers-based outfit. However, this is not to deny the inherent femininity of this young woman, whom the famous Serbian Romani trumpet player Boban Marković called once, half-endorsing half-patronizing, ‘a little trumpet princess’ (see Petrović 2013c: 9).
Overall, the evidence presented so far corroborates the claim that the Guča organic space narrates, stages, and embodies the patriarchal phantasm of warrior-masculinity, on the one hand, and that of female chastity and fecundity, on the other. Juxtaposed with these overly romanticized projections of collective national unity are the gendered representations of the nation’s ‘body’ in its carnivalesque and thus perverted form to be found in the non-scripted lived spaces of Guča festivities. However, even when framed by the imperatives of hedonistic consumption and bodily excess, the construction and performance of gender difference in and by the Guča organic social space remains patriarchal at its core. The patriarchy here consists precisely in the fact that men are at a distinct advantage over women in the deployment of power.

Specifically, there are two fundamental ways in which male dominance is asserted in the lived spaces of Guča festivities: (1) through a display of rampant masculinity, transgressive vigor, and impressive stamina for days and nights of drunken revelry; and (2) through a conspicuous demonstration of material wealth. The latter is partly consistent with the hierarchization of the festival spaces of fun and play on the basis of the socioeconomic status of Guča-goers – namely, the more prestigious tent-restaurants, the greater power position of men occupying them. But more importantly, the ultimate measure of manhood is tested through the ritualized expressions of joy and pleasure. Of special relevance here is the distinctively Balkan/Serbian kafana ritual, in which a man throws his hands in the air and spit-sticks banknotes on to musicians’ foreheads or inserts tips into their instruments. Alternatively, the money is tucked into the cleavage or panties of scantily clad (largely Romani) females dancing on or around the tables. The kafana ritual is usually charged with the strong emotions of dert and sevdah – both words being adopted from the Ottoman Turkish vocabulary to specify ‘a muffled pain [of unfulfilled desire and destiny] which can erupt with mad and limitless intensity’ (Dvorniković 1939, in Longinović 2000: 629). In short, as Lukić-Krstanović (2007: 320) infers from the Guča festival media coverage, ‘financial prestige [among men] is proportional to the[ir] boldness in debauchery and proportionate to the[ir] consumption of the female body’ (see Figure 31 below).

Conversely, the patriarchal logic of Guča carnivalesed spaces constructs women as an exaggeration of the ideal feminine sexual object (alluring, submissive, and available for the male gaze and pleasure) to complement and make sense of the dominant masculine sexual subject. In the male-dominated world of Serbian brass and kafana-like carousing, the social roles played by women are thus largely decorative and subordinate. Women usually take center stage when flaunting their curves to brass music in what can be called the Serbian version of belly dance. The Orientalized female body in motion, with its seeming promise of unbridled sexuality and sensual fulfilment, makes the men’s imaginations run wild. The objectified female body
is thus put on erotic display for a predatory male gaze, offering itself in the place of the subject (see Figure 32).\footnote{The social expectations of women to fulfill standards of beauty and sex appeal are also entangled in the politics of Guča festival programming. For instance, featured in the 2008 festival production was ‘a selection of the most beautiful (female) Guča-goer’ within the beauty contest Miss Forty-Eight Festival (see Tadić et al. 2010: 360).}

**Figures 31 and 32. Conventionalized codes of gender display in Guča**

The most common way for women to assume an active role in the production of Guča lived spaces is apparently by adopting masculine attitude and behavior. It is specifically through the pursuit of pleasures traditionally coded as male that women come to assert male power. Instances of so-called *female machismo* include the debauched display of ‘good drinking capacity’, and perhaps more importantly the exercise of male authority and skill in the *kafana* environment. I was, for example, absorbed in the sight of two local females encircled by Romani brass band musicians whom they commanded to play music in squatting position. To make the musicians subservient to their wishes, the two women kept tantalizing them with the prospect
of financial reward by waving a folded banknote in front of their noses. Demonstrated here is clearly the female appropriation of a pleasure form rooted in the exercise of (male) power, even to the point of humiliating others. However, the model of female behavior which is organized around ‘a simple inversion of the male “macho” principle’ (Graham 1982, in Reynolds and Press 1995: 244) has long been viewed as an unsatisfactory vehicle for achieving gender equality or for performing gender maneuvering. As many gender studies experts (see e.g. Butler 1999; or Schippers 2002) argue, when women ‘do masculinity’, their culturally subordinate position may well be empowered, but the overarching gender structure remains intact. And so too does the patriarchy of Guča organic social space remain unchallenged despite sporadic displays of ‘macha’ bravado therein.

4.4 What’s in a Place? The Monumentalization of Guča Organic Space

Discussed in this section is a way in which the main symbols of Guča organic space – the church, the trumpet, and the peasantry – are made monumental on the festival ground. As I argue here, not only do these symbols chart the Guča place in the form of landmarks, monuments, and museums. They also represent the powerful reifications of Serbian nationalist ideology and attendant phallocracy as the major orientations of Guča organic space. What therefore follows is the illustration of those symbolic objects that bring all three major aspects of Serbian national tradition (historico-military, religious, and folk) to the fore.

As it has been established in the argument above, various narratives of the festival history and present situate the Guča Church of Sts. Michael and Gabriel at the nexus of festivities (see Figures 33, 34, and 40 below). In like manner, tent-restaurants temporarily installed within the Church’s immediate radius continue to be recounted as the festival ‘soul’ despite the fact that they were relocated from the churchyard elsewhere from 2007 until 2014 due to persistent disputes of financial and purist nature between representatives of church and municipal authorities. If this represents on the symbolic level one aspect of the organic unity of nation and religion, the other are two massive panels fixed on the front side of the Church building featuring over 569 names of its parishioners who fell in the First World War (Stojić 2006: 25). Specifically, the text engraved into the panels depicts the fallen fighters as ‘immortal (...) heroes of this parish (...) who laid down their lives for the honorable cross and golden freedom on the altar of the [Serb] race’ (festival fieldnotes, Aug 2013).
Importantly, the painting of the Church building, both inside and out, as well as the renewal of the Church’s iconostasis took place in the mid-to-late 2000s (informal interview with a local priest, Aug 2013). This is clearly yet another example of close ties between the SOC and the state. Indeed, not only did the new Serbian political elite support financially the renovation of Guča Church, but some of its representatives such as then Serbia’s Minister of Construction and Urban Planning Velimir Ilić, would also include a Church visit in their festival agenda (see Bojović and Milojković 2013b).

The ‘soul’ and the ‘body’ of the Serb nation are also organically fused through many Guča monument-sculptures, made and inspired by the creative ‘genius’ of the Serbian peasantry. It was indeed the work of self-taught Serbian stoncutters and naïve sculptors – notably by Radosav Ćikiriz (1823–1864) from Dragačevo and Bogosav Živković (1920–2005) from Leskovac (South Serbia) – that made selected images of Serbian peasant-laborers (less often peasant women and minors), peasant-warriors, and peasant-trumpeters eternalized in stone. The list of such monuments includes: old gravestones collected and displayed within the small-scale, entrance-free, and open-air Museum of Tombstones and Roadside Stone Monuments adjacent to the Guča elementary schoolhouse (since 1983) (see Figure 35 and the Guča map in Figure 40); then, sculptures by Živković and his pupils scattered around the park of the same school (since 1978) (see Figures 36 and 40); and the three-meter ‘mon-
ument to the trumpeter’ (Tadić et al. 2010: 416) erected in 1975 at the entrance of Guća from the north, also carved by Živković.

Figure 35. Museum of Tombstones and Roadside Stone Monuments

Figure 36 (on the right).
Živković’s sculpture of Serbian peasants

What, however, the Guća organic space commemorates most fervently is the trumpet and everything that this phallic symbol stands for – the glory of the Serbian military past, brass band tradition, and festival itself. To begin with, the Museum of the Trumpet (see the Guća map in Figure 40) was opened in 2010, on the occasion of the festival fiftieth anniversary, as a tribute and preservation site for narrating and illustrating the history of the festival through the years (in selected program flyers, posters, and photos), with a special emphasis on the competition part of the program (through a portrait timeline of Guća’s multiple competition winners and thus most renowned Serbian folk trumpeters). Included in the exhibition are as well many other elements of the festival program that celebrate the overall Serbian folk production (such as old Dragačevo wedding ceremony, national costumes, traditional crafts), not least the history of Serbian brass band tradition. Displayed as an illustration of the latter are also several trumpet showpieces formerly belonging to both older and younger generations of Serbian trumpet players.

Furthermore, Guća is spatially outlined by the phallic power of three major monuments erected in the glory of the trumpet, Serbian trumpet players, and brass band tradition in general. The most famous one is the Guća Monument ‘Trumpeter’ (since
1998), a work of academic sculptor Velimir Karavelić sponsored by the Foundation of the Brothers Karić (see Figure 37 below). Located in the main square of Guća (see the map in Figure 40), this monument-statue immediately became the key site of carnivalesque play, bringing together younger Guća-goers and a few Romani street brass bands, whose simultaneous playing of different tunes fuses into a joyous cacophonous mess.

Another trumpet monument-statue was unveiled in 2010 on the northeastern fringe of the village to commemorate Dragačevo’s greatest trumpet player and the first competition winner ever – Desimir Perišić (Figures 38 and 40 below). Dressed in the traditional national costume with the trumpet in his left hand, the figure of Perišić stands tall and proud, with a face of welcome turned towards road travelers heading to Guća from the northeast side. The statue was financed by public funds (at both republic and municipal levels) and cast in dark bronze by Olivera Jolović, a Belgrade-based architect.92

Finally, the third monument comes in the shape of the giant ocher yellow trumpet to be found on the southern outskirts of the village (see Figure 39 below). Given as a gift in 1975 by the Chemical Industry ‘Milan Blagojević’ from Lučani, the monument ‘Trumpet’ endures as a reminder of the socialist times. This explains why it was relocated – or perhaps better to say, dislodged – from the Guća main square to the less-trafficked end of the village during festivities. The monument dislodgment did not simply occur because the Trumpeter Statue took its place. Rather, there is every reason to believe that the Trumpet monument has been deliberately forgotten and left out of the collective memory. This is not only evident from the marginalized position it presently occupies. The monument is also left unsigned, unlit at night, and unspoken about in Guća’s tourist brochures.93

92 The other two most acclaimed Serbian trumpet players, each considered the founding father of a distinctive regional brass band style, have also been posthumously memorialized in their respective home towns. Specifically, the bronze monument-statue of Bakija Bakić (1923–1989), as the representative of the so-called Vranje style (in the southeastern region), was unveiled in 2006 on Vranje’s Freedom Square, whereas Raka Kostić (1927–1994), as the representative of the so-called Vlach style (in the northeastern region), has a memorial stone in his hometown of Lukovo (see Tadić et al. 2010: 416).

93 Other festival- and trumpet-related memorials include: 1) the marble panel (since 1996) attached to the façade of the Guća Culture House building with the engraved names of Trumpet Masters; 2) the two-meter memorial fountain ‘Trumpet’ (since 1999), a gift by two local businessmen, Milenko Kostić from Čačak and Milenko Surudžić from Guća, located in the center of Guća; and 3) the mosaic with the trumpet motif and other decorative ornamentation on the kafana building across Guća Culture House, designed by visual artist Božidar Prodanović (see Tadić et al. 2010: 416).
Figure 37. Monument ‘Trumpeter’

Figure 38. Monument to Desimir Perišić

Figure 39. Monument ‘Trumpet’
Equally fallen into oblivion are the monuments honoring the Antifascist Partisan Resistance in the Second World War, which I accidentally came across while strolling through Guča. Examples here include bronze busts of so-called People’s heroes of Yugoslavia such as Branislav Obradović ‘Džambo’ (1920–1942), Dušan Ječmenić (1909–1943), or Bogdan Kapelan (1914–1941); then, a memorial to the fallen Dragačevo Partisan ‘soldiers and victims of fascist terror’ with the communist symbol of the Red Star jutting out (in the park of the Guča elementary school); or a modernist monument – comprising a large spherical hole made in the ocher stone slab with the rhomboid metallic figure in the center – with the engraved Star, Rifle, and Sickle as another set of symbols representing the values of Communist revolutionary struggle in the Second World War (in the patio adjoining the newly refurbished and centrally located hotel Nordik-Guča; see the map below). None of them is any longer ‘the places of remembrance’, but rather ‘the witnesses of oblivion’ that hold no meaning...
since ‘they are completely pushed out of [Serbian national] consciousness and exist only as [pieces of] stone’ (see Milošević and Stojanović, in Karabeg 2012).

More meaningful for the present national identity narratives is, by contrast, a sandstone pillar-shaped memorial-fountain commemorating Dragačevo ‘freedom fighters’ in the recent Yugoslav wars, including the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Engraved into the memorial-fountain are specifically the names of nine Dragačevo soldiers who, according to the accompanying text, fell for the ‘freedom of the Fatherland’ performing their honorable duty to the country from 1991 until 2000. Interestingly, this new place of remembrance occupies the same little green oasis as two forsaken busts of Partisan heroes – namely, at the cross section between Miloš Obilić Street and that of Republike (see the map above). However, these two grim relics of the unwanted past, even if spatially juxtaposed with the recent memorial, are clearly overshadowed by the greater symbolic power of the latter.

To sum up, then, the monuments and memorials that came to be venerated in and by the Guča organic space seem to be nothing more than the inscriptions of patriarchal power facilitated by the enduring ideology of Serbian nationalism. As illustrated above, the dominance of the male principle in the Guča organic space emerges from the unity of the SOC (as the nation’s spiritual Father), the state (represented by the Serbian new elite as the nation’s ideological Father), and the people (represented by the Serbian peasantry as the nation’s labor, warfare, and creative force). The phallic enterprise of Guča’s Symbolic Order, to use Lacan’s terminology, results ultimately in the production of what Lefebvre (2009) calls masculine space. As he clarifies:

The Phallus is seen. The female genital organ, representing the world, remains hidden. The prestigious Phallus, symbol of power and fecundity, forces its way into view by becoming erect. In the space to come, where the eye would usurp so many privileges, it would fall to the Phallus to receive or produce them. The eye in question would be that of God, that of the Father or that of the Leader. A space in which this eye laid hold of whatever served its purpose would also be a space of force, of violence, of power restrained by nothing but the limitations of its means. This was to be the space of the triune God, the space of kings, no longer the space of cryptic signs but rather the space of the written word and the rule of history. The space, too, of military violence – and hence a masculine space. (Ibid., 262; emphasis in original.)

Significantly, the (dominated) spaces of Guča representation are also infused with phallic symbols. For example, on the occasion of the forty-ninth Guča festival production (in 2009), Radoslav Grujović, a middle-aged tinsmith from the nearby village Lunjevica (Municipality of Gornji Milanovac), put together a giant steel trumpet
on one of Guča’s surrounding hills (see Figure 41 below). One of the ideas behind this eccentric project was, in Grujović’s words, to move his trumpet-sculpture to Ravnina Gora (a gathering place of Serbian Chetniks) after its exhibition at Guča 2009 (see Otašević 2009). Symbolically, then, Grujović’s temporary artistic intervention in the Guča place did not afford any diversions from the dominant ideology of Guča organic space into which it was interpolated. On the contrary, it only served to reproduce and reinforce the same corpus of meanings within the prevailing discourse of Serbian nationalism to be found in the creative ‘genius’ of Serbian people and the nationalism-driven revisions of the Serbian antifascist past.

Figure 41. Temporarily installed trumpet-sculpture by a local Guča-goer

The fixation of Guča lived spaces on the phallus as a source of male power also shows in creative and humorous uses of the symbolic penis. In such cases, the ‘penis’ as the very epitome of the phallic power seems to stand in for other symbols of patriarchal authority in the Guča organic space. For instance, while waiting at one of the festival food stalls for pljeskavica (a Serbian version of hamburger) to be grilled and served

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94 Let me also add that this twenty-two-meter-long and three-meter-wide trumpet contains eight sleeping cabins. As FoNet (‘The largest trumpet…’, Večernje novosti, 2009) reports, ‘‘‘[s]leeping cabins are intended in advance for [the politicians] Velimir Ilić, Boris Tadić, Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin, in case they come round, but also for good friends and neighbors’’, Grujović stated. The sleeping cabins intended for Velimir Ilić and Boris Tadić are given five stars each, and for Obama and Putin four stars each, while neighbors and friends are to be accommodated in the cabins with two stars. (...) “If I consider selling this trumpet, I’d sell it as an idea rather than as a material, and the price wouldn’t be less than 10,000 euros”, Grujović specified. The quoted extract is indeed revealing on several grounds. First, it shows that the festival commercialization has awakened the entrepreneurial spirit amongst the general Serb population. Second, it also points towards the micropolitical ramifications of Serbia’s foreign policy ‘both Kosovo and the EU’ launched by Boris Tadić during his second-term presidency (2008–2012). Not only has such a policy neutralized the relevance of the earlier ideological struggle in the Serbian political life, but it has also fostered a way of thinking that all money is good money, since profit-seeking apparently has no ideology. In any case, this explains Grujović’s welcoming attitude towards both left-center and right-center (i.e. Tadić and Ilić), that is, both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (i.e. Obama and Putin) political representatives.
to me, I noticed several humanoid figurines of both sexes made of various vegetables, exposed as decoration. What caught my eye immediately was the disproportionately big carrot penis (clearly in erection) affixed to the male figurine (fieldwork observation, 2013). On another occasion, I was observing the festival crowd carousing in one of numerous tent-restaurants cramming the streets of Guča. At one table was a group of eight tipsy chaps standing on chairs and singing *kafana* (folksy) songs to the live band playing. One of the group members was costumed in green curly wig and white apron with a flap stitched across the genital area, saying in green printed letters ‘why do women love me...’ After a while the apron-wearer turned the flap around. What jumped out like the clown out of the box was the giant erect penis made of sponge (fieldwork observation, 2012). It goes without saying that these and similar instances of penis jokes are part of carnivalesque pleasures to be found in lived spaces of almost any public festivities. However, when framed by the discourse of Serbian nationalism, the celebration of the symbolic penis in the Guča organic social space can be said to reinforce the dominance of the male principle and its nationalist implications. And just as phallocracy is central to the reproduction of Guča organic space, so is the notion of *izvor* to its musical projections. What I mean by the latter is elaborated in full below.

### 4.5 The Central Role of ‘Izvor’ in Musical Imaginings of Guča Organic Space

The idea of the *izvor* (literally, the ‘wellspring’) of tradition is central to the musical projections of Guča organic space and is inbuilt in the very conceptual foundations of the festival. To corroborate this claim, the present section opens with a discussion on two main driving forces behind the festival’s foundation and development – forces that are at the same time indicative of its micronational premises. The first arguably pertains to the fact that Guča Festival was initiated as a folk revival, whereas the second implicates the early ambition of festival organizers to create a specifically Serbian brass band idiom. The following subsection delves in greater detail into this matter by looking into the historical and ideological construction of the Guča *izvor*.

#### 4.5.1 The Roots and Ideological Premises of the ‘Izvor’ of Serbian Brass Band Tradition

The idea to restore the vanishing brass band tradition and collective cultural practice in the Dragačevő region came from a group of Serbian intellectuals and academics
gathered around the Guča Cultural-Educational Community95 (see Milovanović and Babić 2003: 135–139). As Reynolds (2011: 206) following ethnomusicologist Livingston (1999) points out, ‘music revivals are generally middle-class phenomena that construct a collective identity for individuals “disaffected with aspects of contemporary life”’. Indeed, the efforts of Guča revivalists to breathe life into the declining local brass band practice were based on the belief that an organic communal space in Serbian villages disintegrated under the wave of Yugoslav industrialization and modernization advancing rapidly at the time. In the sphere of culture, such processes were apparently reflected in the growing popularity of cultural products of the local music industry, in particular of newly-composed folk music (NCFM). In the narratives surrounding the festival foundation, the said genre was deemed largely responsible for a decline of ‘an old, uncorrupt song’ and the country’s cultural heritage in general. As Zdravković (1962, in Stojić et al. 2000: 56) wrote back in the days, ‘[t]his massively spread, negative musical activity [i.e. NCFM] significantly deforms [cultural] taste and results in the creation of some sort of new folklore in a distorted form’.

The Guča brass band revival was recommended instead as an authentic alternative to ever more ‘imitative and reproductive’ folk art, with a view to becoming a new-old tradition. Not only were in such views incorporated all assumptions upon which a folk aesthetic rests, namely, those about folk music as a music created and consumed ‘live’ by indigenous community members, a music uncorrupted by modern influences, orally transmitted and thus canonized through a process of self-selection by the ‘people’ themselves (see Carlin 2004). Moreover, the revivalist discourse of Guča authenticity bore a strong resemblance to that in the first British folk revival from the early twentieth century (cf. Anderton 2006: 106–108). In both cases, it was entangled with Herder’s romantic notion of the Volk and the idea that it is in folk music that the pristine cultural core of a people (still unspoiled by ‘society’) resides. And because for romantic nationalists, ‘[t]he folk constituted the collective actors of the nation, and the culture they shared (...) comprised the history of the nation realized from bottom up’ (Bohlman 2011: 29), the early conceptualization of folk music in Europe was inevitably nationalistic in tone. The exact same approach to the culture of the Volk was also embraced by Guča revivalists. In their views, the significance of folk tradition for preserving the essence, continuity, morality, and vitality of the nation was particularly highlighted (see Milovanović and Babić 2003: 135–139). This recourse to the ideology of romantic nationalism, which presupposes an unmediated relationship between the Volk and folk music, persists in Guča-related narratives and practices to the present day. And it is upon these bases that Guča Festival continues to recreate itself as a micronational space.

95 In the former Yugoslavia, such institutions were set up to secure the socialist development of cultural life in rural communities.
Equally importantly, since its modest beginning with four competing local brass bands (in 1961), the Guča trumpet festival grew rapidly to represent, before long, the regional diversity of what can be dubbed the Serbian brass band tradition. Already at Guča 1963, the brass band competition was expanded to include three distinctive and territory-bound musical styles: (1) Zlatibor-Dragačevo style (in the southwestern region), (2) Vlach style (in the northeastern region), and (3) Vranje style (in the southeastern region) (see e.g. Dević 2000, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 229–231). And from 2010, the competition has also been joined by brass bands coming from Serbia’s northern province Vojvodina (Tadić et al. 2010: 85; see also Otašević 2015). In presenting a variety of brass band styles along the regional axes, Guča Festival replicates the hegemonic power of the nation-state to map, classify, and subsume the invariably heterogeneous cultural field within its overarching framework. It is arguably through this capacity to construct national identity in relation to one segment of the country’s overall cultural production that Guča once again authorizes itself as a micronational space par excellence.

Underlying this heterogeneity in Serbian brass band practice are certain basic traits of village musicianship that had already been in place before the advent of socialism. As Buchanan (2006: 81–82) explains in the comparable case of Bulgarian music folklore,

Under socialism, these traits were reinterpreted and romanticized as the izvor ... of tradition ... and authenticity (...). All post-1944 folkloric activities, including ensembles, were conceptualized as evolving from this construct and measured in reference to its properties, which were perceived as timeless and universal attributes of Bulgarian identity.

The izvor of Yugoslav / Serbian tradition likewise amounted to such traits as ‘purity of language and artistic expression, noble simplicity and wisdom’ (Vidić Rasmussen 2002: n.p.). On top of that, the adherence to regional distinctions was and is still largely decisive in assessing whether one’s folk music-making and performance is to be considered traditional and authentic (cf. Buchanan 2006: 81). The same criterion applies to the aesthetic evaluation and ranking of Serbian brass bands competing at Guča Festival. Moreover, ethnomusicologist and member of the Guča brass band competition’s expert jury Mirjana Zakić (in Kaplarević 2007, in Tadić et al. 2010: 356) goes so far as to advocate a deterministic view of the relationship between a folk musician’s place of origin and the music s/he (usually he) creates and performs. Referring to Serbian brass band players, she asserts that ‘[f]olk musicians are always at their best when performing the music of their country, that is, of their region, because they are then in complete harmony with their own musical genetic code’ (ibid.).
gadulka\textsuperscript{96} player from the Sofia-based Koutev Ensemble expressed a similar attitude about the subject at hand, as the following quote from Buchanan’s (2006: 222) study on Bulgaria’s national folk ensembles exemplifies:

‘Whatever region you come from, usually you carry the ornamentation typical of that area within you. You don’t need to know ornamentation as theory, but to sense it.’ Classical musicians cannot perform narodna muzika [folk music] successfully (…) because ‘they cannot do the ornaments’ and do not carry ‘the inner feeling in their hearts’.

The rationale behind this comment is indeed very revealing for the way in which the purported authenticity of Serbian brass band tradition is discursively constructed, too. Specifically, the musical identity of folk brass band players is built both in support of and in opposition to classically trained musicians. To be more accurate, the similarity and equality of musicians from both music worlds are emphasized when the level of each group’s technical mastery is discussed. For instance, Ajdačić (in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 181), the festival director for thirty years (from 1967 until 1997), recalls how the festival guest-conductor of the Rostov-on-Don Philharmonic Orchestra at Guča 1995 was surprised to find out that Serbian brass bands work outside official musical institutions and make their music all by ear. The similar report (Stamatović, in Bojanić 2002: 141–146) was made at Guča 1996, where Dimitris Kafiris, another guest-conductor, this time of the Corfu Philharmonic Society, expressed astonishment at the professionalism of musically illiterate Serbian brass bands. In his words, festival ‘[b]ystanders would think that [Serbian brass band players] actually completed music degrees. (…) [Serbian] people speak from the heart, and [Serbian] trumpeters play from the depths of the soul’ (ibid., 144). Put forward not only by foreign festival participants but also by commentators from all over the country (see e.g. a media report on Guča 1968, in Tadić et al. 2010: 150) is thus a feeling of reverence and wonder at the capability of Serbian brass band musicians to play by ear but sound as good as their musically educated colleagues. Or rather, the interpretation here is given a slightly different inflection: precisely because Serbian brass band members play by ear, they can more easily tune into their inner-selves and make music from their heart or with their soul. That this point of view is commonly maintained by Serbian trumpeters, ethnomusicologists, and wider public can be seen in two relevant statements quoted below. The first is from Fejat Sejdić (in Bogovac 2007: 59), a renowned Master of Trumpet from Serbia’s southeast region: ‘[Serbian brass band] music does not tolerate notation. If you play music from notation, what then do you need a soul for?’ And the second quote is from ethnomusicologist Dević (2000, in Marinković 2002: 83): ‘[Serbia’s] contemporary trumpet players

\textsuperscript{96} Gadulka is Bulgaria’s traditional bowed string instrument.
are, just as were their forebears of the Prince Miloš era [in the nineteenth century], autodidacts and ear players, performing a vast repertoire of songs and dances by heart and by ear, improvising while playing, spontaneously, from the soul and heart’.

What, therefore, ultimately validates the musical authenticity of Serbian brass band players is a sense of distinction and difference from the ‘artificial’ worlds of pop and classical music – which is in turn said to enhance the artistic value of their performance. Such value judgment is clearly made under the implicit assumption that music literacy somehow kills the spontaneity, purity, and simplicity of artistic expression. The two following quotes below – one by Serbian composer Petrović (in Stojić et al. 2000: 93) and the other by guard musician Knežević (in Bogovac 2007: 96) – are good cases in point:

I listen to our [Serbian] trumpets from the South, the West or the East, I hear how often these ‘heroes of brass playing’ don’t conform to [Western] musical standards, form, harmony... And it’s wrong to assume that these trumpet players cannot learn all this... Often they don’t even want to... For they fear that the literacy will ‘kill them’... It’ll ward off from their lips and souls the true image and sense of why they reached for the trumpet in the first place... (...) One might say that [Serbian] trumpet players of true folk songs dread making the sounds which don’t come from their souls, basements, houses, farmsteads and barns. For those images are their inspiration and substance... Whenever I advise these trumpeters to learn notes and get musically literate, to play from scores, I understand all too well that this is much needed... But afterwards, I’d always feel like telling them something in addition: never forget the trumpet of the home, from the garden, from the village and traditional celebration, from the epic battlefield...

Knežević, whom Radovan [Babić, the first Master of Trumpet from Serbia’s western region] often asked for [professional] help[, recalls:] (...) ‘Afterwards I would forward that which Radovan composed to academic musicians. They play it, but I clearly [hear] – that’s not it! I mean, it’s the same, but not even close to it. [Radovan] crafted “his” sound, melancholic but clear.’

What seems to lie at the core of all the quotes above is thus the image of a folk musician’s heart and soul as both physiological and spiritual loci in which the izvor resides. Brass playing represents, by implication, only an externalized manifestation of izvor which has already become part of the musician’s inner self over years of committed musical practice. To play music from the heart/soul is, therefore, to emotionally connect to ‘the truth of tradition’ and bring out its aesthetic properties in a way which rings true to the insiders’ understanding of the past times (cf. Buchanan 2006: 220–221).
Historically, the roots of the Serbian brass band tradition are most often traced back to the nineteenth century, even though evidence for its continuity as a traditional musical practice is in some instances looked for as far back as the seventh century (see Tadić et al. 2010: 34). At any rate, in the writings of domestic ethnomusicologists (see e.g. Đević 2000, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 229; Golemović 1997: 61–62; Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović 2012: 65) and Guča festival publicists alike (see e.g. Bogovac 2007: 89, 92; Tadić et al. 2010: 41), the story about Knjaževsko-serbska banda is commonly cited as the mythical birthplace of this tradition. As the story goes, it was in 1831, during the rule of Prince Miloš Obrenović, that Knjaževsko-serbska banda was formed as the first Serbian brass band that adopted the Western tonal tradition and served various purposes, military and otherwise.\(^{97}\) Another consensus view is that the ‘folklorization’ of the imported brass band idiom took place in Serbian villages at the turn of the twentieth century. What happened then was that the military trumpets brought from battlefields by returning Serbian soldiers became gradually integrated into vernacular musical practices of rural communities (see Babić 2004: 25–26; Stojić et al. 2000: 29–30; Tadić et al. 2010: 42; Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović 2012: 65).

Despite a number of documented oral testimonies of old brass band players confirming that this musical practice used to flourish in Serbian villages in the first half of the twentieth century (Đević 1986: 55; Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić 2012: 227), especially during the interwar years, 1919–1938 (Golemović 1997: 64; Marinković 2002: 18), the fact remains that its continuity was largely broken with the outbreak of the Second World War. For this reason, I tend to align with those academic writers, such as Lukić-Krstanović (2006: 189, 191) and partly Đević\(^{98}\) (2000, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 231) and Golemović (1997: 64), who take Guča Festival itself as the most certain factor behind the installation of this folk tradition as we know it today. If so, the ideas of what constitutes the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition and its historical roots seem to have been mainly shaped through Guča-related discourses. In this sense, Serbian brass band music can be understood as an ‘invented tradition’, all the more so when two additional facts are brought into play. The first is that the notion of the tradition’s izvor became, in the course of the festival development, infused with rituals and symbols of Yugoslav socialist ideology (especially from the 1970s until the late 1980s) and Serbian nationalist ideology, respectively (cf. Timotijević 2005). And the second fact is that the reinvention of Serbian brass band music

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97 Up until that point in time, the development of Serbian instrumental practice was shaped under the oriental Ottoman influence and put in the service of Ottoman panjandrums living in Serbian towns. Similar types of musical ensembles were initially hired at the court of Prince Miloš, too.

98 Indeed, this eminent Yugoslav/Serbian ethnomusicologist acknowledges himself that ‘the performance and expansion of brass band [music] in Dragačevo is more of a contemporary phenomenon’ (1986: footnote 5, p. 300).
band tradition has always been carefully designed and supervised by various members of the Yugoslav/Serbian cultural elite – military trumpet tutors, music teachers, ethnomusicologists, composers, conductors, and the like (see Bogovac 2007; Golemović 2002, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 238; Marinković 2002; Tadić et al. 2010). In this latter aspect, Dragačevski sabor [Dragačevo festival] was once again strikingly consistent with its Bulgarian counterpart, săbor. As Buchanan (2006: 172) explains, ‘[s]uch events focused on presocialist village lore performed by amateur artists in a seemingly unadulterated manner, even if rendered by folklore collectives in consultation with professional specialists.’

Clearly, the construct of izvor, as outlined above, has from the beginning been central to the production of Guča micronational space, regardless of the different ideological layers that came to shape it over time in accordance with the country’s ever-changing sociopolitical situation. In order to fully comprehend the role of izvor in the organic inflections of Guča micronational space, it is thus necessary to map the complex discursive field within which the notion of izvor has operated in any given context of the festival’s changing present. What primarily determines such a broadly conceived discursive formation are arguably tensions arising from the impossible task of safeguarding the assumed izvor of Serbian brass band tradition within the context of constant transformations that the festival inevitably undergoes since its establishment in 1961. This also explains why Guča-related discourses surrounding issues of the tradition’s izvor and authenticity are largely imbued with the feelings of anxiety and nostalgia. And these are in turn discursively framed by a long chain of binary oppositions, such as those of traditional vs. modern, authentic vs. commercial, amateur vs. professional, rural vs. urban, local vs. global, and so on. Within this polarized logic, it is always the second item within any given equation (i.e. modern, commercial, professional, etc.) that apparently puts the izvor of Serbian brass band practice at risk of potential corruption, decline, and, eventually, demise.

Indeed, a great deal of criticism directed against the professionalization and commercialization of the festival and Serbian trumpet music, respectively, began as early as 1963 (see Marković 1963, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 154–158). Forty years later, Bojić (in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 163) likewise warned that the festival ‘lost its soul’ and came to resemble the ‘Serbian Disneyland’. What has changed in the meantime is, of course, the context and to some extent the sources generating this anxiety and sense of loss. Therefore, provided below is a brief overview of the Guča growth and popularization with two interrelated goals in mind. The first is to set the discursive frame within which the current field of tensions is played out, and then within this, the second aim would be to discern a perspective that renders the Guča festival space ‘organic’ in its musical imaginings.
4.5.2 The Musical Bifurcation of Guča Organic Space

It is worth acknowledging that a more aggressive promotion of Guča Festival across the states of the former Yugoslavia began as late as the mid-1980s (see Tadić et al. 2010; Timotijević 2005). The further development of the festival could be described as insular due to the explosion of nationalism in the region and its dire isolating effects on the country. But precisely because of the emerging preoccupation of the ruling elite with the rediscovery and restitution of Serbian ethnicity in culture, including the Serbian brass band tradition, Guča’s popularity grew steadily among the Serbian public. However, it was not until the great international success of several movies made in the 1990s by Serbian film director Emir Kusturica, in which he presented Serbia’s Romani brass, that the profile of the festival began to raise more decisively both nationally and internationally.

Coinciding with Kusturica’s far-reaching acclaim was the rise of the World Music phenomenon, whose transnational music network had already been in place at the time. Received as a great commercial novelty, Serbian brass bands were accommodated eagerly by the ever-expanding global music market. The first acts to penetrate into this market niche and capitalize on the Balkan brass craze were Emir Kusturica & The No Smoking Orchestra, Goran Bregović & Wedding and Funeral Band, and Boban Marković Orchestra. As the winner of multiple awards at Guča’s brass band competition, Marković can be said to represent the only genuine offspring of Serbian brass band tradition and the best-known trademark of the festival.

The next key factor that contributed substantially to the global visibility of Guča trumpet festival was the shift in Serbia’s political leadership following the overthrow of Milošević in 2000. Advocating the politics of EU integration, the country opened up to the Western world and began to recover economically with its financial support. The government could accordingly secure more funds for the national and international promotion of Serbian tourism, with a special emphasis on such music events as the Exit and Guča trumpet festivals (interview with Čerović, PR representative for the Tourist Organization of Serbia, Aug 2011). As a result, the increasing trends towards the internalization and rejuvenalization of the festival were already evident in the early 2000s along with the changing demographic structure of the festival audience. As Timotijević (2005: 135–137) documents, Guča 2003 witnessed for the first time large groups of foreign visitors, and at Guča 2002, the overwhelming majority of the present crowd was made up of younger festivalgoers.

It was arguably the confluence of all these factors that gave the Guča festival program a new profile in the post-Milošević era. Specifically, a split between old and new with all its derivatives (traditional-modern, local-global, and so on) lost to some degree its differentiating power in the 1990s due to a general deregulation of the national music market occurring at the time. But all such binaries came to be
restored during the 2000s and made their way into the festival program. As Zakić testifies in an interview (Kaparević 2007, in Tadić et al. 2010: 356):

The first time I came to the Guća trumpet festival was seven years ago [in 2000] as a member of the [expert] jury. On my first encounter with the festival, I remember that then hit numbers from movies, TV series, or Goran Bregović’s songs, were almost a mandatory part of the repertoire of most brass bands. Such music was performed equally on and off stage. I was honestly surprised not to find a much stronger presence of the Serbian traditional sound. Everything seemed somehow fair-like, a little chaotic and without clear conception (which in recent years has luckily not been the case).

Indeed, in the early 2000s, the authority of the festival rulebook was successfully recovered and fully reapplied to the competing part of the festival program. Designed in cooperation with various music experts, the festival rulebook sets up a general framework for the brass band contest, outlining ‘the repertoire, aesthetico-artistic and technical norms in this field of folk music production’ (Tadić et al. 2010: 438). The strict adherence to the rulebook reflects therefore the aspiration of festival organizers and supervisors to keep the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition unsullied and alive.99

At the same time, it was in the post-Milošević times that contemporary commercial acts began to enter the Guća official stage. While this conceptual change seemed to be without precedent in the history of the festival programming, it was in fact anticipated by the earlier introduction of so-called Midnight Concert (in 2001), comprising brass band performances of a free-choice and largely pop-oriented repertoire. Moreover, at Guća 2003, Midnight Concert was already decorated and staged in a way to replicate the lighting effects and atmosphere of rock spectacles (Timotijević 2005: 137). However, Boban Marković was arguably the first to inspire more substantial changes in the festival’s overall conceptualization. Not only was his vocal repudiation of the festival rulebook tolerated by organizers and jury members at the

99 Not that the Guća Assembly Board was equally committed to the preservation of the tradition’s izvor under socialism. For instance, at Guća 1966, an entry to the competition was allowed only to amateur folk brass bands. The board at the same time warned competing brass bands to play traditional songs and dances rather than numbers made by contemporary authors (Timotijević 2005: 40). At Guća 1974, the Assembly Board likewise decided to remove from the official program everything that resembled trash and kitsch (Timotijević 2005: 56). At Guća 1985, Nani Ajdinović Orchestra was disqualified from further competition because its repertoire incorporated parts of the opening theme from then popular American TV series Dynasty (Timotijević 2005: 76). And at Guća 1989, the Assembly Board unanimously rejected a request from Serbian rock band Galija to stage a concert at the Guća stadium with renowned trumpet player Fejat Sejdić (Timotijević 2005: 91).
Guća brass band contest in 2001. More importantly, a timely shift in his music-making and performance style towards what can be dubbed Balkan Brass Beat paved his road to international success and recognition. Marković’s worldwide fame made in turn a permanent impact on the way in which the Serbian brass band tradition was (and still is) perceived and evaluated nationally. This also explains why Guća festival organizers have granted Boban and his son Marko the privilege of holding individual concerts since 2004 – which is another historical precedent in the festival programming.

It appears, then, that it was the Markovićs who smoothed the way for other popular acts from the commercial worlds of ethno and WM/WB to be invited as festival participants in the years to come. Among local artists from this group, Guća Festival has hosted, for example, Biljana Krstić i Bistrik (2005), Sanja Ilić i Balkanika (2010, 2015), Hypnotized (2013), Orkestar Crno-beli svet Dejana Pejovića [Dejan Pejović Black and White World Orchestra] (2013), and let’s include in this category also Goran Bregović (2007, 2010, 2013, 2015) since his musical collaborations are mainly Belgrade-based. As for international WM/WB acts who have graced the Guća stadium’s stage, the list includes German DJ and producer Shantel & Bucovina Club Orkestar (2010, 2012), Slovenian singer Magnifico (2010, 2014), and Polish folk-rock group Golec uOrkiestra (2010). Put in the festival limelight since 2011 have also been other Serbian brass bands following in the Markovićs’ footsteps, notably Dejan Petrović Big Band (from 2011 through to 2015) and Dejan Lazarević Orchestra (2013, 2014, 2015). However, the commercialization and ‘estradization’ of the Guća festival program reached its culmination point in 2010, on the occasion of the festival fiftieth anniversary. Since then, the festival program has expanded to include Serbian neo-folk/TF singers, often in some sort of fusion with selected brass bands. Two big names from the Serbian estrada especially stood out in the Guća context: (1) Miroslav Ilić (2010, 2011, 2014, 2016), a long-lasting representative of ‘old-school’ neo-folk style, and (2) Svetlana Ražnatović aka Ceca (2012, 2014, 2016),

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100 Even if disqualified as ‘unsuitable’ prior to the competition finals, Marković’s cover version of the main theme from the cult Serbian TV series Otpisani [The Written Off] brought him the most coveted First Trumpet award on that occasion.
102 ‘Estradization’ is a derivative word from the originally Russian term estrada (literally, ‘small stage’) denoting various music forms of Soviet light (pop) entertainment. As Mišina (2013: footnote 10, p. 65) following Kremer (1988) explains, estradization in the Yugoslav (and later, Serbian) sociocultural context refers to ‘the process of “catering to mass audience and mass media [with] simultaneous polishing of the form and emptying of the content” – in simple terms, the dumbing down of cultural expression for the purpose of wide commercial appeal’. 
the notorious Serbian TF diva mentioned above (in 3.2.5), whose title *Ceca Nacion- nale* attests to her status in the country as the symbolic ‘mother of the nation’.\(^\text{103}\)

The bifurcation of Guča musical offerings into traditional vs. modern points to a fundamental dilemma encountered by all cultural revivals. As Reynolds (2011: 211) illuminates, the unreserved commitment to music styles that are remote in time, space, or both,

inevitably condemns the devotee to inauthenticity. Either he strives to be a faithful copyist, reproducing the music’s surface features as closely as possible, risking hollowness and redundancy; or he can attempt to bring something expressive and personal to it, or to work in contemporary influences and local musical flavours, which then risks bastardising the style.

In the Guča case, the current old-new split is only a logical continuation and intensification of similar musico-stylistic dilemmas faced in the earlier uses of tradition. As many documented stories of the earlier Guča trumpet winners illustrate (see e.g. Babić 2004; Bogovac 2007; Timotijević 2005), negotiating and finding the right measure between traditional and modern elements in their musical output was a challenging task in the past times, too. This became all the more difficult as the Serbian brass band tradition reintegrated with the people’s everyday life shortly after its revival in Guča Festival. Apparently, the greater the popularity of Serbian brass, the wider the schism between old and new songs in the festival repertoire. To paraphrase popular Serbian trumpet player Dejan Lazarević (in Petrović 2013b: 8), unlike the festival crowd of the 1990s, modern-day Guča-goers respond more passionately to cover versions of (local) rock hits than to old Serbian tunes, so trumpet players have no other choice but to adapt to the changing trends on the musical market.

Besides, as Carlin (2004: 183) rightly points out, ‘our ideas of what is “good” and “bad” change over time, as the definition of what is traditional has changed’. This becomes clear when considering in hindsight an ever-changing dynamic in Serbia’s popular music culture. Of relevance to the musical construction of Guča micronational space are specifically those music value judgments reflecting tensions between neo-folk and TF, on the one hand, and between traditional music and neo-folk/TF/ethno/WM, on the other. In the B92 TV serial *All That Folk* (Kupres 2004, Episode 1), Miroslav Ilić differentiates between his ‘old-school’ neo-folk songs (i.e. ‘good’ folk music) and TF as ‘that monster of a music genre still dominating’ the local scene (i.e. ‘bad’ folk music). The ponderings of reputable Serbian rock critic Petar Janjatović on the same topic perhaps more tellingly capture this shifting percep-

\(^{103}\) The two other Serbian TF singers featured at Guča were Dragan Kojić Keba (in 2010 and 2016) and Aca Lukas (in 2013).
tion of what constitutes the good-bad dichotomy in local folk music. As he recounts in the same TV serial (Episode 1):

When two days ago a friend played for me the CD Best of newly-composed folk music from the 1970s and 1980s, I said, ‘Man, this is awesome!’ And the first track [from the compilation] was Silvana Armenulić’s ‘Noćas mi srce pati / My Heart Is In Pain Tonight’. We started listening and realizing that it’s good. These are today the classics of NCFM, of which I can think most highly considering what [sort of folk music] followed next.

That the interpretation of what falls under the category of traditional music is subject to constant change has also been acknowledged by Serbian ethnomusicologists. For instance, as early as the mid-1980s, Dević’s study (1986: 297) showcased that 90% of the surveyed pupils from the Dragačevo elementary school (age 11 to 14) believed that many of presented neo-folk songs were traditional. And in relation to Guča Festival, ethnomusicologists Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić (2012: 232) are likewise compelled to admit that ‘[t]he performance of such tunes as [Bregović’s] “Kalashnikov”, “Moonlight”, “Ederlezi”, and the like, even within the framework of the [festival] competition is an indication of their ponarodnjivanje [rooting into tradition] and the incorporation of this [WM] genre into’ the corpus of national trumpet music. Disclosed in both instances is thus an implicit understanding of tradition as something ‘of the people’. Within such a perspective, as Vidić Rasmussen (2002: n.p.) points out, ‘the “popular” song [can] become “traditional” in the sense of acquired historical value’, despite the demystified source of its creation, which is no longer ‘the anonymous folk’ but ‘a known songwriter’.

4.5.3 Nostalgic and Anxious Narratives About the Loss of the Guča ‘Izvor’

Despite the widely recognized complexity of a new-old dynamic involved in the development and perception of traditional music,104 Guča Festival continues to cultivate the Serbian brass band tradition in a way which leaves it torn between its commitment to the izvor’s ‘authenticity’ and living practice, that is, between the processes of this tradition’s ‘recreation’ (i.e. staying faithful to izvor) and its ‘transfor-

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104 Indeed, as Radano and Bohlman (2000: 31) teach us, music’s ‘placeness and fixity must always be seen as a momentary pause extending from prior intersections and shifts. (...) That each new center reveals a prior past is never enough to cease the process of centering and naming, for these truth claims remain central to the musical constitution of identities’. For similar viewpoints, see also Brah 1996: 234–235; Buchanan 2006: 425; or Silverman 2012: 4, 55, 274.
mation / innovation’ (see Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović 2012). It is precisely the unchanged conceptual framework of the festival, which is to live up to the imagined ideal of Serbian (brass band) tradition, that renders the remaining tension between old and new at Guča inherently problematic and impossible to settle. The narratives prevailing in the production of Guča micronational space are accordingly those of nostalgia and loss, combined often with purist demands.

As the professional gatekeepers of knowledge about folk music, Serbian ethnomusicologists are, unsurprisingly, among the leading voices in the call to protect the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition. For instance, Golemović (1997: 65–67) and Vasiljević (in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 228) note that the professionalization and modernization of Serbian trumpet practice led over time to the homogenization of the brass band idiom, with the Oriental style overriding all others due to its growing popularity among audiences. These changes are viewed as the negative corollaries of the media and entertainment industries and are said to be mirrored in ‘catastrophic arrangements’ of the Serbian brass band repertoire. Specifically, many of its numbers are deemed far too long and stylistically implausible and stilted due to their rhapsodic / bricolage structure. Other numbers are then again dismissed as ludicrous in their aiming at external stage effects, both aural and visual. Considering all this, Serbian brass band practice is said to suffer from the overall decline in originality and authentic traditional expression. A similar assessment is made by Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović (2012:229). According to them, contemporary Serbian brass music enacts what can be called an ‘aesthetic of intensity’ – that is, an aesthetic guided by the principle ‘play it fast and loud’, as reflected in the evermore speeded-up tempo and increased sound volume of played songs.

Those involved in the production of Guča lived spaces, be they public figures or anonymous representatives of Serbia’s vox populi, tend to likewise call into question the izvor of national brass band tradition. This typically occurs whenever ‘foreign’ or ‘external’ musical elements and influences are acknowledged to be ‘contaminating’ traditional trumpet music. Importantly, the origins of the ‘corrupting’ factors in question are sought at either end of the West-East axis, or in the combination of both concurrently.

At one end, there are thus anxieties about the izvor’s demise, triggered by such interrelated phenomena as modernization, Americanization, Westernization, and globalization. As the argument goes, it is specifically the influence of WM and jazz that gave rise to standardization of the Serbian brass band sound. For example, prominent Serbian journalists Panović (2011: 7) and Tirmanić (2000, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 177–178) agree that globalization has opened the door to mass transmission of Serbian brass music but at the costly price of the izvor’s decline. In Panović’s own words, ‘[m]usic-wise, Guča is primarily and paradoxically a World Music victim, for this phenomenon, on the one hand, globalizes the Serbian trumpet, but on
the other, stifles its authenticity altering the playing of individual bands beyond rec-
ognition’. Tirmanić, for his part, holds Bregović’s music responsible for the present-
day uniformity of Serbian brass, whilst acknowledging that it was his internationally
acclaimed music career that brought fame to the Serbian trumpet. As Tirmanić (in
Bogavac 2007: 92) remembers with nostalgia:

There was a sense of irresistible charm in the kitsch of [Guća’s] three-day dert
[sorrow, yearning, ecstasy]. Guća represented once a return to ancient primitive-
ness whose call was hard to resist. What has left in Bregović’s work from the
earlier authentic kitsch is simply kitsch without authenticity.

The two quotes below – one by distinguished Serbian novelist and painter Momo
Kapor (2009, in Tadić et al. 2010: 377), and the other by an online commentator un-
der the alias Surovi / ‘The Brutal’ (‘Elvis Ajdinović is...’, Blic [comments], 2011) –
express a similar kind of concern about the perceived loss of the Guća ızvor. How-
ever, the changes discerned in the festival (regarding the composition of brass bands,
repertoires played, performance styles and techniques, and professed emotional im-
pacts of brass music listening) are not ascribed in this case to the ambiguous influ-
ence of WM trends. The signs of the ızvor’s decay are rather traced here in the fes-
tival’s adoption of values and aesthetics associated with the world of Western(ized)
popular music and, in particular, with the American jazz tradition. As Kapor writes
bitterly,

I also noticed that Guća, despite its popularity, is slowly but surely losing its ız-
vor’s soul, coming evermore closer to the American Woodstock or to the Novi
Sad Exit. Its future downfall began with the presence of saxophone in [brass]
bands, which was until that point an unknown instrument to the Serbian folk
music, and continues with the increasing use of keyboards. The only missing
thing is the organ and harpist in the šajkača hat so that the picture is complete.
One more thing: the repertoire is becoming increasingly invaded by world-fa-
amous schlagers from [Sinatra’s] My Way to [the best-known Peruvian tradition-
al song] Flight of the Condor – like, we can play it, too. For the next year Guća
has announced a competition for the First Trumpet of the World. Too bad that
Dizzy Gillespie and Miles Davis passed away – they would certainly come to
compete with the Salihevićs.\(^{105}\) (In Tadić et al. 2010: 377.)

\(^{105}\) Slobodan Salihević Orchestra (from Prekodolce of Southeast Serbia) gained international
fame through their involvement in the soundtrack for Kusturica’s movie Underground (1995).
The Orchestra is also well-known for having won all prestigious awards in Guća during the
1980s and 1990s.
The Brutal’s comment, on the other hand, reflects more of a nostalgic sentiment than resentment:

This modern-day Guča reminds me rather of a jazz festival than of the earlier Serbian music contests dating back to the days of Bakija Bakić [the founder of the Vranje-style trumpet playing], Fejat Sejdić and other wonderful trumpeters that Serbia has yielded. Back in those days, by listening to music, you felt how it was lifting you from the ground, how your heart was jumping with joy; but nowadays everyone is trying to become a trumpet virtuoso, everyone would like to emulate those stupid Americans. Why? We have our wonderful music and our wonderful people and customs, so why not let them return and help us preserve our tradition. (In ‘Elvis Ajdinović is...’, Blic [comments], 2011.)

And let’s add to this also a quote by the abovementioned president of the Guča expert jury, Mirjana Zakić (in Ilić 2010), who also speaks disapprovingly of jazz influences. Her comment carries, as usual, the authority of ethnomusicological expertise: ‘As in previous years, we’ve heard once again jazz elements in čočeks,¹⁰⁶ which is something that doesn’t belong to Serbian music and doesn’t sit well with the jury’.

