PRO GRADU THESIS

JAPAN’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:
CASE PHILIPPINES AND HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract

Through the initial exploration of the history of Japan’s Official Development Assistance program, this thesis has identified its distinct phases, influential actors, norms, ideology and the philosophy behind it. Ever since the release of the original Official Development Assistance Charter in 1992 and its subsequent revisions in 2003 and 2015, the program has gone through seemingly fundamental changes, the most radical being, the adoption of human security as its guiding principle. Consequently, the main research objective of this thesis is to initially, compare the values, basic policies and goals of the 2015 Charter to the implementation of Japan’s Official Development Assistance program in the Philippines and to evaluate the degree of their alignment. Secondly, the thesis has assessed what are the concrete manifestations of human security in Japan-Philippines development cooperation. Due to the extensive history and wide manifestations of Japan’s development cooperation with the Philippines, encompassing peacebuilding, infrastructure improvement and securitization among other fields, the country provides an excellent focus of analysis. The research objectives of this thesis have been achieved through the utilization of policy and frame analysis concurrently. Subsequently, the analysis revealed alignments and misalignment between the policy projections in the Charter and the implementation of Japan’s Official Development Assistance in the Philippines, as well as, unexpected observations regarding the manifestations of human security. Most prominently, the research discovered a conflict between the pacifism in the Charter and the de facto security and defense cooperation through Japan’s Official Development Assistance framework to the Philippines. In addition, the thesis came to the conclusion that, Japan’s peacebuilding efforts in the conflict of Mindanao have been more aligned with proactive pacifism, rather than human security, due to the lack of grassroots level individual security approach. Moreover, the research has identified scaling issues in regards to the policy projection and goals in the Charter, which may explain the continuing lack of a judicial basis for the Charter. Consequently, the author suggests that the true purpose for the Charter is to act as a statement of purpose for the international donor community, instead of being a comprehensive foundational policy document.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 4

ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 7

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 9

2. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE ODA ....................................................... 12

  2.1 POST WORLD WAR II ERA ....................................................................................................... 13

  2.2 THE HIGH GROWTH YEARS ...................................................................................................... 15

  2.3 THE 1990S ................................................................................................................................. 19

  2.4 THE 2000S AND BEYOND .......................................................................................................... 22

  2.5 SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPAN’S ODA ................................................................. 25

  2.6 DISCUSSION OF NORMS, MOTIVES AND VALUES ............................................................ 28

  2.7 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 31

3.0 BILATERAL RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ......................................... 32

  3.1 HISTORY ..................................................................................................................................... 34

  3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS ................................................................................................. 38

    3.2.1 NEW BOHOL AIRPORT ......................................................................................................... 40

    3.2.2 METRO MANILA SUBWAY PROJECT ................................................................................ 41

  3.3 PEACEBUILDING IN MINDANAO ............................................................................................ 42

  3.4 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT ............................................................... 46

  3.5 JAPAN OVERSEAS COOPERATION VOLUNTEERS .............................................................. 49

  3.6 THE ROLE OF NGOS ................................................................................................................. 52
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.7. SECURITIZATION &amp; STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE DUTERTE ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9 SUMMARY</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0 FRAMES AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 VALUES, GOALS AND BASIC POLICIES</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 INTRODUCTION TO FRAME ANALYSIS</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 SUMMARY</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

ADB – Asian Development Bank
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations
BDA – Bangsamoro Development Agency
BPO - Business Process Outsourcing
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DHF – Development History Frame
DOTR - Department of Transportation
DPJ – Democratic Party of Japan
DRRM – Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
EOJ – Embassy of Japan in the Philippines
EPA - Economic Planning Agency
FTA – Free Trade Agreement
GGP - Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects
GNP – Gross National Product
IMT – International Monitoring Team
IWC – International Whaling Commission
JANIC - Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
JBIC – Japan Bank for International Cooperation
J-BIRD - Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development
JEXIM – Japan Export-Import Bank
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
JOCV – Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JPEPA - Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
JSDF - Japan Self-Defense Forces
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party
LGU – Local Government Unit
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
METI - Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MEXT - Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MITI - Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MMSP – Metro Manila Subway Project
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSCIP - Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project
NEDA – National Economic Development Authority
NGO- Non-Governmental Organization
NSS – National Security Strategy
ODA - Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECF - Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
OFW – Overseas Filipino Worker
OIC – Organization for Islamic Cooperation
OOF – Other Official Flows
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAGASA - Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
PCG - Philippine Coast Guard
PHIVOLCS - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
PHP – Philippine Peso
PNVSCA - Philippine National Volunteer Service Coordinating Agency
PSA – Philippine Statistics Authority
REAL - Re-Consider Aid, Citizens’ League
SEA – South East Asia
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WB – World Bank
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
1. Introduction

This thesis will discuss and analyze Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) program, vis-à-vis, one of the major recipient nations in Asia, the Philippines. It will also reflect upon this donor-recipient relationship with the bilateral relations in general, while paying special attention to recent developments in the relations, since the inauguration of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. As a developing nation with a growing economy and a youthful and energetic labor force, the Philippines has consistently been a major recipient of Japan’s ODA for more than half a century. In addition, there are significant trade flows between the nations and in 2006, the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), was signed bilaterally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA] 2006). Furthermore, between the two nations, there are significant amounts of technology transfer, volunteering, labor movement and most importantly, material and immaterial resources towards the improvement of Philippine infrastructure and social welfare, sent and implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

The JICA plays a key role in the actual implementation of Japan’s ODA program in all the recipient countries. It is the largest bilateral ODA agency in the world, operating in 150 different states and regions around the globe. In 2017, a total of $19.57 billion of ODA funds was funneled through the organization (JICA 2019). In recent decades, several high profile infrastructure projects in the Philippines have been funded and implemented by the JICA. These projects have eased travel congestion, boosted economic development and growth, as well as improved the highway, flooding prevention, disaster preparedness and air travel infrastructure on the Philippine islands. In the near future, even more ambitious development cooperation can be expected since, the JICA and the Government of the Philippines have approved the construction of an entire subway system in the capital region, Metro Manila (Gatpolintan 2017).

The Japanese ODA model and philosophy, has often been challenged by western donor countries in the international arena, as Japan is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This sub-organization of the OECD is essentially an inclusive international forum for the largest donor countries and multilateral organizations. Japan was the first Asian country to join the DAC in 1961, which it joined, even before officially becoming a member of the mother organization, the OECD itself (Jain 2016, pp. 94-95). As a general rule concerning at least the ODA programs of all the DAC
member countries, ODA essentially consists of: grants, technical assistance, loans and multilateral assistance (handled and distributed by: Asian Development Bank [ADB], World Bank [WB], United Nations [UN] and so on) (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 264).

The primary research objective of this thesis is to examine, the degree of alignment of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines, with the stated goals and basic policies of the latest revision of the program’s foundational document; the Official Development Assistance Charter (hereafter ODA Charter). In other words, the thesis will engage in policy assessment of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines. The initial research question of the thesis is the following: “How well does Japan’s contemporary ODA to the Philippines align with the values, goals and basic policies of the 2015 revision of the Official Development Assistance Charter?” In the Charter’s most recent revision of 2015 (renamed “Development Cooperation Charter”), the promotion of human security and contribution to peace and prosperity have been included in its basic policy objectives (MOFA 2015, p. 4). In addition, human security is described as being the founding principle of Japan’s contemporary ODA (ibid.). Consequently, the second research question for this thesis is the following: “What are the concrete manifestations of human security in Japan’s ODA policy implementations in the Philippines?”

The primary sources of the thesis are the newest ODA Charter, other documents, publications and statistics released by the MOFA and the JICA, in addition to, those released by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) of the Philippines. In regards to secondary and tertiary sources, the author shall use relevant books, scholarly articles from academic journals, and news articles and other web based sources, which are relevant to the topic, research objectives and the context.

The progressive concept of human security was introduced to Japan’s foreign policy in the late 1990s and subsequently, to its ODA policy, via ODA Charter revision in 2003. The concept has maintained its prominent place in the 2015 revision as well. The UN General Assembly has defined the concept as: “The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” (Kitaoka 2016, pp. 32, 34, 35). As a consequence of this breakthrough of human security into the foreign and development cooperation policy of Japan, it is vital to assess, how much of its ideals can be observed in the implementation of ODA in the Philippines. As a developing nation suffering from severe poverty, lack of infrastructure, armed conflicts and terrorism, it is prime candidate for such analysis.

Due to Japan’s active role in peacebuilding in the armed conflict of Mindanao among other humanitarian efforts in the Philippines, this particular development
assistance relation provides an adequate base for a case study. However, as one might question the validity of categorizing peacebuilding under the umbrella ODA, according to the ODA Charter of 2015: "development" in this Charter is used in a broader sense rather than in the narrow sense; it also encompasses such activities as peacebuilding and governance, promotion of basic human rights and humanitarian assistance” (MOFA 2015, p. 1). Consequently, the scope of activities that Japan’s ODA entails differs from the conventional understanding of development assistance.

After this introduction, this paper will discuss the history of Japan’s ODA, through exploring its inception and development from the 1950s to the 2000s and beyond. The “High Growth Years” subsection will discuss the 1970s and 1980s, which culminated in Japan becoming the global top donor in 1989. The latter subsections of this chapter will discuss and analyze what characteristics make Japan’s ODA stand out in comparison to the ODA of other major donor countries, and to analyze the ideology, motives, norms and values behind it. Such analyses of the latter kind have been frequent among scholars of international relations and political sciences in general (Miller & Dolsak 2007; Sato & Asano 2008; Asplund 2015) and thus, these are important aspects to explore.

The subsequent section of the thesis will firstly, detail the history of Japan-Philippines relations and the inception of bilateral developmental cooperation, which is followed by two brief reports of major recent and future infrastructure projects in the Philippine islands. The subsequent chapters of the section will discuss alternative forms of Japanese ODA to the Philippines such as; Japan being a peacebuilder on the southern island of Mindanao. In addition, it will also discuss the growing role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and their role in Japan’s ODA to the Philippines. The following chapter about securitization will discuss arguably the most unorthodox field in the contemporary bilateral development cooperation. Before concluding the section, a discussion of developments following the election victory of controversial populist President Rodrigo Duterte will commence. Chapter 4 will analyze the Development Cooperation Charter by identifying the goals, values and basic policies in the Charter and then, it will conduct a policy analysis in regards to them and the implementation of Japan’s ODA in the Philippines. Secondly, Chapter 4 will also use frame analysis firstly, by identifying and extracting the dominant frames in the policy document and then, it will compare the dominant frames to the policy implementation as well.
2. The History and Development of Japanese ODA

This chapter will outline all the major historical phases in Japan’s ODA, which have all had a role in shaping it into what it is today, from its inception in the 1950s to the 21st century and beyond. Scholar Hirata (2002, p. 165) has conceptualized the historical development of Japan’s ODA into three distinctive phases, with the first phase of 1950s to 1975 titled: “Japanese economy-first policy”. The second phase from 1975 to late 1980s formulated as: “the beginning of aid diversification and politicization”. Finally, the last phase from her book, stretching from the late 1980s to the 2000s is phrased as the following: “further diversification and politicization of aid”. Based on subsequent developments in the new millennium, especially since the release of the Development Cooperation Charter in 2015, there is a clear need for a fourth phase in the trajectory of the development of Japan’s foreign aid policy. The characteristics and title of the fourth phase will be revealed at the summary section of this chapter.

The roots of Japan’s ODA program date back all the way to the Article 14 of the Treaty of San Francisco of 1951, which forced Japan to pay war reparations to the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, that had suffered damages caused by Imperial Japan during World War II. The initial reparations were non-monetary transfers, consisting of industrial materials and equipment, which were direly needed to rebuild industry and infrastructure in these impoverished war-torn nations. Initially, the SEA states demanded monetary compensations from Japan however, due to US pressure these states eventually dropped their demands and accepted the material reparations. This was all due to a US Cold War agenda, in which, the goal was to support the quick economic recovery and growth of Japan and to foster a strong ally against the spread of Communism in Asia (Mitsuya 2007, pp. 18, 20).

In the case of the Philippines, the war reparation payments begun in 1956 with the transfer of $550 million worth of machinery and equipment along with technical assistance to the Philippine government (Pante & Reyes 1991, p. 122). As noted by scholar Hirata (2002, p. 166), the reparations did not solely take place as stipulated by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but they also served the purpose of stimulating the recovering Japanese industry and the economy as a whole. Consequently, it can be concluded that the collective national punishment on Japan’s wartime aggression was conveniently used for the benefit of domestic economic interests as well.

The reparation transfers lasted until 1976 and although, the majority of the transfers consisted of earmarked Japanese machinery and technical equipment, the
reparations also contributed to the improvement of basic infrastructure, educational, health care and other public facilities (Pante & Reyes 1991, pp. 122-123). Thus, in consideration of this background, it is clear to perceive how the roots for the subsequent ODA program were established through the war reparations.

In 1958 the first ODA loans from Japan were handed out to developing countries in Asia, which received most of the aid, both then and now. Both loan provisions and war reparations saw significant increases in the 1950s and 1960s, with the goal of expanding the export market for Japanese products and securing imports of raw materials into Japan (Asplund 2017, p. 4). Thus one can conclude that, the rapidly growing and developing Japan was able to turn the war reparations into an economic stimulus and an export boost for the private sector, as Hirata (2002 p. 166) details:

“Although the total amount of reparations and quasi-reparations was relatively small (approximately US$1 billion and US$490 million in total) they benefitted the Japanese economy significantly”. Hirata (ibid.) continues: “the Japanese products under the reparations brought about further demands for Japanese goods in the recipient countries as local markets became dependent on them”.

Peculiarly, at the time when Japan started its ODA program in the 1950s, the country was also a major recipient of ODA loans itself from the WB. Most notably, these loans enabled the construction of the first bullet train line (Tōkaidō Shinkansen) from Tokyo to Osaka, as well as that of highway infrastructure around the national capital Tokyo. Astoundingly, in 1990 Japan was able to pay fully pay back its debts to the WB, while at the same time, it had become a global top ODA donor a year earlier in 1989 (Orr 1990, p. 1). This collective experience of rebuilding the nation from the ashes of devastating war, using loan aid responsibly on the improvement of key infrastructure and paying the loans back on time, has clearly impacted the underlying ideology, characteristics and development of the Japanese ODA program as a whole. In Chapter 1.6 of norms, motives and values, this and other factors will be discussed in more detail.

2.1 Post World War II Era

In terms of terminology, ODA and foreign aid as terms were not initially present in Japan’s official foreign policy vernacular. Prior to the inclusion of this terminology, the
activities that are now categorized under the umbrella of ODA, or of Other Official Flows (OOF), were simply labeled as economic cooperation (*keizai kyōryoku*). This cooperation also included private foreign investments (Söderberg 1996, p. 33; Orr 1990, p. 53). The term OOF, essentially stands for bilateral transactions that do not meet the OECD’s requirements for an ODA classification. That being said, they can be very similar to ODA transfers in nature. As an example, monetary transfers for the purpose of promoting development that have a grant element of fewer than 25 %, fall under the category of OOF instead of ODA (OECD Data 2018).

During these early steps of Japanese development assistance, western observers were often confused whether Japan was truly engaged in a development cooperation with the developing countries or simply, furthering its own trade and economic agenda. Following the cessation of the war reparations, it became increasing clear to be more of the latter than the former. Even in Japan’s official Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) white paper released in 1958, aid was essentially tied together with the promotion of trade (Orr 1990, pp. 53-54). From a cultural point of view, charity and foreign aid have a strong correlation with Christianity and western colonialism which, according to Orr (1990 p. 54), explains the difference in Japan’s foreign aid. Also in contemporary ODA of Japan, the principle of self-help is still one of its founding principles, which stands in contrast to western aid philosophy that is arguably more altruistic in nature. These fundamental differences in aid philosophy will be discussed further in chapters 2.5 and 2.6.

As previously mentioned, the beginning of the Japanese ODA program had two influential enabling factors in the early 1950s: the war reparations and Japan joining the Colombo Plan. In 1954, Japan made its first donation of $50,000 to the Colombo Plan, which was a multinational organization for the social and economic development in Asia and the Pacific (Söderberg 1996, p. 33; MOFA 2014, p. 2). Much like what are now known as ODA and OOF transfers, the war reparations were not recognized as foreign aid at the time, instead, the reparations were seen as export promotion. The recipient countries of war reparations corresponded well with Japan’s military campaign during World War II. However, there were some notable countries that did not receive any reparations from Japan, despite being some of the most negatively affected by Japan in World War II, namely: China and South/North Korea. This was mainly the case due to political alliances and the Cold War dynamics, particularly since the communist takeover of mainland China (Söderberg 1996, pp. 33-34). That being said, there were neither any claims for reparations from China, as the country was embroiled in intense
Maoist fervor in the 1950s, while Japan was already deeply embedded in its alliance with the US (Orr 1990, p. 53). Consequently, Taiwan on the other hand, did receive aid since the inception of the ODA program till the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 (Söderberg 1996, p. 214).

