THREE-DIMENSIONAL NATIONALISM

A Conceptual Approach

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The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.
This thesis presents a three-dimensional approach of visualising and examining the phenomenon of nationalism. In this view, nationalism is seen as a modern social construction which can be subjected to critical analysis. By identifying the three respective dimensions of psychological, political, and discursive of nationalism, it is possible to create a framework with which to delve deeper into the concepts, ideas, and notions that nationalism portrays, and study the phenomenon in a more holistic manner.

The psychological dimension is the basis for concepts such as identity, ethnicity, and culture, which were found to be of key importance to nationalism. By itself, these concepts are not enough to constitute as nationalism but require a political component to make it so. This is why the political dimension is needed as it provides nationalism with such concepts as self-determination, rights, state, and sovereignty. In the third, discursive, dimension the ideas stemming from the other two are compiled and compressed into a single nationalism that can be presented as a narrative to the public arena.

With the framework the thesis presented, nationalism was found to operate in both of the realms of pluralism and monism. As the different sort of nationalisms offer people normative notions about living, behaving and thinking, they draw from the infinite pool of possible ideas and try to fuse them into a single worldview i.e. ideology that is then imposed on to the public.

With the help of the framework which this thesis argues for, it can now be studied, just what sort of a life nationalism wants people to live, and how problematic or unproblematic such a life possibly is.

Keywords: nationalism, concept analysis, ideology, discourse, identity, culture, state, democracy
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1 INTRODUCTION

Ours is a world of nations, there is no doubt. But its driving force, nationalism, has nowadays become a heavily loaded term which can be used in a myriad of ways: as a pejorative to something to be enthusiastic about; or as an insult as well as compliment. While in reality, nationalism is actually in itself a neutral term, as it is essentially nothing more than a socially constructed phenomenon. It is us humans that adjoin different meanings to it as well as experience these meanings in the pluralist way we do. This is what allows it to be all of the things mentioned above while still being none of them. It is also not to be blamed or unrequitedly demonised, even if its extremely intricate and complicated nature allows it to be used as an instrument of manipulation, crude simplification and bigotry. What must be criticised is how nationalism is framed and used by those using it, and not the phenomenon itself. Although one can, of course, criticise the reasons for its prominence and mishandling. Nevertheless, to demonise the phenomenon without understanding its true nature and thus disconnect it from societal and political life would equate with missing the mark completely.

With the current march of right-wing populism that has been thriving for the better part of a decade now, at least in a European context, nationalism is seen somewhat restrictive. Stemming from these populist movements right-wing nationalists have virtually single-handedly appropriated the term for their own usage while media has done nothing but aiding them in their task, especially when it comes to dealing with the issue of ‘ethno-nationalism’. However, this is only one part of the equation. In essence, nationalism as a phenomenon functions as a tool for forming, maintaining, and transforming a collective of people that has political goals through nationalist argumentation.

Whether or not you accept that nationalism is on the rise it certainly is not going anywhere. We cannot turn a blind eye to the utilisation and manipulation of nationalist sentiments, but see them as just one alternative doing politics in a world full of other alternatives. Following Özkırımlı, we must be aware that nationalism does indeed “matter” as it is the “fundamental organizing principle of the interstate
order, as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, as a readily available cognitive and discursive frame, as the taken-for-granted context of everyday life” (2010, 2).

Nationalism by itself amounts to very little as it requires vast amounts of people behind it. But if this is achieved, it possesses enormous potential to be used for achieving goals were they political, economic or some other by nature. Seen this way, nationalism is ultimately a performance and to this performance should the critique be directed to, and not only argue that nationalist claims are always and inherently wrong. On the contrary, the analyst of nationalism must always go deeper than that and this thesis helps doing exactly that by providing a framework and with it a set of tools with which to grasp the concepts required in a holistic understanding of the phenomenon.

This is done by employing concept analysis to identify and clarify the most central notions and ideas that nationalism and its different dimensions consists of, which in turn leads to a more profound understanding of the phenomenon. In the thesis certain seemingly familiar concepts close to the phenomenon of nationalism are examined. They include but are not limited to ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘democracy’, and ‘state’. Doing this in a critical manner allows the revelation of perspectives that might otherwise get lost in the crowd. This approach is thus semiotic by nature as “man [sic] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” (Geertz 1973, 5). We, as humans, create the world around us and perceive it from that perspective, as humans.

