Translating United States congressional speeches: functionalist and discourse-analytical perspectives

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The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
This thesis seeks to highlight problems and strategies relevant to translating United States congressional speeches for a European readership. The analyzed material comprises ten as-yet untranslated speeches held in the House of Representatives and the Senate by members of both main parties, Democrats and Republicans. The material was delimited by time frame and subject matter: the speeches coincide with Donald Trump’s presidency and concern the United States’ commitment to NATO.

The method of analysis involves a merger of functionalist translation approaches and political discourse analysis. Political source texts and their translations have been discussed by Christina Schäffner, upon whose genre-specific analyses of political speeches this thesis relies. Discourse analysis was chosen as a supplementary perspective due to the instruments it offers for the sociocultural contextualization of texts beyond their linguistic units, thus adding to the generalizability of the analysis across potential target language communities.

The discourse-analytical models employed in the thesis are derived from Muntigl (2002) and van Dijk (2002). Muntigl examines how political issues are politicized and depoliticized through specific linguistic resources, while van Dijk discusses discourse structures and how they reflect the wider context of discourse production, including a “cultural Common Ground” between interactants. The speeches are first analyzed under these two models, whereafter parallels are drawn between the results of the discourse analysis and Schäffner’s functionalist framework, so as to establish what implications the material poses for translation.

The analysis found notable overlap between Schäffner’s functionalist approaches and the Muntigl and van Dijk models. The translational problems identified concern chiefly metaphor (including path semantic structures by which issues are politicized and depoliticized), genre conventions, contrastive meanings, deixis and, lastly, implicit information resulting from the speakers’ beliefs and the knowledge they assume of primary addressees. In light of these observations, further research on the translation of United States congressional speeches is encouraged.

Keywords: translation, functionalist theory, political discourse analysis, speech, politics
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1 Introduction

Among the questions pertinent to practical translation and translation theory alike is that of the influence of genre on translation. When one considers the ways in which the strategies taken in translation have to conform to text-specific conventions—not to mention the change in intention that some texts require when rendered for a new readership (Sager 1997)—the close relationship between genre and translation becomes evident. Moreover, certain genres of text are by their nature deeply embedded in local or national discourses, the nuances of which may not only be lost on target readers but also misrepresented in the target text were the translator to lack sufficient background knowledge of the cultural and social factors reflected by the source text.

In this thesis, I examine genre-specific translation to the extent that it applies to political texts or, more precisely, legislative speeches. Under analysis is a selection of speeches from the United States Congress, and the perspective assumed in the thesis is that of a translator adapting American political speeches (or excerpts thereof) for a primarily European readership. In most cases this would mean a translator working for a European news organization, and the main aim of such translations would be to function as reports of political developments taking place in the United States.

The translation-theoretical framework under which the topic is examined derives from the functionalist tradition, which sees translation as purposeful activity. According to functionalists, the main concern in translation is not (or at least not always) semantic correspondence with the source text; it is instead to emphasize the specific purpose for which any given target text is produced and the translation strategies that this purpose gives cause for. Functionalist analyses are of high interest to the aims of the thesis since they have sought to establish genre prototypes—models that identify elements characteristic of specific genres in source and target cultures. Thanks in no small part to Christina Schäffner, such models have included genre specification for political texts as well.

What, then, can be found among the distinguishing features of political speeches specifically? Unlike political texts produced on the supranational level, such as treaties or documents of international organizations, political speeches tend to be confined to individual countries and therefore reflect a high degree of culture-boundedness (Schäffner 1997, 127). They are particularly affected by such factors as ideology, national history and the immediate political circumstances to which they respond.
The translation of political speeches is further complicated by the prevalence of *hedges*—mitigating words and phrases that add to the ambiguity of the source text (Schäffner 1998). It typically behooves the translator to assume a mediating role between the two cultures represented by the source and target texts, and with political speeches the task will likely require more than cursory acquaintance with the surrounding political discourse.

It is precisely due to this significance of discourse that I have chosen as my methodological approach not textual analysis per se but an intertextual form of analysis that looks at the wider socio-cultural context. With the advent of Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics, which considers the social and ideational aspects of text production, discourse analysis has been observed to have several points of convergence with translation studies and has for this reason been employed by scholars across the discipline. Discourse analysis allows for a more macro-level specification of source text features and, thus, for generalizations that are not specific to the language pairs with which the translator may be working. The aim is to demonstrate how it would be possible to better contextualize and, thus, render more accurate and comprehensible political texts from the United States by relying on tools provided by political discourse analysis.

1.1 Material

Forming the focus of the thesis are ten examples of American congressional debate, as transcribed in the *Congressional Record* and archived in video form in C-SPAN’s online library. The speeches, held by members of Congress on both the Senate and House floors, pertain to the United States’ commitment to NATO, an issue that has of late been subject to extensive coverage on both sides of the Atlantic, due in no small part to the Trump administration’s perceived unilateralist or, at times, even isolationist approach to foreign policy. All speeches have been held during the Trump presidency, and speakers from both main parties, Democratic and Republican, are featured. This provides the opportunity to highlight any interparty or, for that matter, *intraparty* divergences in policy, rhetoric and ideology.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology as mentioned derives from political discourse analysis and employs two analytical approaches that are of great use in contextualizing political texts. The first of these is a dialectic-related approach centered around the of concepts of *politicization* and *depoliticization*. Both are
discursive practices that reflect speakers’ attitudes towards the issue under debate. Whereas with *politicization* one seeks to challenge existing policy, *depoliticization* refers to a practice which “effaces” alternative ways and seeks to present prevailing circumstances as fundamentally apolitical (Muntigl 2002). The task, then, is to cast light on elements in the speeches that work to either politicize or depoliticize the United States’ NATO policy. Central to this form of analysis are *path* and *force semantics*, in which a certain policy is seen as a set path and its alternatives as disruptive forces that risk derailment.

The second approach employed for a discursive analysis of the study material comes from van Dijk (2002). Grounding his ideas in a multidisciplinary framework where political discourse and political cognition intersect, van Dijk delineates a form of analysis which looks at not only political discourse structures (such as topics and rhetoric) but the ways they are based on personal mental models that speakers construct in particular contexts. Such personal models, in turn, reflect socially shared representations of political and cultural groups or, more generally, a “cultural Common Ground that defines such notions as ‘common-sense’ and ‘taken-for-grantedness’” (van Dijk 2002, 209).

My own analysis seeks to show how the speeches reflect, for one, the addressers’ worldviews and their assumptions of shared knowledge with the addressees. Attention is also to be paid to the ideas, mutual relations and inner loyalties of the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as key aspects of American foreign policy with its historical and ideological underpinnings. Since the study material is closely linked with the field of collective security, of particular interest are prevailing attitudes about the United States’ responsibilities on the global stage.

As the culturally and situationally bound semantic nuances of the speech are elucidated through the application of these analytic tools, so too become clearer the potential challenges they pose for translation. Once the speeches have been properly contextualized, I refer to the questions that Schäffner discusses with relation to the translation of political speeches and the considerations that readers in the target culture should be afforded.

### 1.3 Structure

The research data is described in detail in the following chapter of the thesis. Thereafter, in Chapter 3, I proceed to discuss the literature forming the theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis. The discussion is not limited to discourse analysis; touched upon are also the importance of
genre to translation and the characteristics that political speeches embody as source texts. Chapter 4, in turn, constitutes an overview of the subject matter of the speeches, intended as a preface to the analysis in Chapter 5—the thesis’ core content. Therein, the selected speeches are first analyzed through a discourse analytical lens, after which inferences gleaned from the analysis, particularly as they relate to the task of translating political source texts from the United States for a European readership, are discussed. The concluding chapter 6 summarizes the findings and makes suggestions for future research.
2 Material

This chapter begins with a description of the research material. I address, first, in what manner and by which criteria the analyzed speeches were chosen. I then outline their content in general terms and provide a window into the partisan and ideological backgrounds of the speakers. The last section discusses the practical dimensions of the methodology by which the material is analyzed (refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed theoretical description).

2.1 Acquisition and delimitation

The data analyzed in the thesis comprise contributions to legislative debate within the United States Congress, a bicameral legislative body consisting of an upper chamber called the Senate and a lower chamber called the House of Representatives. Excerpts of legislative debate are regularly featured in news broadcasts and news articles, and on occasion their newsworthiness transcends culture, as happened in March 2019 with Senator Mike Lee’s speech on the Green New Deal, with translated portions appearing in French and German publications (Drum 2019; Otten 2019). The need for translating speech excerpts for foreign language publications adds to the importance of examining the speeches from a translational point of view. And since the point of view adopted in this thesis is that of a translator commissioned to translate such texts, I elected not to choose as my material texts which had already been translated, for the strategies applied in existing target texts might have only interfered with the task of exploring the approaches translators can take when no exact blueprint exists.

The speeches chosen for this thesis are examined in their published form—that is, the way they were transcribed in the Congressional Record, the official record of congressional proceedings and debates. Unlike the journals of the Senate and the House, which only show general listings of a legislative session’s proceedings without the accompanying debate, the Congressional Record is where all congressional debates are recorded verbatim. The Record is published daily whenever at least one chamber of the Congress is in session. Where relevant and when available, video recordings of the speeches are used as supplementary data. The recordings are archived in the online library of Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN), a private and non-profit television network which broadcasts legislative sessions and many other political events taking place in Washington, D.C. to cable and satellite households across the United States.
As a publication whose history dates back to 1873, the *Congressional Record* has kept record of congressional proceedings for almost a century and a half. Given the immense volume of studiable material that has accumulated over such a long period of time, it is necessary to examine only a select number of speeches to make thorough discourse analysis feasible. The manner of delimitation is elaborated on below.

For the material to be of an appropriate size, it seemed logical to demarcate it by time frame and subject matter. Firstly, I decided to select only speeches that coincide with the presidency of Donald Trump, as this would make the data relevant to the present day, both in terms of the general state of politics and the linguistic features that accompany it, namely the register of political speeches. As for the subject matter, it was important to choose speeches that appear to be of high interest to European observers, as this would make the need for translating such speeches all the more likely when word of them travelled across the Atlantic. The subject that I thought among the most pertinent in this regard was the United States’ commitment to NATO under the Trump administration, and so this became the common theme that runs through the debate observed in the thesis.

The subject has been widely discussed in Western media, and not exclusively in states that are members of NATO. During his presidential campaign and the early days of his presidency, Trump caused concern among American allies with his dismissal of NATO as “obsolete” and his suggestions that, were the allies to be attacked, they should not count on the United States’ unconditional support; such a stance stood in stark contrast to the country’s established foreign policy tradition (BBC 2017; Wright 2016). After his first few months as President, however, Trump walked back these comments, stating NATO was, after all, integral in the struggle against terrorism (Liptak & Merica 2017). However, since then he has maintained that the burden placed on the United States for the West’s defense has been disproportionate, and at the Brussels NATO summit of July 2018 he stirred another wave of controversy by demanding that NATO member states immediately increase their defense spending to 2 percent of their gross domestic products, a benchmark they pledged in 2014 to meet by 2024 (CNBC 2018). According to Sloan (2018, 221), Trump’s interactions with NATO have “upended decades-old assumptions about the transatlantic alliance and the presidency.”

With this background in mind, the task was to find congressional speeches that have been given in the House and Senate since Trump’s inauguration (January 20, 2017) and which discuss NATO as their primary topic. A search of the *Congressional Record* returned a total of ten speeches that satisfy these criteria. I then turned to C-SPAN’s online library in an effort to locate their respective video
recordings and succeeded with the exception of one speech. The speeches vary in length, with the shortest ones having been allotted only one minute, while the two longest speeches boast a duration of over ten minutes. Transcribed, the data amounts to approximately 4,900 words.

These ten speeches are divided equally among the two main parties in the United States Congress, with five speeches having been given by legislators of the liberal Democratic Party and another five by legislators of the conservative Republican Party. The five Democrats are Representatives Brendan Boyle, Steve Cohen, Gerry Connolly and Sheila Jackson Lee, and lastly Senator Sherrod Brown, whose speech is the only one lacking a supplementary recording. The five Republicans are Representatives Rob Bishop, Ted Poe and Joe Wilson, and Senators Jeff Flake and Dan Sullivan. The length and chronological order of the speeches are shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Speaker(s)</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 4, 2017</td>
<td>Brown (D)</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>675 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 2018</td>
<td>Jackson Lee (D)</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>206 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohen (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>156 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boyle (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>142 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12, 2018</td>
<td>Flake (R)</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>1542 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sullivan (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1448 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 2018</td>
<td>Bishop (R)</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>203 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connolly (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>159 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poe (R)</td>
<td></td>
<td>186 words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17, 2018</td>
<td>Wilson (R)</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>175 words</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That the speeches are concentrated in July 2018 is a consequence of the NATO summit held in Brussels on July 11 and 12. The occasion was widely covered in the media, and not least because of the perceived belligerence of the comments Trump made while attending the summit. Sources of controversy were not limited to the demand that American allies raise their defense spending but also included the contention that one major ally, Germany, was “totally” under Russian control, which claim the president based on German reliance on imported natural gas from Russia.

The following section will describe the content of the analyzed speeches and, thus, provide insight into the congressional reception to Trump as he appeared at the Brussels summit. Two of the speeches, however, adopt a different perspective, as they are not directly related to either Trump or the summit.
The congressional speeches held in the aftermath of the 2018 NATO summit mainly express the speakers’ own evaluations of Trump’s conduct during the summit. In the earliest of these speeches, Democrat Jackson Lee (2018, H6099), while conceding the need “to give criticism where necessary” and “to engage with your enemy” (referring to Russia), ultimately considers the President’s approach unproductive and suggests a perversion of priorities in his disparagement of the United States’ closest allies while refusing to treat unsavory figures such as Vladimir Putin with equal harshness. The other speeches from July 11 were held by Cohen and Boyle, with the latter considering Trump’s highly conditional commitment to NATO a worrying departure from established United States foreign policy (Boyle 2018, H6101). Cohen’s (2018, H6100) speech, however, is absent of any explicit references to the president, focusing instead on the passing of a House resolution of which he was the sponsor and which reaffirms American support for NATO and particularly those of its members that are threatened by Russia.

The senatorial speeches held on the following day by Flake and Sullivan reflect, despite the speakers’ identical party affiliations, conflicting views on the rationality of recent executive leadership. Flake (2018, S4934–S4935) adopts a view in line with the Democratic stance, namely that the president has managed to destabilize the Western alliance with the aspersions he has cast on other NATO countries and the overtures he has made to Russia and, in particular, its leader Putin, whom Flake accuses of dictatorial governance, of hostility toward the United States and of aggressive expansionist aspirations as regards the neighboring countries of Russia. He is for this reason very concerned of Trump’s approaching private meeting with Putin in Helsinki, the contents of which are to remain confidential.

Sullivan (2018, S4934), on the other hand, gives Trump credit for succeeding where past presidents have failed by pressuring NATO countries to move away from cutting their defense spending. Like Trump, the senator also raises the issue of Germany’s importation of Russian gas, which, he argues, “undermines energy security and national security in Europe and in NATO.” However, where the sentiments expressed by Sullivan and Flake converge is in the senators’ commendation of the European allies for their past support for the United States, as evidenced by the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty following the attacks of September 11, 2001, by which act all members of the organization recognized the United States as an aggressed-upon party worthy of its allies’ military
support. Sullivan (2018, S4935) further stresses the importance of not allowing rivaling nations, including Russia, to tear asunder America’s vast network of foreign alliances.

The three speeches of July 13 showcase clearer partisan divides, with Democrat Connolly opposing and Republicans Bishop and Poe approving of the president’s approach at the summit. While Bishop (2018, H6179) sheds light on what he considers the United States’ “unequal financial burden” and pushes for this burden to be more equally shared, Connolly (2018, H6179), in direct response to his colleague across the aisle, maintains that NATO allies have, in fact, honored their obligations, citing Article 5 as an example, and that the proper way to conduct foreign policy is through discretion and not outright disparagement of allies. In a manner echoing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous line “I welcome their hatred,” Poe (2018, H6193) does not see the irritation felt by the Europeans as an inherently bad development, as it may finally induce them to “pay their fair share.” Neither does he adopt the more conciliatory approach of his fellow Republican Sullivan, who recognized the times Europe has come to the United States’ aid; instead, he highlights the reverse, invoking the sacrifices his country made for the liberation of Axis-controlled territories during World War II.

The last speech of July 2018 was given by Republican Representative Wilson (2018, H6272), who lauds the president’s performance at the summit with favorable quotes from The Washington Times and the “Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity.” With the recent arrival of a Bulgarian delegation in the United States, Wilson uses this opportunity to also express his appreciation for the close cooperation between the two NATO members.

The only speech not held in July 2018 took place in April 2017, in acknowledgement of NATO’s 68th anniversary. Its author Senator Brown does not include any direct criticism of the Trump administration, which is not to say he would refrain from expressing his own foreign policy positions regarding NATO. He does, after all, consider his country’s continued support for NATO critical, noting the organization’s role in securing peace and stability in the West during and after the cold war and in combating various global security threats, including terrorism and Russian aggression. He concludes his speech by stating, “As we celebrate the anniversary of this pivotal organization today, we must remain committed to its successful future” (Brown 2017, S2213).
2.3 Author backgrounds

For the analysis to include members from both parties allows it to identify partisan divides in American politics. Such partisanship can be observed in how the speeches respond to rhetoric and policy exercised by the Republican-controlled executive branch and, furthermore, in how the United States’ international obligations and its European allies are characterized in the country’s contemporary political discourse. Speakers’ differing views on presidential performance become especially relevant when the thesis proceeds to Muntigl’s style of analysis that centers around the concepts of politicization and depoliticization, already mentioned in the introduction and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

There is also ideological diversity to be found within parties: Cohen and Jackson Lee are members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, which represents the progressive faction of the Democratic Party and favors unmistakably left-leaning social and economic reforms. Connolly, on the other hand, belongs to the more pro-capitalist New Democrat Coalition, which comprises moderate and centrist—Clintonian, if you will—Democrats. In terms of foreign policy, all five Democrats appear to favor a multilateralist approach to international relations, which places emphasis on cooperation with foreign states in pursuit of common goals, rather than claiming the right for the United States to act strictly in accordance with its own interests. However, generally those on progressive end of the American political spectrum tend to exercise more caution about American military intervention than do the centrist Democrats.