Falling into another and, admittedly, larger group of ‘alien’ elements ‘corrupting’ the Guča izvor are (trans)local forms of commercial folk music – neo-folk and TF in the first place, but also Serbian ethno and WM considered occasionally as their close relatives. Either influenced by these and similar products of the (trans)local music industry, or simply juxtaposed with them within the festival music program, the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition appears invariably at risk of being coopted by the system of music production, mediation, and consumption which is deemed inappropriate to it (cf. Frith 2004). Emphasized in domestic laments over the loss of the Guča izvor is therefore a clear demarcation line between the ‘authentic’ sound of Serbian traditional brass and the ‘spurious’ sound of Serbian new folk music. This dichotomy draws in turn on several interrelated discursive sources.

The first calls to mind the Frankfurt School’s critique of mass culture and the attendant unfavorable understanding of popular music. By this line of reasoning, not only is Serbian new folk music perceived as deprived of any aesthetic value, but also its clichéd formulas and negative socio-ideological meanings are occasionally interpreted as a means of dumbing down and controlling the mass population.

The second discursive frame recreates the long-lasting clash of values between folk and pop discourses operating not only across these two music worlds, but also

¹⁰⁶ Čoček is a Romani-specific musical genre in the Balkans. Since the post-1989 change, it has become a shared genre across much of Eastern Europe, but also migrated to the West along with the Romani diaspora, or through the distribution channels of the transnational music industry (see Silverman 2012).
within any genre-specific section of music making. By analogy, the dichotomy between Guča’s izvor of tradition and Serbia’s new folk music rests on the association of the former with the Romantic notions of the folk’s organic character, wholesomeness, authenticity, creativity, wisdom, simplicity, and honesty. Serbia’s new folk music is conversely metonymic with commerce, artifice, glitter, banality, frivolity, and prefabricated sound.

As pointed out in Chapter 3, the negative aesthetic evaluation of Serbian new folk music contains in addition a critical social commentary on the incomplete processes of the country’s modernization and urbanization. Central to this critique is the professed urban-rural difference and its underlying socio-anthropological assumptions. Serbian new folk music, so the argument goes, continues to cater to the lowbrow taste of the city’s ‘newcomers’ – Serbia’s peasant urbanites – reflecting the hybrid condition of their dwelling within-and-between two worlds (cf. Vidić Rasmussen 1995; 2002; 2006). Accordingly, Guča-related narratives on the izvor’s decline refer in part to the perceived misrepresentation and adulteration of ‘authentic’ Serbian trumpet music by and for peasant urbanites.

The final and fourth discursive frame underpinning the distinction between the Guča izvor and Serbian new folk music is that of Balkanism. Lying at the core of the latter is a ‘set of institutionally and psychologically maintained boundaries reinforcing perceptions of culture-core differences between Balkan and (Western) European culture’ (Vidić Rasmussen 2002: n.p.). In domestic Guča-related discourses, the West-East divide translates into the dualistic concepts of civilization and primitivism, that is, of cultured and uncultured sensibilities and behaviors. Within this polarized continuum, (trans)local new folk music naturally occupies a debased position.

There are clearly many intersecting points between the semantic fields of each discursive frame listed above. But it seems that they all ultimately boil down to ethical value judgments and the binary logic underpinning them in such basic terms as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Let me consider next how these fundamental aesthetico-ethical categories are typically operationalized in the lived spaces of Guča representation. Specifically, cited below are several online comments conveying a sense of nostalgia, resentment, and anxiety over the loss of the Guča izvor due to the recent incursion of (trans)local commercial folk music into the festival’s official program:

What a disgraceful [festival] organization!!! They made a typical Grand Show107 out of the trumpet festival... If I was interested in Aca Lukas, [Dragan Kojić]

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107 The Grand Show is a widely popular music program on TV Pink, Serbia’s commercial TV station established in the early 1990s. The Grand Show mainly features local TF performers and, similarly to the broader notion of ‘Pink culture’, it epitomizes the ascendancy of ‘trash culture’ and general moral degradation that befell the Serbian society in the 1990s (see Simić 2009: 127, 171–172).
Keba, Miroslav [Ilić], Ceca and the likes [the names of the Serbian neo-folk and TF singers recently included in the Guča music program], I’d stay in Belgrade and listened to them! You’ve peasantized Guča so it’s no longer as it used to be! (H2SO4, in Bojović 2013b [comments]; emphases added.)

Guča until fifteen years ago and this fair and circus of the present day cannot be compared. Bring back the real Guča, who gives a damn about bloody Ceca, Seka [Aleksić, another (in)famous Serbian TF singer], Bregović... (Che, ‘Guča is (not) a cultural event’, B92 [comments], 2012; emphases added.)

Guča could have been a nice traditional festival with spit roasts, traditional dishes and delightful folk music. Now it has turned into a hideous mishmash of newly-composed songs, debauchery, kitsch and non-culture that is anything but traditional Serbian. (Pentraksil / Pentrexyl [a type of antibiotic], in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments]; emphasis added.)

The ‘bad’ influence of Serbian new folk music, in all its varieties, on the Guča izvor is indeed one of the most prominent themes in festival-related narratives. Much of this criticism is obviously informed by the same discursive framework operating in the negative domestic reception of TF and its predecessor, neo-folk. What seems to be at stake in both types of criticism are the undermined notions of tradition, culture, and good taste (cf. Vidić Rasmussen 2002; 2006). As illustrated by the quotes above, Guča is seen specifically as the embodiment of the same aesthetico-ethical notions of kitsch, non-culture, and inauthenticity as in neo-folk/TF. Such a negative evaluation prompts, on the one hand, anxious calls for the festival’s return to its ‘real’ essence (i.e. to what it used to be in the past). On the other hand, the negative aesthetic characterization of the festival reveals simultaneously a social commentary on Serbia’s peasant urbanites in whose hands Guča apparently underwent peasantization (i.e. inauthentic or quasi-urbanization), the emblems of which are debauchery, vulgarity, and primitivism. Constructed in the above quotes is hence the image of Guča as an event of low sociocultural status, comparable to fair, circus, TV Pink’s Grand Show, or a hideous mishmash of everything comprising Serbia’s so-called ‘newly-composed culture’.

The term ‘newly-composed’ can indeed be understood as an important signifier of the izvor’s decline in Guča. For instance, Zoran Kesić (in Živanović et al. 2013: 4), a well-respected Serbian TV host of satirical talk-shows, uses it as well in his critical review of Guča:

As much as I admire phenomenal brass bands and virtuosic (...) trumpet masters, there’s no way I can possibly digest that newly-composed euphoria surround-
ing Guča Festival. I have nothing against alcohol and indulgence in bohemian pleasures, but I surely have against a parade of bad taste, against celebration in a hooligan manner on the verge of fight, or belly dancing in a striptease manner on the verge of fucking. Add to that a python with which you can have a photo, American little donuts, Serbian cattle on a Serbian spit and Aca Lukas, and you will realize that very little has remained of the festival’s essence, and this should only be just the trumpet. (Emphases added.)

As Vidić Rasmussen (1995: 242) clarifies, the adjective ‘newly-composed’ implies ‘novelty, temporariness, bricolage, kitsch; that is, a lack of historicity, stylistic coherence, and aesthetic/artististic attributes’. Importantly, the term came to extend beyond the field of its primary musical denotation (as in the phrases ‘newly-composed music/song/style/performer/audience’) to turn into a potent symbolic expression of new sociopolitical realities. In the latter case, the use of ‘newly-composed’ underscores a cynical stance not only towards the geopolitical outcomes of Yugoslavia’s breakup (as in the expressions ‘newly-composed regions/democrats/heroes’; see Vidić Rasmussen 1995: 242; 2006: 105), but also towards the wider collapse of cultural and moral values (as in the expression ‘newly-composed culture’). By the same token, the expression ‘newly-composed euphoria’ from Kesić’s quote above points to the ‘short-lived’, ‘flimsy’, ‘kitschy’, ‘spurious’, and ‘untenable’ character of the Guča newer productions. Along the same line of reasoning, Guča is said to embody ‘a parade of bad taste’ – a familiar formulation used for discrediting all tenets of ‘newly-composed/TF culture’. According to Kesić, the latter comprises in addition: (1) ‘celebration in a hooligan manner’ – referring to nationalist and war-mongering undertones in Guča festivities; then (2) ‘belly dancing in a striptease manner’ – alluding to the festival’s misappropriation of Oriental culture; and (3) photos with a python, American donuts, traditionally prepared cattle on a spit, and Aca Lukas (the latter being an emblematic exponent of Serbian TF music and life-style) – typifying a distasteful bricolage of cultural items of both Western and Eastern origin.

As pointed out above, what really lies beneath all these negative evaluations of Guča is a sociocultural critique of contemporary forms of Serbia’s modernity, which are clearly narrated and experienced as inadequate. Criticized are in particular the excess and crudity of ‘conspicuous consumption’, associated with the behavior and sensibility of Serbia’s emergent class of nouveau riche. Due to their high economic but apparently low cultural capital, members of this class are of course held in low regard by Serbian self-identified urbanites (see Jansen 2005b; and Simić 2009). Ac-

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108 It is worth noting that the semantic field of the term newly-composed (introduced in the mid-1960s) overlaps significantly with that of the 1990s neologism turbo-folk. This explains why the two expressions are so often used interchangeably in discussions about local popular music-culture.
accordingly, as Prica (1988, in Vidić Rasmussen 1995: 253) notes in her anthropological analysis of Yugoslav peasant urbanites as a whole, ‘th[eir] urban outlook … “is never read as urban and modern, but as a tendency and aspiration toward urbanity and modernity”’ (emphasis in original). Serbia’s peasant urbanites are hence allocated ‘a stage between the backward and the modern, signifying a vision of rurality in the city’ (Jansen 2005b: 163).

Furthermore, in local discourses on the izvor loss in Guča, the emergent class of Serbia’s skorojevići [nouveau riche] is further linked to particular occupations – politicians and estrada workers (i.e. showbiz musicians) for the most part, but occasionally businessmen, too (see Ignjić, in Kovačević 2011: 13; or Lazarević, in Petrović 2012c: 5). It is accordingly claimed that ‘Guča lost its luster the moment politics encroached upon it’ (radoslav UE, ‘South Serbia requests…’, B92 [comments], 2012; see also Timanić 2000, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 177); or alternatively, that ‘the festival was put in the hands of estradna mafija [showbiz mafia]’ (Pihalniumjetnik / Woodwind-artist [trans. from Slovenian], ‘Best trumpet players are…’, Blic [comments], 2013). Sometimes these two fields are seen to work together against the izvor’s well-being in Guča, specifically when female estrada / TF singers are affiliated to male politicians as their mistresses/girlfriends (like in the case of politician Milutin Mrkonjić ‘Mrka’, a committed festival supporter, and TF singer Ana Bekuta, whose performance at Guča 2012 was first announced and then cancelled) or their friends / favor-returners (as in the case of the longstanding half private-half business alliance between abovementioned politician Velimir Ilić and TF singer Svetlana Ražnatović ‘Ceca’). The bottom line under all these and similar critical comments is that contemporary Guča is organized and staged ‘in the image and likeness of new Serbian vulgarity and primitivism’, as classical music composer Isidora Žebeljan (in Živanović et al. 2013: 5) put it. Condemned are thus the excesses of politics, estrada, and business, their close ties within the local and national structures of power, and the low cultural and moral capital their exponents are claimed to possess. In a circular argument, the negative critique of Guča Festival, whether it be aesthetic, social, or ideological in its content, points once again towards the phenomena outside music – that is, to the changing political, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural realities in the country that are in general considered ethically dubious.

In local Guča-related discourses, there are also claims that various Oriental elements and influences discerned on the ground pose another ‘foreign’ threat to the Guča izvor. Underlying many of these disputes is often the Balkanist discourse with its attendant spatial imaginary of Serbian society as internally divided into ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ parts. There are specifically two major music-related axes around which Guča’s Oriental dispute is constructed. One involves condemnatory reflections on the abundant presence of belly dancing/dancers in the festival’s lived spaces. As illustrated by the two online comments below, the (Middle) Eastern / Islamic origins
and associations of belly dance practice are seen not only as alien to the Serbian cultural tradition, but also as potentially detrimental to the survival of the Serb nation:

One doesn’t expect at the Serbian trumpet festival to see belly dancers, the primary entertainment of Turks, Iranians and other Middle Eastern nations. (Hm, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

So long as we [Serbs] are guided by the Middle East as our cultural determinant, there’s no salvation for us as a people. We’ll be extinct like the Khazars.109 Simply put, nothing good have we inherited from Turkey [and] Guća shows that there’s more of the desolately Arabic and Bedouin bazaar-like in us than of the European and civilizational. Alas… (Jarmusch, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

Similar views of this type of dance practice are by no means new in the Serbian written history. The alleged depravity of Muslim culture, as embodied in the figure of çengi (professional female dancers of Romani descent), was denounced with the same fierceness during the late-nineteenth-century nationalist movements of the Eastern Orthodox South Slavs (see Sugarman 2003, in Silverman 2012: 108). However, with that said, the fact remains that in Tito’s Yugoslavia, the earlier forms of belly dance were part of the official representation of national folk culture rendered either by Roma or non-Roma folk ensembles (Silverman 2012: 116, 119). Accordingly, the claims that belly dance practice is alien to the Serbian / Balkan folk tradition are clearly ill-founded. I would, however, agree with the Serbian columnist Panović (2011: 7) that the belly dance phenomenon in Guća is of unmistakably urban origin, imported ‘from Belgrade floating river clubs’ (called splavovi / ‘rafts, barges’) and similar TF meccas. And, if I may add, it is not only TF and similar music genres across the Balkans and postsocialist EE that draw on the belly dance imagery. It is also contemporary transnational (primarily Western) forms of this dance practice that are making a significant impact on prevailing belly dance styles in Guća and beyond. Think, for instance, of Shakira and Britney Spears as promoters of this pop-

109 The Khazars are a mediaeval, semi-nomadic Turkic people with its core population living along the rivers Volga and Don. The Kingdom of Khazaria grew into one of the leading trade centers of the mediaeval world, reaching the peak of its power between seventh and tenth century. However, once conquered and superseded by the Kievan Rus’ (i.e. the first East Slavic) state, the Kingdom of Khazaria disintegrated leaving almost no trace behind, whereas its population became assimilated into successor tribes. What may also be remarked here is that the vanishing of the Khazars has been an important theme in modern Serbian literature, specifically in Dictionary of the Khazars: A Lexicon Novel (1984), written by widely translated Serbian writer Milorad Pavić.
ularized version of belly dance in the West; or think of the belly dance frenzy among Westerners for the last fifteen years or so.

Subject to the Orientalist type of criticism is likewise the music repertoire of Guća brass bands. Recognized therein are certain Oriental musical elements that are, similarly to belly dancing, denounced as ‘foreign’ to Serbian culture. As pointed out by one festival commentator:

‘Guća’ needs to go away from Serbia because a majority of brass bands don’t play SERBIAN music at all. There is no such thing in Serbian traditional music as irregular rhythms [i.e. time signatures] like five eighths, seven eighths... Such music doesn’t belong to the Serbian nation!!! This is the impact of newcomers and invaders from the South and from Asia. (Umpapa, umpa, umpa, ‘South Serbia requests...’, B92 [comments], 2012; capital letters in original.)

The quote above conveniently paves the way for the second major theme of Guća’s Oriental dispute, which can go under the heading of the kolo-čoček controversy. The said binary opposition follows closely the pattern of regional differentiation in Serbia’s brass band tradition, specifically, between the Šumadija (i.e. Central Serbian) kolo dance with its distinctive dvojka rhythm (2/4; 4/4), and the Vranje (i.e. Southeast Serbian) čoček dance with its lively, Oriental-sounding tunes. Indeed, as Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić (2012: 228) note, the major musical difference between kolos and čočeks lies in their respective metro-rhythmic organization. While kolos follow regular rhythmic patterns in simple duple or quadruple time signatures, čočeks are either associated with irregular meters and so-called aksak rhythms (literally, ‘limping’, ‘crippled’, or ‘flawed’ when translated from Turkish) comprising mainly such combinations of binary and ternary rhythmic units as in 2-2-2-3 or 3-2-2; or with idiomatically syncopated rhythms in regular meters (see Silverman 2012: 28–29). Other differences between kolos and čočeks that Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić discuss in their joint study on Guća Festival, are those pertaining to: (1) corresponding dance styles – kolo is a collective dance performed in a circle according to predefined movement patterns, whereas čoček refers to the improvisatory type of solo (less often line) dance that ‘lies in a continuum ... [between its historical Ottoman inflections and] contemporary forms of belly dance’ (Silverman 2012: 107); (2) the type of musical texture – in kolos, the leading melody moves alongside the accompanying brass band

110 The other two Serbian brass band idioms – namely, the Vlach (i.e. (north)eastern Serbian) and Vojvodina (i.e. northern Serbian) styles – are left out of Guća’s Oriental discussion, partly because one is in decline (Vlach) whereas the other is under its way to take shape (Vojvodinian); and partly because of their respective music-ethnic ‘impurity’ which renders them ill-suited for the discussion at hand. To be exact, the Vlach brass band idiom encompasses a Serbian-Vlach-Romani juncture, whereas the Vojvodina style typically involves a Serbian-Hungarian-Slovakian-Croatian mix.
sections in streams of close-packed sound, whilst čočeks typically combine precomposed parts with highly improvisatory ones (called taksim or mane), in which a selected soloist, usually the first trumpeter, showcases his creativity and virtuosity over a metric ostinato played by the rest; (3) the structure of melodic lines – kolos belong to the category of narrow-range melodies with gradual movements and smaller leaps, based in major-minor tonality, whereas čočeks consist of heavily embellished and stretchy tunes that make use of both Western- and Turkish-derived scales; and (4) respective sonic prototypes – a typical kolo performance evokes the softer, gently rustling sonority of Serbia’s traditional frula [flute] which is a trumpet precursor in the kolo dance accompaniment, whereas the pungent piercing sonority of čočeks resembles that of zurla, a Serbian traditional woodwind instrument of Oriental origin, to which čočeks were initially danced (for more detailed account of čočeks, both as a traditional music genre and as a dance type, see Silverman 2012, Chapters 2 and 6).

Bearing all this in mind, it comes as no surprise that in the Guča lived spaces kolo is considered the only true and authentic form of the Serbian brass band tradition. Moreover, to prioritize kolos over čočeks in the festival spaces of representation apparently amounts to securing the nation’s salvation, as one online commentator under the indicative alias, Serbian Lion, suggests:

I want the trumpet as it used to be. I want the SERBIAN DVOJKA. I want much more the dvojka-style trumpet, and much less the čoček-style trumpet. My wish is to see people coming, as before, to the trumpet [festival] because of the [brass band] contest and trumpet listening, and not because of the [festival] guest-performers partaking in the evening programs with the instruments for which there is no place in the festival. And I DON’T WANT to see belly dancing in Guča because there is no place for it in the festival either. I WANT SERBIAN kolos to be danced!!! Think about it, my SERB FELLOWS... Let’s preserve our country SERBIA!!! (SrpskiLav / SerbianLion, in Bojović 2013c [comments]; capital letters in original.)

Importantly, the kolo-čoček controversy does not only reproduce the everlasting tension between Serbia’s two major regional brass band idioms, whereby the latter invariably occupies lower ground precisely because of its Oriental/Eastern/Islamic associations. The kolo-čoček opposition arises also from the division of Serbian brass bands along ethnic-racial lines, with the Serbs playing kolos and the Romani playing čočeks. Guča Festival is therefore often talked about as a contest between ‘white’ (Serbian) and ‘black’ (Romani) brass bands. That the latter are often dismissed in and by the Guča organic space as non-Serbian and aesthetically less worthy (if not
worthless) when compared to ‘white’ players, can be inferred from the following online quote:

Boban Marković is by no means a representative of the Serbian trumpet but of the Oriental one. If anything is well-established about the Trumpet Festival, it is that Gypsy bands play čočeks, and the Serbian ones kolos, and that the two do not intermingle. *Dejan Lazarević Orchestra*\textsuperscript{111} is, for example, a genuine Serbian brass band. Also, anyone who has ever visited Guča knows all too well that Gypsy bands only induce ennui, whereas the Serbian ones receive ovations. (Jovan, ‘Boban Marković tonight at Guča’, *Blic* [comments], 2010.)

This comment reveals, in addition, two interconnected points: first, that Guča-related discourses of ‘organic’ Serbianhood are implicitly rooted in the idea of whiteness; and second, that aesthetic judgments that favor ‘white’ over ‘black’ brass bands have wider social ramifications. As Vidić Rasmussen (2006: 109) explains, the depreciation of ‘musical styles variously associated with the local notions of [“Oriental”,] “Eastern”, “Islamic”, “ethnic”, and “foreign”’ within the hierarchically organized system of national culture representation, is tightly linked to the marginal status of sociocultural groups that produce them. By the same logic, dismissive and diminishing comments on the Vranje brass band idiom, made within the discursive framework of Guča organic space, go often hand in hand with corresponding views of its exponents – Serbia’s Romani minority.\textsuperscript{112}

Historically, and more generally, the Oriental issue in music has long been a recurring point of controversy in the entire Balkan region. For example, in the realm of folk music, Timotijević (2005: 226–227) and Vidić Rasmussen (2006: 102) document a number of institutional attempts at suppressing and restyling Yugoslavia’s Oriental musical tradition ever since the 1930s. In like manner, Đurković (2004) and Pennanen (2008) scrutinize the continuous efforts of the Western-oriented Balkan intelligentsia (since ca. 1900) to exclude the Ottoman legacy from national histories.

\textsuperscript{111} Dejan Lazarević from Požega (a town located in West Serbia) is a Guča Master of Trumpet and a distinguished representative of the Šumadija brass band style.

\textsuperscript{112} The story of the late Serbian Romani trumpet player and another Guča Master of Trumpet, Ekrem Mamutović (1942–2008) from Vranje, is very much revealing of discriminatory practices against Serbia’s Romani minority, especially when their birth names bear Islamic / Eastern associations. Namely, in 1996 Ekrem Mamutović changed both his fore- and last name into the more Serbian-sounding Milan Mladenović. Having faced severe harassment and death threats immediately after a gig in the Republika Srpska due to his Islamic name, Ekrem was advised to change it by notorious Serbian paramilitary commander in the Yugoslav wars, Željko Ražnatović, who used his authority to talk Ekrem’s way out of danger (see Otašević 2013a). For more about the racial aspect of Serbian national identity representation in Guča, see also 5.4.5.
of music and the attendant canon of national music. Pennanen makes an additional argument here:

This marginalisation, or rather the negation of the Ottoman past, has had a long-lasting, powerful effect on Balkan folk music research: instead of historical facts, music studies are often based on an imagined Orient and speculative Oriental influence. (Ibid., 130.)

[Balkan scholars] have represented ‘Oriental’ musical characteristics as domestic, claimed that Ottoman Turks merely imitated Arab and Persian culture, and viewed Indian classical raga scales as sources for Oriental scales in the Balkans. In addition, some scholars have viewed the ‘Oriental’ characteristics as stemming from ancient Greece. (Ibid., 127.)

And as already said, in the discursive field of Yugoslav/Serbian popular music, neo-folk and TF have traditionally been designated as the ‘usual suspects’ in Oriental disputes across the region. The peak in such debates was reached on the eve of Yugoslavia’s breakup, coinciding with the ‘Oriental surge’ surrounding the Belgrade-based label Južni vetar [Southern Wind] and their neo-folk music production with a strong Oriental Balkan flavor (see Vidić Rasmussen 1995; 2002; 2006). The other heated moment in Oriental disputes across much of the former Yugoslav region was of course stirred up by the subsequent rise and popularity of Serbian-specific TF music, especially in the 1990s, but also well into this century (see e.g. Baker 2006; 2007; Đurković 2004; Simić 2006; 2009).

At any rate, what seems to drive all above-cited instances of the Oriental dispute are ‘the forces of Eurocentricity at its peripheries’ (Vidić Rasmussen 2006:108). The same is also true of similar music genres such as svatbarska muzika [wedding music] in socialist Bulgaria (Silverman 2012), and chalga in postsocialist Bulgaria (Buchanan 2006; Kurkela 2007; Levy 2004); muzică orientală or mânăl in postsocialist Romania (Beissinger 2007); or muzika popullore in postsocialist Albania (Sugarman 2007). In all these cases, the putative Oriental elements bear witness to multifaceted music-cultural traces of the Ottoman past, variously associated ‘with Islamic or Turkish (and to a lesser extent Arabic and Persian) influences’ (Todorova 1997:162). The reason such traces are commonly treated as instances of ultimate Otherness in all domains of Balkan life, not least in music, lies in the consensus view among Balkan historians that the Ottoman legacy represents ‘a religiously, socially, institutionally, and even racially alien imposition on [the] autochthonous Christian / European core of Balkan societies (cf. Todorova 1997: 162). Thus, the fact that Orientalist discourses underpin much of music-related discussion across the Balkans, speaks volumes a-
bout the region’s internal schism between the ‘shameful’ Ottoman past and the wishful European present and future.

More to the point, there have been several official attempts at purging the Guča organic space of Oriental influences that are worth mentioning. Perhaps predictably, the most radical episode in this regard occurred in the early 1990s, in parallel with the eruption of nationalist fervor across the former Yugoslav region. Specifically, at Guča 1992, the festival committee issued an official recommendation that participating brass bands “cut down a bit” on čočeks and Oriental arias’. Radoslav ‘Rašo’ Protić, then in charge of the festival organization, justified this initiative with the following explanation: ‘We’d like to hear more of Serbia’s authentic traditional music in the [festival’s] official program’ (see Bojanić 2002: 123).

Another example of an institutional move at purging Guča of musical Orientalisms is of a later date and it centers on a controversy surrounding the popular Yugoslav / Serbian neo-folk song ‘Šote, mori, Šote’ [Shota, you, shota]. The controversy emerged on the eve of Guča 2007 and involved joint efforts of festival organizers and politician Velimir Ilić to put a ban on the song because of its alleged historical associations with Albanian separatists Azem Bejta aka Azem Galica (1889–1924) and his wife Qerime Radisheva aka Shota Galica (1895–1927), who fought side by side for the unification of Kosovo with Albania. Sensationally published in the domestic media was a historically implausible explanation of the song’s origins. According to it, ‘Šote, mori, Šote’ is allegedly a song commissioned by Azem Galica as a wedding gift for his wife Shota Galica. As the legend has it, immediately after her husband was killed fighting the military troops of the Royal Yugoslav Army, Shota captured six Serbian herders and chanted the song whilst burning them alive. Speaking on behalf of Guča festival organizers, Ilić (in Luković 2007) stated publicly that:

[t]here are not many among us who have been aware of the gruesome history of this song. Now we are determined to recommend its proscription from Guča. With all brass bands we have signed contracts which oblige them to play only traditional, authentic, high-quality Serbian music. (...) [Guča Festival] is a fair of most beautiful compositions from the Serbian history and culture, so there is no reason to include songs of other nations therein, and especially not of the people who were, and still are, our great enemies.

Exemplified here is clearly the fantasy of Serbian nationalism at its purest. Inherent to it is a sort of twisted logic that defies the actual facts about the song’s already

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113 Šota is a traditional solo dance from Kosovo. It represents part of the common heritage shared by all ethnic groups living therein, be they Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romani, or Gorani.
existing copyrights. To be exact, ‘Šote, mori, Šote’ was released in the early 1970s by Jugoton Records. The songwriting credits belong to Dragan Aleksandrić, the lyric credits go to Radmila Todorović, and the singing credits to Nenad Jovanović. Unsurprisingly, in addition to ‘Šote, mori, Šote’, the festival practice of (belly) dancing on the tables was officially banned, too, from the Guča lived spaces within the same recommendatory initiative (see Luković 2007).

Thus, as showcased in a number of examples above, the Oriental dispute is still very much alive in both conceived and lived spaces of Guča representation. It is however worth stressing that the Oriental dispute has its flip side, represented by those Serbian voices that speak approvingly of ‘Oriental’ musical qualities in Guča (and beyond). That such dissonant voices are perhaps loudest in the kolo-ćoček controversy can be corroborated by the following evidence:

I am a Serb, but I prefer ćoček! Ćoček is full of energy and rhythm! Jovan [see the quote above], it looks like you’re jealous of Gypsies!? Gypsies make a much better atmosphere than Serbs! (Acafača, ‘Bovan Marković tonight at Guča’, Blic [comments], 2010.)

Frankly speaking, who’d bother with listening to the mind-numbing dvojka of Zlatibor [brass band] players, which is anyway a product of the German rhythm set to the Dinaric ojkanje singing.\(^{114}\) The real [Serbian] trumpet is [represented by] the melos of the South, which is also the melos of Serbia, because Serbia is not only Šumadija. (Jola, ‘South Serbia requests its own “Guča”’, B92 [comments], 2012.)

Finally, to complete the analysis above, it is also necessary to take notice of those institutional moves at purification of Guča organic space that go beyond the Oriental dispute. The purist tendencies in attitudes of festival organizers and institutional instances alike (such as Cultural-Educational Community of Serbia, Belgrade’s Association ‘Dragačevo’, or Guča’s Ecological Society ‘Dragačevo’) are propelled, at least on the surface, by the festival’s professed commitment to the izvor’s preservation, as well as by a need to respond to the public criticism documented above. As Mladomir Sretenović, president of the Municipality of Lučani and chairman of the festival administrative board (2012–2014), asserted in an interview (Petrović 2012d: 10), ‘[w]e want to return the festival to its roots’. This formulation perhaps captures best the spirit of ideological puritanism manifest in the Guča organic space.

\(^{114}\) This is a reference to a peculiar ancient style of Dinaric singing in western Šumadija, based on two-part, unison-heterophonic ‘singing melisma with a sharp and prolonged shaking of the voice on the syllables of or hoj’ (Randel 2003: 227).
One way festival organizers continue to exert control over its musical content is by means of the festival rulebook which sets up conditions, protocols, and rules of the brass band contest. As mentioned above, the regulatory bodies supervising the competition recovered their position of authority after 2000. However, in spite of these disciplinary efforts, there are still many inconsistencies in the way Serbian brass band competitors understand tradition, make repertoire choices, and perform traditional music, as convincingly shown by Zakić and Lajić Mihajlović’s (2012) analysis of the competing numbers at Guća 2010. This was perhaps a contributing factor to the subsequent decision of the festival committee to stiffen the regulations on the competition repertoire. Specifically, from 2013 onwards, it is no longer up to competing brass bands to decide which two numbers, from two mandatory folk genres (i.e. ‘authentic folk song’ and ‘folk kolo/čoček’), they may play at the festival contest. According to the festival rulebook (Administrative Board of the Centre for Culture and Sport of the Municipality of Lučani in Guća, 2013, Article 16, p. 4), now, ‘[e]ach [participating] brass band (...) is obliged, not later than sixty days from the start of the preliminary contest, to draw lots for the song they will perform at the preliminary, semifinal, and final competition’. In the words of festival director Adam Tadić (see Otašević 2013b), the new rules were enforced not only to prevent competing brass bands from selecting and performing, year after year, a limited number of folk songs. More importantly, the change was also introduced to call their attention to ‘old, traditional songs from their homeland’.

Another way in which the Guća organic space seeks to restore the tradition’s izvor is through an emphatic insistence on a strictly traditional dress code for trumpet players and festival participants alike. The purist discourse on the festival clothing style is naturally nostalgic for ‘good, old Guća days’ and at the same time critical of the changes that have occurred in the meantime. As Marinković (2002: 46–47) notes, ‘[i]n the last two decades, trumpet players have been dressed in the latest fashion. (...) No longer does any of the trumpet players cover their head with šajkača, and this was something unimaginable for older generations of trumpeters’. Given the situation, Stojić (in Nenković 2013) suggests the following as a remedy to the ‘spoilt’ trumpet tradition on the ground: ‘No trumpet player should play the trumpet unless dressed in the folk costume [with the distinctive design and embroidery of the region he comes from]. I’ve told them recently that I won’t tolerate seeing them in jeans’. Suggestions of this kind expand to include all Guća performers and their outfit. For instance, it is specifically demanded that all program participants wear traditional national costumes of their home countries during the entire time of the festival; that reenactments of the old Dragačevo wedding ceremony retain the original nineteenth-century features (Otašević 2011b); or that female folk ensembles refrain from wearing traditional Šumadija costumes in combination with uncovered heads, makeup, and gold jewelry (Stojić 2006: 168).
A recurring theme in the festival discussions and initiatives that pertain more directly to the realm of music, centers on the call for purging the Guča organic space of estrada elements. While many Serbian cultural institutions, experts, and commentators seem to unanimously support a radical break with the estradization of Guča, festival organizers strive in general to strike a balance between izvor and estrada, that is, between traditional and commercial aspects of the festival program. To quote festival president Sretenović (in Petrović 2013a: 3), ‘[w]e are trying to reduce a number of estrada [pop-folk] stars within the [festival] program, as well as to adapt their music to the trumpet [idiom]. That way these stars also get to perform their songs accompanied by brass bands’. However, this generally moderate approach to the festival music programming was challenged at Guča 2015, when festival organizers adopted a stricter policy towards pop-folk singers. Speaking on behalf of the festival board, the newly appointed director of Guča Culture House, Zoran Vučićević, announced publicly that ‘[t]he trumpet only is to be heard at the festival’ (‘No longer will be heard...’, Press, 2015; emphasis added). He highlighted in addition, ‘[w]e’ll find a way to prohibit any other kind of music in tent-restaurants, too. For our goal is to bring to the festival its former luster and reputation’. A decision of festival organizers to endorse a purist policy was apparently made on the basis of a large-scale national survey conducted upon their own request. According to its results, an overwhelming 85% of survey respondents indicated that they would prefer Guča to have exclusively a trumpet-based program, thus ‘purified’ of pop-folk acts. However, having suffered a disastrous attendance drop in 2015, the festival saw the restitution of the earlier program policy as soon as next year. A compromised stance towards estrada singers yielded a modified structure of the festival program in 2016. To quote Jolović (in ‘Show in Guča’, Telegraf, 2016), reappointed president of the festival board in 2016, ‘[t]he official festival days are [now] Thursday, Friday and Saturday, while Wednesday and Sunday are set aside for commerce. (...) During these two days, which are not strictly festival-oriented, caterers will be allowed to play also other music than trumpet’.

With this brief overview of policy interventions in the musical production of Guča organic space, the analysis of izvor-related discourses has finally come full circle. One key point that needs to be reiterated is that the Guča old and new musical trends clearly cannot be reconciled in a satisfactory way, that is, in a way which would not compromise the izvor of tradition. The other important point here is that various calls for the purification of Guča organic space in domestic public discourse come from all sides of the political spectrum. The final section of the present chapter concludes therefore with a reflection on particular ways in which various Guča-related narratives of the izvor’s preservation converge and diverge from one another.
4.5.4 Convergences and Divergences in Domestic Discourses on the Preservation of the Guča ‘Izvor’

Guča-related discourses on cultural heritage preservation cut across conventional ideological divides in that they draw on similar underlying assumptions. Both camps explicitly agree that there is an intrinsic value in the Serbian brass band tradition as well as in the festival that safeguards it. Both ideological camps are also unanimously in support of the preservation practices and policies that set up theoretically objective criteria for defining ‘the authenticity, integrity, and significance’ inherent to the Guča cultural heritage (cf. Koziol 2008: 45). But despite their shared point of departure (which is clearly essentialist), Guča observers on each side of the political spectrum use the preservationist discourse to articulate and pursue different aesthetico-ideological agendas. Not only is thus the notion of authenticity associated with more or less different understandings of Serbian (brass band) tradition. Also, the shared quest for authenticity in the Guča micronational space is meant to fulfill different aesthetic and ideological needs.

For Serbian nationalists, the Guča cultural heritage apparently amounts to the idea of timeless authenticity as embodied in the creative output of Serbia’s premodern rural community. This point of view is further linked to a type of populism that caters to traditional patriotic sentiments, and thus facilitates the construction of what Burke (1992, in Koziol 2008: 43) calls identities of consensus. Within such a perspective, it is maintained that the Serbian brass band tradition represents an incarnation of the Serb people’s ‘soul’, and, consequently, that ‘the salvation of the folk’s soul’ depends upon the preservation of the tradition (cf. Naumović 2009: 111). In other words, the preservationist discourse reflects here wider concerns with the homogeneity and purity of the Serbian national core and is therefore conservative in its nature – or perhaps not so much “backward-looking” [as] it is looking backwards to a past that never was’ (cf. Massey 2005: 65). Either way, nostalgic and anxious narratives about the ‘spoil’d tradition in Guča evoke ‘the image of ethno-national uniqueness (...) of early to high modernity, when the invention of national traditions and imagining of nations were characterized by a quest for essentialism and purism’ (cf. Regev 2007: 125).

Furthermore, the preservationist agenda that presumes a correlation between the izvor’s purity and the nation’s survival generates the exclusivist view of (Serbian) national identity. Such an approach not only fosters a sense of ethnonational exceptionality, but it also excludes all those identity groups that are deemed disruptive to the desired national image. Indeed, as illustrated in some of the examples above, various suggestions to purge the Guča izvor of ‘foreign’ and especially Oriental influences reveal a hostile attitude towards the nation’s multiple Others, whether they be labeled Turks / Asians / Muslims / Romani / Albanians, Americans / Westerners, or internal ‘polluters’ (i.e. Serbia’s peasant urbanites).
Conversely, for cosmopolitan and more left-oriented Guča critics, the essentialist quest for authenticity is informed by aesthetico-ideological values of the folk music world, as articulated in ethnomusicological and WM discourses, but also in popular music discourse more generally. The preservationist agenda underlying each is, by implication, based on the same assumptions as the one proposed by nationally-oriented festival devotees – namely, that aesthetic qualities inhere in Serbian brass music, and that they are subject to objective evaluation using the self-referential system of musico-aesthetic norms. Moreover, Guča cosmopolitans are, similarly to Guča nationalists, suspicious and critical of commercial interventions in the tradition to be found all over the festival ground. Importantly, however, the shared idea of timeless authenticity, embodied in the Guča cultural heritage, is overall more flexibly deployed in the cosmopolitan preservationist discourse than it is in the nationalist one. The former position typically allows and even urges engagement with global trends, encouraging thereby postmodern sensibilities and what Boym (2007) calls reflexive nostalgia – that is, a fascination with the idea of temporal or geographical distance and related sentimental explorations of the past for one’s imaginings in the present. Note that the said approach to tradition has been elaborated at full length in relation to the WM discourse and practice in the Exit counter-space (see 3.2.5). In the case of Guča, the cosmopolitan imaginings of Serbian brass band tradition are likewise imbued with ambiguities, as will become especially clear in 5.4.2.

However, while the aesthetico-musical values of Serbian brass brand tradition are presented in the preservationist discourse of Guča cosmopolitans as relatively autonomous from wider social concerns, they are at the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, invested with the perceived values of Serbia’s national-local communities within which this music thrives. As will be shown in the next chapter, cosmo-local commentators are indeed very much sensitive to issues of national identity representation in Guča Festival. But in contrast to Guča nationalists, they refute the Romantic idea that the national essence is to be found in the Serbian brass band tradition; or that the latter represents the only true and universally shared expression of the national culture. The populist premises underlying the preservationist discourse of Guča cosmopolitans pertain therefore to so-called identities of resistance, to use Burke’s terminology once again. This brand of populism raises concerns for disenfranchised sections of society, which are in the Guča context identity groups organized along ethnic-racial lines (such as in concerns for the mistreatment and discrimination of Romani festival participants), vocational lines (such as in concerns for the exploitation and marginalization of Guča brass band players), communal lines (such as in concerns for the well-being of the local Guča population), and class divisions (as in comments calling attention to the affordability gap in the domestic festival consumption) (see e.g. Arsenijević 2012; Bojović 2010b; Dragićević-Šešić, in Marković 2008; Kesić, in Živanović et al. 2013: 4; Lukić Krstanović and Stojanović, in Petrović 2012
b; Stanković 2013). In view of the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the preservationist discourse of Guča cosmopolitans propagates the universalist framework of (Serbian) national identity. The image of Serbia constructed accordingly is one of a cosmopolitan nation that endorses policies of inclusion and civil rights, and that freely interacts both with the world outside and with the Other within.

It goes without saying that the two opposed positions on the izvor’s preservation in Guča, a nationalist and a cosmopolitan one, have been presented merely as ‘ideal types’. No doubt there are a number of intermediate positions that can fall somewhere between these two extremes, not least because nationalism and cosmopolitanism complete and presuppose each other – namely, there is no cosmopolitanism without its localized articulations, and no nationalism without its engagement with wider contexts. For example, Guča nationalists can tolerate and even delight at instances of cultural hybridity and diversity on the festival ground, whereas Guča cosmopolitans can engage in their own discriminatory and exclusionary practices against those Others, both internal and external, that do not fit into their fixed cosmopolitan imagination or do not share their cosmopolitan worldview.

But more importantly, the reason why it is so difficult at times to draw a sharp demarcation line between the two perspectives is that they touch each other at a number of points. As emphasized above, it is the underlying assumptions of both folk and preservationist discourses that oblige each to be committed to the ideal of izvor and communal values associated with the Serbian trumpet practice (including here a shared concern for the fair treatment of trumpet players). Another common ground that Guča nationalist and cosmopolitans share lies in the neo-Marxist premises of their preservationist reasoning. Both groups, indeed, strongly disapprove of the ongoing processes of the festival commercialization and the attendant commodification of Serbian brass band tradition. This does not really come as a surprise, considering that preservationists with essentialist and/or populist inclinations generally maintain that cultural heritage ‘should not be subjected to market forces’ (Koziol 2008: 43). Nonetheless, the incorporation of commercial and contemporary music acts into the festival’s official program provide evidence that producers of Guča organic space do not hesitate to compromise the core values of Serbian nationalism for profit and the festival’s further growth. Also, a paradigm shift in post-Milošević Serbia towards neoliberalism (in the mid-2000s) has urged some native exponents from both sides of the political spectrum to adopt the entrepreneurial mindset and advocate private initiatives in the cultural sector on the whole. This is indeed a critical topic which will be briefly touched upon in Chapter 6.

On a related note, common to both types of Guča preservationists is also a critique of the festival rurbanization, mainly directed against the Serbian estrada and nouveau riche moving up the social ladder in times of postsocialist transition. In these discourses, the perceived rurbanity in Guča stands for the vulgarity, primitiv-
ism, and decadence of contemporary Serbian culture and society at large. In this re-
spect, the notion of Guča rurality apparently overlaps with the semantic implica-
tions of the wider Balkanist discourse and its divisive effects on society.

At any rate, even if the preservationist discourse in Guča tends to blur the divid-
ing line between two ideological extremes discussed above, it still does not do so in
a way which undermines their essentially different agendas. To illustrate the full sig-
nificance of such polarities for the discursive reproduction of Serbia’s national iden-
tity schisms, I proceed next with analytical considerations of both emic and etic rep-
resentations of Exit and Guča micronational spaces in which these two are more di-
rectly opposed to one another along familiar binary poles (i.e. global-local, urban-
rural, modern-traditional, and West-East).
5 Exit and Guča in Trans/National Symbolic Geographies

The present chapter explores further the perceived schisms of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guča within both intra- and international hierarchies of geopolitical images and relations – in short, the place of two festivals in national and transnational symbolic geographies. The way it does so is through a focus on four spatial layers that cut across Serbia’s symbolic geography and attendant national identity imaginings. Accordingly, the chapter comprises four sections, each covering one spatial aspect of the country’s divide: global-local, urban-rural, North-South, and West-East.

It is important to note, however, that these spatial frames are not approached as fixed categories during the actual analysis. On the contrary, the analysis shifts freely from one spatial level to another, since the production of Exit and Guča micronational spaces involves, by definition, different spatial imaginations at once (from local to global). As Lefebvre (2009: 88) notes himself,

the places of social space (...) may be intercalated, combined, superimposed – they may even sometimes collide. Consequently the local (or ‘punctual’, in the sense of ‘determined by a particular “point”’) does not disappear, for it is never absorbed by the regional, national or even worldwide level. The national and regional levels take in innumerable ‘places’; national space embraces the regions; and world space does not merely subsume national spaces, but even (for the time being at least) precipitates the formation of new national spaces through a remarkable process of fission. (Emphasis in original.)

In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the Balkanist discourse, even when not explicitly brought into play, works as an overarching epistemological framework that substantiates the analysis throughout the rest of the chapter. As a result, the suggested image of Serbia may seem to be one of irreconcilable differences, along with the corresponding views of Exit and Guča as polarized essences. However, one of the main aims of the analysis below is precisely to problematize the binary-based projections of Serbia’s national identity in Exit and Guča by pointing to internal contradictions.
in each festival. The analysis ultimately seeks to showcase that both Serbian music festivals are constructed as ‘places of specific liminality’ (cf. Jansen 2005a: 99) – thus, marked by the West-East split from within, but also by a range of other conflicted arenas too.

5.1 A Native Perspective on Global-Local Tensions in Exit and Guča: Copy vs. Original

One way in which the native construction of Serbia’s national identity schisms takes shape in public discussions on two Serbian music festivals is through an understanding of Exit-as-copy and Guča-as-original. The Exit-Guča opposition is occasionally debated in exactly those terms, as the following online comment illustrates: ‘Exit is a copy (there are five hundred such festivals), while Guča is not’ (Pecaroš / Fisherman, ‘To what extent does the Government...’, B92 [comments], 2007). The critical claim here is thus that Guča should be acclaimed as a specifically Serbian cultural product – authentic, unique, age-old, place-specific, whereas Exit should be devalued for being a foreign (Western) replica of something to be found elsewhere. Such a line of reasoning clearly falls back on a simplistic global-local dichotomy that acknowledges a unique sense of place in Guča whilst denying any sense of place to Exit. On a more profound level, the claimed authenticity of Guča organic space finds its grounding in the neotraditionalist assumptions and pro-rural leanings of Serbian nationalism. Before illustrating this argument, it should be noted that in a majority of other instances the copy-original distinction branches off further into a range of related binary pairs, each of which equally reinforces polarized native views of Exit and Guča. At any rate, in the analysis below, I treat the latter as ‘subordinate’ or ‘satellite binaries’ because the meaning implied in each either derives from or extends upon the same premises as those lying at the basis of the ‘umbrella’ binary opposition between Exit-as-copy and Guča-as-original.

To begin with, in the Exit-Guča debate, the copy-original distinction is sometimes discussed in terms of import and export. A good example is the following statement by president of the Guča festival board Slobodan Jolović (in Petrović 2010a: 8): ‘Exit is a product that we import, Guča is a product that we export. Foreigners come over to see šajkača and opanak; they’ve already got jeans and Coke over there’. Or as put in the coarse language of the popular rhyme flashing from Guča Festival-inspired T-shirts: ‘Fuck the Cola, fuck the pizza, all we need is šljivovica’. Alternatively, it is stated that ‘Guča and Exit [are] two different things. One is tradition, the other is fad’ (Davor, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006). Or that:
Exit is an ordinary international festival of the present day, and GUČA IS EVERYTHING SERBIAN FOR THE SERBS AND ALL REMOTELY HAPPY AND GOOD PEOPLE IN THE WORLD. (Svlbsp, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments]; capital letters in original.)

[Original quote: Exit je običan internacionalni festival moderne današnjice a ГУЧА ЈЕ СРПСКО ЗА СРБЕ И СВЕ ИОЛЕ ВЕСЕЛЕ И ДОБРЕ ЉУДЕ У СВЕТУ.]

The interpretations of the copy-original distinction in the two last quotes above are clearly expanded into a string of two other binary pairs – that of fad-tradition and international-national respectively. Implied by the former binary is that Guča as a bastion of the Serbian tradition epitomizes something ancient as well as something deep-rooted in Serbia’s national consciousness – something that captures well some measure of the nation’s quintessence. Exit, by contrast, seems to fall victim to the transitory trends dictated by the West. In the latter binary, the international character of Exit is likewise equated with the poorly rated qualities of the copy, for to assume an international outlook is apparently tantamount to representing oneself as generic, dull, and thus unmemorable. Guča is conversely identified with the very essence of the Serb people and is therefore automatically made valuable, special, and meaningful. By this logic, then, to be nationally conscious means to take pride in one’s difference and exceptionality. This is exactly the point where Guča is taken to signify ‘everything Serbian for the Serbs’, whereas foreign visitors are by implication welcome insofar as they can appreciate and enjoy Guča on the Serbian terms. The perceived Exit-Guča opposition, within which the former member of equation is a de-based one, is also underscored visually. As illustrated by the original quote above (in Serbian), the Latin lowercase version of Exit section is pitted against the visual representation of Guča section in Cyrillic capital letters. Such a representation clearly seeks to highlight the perceived authenticity and moral authority of Guča over Exit in Serbia’s national imagination.

The more straightforward readings of the copy-original distinction in terms of Exit inauthenticity as opposed to Guča authenticity can be discerned from the following comment: ‘Exit is good (for whoever likes it), but compared to Guča, it’s “plastic fruit”’ (Marin, ‘The Guča trumpet festival has begun’, B92 [comments], 2006). In the Exit-Guča discussion, there is in fact an entirely distinct group of binaries using the festival-related bodily stimuli and experiences (i.e. images of particular food, drink, and substance consumption) as metaphorical expressions for the corresponding ideas of (in)authenticity associated with each festival. One point that emerges in these debates is that (authentic) Serbian pljeskavica is, for example, part of the Guča food offer, whereas Exit serves (inauthentic) hamburger. Furthermore, Guča, so is
claimed, likes best kis’o kupus / ‘sauerkraut’ in contrast to the Exit preference for neke druge kiseline / ‘some other acids’\textsuperscript{115} (divxking, in Stojković 2012 [comments]). It is likewise commented that the experience of bodily excess in Guča centers on the ingestion of ‘organic stuff’ such as alcohol, especially Serbian rakija [schnaps] and beer. At Exit, as the story goes, are typically consumed weed and synthetic drugs, in particular ecstasy pills. The perceived difference between Guča and Exit recurs, for instance, in the form of the popular Serbian tagline rhyme: ‘Bo-lje alkos nego narkos! / Better a drunkie than a junkie!’ (nego-štā / you bet, ‘Best trumpet players...’, Blic [comments], 2013). Or put slightly differently: ‘I’d rather be a drunken pig than a stoned idiot bobbing his head to the same rhythm for fourteen hours [clearly a reference to DJ acts comprising a large portion of the Exit festival lineup]’ (Davor, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006). It is rather clear that all these comments function (explicitly or implicitly) as value judgments, whereby ‘alcohol abuse’ in Guča is evaluated as somehow more natural, authentic, honest, even heroic, and thus morally more acceptable than the supposed drug abuse in Exit. But what ultimately lies at the heart of all these organic-synthetic metaphors are, arguably, Serbia’s Occidentalist ideas about its own culture and people, as represented in and by the Guča organic space, as somehow purer, truer, more real, more vigorous and exuberant, compared to the wannabe Westernness of Exit counter-space.

In addition, the ideas of Exit as a colonized space versus Guča as a space of sovereignty, freedom, and resistance lend yet another semantic inflection to the copy-original binary in the Exit-Guča debate. The following quote exemplifies this point: ‘In the past twelve years, Guča has been the only free territory in colonized Serbia, where it hasn’t been forbidden to say that you aren’t ashamed of being a Serb’ (Dimitrije, in Stojković 2012 [comments]). Exit is here, by implication, taken to signify politically, economically, and culturally ‘colonized’ Serbia, a get-together place of all self-hating, undignified Serbs. As explicated in 3.2, the Exit counter-space is indeed typically accused by the Serbian right-wingers of conforming to the perceived materialist, consumerist, individualist, hedonistic, and liberal values of Western democracies.

Furthermore, in the Exit-Guča discourses, the distinction between Exit conformity (subjugation) and Guča nonconformity (resistance) ultimately expands into such binary pairs as global-local, universal-particular, and same-different. Indicative of the Exit-Guča reading in these latter terms is, for example, the standpoint by which ‘Exit is all about the suppression of individuality and local flavor’ going on all around the world but presented '[by] some among us [a]s an ideal to aspire to’ (Greenwich in Belgrade, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006). Following this logic, the endorsement of Guča amounts to a political defense of locality, particularity, and

\textsuperscript{115} This is in Serbian clearly an example of the ‘homophonic pun’, intentionally deploying similar-sounding words (kiseo / ‘sour’ and kiseline / ‘acids’) for a humorous effect.
difference against the ostensibly placeless, faceless, and disembodied globalization forces at work in Exit. Underlying such thinking is what Massey (2005: 101, 103) calls ‘the old reason of spatial fetishism’, or ‘metaphorical “geographies of resistance”’. As she points out, it is through romanticized imaginings of such spatial entities as locales, nations, ‘margins’, or ‘interstices’, that one’s understanding of a global-local dynamic comes to be occluded. It prevents one from realizing that the workings of ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ are closely intertwined rather than constituted as separate spatial units, whereby ‘global’ apparently stands for power, and ‘local’ for resistance. Moreover, as Massey further argues, by refusing to acknowledge that the local (particular) is always implicated in the production of the global (universal) and vice versa, one also ‘refuses to recognize any implications in this “power”, or to take responsibility for it’ (ibid., 103).