To clear the convolution surrounding the phenomenon of nationalism the purpose of this thesis is to examine the research questions of:

1. **what nationalism is;** and
2. **what allows it to be such a varied phenomenon it is.**

This happens by treating nationalism as an analytical category that consists of **three dimensions** with each one having their own concepts, ideas, and notions that answer certain questions which the phenomenon tries to solve for its own purposes. The term ‘dimension’ is chosen as it makes clear the importance of how a vast subject we are dealing with in the first place. The world we inhabit (or at least the
way we perceive it) is not one-dimensional, and so neither is nationalism. The dimensions are the different angles through which we can examine the phenomenon while acknowledging that all these dimensions are required to make up the whole. The thesis thus follows Alexander Herzen in his exhortation to reveal the previously unseen:

People love a neat outward appearance. When it comes to truth, they see only one striking aspect and do not want to see grass growing round the back. But *real truths come only in three dimensions*, all of which are essential. (cited in Kelly 2016, chapter 18; emphasis added)

To achieve this, this thesis offers a novel framework of (a) visualising, and (b) analysing nationalism without the need for unnecessary value-laden qualifications. The visualisation part of this framework is formed by treating the phenomenon as what it is: an extremely complicated social phenomenon. The complexity is concretised by the myriad of definitions that scholars have suggested in their quest to exhaustively explain the phenomenon. What this thesis does in connection to this, is gather the most prominent of these definitions and treat them as the different dimensions of the subject that individually only form a part of the whole and must thus be analysed collectively to understand their interrelation and interdependence to reach a holistic understanding of the phenomenon and its processes altogether. In addition, to reach an understanding that is critical, we must be aware of how nationalism is ultimately a human social construction, an invention, and can thus be analysed critically, i.e. in a manner where nothing is taken for granted, even if (and especially because) it has permeated so much of our social existence.

Nationalism is intrinsically political by nature and as such it can function as an ideology which aim is to get people to think and act in a certain normative manner, which can in turn be analysed critically. The term ‘critically’ here refers to the view of how everything can be thought of having a purpose, i.e. that everything that is said, is said because something is trying to be achieved via this saying. These underlying reasons can then be identified, scrutinised, and analysed. This way, this thesis wants to lift the stigmata out of the social phenomenon of nationalism which in itself as a concept is objectively value-free and neutral, even to the point of being an empty signifier, which draws attention to the ways it can be used, abused, exploited, and taken advantage of.
As nationalism is not in any way ‘natural’ (discussed in section 1.1), required, or even needed in the most existentialist understanding of the word, its impactfulness cannot be contested, however. What must be done, is to examine where its power truly resides and from where it is derived, in addition to why do people attach themselves to it in so vast numbers and why it has become such an instrumental phenomenon in our construction of the social world. With the help of this framework, it is possible to explicate what it is exactly when someone is doing something in the name of nationalism. As stated earlier, very much is done by the right-wing ethno-nationalists but it is certainly not limited to only them. Nationalism is all around us, whether we like it or not, in all spheres of political, social, and domestic life. Because of this it is imperative that we ought to be able to understand it as completely as possible. The point is to “seek to understand the conditions under which they became [and are] central to modern politics and culture” (Özkırımlı 2010, 170).

The scholar and the analysis of nationalism, in an academic setting at least, must also adhere to the proper science making mechanisms, namely impassion and objectivity and this is what Hobsbawm advocates for when he claims that the student of nationalism cannot be a nationalist themselves. The academic study of nationalism is to treat the subject as something to be explained rather than merely criticised or defended. A sense of healthy scepticism about nationalist claims is thus required (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 2) for a clear understanding of nationalism. Only when nothing is taken as a given can we see through the fog and start to make real sense of this complex issue that affects people's lives the way it does and has done since the beginning of the modern era.

This thesis looks at the previous analysis and handling of nationalism in an academic setting via dialectical approach where a thesis is countered with an antithesis which in turn leads to a synthesis that introduces us to new and broader horizons and thus allows for more rigorous and enlightened analysis and scholarly work to be done. The academic discourse around the phenomenon up until now seems to be just trivial bickering about classifications or categorisations and this thesis aims to bridge the gap between these ‘warring’ factions to create a synthesis. In this synthesis is where this thesis’ novel input into academia lies. Although one could
and can choose to emphasise one dimension over the others in their analysis, the interrelation and interdependence of the dimensions cannot be overlooked or denied and must always be taken into account one way or another.