On the Republican side, it stands to reason that Jeff Flake would be the most likely to break party lines, given his record as a frequent critic of the Trump administration, as evidenced by his 2017 op-ed for Politico Magazine, “My Party Is in Denial About Donald Trump.” In the piece, Flake argues that his fellow conservatives have continually displayed hypocrisy and partisan tribalism in their embrace of a man who has spoken favorably of foreign authoritarian leaders and who, in the senator’s view, threatens the very integrity of the United States’ traditional institutions—faults for which the Republicans would not dither to condemn Democratic presidents (Flake 2017). The record of the other Republicans appears to be markedly more party-loyal; this includes even Sullivan, who, despite having withdrawn his support for Trump in the 2016 election, has voted in line with President’s position ninety percent of the time (FiveThirtyEight).
2.4 Notes on analysis

Analysis of the material is conducted through the means of discourse analysis; what this entails is the employment of an intertextual form of analysis that takes into account the wider socio-cultural context in which the text is produced. Since the limited number of material that this thesis examines is evaluated without the use of statistical averages, the research method is qualitative rather than quantitative, though this does not preclude the observations made from having wider implications for translating texts of the same genre, instead of their being particular to only the analyzed material.

Since the thesis assumes the point of view of a European translator regardless of the national community to which they may belong, it does not take as its primary focus the problems posed by variance between the source language and all potential target languages; the point of the analysis is rather to capture any culture-specific elements that translators across Europe should consider when tasked with rendering political texts from the United States.

The thesis relies most heavily on two models of discourse analysis, the first of which is based on the politicizing (and depoliticizing) nature of language (Muntigl 2002), while the second is characterized by a political-cognitive form of analysis (van Dijk 2002); these are described in greater detail in Chapter 3. Relying on two discourse analytical approaches rather than just one allows me, first, to analyze the material more comprehensively and, second, to make comparisons between the two approaches in the concluding discussion of the thesis and thereby evaluate which one may be more useful from a translational perspective.
3 Theoretical framework: genre, translation and discourse

This chapter focuses on the literature and body of research that forms the theoretical basis of the thesis. It begins with an overview of the significance of genre to translation, with a particular emphasis on how political speeches should be examined as source texts. The discussion then proceeds to functionalist translation strategies that are of great pertinence to translators of political speeches. Thereafter, the chapter examines the methodologically significant topic of political discourse analysis and the specific approaches that are to be employed in the thesis’ analysis chapter; explanations of how translation and political discourse analysis are interlinked will be provided in the concluding section.

3.1 Genre-specific translation and political speeches as source texts

From its early stages in the mid-twentieth century, translation theory was primarily based on linguistic approaches, with the process of translation being seen as one of “linguistic transcoding” (Schäffner 2001, 6). Analyses comparing source and target texts were, as a result, focused on linguistic elements, such as words, phrases and clauses. The levels of variance (or, ideally, invariance) between source and target text elements were judged under the framework of equivalence. The concept has been interpreted in varying ways, but at a basic level equivalence analysis involves the treatment of the source text as the baseline against which the target text is evaluated, the key factor being differences that are not simply attributable to crosslinguistic variation (Sager 1997, 25). Within a linguistic framework that prioritizes a traditional view of equivalence, a translation should ideally strive for as much semantic similarity with the source text as possible (Schäffner 2000, 209).

However, the shortcomings of linguistic approaches were made evident by their failure to consider the text-specific communicative purpose of translation in the target culture, which purpose a semantically correct translation may not always fulfill. Greater consideration was subsequently afforded to relevant subfields of applied linguistics, including pragmatics and discourse analysis. Equivalence thereby evolved into something observable on several levels of textual content: while some variations of equivalence continued to be based on purely formal or structural parameters, others emphasized communicative ones (Schäffner 2001, 8–9). Of the latter kind, Nida’s (1969, 22–24) dynamic equivalence (i.e. the elicitation of equivalent response from the target text audience) serves as a well-known example.
Despite the introduction of these pragmatic dimensions, the preoccupation with equivalence continued to be challenged by some theorists, with one target of criticism being the implausibility of achieving equivalence in the strict sense of the word (Schäffner 2001, 8). Sager (1997, 26) and Nord (1997a, 43–44) also object to the vagueness of the term, with Nord going as far as to call it “one of the most ambiguous concepts in translation studies from the start.” Nord (1997a, 45) further questions the alleged universality of equivalence as a concept: since conventions of translation vary across cultures, the way translational equivalence has been formulated by the theorists vouching for it may not fit well with the prevailing schemata of all cultural communities.

Perhaps most importantly, though, linguistics-based approaches are perceived by Sager and Nord as representing a “static” view of translation that fixates on source-to-target text correspondence at the expense of the cultural and situational aspects of translation. With the recognition of equivalence theory’s inadequacy to consider these aspects, functionalist theories have since gained in significance, causing translation studies to experience a shift from micro-level semantic evaluations to a more dynamic view of translation that also considers macro-level questions of function (Schäffner 2000, 209–210). Thus, rather than follow the linguistics-based tradition of treating the text as a string of independent source language units, functionalist approaches derived from text-linguistics a holistic view of the text as “an organic whole,” in whose translation the target language resources chosen by the translator serve a common purpose (Schäffner 2001, 9–10).

According to Schäffner (2001, 15), the key principle at work in a functionalist framework is that both the production and receipt of texts involve a specific function. The role of the translator is seen as that of a cultural mediator who is to adapt the source text for a new audience in a manner most befitting its function in the target culture, which in turn is determined by the translation’s situational aspects. Different categories of text function have been presented, and the four main ones as defined by Nord (1997a, 50–51) include referential, expressive, appellative and phatic. Under the referential category can be placed informative and instructive texts, while expressive texts often take an artistic form that expresses “sender’s attitude or feelings towards the objects and phenomena dealt with in the text.” Texts that are appellative (or operative), in turn, seek to elicit a desired reaction from receivers by appealing to them through ethos, logos or pathos. Finally, the phatic function refers to methods of facilitating interpersonal contact, such as salutation and small-talk. It is important to note that, in translation, text function may well change due to the different expectations placed on source and target texts, as Nord highlights below:
Text function is [...] a pragmatic quality assigned to a text by the receiver in a particular situation and not something attached to, or inherent in, the text. Thus, it seems only logical that the function of the source text is specific to the original situation and cannot be left invariant or “preserved” through the translation process. The function of the target text, on the other hand, is specific to the target situation, and it is an illusion that a target text should have automatically the “same” function as the original.

(Nord 1997a, 95)

The potential situations pertaining to translations are multifarious. They may involve writers who wish to expand their readership to other cultures, or publishers seeking to have a novel translated, or “individual readers who need to know what is new in a scientific paper written in a language they do not understand” (Sager 1997, 26). The translator should therefore consider such aspects as sender’s intention, the time and place of the target text, the reason why it was commissioned, the manner or medium by which its content is communicated, and, finally, the specific group for whom it is intended—that is, the addressees, whose expected knowledge and needs are to be accounted for (Nord 1997a, 56; Schäffner 2001, 22). Such factors can sometimes be deduced from translation briefs, though the translator’s personal experience and expertise is also important in assessing the situation surrounding the target text.

With the shift that translation studies underwent from a purely linguistic framework to a text-linguistic one, theorists also began to outline prototypes of genre (Schäffner 2001, 11). This mainly involves specification of genre conventions, which vary across time and cultures and are therefore of great interest to translation. Being knowledgeable of the genre conventions that apply in both the source and target culture allows “for the retextualisation of the SL-text according to the TL conventions.” It is therefore reasonable to assert that for translation to be “functionally appropriate,” the translator should not ignore the role that genre plays in the achievement of desired target text function.

The relationship between genre and translation has been addressed by several scholars, including Sager (1997) and Schäffner (2000). The following paragraphs will provide a more detailed discussion of the topic, becoming more heavily focused on the genre of political speeches toward the end.

For adequate identification of a particular genre’s characteristics to take place, the first question worth examining is how genre should be defined. Trosborg (1997a, 6) calls genres “text categories readily distinguished by mature speakers of a language” and cites as examples guidebooks, poems, newspaper articles and advertisements. To consider this a satisfactory definition, however, would mean differentiating such categories by intuition, so a more technical approach is needed. Trosborg
(1997a, 9) notes that some scholars have tried to address this question by proposing communicative purpose as the defining characteristic of genre. The problem with this view, however, is that texts commonly recognized as belonging to different genres can exhibit identical communicative functions, as is the case with advertisements and job applications, since both aim to convince addressees of the value of something (Trosborg 1997a, 11). When texts are categorized by their communicative purpose, it is therefore more useful to speak of text types. Contrary to common perception, the term text type does not refer to content but rather to the application whose ends a specific text structure serves (Sager 1997, 30–31).

In addition to the specification of communicative function, scholars have sought to arrive at precise definitions of genre through register analysis. A register is a variety of language particular to a certain communicative setting, such as the language of religion and that of legal documents. Trosborg (1997a, 10) notes that texts commonly recognized as belonging to the same genre cannot always be neatly grouped by register, since a single register, like a communicative function, can apply across genres. It is therefore her conclusion that genre can be fully understood only through a multidimensional approach involving Halliday’s systemic-functional analysis that considers three register variables: field, tenor and mode (Trosborg 1997a, 10–12).

Of the components of this model, field refers to the subject matter of the text and the nature of its linguistic content (technical or nontechnical?), while tenor accounts for the text’s discursive participants, namely the author and addressees, their relationship and the communicative function arising therefrom. And, finally, by mode is meant the medium of the text, which is to say the means by which the content is communicated: is it spoken or written, formal or informal, distant in both time and space or happening in the here and now (Munday & Zhang 2017, 2)? Within this framework of field, tenor, and mode, the genre of a text is for a large part attributable to how the text aligns on each of these three parameters: Eggins ([1994] 2004, 58) uses the example of horoscope texts, where field is realized as romantic or career predictions, tenor as advice, and mode as the informal, direct manner in which the reader is addressed with the pronoun you.

However, these register variables may not be sufficient to account for all the ways genres can be signaled: according to Trosborg (1997a, 12), recognizing genres also necessitates “a description of linguistic features realized in the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual components of particular texts,” which is in alignment with the definition Schäffner (2000, 210) gives of genres as “global linguistic patterns which have historically developed in a linguistic community for fulfilling specific communicative tasks in specific situations.” Such patterns may be observed in the functionally
significant stages into which a text is structured and the lexico-grammatical features by which these stages are differentiated: the genre of recipes, for example, exhibits a standardized progression that includes as its stages ingredients and method of cooking, the former being realized as a list of noun phrases and the latter as a succession of imperative main clauses (Eggin 2004, 58–69). What implications, then, do factors such as subject matter, author-addressee relationship, medium and linguistic features have for the translation of the genre examined in this thesis?

Typically, translators have to render documents “outside their original communicative situation,” which calls for a reconstruction of the source text for it to be sufficiently understood (Sager 1997, 27). It was established above that text function may change between source and target text, and of key concern is whether texts, by virtue of specifically their genre, retain their original authorial intention even in translated form. While this is usually true of literary works, it cannot be assumed of many other kinds of texts, which also affects the ways the translator should address the expectations of target text readers. Any persons excluded from the original writer’s intended audience are, after all, secondary readers, whose knowledge or lack thereof is not accounted for in the source text. They can be considered primary readers only if it is the explicit aim of the writer to communicate his or her creations to new audiences through translation (Sager 1997, 28).

By their original communicative function in the source culture, political speeches can typically be classified as hortatory exposition, in which the aim is not simply to convince addressees of the validity of an ethical or epistemological thesis, but to compel them to action—“to do what the Thesis recommends” (Martin 1990, 16–17). When a politician gives a speech, the perlocutionary force of the speech would ideally involve increased political support for the stated agenda and, especially as concerns lawmakers, the securing of future electoral support from constituents, who, as has already been established in the case of the United States, have both online and cable access to congressional speeches. While Muntigl (2002) refers to a speech he analyzes as analytic exposition—a concept distinguished from hortatory exposition by its lack of an operative function, with the aim of the text being simply to persuade the mind and not drive its owner to action—this specific speech was given by a member of the European Commission, who, compared to elected legislators and especially those working on the national level, does not rely to an equal degree upon the electorate’s approval to maintain his position. I would therefore label the speeches analyzed in this thesis as hortatory exposition, though in either case political speeches maintain a distinctly operative function.

However, through translation this operative function most often transforms into an informative one. It is conceivable that political speeches would retain their original function in certain contexts, such
as in multilingual societies where politicians may want to promulgate their ideas by having them translated for those segments of the populace who have little to no knowledge of the source language. In other cases, however, the audience to which the target text is presented are clearly secondary addressees who, rather than being appealed to by the rhetoric of the speech, are merely observing political developments in the source culture. This is true of both communicative situations that Schäffner (1997, 127–128) associates with political speeches, be it *internal political communication*, in which a speech is delivered by one politician to other politicians as an exercise in policy-making, or *external political communication*, in which the speaker addresses the public. Political speeches thus stand in contrast to hybrid political texts such as multilateral treaties and documents of international organizations, because when these are produced in several languages, the different versions are usually meant to serve mutually identical functions (Trosborg 1997b, 145).

Another difference between political speeches and hybrid political texts is that the cultural confines of the former tend to be much smaller, thus making their content harder to understand to readers outside the original cultural context (Schäffner 1997, 127). Due to the shared, often historical knowledge that members of the same cultural community possess, the information communicated in a political speech may be left implicit, with the author assuming no further clarification to be necessary. This is shown in an example Schäffner (1997, 129) cites from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in whose speech from 1990 East Germans who fled their country to Hungary (with the intention of ultimately settling in Austria) are simply referred to as “refugees.” The reference has no antecedent or postcedent that would inform the non-German reader as to the true identity of these refugees, thereby making it purely exophoric or, in other words, reliant on discourse external to the immediate situation of the source text.

Further culture-related (and subject matter-related) challenges may be posed by political concepts. This applies to both foreign concepts that lack corresponding linguistic labels in the target culture and, as is sometimes the case, concepts for which one can find equivalents in target language dictionaries but which carry different connotations in the source culture; such concepts include *democracy* and *human rights*, the exact interpretations of which can vary across cultures (Schäffner 1997, 130–132). Concepts are part of conceptual structures—what one might call *schemata*—that are shared a community of people, and they “[represent] a particular amount of stored knowledge within such a structure.” In political discourse, concepts have ideological underpinnings and are therefore not always deconstructable by logic or lexico-grammatical knowledge alone (Schäffner 1997, 130).
It is important to note that concepts do not emerge in a vacuum but are the result of often long historical processes, and the translator ought to be cognizant of the wider source culture schemata to which concepts are bound. The ramifications of misinterpreting concepts can be far-reaching, and Schäffner points to Wallerstein (1996, 116), who explains that while an individual reader will only cause harm to him or herself when misinterpreting a text, misinterpretation on the translator’s part will be lamentable on a mass scale, since his or her misinterpretation will be read or heard by all target culture recipients.

Another element that may pose translational problems is the tendency of political speakers to use *hedging devices*, which Schäffner (1998) examines in her analysis of German political speeches rendered into English and vice versa. The act of hedging is described by Kussmaul (1997, 74) as “hiding behind a hedge,” prompted by the author’s unwillingness to “[take] all the responsibility for the truth of the propositional content of his utterance.” Indeed, hedges are linguistic units that, to varying degrees, introduce vagueness, fuzziness or indeterminateness to a statement. They vary from multi-word phrases to single morphemes, and examples include the adverbial *all but technically*, the adverb *mostly*, the adjective *true* (e.g. in “no true Scotsman” fallacies) and the prefix *crypto-* (Lakoff 1973, 471–472). With the incorporation of such expressions into an utterance, the overall message may become less definite and allows authors more wiggle room.

Typical of political speeches are what Sweetser (1987) classifies as *evidentiality-hedges*, by which speakers may refuse to fully attest to the veracity of the proposition put forth. Among common evidentiality-hedges are the expressions “I believe” and “to the best of my knowledge.” However, hedges can also be used for the modification or quantification of scope (e.g. *typically, in some respect*), specification (e.g. *exactly, true*) or despecification, as is the case with *roughly* and *sort of* (Schäffner 1998, 190–196). Though hedges vary by function, they all have the potential of making the message of the source text more ambiguous and are therefore not be dismissed as inconsequential for translation.

Schäffner (1998, 200) concludes that hedges, when employed in the textual genre of political speeches, carry not only semantic but also pragmatic implications: When politicians use, say, evidentiality-hedges, they may seek to proactively quell criticism by distancing themselves from a proposition they expect to be controversial among certain addressees. This is well illustrated in a 1996 speech by the then-German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, delivered originally in German and translated into English. Kinkel, in addressing the British government’s unfavorable view of European integration—a view he does not share—hedges his criticisms of the British with such phrases as “I
have the impression,” “one could almost think” and “it seems.” Also of significance is the use of syntax, for while the German source text uses a roundabout expression in reference to British attitudes (“in the British view”), the English target text opts for an active verb (“the British believe”); such a change results in a less ambiguous message that, by ascribing to the British greater agency, may be received by them more negatively than the original phrasing found in the source text. The translator should therefore consider carefully the choice between vagueness and directness when it has the potential for real-world consequences (Schäffner 1998, 188–189).

From these perlocutionary factors it follows that a comprehensive understanding of a text cannot solely rely on lexical and grammatical knowledge of the language, for paramount is also the body of knowledge that analysts—be they translators or discourse theorists—have accrued about the pragmatics of language use in the settings wherein the texts are produced (Schäffner 1998, 200). This, again, demonstrates the necessity for contextualizing political speeches as part of a wider discourse, even at the level of individual phrases, of which hedges serve as one example.

Besides hedges and syntax, Schäffner discusses potential problems with pronoun use, which arise from the implicitness inherent in deixis—that is, the use of imprecise expressions whose semantic value relies heavily upon the context in which they appear (Sauer 2002, 116). Common deictic words include pronouns (me, it, those) and adverbs (here, now, later). Thus, when a speaker mentions an entity not by name but by pronoun, the identity of the referent may well be lost on those not well-versed in source culture discourse. Schäffner (1998, 197–198) provides an instance of this by quoting East German Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière. In a policy statement given on April 19, 1990 (when East Germany had undergone a democratic transition allowing for greater partisan and ideological diversity even at the top levels of government), the Christian Democratic de Maizière takes a stance against claims made by his political opponents in the Socialist Unity Party (SED); however, recognizing the political inexpediency of potentially divisive rhetoric as the head of a government committed to German unification, he does not openly criticize the socialists but resorts instead to an argument that, at least in the English translation, reads more like a maxim than a direct accusation: “one cannot claim to be solely the heir of the positive aspects of German history and let others bear responsibility for the negative sides.” If deficient of source culture background knowledge, a reader of the target text is unlikely to understand the implicature of the pronoun “one.”