In the same vein, supporters of Guća organic space (and thus advocates of the discourse of locality, difference, and resistance) fail to recognize that the Exit appropriation of global music and Western attitude more generally generates a host of idiosyncratic meanings when adopted and consumed in Serbia’s local and national contexts. What Guća supporters additionally fail to recognize is that the transnational music and leisure industries actually feed off diversity and have long subsumed under their canopy such WM phenomena as Guća and the Balkan / Serbian brass (cf. Leyshon et al. 1998). It is thus important to call attention to a two-way process in which the global and the local operate in both Exit and Guća.

That said, within the horizon of the Exit-Guća debate at hand, the main perception remains that Exit suffers from a loss of a unique sense of place due to its voluntary subscription to the global cultural model. It should go without saying that the assigned position of moral inferiority in Exit-as-copy does not sit well with Exit supporters. Analyzing the pertinent media discourse on two Serbian music festivals, I have indeed distinguished three major lines of defense in the Exit counter-argumentation. I classify them here under the following rubrics: (1) the postmodern denial of origins, (2) obliviousness, and (3) trickery.

It appears that for Exit producers it is by no means controversial to openly acknowledge the festival’s ‘inauthentic’ status. To paraphrase Exit co-founder Kovačević (in Milović Buha 2008), ‘Budapest Sziget Festival inspired and provided a template for Exit Festival. Sziget then again found its template in the iconic 1969 Woodstock Festival, and Woodstock – in the Carnival of Venice, and so on’. By placing Exit within a network of relational signifiers (namely, Sziget, Woodstock, Venice Carnival), Kovačević apparently challenges, in fine Derridean fashion, the very idea of ‘origins’ and thus the possibility of being and knowing outside some referential system (or what Derrida calls ‘the system of differences’). Kovačević, in other words, suggests that there is actually no true original meaning in the ‘Exit’ signifier. The latter can only exist and be comprehended by virtue of difference, that
is, in relation to other things. Or as Radano and Bohlman (2000: 31) put it, “"[o]ri-
gins" necessarily give way to prior positions which destabilize fixities of place’.

Closely tied to Derrida’s notion of *différance* are his other two concepts, specifically, those of *bricolage* (1978) and *repetition* (1993). Just as the idea of origins is repudiated in the former case, so is the idea of creating out of whole cloth in the latter two cases. Instead, as the argument goes, it is actually through the activity of bricolage and repetition that all material and symbolic production comes into being. This point of view seems to resonate with the former Exit CEO Bošković’s take on the issue of festival (un)originality. As he put it to me in an interview (Sep 2014), ‘What can really be called original anyway!? Everything new is in some way derivative of what already exists. You always get inspired by something that is already out there’. This is precisely the kind of reasoning that enables Exit producers and consumers alike to reclaim the moral value of Exit-as-copy. Namely, if the act of copying (bricolaging, repeating) is everything there is, then the Exit approach to its forerunners as the templates to be copied becomes reevaluated as something im-
manent to the process of creation as such. And more, ‘bricolage’ and ‘repetition’ in-
volved in the Exit counter-space production are, in this model, redesignated as the very source of the Exit authentication. For, as poststructuralists would have it, ‘repe-
tition of the same’ cannot be identical to what it repeats. Repetition rather becomes a source of something new and original. By the same token, it was through the adoption of familiar festival templates that Exit could become unique in many aspects of its operation and presentation. According to Bošković (interview, Sep 2014):

[Exit] has a unique story of why and how it came into being [a reference to the political background of the festival foundation], it has a unique core location [the Fortress], it is uniquely integrated with the rest of the city, it has a unique ‘East meets West’ structure of the audience, a unique booking policy and a unique business model.

Thus, when considered in the light of postmodern theory, the statements above not only make the initially devalued status of Exit-as-copy reversed. They also serve to implicitly reaffirm the desired distinction of Exit counter-space and its well-educated, urbane, and cultured users – thus, a social group very much deserving the title of what Friedman calls *postmodernist elites*.

Another strategy for the reclamation of Exit credibility, labeled above as ‘obliv-
viousness’, consists in striking back at Guća with the same questions of authenticity and origins. Exit supporters specifically refute Guća’s claims to originality by point-
ing out that the Serbian brass brand tradition is also ‘Western’ in its origins. It is a truism that neither Guća producers (e.g. Tadić et al. 2010: 41–42; Stojić in *Guca Trailer 2010*, 2010) nor Serbian ethnomusicologists (e.g. Dević 1986; Golemović
1997) deny the fact that the trumpet and the homophonic style of brass band playing were both imported from Central Europe to Serbia over the course of the nineteenth century. Nor is much disputed that the Serbian brass band tradition is of a newer date, since it penetrated into the village music life as late as the beginning of the twentieth century, later to be regenerated precisely thanks to Guča Festival (see 4. 5.1). With this in mind, the Exit counter-argument here seems to be twofold. Criticized is, first, a tendency in the representations of Guča organic space to let the historical facts about the Serbian brass music origins sink into oblivion. And second, when it comes to the issue of authenticity, it is suggested that Exit and Guča should be treated as equal in status. Specifically, it is argued that both festivals are authentic to some degree. By this logic, just as the worldwide standard of the Western brass band idiom was made to sound in Guča, through the process of indigenization, ‘music you can call your own’ (Boonzajer Flaes 1999: 20), so is the Exit appropriation of Westernness made a site of local self-expression and resistance to the dominant culture. Alternatively, authenticity is contested in both music festivals, as the following online comment makes clear:

There is no authenticity in either Guča or Exit, at least not in terms of Serbian origins, and it’s wrong to sell the story that Guča is Serbia because it’s not. The music [at Guča] is mainly not Serbian and neither is music at Exit (in most cases) and there is of course nothing wrong with it, it just needs to be acknowledged. Popular melodies that are traditionally performed by [Serbian] trumpet players, such as ‘Đurđevdan/Ederlezi’, ‘Mesečina/Moonlight’, etc., are not Serbian, and it should be noted that several countries are laying claim over their origin. (Dušan, ‘Guča is (not) a cultural event’, B92 [comments], 2012.)

Relatedly, the third line of defense detected in Exit counter-discourses is called ‘trickery’ on the basis of the claims that Guča in its contemporary form deceives the public by presenting itself as something that it is not – the Serbian tradition. As one online comment goes:

Once upon a time the Guča Assembly of Trumpet Players used to really cherish the tradition of the [Serb] people, but now... if this has become a tradition, how to explain it to our children and grandchildren: The tradition of our people is to wear a T-shirt with the imprint of a [war] criminal, to drape yourself in the Serbian flag, and then dead drunk fall asleep in the mud... Or, the tradition of our people is to loosen up a bit with a beer or two, take off as much clothes as possible, and then climb all day long on the tables listening to the traditional Serbian instrument – for that’s the best way to get it! What a disgrace! Guys, let’s cultivate the tradition for its own sake, and not in a hypocritical fashion, as a five-
day excuse for overindulgence and quick profits. (Damir, ‘To what extent...’, 
*B92* [comments], 2007.)

Clearly, the assumption here is that Guča used to be authentic but has over time deviated from its original meaning and purpose, letting the ancillary (nationalist) kitsch and decadence spoil its pure, authentic core. ‘For all these reasons’, as it was written in the public statement (‘Guča is (not) a cultural event’, *B92*, 2012) issued by Serbia’s Movement for European Cultural Cooperation (MECC)\(^{116}\) in response to controversies surrounding the Guča trumpet festival,

we believe that there has been enough deception of domestic and world public and enough abuse of the concept of culture. We do not demand the abolition of ‘Guča’, but we feel that the festival which went astray should no longer deserve to be categorized under the rubric of original folk creativity, or to be included into the events of cultural significance [for Serbia].

Within this line of argumentation, the status of Exit-as-copy is not disputed as such, but our attention is rather called to the fact that Guča is no longer original either. The issues of authenticity and culture heritage preservation raised above are of course most fiercely debated in the music arena, as already showcased in 4.5. What, however, needs to be discussed further is one additional way in which the Exit counter-space responds to the popular assumption that the singularity of its place has been somehow lost ‘through the imposition of a generic or globalized “form”’ (cf. Malpas 2015: 71). Such accusations are not entirely ill-founded insofar as the cosmopolitanism of Exit counter-space takes on the form of the universal breaking away from the local and particular (see 3.2.5). This brand of Exit cosmopolitanism is tightly linked to a common tendency among Exit producers to incorporate certain ‘placeless’ qualities in the festival’s spatial representation. Exit Festival markets itself as ‘international’ (i.e. open to world cultures) precisely by creating a sense of *placelessness* (cf. Relph 2008: 143), that is, by using generic signifiers of global modernity.

I exemplify the latter by briefly referring to the Exit 2002 marketing campaign, descriptively titled as ‘an arm making waves’. Presented in the advertising video (*EXIT 02*, 2009) are successive images of young city people, mainly grouped in couples, seated in a moving car or in a flat, or placed in front of a glass building, shop

\(^{116}\) MECC is a non-governmental, non-profit, youth organization founded in Belgrade in 2010. ‘The goals of the Movement are to advance cultural cooperation among the peoples, regions and states of Europe, to promote understanding, mutual recognition and cooperation between people and communities, and to encourage all-round and free communication among them, primarily in the spheres of culture, education, ecology, information and politics, as well as to combat all forms of violence or discrimination’ (see peksbh.weebly.com).
window, or gramophone. All of them repeat the same waving movement with an arm, including a male-female couple performing capoeira dance in the midst of the city’s concrete, glass, and steel. The laidback, dreamy, and visceral atmosphere of the video is conveyed and underlined by such sensual qualities as the sun’s heat, the wind’s breeze, and the tactile effects of music listening. What especially adds to the sensuality of the visuals presented here is the yearning Brazilian feel of Smoke City’s ‘Underwater Love’ used as a video soundtrack. The video director Ivan Stefanović stated for Exit News (‘An arm making waves’, 2002: n.p.) that the main idea behind the festival marketing campaign was to popularize a more beautiful view of life by ‘making waves’.\(^{117}\) As he explained further, of crucial importance was to find a shooting location which bears no traces of locality. ‘Together with capoeira, which is a Brazilian dance, we’ve managed to put across this international atmosphere of Exit’, Stefanović added. In this ‘superficial and cosmetic relationship’ to the Other (in this case Brazilianness) within a larger framework of ‘placeless’ modernity, the understanding and representation of cosmopolitanism in and by the Exit counter-space are not far from so-called \textit{boutique multiculturalism} of Western metropolitan spaces. In Fish’s (1997: 378) words:

\begin{quote}
Boutique multiculturalism is the multiculturalism of ethnic restaurants, weekend festivals, and high profile flirtations with the other in the manner satirized by Tom Wolfe under the rubric of ‘radical chic’. Boutique multiculturalism is characterized by its superficial or cosmetic relationship to the object of its affection. Boutique multiculturalists admire or appreciate or enjoy or sympathize with or (at the very least) ‘recognize the legitimacy of’ the traditions of cultures other than their own; but boutique multiculturalists will always stop short of approving other cultures at a point where some value at their center generates an act that offends against the canons of civilized decency as they have been either declared or assumed.
\end{quote}

So, while insisting on the universal breaking away from the particular, the Exit counter-space simultaneously presents itself as urban and European precisely on the grounds of its embeddedness in Serbia’s local and national geographies. Recurrently employed in Exit-related narratives is indeed a tribute to the festival’s host location, the city of Novi Sad, serving here as corroborating evidence for the alleged inevitability of Exit’s urban and cosmopolitan orientation. The apparent paradox in the spatial representations of Exit cosmopolitanism, based on the simultaneous incorporation of both ‘placeless’ and ‘singular’ qualities, lies in the mistaken conceptualiza-

\(^{117}\) Whether intentional or not, the symbolism of both phrase and gesture ‘making waves’ is central to the ideological underpinnings of Exit counter-space production. Namely, to ‘make waves’ is to express a desire for change by introducing something new or different.
tion of cosmopolitanism as a stance that pits a global perspective against a local one. As Malpas (2009: n.g.) explains,

it is only our concrete locatedness in the world (...) that gives content to the ethical and political decisions we must make... The idea of an engaged stance that is not concretely situated is not the idea of an engaged stance at all. (...) If cosmopolitanism is indeed to constitute a way of engaging in the world, then it cannot be understood as entailing any dislocation from place, any dissociation from the particularity of our locality, region, or whatever.

With this reconfigured notion of cosmopolitanism in mind, it is worth referring to Jovanov (2009: 183), according to whom there is a commonly held view among the local populace that Exit did not emerge in the city of Novi Sad by coincidence. First of all, Novi Sad is the capital of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, Serbia’s wealthiest region located in the north. The city especially takes pride in its Austro-Hungarian past, during which it became known as the Serbian ‘Athens’. This title was earned under the Habsburg rule over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries owing to the city’s status as the largest and most thriving hub of Serbian political and cultural activity. Today Novi Sad represents a second important center of culture, economy, and education in the country after Serbia’s capital Belgrade. Thus, the urban spirit of Exit Festival is said to be owed significantly to the city’s urban environment and its rich and diverse cultural heritage.

Second, Novi Sad is praised by Exit producers for belonging to the ‘region famous for its multiethnicity – 28 different ethnic groups live in it, in peace and tolerance’ (‘Novi Sad’, Exit News, 2001: 59). Extrapolated from this is a point of view, by which the multiethnic composition of the city itself, along with its ‘mostly democratically-oriented population’, reflects liberal democratic values that Exit promotes (see Jovanov 2009). The claim about essentially democratic inclinations of Novi Sad inhabitants should be, however, accepted with caution. Not only have Serbian politicians on both sides of the political spectrum participated in the city governance. There is also clear evidence of the ongoing activity of neo-Nazi groups as well as the increased incidence of juvenile and domestic violence reported in the city (since 2013).

Notwithstanding the latter observation, the above argument is further developed to suggest that the perceived homology between Novi Sad and Exit in terms of the qualities and values each embodies (such as those of urbanity, diversity, or liberal democracy) works actually as a two-way process. Put differently, it is not only that Novi Sad set the stage for the production of Exit counter-space, but also that ‘Exit changed the landscape of Novi Sad, transforming it into a cosmopolitan city and putting it “on the world map”’ (Simić 2009: 204). That the cosmopolitan and urban
spaces of Novi Sad and Exit, respectively, do reinforce each other is a viewpoint that agrees neatly with the conclusions of Anderton’s (2006) festival study. And these are that ‘a unique sense of place’ constructed in contemporary British greenfield music festivals is closely related to the perceived uniqueness of their host locations (ibid., 319).

However, not everyone among the local populace would subscribe to the above viewpoint. As evidenced in 3.2.2, the Exit counter-space is partly dismissed for its alleged material and symbolic incongruity with what is held to be the autochthonous culture of local and national geographies into which the festival is embedded. Moreover, it is through recurring attacks from the Serbian political right, moral panics, and anxious narratives of the loss of national cultural identity that the reproduction of Exit counter-space is made possible in the first place. Exit opponents, by implication, assume an entirely opposite ethical stance towards urban and cosmopolitan qualities ascribed to the festival and its host location, Novi Sad. What is, in other words, a source of pride for Exit proponents is simultaneously a definite sign of moral decline for Exit opponents.

It should be noted that the latter understanding forms part of wider anti-city discourses to be found in over a century-long tradition of Serbian nationalist thought. In some instances of such writing, cities are, as Milosavljević (2002: 182) notes, generally denounced as ‘a primary wellspring of the elements contaminating the nation’. A sharp distinction between city and village is further articulated into several other dichotomies such as those between modernity and patriarchy, individualism and collectivism, or change and stagnation. From a nationalist point of view, it is obviously the first member of each binary listed above that becomes denounced as morally dubious. More to the point, it was not until Serbia’s national revival in the 1990s that the anti-urban rhetoric resurfaced with a vengeance in Serbian public discourse. As Jansen (2005b: 156) documents, ‘[s]ome 1990s ultranationalist discourses depicted cities as promiscuous and degenerate melting-pots where traditions had been abandoned and once pure cultural communities contaminated’. Viewed through this perspective, Novi Sad and Exit as the places of ‘cosmopolitanism, civilisation, and tolerance’ (cf. Jansen 2005b: 157) are held responsible for spoiling the authentic, pristine, patriarchal, and collective core of the organically understood Serb nation. By this logic, Serbia’s national essence is to be preserved through ‘a return to rural purity’ – a task of national significance that the Guća organic space apparently commits itself to. And as illustrated in Chapter 4, the Guća organic space does so through recourse to the Serbian tradition in all the richness of its spatial representations. It is upon this basis that I proceed further with the analysis of Serbia’s urban-rural divide and its various expressions in Exit and Guća using popular metaphors of another binary pair – that of asphalt and mud. As suggested by
their very semantic content, the asphalt-mud opposition evaluates positively the urban and cosmopolitan worldview associated with the Exit counter-space.

5.2 Serbia’s Urban-Rural Divide in Exit and Guča: Asphalt vs. Mud

Explored in the present section are specifically the ways in which Serbia’s self-identified urbanites, and presumably Exit supporters, adopt the urban-rural distinction as a discursive tool for expressing a condescending attitude towards their ‘peasant’ compatriots. A reference to asphalt and mud used in the title above establishes thus a value system by which the modernity and urbanity of the city (covered in asphalt) is ranked higher than the assumed traditionalism and backwardness of the village (mired in the dirty mud). Jansen (2005b: 162) gives a more detailed account of the origins and meanings of this metaphorical binary opposition:

Asphalt, covering and conquering mud, had been a key metaphor of the Yugoslav modernisation ethos, as evidenced in road building programmes. Represented as heroic labour for Progress, road construction brought asphalt to the village, thus disclosing it and lifting it into modernity. A metaphor still frequently used in mundane contexts to evoke urban-rural differences (...), asphalt set modern life apart from backwardness: situated between the body and the underlying mud, it mediates the experience of the land, and thus of peasant origins.

Note, however, that Serbia’s urban-rural tension stretches much further into the past. As Naumović (2009: 120–121) clarifies, there is actually a two-century long tradition of Serbian intellectual thought (spawned by Enlightenment proponents), within which the notion of peasantry has been assigned overtly negative connotations. Two discursive formations are of special relevance here. One was given shape in the post-1989 period of Serbia’s transition from socialism to nationalism; and the other was set in motion during the postwar years of Yugoslav socialism, but its discursive patterns can still be traced in the Exit-Guča debate.

As indicated in 3.2.5, it was the politics of progress in Tito’s Yugoslavia that gave decisive momentum to an understanding of urbanization and modernization as two inextricably linked phenomena and processes. The idea of progress was accordingly conceived ‘as “a teleological process, a movement toward a known endpoint that would be nothing less than a Western-style industrial modernity”’ (Ferguson 1999, in Simić 2009: 157). The inevitable corollary to the socialist state project of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization was ‘a general devaluation of all things agricultural and ultimately of village life’, and the attendant ‘disengagement from agricultural identities’ (Buchanan 2006: 40). That said, romanticized images of
peasantry and village customs, coupled with the decisive role of peasants in the Partisan victory in the Second World War, were made at the same time (and paradoxically so) an integral part of the Yugoslav national consciousness and identity. In the comparable case of Bulgarian state socialism, as Buchanan (2006: 40–41) writes:

> Peasants became the backdrop against which ‘progress’ was measured, while at the same time they were its source. Put differently, while the agrarian sector, in the form of laborers and raw materials, served as the cornerstone of industry, it was also the wellspring of tradition, supplying all manner of colorful folkloristic materials that, through different kinds of performance, came to symbolize the nation.

The Titoist regime likewise sponsored a variety of folk music societies and ensembles with the aim of promoting ‘the concept of “Yugoslav” folklore’ and its underlying ideology of brotherhood and unity (see Longinović 2000: 633). Guča Festival, for its part, actively participated in the reproduction of exactly the same ideological agenda, despite the occasional finger-pointing from above over some instances of ‘serbing’ on the festival ground (see 4.3.1).

In the present-day context, the Guča organic space is also built upon the socialist discourse of authenticity surrounding Serbia’s folk peasant tradition. However, in line with the ideological shift from socialism to nationalism was also the reconceptualization of ‘authentic’ Serbian tradition as the only true path to the nation’s revival that simultaneously bears evidence of its longevity and exceptionality. Thus, contrary to the socialist discourse of modernization and progress, the Guča organic space embraces the previously disparaged notions of traditionalism, conservatism, and nationalism. Moreover, the Guča organic space paved the way for the celebratory discourse of peasantry that came to the fore in the political rhetoric of Serbia’s national revival of the 1990s. Promulgated by both Guča’s micronational and Serbia’s national spaces was specifically the idea of Serbian peasantry as the only true incarnation of the nation’s ‘soul’, but also as the most loyal supporter of the country’s latest nationalist agenda.

It was owing to the same set of discourses born out of Serbian nationalism that Guča Festival came to figure in the minds of its urban-identified critics as a gathering place for barbarian and warmongering highlanders. Thus, whilst Tito’s Yugoslavia

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118 It is perhaps worth noting that this paradox of urban-rural schisms across the Balkans extends back to the early stages of modern state-building. As Longinović (2000: 627) explains, ‘[t]he Balkan urban mentality emerged as a simultaneous embrace and distancing from the “primitive” non-culture of the peasants, whose life was posited as a national ideal that counters the artifice and degradation of urban life, while such rustic life was to be personally avoided by all means’. 

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cultivated a more ambivalent attitude towards the existing city-village differences, it was in the 1990s that the urban-rural divide took the form of a radical segregation. The perceived ‘peasantisation of the city’ was primarily associated with the 1990s’ arrival of Serbian refugees from the less urbanized areas of the former Yugoslavia and, at the same time, with the rise of nationalism in the region (see Jansen 2005b). Later in the process, these changes eventually resulted in the phenomenon sometimes spoken of as *urbicide* – ‘a neologism denoting the conscious physical destruction of urban environments and, perhaps more importantly, the onslaught on urban ways of life’ (ibid., 157).

This is precisely the discursive backdrop against which the statement by former Serbian PM Koštunica that those who do not understand Guča do not understand Serbia either, became the subject of sharp criticism by those belonging to Serbia’s antinationalist / cosmopolitan camp (‘Closing days at Guča’, *B92*, 2006). For instance, historian Branka Prpa (ibid.) saw in the PM’s statement the undisguised intention of the Serbian political establishment to impose ‘the cultural model of agrarian society’, on which the festival is apparently based, as the only true cultural paradigm at work in post-Milošević Serbia. As she pointed out, the Guča trumpet festival is not problematic in itself, but the fact that the Serbian political elite and media put it forward as something essentially Serbian. Koštunica’s statement was likewise condemned for its reductionism by Serbian columnist Panović (2011: 7). In his view, it is impossible to understand Serbia solely through Guča, for Serbia is also made through the trumpet sound of such Serbian acts as Duško Gojković and *Disciplina kičme*.120

If the negative evaluations of peasantry and rurality are concealed here under the banner of the nation’s cultural pluralism, this is certainly not the case with the lived spaces of Guča representations, where overtly negative remarks about the festival proliferate in many guises. For example, in the following comment: ‘[The] Serbian redneck festival has just started!’ (Nevolem / I ain’t love [in the Vojvodina dialect], ‘The fifty-first Guča begins’, *B92* [comments], 2011; emphasis added), the perceived peasantry in Guča is clearly associated with the rural and more backward segments of the Serbian population. Pointing to the same understanding of peasantry is also the most common portrayal of the festival as ‘a parade of drunkenness and kitsch’ – which is otherwise a well-known verse from the cult classic song ‘Svrajte mi “Jesen stiže, dunjo moja”/Play “Autumn Is Coming, My Dear” to Me’ by Yugoslav / Serbi-

119 Duško Gojković is a Serbian-born jazz trumpet player with an acclaimed and longstanding international career. He is considered the father of Balkan Jazz.

120 *Disciplina Kičme* (literally, ‘Backbone Discipline’) is a Yugoslav / Serbian postpunk and experimental band, also known by the name *Disciplin A Kitschme* since the band’s frontman and bassist Dušan Kojić ‘Koja’ began carving out an international career in London in the 1990s. Addressed above is the idiosyncratic sound of trumpet and saxophone sections to be found in the band’s album releases from 1986 through to 1990.
an singer-songwriter Đorđe Balašević from Novi Sad.\textsuperscript{121} It tells the first-person story about a man who upon his arrival home from military service finds himself at the wedding of the woman he loves. The verse ‘a parade of drunkenness and kitsch’ appears in the part of the song in which this Vojvodina wedding is described. Such a label is obviously used in many Guča-related comments to indicate poor cultural taste and vulgar behavior among local festival visitors. The claim here is that these and similarly derogatory depictions of the festival seek to project a negative mirror-image of Serbia’s Occidental Self. Foregrounded here are, in other words, the renderings of Guča Festival and the associated Serbianhood through the Oriental and thus negative pole of the West-East equation.

Listed below are several festival-related comments from the selected online forums encapsulating accurately this interiorized Occidental view of Serbia as being stuck in time or relegated to the faraway past due to its rurality, primitivism, and underdevelopment (contrary to high standards of the Western developed world). What seems to lurk beneath all these statements is a feeling ‘of mock, shame, and nausea against the [Serbian Oriental] “semi-other” who prevents the completeness of the [Serbian] Occidental self’ (cf. Kiossev 2005: 180):

While the world moved forward, we’ve got stuck in Guča. (Daca, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

When the national brand of one country is something like Guča, then this will tell you what level we are at. (Milan, ‘The fifty-first Guča begins’, B92 [comments], 2011.)

Even when I see an ox or another animal on a spit, I wonder a bit if I’m still in the Stone Age, so I can only imagine what the [foreign] ambassadors [visiting Guča] think about all this. It must be unthinkable for Denmark that something can be turning on a spit. We need to move away from these pagan-peasant customs once and for all. (Deki, in Milojković and Bojović 2012a [comments].)

Furthermore, in some comments, the peasantry of Guča organic space is discerned in the ‘rural’ features of the visual appearance and even physical constitution of local Guča-goers:

Can you imagine chicks, in large quantities, with skulls of rural shapes, walking around in miniskirts with Chetnik caps and cockades on them!? I couldn’t spot

\textsuperscript{121} The song is featured on his second album \textit{Celovečernji the Kid / The Kid for the Whole Evening} (PGP-RTB, 1983).
two single hotties while over there. Young men grow beards just to look like Draža [Mihailović]. (Syrus, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

I don’t understand how some people here can admire Guča (‘festival’). I’ve traveled all over Europe and been living outside Serbia for years now. But browsing through the gallery of [festival] photos, I think I’ve seen nowhere else so many badly dressed people, with bad haircuts, bad skin texture and bad teeth as in images from Guča. This is probably because we’re dark and hairy, or because we don’t know how to dress up (a couple of girls in the pictures are dressed as porn stars: perhaps they have beautiful facial features but are experts in uglifying themselves shamelessly and so losing all their appeal, if ever there was some). Men - God forbid - or some leviathans two meter tall working on scaffolds, whose only purpose in life is to carry cement bags all day long and then come here to carouse for these five days; or some semi-fat, bald, unkempt [blokes] that nobody would call to a party – and they all congregate here. (Wikki, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

Common to both comments are explicit racist undertones, specifically in the descriptions pertaining to some ‘innate’ physical features of the Serb people. Referring either to the ‘rural’ head shapes in women (first comment), or to the darkness, hairiness, tallness, robustness, and corpulence in men (second comment), they are arguably both evocative of the racial study of the European population by the Nazi eugenicist Hans F. K. Günther (1927). It is a truism that the racialization of urban-rural tensions internally cannot carry the same weight as in the racialized or racist descriptions of any given racial-ethnic group by outsiders. Yet, the very fact that these tensions tend to be articulated in racial terms speaks volumes about the presumed depth of the schism between Serbia’s two halves – one urban and one rural. Which explains why the ‘rural’ physical traits of local Guča-goers in two quotes above are further complemented with the halo of negative value judgments surrounding Serbian nationalism (first comment) or the crudeness of the Serbian visual looks and behavior, partly innate, partly stemming from the low social status (second comment). With all these disparaging characterizations in mind, the perceived rurality of Serbian Guča-goers clearly operates here as a marker of racial inferiority. It occupies thus aesthetically, socially, and morally lower ground when compared with the implied superiority of the urban, modern, progressive, and pro-European attitude assumed here (with elitist inflections in the second comment).

In his characterization of the so-called Dinaric race (to which Serbs apparently belong), Günther uses a number of similar terms, pointing towards such physical features as the Dinaric ‘high head’ (i.e. the narrow-faced and brachycephalic shape of the head, thus, flat at the back), brownish skin, thick and brown-to-black hair, and the tall and sturdy body type.
Importantly, in some Guča-related narratives, discussion on the peasant-like character of the festival often narrows down to Serbia’s peasant urbanites. As mentioned in 4.5.3, this is a derogatory term for city dwellers of rural origins. Members of this social group are typically frowned upon as displaced hybrid embodiments of Otherness. Guča is described accordingly as ‘[a]n entertainment for those who are half way between village and city’ (CityWatch, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments]). That the festival apparently caters to the aesthetic and cultural needs of peasant urbanites is also made crystal clear in the following comment:

Yay, finally [the festival has begun]! Now we’ll be able to see how many ‘Belgraders’ go to the famous Festival of mud, tent-restaurants, cigu-ligu [an onomatopoeic expression signifying corny tunes usually played on the violin] music, bad brandy and draft beer. Oh, if only they could stay over there, we’d all be better off. This city would flourish and so would the village. They’d return nicely and in joy to the place whence they came. Sadly, this is nothing but a dream, so let us at least enjoy our beautiful city for these four days and carry on imagining how nice it would be... Asphalt Strike!!! (UrB, ‘The Guča trumpet festival has begun’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

Evidently, the implication here is that Guča-goers are parochial newcomers whose deep-seated affinity for everything rural and thus impoverished in terms of cultural taste and attitude stands in sharp contrast to the aesthetico-cultural values of urban lifestyle. Consequently, as is argued, Serbian peasant urbanites in Guča have not only failed to adopt the cultural norms of their new urban habitat (in this case, the urban spirit of Belgrade), but they should also be held responsible for the overall decline of the city.\(^\text{123}\) The seemingly insurmountable differences between Serbia’s ‘urbanites’ and ‘rurbanites’ are additionally emphasized by the use of the enduring metaphors of asphalt and mud (in the second quote above).

In attempt to disrupt this binary logic of Self-Other, the online commentator under the nickname Seljanka / ‘Peasant girl’, obviously used as a take-off on the corresponding nicknames of self-identified urbanites such as CityWatch and UrB in the examples above, points out that the distinction between the two categories is in fact everything but impermeable:

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\(^\text{123}\) That said, it is important to remember that the category of peasant urbanites typically cuts across traditional left-right divisions due to its unfavorable status with both ideological camps. As indicated in 4.5, this social category receives negative attention from Serbian intellectuals at both ends of the political spectrum, albeit for very different reasons. Note also that the history of Serbian critical writings about rural newcomers is at least one century old. Some of the right-wing writers on the subject are Đorđević (1924) and Velmar-Janković (1938) (both in Milosavljević 2002: 183), whereas the writings of e.g. Kostić (1969) and Konstatinović (1981) (both in Jansen 2005b: 158) occupy the opposite ideological pole.
Everyone [condemning Guča] pretends to be a Belgrader and to everyone [Guča] is ‘yack’, but when the weekend arrives, the [Belgrade] bus and train stations are fully packed; everyone travels back to their [provincial] birth homes to get their food packed up for the following week by their parents. Ask yourself where you are from rather than complaining about the trumpets and how they disrupt your morning sleep. (‘The Guča trumpet festival has begun’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

Close ties between city and village observed above point simultaneously towards two aspects of the actual porousness of Serbia’s urban-rural divide – tangible and intangible. The observation on the substantial material dependence of city upon village is much consistent with the conclusion reached in Jansen’s (2005b: 162–163) study on urban-rural tensions in the everyday experience of post-Yugoslavs. Noting the relationship of interdependence between city dwellers, notably Belgraders, and their kin-based social networks hitherto established in rural areas and now restored due to the recent wars and the resulting impoverishment of the local population, Jansen pushes the asphalt-mud metaphor further. In his words, ‘rather than generously providing asphalt for the village, the city was hit by a mudslide, and forced to lay back and take it’ (ibid., 163).

Another aspect of the blurred boundaries between urban and rural pertains, of course, to the cultural sphere and is symptomatic of ‘unease about the depth of urbanisation’ felt among self-proclaimed Serbian urbanites. To quote Jansen (2005b: 162) again:

While there was a relative consensus on the backward character of the rural, this was not reflected in an agreement on where to place the dividing line between urbanity and rurality. (...) [In consequence,] few people could safely assert their distance from village mud.

What exactly constitutes the Serbian idea of urbanity is indeed a deeply contested matter, as already shown in the discussion on internal ambivalences concerning Serbian WM and related genres in both Exit and Guča discourses (see 3.2.5 and 4.5.3). On the other hand, even though ‘the backward character of the rural’ is seemingly never disputed among Serbian urbanites, festival-related discussions provide evidence that for some of them, the notion of rurality can be positively connoted. This specifically applies to those comments that distinguish between ‘real’ peasants and peasant urbanites as two distinct social categories. On that note, Guča Festival is said to represent ‘[a] congregation of peasants, and I don’t refer here to honest peasants living off their land...’ (Mrtvac / Dead Man, in Stojković 2012 [comments]). Furthermore, included in the specification of ‘real’ peasantry are affirmative portrayals of the local rural life and culture as wholesome, authentic, collective, honest, noble, and
pivotal in Serbia’s national imaginings. Opposed to the claimed high moral qualities of Serbian rural community is the philistine sensibility of Serbian urban-rural petite bourgeoisie, whose poor taste and value judgment make them especially susceptible to the political manipulation and nationalist kitsch observed on the festival ground (see e.g. the online comment by Nikola, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92, 2006).

Thus, what seems to be common to all above-cited Guča commentators criticizing either ‘real’ or ‘inauthentic’ forms of peasantry, or both, is indeed their unmistakably urban (self-)identification. Urbanity here clearly provides the basis for their distinction, thereby reproducing, legitimizing, and naturalizing the existing social hierarchies. It is a cultural property allowing city-born-and-bred people to exercise authority over their ‘rural’ compatriots, but also to relate their personal stories to the larger discourse of Western European modernity. Significantly, claims to a city pedigree and all positive qualities associated with it (such as culturedness, civility, open-mindedness, or Europeanness) are usually not stated explicitly. Rather, they are implied through severe criticism of everything rural that Guča is said to epitomize, incorporating a wide palette of pejorative meanings attached to traditionalism, dogmatism, authoritarianism, nationalism, backwardness, barbarianism, primitivism, or vulgarity. Even in those few Guča-related comments where the category of village peasants wins affirmative response through its differentiation from city peasants – that is, where the former is praised for its resourcefulness (both tangible and intangible), integrity, wholesomeness, and vigor – it is still deemed utterly inferior to its urban counterpart. In this ambivalent approach to the notion of peasantry, such reasoning does not seem to step outside the discursive frame of socialist modernization.

Persistent public attacks on Guča’s alleged primitivism and debauchery naturally give rise to a range of defensive or critical responses to the Exit counter-space and its ‘urban’ users. There are specifically three categories into which such responses fall: (1) responses that question the taken-for-granted aesthetico-ideological premises of the Exit cultural hierarchies; (2) responses that accuse Exit self-identified urbanites of acting as people with double standards, low self-esteem, or opportunist intentions; and (3) responses that seek to move the Exit-Guča debate beyond the simplistic and outdated urban-rural binary.

Let me start with an example of critical responses that fall into the first category. A web user under the alias Narodni muzej je opljačkan! [National Museum has been looted!]\(^{124}\) (in Stojković 2012 [comments]) commented on the news about the opening of Guča 2012 in the form of a sarcastic question: ‘Why is this news in the rubric “Culture”?’; thus alluding to the perceived status of the festival as something oppo-

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\(^{124}\) The selected alias calls attention to the poor state of Serbian culture by ironically referring to the fact that not even the building of the National Museum in Belgrade has been open for the public since 2003.
site to culture or as ‘non-culture’. Instead of answering, another online commentator parries this attack with the following counter-question:

And why is the news that Lady Gaga announces her new studio album [Artpop] with a tattoo, and that Beyoncé directs a movie about herself in the rubric ‘Culture’? I take my hat off to whoever explains why Lady Gaga is considered art and [Serbian] trumpet players are not. (Here I have in mind the music itself, and not [Guća’s] debauchery and kitsch that both fall under the responsibility of festival organizers.) (Madmax, in Stojković 2012 [comments].)

The quote above clearly reproduces a pervasively condescending rhetoric about the ‘kitsch’ and ‘decadence’ of Guća organic space, disclosing thereby a sense of strong alignment with Serbia’s urban camp. But equally importantly, it also pits Lady Gaga and Beyoncé, as the emblematic exponents of global / Western pop that Exit promotes, against the Serbian brass in a way which justifiably questions the aesthetico-ideological values associated with each festival. Perhaps an additional reason why the notion of kultura [culture] is such a contested topic in the Exit-Guća debate is to be sought in the blurred boundaries between kultura and its constitutive opposition nekultura [unculturedness] in Serbia’s everyday life practices. As Jansen (2005b: 159–160) convincingly argues, kultura is always ‘constructed at least partly outside oneself, (...) remain[ing] the object of aspiration and competition, despite claims of self-evident possession’. The discussion illustrated above likewise reflects uncertainties among Serbian ‘urbanites’ in matters of cultural taste that came along with new aesthetic developments around the world and the attendant endorsement of WM practices (see 3.2.5).

The claimed urbanity of Exit counter-space and its supporters is additionally put under scrutiny by way of comparison between two festivals in terms of obscenity and depravity observed on the ground. The argument here goes as follows: since Exit Festival implicitly adheres to the countercultural ideology of ‘sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll’, its ‘urban’ proponents are accused of exercising double standards when making ethical judgments about comparable instances of decadent behavior in Guća. The same line of criticism applies to the perceived aesthetico-ethical bias with which Serbian self-identified urbanites evaluate artistic and cultural forms typical of each festival. As put sarcastically by two critics of such discriminatory practices:

You are bothered by [Guća’s] belly dancers, but not by naked female dancers at Exit hanging from the pole on every second stage? This is art, or what!? (Fegro, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)
A form of primitivism where guitars and amplifiers get smashed on the stage is of much more appeal [than a Serbian type of primitivism in Guča], right? (Autošovinizam / Auto-chauvinism, in Perišić 2013 [comments].)

Viewed in this way, Serbia’s self-identified urbanites are not only finger-pointed as false puritans, but also as false Europeans. They are specifically accused of the latter on the grounds of their purely declarative endorsement of the EU discourse of tolerance and cultural diversity. In practice, however, Serbian urbanites are said to betray the said ideals by assuming arrogant but in fact ignorant and intolerant attitudes (bordering on cultural racism) towards those portions of the local population that enjoy music-cultural forms and practices other than those promoted in Exit (see e.g. online comments in ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92, 2006; or in ‘Guča Festival: An authentic brand...?’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2012).

Alternatively, Serbia’s self-identified urbanites are seen as people with serious self-esteem issues, who are deep down actually as ‘uncivilized’ as those they attack. The two quotes below attest to this:

Those [that persistently criticize me and my work] are ashamed of everything with the slightest hint of Serbian tradition and culture, but when inebriated, they set to bouncing and yipping to the sounds of trumpets. (Emir Kusturica, in Živanović 2011: 6.)

On countless occasions I’ve witnessed how these ‘purists’ after three rakija shots turn into pigs and start to eat with their fingers. Their inner brakes loosen up and everything forcibly suppressed starts to rear its ugly head. (Pokondirena tikva / The upstart, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

Thus, when it comes to carousing, there is apparently no essential difference between Serbia’s ‘urbanites’ and ‘rednecks’. Members of the former group are said to be driven by the same animalistic desires, and thus to exhibit the same primitive behavior during festivities as their rurban brethren. The claimed civility and urbanity of Guča critics seem by implication to be ‘nothing but a thin layer of varnish’ (cf. van de Port 1999: 303).

Furthermore, those who refuse to acknowledge any values in Guča are also spoken of as kompleksaši [people suffering from an inferiority complex], who are evidently ashamed of their rural background. In one of the domestic online forums, it is specifically said that ‘[t]ypical kompleksaši speak against Guča. They [also] descend from hoe-users and now criticize Guča in order to “fix” their [inferiority] complex! So miserable and pitiful!’ (Beograd, in Stojković 2012 [comments]). Another online commentator likewise asserts: ‘I’m afraid that all those that don’t go to Guča but
bitch here endlessly and at high volume about rednecks, are each and every one pokondirene tikve [literally, “conceited gourds”; figuratively, “upstarts”] (Dorčolac / A resident of Dorčol [an urban neighborhood of Belgrade], ‘To what extent does...’, B92 [comments], 2007). Pokondirena tikva is the title of the famous comedy written in 1830s by Serbian playwright Jovan Sterija Popović. In this satirical play, Popović heavily caricatures and ridicules the main female character, Fema, in her desperate attempts to rise from her lower class origins to the status of nobility. The perceived analogy here with Serbian self-identified urbanites is clear.

In addition, members of the latter group are often frowned upon for what is perceived as lack of national subjectivity before the gaze of the big Western Other. They are specifically seen as representatives of Serbia’s comprador bourgeoisie, who think of themselves as better than the rest but are in fact incapable of acting in the national interest as sovereign political subjects (see e.g. the online comment by domaćin u pokušaju / ‘wannabe host’, in Stojković 2012). Kusturica adds to this interpretation when he claims that Serbia’s ‘comprador elites’ are so alienated from the people that their endorsement of Guča is nothing but a pathetic attempt to ingratiate themselves with the people (see Živanović 2011: 6).

Lastly, to the third category of critical responses belong those local voices that call attention to the reductionism and exclusionary practice implicated in the Exit-Guča debate, whereby

one event [Guča] is designated as vulgar, primitive, filled with unrestrained outbursts of animalism, whereas the other [Exit] is defined as God-given, and intended to be established as an axiologically positive cultural model for the entire country? Indeed, (...) isn’t that a sort of cultural solipsism? Personally, I’m not fond of Guča, but neither am I of these discharges of the ‘civilizing spirit’ which themselves have no self-criticism whatsoever. (Lazar_KSH, ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

Criticized here are thus the haughtiness, egotism, and narrow-mindedness of Serbian urbanites whose one-sided vantage point makes them blind to complexities inherent in each festival. Several other commentators among the local vox populi, seeking to likewise find the middle ground between two extreme views of Exit and Guča, suggest possible factors driving each extreme. For example, in the reading of online reviewer djuro (‘Closing days at Guča’, B92, 2006), Guča is not to be equated with Serbia’s self-proclaimed patriots who actually conceal their opportunism behind the ideology of nationalism. It is rather the festival’s unique cultural offer (i.e. local music, food, carnivalesque atmosphere) that should be appreciated as a value in itself. On the other hand, Serbia’s self-proclaimed urbanites are, according to the same reviewer, deplored for their bigotry and one-sidedness, at the core of which lies a
complex of inferiority induced by the interiorized Occidental gaze, and perhaps poor knowledge of multiple Others living in the world ‘out there’.

There is no doubt that this and similar critical inputs point rightly to the cultural constructedness and untenability of Serbia’s urban-rural divide and related socio-spatial divisions. However, despite their apparent impartiality, they also lack the capacity to capture the internal ambivalencies and discords surrounding each festival. That said, the fact remains that much of Serbia’s self-narration is driven by binary oppositions – which is clearly something that warrants further investigation.

5.3 Serbia’s North-South Divide in Exit and Guča: Vojvodina vs. Serbia Proper

What additionally reinforces the perceived urban-rural difference in Exit and Guča is the specific geographical location of each festival. Hosted in the Vojvodina and Dračiovo region, respectively, the two festivals are commonly pitted against one another using the historical backdrop of Serbia’s colonization by two major imperial powers – the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the north and the Ottoman Empire in the south. The apparent divisions between Serbia’s more and less ‘civilized’ regions necessitate a brief review of the historical foundations of Serbia’s postsocialist symbolic geography.

It was arguably in the national geographical imaginary of the former Yugoslavia that the Orientalist model of the West-East divide gained wide currency. Specifically, drawing on the historical experience of the region’s subjugation to the foreign imperial rule, the Orientalist model provided the basis for the hierarchical ordering of different regions across ex-Yugoslavia (cf. Jansen 2005a). Following this logic, in the Yugoslav symbolic geography the major line of difference was drawn between the northwestern parts of the country with the Austro-Hungarian heritage (comprising Slovenia, partly Croatia, and the Serbian northern province of Vojvodina), and the southeastern ones with the Ottoman heritage (encompassing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia proper, the Serbian southern province of Kosovo, and large portions of Croatia and Montenegro). The northwestern regions were accordingly deemed more advanced, cultured, and thus (Western) Europe-identified, whereas the Yugoslav southeast was routinely imagined as the embodiment of ‘Oriental barbarity’. Indeed, as Simić (2009: 152) notes:

Many anthropologists who studied Yugoslav societies before the disintegration of the country in the 1990s followed Spangler who argues that despite rapid ‘industrialization and modernization’ in the post-Second World War period, previous boundaries between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman borders ‘coincide to-
day with the borderline between Yugoslavia’s advanced and underdeveloped provinces’ (Spangler 1983: 84).

The dismantling of Tito’s Yugoslavia in the early 1990s did not really affect the pre-established hierarchical taxonomy of the country’s different geographical regions and ethnonational groups. However, it did give rise to the reemergence of the earlier tropes of a troubled periphery, tropes with which to characterize the geography of new sociopolitical relations in the region, both externally and internally. Specifically, once Yugoslavia lost its exceptional status which it held throughout the Cold-War era, the Balkans came into play once again (see 1.3 and 1.6.4.3). This explains why, ‘the identity debate in the 1990s was largely dominated by the question of whether to be or not be Balkan’, as Ditchev (2005: 235) wittily put it. And as already showcased in Chapters 3 and 4, the vestiges of such discursive practices continue to participate in the construction of Serbia’s post-2000 realities. One remaining question to be explored here is how the constructs of Europe and the Balkans are used in various representations of Exit and Guča so as to position each festival at the opposite end of Serbia’s national identity schisms along regional lines. Before answering this question, let me first draw attention to the importance of the notion of (Central) Europe for the production of the local and regional distinction in the representations of Exit counter-space from both above and below.

As emphasized above, Exit producers take pride in the fact that the festival takes place in Novi Sad, the capital of Serbia’s most multicultural and affluent Vojvodina region. In their view, the richness and diversity of local / regional cultural heritage contribute to the cosmopolitan and urban outlook of the festival (see 5.1). But pertinent to the present inquiry is of course the Exit identification with Vojvodina and through that, with Central Europe and a set of values that this region represents in Serbia’s geographical imagination. On the latter subject, Živković (2001: 81) writes that

Austro-Hungary, or Central Europe in its various incarnations, was arguably the most relevant European Other for Serbia – a place where the new [Serbian] elites were being formed, and the nearest source of civilizational and cultural models, at least in the period up to the First World War, that is to say, in the crucial period for the (incomplete) induction of Serbia into the European modernization.

125 Note that just as in all previous instances of the Exit-Guča debate, the opposition between Europe and the Balkans is used interchangeably with other closely related binary pairs such as those between urbanity and rurality, modernity and traditionalism, and cosmopolitanism and nationalism.

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Indeed, emphasized in Exit-produced discourses is the Central European heritage of Novi Sad and Vojvodina. A couple of examples are listed below as an illustration:

Novi Sad is the capital of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, once a rich Central European region with two million inhabitants. (...) [Today] Novi Sad represents the crossroad of all roads connecting South and Central Europe. (‘Novi Sad’, Exit News, 2001: 58–59; emphasis in original.)

The city center [of Novi Sad] consists mainly of buildings from the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, which gives it a nice touch of Central European charm. (...) They say that Novi Sad is the easternmost city of Western Europe and the westernmost one of Eastern Europe. (‘Novi Sad: Home of Exit’, Blic Extra, 2007: 94; emphasis added.)

The narratives of past and present days are clearly juxtaposed here in a way which both affirms and questions the place of Novi Sad and Vojvodina in the European symbolic geography. While the references to the Central European heritage serve as a source of authentication for the Exit claims to Europeanness, the narratives of the present highlight the liminal status of the festival’s host location. Importantly, the notion of liminality seems to be coded here both positively and negatively. In the former case, Novi Sad and Vojvodina may be understood as the places of centrality rather than marginality. As Fleming (2000: 1232) points out, ‘[t]o be “liminal” (...) is to be between (and overlapping) two (or more) domains, while to be marginal is merely to be at the edges of one’ (emphasis added). In the latter case, the liminality of Novi Sad and Vojvodina perhaps suggests that the European identity aspired to by these places should be called into question. Having done her anthropological study on self-identified Novi Sad urbanites, Simić (2009) described her ethnographic setting, Novi Sad and Vojvodina, exactly in terms of uncertainty about their European orientation. In her words:

I did my fieldwork in a place that is usually imagined, both in academic writing and among people who classified themselves as [the Novi Sad and Vojvodina people], as being less ‘European’ than ‘Europe proper’, in a region that is understood as more ‘European’ than the rest of the country, but whose ‘Europeanness’ is still contested. (Ibid., 25.)

The above-cited quotes describing the specific trajectory of Vojvodina’s historical development and its attendant ‘civilizational’ distinction from the rest of the country, surely consolidate the view of Exit counter-space as ‘naturally’ belonging to Europe. But perhaps more critically, such quotes also indicate the need of Exit producers to
demonstrate their local / regional loyalties and champion their vision of Vojvodina’s future course. The latter becomes particularly evident in those Exit statements whose strong political undertones arise from the fact that the question of Vojvodina status within the Serbian state remains a delicate one in domestic political debates. Namely, ever since Milošević abolished the substantial autonomy of Vojvodina (in 1988) under the pretext of ‘preserving Kosovo’, this Province has been economically exploited and politically controlled by the centralized state power (see Boarov, in Tagicov 2013).

A local political ‘affair’ surrounding Exit 2012 is especially telling in this regard. The affair saw the light of day because the festival occurrence coincided with the decision of Serbia’s Constitutional Court to declare a number of legislations comprising the Vojvodina Statute essentially unconstitutional (see ‘The Constitutional Court disputed...’, Naslovni.net, 2012). Disputed was thereby a great deal of jurisdiction of the AP Vojvodina Government in many areas of the Province’s life (from legal rights, international representation, and agriculture, to urban planning, social protection, science, and technological development), resulting in the further undermining of the already reduced autonomy of the Province. Revolted by this political outcome, Exit organizers displayed a huge banner on the walls of Petrovaradin Fortress with the message: ‘Welcome to Novi Sad, the Capital of Vojvodina’. This was clearly a protest against the decision of the Serbian Court to abolish the right of AP Vojvodina to have its own capital. Unsurprisingly, the coalition formed at the state level around the center-right Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) accused Exit organizers of letting ‘the famous festival become an exponent of the provincial and city authorities’ then led by the coalition formed around the oppositional Democratic Party (see ‘SPP: The abuse of Exit for political purposes’, Blic, 2012).

Two additional remarks are in order at this point. The first is that expressions of local/regional patriotism in and through the Exit counter-space have been part of the festival identity from its early days. The following excerpt from the festival special publication State of Exit (2003:n.p.) can serve here as a case in point: ‘Exit has shown that Novi Sad is [in all respects] the CAPITAL of Vojvodina, and that Vojvodina, [as] a full member of the Assembly of European Regions, is a multicultural, multi-confessional, and multipositive community overall’ (capitalized letters in original). The second remark worth making here is that strong local/regional affiliations in Exit may be said to reflect the general feelings of Vojvodina residents. That the latter group feels affiliated with the Vojvodina region to a greater degree than with Serbia as a whole, has also been confirmed by the outcomes of Lazar’s (2008: 91–92) survey-based study conducted in 2002 and 2006, respectively, on a degree of different territorial identifications among Vojvodinians. It is thus within this framework that I analyze next the sources and expressions of regional animosities in Exit and Guča.
As mentioned above, Exit and Guča are staged in locations belonging to Serbia’s two different regions, each with a distinct natural landscape, demographics, socio-economic status, and historico-cultural heritage. Reproduced on the basis of all such differences are regional animosities between the Srbijanci (Serbs from territories once belonging to the Ottoman Empire) and the Prečani Serbs (populating territories once ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire). The history of those tensions is long-lasting and can be traced back to nineteenth-century Serbia troubled by “the rift between the better educated and “Europeanised” “Prečani” Serbs and the [“Orientalized”] “Srbijanci”” (Naumović 2005: 86). Of relevance for the polarized views of Exit and Guča along regional lines is precisely a sense of distinction afforded to the Vojvodina region within the symbolic geography of Serbia and the Balkans more generally. Constructed in both academic and vernacular discourses as the most “European” part of Serbia, and as different from “the Balkans” down south (Simić 2009: 147), Vojvodina acquires all such positive attributes as ‘modern’, ‘developed’, ‘progressive’, ‘urban’, ‘cultured’, and ‘civilized’. But it does so only when juxtaposed with its negative mirror-image – Serbia proper. Paradoxically, as Simić (2009: 146–147) notes, Vojvodina is seen as the most urban part of the country despite the fact that a substantial part of its economic activity consists of agriculture. The urbanity of the Province is further linked to a distinct type of its spatial organization. Namely, Vojvodina’s villages comprise houses lined up in straight rows on each side of the paved road with garden plots in the back, and pedestrian pathways adjacent to lawns in the front. In contrast to Vojvodina’s flat landscape and straight layout of its settlements, the topography of Serbia proper is hilly or mountainous with village houses scattered all over hills without any apparent order.