Japan started handing out yen loans through the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) in 1957, of which the majority were granted to India and Pakistan, in addition to various SEA nations. Considering the ODA guidelines of the present day, these loans would not have been qualified as ODA now, due to their high interest rates. Between the years 1957 and 1964 a total of 21 bilateral yen loan agreements were made, of which, 16 were signed with India and Pakistan. These loans served a dual purpose of aiding the development of impoverished countries, while at the same time, aiding Japanese companies to break into the growing markets of Asia. During the 1960s, the economy of Japan was gaining momentum and consequently, it became a member of the OECD’s DAC and handed out the first grant aid in 1969. Coincidentally, the concept of ODA was introduced during the same year by the DAC (Söderberg 1996, p. 34).

2.2 The High Growth Years

During the 1960s, the vast majority of Japanese aid was directed towards Asia. However, the recipients of Japan’s ODA became more diverse after 1973, as a consequence of the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East and the subsequent oil embargo on US allies, imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Subsequently, an unofficial ratio of 7:1:1:1 was adopted in regards to the geographical distribution of Japanese ODA. To be precise, this ratio allocated 70 % of ODA to Asia, and 10 % each to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. This oil crisis highlighted Japan’s reliance on energy imports and politicized its ODA allocations, which materialized into generous ODA packages being offered by a Japanese delegation visiting the Middle East. The goal of this donation diplomacy in the Middle East was to demonstrate Japan’s neutrality vis-à-vis the US and Israel, while guaranteeing the smooth shipments of oil from the Middle East to Japan. This was essentially the start of the so called gifting diplomacy (omiyage gaiko), which would later become a salient feature of Japan’s foreign policy especially in Asia (Söderberg 1996, pp. 34-35; Orr 1990, p. 55).
Thanks to the oil crisis of 1973, the utility of ODA as a diplomatic tool in the pacifist nation’s arsenal became acknowledged in the political and bureaucratic circles of the Japanese state. Countries rich in energy resources and even those on the shipping routes towards Japan became candidates for Japan’s aid fund allocations (Orr 1990, p. 55). Consequently, a major theme in the post-1973 oil crisis ODA was to improve the economic infrastructure of resource rich developing nations (Asplund 2015, p. 5). As infrastructure projects still play a significant role in Japanese foreign aid, it is evident that this characteristic of it became increasingly salient following the 1973 oil crisis. Furthermore, the oil crisis brought about a new focus in Japanese foreign policy on resource security, which was tied to the use of ODA as a strategic foreign policy tool.

A key concept of this era in Japan’s general foreign policy was the so called Fukuda Doctrine, spearheaded by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and it was initiated during his speech in Manila, Philippines in 1977. Overall, it was a watershed moment in the foreign policy of Japan and in its relationship vis-à-vis SEA in particular. The Fukuda Doctrine had essentially three main characteristics. Firstly, a key point in it was to ensure the ASEAN community and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole of Japan’s peaceful intentions, and of its complete rejection of war and military aggression. Other key points were the following; building bilateral trust and confidence between the representatives of Japan and the ASEAN member states and having an equal partnership between the two. In addition to this new policy declaration, a generous sum of 1 billion US$ in ODA funds was to be dispensed around the ASEAN region (Hirata 2002, pp. 168-169).

During the late 1970s, a sequence of events paved the way towards Japan reaching the global top donor status in 1989. In 1977, the first ODA doubling plan was announced by Prime Minister Fukuda, which triggered the first major infighting between different government ministries regarding ODA. The announcement to double the aid volume was seen as a victory to the MOFA, while the Ministry of Finance was against it based on fiscal reasons. In addition, MITI was campaigning against the increasing untying of aid, which was a response to international criticism of Japan’s ODA of being too self-serving. Unsurprisingly, MITI perceived this liberation of aid funds to be against core Japanese business interests and consequently, campaigned against it. Furthermore, there was a clear divide between whether to use ODA as a political tool or as an economic one as, MITI was in favor of latter and MOFA of the former (Orr 1990, pp. 55-56). Through cumulative budget increases and the rise in the
value of Japanese Yen, during the 1970s and 1980s, the value of Japan’s ODA increased tremendously from $500 million to $9 billion (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 259).

In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, as Japan was gaining impressive trade surpluses, the economy was still growing strong and the country’s wealth was on par, if not even surpassing that of western developed nations. Consequently, there were increasing calls in the international forums for Japan to start taking a larger and a more responsible role in international relations. There was a clear understanding in Japan’s political elite that, the increasing burden-sharing would essentially mean increasing funding for ODA to which, it was not opposed as, it was becoming an increasingly important diplomatic and strategic tool for the pacifist state. The instability of this period of history caused by: the second oil crisis of 1979, the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam in 1973 and the debt crisis spreading among the developing nations, were great pushing factors for the greater burden-sharing role for Japan (Hirata 2002, pp. 168-169).

During the years 1980 to 1989, Japan’s ODA disbursements nearly tripled in size: from 3,304 million US dollars in 1980, to 8,965 million in 1989. However, its ODA as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) stayed roughly the same at 0.32, which has been slightly lower than the DAC average at the time (Yanagihara & Emig 1991, pp. 42-44). According to Mochizuki (et al. 2007, p. 4), during the 1980s the concept of comprehensive security became trendy among major donor countries. This concept essentially combined defense, social and economic aspects for the welfare and safety of people. Because of the prominence of comprehensive security as an ideal internationally, it also had an influence on Japan’s development cooperation at that time. The idea was that, Japan could spread its huge trade surplus to support the development of impoverished nations, which would indirectly benefit Japan, by keeping the international system stable and secure for trade and other purposes (ibid.). The concept of comprehensive security can be seen as a precursor to the concept of human security, which Japan’s ODA and also the foreign policy as a whole has embraced and integrated since the early 2000s.

Over the past decades, China has been a huge recipient of Japanese ODA. According to one estimate, up until 2007, a huge majority (91.5 %) of it has been received by China alone (Jain 2016, p. 104). Since the 1979 visit to China by the then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (Söderberg 1996, p. 214), Japan’s ODA has played an enormous role in the development of Chinese infrastructure and consequently, as one
can argue, it has also massively contributed to its staggering economic growth in recent decades. The Japanese aid allocations to China grew vastly during the 1980s. For instance, from 1982 to 1986, China stood out as the single largest recipient of Japan’s ODA funds (Söderberg 1996, p. 214). This was also the case in 1988, with the total amount of $673.70 million, which made Japan the top donor to China of all its 15 donor countries. However, aid disbursements and plans for future projects were temporarily halted in 1989, as a response to the infamous Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing. This action was a clear value based judgement to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to liberal democratic values in line with the western nations. Until the events that unfolded in Tiananmen and its aftermath, the vast majority of Japan’s ODA transfers to the People’s Republic, consisted of concessional loans (Orr 1990, pp. 73-75).

The reason why China was such a magnet for Japanese ODA funds in the 1980s was due to two different factors. Firstly, as a consequence of the sheer size of the country and surely, due to the incredible ambition for development that both the public and private sector had in China, the list of projects to be eligible for an ODA loan was seemingly endless. As a second factor, the Chinese officials always had feasible and well thought out projects to propose for Japanese ODA funding in the pipeline, which was often not the case with other developing countries and thus, it was convenient for the Japanese bureaucrats as well (ibid.).

For the back then developing (now middle income) country like China, the Japanese style of ODA, which requires active participation and planning of the recipient country’s administration (self-help), is very suitable, due to the high human capital and skills in the Chinese population. However, such a requirement often excludes the neediest and the most impoverished of countries from receiving Japan’s ODA, which has been an internationally contested topic in Japan’s ODA (see Jain 2016 for instance).

To conclude, because of the first oil crisis of 1973, the portfolio of Japanese aid recipients became more diverse and global. Because of a variety of additional factors including: economic growth and trade surpluses, the Fukuda Doctrine and the developmental rise of China, Japan rose to the top position in term of ODA disbursements in 1989. It also maintained this global top donor status for much of the 1990s (Fujisaki et al. 1997), despite the end of its high growth economic boom era. The huge growth in ODA volume from the 1960s to the end of 1980s, can also be partly explained by normative foreign pressure and also, by the realization in Japan’s political elite that, ODA can be used as a geopolitical and strategic tool by the pacifist state.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of the vast majority of socialist countries and the resulting end of the Cold War, caused major changes to the international system and consequently, to Japan’s foreign aid policy as well. The 1990s provided a new set of challenges to the international donor community and also new recipient nations emerged from the ashes of real socialism. Japan eagerly established development support relations with Mongolia and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in the early 1990s. In addition, Japan resumed its aid to Cambodia and Vietnam after a long hiatus. Overall, Japan was increasingly tying its aid with democratization, marketization and with the respect of human rights. In relation to these values in 1990, the former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, announced Japan’s support for the democratization of the newly independent Eastern European states. These values were made an official part of Japan’s foreign aid policy, through the publication of the first ODA Charter in 1992 (Hirata 2002, pp. 172-173). This initial Charter was made in response to criticisms, of both domestic and foreign in origin, which claimed that Japan’s ODA program lacked any philosophical and/or ideological foundation. Despite the fact that the Charter was approved by the Cabinet of Japan, it is not based on any national laws (Jain 2016, p.98).

To detail, the ODA Charter of 1992 lists four different principles or themes that should be abided by the MOFA and the JICA. These principles were: environmental conservation, avoiding the use of ODA for military or malignant purposes, denying ODA from countries with high military budgets and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the promotion of democratization and market economy. As stated by the Charter, the actual implementation of Japan’s ODA will also be influenced by the country’s bilateral relation with Japan, the socio-economic environment and by the type of development assistance request of the recipient nation (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 260).

A new development in regards to Japan’s foreign aid policy in the early 1990s, was the inclusion of international peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping was a major humanitarian activity coordinated by the UN. Meanwhile, Japan was seeking a greater role in the transnational organization, and to become a permanent member in UN’s Security Council. In 1991, in tandem with the resumption of aid to Cambodia, Japan also sent peacekeepers to the country under a UN peacekeeping mission. This was the first instance since World War II that, Japan sent members of its military, in other
words, members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) abroad (Hirata 2002, pp. 173-174). One can also see this as a response to past criticisms in which, Japan’s aid was perceived as highly impersonal and lukewarm, merely as financial assistance, in other words, as checkbook diplomacy.

It was also in Cambodia later during the decade that, Japan ventured into the domain of peace building as well. In 1997 Japan successfully acted as a mediator between two rival Prime Ministers, which helped to prevent the outbreak of yet another civil conflict in Cambodia. This successful experience gave Japan the courage to later participate in other peacebuilding projects around SEA, namely: in East Timor and Mindanao (Peng Er 2008, p. 47). Details of the latter case will be explored in Chapter 3.3.

When it comes to the terminology of peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding, the UN makes the following definitions and distinctions between the two:

*The boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace (UN Peacekeeping: Terminology).*

Similarly to the UN, Japan also tends to use its peace operations terminology interchangeably in its communiqué, as Peng Er (2008, p. 46) details:

“*For example, when Tokyo talks about its ‘full-scale’ peacebuilding in Cambodia, it includes diplomatic efforts toward a peace agreement, the dispatch of personnel to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and cooperation in social and economic reconstruction”.*

When measured in absolute US dollar value, Japan was the top global donor for most of the 1990s, or as some argued, it had consequently emerged as a new type of
superpower. However, in 2001 this phenomenal period came to an end as, Japan had to cut down on its aid budget due to the on-going stagnation of its economy. Meanwhile, competing aid donor countries were increasing their aid allocations. Both of these factors synergistically, contributed to the end of an era of Japan’s top donor status (Jain 2016, p. 96). According to Hirata (2002, p. 175), the focus of Japan’s aid giving had shifted from quantity to quality. Furthermore, humanitarian and technical development cooperation of the grassroots variety had proliferated during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as cooperation with various NGOs (ibid.). In addition, ODA partnerships were offered not just to NGOs, but also to local governments and universities in Japan (MOFA 2014, p. 4).

Amidst continuing economic stagnation, mounting national debt, demographic decline and the shock of Japan losing its economic superpower status, the perception and support for foreign aid was changing. The public image and political perception of ODA suffered substantial setbacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As the representative of ODA both domestically and internationally, it was the MOFA that, was at the center of the controversies. The first controversy was the increased untying of aid, that the MOFA argued, was necessary in order to conform to international standards of foreign aid giving. Back in 1987, Japanese companies received 55 % of loan contracts, as the loans were tied to contracts and purchases from the Japanese private sector. This practice was becoming increasingly rare over the years, as by 1999, the figure had dropped to a mere 19 %. Consequently, ODA was perceived to be against the economic interests of Japan by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated political elite and the business community (Arase 2005, pp. 3-4). This demonstrated the fundamental cultural value difference between the western and Japanese norms of charity giving.

Other scandals and controversies continued to plague the public image of ODA in Japan, and its mouthpiece, the MOFA. Since Sino-Japanese relations were on the decline in the late 1990s, the public started questioning the validity of granting such vast sums of ODA loans to China. On average, mainland China was receiving $1 billion a year from Japan in concessional loans. In addition, as China’s economic status and prestige was rising, while Japan’s was on the decline, in combination with the rising military spending of China (including WMD testing and development), skepticism of Sino-Japanese development cooperation was not unfounded. ODA to China was questioned once more when in 2002; North Korean refugees were detained by force
from a Japanese consulate in Shenyang, Northeastern China by the local authorities (ibid. pp. 4-5).

The 1990s brought significant changes to Japan’s ODA policy. The collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the newly independent states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, were great shocks to the international system and consequently, these events had ramifications on the development cooperation policies of major donor countries. In 1992, the original ODA Charter was released by the MOFA, which laid down the underlying philosophy, principles and priorities of Japan’s foreign aid program. In addition, Japan’s ODA became substantially more aligned with western values and norms, and it also became more similar with western aid programs. Furthermore, during the 1990s, Japan also ventured into the domains of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, which are considered as components of its contemporary development cooperation scheme. Despite the amassing economic and fiscal woes, in addition to public scandals related to ODA, Japan still maintained its high spending commitment approach to ODA also during the 1990s.

2.4 The 2000s and Beyond

Following the golden years of Japan’s aid giving prestige and high spending, amid seemingly never-ending financial and fiscal woes, donor fatigue became a public phenomenon in Japan. That being said, Japan is hardly the only significant donor country that has experienced major public donor fatigue and skepticism, as a similar phenomenon has been observed in other high profile donor countries as well, such as the US (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 270). Hugh (2008, p. 213) rephrased the public’s sentiment in the following way: “Since the late 1990s, many Japanese have been asking: why should Japan’s foreign aid be the largest in the world, even surpassing the U.S., when Japan has so many domestic economic and financial problems?” In addition to fiscal criticisms, Japan’s ODA policy has domestically in the early 2000s been criticized for its perceived lack of transparency, giving aid to hostile and militarizing China, and for its strong focus on large infrastructure projects, at the expense of soft infrastructure and social development (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 270). Amid such conditions and criticisms and quite possibly in response to them, the ODA Charter was revised in 2003 by the Government of Japan.

The Charter of 2003 recognized that, changes were necessary in ODA policy, in order for Japanese aid to be effective in combating contemporary developmental and
transnational issues. In tune with the times, the Charter expressed worry of terrorism, transnational crime, infectious diseases, increasing religious and ethnic conflicts, poverty, rising income equality, gender issues and so on (MOFA 2003). One of the differences in comparison to the original charter, the 2003 revision includes the concept of human security as a priority for Japan’s aid in the following years. In aid policy discourse the concept of human security, has been defined as ‘freedom from fear’ and as ‘freedom from want’ (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 91-92).

Zappa (2018, p. 408) has described, what he defines as, the ‘human turn’ of Japanese ODA in the 2000s as a dichotomy between national interests (kokueki), and international affiliation (tsukiai). In addition, he attributes the changes in aid policy to certain key actors or intellectual entrepreneurs, such as the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCF) Ogata Sadako and the former Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko. According to Zappa, Ogata and Kawaguchi played the most important roles in the initial ODA reform in the early years of the new millennium, which were plagued by a number of corruption and bribery scandals related to Japan’s aid program (ibid. p. 414). In addition, Asplund (2015, p. 2) attributes the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003, to the lowering domestic support for foreign aid and to the international community’s adoption of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Much like the original Charter of 1992, the 2003 revision echoed the same support for the liberal western ideals of democracy and the respect for human rights. However, unlike the original Charter, the revision promised priority to those recipient nations that actively strive for democracy and human rights for its citizens (ibid.).

As discussed by Kurusu and Kersten (2011, pp. 115, 116, 127), in addition to Canada and Norway, Japan was one of the first states to adopt and actively promote the concept of human security in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Starting from 1998, human security became one of the core pillars of Japan’s general foreign policy. In addition to being included in the 2003 ODA Charter, it was also included in the JICA’s guidelines and in a 2005 midterm policy paper on ODA, in which, human security stood out as the top concept. Furthermore, the concept was described with the following words: “a way of thinking that makes each individual a central concern, in other words through protecting and empowering individuals or communities that are under immediate threat, aiming to create a society where each individual can live in dignity (ibid. p. 128).”