The hedging and deixis present in Kinkel and de Maizière’s speeches provides us but a glimpse into the totality of ways in which political speeches are affected by ideology (or one’s interest in furthering ideologically motivated policy goals). Vocabulary in general can be very carefully chosen so as to
prevent one’s rhetoric from appearing insensitive, and Schäffner (2001, 134–135) also mentions topicalization (i.e. the selection of certain topics as worthy of discussion) and issue formulation as examples of ideological aspects that, from the perspective of target culture addressees, add to the opacity of political texts. And since political texts and their translations serve different purposes, the communicative value of the target text may be lost if the translator assumes the target audience to possess relevant background knowledge and, consequently, neglects to make any rectifying changes.

There thus exist many elements in political speeches that may not be deemed immediately recognizable or relatable by target culture readers, with the frequency of such elements being positively correlated with the size of the challenge that a translator faces while serving in the role of cross-cultural mediation.

### 3.2 Translation strategies

Given all the challenges highlighted in the previous section, by what strategies, then, ought political speeches to be translated? In Peter Newmark’s conception, political speeches are “authoritative texts,” which typically involve authors of notable standing, including politicians (Newmark 1988, 39). In authoritative texts, the form is no less important than the content, and they can thus be contrasted with informative texts such as scientific and financial articles, where content and its effective communication takes precedence (Newmark 1991, 135). Owing to the significance that the form in authoritative texts is accorded, a translation should, in Newmark’s view, constitute a close formal representation of the source text. He also argues that “the more authoritative the text, the fewer concessions to the readership can be made. […] Any ‘concessions’ for the readership are outside the translation, in notes, glossaries, prefaces” (Newmark 1991, 99).

Schäffner (2001, 135) notes, however, that Newmark’s notion of the inviolability of authoritative texts cannot be applied to all instances of translating political speeches. The process may, depending on the target text’s purpose, demand a more addressee-oriented strategy, one that, while recognizing the occasional utility for the translator’s visible explanations, does not by default relegate “concessions to the readership” to “notes, glossaries, prefaces.” This kind of functionalist view “leaves the translator more leeway in his or choices.” Worth noting is that functionalist approaches do not preclude translations from being semantically accurate renditions of source texts, since their function may well be best-served this way; crucial here is the recognition that translators have more than one option to consider (Schäffner 2000, 209).
This section will proceed with descriptions of the specific strategies that are of use to a translator of political speeches. Strategies are defined by Chesterman (2000, 82) as “well-tried” and “goal-oriented” procedures that one turns to when the means initially applied seem inadequate for solving a specific problem; one might consider as an example the translation strategy of antonymy (or negation), by which an affirmative assertion is not translated word-for-word but replaced with a more natural-sounding negative assertion (Chesterman 1997, 102). Since a functionalist view of translation has been taken as the approach, the strategies presented here will be largely based on Schäffner’s illustrations of how functionalist approaches can be applied when translating political texts for audiences outside the source culture context.

There are, first of all, some preparatory steps that a translator may take before the writing process. Schäffner (2001, 22) maintains that the first step should involve specification of target text function through careful analysis of the translation brief, which will ideally provide the translator a clear picture of the wider situation surrounding the translation. The translator, as mentioned earlier, should become aware of such factors as the motive for the translation, the nature and needs of the addressees, and the context in which the finished translation will be used. Once these have been specified, the translator may settle on the type of translation, which can be either documentary or instrumental.

These two translation types are distinguished by their visibility as translations. Documentary translations function like reported speech, being texts that, in essence, constitute reports of other texts, while instrumental translations aim to secure the illusion of being original texts in their own right, despite having been modelled after their respective source texts (Nord 1997b, 47–52). Chesterman (1999) likens Nord’s documentary and instrumental translation to Juliane House’s overt and covert translation, respectively, and cites political speeches as examples of overt and, by extension, documentary translation.

The second step discussed by Schäffner (2001, 22) involves an analysis of the source text. As Nord (1997b, 62) notes, despite the functionalist emphasis on target text purpose, the source text should by no means be considered an irrelevant component of the translation process, being always the starting point of the crosslinguistic transfer realized in the target text. The analysis should, however, be pragmatic, with the translator’s task being to compare the situation of the source text with that of the target text. Moreover, since the translator cannot be expected to possess expertise of all potential source text subjects, this phase typically involves source text-related research, be it linguistic, cultural, subject matter-related or otherwise (Schäffner 2001, 22–23). It is also imperative to continue this
research when translation has begun, since decisions made early into the process may require later modification if the translator, through his or her acquisition of greater knowledge, finds certain target text units in violation of, for example, genre conventions or text coherence. Research therefore plays a role in shaping the translator into a better judge of how target text function is best served (Schäffner 2001, 23).

Among the translator’s main objectives in conducting source text analysis is the identification of potential problems for translation as well as the strategy by which they may be addressed (Nord 1997b, 62). Translation problems have been categorized by Nord (1997b) into four groups, these being pragmatic, intercultural, interlingual and text-specific. Pragmatic problems are caused by differences between source and target culture situations, and they can result in errors that are not sufficiently addressee-oriented. Because pragmatic problems occur in all cases of translation, Nord (1997b, 65–66) argues that they should be accorded more attention in translation training than the other three other categories. Of these other problems, intercultural ones refer to how source and target cultures differ in their norms and conventions: if a slogan, for example, is translated in a semantically accurate way but lacks the idiomacy necessary for it to be recognized as a slogan, the translator can be said to have committed an intercultural translation error (Nord 1997b, 66). Interlingual problems, in turn, arise from lexico-grammatical or suprasegmental differences between the source and target languages, and here the translator may find assistance in contrastive grammar and comparative linguistics (Nord 1997b, 66–67). Finally, the translator may encounter problems specific to the source text, such as neologisms or original figures of speech; problems of this type cannot be generalized as easily as the others, and there may be times when the translator has to address them by simply relying on his or her personal creativity (Nord 1997b, 67).

As regards political texts, the translation problems that Schäffner has observed in her analyses extend to all four categories. Pragmatic problems can arise from political nomenclature specific to the source culture (such as titles and names of political groups), the political or historical background of the source text and the situation of the target text (Schäffner 2001, 147–155 & 174–175). Problems related to historical background are to be found in those parts of the source text that “require the activation of culture-specific background knowledge,” and they can involve references to source culture history or tradition. While Schäffner does not define a problem category for hedges, they too appear pragmatic, in so small part due to their perlocutionary aspects and the background knowledge that their full comprehension often calls for (Schäffner 1998, 199–200).
Of pragmatic problems related to the source culture situation, deixis is a typical example. The source text may, after all, include situation-specific references that are relative to the author’s spatiotemporal location: were the author to use, for example, the adverbial last night, secondary addressees may well be left clueless as to the point in time such a relative phrase refers to. Deixis is not the only situational problem, however, since authors may also refer to recent events with generic phrases that assume addressees will recognize the referent without further elaboration: a specific occurrence of terrorist attacks may thus be simply called “the attacks.” Depending on the international significance of such events, further elaboration in the translation may not always be necessary, but a consideration of addressee knowledge should nonetheless be part of target text specification.

Intercultural problems may involve genre conventions, among which are included, in the context of political speeches, ritual openings and the ways listeners are addressed; in this way, though political speeches may be primarily appellative in function, they also exhibit a phatic function that aims at the retention of interpersonal contact. In legislative settings, these phatic qualities can be observed in how the presiding officer is addressed (“Mr. Speaker,” “Madam President”). Besides genre conventions, intercultural problems encompass conceptual metaphors. Typical of English language political discourse is the metaphor of the heart (“at the heart of a conflict”), construction metaphors (“to rebuild the peace process”) as well as the treatment of political processes as moving objects, as demonstrated by the ascribing to the agent peace process such verb phrases as stand still or move forward (Schäffner 2001, 156–157). Conceptual metaphors are made problematic mainly by the fact that matching conceptualizations of politics cannot always be found in the target culture, and so in translation they may require some level of adaptation.

Schäffner (2001, 158–162 & 178–179) has also made note of interlingual translation problems, of which idiomatic expressions—such as knee-jerk reaction—are among the most easily recognizable. Grammatical problems will invariably depend on differences specific to the source and target languages, and the particular problems Schäffner comes across are related to syntactic variation between English and German. While grammatical features are therefore not as conducive to generalization as pragmatic or intercultural problems (or other types of interlingual problems), elements such as word order do carry significance on the level of discourse as well, as will be demonstrated in the following section, which examines political discourse structures.

Problems specific to Schäffner’s analyzed texts include headings, contrastive evaluations, dominant lexical-semantic fields and quotations (Schäffner 2001, 162–165 & 178–179). While these do not apply across texts, they do bear implications beyond their text-specific context. Firstly, a source text
heading may pose challenges for consistency, for if it appears as a rhetorical element in the text itself, the target text will need to reflect this connection as well. Secondly, since political texts are often argumentative not only in what they argue for but what they argue against, they can display contrastive evaluations. Such evaluations are relevant to translation due to the connotations that certain words and phrases trigger among addressees, and were the source text to attribute decisively negative connotations to what the author opposes and positive ones to what he or she supports, the translator may want to convey this binary juxtaposition in the target text as well—a task for which literal translation does not always suffice. Thirdly, the term lexical-semantic fields refers to schemata that take a specific linguistic form (Schäffner 2001, 42). This includes the fields of conflict and negotiation, both of which can be recognized by their associated lexicon. And, lastly, problems with quotations arise from their function as rhetorical devices and the possibility that the translator may have to locate existing translations of them for consistency.

To these problems the translator may find a solution in Chesterman’s (1997, 93) translation strategies, of which there are three categories: mainly syntactic, mainly semantic and mainly pragmatic. The first two are perceived by Schäffner (2001, 30) as micro-level and the last one as macro-level strategies. The inclusion of the adverb mainly stems from a recognition that there exists some overlap between the three categories, and Schäffner (2001, 31) notes that, consequently, one strategy type cannot be directly linked with one of Nord’s proposed categories of translation problems. There are, however, intercategorical differences in terms of how frequently a strategy may be applied to a particular problem, with pragmatic problems being often the focus of pragmatic strategies.

In the end, the primary concern of the translator should be the function of the target text and the employment of strategies that best serve the task of achieving it (Schäffner 2001, 31–32). Below, I will highlight some of the ways in which problematic elements specific to political speeches may be addressed under a functionalist frame of reference.

As was discussed in the preceding section, when the text treats a source culture audience as its primary addressees, it tends to be rich in culture-specific elements. Schäffner (2001, 134) argues that in such cases there is a need for “an analysis of the translation brief, reflecting, in particular, on the knowledge and experience that can be expected of the [target text] readers.” The objective here is to assess how much more explicit any implicit information in the source text should be made, which connects to Chesterman’s (1997, 108–109) translation strategy of explicitness change. Where the translator may encounter expressions tethered to source culture-specific background knowledge, Schäffner (1998, 200) suggests explicitation as one way to avoid misinterpretation: “Whenever there are differences in
the background knowledge of [source] and [target text] addressees which might affect the comprehension of the message, the translator would have to take decisions as to the textual format of the [target text], for example making implicit information explicit.”

Besides explicitation, one way to address pragmatic translation problems stemming from the culture-boundedness of the source text involves visibility change (Chesterman 1997, 112). By this the translator makes him or herself more visible by using “footnotes, bracketed comments [...] or added glosses” that function as explanations of any unclear source text elements (this is essentially the strategy suggested by Newmark, as discussed above). While in her own translation of an opinion article (by a noted politician) Schäffner (2001, 152) opts for bracketed comments for context, she points out that they should not be relied upon excessively, for “this would be detrimental to the genre.” Moreover, it would most certainly conflict with target text function, which does not always demand that addressees understand the text down to the minutest detail, as taking this as the objective easily lends itself to overtranslation (Schäffner 2001, 152). From a genre-analytical perspective, the same can be said to apply to political speeches, because while speeches and opinion pieces differ in terms of mode (medium), they share an operative function that aims to persuade addressees through rhetoric. And while this persuasive function no longer applies to secondary addressees (i.e. target text readers), the metatextuality of the translation would still dictate the preservation of the text’s recognizability as rhetoric, which long and frequent explanations would work to only erode.

Another way of addressing potentially difficult source language expressions is to consult parallel texts, which are defined by Neubert (1985, 75) as “L 2 and L 1 texts of equal informativity which have been produced in more or less identical communicative situations.” For the translator, parallel texts can function as genre prototypes that assist him or her in capturing linguistic forms that a certain type of content regularly takes in the target culture (Schäffner 2000, 214). What makes this an important observation is that a translation which conforms to target culture conventions is more easily recognized by addressees as belonging to its respective genre. Since political institutions such as parties and governmental bodies tend to use standardized expressions, it is advisable to seek relevant target culture expressions in texts that bear an institutional connection to the source text (Schäffner 2001, 134). Were the source text to be composed of, for example, legislative debate, the translator should want to examine corresponding debate in the target culture and put to good use the registerial conventions he or she finds pertinent to the source text. Parallel texts may thus serve as roadmaps for solving such intercultural translation problems as speech openings and forms of address, including “Mr. President.”
Schäffner (2001, 135) suggests further comparative textual analysis, this time involving the author of the text: some politicians may, after all, speak or write in a distinct style, and it may therefore be desirable to compare the source text to other speeches by the same author, so as to trace any recurring rhetorical patterns that should be reflected in the target text as well. Furthermore, politicians sometimes quote each other (or authors of other authoritative texts), and in such cases the translator may have to check possible translations of these quoted texts for consistency.

There exists yet another kind of text that translators can consult, though they should do so with some reservation. These are background texts published in the target culture about the political context of the source text. The translator may feel inclined to examine such texts as blueprints for translating problematic source text elements. However, Schäffner (2001, 135) notes that such texts should not be relied on excessively as far as translational choices are concerned, for sometimes they reflect the ideological leanings of their authors and thus may refer to certain concepts and institutions with politically charged evaluative labels, as evidenced by German discourse about the conflict in Northern Ireland, wherein such descriptors as militant, radical and terrorist have been used in reference to the various factions of the conflict. Schäffner warns that “the translator has to be extremely careful not to copy [such] evaluations,” as they as may come off as far too divisive when attributed to politicians who want to appear neutral or diplomatic. As I see it, depending on the function of the target text it may be advisable to opt for these ideological evaluations only when corresponding source language expressions are used by the quoted politician themselves, and as long as they can be presented as reflecting only the politician’s own world view and not an attempt at objective reporting.

This same call for prudence applies to some extent to hedges. Of the different types of hedges, evidentiality-hedges are the least problematic in the translations analyzed by Schäffner, for whenever they occur in the source text, they are simply replaced by close target language equivalents (Schäffner 1998, 187–190). In some cases, however, evidentiality-hedges are added to originally unhedged statements, which may render them more vague than the original speaker intended (Schäffner 1998, 197–198). As for other types of hedges, some translations exhibit the strategy of deletion, of which Klaus Kinkel’s speech, again, serves as one example: whereas the German source text references the British ideal of the European Union negatively as “a community merely for the purpose of pursuing free trade and prosperity,” the target text has omitted the modifying hedge merely by replacing the noun phrase with “a community of convenience in pursuit free trade and prosperity” (Schäffner 1998, 196–197). Here, hedge omission is of little consequence thanks to the negative associations that the replacing word convenience shares with the source text hedge.
Like many other translation problems, the vagueness of hedges may require explicitation since, after all, translation from a functionalist point of view is to be seen as cross-cultural communication where the function of the target text and consideration for the target readership’s lack of knowledge take precedence (Schäffner 1998, 200).

The last area examined in the translation of political texts involves metaphor. Traditionally, metaphor has been understood in linguistic terms—that is, as an element used as a non-literal stand-in for a literal expression, with the goal of achieving “stylistic embellishment of the text” (Schäffner 2004, 1254). However, such a narrow view does not sufficiently account for the cultural dimensions of metaphor, particularly since metaphors are not mere embellishments but represent societal thought processes, or schemata; the way certain phenomena are conceptualized within each culture (Schäffner 2004, 1257–1258). One example of such is the perception of politics as “movement along a path towards a destination,” which, if not a universal concept, is present in several cultures, although the exact linguistic resources by which this conceptual path is communicated vary. To demonstrate the use of path metaphor and its variation across cultures, Schäffner (2004, 1265) quotes the 1994 manifesto of the Party of European Socialists, which, in the English version, uses the phrase “a long way to go” in reference to one of the party’s goals, whereas the German version of the text corresponds semantically to the phrase “a long way towards there.”

Metaphors in political discourse can also be anthropomorphizing, such as in their treatment of political entities as persons that form not with one another not only good relations but “friendships”; it is for this reason that Schäffner (2004, 1258–1261) contends that to render a German phrase corresponding formally to transatlantic bridge as transatlantic friendship in an English translation does not constitute metaphor deletion (as per a linguistic view of metaphor), but rather shifts the metaphor to another domain. Political metaphors can also be containing, as is the case with the metaphor of the heart and of the umbrella (e.g. “at the heart of the matter” and “under the umbrella of”). When translated, the heart and umbrella metaphors may often require adaptation similar to path metaphors, since they may have to be rendered with the involvement of another word conforming to target language convention, such as the words core and roof—consider the German Kern and Dach (Schäffner 2001, 156–157; Schäffner 2004, 1265).

According to Schäffner (2004, 1264) scholars have formulated one basic rule for culture-oriented metaphor translation thusly:
[I]t has been argued that if a metaphor activates different associations in the two cultures, one should avoid a literal translation and opt either for a corresponding TL-metaphor or for a paraphrase. If, however, the culture-specificity of the ST is to be stressed, then it would be better to reproduce the SL-metaphor and add an explanation, either in a footnote or by means of annotations.

As the highlighted bridge–friendship example shows, when there is a need for “a corresponding [target language] metaphor,” source and target text metaphors may well be considered identical on the macro level, even if some of the micro-level features are not carried over source-to-target text. It is therefore Schäffner’s (2004, 1267) contention that specifying or domain-shifting target text metaphors can hardly be deemed translation errors.