This thesis is not just a review of literature, however, but it also seeks to accommodate the findings of previous research in finding their common thread. By no means is this thesis exhaustive either. No matter how broad a handling we might take, omissions are bound to be made, considering space restrictions and the vast literature about the subject. This selection, while inevitably partial, nevertheless offers a clear reflection of the primary issues and main trends required for a holistic approach of the matter. If discussion about the approach should arise, it can only mean that a nerve has been struck within the subject and further excavation will occur, thus furthering the cause of nationalism studies. The illustrative nature of the approach (see Figure 1) suggested by this thesis enables scholars to start reaching a common ground in understanding the phenomenon and stop beating around the bush.

The purpose of this thesis is thus to position already familiar (although contested) concepts in such a way that the convolution surrounding the phenomenon of nationalism itself would dissipate and allow for more fruitful analysis of this extremely complex issue. The point is to find out and argue what makes nationalism nationalism, what we need to take into consideration when studying it, what is indispensable in it, and what we can say critically about it. Nationalism is such a fluid and dynamic concept that we cannot be complacent in our handling of it as something concrete and absolute. Of course, one must keep in mind that each individual manifestation of nationalism differs from each other, but surely there is something in common to all of them which the framework this thesis advocates for helps in extracting.

The convolution surrounding the term ‘nationalism’ and its use is due to its highly complex nature as a socio-political phenomenon. This complexity is derived from its constituent parts as they are themselves complex as well, and as such they have been used to mean nationalism by themselves. But in a similar fashion of how a wheel is comprised of a tyre and a rim, so is nationalism comprised of its constituent
elements, and what those elements are is what this thesis aims to find. In Figure 1 we can see those elements, their contents, and their relationships explicated.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1.** The three dimensions of nationalism and their relationships.

We will delve further into these dimensions in the upcoming sections of this thesis but a brief introduction is surely in order. As mentioned earlier, nationalism in the most basic understanding of the term is the formation of a political collective through nationalist argumentation. The dimensions presented in Figure 1 correlate with this definition: the collective is shaped in the psychological dimension; what
makes it political is explicated in the political dimension; while the ultimate formation i.e. the choices and decisions, are done in the discursive dimension.

Anthony D. Smith, a well-cited and respected figure in nationalism studies and the late Professor Emeritus of Nationalism and Ethnicity in the London School of Economics, comes close our definition with his definition of nationalism, or actually definitions, which are five in total:

1. “the whole process of forming and maintaining nations;
2. a consciousness of belonging to the nation;
3. a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’;
4. an ideology (including a cultural doctrine of nations);
5. a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize the national will” (1991, 72).

It seems that Smith is unable to provide a single definition and almost opts out of the categorisation process altogether. This only goes to show how complex of an issue nationalism truly is. Still, let us see if we can make Smith’s definitions a bit more focussed, where we would not need five definitions but could do with just one. The first definition of Smith is perhaps the most general and thus, at least seemingly, easiest to understand as it talks about the whole process that goes on between nationalism and nations which reveals an almost teleological connection between them: when nations are under discussion, then surely we must be talking about nationalism. Fair enough, but this does not tell us in the least, what this process is, what it looks like or what it consists of. The remaining four definitions of Smith offer some answers regarding this.

Even if these definitions cannot be separated from nationalism, some of them cannot even be separated from each other. Looking at points 2. and 3. of Smith, we can see that they both have to do with something psychological, i.e. something that goes on in the minds of individuals. The consciousness of belonging to a nation is perhaps not caused but certainly at least aided by the language and symbolism of it. This in turn manifests itself in or as the process of group formation via identity construction and formation. This connection adds to our proposition that one element of nationalism is this psychological dimension.
In connection to this, Smith’s definitions 4. and 5. seem to closely correlate with our political dimension. Through them we can see that nationalism has much to do with politics as it offers itself as an ideology, i.e. something normative to live, think, and act by as well as functioning as movement which has drawn up the goals to achieve. This dimension allows us to view nationalism as something political as it has the potential to affect people’s thinking and behaviour in such a manner which can be quite impactful societally, not least seen in how the world around us is organised through nation-states, for instance. In fact, the political dimension is the element of nationalism that elevates the collective that is identified as the polity of a ‘nation’; into something that is able to achieve something nationalistic, as this always happen via politics.