According to Nikitina and Furuoka (2008, pp. 1, 19), the institutional setup of Japan’s ODA was overwhelmingly complex prior to a major revision, which took place
in 2001. In the old system of foreign aid administration, there were a total of ten
different government ministries and agencies involved, which involved a lot of fighting
for influence, funding and prestige between the different institutions involved in ODA
policy. Despite the reform, which shrunk the institutional framework considerably, this
is still an administrative issue in Japan’s ODA. In addition to the MOFA, JICA, MOF
and METI, there were three additional institutional players involved in the actual
dispensing of ODA, namely: the JEXIM, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) (ibid.).

Later in 2008, the JEXIM was renamed as the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC), and the department responsible for the ODA loan provisions in the
JBIC was merged together with the JICA. This decision made the administration and
delivery of ODA much less institutionally fragmented and more centralized, as now, the
loans, technical assistance and grants were all under the same grand organization, the
JICA (Kato et al. 2016, p. 5).

The second revision of the ODA Charter was released in February 2015, and it
was also renamed as the Development Cooperation Charter. This revision and
rebranding of the Charter was pushed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself, in order to
facilitate increased strategic use of ODA, and to better contribute to the peace and
stability of the international system. The most remarkable change in the second revision
is the fact that, it permits Japan’s ODA to be dispensed to foreign armed forces for non-
military uses, such as for disaster rescue. However, such cases of foreign military use of
ODA shall be reviewed and decided individually (Asplund 2015, p. 2). Considering the
recent reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, also spearheaded by
Prime Minister Abe, this development aligns neatly with Abe’s general foreign and
national defense policy direction.

Consequently, the post-2015 ODA of Japan is increasingly focused on regional
security cooperation, peacebuilding and human security. Since Japan has been lacking
in its ability to project military power internationally, due to its constitutional
limitations, according to Gaens (2015, p. 4) Japan has adopted a similar rhetoric to the
European Union in international forums. In other words, Japan has been framing itself
as a great civilian and humanitarian power in recent years. That being said, the
ambitious infrastructure projects of which Japan’s ODA is known for, still play a
considerable role in the overall aid program. Consequently, two examples of such
projects in the Philippines namely: the Metro Manila Subway Project (MMSP) in the
capital region, and the construction of the New Bohol International Airport on the
Panglao Island, will be discussed in the later chapters of this thesis. In relation to peacebuilding and human security, Japan’s role in the Mindanao peace-process will be explored in Chapter 3.3 respectively.

The 2000s and 2010s were undoubtedly revolutionary years in the history of the development and progress of Japan’s development cooperation policy and its implementation. During the years 2001 and 2008, the institutional set-up of Japan’s ODA program was reorganized and streamlined to a considerable degree. This reorganization most notably resulted in the JICA becoming a true power house for Japan’s development cooperation, not just in its implementation around the globe, but also in allocating grants and loans for developmental and humanitarian projects. Despite domestic donor fatigue and continuing financial and economic challenges, Japan has nevertheless, consistently been developing its ODA program towards a more humanitarian and grassroots focused direction, while at the same time, it continues to be one of the largest ODA donor countries in the world. Thanks to the efforts of Ogata Sadako and Kawaguchi Yoriko, the concept of human security was integrated to Japan’s foreign policy, and subsequently to its ODA policy, via the 2003 ODA Charter revision.

2.5 Special Characteristics of Japan’s ODA

Over the last 60 years of Japanese ODA, the program has been modified significantly, as a response to harsh criticisms from western aid donors, international organizations and NGOs. However, Japan has none the less managed to maintain its underlying aid philosophy and it has modified and adjusted its ODA based on past successes and failures. In addition, Japan’s ODA model has clearly influenced other East-Asian nations that have established their own ODA programs in recent times (for instance: South Korea and Taiwan). Therefore, one can conclude that, the success of Japanese ODA as an alternative form of development cooperation to the western ODA model, has given Japan unintentional soft power as a prime donor country to emulate (Jain 2016, pp. 94-95).

Meanwhile, many aspects of the aid program that attracted criticism from the international community in the past have been significantly improved, or from another perspective, these aspects have become increasingly conforming to the western ideals of development cooperation. One example of this was the significant and progressive untying of Japan’s aid funds, which was discussed in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
The controversy and international condemnation regarding the tying of Japanese aid relates to the fact that, in the early decades of the aid program and especially during the war reparations period, Japan’s aid funds were heavily tied to the purchase of Japanese products and services.

Similarly, Japan has been criticized for its high proportion of loans in relation to grant aid, which relates directly to its underlying self-help philosophy. However, contemporarily it is fair to conclude that Japan has improved its aid policy drastically when it comes to the tying of aid. The share of untied aid in Japan’s ODA has increased from 25.8% in 1980 to 96.4% in 1999 (Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 264-265). Other prominent and extinguishing features of Japanese ODA have been: assistance based on recipient requests, the emphasis on large scale infrastructure projects, strong role of recipient government and the emphasis on bilateral aid (ibid. pp. 266-269).

Generally speaking, there are several noticeable characteristics that make Japan’s ODA policy and implementation remarkable in international comparison. In terms of geographical allocation, the vast majority of Japan’s ODA (including both grant aid and loans) has been distributed to recipient countries in Asia. Although Japan has been able to increase its aid allocation to developing countries in other regions of the globe, the proportion targeting Asia is still the most substantial. As an illustration, the proportion of loans and grants to Asian countries in the early 1970s was in the range of 90%, while in 1999 the proportion was still at 70% of bilateral aid. Based on the most recent OECD data for 2015-2016, of the top 10 recipient countries of Japan’s ODA, only Iraq and Afghanistan stood out from a list of South- and SEA nations (OECD 2017).

On the other hand, according to der Veen’s statistical analysis of the geographical distribution of aid from various major donor countries (2011, p. 175): “A few states appear to be favorites of all donors”. Some analysts have even suggested that there is a clear division of labor among the DAC donor nations, with the US supplying Latin America with aid, Europe doing so to Africa and finally, Japan doing its part in Asia (ibid.). However, a multitude of historical, colonial, trade and political factors is likely a more sound explanation to the phenomenon.

One phenomenon that has remained constant over the decades is the infighting for political power, funding and influence between the different ministries, behind the ODA policy, and in its actual implementation in the receiving countries. As discussed by Jain (2016 p. 96), the different parties in this infighting have been: the MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
The budget of the foreign aid program is controlled by the MOF, which favors yen loans as opposed to grant aid, due to their interest rate albeit the interests are very conservative and lenient on the borrower (ibid.). In addition to this, the MOF also strives to contribute to international financial institutions through the ODA policy (Kato et al. 2016, p. 6). The METI on the other hand, favors Japanese business interests related to the ODA. Lastly, the MOFA is the least nationalistic of the ministries, as it tends to side with DACs and UNs’ norms when it comes to foreign aid. In addition, MOFA is also concerned with the image of Japan internationally and with Japan’s close relations with the US (Jain 2016 p. 96).

Outside of the aforementioned ministries, there are also other government institutions that play a role in ODA policy, albeit their budget and influence has been on the decline for a while. The most notable is perhaps the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which hands out scholarships through the ODA program. Because of the decline in ODA decision-making of several government ministries, other than the MOFA, MOF and METI, and also due to the merger of the JBIC and the JICA, the high degree of institutional fragmentation that once characterized Japan’s ODA for decades, is increasingly in the past (Kato et al. 2016, p. 6).

There are three main characteristics in Japan’s ODA that have been consistent over the course of the history of Japanese ODA program. These characteristics are namely: the large proportion of loans against grants in total ODA volume, the self-help and the request-based principle. In regards to the first characteristic, Japan’s share of grants during the period of 1990 – 2000 was around 40% of its total ODA. In comparison to other DAC donor countries, such as France and Germany, the same figure is 80% and 70% respectively. This fact has often been a point of criticism towards Japan’s ODA and Japan often defends its high proportion of loans by referring to the self-help principle, and how loans in contrast to grants, promote fiscal responsibility on the part of the receiving nation. Naturally, both grant aid and loan aid have their plusses and minuses and consequently, around the turn of the millennium, there were big debates on their appropriate use among donor countries. Eventually, a consensus emerged that, there is a right time and place for each type of aid. Japan also embraced this principle and started allocating grant aid for the most vulnerable of aid receiving countries i.e. sub-Saharan Africa, while allocating loan aid to the more well off ones, i.e. SEA (ibid. p. 7).
Japan’s foreign aid being based on recipient requests is a characteristic, which has been present ever since the dawn of Japan’s foreign aid program. In fact, the origins of this principle have been traced back to the war reparations of the 1950s. It is also based on, what can be described as, a sense of respect for the recipient countries autonomy, as in the recipient country knowing what it needs to develop the most. However, this principle seems to be in a state of flux recently, as the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter states that Japan should take a more active role in negotiations with recipient countries (ibid.). Thus one can see evidence of increasing conformity growing towards western ODA ideals.

For all the different factors and reasons stated, Japan’s ODA can be considered to be a developmental cooperation model of its own. This model has historically supported the recovery and growth of the Japanese economy, while at the same time, respecting the sovereignty of developing countries and culturing their sense of fiscal responsibility and dignity. However, in recent decades since Japanese ODA has been largely untied, the pure business interests in it have consequently faded. In some aspects Japan’s ODA policy has become more like those of the western nations. Despite this on other fields, which have become focus points for ODA policy, such as securitization and peacebuilding (human security), it does not appear to be so. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5 and 3.3.

2.6 Discussion of Norms, Motives and Values

The great watershed moment in regards to, motivations and norms surrounding Japan’s ODA policy came in 1992, when the first ODA Charter was released by the Government of Japan. Prior to this turning point, Japan’s ODA was often perceived in the international community as serving solely the economic self-interests of the Japanese government and industry. Such criticisms and allegations heightened during the turn to the 1990s and it even spawned the famous colloquial term “checkbook diplomacy” (Zappa 2018, p. 409). Another major characteristic of the pre-Charter ODA was resource pooling in alignment with the US-Japan Security Alliance and the Cold War effort. In relation to this, Fujisaki (et al. 1997, p. 521) details regarding the expansion of Japan’s ODA in the 1970s: “This rapid expansion was buttressed by pressure from western countries, especially the U.S., on Japan to share a greater financial burden for the collective global security”.

The main changes that came with the ODA Charter were; the incorporation of norms championed by the western countries such as: democratization and humanitarianism. This was not simply rhetoric as even prior to the ratification of the Charter, Japan cut its aid from Myanmar following military coup of 1988. Subsequently, Japan acted similarly also towards China in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Another important change that came with the Charter and its later revisions was the incorporation of humanitarian assistance in conflict ridden regions, which spawned assistance projects in Timor-Leste (1999), Afghanistan (2003) and Sri Lanka (2004) respectively (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 88-89).

In hindsight of these changes, it can be said that, Japan’s ODA became more in line with western values and norms concerning foreign aid and development cooperation as a whole (ibid.). This relatively new focus on humanitarianism and peacebuilding is also present in the Philippines, as Japan has been an active participant in conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness and in assisting infrastructure improvement and economic development in Mindanao of southern Philippines. Further discussion concerning these efforts will commence in chapter 2.3.

From 1998 onwards, the concept of human security had become central in Japan’s foreign policy. Japan has also been promoting the concept in international arenas, such as, the UN General Assembly and by financially contributing to the United Nations’ Trust Fund for Human Security (Kurusu & Kersten 2011, p. 116). Through the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003, human security came to the fore, as one of the basic principles of 21st century ODA policy. To be precise, it was described in the Charter in the following manner (MOFA 2003, p. 2):

“In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals (ibid.).”

It kept its place in the 2015 revision however, instead of using the heading “perspective of human security”, it was instead changed to “promoting human security”.
under the basic policies of the Charter (MOFA 2003, p. 2; MOFA 2015, p. 4). The verbatim description of this basic policy is the following:

“Human security - a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment - is the guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan's development cooperation. Japan will thus focus its development cooperation on individuals - especially those liable to be vulnerable such as children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, refugees and internally-displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - and provide cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security. At the same time, Japan will make efforts so that this basic policy will be understood and accepted widely among its partner countries, thereby mainstreaming the concept even further in the international community” (MOFA 2015, p. 4).

As can be observed from the extracts above, the MOFA has not only kept human security as a central concept in Japan’s ODA, but it has also taken a more central and pronounced role in it, as is evident when comparing the extracts from the 2003 and 2015 ODA Charter revisions to each other. In addition, it appears that Japan has taken an active role in convincing its ally and partner nations to embrace human security as well. What is perhaps the most peculiar notion about Japan’s newly found affinity with the concept, is the concept’s clear focus on the individual, rather than the collective, which seems more western than Asian from a societal and traditionalist point of view. Nevertheless, as the secondary research objective of this thesis is to find out how this concept of human security particularly as it is framed and described above, corresponds in Japan’s ODA implementation in the Philippines, it will be further analyzed and discussed in Chapter 4.

According to a statistical research on aid giving done by Alesina and Dollar (2000, pp. 22-23), Japan’s aid allocations during the study period of 1970 – 1974 and 1990 - 1994, is highly correlated with UN voting patterns. In other words, aid recipient countries that vote with, or for Japan’s proposals in the UN, receive higher amounts of aid according to their research. Meanwhile, Strand and Tuman (2012, p. 425) found out a correlation between Japanese ODA to microstates and their International Whaling Commission (IWC) memberships. However, the authors also found that, neither Japan’s commercial interests nor the interests of the US had any correlation with predicting
Japan’s ODA allocation patterns. On the other hand, Strand and Tuman found such a correlation with humanitarian concerns instead (ibid.).

In addition to human security, Japan’s contemporary foreign policy, of which ODA is a high profile component of, is often stated to ascribe to the concept of proactive pacifism. In official guidelines of the Ministry of Defense for 2014, it is simply defined as: “proactively contributing to peace, based on international cooperation”. Moreover, this necessitates among other actions “actively promoting security cooperation with other countries” (Weston 2014, p. 169), which on an ideological level explains Japan’s increasing security cooperation with the Philippines. Both human security and proactive pacifism can be seen as complementing concepts as the foundations of Japan’s foreign policy as, human security focuses on the security of individuals comprehensively while, proactive pacifism is concerned with the international level of peacebuilding.

2.7 Summary

As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the history of Japan’s ODA policy and its development have gone through distinct phases in the past 60 years. The period from the year 2000 to the present is characterized most notably by the breakthrough of humanitarian norms into Japanese ODA policy, which can be observed both from policy documents (the ODA Charters) and from policy implementation (for instance: peacebuilding in Mindanao). This breakthrough of humanitarian norms can be at least partially explained by the influence and promotion of said norms by influential individuals in high positions, such as; Kawaguchi Yoriko and Ogata Sadako. However, at the same time one can observe the increasing securitization of aid by the Abe government as a geopolitical tool to counter the increasingly assertive China in the South China Sea region. Thus, in relation to the developmental and historical frames of Japan’s ODA as defined by Hirata (2002, p. 165), the author would describe the current era as that of embracing the concept of human security and increasing securitization of Japan’s ODA.

Through historical events, international critique and through Japan’s adoption of UN’s and western nations’ norms, its aid policy has changed considerably from its early post World War II phase as an aid and business facilitator. Some contentious
characteristics in Japan’s aid policy such as; tying aid excessively with domestic business interests and lacking an underlying aid philosophy, have subsequently been addressed by policy makers. Meanwhile, several contentious characteristics still persist such as; high proportion of loan versus grant aid, dominance of large infrastructure projects, developing nations in Asia receiving most of the aid and, the need for recipient nations to propose viable projects for ODA funding (self-help principle/request-based assistance). However, focusing on the differences between the development cooperation model of that of the western nations and that of Japan, while implying that the latter should conform to the former, fails to recognize the Japanese model as distinct from its western equivalent.

In hindsight of this evolution of Japanese ODA, the bilateral development cooperation with the Philippines provides an interesting case study, due to its equivalent duration with the overall ODA program since the war reparations in the 1950s. On a similar note, this bilateral development cooperation has evolved and become increasingly multifaceted, as will be demonstrated in the further chapters of this thesis. However, at the same time some of the core values and characteristics of the Japanese development model have remained the same and are visibly recognizable in Japan’s contemporary development cooperation with the Philippines.