3.3 Political discourse analysis

Since discourse is expressed through language, the discipline of discourse analysis inevitably involves the study of language on one level or another. While it can thus be seen one of branch of linguistics, discourse analysis attempts to go well beyond the sentence, with individual linguistic units being considered significant in as far as they reveal noteworthy aspects of the overarching discourse. Under Paltridge’s (2012, 2) definition, discourse analysis aims to capture how language reflects sociocultural context, understandings of reality and the relationship between participants; it can furthermore examine how language affects socially situated identities (such as those related to class or ideology). The main point of divergence between discourse analysis and textual analysis is that the former is concerned not with individual texts but elements that appear across texts (Munday & Zhang 2017, 2); the approach can thus involve analysis of intertextuality, which looks at what the analyzed texts draw from earlier texts (Paltridge 2012, 11–12). With so many dimensions, discourse analysis allows one to approach a great variety of research questions across many areas of study, with more than one research method.

Among the subdisciplines of discourse analysis can be found political discourse analysis, which examines language use specifically in the political domain. The term political is typically associated with those who practice politics as a profession—that is, politicians, particularly when discourse takes place in institutional contexts such as legislative debates and governmental regulations; the full scope of political discourse analysis, however, extends to other, less formal discursive genres, including propaganda, political advertising, electoral speeches and political talk shows (van Dijk 1997, 18). And while this thesis focuses specifically on discourse by politicians engaged in legislative debate, politicians are by no means society’s sole political participants, as the wider citizenry may, at least in
democratic polities, affect the status quo through such means as voting, pressure politics and activism (Verba et al. 1993). The defining feature of political discourse is that it serves a purpose of some kind in the political process, which leads van Dijk (2002, 217) to assert the following: “Whatever a politician says is thus by definition a form of political discourse; and whatever anybody says with a political aim (viz., to influence the political process, e.g. decision making, policies) is also a form of political discourse.”

According to van Dijk (1997, 23–37), key to analyzing political discourse is the study of discourse structures, which include topics, superstructures, local semantics, lexicon, syntax, rhetorical operations, expression structures and speech acts. The first category, topics (or macropropositions) has to do with the issues that are given preference in political discourse and the ways different issues are associated with one another (for instance, when a discussion about drug policy touches upon the issues of crime and the national economy). Also, since political discourse concerns primarily politics itself—with politicians often talking about themselves, the institutions they represent and their political opponents—topicalization in political discourse can also be said to exhibit a reflexivity not commonly found in other discourse areas such as legal and educational discourse. The second category, superstructures (or textual schemata) refers, particularly in the context of political speeches, to the standardized organization of an argument, which makes it easier to follow and thus more convincing to potential listeners; a basic example of this is beginning an argument with a premise and ending it with a conclusion. The argumentative progression of legislative speeches can also display thematic convention, with conclusions being preceded by “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation” (van Dijk 1997, 30).

Of the other structures, local semantics (van Dijk 1997, 30–34) bears a close connection to topics, namely in that it refers to the local (non-macro) propositions expressed in the discourse around a political issue. Quite often this manifests in how politicians and other political actors tend to speak of their own in-groups and the corresponding out-groups: cleavages typically form between partisan lines (Democrat versus Republican) or ideological ones (pro-immigration versus anti-immigration), and local semantics encompasses the means whereby the listener is swayed to judge the in-group favorably and the out-group unfavorably. In rhetoric, local semantics can be observed in the employment of contrastive meanings (positive and negative attributes), of explicitness and implicitness, and of generalization and specification. In line with the aforementioned contrasting of the moral self with the immoral other, it would not be uncommon for a political speech to extol the great deeds of the speaker’s in-group in vivid detail while mitigating (perhaps through hedging) whatever virtues he or she is willing to attribute to the opposing side.
Political discourse analysis can also focus on individual words and syntax. A *lexical* analysis of a political text attempts to explain the implications of words used in political discourse and can involve the deciphering of euphemisms (consider the substitution of *torture* with *enhanced interrogation*). Correspondingly, a *syntactic* analysis focuses on the importance of sentence structure, such as word order, pronoun use (*us–them*), and the active and passive voices. Questions of voice are of great relevance when there is a will to either emphasize or de-emphasize agency: does one say “police killed demonstrators” or “demonstrators killed by police” (van Dijk 1997, 34)?

Local semantics and lexico-syntactic features can be grouped under the broad term *rhetoric*, which also includes *rhetorical operations* fundamental to classical rhetoric; these are repetition, addition, deletion and substitution. Van Dijk (1997, 35) notes of these operations that “their presence usually has persuasive functions, and therefore political significance in a political context of communication.” Addition may, for instance, manifest as hyperbolic verbosity that highlights “[the speaker’s] own group’s beneficial actions and the horror stories about their enemies,” while substitution can take the form of metaphor that, by stirring the audience’s imagination with associations that range from the mythical to the sports world, works in a more rhetorically effective way than the literal alternative (Zashin & Chapman 1974; Howe 1988).

The last two discourse structures discussed by van Dijk are *expression structures* and *speech acts*. Expression structures are, in essence, the extratextual and audiovisual elements of a speech, which include pitch, intonation, volume, and any graphical enhancements such as charts and photographs (van Dijk 1997, 36); here video recordings become a useful source for analyzing discourse, as a mere transcript could not possibly present the totality of what makes a speech effective. Finally, political discourse analysis looks at which *speech acts* predominate in the various subgenres of political discourse. Assertions, questions and accusations are all speech acts typical of legislative debate; of these, accusations are often levied by members of the opposition against the executive branch, of whom it is not uncharacteristic to respond with a *legitimation* of the policy under attack. Legitimation is not a speech act in itself, but rather a process that is constituted of multiple speech acts, including counter-accusations (van Dijk 1997, 37).

What underscores the importance of examining political discourse is that political activity manifests itself to a high degree through language and could hardly exist in its absence (Chilton & Schäffner 2002, 3; van Dijk 1997, 37–38). Political scientists have not traditionally been too keen on adopting a discourse-based research approach as, for them, the issue has been the perceived complexity of
political rhetoric and, hence, its inaptness as grounds for valuable inference. Today, however, study instruments are more refined than in decades past, thus bequeathing to the discourse analyst a readiness to conduct research in a more focused and empirical way (Chilton & Schäffner 2002, 4). This thesis employs two principle discourse analytical approaches—one provided by Muntigl (2002), the other by van Dijk (2002), both explained in the following two subsections.

### 3.3.1 The Muntigl model: Politicization and depoliticization

In his methodological framework, Muntigl applies to his own field of study Palonen’s (1993) concept of the political, in which the terms *polity, policy, politicking* and *politicization* play a key role. While *polity* is conventionally understood as a political system, with its hyponym *state* being one of its most common manifestations, Palonen (2003, 179–181) describes polity as “a complex in which […] certain power shares have gained privileged positions, others have faded away and appear as anachronistic, while attempts to create new ones are viewed with suspicion.” *Policy*, produced typically by those in control of the polity, is seen as serving “a regulative function” in which politicking is discouraged (Muntigl 2002, 48). The concept of *politicking*, in turn, is understood in a performative sense of “acting politically,” which involves “opposing to others, acting cunningly and cleverly” for political ends (Palonen 1993: 10–11).

Whereas politicking takes place in spheres already recognized as political, the narrower term *politicization* involves attempts, often from the opposition, to reinterpret other policy questions as open grounds for politicking, thus allowing for “alternative constructions of reality” (Muntigl 2002, 48). *Depoliticization* can also occur, not uncommonly as a response to politicization. What is sought with depoliticization is the effacement of any alternative ways of action, the interpretation of prevailing policy as fundamentally apolitical, as in accordance with common sense and in line with the polity’s historical origins (Muntigl 2002, 48–49; Palonen 1993, 12). Depoliticization is thus one of the forms that the process of legitimation may take.

Basing his analysis on the afore-described politicization and depoliticization dichotomy, Muntigl (2002) examines a 1996 speech held by Pádraig Flynn on the European Union’s employment policy. Flynn served as the European Commissioner for Social Affairs from 1993 to 1999, and as such is, in the context of this particular speech, serving as a representative of the entity responsible for the employment policy—that is, the European Commission, which in turn is the main executive body of its respective polity, the European Union.
Muntigl demonstrates how Flynn attempts to sell EU policy through the strategy of depoliticization, manifest in Flynn’s use of path, link and force semantics. By path semantics is meant the formulation of a certain policy question as having a specific course that ought not to be changed in the interests of, for instance, precedence and common sense. The presence of path semantics is evident in Flynn’s descriptions of how the employment program has evolved over the years and in his highlighting of the benefits that a continued adherence to the program—that is, the decision by Europeans to remain on the right path—will doubtless reap (Muntigl 2002, 63–64 & 72). Link semantics come into play in Flynn’s statement that support for the path taken extends far beyond the European Union: the employment policy does not reflect the whims of a detached elite but instead the consensus of a vast array of parties, including national governments (Muntigl 2002, 63–64). Link semantics can thus effect a form of depoliticization in which the political position of the orator is linked with entities that the receivers of the message are wont to deem credible; such invocation will, ideally, shroud the policy in a pall of impartiality.

The term force semantics becomes relevant in relation to the barriers that Flynn sees on his stated path to success: dissenting voices are presented as forces that only cause unnecessary disruption to an already agreed-upon process whose validity bears no repeating (Muntigl 2002, 62 & 75). Indeed, Flynn’s aversion to those who would oppose the employment policy is revealed in his use of the distancing pronouns they and those, which serve as examples of deixis. As was discussed earlier in the chapter, deictic elements make speeches less comprehensible to the uninitiated observer and are hence of great relevance to the translator’s task of contextualization if the situation surrounding the source text is to be sufficiently conveyed even after its adaptation to a secondary audience.

It should be noted that Muntigl does not conceptualize path, link and force semantics strictly in the metaphorical sense but attributes to them also interpersonal and ideational dimensions. This means that for an instance of path semantics to be regarded as such, it would not have to involve distinctly path metaphorical expressions that liken political development to literal movement (such as speaking of a political process as having moved forward or taken a step back); path semantics can thus be also realized as a temporal path, by which the speaker may, for example, describe the evolution of a political issue over the years by mentioning certain key points in time (Muntigl 2002, 60). Muntigl (2002, 53–54) therefore does not describe path, link and force semantics as strictly metaphorical but as “discourse semantic.”

From a translational perspective, however, it bears noting that English is a language in which movement metaphors are by no means rare (Schäffner 2001, 157), and such linguistic features may
not necessarily appear in other European languages with the same frequency or domain. The narrower metaphorical dimension of discourse semantics therefore seems to be of more relevance to the aims of this thesis, though the analysis of Chapter 5 still follows Muntigl’s broader conceptualization.

More generally, the way the Muntigl model will be employed in the analysis of Chapter 5 involves observation of the party-specific stances on the Trump administration’s NATO policy among members of the United States Congress. It is entirely conceivable that Republicans would generally seek to depoliticize the issue to muffle opposition, whereas Democrats would assume a highly critical stance against the administration’s policy.

3.3.2 The van Dijk model: Political cognition

The second discourse-analytical approach applied in the thesis comes from van Dijk, who argues that instances of political discourse analysis can be judged empirically sound only when the analyst is able to establish a link between discourse structures (topicalization, rhetoric, etc.) and political structures (political actors, the actions they take, and the environments in which they operate). Van Dijk’s proposed way of meeting this requirement involves the marrying of political discourse analysis with political psychology. Advances in psychology have, as van Dijk (1985, 61) states, shown that discourse cannot be sufficiently dissected on the basis of linguistic knowledge alone, for the task also requires a good deal of world knowledge, including of the cognitive dimensions of language use. When such knowledge is extended to political discourse, analysis can take place on both a socio-political level and a socio-cognitive level (van Dijk 2002, 203–205).

How are these two levels, then, to be distinguished? On the socio-political level of analysis, one can describe the manner in which a political act, such as advocacy for a policy position, is realized in discourse “through a specific form of interaction, viz., a parliamentary speech.” On the socio-cognitive level, however, one can employ a deeper form of analysis that describes the cultural and ideological factors that underlie such acts (van Dijk 2002, 212–213). This is based on the identification of political discourse as reflecting “personal mental models” and the “socially shared political representations of political groups and institutions” (van Dijk 2002, 203 & 233).

Of these aforementioned concepts, personal mental models reflect an individual’s body of knowledge, beliefs and experiences, which are stored in episodic memory and, as such, are part of long-term memory. Socially shared political representations, on the other hand, refer to understandings of the world on a collective scale, be it political groups or entire nations. They thus belong to semantic memory or, as van Dijk (2002, 208) prefers to call it, “social memory,” which is another type of long-
term memory. The relevance of models and representations to politics becomes especially apparent in the way political actors conduct themselves in political settings, how they frame topical issues and display a “cultural Common Ground” of knowledge and beliefs that the intended recipients of the rhetoric take for granted. The two concepts are interrelated in that personal mental models are themselves instantiations of socially shared representations; in other words, individuals who partake in discourse are not simply stating their personal beliefs but are typifying “the attitudes and ideologies” present in their respective culture, be it strictly a political group or the nation as a whole (van Dijk 2002, 211).

Political discourse is inevitably dependent on the context in which it occurs, and personal mental models that guide speaker behavior in particular communicative situations are called context models. These reflect the individual interpretations political actors make of the communicative situation in which they engage in discourse (van Dijk 2002, 214). They are therefore not objective but subjective assessments “of self and other participants, and of the other discourse-relevant categories of communicative situations.” These categories, as specified by van Dijk (2002, 226), include the following situational factors:

- overall domain (e.g. politics)
- overall societal action (e.g. legislation)
- current setting (time, location)
- current circumstances (e.g. addressing parliament/Congress)
- current interaction (e.g. political debate)
- current discourse genre (e.g. speech)
- the various types of role of participants (profession, political affiliation, age, ethnicity, etc.)
- the cognitions of the participants (goals, knowledge, beliefs, etc.).

These contextual factors, which include time constraints and speaker assumptions of addressees, regulate the stylistic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of political discourse, such as whether the speaker elects to use rhetorical questions or present certain information in an implicit manner. Thus, the discourse structures discussed earlier in this chapter are inevitably affected by the context in which they appear (van Dijk 2002, 226–227).

Under the cognitive framework defined above, van Dijk (2002, 204) relates to each other what he calls the three levels of the political domain: the base level, the intermediate level, and the top level. The base level is composed of individual political actors, including their knowledge and opinions, while the intermediate level refers to the political groups into which these individual actors organize,
the most prominent—and relevant for the aims of this thesis—being political parties. At the top level, the one finds entire political systems and the various ideologies and cultural norms that define them.

Were this multilevel analysis to be applied to debates in the United States Congress, a single speech could be regarded as not only representative of the personal beliefs of the legislator (base level) but also of party lines and the interests of a certain state or congressional district (intermediate level). It could also exhibit the cultural knowledge and norms recognized by all political groups in the United States—Democrats, Republicans and independents alike—and stand as a manifestation of the practice of liberal democracy in a federal constitutional republic bound by international treaties (top level).

My own analysis thus seeks to show how the speeches under examination reflect the context in which the addressees operate, including their assumptions of shared knowledge with the addressers. This should provide insight into the ideological differences, mutual relations and inner loyalties of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as the historical and philosophical aspects of the American political system.

3.4 Intersection of translation and discourse analysis

The relationship between translation studies and discourse analysis has been discussed by various theorists, including Schäffner (2012) herself. While much of the discussion has centered around how existing translations themselves are influenced by ideology, there are also theories on how discourse analysis may be employed for translation. Often discussed in this context is Halliday’s model, which stems from systemic functional linguistics and uses register analysis (based on the variables field, tenor and mode) to deconstruct the cultural context of the analyzed text. More recently, this perspective has been touched upon by contributors to the 2017 book Discourse Analysis in Translation Studies, edited by Jeremy Munday and Meifang Zhang. The editors comment the relevance of discourse analysis to translation thusly: “[discourse analysis] is a method that studies a discourse in its context of culture, context of situation, its structure and individual constituents. It provides a model for uncovering patterns of choice and relating them to specific concerns and contexts in which the translator works” (Munday and Zhang 2017, 2–3).

The aim of this thesis is to examine how methods of analysis specifically tailored for political discourse may serve the aims of functionalist translation strategies. After all, the expertise or competence required of the translator in a functionalist framework is not limited to the linguistic and
textual spheres, but also includes subject matter and culture-specific knowledge, which extends to such areas as target culture history and politics (Schäffner 2001, 20–21). Discourse analysis offers the translator a set of instruments to go beyond the sentence level of the source text and delineate why authors make certain choices in their own cultural context.

The contextualization of political speeches through discourse analytic approaches can, therefore, help in addressing the potential problem areas that Schäffner (1997) associates with the translation of political speeches and the functional considerations to which they give rise. She describes the relationship between speakers and primary addressees as one of “mutual knowledge due to community co-membership,” a membership from which secondary addressees are excluded. This in my view relates to van Dijk’s notion of a “Common Ground” of knowledge and beliefs—social representations that are limited to specific cultures and subcultural groups. Indeed, Schäffner (1997, 130) speaks of political concepts as being part of schemata that are “shared by a group of people or by a whole speech community.” And just as van Dijk (2002, 205) is calling for a socio-cognitive level of descriptions to be included in political discourse analysis, so does Schäffner (2004) highlight the relevance of cognitive approaches in decoding metaphor, which, after all, is not mere decoration but reflects thought processes specific to the source culture. As was mentioned in the previous section, knowledge of these culture-specific schemata is not to be glossed over even in translation, for such neglect may well net a target text that is but a distortion of the original message.

One major point of convergence between van Dijk’s model and functionalist approaches is the significance both place on the situation in which a sample of discourse takes place: consider the similarity between the variables that context models share with target text situation, including medium, time and location, and interactants.

And what of the Muntigl model? While from the translator’s perspective it may not enjoy relevance equal to that of van Dijk’s analysis of the cultural “Common Ground,” it may nevertheless serve a meaningful function by equipping the translator to explore how political groups politicize and depoliticize certain policy questions in ways that are very particular to the source culture. After all, political speech does involve metaphor as a recurring rhetorical element, and decoding source culture-specific semantics and evaluating it against genre prototypes of the target culture should help the translator in arriving at a proper reconstruction of the source text and, consequently, an improved comprehensibility of the target text. As mentioned previously, the way in which metaphor manifests in the political domain is in the conceptualization of politics as “movement along a path” (Schäffner 2004, 1265), and such path metaphors are a key component of the processes of politicization and
depoliticization. Moreover, Muntigl’s observations about the political implications of pronoun use are also reflective of the translation problems that Schäffner associates with deixis.