Let me illustrate now how this sense of northern distinction pervading the Serbian and especially Vojvodinian consciousness is conveyed in the lived spaces of Exit and Guča representations. Prominent here is in particular the view of Vojvodina and Serbia proper as two worlds apart, as put forward by two Guča commentators:

What the wise is ashamed of, the foolish is proud of [a well-known Serbian proverb]. Guča Festival is neither a brand, nor a fair – it’s a circus. A parade of drunkenness and kitsch. Suffice it to google the festival name to see the images of the drunken, voracious, grimy, bewhiskered, toothless in the mud. Serbia protests when rendered vulgar, but it brags about it of its own accord. It might just as well be that this is the only true face of Serbia, and that I’m making an overstatement in this regard; but we [the Vojvodinians and the ‘Srbijanci’] have always been two worlds apart, and that’s how it is. (Vojvodina, ‘Guča Festival: An authentic brand…?’; Radio Slobodna Evropa [comments], 2012; emphasis added.)
In like manner, another Guča Festival commentator from Vojvodina observes:

If Guča is something ideal for you, then you can’t be helped. It’s just one more important difference between You and Us. Vojvodina doesn’t want to be represented by grubby and toothless Guča. This probably is the great achievement of ‘srbijsanka’ culture, but it’s not part of the Vojvodina tradition and culture. We do not therefore wish to be represented in the world by this circus [Guča]. You can sulk as long as you please, but that’s the way things are. There is a large discrepancy between Serbia and Vojvodina in every sphere of life, from political through to economic to cultural differences which are insurmountable. De facto, Vojvodina and Serbia proper are not part of the same country; this is the first comment you’ll hear from tourists who aren’t from around here. (Lala iz Banata / Lala from Banat126, ‘Guča Festival: An authentic brand...?’, Radio Slobodna Evropa [comments], 2012.)

Common to both quotes above are typical Orientalist depictions of Guča as a representative of Serbia proper. The condescending attitude here is perhaps most explicitly expressed through the imagery of grimy and toothless Serbia in the mud. As explained in the prior analysis of Exit and Guča along urban-rural lines, such imagery is commonly ascribed to what is perceived as Serbia’s rural, barbarian, undereducated, and uncultured semi-Other that Guča is claimed to embody. The Otherness of this (‘Balkan’) half of the country is additionally underscored by the equation of Guča with a ‘circus’, apparently standing here for a ‘freak show’. Expressed is also a concern about Serbia’s national image created through the Guča ‘circus’ for the gaze of the Significant Other – the ‘civilized’ West / Europe. In light of such North-South constellations, the idea of national identity schisms comes to be reproduced once again, whereby the Oriental / Balkan semi-Other recognized in Serbia proper clearly stirs up feelings of ‘mock, shame, and nausea’ in Vojvodina’s Occidental Self.

The same disparaging views of Guča are promulgated in the next three festival comments, but this time using historical reference to the long period of the Ottoman rule which is seen as both the cause and effect of Serbia’s cultural ‘backwardness’. The reviewer Držte-lopove / ‘Stop the crooks’ (in Bojović 2013d [comments]) writes accordingly: ‘What else to say but YACK, YACK, YACK... [The Guča] insolence, carousing, rakijada [rakija festivity], horseplay are the effects of five centuries under the Turkish yoke... Only [to be seen] in Serbia’. It is likewise written that Guča is ‘[t]he last enclave of the Ottoman Empire!’ (Jovan, in Bojović 2013d [comments]);

126 The Lala is a colloquial term for the resident of Banat, a Central European region shared between western Romania, northeastern Serbia (mainly Vojvodina), and southeastern Hungary. The term ‘Lala’ is also used to designate the inhabitant of Vojvodina in general.
as well as that ‘Guča is actually [a product of] our relationship with Asiatic rule. This obscenity, excess and vulgarity are not to God’s likings, but as usual we from both the East and the West collect only the worst instead of wisdom’ (Nenad, in Milojković and Bojović 2013a [comments]). The presumed belonging of Serbia to both the West and the East, thus divided along the imagined geographical line between the former Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, is indeed presented here as a false dilemma between Western ‘wisdom’ (i.e. ‘civilization’) and Asiatic ‘barbarity’. Even though the idea of Serbia’s national identity schisms is explicitly articulated only in the last quote above, the Orientalist logic underlying both West-East and North-South binaries remains implicit in the other two comments, too. In each case it is the Ottomans\textsuperscript{127} that are made scapegoats for all of the transgressions associated with Serbia (proper) and Guča as its emblematic exponent.

Historically, as Neumann and Welsh (1997, in Simić 2009:120) argue, ‘the Turk’ long played the role of ‘the dominant Other’ in the formation of European identity due to the geographical proximity of the Ottoman Empire and the power of its military and religious traditions. And this is all the more so in the Balkans where the legacy of the Ottoman Empire became an integral part of the region’s cultural identity and everyday life practices (see e.g. Buchanan ed. 2007). Reporting on the results of comprehensive research (\textit{News from the Past}, 2010) on the understanding of the national past among more than a thousand Serbian citizens, historian Stojanović (in ‘Public Lecture on Srebrenica’, \textit{Peščanik}, 2016) pointed out that ‘the mantra “five hundred years of Turkish yoke” plays a key role in [Serbia’s] historical consciousness’. There is, in other words, a general consensus among all social strata of the society that the Turks, as Serbia’s archenemy, have caused the greatest suffering to the Serb nation during its entire history. Hence Stojanović (ibid.) concludes that

\begin{quote}
The Turks are our mental time border. The year of 1389 [a reference to the Kosovo Battle], that’s our new era, that’s where things begin or end. The Turks are a buzzword, they’re an excuse, they’re an explanation, they’re an irrational solution to every real problem. The streets are dirty because of five hundred years [of Turkish yoke], communism came to power because of five hundred years, we are handling democracy badly because of five hundred years, we’re incapable of making progress because of the Turks. We are forgetting that we could perhaps have done something for the last two hundred years of the modern Serbian state. If someone was to take the Turks away from us, we would have had to face ourselves. They are the key to our identity and the main excuse [for all our failures].
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{127} The terms ‘Ottoman’, ‘Turkish’, and ‘Islamic’ are used interchangeably in Serbia and the Balkans more generally (see Buchanan 2006; or Todorova 1997).
More to the point, the perceived difference between Vojvodinians and Srbijanci also comes to the fore when articulated through a series of corresponding regional stereotypes. Each stereotype alone is not, however, fixed in its meaning, but rather subjected simultaneously to both positive and negative value judgments. Either way, the distinction between Vojvodina and Serbia proper is once again based on the Orientalist model of (self-)differentiation within the larger Balkanist discourse (cf. Bakić-Hayden 1995; or Bjelić 2005). Accordingly, in Exit-produced narratives, it is, for instance, said that “[p]eople from other places maintain that in Novi Sad everything runs in a slower, calmer, more cultured way. Everything is so easygoing. And this is the most wonderful thing’. (‘Novi Sad: Home of Exit’, Blic Extra, 2007: 94; emphasis added.) The given self-portrayal of the Exit festival’s host location and its inhabitants is strongly consistent with a set of character traits to be found in the stereotypical views of Vojvodinians as a whole. In Simić’s (2009: 148–149) description, members of the latter group are viewed

as polite and of moderate temper, oriented toward their own households (while the ‘typical’ Serb is impatient and rude, spending more time in the taverns [kafene] than at his home), but they are also seen as slow and lacking any real passion.

During my festival fieldwork at Guča 2012 and 2013, I was indeed told that the Vojvodanin [the Vojvodina inhabitant] would never come to Guča Festival because s/he would not appreciate nor understand it. The difference between two regions is claimed to be insurmountable in terms of mentality, temperament, sensibility, even conversational manner. As Milena, my host in Guča, pointed out, her nephew from Vojvodina has a carefully articulated way of talking because beauty of speech is something cultivated up north, whereas in Serbia proper sentences are often broken and incoherent.

A belief that the Serbian brass music does not sit well with the Vojvodina sensibility is also maintained by Vojvodinians themselves. For instance, when asked for his opinion on Guča Festival, Goran Ješić (in Živanović et al. 2013: 4), then Vice President of the Government of Vojvodina, stated half-jokingly: ‘How could I as a Vojvodanin be possibly able to listen to the trumpet?’. Exit team member Voja likewise suggested in an interview with Simić (2009: 149)

that when they organized the anti-Milošević protest that later became the Exit festival, they did not think of inviting trumpet players [because], as he explained,
‘people said, it’s not for us. We [Vojvodinians] don’t know how to carouse, like people from Belgrade’.{128}

Alternatively, there is a view among the local public that Serbia’s North-South divide, as embodied in Exit and Guča, mirrors a wider discursive pattern of popular music practices in the country – one revolving around the rock-TF binary (see 3.2.5). As put by one Exit supporter:

I believe it’s important that there is [Exit as] a counterweight to that horrible music that is adored down south of the Sava and Danube rivers [i.e. in Serbia proper]. Countless Cecas, Gocas, Sladas, Pecas [typical names of Serbian female TF singers] with the melos that defines this country in a way which might easily bestow on its name the ending ‘-stan’ [a reference to the countries of Central and South Asia such as Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and the like], are not affected by this festival, but at least we know that there is a part of Serbia / ‘Serbistan’ where the European rules for music apply. And that there is someone to back it up. Enough of seljačenje [peasant behavior]! (Mattko, ‘200.000 people at EXIT R:Evolution’, B92 [comments], 2013.)

This point of view is, of course, immediately countered as follows:

I’m so fond of this kulturfašizam [cultural fascism]. To be fair, a majority of local [Exit-goers] come exactly from Serbia proper, not to mention that the peasant music [TF] is no less listened to in Vojvodina. Well, even Novi Sad is sadly full of venues playing that kind of music. (Miša, ‘200.000 people at EXIT R:Evolution’, B92 [comments], 2013.)

What is thus seen as underlying Serbia’s North-South division is ultimately the discourse of kulturfašizam. At the same time, the quote above uses some facts on the ground to undermine the simplified musical mapping of the country along regional lines.

In summary, then, the purported differences between Serbia’s North and South in their respective taste cultures and modes of conduct are said to owe their existence

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{128} Note that this point of view stands in sharp contrast with the facts on the ground; namely, the rising popularity of brass band practice in Vojvodina actually resulted in the organization of a separate brass band pre-competition in Kovačica (a town in the South Banat District of Vojvodina) from 2010 onwards, thus leading to the selection of the best Vojvodina brass bands for the Guča national contest (see Tadić et al. 2010: 85; Otašević 2015). Besides, as mentioned in 3.2.1, the Serbian/Balkan trumpet was not accidentally selected as part of the Exit opening ceremony in 2004. Its sound was supposed to enhance the celebratory atmosphere following the victory of Serbia’s newly elected and ‘pro-European’ president Tadić.
to the differing cultural backgrounds and geographical features of these two regions. Specifically, the perceived moderation, politeness, and a lack of passion in Vojvodinians are precisely related to the region’s Austro-Hungarian heritage as well as to its flat and dull landscape. Even though these character traits are open to both positive and negative evaluation, they are ultimately understood as sure indicators of Vojvodina’s ‘innate’ culturedness and Europeanness – something which Serbia proper is claimed to lack.

Conversely, many popular publications on Guča Festival, published since 1980 (see the list in Tadić et al. 2010: 406–407) and promoted at the festival site, regularly contain various details (geographical, historical, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural) about the Dragačevo region as the festival’s home. Included therein are occasionally nostalgic narratives about the loss of old village communal customs as well as about a general decline of the region due to the processes of industrialization and rural-urban migrations. At the same time, it is a sense of local patriotism that persistently shines through celebratory narratives about the ‘glorious’ historico-military past and cultural richness of the region. Incorporated into the latter narratives are also flattering reflections on the Dragačevo people. Slavković (2006), for example, portrays them as follows:

One becomes the Dragačevac [the Dragačevo inhabitant] by birth and takes pride in identifying with his place of origin – and wherever he lived in the world, he would remain the Dragačevac. And just as each and every Serb, he has an aristocratic spirit. ‘[The Dragačevo people] are normally a good-looking human breed; they are mostly dark-skinned, with black eyes and black hair’ [no reference to the quote]. (Ibid., 12.)

The Dragačevo people are very hospitable. A stranger is received into every family with particular respect. They are quite curious and talkative; enjoy jokes, stories, humor; they are very sociable; not ‘cowards’ (penny-pinchers); nor materialists (...). They are righteous, hard-working, honest and fair. Of course, not all Dragačevo people have all positive characteristics since there are always a few bad apples in every bunch. (Ibid., 13.)

What thus characterizes the regional self-representations of Guča micronational space is once again an ‘organic’ understanding of the local community. Not only is belonging to the Dragačevo region a matter of biological ancestry and male-lineage identification. Also, the exceptionality of the Dragačevo people is said to reside in the beautiful features of their physical appearance, as well as in such positive character traits as hospitality, generosity, diligence, honesty, and spiritedness.
Of special relevance to the present concerns of the Exit-Guča debate is, however, the fact that Dragačevo represents ‘a special part of the “Dinaric” area of southwestern Serbia’ and that the Dragačevo population\textsuperscript{129} originates largely from the Dinaric region\textsuperscript{130} (Dević 1986: 7–8). This is relevant because the idea of the Dinarski Srbi [Dinaric Serbs] as the aspired prototype of heroic Serb warriors held especially wide currency in Serbia’s nationalistic discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The idea was appropriated from Jovan Cvijić (1912, in Rihtman-Auguštin 2000: 165–192), an eminent Serbian anthropogeographer, ethnologist, and sociologist, who was first to develop an influential theory about the Balkan mentality. According to Cvijić (in Rihtman-Auguštin 2000: 171–172), the most dominant character type among all Yugoslav nations is the Dinaric man, whom he describes as an authoritarian and volatile, but fearless character. The dominant values of this man’s type are dignity and courage, national pride, the idea of a Greater Serbian state, and grief over the lost Kosovo Battle in 1389, as evidenced, allegedly, by the national poetry.

Even though not explicitly mentioned in Chapter 4, it is clear now that the production of Guča organic space is very much consistent with the aforesaid assumptions of Cvijić’s theory. It is, indeed, through the promoted ideal of the Serbian / Dragačevo peasant-warrior that all dominant values of Cvijić’s Dinaric man come to be materialized in both conceived and lived spaces of Guča representation. Conversely, the ‘ideal’ prototype of the Dinaric Serb endorsed by Guča is repudiated with disgust by Second Serbia proponents. As Simić (2009: 166) notes, ‘in anti-Milošević discourses of opposition, Dinaric Serbs ... were often seen as “wild” and “untamed” and accused of war violence’.\textsuperscript{131} It is therefore upon these premises that Serbia’s self-identified urbanities continue to look down upon the Guča organic space users.

\textsuperscript{129} Drawing on Erdeljanović’s (n.d.) anthropogeographic study of the Dragačevo region, Dević (1986: 8) notes that ‘a majority of the [Dragačevo] population consists of migrants from southwestern areas (from the ‘Old Vlach’, Old Serbia, Herzegovina, Montenegro) ... settled [in Dragačevo] at the turn of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth’.

\textsuperscript{130} The Dinaric region encompasses areas within the mountain chain of Dinaric Alps or Dinarides, thus stretching from Italy and Slovenia to Serbia and Albania.

\textsuperscript{131} In Davidović and Timotijević’s (2005) historical analysis of the Second World War events in the Čačak area (which belongs to the Dragačevo region), the Dinaric type of Serbs dominating these lands is also evaluated negatively. Specifically, they assert that the ‘fiery, explosive, hajduk temperament’ of Dinaric Serbs populating this region reared its ugly head especially during the Second World War (but also beforehand) when the Serbian countryside became split between three warring factions, thus turning into the site of carnage, thievery, and all sorts of violent behavior.
5.4 Trans/National Racial Imaginations of Self and Other in Exit and Guča: West vs. East

In this section, the analysis of Serbia’s national identity schisms in Exit and Guča is organized around Europe’s conceptions of race which, according to Bohlman (2000), are multiple and shifting in their forms and meanings. In his own words:

Race does not have single forms in Europe, past or present, nor does it lend itself to single definitions. Because it is elusive, it may have other names: nationalism, ethnicity, religious groups, even family and civilization. Names and the ideological strategies they muster and mask, therefore, ensure that race is many things in Europe and that the agendas of racializing constantly shift. (Ibid., 648.)

Likewise, the concept of race refers here primarily to perceived ethnic and civilizational differences between Us and Them, as they are both played out in the Exit and Guča micronational spaces. Significantly, ideological constructions of racial difference in Exit and Guča are largely determined and subjectified by the binary logic of Orientalist / Occidentalist discourses. As suggested on the previous pages, the ideological workings of the West-East divide, or alternatively of the North-South divide, operate at many spatial levels concurrently (from global to local). Engendered in each case is what contemporary cultural theorists have theorized as ‘racism without race’ – a new brand of racism based on the perception of insurmountable cultural differences among given communities (see Longinović 2000: 630–631; or Taguieff 2001). It is precisely this form of cultural racism that reproduces the condescending attitude of West Europeans towards all their ‘Eastern’ neighbors, including the Balkan ones. And as pointed out more than once, the same discriminatory practices have long been exercised among former Yugoslav nations, but also among the Serbs themselves.

Lying at the core of polarizing racial imaginings of the Serb nation in Exit and Guča is thus the gaze of the West / Europe as Serbia’s ultimate Other. It is, in other words, through the ideas of concomitant sameness to and difference from the big Western Other that the Exit and Guča micronational spaces continue to exist in relations of opposition. Throughout this section, the focus is accordingly on a complex dynamic, with all its accompanying contradictions, between the Serbian Self and the Western / foreign Other in each festival. Also shown, in parallel, is how this power dynamic feeds into both Orientalist and Occidentalist narratives, whose concurrence obviously points to the larger Balkanist discourse. Importantly, the recursive logic of these Orientalist / Occidentalist discursive strategies is scrutinized, too, in relation to Serbia’s more immediate Significant Others, be they select former Yugoslav nations and dispersed Serb communities (5.4.4), or Serbian Romanies as ‘the strangers
within’, to borrow again van de Port’s phrase (5.4.5). In the former case, ‘[s]ince all Balkan peoples are more or less “white” according to American racial criteria’, the notion of racial difference is largely grounded in the long-established hierarchy of geopolitical relations, both material and symbolic, drawn along the fault line of the region’s former imperial powers. As Longinović (2000: 630) specifies further

These identifications are largely based on territorializations of one’s religious confession: Croats [and Slovenes] see themselves as part of the culture based on Roman Catholicism, Serbs as part of Eastern Orthodox culture stemming from Byzantium, while Bosniak identity is defined by their conversion to Islam during five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

Additionally, in the last segment of the chapter (5.4.5), issues of race in Exit and Guča are approached in a more conventional way, that is, as ‘the shifting matrix of ideological constructions of difference associated with body type and color that have emerged as part of the discourse network of modernity’ (Radano and Bohlman 2000: 5). Apart from the case of Serbian Romanies at Guča, the analysis below also touches briefly upon the racial imaginations of black and Asian participants in both festivals.

The representations of Serbia’s national identity schisms in Exit and Guča ultimately point to ‘the incapacity to conceive of oneself in other terms than from the point of view of the dominating other’ (Močnik 2005: 95). The underlying principle driving these fractured racial self-projections should be therefore understood and interpreted in the light of Serbia’s attempts at coping with what Goffman (1968: 14) calls the tribal stigma – that is, the ‘stigma of race, nation, and religion (...) that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family’. In Serbia’s case, the Balkan stigma, which pertains to the racialized notions of cultural difference, is clearly constituted in relation to Westerners as ‘normals’, that is, as ‘those who do not depart negatively from the particular expectations at issue’ (Goffman 1968: 15). It is indeed the said ideological construct of normality, accompanied by that of madness as its binary opposite, that I explore next in Exit and Guča respectively.

5.4.1 Exit vs. Guča: Normality vs. Madness

One way in which the big Western Other critically shapes the national identity narrative of Two Serbias is through the Exit construction of normality (informed by the discourse of sameness), as opposed to the Guča construction of madness (informed by the discourse of difference). Two corresponding vignettes from each festival can illustrate this vividly. One is the concert of Rambo Amadeus at the Exit Main Stage in 2004, during which he played the song ‘Rambo’s normal kolo’ with the following
lyrics: ‘I feel normal only when I unwind totally. Unwind with me till total normality’
(see The State of Exit, 2004). The corresponding vignette relates to the concert of Goran Bregović at Guča 2013, which he opened with the statement: ‘If you don’t go crazy here, you are not normal’ (GUČA: Goran Bregović closes Trumpet Festival!, Kurir, 2013). Even though the semantic implications of both utterances are basically the same – that only those who go ‘crazy’ actually stay ‘normal’ – their teleological reasoning is completely opposite. In the case of Rambo’s song, the aspired state of mind is that of normality, whereas in the case of Bregović’s concert opening, the goal is to surrender oneself to madness.

There is much evidence that ‘normality’ has from the beginning been a prominent trope in the media representation of Exit Festival. The slogan of the initial Exit 2000 was indeed ‘EXIT out of ten years of madness’, clearly referring to the detrimental politics of the Milošević’s regime (‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.). On the same note, Veran Matić (in Sejdinović 2002b: n.p.), editor-in-chief of RTV B92, stated that Exit Festival represents for many ‘the strongest symbol of a return of normal life to the [ex-Yugoslav] region’. And for Serbian writer Vladimir Arsenijević (in Gruhonjić ed. 2003: n.p.), Exit should likewise be understood as ‘one of the signals that we are returning to the list of normal societies’. From a slightly different vantage point, Goran Svilanović (in Gruhonjić 2002b: n.p.), then Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted that the festival represents Serbia as a country with ‘young people who are exactly the same like those from elsewhere in the world, and who desire and love the same things like kids in Berlin, Paris, London’. The focus on cultural similarities rather than differences from the rest of (Western) Europe is clearly meant to emphasize the importance of the Exit role in abolishing the borders between the EU and Serbia, as well as in ‘demonstrat[ing] that we [Serbs] belong to Europe’ (Serbia’s Minister of Foreign Relations Goran Pitić, in Kolundžija 2002a: n.p.). Or how some put it, Exit represents ‘a voice of Serbia that wants to be in the center of Europe’ (Executive Director of MTV Europe Foundation Thomas G. Her, in Krstić 2004: 8), and ‘that wishes to itself, its neighbors and everyone around a better, more normal and humane life’ (Pančić, in Bizjak et al. 2005: 24).

The views of Exit held by my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors (group interview, Aug 2013) correspond well with the aspirations of the early Exit project to rebuild Serbia in the image of the ‘civilized’ world (see 3.2.4). As Serbo-Belgian festival-goer Dragan specifies, ‘[w]hat I think is Serbian about Exit is the image of New Serbia [that the festival projects]. It shows another face of Serbia. All Serbian friends I like fit into that image’. The cozy familiarity with the Exit (native crowd’s) outlook, values, and aesthetic sensibilities is something that Dragan’s friend Nicolas ac-

132 The latter verse is a parodic reference to the 1993 hit song ‘Unwind [with me till madness]’ by Serbian TF singer Mira Škorić.
133 The same slogan appears also on T-shirts sold around the festival site.
knowledges, too, but unlike Dragan, Nicolas is rather ambivalent about it: ‘This New Serbia [represented in and by Exit] is more globalized. It’s the same world as mine because of stupid corporate things. Of course I feel more at home at Exit, because it’s my environment, but then again, there is less surprises’.

At the same time, for local Exit proponents, this element of surprise that Nicolas glorifies and pursues in his explorations of Serbia amounts precisely to the chaotic reality of Serbian everyday life that they so strongly disapprove. In their view, the dominant cultural model in postsocialist Serbia is apparently flawed at its core and therefore in dire need of ‘normalization’ that the festival not only epitomizes but also restores in the middle to long run as part of its civilizing mission. For example, Exit co-founder Dorijan Petrić (in Milović Buha 2008) articulates the idea of normality in the following way:

University professors drive fića [Fiat 500D], whereas mobs drive jeeps. That is the system of values that should be reverted back to normal. We wish to give young people positive role models, to show them that hard work and education pay off. The Exit festival itself is a good case in point. Take [Exit CEO] Bojan Bošković as an example: he became one of the most successful managers in Serbia. (...) This is not a man who could inherit something from a rich dad, or a man who went to study overseas. (...) He carved out his own way to success. Each of us, around fifty organizers, has, just like Exit, moved forward since the festival foundation. (...) So much we’ve learnt. We’ve established ourselves individually as leaders in various areas [of creative industries]. (...) [Exit is a] brand that [has] perhaps grown most exponentially since the 5 October 2000 [Revolution] at both local and international levels.

While Petrić’s approach to normality clearly conflates the nostalgic view of Yugoslav modernity (see 3.3) with the neoliberal discourse of adaptive self-reliant subjects (see Chandler 2013), Bošković (interview, Sep 2014) situates the notion of normality within the ideological framework of Left-Right opposition:

There are things that are open for debate, and those that are not. You can’t beat up two men on the street because they speak in German [reference to the xenophobic attitude of Serbian far-right groups], or because they hold hands [reference to Serbia’s homophobic incidents]. That’s [my idea of] a normal value system. (...) A normal value system is everything counter to Serbia. Denmark and Finland are, for example, good country role models.

From the point of view of Exit liberal critics, normality clearly resides outside Serbia / the Balkans and is to be found in the West / Global North, that is, in countries such
as Denmark and Finland. This discursive device of distancing or otherizing the Serbian Self in relation to the desired Western norm is familiar from earlier anthropological discourse that views places and societies as living in different time frames, thus denying their coevalness (see Fabian 1983). Such reasoning evokes in addition the evolutionist idea of ‘catching up’ with ‘the West as the desired apex of any future modernity’ (Buchanan 2006: 38). It adds thus a temporal dimension to the geographical differentiation pattern of the West-East divide, ‘where the movement from past to future [is] not merely motion but evolution from simple to complex, backward to developed, primitive to cultivated’ (Todorova 1997: 11).

Surprisingly perhaps, the same catching-up discourse crops up in some comments of foreign Exit participants, at least in the early-to-middle stages of Exit development. According to e.g. Robert Del Naja from Massive Attack (The State of Exit, 2004), ‘[Exit] is very different. (…) It’s a shame to see that our [British] festivals have become more about making money. And seeing that there are festivals with a connection to politics is the reason we’re here’. Also, Exit UK/EU promoter Paxton Talbot (in Kesić 2002: n.p.) stated something similar:

The atmosphere [at Exit] is very similar to that in the UK twelve years ago when dance music was on its way to become popular. There was a cultural revolution, and people began to organize outdoor [rave] parties. The atmosphere was very moving. (...) This is exactly how I feel here. This kind of thing no longer happens. Neither in Britain, nor in America, nor anywhere else.

Complementary to this is the statement by another Exit foreign guest, Liam Farrell aka Doctor L (Exit News 2002: n.p.):

We come from Paris where, as in most European countries, everything is very orderly and well-organized. What we highly appreciate here is precisely a human factor, for it is commotion, confusion, a sort of chaotic order that we all need to think properly.

What can be inferred from all these quotes is a romanticized view of Exit as ‘lagging behind’ its Western counterparts. Foreign Exit participants either relegate it to the past cultural experiences of their native countries (Britain in this case), with a similar sort of nostalgic sentiment they express when attending ‘exotic’ music events from afar (such as Guča). Or they read into it the romanticized ‘Eastern’ stereotypes associated with Serbia and the Balkan region more generally (such as that of chaotic order).

In any event, in the West-East debate surrounding Exit, it seems that the former category remains unchallenged as a dominant norm, against which Exit is then evalu-
ated. This is even the case when Western (festival) culture is criticized for its commercialization, depoliticization, and overregulation (as in the quotes above). In all other cases, the Exit conceptions of normality are, at least on the face of it, uncritically equated with the utopian vision of (Western) Europe as the promise of a new paradise. Such an equation clearly presumes that everything associated with Serbia and, more broadly, with the Balkans appears to be inadequate, perverted, uncivilized, and with no positive values to speak of (cf. Jansen 2001). At yet another level, the Exit overidentification with the West/Europe can also be interpreted in terms of Spivak’s strategic essentialism. That is, it very well might be that Exit proponents are fully aware that the construct of the West / Europe is just a fantasy, but nonetheless draw on it as a strategic means to oppose Serbian nationalism and partocracy. Moreover, the fantasy of the West / Europe seems to give them the option to refuse to be categorized as Europe’s Others, as well as to actively participate in the political makings of Serbian society within the context of the New Europe and globalized world (cf. Simić 2009: 123).

Conversely, the Guča micronational space uses the discursive strategies of self-exoticization to construct and perform Serbian racial-ethnic difference as specifically Balkan. This is most vividly conveyed through the construct of madness emerging from media coverage of the festival, both national and international (see Gligorijević 2012). For instance, the website of a Serbian travel agency specialized in international Guča festival tourism is titled as ‘Guča: Madness Made in Serbia’ (see www.guca.rs). Also, the trope of madness is widely used by both Guča producers and consumers, as the two comments below can testify:

[Guča] is the biggest psychiatric clinic in the world! (Festival co-founder Nikola Stojić, in Guča: The Serbian Woodstock, an untold story, 2006.)

‘You don’t get this anywhere else, this kind of craziness,’ says Zora Tankosić, 66, a Serb from Las Vegas, Nevada, who has been coming back with her husband Miloš, a Guča native, since 1970. (‘Brass band festival trumpets a mass party’, The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, 2005.)

The trope of madness is especially prominent in the Western media, where the festival tends to be described as ‘the Europe’s biggest, wildest and craziest party’ (‘Europe’s lesser-known music festivals’, The Guardian, 2010), as ‘a cacophonic and crazy brass band festival’ (ThisIsTheLife.com, in ‘A cacophonic festival of crazy people’, Politika, 2007), or as ‘the Balkan trance party’, ‘the mayhem’, ‘a ... manic, exhilarating experience’ (Cartwright 2009). Unsurprisingly, a common reference point in these and similar festival reports are Kusturica’s films such as Underground (1995) (see the synopsis for Guča, 2006) and Black Cat, White Cat (1998) (see a report from
Rolling Stone Magazine, in ‘A good atmosphere...’, Danas: Guča 52, 2012: 5). Or in Cartwright’s (2009) words, ‘[e]ntering Guča’s main street feels like stepping onto Kusturica’s film set’. It was indeed Kusturica’s films that drew Western attention to Serbia’s Romani brass bands and Guča Festival in the first place. It was specifically the use of Magical Realism in his movies (see Haeng 2013) that conveniently fed into the Western racial imagination of a ‘crazy’ Balkan (Serbian/Gypsy) Other.134

Either emic or etic, such constructions of the Serb people produce several discursive effects which are not without contradictions. To begin with, the demonized ‘Balkan’ characteristics of the Serbs come to be reassessed and reinterpreted in an affirmative way as somehow more authentic and true-to-life than those that are associated with Western nations (Jansen 2001: 57). This ‘lack of popular will to be Westernlike’ manifest in Guča and elsewhere in the Balkans (see Kiossev 2005: 184–185) thus results in a reversal of the Europe-Balkans binary, whereby the initially debased item of the equation (the Balkans) takes over the position of power. Out of this there emerges, then, a belief that ‘the Balkan liveliness, freedom, temperament, passion, beauty’ evoke a sense of envy in apparently constrained, blasé, and lethargic Westerners, for whom Guča Festival represents ‘a sort of nostalgic reminder of distant but lost vitality’ (Timotijević 2005:320).135 This point of view is commonly used by both natives and foreigners. An example of the former is the online comment by festival reviewer Dundoje (in Milojković and Bojović 2012a [comments]), saying:

As usual, the Balkans are the avant-garde, an indication that Western culture is in its final stage of decline, that it has no longer any new ideas nor options but to return to the primitive and tribal. Guča is the id of Europe; we really are Europe’s Mexico and Thailand at the same time.

The Guardian journalist Cartwright (2009) writes along similar lines:

Guča captures the big, bold Balkan spirit perfectly. No matter your nationality, ethnicity, sex or age, Guča will embrace you. Folkloric in origin but absolutely contemporary in spirit, Guča offers a real sense of collective celebration and reminds you that music was once something tribal, wild, unshackled by industry.

134 Žižek (in Žižek and Levy 2008) comments on Kusturica’s film Underground in like manner: ‘In Underground, [Kusturica] stages for the Western gaze the image of the Balkans as a crazy piece of the world, outside history, where people, frankly [speaking], eat, drink, kill, and fuck all the time. A perpetual spiritual orgy. This is what the West wants to see in [Balkan people], and he’s delivering it to them. I’m against him, not because he’s a too primitive Balkan, but because he’s too Westernized’.

135 Note that even when rendered or viewed through the lens of (self-)irony, the inverted representations of the Balkans/Serbia do not seem to have potential for subverting or challenging racial-ethnic stereotypes associated with this region (see Marković 2013: 129, 194).
Where Glastonbury involves a corporate pop-rock event that lacks surprises and spontaneity, Guča encourages dancing on the street to organic trance music.

The accounts of Guča, and Serbia in general, by my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors at Guča 2013 were likewise rooted in the same reversed reading of the Balkans. For example, Nicolas (coming to Serbia since 2006) and Karl (visiting Serbia the second time around) felt drawn to places like Serbia and Guča in particular, because they were ‘looking for something else, something different’. For Nicolas, Serbia offered in addition a safe getaway from his native Belgium, its history and politics. As he put it, in Serbia there is

No Europe, no NATO. I was hoping for a life with fewer norms, more of a chaos, in a good sense of the word. (...) I wanted to have a break in a real country and not in an amusement park. (...) It is the people I liked best, because they are so welcoming, they live in a moment, they are real.

Articulated by Nicolas are thus two major ideas, both of which based on a romanticized view of more ‘primitive’ societies (such as Serbia), as opposed to ‘civilized’ ones (such as Belgium). One such idea comes close to earlier socio-anthropological taxonomies of human societies, by which simpler societies are said to have fewer and less complicated norms, and vice versa (see Marković 2002: 14). The other idea falls back on exoticized projections of Serbian ‘craziness’, but with one important difference: the trope of madness is reworked here into the idea of realness (or authenticity) that Serbian people apparently embody. The latter seems to carry a significant weight in the accounts of Nicolas’s friends, David and Karl, too. For David, the realness of the Serbs that he experienced at Guča was manifest in:

a really deep way [they] look at you. It’s sincere and pure for me. In my country [Spain-Belgium], people have more masks, barriers, boundaries. It’s not so direct. But here people look at me and I think they can see straight into my soul!

And for Karl, the realness of the Serbs shows in their honesty and capacity to immediately interact with others at a very profound level. In his words:

What I like about the Serbs is: if they think you’re shit, they’ll tell you. If they think you are a great guy, they’ll tell you. In Belgium, people tend to be too polite. You have to meet them over and over again to make a connection. The Serbs [by contrast] really wanna get to know you. The interaction with them isn’t superficial; it’s not like ‘did you sleep well?’ and shit like that. They really wanna know you.
To sum up, then, the Western construct of madness in Guča essentially rests on the (neo)colonial discourse of Noble Savage. This discourse is highly ambivalent in itself, since it projects the (neo)colonist’s simultaneous fear and fascination onto its object. As Grainger (2008: 208) notes, ‘[t]he Noble Savage [is] a contradictory myth: on the one hand embodying the positive virtues of simplicity, beauty, and freedom; on the other, suspect because of the animalistic instincts that motivate him’. When applied to Guča, the discourse of a noble savage clearly overlaps with that of Balkanism insofar as each of them gives rise to contradictory external views of the Serbs in Guča – romanticized and disparaged at the same time.

Note, however, that the traditionally negative portrayal of Serbian / Balkan people as ‘raw barbarians’ (Todorova 1997) invariably surfaces in both Exit- and Guča-related narratives. Indeed, regardless of the festival in question, almost all of my foreign festival interlocutors pointed to the negative image that Serbia had suffered in the international media since the 1990s. On top of that, as few interviewees emphasized, some representatives of the Serbian / Balkan diaspora had earned a notorious reputation among host populations in Western Europe, notably in Austria and Switzerland, which was not helpful either in seeing them outside their stigmatized ethnic identity. Thus, despite high ratings in local surveys of international visitors attending Exit (see ‘Evaluation of the festival...’, TIM Centar, 2006–2009), the image of Serbia in ‘more developed European countries’ remains catastrophic, to put it mildly. A whopping 93% of visitors from Western Europe stated that Serbia receives in their country some of the negative epithets [associated with the recent Yugoslav wars, instability, poverty, backwardness, under-development, and aggression]. (…) Examples include [such statements as]: ‘the [Serbian] people are wild’, ‘a nasty and angry people’, ‘an aggressive people’, ‘terrifying’, ‘a land of wars’, ‘not a destination to visit’, etc. (‘Evaluation of the festival...’, TIM Centar, 2006.)

Even though the negative views of the country have over years become mitigated or more neutral according to the same center’s surveys (2007–2009), the enduring power of the Balkanist discourse in shaping Western public opinion cannot be denied. As stressed above, this especially applies to Guča, where the Balkanist discourse works jointly with that of Noble Savage to construct the image of a Serbian Other as simultaneously exotic and dreadful – in short, an image against which the implied superiority of the civilized (Western) European Self can be reasserted.

Note in addition that the Guča construct of madness is not received with approval by all sections of Serbian society. On the contrary, Serbian journalist Pančić (in ‘Closing days at Guča’, B92, 2006) is, for instance, highly critical of Guča’s self-exoticizing representational tactics and assesses them accordingly ‘as nothing less than
promotion of the Serb as a tamed savage who makes Guča out of his life and does nothing else. According to Pančić, it is Exit Festival that gives Serbia dignity, not Guča’. In like manner, another Serbian journalist, Draža Petrović (2012a), writes about the apparently self-degrading way in which Serbia, embodied in the figure of then Serbian PM Ivica Dačić, presents itself to the Western gaze – in this particular case to the PM’s American guest at Guča 2012, renowned actor Armand Assante. In Petrović’s words, ‘Assante was taking pictures all around [Guča], probably to show this “safari with savage tribes across Amazon” to his blokes back in America’. Former Exit CEO Bošković (interview, Sep 2014), for his part, compared Guča to the zoo: ‘Foreigners like the zoo, because after [visiting] the zoo, they can go back to their orderly societies, while we stay in the zoo. We are living it!’

The Guča construct of madness is criticized with a similar force in domestic online forums. As one commentator put it, both emic and etic imaginings of the Serbs in Guča

[are] just another way of saying: “Yes, bro, we are wild and primitive, we love to eat mesište [piles of meat], to make out with waitresses and pevaljke [female kafana singers] screaming from the tables, to drink till we black out, to look like a horde of raging Huns, but, as you can see, the entire world loves it and appreciates it and comes over to eyewitness it.” (...) So let [foreigners] have fun, let them maintain the eternal flame of such an image of [the Serb people]. Perhaps that’s not bad at all. We’ve got some standard, an ISO [International Organization for Standardization] certification... You know what they say, Germans are industrious, Scots are stingy, and we are rednecks. (Vojin, ‘The Guča trumpet festival has begun’, B92 [comments], 2006.)

Thus, while compliance with the Orientalist image of a Serbian tamed savage visibly undermines a profound sense of civility and urbanity in Serbia’s self-identified cosmopolitans, it is at the same time vigorously defended by Guča supporters: ‘Enough is enough! If you are ashamed [of who you are], then keep quiet about it. Don’t tell anyone that you are the Serbs. And let us, rednecks, carouse our way’. (Beli, ‘Guča Festival: An authentic brand...?’, Radio Slobodna Evropa [comments], 2012.)

It is precisely a deep sense of shame and inferiority that pervades not only the liberal members of Serbian society, but also those who boast about their Serbian / Balkan identity. These negative feelings are in both cases incited by the burden of the ‘tribal stigma’ that extends back into the early era of Serbian / Balkan modern history but resurges with a vengeance in the 1990s owing to the disastrous political events in the region. Contributing to the Serbian / Balkan inferiority complex is also the awareness of the region’s factual ‘geo-political and geo-cultural irrelevance’ (Ki- ossev 2005: 180). Viewed in this light, the constructions of normality and madness
in Exit and Guča respectively are nothing else but responses to Serbia’s tribal stigma and the country’s low ranking in both real and symbolic global geographies. Or to borrow Kiossev’s phrasing again, the constructs of normality and madness in two Serbian music festivals presume consent on the part of the Serb nation ‘to recognize [itself] in a discursive pattern that stigmatizes [it]’ (ibid.).

On a surface level, the conclusions inferred from the corresponding narratives of Exit normality and Guča madness seem to suggest a clear-cut division between two festivals and the concomitant image of Serbian society as split in half. In the analysis that follows, I proceed upon these grounds only to problematize them further. Specifically, I show that the discursive tactics involved in the racial imaginings of the Serb nation in Exit and Guča along the West-East axis are marked by considerable ambivalences in each festival.

5.4.2 Cosmopolitanism of Guča Micronational Space: Between Hospitality and Hostility

The Guča construction of madness represents but one aspect of the Europe-Balkans binary. Yet, to fully understand a complex dynamic between Guča’s claimed Europeananness / cosmopolitanism and ‘ressentiment-based nationalism’ (Greenfeld 1992) as its flip side, it is necessary to explore other discursive layers surrounding each binary member. As is argued below, it is the decidedly contradictory readings of both ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’ in Serbian nationalist discourses that facilitate the reproduction of Guča micronational space as cosmopolitan and nationalist at the same time.

The analysis here follows in the footsteps of Jansen’s (2001) study on the ambiguous charges of ‘Europe’ and ‘the Balkans’, respectively, in Serbian nationalist narratives of the mid-to-late 1990s. For Serbian nationalists, as Jansen maintains, ‘the Balkans’ convey a sense of cultural pride, resilience, defiance, and resistance to the foreign rule, especially to five hundred years of the Ottoman yoke. Then again, the notion of the Balkans is simultaneously deployed as a metonym for Serbia’s ‘economic underdevelopment, laziness, inefficiency, primitivism, and backwardness’ (ibid., 36). By the same token, Europe is, on the one hand, admired as a symbol of modernity, orderliness, rational thinking, and high standards of living, but, on the other, it is accused of the inappropriate and unfair treatment of the Serbs. There is indeed a strong sense among Serbian nationalists that Europe tends to favor other Balkan nations when interfering in the political affairs of the region. Moreover, Europe is deemed ungrateful for Serbia’s ‘civilizational’ contributions, apparently refusing to recognize its population as a truly European people ‘who have for centuries defended [the Old Continent] from “the Islamic invasion”’ (ibid., 37). All this may explain prominent feelings of injustice, victimization, resentment, and anger that many nationally minded Serbs harbor against the big Western Other.
Within this discursive framework, the Guča constructions of Europeanness / cosmopolitanism should also be read as performing a compensatory function in Serbia’s management of the Balkan stigma. This is most evident in those Guča-related narratives that emphasize the European origins or character of the festival. For example, longstanding Guča reporter Otašević (2013c) writes, ‘Guča would never have happened if Prince Miloš Obrenović did not decide (...) to modernize Serbia and make it closer to Europe’. (See 4.5.1 for the most common explanation of the origins of Serbian brass band tradition.) Serbia’s then Minister of Infrastructure Mrkonjić (in Tadić et al. 2010: 359) spoke in the same vein when playing the host role at Guča 2008: ‘This is a European festival and the whole Serbia knows it’. This statement cannot be properly understood without the political context in which it appears. Namely, in 2008 the Serbian coalition government was formed between the late Milošević’s Socialist Party, to which the quoted minister Mrkonjić belongs, and the Democratic Party, led by then Serbian president Tadić. Soon after this coalition government was inaugurated, the largest right-wing political party, Serbian Radical Party, split into two because of a dispute among its key members over EU membership. What emerged out of all these events was a national consensus on the European (Union) orientation of the country, as reflected in Mrkonjić’s newly acquired ‘European’ perspective on Guča Festival.

Note, however, that Guča’s longing to belong to the (Western) world has longer been part of the festival’s self-narration, in particular since Serbia’s democratic ‘revolution’ in 2000. Not only did, for instance, nation-minded poet Bećković (in Todoširović 2002) state in 2002 that Guča represents ‘Serbia’s contribution to globalization’. More importantly, the view of Guča, and through it of Serbia, as open to other cultures and to global cultural trends, is incorporated into the very concept of the festival. It has indeed been endlessly repeated by festival organizers that people from all around the world are most welcome to visit Guča, ‘regardless of their skin color, religion, nationality, or political affiliation’ (Stojić et al. 2000: 35). Or in the words of the festival’s two key people:

[W]e are open for the presentation of other cultures – acknowledging and cultivating our own roots, we come to know and acknowledge the traditions of other nations. Hence the growing number of festival participants from Europe and the world over. Following at the same time the Zeitgeist, (...) we also need to be open to contemporary cultural achievements – those which are modern in expression but rooted in tradition to eventually become themselves part of the national repository. (Director of Guča Culture House Tadić, ‘Guča-goers will be welcomed by...’, Dragaćevski trubač, 2007: 2.)
The [Guča] Festival is the guardian of our national being, but precisely because of that, it fosters an international spirit, too. There is no doubt that we will keep the basic content of the Festival focusing on the presentation of national culture, but we also need to keep up with the times. (President of Lučani Municipality and Chairman of the Festival Board Jolović, ‘Guča-goers will be welcomed...’, *Dragačevski trubač*, 2007: 2; emphasis added.)

It goes without saying that Guča’s official call for reconciling past and present as much as nationalism and cosmopolitanism has practical motives, namely, to justify a more commercially sustainable model of the festival programming while preventing public criticism of the izvor’s loss. What, however, seems to lurk beneath this plea is, just as in Exit, the evolutionist idea of ‘catching up’ with global cultural norms dictated by the West; hence the imperative expression ‘we need to keep up with the times’ in the quote above. In this and similar statements, the stigmatizing edge of the catching-up discourse is apparently disguised as a call for recognition and exchange of different national cultures. Occasionally, however, the catching-up discourse implies a strong sense of national shame before the gaze of the Western Other. ‘I’m glad that we don’t have to feel ashamed when people from around the world come to Guča’, commented then festival president Sretenović (in Petrović 2013a: 3) in reference to the village’s considerable infrastructural developments ever since local politicians took a hold of the festival (in 2004).136

Either way, despite Guča’s cosmopolitan and New Age claims of a shared humanity, I argue that there is a thin line between the festival expressions of Serbian hospitality (inclusiveness) and hostility (exclusiveness). The main driving force underlying this dynamic is an overall sense of resentment directed towards the big Western Other. Such a sentiment can, for example, be detected in the following statement by Serbian journalist Babić (in Tadić et al. 2010: 81):

> Spontaneous and sincere, played from the heart and with passion, but above all as the distinctive primordial sound of this region, the [Serbian] trumpet has quickly conquered other parts of the world, too... Today, in those sounds even the Balkans recognize themselves, whereas the trumpet sound emanating from

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136 For the purpose of Guča Festival, many facilities have been built or upgraded, such as festival stages, bridges, roads, footpaths, heliport, sanitary knot with public toilets, motel, sports facilities, swimming pools, riverbed and promenade along the river Bjelica, monument to Desimir Perišić, and Trumpet Museum (see Tadić et al. 2010). According to Ilić (2011), ‘[o]ver the period 2004–2010, the festival generated around 1.6 million euros in revenue, while Guča saw around 5.4 million euros in investment’. 

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the soul of this nation is understood by others even when they do not understand us.

And who else could be those ‘others who do not understand us’ but Westerners and possibly neighboring Balkan nations as Serbia’s Significant Others. As indicated above, it is precisely feelings of being continually hard done-by that pervade Serbia’s national consciousness (see Bieber 2002; Jansen 2001; Milosavljević 2002), thus giving rise to what Greenfeld calls (1992: 250) ‘ressentiment-based nationalism’ – that is, ‘a sustained sentiment of existential envy and resentment based on a sense of one’s inferiority vis-à-vis the societies from which the ideas of nationalism were imported, and which therefore were originally seen as models’. In the case of recent Serbian nationalism, as the late Yugoslav/Serbian lawyer and political activist Popović (2012) argues, a sense of bitterness and indignation, together with ‘attempts at self-victimization’, emerged ‘after the initial aggressive militant nationalism suffered historical defeat’ (as in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, or in the loss of Kosovo province in 2008). Following Popović, I investigate next how these suppressed feelings of resentment, envy, hatred, anger, and aggression towards the nation’s Significant Other (in this case, towards the West as an authority figure and an aspiring nation-state model) play out in Guča in relation to the concomitant discourse of cosmopolitanism. Specifically, I focus on those Guča constructions of Serbia’s cultural difference that are meant not only to showcase that the Serbs are better than others, in particular Westerners, but also to account for the imperialist aspirations and fantasies of the nation that is actually powerless, deflated, shunned, and disgraced.

Serbia’s ressentiment-based nationalism clearly provides another explanation for Guča’s responses to the tribal stigma in the form of hyperbolic national pride. However, in contrast to Chapter 4 where ‘the West’ was mainly implied as an absent Other, here it comes to the fore as an explicit point of reference. In the analysis below, I show accordingly how the claimed supremacy of Serbian culture over Western culture is expressed in Guča-related narratives in two major ways: (1) through the discourse ‘We, Serbs, are simply THE best’, and (2) through the discourse ‘We, Serbs, are able to conquer the entire world, including most distant terrestrial and extraterrestrial spaces’. Common to both groups of discourses are those media constructions of the Guča phenomenon in which both native and foreign (in particular Western) festival visitors speak about it in superlatives only. Let me illustrate this claim with some examples.

The former group of narratives emphasizes, first and foremost, the superiority of Serbian brass music and Serbian brass band players, respectively. For instance, at the 2010 Guča opening ceremony of the first international brass band competition, Deputy PM Dačić (in Bojović and Džodan 2010) stated: ‘The trumpet is played the world over, but the Serbian trumpet is the best’ (emphasis added), clearly seeking to
strike a national chord with the local audience. Commenting on the expected outcome of the competition in question, an Austrian Guča-goer (in Bojović and Džodan 2010) asserted: ‘I’m not disappointed that a foreign brass band didn’t win [the contest]. On the contrary, I think the jury decision was realistic, especially because Dejan Petrović [the winner of the First Trumpet of the World] is my favorite trumpet player’.

That Serbian brass band players deserve the title of best is also apparent in the statements by important foreign visitors to Guča / Serbia. According to domestic media reports:

Nobody in the world plays the trumpet like [Dejan Petrović] and his orchestra. This [music] sounds absolutely incredible’, said famous [American] actor Assante. (In Milojković and Bojović 2012b.)

[Johnny] Depp has listened to plenty of trumpet music but admitted that this style of playing he’d heard never before. (Dejan Petrović on Depp’s reaction to his band’s performance at Kusturica’s 2010 Küstendorf Film and Music Festival, held annually in the village of Drvengrad, also known as Küstendorf, in Western Serbia; see Bojović 2010a.)

Domestic media observers also report enthusiastically on how Guča’s foreign brass band players deeply admire their Serbian counterparts. For example, Paul of the American brass band What Cheer? Brigade (from Providence, Rhode Island) reflects on his expectations of the festival as follows: ‘Now we get a chance to learn how it’s done from the masters. We will be humbled, surely, by the musical skills of the bands at Guča...’ (www.guca.rs, 2007). A similar attitude of humility can also be detected in the statement by the leader of Norway’s Balkanfest Evanger Orchestra (in Milojković and Bojović 2013b):

‘Zapevala sojka ptica / The Jaybird Began to Sing’, that’s the song we prepared for the competition. We’re not disappointed that we didn’t win an award. It was not easy for us to learn [the song], but our hearts are full after the audience sang along this Serbian song whilst we were playing.