3.0 Bilateral Relations and Development Cooperation

In relation to Japanese foreign aid to SEA during the 1970s and 1980s, Orr (1990, p. 81) stated the following; “The Philippines is perhaps the most controversial and, arguably from a political perspective, the most important country on Japan’s aid agenda in Southeast Asia”. Despite the fact that, Japan’s ODA to the Philippines declined as a consequence of the termination of war reparations transactions in 1976, the island nation resurged to the top of the recipient country list of Japan’s ODA during the 1980s. The reason why Orr labeled the bilateral development cooperation of the time as controversial was partly due to a domestic political scandal in Japan regarding the misuse and embezzlement of ODA funds, by the brutal and undemocratic Ferdinand Marcos regime. This particular case will be further discussed in Chapter 3.1 and 3.6 respectively. Second factor stirring controversy in the Japanese Diet in the 1980s, was related to a perception of Japan’s aid to the Philippines solely serving US strategic interests (ibid. p. 82).
Generally speaking, the Philippines has historically been a bit of an enigma for Japan, as it has until very recently been very closely associated with the US, which stems from the history of it being a US colony and subsequently, a location for US overseas military bases. These commonalities between Japan and the Philippines however, in a geopolitical sense, are without a doubt mostly a strength, because of the strategic location of the Philippines when it comes to commercial sea-lanes towards Japan and increasingly, countering the growing influence of China in the region. Furthermore, the US has also been a major aid provider to the country in a similar manner as Japan (Pante & Reyes 1991, pp. 121-135; Figure 5). Moreover, according to Asanuma (1991, p. 111) Japan’s ODA rarely concentrates towards a country in which, the US has a strong presence and strategic interest in, the Philippines being a notable exception to this trend. Consequently, the ODA programs of the US and Japan in the Philippines can be seen as either competing or complementing models. Such a triangular geopolitical alliance between the US, Japan and the Philippines, which encompasses security, development and commercial matters, is rather exceptional in the East- and SEA regions.

In the 21st century, the Philippines and Japan have become important strategic and economic partners. According to De Castro (2017, pp. 35, 36), Japan is the largest foreign investor and a significant trade partner with the Philippines. For instance in 2015, trade with Japan totaled at $18.8 billion in value, which represented 14.5% of the total Philippine economy. More than 1,500 companies from Japan operate in the Philippines, mostly in Business Process Outsourcing (PBO) and in industrial production (Go 2018). In 2017, the JICA was the largest contributor of ODA to the country, sending over a total amount of 5.33 billion USD of ODA, which amounted to 36 % of the Philippines’ total ODA portfolio (NEDA 2018, p. 13; Figure 5). The free flow of goods, services and even labor to a limited extent is enabled by the bilateral JPEPA, which was signed already back in 2008.

In addition, the Philippines has an ample supply of labor, especially in the health care and service sector. Since the standard of living and salaries are much higher in Japan than in the Philippines, the Japanese job market is very attractive to current and prospective Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). However, because of the steep language barrier, high training requirements and strict immigration rules of Japan, the labor movement has been restricted so far (Nieva-Nishimori 2018). In the future, the situation regarding Filipino immigration to Japan is subject to change since, the Abe government recently announced to relax the immigration rules for foreign manual labor.
The Japanese ambassador to the Philippines Koji Haneda estimated that, under this scheme, 50,000 OFWs will enter the Japanese work force by 2025. Since so far, Japan has only allowed highly and educated skilled labor to enter its work force from abroad, mainly university educated professionals, such as engineers and academics, have been able to do so. However, as a consequence of the JPEPA, limited numbers of Filipino nurses have been allowed to engage in labor in Japan since 2008 (Go 2018). Despite this, Ambassador Haneda also stated that, the number of OFWs in Japan already amounts to 153,600 which, accounts to 12 % of the total foreign work force in the country (Manila Standard 2018). Since remittances sent by OFWs back to the Philippines amount to a significant amount of foreign income for the developing nation (Advincula-Lopez 2005, p. 58), in regards to bilateral development cooperation, the relaxation of labor immigration rules is a welcomed decision by the Abe government.

3.1 History

Contacts and trade relations between Japan and the Philippines reach far back into the pre-modern era. However, when it comes to the post-World War II period, trade and investment into the Philippines began slowly trickling in the 1960s. The lack of prior bilateral economic activity was due to Filipino hostilities following World War II towards the Japanese, due to the prior occupation of the archipelago and the huge damages caused by the Battle of Manila among other such dreadful incidents. It was not until the declaration of martial law in 1972 and the signing of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Japan that, Japanese investments into the Philippines truly begun to accelerate. Japan reached the second place behind the US in foreign investments at the end of the 1970s, and it reached the top position during the years of 1988 and 1993 when the total investments amounted to $946.389 million. The amount of Japanese investment to the Philippines stayed at a high level during the late 1980s and early 1990s with moderate fluctuations. However, during these years the amount of ODA funds flowing into country were on average five times higher than investments (Warkentin et al. 1996, pp. 156-158).

In recent years since 2011, the bilateral relations have reached a previously unexplored area of regional security and defense. Originally in 2011, the former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan and the former President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines signed a joint declaration, declaring a strategic partnership between the two
nations. Subsequently, in 2015 this partnership was strengthened and expanded into the realm of security cooperation by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the former President Aquino, for the benefit of maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, facilitating economic growth and striving towards human security in the region. The crucial difference with the 2015 declaration in comparison to previous joint communiqués was the inclusion of practical security and defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. The bilateral cooperation of the previous decades and administrations had solely focused on trade, investment and development cooperation (ODA) and thus, it was an unprecedented development. The practicality of this security and defense cooperation encompasses the transfer of defense technology, equipment and the conduct of joint naval exercises (Trinidad 2017).

Based on the recent changes on the reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitutions’ Article 9, and the peculiarities of Philippine Republic’s strong presidential system in conjunction with geopolitical changes in the region vis-à-vis China and the US respectively, much can be expected from the increasing security and maritime defense cooperation of the two nations (Grønning 2018). However, further details and developments of this cooperation will be discussed more deeply in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

As a sign of mutuality in the bilateral relations as well as in development cooperation, during the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe Hanshin earthquake in Japan, the Philippines and other nations, offered to provide rescue and humanitarian assistance to the affected areas in Japan. After a notably delay, the Japanese government accepted the assistance on the basis that, it will reciprocally convince these countries to accept Japan’s ODA in the future (Söderberg et al. 1996, p. 31). In addition, following the devastation of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, the Philippines sent a medical team to the tsunami and earthquake affected areas to help victims of the disaster in the Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. Peculiarly, the JICA also made an educational disaster preparedness DVD by filming and interviewing Filipinos in Japan, who were affected by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami (JICA 2012, pp. 2, 7). These aforementioned cases display how the bilateral development cooperation is not a one-way flow of assistance, but a reciprocal exchange between Japan and the Philippines. Naturally, because of the massive wealth and development cap between the two nations, the degree and amount of contribution is in proportion to it.

Japan’s ODA to the Philippines has not gone without its own public scandals and controversies. A case in point is the so called ‘Marcos Scandal’, which took place
following the People Power Revolution of 1986 in the Philippines, which concluded the rule of Dictator Ferdinand Marcos and made him and his wife flee the country to Hawaii. Upon entry, the US customs confiscated documents from the Marcos’s, that documented bribery involving the Marcos family and several Japanese trading companies (Hirata 2002, p. 89). At the center of this scandal was Ferdinand Marco’s old fraternity brother from his alma mater, Roberto Benedicto, who was personally appointed as an ambassador to Japan by Marcos himself. Benedicto used his position as an ambassador to act as a middleman between local sugar producers in the Philippines and investors in Japan, amassing massive profits. He was also found out to have received over $550 million of Japan’s war reparations, which he used for personal business investments (Martial Law Museum).

The degree of corruption involved in the Marcos Scandal was deemed systematic at the time and it also involved Japanese ODA loans to the Philippines. Through the confiscated documents, it was revealed that, the Japanese firms involved had been paying bribes to the Marcos family and its associates through Filipino companies, which were estimated to constitute to 10 to 15 % of the ODA loans involved. The Marcos Scandal drew public attention to the misuse of ODA by Japanese firms and spurred skepticism towards corporate authority in general (Hirata 2002, p. 89).

In the 2000s, a point of both grassroots and mainstream tension has been in relation to the JPEPA ratified in 2006 and finally implemented in 2008, following six long years of negotiation and a strenuous approval process in the Philippines (De Haar 2011, pp. 114). The oligarchic status quo in the Philippine economy and politics, coupled with a lack of tradition in regards to free trade and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and in hindsight of an extensive history of protectionism, it comes as no surprise that the ratification of the JPEPA was such an arduous process. The civil society, labor unions and even high profile priests from the Catholic Church got into public debates and activism, both for and against the JPEPA. The public debate centered around environmental issues and whether the FTA would be beneficial to the Philippine economy as a whole or not (ibid. pp. 114-129).

In regards to the former, environmental concerns were based on an interpretation of a clause in the treaty, which would allegedly grant the dumping of Japanese waste in the Philippines. These concerns were fueled by a collective memory of an incident in 1992, in which, a mislabeled container from Japan in Manila seaport turned out to contain harmful waste. The hazardous container was subsequently shipped back to
Japan, but the legacy of the event lives on. A similar incident took place in 2006, as local farmers claimed that a plot of land in Cavite, on the south side of Manila, had been reserved for Japanese waste dumping. Despite the fact that the claim was completely unfounded, after much ballyhoo fueled by anti-JPEPA NGOs, it warranted an official response as in a bilateral meeting, Prime Minister Abe had to confirm to President Arroyo, that Japan would not be engaging in any waste dumping on the Philippines (ibid. p. 129).

Overall, the bilateral relations between Japan and the Philippines have an extensive and at times even tumultuous history. Despite Japan’s Imperialist past and its consequences to the Philippines, the bilateral relations and cooperation in many fields, have been cemented and broadened considerably in the 20th and 21th centuries. Bilateral development cooperation, which begun as war reparations from Japan to the Philippines, has evolved to encompass regional security cooperation, as well as, becoming increasingly reciprocal, albeit in proportion to national wealth. Moreover, through the Philippines’ disaster relief efforts following the devastation caused by major earthquakes in Japan both in 1995 and 2011, one can observe the implementation of human security returning to Japan in a reciprocal manner. A major milestone in the bilateral relations was the signing and ratification of the JPEPA, which as often is the case with FTAs, has been a controversial agreement in the Philippines. Nevertheless, as Japan rather sparingly signs FTAs, especially with developing countries, the JPEPA can be considered as a major sign of increasing cooperation and partnership between the Philippines and Japan.
3.2 Infrastructure Projects

This section of the thesis will discuss a recently completed infrastructure project (New Bohol [Panglao] International Airport), and an approved such ongoing project (MMSP), which have both been planned and funded by the JICA, in close collaboration with the Government of the Philippines. As discussed and noted by several authors (Hugh 2008, p. 196; Mitsuya 2007, p. 26; Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 267-268; Zappa 2018, p. 424), Japan’s ODA policy has had a major emphasis on building and improvement of basic infrastructure in developing nations. The building of both hard (physical) and soft (non-physical) infrastructure is also recognized in the 2015 revision of the Charter, as one of
the most important steps towards achieving quality growth, a higher standard of living and attracting foreign investments (MOFA 2015, pp. 5, 8, 12).

In fact, the lack of adequate infrastructure both in the major urban metropolises and in the provinces is possibly the most substantial obstacle for an increased level of foreign investments, economic growth and that of standard of living in the Philippines. The state and standard of its urban, rural and even e-commerce infrastructure is considered of the lowest quality in the region (Clarete et al. 2018, p. 9). Consequently, the Philippines has been lacking behind other developing ASEAN states both in poverty reduction and growth rates, which has earned the Philippines the moniker “sick man of Asia”. Despite the country’s natural resources, largely English-speaking and relatively well educated population, poverty and income equality seem to continue endemically (De Haar 2011, p. 114).

The prominence of infrastructure building has been substantial in Japanese ODA, which has historically been one of the defining key differences between Japan’s ODA model and implementation, and of those of the western nations (Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 267-268). However, in recent decades Japan’s ODA policy has started to emphasize more humanitarian and social forms of aid thus, pluralizing the development cooperation program (Fujisaki et al. 1997; Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 95-96).

This new emphasis on softer aid has appeared in tandem with the introduction of human security into Japan’s foreign policy, in addition to, criticisms and influence from the DAC donor community. One of the most prominent cases of this is Japan’s participation, through its ODA, in the peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao of the Southern Philippines (Lewis-Workman 2018, p. 95). Despite the aforementioned “softening” of Japan’s ODA contemporarily, infrastructure still plays a major role, especially when it comes to the Philippines. For instance, according to NEDA statistics (2017, p. 1) more than half of Philippines’ ODA loans portfolio (52% or 6.42 billion USD) for 2017 accounted for infrastructure development. Meanwhile, 42% of the total loans portfolio came from the JICA (5.17 billion USD). Furthermore, the current national infrastructure improvement program spearheaded by President Duterte titled, “Build, Build, Build”, includes several high profile JICA loan and collaboration projects including the MMSP and the New Bohol Airport (JICA 2017B, p. 9).
3.2.1 New Bohol Airport

The New Bohol Airport on the Panglao Island in the Bohol region of the Philippines was recently completed in November 2018, and it is currently serving both international and domestic air traffic. The main impetus for the construction of a new higher capacity airport in the region is to better manage and facilitate the growth of tourism in the region, in a sustainable and environmentally conscious manner and thus, replacing the outdated Tagbilaran Airport as a regional air transport hub. The construction project was funded with a 15 billion yen loan from the JICA and its construction was contracted to the Chiyoda and Mitsubishi corporations as a joint venture (EOJ 2018; Airport Technology; Timetric 2017 p. 4). Earlier JICA funded airport construction projects in the Philippines include the expansion of Mactan-Cebu International Airport, which is the second busiest air hub in the nation (JICA 2000, p. 133).

In hindsight of the history of Japanese ODA model, such public-private partnership between a Japanese government agency and the private sector is rather quintessential and even notorious. However, the decision to grant the implementation of the project to the aforementioned Japanese contractors, took place following a bidding process among several competing construction contractors (Timetric 2017, p. 9). As the Bohol Island is largely an eco-tourism destination, the New Bohol Airport was designed in consideration of low environmental impact and energy usage. Consequently, it incorporates top-level Japanese technology both in its design and day-to-day operations. Among other measures and technologies, the surrounding soil is protected with geo-textile sheets, in order to prevent the absorption of drainage water, petroleum and so on into the surrounding soil. Likewise, the airport utilizes solar energy to power its air condition in addition to, utilizing LEDs for its lighting requirements (Airport Technology). Furthermore, the recently opened airport has already been planned for expansion in the near future, enabled by a 4.37 billion yen loan agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the JICA (GMA News 2018).

As an important milestone in the development and growth of tourism in the more peripheral province regions of the Philippines such as Bohol, the completion of a state of the art environmentally conscious air-hub, will undoubtedly assist to facilitate the growth of the tourism industry and the overall economic development in the region during the near future. However, when it comes to the former that is the case presuming, that the growth and flow of tourism to the region continues according to estimates. Possible future limitations on the growth and profitability of the aviation industry
caused by increasing political demands for carbon taxes on air travel may negatively affect the industry as it is. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the Philippines to intense typhoons on an annual basis, causes further challenges to both international and domestic aviation and consequently, to its tourism industry. On the other hand, in consideration of the challenging geography of the Philippines as a fragmented island nation, the improvement of air travel infrastructure is important for national economic development as a whole.

### 3.2.2 Metro Manila Subway Project

The extensive and populous capital region of the Philippines, Metro Manila, suffers from severe traffic congestion and an acute lack of adequate public transportation infrastructure. As a consequence of the high population density and poor urban planning, large scale infrastructure developments in the region are difficult and prohibitively costly to implement. However, according to Corpuz (et al. 2018, p. 143) inaction in this regard, would most likely be even more costly in the long term as the capital region continues to expand and grow in population. As a response to these challenges, the governments of Japan and the Philippines have approved a 50 billion Philippine Peso (PHP) loan from the JICA to finance the first phase for the construction of the MMSP. The MMSP Phase 1 will result in 25.3 km of underground rail and connect the main air hub of the country, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) to major urban business centers of Metro Manila, such as Quezon City and Makati (NEDA Sep. 2018; JICA 2017A, p. 11).

According to census data, the population in the capital region Metro Manila has grown from 7.92 million residents in 1990 to 12.88 million in 2015 meanwhile; its population density has increased up to 20,000 residents per square kilometer. Such an extreme figure makes Metro Manila’s population density three times as high as that of Tokyo’s. While Tokyo has arguably one of the best public transportation systems in the world, due to its extensive subway and rail network, the residents of Manila need to rely excessively on busses and jeepneys (makeshift minibuses) for their daily commuting needs and consequently, wasting hours daily on traffic congestion, as the local rail coverage is currently severely limited (JICA 2017a, pp. 10-11).

According to a NEDA-JICA co-report (2015, pp. 3-6), travel congestion in Metro Manila is estimated to have a daily cost of 2.4 billion PHP per day, including the
cost of operating a vehicle and the loss of time and consequently productivity because of traffic congestion. This figure is expected to rise to 6 billion PHP by 2030, if no action is taken on the matter. Moreover, the report also found out that, spending at least 20% of a month’s income on transportation was a common occurrence for low-income families. As one of the basic policies of Japan’s ODA is to promote human security (MOFA 2015, p. 4), which is also concerned with the negation of poverty, the improvement of infrastructure aligns well with the aforementioned goal.