Furthermore, as Palonen (2003, 171) points out, in several European languages the concepts of politics and policy are referred to by the same noun (consider the German Politik, or the Finnish politiikka). Therefore, the translator should be particularly vigilant in preventing these two concepts from being conflated by the target readership, all the while taking care to portray accurately the politicizing and depoliticizing rhetoric that members of the two main parties engage in.

The connections do not end there, however: Newmark (1981, 176–179) speaks of translational text analysis as a form of discourse analysis which takes into consideration deictic references and redundancies that, if retained in their original form or modified without deeper knowledge of what they refer to, may leave the recipient of the target text utterly confused. Similarly, both Schäffner (2001) and van Dijk (1997) have written about the effects syntax has on representations of culpability in political texts and about issues concerning pronoun use, which often contributes to the implicitness of political speeches and is as such well worth the translator’s consideration.
The topic of American foreign policy is a subject of which innumerable pages could be written, but for the purposes of this thesis it will suffice to describe some of the basic history and characteristics of United States’ role in international relations, particularly as it relates to NATO and military involvement more generally. This is to set the ground and provide context for the observations anticipated to be made in the deeper discourse-based analysis of the material under study.

One aspect that has characterized American foreign policy since the early twentieth century is the perpetual tension between two ideological doctrines of international involvement: unilateralism and multilateralism, which have implications for NATO as well. While both unilateralism and multilateralism are distinct from isolationism, which refers to the strict avoidance of military entanglements and other international commitments, they nonetheless stem from different schools of international relations theory. Unilateralism may well involve active engagement in world affairs, but in a way that conforms to the state’s own interests, which would be in accord with Trump’s demands that American allies contribute more to the collective defense of the West (and, beyond NATO, with his decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal). States working within a multilateralist framework, by contrast, attempt to have international influence by cooperating with other states on a more or less equal basis. American multilateralists would therefore want their country to play according to the same rules as less powerful states, while unilateralists would generally reject the idea of other nations having influence over decisions that the United States should be able to make on its own, even if the effects of such decisions reverberate across the globe.

The foreign policy of the United States has been characterized by unilateralism throughout the country’s history. Since President George Washington’s Farewell Address, which called for the avoidance of permanent and entangling alliances, the United States opted to stay out of European affairs, at least in as far as they were not compelled to become involved by the Monroe Doctrine, which saw European encroachment of the independent territories of the Americas as an act of aggression against the United States itself. It would, however, be misleading to call American foreign policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as isolationist, since the country did engage in active diplomacy and what Jefferson called “commerce with all nations,” thereby differentiating itself from the actual isolationism of, say, Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate. Still, even the early twentieth century witnessed a rather noncommittal United States, which, despite having entered World War I,
rejected then-President Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a League of Nations, with unilateralism “reach[ing] its apex during 1920s and 1930s” (Gaddis 2004, 23–25).

With the later horrors of World War II, however, multilateralism gained ground under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and thus in 1945 was born the successor to the now-defunct League: the United Nations. This time, the United States joined in as a founding member, and before decade’s end many Western states would unite under another organization that would ideally guarantee them continued security.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, commonly identified by its acronym NATO, was formed in the early years of the Cold War as a response to the perceived expansionist aspirations of the Soviet Union, with the United States representing the greatest military might of the twelve founding countries. As the number of NATO member states grew through the 1950s, culminating in the accession of West Germany, the Soviets sought to remedy this geopolitical asymmetry with the Warsaw Pact, thereby strengthening their influence over other socialist states of Eastern Europe. Despite seemingly irreconcilable tensions that escalated in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the nuclear-armed Western and Eastern blocs avoided direct conflict with one another and were instead entangled in several proxy wars, most notably in Korea and Vietnam.

As the 20th century entered its last two decades, rising separatist sentiment within the Soviet Union augured the end of its dominance and, with it, that of the Cold War. The early 1990s witnessed the final unravelling of the Soviet federation and the independence of its satellites and member republics. Suspicious of the Soviet successor state of Russia, many of these newly restored nation states joined NATO in pursuit of a more secure future under the defensive guarantees of the United States. NATO thus outlived the era that had given occasion for its creation in the first place (Sloan 2018, 221).

Illustrative of NATO’s relevance in the present century was the invocation of Article 5 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, consequently acknowledged as an attack on not merely the United States but on all NATO members. Though originally conceived as a safeguard against Soviet aggression, Article 5 remained untouched in the over-forty-year period of the Cold War. Under American leadership, all NATO countries would go on to participate in the invasion of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which was providing a safe haven to al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden, the perpetrators of September 11.
When evaluated against this historical backdrop, NATO’s importance in the American conscience becomes apparent even to the foreign observer. A key component of American discourse concerning NATO is the organization’s importance in the fight against terrorism and its continued responsibility to ward off Russian aggression in the present day. While many American voters welcome efforts to even the burden for the collective defense of the West, there is wide consensus that the alliance structure should remain in place, and it is also unlikely that the plans Trump expressed during his presidential campaign for reconciliation with Russia translated to a net electoral gain (Jervis 2018, 6). Another factor explaining American support for NATO, as suggested by O’Connell (2010, 195), is that through its position as NATO’s leading member, the United States is better able to influence European defense policy and thus preserve its own global preponderance. It is therefore not difficult to see why NATO would figure prominently in discussions about the Trumpian foreign policy and why the president’s claims about the organization’s status as an anachronistic Cold War relic would not receive a warm welcome from wide swaths of the American political class, media or the public.

However, this is not to say that the United States has not continued to display its unilateralist tendencies in the post-World War II world, even as regards NATO. Around the time NATO was formed, nowhere was this clearer than in the Senate, which in those days still assumed an active role in managing the Western alliance. Several senators suspected that the Europeans would fail to contribute sufficiently to defense, thereby placing on the United States a disproportionate financial burden; then-President Harry S. Truman attempted to assure the concerned lawmakers that such would not come to pass. While complaints of European parsimony persisted in the decades that followed, another kind of argument was intermittently put forth in the Senate: that the Europeans had become strong enough to defend themselves and thus were no longer in need of American assistance, which consequently led to resolutions being introduced for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. To counter such sentiments, it was usually up to the occupant of the White House, regardless of party affiliation, to defend the transatlantic alliance and portray its existence as beneficial to all parties, including the United States (Sloan 2018, 222–223).

It is noteworthy that, with Trump’s presidency, these past roles of executive optimism and legislative cynicism about the transatlantic relationship have become reversed. Congress has, after all, been highly supportive of NATO and its continued expansion in recent years, while it is now the executive branch that is creating rifts in Western unity (Sloan 2018, 223). Of course, now that Trump has largely abandoned his previous view of NATO as “obsolete” and focused his efforts on urging allies to do more financially, legislators of his own party—especially those of a more unilateralist streak—may have grown more receptive to his message, so the divides discernible in congressional debate can be
expected to reflect party lines instead of those between government branches. These aspects will be a major focus of the analysis presented in the following chapter.
5 Analysis

Relying on Muntigl and van Dijk’s approaches, this chapter provides a multi-level discourse analysis of the material under study, the findings of which will then be evaluated from a translational perspective. The first section, 5.1, examines the discursive resources that the speakers use to the either politicize or depoliticize these issues, while in the second section, 5.2, the analysis adheres to van Dijk’s cognitive model of personal and group representations. Section 5.1 devotes its first half to speakers of the governing Republican Party, after which speeches by Democratic legislators, who by and large stand in opposition to the administration’s policies, are discussed. However, Section 5.2 abides by a more thematic progression in grouping the speeches by their contextual features and discourse structures. The concluding Section 5.3 explores what implications the discourse analysis thitherto conducted has for translation.

5.1 Politicization and depoliticization

The first two speeches analyzed in the thesis were held during the same Senate session by two Republican members, Jeff Flake (2018, S4934–S4935) and Daniel Sullivan (2018, S4938–S4939). Though both represent the president’s party, the two speakers put forth differing assessments of his performance in the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, thus demonstrating the intraparty fracturing that has taken place within the Republican ranks in the Trump era. While Flake laments the Trump’s favorable comments about Russia and his allegations that the NATO partnership has been of wildly unequal benefit to the parties concerned, Sullivan in turn commends the toughness with which the United States has of late negotiated with its European allies. In his view, the administration should be credited for compelling other NATO countries to increase their defense budgets and shoulder a greater share of the burden that has hitherto been disproportionately shoved onto the United States.

Of the ten speeches, Sullivan and Flake’s are among the longer ones and show at least some of the semantic elements discussed by Muntigl. Sullivan, after calling the summit “a good trip” from the American point of view, takes as his initial focus the 2 percent threshold that Trump has pushed other NATO members to meet. He stresses that the percentage is not some recently and randomly concocted number but has in fact a history that legitimizes the United States’ viewpoint. This history Sullivan presents as one of several argument stages that support his thesis—stages that may be called orientational in that they orient addressees toward the thesis by providing background knowledge...
they may not already possess (Muntigl 2002, 57–58). Such argument stages may be considered what van Dijk (1997, 29–30) calls superstructures, which, as explained in Section 3.3, refer to the general structuring of a text from title to conclusion.

The linguistic resources Sullivan employs for such argumentation create what Muntigl (2002, 59–60) calls motion and temporal path schemas, with motion being realized with material processes and temporal paths with temporal thematic phrases. These elements are highlighted below, with material processes being underlined and temporal expressions italicized:

Orientation/history
There has been this commitment by NATO members since at least 2014—but it really goes way earlier than 2014—for each country to spend 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense spending so that we share the burden of defense.

Orientation/problem
The United States has essentially always met this target—easily met this target—but a lot of other countries haven’t. They have heard time and again from Presidents about this, and yet they have kind of ignored it.

Proposition
The success of this trip is that it looks like for the first time in years, NATO countries are moving away from cuts in defense spending. Even in the United States, from 2010 to 2016, we were cutting our defense spending. Although it was way above 2 percent, we cut it by almost 25 percent. We saw a huge drop in readiness. We are changing that. Almost all of the NATO countries are starting to add billions of dollars to defense spending. I think the President deserves a lot of the credit for really pressing this issue. Other U.S. Presidents have pressed it, and the Europeans have kind of ignored it, and it seemed to go away. President Trump stayed focused on it, and we are starting to see a shift, and I think he deserves credit.

Sullivan (2018, S4938)

Sullivan’s path semantics are thus realized by his use of the directional expressions go, move away, drop, go away, and shift, as well as temporal phrases such as “since at least 2014,” “time and again,” and “for the first time in years.” From a macro perspective, these lexical choices give the impression that it has for a long time been clear as to which direction the United States should be heading and that for various reasons the desired destination always seemed to elude the country, almost to the point of no return (“it seemed to go away”). Now thanks to Trump, however, the process has been steered into the right direction with the “shift” that Sullivan approvingly references. The senator goes on to further depoliticize Trump’s tactics by asserting, first, that the president has not done nearly as much to undermine the Western alliance as Germany’s reliance on natural gas has and, second, that the “2 percent GDP goal” has for some time been a bipartisan and not a Trump-specific concern.
However, having given the president credit for the sternness with which he has confronted European members of NATO, Sullivan performs a shift of his own by calling attention to what the allies have done right. He reminds his listeners that the value of ally support should not be measured in money alone, acknowledging the sacrifices that these very same countries have made while fighting by the United States’ side. This he does to make a larger point about the necessity for the United States to remain an ally-rich nation, which will always give it an edge over its adversaries, including Russia and China. This part of the speech will receive a more in-depth analysis in the second section of this chapter, due to its use of some of the discourse structures that van Dijk (1997; 2002) in particular has discussed.

In Flake’s speech, link semantics are particularly visible in the following paragraph: “I join my senior Senator, John McCain, in the sentiments he expressed just weeks ago. To our allies: Bipartisan majorities of both parties support our alliances based on 70 years of shared values. Americans stand with you” (Flake 2018, S4935; emphases added). Here Flake seeks to portray his own stance as not only enjoying bipartisan support but as reflecting the collective will of the United States as a whole, thereby emphasizing the vast coalition of like-minded people who stand behind his arguments. Furthermore, by referencing his fellow Arizonan John McCain, he associates himself with another prominent member of the Republican Party who, while still alive at the time of the speech, did not shy away from publicly criticizing the president on matters of genuine disagreement.

Flake’s speech also involves the use of force semantics, as is observable from the warnings he issues about the destabilization that may well occur if the administration were to continue on its misguided path. At stake would be no less than Western unity and the collective security that NATO has so successfully upkept since its formation: “If we fail to see these things clearly, then we fail the world, and we fail ourselves, and we dishonor those from our own country and from our allied countries who kept the Soviet menace at bay for half a century as the world hung in the balance” (Flake 2018, S4934).

Flake may not be the only Republican in Congress to defy party lines on this question, but the speeches held on the House side by Representatives Rob Bishop (2018, H6179) and Ted Poe (2018, H6193) betray no such disapproval of executive action. Here, as with Sullivan, the criticism is directed more at NATO allies who, according to the speakers, have for far too long relied on American charitability while avoiding their own financial commitments to the organization. Bishop and Poe’s speeches thus stand as supporting pillars to the administration’s stance, and while none of the speakers question NATO’s importance, its recent history is represented as one of exploitation.
The speeches by Sullivan, Poe and Bishop can be seen as emblematic of the rhetorical methods of depoliticization and legitimation: embedded in their arguments is the suggestion that the course taken by the Trump administration is a vital one, showing both common sense and moral righteousness, as revealed by the normative elements in the title of Poe’s speech: “Europe should pay their fair share” (emphases added). The blustering rhetoric of the chief executive notwithstanding, the logos and ethos of the speeches can be discerned from, first, the attention they bring to the benefits of a more equal sharing of the burden; and, second, by their characterization of the issue as a moral responsibility of European NATO members to honor their commitments.

On the Democratic side, the speech by Representative Gerry Connolly (2018, H6179) was delivered directly after Bishop’s and even references the latter as “my friend from Michigan”. Here, though, the phrase “my friend” is more indicative of congressional decorum than any type of ideological camaraderie, of which the reader is informed by the speech title alone: “Disparaging NATO allies is not productive.”

Connolly’s speech is particularly exhibitive of force semantics. He argues, in a paragraph that serves as an argument stage of historical orientation, that the decades-spanning relationship between the United States and its Western allies has been one of symbiosis, not parasitism. The change of course that the Trump administration has taken will, in his view, only hurt the United States, and he attributes to it such force semantic characterizations as “blow[ing] up a NATO summit,” “wrecking ball strategy” and “destructive.” Thus, the central message of the speech is that pre-Trumpian NATO diplomacy, characterized by its fundamentally non-confrontational way of negotiation, represents the path on which the United States should remain and that, unfortunately, disruptive forces that threaten the continuation of this tranquility have of late taken hold.

Adding her own voice to this call for discretion is Democratic Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (2018, H6099), who took to the House floor on July 11, 2018. Her speech, which employs path and force semantics, includes what Antaki and Wetherell (1999) would call show concession. Concessions of this kind involve a three-stage argument structure where a speaker arguing for a certain proposition acknowledges the opposing view (concession), only to then undermine it with a statement supporting the original proposition (reprise). Jackson Lee’s use of this rhetorical device can be observed from the following excerpt:
NATO is thought. It is purpose. It is a sense of collaborative viewpoints [proposition] on the value of democracy.

It is important that any Commander in Chief, no matter what party affiliation, passes the standard of decorum [...] [concession] to give criticism where necessary and to seek improvement [reprise]

but not to be an embarrassment.

Here, Jackson Lee does not deny the necessity for sternness should the United States find grievance in its allies’ conduct. Indeed, Trump’s Democratic predecessor Barack Obama took a similar stance in 2016, expressing his dissatisfaction with NATO’s “free riders” and telling the then-British Prime Minister David Cameron that the United Kingdom would risk its special relationship with the United States if it refused to raise defense spending to the 2 percent threshold it had committed itself to in 2014. Obama even used the phrase that Representative Poe would later echo in his speech: “You have to pay your fair share” (Goldberg 2016; emphasis added). There are, however, multiple ways to express such criticism, and the stridence with which the Trump administration has decided to confront other NATO countries will, according to Jackson Lee, only prove an impediment to the West’s continued stability.

Further into the speech, Jackson Lee criticizes the president’s prioritization of Russo-American relations over the United States’ relations with its Europeans allies, as exemplified by Trump’s favorable comments about Vladimir Putin. This leads to another use of show concession on Jackson Lee’s part:

I think it is important [...] that we recognize that our allies are far more important than an individual who continues to provide nerve gas to kill people on foreign soil, to be behind attacks on airplanes taking over Crimea and other places. [proposition]

It is important to recognize that,
yes, you engage with your enemy, [concession]
but you recognize that they are your enemy. [reprise]

The suggestion is that while diplomacy has a place even when dealing with antagonistic powers such as Putin’s Russia, the United States should approach such exchanges with an attitude vastly different from the way past administrations have negotiated with allies. The presence of path and force semantics in Jackson Lee’s speech is thus made evident by, first, her idea of what progress entails and, second, her identification of the president’s approach as a barrier that lies athwart the path toward this progress. With her recognition that there is wisdom in holding allies to account and in influencing enemies through deliberation, Jackson Lee seeks to strengthen her proposition by addressing the of her opponents’ view and then undermining them with a more fruitful alternative.

The same July 11 session saw two more Democratic contributions to the discourse surrounding NATO: one from Representative Brendan Boyle, the other from Representative Stephen Cohen. In his speech, Boyle (2018, H6101) voices concern over the United States’ wavering commitment to NATO under the Trump administration, which he views as an unprecedented state of affairs—a barrier, one could say—and advocates its immediate reversal. In addition to the force semantics at play here, the speech shows a use of link semantics in which the United States’ past approach to NATO is presented as bipartisan: “Standing up and supporting our Western European allies, standing up and supporting NATO was an absolute given and, frankly, not even a partisan issue” (emphases added).

In terms of path semantics, Boyle’s speech includes an orientation stage by which listeners are informed of NATO’s history and its importance to the United States. The temporal path of this orientation is realized by the italicized elements of the following sentence: “Mr. Speaker, for nearly 70 years now, the United States has led the Western alliance standing up to first the Soviet Union and then Russia within the organization known as NATO.” In the congressman’s view, American leadership combined with a strong commitment to NATO has shielded the West from collective security threats for a very long time, and although this period may have witnessed the collapse of America’s greatest rival, the Soviet Union, Russia continues to act as a destabilizing force that Americans and their allies overseas must oppose in a unified coalition.