137 Note that the origins of ‘Zapevala sojka ptica’ are disputed in ethnomusicological circles, which only highlights the fact that Balkan grassroots music knows no borders. According to Silverman (2012: 28), the song is originally from Macedonia. Conversely, Serbian ethnomusicologist Dević (in ‘Zapevala sojka tica’, Blic, 2005) claims that ‘Zapevala sojka ptica’ originates from Prizren (Kosovo), whereas March (2013: 157) writes about it as a school example of traditional Bosnian sevdalinka – a type of urban love song thriving in Islamic Bosnia from the Ottoman times, characterized by broad, highly ornamented, melismatic, and rhythm-
Guča-related comments from foreigners are thus mainly selected in a way which indicates that the Serbian brass really is ‘the best music in the world’, as members of the competing Brazilian Go East Orchestra put it (in Milojković and Bojović 2012a). The idea of its superbness also partly emanates from the alleged difficulties with which foreign brass band players contend when trying to learn it. Contemporary Serbian author Basara (2011: 12) comments on why brass bands from abroad never seem to sound as good as domestic ones: ‘they don’t know how to wear the Serbian šajkača, and that’s of essential value here’. This is presumably a jokey way to say that foreign musicians are simply not ‘Serbian’ enough to win the Guča brass band competition.

Alternatively, the discourse ‘We, Serbs, are simply THE best’ informs those domestic media reports, in which foreign Guča visitors admire either (1) the festival itself, as in: ‘This is the most interesting festival, completely different from all others in the world’ (Assante, in Milojković and Bojović 2012b; see also statement by French Guča-goer, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d). Or (2) the Serbian tradition on the whole, or selected elements thereof, as in: ‘[T]he world should come to Serbia to witness the richness of your culture’ (Austrian Guča-goer, in Bojović and Džođan 2010), or: ‘We are thrilled. The music is amazing, (...) the food is excellent, and rakija is the best [alcoholic] beverage in the world (Czech Guča-goer, in Milojković and Bojović 2013c). Or (3) the country’s natural beauty, as in: ‘We are surrounded by the beautiful scenery. You really have a beautiful country’ (German couple visiting Guča, in Ilić and Janković 2012). Even though local festival reporters seem to actively fish for compliments from foreign Guča-goers, the fact remains that the profusion of such positive epithets as ‘awesome’, ‘great’, ‘amazing’, ‘excellent’, or ‘beautiful’ in the media descriptions of the Guča phenomenon invariably fulfills the purpose of Serbia’s wishful thinking that ‘the Serbs are simply THE best’.

In the second group of discourses are included countless Guča-related stories about the power of Serbian (brass band) tradition to conquer the world. Two anecdotes stand out here as perhaps the most extreme examples of such fantasies. According to the first, the official flag of Guča Festival / Trumpet Republic apparently flies at the summit of Earth’s highest mountain – Mount Everest. It was, specifically, Serbian alpinist Dragan Jaćimović, a native of Puhovo, a village halfway between Guča and Lučani, that planted it atop Everest in 2000 alongside the Serbian flag (see Tadić et al. 2010: 309). The second anecdote involves engineer Milivoj Jugin (in Marinjanović 2000, in Slavković 2003: 84–86), a legendary Yugoslav/Serbian TV commentator and popularizer of space exploration, telling a story about Soviet/Russian cosmonaut Viktor Savinykh and his visit to Serbia way back in the socialist era. On that occasion, Savinykh was taken on a road trip across the country, which incidentally free tunes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in its Serbian version, the name of the song’s female protagonist is typically Serbian ‘Kata’, and in the Bosnian version – typically Bosniak ‘Fata’.
tally included a first-hand experience of Guča trumpet festival. As the story goes, on his third space mission, Savinykh brought with him a memorial photo of himself and his Serbian host Jugin posing in front of Guča’s Trumpet Monument. ‘That is how the Dragačevo trumpet arrived in the cosmos, too’, writes Marjanović (in Slavković 2003: 86).

There are, of course, other ways in which Serbia’s imperial spirit shines through local media reports on the festival. Some of them focus on the stories and images of foreign festival participants wearing Serbian costumes, dancing Serbian kolos, or playing Serbian songs on their brass instruments. Particular attention is paid to those foreign Guča-goers who seem to adhere to ‘Serbian’ ways in their native lands, too. Stojković (2012), for example, brings to screen the story of Renato Rocco Gullo, a regular Swiss Italian Guča-goer for a decade or so, who speaks some Serbian and is a member of a Serbian folk dance ensemble back at home. Viewed favorably are also those foreign festivalgoers living in ‘Serbian lands’ and trying to assimilate to Serbian culture and habits. Otašević (2011a) writes, for instance, about Chinese Guča-goer, Janko Jiao from Trebinje (Republika Srpska), who became (through baptism) a member of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2008, and who came to Guča to ‘serb around’. In any case, the main assumption here is that Serbia is ‘invading’ the world through the symbolic conversion of foreign Guča visitors into the members, even if only temporary ones, of the Serb nation. Furthermore, by masquerading as the Serbs wherever the road takes them, foreign Guča fans seem to tacitly agree that ‘the Serbs are [once again] simply THE best’, apparently much to the detriment of their given racial-ethnonational identity.

The belief that the Serbian spirit of imperialism comes into existence in and through Guča is something that may also surface overtly in local public discourse. According to the late Serbian actor Danilo Lazović (in Tadić et al. 2010: 325), who spoke publicly at Guča 2002, the festival indeed embodies all the imperialism of Serbian culture, Serbian charm and irresistibility, so it seems important to me that elected mayors from across the country grasp and experience this feeling of imperialism and facilitate accordingly at least one hour of the Serbian trumpet every Sunday, after the liturgy, in the city park so that their fellow citizens feel the same way...

A similar imperialist sentiment, albeit muted in its expression, can be discerned, too, in the poem ‘Guča’ by Momčilo Šebez from Mladenovac (2005, in Tadić et al. 2010: 428):
Srpske pesme ceo svet će znati,
Srbija će u raju cvetati.
Srpska Guće, ti si znala –
Srbiju si ulepšala.

Srpska trubo, trubi jače
i nadjačaj sve trubače.

(...)

Guće mala, u cveću bila
i svetu se tako predstavila –
ceo svet će tada znati
i Srbiju poštovati.

The whole world will know the Serbian songs,
Serbia will blossom in paradise.
Thee, Serbian Guča, you knew [this] –
you’ve got Serbia beautified.
Thee, Serbian Trumpet, do trumpet more
forcefully
and overrule all other trumpeters.

(...)
Thee, petite Guća, let yourself bask in flowers
and present yourself to the world accordingly –
the whole world will then distinguish
and appreciate Serbia.

What can be inferred from these lines is clearly a sense of longing among Serbs for recognition by the (Western) world, but also for power and status. Some of the verses disclose at the same time Serbia’s imperial desire to subjugate and dominate the rest of the world, only this time by symbolic rather than by physical means, since the latter have proven to be futile (think about the cardinal Serbian defeat by the NATO air forces in 1999). In short, the imperialist and self-aggrandizing claims in Guča should be understood in light of the Serbian stigma, that is, as a cover and as a coping mechanism for a life of indignity, poverty, and chaos. As one local Guča-goer put it in a British documentary (Guća, 2006): ‘When you don’t have a good car, when you don’t have money, when you can’t live normally, these five minutes of the trumpet really mean a lot, five minutes of life!’

That the native understanding of Guča as ‘the “imperial” expression of Serbian spirit’ (Timotijević 2005:136) ultimately boils down to the country’s low self-esteem is something that Popović (2012) also underscores in his illuminating analysis of the post-2000 Serbian society. Following Moïsi’s (2009) typology of political cultures shaping the world today (namely, cultures of fear, hope, and humiliation), Popović maintains that it is the culture of humiliation that prevails in contemporary Serbia. Defined as powerlessness (i.e. as a self-perceived loss of power and control over one’s life), or as a feeling of despair combined with a longing for revenge, the notion of humiliation, in Popović’s interpretation, takes on many forms in the recent Serbian historico-political arena. Of importance for the present discussion is specifically the part of Popović’s analysis pertaining to the domestic perception of Serbian tennis superstar Novak Đoković, precisely through the humiliation lens. In his words:

Novak Đoković, a tennis ruler of the world, who is said to have conquered New York, reigned in China – he is seen as a [Serbian] vigilante on the tennis court. This is how he is perceived by the [local] audience and media, and then the latter
feeds back into Novak’s understanding of his own role and his behavior on the [tennis] court. Which in turn reinforces vengeful feelings in the audience. (Ibid.)

The quote about Đoković is indeed revealing in that it shares the same (vengeful) vocabulary as the excerpts above, taken from selected local publications and reports on Guča Festival, Serbian trumpet(ers), and Serbian culture in general.

It appears that foreign Guča visitors are fully aware of Serbian nationalism pervading the festival ground. Some judge it (see e.g. Loshkin 2012; or Prodger 2005), whereas a vast majority seem to tolerate or ignore it altogether. Consider, for instance, the following quote:

‘I knew about the wars in the Balkans but I came with an open heart and mind’, said Gunnar Ericsson, 44, from Stockholm, Sweden. ‘The shirts [with images of Karadžić and Mladić] don’t bother me’. (‘Brass band festival...’, The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, 2005.)

On that note, when asked in an interview (Aug 2013) to elaborate on his love of Serbia in greater detail, Nicolas, my Belgian Guča interlocutor and a regular visitor to Serbia since 2006, responded as follows:

I’m not sure ‘love’ is the right word. When you love someone [or something], you love everything [about them], you also love the faults. And here [in Serbia], I take what I like and ignore what I don’t like. The images of Karadžić and Mladić all around Guča are, for example, the things I choose not to see. Or if I see them, I don’t care about them, I don’t judge them.

Nicolas’s main focus is instead on Serbia’s ‘good points’. According to his testimony, these are in general all the things that strike a chord with his own self-image (cf. Laušević 2002, where it is shown that the appropriation and performance of Balkan music and dance within the small circle of USA born and bred Americans is likewise driven by deeply American values). In this perhaps inevitably selective and self-centered approach to the experience of other cultures, it becomes clear why the native enactments of nationalism in Guča carry little, if any, weight for foreign tourists. Besides, as Nicolas admits openly, ‘[i]t’s easy for me to enjoy Serbia [the way I do], because as someone living in prosperity, on a Western wage, I’ve got a choice’.

Nicolas’s friend Karl (group interview, Aug 2013) takes a slightly different view on the subject of Guča’s presumed nationalism:

It isn’t a type of nationalism one would expect to see, like that in Belgium or elsewhere. It’s more of a communitarian kind, not closed and xenophobic. I
mean, some Serbs [at Guča] clearly are [closed and xenophobic], but that’s the case in every country.

Based on my fieldwork observations, I would agree with Karl that foreign Guča-goers seemed to be ‘able to enact [the festival] rites along with the hosts in sense of notional equality’ (cf. Picard and Robinson 2006: 20). In my festival experience, social contacts between natives and foreigners were typically forged during moments of shared festive joy associated with collective rituals of dance and music listening. On occasion, however, it was hard to determine where hospitality ends and hostility begins, and vice versa. Let me illustrate the latter point using three vignettes from my fieldwork diary.

**Vignette 1** (Sat night, 10 Aug 2013): The concert of Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra is over and the Guča stadium is getting empty. My Belgian companion Karl and I get unexpectedly caught in a conversation with Dariko, a local Guča-goer standing next to us. Since Darko has no English skills whatsoever, I offer myself immediately as a channel of communication between the two men. At first, Darko wonders where Karl comes from, and mentions that everyone is welcome in Guča. But shortly after, he starts to attack my Belgian friend for not being able to speak Serbian. ‘If you’re in Serbia, you should speak Serbian, bro’, Darko explains the logic behind his accusations. Even if visibly annoyed, Karl still thinks of a reasonable way to convince him otherwise. ‘I’m just visiting here, so English should do, no!?’, Karl is trying to talk sense into Darko. What Karl probably doesn’t know is that there is a Serbian saying: ‘Speak Serbian so the whole world understands you’, which is colloquially used in both self-aggrandizing and self-ironizing ways. But right now, I’m thinking to myself: ‘My gosh, poor Darko must have taken the saying too literally’.

**Vignette 2** (Thur night, 9 Aug 2012): I’m standing at the Guča stadium with my Greek informant Giorgos, whom I met earlier through my Guča hosts. The international brass band competition is underway and Giorgos and I are trying to follow it attentively. A loud, mischievous laugh from behind us catches our attention immediately. Three drunken youngsters, emblazoned with multiple Serbian emblems, are trying to climb onto each other’s shoulders. After greeting us, they wish to interact further, but the communication flow breaks down the moment the foreigner is spotted. ‘Oh, Giorgos is from Greece’, I explain nonchalantly, which seems to be enough to have the ‘national theater’ set in motion. What I see next is perplexed Giorgos surrounded by the three blokes. They start chanting Serbia’s name repeatedly into his face, accompa-
nied, as usual, by the Serbian three-fingered salute. Then they jam a šajkača hat on his head and offer him a sip of their rakija bottle. I’m not quite sure whether what I’ve just witnessed was an act of friendship or perhaps an aggressive demonstration of power.

Vignette 3 (Wed evening, 8 Aug 2012): I’m taking a stroll along the streets of Guča when an unexpected street performance catches my eye. It is as clear as daylight to me that this group of three young performers is composed of foreigners, specifically, the type of foreign Guča-goers wearing dreadlocks and scruffy clothes – which is precisely the reason I like calling them ‘neo-hippies’. Two men playing the guitar and some sort of the goblet drum provide the instrumental accompaniment to a beautiful dark-skinned lady dancing with a clear see-through ball. However, the mesmerizing spells of the performance are at one point abruptly broken by a corpulent local passerby. Encouraged by the cheers of his two male comrades, the young Serbian man walks into the performance space and tries to take the see-through ball out of the hands of the lady-dancer. The ball eventually hits the ground, and the mischievous bloke continues to walk as if nothing happened. What on Earth was that!?, I wonder. Was he just teasing these Guča foreigners, or was he trying to tell them that they are not welcome here?

In any case, it is also worth emphasizing that there is not much evidence on the ground that native and foreign festivalgoers intermingle with one another at a more substantial level, not even in the camping area of either Guča or Exit festivals. This was at least what all of my foreign festival interlocutors confided to me. It would therefore be reasonable to hypothesize about the parallel coexistence of two different types of festival crowds and thus two different sets of Guča festival expectations – native and foreign.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the simultaneity of ‘two parallel worlds’ in Guča is duly reflected in the workings of WM practices. A tendency towards the essentialization of ethnicity / cultural difference is definitely a commonplace for WM practices, where it has been exercised by both insiders, ‘who might view music as an incarnation of the national being’, and by Westerners, who tend to ‘attribute the “exotic” quality to “native” musical cultures’ (Nenić 2006b: n.p.). This should come as no surprise, ‘given that the categories of “nationalist” / folk-inspired music, on the one hand, and “exotic” music, on the other, display certain inherent similarities’ (see Locke 2009: 27). The Serbian brass band tradition promoted at Guča has indeed turned into one of the most emblematic forms of Serbian national culture (see 4.5 and 5.4.1). Not only is this music said to have the expressive power to capture and narrate the heroic history and collective character of the Serb nation. Moreover, the
Serbian brass is deemed, especially by nationalists, to be more authentic and natural than any other, ‘because it is [allegedly] nourished by sources to which no other nation has access’ (cf. Radano and Bohlman 2000: 29). Conversely, the Serbian/Balkan brass is packaged for foreigners as an ‘exotic’ WM product. Here the term exotic denotes any music ‘coming from (or referring to, or evoking) a place other than here’ (Locke 2009: 1). Widespread global interest in Serbian/Balkan brass bands represents therefore an integral part of the wider postmodern search for ‘natural’ musicians and musics that are largely seen as existing outside historic time (see Radano and Bohlman 2000: 29–30). As Brusila (2003: 165) writes, ‘[t]he expectations of the audience, for whom the world music artist signifies Otherness, are underpinned by the idea of an unchanged essence of other cultures, in which notions of place, ethnic groupings and music are combined’.138

More to the point, what counts as the exoticism of Balkan music as a whole seems to be applicable to the Serbian brass, too. Silverman (2012: 245) specifically argues that

in the Balkans exoticism is coded as ‘oriental’ or eastern (Turkish and Middle Eastern), and marked by scales and rhythmic patterns that are associated with the East, Gypsies, sex, and passion. These elements of musical style and text have been appropriated by non-Roma and are now widespread in pop and fusion styles such as chalga in Bulgaria and mane le in Romania.

Let me add that the same kind of Balkan exoticism can also be found in Serbian TF or in musical constructions of the Balkans in Bregović’s songs (see Marković 2013). That said, it may be still necessary to draw a distinction between TF and Serbian WM / Balkan Beat because of a different aesthetic value that is bestowed on each by foreigners. Consider below several scraps of evidence, both media-derived and ethnographic, illustrating the great popularity of Dejan Petrović Big Band as well as Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra among foreign Guča-goers. To start with, a local daily newspaper publishes the comment by Italian festival visitor Marco (in Bojović 2012 b: 30): ‘I like what Dejan Petrović does. I recognize sounds of international hits but colored at the same time by the distinctive charm of this region’. A similar opinion is also voiced in a domestic online forum:

If there’s anything that foreigners go nuts about, it is exactly the [brass band] covers of well-known [international / Western] hits. If you ever bothered to actually watch the [Guča] show, [you’d know that]. Many [Serbian] brass bands

138 From a critical perspective, the WM label arguably segregates racialized and exoticized WM practices from the prestigious world of Anglo-Western pop, so that the hegemony of the latter can be reasserted (see Byrne, in Locke 2009: 307; or Guilbault 2006).
began to play covers in the showcase part of the festival night program as early as seven or eight years ago. So it’s not happening for the first time, nor was it Dejan who thought of it first. But of course, kudos to the mastery of his trumpet playing! (Saša, in Bojović 2012a [comments].)

My Belgian-Spanish Guča festival interlocutors (group interview, Aug 2013) spoke along the same lines about their musical preferences:

**Nicolas**: I came here for traditional and WM stuff, since I’m a fan of brass bands. In my view, this is authentic music.

**David**: It’s authentic, but not traditional. It’s a sort of new tradition. When you think about tradition, you think about old things. But tradition evolves and so does Serbian brass music. It’s original in that sense.

**Nicolas**: Take [the hit number] ‘Šljivovica’ by the Markovićs as an example. It sounds like the old-school brass but infused with modern elements, both in music and lyrics.

It is a truism that in WM discourse, ‘[n]o one really denies the transnational mix’, as Radano and Bohlman (2000: 36) put it succinctly. Nor does anyone deny that pastiche and ‘a musical language of hybridity’ have long been considered new markers of authenticity (see Brusila 2003: 17–18). Moreover, according to Brusila, the WM ‘consumer ... is looking for the stereotypical image of difference, which the listener has learnt to identify as the exotic’ (ibid., 177). This typically results in ‘a simultaneous demand for both “accessibility” and “authenticity”’ (ibid., 157), that is, in search for ‘different yet familiar music’ (ibid., 138). (For the same argument, see also Bellman 1998 and Locke 2008, both in Marković 2013: 216.)

Apparently, the Markovićs broke into the transnational WM scene once they began to apply the same formula to their music. As Bojan Đorđević, their long-term manager (from 1999 to 2013), discloses in an interview (Sep 2014), it was around 2011 when Marko Marković picked up from DJ Shantel, Fanfare Ciocărlia (Romania’s Romani brass band), and Ninoslav and Alen Ademović (Bregović’s in-house musicians) that he should likewise simplify the tunes and adjust them to the Western ear. Once the Markovićs brought their music closer to a mainstream pop style, they began receiving a greater share of international attention.

It goes without saying that that the international success and popularity of the Markovićs (or Goran Bregović for that matter) incited many other Serbian brass bands to follow in their musical footsteps. This is the reason why some of my fieldwork interlocutors asserted that ‘Serbian trumpet music is struggling with copycat
issues. Everyone wants to sound like the Markovićs’ (interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014); or that ‘[i]t’s a pity that a lot of [Guča] brass bands play the same music’ (Nicolas, group interview, Aug 2013); or that the festival and its musical offer are too modern, too commercial, and of poor quality in street performances. Paz, a Chilean female musician playing a bass drum in an international Balkan music band, asserted specifically that she would actually learn more about Serbia’s Romani brass outside the festival context (Guča fieldwork diary, 10 Aug 2012).

Notwithstanding these critical comments, my participant observation at Guča 2012 and 2013 confirms that the atmosphere at the Guča stadium was liveliest during the concerts of Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra and DJ Shantel & Bucovina Club Orkestar. By contrast, the stadium was half-empty when the Serbian brass band competition was on. I was admittedly surprised at the low number of spectators, as well as at their mild response to the live sound of the traditional Serbian brass. Significantly, renowned Serbian trumpet player Lazarević (in Petrović 2013b: 8) shares the same perception of the situation on the ground:

By the mid-1990s, people were coming to Guča because of the brass band competition. The stadium was full. People were politely sitting or standing around, applauding. At the Guča trumpet contest today, 70% of people have no idea what is going on on that stage. The festival visitors are foreigners, many of our youngsters, to whom the only thing that matters is some rumble and noise. Sure they make a great atmosphere, I cannot say otherwise!

Or as my Belgian interlocutor Nicolas (group interview, Aug 2013) observed, ‘I saw few people at the [competition] finals, but when [a] shitty TF [concert] starts, the stadium is full. Perhaps the tradition is not really at the heart of the people coming over here’.

The case of Serbian TF is indeed a telling one with respect to the musical preferences of the foreign festival crowd. Closely linked to this is also the question of whether TF can be regarded as a legitimate form of Serbian WM – a question that remains controversial in local intellectual discourse (see, e.g., Dimitrijević 2002; Ćirjaković 2004; Nenić 2010). However, I would agree with Vidić Rasmussen (2007: 89) that

[TF] is clearly not a ‘global’ style, if only because it lacks that distribution niche in Western transnational markets which would translate localness into worldly relevance. But even as a singularly Balkan style, it operates on already tested precepts of ethnopop globalization: manipulating myriad local sources and those of a few selected Mediterranean locales, appealing to a larger Balkan home, and rejuvenating its modernity by co-opting the latest from the West.
Indeed, ethnographic evidence from Guča (and elsewhere) shows (1) that the blossoming of TF music continues at both local and intraregional levels as well as among Serbian / ex-Yugoslav diaspora communities; and, relatedly, (2) that foreign Guča-goers are not really fond of it. I illustrate the latter point with a couple of quotations collected during my festival fieldwork. One explanation I heard was that ‘[TF] music doesn’t really speak to the heart’ (Italian Guča-goer Giuseppe, fieldwork diary, Aug 2012). Another was that ‘TF is ugly funny. It’s kitsch but without any exotic appeal. It’s ok to listen and dance to it for fun, but it’s definitely not something worth collecting and bringing home for aesthetic appreciation’. (Belgian-Spanish Guča visitor Bibiana, group interview, Aug 2013.)

The claimed distinction between Serbian WM and TF also makes sense when one considers the general descriptions of foreign Guča visitors in the local media:

Groups of long-haired boys and unusually dressed girls imitating circus acrobatics have been the biggest attraction at Guča Festival. (Timotijević 2005: 138.)

No one was counting, but in the past three or four festival years, Guča saw more teenage punkers from all around the world than the Šumadija and Zlatibor peasants. (Tmušić 2011, in ‘More punkers than peasants’, Danas: Guča 52, 2012: 6.)

Boban and his son Marko are popular with both rockers and ravers, but also with those who appreciate regional musical forms. (Đurić 2011.)

In fact, there seems to be a broad consensus on what sort of (Western) crowd is likely to be drawn to WM events and practices. Members of the WM audience appear to belong predominantly to the white, well-educated, middle classes, specifically students and middle-aged people with a special interest in alternative music and different musical cultures (Brusila 2003: 77–78; Silverman 2012: 223; interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014). Ideologically, WM fans are typically associated with the liberal-progressive thinking of ‘the Left’s intellectual elite’ and their multi-culti and antiracist rhetoric (interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014). As Brusila (2003: 50) further specifies, it is the interrelated discourses of ethnomusicology, the folk music movement, and rock culture that constitute the ideological background of WM practices.

Much of folk ideology rests on the countercultural values of hippiedom, such as authenticity, multiculturalism, international solidarity, anticapitalism, a back-to-the-land green ethos, and so on. The ultimate embodiment of this ideology is, arguably, a particular type of foreign Guča-goer that I was able to detect on the ground. Namely, during my festival fieldwork in 2012 and 2013, I had the opportunity to observe and interact with foreign men and women in scruffy clothes or colorful outfits in a
wannabe Gypsy style, with dreadlocks or stylized turbans on their heads, some of them walking around barefoot or juggling (fire) balls – in a word, with people resembling hippies and New Age travelers. Back then, I could also eyewitness the enthusiastic attempts of foreigners to interact with Romanies, in particular with youngsters and elders, begging or entertaining festival visitors for money in the Guča streets. This should not really come as a surprise if one recalls that popular conceptions of the ‘Gypsy’ image and lifestyle have long been replicated by Western artists and poor students (see Locke 2009: 155). Moreover, as Martin (2014: 95) points out, the free festivals associated with New Age travelers, notably during the 1980s, continued to cultivate the ideals of the Albion Fairs, including ‘the initial connection with gypsies’. And the fact that ‘Romani musicians have recently become hip images for Hollywood stars and the fashion industry’ (Silverman 2012: 254), might also have contributed to the ongoing Western fascination with Romanies in Guča and elsewhere.

By the same token, many among later rockers and punkers made a stylistic shift to WM, partly because of the conservative political context of the 1980s, and partly because rock and WM share a similar ideological foundation, specifically ‘the (...) values of “authenticity”, “locality” and “independent artistry”’ (Brusila 2003: 54). According to Đorđević (interview, Sep 2014), ‘[r]ockers are a highly visible segment of the WM audience, whereas ethno-jazz aficionados remain in the background. But it’s totally true that Balkan Beat is received exceptionally well at rock festivals. (...) The Markovićs certainly have that raw rock energy’. Not only is there substantial ethnographic evidence corroborating that rockers, punkers, and metalheads can be seen in situ. I also bore witness to a booze- and mud-fuelled frenzy occurring in the crowd during the concert of Boban & Marko Marković Orchestra at the Guča stadium on August 10, 2013 – a familiar male-dominated spectacle associated with any rock festival since Woodstock. In my experience, there was something enchanting and repellent at the same time in watching half-naked men in front of the concert stage jostling around a mud puddle formed by a summer shower.

At any rate, foreign Guča visitors are more or less likely to be perceived negatively by the host population, depending, of course, on the cultural group they happen to belong to. The Guča local Miško confessed to me in a short interview (July 2012): ‘It saddens me that every year more and more vagrants with permed hairstyles [neo-hippies with dreadlocks] frequent the festival’ (emphasis added). Another set of negative remarks I heard from locals relate to the familiar discursive trope of a dirty foreigner. For example, a young local working in the Guča parking lot explained to me that his parents are renting camping space in the yard of their house ‘to all campers except the French’. When asked, ‘And why not to the French?’, he simply replied, ‘Because they are dirty and sloppy’. (Fieldnotes, 6 Aug 2013.) On another occasion, while observing a cheerful group of young foreign festivalgoers in a Guča café, I
was told by another onlooker, a youngish blonde from the nearby town of Arilje, that ‘foreigners stink’ – a statement clearly echoing a stereotypical image of dreadlockers and hippies (fieldnotes, 6 Aug 2012).\(^\text{139}\)

The implied juxtaposition of ‘clean us’ and ‘dirty them’ comes more clearly to the fore in the following exchange of comments in a domestic online forum:

‘[Four French] campers are taking a bath down the river [Bjelica]. (...) They took out soaps and shampoos, bubbles rise from all sides, whilst they are splashing about and singing [Bregović’s hit song] in charmingly broken Serbian: “Mesečina, mesečina, joj, joj, joj, joj / Moonlight, moonlight, oh, oh, oh, oh...”’ I am speechless. Who gives them the right to pollute our rivers with soap and shampoo!? (Milanka, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

Sure, these few Frenchmen would cause a natural disaster in Serbia, whereas we’re all a bunch of fine, sincere neatniks regularly cleaning Serbia, which is the real mirror of cleanliness. (...) God knows how many bottles and other articles end up in the river during that Guča [festival], and all this thrown away by us, local visitors? (Hahhaha, in Milojković and Bojović 2012d [comments].)

It is clear, then, that the alleged pollution of Serbian land by foreigners is not only of material but also of symbolic nature, adding therefore a moral tint to the clean-dirty binary. The latter should be linked to either colonial or nationalist discourses, where the notions of dirt and dirtiness are typically associated with the Other and seen ‘as symbolic of some inner depravity’ (cf. Cohen 1980: 14; see also 3.2.2). Similar observations on the clean-dirty and pure-impure antinomies surrounding Guča have also been made by Lukić-Krstanović (2006). In her words,

Guča Festival and [Serbian] trumpet culture are becoming (...) a bone of contention between two streams: ‘clean Guča’ and ‘dirty Guča’. The popularization of the event, the town, [and] the region, with massive attendance and tourist pilgrimages, brings about contradictions. The community of life and the community of festivity are at odds with one another concerning the ethical principles of ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’, native and foreign. (Ibid., 184.)

In summary, the above overview of the structure and native perception of foreign Guča visitors was intended to fulfill two functions: (1) to illustrate the ways in which

\(^{139}\) According to surveys conducted by the Novi Sad TIM Centar (2007–2009), between 10% and 20% of the residents surveyed likewise held a negative view of foreign Exit-goers, especially of British ones, characterizing them as dirty, arrogant, crass, crude, and thus disrespectful of Exit Festival, its host city, and local residents.
the nationalism of native Guča right-wingers is juxtaposed with the cosmopolitanism of foreign Guča left-wingers; and (2) to emphasize the existing ambiguities between hospitality and hostility in Guča – or what Derrida famously called hostipitality – that continues to linger even after foreign visitors have been welcomed and admitted to the host’s space. However, it should go without saying that the purported division of native and foreign Guča audiences along the nationalism-cosmopolitanism opposition is inevitably too simplistic. To suggest, specifically, that Serbian nationalism qualifies as an absolute model of identification for local festivalgoers is simply misleading. What is rather at stake are a number of alternative subject positions inverting or undermining the fault line between (Western) Europe and the Balkans, thus complicating further the notions of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. I therefore conclude the present discussion by briefly hypothesizing about several such positions on the basis of relevant findings from comparable cultural studies on Serbia and the Balkans more generally.

In light of what has been said above about local approaches to WM discourse and practice (see 3.2.5), it is safe to assume that among local Guča-goers there are certainly those consuming and evaluating Serbian brass music in the same way Westerners do: they approach to their own musical culture as if it was coming from elsewhere. In doing so, local Guča-goers are able to appreciate Serbian brass band tradition as a transnational WM product and validate their cosmopolitan outlook accordingly (cf. Ćolović 2006b; Jansen 2001: 60). Another group of local Guča visitors are likely to acknowledge internal contradictions in each member of the West-East binary, thus negotiating between these two poles and embracing Serbia’s in-between status (cf. Jansen 2001: 65–67). Highly likely within this horizon of thinking are also the affirmative views of intercultural mixing in the Balkans, which are fully in line with the main hypothesis of the edited volume Balkan Popular Culture and the Ottoman Ecumene (Buchanan ed. 2007). For example, Stokes (2007) writes about recent musical forms of cosmopolitan imaginary across the Balkans that emerged after the fall of communism. He specifically asserts that emergent musical cosmopolitanism in the region arises from ‘a shared Ottoman past as the basis for a shared musical conversation’, despite the fact that such collaborative projects are largely intended for local rather than pan-regional consumption (ibid., 309–310). Even though Guča does not promote this kind of collaborations, its music-cultural offer can be read from the same perspective – as a manifestation of Balkan musical cosmopolitanism which sees in the region’s liminal nature and hybrid crossovers of Western and Eastern cultural signifiers not only an inexhaustible source of creativity but also a powerful strategy in articulations of Serbia’s contemporary national identity.
5.4.3 Serbia’s Ethnic (Self-)Stereotypes and Myths

Ethnic (self-)stereotypes and myths play an important role in defining the Self and the Other, but in ways that are inevitably reductionist, ideologically motivated, and ethically questionable (see e.g. Bakić 1999; Marković 2013; Pickering 2001). This is precisely why related issues of the representation of difference and Otherness have long become central political concerns within the humanities and social sciences (see Marković 2002: 8–9). By the same token, Serbia’s ethnic (self-)stereotypes and myths surrounding Exit and Guča are worth exploring further for at least two reasons. The first is obviously to delve deeper into the question of Serbia’s national identity representation in two Serbian festivals. And the second is to show that the ethnic (self-)stereotypes and myths associated with each festival not only cut across the West-East divide, but that they are also open to contradictory interpretations. Note in addition that the categories of ethnic stereotypes and national myths are used interchangeably in the analysis below, insofar as both entail ‘popular expectations and conceptions of reality’, regardless of whether they are true or not (cf. Naumović 2005: 66). Common to both categories is also the perpetual reproduction of an inflexible, inaccurate, and standardized image of the ethnic group in question in a way which already fits with popular preconceptions (cf. Pickering 2001: 3–4).

Central to the reproduction of Serbia’s ethnic (self-)stereotypes and myths is arguably the resilient Balkan trope that places the whole region outside historical time and portrays it as ‘suffering from a congenital, immutable defectiveness’ (Marković 2013: 45–46). The resilience of the Balkan trope is not simply owing to the repetitiveness of the latter. More importantly, it is ‘the fixity of the colonial discourse’ that reinforces and cements the perceived Balkan / Serbian Otherness (see e.g. Marković 2013; Said 2003; Todorova 1997). Viewed in this light, the Guča construct of madness analyzed above falls perfectly into the tainted Balkan / Serbian image as a powder keg exploding into, or lingering on the brink of, interethnic violence. Coupled with the Exit construct of normality, Serbia’s ethnic (self-)stereotype of madness clearly reflects the wider Balkanist discourse on Serbia’s indeterminate position between the West and the East.

In general, ethnic (self-)stereotypes about the Serbs seem to be based on the idea of Serbia’s civilizational difference from the West. Beside the Balkanist discourse, such conceptions draw on the combination of other historico-cultural sources, such as: (1) ‘the racial notion of “Slav-dom” [accompanied] with the … historical destiny of “slave-dom”’ (Longinović 2000: 622); then (2) the affiliation of the Serbs with Byzantine culture and Eastern Orthodoxy; and (3) Serbia’s totalitarian heritage of the Cold War and Milošević eras (see Bakić 1999: 30). With all these underlying sources in mind, the focus in the following analysis is on both emic and etic understandings of selected ethnic stereotypes and myths about the Serbs surrounding Exit and Guča, as well as on their place within the transnational symbolic geography. Ad-
dressed are specifically such notions as Serbian hospitality, victimhood, freedom, machismo, and disunity.

One of the most widespread (self-)stereotypes about the Serbs is that of ‘hospitality’, portraying the nation as generally warm, kind, sociable, generous, and welcoming (cf. Popadić and Biro 1999: 93). The institution of the Serbian host, be it related to family, nation, or any other type of social groupings, forms part of such (self-)stereotyping and is indicative of the society’s deeply patriarchal origins. This is especially evident in Guča, where the institution of the festival host seems to replicate the organicist conception of the nation as a family writ large (see 4.1). Assigned to selected representatives of Serbia’s political, cultural, or economic elites, the role of the Guča host arguably performs two main functions: nationalist and demagogic. In the first case, the festival host participates in the social reproduction of Guča organic space by evoking the original patriarchal sentiment and a sense of organic collectivity associated with his hosting role. The demagogic function of the Guča host is, on the other hand, reflected in strong political ties between festival organizers and influential Serbian politicians, both of whom claim to represent ‘the people’ when in fact each group follows their own particularistic interests. In consequence, the representation of Serbian hospitality in Guča by festival producers does not go beyond the scope of its traditionally conservative, male-dominated, and Oriental implications.

Local media outlets routinely report on Serbian hospitality and associated virtues in Guča (such as Serbian kindness, soulfulness, easygoingness, and generosity bordering on reckless spending), which only enhances the sentiment of national self-glorification. Such statements seem to carry more weight if they are made by Significant European Others, or if they are contrasted with the implicit Occidentalist critique of Western stringency, prudence, penny pinching, alienation, insincerity, and the like (cf. Radović 2007: 52–54). Below are a couple of excerpts from selected media reports illustrating the said dynamic between Serbia’s self-Orientalizing and Occidentalist discursive strategies:

Milutin Davinić and his wife, Frau Irena, on roller skates, regular visitors of Guča Festival for fifteen years now, have become the face of this famous festival. (...) And the fact that she is a German, a member of the nation that knows only work and discipline, whereas here in Guča everything is the opposite, does not really matter to her. ‘A little bit of chaos, why not! I don’t mind this relaxed attitude, not at all. Guča has a big, open heart, this good, great nation likes foreigners, likes guests, no one here bothers anyone’, says Irena. (Šaponjić 2013; emphases added.)
Petr and Diana have arrived in Guča by bike from the Czech Republic. (…) ‘The two of us go to many festivals in Europe, but Guča differs from everything. People here are different, you [Serbs] are hospitable, you like visitors…’, says Diana. (…) ‘In Serbia, we slept in the homes of random people. We stopped to ask them for water, but they invited us into their home, they gave us food and shelter. They refused to take any money for it…’, Petr recounts enthusiastically. (Milojković and Bojović 2013c.)

In foreign media reports on Guča, Serbian hospitality is equally praised but often against the backdrop of the Serbian stigma earned in the former Yugoslav wars. For example, partaking in the BBC radio program on Guča, BBC correspondent Allan Little (in Serbian Trumpets, 2010) speaks about the Serb nation as follows:

This is a very big-hearted culture, this is a very big-hearted nation. You are smothered in hospitality. They’re warm, they’re generous, they want you to accept their hospitality, they want you to like them, they want you to understand them. This is my experience of the Serbs everywhere, in Serbia, in Bosnia, in Croatia. Even at the time when the greatest cruelties were being perpetuated, either in their name, or indeed by them, there was this other side that was prevalent – this hospitality.

Despite (or precisely because of) its pro-Western outlook, Exit Festival likewise boasts about Serbian hospitality, which is by definition evocative of the Balkans / East (cf. Buchanan 2006: 71). It is specifically the ‘hosting team’ that represents an integral part of the Exit organizational structure, and that caters to the needs of festival performers and visitors during their entire stay at the festival. To paraphrase Exit co-founder and current CEO Kovačević (in Milović Buha 2008), an interaction with members of the Exit hosting team is considered by festival guests as something unique that can be experienced nowhere in the West, and it has developed into another distinct Exit-related brand.

In media reviews of Exit, the perceived Serbian hospitality and sociability are hailed with similar enthusiasm, both nationally and internationally. Festivalgoer Rachel Lough from Bristol acknowledges, indeed, that ‘[p]eople who live here are very sociable’ (Blic Extra: EXIT festival, 2007: 86). German DJ and journalist under the alias of killerPOKE (2003) writes in like manner: ‘For a foreigner the [Exit] festival was about the friendliest thing you can imagine – I have never been welcomed that warmly and felt to be a part of the whole in such a short time before’. Closely linked to this are also many Exit-produced stories about the special energy of the festival, which apparently compels Exit guests not only to prolong their stay at the Fortress but also to labor voluntarily beyond the originally agreed time. According to Kova-
čević’s (in Kojić 2016: 3) testimony, Sonny John Moore aka Skrillex rearranged his travel plans at his own expense and spent two more days at the Fortress when confronted with the extraordinary energy of Exit Dance Arena. As the story goes, he even closed the festival with a free DJ set, much to the surprise and pleasure of the present audience. In another interview (by Milović Buha 2008), Kovačević similarly recalls how Roni Size was so carried away by the enthusiastic response of the audience (at Exit 2001) that he extended his stage performance from planned two to more than four hours. It seems, then, that in Exit-related narratives, the institution of the Serbian host is divorced from its original patriarchal sources, but not from its Balkan / Eastern associations. Moreover, the latter is considered desirable, especially when it serves the festival’s self-promotional interests. The following mission statement of Exit Festival: ‘Our ambition is to help the Balkans become the Latin America of Europe’ (Kovačević, in Milović Buha 2008), should be read precisely in this light.

Thus, despite its differing semantic inflections in each festival, the (self-)stereotype of Serbian hospitality appears to be equally exploited by both Exit and Guča producers. The same (self-)perception of the Serbs prevails among Exit and Guča festivalgoers too, specifically those that I had a chance to interact with during my fieldwork at each festival. But once again, it was my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors at Guča 2013 that paid more analytical attention to this phenomenon. In Bibiana’s view, the Serbs tend to overdo their hospitable attentions because they may not be used to commercial exchange. In her words:

> We’ve been to Asia, Japan, and over there you rent a house, pay the money, and that’s it. That’s all you get. But here [in Guča], our hosts come to make us coffee and offer food. They are indeed very generous. They are happy when we are happy. We’ve even played with the boy [the son of their Guča landlord] who hangs around and takes care of our needs. (...) It’s more than a simple money exchange.

By this reasoning, Serbia seems to belong to a group of premodern societies, ‘unspoiled’ by impersonal commercial relations and as such ‘lagging behind’ both its Western and Eastern counterparts. Alternatively, my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors suggested that the Serbs are overdoing their hosting service so as to compensate for their Balkan/Serbian stigma. To quote Bibiana once again, ‘[the Serbs] are trying to impress us [foreigners] with their hospitality, because they are concerned about Serbia’s negative image in the international media’. Finally, by comparing their stories and experiences of Serbian hospitality from both Exit and Guča, my interlocutors agreed that this pattern of behavior not only cuts across the country’s urban-rural and North-South divisions – namely, instances of incredible generosity of the locals have been pointed out in relation to each festival location. Moreover, there is persuasive
ethnographic evidence, based on my own and other local people’s experiences of either festival, that Serbian hospitality also cuts across the native-foreign distinction among Exit- and Guča-goers. This insight made my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors go so far as to view hospitality as an innately Serbian quality.

Another ethnic self-stereotype about the Serbs that Exit and Guča have in common is that of victimhood and underdog mentality. Recurring in the narratives of festival producers is indeed the idea that Serbia’s centuries-old tragic destiny is precisely what has made the Serbs exceptional (see Milosavljević 2002: 132–138). Importantly, however, the assumptions underlying the self-stereotype of Serbian victimhood differ significantly in each festival, not unlike in the case of Serbian hospitality.

Indicated in the Guča nationalist discourse is that Serbia and its people continue to be imperiled by other nations’ attempts at suppression. The myth of Serbian victimization is used accordingly as part of the nationalist rhetorical arsenal to glorify the national history and culture (see Chapter 4.1 and 5.4.2). Conversely, the Exit oppositional discourse, standing fiercely against Serbia’s recent warmongering past and its recurrent nationalist and xenophobic aspirations, emphasizes the victimization and oppression of Serbia’s self-identified urbanites and cosmopolitans at the hands of the ruling nationalist regime (cf. Bieber 2002: 105). Either way, the self-stereotype of Serbian victimhood reveals itself in the Exit and Guča self-narration through the characterization of toughness that comes along with the collective experience of adversity and oppression.\footnote{This is clearly one way to authenticate the collective identity and experience of social groups with a fundamentally underdog mentality – as is the case with Finnish sisu [perseverance], or with the working-class ethos of northerners in Britain.} Given that each group in question feels hard done-by for one reason or another, any such expression of toughness should be understood in the light of Serbian victimization. Emphasized specifically in the Exit self-narration is what Živković (2001: 86) calls a ‘Turkish stake’ (a reference to impalement as a brutal form of execution performed by Ottomans) to designate the victim’s ‘claim to wisdom originating from the[ir] agony and moral superiority’. The implication of such an ethnic self-characterization can be grasped in the following statement by Exit associate Rajko Božić (The States of Exit, 2012):

> I’m quite sure that somebody facing difficulties on this scale in the Netherlands, in the UK, the US, or in Sweden for that matter, would abandon this festival after four years, and we’re still doing it. Probably these unrealistic expectations to make your dream here and now, it’s [sic!] a result of the war years we lived.

Thus, even though different in its semantic form and substance, the self-stereotype of Serbian victimhood in Exit and Guča can once again be said to perform the same compensatory work with respect to Serbia’s tribal stigma. Analyzing selected Serbi-
an neo-folk songs of the 1990s, Longinović (2000) reaches a similar conclusion. In his words, ‘a culture nurtured on stories of racial and historical victimization can easily transform their status of “international pariah” into a position of “superhuman” strength’ (ibid., 637).

The (self-)stereotype of Serbian freedom is yet another trope that is commonly associated with Exit and Guča. Specifically, in both emic and etic discourses surrounding the two festivals, one can easily distinguish an (self-)Orientalizing approach to Serbia as a promised land of unrestrained freedom. Complementary to such views are, unsurprisingly, common imaginings of the West as overregulated and prudent. This is all the more curious if one considers that in some Serbian (and otherwise) Occidentalist discourses, the West actually occupies an unmatched first place as the main source of liberal freedoms, moral nihilism, and ultimate decadence; or that festivities all around the world are universally marked by liminal experience and a heightened sense of freedom. And yet, Milan Ristić, president of Belgrade-based advertising agency Profile hired by Guča Festival to develop the ‘Guča brand’, used the Orientalized ideas of Serbian freedom when speaking at the 2013 Exit conference Rebranding Serbia about Serbian music festivals as one of the country’s biggest brands. He specifically asserted that ‘global society is in dire need of freedom’, which is why people from all around the world come to Exit and Guča – ‘the symbols of freedom par excellence’ (ibid.).

The notion of Serbian freedom that Exit and Guča are said to embody is arguably composed of several semantic layers. In one interpretation, for example, freedom in Guča amounts to the festival’s capacity to mirror and bring out thoughts, feelings, and drives that are otherwise denied and repressed in everyday life. As written in one popular publication on Guča Festival (Bogovac 2007: 122),

‘Guča’ is freedom! It is there that the shackles of pharisaic rules are thrown off, that the trappings of false decency and moralism are discarded; it is there that one’s hidden desires are made known and dominant, that every man discloses his nature.

Such an understanding of Guča is clearly not far from Žižek’s psychoanalytic reading of Andrei Tarkovsky’s movie Solaris (in ‘The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema’, Bean-Hu’s Blog, 2009), where this newly discovered planet called Solaris functions comparably as an ‘Id-Machine’, a mechanism that instantly materializes fantasies of the subconscious mind.

The idea of Serbian freedom is, however, more frequently linked to the experience of each festival as a place with no or few rules, or simply lacking the general will to follow previously established rules. As my Belgian-Spanish interlocutor David made it clear in a group interview (Aug 2013), ‘In Guča, unlike Spain, there are
no rules, at least no visible ones. It’s liberating, a sort of order in the chaos. People seem to respect each other... There is no aggression you’d expect to see at a place with so much alcohol involved’. In contrast to David’s perception of Guča freedom as a sort of organized chaos, other festival commentators, be they natives or foreigners, tend to see Serbian freedom as reckless hedonism and the modes of behavior seemingly shocking to European sensibilities. One such comment reads as follows:

Festival in Guča should rumble, roar and grind for thirty days and nights so that everyone has time to see, experience and feel what Serbia is. This is Serbian freedom! Things happening in Guča are not allowed in Europe and America – there would be otherwise twenty thousand police officers and cameras on all sides. Serbian freedom is unique and can be found nowhere else in the world. Imagine that the police come to you and say – put out cigarettes, don’t drink beer, watch the fats you eat, shagging and bare asses are prohibited. Hence Europe and the world can only dream of man’s freedom. Serbia is a free soul, can’t you hear now the trumpets in your ears and [the buzz of] Kalashnikov bullets passing close by? (Ivan, student at a U.S. university, ‘Guča for all time’, 2011: 3; emphasis added.)

The quote above calls to mind one particularly detrimental type of freedom exercised in the contemporary world that Žižek warns about in his speech on the topic (What is freedom today?, 2014). Namely, having talked to some Serbian nationalists in the late 1990s, Žižek became aware of the close links between nationalist ideology and the (Serbian) idea of freedom to ethnically cleanse, rape, smoke, eat unhealthy food – in a word, to be able to behave against the perceived Western imposition of countless regulations and prohibitions.

On a lighter note, for my Spanish-Belgian interviewee Bibiana (Aug 2013), contributing to a sense of freedom in Guča is a truly carnivalesque experience of Serbian brass bands playing freely in the streets of the village. To her mind, this stands in sharp contrast to staged performances of Balkan brass bands at comparable events she has attended in the West. Cartwright (2009) for his part adds to this picture a further note on Serbian freedom:

Guca Festival has no curfew, few rules and a real sense of bacchanalia as hundreds of musicians blast exotic eastern funk while everyone dances until they drop. I used to attend illegal raves in the 90s, parties held in open fields or deserted factories, but they were no match for Guca. The energy, the joy, the sheer gonzo exuberance that overtakes this hamlet across the weekend, is incomparable. Dancers leap on tables, jump off statues, bounce off walls, belly dancing to
hard zigzagging rhythms, achieving ecstasy via neatly dressed brass orchestras and copious supplies of beer and meat.

In the case of Exit Festival, Serbian freedom is likewise measured against the widely accepted image of the orderly and rule-obsessed West. For example, my American interlocutor Gab (interview, July 2012) reminisced about a zip line stretching over Petrovaradin Fortress as the highlight of his Exit experience: ‘You never see anything like that in the U.S. because of liability. (...) And I was shocked that [the Exit staff] would let us go up there. I could’ve fallen off the hook [laughing], I was so drunk’. The perceived lack of strict regulation in Serbia and/or an incapacity of Serbian people to adhere to them is also something that Swiss Italian Exit-goer Fabio brought up during our interview (July 2013). Sharing his first impressions of Serbia, he recounted the following anecdote with a conspiratorial smile on his face: ‘Upon our arrival in Serbia, we took a taxi. There was a “No Smoking” sign displayed in the cab, but the next thing we heard was a taxi driver offering us a cigarette’.

Furthermore, there are several other factors consolidating the stereotype of Serbian freedom in the minds of many foreign festivalgoers I was interacting with on the ground. On numerous occasions, they pointed out that Exit and Guča are untypically integrated into their respective host locations. Some of them gaped in astonishment as they wondered how the local population can put up with a sudden influx of people and the environmental pollution caused by festivities. Another factor that my foreign Exit and Guča interlocutors found liberating are late working hours of both festivals (see also Cartwright’s quote above). As American Exit-goer Jesse (interview, July 2012) put it to me:

I can stay here as late as I want. And that feeling you get at four or five o’clock in the morning, it is an out-of-body experience. I remember I was on my feet, and there was a lot of substance ingestion, but that’s it, it’s still 4 am and you are gonna get that memorable experience if you are still up doing it. Other festivals that I was doing were pretty much day-time experiences.

If this connotation of Serbian freedom is fully applicable to Exit (namely, the Fortress closes at 7 am and then an electronic after-party continues in the festival camping area), this is no longer the case with Guča. The carousing therein is over at two or three o’clock in the morning so that trash can be collected before the next festival day begins (see Tadić, in Petrović 2010c: 10). The only exception to this is the kafana ‘Lav / Lion’ (named after a Serbian beer brand), a terraced hillside bar-restaurant overlooking the Guča stadium and hosting late-night sets of renowned Serbian brass bands.
At the same time, it is the outsider’s perception of festival security measures that most strongly contests the image of Serbia as a place of unbridled freedom. My Guča interlocutor David (group interview, Aug 2013) observed, for instance: ‘It’s true that there are more police here than at Spanish festivals, but at least they’re friendly’. While the heavy presence of police at Guča was thus acknowledged, but with no judgmental undertones, this turned out to be one of the hottest discussion topics for my Swiss fellow festivalgoers at Exit 2013. They confessed that they were shocked at particularly harsh security measures at the Fortress, and that ‘Serbian cops look very scary and unkind’ (Roger).141 At Swiss music festivals, by contrast, ‘you don’t really see police. They are of course there, but invisible’ (Flo). Moreover, my Swiss interviewees asserted that their music festivals are so liberal that ‘you can walk around with a joint in your hand’ (Roger), or ‘ask a security member for cigarette papers to roll a joint’ (Martin). And at Exit, ‘real police officers are patrolling around with guns’ (Flo). That’s why ‘it feels a bit more oppressive’ (Martin). It goes without saying that negative preconceptions about Serbia, and the Balkans more generally, were brought into play the moment my Swiss interlocutors began to speculate about the reasons behind such a heavy presence of police at Exit. Perhaps this is ‘because it’s more dangerous and risky to stage a festival in Serbia than in Switzerland’ (Flo). In Roger’s opinion, the festival’s heavy security perhaps has something to do with ‘the generally poor state of human rights in the country’. Then again, my Swiss interviewees witnessed not one scene of violence or substance abuse at the festival. This made them ponder whether Exit Festival is peaceful precisely because of so many police on the ground. Added to this was, lastly, a common-sense explanation that the Fortress is a type of festival setting that requires stricter security measures than usual. However, all things considered, it is reasonable to question the whole idea of Serbian freedom at Exit Festival seeing that key Exit people pat themselves on the back for enforcing strict security measures on the ground (see Milović Buha 2008; The State of Exit, 2004). When compared to Woodstock’s mythic scene of fence-breaking by the festival crowd, one really starts to wonder how the (self-)stereotype of Serbian freedom can be made plausible given such close supervision of the Exit festival site.