Currently, the MMSP is without a doubt the JICA’s most ambitious public infrastructure project in the Philippines. Upon completion, which is estimated to take place in 2025 (Department of Transportation [DOTR] & JICA 2017. p. 5), the MMSP will be the Philippines’ first urban underground rail transportation system and surely, the most advanced and efficient public transportation system in the country. Contrary to the past administrations, the one currently lead by President Duterte is finally taking the country’s infrastructure deficit seriously. Fueled by ODA and investments from Japan and China, in addition to increasing national tax revenue (Heydarian 2018a), Duterte’s ‘Build, Build, Build’ program is essentially attempting to lift the Philippines out of its poverty trap and sent it on a course of steady and sustainable economic growth and development.

Similarly, as in the case of the New Bohol Airport as discussed earlier in the thesis, a Japanese consortium including multiple high profile construction companies (including Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd.), won the bid for the construction of the MMSP (Caraballo 2018). To conclude, in the case of these two major infrastructure projects in the Philippines, both the funding (loan provision) and the technological expertise, came from Japan’s public (JICA) and private sector. Thus, whether such a public-private partnership in development cooperation is excessively benefiting Japanese interests, or whether this constitutes as bilateral development cooperation in the literal sense of the word, creating a win-win situation for both parties is an excellent question to consider.

### 3.3 Peacebuilding in Mindanao

The armed religious and political conflict in Southern Mindanao, between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), is one of the longest lasting in SEA (Peng Er 2008, p. 45). According to estimates of the last four
decades, 200,000 lives have been lost in the conflict and 1,500,000 people have become internally displaced due to the conflict. In addition, because of the long duration of the conflict, economic growth in the Muslim regions of Mindanao has been seriously hindered, for instance: the GDP growth of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was half of the national Philippine average in 2014 (3% vs. 6%) (Ochiai 2016, p. 39). The historical origins of this conflict date back several hundred years to the arrival of the Spanish colonists on the Philippine islands. While the Spanish were able to conquer and Christianize the inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas archipelago to the north in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were never successful in achieving the same in Mindanao, despite waging war against the Moros (Muslim natives) for over 300 years (ibid. pp. 38, 39).

Despite the fact that, Spain had no de jure control over Mindanao, the island was acquired by the US, following Spain’s defeat in the Spanish – American War of 1898. The US military forces defeated the Moro resistance on the island and for the first time, Mindanao became officially part of the Philippines. Starting in 1912, the US colonial regime started promoting the migration of Christians from Visayas and Luzon, a policy which, the later newly independent Republic of the Philippines continued and accelerated in 1946. The result of this policy by Manila was the increasing population replacement in Mindanao, in favor of the Catholic Christian Filipinos (Peng Er 2008, p. 49). The modern phase of the conflict ignited in 1968, when 14 Muslim soldiers were executed by the Philippine Armed Forces on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. This resulted in a bloody civil conflict between the Catholics and Muslims in Mindanao and eventually, as a consequence, the Marcos regime declared martial law in the Philippines in 1972 (Ochiai 2016, p. 39).

With support and training from Muslim countries, most notably Libya and Malaysia, the Moros were able to form organized resistance against the Philippine government. Thus in 1971, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was born. At its heyday, the MNLF had 65,000 guerrillas in its service, which were able to keep the government forces out of Muslim Mindanao. Eventually in 1976, the Marcos regime and the MNLF came to a peace agreement mediated by Libya, which granted the Moros limited autonomy from the Manila government. This was the beginning for what in 1989 would become known as the ARMM. However, some members of the MNLF felt betrayed by the organization’s leadership and the limited autonomy granted by Manila. Subsequently, the more radical and Islamic MILF was established (Peng Er 2008, p. 50).
It was not until the new millennium that, Japan became actively involved in the peace process in Mindanao, although, it has been sending ODA to Mindanao since 1989 (excluding rebel-controlled regions). Back in 2001, the newly elected President of the Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, decided to take a more conciliating approach to the Mindanao issue, in contrast to her predecessor Joseph Estrada. Subsequently, a ceasefire with the MILF was established, which was mediated by Malaysia. During a bilateral summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan’s assistance in the peacebuilding effort was promised. This also suited well with the zeitgeist of the time as, the poor and disenfranchised Mindanao was seen as a brewing pot for radical Islamic terrorism by the US and its allies (Ibid. pp. 51, 52). Before Mindanao, Japan had engaged in peacebuilding in Cambodia (1992, 1998), in Timor-Leste (1999) and in a multitude of locations simultaneously with the involvement in Mindanao (Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq) (MOFA 2007, pp. 4-8).

In the following year of 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi pledged a support package for peace and stability in Mindanao, worth $400 million. The support package had two stated aims, firstly to help eradicate extreme poverty in the region and secondly, to help in the conciliation of the conflict and in preventing further radicalization of the local population. From Japan’s perspective, the support package demonstrated further support for the Arroyo administration and increasing engagement with the peace process in Mindanao. In addition to monetary support, or as critiques of Japan’s foreign policy would often put it, checkbook diplomacy, the package also included training programs and sending policy advisors, in order to train ARMM government officials. In fact, eventually 700 officials from the ARMM government received training from Japan and the ARMM also received its very own ODA advisor from Tokyo (Peng Er 2008, p. 52).

In 2006, Japan joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) of the Mindanao conflict. It was the only non-Muslim, non-Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) state to do so, as the other IMT member states were: Libya, Brunei and Malaysia. This was a great milestone for Japan’s foreign policy, as this was an independent move for Japan, outside of the frameworks or influences of the UN and the US. The purpose of the IMT was to monitor the ceasefire that had been in place since 2003. Originally, Japan was invited to join the IMT much earlier by Malaysia in 2004, but since the ceasefire was still deemed unstable at that time by Japanese officials, it did not take place until two years later. As a member of the IMT, Japan is also cooperating with MILF and its own developmental agency the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)
with the silent approval of the Government of the Philippines. The former head of the
JICA Ogata Sadako and a delegation of 15 Japanese officials even made an official visit
to the MILF controlled territory in 2006, meeting high ranking officials of the
insurgency. In a subsequent speech delivered by Sadako, she proclaimed that Japan’s
peacebuilding effort in Mindanao will be based entirely on the principle of human
security (ibid. pp. 52, 53). To verify the prominence and importance of peacebuilding in
Japan’s ODA, according to Trajano (2013, p. 2), Japan’s extensive peacebuilding
project in Mindanao has become one of three main foundations for its overall ODA to
the Philippines.

In 2011, an important and historic meeting between President Aquino and MILF
Chairman Murad Ebrahim took place in Narita, Japan in which, the two sides of the
conflict discussed the future, and how to move forward towards peaceful reconciliation.
Furthermore, eventually a basic outline of a peace accord was signed by both parties
(Ochiai 2016, pp. 40-41). The peace negotiating process, which began in Narita, was
eventually finalized in 2012 by the Government of the Philippines and the MILF
signing a peace agreement (BBC News 2012). That being said, Islamic terrorism and
sectarian violence conducted by terrorist organizations such as Abu Sayyaf continue to
be serious issues in the Southern Philippines to this day (The Diplomat 2019).

The latest stage of the conflict resolution concerns the creation of a new
autonomous region for the Muslim minority in Mindanao, which will replace the current
ARMM. In July 2018, President Duterte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which
will establish a new autonomous region for the Moros, namely, the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This development has come about since, its
predecessor the ARMM, has been plagued by corruption in governance,
mismanagement of resources and clan warfare. The second factor behind the new law
and the establishment of a new constitutional entity is due to the fact that, the Moros
have not been satisfied with the degree of autonomy under the ARMM (Ver 2018). On
the domestic front, by signing the new law, President Duterte is advancing his agenda of
federalizing the Philippines, which conveniently matches with the Moros aspirations of
greater autonomy (Ochiai 2016, p. 45).

To recap and conclude, despite the conventional understanding and grouping of
the categories of ODA and peacebuilding, in Japan’s foreign policy framework,
peacebuilding has been integrated as a part of Japan’s ODA (MOFA 2003, p 4; MOFA
2015, pp. 1, 6, 8). Japan’s involvement in the peacebuilding process in Mindanao is one
of the best and arguably, one of the most successful and prominent instances of the
nation’s commitment to human security and proactive pacifism in its foreign policy. One of the highlights of Japan’s peacebuilding in Mindanao is the fact that, it has been an independent endeavor of Japan, excluding US or UN initiative in the matter. Secondly, being the only non-Muslim participant nation in the IMT, demonstrated trust in Japan as a proactively pacifist nation. It has also demonstrated the Philippine government’s trust on Japan as a neutral mediator, as it has allowed the JICA to cooperate with the BDA of the MILF.

Figure 2: The Peace Process and Japan’s Involvement (timeline). Source: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2018/c8h0vm0000djw93s-img/c8h0vm0000djw9b2.jpg (accessed: 14.2.19).

3.4 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management

As a developing country afflicted by natural disasters such as; typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and so on, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) is a fundamental part of comprehensive development cooperation with the Philippines. Secondly, from the point of view of human security, which holistically considers a multitude of threats to the security, basic needs and wellbeing of the individual, this is
also clearly the case. However, due to the effects of climate change on strengthening tropical storm intensity, poverty and lack of resources in the Philippines, it is a very challenging task even for a major donor such as Japan to have a major impact on. In regards to the 2015 revision of the ODA Charter, references to the mitigation of natural disasters and disaster relief occur frequently in the policy paper, which is evident in its priority issues chapter (MOFA 2015, pp. 7-8). To be precise, the Charter states that, Japan seeks to assist developing states in not only DRRM capacity, but also in post-disaster recovery measures as well. In addition, such development cooperation with the SEA countries is particularly emphasized as a priority field and region (ibid.).

In recent years, the Philippines’ vulnerability to typhoons of increasing intensity has become increasingly evident and clear. In 2013 the country was struck by Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), which is considered the strongest ever to have struck any nation. The devastation caused more than 6300 fatalities and according to estimates, 2.3 million Filipinos became impoverished as a direct consequence of the havoc. According to a WB report on the matter: “the total damage and loss was estimated at PHP 571.1 billion (USD 12.9 billion) hampering economic growth by about 0.9 % in 2013, and another 0.3 % in 2014 (World Bank). Furthermore, in the philosophy of human security, the overlapping of persistent poverty, natural disasters, armed conflict and violence among other human insecurities, together amplify their disastrous effects on the population, and can even affect the citizens of neighboring nations (United Nations). Against this background, Japan’s ODA with a solid basis on human security in combination with an emphasis on DRRM, clearly corresponds to a dire necessity, especially when it comes to the Philippines. In addition, as a donor nation also facing natural disasters on a regular basis, Japan has accumulated vast knowledge and expertise in the field of DRRM and in post-disaster rescue efforts.

The efforts to improve the Philippines’ DRRM capabilities and infrastructure through Japan’s ODA have not solely encompassed governmental agencies since, Japanese universities, Local Government Units (LGUs), NGOs and small and medium size enterprises have also participated in these efforts. This multilateral participation has taken place through the following partnership programs running under the JICA umbrella: JICA Partnership Program, Survey for Technology Promotion of Japanese Small and Medium Enterprises, and for the NGOs through grant assistance schemes (NEDA et al. 2016). The mainline bilateral DRRM ODA has however, been implemented in collaboration between the JICA and national governmental agencies, LGUs, NGOs and People’s Organizations in the Philippines (ibid. p. 18).
As described in the Charter, the DRRM improvement measures include the development of both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure in the recipient nations. The “hard” infrastructure refers to physical constructions, for instance flood barriers, while the “soft” refers to systemic enhancement or training of staff (ibid. p. 17).

One example of a “hard” infrastructure DRRM project in the Philippines funded by Japan’s grant aid is “The Project for Improvement of the Meteorological Radar System”, which was completed in 2014 (ibid. p. 19). In a nutshell, the project strived to improve the forecasting of weather on the Philippine islands, especially when it comes to locations, movement patterns and landfall projections of tropical cyclones. This improvement in the national meteorological capabilities was achieved by constructing radar towers in peripheral provinces such as Eastern Samar, Cagayan and Catanduanes. Prior to the completion of the project, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) had to rely on satellite images, which was considerably more time consuming as, calculations were required to estimate the arrival times of weather fronts and tropical cyclones. In addition to the construction
of the radar towers and the provision of new equipment, the JICA also established a
technical cooperation scheme with the goal of providing training for the local PAGASA
staff by Japanese meteorology experts (ibid. pp. 25-26). Thus, in this case the grant aid
provided the “hard” infrastructure for this project while, the subsequent technical
cooperation provide the “soft” infrastructure.

In addition to the PAGASA, the JICA has been assisting the Philippine Institute
of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) on multiple projects around the country.
One of such projects is one where, PHIVOLCS in collaboration with Japanese scientists
developed and launched a house structure evaluation tool, in order to improve
earthquake preparedness of mainly residential houses in the Philippines (JICA 2014b).

As both the Philippines and Japan face virtually the same threats posed by
natural forces (tsunami, volcano eruptions, typhoons and earthquakes) on a regular
basis, bilateral cooperation in DRRM is most certainly a worthwhile venture. As a
nation with an extensive history of DRRM, both in hard and soft infrastructure sense, it
is in fact hard to imagine a better development cooperation partner-state other than
Japan. Consequently, the DRRM is arguably one of the most important fields in
bilateral development cooperation, as the transfer of technology and know-how enabled
by it, can literally safe lives and improve the human security of thousands, if not,
millions of Filipinos. It is also not a one way movement of assistance, as there have
been manifestations of reciprocity in it, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.1.

### 3.5 Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers

Since its inception in 1965, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV)
program has sent over 40,000 Japanese citizens as volunteer workers to developing
countries around the globe. The volunteer program is managed by the JICA and its
objectives are the following: provision of technical assistance to developing nations,
promotion of friendship between Japan and developing countries and finally, to
internationalize the Japanese youth and the public as a whole. The inspiration for the
program came from the US Peace Corps, which was established just a few years prior to
the JOCV. The volunteers, who are between the ages of 20 and 39 years old, are
selected from a pool of applicants and then, they are trained prior to their two year
assignment abroad (Okabe et al. 2016, pp. 222, 223).
Typical economic and social sectors in which volunteers are placed in the destination country include: agriculture, education, forestry and fisheries, sanitation, manufacturing and sports, among other fields (JICA, Civil Participation). As the Government of Japan perceives the JOCV to be a nationwide participatory element of its ODA (Okabe ibid.), it essentially grants the average citizen a chance to participate in the nation’s development cooperation with the developing world, and to make a difference in it.

Since the memories of Japanese occupation and the immense battles between the US’ and Imperial Japanese forces in the Philippines were still fresh on people’s minds, the JOCV had a very modest initial objective in the country, namely, to build trust and rapport with the local community. Possibly the greatest and the most long term impact the JOCVs have achieved in the past 50+ years in the Philippines, is in the fields of veterinary medicine and animal husbandry. The volunteers have particularly excelled in introducing and teaching artificial insemination techniques to local cattle owners and farmers. Through working in close cooperation with the Philippine Department of Agriculture, the JOCVs played a key role in the widespread adoption of artificial insemination in rural areas of the Philippines (JICA 2005, p. 3). Such efforts have increased the profitability and the overall quality of the Philippine livestock (JICA 2014a p. 19).

As of 2017, the Philippines was the second largest destination country for JOCV volunteers, with the cumulative figure of 1639 volunteers received (Figure 4). The JICA has been sending Japanese volunteers to the country for more than 50 years now, since 1966 to be precise. Since that was just the second year of the JOCV program running, it demonstrates the long duration and consistency of Japan-Philippines development cooperation and grassroots affinity. The JOCV participants in the Philippines, have participated in assisting the development of various economic and social sectors in the country, such as in; organic agriculture, community development, design, environmental education, disaster relief and prevention, food processing and so on. (JICA 2016a). According to the JICA (ibid.), the economic and social sectors open to Japanese volunteering shall in the future, broaden up to include tourism, education, care and support for the disabled and nutrition.

According to Joselito De Vera, the Executive Director of the Philippine National Volunteer Service Coordinating Agency (PNVSCA): “With JOCVs here in the Philippines, we are able to provide the necessary technical expertise to Filipino partner institutions – both government and non-government and at the same time, promote
better socio-cultural understanding between our societies (JICA 2014a, p. 16).” As can be deducted from the statement above, the JOCV program does not solely facilitate cross-cultural understanding and bilateral development cooperation, but also, it supports its domestic national equivalent in the Philippines, the PNVSCA.

In the 2015 Charter revision, the JOCV program is referred to in the following way:

“The government will also encourage the participation of its people from all walks of life in development cooperation and promote utilization of their expertise in society, with a view to expanding those involved in development cooperation, including the recruitment of JICA Volunteers. In this regard, the government will provide adequate information to the public and listen to the voice of the people at all levels including suggestions regarding development cooperation” (MOFA 2015, p. 14).