As for Cohen (2018, H6100) his speech was delivered after the passing of the 115th Congress’ House Resolution 256, which affirms the United States’ support for NATO and, in particular, its member
states that are threatened by Russian aggression. Cohen, who sponsored the resolution, stresses the importance of defending the territorial integrity of the Baltic states against Russia and also extends his sympathies to the Balkan states. The speech makes no mention of the Trump administration, so it functions as a rather implicit counterargument to the rhetoric wherein the relevance of the Western alliance has been undermined.

Like some of the other speakers, Cohen makes sure to note that his own political position enjoys wide approval, and this time the backing is not solely bipartisan but also bicameral, with a similar Resolution having been passed in the Senate by a virtually unanimous vote of 97–2. He also expresses gratitude to the Republican Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, who allowed the resolution to be voted on. The last sentence offers a clear example of link semantics: “The House and the Senate stand together in support of NATO and our allies in Eastern, Central, and Western Europe” (emphases added).

Last, we turn to Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown (2017, S2212–S2213), who spoke in celebration of NATO’s 68th anniversary on April 4, 2017. His speech is in fact chronologically the earliest, yet at the same time it seems appropriate to discuss it last, considering how circumstantially different its context and function is from the rest. Like Cohen’s speech, it does not reference the White House at any point, but the former was at least framed as commentary on a specific foreign policy decision, whereas Brown discusses his vision of the United States as a player in global affairs in more general terms.

Given the commemorative nature of the speech, the politicking it displays is not as immediately evident as in the other speeches, yet it cannot be said to be completely absent either, given the praise that Brown affords NATO and the United States’ European allies in a context where both have been subjected to belittlement by the country’s chief executive. The first stage of this praise involves a historical orientation stage similar to Sullivan and Boyle’s speeches, again by means of constructing a temporal path (shown in italics) but also, like Sullivan’s speech, by incorporating a vocabulary of material processes that present NATO’s development over the decades as a path towards a destination (underlined):

Mr. President, nearly 70 years ago today, the United States and 11 other nations—in the face of Soviet aggression—joined together in mutual defense to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. Since its inception, NATO has expanded to 28 member nations. The breadth of its mission is impressive—from ensuring regional stability and combating terrorism to training partner countries and supporting humanitarian aid. While
NATO was founded to ensure Western peace and stability *in the face of the Cold War*, its work has come to encompass all corners and peoples of the globe.

NATO is more important than ever *today* in deterring regional conflict. The U.S. must stand by its ironclad commitment to NATO’s security and solidarity as Russian President Vladimir Putin flouts international law and exerts Russian aggression around the world, from meddling in our own election to the illegal annexation of Crimea.

Brown (2017, S2212)

Such path semantics are accompanied by link semantics very reminiscent of those used by Brown’s colleague Flake. This involves the portrayal of the senator’s own pro-NATO stance as one that enjoys tremendous support across parties, generations and the political spectrum: “American support for NATO is and must remain steadfast. The nearly *unanimous* vote in the Senate ratifying Montenegro’s accession to be a member state is evidence of this *well-established, deeply founded support*” (emphases added).

Brown goes on to note NATO’s triumphant history in combating terrorism, human rights violations and many other problems that induce instability across the globe. He stresses that for the international community to make headway on these issues in future years, it is incumbent upon the United States to preserve its firm commitment to the alliance—in other words, to stick to the path of proven success.

In sum, it is interesting that the Democrats—and Flake—who seek to challenge executive policy and would in so doing be assumed to politicize the issue, do display in their arguments features of depoliticization, namely the invocation of history and bipartisanship. As already noted in Chapter 2, Trump has through his actions “upended decades-old assumptions about the transatlantic alliance and the presidency” (Sloan 2018, 221), so in this sense the observation is not all too surprising. What it shows is that the division between typical methods of politicization and depoliticization does not perfectly correspond to that between the government and the opposition.

**5.2 Political cognition**

In this section, the main focus is on the discourse structures described in Section 3.3 and the contextual factors upon which these structures are based (Section 3.3.2), which factors contribute to the speakers’ personal mental models, themselves at least in part derivative of socially shared knowledge, beliefs and attitudes. As already highlighted in the chapter introduction, the analysis does
not primarily progress speech by speech but instead groups the speeches by the discourse structures they exhibit.

5.2.1 Context

Before examining discourse structures, however, there are some factors that are to be considered as part of the overall context that regulates the length and content of the speeches. Firstly, since they take place in a legislative setting (and specifically the House and Senate floors), they are constrained by time, with each of the House speeches having been allocated only one minute. The Senate speeches, however, are much longer, which is likely due to the upper chamber having far fewer members than the lower chamber (100 to 435), thus allowing more time to be granted per legislator and the legislators themselves to be more verbose.

The time is allotted by the presiding officer of the session, who, in the lower chamber, holds the title Speaker, while in the upper chamber, he or she is referred to as President. Constitutionally, the Vice President of the United States is the President of the Senate, in whose absence a formally chosen President pro tempore presides, but today most Senate sessions are presided over by junior senators who are advised by the Senate Parliamentarian (Mershon 2011). Similarly in the House, the Speaker regularly delegates presiding powers to lower-ranking representatives, always of his or her own party. The presiding officer is addressed as “President” or “Speaker,” with the preceding honorific “Mister” or “Madam,” even when he or she is presiding pro tempore. Members of Congress will therefore begin their speeches by addressing the respective presiding officer, after which they proceed to make use of the time allotted them to discuss the topic they find of import.

Context also influences the way legislators will address each other, resulting in such deictic phrases as “my colleagues,” “my friend from Michigan” and “the gentlewoman from California.” In congressional as in parliamentary discourse, typically only the presiding officer is addressed directly in the second person, whereas other members are referred to in the third person, unless they are included in collective first-person pronouns such as in “we in the House” and “we Democrats.” Both of these phrases also show the importance of group membership or “the discursive polarization of Us and Them,” which reflects “the models and social representations of speakers as group members” (van Dijk 2002, 226).

Related to this binary group membership are contextual factors stemming from the American electoral system. Since the country uses first-past-the-post voting, wherein each electoral district is entitled to one officeholder who wins by gaining a plurality of votes, the result is a two-party system with only
the occasional independent legislator on the national level (such as Senator Angus King). It is therefore not atypical of members of Congress to use such expressions as bipartisan and both sides of the aisle, the latter having been used, as shown by an online search of the Congressional Record, over 18,000 times since the opening of the 104th Congress in January 1995. While aforementioned expressions often attempt to unify (i.e. setting aside partisan differences to support a specific proposal on which there might be more agreement across the political spectrum), others can also be polarizing: “The failure to produce this budget begs the question: Are our friends across the aisle concerned about our national debt? Again, I refer to the Speaker's words: No budget, no values” (Hern 2019: H3071; emphasis added).

Another context variable relates to the fact that congressional debate is televised, live streamed and recorded for later viewing, which means that while legislators may be primarily communicating to each other, they also have the opportunity to appeal to their constituents and the American public as a whole. Bailey (2004, 11–12) argues that while parliamentary discourse is “probably consulted by very few” despite its generally easy availability, “political debate does not take place in a void,” as evidenced not only by the party, constituent and pressure group interests that politicians need to uphold, but also the fact that their contributions to political discourse are subject to media coverage that affects their public image. There are, indeed, rather drastic examples of congressional debate that, in all likelihood, would not have enfolded the same way had it not been for the presence of cameras: on March 27, 2019, Republican Senator Mike Lee—mentioned previously in Chapter 2—mocked the recently introduced Green New Deal stimulus program by incorporating into his presentation images from popular culture (including Star Wars and a velociraptor-riding Ronald Reagan), his stated goal being to consider the proposal “with the seriousness it deserves” (Hayes 2019).

Finally, context also includes knowledge, beliefs and goals. Knowledge is manifested namely in the body of background knowledge that senators and representatives expect of each other and any extra-congressional entities they may seek to influence with their speeches. As van Dijk (2002, 226) points out, some knowledge may be presupposed—seen as not warranting any explicit explanations if assumed to be decipherable from the overall context, as is often the case with deictic expressions. Political speech also reflects a goal of some sort, whether it is to defend or challenge executive policy, and beliefs, which are the personal mental models politicians construct of issues and groups. As will be seen below, knowledge, beliefs and goals invariably play a role in political discourse.
These factors demonstrate the effect context has on the personal mental models that political speakers construct for specific instances of discourse and, naturally, the discourse structures present in their speeches. The analysis of this section will henceforth examine the discourse structures found in the research material and some of the cognitive-contextual factors that explain them.

5.2.2 Topics and superstructures
The first structure that I examine is that of topics, also known as macropropositions. As van Dijk (1997, 25) maintains, political discourse is reflexive, meaning that the topics politicians talk about involve not only governmental policy but also themselves and the political processes in which they engage. One way this aspect is realized linguistically is deixis, as demonstrated by the pronouns and determiners that appear in the analyzed speeches: “my friend from Michigan,” “our allies.” Cohen and Bishop also explicitly reference House resolutions that they themselves have helped draft, while Flake and Sullivan, being members of the United States Senate currently speaking on the Senate floor, refer to their respective institution as “this body.”

As concerns the overarching topic of the speeches, the United States’ commitment to NATO, it is of course already a given that this is what they all focus on. Still unaddressed, however, is why the speakers would choose to cover this particular topic. For the Democrats who explicitly voice their opposition the president’s handling of the NATO summit, the controversy surrounding the topic allows them to challenge their political rivals and make the case for alternative ways of action towards which the political pendulum will ideally swing. As concerns the Republicans who support the president on this question, seeing that they are themselves members of the governing party, it is only to be expected that policy legitimation would be a major driving factor. Flake, as has been shown, is obviously an exception, with his goal being closer to the Democrats. Brown and Cohen’s speeches are further exceptions in that they do not touch upon the NATO summit at all, the former for obvious chronological reasons and the latter presumably because of time constraints, having been granted only one minute to discuss a resolution to which he attributes great import. At the same time, though, it is possible Cohen chose to avoid mentioning Trump so as not to distract from the bipartisan sentiment he wished to foster with his speech.

Besides the primary topic, what is also of interest is the dedication of time to other, more or less related issues that speakers consider worthwhile to raise in this context. Sullivan (2018, S4938), for example, speaks not within a strict framework of collective security but raises the issue of Germany’s importation of Russian natural gas. This he does to counter claims that the United States has through its recent stridence undermined Western security, alleging that if the NATO’s integrity has been
weakened by anyone, it is not Trump but former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who played a key role in the establishment of the Nord Stream pipeline between Germany with Russia. Here is brought to the fore a perceived interconnectedness of foreign policy with energy policy, and how such links can be used to bolster one’s own political beliefs and goals. Security was similarly tied to a seemingly unrelated issue in 2015 by Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, who mentioned the significance of climate change in the fight against terrorism, arguing that drought resulting from inaction on rising global temperatures would betoken greater conflict over increasingly scarce natural resources and, by extension, more terrorist activity (Gass 2015).

A similar interconnectedness is established in Jackson Lee’s speech, more specifically in the penultimate paragraph: “I would also suggest that it is hardly the American way for the U.S. delegation to oppose a breastfeeding resolution at the World Health Organization and to punish a little country like Ecuador.” To fully comprehend this statement requires background knowledge one can glean from discourse external to the source text situation: The congresswoman is referring to the administration’s refusal to back a WHO resolution calling for governmental protection and promotion of breastfeeding, with the stated reason that it would lead to restrictions on mothers’ access to formula. *The New York Times* reported that Ecuador, who was to introduce the resolution, later backed down after being threatened with crippling trade measures by the United States. The administration was subsequently accused of acting on behalf of formula manufacturers (Kennedy 2018).

Jackson Lee’s highlighting of the WHO resolution socially shared aspects of progressive thought, which sees as crucial the promotion of international initiatives that go beyond security issues and national self-interest; Democrats and liberals are, after all, on average more supportive of multilateralism and developmental foreign aid (Milner & Tingley 2013, 320 & 327). That Jackson Lee would mention the issue in a speech primarily about NATO is in part due to her having the time and opportunity to do so—an opportunity she dare not waste while the issue remains topical. Moreover, there are some unifying elements between her comments on these two issues, namely executive mishandling of international affairs and potentially also compassion toward wronged parties (European allies in the NATO case, Ecuador in the WHO case).

Of course, the speakers do also raise issues that fall squarely into the security domain, even when they are of varying relevance to NATO. Poe, as shown in the previous section, references American efforts during World War II as a justification for Trump’s conduct, while Bishop mentions the passage in the House of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, which “included [his] amendment urging our NATO allies to step up and participate in the cost of their own defense (Bishop 2018,
H6179). For the act to retain this amendment upon becoming law is in his view vital because
American allies need to be better prepared to face the growing security threats of today’s world,
including those related to cybersecurity, itself a vast topic.

While Flake devotes several paragraphs to Trump’s troubling relationship with Vladimir Putin—an
issue that carries obvious security implications—he shifts momentarily out of the domain of security
issues to the president’s misconceptions about trade: “The mindset that comprehends a trade deficit
as a grievous offense or an unfair act of aggression is the same mindset that can upend vital security
relationships that have been similarly misperceived” (Flake 2018, S4934). However, here the senator
appears to be not so much linking trade with NATO as simply trying to support his claims about
Trump’s generally warped understanding of the world.

Yet another topic-related example comes from Wilson, who ends his speech with the following
statement: “In conclusion, God bless our troops, and we will never forget September the 11th in the
global war on terrorism.” While on first reading the sentence may appear as a left-field non sequitur,
invoking the attacks of September 11 when they have no direct relation to the primary subject is by
no means an uncommon occurrence in American political discourse. Both Trump and his Democratic
contender Hillary Clinton did so during their respective primary debates in 2016, with Trump using
it to defend “New York values” against Texan Senator Ted Cruz and Clinton to defend her ties to
Wall Street (Diamond 2016; Krieg 2016). What is noteworthy about Wilson, however, is that his use
of this exact sentence is not an isolated incident but appears to be the standard way he closes his
speeches: searching it in the online archives of the Congressional Record returns 463 results, all
attributed to Wilson. While his exact reasons for using this closing are not clear, it does signal to his
colleagues and constituents where his priorities lie and is reflective of a context model under which
it is seen as advantageous to associate one’s own positions with issues that lie at the heart of
contemporary American identity (in particular, supporting the troops and remembering 9/11). It may
also be noted that Poe too has used his concluding remark (“And that is just the way it is”) over 400
times.

Wilson’s concluding remarks also serve as an example of the superstructures common in legislative
discourse. As was pointed out in the previous section, the speeches include argument stages that orient
addressees to the author’s point of view with history. This is true of Sullivan, Flake, Connolly and,
all of whom call attention to NATO allies’ past contributions to the United States, as well as Bishop
and, again, Sullivan, both of whom the cite the 2014 pledge by NATO members to increase their
defense spending to 2 percent of GDP. Structurally, the speeches also have in common titles that
serve as theses, premises or topics more generally (e.g. Boyle’s specific “Urging NATO allies to honor financial commitments” and Flake’s minimalistic “NATO Summit”); introductions that begin with addressing the presiding officer (“Mr./Madam Speaker,” “Mr. President”) and set the tone for the arguments to follow; arguments, including supporting and orientational ones; and, lastly conclusions. To illustrate these in more detail, I have included below Connolly’s speech in full, with designations of its superstructural features:

**Title/thesis**
Disparaging NATO Allies Is Not Productive

**Introduction/opposing argument**
Mr. Speaker, we just heard my friend from Michigan talk about how NATO allies have to live up to their obligations.

**Rejection of opposing argument**
NATO allies have been living up to their obligations.

**Argument (history)**
In fact, article V of NATO has only been invoked once, and it was on behalf of the United States by our NATO allies.

**Argument (history)**
The way to get NATO working is not to blow up a NATO summit, and it is not to disparage NATO allies—allies of half a century.

**Argument (analogy)**
Now we see that same wrecking ball strategy in the United Kingdom, our oldest ally on the face of the Earth.

**Conclusion**
This is no way to conduct foreign policy. It is destructive, and it will hurt the United States’ interests that have been served long by our allies and by NATO in particular.

I hope the President of the United States comes to his senses and understands talking discretely is far better than blowing it up.

Connolly’s comment about the “wrecking ball strategy in the United Kingdom” presumably refers to Brexit, which, along with the election of Donald Trump, is often seen as part of a wider pattern of rising nationalist populism in the West (Gusterson 2017). Here, like in Jackson Lee’s speech, is thus shown an instance of presupposed knowledge that fits into the wider internationalist framework to which Democrats subscribe.

### 5.2.3 Local semantics

From macro-level structures we turn to local semantics, which, as van Dijk (1997, 31) states, often appear as contrastive evaluations, also noted by Schäffner (2001, 162–163). With the rhetoric analyzed thus far, it can be said that at least some of the speeches exhibit such evaluations. On the
Trump-supporting Republican side, what tends to be seen are positive attributes applied to the United States and the president’s negotiation strategies at the NATO summit, while the opposite is true of their evaluations of European NATO member states, or, alternatively, the individual political actors associated with this side of the negotiations, as is the case with Sullivan’s criticisms of Gerhard Schröder. However, since Sullivan does go on to commend the European allies for their past conduct, his evaluations do not exhibit as stark a dichotomy as those of his fellow party members.

More specifically in Sullivan’s speech, there is an attribution of positive descriptors to Trump’s trip to Brussels, these being “good,” “success,” and “good progress,” while to Schröder’s past actions he attributes such words as “undermine” and “betrayal” (Sullivan 2018, S4938–S4939). In his colleague Flake’s speech, the negative descriptors associated with Trump become clear in the very first paragraph: “Global peace is not a zero-sum game, and global alliances ought not be subject to whim, impulse, opaque machinations, or material threats of cancellation over internal disagreements” (Flake 2018, S4934–S4935; emphases added). Similar characterizations are scattered throughout his speech, including “posture of antagonism,” “heedless,” “antipathy and hostility,” and “willfully destructive”; the transatlantic partnership, on the other hand, is afforded such descriptors as “vital” and “one of the greatest and most visionary investments our Nation has ever made.” A similar juxtaposition appears in Jackson-Lee’s speech, namely in her use of the descriptors “embarrassment” and “important” in reference to the Trump strategy and good ally relations, respectively.