Now that we have touched on two dimensions of nationalism we can look back at Smith’s first definition that was deemed quite general. But now that we know that in the process of nationalism there is already a psychological and a political dimension, we can start looking in more depth about how these dimensions add to the very formation and maintaining of nations. We can think of this process through the questions the dimensions try to answer. The psychological dimension essentially answers the question “what” as in what the nation is, i.e. what sort of people make up the nation and what is expected of them to be allowed to be a part of it in the first place. In other words, in the psychological dimensions is where the appearance of the nation is defined (discussed in Chapter 2).

The political dimension (discussed in Chapter 3), in turn, answers the question “why” as in why it matters to be a nation as it offers things to achieve just because of the notion that nations should do something about their situation, whether to create their own nation-state or if it already exists, maintain it. What is left unanswered is, then, “where” this all happens which is what the third, discursive dimension of nationalism answers (discussed in Chapter 4). Nationalism is not some chemical compound that hovers around us no matter what, but it is a human construction, an invention, which has its own and varied objectives depending on who is using it. In this way, we can view nationalism as something that is performed and used to affect and even manipulate us as human beings, which happens ultimately through discourse.
Adding further to our proposition of three-dimensional nationalism, John Breuilly, another prominent scholar of nationalism and the current Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity at LSE, has also made an observation of nationalism as a trifecta. His definitions of ‘sentiment’, ‘doctrine’, and ‘political’ (1996, 146) correlate strongly with the dimensions presented in this thesis. The ‘sentiment’ definition is very much in close connection with the psychological dimension this thesis argues for. But the term ‘sentiment’ is lacking as it only stresses the emotions that nationalism evokes in an individual or people, while the term ‘psychological’ emphasises the overall cognitive capabilities of them, cerebral as well as emotive, when it comes to identity construction and group formation. The psychological dimension thus includes the way people think as well as feel and how this is rationalised and ultimately realised in people’s minds.

The political definition of Breuilly logically correlates with the political dimension where the nation’s political roadmap is drawn, while the third definition of the doctrine has much to do with the discursive dimension. It is in the doctrine where it is ultimately decided what to do and how, considering all the options that the two other dimensions feed to the doctrine, and this doctrine is essentially realised discursively because only through language and discourse can the arguments of nationalism make their way into the consciousness of the public.

We are almost ready to start our deeper analysis of the dimensions but before that, let us take one more definition into consideration. Spencer and Wollman have defined nationalism as:

an ideology which imagines the community in a particular way (as national), asserts the primacy of this collective identity over others, and seeks political power in its name, ideally (if not exclusively or everywhere) in the form of a state for the nation (or a nation state) (2002, 3).

This definition further solidifies our three-dimensional proposition. From this quote we can see the three dimensions of nationalism in play. The psychological dimension is connected to the imagined community and its collective identity while the political dimension can be seen in viewing nationalism as an ideology that seeks political power. More implicit is the nature of the third, discursive, dimension but nevertheless, it is there. It is in how these connections between identity and politics
are mediated in such a way that makes it possible to achieve their respective goals and this is done through discourse where the means and possibilities are contested, discussed and put forth in their path to achieve completion.

Drawing from these definitions this thesis is now able to offer its own definition of nationalism as a concept which empirical basis lays in the three-dimensional socio-political phenomenon where groups with distinct national identities aim to advance their political causes to implement change in their corresponding surroundings with the most suitable argumentation considering the context where it is present(ed). With this definition we are now able to move on to examining the phenomenon through the dimensions but not before some theoretical grounding.

1.1 Nationalism as a modern social construct

Before we can start our conceptual analysis of nationalism it must first be established that it certainly can be subjected under such treatment. This is possible because nationalism is a modern, socially constructed phenomenon. It is basically a human invention, to put it simply, as it is solely based on human cognition and action, and as such is constantly transforming (and transformed) and adapting (and adapted). It is modern in the sense that it has only permeated the human race since the 18th century, tied to the process of other modern institutions and systems emerging as well, and socially constructed in the sense that it is an arbitrary human invention meant to aid in visualising and justifying certain systems of existing and co-existing.

Employing a sort of deconstructive view, one way of approaching the analytic properties of nationalism is first to define what it is not, namely primordial or perennial. According to these views, nationalism is something natural, default, or inherent in human life, i.e. that nationalism is something that has always been with us since the dawn of ages and thus will always continue to be. Actually, this primordialist view is one of the nationalists themselves (Özkırımlı 2010, 49) and as such it is normative and thus ideological which inevitably leads us to consider it
biased, which we can in this academic, objective, and critical setting debunk and reject.