The next racial-ethnic trope that kept recurring in conversations with both my native and foreign interlocutors at Exit and Guča involved perceived gender differences between Serbian and Western men.142 The claims about male cultural machismo in Serbia, as opposed to the apparent effeminacy of male Western culture, can be associated more broadly with the new gender models brought about by the collapse

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141 For similar impressions of Serbian police by foreign Exit-goers, see also the TIM Centar’s survey, 2010.

142 Regularly mentioned was also a stereotypical view of Serbian women as natural born beauties, but such comments brought nothing interesting or new to an analysis of Serbian national identity.
of communism in Eastern Europe – specifically, with the tough image of the alpha-male mobster, complemented by the figure of the female bimbo. As in the comparable case of the Bulgarian mafia of the 1990s, such men are ‘easily recognizable by their gold chains, Rolex watches, BMWs or Mercedeses, “mobi” phones, and other conspicuous symbols of wealth’ (Buchanan 2010: 144). This is exactly how my Swiss informants at Exit 2013 presented the stereotypical image of Serbian / Balkan men in their home country. My other foreign Exit and Guča interlocutors likewise described the Serbs (living in Serbia) as taller men of robust body build, with darker skin color, and uniformed in their hairstyle, outfit, and behavior. A subtler explanation of Serbian machismo was additionally offered by my Belgian interlocutor Karl (group interview, Aug 2013). In his view, this phenomenon ‘is not [related to] the face type; it’s more [about] the attitude and style. [Serbian men] come across as very manly even when their appearance isn’t muscular’.

All these descriptions call to mind the widely accepted self-perception of the Serb nation as one with ‘balls’. According to Bjelić and Cole (2005: 280–281), the latter notion emerged in the interplay between Orientalist and Occidentalist imaginings of masculinity and male sexuality in the East, the Balkans, and the West respectively. Thus, contrary to the established image of the sexualized, sensualized, and feminized East/Orient, literary representations of the Balkans have largely centered on the ‘standard Balkan male’ and his alleged cruelty, crudity, and barbarianism. In newer domestic discourses, the Slavic/Serbian virility is additionally opposed to the seemingly wimpy and effete prototype of the Western male subject that an advanced market economy is said to engender.

That the locals tend to draw on the virile-effeminate binary to differentiate between Serbian and foreign men can be inferred from some of the statements I collected during my festival fieldwork. For instance, several Guča residents confided in me that, in their view, ‘there are evermore faggots among Guča visitors’, primarily referring to the increased number of male foreigners at the festival. By the same token, when asked to share his impressions on foreign Exit-goers, Dalibor, a receptionist at a student dormitory in which I stayed, compared foreign male visitors to ‘faggotized hobbits’ (fieldnotes, July 2012). The macho sentiment of Serbian culture surfaces even in the police statements for the press, asserting that it is the local Guča visitors, not foreigners, getting into fights when drunk (see e.g. Milikić and Živanović 2010). Note, however, that some of my foreign festival informants could tell the difference between local males frequenting Guča and those convening at Exit. For example, my Belgian-Spanish fellow festivalgoers at Guča 2013 claimed that while Guča is packed with Serbian alpha males, at Exit they can be spotted only at the festival’s more commercial stages such as Dance Arena. Martin, my partner and interviewee at Exit 2013, likewise maintained that the Serbs he had a chance to observe at Exit ‘look much more beautiful, urban, and alternative than those we are used to
seeing in Switzerland’. Then he added immediately, ‘[i]t’s true, though, that those we can recognize at home as the Serbs usually fit the negative Balkan stereotype’.

On the other hand, it is equally worth noting that what counts as clear-cut evidence of Serbian male machismo, especially in Guča, can at the same time pass as homoeroticism – if one is only willing to apply a queer frame. I was indeed puzzled by the occasional ambiguity of sexual messages that some of the seemingly hypermasculine Guča-goers were emitting to others – just like, for example, in the scene at the Guča main square where an overtanned, topless Serbian guy flashes the well-toned muscles of his upper body and dances to the trumpet music with the flower in his mouth while his fellow mate performs the erotic ‘hip and pelvis-thrusting’ movements behind his back. Also, my Belgian-Spanish interlocutors (group interview, Aug 2013) commented in like manner on the common practice of local Guča-goers to sprinkle beer all over their topless bodies when carousing to music. ‘By the way, that’s considered to be very gay in Europe’, David remarked through laughter. His friend Karl observed in addition that ‘the Serbs are [indeed] very touchy people, even men’. In that, according to Karl, they resemble some of the African societies where it is considered normal that men, for example, hold their hands, but where homosexuality is not tolerated whatsoever.

Finally, of relevance for Serbian self-perceptions in Exit and Guča are also the popular narratives invoking the longstanding myth of Serbian disunity and attendant schisms. As Naumović (2005: 67) showcases at great length in his political and socio-historical analysis of the national myth in question, disunity and discord ‘are often perceived as being the chief malefactors in Serbian history, causing political or military defeats, and threatening to tear Serbian society completely apart’. When analyzed in Exit and Guča, the myth of Serbian disunity helps us realize that Serbia’s national identity schisms are not merely articulated through the Exit-Guča binary, but that they are also being enacted in each festival separately. In the following, the objective is accordingly to establish how the idea of Serbian disunity plays out in each festival’s discursive practices, both symbolically and materially.

Symbolically, national disunity is discussed vis-à-vis issues concerning the specific musical profile associated with each festival. In Guča’s case, this is specifically expressed through the notion of cacophony. The way in which disunity and cacophony relate to one another can be illustrated best by quoting once again from Kapor’s (1986, in Bojanić 2002) writings on the festival. In his words,

While other happier nations, with much less talent, are singing in unison when gathered together in a pub, tavern, bistro or trattoria, all singing the same song with one voice, here [at Guča] even the trumpets are at odds with each other! (Ibid., 96.)
Importantly, however, the cacophony produced by the physical proximity of brass bands playing together in the streets of Guča is not necessarily laced with the fatalistic undertones of Serbia’s disunity narrative. As Kapor further writes, Serbian brass bands in Guča ‘create an indescribable cacophony, [in a manner] worthy of most avant-garde music’ (ibid., 97). In this interpretation, the Guča brass cacophony is assessed positively for its sonic qualities, ‘its volume [and] uncontrolled, wild strength’, comparable to those in avant-garde music. While there is undoubtedly a progressive edge to the said viewpoint, an outsider’s take on the phenomenon of Guča cacophony does not seem to be favorable in its tone. Indeed, for my Belgian Guča interviewee Karl (Aug 2013), the festival’s cacophony represented a sure sign of rudeness and disrespect towards those participating in staged festival performances. Even though the myth of Serbian disunity is less directly evoked in public concern with the questions of musical content in each festival, its symbolic implications are arguably still traceable therein. It is possible to distinguish several fields of tension in Exit, not unlike the ongoing points of friction between traditional and neo-folk musical styles or between kolo and čoček in Guča (see 4.5). The first pertains to the perennial question of the right balance between rock and DJ acts in the Exit music programming. Usually it is rock supporters who are loudest in their denunciations of the festival’s alleged susceptibility to prevailing trends in electronic music (see Đuran 2003; Pankov 2002; 2004; Branislav Babić ‘Kebra’, in Reljić 2002). As we have seen, the second field of tension is between banal and more elite forms of Balkan/Serbian WM (see 3.2.5). Besides this, the idea of Serbian disunity also translates into a negative evaluation of the Exit musical policy, or rather, a lack thereof. Specifically, my Novi Sad interviewee Vlada (July 2012) asserted that ‘Exit promotes a hodgepodge of musical styles. And because it’s not musically profiled, it develops no particular audience or scene’. Not only is thus the Exit collage-like musical offer seen as detrimental for the cultural life of Novi Sad and Serbia more generally. Moreover, the festival is accused, too, of usurping the entire cultural space of the city by ‘sucking out’ available public funds (at both municipal and provincial levels), and thus leaving smaller music companies without necessary resources for solidifying niche music scenes. Relatedly, the myth of Serbian disunity equally lies at the core of the public clash between Exit Festival and the ‘independent’ or ‘alternative’ Novi Sad cultural scene, in particular the one led by renowned local artists such as experimental musician Boris Kovač and film director Želimir Žilnik (interviews with Novi Sad locals Tihomir and Vlada, July 12 and 29, 2012).

At yet another level, it is through attempts at relocation, takeover, or division of each festival that the myth of Serbian disunity takes on a more direct and concrete form therein. In the case of Guča, there have been several episodes threatening the survival of the festival. The first took place in 2000, when Žika Ajdačić, a longtime director of Guča Festival and a political representative of the then ruling (Miloš-
vić’s) party in a number of Serbian cultural institutions, tried, with the backing of many politically and socially influential public figures, to usurp the entire event and branch it off to Zlatibor, a popular tourist town in Western Serbia traditionally hosting the preliminary Guča contest of Serbian brass bands from the area (see Marjanović 2001). The next example of the reification of Serbian disunity narrative occurred immediately after Guča 2012, when the trumpet leaders of fourteen top brass bands from Southeast Serbia sent a protest note to festival organizers for ‘an open trade with the festival awards’, as well as for ‘the inhumane and degrading treatment of [their] brass bands’ (‘South Serbia requests its own “Guča”’, B92, 2012). On that occasion, the bandleaders also agreed to cut all ties with the Guča festival management and organize the following summer a Balkan brass band festival of their own (which in the end did not eventuate). And the following year (in 2013), it was best brass bands of Western Serbia that boycotted Guča, because the next national competition winners were apparently known in advance (see ‘Best trumpet players are boycotting Guča’, Blic, 2013).

A similar sentiment of Serbian disunity can also be discerned in public discussions on the relocation of Exit Festival from Petrovaradin Fortress (see 3.2.2), or on conflicts over material interests between festival stakeholders. Some media reports do indicate that ‘[s]ince 2007, the festival has been a subject of several official and unofficial takeover bids’ (‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.). According to Exit associate Ilija Milošević (interview, Aug 2012), it is several key management people in Serbia’s music and entertainment industry – namely, Radomir Marić ‘Raka’ (the owner of Music Star Production) and Maksa Ćatović (the owner of Komuna) – who have made an offer to the Exit team. At the same time, on the flip side of this argument is the assumption of Serbian unity as crucial to the Exit’s enormous success. When asked why Exit did not emerge in Belgrade but Novi Sad, festival co-founder Kovačević (in Milović Buha 2008) answered as follows:

Because Belgrade people were divided. There were many groups involved, each working to its own advantage. If they had been united, they would have made it... We [Novi Sad people] were, by contrast, friends when we started the whole story. I was president of the Student Union at the time and we were unbreakable in the sense of having infinite mutual trust.

More to the point, the myth of Serbian disunity lurks also underneath those Guča-related narratives that are critical of the incapacity of Serbian trumpet players to unite and act jointly against the festival’s multiple irregularities. As trumpet player Dragan Ignjić testifies in an interview (Kovačević 2011: 13):

...
Many of my colleagues are unhappy and complain, but this is ‘typical Serbian business’ [a colloquial expression, not far in meaning from the phrase ‘monkey business’] so we cannot come together to make a difference. Some of us have been promised a pass to the Guča finals or awards so that we stop complaining. I responsibly claim that each year award winners are designated in advance. (...) This is, like everything else in Serbia, shady. It’s really sad that some barbecue shop owners and car dealers, each with their own favorite [brass band], have been permitted entry to the Festival.143

Lastly, I call attention to another reified form of the Serbian disunity narrative surrounding each festival, but familiar from the political history of modern Serbia in general. At issue here are bitter public disputes and resulting splits between chief people in the festival organization, previously known as longtime friends and business / political partners. In the case of Guča, a growing animosity between Slobodan Jolović (president of the Municipality of Lučani and chairman of the festival board, 2004–2012) and Adam Tadić (director of Guča Culture House, 2004–2014, with the exception of 2011) reached its decisive point four months after the festival’s fiftieth jubilee (in 2010), when they started accusing one another publicly of misappropriation of festival funds (see Kovačević and Petrović 2010). By the same token, two key people in Exit, Bojan Bošković and Dušan Kovačević, went their separate ways in 2004. From that year until 2012, Bošković was in charge of the festival organization and then, since 2013, superseded by his opponent Kovačević. The culmination of personal and ideological differences between the two men took place in 2007, when they went on trial over the division of intellectual property rights (interview with Bošković, Sep 2014; for more details on the lawsuit that Kovačević filed against the Exit Association, see also ‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.).

5.4.4 Racial Differentiations Across the Former Yugoslav Region and Serbian Diaspora Communities

National identification processes involved in Exit and Guča cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account a complex and often contradictory dynamic between natives and their former Yugoslav compatriots frequenting either festival. This is all the more crucial given that each festival attracts a great number of ‘foreigners’ from ex-Yugoslav republics. However, the ways in which this fact is publicly discussed and dealt with on the ground differ significantly between two festivals. While

143 The same opinion has been expressed by another Serbian trumpeter, Dejan Lazarević (in Petrović 2012c: 5), saying that ‘all sorts of brass bands are coming to Guča, with this or that sponsorship, with connections here and there, whereas the decision on who receives an award is made by some people who have nothing to do with music’.
Exit-related reports do not appear to obsess with specifying the nationalities of festivalgoers coming from the former Yugoslav region, in Guča-related reports it is regularly emphasized that a majority of non-native festivalgoers come from Slovenia and Republika Srpska (see e.g. the festival report from 2007, in Tadić et al. 2010: 355). By the same token, while various anecdotes about members of dispersed Serb communities visiting the Guča festival gain strong media coverage, in Exit-related narratives no special attention is paid to this topic either (something I address later in this section).

There are arguably several reasons for this fundamental difference in each festival’s approach to the former Yugoslav nations and fellow nationals living outside Serbia. What first comes to mind are the polarized views of Exit and Guča based on the cosmopolitan-national binary as a major point of reference (see Chapters 3 and 4). Let me briefly reiterate: while the Exit counter-space insists on the type of cosmopolitan relationships that sideline the relevance of national identification, the Guča organic space considers the latter its predominant concern. Specifically, while Exit rather endorses the idea of global citizenship, with social class and a sense of civility and urbanity as the primary sources of subjectivity (cf. Simić 2009: 213–215), Guča adopts and promulgates the neotraditionalist and quasi-patriotic rhetoric of Serbian nationalism, whether the latter be expressed in the form of ‘close-at-hand’ or what Benedict (1994, in Bock-Luna 2007) calls ‘long-distance nationalism’.144

Perhaps most indicative of the said schism between two festivals is their opposite stand on Serbia’s involvement in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Two memorial events, one taking place at Exit and the other at Guča, bear witness that both festivals take an interest in the ongoing ‘mnemonic battle’ (Zerubavel 1996: 13–15) over the ‘correct’ way to remember and interpret Serbia’s contested past. On one side are thus Exit producers and their initial plan in 2005 to mark, on the last festival night, the tenth anniversary of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre and pay tribute to its Bosnian Muslim victims through a moment of silence. The commemoration was in the end called off owing to high security risks and irresistible political and economic pressures (interview with Bošković, Sep 2014; Petrović 2015).145 Conversely, on the third festival day, 5 August 2015, Guča producers joined in the national day of remembrance that commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the Croatian persecution and killing of the Serbs in the ‘Operation Oluja / Storm’.146

144 The concept of long-distance nationalism is based on the assumption that exile provides fertile ground for the development of strong national identities, attachments, and sentiments in dispersed ethnic communities.

145 Note, however, that the facts surrounding the Srebrenica massacre were discussed alongside issues of Serbian genocide denial within a series of the Exit 2009 open debates, hosted and moderated by Serbia’s highly critical and civic-minded NGO Peščanik [Sandglass].

146 The Operation Storm took place on 4–7 August 1995 in Croatia’s region Kninska Krajina [Knin Frontier], which became occupied during the Serbo-Croatian conflict (1991–1995) by
(2015) report on the Guča commemoration, the entire village apparently sank into silence: brass band players were nowhere in sight, and neither were scenes of carousing festivalgoers. It was also observed that both the Serbian national and the Guča festival flags were lowered to half-staff. In any case, the fact that the decision of Guča organizers to pay tribute to the Serb victims and survivors of the Operation Storm was met with no criticism nor negative reactions in Serbian public discourse (in contrast to the Exit Srebrenica massacre memorial initiative), can be taken as an additional confirmation that the ideology of Serbian nationalism and victimhood still prevails in the political discourse of present-day Serbia.

Furthermore, the Exit inclusive and egalitarian approach to different ex-Yugoslav nations reflects clearly the idea(1)s and goals of the festival’s political mission, namely, to promote regional peace, stability, reconciliation, and collaboration. Various aspects of the Exit activity and program have attested to this, especially in the earlier years of the festival production (see Exit News, 2001; 2002; Bizjak et al. 2005). Integrated in the Exit ideological agenda have been specifically public discussions and workshops tackling ‘the issues of truth, reconciliation and responsibility’ in the former Yugoslav wars of the 1990s (Kleut 2002; see also 3.2.4); political campaigns for the abolition of visas in South East Europe (Tomić 2002); or the program selection of theater plays (Miletić 2002) and music acts (‘Cross (out) borders’, Exit News, 2002; ‘Exit Festival’, Tribal Mixes, n.d.; Žabeva-Papazova 2012) with strong ex-Yugoslav undertones. Conscious efforts at reestablishing a sense of continuity with the socialist past come particularly to the fore in those segments of Exit music repertoire that feature ex-YU rock acts from the 1980s, such as Macedonian Mizar or Kiril Džajkovski from Leb i sol [Bread And Salt], Slovenian Laibach or Borghesia, Croatian Psihomodo Pop or KUD Idijoti [Cultural Artistic Society ‘Idiots’], Serbian Disciplina kičme [Backbone Discipline] or Pekinška Patka [Beijing Duck]. What’s more, the claimed integrative effect of regional rock music has prompted some cultural researchers to see this music genre as a drop of hope for future generations in the Balkans (Božilović 2004, in Žabeva-Papazova 2012: 102), or as ‘the seventh republic’ – a symbolic, supranational entity drawing the six (then-constituent, now-separate) republics of ex-Yugoslavia together (Perković 2011, in Žabeva-Papazova 2012: 198–199).

In addition, Petrovaradin Tribe (Bizjak et al. 2005) is the name of yet another Exit-related project with a strong ex-Yugoslav appeal and a clear pro-European orientation. The project was designed on the one hand as an experimental film work-
shop connecting artists from Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and on the other hand as a series of discussions involving expert panels from ex-Yugoslavia and Austria. Using these two modes of expression, the project Petrovaradin Tribe sought to explore ‘newly established connections and energies between young people [Exit-goers from the former Yugoslavia] who refuse to live with the burden of past wars, condemnation and guilt’ (Bizjak et al. 2005: 58). Somewhat predictably, one of the project’s main observations was that there were indeed no real obstacles for the younger generation of ex-Yugoslavs to interact and exchange in situ with one another (see Bizjak et al. 2005: 56).

I arrived at the same conclusion when doing my fieldwork at Exit 2013. In the Exit lived spaces, such as the Exit Village campsite, I did witness myself what could be described as a small-scale simulacrum of the former Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’. Having met two Slovenian Exit-goers, Mitja and Matej, at the Fortress, I was invited to the festival camp area where they pitched a rather large white canopy tent. Upon both of my visits, I was not surprised in the least to see that their tent served as a sort of meeting place for several other festival campers coming also from the ex-Yugoslav region, notably Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The reasons seemed obvious to me: first, it was difficult to resist the warm-hearted openness of my Slovenian interlocutors; and second, their powerful canopy tent provided glorious shade for a couple of folding chairs and air mattresses in the cozy space below. Aside from the idle but truly enjoyable time I spent under this canopy roof, I was also able to establish how my Exit Village informants relate to the political realities of the region, both past and present. The first observation was that none of my informants spoke nostalgically but rather critically (or simply with common sense) about what happened in the region (i.e. about unnecessary bloodshed and destruction of the recent Yugoslav wars), as well as about what is still going on (such as the futility and dangers of right-wing populism, or the inefficiency and corruptness of the new nation-states). Perhaps even more exciting was the realization that all my informants could joke freely with each other using rather offensive ethnic stereotypes associated with each constituent nation of ex-Yugoslavia. Immediately popping into my head was Žižek’s (in Merelli 2015) sharp criticism of political correctness and the attendant prescription for how to possibly resolve existing racial-ethnic tensions. In Žižek’s view, it is very difficult to make real contact with an Other without ‘an occasional exchange of “friendly obscenities”’ (ibid.). If it is true what Žižek claims, then my Exit Village interlocutors and I did establish a true relationship of equality and mutual respect.

But what arguably represents the most tangible effect of the Exit rhetoric of regional pacification and reintegration are the festival’s recent expansion ventures across the Balkans. Exit has surely capitalized, both financially and culturally, on this ‘consciously built concept of anti-nationalism [coated] in some sort of pro-Yu-
goslav rhetoric’ (cf. Simić 2006: 121) by launching a series of sister festivals, one in Montenegro (since 2014 – Sea Dance Festival on Budva’s Jaz Beach in mid-July), the second in Romania (since 2015 – Revolution Festival at Timisoara’s Village Museum Park at the beginning of June), and the latest one on the Croatian seaside (since 2017 – Sea Star Festival at Umag’s Stella Maris resort at the end of May). The increasingly commodified character of Exit counter-spatial practice arrives apparently in the form of ever-extensive regional festival-runs, appropriately dubbed EXIT (Magic) Adventure (in 2014, 2015, and 2016) or EXIT Summer of Love (in 2017). Conceptually, they do not really differ from special holiday packages with similarly luring titles.

More to the point, reflecting on Exit, my Serbo-Belgian festival interviewee Dragan (Aug 2013) also noticed that ‘there’s definitely something Yugoslav about it’. But as pointed out in Chapter 3, the Yugo-nostalgic undertones in Exit have nothing to do with the phantasms of the old socialist country being resuscitated, nor with a possibility of having Yugoslav nationality remodeled in some acceptable way. What is at stake here is rather nostalgia for (Western) European modernity, urbanity, and ‘normality’, as embodied in somewhat romanticized memories of the old Yugoslav state.147 Or as Petrović (2007: 270) put it,

Yugo-nostalgia is a feeling most strongly present among those former Yugoslavs who could not identify with new [post-1990] national spaces. (...) [I]t is longing for the space in which individuals felt more comfortable, shared values and lived in dignity. More than a longing for the past, Yugo-nostalgia expresses a demand to retain the right to remember – a right that was taken away from ordinary people for the sake of ‘national projects’.

Adding to a better understanding of the possible functions of Yugo-nostalgia at Exit are also more politically charged explanations of this phenomenon circulating in regional academic discourse. Specifically, Markovina and Klasić (in Otvoreni magazin, 2015) discuss in a round-table debate within Sarajevo’s fourth Open University that Yugonostalgia should be considered from two opposite perspectives. On the one hand, anti-Yugoslavs and ethnonationalists across the Balkans (notably in Croatia) use the irrational fear of old Yugoslavia solely as a means of discrediting their political opponents, especially those perceived as followers of leftist ideas. On the other hand, for the people belonging to the opposite camp, every expression of Yugoslavhood amounts to a direct subversion of ethnonationalist policies prevailing in all

147 The sociological study on the structure of domestic Exit festival audience (Lazar, in Bizjak et al. 2005: 10) also provides evidence that the number of the visitors declaring themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ dropped dramatically (from 8,5 % to 1,7 %) between the festival years 2002 and 2004.
post-Yugoslav countries. But even when drained of its subversive function, the Exit pro-Yugoslav rhetoric may be said to reflect a desire, presumably shared among a majority of ex-Yugoslav festivalgoers, for some sort of positive self-identification and recognition in a wider context of the globalized world (cf. Sebić, in Bizjak et al. 2005: 40).

Conversely, in Guča-related discourses, instances of Yugo-nostalgia are reported only incidentally. For example, Todorović (2003) writes about a Macedonian Guča-goer claiming that ‘no one can separate us [ex-Yugoslav nations]’, or about a local Guča regular, Gojko Agotonović from Ribarska banja, who is rebuilding old Yugoslavia in his own backyard. In another media report on Guča (Milojković and Bojović 2013d), it is claimed that T-shirts with Tito’s portrait are the best-selling product at the festival (a claim that contradicts my fieldwork observation), especially among middle-aged local Guča-goers, that is, those that actually have first-hand memories of socialist times. The report then goes on to mention that T-shirts with the image of General Draža Mihailović cost around the same price but are displayed ‘at a stand on the opposite side of the street’. Even if the report gives us a hint of great political weight that these two highly contested symbols of the Yugoslav/Serbian past are bound to carry, one cannot help but notice that they are at the same time trivialized and politically diluted by the language of visual merchandising. Importantly, a similar remark also appeared in two separate interviews I conducted with my Guča interlocutors, host Bogdan (Aug 2012) and Belgian festivalgoer Nicolas (Aug 2013). They both asserted that the Chetnik symbols in Guča are emptied of their original meaning and that they operate rather as an integral part of the festival branding and merchandising, similarly to T-shirts with Che Guevara’s face. Having pondered over related matters, but in a way that more directly addresses the Guča attitude towards the ex-Yugoslav nations as Serbia’s Significant Others, Kuljić (2006a: 311) wrote:

Draža and Tito are nowadays more brands than symbols (...) that differ from one another in terms of their passability within the Western Balkans space. Brands (...) nonetheless convey attitude towards others, the world, and towards the past. With Draža, one can go only to Republika Srpska, but with Tito, one can go further. (...) It goes without saying that the symbol of the past stirring up interethnic conflicts is a dysfunctional one.

It is for this reason that the phenomenon of Yugo-nostalgia, associated predominantly with Exit, is by far more benevolent than the Chetnik ideology and iconography prevailing in Guča.

In any event, what was arguably crucial to triggering reminiscences of Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ in Čičeo was a mass festival visit from the Slovenes soon after the fall of Milošević (see Timotijević 2005: 346). This fact alone led to a series
of events, specifically, to a renewal of cooperation in 2004 between Lučani (a municipality to which Guča belongs) and Dravograd (in northern Slovenia), two towns known as Twin Municipalities in the former Yugoslavia (Tadić, in Petrović 2010c: 10); then, to negotiations over Guča’s cooperation with another Slovenian municipality (near the Italian border) – that of Divača (‘From Festival to Festival’, Dragačevski trubač, 2008: 10); or to occasional promotional tours of Serbia’s most renowned brass bands in Slovenia’s capital Ljubljana (see Bojović 2013c; ‘From Festival to Festival’, Dragačevski trubač, 2009: 10); or to the boom of various Guča-inspired events organized by the Slovenes themselves across Slovenia (such as Guča po Guči / ‘Guča after Guča’, or Zlatna trobenta Dravograda / ‘The Golden Trumpet of Dravograd’), but also in Italy (Guča na Krasu – Guča sul Carso / ‘Guča on the Karst’) (see Bojović 2013c; Hofman 2014; Šivic 2013).

Nevertheless, there appears to be more to the Yugo-nostalgic sentiment for both festival hosts and its Slovenian visitors, especially those of the older generation. According to the testimonies of Slovenian tourists visiting Serbia (see Jakšić 2004, in Timotijević 2005: 347), the reason why the Slovenes are drawn to everything Serbian, including Guča, is because they see the latter as their ‘exotic lover’. For them, the experiences in and of Serbia are specifically associated with ‘the [hot-blooded] temperament, good music, hedonism, and entertainment’ (ibid.). Such an approach to Serbia echoes the prior internal divisions within the former Yugoslav space along West-East axes, whereby Slovenia occupies the highest end of the imagined civilizational hierarchy, whereas Serbia leans more towards its bottom end. The claimed civilizational difference between the two nations can also be found in the field of (neo-)folk music, where Slovenian yodeling, polkas, and accordions are posited against Serbia’s Oriental brass and TF music. As Longinović (2000: 629) notes, the culmination of this type of racism took place in the maelstrom of Yugoslavia’s break-up, when ‘a hierarchy of musical differences (...) was constructed as a tool of “racial/cultural” separation from the common state’. In any case, the perceived civilizational difference between Slovenes and Serbs is in today’s Guča apparently experienced and consumed in the form of (self-)exoticism. On the other hand, Slovenian sociologist Rastko Močnik (in Timotijević 2005: 347) asserts that the Slovenian fascination with Guča (and Serbia in general) is driven by nostalgia for authentic places and intense experiences. This sort of nostalgia is not so much indicative of Occidentalist discursive practices at work in Slovenia, as it is, according to Močnik, of ‘a lacking sense of cultural identity in the new nation-state’. On top of that, as Močnik further argues, the influx of a large number of Slovenian visitors to Guča also partly owes to strict legal restrictions on Slovenia’s cultural life, contributing to the general atmosphere of ‘cultural repression’ in the country (ibid., 347).

These and similar observations only feed in turn the flames of anti-Western / EU sentiment among native Guča supporters. In a domestic press report, one reads ac-
cordingly that the Slovenes come to Guča because of ‘fatigue from “the orderliness of the [living] space” in the country that belongs to the EU. “If everything in Guča was in place like in Slovenia, the Slovenes would no longer be coming over”’ (Stamatović 2004, in Timotijević 2005: 145). Serbian novelist Kapor (in Tadić et al. 2010: 377) writes also unfavorably of Slovenian Guča-goers:

Another thing that continues to strike me [at Guča], over and over again, are wasted Slovenes who are living proof that there’s nothing for us [Serbs] in the EU, for if things were so good over there, they wouldn’t be coming to us in Guča to let off steam... (...) One can tell how well they are doing by the way they go on the booze: they carouse in a dark and depressing way, using whatever comes to hand, just to escape the drudgery of their everyday life back home.

To dig further into the complexities and ambivalences of Serbo-Slovenian relations in the post-Yugoslav context, it is worth referring to a festival-related anecdote recounted in another domestic media outlet (Bojović and Milojković 2013a). It tells the story of an accidental encounter between a Serbian and a Slovenian Guča-goer, in which the Serb is persuading the Slovene that he is ‘one of us’ with the following explanation: ‘Slovenia is Serbia, bro!’. There are several possible interpretations of this anecdote. The first is that the Serb wants to say to the Slovene that they are ‘the same Balkan shit as us’ (cf. Ignatieff 1999, in Kiossev 2005: 183). In this interpretation, the Slovenian (br)Other is either embraced through what can be seen as a friendly gesture of self-mockery or is put in his place in case he thinks better of his own tribe than he does of the Serbs. The second interpretation amounts to a possible suggestion by the Serbian Guča-goer that the two nations stand united in their suspicion of neighboring Croats. This might just as well be the case, considering a remark that a festival correspondent from Slovenia made – that ‘the partying in Guča will die down once posers from Zagreb begin to show up’ (‘Serbia: A country of mass drinking sprees’, Vesti Online, 2010). Finally, by laying claim to Slovenia, the Serbian Guča-goer simply evokes Serbia’s nationalist aspirations and imperial nostalgia for the earlier times in which Serbia held a hegemonic position in the region (e.g. the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which the Slovenes participated, was dominated by the Serbs).

The Serbo-Slovenian relationship in Guča is clearly one of mutual trust and suspicion at the same time. This, however, does not apply to the Croats. The Guča attitude towards the latter national group is far more unequivocally filled with tension. According to domestic tourism statistics (in Bojović 2012c), the Croats were the only people from the region staying away from Guča, at least until around 2009. In local media reports, their appearance at the festival is thus considered nothing but exceptional. For instance, when the owner of the Guča camp, Radovan Milutinović (Bojo-
vić 2013a), speaks about a wide variety of nationalities that the camp has seen, he calls special attention to the fact that ‘we also had on board one Croatian female’. The hesitant and skeptical attitude among the Croat population towards the festival comes as no surprise considering that the symbolic production of Guča micronational space may come across as extraordinarily offensive to many of them. As Croatian Guča-goer Josip (in Milojković and Bojović 2012c [comments]) testifies, ‘We had a great time [at the festival]. (...) The only thing I disliked was that some [local visitors] wear the [Chetnik] cockades in their šajkača hats’. The notoriety of this insignia is fully understandable given its heavy historical baggage, specifically, its association with Serbia’s Chetnik war crimes against the Croats in the Second World War as well as in the recent Serbo-Croatian conflict.

Furthermore, according to domestic press reports, encounters between Croatian and Serbian Guča-goers seem to be characterized by fear and the possibility of violent outbursts. One news report states, for example, that ‘a busload of tourists from Pula [a Croatian seafront city] has arrived in Guča under police escort’ (Bojović and Milojković 2013c). In another press report (Bojović 2012c), Croatian festivalgoer Boris admits that he felt a bit fearful when visiting Guča for the first time. And his compatriot Josip (in Milojković and Bojović 2012c [comments]) writes likewise in an online forum that he went to Guča by a company car with Belgrade plates because he was told that it might be dangerous to travel over there with Croatian license plates.

What also seem to be worth reporting domestically are anecdotes illustrating Serbia’s symbolic subjugation of the Croatian Other. Longtime festival reporter Otašević (2011a) tells, for example, the story of a Croatian woman who decided during her first festival visit to be baptized at Guča Church and thus received into membership of the Serbian Orthodox Church. To some extent, the decision of Guča organizers to invite Croatian pop-folk diva Severina Kojić to take part in the official festival program in 2016 can be read in the same way. What may be specifically indicative of Severina’s apparent falling victim to Serbianization is her nickname ‘a Serbian daughter-in-law’ circulating in the domestic media because of her second marriage to a Serbian man (formerly to a Serbian businessman, and currently to Igor Kojić, a sportsman and the son of Serbian neo-folk singer Dragan Kojić ‘Keba’). In the context of a patriarchal society such as Serbia, this is definitely considered evidence of Serbianization, since it is only the father’s ethnic lineage that counts in the biological reproduction of the nation. Also, the fact that Severina was willing to receive a traditional Serbian šajkača hat as a present from festival organizers may be understood as further evidence of her ‘subjection’ to Serbian dominance (see ‘Severina caused chaos in Serbia’, Net.hr).

Note, however, that the interpretation above goes against the grain of most local media reports on Severina’s participation in Guča. For conservative and national-
minded groups in Serbia, her appearance in Guča was deemed nothing less than an insult. On the one hand, there are claims that the entire concept of the festival celebrating Serbianhood was called into question, since entry into the festival was granted to someone who had apparently worn earlier a T-shirt with the image of Franjo Tudman, the so-called Father and first president of independent Croatia. On the other hand, for Serbian brass players, her highly paid performance at the festival which is officially committed to the preservation of Serbian brass band tradition was perceived as yet another slap in their face by Guča organizers (see ‘Severina caused chaos...’, Net.hr). Paradoxically, perhaps, Severina is a thorn in the side of prevailing national ‘regimes of truth’ in both Serbia and Croatia. In her native country, she is likewise denounced by self-proclaimed patriots as a national traitor, not only because of her close personal ties to Serbia, but also because of her controversial musical projects (notably the one with Goran Bregović) based on what is perceived as the Balkan / Eastern melos and thus as culturally incompatible with Croatia’s European identity (see Baker 2007).

A similar paradox was displayed in one of Guča’s tent-restaurants, where Halid Muslimović, a 1980s Yugoslav Bosnian neo-folk singer, had a gig in 2013 with accompanying Romani brass band. The best way to explain what this paradox entails is to refer to the scene I witnessed and then described in my fieldwork diary as follows:

*A Serbian Chetnik, dressed in full military gear (black uniform completed with the šajkača on his head), falls to his knees in front of the singer, his eyes closed in ecstasy, arms outstretched to heaven. He wrings his hands, pulls his hair, and starts to weep. What a paradox, I think to myself. How on earth can the Chetnik ideal of Greater Serbia, ethnically cleansed of Muslims, be possibly congruent with an experience of excessive enjoyment brought about by one’s immersion in the music of the Muslim Other!?*

The paradox clearly lies in the fact that it was Serbian right-wingers who spoke critically during the war against Bosnian Muslims about neo-folk / TF and related musical Orientalisms in terms of the ‘Teheranization of Serbia’ (see e.g. Ćirjaković 2004; Simić 2006). But similar paradoxes can be said to plague the entire region. For instance, the tremendous popularity of Serbian TF in Croatia is characterized as a ‘creeping occupation’ of its cultural space (Gall 2005, in Baker 2007), whereas the endorsement of Serbian TF by Bosnian Muslims is denounced as the ‘culturcide’ of traditional Bosnian song (Ćirjaković 2004). At any rate, this is precisely where the constructed nature of purported racial-cultural differences among South Slavic nations along West-East axes reveals itself at its starkest.
It should be noted, too, that the names of Bosniaks are otherwise conspicuously absent from the Guča program as well as from Guča-related media reports. The situation is, of course, completely opposite when it comes to the festival participation by the Bosnian Serbs (from Republika Srpska). That the latter typically look to Serbia as their motherland is also manifest in Guča Festival. To begin with, Milorad Dodik, the former PM and currently serving president of Republika Srpska, has been honored with the title of the festival host already twice – in 2007 and in 2016. Especially telling was the part of his opening speech at Guča 2007 (in Tadić et al. 2010: 355), in which he pointed out that ‘many festival participants from Republika Srpska get inspired in Guča with a new sense of belonging’. Apart from providing an important site for ethnic identity work among most Bosnian Serbs, Guča Festival and Serbian brass music in general also enjoy great popularity in Republika Srpska itself. To quote Dodik (in Živanović 2012: 9) once again, ‘no single celebration here, in Republika Srpska, can be held without trumpet players’.

It is in this light that one should also interpret the emergence of Guča-inspired events in Banjaluka, the largest city and administrative center of Republika Srpska. The festival Zlatna truba Srpske / ‘The Golden Trumpet of Republika Srpska’ was already established in 2002 within the manifestation Banjaluka Summer Games and is accompanied, similarly to its Serbian counterpart, by strong national sentiments (see Milovanović 2002, in Milovanović and Babić 2003: 219–220). Among similar events, such as Guća u Banjaluci / ‘Guča in Banjaluka’ or Jelen trubački sabor u Banjaluci / ‘Jelen Trumpet Festival in Banjaluka’, it was only 48 sati Guče u Banja-luci / ‘The Forty-Eight-Hour Guča in Banjaluka’, held in June 2011, that had been sponsored by Serbia’s Guča Festival, apparently, for promotional purposes (see Tipura 2011). However, despite close ties between Guča Festival and Republika Srpska, the relationship between the two is at times also marked by rivalry and struggles over the Guča brand ownership. For example, the Guča administrative board imposed penalties (namely, a three-year prohibition on participation in the national Guča contest) on several Serbian brass bands because of their participation in the Banjaluka festival The Golden Trumpet of Republika Srpska (see Basara 2003).

A similar nostalgic desire for homeland – but not necessarily of returning home (see Brah 1996) – can also be observed among Serbian Guča-goers from the diaspora. Testifying to this is, for example, the following statement by Zoran Jovičić, president of Serbian World Congress149: ‘the Serbian diaspora (...) go [to Guča] for years as on a pilgrimage’ (‘World Music: Bregović and Guča receive top billing’, B92, 2012). By the same token, I was told by my Guča housemates and interlocutors Slaviša and Novica (Aug 2013), otherwise Bosnian Serbs living in Vienna since the

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148 Jelen Pivo (literally, ‘Deer Beer’) is one of Serbia’s leading lager brands, produced by the Apatin Brewery.
149 The Serbian World Congress is a Belgrade-based NGO representing the Serbian diaspora.
collapse of Yugoslavia, that it is Guća (and almost never Exit) that is considered by their diaspora peers to be a must-see for anyone of Serbian decent.

Moreover, Guća Festival seems to inspire diasporic nostalgia and long-distance nationalism among Serbian immigrants in their host countries, too. The best case in point is the Serbo-Bavarian Festival in Munich – an event launched in 2004 by Miodrag Stojanović, Munich caterer of Serbian descent. Conceptually modeled after the Serbian trumpet festival, with the administrative help of several key Guća people, the Serbo-Bavarian Festival is likewise based on the contests of brass bands and folk ensembles, comprising the Serbs from both the homeland and the hostland, as well as the Bavarians. Their presentation of mainly Serbian but also Bavarian traditional music and dances is additionally spiced up with performances of popular neo-folk guest-singers from Serbia (see Kaplarević 2005; Miličić 2004). Two next Guća-inspired events, in which members of the Serbian diaspora are involved as either organizers or attendees or both, are Guća na Krasu (in Italy since 2009) and Guća en Seine / ‘Guća on the Seine’ (in France since 2015). Note, however, that both events are primarily of transnational significance in both their reach and stylistic output (see Hofman 2014; personal e-correspondence with president of the humanitarian organization Voisinage(s) which is in charge of the Guća en Seine music events, June 2017). Conversely, Guća u Beču / ‘Guća in Vienna’ (2016) was intended to be a specifically diaspora event, but it never came about due to the fraudulent activities behind its organization (see Ilić and Uskoković 2016).

In contrast to this, the way in which Serbian diaspora members are perceived in Guća by their host fellow nationals appears to be fundamentally ambivalent. To illustrate the ‘hate’ side of the love-hate relationship of Serbia-based Serbs with their diaspora brethren, I refer again to Kapor’s writings (1986, in Bojanić 2002: 96) on Guća Festival. Therein he speaks of Serbian diaspora members as ‘notorious international criminals from the cities of Northern Europe, with pockets full of foreign banknotes, [that] suddenly begin to wonder whether it is generally worth living in a foreign country, no matter how much money one makes, when one is missing out on all this [Guća] fun?’ What Kapor expresses here is a typically Occidentalist view of the West as a materially rich but spiritually deprived place, combined with the prevailing Orientalist presumption about the criminogenic nature of the Serbian diaspora residing in the West. This obviously biased point of view can be easily countered with what my Guća interviewees Slaviša and Novica said on the topic (Aug 2013). According to their testimony, Serbia is indeed seen as a motherland, but without any nostalgic desire to return to it. On the contrary, Vienna, their longtime habitat, is considered the only true home, despite (or precisely because of) the fact that they feel and are treated like foreigners in both their hostland and homeland.

The negative attitude towards Guća diaspora visitors is likewise echoed in domestic online forums. As Lala iz Banata / ‘Lala from Banat’ (‘The fifty-first Guća
begins’, B92 [comments], 2011) writes critically: ‘heedless gastoši [a derogatory term for Serbian work immigrants] … come [to Guča] to beat their complex of “second class citizens” in the European Union. After eleven months of difficult and dirty jobs, Guča is for them – a recovery’. Such reasoning is very common among Serbia’s self-identified urbanites and exemplifies clearly their deep scorn for so-called gastabajteri [Gastarbeiter / guest workers]. In Simić’s (2009: 131) comparable ethnographic study, her Novi Sad ‘sophisticated urban informants of all ages’ differentiated between Serbia’s low-skilled gastabajteri and those migrant workers / travelers with high education and cosmopolitan attitude. Members of the former group were judged accordingly ‘as a kind of tasteless nouveau riche’, thus lacking the ‘cultural capital’ that the latter group was said to possess. Serbian gastabajteri were, in short, dismissed as people without any apparent interest ‘in the “culture” of the country they were visiting, but simple economic gain’ (Simić 2009: 134).

A similarly scornful attitude towards Serbian gastabajteri can also be discerned in online responses to the press report on Živorad Tomić ‘Žika’, a successful Serbian businessman in the U.S. literally living the American Dream, and his glamorous arrival in Guča in a personally piloted helicopter (Milojković and Bojović 2013e). To quote from the report: “My grandfather used to come here in a horse-drawn carriage, and I arrive now in a helicopter”, says Žika the American while buying a šajkača [hat], jelek [waistcoat] and Serbian flag at a stall’. The pomposity of Žika’s arrival in Guča was characterized by an online commentator using the nickname Anonymous as ‘[t]ypical Serbian business; the redneck wants to show off his wealth so he lands in a helicopter among the ordinary people that have no bread to eat’.

In response to the same press report informing us on Žika’s plan of business operation in his homeland (namely, to buy helicopters with the celebrity pilot Goran Krneta and open the company Helicopters of Serbia for tourist transport services and for supervision of forests, electrical installations, gas pipelines, and the like), another online commentator, Kgb, writes in addition:

> Everyone leaves Serbia, but as soon as they earn money somewhere in the world, they immediately start with a story of their great Serbianhood and with a purchase of [national] flags! And as soon as an opportunity arises, they immediately seek to multiply their assets and become big Serbian bosses paying their workers 15,000 dinars [less than 150 euros per month]!

But as mentioned above, not all Guča-related comments on Serbian diaspora members are cynical in their tone. In the case of Žika the American, positive responses come, for example, from the commentators with such aliases as Cartagena and Kreoji-Kure. More specifically, Cartagena accuses all suspicious forum participants of envy, inviting them to ‘admire anyone who seized the chance to do something
with their lives [like Žika did’]. And in Krejzi-Kure’s comment, Žika is endorsed in like manner: ‘All those badmouthing your name can only spit under your window [a Serbian idiomatic expression emphasizing the powerless position of those “spitting under one’s window”]. Serbia is in your heart and soul; you earned your own money, so spend it now as it pleases you’.

A similar love-hate relationship in Guča and to a lesser extent in Exit exists, too, between the Serbs and their Others, this time racialized on the grounds of their different skin color. This is a subject that I am discussing next.

5.4.5 The Imaginings of Romanies and Other Racialized Identities

The topics that inevitably dominate any discussion on racial issues (with a capital ‘R’) in two Serbian festivals are those of Serbia’s Romani brass band players in Guča, the ethnic-racial stereotypes assigned to them, and the complex positioning of the Serbs vis-à-vis this minority group. But before I delve into this problematic, it is important to first establish the particularities of the Exit and Guča relationship with those festival participants designated as Serbia’s ‘real’ racialized Others, such as blacks and Asians.

Arguably, the biological notions of race and racial difference in Exit play a significant role in the authentication of aesthetic experience and cosmopolitan attitude among local festivalgoers. The reason for this is clear: the very stylistic orientation of Exit music program presupposes the desire and ability of the domestic audience not only to appreciate what is labeled as ‘black music’ or World Music, but also to interact with a considerable number of international black artists performing at the festival. It is also worth noting that performances of local Latin dance and percussion groups within the Exit 2013 warm-up events at both the city center and the Fortress were led by black music experts, presumably from Latin America (fieldnotes, 9–11 July 2013). Note in addition that an ad hoc dance competition among festivalgoers organized at the Exit Reggae Stage in two categories, male and female, was likewise hosted by two black Rastafarians (fieldnotes, Sat night, 13–14 July 2013).

What all these examples illustrate are two main assumptions about race and music in Exit. The first pertains to racialized discourses of authenticity, belonging, and ownership in music and their entanglement with the process of identity formation. Common to such discourses is indeed a deeply essentializing idea that the music of Others can and should be owned, made, performed, interpreted, and so on, by native members of the racial-ethnic group in question. It is in this light that the participation of Serbia’s ‘real’ Others in Exit Festival can be said to validate the local experience of other musical cultures as real and genuine. The second assumption about race and music in Exit draws on the related discourse of (aesthetic) cosmopolitanism and has
already been discussed in Simić’s (2009: 211) analysis of Exit cosmopolitan practices. The main argument here is that members of the local festival audience are in dire need of these ‘real’ Others (notably blacks) in order to reaffirm their cosmopolitan position. Then again, that the Exit lived spaces may contradict the festival’s cosmopolitan vision of a multiple One World can be corroborated by an example of racism in situ. According to the testimony of Exit organizers (in Milović Buha 2008), a female Exit-goer of Asian descent complained in 2005 to the BBC because she was insulted on racial grounds. Based on this isolated case, the BBC decided to temporarily freeze cooperation with Exit Festival.

As expected, the Guća lived spaces are by far more controversial in regard to nominal racial equality professed by festival organizers. The apparent split between the festival lived and conceived spaces is something that foreign Guća-goers tend to link to the festival celebration of Serbianhood. As foreign visitor Ariane writes on the website of a Dutch tour operator offering a range of Guća festival packages to international tourists (see guca-festival.com):

If there were things to regret, that would be too much nationalism in the festival. My Chinese friend couldn’t be at peace for more than five minutes because of too many enthusiastic Serbs who wanted to take a photo with him, offered him a drink all the time (it wouldn’t have been a bad thing if there weren’t so many of them), and if it wasn’t only because he was Chinese, while he’s from France actually. In France we would consider this disrespectful and rude, but we didn’t take it badly as long as people were not mean. Just two people were making the cut-off-head gesture.

It probably comes as no surprise that my Guća companion and interlocutor Karl, an Afro-Belgian man in his mid-thirties, received exactly the same treatment in Guća by local visitors. Obviously, the appearance of Serbia’s ‘real’ racialized Others (Asians and blacks) in the festival like Guća is considered so exceptional that it evokes the atmosphere of a freak show. Perhaps their racial difference raises eyebrows among local Guća-goers precisely because it stands in sharp contrast to the purist premises of Guća organic space. The perceived nationalism in Guća was also the reason why Karl’s Belgrade friends, undoubtedly self-identified urbanites, advised him strongly not to go to the festival. But having spent a couple of days over there, Karl recollected some of his impressions in an interview (Aug 2013):

Of course I was concerned about nationalism and racism at Guća because they go hand in hand. But I’m glad to say that the alarming information I got from the international media and my Belgrade friends was wrong. I spent the last two

150 Note, however, that this is the only racist incident in Exit that I am aware of.
days dancing, laughing, and sharing with so-called [Serbian] nationalists. (...) It’s true that people are staring at me, but it’s the same for white people going to Africa. They are seen as aliens. This bothers me only when I’m not in the mood, and especially when I want to spend quality time with my friends.

In contrast to Karl’s tolerant and sympathetic take on the issue, I experienced the overwhelming attention he was receiving from local Guča-goers as something intrusive and bordering on violence. Although no single incident of physical harassment occurred at the time, the tension was palpable, generating the same kind of ambiguity between hospitality and hostility discussed above (see 5.4.2). This was especially noticeable when a few all-male groups of local Guča-goers called him out in passing, using the names of familiar black figures such as Muhammad Ali or Barack Obama.

At any rate, it is the racialization of Romanies as a traditionally infamous racial-ethnic group in Serbia and elsewhere that raises the most controversy over issues of national identity representation in Guča. That the Romani minority calls attention to exclusionary practices of the Serbian nation-state and major population, as well as to the ‘white’ and monoethnic assumptions of what is considered to be the Serbian cultural heritage (cf. Silverman 2012: 127), has already been demonstrated in the kolo-čoček debate surrounding Guča (see 4.5.3). Discussed next are the political motivations and the controversial ways in which the Serbian authorities support Romani people and their musical culture in Guča.

The official endorsement of Romani brass bands in Guča is not solely driven by economic interests, given that a majority of foreign visitors are largely drawn to the festival because of Romani musicians. What is at stake here are also political reasons – specifically, a desire of Serbian national elites to demonstrate their ‘Europeanness’ by adopting discourses of human rights and multiculturalism, in particular vis-à-vis the Romani minority. Thus, the apparently equal treatment and display of Romani musicians in Guča can be regarded as instrumental in the process of Serbia’s accession to the EU. It helps the country’s ruling classes achieve their political goals and gain credibility in both the local and international political arenas. It is in this light that affirmative public statements about the ‘European’ character of Guča Festival should be understood. Recall, for example, the statement by Serbian politician Mrkonjić (in Tadić et al. 2010: 359) that Guča ‘is a European festival’; or take notice of a suggestion made by Vranje mayor Antić (in Živanović 2012: 8) that ‘[t]he present Festival should showcase loud and clear the extent to which the Serbian tradition incorporates a multicultural European dimension’.