5.2.4 Lexico-grammatical features

While contrastive evaluations may be considered lexical features of political speech, what is of more interest to the type of lexical analysis that van Dijk (1997, 33) discusses selectiveness of the vocabulary: does it reflect a political calculation of some sort that may manifest as, say, euphemism? While euphemisms themselves are not easy to detect, there is one fascinating, potentially ideologically motivated discrepancy between Bishop and Connolly’s speeches: while the former alleges that in failing to meet the 2 percent threshold the NATO allies have shirked their “commitments,” Connolly, when voicing his disagreement, uses instead the word “obligations.” This may be a result of the fact that, as has been established, in 2014 NATO countries pledged to meet the threshold not immediately but by 2024, and thus Connolly’s opting for the word obligation may imply that he’s specifically considering the very fundamental functions and contributions required of the allies in the present, while Bishop’s objective would seem to be to hold the allies to their commitments before these commitments become obligations in 2024.
Closely related to lexicon is, of course, syntax, the political significance of which is chiefly shown in pronoun use and word order. Of pronouns, van Dijk (1997, 33–34) notes the polarizing effect of “us versus them” phrasings, and the speech that comes closest to this is Poe’s—in particular, in the following sentence: “If President Trump’s comments irked the sensibilities of our allies, well, they should just get the message” (Poe 2018, H6193; emphases added). These deictic expressions are reflective of an attitude that Kelly (2003) observes as having deeply affected the Republican Party since George W. Bush’s presidency: a conservative unilateralism that does not see as particularly troublesome the objections of other states.

As regards word order, there are of course examples of marked word order, such as Flake and Sullivan’s use of the existential *there* (italicized):

> What would this President replace the Western alliance with? *There* simply is no better order that could be achieved by this destabilization.
> 
> Flake (2018, S4934)

> *There has been* this commitment by NATO members since at least 2014—but it really goes way earlier than 2014—for each country to spend 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense spending so that we share the burden of defense.
> 
> (Sullivan 2018, S4938)

However, if the word order in these excerpts is transformed into an unmarked one (i.e. “This destabilization simply could not achieve any better order” and “NATO members have been committed since at least 2014 [...]”), it would be difficult to pinpoint ideologically motivated differences. Perhaps closer to the mark would be Flake’s employment of the passive voice in the following sentence, wherein he criticizes Trump’s disregard for the United States’ mutual history with its NATO allies: “Apart from our shared sacrifice and our shared security, what we have been through together over those 70 years cannot adequately be reflected on any ledger or list of petty grievances.” Here, the passive voice works to add a greater level of objectivity to the statement.

### 5.2.5 Rhetorical operations

The three discourse structures remaining to be analyzed are rhetorical operations, expression structures and speech acts, of which rhetorical operations will be addressed first. Of the four operations that van Dijk specifies, repetition and substitution in particular stand out, the latter in the form of metaphor.
Repetition appears in the speeches of Flake, Jackson Lee and Sullivan. Flake, in a section describing the problematic behavior that the president has recently engaged in, from his willingness to overlook Russian aggression to his lambasting of NATO allies, follows each sentence with the question “why?” (as in why would the president do such a thing?). In further arguing against the course the administration has taken and the results it will have, Flake (2018, S4934) repeatedly uses the word fail: “If we fail to see these things clearly, then we fail the world, and we fail ourselves.” Jackson Lee, in turn, begins three consecutive paragraphs with “it is important,” followed by the arguments to which she attributes this importance. Lastly, Sullivan, having shifted from critiquing the allies to acknowledging their past contributions, repeats the clauses “[t]hey did” (in reference to NATO allies helping the United States after 9/11) and “[y]ou can’t put a pricetag on that” (in reference to the over 1,000 non-American NATO troops killed in Afghanistan). Furthermore, he combines metaphor and repetition in the following excerpt:

But this alliance, which many have viewed as the most successful military alliance in history, is a lot more than just money. At its heart, it is about common values. At its heart, it is about countries coming together to defend democracy. At its heart, it is about countries that have the same core national security interests.

Sullivan (2018, S4938)

When intentional, repetition is a strategy commonly used for emphasis, “to draw attention to preferred meanings and to enhance construction of such meanings in mental models and their memorization in ongoing persuasion attempts or later recall” (van Dijk 1997, 35). An examination of the C-SPAN recording also confirms that the repetition mentioned above is indeed intentional and not the result of unintentional speech disfluency (which does occur in the recordings but was not included in the transcripts). Repetition therefore carries here to a great extent an emphatic function that reflects what the speakers, by virtue of their beliefs, wish to prioritize in the discourse surrounding the NATO summit. Additionally, however, Jackson Lee’s “it is important” openings and Sullivan’s repeated use of the heart metaphor in particular also exhibit a cohesive function by which sentences and paragraph-spanning argument stages are interlinked.

And what of metaphor? To take a closer look at Sullivan’s heart metaphor, it is, as previously noted in Chapter 3, not an atypical feature of English political speech, one used to encapsulate the essence of its referent. Thus in associating with the heart of the Western alliance such things as shared values and solidarity, Sullivan suggests that while the Trump administration may be right to call attention to a matter that is—at its heart—a financial one, the features that define NATO go far beyond “just money” and so United States’ ought to retain a strong overall commitment to the alliance and its
members. The same sentiment appears to be present in Jackson Lee’s speech, where, after emphasizing that “NATO is not just [Article] 5,” she further describes the organization as “thought” and “purpose,” indicating that Americans are not to see the alliance as one of simple convenience but as one furthering long-term goals that are of far greater consequence than the momentary interests of one country.

Two more metaphors appear in the speeches. One is from Poe, who calls Vladimir Putin “the Napoleon of Siberia,” which seems to be a reference to the Russian president’s territorial aspirations. The other is from Brown, who says that NATO, through the assistance it provides to non-member states, “serves as a beacon for democratic values like gender equality and rule of law” (Brown 2017, S2213). Charteris-Black (2017, 169–170) states that the beacon metaphor “symbolizes hope and aspiration” through its activation of directional and even divine associations: beacons are, after all, conceptualized as being above the viewer while giving off light, with something that is “up” being generally thought good and “light” being a common theme in religious iconography. NATO is thus characterized as not a mere contract between self-interested parties but a key player in ushering the world towards a more democratic, equal and, indeed, brighter future.

5.2.6 Expression structures and speech acts
To analyze expression structures—that is, suprasegmental and audiovisual features—I consulted C-SPAN’s video recordings, which included all but Brown’s speech. While it is not uncommon for members of Congress to supplement their speeches with images (as exemplified by the aforementioned Mike Lee), none of the analyzed speeches include such. As concerns gestures and the prosody of speech, Connolly and Jackson Lee stand out most prominently: For example, when countering Bishop’s claim about the allies’ failure to meet the 2 percent threshold, Connolly says “NATO allies have been living up to their obligations,” stressing the auxiliary verb to emphasize the contradiction with his colleague’s statement. He also shakes his head upon uttering the word no when he states, “This is no way to conduct foreign policy.” Jackson Lee, when discussing the WHO resolution, stresses the italicized words in the following sentence: “I would also suggest that it is hardly the American way for the U.S. delegation to oppose a breastfeeding resolution at the World Health Organization and to punish a little country like Ecuador.” These emphases work to express flabbergast at the administration’s hostility toward something as innocuous as a breastfeeding resolution and the act of introducing it.

The last discourse structure under analysis is that of speech acts. In legislative contexts, typical speech acts include “assertions, questions, accusations or apologies” (van Dijk 1997, 36). Since the analyzed
speeches are mostly commenting on executive action, it would be expected that they mostly involve assertions and accusations. Questions, as has been observed, occur as well, but in as far as they concern executive action, they are largely rhetorical in nature since, after all, American congressional debate does not include the opportunity to pose questions directly to the Cabinet, unlike the parliamentary systems in Europe.

As concerns the earliest of the speeches—that is, Brown’s—due to its commemorative nature its speech act composition is exclusively constitutive of assertions. These function to praise NATO for its past successes and underscore the imperativeness of the United States’ continued commitment to the alliance. To the extent that his assertions instantiate a context-based mental model, it bears mentioning that when the speech was held on April 4, 2017, the president had not taken back his characterization of NATO as “obsolete,” and it was about a week later that the public witnessed this reversal (Liptak & Merica 2017). Thus the perlocutionary force of the speech would be, first, to dissuade those who have grown or might grow receptive to the president’s message (including congressional Republicans) and, second, to reassure supporters of the alliance—who, as polling suggests, represent 80 percent of Americans (Smith 2019)—that whoever occupies the White House, strong voices on Capitol Hill still understand NATO’s importance.

Of the speeches held in 2018, Cohen’s is similar to Brown’s in that it is not an explicit response to actions taken on the executive level. It is therefore absent of accusations, and central to Cohen’s message is the threat of Russia as one of the chief motives for keeping NATO alive and, furthermore, the reach across the aisle he performs by noting the vast support for his sponsored resolution and by thanking Republican Speaker Paul Ryan for enabling its passage in the House.

The speeches of the other Democrats, however, suffer no shortage of accusations. In Jackson Lee’s case, accusations are realized as reprises in the show concessions discussed in Section 5.1, wherein she accuses the administration of embarrassing behavior and of excessive friendliness with the United States’ enemies, after which she proceeds to criticize the administration for its handling of the WHO resolution. Boyle and Connolly, after establishing the importance of both NATO and the United States’ commitment to it, accuse the president of undermining decades-old tradition, of “disparaging NATO allies” and of “blowing up” the summit. Both speeches end with an instruction to change course:

I urge the Trump administration to follow the bipartisan lead of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to support NATO and support our Western allies. It has underpinned peace for 70 years.
I hope the President of the United States comes to his senses and understands talking discretely is far better than blowing it up.

Shifting to the two Republican Senators, Flake and Sullivan, it may be noted that the former’s speech is very rich in accusations, while in the latter’s, assertions predominate. So numerous are the individual accusations in Flake’s speech, in fact, that it would hardly be meaningful to list them all here, but suffice it to say that they mainly involve Trump prioritizing money and enemy appeasement over the common values, goals and history that NATO stands for:

This is the danger in viewing these relationships as mere transactions, absent our shared values. Absent values, the world is nothing but a cruel and cold place of warring camps and territorial ambitions and no durable alliances whatsoever. [...] This posture of antagonism and suspicion toward our partners and peace can be held only when you blot out 70 of the most consequential years of the world. [...] Vladimir Putin is not “fine,” as the President recently asserted. And singing his praises for no good reason sends a terrifying message to our allies, especially those countries that share a border with Russia.

Flake’s assertions also carry a persuasive function, namely in their identification of what the alliance has contributed to world security and gratitude that the United States owes its allies for their sacrifices, which, as has been noted, are also mentioned by Sullivan. More generally, Sullivan’s assertions seek to commend the president for his performance in Brussels and the allies for what they have done for the United States since September 11, 2001. The main target of the few accusations that appear in his speech is of course Schröder, and criticisms of more subdued intensity are directed at the allies for how they have “ignored” their commitment to the 2 percent threshold. However, his uses of the word ignore are hedged with the despecifying expression kind of, which may serve as an acknowledgement of the fact that some allies—Estonia, Greece, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom—have in fact met the threshold. Several of Sullivan’s assertions are also hedged with “I think,” though this appears to function mostly as an expression of Sullivan’s personal opinion about the value of the president’s efforts, rather than a mitigated factual statement, which distinction Schäffner (1998, 187–188) notes in her analyses.

Of the last remaining legislators, Bishop, Poe and Wilson all assert that Trump was right in calling the allies out on their parsimony. Wilson’s speech is the only one of the three that does not include accusations against the allies, while Bishop and Poe accuse them of failing to honor their
commitments. Poe further accuses them of “[making] excuses” and of hypocrisy, as is evident from the following excerpt:

Our ever-proper European friends may not remember that American teenagers went to war and shed blood two times in the last century to help save Europe. [...] It is time for all NATO countries to be as concerned about European defense as America is. If President Trump’s comments irked the sensibilities of our allies, well, they should just get the message.

Poe (2018, H6193)

To strengthen their own assertions about the president’s conduct, both Wilson and Poe quote *The Washington Times* newspaper, specifically its editors S. A. Miller and Wesley Pruden, respectively, who reported approvingly on Trump’s performance in Brussels. The quotes used by Wilson are “President Trump’s bare-knuckles diplomacy paid off” and “Mr. Trump declared that the U.S. remained committed to the military alliance,” while Poe quotes Pruden to argue that “This is no NATO for deadbeats.” The significance of this is the editorial stance of the outlet, which is markedly pro-Republican. Thus, it would be considered natural for members of the party to rely on it in their rhetoric.

Another element to note is that, whether intentionally or not, Wilson’s first quote from *The Washington Times* appears to be a misquote, since the article by Miller does not use the exact phrasing cited above but says instead the following: “President Trump’s bare-knuckles diplomacy agitated NATO allies, but he said it paid off” (Miller 2018). Here the paper is rather presenting the president’s assessment than expressing its own. The inclusion of quotations in the text version of the speech could be a transcription error of an intended paraphrase, since the speaker does not use the indicators “quote” and “end of quote.” However, even the video recording still gives the impression that the statement “Trump’s bare-knuckles diplomacy paid off” reflects *The Washington Times’* opinion and not the paper’s reporting on Trump’s opinion. Given the ideology of the publication and Miller’s use of the phrase “mission accomplished” in the article’s heading, Wilson’s misquote may not be too far off the mark, though it still remains unclear whether there was any intention on his part or not to present the paper’s reporting as favorable to the president and his own position.
5.3 Implications for translation

This section examines how the observations made in the previous sections of this chapter relate to the application of functionalist translation strategies. I elaborate on both the problems that the texts pose for translation and, where applicable, strategies by which they may be overcome or, at least, initially addressed, to account for the needs of the target text situation. I do not seek to cover all potential translation problems in the speeches but specifically the ones that were of interest to the discourse analysis above. The problems are grouped as per Nord’s (1997b) categorization of translation problems.

Since functionalist approaches hold that target text situation is integral to the specific strategies employed, there will have to be some specification of target text function, motive, time and place, medium and addressees. First of all, as mentioned in the introduction, the translations would be published in European online or print outlets reporting on political developments in the United States. It would also be purposeful for them to appear shortly after the delivery of the original speech, when the issue addressed by the speakers remains topical. Their function would thus be one of metatextuality in informative texts, which in turn implies a need for a documentary form of translation. Lastly, addressees would not necessarily include the entire public in the target culture but those who regularly follow political news while still lacking source-culture specific background knowledge.

In news reports, there may be a need to quote the speeches not in full but in excerpts (as was done in German and French reportage on Mike Lee’s speech), though this aspect does not feature too prominently in the analysis to follow. This is because contextual problems arising from including a speech segment in isolation may be addressed with explanations given before and after the quoted portion, thus making the explanations not part of the target text per se.

5.3.1 Pragmatic problems: knowledge, hedges and deixis

As was discussed in previous sections, knowledge—be it that which is held by the author or that which is expected of the addressees—is one variable of context, which in turn directly affects discourse. Knowledge can be expressed in varying degrees of implicitness and explicitness, and where knowledge is presupposed, the translator would need to consider how to best convey information that readers in the target culture cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of.
Some of the speeches, particularly the senatorial ones, included historical orientation stages that would inform even the uninitiated reader of the background knowledge relevant to the speech. Instances where such knowledge is not explicit, however, include Jackson Lee’s comments about the WHO resolution, especially as concerns the treatment of Ecuador, and Connolly’s reference to Brexit (“we see that same wrecking ball strategy in the United Kingdom”). To an extent this also applies to mentions of Article 5, the function of which is explained by Jackson Lee but not by Connolly. In such cases, the translator would have to consider whether to make implicit information more explicit. Since the type of translation would be documentary and not instrumental, bracketed explanations may well be considered to bridge this informational gap between the author and target culture readers, as per the strategy of visibility change (Chesterman 1997, 112). At the same time, though, the translator would have to avoid verbosity with such explanations, since this would, as Schäffner (2001, 152) argues, disturb the style and structure readers expect of the genre.

Further problems related to knowledge concern ideology, namely the recognition of discourse structures as stemming from the beliefs and group identities of the speakers. Poe and Wilson’s decisions to quote specifically *The Washington Times*, a conservative outlet, is one example where the full nuances of discourse could well be lost on target text readers, though even in this instance bracketed comments may well provide a solution if a translator’s note as succinct as “*The Washington Times* (TN: conservative newspaper)” is deemed sufficient. Of course, the more fundamental differences between American multilateralism (generally espoused by Democrats) and American unilateralism (generally espoused by Republicans) would be much more difficult to deconstruct in the target text itself. As discussed above, however, documentary translation does allow such aspects to be explained elsewhere in the reports into which the speeches are embedded, particularly if only excerpts are included.

Another pragmatic problem relates to hedges, which appear in Sullivan’s accusations that the NATO allies have “kind of” ignored their commitment to the 2 percent threshold. According to Schäffner (1998, 198), *kind of* is an example of despecifying hedges which “extend the scope of indeterminateness” and may well involve pragmatic explanations as to their mitigating function. In this case, as I suggested in the previous section, Sullivan’s use of the hedge can be linked to the fact that not all allies have ignored the 2 percent pledge, which would be important for the translation to also reflect. Another hedging device that appears frequently in his speech is the evidentiality-hedge “I think,” but, as already mentioned, since here it expresses opinion rather than verifiable facts, it does not have the same context-bound mitigating impact as “kind of” and, consequently, does not pose as many problems for translation.
Finally, the speeches also displayed deictic elements. While it is fair to assume that the first-person pronouns uttered by the speakers would not pose problems, be they singular pronouns used for self-reference (“my friend”) or plural ones representing the United States as a whole (“our allies”), one potentially problematic aspect is Sullivan and Flake referring to the Senate as “this body.” This could of course be rendered as explicitly as “the Senate,” but whether this properly conveys the speakers’ personal connection to their surroundings is another matter.

5.3.2 Intercultural problems: genre conventions and metaphor
As regards genre conventions, it has been established that corresponding target texts may be used as reference points for translating source texts. Thus, where the text uses expressions typical of United States Congress register, the translator may want to consult parallel texts, namely records of target culture parliamentary debate. Such records can provide communicatively appropriate target language resources that match addressees’ expectations of the genre in question. If the availability of parliamentary records is limited in the target culture, one potentially valuable alternative can be found in the online archives of the European Parliament (europarl.europa.eu), which provide versions of parliamentary debates in all the official languages of the European Union—assuming, of course, that the debate took place after the date of accession of the country representing the target culture (one would not typically find, say, Estonian translations of European parliamentary debate from a time when Estonia still was not a member of the union).