More importantly, to claim nationalism to be something natural, primordial or perennial would be to devoid it of any analytical potential which certainly is not the case. This is due to the fact that for us to be analytical we must also be critical and that cannot be done to these so called “natural” phenomena that cannot (or perhaps should not) be criticised. Mere description furthers the cause of human enlightenment and advancement very little which is why we must strive to seek proper understanding of the processes underway. If these processes are tried to be explained away with nationalism being fatalistic and preordained, it only serves to sustain or even protect nationalism’s unquestioned and unchecked rule of the land. There are, of course, alternatives to nationalism, and even if we cannot envision them epistemologically, it does not mean they cannot exist ontologically.

Still, the world as we know it today is very much divided into nations but them being “the irreplaceable cells” of human existence, as Tudjman (1981, 289) argues, can certainly be contested. One only has to think about the isolated people living in the Amazonian rainforests that have stayed elusive for centuries and are only being found just now. It would certainly be quite a reach to claim that these people were something else or more, i.e. Brazilian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian etc. depending on the geographical location which they inhabit, than the immanent community they do share, or them even considering a nation of their own.

This is due to the fact that the term ‘nation’ refers only to a way of group formation and identification for people already a part of it or willing to become a part of it or even differentiating from it, and as such the ‘nation’ is an arbitrary construct; it in itself cannot have or contain things such as rights, morality, freedom, will, self-determination. This sort of thinking stems from a twisted way of looking at Kant, whose emphasis was on the individual and their “unchanging rights” (Berlin 1996, 223). In the early stages of modernity, nationalist thinking, however, attributed these rights to the nation as well, treating the nation as an autonomous individual in the process when moving forward with the project of self-realisation.
The anthropomorphisation of this kind is not alien even today as for instance it is quite common to see it in the neoliberal discourse where institutions such as those of the sectors of industry, finance and service provision, in addition to the ‘brands’ they consist of, are presented as autonomous entities that can only thrive in the context of the free and unregulated marketplace. But these institutions, including nations are not some sentient beings whose preferences can be objectively examined. Nations cannot think, they are always thought for, used and abused, by people with various reasons including but not limited to manipulation for personal gains. These institutions, nations among them, are not some inorganic machinations or forces beyond our control. Instead, they are nothing but conglomerations of people and as such have much to gain to be able to influence the ways how to organise humans’ co-existence and actions, i.e. the place we call society. In this way, the crucial political element inherent in nationalism becomes evident once more.

One critique that the primordial and perennial views have against the modern view of nationalism is where they claim that people have organised themselves nationally long before the modern era, e.g. Egyptians, Romans, or pre-modern European ‘nations’ such as the English or the French. The modernist view, however, holds these polities to not be nations per se but rather civilisations and communities of a larger context. These civilisations, no matter what we call them today, did not have or at least exhibit any elements that are vital regarding the process of nationalism. For Renan, there were no nations in pre-modern times, just “republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and empires” (1990, 9). It is only when the political element inherent to nationalism is introduced to these people, can we talk of nationalism. Consider Hayes:

We can be sure that prior to the eighteenth century A.D. it was not the general rule for civilized nationalities to strive zealously and successfully for political unity and independence, whereas it has been the general rule in the last century and a half. Universal mass-nationalism of this kind, at any rate, has no counterpart in earlier eras; it is peculiar to modern times. (1931, 292–3)

The perennialists are those who hold that while nations might not be natural, certain continuities do exist between the concepts of nations ancient and modern (Smith 1998, 43). While this is true (and it most certainly is because to claim that history is a continuum is only to utter a tautology), when it comes to socio-political systems
and changes within and between them, nothing comes about *ex nihilo*. Without modernism and the different phenomena that emerged with it, there would be no such talk of nations that we do have today because nationalism created nations and not the other way around (Gellner 2006, 39) in the sense that we today have grown used to thinking.

Actually, Ernest Gellner, the arch-modernist and one of the most respected and quoted scholars of nationalism, has a most critical view of the issue:

> Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men [sic], as an inherent [...] political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality (2006, 48–9).