This verbatim quotation from the Charter demonstrates the grassroots nature of the JOCV program. Furthermore, it displays the positive view of the Japanese government in regards to citizen participation in the actual implementation of ODA and its technical cooperation. In regards to human security as defined by the Government of Japan as: “freedom from want” (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 91-92; MOFA 2015, p. 4), one can observe JOCV assistance in the introduction of advanced artificial insemination to the rural Philippines as working towards that goal. In other words, in this context the volunteer efforts have managed to enhance the continuity of profitable livestock raising in the country and to strengthen the domestic livestock industry as a whole.

Despite the JOCV program’s modest size in comparison to other types of ODA from Japan to the Philippines, it is an interesting grassroots (people-to-people) dimension of the bilateral development cooperation. As created and implemented very shortly following the US Peace Corps, it demonstrated a certain strive towards assisting the developing world, even when Japan’s own level of prosperity and development was still relatively modest in hindsight. One could argue that, Japan’s embrace and advocacy of human security in its ODA and foreign policy as a whole, is the culmination of this desire. Despite the program’s modest beginnings in the Philippines as a grassroots bridge builder between the peoples of the nations, it has gained the recognition of the PNVSCA and it has most prominently enhanced the professional lives of especially small scale cattle farmers in the rural areas of the country.
3.6 The Role of NGOs

Japanese NGOs have not only participated and cooperated with government entities in the grassroots implementation of foreign aid policy, but also, some of them have been staunch critiques of corrupt and questionable practices of the past. A case in point was the ODA embezzlement scandal involving the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986, which spurred the formation of a lobby group called Re-Consider aid, Citizens’ League (REAL) by activists of various Japanese NGOs. REAL was formed as a response to the grassroots anger and frustration caused by the massive misuse and embezzlement of ODA funds by President Marcos, Marcos’ family and high officials in the Philippine government. The country received huge amounts of aid from Japan under the Marcos regime. The total amount being 504 billion yen, which was mostly, allocated to large infrastructure projects. The most controversial portion of the monetary transfers were the so called commodity loans, which according to some estimates, helped to keep the regime in power in precarious times, such as following the assassination of opposition candidate Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983 (Ohashi et al. 2016, p. 328).
The Marcos scandal highlighted structural faults in the management and supervision of the ODA program. Consequently, the Japanese parliament established an investigative body to look further into the matter in 1986. However, REAL activists demanded a complete reform of the system to be implemented including the establishment of a special ODA ministry and a law, which would specify the underlying ideology of the ODA policy and also, to enable parliamentary involvement in ODA policy (ibid. p. 329). In hindsight, even though the demands of the activists were never realized, Japan’s ODA policy did gain a cabinet approved ideological basis in the form of the original ODA Charter in 1992. However, neither the original ODA Charter nor its revisions are laws per say, but rather policy guidelines (Jain 2016, p. 98).

When it comes to the state of the Japanese civil society in general, there was a great increase in the number of developmental NGOs in the 1980s. Their main expertise coveted fields such as: global advocacy, peacebuilding and disaster relief. Some of the most prominent development NGOs were: the Japan International Volunteer Center and the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). JANIC’s goal was to form a network of Japanese development NGOs, which contributed to the increasing cooperation between civil society and the Japanese government in the field of development cooperation. The NGO advocacy for an ODA reform truly kicked off following the 1996 and 1998 meetings between civil society members and the MOFA, and the JICA respectively. In terms of the Japanese political system, in the 2000s development NGOs have been largely excluded from the ODA policy making process. However, they do enjoy close ties with the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), due to the fact that, a few founding DPJ members had worked for development NGOs in the 1980s (Kim et al. 2017, pp. 130, 149, 150).

On the domestic grassroots level, Ohno (2013, p. 70) has made a note of how the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 and its aftermath, enhanced the cooperation between businesses, NGOs and local communities. On top of that, as the disaster was followed by huge floods in Thailand during the same year, which also negatively affected Japanese businesses and commerce, these events served as a reminder to the ordinary citizenry and to society as a whole, of the interconnected nature of the contemporary globalized world. Thus, one can say that inadvertently, this sequence of unfortunate events helped to raise awareness and profile of development cooperation in this donor fatigued nation. Furthermore, it helped to raise the profile of NGOs in the fields of disaster relief and development cooperation as a whole.
In regards to the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, the NGOs have raised concern, that it strongly represents the interests of the current Abe administration, while neglecting any long term strategy. This is the main reason for the advocacy of various NGOs since the 1980s of a ground law governing ODA, which would prevent short sighted politicization of Japan’s ODA (Ohashi et al. 2016, p. 341). On the other hand, the 2015 ODA Charter recognizes the importance of cooperation with NGOs and the civil society in general. What this concretely implies is that, the MOFA and the JICA should now be working more closely with NGOs, of both Japanese and foreign origin (MOFA 2015, p. 14). On a different strain of thought, such an addition to the policy guidelines signifies increasing multilateralism in ODA. On the other hand, the term ‘development cooperation’ in itself, which appears to be becoming the most preferred, already implies an element of multilateralism.

Since 1989 a program titled Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the Philippines, administered by the Embassy of Japan in Manila has been in operation. Through the program NGOs, LGUs and medical, educational and research institutes can organize and receive grants from the Government of Japan for small-scale grassroots developmental projects, in order to contribute to the socio-economic development at a grassroots level (Embassy of Japan to the Philippines [EOJ] 2017). Since the creation of the program in the Philippines, a total of 525 projects have so far been funded and implemented until 2017 (ibid.). In addition, the JICA also maintains a so called NGO-JICA Japan Desk in the Philippines. Similarly to the GGP framework, the desk supports the collaboration between Japanese universities, NGOs, LGUs and their partner institutions in the Philippines (JICA Philippine Office A). In addition to the GGP, there are also similar schemes facilitating grassroots cooperation within the context of ODA in other fields namely: Technical Cooperation for Grassroots Projects (TCGP) and Grant Assistance for Cultural Grassroots Projects (GACGP) (JICA Philippine Office B).

As has been detailed prior in this section, the relationship between the government and its ministries and agencies involved in ODA and the NGOs, has sometimes been a contentious one. The advocacy and activism on ODA reform and the criticism of abuses of the funds and corruption, together with international criticisms, have no doubt had an impact on the development and contents of the ODA Charters. The Marcos scandal in 1986 was a major catalyst to NGO activism for ODA reform and ODA law, which spurred activism well into the 1990s. In regards to the MOFA and the JICA as the main actors in Japan’s ODA, these governmental organizations appear to be
much more collaborative with NGOs, universities and LGUs. This can be considered as a major improvement, as in the past, Japan’s excessive bilateralism in development cooperation used to be one of the main points of criticism (Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 268-269). Both the MOFA and the JICA operate several multilateral grassroots level projects focusing on human security, culture and technical cooperation.

3.7. Securitization & Strategic Partnership

Since 2013, Japan has been actively diversifying its security ties outside the framework of the ubiquitous US-Japan Security Alliance. Two prominent examples of this are the growing security ties, cooperation and capacity enhancement with the Philippines and Vietnam (Grønning 2018, p. 533). At a first glance, ODA as a sphere of foreign policy does not appear to have much overlap with matters concerning regional security and geopolitical defense strategy. However, this is not the first instance of Japan’s strategic use of ODA in regards to the Philippines. Already in the late 1980s as a consequence of US pressure, Japan pledged substantial contributions to the Multilateral Assistance Initiative, which was also known as the mini-Marshall Plan for the Philippines. Since the Philippines was a host to prominent US overseas military bases at the time, the tacit understanding behind the decision was to allocate support to the US military presence in the region without breaking Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Yanagihara & Emig 1991, p. 62).

The securitization of ODA in the contemporary era has undoubtedly been influenced by the increasingly assertive China, the rise of its military capability and the territorial disputes with it, both in the East China Sea with Japan, and the South China Seas with the Philippines respectively. Despite the fact that, virtually all ODA Charter revisions to date have explicitly banned the use of Japan’s development aid for military purposes, the 2015 revision creates a loophole for it. To be precise, the Charter states the following:

“Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance (MOFA 2015, pp. 10-11)”. 
It should be noted that, in the previous revision of the ODA Charter from 2003, such a loophole was missing, while the military use of ODA was explicitly banned in a similar manner as in the latest revision (MOFA 2003, p. 5). Outside of the ODA framework, a relevant recent policy change has been the fact that Japan is also now able to commercially export arms and defense equipment, through the adoption of the three principles on the transfer of defense equipment and arms by the Abe administration (Trinidad 2017, p. 621). As a consequence of the aforementioned factors, Japan has been providing surveillance boats, security equipment and naval training to the Philippines and other SEA nations in recent years under the framework of the ODA program (Gaens 2015, p. 5).

Japan’s main interest in the South China Sea and in the security cooperation with the Philippines, is to secure the shipping lanes penetrating the region, on which, it is heavily dependent on economically and ultimately, even existentially. For the Philippines on the other hand, as a developing nation, it needs all the material and monetary assistance it can receive from affluent nations to improve its maritime military capabilities and coast guard’s training and equipment. The modernization of the Philippine Navy and coast guard was hastened by the infamous stand off on the Scarborough Shoal between the Philippine Navy, Chinese fishermen and coast guard in 2012. The subsequent diplomatic feud with China did not ease the tension, quite the opposite in fact. From a geostrategic point of view, since both countries share a security partnership with the US, while at the same time, facing a challenged posed by China, this bilateral security cooperation is surely a sound one (De Castro 2017, p. 34, 38). In fact during the Scarborough Shoal incident, the former ambassador of Japan to the Philippines Toshio Urabe described the state of bilateral relations with the following words: “close-knit triangular relationship among Japan, the Philippines, and their closest (mutual) ally—the U.S” (ibid. p. 39). Furthermore, despite President Duterte’s rapprochement towards China and even arguably pro-China rhetoric at times, territorial and fishing rights clashes are still an ongoing issue on the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (Zambrano 2019).

In addition to the so called ‘China factor’, there are also domestic factors and political changes that have taken place, which have facilitated the move into security cooperation in the bilateral relations. In the case of the Philippines, due to the strong role of the President of the Republic in setting the direction of foreign policy, alliances and partnerships with foreign nations are dependent upon the personality, opinion and experiences of the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, foreign policy of the Philippines is vulnerable to discontinuities and lack of long term strategy. Under the former President Aquino (in office: 2010-2016), the Philippines pursued a very defensive foreign policy vis-à-vis the territorial dispute with China. The Aquino administration took the bold move of taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice in Hague, which eventually ruled in favor of the Philippines (Trinidad 2017, pp. 616, 617, 631; Panda 2016). Moreover, initially the Aquino administration pursued US military assistance, in order to secure the country’s maritime territories against China. However, because of skepticism regarding the waning American engagement in Asia, Aquino decided to seek such assistance from Japan instead (Trinidad 2017. p. 617).

Through Prime Ministerial and Presidential joint declarations, the Japan-Philippines Strategic Partnership, which was signed in 2009, has been evolving towards increasing regional security cooperation and capacity enhancement during the last decade. It has been a radical change in Japan-Philippines relations since, prior to this development, the relations were solely characterized by commercial ties (JPEPA) and development cooperation (ODA) in conventional fields (Galang 2019). In March 2016, a bilateral treaty on the transfer of defense technology and equipment was signed, which made the Philippines the fourth state that has established such a treaty with Japan. Consequently, transfers of patrol boats, surveillance aircraft and radar technology have been concrete manifestations of this rapprochement in security cooperation (Parameswaran 2016; 2017). The provision of aforementioned technology to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has been taking place under the JICA scheme titled: Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP) (JICA 2016b).

According to the JICA, the purpose of the MSCIP is to enhance the maritime safety and to be an integral part of nation building and development of the Philippines. As an island nation consisting of approximately 7000 islands and islets and consequently, with an immense amount of coastline, the capacity building of the PCG is of paramount importance for the safety of increasing maritime cargo and passenger traffic in the region (ibid.). The aforementioned factors are the official rhetoric for the MSCIP, however, the territorial dispute on the Scarborough Shoal and the geopolitical China factor as a whole surely plays a tacit part in the MSCIP.

To conclude, the move in the implementation of Japan’s ODA to encompass security and defense matters during the last decade has been a controversial one, considering the traditional stance in the current and past ODA Charters against ODA provision towards military use. That being said, in consideration of the fact that, the
aforementioned clause in the Charter enables a loophole for such ODA provision in the case of public welfare and disaster-relief, the justification can be a matter of framing and argumentation, especially in hindsight of the geographical and material realities in the Philippines. In consideration of human security, especially regarding the MSCIP, the capacity improvement of maritime security surely on its part, enhances the security of seaborne individuals and protects their livelihoods as well from overfishing by foreign fishing fleets.

3.8 Recent Developments with the Duterte Administration

This chapter shall discuss the state and development of bilateral relations between the Philippines and Japan, since the inauguration of controversial populist President Rodrigo Duterte in June, 2016. In addition, it will mirror these diplomatic and political changes with the developmental, security and strategic cooperation between the two nations. Despite the fact that this discussion is not directly relevant to this thesis’ primary or secondary research questions, it is still worth discussing as; development cooperation between the two countries cannot be analyzed and discussed in isolation from general bilateral relations and geopolitical factors. In addition, as stated by Hirata (2002, p. 3) unlike in the case of the US for instance, in which ODA is a fairly insignificant field of foreign policy, in Japan’s foreign policy on the other hand, it is one of the most important fields. Consequently, it is difficult if not impossible to separate ODA from Japan’s foreign policy, as the former is incorporated so strongly with the latter.

First of all, it can be said that the election victory of Duterte broke a certain trend in the trajectory of Philippine presidential and domestic politics, which has been characterized by the dominance of elite families and clans, both in the economic and political sectors of the society (De Haar 2011, pp. 127-128). Such powerful interest groups have often hindered trade liberalization in the country and consequently, economic growth and development as well (ibid.). As the first President of the Republic coming from the historically and economically marginalized region of Mindanao, Duterte’s presidency with all its related controversies can be seen as a great watershed moment in the domestic politics of the Philippines. The dramatic election victory and subsequent presidency has brought serious dark clouds over the continuity of the country’s cooperation and alignment with the US and consequently, this has also put the
future of bilateral relations with Japan into a state of perceived uncertainty. As noted by Trinidad (2017), the recent rapprochement in relations that the Philippines has had with China, and to a lesser degree with Russia, since Duterte’s presidency, has put the increasing strategic and economic partnership between Japan and the Philippines, which was most notably championed by the former President Benigno Aquino III into jeopardy.

However, whether these fears fueled by the perceived uncertainty vis-à-vis relations with Japan, has had any concrete effect is definitely a question worth exploring. In previous decades, the Japan-Philippines bilateral relations have been dominated by trade and cooperation in the fields of economy and development (ibid. pp. 630-631). That being said in the 2010s, this bilateral cooperation has become more comprehensive, which is partly due to Japan’s involvement in the peace process in Mindanao and secondly, due to the changed geopolitical climate in the region in addition to, changes in Japan’s domestic politics in relation to its pacifist constitution. Both of these factors have been discussed in more depth in Chapters 3.3 and 3.7 respectively. Since both securitization and peacebuilding in Japan’s foreign policy are conceptualized under the umbrella of ODA (MOFA 2015, pp. 1, 6, 7, 11; Gaens 2015, pp. 4-5; Ochiai 2016), these factors make Japan’s ODA arguably the most important instrument in contemporary Japan-Philippines relations. Furthermore, as Japan continues to be the largest source of ODA funds to the Philippines under the Duterte administration, according to the latest annual report by NEDA (2017, p. 13), the case for this argument becomes even stronger.

In the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting of 2017 between Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte, development cooperation played a key part in the Summit, as the yen loan provision for the Phase I of the construction of the MMSP was signed by both parties, in addition to, other infrastructure and rebuilding projects, such as the reconstruction of the city of Marawi, which was severely damaged due to an armed struggle between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Islamic State affiliated insurgents. The bilateral signing of exchange notes, which also encompassed the provision of a TC-90 Maritime JSDF aircraft and coastal radar equipment as a concrete manifestation of defense cooperation, also took place in the Summit (MOFA 2017).

In contrast to the Aquino administration, the incumbent President Duterte, has been taking a more reconciliatory approach towards China, which has raised concern regarding bilateral ties with Japan (Trinidad 2017, p. 624; De Castro 2017). In addition, due to the personalized nature of the Philippine presidential system and the evident
observation, that the current President harbors resentment towards the US, there is uncertainty of how it will ultimately effect the triangular relations between the Philippines, the US and Japan (Trinidad 2017, pp. 625, 629). That being said, so far in light of the statistical data utilized in this thesis, the newly found reconciliation between Manila and Beijing has yet to manifest into anything substantial, in terms of development aid and investments. Despite promises of a ‘golden era’ in Sino-Philippine relations and remarkable investments from China, as of 2017, the largest foreign investors to the Philippines were; Japan, Taiwan and Singapore (Heydarian 2018b; Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 2017, p. 7).