However, as Silverman (2012: 165) rightly notes, ‘that the state recognizes Romani art does not automatically mean progress in human rights; the state often recognizes a few talented Romani artists as tokens while ignoring the rest’. Or in Imre’s
(2008, in Silverman 2012: 174) words, ‘embracing selected Roma musicians has long been a strategy employed by the state (...) to handpick and isolate from their communities “model” representatives of the minority, most of whom remain all the more excluded from the national community’. In the case of Guča, the segregation of Romanies from the rest of society is evident in the limited social roles available to them at the festival. Namely, they usually appear in the capacity of entertainment workers (musicians and dancers) or beggars. The implication here is that Romani and Serbian festival participants do not mix, not even members of brass bands, as noticed also by two festival documentary makers from Germany (see Stojanović 2007: 17). Although instances of unfair treatment, exploitation, and corruption are reported by trumpet players from both ‘white’ and ‘black’ camps (see e.g. Ignjić, in Kovačević 2011: 13; Lazarević, in Petrović 2012c: 5; Stanković 2013), there is a widespread perception that Romani musicians suffer more in these respects. For example, Arsenijević (2012), Lukić-Krstanović (2006: 200), and Lajić Mihajlović and Zakić (2012: 232) write about ethnic discrimination against ‘black’ brass bands in Guča, as well as about their underrepresentation in the festival music programs and Internet presentations. Đorđević (interview, Sep 2014) for his part accuses festival organizers of having a condescending attitude towards Romani musicians, with the exception of Boban and Marko Marković.

Indeed, among a large number of successful Romani trumpet players competing and winning at Guča, Boban Marković is an absolute star of the festival, appealing equally to both local and international audiences for the reasons explained in 4.5.2 and 5.4.2. Numerous honors that he has received from the Guča authorities can be said to speak volumes of his status as a role model for the rest of Serbian Romani community. Not only did festival organizers grant Boban and his son Marko the privilege of holding individual concerts since 2004; at Guča 2007, Boban was also appointed the World Ambassador of Guča Festival by president of the festival board Jolović, while the Guča Local Community Council proclaimed him an honorary citizen of the Trumpet Republic (Tadić et al. 2010: 350). And to add a trivial detail to the list, in one of Guča’s hotels, a luxury hotel apartment was named after Boban Marković and decorated with items related to this musician (‘Boban Marković: We play...’, Blic, 2010). But in reality, as Silverman (2012: 166) points out following Imre (2006), ‘Roma occupy a delicate position where they are suspect both because they can never be true representatives of the nation and because they are too closely allied to forces of commercialism and consumption’ (for the latter, see 4.5.3 and 5.4.2).

The opposite story of Serbian trumpet player Dejan Petrović is very illustrative in this respect. According to Đorđević (interview, Sep 2014), Petrović is far better treated than any other trumpet player, including Boban Marković. This is arguably due to his Serbian lineage, but also due to his strong connections with powerful po-
itical figures in Serbia (in particular with Ivica Dačić, the former PM and leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia) that he inherited from his late father, also renowned trumpet player Mića Petrović (see Petrović 2012b). It therefore comes as no surprise that it is Dejan (and not Boban) who is regarded as a true representative of the nation – hence his title of the Ambassador of the Serbian Trumpet (‘Winner Guca 2010’, Guca Festival, 2010) – and who is routinely selected to represent Serbia at various international fairs, festivals, sports and cultural events. For instance, he was invited by the Serbian Government to participate in the mini-concert Senses of Serbia held at the European Parliament in 2011. In the same year, Petrović also represented Serbia at the Thessaloniki International Fair, but also at Tourism Fairs in Brussels and Milan respectively (see Milojković 2011).

According to Scott (1990, in Silverman 2012: 228), Romanies tend to flatter national elites publicly but express their grievances behind the scenes. That this generalization may also apply to Boban Marković became crystal clear during the first international brass band competition at Guča 2010, when it was decided that Dejan Petrović and Ekrem Mamutović compete on behalf of Serbia for the World’s First Trumpet and First Band awards. It is true that Boban did not hide from the public his disappointment with the decision of festival organizers to invite neither him nor his son Marko to represent Serbia in the competition (see Novaković 2010; or Petrović 2010b: 1). But it was his colleague Ignjić (in Kovačević 2011) who disclosed to a local newspapers how Marković really felt about this. To quote him fully:

Ask Boban Marković why his son Marko didn’t want to compete for the First Trumpet of the World last year? You know what he told me – I wouldn’t let them diminish my son, as it was known in advance that Dejan Petrović would receive the World’s First Trumpet award. That was Boban’s answer. For the last ten years, all [major] awards swing back and forth between Dejan Petrović and Dejan Lazarević. They’re great guys, but that’s the way it goes. (Ibid., 13.)

The main reason Marković and other Romani artists rarely ever speak publicly about their grievances is that raising political issues is not generally considered a wise career move. Or as Silverman (2012: 254) put it, ‘Roma know that they are paid to entertain, not educate, so they learn not to raise political issues on stage’. The other important reason for political apathy among the Romanies may lie in their longstanding distrust and fear of the authorities. According to Đorđević (interview, Sep 2014), Romani artists, including the Markovićs, rather opt to adopt a servile and opportunistic attitude towards the major population in order to avoid harassment and pursue their own advantage. It is from this perspective that one should read Boban’s choice
of ‘Marš na Drinu’ [March to the Drina] as an opening song at his concerts in Guča. The same applies to some of his media statements, such as the two following examples:

Wherever in the world I played, I’d always point out and feel proud that I come from Serbia. The most interesting event in my career was a stage appearance in New York, where I made the Americans applaud me and shout out ‘Serbia! Serbia!’, while standing before them draped in the Serbian flag. (Milojković 2010a.)

I’m proud when [foreign brass band musicians] say that Serbian music is the best in the world. (Milojković and Bojović 2012c.)

However, behind the scenes, as Boban’s ex-manager Đorđević testifies (interview, Sep 2014), Marković does not deny a sense of national pride and belonging to Serbia but ranks it as secondary to his primary identification as an ethnic Romani. Either way, by rousing his local audience with patriotic songs and statements, Marković (just as many other Romani artists) not only agrees to fashion a ‘whitewashed and nationalized’ image of himself (cf. Imre 2008, in Silverman 2012: 174). He also becomes implicated in the reproduction of Serbian national ideology in Guča and elsewhere. If we add to this the political arguments discussed above, then it is plausible to view Guča’s Romani stars (such as the Markovićs and others) as performing a double ideological function for the Serbian authorities. Namely, ‘they [either] […] reinforce nationalism, or they […] display the nation’s commitment to diversity’ (cf. Silverman 2012: 174).

But it is not only Serbia’s ruling classes that profit from the economic, political, and cultural capital that Romani musicians in Guča embody. The latter group is also widely exploited by people from the music and entertainment industry. In fact, the label ‘Gypsy music’ has become such a powerful trademark in itself, both commercially and symbolically, that it requires no longer any references to actual Romani music, nor any involvement of actual Romani musicians (see Marković 2013: 204; or Silverman 2012: 241). Those capitalizing most on the type of Gypsy music promoted in Guča are, of course, Emir Kusturica and Goran Bregović. Both men are much debated and highly controversial figures, particularly within the former Yugoslav region where they are admired and despised at the same time. Both are, for example, applauded for international success in their respective fields of artistry, but

151 ‘March to the Drina [River]’ is a Serbian patriotic song, composed by Stanislav Binički during the First World War, that symbolizes national resistance to the Great Powers.

152 The Marković’s former manager Đorđević (interview, Sep 2014) claims that the said event took place in Chicago.
simultaneously denounced ‘for promoting a version of the Balkans that corroborates centuries-old stereotypes’ (Marković 2013: 8–9). Relatedly, both men are praised as the artists who helped revive widespread interest in the rich music-cultural heritage of the region. But at the same time, they are accused of adjusting it to a decidedly Western sensibility and thus of trivializing it for their personal advantage, economic and otherwise. Kusturica and Bregović are additionally thanked for having opened the door to numerous musicians from the Balkans, above all to Serbia’s Romani brass bands. Then again, there is simultaneously a gnawing sense that the latter are left with little space for creative maneuvering due to the audience’s already formed expectations about the Balkan images and sounds. (For more about Bregović-related controversies, see Marković 2013.153)

Furthermore, some of Bregović’s greatest hits (e.g. ‘Kalashnikov’ and ‘Moonlight’) are appropriated tunes from such Serbian Romani musicians as Boban Marković, Slobodan Salijević, and Šaban Bajramović (see Babić 2004: 239–241; Marković 2013: 146–151). According to their testimonies, the cooperation with Bregović left them with a bitter taste in their mouth (see also Silverman 2012: 275–276; interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014). As pointed out by Aleksandra Marković (2013:147), a specialist in Bregović’s music:

Even if they were acknowledged as authors or paid a one-off fee for collaborating on the CD production (as is standard practice in recording business), some artists felt deceived, as they were never paid royalties for the countless live performances subsequently given by Bregović.

But there is surely more to the grievances of Romani musicians than the simple sense of economic injustice. As Romani trumpet player Salijević stated once, ‘At the end of the day, it is Goran Bregović that travels [and plays] around the world, [while] the Salijevićs are nowhere. There is no single mention of them.’ (Babić 2004:240.) Clearly, such matters as popularity, artistic prestige and credibility seem to carry just as much weight in these disputes.

153 Note that similar contradictions appear in academic discussions of WM practices in general. This music market niche has indeed proved very helpful in increasing the visibility and revenue of marginal peoples (including the Romanies), while simultaneously keeping the structures of inequality in place. Referring to Imre (2006) and Feld (2000), Silverman (2012) notes that the incorporation of ethnic-racial difference into various outlets of the global entertainment industry is a double-sided process: ‘it can be seen as liberating and democratic, empowering minorities whose voices would otherwise be missing or stereotyped. At the same time, it implies the appropriation of such voices and images by corporate multiculturalism ... which re-trivializes racial difference on a commercial basis’ and ‘reproduces the institutions of patronage’. (Ibid., 293, 276.)
More generally, it is important to emphasize that ‘there is no problem with creative trading of cultures, but rather we must investigate the terms of the trade’ (Hutnyk 2000, in Silverman 2012: 43). It is in the light of this critical reminder that many collaborative WM projects, such as Paul Simon’s *Graceland* or Ry Cooder’s *Buena Vista Social Club*, are criticized for maintaining and reinforcing the hegemony of neocolonial power relations within the global music industry (Gligorijević 2012: 8). Importantly, however, the appropriation of the Serbian Romani brass by Kusturica and Bregović is quite exceptional in this regard. The way in which both artists repeatedly gloss over issues of ownership and appropriation is by assuming the ‘double role of the curator [and] the “authentic” Balkan native’ – that is, of someone positioning himself both inside and outside the commercialized transnational film / WM markets (see Marković 2013: 8).

In defense against public charges of Romani exploitation, Bregović presents himself and behaves as if he is one of them, or at least as if he is on their side. As Marković (2013: 230) notes, ‘his identification with Gypsies (...) span[s] from joyful camaraderie to overt physical transformation into a prototypical darkskinned Gypsy’. Moreover, Bregović deploys the Gypsy voice and image for many purposes – to justify his ethically dubious compositional techniques (recycling and collage), to explain his multisited ‘nomadic’ living caused by the recent Yugoslav wars, and to claim authenticity in the presentation of his Balkan Beat production and his stage persona (see Marković 2013). Kusturica (in Živanović 2011) defends himself in like manner, by declaring the Romani world to be an integral part of his childhood experience as well as of who he is today. In his own words:

> And where else am I supposed to draw energy and disperse [my creative] doubts but in the world I know and love? I grew up alongside a Romani settlement, became friends with Gypsies, and already as a kid, got to know their music. I was living out the life from my movies. (Ibid., 6.)

The blurred lines between the Balkan nations and the region’s Romani minority in Bregović’s and Kusturica’s artistic work can be said to reflect the ambivalent feelings with which Romanies are received by the Serb population in general. Just as elsewhere in Europe and the world, Serbia’s Romanies occupy a continuum between extreme disparaging and romanticizing (see Silverman 2012; Živković 2001). The label *Gypsy* accordingly carries contradictory meanings. Within the Serbian / former Yugoslav context, the term is often used pejoratively and in a recursive manner (similarly as the term *Balkan*), operating thereby ‘as a metonymic signifier for everything that is considered to be a weaker, debased item in dichotomies’ (Živković 2001: 89; see also van de Port 1999: 300). This explains why a substantial segment of the Serbian public blames Kusturica and Bregović for creating abroad an apparently mis-
leading image of Serbs as Gypsies (cf. Jansen 2001: 54). Disclosed here is a scornful attitude towards the Romanies, whose status as Others in Serbian society has been duly noted and already discussed in terms of the ever-present polarization between Guća’s ‘white’ and ‘black’ brass bands.

Still, in the larger framework of everyday life, there appears to be an ambiguous self-characterization of Serbs as Gypsies and non-Gypsies at the same time (see Jansen 2001). Such an attitude arguably performs two major functions. One is to reestablish a sense of superiority within the wider geographical hierarchy of power relations. As Goffman (1968: 130–131) clarifies, this is the mechanism by means of which one social group (e.g. the Serbs) renders itself ‘normal’ and thus superior when compared to those (e.g. the Romanies) whose stigmatized status is displayed even more dramatically. In the second scenario, the national self-identification with Gypsies seems to be utilized as a form of scrutiny, the outcomes of which vacillate between self-deprecation (i.e. self-critical discursive strategies that reaffirm negative views of the Serbs / Balkan nations) and self-exoticization (i.e. self-praising narratives resulting from the positive revaluation of the Serbian/Balkan stigma) (cf. also Goffman 1968; and Živković 2001).

Note, however, that it is not only the Serbs who relate ambiguously to Gypsy stereotypes. Some Balkan Romani musicians, notably Boban Marković and the late Esma Redžepova, find Kusturica’s and Bregović’s representations of Romani people problematic, too (interview with Đorđević, Sep 2014). Unlike their Romanian fellow musicians of Fanfare Ciocârlia, the Markovićs, for example, refuse to play into the stereotypes about Balkan Gypsy musicians when it comes to appearance, attitude, and behavior on and off stage, as well as to the repertoire played. As their former manager Đorđević specifies, they strongly oppose playing in the streets or kafanas for money, mingling with the audience during the gig, or inviting foreign journalists to their native Vladičin Han – knowing that the latter are searching for the stereotypical poverty-stricken but romanticized images of Romani life. And when on tours abroad, the Markovićs are apparently not willing to compromise their artistic integrity either. Judging by Đorđević’s testimony, they refuse to play Serbian traditional or patriotic / Chetnik tunes to the Serbian diaspora across Europe, since they see themselves primarily as a modern brass band, both visually and sonically. The Markovićs have, in his words, ‘always sounded too jazzy, too modern for the Serbian diaspora’. But when that suits their goals, as Silverman (2012: 7) reminds us,

some Romani performers [the Markovićs included] strategically employ aspects of self-stereotypification to monopolize various musical niches. Labels such as exotic, passionate, genetically talented, and soulful, for example, are (...) also sometimes defended by Romani performers. (Emphases in original.)
The following passage describing Marko Marković’s inherent musical ability due to his Romani origins illustrates well that this sort of labeling is indeed more than welcome when it serves the economic and self-promotional purposes of Romani musicians:

Marko has been playing since the age of three. ‘It’s normal where I’m from. From the moment you get up in the morning, you can hear children practising their instruments. Yet it has to be in your blood – you can’t learn to play like a Roma. It’s like God designed the Roma to play music’. (Bolton 2012.)

The widespread myth about natural born music virtuosi among Romanies is clearly predicated upon another underlying set of Gypsy stereotypes. Specifically, they are considered to be free from the shackles of modern life and thus somehow closer to nature, which in turn adds to the perceived authenticity of their music production. (For more on this topic, see Marković 2013.) In short, then, the story of Boban and Marko Marković is truly illuminating. It teaches us that acts of resistance to the imposed stereotype usually go hand in hand with catering to the expectations of audiences and state authorities (in the Guća case represented by festival organizers). The same conclusion has been reached by Carol Silverman (2012: 145), who maintains, following Ortner (1995), ‘that resistance is neither singular nor pure; (...) it is always paired with collaboration’.

Let me finally re-emphasize that the ambivalent attitude towards Serbia’s Romanies in Guća and elsewhere, constantly shifting between the poles of fascination and loathing, applies equally to both local and international festival audiences. Romanies are indeed ubiquitous fantasy figures, ‘feared as deviance, idealized as autonomy’ (Trumpener 1992, in Silverman 2012: 9); or in another definition, ‘paradoxically revered as musicians and reviled as people’ (Silverman 2012: 3).154 The positive coding of Romani stereotypes can be found, for example, in the Guća documentary *The Brass Music Oscar* (2002). Here, the reasons for the peaceful atmosphere of the festival are sought in the non-violent history of Romani people, as opposed to the implicitly presumed warmongering impulses in the host population. In the words of (German) documentary director and commentator Matthias Heeder, ‘[m]aybe this is due to the spirit of the Roma who in their history never went to war; and maybe it is this spirit which is passed on to the listeners of their music’.

Otherwise, the way in which virtually all Guća-goers respond to the Romani brass is usually in a combination of *sevdah* (a Balkan version of trance experience), high-energy outbursts (through jumping), and enhanced eroticism (through belly

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154 For the roots of negative stereotypes about Romanies, see Hancock 2002: 126–127; or Silverman 2012: 9. For the positive associations of Romani Otherness with nostalgia and Orientalized / exoticized images, see Silverman 2012.
dancing) (see 4.3.2). The quintessential Otherness of Gypsies in this and similar contexts apparently helps non-Romani festivalgoers to ‘exteriorize their state of soul’ (Block 1936, in van de Port 1999: 291) and experience themselves in a new light. Specifically, as van de Port (1999) convincingly argues, masquerading as a Gypsy (or as a Balkanite for that matter) – by assuming the qualities s/he is typically associated with, such as freedom, mercurial temperament, and unbridled passion – is a way to allow the repressed Other within the Self to take the stage (cf. also Beissinger 2007: 123). From this psychoanalytic point of view, to quote van de Port (1999: 306) verbatim, ‘the wish to re-inject the Self with [Balkan Gypsy] Otherness – for exploratory or liberating purposes – is as common … [as e]stablishing a notion of Self by way of projecting unwanted parts of the Self onto significant Others’.
6 Conclusion

The present study sought to investigate issues of national identity articulations in post-Milošević Serbia using the Exit and Guča trumpet festivals as case studies. It looked specifically for answers to two main research questions: first, how do Exit and Guča function as micronational spaces; and second, what does this tell us about national identity articulations in post-Milošević Serbia? The summary below provides major insights into these questions.

6.1 Summary: Serbia’s National Identity Schisms in Exit and Guča

Drawing on the ideas of Lefebvre (2009), I first attempted to show in detail how Exit Festival reproduces itself as a micronational counter-space, that is, as a space with a utopian vision of a truly democratic Serbian society yet to come. The Exit ‘diversion’ of real space was especially evident in the founding year of the festival (in 2000), when its participants used the concepts of noise and unbounded space to boycott and overthrow the Milošević regime. It was precisely through these ‘unruly’ politico-cultural elements that the festival adopted a prophetic role, thus actively envisioning and participating in the establishment of Serbia’s subsequent political order. Not long after that, the festival underwent multiple processes of institutionalization, commercialization and internationalization on the ground. In consequence, the Exit counter-space has over time lost its initial political power and significance. But despite all such changes, I provided strong evidence above that the discursive effects of Exit counter-spatial practice can be still traced in the Serbian self-narration. I argued specifically that there are two major discursive frameworks that continue to inform and facilitate the Exit counter-space reproduction. Within the first, the Exit festival reaffirms itself as a counter-space every time it suffers attacks by right-wing and conservative sections of the domestic population. In this aspect of its self-identification, the Exit counter-space clearly assumes a negative identity based on opposition to the still hegemonic ideology of Serbian nationalism. Serving as a historical backdrop to this line of Exit counter-spatial practice is in particular the first-hand experience of nationalism in Milošević’s times. It is therefore the idea of a radical break or discon-
continuity with the prior sociopolitical order that underpins the Exit identity construction in oppositional terms.

Indeed, the analysis above made it crystal clear that the countercultural, urban, and cosmopolitan reproduction of Exit counter-space is virtually impossible without its negative mirror-image, epitomized in Guča and Serbia’s ‘rurbanites’ more generally. In the imagination of Serbia’s self-identified urbanites, the latter group is positioned as a constitutive Balkanized Other of their Occidentialized-Self. The Exit contempt for the perceived Guča Otherness is perhaps best captured in those domestic narratives using the metaphors of asphalt and mud to endorse the city’s progressive urban spirit. Moreover, the discourse of Serbia’s national identity schisms in Exit and Guča operates at multiple spatial levels at once, as exemplified through analysis of such binary oppositions as global-local, urban-rural, North-South, and West-East. Central to this asymmetric binary logic of Serbianhood is arguably the concept of kultura [culturedness] as a self-evident asset claimed by Exit urbanites. It is indeed kultura, so the argument goes, that authorizes the Serbian cultured class to set up aesthetic standards and then express disdain for those national fellows – specifically, their ‘rural’ brethren in Guča – whose cultural taste falls outside it. Moreover, the hierarchical relationship of Exit kultura and Guča nekultura [non-culture, unculturedness] often adopts racial arguments and is manifest in the condescending attitude of the ‘superior’ (urban) group towards the ‘inferior’ (rural) one.

As shown in the analysis above, Exit’s urban credentials and claims to kultura are additionally defended through a focus on the festival’s local, regional, and European affiliations. Praised are specifically the cosmopolitanism, tolerance, democracy, and civility of the festival host location – both the Vojvodina region and the city of Novi Sad as its capital. The difference and implied superiority of the Novi Sad people / Vojvodinians / Prečani Serbs is said to owe to the Austro-Hungarian heritage and is thus measured by the perceived barbarity and vulgarity of the Srbijanci living down south and carousing in Guča. The kultura of Exit counter-space is therefore deeply anti-Ottoman / Oriental / Balkan in its assumptions and practices. Being such, it automatically enters into a relation of juxtaposition with the nekultura of Guča organic space and the associations of the latter with Serbian rurbanites, Serbia proper, and the Balkans in general. The Guča nekultura is specifically said to reflect the excess, crudity, and depravity of Serbian nouveau riche, embodied in the figures of politicians, businessmen, and estrada [showbiz entertainers]. In any case, I made the argument that the vocal denunciation of Guča organic space by Serbian self-identified urbanites ultimately amounts to a critical social commentary on the ethically dubious character of the country’s postsocialist realities of everyday life.

When discussed through the lens of the second discursive framework, the Exit counter-spatial practice seeks to create qualitatively different imaginings of the nation’s present and future. Based on the evidence above, I claimed that one way in
which the Exit counter-space does so is through the rhetoric, initiatives, projects, and programs with strong pro-Yugoslav undertones. This, as I argued further above, is not a nostalgia for the former socialist state but rather for the Western values of modernization and progress it embodies. I showed additionally that the pro-Yugoslav attitude in Exit is also used for subversive ends, specifically, for opposing ethnonationalist policies of the new Balkan nation-states. The other way in which the Exit counterspatial practice is productive in its quest for the country’s social transformation is through the interrelated ideological discourses of youth, future, counterculture, change, progress, cosmopolitanism, urbanity, normality, and the West / Europe. In this aspect of its reproduction, the Exit counter-space is thus positively self-identified, setting itself the task of reforming Serbian society at large.

Having illustrated multiple instances of the Exit ‘missionary’ work in both conceived and lived spaces of the festival representation, I moved on to discuss the main premises of Exit counter-space. The main argument therein was that the Exit ‘civilizing’ mission is ultimately based on the appropriation of Westernness and is reified on the ground through a variety of ‘countercultural’ practices. In Exit-related discourses, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, counterculture is defined either using the notions of excellence, resistance, urbanity, and cosmopolitanism in music-culture, or as a vehicle for social critique and political engagement. Either way, due to the specificities of the festival’s local geography, the Exit pro-Western orientation seems to sufficiently guarantee the credibility of Exit counterculture. The reason for that lies arguably in the fact that Western discursive practices usually occupy a minoritarian and oppositional status in the Serbian popular imagination.

The analytical considerations of Guča Festival as an organic space were also informed by Lefebvre’s (2009) musings on the corresponding spatial concept. It was proposed accordingly that a substantial segment of socio-spatial practice in Guča is devoted to the vision of the Serb nation as an ancient, unvarying, and ethnically homogeneous entity. The concept of the organic nation creates, in other words, the image of an organism whose head (the national elites), soul (the church and folk peasant culture), and body (the people) operate as one. In the present study, I illustrated in detail how each component of this organic unity manifests itself in the Guča micronational space.

In particular, I first analyzed the ways in which selected representatives of Serbia’s political, economic, and cultural elites from the conservative end of the political spectrum participate in the reproduction of Guča organic space. Central to this analysis were the institution of the festival host and the Guča welcome speeches with strong nationalist undertones. The analysis specifically pointed to two underlying purposes that the hosting role seems to play in Guča: one is to evoke the ‘organic’ relationship between the nation-state as home and the national elite as host; and the other is to reinforce the view of Guča Festival as a microstate (i.e. Trumpet Republic)
in its own right. The functions of Guča national-minded speeches were likewise several. On the one hand, they centered on recollections of the mythic glory of the Serbian historico-military past with its expansionist aspirations and freedom fighting culture. On the other, they celebrated Serbian tradition in all its diversity (above all, Serbian Trumpet), and not simply to foster a sense of national pride, continuity, and exclusivity among the local population. According to such speeches, efforts at preserving Serbian tradition in and through Guča amounted to the survival and renewal of the Serb nation itself.

The analysis then followed two main discursive paths along which the idea of the Serbian ‘soul’ apparently comes to life in Guča. The first was organized around the concept of organic unity of church and people / state and its various manifestations in Guča – such as, the inclusion of church authorities and religious content in the festival program, the spatial and symbolic centrality of the local church in the narratives of past and present, or the discourses of Svetosavlje, sabor, and sabornost (see 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). My claim here was that these trends not only reflect the general Orthodoxification of Serbian national space; they, equally importantly, came to signify the publicly desired expression of belonging to the Serb nation.

The analysis of Guča organic space which followed the second discursive path located the national quintessence (‘soul’) in the people’s language, cultural expressions, customs, and mentality. It is on these grounds that I claimed that the festival is in totality of its spatial practice arranged as a sort of Volksmuseum, where a miscellaneous collection of objects (both material and non-material in form) is gathered to showcase the authenticity and richness of Serbia’s folk peasant culture (ranging from old crafts and customs, to national songs and dances). Referring to Ugrešić (1993), I interpreted the Guča Volksmuseum as ‘the kitsch of Serbian nationalism’, whose primary function is to create distorted collective memories of the country’s past and thereby help the native population come to terms with the present lamentable state of affairs caused by recent wars and systemic corruption in transition.

Special attention in the analysis of Serbia’s ‘soul’ was paid to the notion of the izvor [wellspring] of Serbian brass band tradition and the central role it plays in the musical projections of Guča organic space. I demonstrated that the complex discursive field surrounding the Guča izvor is largely marked by tensions arising from the impossibility of reconciling in a satisfactory way what is considered part of Serbia’s old, authentic, ethnically pure tradition with new, commercial, and foreign musical trends and influences. The narratives prevailing in the production of Guča micronational space are accordingly those of nostalgia and loss, combined often with purist demands.

Finally, the third pillar – the ‘body’ – of Serbian organic unity in Guča was discussed by exploring the link between the dominant representations of the national past evoked by the military imagery of the trumpet, and their internalization by the
local festival crowd representing here the ‘body’ of the Serb nation. The essential part of the analysis was informed by the fact that the post-2000 revisions of Serbia’s national past made the once-repudiated Chetnik movement become a legitimate and naturalized part of the country’s official discourse and its rememberings of the anti-fascist struggle. Showcased were accordingly all visible and evocative trappings of Chetnik nationalism and their spillover effects on the Guča social space. I illustrated specifically how different elements pertinent to the Chetnik heritage and ideology (such as the national flag, šajkača hat, three-fingered salute, images of the Second World War Chetnik ‘heroes’ and indicted Serbian war criminals) are conveyed and lived out discursively, visually, sonically, and bodily in the lived spaces of Guča organic representation. Then I moved on to showcase that the Guča organic space stages, narrates, and embodies not only the patriarchal fantasy of warrior-masculinity, but also that of female chastity and fecundity. Juxtaposed with these overly romanticized projections of collective national unity are the gendered representations of the nation’s ‘body’ in its carnivalesque and thus perverted form to be found in the non-scripted lived spaces of Guča festivities. Importantly, the analysis showed that even when framed by the imperatives of hedonistic consumption and bodily excess, the construction and performance of gender difference in and by the Guča social space remains patriarchal (i.e. male-dominated) at its core.

Moreover, the analysis showed that the observed phallocracy of Guča organic space is visually emphasized also through the in-situ monumentalization of the main symbols of Serbian tradition – the church, trumpet, and peasantry. It was asserted additionally that the analyzed web of Guča’s major landmarks, monuments, and museums represents the powerful reification of Serbian nationalism as the prevailing regime of truth and the very basis of the nation’s revised cultural memory in the post-socialist era.

Moving forward to analytical considerations of Exit and Guča as the micronational spatial embodiments of Two Serbias necessitated tackling the pivotal question of tradition and its value for national identity imaginings. This leads us to the starting point of this work – namely, whereas Exit proponents view the Serbian tradition as a hindrance to the fulfillment of a desired modern, urban, and European image of the country, Guča supporters recognize in it a core value in the (re)construction of Serbian national identity. Whether the given national identity schisms are evaluated as markers of either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ representational practice depends, of course, on the perspective assumed. What is, in other words, deemed a positive value by Guča organic space users occupies the negative end of the value continuum professed by Exit counter-space users, and vice versa.

The perceived schisms of Serbian national identity were explored in depth in Chapter 5, where Exit and Guča were pitted more directly against one another. Analyzed were specifically four spatial layers cutting across Serbia’s symbolic geogra-
phy and related national identity imaginings. The first pertained to what I identified as a global-local dynamic and its inscriptions in the Exit and Guča micronational spaces. The opposition between two festivals was concretely articulated as the Exit placelessness versus the singularity of Guča place, or in a more popular understanding, as Exit-as-copy versus Guča-as-original. Illustrated above were first the multiple ways in which the Guča organic space, drawing largely on the discourse of local-national uniqueness with its neotraditionalist and nationalist inflections, lays claims to authenticity, originality, moral authority, and the right of resistance to the ostensibly faceless, placeless, and disembodied globalization forces at work in the Exit counter-space. Then I pointed to three main counter-discourses aimed at the defense of Exit Festival, which I classified as: 1) the Exit denial of origins formulated in postmodern terms; 2) the Guča obliviousness to its Western origin; and 3) the Guča trickster-like attempt at presenting itself falsely as the Serbian tradition.

The socio-spatial approach was further applied to the analysis of the Exit-Guča opposition as embodying Serbia’s longstanding tensions between city and village (i.e. Serbia’s urban-rural divide), on the one hand, and between Vojvodina and Serbia Proper (i.e. Serbia’s North-South divide), on the other. In both cases, the analysis disclosed the rationale behind moral norms underpinning such binary oppositions. At stake here is, again, an evaluation system that puts a premium on the urbanity, modernity, and cosmopolitanism of the city and Vojvodina region (and thus of Exit counter-space endorsing the said values) whilst looking down upon the presumed traditionalism and backwardness of the village and Serbia proper (as expressed in the discursive production of Guča organic space). Illustrated at the same time were several ways in which the claimed Europeanness and civility of Exit counter-space are called into question by Exit critics. This was done in three ways: (1) by questioning the taken-for-granted aesthetico-ideological premises of the Exit cultural hierarchies; (2) by accusing Exit self-identified urbanites of acting as people with double standards, low self-esteem, or opportunist intentions; and (3) by proposing a Third Way approach to the Exit-Guča debate. The analysis above showed as well that one more alternative to defending Guča in this type of debate is through an emphasis on the physical and moral beauty of Dragačevo/Guča people – a narrative that feeds back into the nationalist discourse of the Dinaric Serbs populating the region as the desired prototype of heroic Serb warriors.

In the final considerations of Serbia’s national identity schisms along West-East axes, significant focus was placed on the issues of Serbian ethnic (self-)stereotypes and their articulations in Exit and Guča. The discourse of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ surrounding both festivals was specifically discussed in relation to Serbia’s multiple Significant Others, notably, Westerners, selected former Yugoslav nations, dispersed Serb communities, and Serbian Romances as ‘the strangers within’ (van de Port 1999).
both its biological and cultural emanations, and on the other, the recursive logic of Orientalist / Occidentalist discursive practices in which this concept is embedded. The analysis that observed and exemplified the sheer complexity of racial imaginings of the Serbian Self and its multiple Others in each festival, ultimately attested to the corresponding variety of ways in which Serbian people respond to and manage their *tribal stigma* (Goffman 1968). Despite the variety of such responses, my claim is that existing articulations of Serbian national identity in Exit and Guča reveal a fundamental incapacity of the native population to create and perform new national subjectivities outside the stigmatized Serbian/Balkan identity. In the analysis above, this was especially evident in those projections of the Serbian Self that are framed by the polarizing constructions of *Exit normality* and *Guča madness*.

Specifically, Serbia’s discourses of normality and madness essentially run along the dividing line between those nation’s members who disidentify and those who overidentify with their native land (cf. Kiossev 2005:182–183). For the first group of Serbian citizens, disidentification strategies amount to attempts to cast off the tribal stigma by means of a radical emigration, usually to Western countries. Alternatively, the strategies of distancing from the ‘troubled’ Serbian / Balkan identity necessitate the interiorization of the Western gaze, which in turn results in the evaluation of one’s own group members (the Serbs) through the lenses of the accepted stigma (see Živković 2001: 105). The Exit counter-space, using a pro-Western cultural model (dubbed ‘counterculture’ by festival producers) as a means for transforming Serbian society, is a clear-cut example of such an approach (see Chapter 3).

To the second group of Serbian citizens obviously belong those who are trying to compensate for the tribal stigma by endorsing national megalomania, hyperbolic patriotism, and Magical Realism. Numerous instances of organic nationalism and excessive national pride in Guča were illustrated at length in Chapter 4, whereas the expressions of Magical Realism were discussed in 5.4.1 in connection with the Guča construction of madness. In the latter case, Guča’s self-exoticizing strategies seem to vacillate ‘between Magical Realism as a positive and romantic utopia tailored to suit the Western taste, on the one hand, and Magical Realism as a disturbing dream-vision, nightmare and condition of collective psychosis, on the other’ (cf. Živković 2001: 101). As demonstrated above, both aspects of Magical Realism intersect in the Guča conceptions of madness in the form of intertwined discourses of Serbian / Balkan people as tamed savages and of Serbia / the Balkans as a more authentic but dangerous place of ‘ancient animosities, conflicts and bloodsheds’ (ibid., 106).

But either megalomaniac or self-exoticizing, the articulations of Serbian national identity in Guča imply again ‘the melting and disappearance of the national subjectivity before the gaze of the “Significant Other”’ (cf. Kiossev 2005: 182). In the first case, the projections of Serbian national identity are grounded in the ongoing political discourse of discontinuity (with the socialist past) and the attendant cultural prac-
tices of differentiation in the new Balkan nation-states. This is why the Guča organic space pays special tribute to the Serbian Trumpet and the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition; or why it celebrates Serbia’s military historical past, as well as the purity and authenticity of the overall national folk production at the expense of its Ottoman / Oriental influences (see 4.5.3). In all such instances, ‘the markers of national identity are produced as if mainly to be presented to the big Western Other, who is supposed to adjudge [Serbia] better than the rest’ (Ditchev 2005: 245).

Conversely and paradoxically, the Guča madness finds its expressions in such Orientalized and commodified musical forms as Serbian / Balkan WM, ethno, neo-folk, and TF. Here recourse to Magical Realism clearly entails ‘the self-exoticization of the periphery [Serbia] which is intended for consumption in the [Western] Metropolis’. And, as Živković (2001: 106) notes further, ‘[e]ach periphery should ideally be an exemplary place, a perfect embodiment of some extreme cultural difference’. In Serbia’s case, this is clearly Guča’s pre-packaged image of a crazy Serbian ‘Barbarogenius Decivilizer’ (to borrow the neologism of Serbian avant-garde artist Ljubomir Micić) that simultaneously thrills and terrifies the Western imagination.

Let me finally add that these two models of Serbia’s representational strategies in Guča can also be explained in terms of a collision between ‘identity-from-above’ and ‘identity-from-below’ (cf. Ditchev 2005: 245). At times, these representational models do stand in relations of sharp opposition – as shown in the analysis of Guča’s ongoing tensions between the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition and commercial neo-folk musical forms (see 4.5). But at times, they seem to fulfill the ideal of peaceful co-existence, largely owing the fact that ‘the standards imposed by [the] foreign gaze are changeable’ (see Ditchev 2005: 245–247). This is arguably how the Guča micronational space sutures over the apparent contradictions in its reproduction. It is precisely the porous line between two different cultural paradigms that enables local Guča supporters to shift freely between discourses of early nation-building projects – pertaining to Serbia’s neotraditionalist concerns with national homogeneity, purity, and authenticity – and those of information society, consumption, and multiculturalism that not only endorse but also privilege Serbia’s cultural difference over more ‘universal’ and ‘impersonal’ cultural products of global modernity, such as Exit on the whole.

More to the point, the construction of Exit and Guča as the representatives of Two Serbias ultimately upholds a widely accepted view of Serbia, and the Balkans in general, as ‘a place of specific liminality’ (Jansen 2005a) – a place characterized by what Todorova describes as the ‘imputed ambiguity’ of its symbolic geography. Adding to this view are the observations of this study that each festival alone is affected by the West-East clash of codes from within, as well as by many other antagonisms. This holds true especially for Guča, as corroborated by a number of discussions above, covering such topics as the musical bifurcation of the festival, the kolo-
čoček controversy, or the TF-WM distinction. Each of these discussions pointed to different kinds of social divisions (cultural, ethnic-racial, and otherwise) at work in both national and transnational geographies of social relations in Guča and, of course, elsewhere in Serbia. As shown above, the liminality of Guča space was likewise exhibited through the principal difference between Serbian ‘nationalists’ and ‘cosmopolitans’ in their joint defense of the Guča izvor. The claim here was that despite the shared essentialist and populist assumptions about the izvor of Serbian brass band tradition, and despite the common critical remarks on the Guča commercialization and rurbanization, their respective quests for authenticity are informed by fundamentally different ideological frameworks. The debate on Serbian nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism in Guča amounts specifically to such distinctions as exclusivity (erecting boundaries) vs. inclusivity (bridging differences), particularity (difference) vs. universality (sameness), anxiety about identity loss vs. celebration of emerging identities, monocultural vs. multicultural assumptions of national identity, or homogeneity/purity/authentic tradition vs. diversity/hybridity/invented tradition.

The internal fractions and tensions in Guča can be perhaps best explained by Boym’s (2007) two-part notion of reflexive and restorative nostalgia. A key difference between two types of nostalgia also seems to lie in the ideological drives behind each. The former is fascinated with the idea of geographical or temporal distance and its use in imaginative projections of one’s present identity. The latter is, by contrast, mostly occupied with the revisionist projects of national past and identity that are grounded ‘in an ahistorical discourse of origins, authenticity, truth, tradition, and ethnic and cultural purity’ (Buchanan 2010: 129). As documented above, the multifaceted projections of restorative nostalgia onto the Guča organic space are closely entangled with the process of rediscovering ‘ethnicity’ in Serbia’s postsocialist culture. This is most clearly manifest in the anxious narratives revolving around issues of the origins, authenticity, homogenization, and commodification of Serbian brass band tradition. Conversely, the instances of reflexive nostalgia can be discerned in those Guča-related narratives that celebrate the ideas of intercultural exchange, equality, harmony, tolerance, unity, hybridity, and neoliberal multi- and transculturalism. In this, expressions of Guča reflexive nostalgia apparently occupy the same ideological ground as the celebratory and closely intertwined discourses of World Music and New Ageism (see 3.2.5 and 5.4.2).

Relatedly, the study found that Guča’s liminality further appears as a tension between the overtly claimed Europeanness and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and the subtly expressed resentment-based nationalism (Greenfeld 1992) and the culture of humiliation (Moïsi 2009, in Popović 2012), on the other. This tension, I argued, manifests itself primarily in a love-hate type of relationship wherein Serbia relies on and simultaneously repudiates the authority of the big Western Other. The Guča ambiguous relationship to the latter was additionally explored through an analytical fo-
cus on two differing types of the festival crowd – native and foreign, and thus on two differing types of festival sensibilities and expectations, operating through such binaries as national-minded vs. neo-hippie, TF vs. WM, and clean vs. dirty (see 5.4.2).

Similar ambivalences were also discerned in the Guča relationship towards its more immediate Others, specifically, towards ex-Yugoslav nationals visiting the festival. As the study evidenced, this is particularly the case with Slovenes and Serb diaspora members, whose descriptions in Guča-related narratives include such diverse sentiments and moves as Yugonostalgia, chauvinism, irony, envy, unity, the use of Occidentalist and (self-)Orientalizing stereotypes. In contrast to this, the Guča relationship is far more straightforward with Bosnian Serbs (largely positive), Croats (from tense to controversial), and Bosnian Muslims (from neutral to contradictory).

Another prominent area of controversy in Guča is its ambivalent attitude towards Serbia’s ‘real’ racialized Others, above all towards Serbian Romanies. The attitude in question is one of alternation between hospitality and hostility, fascination and fear, admiration and contempt, trust and suspicion. The relationship of Romanies to various institutions of power (local and otherwise) is likewise fraught with contradictions, apparently based on instances of both collaboration and resistance, or on instances of playing both into and outside the Gypsy stereotype. In addition to the documented tensions between Serbia’s ‘white’ and ‘black’ brass bands / festival participants on the ground, and to the kolo-čoček debate that forms part of the larger ‘Oriental controversy’, the study also established that the Romanies are subject to shifting national political agendas. The position of the Serbian / Guča authorities towards the Romanies moves indeed between the politics of diversity and the politics of nationalism; or alternatively, between the politics of endorsement (i.e. handpicking the talented few) and the politics of exclusion (i.e. evermore alienating the rest). Using the case studies of Guča’s best-known ‘white’ and ‘black’ trumpet players, Dejan Petrović and Boban Marković respectively, I argued that the Romanies ultimately have no real prospect of ever becoming the ‘true’ representatives of the Serb nation.

A brief review of the influence of Bregović’s and Kusturica’s artistic work on Guča likewise revealed the deeply ambiguous self-perception of Serbs as Gypsies and non-Gypsies at the same time. In the affirmative scenario, the Serbs arguably identify with the Romanies either for the sake of self-criticism (which is one way of dealing with the tribal stigma known as self-deprecation); or just as many other international recipients of Romani art and culture, the Serbs do so for self-exploring purposes (which amounts to the strategy of identity construction called self-exoticization). Conversely, the resistance and insult that the Serbs feel when being confused with the Gypsies discloses yet another way of compensating for the tribal stigma – which is to exercise power over those (Romanies) whose stigma is even more apparent.
Additionally, the ideological framework which the study recognized as lying at the core of Exit’s liminality is that of cosmopolitanism. I showed that the latter seeks to reconcile, on the one hand, the modernist ideas of universal breaking away from the particular, and on the other, the postmodernist fetishization of the local. In another instance, I showed as well how ‘placeless’ signifiers of global modernity are employed, side by side, with specificities of the local geography, providing thereby two equally viable strategies for the construction of Exit cosmopolitanism. It seems clear, then, that despite these internal contradictions (which are also exhibited in the Exit ambivalent attitude towards Serbian / Balkan ethno / WM), the festival’s overarching cosmopolitan framework remains intact. But as pointed out above, the Exit internal discords and tensions are at the same time indicative of two opposing ways in which festival supporters seem to cope with the tribal stigma (namely, self-deprecation and disidentification vs. self-exoticization and joyful distancing). It was argued that moving between these two extremes can be further explained by the Exit shifting approach to the question of Serbian national identity representation – the first which appears to be critical, elitist, modernist, highly discriminatory, and context-sensitive; and the other which tends to be populist, democratic, postmodernist, non-discriminatory, and relativist. The latter approach is, I claimed, especially evident in the Exit internalization and articulation of such ethnic (self-)stereotypes as Serbian hospitality, freedom, victimhood, and to a lesser extent machismo. Thus, while invariably consistent with its main ideological premises (i.e. cosmopolitanism), Exit is clearly not immune to the appeal of self-Orientalizing discursive practice, especially not when this serves the festival’s self-promotional interests.

There are in fact many other internal contradictions that can be discerned in each Serbian music festival, even when they are discussed within the larger and seemingly neutral discursive framework of (nation) branding. It is therefore of vital importance to assess Exit and Guća also as brandscapes (Carah 2010) and the effects this conceptual change has produced on the native perception of the festivals themselves, Serbian popular music, and Serbian national identity respectively. In the epilogue that follows, I begin with a few words about nation branding in general, and then in Eastern Europe (EE) in particular.

6.2 Epilogue: Exit and Guća as Brandscapes in the Era of Neoliberal Corpo-Nationalism

Nation branding is a global trend that began to dominate the public stage from the mid-1990s, along with the boom of nation branding literature across disciplines with either market-driven or critical concerns (see Kaneva 2012a). Nation branding is broadly defined ‘as a set of discourses and practices at the intersection of the economy, culture, and politics’ (Kaneva 2012a: 5); or more specifically, as ‘a marketing
practice that simplifies and borrows only those aspects of a nation’s identity that promote a nation’s marketability’ (Volčić 2012: 148; see also Anholt 2003: 214). It is often emphasized that there is more to nation branding than ‘just advertising’. While the latter practice is usually understood as simply one way of communicating the core meaning of nation brand identity to the world outside (cf. Klein 2000: 5), nation branding aspires to become an integral part of national policy and, as such, to ‘reconstitute nationhood at the levels of both ideology and praxis’ (Kaneva 2012a: 4; emphases in original). The success of nation branding shows in substantial public funds that many governments around the world are willing to invest in numerous media and marketing campaigns, as well as in the services of branding experts that advocate or supervise them.

In postsocialist countries, nation branding is closely intertwined with the discourses of transition, Europeanization, and globalization. Being imported from the West, nation branding operates as a metonym for modernity. As such, it recommends itself to the EE countries as a new discursive vehicle for reimagining nations as ‘hip’ and nominally equal to the West. In this respect, the nation branding talk implicitly reproduces the West-East hermeneutic, whereby Occidental Europe remains a desired model of civilization and modernity that the EE countries are to replicate and aspire to. In fact, the EE countries view nation branding as the only possible way to respond to the changed rules of the global game, according to which a nation can apparently survive in the global arena solely by adopting the language of advertising and branding. For the EE countries, nation branding, in other words, has become one of the pathways to neoliberalism, that is, a pathway that secures their integration into economies of the EU and the world at large (cf. Kaneva 2012b; or Sussman 2012).

Speaking more broadly, what lies at the core of branding is the ideology of free market utopianism, which is used to conceal two major truths: one, that (nation) branding ultimately serves the interests of global capital (see Kaneva 2012b); and two, that branding naturalizes capital as the only imaginable form of social organization (cf. Carah 2010).

Within the overarching framework of neoliberal global capitalism, nation branding is clearly an integral part of wider branding practices and their primary focus on sign-value production ‘through the commodification of affective attachments’ (Kaneva 2012a: 10; see also Blackett 2003; Klein 2000; Lash and Lury 2007). Accordingly, all realms of life – from education and political activism, to nationhood and personal relations – have come to be colonized by branding practices and therefore subsumed under what Fairclough (1992: 207–215) calls the ‘commodification of discourse’. As Kaneva (2012a: 10) further points out, the effects of this discursive shift are such that ‘the economic and ideological are no longer separable’, and that branding has become a constitutive part of the everyday production and circulation of social meanings. Moreover, drawing upon the ideology of free market utopianism,
branding, on the one hand, conceals the workings of power at various levels – specifically, at the level of particular interests of those involved in (nation) branding practices, and at the wider level of global politico-economic structures within which (nation) branding ultimately serves the interests of global capital (see Kaneva 2012 b). On the other hand, branding naturalizes capital as the only imaginable form of social organization through a process which Fairclough (1992: 215–218) describes as the ‘technologization of discourse’.

Despite the copy-paste character of nation branding campaigns (Volčić 2012: 148), and despite the fact that there is no real evidence that nation branding improves the prospects of a brighter future for individual countries and the world as a whole (Sussman 2012: 30), the development of a nation branding strategy is still widely accepted as a necessity. The same applies to the former Yugoslav countries, including Serbia, where the idea of nation branding is based on ‘[t]he promise … that with a better image, other social problems can be addressed, that ultimately they are all tied to the economy, and the economy is tied to the national “brand”’ (Volčić 2012: 147).

Nation branding started gaining a foothold in Serbian public discourse at the turn of the millennium (Mijatović 2012: 213). Since the Serbian government’s efforts at nation branding initiatives are most tightly linked to those at making Serbia an attractive tourist destination, it is virtually impossible to draw the dividing line between two economy sectors. This is all the more remarkable insofar as one acknowledges that the discursive framing of culture as a resource seems to be central to each (see Papastergiadis and Martin 2011). It comes as no surprise then that the main strategy in Serbia’s nation branding and tourist promotion initiatives is to use local cultural events, notably Guća and Exit, as ‘a hook to attract tourists’ (Vuković, in Andrić 2011: 1). Indeed, both music festivals are heavily integrated into Serbia’s official tourist offer – as the 2011 campaign Sounds of Summer in Serbia155 organized by the Tourist Organization of Serbia (TOS henceforth) can attest to – and are largely promoted at various international fairs or within presentations of the country to foreign guest journalists who then report on them in their native countries (interview with Čerović, a TOS PR representative, Aug 2011). In line with the neoliberal mantra ‘culture as a resource’, Exit and Guća are indeed routinely described as engines of economic growth at both local and national levels, each contributing particularly to the development of tourist industry in the country (see The States of Exit, 2012; or footnote 136, p. 294). It is through this lens that the following statements by Exit Festival CEO Kovačević and Serbian PM Vučić are to be understood:

155 The campaign was based on the promotion of Serbia’s three music festivals – namely, Guća Trumpet Festival, Nišville Jazz Festival, and Belgrade Beer Fest – all taking place within two weeks of August 2011, except for Novi Sad Exit Festival which was promoted as a ‘plus’ event in July.
Exit Festival is the most lucrative investment in Serbia, which annually contributes to the local economy with more than fifteen million euros, and which has afforded to the economies of Novi Sad and Serbia more than a hundred million euros. (‘Kovačević: Exit is the most lucrative investment in Serbia’, *B92*, 2014.)

The PM pointed out that Exit also [strengthens] the candidacy of the City of Novi Sad for the European Youth Capital 2019, as well as for the European Capital of Culture in 2021. (‘Vučić: Exit will receive financial support from the Government of Serbia’, *Blic*, 2016.)

Furthermore, the Serbian Government has allocated substantial funds to both tourism and nation branding. Examples of the latter include annual Brand Fairs (since 2005), costly nation branding ads on CNN and on one of the central London billboards, ‘smaller scale projects and events, and the creation of two national bodies for country brand development’ (Mijatović 2012: 226; ‘The Guča trumpet festival has begun’, *B92*, 2006). Note that Exit, Guča, and Profile Ltd (a Belgrade-based marketing and communications agency responsible for building the Guča brand since 2006) also do their share in promoting nation branding. Both festivals were, for example, nationally awarded the status of Superbrands Serbia in 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, Profile Ltd organized a nation branding conference in 2004 (Ristić 2013), whereas Exit initiated a series of conferences titled *Rebranding Serbia* (2013–2015) with the aim of highlighting ‘the significance of the systematic development of a positive image of Serbia and the Serbs in the world’ (see www.rebrand.rs). Apart from the participation of globally distinguished nation branding experts, the conferences also brought together Serbia’s public and private sectors. Yet it is the latter sector which is seen as a primary leader in nation branding, while the government’s engagement with this branch of the marketing industry is criticized as either insufficient (Ristić 2013), or as lacking a clear ‘vision, (...) coordination between various governmental bodies, and (...) strategic plan of action’ (Mijatović 2012: 227).

From the foregoing arguments, it appears that nation branding has forged a more unified view of Exit and Guča as national brands having much in common, above all promoting a positive image of the country. To paraphrase Profile president Milan Ristić (2013), Guča and Exit are internationally recognized brands that cater to the nascent needs of global society, which are freedom and human equality. Exit co-founder Petrić (in Milović Buha 2008) asserts in like manner that there is plenty of room for cooperation between the two festivals, from sorting out common infrastructural issues and exchanging selected WM artists, to undertaking joint overseas projects with the aim of balancing out the current demographic structure of their respective foreign audiences. In fact, the two festivals are said to complement each
other to such an extent that they might form a synergy in the future, as the proposed slogans *Exit at Guća* and *Guća at Exit* suggest (Ristić 2013).