Here we see that to hold nations as something natural or inherent in humankind is quite naïve as it is truly “a myth” i.e. make-believe. If one were to claim this, one is consequently also begging the question of when did the humans begin, which illustrates this point quite effectively. Was the Cro-Magnon a nationalist? Did Adam and Eve have their own nation? Were their ‘societies’ organised according to nationalistic sentiments? Certainly not, or as Kedourie would have it:

> Humanity is not naturally divided into “nations”. The characteristics of any particular “nation” are neither easily ascertainable nor exclusively inherent in it; while to insist that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government is capriciously to dismiss the great variety of political arrangements to which men [sic] have given assent and loyalty and to strive after a state of affairs the attempt to realize [...] would be, in the nature of things, both ruinous and futile. (1971, 28)

The modernist standpoint is thus quite simple: nationalism was invented because it needed to be invented, even if the reasons why it needed to be invented are varied. There were entities, communes, gatherings of people that we can call ‘nations’ in layman’s terms but to be precise these ancient or pre-modern civilizations were not in fact *nations*. Because even if the term ‘nation’ itself might predate modernity, as what primordialists and perennialists claim, the nations of auld were only defined through their ethnical similarities and thus lacked the political connotation so instrumental to the current understanding of the phenomenon which came with modernity. Nationalism thus becomes not just simply a claim of ethnic similarity,
but a claim that ethnic similarity should count as \textit{the} definition of a political community (Calhoun 1997, 9).

In other words, nationalism is what makes the nations matter. It provides a sense of agency to them, creating a ‘common’ or ‘general’ will which puts the nation first and which can also be advocated and advanced. This all has to do with the political aspect of nationalism, mainly the inseverable link between nations as a people and the rule of the people, which we can also call \textit{democracy}. With these ‘nations’ of old, their only political denominator was to be subjected under a common ruler whose rulable territory varied from time to time and with it did the people of the ‘nation’ as well.

When democracies started to appear the territories under their rule followed the pre-existing ones that the previous rulers had been able to claim and these then in turn became the state. The state thus becomes the penultimate conglomerate of people as kingdoms were replaced by democracies. There also functions an exchange: in turn for the political cohesion that the people and democracy brings, the state offers cultural cohesion for the people to attach themselves into even more, which creates a constant but cyclical formation and reformation of nationalism. The relationship between nationalism and democracy is examined further in section 3.1.

Historically speaking, why nationalism happened the way it did, and is happening the way it is today, can be attributed to modernism. While some might think of this as the “modernist fallacy” of nationalism as it fails “to grasp the continuing relevance and power of pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a firm base for the nation-to-be” (Smith 1995, 40), the modernist view does not reject or deny these perennial notions and their importance or significance. It only argues that they are not \textit{enough} to wholly explain nationalism by themselves. Smith’s “ethnic cores” (1991, 21), while valuable, only tell us about the base and basics for group formation, such as family.

To put it bluntly, Smith is only telling us that nationalism happened or happens because people exists and thrive through co-operation which really does not get us very far in our analysis. Similarly, following Reynolds, we cannot claim that pre-modern peoples were nationalistic in nature as their “whole set of ideas about the collective nature of peoples was too unsystematic” (1984, 302). The communal base
of people at that time was fixed to other elements than of a nation, to those of smaller communities, such as those required for the viability of the agriculture that sustained the inhabitants.

Even if we cannot pinpoint the exact location in history when nationalism began or came to be, we can say that it is in close connection to the spread of Enlightenment values and the *locus classicus* of the French Revolution (discussed in section 3.1.2) to which these values ultimately led to (Kedourie 1993, 9; Calhoun 1997, 9). Of course, one cannot assume that there is or has been a somewhat “pure” moment or model of nationalism from which one can derive the essence of nationalism either, but with proper excavation of key concepts of which the phenomenon consists of and then identifying their occurrences in space and time allows us to draw these critical generalisations about the nature of it all.

Spencer and Wollman (2002, 43) have raised doubts about how fruitful or acceptable it is to equate the notions of people, state and nation, which was promoted around the time of the French Revolution, and whether or not nationalism was linked to progress. These doubts are not without basis but if we look at the autocratic rule of the king at the time which ceased with the Revolution and ushered in the era of democracy, even while not nearly in that sort of form that we today equate with democracy, it nevertheless was most definitely a step forward. This is also what Hobsbawm means with his inclusionary and progressive nationalism (1996, 257).