To conclude, despite much concern among many analysts, the Duterte presidency does not seem to have caused any change or realignment in the status quo of Japan-Philippines relations so far. Such concerns were raised due to Duterte’s pivot to China and apparent break-up with the Philippine traditional alliance with the US. However, despite the fact that Japan has a close alliance with the latter, it does not seem to have had an effect on Japan’s relations with the Philippines, according to media and foreign ministry publications. On a contrary note, Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte seem to have a rather excellent rapport, as demonstrated by the latter’s declaration of a “golden age [for] our Strategic Partnership” (Presidential Communications Operations Office 2017). Overall, the bilateral development cooperation which encompasses peacebuilding, reconstruction of Marawi, infrastructure projects and the capacity enhancement of the Philippine Navy and coast guard, appear to be the most prominent factor in the contemporary bilateral relations.
3.9 Summary

The year 2014 marked the 50th anniversary of Japan-Philippines development cooperation, while 2016 on the other hand, marked the 60th anniversary of JOCV activities on the ground in the Philippines (NEDA et al. 2016). Based on the recognition of these milestones in the bilateral development cooperation, one can conclude that, the cooperation has withstood the test of time and the challenges caused by the radical changes in the government and the political system in the Philippines. In other words, the cooperation has withstood the Marcos regime, Marshall Law, the corruption scandal, the turmoil of democratization and the recent geopolitical uncertainty brought about by the recent change of Presidential leadership in Manila.

Japan’s ODA to the Philippines initially emerged as mere war reparations, but it developed through the decades into a multifaceted and comprehensive bilateral development cooperation scheme. Just as Japan’s ODA policy as a whole, also bilaterally vis-à-vis the Philippines, the program has transformed considerably over the decades while its core and ideology still hold many of its original ideas and norms. Just as the terminology has begun to shift from ODA to development cooperation, which emphasizes donor-recipient reciprocity, so has the Philippines provided humanitarian assistance to Japan in a time of crisis (Great East Japan Earthquake). Currently, Japan’s ODA to the Philippines has become increasingly holistic, as it encompasses both traditional fields of development cooperation such as; infrastructure development, DRRM, grassroots volunteering, and the more unorthodox fields such as; peacebuilding and security and defense cooperation.

4.0 Frames and Policy Implementation

This chapter of the thesis will utilize frame analysis methodology initially to recognize the dominant frames in the founding document of Japan’s contemporary ODA policy. To be precise, the document in question is the Development Cooperation Charter released by the MOFA of Japan in 2015 and approved by the Cabinet of Japan. Secondly, the chapter will compare the extracted frames and their implications with the ODA policy application in the Philippines through, referring to findings from the other chapters of this thesis and through research of official documentation and statistics.
Such an analysis is important in regards to the first research question of this thesis, which set out to explore, how well do the values, basic policies and goals of the Charter align with the actual implementation of Japan’s ODA in the Philippines. However, prior to exploring the framing in the Charter, one must initially analyze and define what the values, goals and basic policies of the Charter exactly are.

### 4.1 Values, Goals and Basic Policies

The value base in the Charter can be extracted via a careful analysis of the Charter, while taking into consideration the previous discussions and developments in the history of Japan’s ODA, which were discussed in detail in section 2 of this thesis. Moreover, the general trends and changes in history and the international system, such as the oil crisis and the increasing globalization in contemporary times, have undoubtedly had an effect on the value base of the Charter and consequently, on Japan’s ODA policy as a whole. The effect of self-perceived history is evident in the Charter’s philosophy section (MOFA 2015, pp. 2-4) for instance, which justifies Japan’s involvement in assisting developing nations, on the basis of its track record as a successful Asian nation that has managed to overcome grave challenges during its modernization, while continuing to do so, in regards to its demographic challenges, among other contemporary issues.

Meanwhile, the philosophy section also makes the case for Japan as a responsible actor in international relations, an actor which, promotes and values an international system based on international law and universal values. In regards to the latter, these are arguably the values of the liberal democratic system, in other words, so-called western values. Since joining the Colombo Plan in 1954, Japan has been a consistent provider of ODA to the developing world for more than 60 years now (ibid. p. 3). Based on this recognition and legacy, the Charter asserts that Japan’s efforts in development cooperation are much respected in the international community and, there is no indication of reprioritization of Japan’s ODA in the near future. In reference to the aforementioned details, one can conclude that, values such as responsibility and self-help form the core for Japan’s ODA’s value base.

In regards to the basic policies in the Charter, which further articulate the philosophy behind Japan’s ODA, there are three in total. The first one essentially frames development cooperation with pacifism, in line with the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9, albeit without the newest re-interpretations implemented by the Abe administration.
In verbatim, the policy is titled with the following words: “Contributing to peace and prosperity through cooperation for non-military purposes” (ibid. p. 4). The description of the policy makes the common appeal to Japan’s post World War II history as a pacifist nation, and to its image as a responsible and peaceful international actor. Perhaps most interestingly, in addition to contributing ODA for military purposes of any kind, the Charter also forbids the aggravation of international conflicts through its ODA. However, as discussed in Chapter 3.7 for instance, as Japan has been assisting the Philippine navy and the PCG by donating vessels and radar equipment for instance, in some capacity, this can be interpreted as aggravating the territorial dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Consequently, depending on the interpretation of this basic policy, there appears to be some breach of it in Japan’s implementation of ODA to the Philippines.

The second basic policy in the Charter is the promotion of human security, which is described as the founding principle of Japan’s ODA policy. As has been extensively discussed in this thesis, the Japan-Philippines development cooperation is rife with projects and forms of development assistance, which can effortlessly be seen as, contributing towards human security in the Philippines. Japan’s involvement in the peacebuilding process in Mindanao, in the reconstruction of the city of Marawi, in DRRM efforts and the assistance of JOCVs in boosting the livelihoods of rural Filipino cattle owners, are all great clear-cut examples discussed in this thesis. Even the more traditional JICA projects, such as the MMSP, have substantial potential in improving the human security in Metro Manila, due to its ability upon completion to, curve the costs and economic losses caused by traffic congestion in addition to, improving the productivity of the workforce and thus, contributing towards the aim of “freedom from want”.

Since human security focuses on the level of the individual and since the basic policy mandates that, Japan should especially cater towards vulnerable individuals, such as; indigenous peoples and the internally-displaced people through its ODA, this also needs to be addressed. In the case of the Philippines, Japan’s support and training provided for the ARMM government in Mindanao, as discussed in Chapter 3.3, can be seen by an extension to be working towards this goal. However, it hardly qualifies as the grassroots level approach that is necessary for truly embracing human security in ODA implementation. On the other hand, the GGP schemes that the JICA has established in collaboration with Japanese NGOs in the Philippines do in fact certainly
embody the grassroots level approach. The same is certainly through in regards to the JOCV program.

The third basic policy in the Charter is articulated in the following manner: “Cooperation aimed at self-reliant development through assistance for self-help efforts as well as dialogue and collaboration based on Japan’s experience and expertise (ibid.)”. In this basic policy, one can notice the convergence of the self-help principle and Japan’s own developmental history in the 20th century. In regards to the former, the MMSP, which is undoubtedly the most ambitious and extensive JICA funded project in the Philippines, was planned and promoted by DOTR to the JICA (DOTR & JICA 2017, p. 3), which is the standard and traditional way of procedure in Japan’s ODA. Furthermore, as the construction contract for the MMSP was granted to a consortium of Japanese construction and urban rail transport companies (Caraballo 2018), it displays a public-private partnership based on Japan’s development experience and know-how. Such a close and convenient collaboration between the public and private sector on developmental infrastructure projects is surely controversial, but on the other hand, in consideration of Japan’s track record in infrastructure building, such an arrangement can gain some legitimacy. Moreover, from the point of view of the change in lexicon and overall narrative over ODA internationally, increasingly focusing reciprocal cooperation, such a public-private partnership creates economic benefits for both the provider and the recipient nation of ODA.

Finally, the goals of Japan’s ODA as defined by the Charter need to be identified and discussed. Although, the Charter does not specifically refer to any particular goals per say, the priority issues chapter following the philosophy section, appears to be the most goal oriented in its narrative (MOFA 2015, pp. 5-7). It is divided into three parts concerning: poverty alleviation through quality growth, universal values and addressing global challenges. In regards to quality growth, the goal of Japan’s ODA is to support the kind of growth, which can withstand the challenges of economic crisis, natural disasters and which does not lead to widening economic inequality or to the unsustainable (unharmonious) use of natural resources.

In consideration of the Japanese ODA model and history, which has been discussed in detail prior in this thesis, it is fair to claim that when it comes to poverty alleviation per say, Japan’s ODA program is concerned with the long term solutions to poverty, instead of short sighted humanitarianism with no long term strategy. In other words, focusing on improving basic and key infrastructure is perhaps the most important policy to implement in a developing economy, in order to support economic
growth, productivity and in order to attract foreign investments. Furthermore, in consideration of the MMSP for instance, such an infrastructure project has an immense potential not just in the economic sense, but also in improving the quality of daily life for the residents and commuters in the extremely congested capital region. Consequently, such utilitarian infrastructure projects also contribute to the human security of the local residents, in addition to, alleviating air pollution.

The universal values in the Charter consist of rule of law, democracy, respect for basic human rights and freedom, to name a few as, an exhaustive list is not provided in the Charter (MOFA 2015, p. 6). Obviously, these terms are consistent with what are commonly known as ‘western values’, which are arguably the staple of post-World War II Japan’s public and general diplomacy narrative. In consideration of these universal values, it is a straightforward procedure to connect the dots between the values, human security and Japan’s support for peacebuilding in Mindanao. Since the final chapter in this section of the Charter concerns global issues and the global commons, the author has decided to exclude it from the analysis since; it is not clearly relevant in this context of bilateral analysis.

Besides, in retrospect of the pre- and post-democratization era in the Philippines vis-à-vis Japan’s ODA to the country, one can clearly see that the embracement and implementation of universal values has not always been a consistent feature in Japan-Philippines development cooperation. A case in point was Japan’s consistent support to the Marcos regime in the 1970s and until 1986 in the Philippines. Already prior to the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos and the subsequent ODA embezzlement scandal of 1986, ODA provision to the undemocratic regime was already deemed unethical by opposition politicians in Japan (Orr 1990, p. 82). Consequently, one can conclude that the embracement of universal values has come about through the codification of values, goals, ideology and basic policies of Japan’s ODA, in other words, through the release of the ODA Charter and its subsequent revisions since 1992.

Overall, the goals and policy projections in the Charter encompass an immense range of fields and issues. For instance, in addition to the quintessential fields of Japan’s ODA such as support for infrastructural development, it pledges to assist developing countries, either bilaterally or multilaterally, in tackling climate change, organized crime, loss of biodiversity and so on. In addition, the Charter pledges to assist developing nations in improving women’s rights, rule of law and the judicial system, food and nutrition and in anti-corruption measures, among other fields (MOFA 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, these aforementioned examples are not exhaustive list of policy goals
instead; they barely scratch the surface of the Charter. As a consequence, even as a foundational document for a major player in the international donor community, it lacks realism and credibility in its scope for development cooperation to be a realistic founding document for national ODA policy.

Consequently, the author proposes that the true purpose of the Development Cooperation Charter and its earlier revisions from recent decades is not to be an exhaustive policy document in the true sense of the term instead; it acts as a statement of purpose for the international donor community. This assertion helps to explain why, despite the consistent lobbying efforts of Japanese developmental NGOs, the country’s ODA policy, still lacks a concrete judicial basis. In addition, as discussed in the history section of this thesis, the original ODA Charter of 1992 was composed and released as a consequence of strong criticisms towards Japan’s ODA practices and implementation from the international donor community and organizations.

In regards to the second research question, which dealt with the normative and progressive concept of human security, frame analysis can also be used as a methodological tool to find correlation and answers to it. In order to find out the concrete manifestations of human security in Japan’s development cooperation with the Philippines, one must initially explore, how the concept is framed in the official governmental discourse and how that correlates with the grassroots reality on the ground. Since the ultimate goal of this thesis is to compare the visions and ideals of a policy projection to the reality in the field where the policy is implemented in, identifying and analyzing the frames associated with these ideals is critically important. By doing so, the researcher is able to identify the associated context of an issue and thus, determine the true motivations and aspirations of policymakers behind it.

When it comes to frame analysis as a research methodology, it can be defined in the following way: “an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and can be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations” (der Veen 2011, p. 29). In other words, when observing matters through an ideology or simply through an idea or a specific subject or problem, the view that can be deducted differs greatly from that of using another frame of interpretation.
4.2 Introduction to Frame Analysis

Generally speaking, development cooperation policies (in other words, aid policies) of various donor countries, can be framed in numerous ways, as demonstrated by author der Veen’s work (2011, pp. 77-109). Der Veen’s research analyzed the aid policies of several European donor countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, by comparing the dominance of specific frames through which, aid policy discussion and policy making in each country is framed with. He achieved this by analyzing the debates over annual aid budgets in the national parliaments of said European countries and by consequently, coding them for further synthesis. The frames that der Veen’s research came up with were the following: security, power, wealth, enlightened self-interest, reputation, obligation and humanitarianism (ibid. pp. 57). The central claim of the book can be summarized as the following; different donor countries have a different frame dominating the aid discourse and parliamentary discussions, however, it is by no means the only frame in the discourse and it can also change or evolve over time (ibid. p. 5).

As this thesis and der Veen’s work both share the same methodology namely, frame analysis, the author will create a similar set of frames for the analysis of contemporary Japan-Philippines development cooperation.

Since this thesis also engages in a field of research called policy assessment, some notes need to be made about the field itself, and how it relates to the research at hand. Policy assessment, as it is commonly understood, can give policymakers and researchers valuable insights into the successes and failures of implemented policies, through the application of analytical tools. Consequently, it can also enhance rational decision-making at the expense of biased and short sighted policy decisions (Adelle & Weiland 2012, p. 26). In essence, the kind of policy assessment that this thesis is focusing on, is the kind between the stated aims and the on-the-ground implementation of the policy (ibid. p. 30). The aforementioned style of policy assessment fits with both research questions of this thesis and thus, it is a valid technique to employ. When used in tandem with frame analysis, policy assessment can demonstrate the material realities regarding the issue, while frame analysis can reveal the context and the association of fields, ideology and ideals in policy decisions.

In general, the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter has exceedingly broad policy guidelines and rules of conduct. The rules evidently have a basis in national ethics or in the values of contemporary Japanese government and society. An example of this is the pacifism in the Charter, although a right to help allies in need militarily is
reserved to protect national welfare of ODA recipient countries, or in the case of disaster relief purposes (MOFA 2015, pp. 10-11). Consequently, from this one can synthesize the frame of pacifism (one of the quintessential foundations of modern Japan’s foreign policy) and as a relative newcomer in ODA framework, securitization. However, it is worth pointing out that, in the 2003 revision of the ODA Charter, the degree of pacifism was absolute, in other words, there was no clause of assisting ODA recipient nations militarily, in any shape or form (MOFA 2003, p.5). In addition, the importance of Japan’s own development experience as the first developed nation in Asia is also clearly visible in the Charter (MOFA 2015, pp. 3, 4, 10). This frame shall be referred to as the Development History Frame (DHF).

As the naming of the Charter changed from revision II (Development Assistance Charter, 2003) to the revision III (Development Cooperation Charter, 2015) it implies that, the 2015 Charter is considerably more multilateral and cooperative in comparison to its predecessor. The general evolution of terminology regarding ODA in the international context is an interesting phenomenon when it comes to frames that can be perceived from it. The terms ‘foreign aid’, ‘ODA’ and ‘development cooperation’ all carry connotations, which can reveal their framing by the user, policymaker and other actors.

Generally speaking, the use of the term ‘development cooperation’ has become increasingly common and politically correct in the modern era, not just in Japan’s official communiqué, but also in that of other major donor countries and international organizations. This shift in lexicon globally reflects the change in attitudes towards aid among donor countries, which emphasizes a more equal and reciprocal relationship, rather than the one-way donor-recipient mentality (Glennie 2011).

Upon carefully reading through the Charter, one can rather easily get the impression that the international system, and consequently the foreign policy of Japan, is clearly at a crossroads, at least in regards to its ODA policy. Based on this realization, one can synthesize the frame of cooperatism, which clearly indicates a sense of reform as, Japan has been criticized in the past of being excessively bilateral (strictly donor-recipient) in its development cooperation. This includes domestic criticisms of the MOFA, as it is the ministry most responsible for Japan’s ODA policy (Hirata 2002, pp. 128-153). However, this development has come about rather unsurprisingly, as the trajectory in the development of Japan’s ODA policy has clearly indicated, since the 2000s, to be of increasing multilateral cooperation, especially when it comes to cooperation with Japanese NGOs (ibid.). Furthermore, the 2015 ODA Charter clearly
recognizes that the strict donor-recipient model of development cooperation is no longer feasible in the modern era, due to globalization and internationalization of NGOs, local governments and the private sector (MOFA 2015, p. 1). Consequently, the frame of cooperatism is very prominent in the charter and it seemingly redefines the charter, due to its title change.