The unstated but obvious conclusion here is that Exit and Guća have so far been transformed into *brandscapes*, that is, into ‘experiential social space[s] where marketers engage consumers in the co-creation of brand meaning’ (Sherry 1998, in Carah 2010: 8; see also Klein 2000; or Lash and Lury 2007). Indeed, Exit and Guća as brandscapes enable and manage what Lefebvre identifies as ‘the spaces of consumption’ (both physical and mediated) and ‘the consumption of spaces’ (festivity, sun, and nostalgia in this case; see 2.3). Within such spaces, they provide festival consumers with resources from which to build their identities, lifestyles, taste cultures, and social experiences. It is therefore from the meaning-making potential of cultural practices they accommodate that they generate value for their consumers, their businesses and associated sponsor companies. In this regard, Exit and Guća, just as many other corporate brands, use methods of so-called *experiential branding*, which is exactly ‘about acquiring and deploying cultural capital’ (see Carah 2010: 71).

However, the point that needs emphasis here is that Exit is far ahead of Guća when it comes to the use of corporate branding know-how. There are arguably a number of factors that can account for this situation. First, Exit is the poster child of postsocialist transition, whereas Guća represents the cultural legacy of Yugoslav socialism. Second and relatedly, the ownership of Exit (registered both as a company and as an NGO) is strictly private, whereas Guća is a state-owned-and-run enterprise. Another factor that consolidates the Exit supremacy over Guća in (nation) branding is a generational gap, manifested not only in the different target audiences attending each festival (younger in Exit vs. both younger and older in Guća), but more importantly in the different age structure of the people running each enterprise. The generational difference between the Exit and Guća producers is typically reflected in their respective attitudes towards new globalized realities. Not only does the former group think about national identity in marketing terms rather than in terms of historical and cultural heritage, as is the case with Guća producers (cf. Kaneva 2012b: 115–116). Exit producers also seem to see in the discursive practices of neoliberal global capitalism an emancipatory force and new business opportunities for capable and creative individuals – as formulated succinctly in the Exit 2005 poster slogan *Life is what you make [it]* (see also 5.4.1 for Petrić’s flattering appraisal of then Exit CEO Bošković along the same lines).

Finally, a greater aptitude for branding in Exit than in Guća is not only predicated on the individual-collective opposition that two festivals are said to epitomize. It is also determined by the very concept and mission of each festival. Namely, in contrast to the Guća preservationist and nationalist concerns with the authenticity and purity of Serbian tradition, Exit is distinctively pro-Western in its aesthetics, ideology, and praxis, and fully devoted to the task of reforming the Serbian society. The Exit ef-
forts at modernizing Serbia’s political, socioeconomic, and cultural practices on the ground are apparently congruent with the discursive horizon of (nation) branding practices. It should therefore come as no surprise that it is Exit (and not Guča) that has organized the Rebranding Serbia conferences, promoted creative industries, startup culture, and technological entrepreneurship (see the State of Exit Foundation annual report, 2013), or made sure that its staff members learn branding expertise from Exit’s music (festival) industry partners based in London, Roskilde, or Budapest (see Krstić 2004: 8; or Petrić and Kovačević, in Milović Buha 2008). According to Serbian music festival scholar Lukić-Krstanović (in Petrović 2012b), Guča producers lack this sort of training and hence have no sufficient knowledge of the music festival business.

I have presented elsewhere (Gligorijević 2019 [forthcoming]) a detailed comparison of the scope and variety of branding practices in two festivals, illustrating such phenomena as a brand canopy – defined as ever-new extensions of the Exit and Guča brands (cf. Klein 2000: 148); experiential branding – defined as the sensory and participatory modes of interaction between festival sponsor brands and festival consumers; then, corporate social responsibility (CSR henceforth) in the domains of substance abuse, traffic safety, ecology, and humanitarian aid; or the ideas and know-how of boutique festivals with their emphasis on immersive environments and direct audience participation (see Robinson 2015). This type of inquiry was conducted with three goals in mind. First, to point to the ways in which Exit and Guča keep abreast of major branding trends and practices in the transnational music festival industry. Second, to put some flesh on the above assertion that Exit beats Guča in this respect. And third, to critically assess the underlying contradictions and main political implications arising from the very production of contemporary music festivals as brandscapes.

When it comes, for example, to various instances of claimed CSR in Exit and Guča, I argued that the major paradox lies in the irreconcilable tension between the festival brand’s primary drive for capital accumulation, on the one hand, and the discourse of CSR it adopts, on the other. In this regard, Exit and to a far lesser extent Guča do not lag at all behind their contemporaneous festival counterparts. They all apparently endorse the socially responsible language of antidrug, antismoking, and safe-driving campaigns, as well as that of sustainable living, while facilitating at the same time ‘spaces which promote the causes of those very social problems’ (cf. Carah 2010: 119). As Carah convincingly shows in his study of pop brands, the primary goal of the latter is not social problem solving, but profit maximization. The discourse of CSR that (music festival) brands fetishize should therefore be understood primarily as ‘a mode of capital accumulation’, which does not aim at restructuring existing ‘social relations but at educating the “ignorant few”’ (ibid., 125, 120).
Two main political implications follow from this underlying attitude of corporate brands. The first is that social problems are deemed less structural than individual in their nature, and that their solving is considered simply a matter of self-policing (Carah 2010: 115). The second implication of ‘socially responsible’ branding practices is a belief that their profit-making activities ‘actually serve as positive forces for good in society’ (Hilton 2003: 47). As partly illustrated in the case of Exit, brands do tend to provide ready-made solutions pertaining to such socioeconomic, political, and ethical domains as ecology, charity, youth support, or restoration of cultural monuments. In doing so, they divert attention from the complexity and contradictions of real social life and therefore from the possibility of generating alternative solutions to real social antagonisms. In fact, ‘[t]he social, ethical and political discourses brands construct relieve us of the duty to think so that we can continue to enjoy’ our participation in the consumer society (Dean 2006, in Carah 2010: 112).

A similar logic applies to the branding aspect of multicultural music projects to be found in festival programs, Exit and Guča included (see Gligorijević 2019 [forthcoming]). Let me first emphasize that such projects fit closely the logic of the transnational music market which actually feeds off cultural diversity. Furthermore, I agree with the critical remarks of such writers as Silverman (2012), Taylor (2004), or White (2011, in Dave 2015) that music-based projects of intercultural dialogue construct and promote a version of hybridity which is largely depoliticized, consumption-oriented, and color-blind. Such initiatives thus tend to obfuscate the lived realities of racialized Others by asserting that we are all the same, and by ‘suggesting that structural and socio-political violence can simply be danced out of existence’ (Dave 2015: 8; see also 5.4.5 for the enduring ethnic distance towards Serbian Romanies despite their artistic and cultural recognition at Guča Festival). Viewed in this light, the EU policy of intercultural dialogue may not differ much from corresponding artistic initiatives in the festival / cultural domain – they both seem to represent a form of political branding; or to quote Vidmar-Horvat (2012: 39), they both function as ‘a means of “logotyping” the collective European mind ... contrib[uting thereby] to the force of representation which displaces the political reality for the ideological effect of the brand’.

At a more general level, a gradual shift to the branding talk has not only affected the perception of Exit and Guča, but it has also reframed the entire discursive field of Serbian popular music. To say this is not, however, to deny that the discursive formation inherited from the 1990s and represented by the rock-TF binary still informs public discussions on popular music (the Exit-Guča debate included), but it does increasingly so as a ‘residual’ frame of reference (cf. Williams 1977). Thus, unlike the earlier popular music discourse, whose sharp polarizing effects used to indicate the totality of conflict between the ruling political majority and its opposition (see Lukić-Krstanović 2005; 2007), the dominant ideology of Serbia’s current pop practice does
not seem to differ much from that in other consumer-based societies. Namely, it also follows the commercial logic of the market that thrives on the plurality of competing music genres, styles, and scenes. That Serbian popular music has lost the power of ideological identification is especially evident on those public occasions that incorporate local music acts of formerly opposite political alliances. For instance, in 2007, at Belgrade’s public celebration of Serbian New Year’s Eve\(^{156}\) a number of renowned rock musicians participated side by side with notorious Serbian TF star Svetlana Ceča Ražnatović in the concert organized by the authorities (see ‘Eyesburn, Rambo and Ceca on the same stage?!’, Politika, 2007).

Furthermore, the expansion and professionalization of local music businesses have also assisted the process of Serbia’s integration into the transnational music market (see Lukić-Krstanović 2007). One manifestation of this process is the development of what Slobin (1993: 68) calls affinity interculture. The latter concept refers to transnational networks of musicians and audiences alike on the grounds of shared musical tastes, sensibilities, and conventions. Signed, for example, by transnational labels and / or performing abroad are, in particular, selected Serbian acts from the worlds of punk rock (e.g. Tea Break, Čovek Bez Sluha / ‘A Tone-Deaf Man’, Six Pack), heavy metal (Introitus, Infest, Tornado), and electronic music (DJs Marko Nastić, Jelly For The Babies, Tijana T) (see Serbian rock critic Bane Lokner, in Rock ‘n’ Roll in Serbia: Rock Culture After 5 October 2000, 2013).

In the meantime, Serbian TF has, just like its various counterparts across the region, evolved into a technologically sophisticated genre with ‘a more pronounced pop aesthetic’, especially that of hip hop and EDM cultures (cf. Silverman 2012: 183). Moreover, TF of the present day is largely regarded a benevolent commercial music genre, not far from global pop or World Beat (WB),\(^{157}\) characterized by stylistic mixtures and ethical nihilism of postmodern times (see Dimitrijević 2002). Alternatively, the genre is said to carry subversive meanings, partly due to the queer potential of the TF aesthetic (see e.g. Mitrović 2011; Nenić 2010), and partly due to the interpretation of TF as a form of anti-global resistance. In the latter reading, all Balkan ethno-pop genres (not only TF) are described as the truly glocal phenomena, a sort of regional versions of global pop, that not only ‘embrace both the European and the Oriental as positive qualities of being Balkan’ (Buchanan 2007: 263), but that also chart ‘new ways of being in the contemporary world’ (Buchanan 2010:139). Closely related to this is another populist-democratic viewpoint, by which contemporary Balkan ethno-pop is considered part of emerging ‘Balkan musical cosmopol-

\(^{156}\) Being a country where Eastern Orthodoxy of the Serbian Orthodox Church is culturally dominant, Serbia celebrates both the Gregorian and Julian New Year holidays.

\(^{157}\) To understand why TF and WB / WM are not really comparable, see Nenić (2010) and Vidić Rasmussen (2007).
itanism’ (Stokes 2007), given the increasing level of cultural interchange within the region as well as the similarity of sonic-cultural responses to a shared predicament.

However, Serbian WM is arguably the most representative genre of Serbia’s new branding realities and their ideological flattening. This is the genre that succeeded most effectively in bridging the previously insurmountable gap between urban and rural, as evidenced by many examples – specifically, by the stylistically eclectic repertoire of best known Serbian brass bands combining traditional and modern sounds; then, by occasional cooperation between Serbian trumpet players and musicians from other musical worlds, notably rock and (ethno-)jazz; or by the odd juxtaposition of the generally leftist leanings of WM audiences, on the one hand, and rightist outbursts among local WM fans, on the other (see 5.4.2). Note in addition a sense of national triumphalism in Bogovac’s (2007: 135–136) writings on the total success of Serbian brass music:

Not only has [this music] been accepted by those, part of whose job description is to never put away the mask of repulsion towards anything that could have the sound or taste of folksy Serbia, but it is precisely them who have capitalized big time on it and its accompanying media-marketing machine. Boban Marković even held a concert at the Belgrade SKC [Student Cultural Center], the ‘temple of the avant-garde’, which was a happening that, conceptually, totally overthrew and dismissed the aesthetic and ideological system of those who were quick to appropriate this Guča champion. The trumpet thereby exposed the Big Lie upon which the ideologico-cultural system of debasing the [Serbian] ‘Cyrillic’ is based, as well as the poor moral foundations of such a system. Having done away with all major assumptions of non-national cultural emissaries, the trumpet opened up another valuable way for overcoming artificial divisions within the nation and its multifaceted living culture. (Emphasis in original.)

It very well might be that Serbian WM brought about ‘a sort of symbolic reconciliation’ of such ideological oppositions as urban-rural, cosmopolitan-nationalist, or liberal-conservative (cf. Mijatović 2012: 219–220). But in doing so, the ideological function of music came to be reduced to the pleasure principle and differentiation along lines of embodied cultural capital and taste, with occasional assertions of distinct cultural identities based on ethnicity, race, gender, or sexuality. The binary oppositions dominating Serbian public discourse today are accordingly those of the mainstream-alternative, commerce-art, or major-minor kind. An effective case in point are online discussions on the Exit lineup, where ‘authentic’ and ‘quality’ music is opposed to ‘non-intelligent’ international EDM and its alleged local equivalent, TF (see e.g. the quotes by online commentators Ddd and dr, in ‘200.000 people at the Exit R:Evolution’, B92, 2013). Alternatively, the quality of festival music
program is being discussed in terms of the ‘rock vs. electronica’, ‘old vs. new’, and ‘hard-core vs. soft-shell’ dialectic (see e.g. a chain of exchanged online comments between Keti S. and Nemanja, in ‘200,000 people...’, B92, 2013). Either way, lying behind these and similar public discussions is, according to Klein (2000: 82), ‘the mostly unquestioned assumption that just because a scene or style is different [i.e. “alternative”] (...) it necessarily exists in opposition to the mainstream, rather than simply sitting unthreateningly on its margins’. Another underlying assumption here is that ‘alternative’ musics are, by definition, anticommercial, even ‘leftist’ in their ideological leaning. In Klein’s opinion, though, ‘the “alternative” breakthrough’ means very little if no substantial social change comes out of it.

In fact, the reframed discourse of Serbian popular music (favoring the mainstream-alternative dichotomy) seems to stand firmly in line with the Exit updated mission statement – which is to offer its visitors a unique festival experience and to promote cosmopolitan ideas of global citizenship (see Kovačević, in Kojić 2016). I argue specifically that the Exit ideological agenda presently vacillates between what Jeff Malpas (2009: n.p.) calls a consumerist form of cosmopolitanism – pertaining to ‘the conception of the individual as having no independent affiliation to any place in particular beyond the financial and lifestyle affordances of that place’ – and a seemingly more serious cosmopolitan mode of political engagement (for instance, public debate on Brexit at Exit 2016, or the festival initiative against growing nationalism in the region, also in 2016). In this regard, the Exit brand is apparently part of the same discursive matrix as many of its contemporary counterparts elsewhere in the world. Their common aspiration is to project a progressive and cosmopolitan image using discourses of globalization, libertarianism (but rarely ever based on leftist economic beliefs), cultural diversity, sustainable living, creativity, and technological progress. However, as Carah (2010: 61) rightly points out following Goldman and Papson (2006), “[t]hese discourses obscure the frictions of “class, race, gender and global inequalities” inherent in capital”.

More to the point, the production of Exit and Guča as brandscapes has equally affected local attitudes towards each festival. My argument is that branding practices have robbed both festivals of their initial politico-ideological meanings, reducing each to a ‘menu’ of cultural resources from which to build a ‘self’ around the pleasure principle and life politics. That brands ultimately hollow out our social and life-worlds is a viewpoint echoed in some of the critical reviews of Exit and Guča in the Serbian media. Panović (2011) states, for example, that the sponsor ‘breweries (...) treat both [Guča] and Exit as “value neutral”. Both events are evaluated solely on the basis of the amount of sold beer kegs’. Jovanov (2002) likewise views Exit as part of the wider capitalist project of conquering new (EE) markets by transnational tobacco and music festival industries. The latter is also in line with the rhetorical question posed by Milovanović (2010): ‘Why does Exit have to “participate” at all costs
in the festival corporate circus that circulates around the continent every season?’. And the following remark by a local Exit-goer (in Petrovaradin Tribe, 2005) contains similar anticapitalist sentiment: ‘What worries me most are not political tensions in the former Yugoslav region, but that these Tuborg wristbands render us all walking ads’. This is clearly one way to criticize the dehumanizing effect of contemporary corporate culture in which the bodies of festivalgoers also become part of the festival brandscape (cf. Carah 2010: 58–59).

It should be emphasized again that the comments surrounding Guča Festival are similar in tone. Senior curator at the Belgrade Ethnographic Museum Stojanović (in Petrović 2012b) notes, for example, that ‘[t]he main sponsor, Apatin Brewery, has encircled Guča with its advertising space and thus appropriated culturally all the happenings during the festival, pushing also trumpet music into the background’. The lines between festival sponsors and sponsored culture have indeed become severely blurred, as the case of Serbian brass band Zao Taro Lajt illustrates strikingly. According to band member Milojko Đurić ‘Beko’ (in ‘The Golden Apple’ awarded so far...’, Danas: Guča 53, 2013: 12), the band was named after its sponsor company, owned by Vidan Mihailović, a Serbian businessman working in Russia.

No wonder, therefore, that a majority of Serbian quotidian discourses of Exit and Guča are nowadays infused with a sense of nostalgia and authenticity loss, calling into question the very credibility and purposefulness (national and otherwise) of each festival. Given its strong political starting point, Exit Festival in particular has left many of its early followers deflated and glum (festival fieldnotes, 2012 and 2013). Prevailing in the public domain is specifically the ‘sell out’ discourse in its several variants. To begin with, Exit is accused of selling out to foreign festival participants at the expense of domestic cultural interests and needs. Criticized here is the festival’s unspecified policy regarding the selection criteria as well as the allocation of performance timeslots and stages for participating domestic acts. This is, in turn, taken to signal a lack of Exit commitment to the affirmation of the local ‘alternative’ scene (interview with Bošković, Sep 2014; see also Milovanović 2010). A similar point of view is upheld in domestic online forums. For example, Keti S. (in ‘200,000 people at Exit R:Evolution’, B92 [comments], 2013) depicts Exit as ‘a festival catering fully to the taste of the British audience, (...) dominated by “slimy” Britpop and (...) even slimier RnB’. (See also the online comment by mile, in ‘Exit will survive nonetheless?’, B92 [comments], 2012.)

Next in line are the domestic narratives of defeat, conveying a sense that there was nothing authentic about Exit as a political project, given its poor material effects and its commercially-minded replicability in the external politico-economic markets. Indeed, looking back in hindsight, Exit supporters came to the disappointing reali-

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158 Many of my interlocutors at both Exit and Guča (in 2012 and 2013) also expressed discomfort with in-your-face advertising on the ground.
zation that neither the festival, nor Serbia’s so-called ‘October 2000 Revolution’ it is associated with, brought about any major sociopolitical changes in the country. The illusion about the ‘revolutionary’ character of Exit 2000 was specifically shattered in the light of the fact that the Western / U.S. financial and know-how assistance in toppling the Milošević regime was largely driven by the economic interests of global capital. As Sussman (2012: 39) notes,

there was nothing at all actually revolutionary about the uprisings in [such] countries [as Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia], as they can be seen as little more than intra-elite transfers of power, world capitalist integration of their economies, and expectations of their membership in NATO.

Moreover, it has turned out that some of the key people involved in the movement Otpor! / ‘Resistance!’ and Exit Festival (see 3.1) – above all, political activist Srđa Popović and music promoter Rajko Božić – made international careers out of this experience, selling the template of the Serbian ‘revolution’ elsewhere. To be specific, Popović is a founder and executive director of the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS; since 2003), which ‘has worked with pro-democracy activists from more than [fifty] countries, including (…) Ukraine [and] Georgia’ (see canvasedictionary.org). Božić was for his part sent in 2009 to Havana by a U.S. government contractor on a mission to spark a youth movement against the Cuban government using the popularity of notorious local rapper Aldo (see ‘Rajko Bozic, rap spy’, National Post, 2014). According to the same source, Božić has been hired for similar projects in Tunisia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁹

It is said, alternatively, that Exit has sold out intra-nationally to the ruling politico-economic elite. In the words of a commentator under the alias cirilica je zakon / ‘the Cyrillic rules’ (in ‘200.000 people at the Exit R:Evolution’, B92 [comments], 2013):

Screw the festival that belongs so unequivocally to the [political] establishment, that is under so much control and has unreserved media support, without a single critical note. The music of youth was once subversive, the media used to ignore or dread their concerts, and now it’s business. Young hedonists have no [new]

¹⁵⁹ Note, however, that there are writers who take an alternative approach to the general experience of disappointment and failure surrounding in particular the ‘color(ed) revolutions’ in the former EE countries. Greenberg (2014: 39), for example, shows in her ethnographic study on multiple forms of Serbian youth activism in their pursuit of sociopolitical change after Milošević how ‘the disappointments of impossible revolutions and unrealizable futures’ are not simply a distinctive characteristic of all postsocialist and postconflict societies, but rather the very essence of what constitutes democratic practice more generally.
ideas, no rebellious impulses, only a state-approved and state-controlled kind of fun.

Exit was admittedly quick to adjust to the new political situation brought about by the Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2012. The significant shift of political power into the hands of the more populist coalition gathered around the Serbian Progressive Party and soon after consolidated at all levels of government, was already visible in the Exit programming the following year. Two significant changes are worth acknowledging here. The first was in the Exit attitude towards sexual minorities, as evidenced by the festival’s subdued support for Loud & Queer Cruising Point\textsuperscript{160} in 2013. Namely, in 2011 and 2012, the latter was enthusiastical-ly promoted as the first queer-oriented stage to be seen at any music festival in the region and beyond, offering all Exit-goers ‘an opportunity (...) to learn more about “queer” culture and the LGBT community’ (see ‘Loud & Queer Cruising Point at EXIT!’, Exit News, 2012). However, in 2013, this stage was downgraded and turned into an obscure, semidark site lying on the fringes of the festival happenings, with the insufficiently profiled music program, apparently played by gay DJs. According to one of them (fieldnotes, July 2013), the program of Loud & Queer Stage was downplayed because the city’s new political leaders do not think favorably of sexual minorities. Or as the former Exit CEO Bošković put it (interview, Sep 2014), ‘the people currently running Exit are committed to the Church and family values’.

The second important change in Exit is that the festival has become almost totally apolitical. Not only has there been a topical shift in festival discussions towards branding practices, but also, perhaps even more conspicuous, is the absence of highly critical Serbian NGO Peščanik from the festival program from 2013 onwards (this organization used to put on relevant political debates from 2009 through to 2012 upon the invite of Exit organizers). The growing apolitical character of the festival simultaneously reflects the Serbian media (self-)censorship and zero tolerance of the new ruling political class to any kind of criticism. The Exit compliance with the authorities has been rewarded accordingly by the Serbian Government, which has committed itself in writing to sponsor the festival over the next six years (‘Vučić: Exit will receive financial support...’, Blic, 2016). Moreover, in an ironic twist, as Petrović (2015) observes, selected Exit organizers were officially welcomed in 2014 by the Serbian PM Vučić, who was saying ‘everything contrary to what he thought about them only a decade ago. And they even handed him a [framed] thank-you note’. The same amount of scoffing criticism can also be discerned in the online commentary, such as follows: ‘Vučić decides about the future of Exit Festival which is a symbol of the struggle precisely against that man and his politics in the 1990s’

\textsuperscript{160} Loud & Queer is the oldest event management organization in Serbia (since 2004) that takes charge of a variety of cultural and artistic activities within the local queer community.
(Vlada, ‘Exit will survive nonetheless?’, B92 [comments], 2012). Or as Milan (ibid.) comments referring to the festival’s self-proclaimed status of the State of Exit, ‘not only will Exit survive, but it will even be proclaimed the STATE OF SPP [the ruling Serbian Progressive Party] by organizers!’ Former Exit CEO Bošković (interview, Sep 2014) likewise warns:

Exit should operate separately from the authorities rather than act as their favorite bitch. The situation was different in the past, since there were some democratic instances of political power to lean on. Now the rule of the political establishment is monolithic and I am at their blacklist.

Guća, for its part, has always been constituted as a site of fierce ideological struggles due to the controversies arising from the dubious notion of Volksgeist on which it is built. Thus, the festival’s perennial nostalgic sentiments and authenticity debates, as articulated through such dichotomies as traditional-modern, old-new, authentic-commercial, native-foreign, or pure-dirty, are an integral part of folk and WM discourses and can attend to both nationalist as well as cosmopolitan concerns (see 4.5 and 5.4.2). Within the new nation branding paradigm, what has arguably changed are not so much the topics of Guća-related debates, but rather their overarching ideological framework and teleological vision. In other words, the discourses of authenticity and nostalgia associated with the Serbian Guća brand are now largely appropriated to serve commercial ends. Packaging the Serbian ethnic difference in a commercially appealing way necessitated a certain change in the festival representation, specifically, a move away from the historico-heroic and religious ethos in the self-national narration towards an evergrowing appreciation of all things Serbian that are deemed natural, mundane, true to life, jovial, and pleasurable. In short, the institutionalization of branding discourse in the Serbian public sphere under conditions of advanced globalization clearly pushed the earlier ethnocentric discourse into the background (cf. Radović 2007).

It goes without saying that the transformation of Exit and Guća into national brands should be understood as part of a larger postsocialist discursive shift towards what Surowiec (2012) calls corpo-nationalism and Volčić (2012) – commercial nationalism. As the latter writer explains, ‘nation branding relies on the conflation of citizen and consumer, promoting a sense of national identity as something to which the consumer has the individualized, choice-based relationship associated with consumption’ (ibid., 149). Implied by the nation branding talk is thus a post-political understanding of nation as a commodity to be marketed and consumed. In this understanding, to quote Volčić (2012: 162) again, ‘nationalism becomes a form of consumption and citizenship a mode of “living the brand”’. The professed affiliation to either Exit or Guća national brands becomes accordingly a matter of different con-
sumption preferences, and thus simply a different expression of the same (commercial) type of nationalism.

Note, however, that while the principles of market economy and branding practice are normatively adopted by both festivals, they tend to be bastardized in execution. This incongruity between the given normative system (as represented by the distributive vs. market type of economic operations) and exercised value patterns (be they collectivistic / traditionalist / economically egalitarian or individualistic / modern / politically egalitarian) is generally indicative of Serbia’s East-West schisms, resulting in what Lazić (2003: 210–211) calls normative-value dissonance. There is no doubt that such contradictions exist in both music festivals but are once again more pronounced in Guča. This is another big theme that I have duly explored by providing examples of corrupt conduct in each festival; by identifying elements of authoritarianism and populism in each festival’s marketing strategies and internal social relations; and by pointing to a number of critical claims, saying that neither festival is run professionally enough to capitalize on its high commercial value (see Gligorijević 2019 [forthcoming]).

Despite given evidence to the contrary, both Guča and Exit CEOs are ostensibly supportive of an open market economy and individual initiative. Jolović (in ‘Guča – A revenue of thirty million euros’, Ekonomist, 2007) asserts, for instance, that ‘the organization [of Guča Festival] must not be based on donations, patronages and sponsorships but on the strict market principles’. And there is no need to repeat that positive appraisals of neoliberal ideology are more uniquely associated with Exit-related discourses (see e.g. Jovanović and Kovačević, in Gruhonjić ed. 2003: n.p.). Either way, the entire ‘free market’ talk in Exit and Guča appears largely an exercise in wishful thinking, given the discrepancies between the professed rhetoric and the evidence on the ground. Perhaps nothing reflects this more than the incapacity of each festival to survive on the market without financial assistance from the state.

Mijatović (2012) having investigated the cases of Exit and Guča from a nation branding perspective, found both festivals politically innocent. Specifically, the main assumption and conclusion of her analysis are that Exit and Guča became co-opted by local politicians for nation branding purposes only after each succeeded in the transnational music festival market on its own, thus independently of political interference. In contrast to her interpretation, I posit that the (nation) branding talk surrounding Exit and Guča is ultimately exercised as a source of political legitimacy for the declaratively pro-European national elites (festival producers included) and, relatedly, as a discursive disguise for the relationships of mutual interest between politicians and festival organizers. As an example of the latter point, the following statement by Guča Culture House director Tadić can be cited: ‘I look forward to politicians, ministers, ambassadors, ... their presence [at the festival] comes in handy since they can help us. On the other hand, politicians like to be with the people.’ (‘For as
long as the trumpet plays...’, *Dansa: Guča* 53, 2013: 2.) And Bošković’s (in Jakobi 2010: 63) assertion that ‘Exit was, in a way, a success both thanks to and despite of politicians’, is partly similar to that of Tadić. Indeed, when the Exit project was in its infancy, Vojvodinian politician Čanak pulled some strings in a national electricity distribution company to technically support the festival organization (Kovačević, in Milović Buha 2008). Acknowledged in the same talk show was also that the festival’s key business contacts were realized with the help of the G17 Plus, initially an NGO, later to become an influential Serbian political party. Nowadays, as argued above, Exit Festival seems to have fully integrated with the ruling political class.

The normative-value dissonance in Exit and Guča also corroborates the fact that the primary purpose of (nation) branding talk is to lend credibility to the Serbian elites and the privileged positions they are handed in the processes of Serbia’s transition and EU accession. In a broader picture, nation branding has indeed served as a potent discursive vehicle signifying a power shift towards more technocratic elites, whose vast expertise, so the public is told, should speed up transition and lead postsocialist nations into a better future (see Kaneva 2012a; 2012b). In Serbia, nation branding has, especially since 2008, also turned into a site of rivalries among nearly all factions of the political elite. To understand, however, the actual implications of these power struggles, one must be aware that ‘nation branding is intended primarily for external legitimation’ (Sussman 2012: 42). The adapted use of nation branding by the local elite can therefore be viewed as symptomatic of the inverted roles of elite and people. To paraphrase Croatian philosopher Buden (in Bauer and Rajačić 2016), it is not the people across post-Yugoslav and EE societies that need the guidance of the national elite. Rather, it is the elite who need the people to climb up the ladder of success in the international political, business, and cultural arenas. This simultaneously forms the basis for Buden’s further claim that postsocialist EE countries, including Serbia, are actually represented and governed by so-called comprador elites, that is, by a select group of local agents that essentially act under instructions from external centers of power. To conclude, then, the new Serbian elites, cloaked either under a patriotic disguise (as in Guča) or under a technocratic rationale (as in both Exit and Guča), do not seem able to act autonomously. In neither case do they seem prepared to respond creatively to the challenges of today’s world, thereby offering no alternative vision of the nation’s future.

On a concluding note, the liminality of the Balkans (and thus of Serbia) is discussed in the literature as the region’s potentially empowering feature with which to reclaim power over its representation (see Bjelić 2005; or Fleming 2000). In favor of this viewpoint is also a reading of the Balkans/Serbia through the lenses of Foucault’s *heterotopia* and Soja’s *Thirdspace* – in a nutshell, as a real, hybrid space, a sort of counter-place opposite to utopia, split across space and time, ‘a place without a place’ that belongs nowhere, that inverts the prevailing regime of truth and ‘resists
the discourse of universal rationality’ (Bjelić 2005: 7; Lazarević Radak 2014: 203–214). Accordingly, the Balkans and similar places are deemed inherently critical because of their openness to an-Other as the third term that disrupts a system of familiar binaries, allowing thereby for new significations and representations to emerge. The Yugoslav project, whose nonalignment policy secured the state’s sovereignty and integrity, perhaps came closest to the realization of the liminal potential of Balkan heterotopia / Thirstspace. Its success was arguably reflected in the country’s capacity ‘to gaze back at those who gaze at [the Balkans] in order to reverse the panoptical process of the center’ (Bjelić 2005: 19; emphases in original). But as Lazarević Radak (2014: 214) points out, within the current context of transition and globalization, the Balkan liminality is not really acknowledged for the epistemological, spatial, and cultural alternatives it potentially offers, but is rather narrated and experienced by the region’s inhabitants as a never-ending nightmare.

6.3 Politics in Contemporary Music Festivals: Rethinking Festival Collectivities Through the Concepts of Microcitizenship and Coming Communities

Note finally that the political effects of (nation) branding in contemporary music festivals should not be considered solely through the lens of such dichotomies as cosmopolitan-nationalist, progressive-conservative, or left-right. Perhaps even more revealing in this regard are academic and media discourses discussing festivals along the major-minor, mainstream-alternative, or corporate-independent axes. Within this discursive framework, critical views of the ever-increasing commercialization of festivals are pitted against what is seen as an alternative music festival model. (For details on so-called boutique festivals, see Robinson 2015.) Contemporary music festivals are accordingly described as ‘a sanitized version of the past’ (Anderton 2006: 348), or as ‘the simulacrum of festival counterculture’, whereby the earlier search for alternative lifestyles and forms of social organization became ‘neutralized into safe, common and expected forms of leisure’ (Robinson 2015: n.p.). Some commentators associate increasing commercialization trends in the music festival industry with ‘essentially a massive change in the kind of person you see attending music festivals in this day and age’ (Spencer, n.d.). Designated as a new target group category is, for example, the hipster / the bobo (short for the ‘bourgeois bohemian’) (Delistraty 2014), or ‘many youths’ buying into the ‘cool’ image that music festivals sell (Morris, in Simonsen 2015). This line of reasoning resonates well with a commonly held view in academia that the increasingly commercial character of postmillennial music festivals is owing to the growing consumerism and higher disposable incomes within the context of neoliberal globalization. This, so the argument continues, brought about changes in the composition of the festival audience (in terms of their broaden-
ing and mainstreaming), many segments of which ‘would refuse to tolerate the ama-
teurish event management and poor living conditions that prevailed at some of the
pioneer pop festivals of the late 1960s and 1970s’ (Stone 2009: 213; see also Ander-
ton 2006 and Robinson 2015). The paradoxical result of such an attitude is what Ži-
žek (2006, in Carah 2010: 38) calls *decaffeinated empowerment* – an explicit request
for the experience of ‘authentic’ music culture, but within a safe and comfortable en-
vironment.

Hence it may be claimed that contemporary music festivals – be they constitut-
ed as (national) brandscapes, or as anticorporate and democratized sites focused on
the audience participation – have insufficient capacity for visionary projections of
society. Apart from profit making, their primary concern is arguably with creating
opportunities for festivalgoers to reaffirm, explore, or reinvent their cultural iden-
tities and alliances within the discursive framework of localized and/or postnation-
al imaginings of community. By implication, the dominant form of politics framing
the global music festival scene today is that of *life politics* (also known under the la-
bel ‘identity politics’ and ‘post-politics’). In contrast to emancipatory politics which
tackles sociopolitical issues of domination and exploitation in different spheres of
human life, life politics revolves around ‘a reflexive relation to the self’ (see Giddens
1991, in Carah 2010: 157). There has apparently been a general move away from
emancipatory to life politics, at least across Western liberal democracies, coinciding
with the period of transition from ‘culture’ in classical culture industry as a site of
power struggles, mediated in and through representation, to ‘culture’ in global cul-
ture industry as a ubiquitous and thingified entity dominating the economic and the
everyday. Lash and Lury (2007: 4–5) describe this change also in terms of a shift a-
way from identity to difference, that is, from ‘determinacy of objects of culture in-
dustry’ (resulting in the construction of identities) to ‘indeterminacy of objects of
global culture industry’ (resulting in the construction of difference, with no serious
hints of resistance).

But more to the point, life politics, according to Carah (2010: 158), entails ‘iden-
tity and meaning-making processes, and those (…) [are in turn] located in the social
spaces and practices of consumption’. Or put simply, life politics suggests that we
are what we consume. Understood this way, life politics has no power to subvert and
let alone fight the current form of capitalism. Life politics rather emerges as a suc-
cessful mode of capital accumulation, reducing even marginal and minoritarian iden-
tities to a set of product choices. Life politics is accordingly symptomatic of what
Klein (2000: 124) calls ‘the politics of image, not action’. She specifically claims
that the prior focus on structural inequalities and the use of concrete political and
legal remedies to counter them, came to be superseded in the 1990s by the lasting
obsession with issues of representation and political correctness. Klein (2000: 115)
notes in addition:
while it may be true that real gains have emerged from this process, it is also true that Dennis Rodman wears dresses and Disney World celebrates Gay Day less because of political progress than financial expediency. The market has seized upon multiculturalism and gender-bending in the same ways that it has seized upon youth culture in general—not just as a market niche but as a source of new carnivalesque imagery.

Moreover, what ‘the politics of image’ keeps failing to address is the larger question of how the rising power of corporations has affected our social and life-worlds. The politics of image is particularly not concerned with discussing a general sense of social insecurity and the dramatic growth of the underclass around the world, brought about by such developments as the return of capitalism in its pure, inhumane form, huge budget cuts in social programs and services, loss of jobs, and fewer market opportunities for small businesses, minority and community groups. In short, the politics of image neglects such crucial issues as ‘the corporate hijacking of political power (...) [and] the brands’ cultural looting of public and mental space’ (Klein 2000: 340).

While I am inclined to acknowledge some political value in our consumption choices and habits, since it is through them that we build a sense of who we are and what we stand for, I must at the same time agree with Klein, Žižek, and other like-minded leftist thinkers that political ramifications of such choices are limited in their scope. The latter assertion can be defended on a number of accounts. First, there is a conspicuous lack of transparency in business operations, which makes it virtually impossible for citizens-consumers to determine what goods and services are produced in an ethical way. Second, a strict focus on life politics in (festival) brandscapes detracts attention from the problematic role of corporations in the reproduction of increasing structural inequalities around the globe. And if there is no reflection on such matters, there is not even the possibility of imagining fundamentally different sociopolitical realities (cf. Carah 2010). Branding and life politics shape instead contemporary (music festival) culture in a way which enables consumers to suture over basic social antagonisms ensuing from an asymmetrical distribution of resources and power. Besides, people are willing to draw on ‘the symbolic fictions (...) [produced by their social] reality, even if they know them to be false, [not only] because their subjectivity and enjoyment are dependent on those very fictions’ (Carah 2010: 117), but also because they feel that they have no other choice but to participate in brand-building practices. Lastly, life politics reduces political action to a series of discrete, particularistic demands, thereby preventing (festival) consumers from uniting and politically acting around such universal categories as class and capitalism.
While class and capitalism are indeed rarely ever part of the political agenda in music festivals today, note that they take a central place in transnational anticapitalist and antiwar movements that St John (2008) calls protestivals. Examples here include Global Day of Action, Carnivals Against Capitalism, For Global Justice, and Occupy Wall Street. Born out of the cause that cuts across large segments of the world population (namely, local autonomy, global distributive justice and peace), these carnivalized and globally orchestrated street gatherings have at least succeeded in putting income inequality back at the center of political discourse. The reason they have not achieved more is, in Chibber’s (in Farbman 2017) view, their weak connection to labor, as manifested also in the type of places that underwent ‘occupations’ (i.e. streets and parks instead of factories). Chibber’s point is clear here: not until social protests begin to disrupt the processes of production and profit making will the ruling elite acknowledge them.

Considering all above, it is safe to conclude that the (re)production of music festivals as (national) brandscapes ultimately promotes a ‘fight for “global capitalism with a human face”’ (Žižek 2008: 459). According to this agenda, as Žižek (ibid.) explains, the reasons for all real antagonisms and problems we confront today are not sought in the system as such. Rather, or so we are told, strategic ends should be achieved by devising ways of making the existing system work more efficiently. Even if this is so, the question still remains whether we should agree to the system which lets corporations dictate and shape our political views and ethical norms. Also, do we feel comfortable with the system which will never allow us to do away with the basic antagonism between capital and labor, simply because this flaw is already inscribed into the system itself? As Chibber (in Farbman 2017) warns us using a vivid analogy between capitalism and cancer:

This is why socialists have said that you can have a more civilized capitalism, and you should fight for that more civilized capitalism, but understand that it’s like a cancer: you can keep giving it chemo, you can fight back the growth of the cancer cells, but they always keep coming back.

I turn now to consider whether and how contemporary music festivals can reclaim politics in the sense articulated earlier in this chapter. But to accomplish this properly requires a few preliminary words about the nature of political struggles today, as well as about how to address them, both in general and in relation to music festivals.

Today, as has always been the case, people’s struggles are often directed against different forms of oppression and injustice. People specifically fight for parliamentary democracy vs. autocracy, for the welfare state vs. neoliberalism, for new forms of democracy vs. corruption in politics and economy, against sexism and racism, especially against demonization of refugees and immigrants, and against the global
capitalist system as such (see Žižek 2015). It is thus within this context that I raise the big questions of what role music festivals (or rather protestivals) may play in these struggles, and whether they can make any difference.

In answer to these questions, I would argue that contemporary music festivals are typically perceived as politically meaningful when organized in oppressive societies. The very case study of this monograph, Serbia’s Exit Festival, provides an excellent example of how music festivals can oppose authoritarian rule and right-wing populism to the point of an actual political change. Another comparable example is Mali’s *Festival au Désert* / ‘Festival in the Desert’ (since 2001), which went into exile in 2012 due to threats from the Al Qaida-linked extremists. In 2013, the festival was given the Freemuse Award for the continual efforts to ‘[defend] freedom of musical expression and (...) keep music alive in the region in spite of extreme Islamists’ attempts to silence all music in Mali’ (see ‘Freemuse Award winner 2013’, *Freemuse*, 2013). There is, in addition, *Kubana* (since 2009), Russia’s biggest open-air festival of international rock music, which also moved (in 2014) from a Black Sea venue to the Kaliningrad region, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, because it did not sit well with the rising political right in the country. But even at its new location, Russian Orthodox activists have protested against the event because of its alleged promotion of ‘decadent’ behavior (see Kozlov 2015).

That said, there are good reasons to claim that music festivals / protestivals can produce only limited political effects. First, and as highlighted above, capitalism feeds off the carnivalesque imagery, especially in Western liberal democracies whose citizens can generally enjoy high levels of civil liberties and political rights. Second, I am sympathetic to Žižek’s (2012) view that joyful and transgressive moments of festivities do not really disrupt the realm of everyday life when things get back to normal. Or as he himself put it, ‘[c]arnivals come cheap – the true test of their worth is what remains the day after’ (ibid.). Think indeed about the people’s disillusion and disappointment after the Exit-related protests leading to the overthrow of Milošević in Serbia, or after Greek protestivals against austerity measures at Sentaga Square in Athens. Third and finally, for true social change to happen, it is necessary to escape the trap of what Žižek (2015) calls ‘false gradualism’, and what Brah (1996: 216) defines as a common ‘tendency to assert the primacy of one set of social relations [whether they pertain to class, gender, or race] as against another’. This line of reasoning – ‘let’s first fight for democracy, the rest will come later’ – was precisely inscribed into the Exit political project and Serbia’s October 2000 Revolution more generally. Perhaps the following quote by former Exit CEO Bošković (interview, Sep 2014) best sums it up: ‘We cannot talk about economy in Serbia before we agree on some basic values and moral standards (...) [and] sort out the questions of human rights and freedoms’.

But be that as it may, I contend that the question of left politics in music festivals / protestivals is still an important one. While it is true that the new millennium has witnessed the emergence of many protest movements, both nationally and transnationally, none of them seems to have offered a coherent program. Unlike Klein’s (2000) hope that the anticorporate activism of the late 1990s would evolve into a big political movement, other leftist thinkers have been visibly less optimistic. According to Harris (2016), the surest sign that the Western Left is in crisis is its increasing inability to cope with ‘three urgent problems: the disruptive force of globalisation, the rise of populist nationalism, and the decline of traditional work’.

Now, if we agree with Žižek (2012) that carnivals / protestivals can only be the announcement of hard and committed work towards social change and not the end in itself, then they could perhaps function as a means of mobilizing the masses, possibly in a way suggested by Chibber (in Farbman 2017) – namely, by having the Left operate outside academia and ‘[implant] itself within labor’ as it did in the past. Žižek (2015), for his part, renounces the course of action based on making abstract demands for the abolition of neoliberal global capitalism. He rather suggests, following French philosopher Badiou, that we should center our politics on the so-called points of impossibility within the system. We should, in other words, make ‘small specific demands’ that seem realistic but are simultaneously sensitive for the society in question. In Žižek’s view, the point of impossibility for, say, the United States amounts to the idea of universal health care; for Turkey – the idea of multiculturalism and minority rights; and for Serbia, if I may add – the idea of dismantling the system of partocracy. The main premise here, so Žižek’s argument goes, resembles that in Sci-Fi movies: if you press the right button, the entire system collapses.

Coming close to this suggestion is perhaps also Fabiani’s (2014) theorization of art festivals as platforms best suited for critical interventions – that is, for tackling pertinent political issues using art and critical discussions. Following McGuigan’s (2005) revised notion of the public sphere, Fabiani specifically makes a case for the capacity of art festivals to operate in a space conveniently situated between uncritical populism (referring here to the festivals’ uncritical approach to consumerism as a form of citizenship) and radical subversion (as articulated in the discursive and performative repertoires of the festival countercultural heritage). It is therefore between these two extremes that possible ‘critical interventions’ may take place. This is clearly a position which acknowledges the limiting effects of a transgression model, whereby ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ are said to stand in a relation of binary opposition. By implication, power and resistance are inevitably caught up in a circular struggle, whereby one set of oppositions undergoes the reversal of the status quo soon to be succeeded by another set of oppositions. In contrast to that, the potentially critical space of (music) festivals should rather follow ‘a model of articulation as “transformative practice”’ (Grossberg 1996: 88). Within this model, as Grossberg
clarifies, the question of identity is rearticulated into an approach to subjects as historical agents, capable of forming alliances in their joint struggle for social change. Furthermore, since music festivals operate in the micropolitical sphere of society’s political practice, they also might assist in the creation of Utopias, defined in Deleuzian terms as the now-here (rather than no-where) places. In such utopias, imaginations of new sociopolitical realities are thus no longer placed in the future but in the now-and-here timespaces. According to Pisters (2011), of crucial importance here is a critical stance towards society rather than fixed and long-term projections of a perfect society to be reached through Revolution. Or in her words, it is critical interventions that might enable ‘a “becoming-revolutionary of a people” (…) available to everybody at any moment in the passing present’ (ibid., 16). The fact that contemporary music festivals are part of the capitalist machinery, which constantly reproduces itself by coopting its oppositional fringes, does not automatically mean that all their critical interventions are doomed to failure. On the contrary, perhaps the only way to politically engage with the outside world in a meaningful way is to perform critical interventions from within the system, that is, by schizophrenically ‘producing and “anti-producing” at the same time’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, in Pisters 2001: 25). Besides, the idea of total recuperation within the immanent system of capitalism is untenable when approached from a spatial perspective, simply because space itself, even when dominated by the homogenizing images of the spectacle, can never be subjected to a closure. As Massey (2005: 116) notes, ‘there are always cracks in the carapace’.

In order to contribute to the discussion at hand, the present study seeks to offer new terms for imagining music festival collectivities. It does so under the assumption that it is through the invention of new concepts that the world and societies come to be redescribed and set in motion towards new futures. To work towards this end, the concept of music festival collectivities is revisited in a way that envisions alternative formations of political identities and alliances alike. The existing theorizations, such as Turner’s communitas, Maffesoli’s neo-tribes, or Anderton’s meta-sociality (see 2.2.2), are apparently all too apolitical in their implications. I therefore turn once again to the key concept of this study – the idea of music festivals as micronational spaces; or to be more exact, to its corollary – the idea of microcitizenship as a form of membership to music festival collectivities.

The concept of festival microcitizenship is predictably analogous to that of citizenship: they both draw on the same principle of universality, thus focusing on one’s ‘position in the set of formal relations defined by democratic sovereignty’ rather than on inscriptions of one’s identity in cultural terms (cf. Donald 1996: 174). This way, the political sovereignty of festival participants and their ‘rights of microcitizenship’ in festival ‘microstates’ are guaranteed on equal terms, rather than compromised by divisions between festival community members along cultural lines, which, if drawn,
would inevitably include some members but exclude others. As a concept emptied of cultural meaning, the term *(micro)citizen* is therefore used to ‘[denote] an empty place (...) [which] can be occupied by anyone – occupied in the sense of being spoken from, not in the sense of being given a substantial identity’ (Donald 1996: 174).

By extension, the festival microcitizenship calls to mind another concept of a belonging without substantial identity – that of Agamben’s (1993) *singularity*. Singularity is a being which is inessential in its nature, that is, a being which is not discernible by

its having this or that property [being red, being French, being Muslim], which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) – [nor is] it reclaimed ... for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-*such*, for belonging itself. (Agamben 1993: 1; emphasis in original.)

The terms under which a singularity lays claim of belonging to a wider whole, or to what Agamben calls *the coming community*, are comparable to the metonymical character of the relation that ‘the example’ holds to a set of items which is said to exemplify. As Agamben (1993: 2) explains, ‘[n]either particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity (...) [by] hold[ing] for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, (...) [by being] included among these’. A singular becoming of a community is an empty, exterior space of infinite ideational possibilities to which a singularity relates only by means of bordering. In other words, ‘[b]elonging, being-*such*, is here only the relation to an empty and indeterminate totality’ (ibid., 15–16). When applied to music festivals, a politics of singularity would lay the foundations for people’s belonging to a common collective – a festival coming community – on the grounds of their singularity rather than on a single definition of their cultural identity. Put differently, it is through a politics based on the ‘coming community’ that various fractions of the festival crowd could be pulled together into a political struggle for change.

Rethinking music festival collectivities in political terms (with a capital ‘P’) apparently opens up the possibility of constructing collective agency across a broad spectrum of the political field, letting music festivals come close to what Soja (1996) calls *Thirdspace*. He formulates the latter as ‘a space of collective resistance’, ‘a meeting place for all peripheralized or marginalized “subjects”’, and thus a ‘politically charged space, [in which] a radically new and different form of citizenship (citoyenneté) can be defined and realized’ (ibid., 35; emphasis in original). The festival coming community clearly diverges from Soja’s Thirdspace in its revisited approach to the notion of resistance (see above), and therefore in its focus on a singularity as the ground of alternative political action (rather than on ‘marginalized
subjects’ and their rights to difference). The festival coming community is in this respect a more inclusive form of affiliation, as it welcomes anyone regardless of their cultural background and their position within the existing structures of power. It is also a form of collective political practice which favors critical interventions to radical movements – in short, “the project of constructing a form of knowledge that respects the other without absorbing it into the same”, or ... [into] the different’ (Young 1990, in Grossberg 1996: 103).

In order to advance my argument one step further, I need to refer once again to Grossberg’s (1996) interpretation of Agamben’s coming community. He asserts that ‘in specific contexts, identity can become a marker of people’s abiding in such a singular community, where community defines an abode marking people’s way of belonging within the structured mobilities of contemporary life’ (ibid., 105). I venture to argue that music festivals can be understood as one such context – as that ‘abode marking people’s ways of belonging’ and defining their singular becoming of the festival community as a trademark of their collective identity. What makes music festival places especially suited for a singular belonging is arguably a pronounced sense of throwntogetherness, a quality of coming together into a now-and-here (itself constituted by ‘a history and a geography of thens and theres’), which confronts festival participants with an immediate challenge of negotiating multiplicity (cf. Massey 2005: 140). This renders festivals a fertile ground for becoming of a community, a meeting place where engagement in a variety of cultural practices can foreground the coevalness of the different trajectories (different spatialities and temporalities) that create particular places and identities, but also point to the workings of power and exclusion in the social relations that construct those places and identities. Because of this truly democratic potential of festival spaces, an infinite number of possibilities for political action might mobilize and organize festival microcitizens into a coming community. And just as the festival coming community is always in a state of becoming, constantly changeable, unfinished, undetermined, and dependent on historically contingent processes and social practices, so is the scope of its political engagement, emerging on ‘a continually receding horizon of the open-minded-space-to-come, which will not ever be reached but must constantly be worked towards’ (Massey 2005: 153).
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161 The slogan Srbe na vrbe! (literally, ‘Serbs on the willows!’, and implicitly, ‘Hang Serbs on the willow trees!’) forms the core part of anti-Serb propaganda to be found mainly in Croatia’s ultra-nationalist discourses, especially in the Second World War and in the aftermath
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of the recent Yugoslav wars. The heading Srbe na trube (literally, ‘Serbs on the trumpets’, and implicitly, ‘Hang Serbs on the trumpets’) is therefore a pun, which, in a subversive twist, turns the external fascist subtext of the original slogan into the field of internal debate about the Serbianness of Serbian brass music.

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On top of this, I conducted informal interviews with dozens of festivalgoers and local residents from both Novi Sad and Guča. These casual conversations were then immediately incorporated into my fieldwork diary. For the purpose of this research, my interlocutors remained anonymous unless they chose to reveal their identity (see 1.6.7 above).