One example of congressional discourse is “Mr. President,” which may not necessarily feature commonly in excerpts, but there certainly ways to account for it in translation. Many European cultures have a national senate, whose presiding officer is referred to with the target language cognate of the president, with the exception of the Dutch parliament, in whose upper house the term voorzitter—also used of the speaker in the lower house—applies. Even with this knowledge, however, the translator should become acquainted with parliamentary protocol in the target culture to discover by what form the president of the senate is addressed when spoken to (in French, for example, the exact phrase is either the feminine madame la présidente or the masculine monsieur le président). The same can be said of unicameral polities, where the form of address reserved for the parliamentary speaker, may—by virtue of there not being an upper house for a president to oversee—function as the default option for translation, given the potential of any cognate of the word president to create different associations in the target culture vis-à-vis the source culture. This is borne out by an examination of translational conventions on europarl.europa.eu, where the Swedish, Danish, and
Finnish translations of president match the title used for speakers in the unicameral systems of these cultures.

For political concepts that have their origins in American institutions, namely bipartisan and its noun form bipartisanship, a functionalist approach, when it serves a translation brief espousing an informative purpose, would lead the translator to heed Schäffner’s advice to examine parallel corpora for any corresponding target culture expressions (to avoid confusion, I avoid here the term target language equivalent, as to some this may denote perfect correspondence by both sense and form). If no conventionalized phrases can be found, Chesterman’s (1997, 95–96 & 108–109) strategies of unit shift and explicitness change could be of tremendous use here: instead of an idiomatic phrase that perfectly matches bipartisanship, the translator may simply want to render it as “support of both parties.”

As far as metaphor is concerned, the manner in which the topic was politicized or depoliticized did not always take the form of metaphor, though there were some clear instances of path metaphor, particularly in Sullivan’s speech. Path metaphors, as Schäffner (2001, 157) states, are quite common in English, and even when they are present in the target culture, the translator cannot always rely on word-for-word renditions in realizing a path that a source text establishes with the kind of verb phrases Sullivan uses, including go, move away, drop or shift. Much depends on target culture conventions whether the translator can, through adaptation, frame political processes as representing movement “towards destination” or whether he or she is limited to dropping the movement element completely.

Another metaphor used by Sullivan was that of the heart, which does not require much elaboration beyond what was already established in Section 3.2. The key factor the translator should consider is that the heart metaphor often calls for target domain shift when translated, with the convention in some languages, such as German, being to use the word core (Schäffner 2001, 156–157).

Metaphors by other speakers included Poe’s “Napoleon of Siberia” and Jackson Lee’s characterization of NATO as “thought” and “purpose.” Poe’s example would appear to pose few problems given the wide recognition of Napoleon across cultures (hence the use of the comparison here by someone who is himself not French), though the translator would need to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether there is a need for modification, even if the overall domain of “great man” and “aggressor” may be retained. In Jackson Lee’s case, to describe something as “thought” and “purpose” does not appear to be very usual even in American discourse, and to render these semantically to the target language may be detrimental for addressee comprehension. One might
consider a non-metaphorical clause roughly corresponding to “NATO has thought and purpose behind it,” or some other solution which conveys the central point that Americans should not treat the alliance as one of mere convenience.

The last example of metaphor was Brown’s “beacon,” which is by no means a text-specific element but a widely used metaphor in both British and American discourse; in the Congressional Record alone, the form “a beacon of” appears almost 2,000 times since the 104th Congress convened. For target text addressees to recognize it as a metaphor in translated form, the translator may want to seek a target language metaphor that embodies associations similar to those defined by Charteris-Black (2017, 169–170), as in accordance with Chesterman’s (1997, 105–106) trope change subclass a, which involves the use of related figures of speech with varying degrees of semantic or lexical correspondence with source text elements. Parallel texts may come of use here, but if these and other research methods fail, the translator may have to consider other types of trope change, including those which abandon the figurative element altogether.

5.3.3 Interlingual problems: idiomatic expressions
The speeches used some idiomatic expressions, namely “deadbeats,” “bare-knuckles,” and “wrecking ball,” the latter two incidentally combined with the semantically similar words approach and strategy, respectively. These may, depending on available target language resources, require a related if not semantically identical figures of speech or a complete dropping of the figurative element (Chesterman 1997, 105–106). Another relevant point is the value judgements attached to these expressions: both “bare-knuckles” and “wrecking ball” may stand as antonyms to “discrete” or “measured,” but while Connolly’s phrase “wrecking ball strategy,” being a force semantic barrier (as noted in Section 5.1), is supposed convey destructiveness in an unequivocally negative sense, the “bare-knuckles approach” mentioned favorably in Wilson’s quote involves, at least in this context, associations with a kind of toughness that is sure to net good results. Considerations for such value judgements may thus be extended to the translation process as well.

5.3.4 Text-specific problems: contrastive evaluations, quotations and author style
Some of the speeches employed contrastive evaluations, such as the adjective phrases “willfully destructive” and “vital” used by Flake. What is of importance here is that when translating such evaluations, there is a need to draw dividing lines between what the speaker opposes and what he or she supports, and so it may well be worthwhile for the translator to consider not simply lexical source-
to-target language correspondence but more generally the target language resources that trigger connotations of such polarization.

The analysis also highlighted the use of quotations by politicians, with both Poe and Wilson using quotes from *The Washington Times* to support their case. Poe cites the title of an article by Wesley Pruden called “This is no NATO for deadbeats,” while Wilson quotes S. A. Miller in arguing that “President Trump’s bare-knuckles diplomacy paid off” and in reassuring his listeners that “U.S. remained committed to the military alliance.” I pointed out that the first of Wilson’s quotes appeared to be a misquote, but since translations of these quotes are unlikely to exist in other sources, the necessity to check for other translations for consistency most likely does not apply here at any rate. The same applies to the congressmen’s concluding remarks, which they have used in hundreds of other speeches, but, again, it is unlikely that translations of these exist in other sources. More relevant to the task is the translator’s recognition that these are recurring elements that do not always have a close connection to the topic under discussion and, hence, do not warrant translational modification that deepens this connection.

However, in his speech Wilson does quote another source, this time the “Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity.” Besides English, the text is available in both French and Russian on the NATO website, so naturally a rendition of the source text to either of these languages should rely on existing target language versions of the quoted text. For other languages, the translator may have to check for translations that exist in other sources.
6 Conclusions

In writing this thesis, my aim was, at its core, to conduct a political discourse analysis of speeches held in the United States Congress and discuss its implications for a functionalist translation approach. Established about the translation of political speeches was that the process more often than not involves adherence to genre conventions and a shift in text function, which is no longer persuasive but rather metatextual and informative. Furthermore, while the relationship between speakers and primary addressees is one of “mutual knowledge due to community co-membership” and shared understanding of political concepts, the same luxury does not necessarily extend secondary addressees. Such factors warrant attention if the context of the source text is to be conveyed sufficiently.

My way of approaching the problematique inherent in communicating the content in political speeches cross-culturally involved the contextualization of political texts as fragments of a wider discourse. By adopting this discourse-analytical perspective, I intended to examine more closely the intertextuality of the research material and not merely the sentence level, so that the observations would be more conducive to generalization across potential target cultures in Europe. For this purpose, I adopted analytical models from Muntigl and van Dijk, which examine, in the former’s case, methods of politicization and depoliticization and, in the latter’s case, discourse structures and the mental context models that explain them.

When the material was subjected to analysis, it was demonstrated that there are, indeed, points of convergence between political discourse analysis and functionalist translation of political speeches, and potential translation problems were found in all of Nord’s four categories. Genre conventions, contrastive meanings, deixis, metaphor and, in particular, knowledge are but some of the aspects where the analyses of Schäffner coincide with those of van Dijk and, to a lesser extent, Muntigl.

The Muntigl model came of use in the identification of path metaphor and force semantic elements, which Sullivan and Brown’s speeches employed, which relates closely to conceptualization of politics “as movement along a path,” also noted by Schäffner. Van Dijk’s methodology similarly touches upon issues that Schäffner discusses. These are, for example, contextual factors that manifest in discourse as implicit information that may require translator’s notes to minimize the possibility for target reader befuddlement. Central to contrastive evaluations, in turn, is the juxtaposition they effect with recognizably positive and negative attributes, which the translator should also consider, and
central to the translation of metaphor is the use of domains connotatively similar to the source culture. Congressional register may also necessitate the consultation of genre prototypes in the target culture, mainly parliamentary debate.

While the thesis obviously cannot function as a comprehensive account of the factors at play when translating American legislative speeches to other languages, this is not to say it has not addressed some generalizable issues—generalizable in that they most certainly apply to a vast number of political speeches in the United States. These relate mainly to the context in which congressional debate is conducted, including some of the linguistic resources that characterize it (e.g. forms of address and concepts like bipartisanship) and the knowledge and beliefs of the participants, be it historical knowledge (about, say, Article 5) or ideological divergences between members the two main parties, as exemplified by the multilateralist and unilateralist split.

Of course, there are several areas which this thesis leaves open for future exploration. At the end of Section 5.1, wherein the Muntigl model was applied, I noted how even a party in the opposition may engage in rhetoric typical of depoliticization, and I think this in itself would be a topic worth examining. Regarding specifically translation of political speeches from the United States, since the analysis was conducted on texts without any known translations, it could be a worthwhile endeavor to conduct descriptive analyses of translated congressional speeches and observe whether they display any patterns that support or conflict with the inferences made in this thesis. If, however, there is difficulty in locating such translations, perhaps one way to improve upon the research would be to look at a far greater number of texts across several subject matters, thereby revealing yet more aspects of United States congressional discourse that are of consequence to translation.

Part of the reason I decided to examine the translation of congressional and not presidential speeches, despite translations being far more widely available for the latter, was the all but nonexistent attention the former seems to have been afforded thus far. It is of course easy to understand why this disparity exists, but were congressional speeches to be more frequently featured in future studies on translation, it is certainly a development I would favor.
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Appendix: Summary in Finnish

Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on soveltaa diskursianalyysia Yhdysvaltain kongressissa pidettyihin puheisiin ja määrittää sitä kautta puheiden funktionaalisselle kääntämiselle oleellisia ongelmakohtia. Analyysin näkökulmana on hypoteettinen eurooppalainen kääntäjä, joka on saanut käännättävän kongressin puheita (tai niiden katkelmia) kääntäjän omaa kulttuuria edustavien mutta kohdekulttuurin poliittikasta raportoivien verkko- ja sanomalehtijulkaisujen tarkoituksiin.


Brownia ja Cohenia lukuun ottamatta kaikki kommentoivat presidentin toimintaa Brysselin vuoden 2018 Nato-huippukokouksessa, jossa hän vaati muita sotilasliiton jäseniä nostamaan puolustusmenojaan kahteen prosenttiin bruttokansatuotteesta ja siten kantamaan suuremmat vastuun yhteispuolustuksesta. Lainsäätäjien reaktiot noudattavat lähes poikkeuksetta puoluerajoja: republikaanit pitävät Trumpin ankaruutta oikeutettuna, kun taas demokraattien mielestä presidentti on tarpeettomasti horjuttanut sotilasliiton sisäistä vakautta samalla, kun hän on mielillensä Yhdysvaltain vihollisena pidettyä Vladimir Putinia. Puoluetovereistaan poikkeaa demokraattien syytöksiin yhtyvä Flake, joka on tullut muissakin yhteyksissä tunnetuksi Trumpin kriitikkona.

Poliittinen diskursianalyysi valittiin tutkielman menetelmäksi, koska sen tarjoamat lähestymistavat auttavat valottamaan lausetason piirteiden lisäksi puheiden tilanne- ja lähtökulttuurisidonnaisista asiayhteyttiä. Tarkoituksena ei siis ole nostaa esille tiettyä kohdekieltä koskevia käännösongelmia vaan pyrkiä analyysiin, jonka tulokset ovat yleistettävissä useampaan kuin yhteen mahdolliseen kohdekulttuuriin.

Toisen diskurssianalyyttisen mallin laatija on van Dijk (2002). Tässä kognitiivisessa mallissa diskurssirakenteet pyritään liittämään diskursia ympäriöivään kontekstiin. Tämä konteksti koostuu diskurssimiljöön (esim. parlamentti) lisäksi siitä kulttuuri- ja ideologiasidonnaisesta tiedosta, jonka puhuja odottaa vastaanottajien tunnistavan tilanteeseen sopivaksi (”cultural Common Ground”). Näin ymmärettynä poliittinen diskursi heijastaa siis kontekstimallia, jonka puhuja rakentaa puhetilanteesta ja sille relevantista tiedosta. Konteksti on samalla suoraan sidoksissa eri diskurssirakenteisiin, joita poliittisesta diskurssia voi havaita. Diskurssirakenteita ovat puhujan käsittelemät aiheet ja niiden painotus; käytettyjen kuvausten kahtiajakoisuus (puollettavaa kantaa kuvataan myönteisillä ja vastustettavaa kielteisillä ilmauksilla); sanasto (esim. eufemismit); kielioppi (esim. aktiivin ja passiivin harkittu käyttö); retoriset keinot (toisto, metaforat ym.); ja puheaktit, kuten syytökset ja väitteet.

Tutkielma pyrkii yhdistämään näiden analyysimallien avulla tehdyn havainnon funktionaalisen kääntämisien tarpeisiin. Funktionaalista lähestymistapaa puoltavat erityisesti se, että funktionaalisessa viitekehysessa toimivat teoreetikot ovat analysoineet genren ja kääntämisien välistä yhteyttä (Sager 1997; Schäffner 2000), ja oman genrensä muodostavat luonnollisesti myös poliittiset puheet.

Funktionaalisessa käännysteoriassa painottuu lähtö- ja kohdetekstin keskinäisen vastaavuuden sijaan kääntämisien tarkoituksen tarkastaminen: oleellista on tiedostaa kohdetekstin käyttötilan ja tuottaa käännös tilanteen perusteella. Käyttötilanteeseen kuuluu tekijöitä ovat motiivi, aika ja paikka, ilmaismuoto sekä vastaanottajat – nämä määrittävät myös sen, muuttuuko tekstin funktio käännöksen myötä. Poliittisten puheiden osalta tekstin funktio on kohdekulttuurissa useimmiten eri kuin lähtökulttuurissa, sillä motiivina ei ole enää vastaanottajin vaikuttaminen vaan näiden

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tiedottaminen kohdekulttuurin tapahtumista (Schäffner 1997). Lähtötekstin kulttuurisidonaisuuden takia kääntäjän on myös huomioitava olennainen kohdekulttuurien vastaanottajilta puuttuva tieto, jota alkuperäisillä vastaanottajilla on oletettu olevan.


Kulttuurien välisiä ongelmia ovat puolestaan kohdekulttuuriset genrekonventiot, joita myös käännöksen soisi noudattavan (esim. puhuttelut), ja metaforat, kuten edellä mainittu liikemetafora, jonka yleisyys ja sanallinen muoto vaihtelevat kulttuureittain. Genrekonventioiden selvittäminen voidaan turvausta kohdekielisiin rinnakkaiden teksteihin, kuten kohdekulttuurin parlamentaariseen keskusteluun. Kielten välisiksi ongelmiksi voidaan taas lukea idiomit ja kieliohjat, ja tekstikohtaisiksi ongelmiksi puheissa esiintyvät suorat lainaukset, otsikot sekä van Dijkin yhteydessä jo mainittu kuvausten kontrastiivisuus, jonka olisi hyvä välittää myös käännöksessä.


Muntiglin mallin mukaista politisointia ja depolitisointia esiintyi puheissa eri muodoissa. Demokraattien ja Flaken puheissa korostui eritoten se, että Yhdysvallat on koko Nato-jäsennytensä


Analyysin toisessa vaiheessa vaiheessa siirryttiin van Dijkin mallin mukaiseen tarkasteluun, jossa on tärkeää hahmottaa sekä puhekonteksti että puheessa esiintyvät diskurssirakenteet. Koska diskurssi on tapahtunut Yhdysvaltain kongressissa, on syytä ottaa huomioon senaatin ja edustajainhuoneen puheenjohtajien puhuttelut sekä Yhdysvaltain kaksipuoluejärjestelmä, jonka vaikutus näkyy myös kielen tasolla, kuten usein käytettyä termissä bi-partisanship. Kontekstiiin liittyvät oleellisesti myös maailmankuvat ja tieto – puhujien henkilökohtaisen tiedon lisäksi siis myös se tieto, jonka he odottavat kuuntelijoilla olevan.

suurena ongelmana; esimerkiksi Ted Poen puheesta välittyi viesti, ettei Yhdysvaltain tulisi juuri välittää liittolaistenä ärssyyntymisestä.


Puheaktien lisäksi puheissa oli havaitavissa luonnollisesti muita diskurssirakenteita, kuten puhujien käsittelemät aiheet. Osa puheista sivusi myös puolustusasioiden ulkopuolisia aiheita, joskus hyvin implisiittisesti: esimerkiksi Connolly viittasi Brexitiin todetessaan, että Trumpin käyttämää huhoisa strategiaa harjoitetaan nykyisin myös Isossa-Britanniassa. Muita diskurssirakenteita olivat kuvalevien ilmausten kahtiajakoisuus (demokraatit puhuivat Natosta ja sen jäsenistä myönteisin ja Trumpista kielteisin sanavalinnoin, kun taas moni republikaani esitti päinvastaisen arvion); kielioppiin liittyvä pronominien käyttö, joka ilmeni deiktisenä me–he-vastakkainasetteluna Yhdysvaltain ja sen liittolaisten välillä; sekä retorisiin keinoihin kuuluva toisto ja metafora, joista kumpakin esiintyi esimerkiksi Sullivanin puheessa toistetun sydänmetafon "At its heart, it is about common values. At its heart, it is about countries coming together – –”

käännöstä ympäröivässä tekstissä. Muita pragmaattisia käännösongelmia olivat deiksis ja varaukselliset ilmaisut, kuten yllä mainittu ”kind of”.


Tutkielma on osoittanut sekä kongressipuheiden kääntämiseen liittyviä ongelmia että yhtymäkohtia poliittisen diskurssianalyysin ja funktionaalisen kääntämisen välillä. Mikäli Yhdysvaltain kongressissa pidetyistä puheista on olemassa riittävä määrä käännöksiä, tuleva tutkimus voisi ottaa tavoitteekseen käännösten deskriptiivisen analysoinnin ja verrata tuloksia tämän tutkielman havaintoihin. Vaihtoehtoisesti voitaisiin tutkielman tavoin tarkastella toistaiseksi kääntämättömiä tekstejä – kuitenkin aiempaa suuremmalla aineistolla, jotta yleiseen tietoon saataisiin yhä enemmän kongressipuheiden kääntämiselle olennaisia näkökulmia.