In regards to the frame of securitization, there is an interesting reference to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 in the Charter (ibid.). Upon investigation of the NSS document itself, the increasing strategic use of ODA becomes apparent, as it is recognized as a policy area, which has an effect on the national security of Japan (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013, pp. 2, 30-32). In the case of the Philippines, the securitization and strategic uses of ODA are both clearly identifiable in both Japan’s ODA policy implementation and in the bilateral relations in general. This security cooperation dates back to 2013, when Filipino and Japanese diplomats and marine officers held a meeting in Manila to discuss mutual cooperation in the South China Sea. During the same year, Japan made the donation of 10 patrol vessels via its ODA program to the PCG, which demonstrated the rapprochement between the former enemies of World War II (Trajano 2013; Zhang et al. 2017, p. 72).

The most prominent factor behind the securitization of ODA and bilateral ties with the Philippines obviously, derives from the territorial disputes and the increasing aggressiveness and assertiveness of China’s maritime expansionism in the East- and South China Seas. At the same time however, there are also more existential security reasons for the increasing security cooperation in the South China Sea with the Philippines and other ASEAN allies. As a consequence of the importance of the Luzon Strait (situated north of the Philippine main island), to the oil and gas imports to Japan, it is of paramount importance to secure the safe passage of vessels through the strait and consequently, to keep geopolitical tension and threats like piracy off the region. Enhancing the security capabilities of ASEAN and South China Sea nations, prominently Vietnam and the Philippines, is a logical step in this trajectory.

Due to the prominence and importance of human security, poverty eradication, peacekeeping and disaster relief in the Charter (MOFA 2015, pp. 4, 5, 13), the frame of humanitarianism can be extracted from its text. Ever since the original ODA Charter of 1992, Japanese ODA has started to incorporate more humanitarian forms of aid, which can also be described as “software aid”. Fujisaki (et al. 1997 p. 519) have discussed this shift in Japan’s ODA policy in detail and they define software aid as the following: “assistance for human resource development and institutional building in economic and
social development”. As has been discussed in earlier sections of this thesis, Japan’s ODA prior to the 1990s and the subsequent release of the original Charter, was heavily dominated by what can be described in this context as ‘hardware aid’, in other words, large material infrastructure projects. Consequently, whether this is the case in the context of contemporary ODA to the Philippines will be discussed in the following chapter.

4.3 Analysis

As the initial frame that has been extracted, a discussion of pacifism in regards to the Japan-Philippines development cooperation shall now commence. The Government of Japan follows a philosophy called proactive pacifism, which the Ministry of Defense defines as: “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation”. Besides, this same definition is also reiterated in the Charter as well (Weston 2014, p. 169; MOFA 2015, p.1). The 2015 ODA Charter recognizes that peace, security and stability are prerequisites for development and nation-building (MOFA 2015, p. 6). Likewise, it promises for Japan to provide seamless assistance for both peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance, encompassing fields such as; conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance for refugees and internationally displaced people, reconstruction of social and human capital and the restoration of governance functions (ibid.). The aforementioned fields do not constitute an exhaustive list of the fields in the Charter’s pledge towards “realizing a peaceful and secure society”, (ibid.) however, already these fields scope Japan’s peacebuilding and post-conflict efforts far and wide, which is a common theme in the Charter and it makes Japan’s ODA policy projection seem considerably ambitious, or even excessively so.

As discussed in Chapter 3.3, Japan’s peacebuilding efforts have largely concentrated on the high profile level of cooperation and on supporting negotiations with the Government of the Philippines, the ARMM and lastly, with the MILF. Since human security focuses on the level of the individual in contrast to the societal and other collective levels of security, there is some theoretical inconsistency with the aforementioned approach. Moreover, when considering the incredibly broad policy projections in the Charter on which, Japan’s peacebuilding and ODA as a whole should be based on, it is very challenging and perhaps even unfeasible to assess and compare all the minor sub-policy projections of the Charter. Consequently, the conclusion
presented earlier in the thesis, which speculated that the Charter is more of a normative and ideological document, rather than one to be assessed literally, fits the context here also.

One of the best illustrations of Japan’s cooperation and contribution to peace internationally, through its ODA, is no doubt its involvement in the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3, Japan has took part in the IMT, provided training and assistance to the ARMM government officials, sent ODA and JICA personnel to the minority region, and acted as a host in the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines. As the Charter also emphasizes post-conflict support, it is difficult to assess the success of Japan’s efforts regarding it as, there does not appear to be a clear consensus on whether it is over and settled or not. Consequently, in this regard it is not possible to assess the matter besides, the historical main opponents, which are the Government of the Philippines and the MILF, have finalized peace negotiations successfully very recently in 2018 and thus, it is too early to make conclusions regarding Japan’s peacebuilding efforts on the matter. In addition, since there are additional entities opposing the Philippine government such as the Abu Sayyaf terror group and groups affiliated with the Islamic State, the endgame for the conflict has become increasing muddled.

Based on the scope and primary source data utilized in this thesis, there appears to be a clear lack of grassroots assistance on the part of the JICA, which as mentioned earlier, does not quite align with the ideals of human security. On the other hand, it does align with proactive pacifism while lacking in the grassroots level of the individual. Nevertheless, Japan’s support for the peace process has been remarkable in the sense that, it has taken place outside of the US-Japan security alliance and the UN peacekeeping framework.

In regards to the DHF, finding a straight correlation in Japan-Philippines development cooperation implementation is not that straightforward. As discussed in Chapter 2.1 of this thesis, Japan’s ODA model, which emphasizes loan aid instead of grant aid, mirrors Japan’s own experience as a developing nation, as the country utilized WB loans to improve its key intercity and urban infrastructure, which was followed by a timely payback of said loans enabled by the rapid economic growth. The Sino-Japanese development cooperation trajectory has followed a very similar path with equal economic growth conditions, infrastructure improvements and loan repayments (Drifte 2008). However, in regards to the SEA ODA recipient nations such as the Philippines, it is difficult to make a similar conclusion at this stage, as their development level is still
far below that of China, which is now widely considered a middle income country, rather than a still developing one. Consequently, one must utilize the data and conditions present currently in the Japan-Philippines development cooperation in order to make any conclusions using this frame.

That being said, in many ways the development trajectory of the Philippines follows a similar path in comparison to the recently concluded Sino-Japanese development cooperation. In other words, in exclusion of peacebuilding, volunteerism and other humanitarian and software aid efforts, infrastructure is a very prominent form of bilateral development cooperation. Since geographically the Philippines consists of more than 7000 islands, which has both historically and contemporarily hampered economic growth and development of the nation, the development of basic infrastructure is of utmost importance. This issue is further compounded by the large population, its growth trajectory and the nation’s critical vulnerability to various natural disasters.

Despite all the enormous challenges caused by geographic, environmental, fiscal and economic factors, since 2010, the Philippine economy has been growing at an impressive speed of approximately 6% annually, which has put it in the same growth league as India and China among the Asian economies. Moreover, the Philippine economy came out largely unaffected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, as well as the global financial crisis of 2008. In addition, the Philippines has emerged in recent years as a major hub for the BPO of services, in strong competition with India for the regional, if not the global leading spot in the industry (Clarete et al. 2018. pp. 2, 3, 6).

Consequently, since 1969 the JICA has been consistently providing ODA loans and technical assistance for the improvement of intercity and interisland road networks, in addition to the national energy grid, renewable energy production and so on (JICA 2014, pp. 68-76). Thus, as discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, the Philippines as guided through its development cooperation with Japan, is following a similar strategy of improving key infrastructure in order to facilitate economic growth and increased prosperity in the Philippine archipelago. However, whether the Government of the Philippines can assert similar fiscal responsibility as Japan did in relation to its WB loans in the 1960s, is another matter entirely, but nevertheless, an integral part of the Japanese development history and thus the frame also. Furthermore, since the per capita baseline income and level of development are hardly the same in the development trajectories of these two nations, it would not be an entirely fair comparison.
To recap, the frame of humanitarianism in relation to the Charter and the Japan-Philippines development cooperation, most prominently, encompasses the following fields and ideas: human security, poverty eradication, peacekeeping and disaster relief. Due to the prominence, ideological and philosophical basis that human security plays in the Charter and in the contemporary foreign policy of Japan in general, it is best to start the analysis with that concept. Firstly, in the Charter’s basic policies, the promotion of human security is displayed very prominently and it is described in the following way:

“Human security - a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment - is the guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan's development cooperation. Japan will thus focus its development cooperation on individuals - especially those liable to be vulnerable such as children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, refugees and internally-displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - and provide cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security. (MOFA 2015, p. 4)”

As a consequence of the basic policy as stated above, human security as a theoretical concept encompasses fields such as poverty reduction and disaster relief, due to its broadly sweeping scale and definitions that can be broadly interpreted. Thus, in order to simplify the analysis and correspondence of the policy projection with the policy implementation, the author will use the concept synonymously with the concept of humanitarianism.

When considering the 2017 statistics of ODA transfers to the Philippines, the proportion of loans for infrastructure development from all donor countries and organizations amounted to more than half of the entire annual portfolio (52%, 6.42 billion USD) (NEDA 2017, p. 1). Meanwhile, 42% of the total loans portfolio came from the JICA (5.17 billion USD). Moreover, the majority of JICA loan provisions listed in the report are related to various flagship infrastructure projects such as: the MMSP (Phase 1), agrarian infrastructure, expressway, mass-transit capacity enhancement and the New Bohol Airport construction project, among other examples (ibid. pp. 40, 45, 59). Consequently, these findings indicate the dominance of hardware aid instead of software aid in bilateral development cooperation with the Philippines. These findings demonstrate that, the degree of a fundamental transformation in Japan’s ODA policy, so as framed in the Charter, does not quite match its implementation in the Philippines.
However, due to the broad definition of human security and its implications, it is ultimately a matter of argumentation whether this ultimately is the case or not.

Meanwhile, the frame of securitization is a covert one as it is not explicitly stated in the Charter, but rather, a possibility for it is left open. Moreover, as there is growing data indicating that securitization in regards to ODA to the Philippines is indeed occurring (Gronning 2018, pp. 538, 544; De Castro 2017, p. 40; Trinidad 2017, p. 614; Gaens 2015, p. 5); such a frame can be extracted from the Charter and used in analysis. As discussed earlier in this chapter and in chapters 3.7 and 3.8, Japan’s provision of coastal radar, patrol vessels to the PCG and navy provide evidence for the concrete application of securitization in Japan-Philippines development cooperation. On the other hand, as securitization, especially through the ODA framework clashes with the Charter’s initial pacifistic basic policy and consequently, this makes securitization the most controversial frame in this analysis.

In regards to the frame of cooperatism as discussed in Chapter 3.4, in the field of DRRM, the degree of multilateral cooperation in Japan’s ODA to the Philippines is arguably the highest. Both the mainline and the special cooperative programs of the JICA collaborate in the field with the following organizations, both of Japanese and of Filipino origin: LGUs, NGOs, universities, People’s Organizations and private companies. In comparison to the traditional model of Japan’s ODA, which operated and conducted projects bilaterally with recipient government departments while shunning a multilateral approach; this is a significant and noteworthy change. However, in regards to infrastructure projects, such as the MMSP, the traditional bilateral collaboration model still persists.

### 4.4 Summary

In order to provide answers to the initial research question, this analytical chapter of the thesis has taken a look at the basic policies, goals and values of the ODA Charter, and found alignments and misalignments between them and the ODA policy implementation in the Philippines. In regards to the basic policies, this chapter has identified the following: “contributing to peace and prosperity through cooperation for non-military purposes” (MOFA 2015, p. 4), promotion of human security, and a final policy, which can be described as the fusion of the DHF and the self-help philosophy. In regards to the former basic policy, it has been identified to be in conflict with the relatively recent form of development cooperation with the Philippines, in other words,
with the securitization and defense cooperation. In regards to the frames identified in the Charter, the same notion manifests as a dichotomy between the frame of pacifism and that of securitization. The former is based on the philosophy of proactive pacifism, which together with human security, are the foundations of Japan’s contemporary ODA policy. Meanwhile, securitization on the other hand, is not officially recognized in the Charter while it is nevertheless taking place bilaterally between Japan and the Philippines. While not concretely stated in the Charter, the securitization of Japan’s ODA is mentioned in the NSS document. In addition, the concrete manifestations of securitization can also be considered violating the Charter in the sense that, they can be interpreted as aggravating the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China on the South China Sea.

When it comes to the frames of pacifism and human security, Japan’s peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao have been identified, as having more alignment with (proactive) pacifism, rather than with human security. This conclusion is based on the fact that, the former’s level of operation correlates more with Japan’s de facto involvement in the peace process, rather than with the grassroots individual security level of human security. Alternatively, human security and the grassroots level approach do manifest prominently in other fields of Japan’s ODA implementation in the Philippines (DRRM, JOCV activities, rebuilding of Marawi and so on), although the public-private partnership and bilateral approach in infrastructure development is still the mainstay of Japan’s ODA implementation. However, due to the broad definition of human security, even hardware aid such as infrastructure, can be interpreted as promoting it.

In regards to the DHF, the Japan-Philippines development cooperation and the development of the Philippines as a whole, is essentially following a similar trajectory as those from recent and more distant history, namely, the development trajectories of Japan and China. Then again, as the frame also implies fiscal responsibility, that remains to be seen, as it relies on the current growth trajectory continuing into the future. Currently, the utilization of concessional loans from Japan and other ODA providers for the improvement of basic and fundamentally necessary infrastructure is a sound national economic development strategy by any measure.

The frame of cooperatism has brought about a paradigm shift in Japan’s ODA policy, which is a global phenomenon among donor nations. In contrast to the past, MOFA and JICA have embraced cooperatism in both ODA policy and its implementation, at least to a certain degree. In the context of the Philippines, this
paradigm shift has been most notable in DRRM efforts and in general collaboration with NGOs. On the other hand, infrastructure projects are still managed on a donor-recipient governmental basis. In regards to the value base of the Charter, it can be defined as a combination of universal values, self-help and responsibility, while the introduction of the former is a relatively recent phenomenon, as demonstrated by Japan’s conduct of ODA to the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s. In consideration of the weak state of infrastructure in the Philippines and the Duterte administration’s ambitions infrastructure building program, which has been long overdue for decades, the embrace of self-help and responsibility on the ODA recipient side seems to be occurring.

5. Conclusions

Over the past 60 years, Japan’s ODA program has developed from war reparations into a comprehensive development cooperation scheme encompassing unorthodox fields, such as; peacebuilding and securitization. Through the decades it has gone through several distinct phases, which have been influenced by changes in the international system, outside pressure and the US-Japan Security Alliance, among other factors. The most noteworthy change to Japan’s ODA policy took place through the release of the first ODA Charter in 1992, which laid down the ideological foundations for the policy. The subsequent revisions of the ODA Charter in 2003 and 2015 have taken the policy towards a more radical direction, through adopting human security as the guiding principle of Japan’s ODA. Furthermore, the most recent revision of the Charter from 2015, which was renamed as the Development Cooperation Charter, also emphasizes multilateral cooperation and reciprocity in ODA policy. Despite these seemingly radical changes, the underlying core values and the mainstay of Japan’s ODA, which is large scale infrastructure construction projects, have largely remained intact.

The Philippines has been a recipient of Japan’s ODA since its inception and contemporarily, the bilateral development cooperation encompasses a wide range of different fields, including: DRRM, peacebuilding, infrastructure improvement and capacity enhancement for the PCG and navy. The overall bilateral relations have become increasingly multifaceted due to the implementation of JPEPA, increasing bilateral movement of labor and the strategic partnership between Japan and the Philippines. Through utilizing policy and frame analysis, this thesis has made the
conclusion that, Japan’s peacebuilding efforts regarding the Mindanao conflict have been more aligned with proactive pacifism, rather than with human security. However, other fields related to Japan’s ODA implementation in the Philippines, namely; DRRM and the discussed JOCV activities have been positively identified as contributing towards human security. On the other hand, the securitization of ODA has been noted to be in conflict with the initial basic policy in the Charter, as well as, with its pacifistic framing. Furthermore, the values in the Charter have become increasingly aligned with the ODA implementation firstly, due to the codification of the values of the ODA program into the ODA Charters and secondly, due to a new emphasis by the recipient government. Meanwhile, cooperatism is identified having the most prominent manifestations in DRRM and in collaboration with NGOs, while being the weakest in infrastructure projects.

Finally, the thesis has identified issues with the Charter’s policy projections as well, which originate from the documents extremely broad guidelines, goals and ambitions. The author has asserted that, in order to appear more realistic and credible as a foundational document for ODA policy, it ought to be simplified to a considerable degree. The fact that the Charter remains to lack a judicial basis further supports the author’s conclusion. In addition, due to the broadly interpretable definitions for human security provided not just by the MOFA, but also by the UN, for the purposes of policy analysis, it can be either convenient or inconvenient for the researcher.

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