Hobsbawm’s modernist handling of nationalism, where historical processes are of key importance in the shaping and understanding of the phenomenon, counters most effectively the alleged universal, natural, inevitable claims of primordialists and perennialists. Nationalism, being a social phenomenon, of course did not go around in a vacuum minding its own business but interacted with other movements and dynamics (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 43). But being a modern phenomenon which means that it “belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period” (Hobsbawm 1992, 9), nationalism left its mark on other and was in turn transformed by other modern phenomena including but not limited to “state-
building, democratization, language construction, scientific racism, socialism *inter alia*" (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 43).

Hobsbawm, a historian by trade, draws the distinction between two forms, or possible viewings of nationalism: one of unity, other of separation. One possible explanation for this could be that during the era when nation-states were formed in the end of the nineteenth century that is, the aim was to make as large as possible entities where the emphasis was more on the political and territorial lines and not so much on ethnic ones; smaller communities were easier to unite under one government and as time passed, certain groups might have found their representation lacking and have thus sought to separate these groups from those already in power.

It has been argued that this idea was not nationalist but state-based, drawing on not the nation but sovereign people. However, these are two sides of the same coin. The sovereign people are the nation within the state, which is the very essence of nationalism. This view only separates the psychological (based on ethnicity) dimension from the political (based on rights), while also erroneously claiming that the latter has got nothing to do with nationalism while it most certainly has.

When talking about the other, separatist form of nationalism, Hobsbawm refers to the "exclusive nationalism of states or right-wing political movements which substitutes itself for all other forms of political and social identification" (1992, 145). This way the ethnic has almost superseded the political, when the argument goes along the lines of 'here we are like this and only this and we live and should live like this and only like this'. Unfortunately, when based on ethnic divisions, the very lamentable considerations of resentment, fear and insecurity will begin to direct the discussion. Nationalism most certainly did start out as mostly a political movement but through these twists and turns it has experienced as time has passed, it has been centring around a stronger ethnic focus since the last quarter of the nineteenth century – a trajectory which still continues on today.

One modern phenomenon that aided in the rise and spreading of nationalism is industrialisation. It is not by itself alone the catalyst what put nationalism in motion, but it certainly has played an instrumental part in spreading nationalism to the
extent that many now see the idea of nation so obvious and even self-evident. For Gellner, the new industrial societies brought about a new division of labour compared to the agrarian societies. In these pre-modern societies, the vast majority of the population lived in fairly isolated communities but under an authority of some sort and all that was expected of them was to farm the land they inhabited and pay their taxes, rents, tenths etc. in time. A common and shared culture was thus not needed as people did not really need co-operation in the sense and scale that nationalism requires and pre-requisites. (2006, 11)

Perhaps the most vital component for the spread and attachment of nationalism ushered by modernism thus becomes the production of mass-communication systems. Communication, in this context, is to be understood in its broadest capacity, as that of which entails all possible systems of cultural dissemination of information. Helping us understand this, Gellner offers us two different concepts of culture: ‘high’ and ‘low’ (Gellner 1996, 102), where the former is equated with the homogenous elite and the latter with the heterogeneous masses. Pre-modern nations were highly hierarchical, fixed, and static when it came to social mobility, and culture was a way of enforcing this differentiation between social classes. But modern industrial societies which are characterised with having high levels of social mobility required the dissemination of a culture that would homogenise the people which in turn came to mean the nation.

Gellner’s concept of ‘high culture’ does not mean what could hastily be thought to mean in the vernacular the appreciation of the so called ‘finer’ arts such as operas and visiting galleries, but rather his concept of ‘high’ has actually more to do with the overreaching or overarching capability of the concept. The high culture is not high because it is somehow more prestigious or ‘better’, but high because it is disseminated from higher ground. In other words, we could speak of the culture, as in the culture that is needed to spread as widely as possible in order for people to be attuned to it. The high had to be infused with the low which requires intensified modes of conveying information which ultimately turns into the creation of the myth of a homogenous cultural unit, i.e. the nation.
In here lies the crux: the information needed to pervade people's consciousness to be effective, and to do this the information needed to be able to spread as wide as possible. For Anderson this is the printed word (2006, 18) while Gellner (1997, 16), echoing Rousseau (2001, 79), attributes this to the state-driven education system. While they are not entirely identical, these elements do have much in common, namely the objective to influence the understanding of the people and ultimately attain their acceptance of the policies presented. These policies offered, or imposed, people with identities which, were they to accept them, would prove their membership of this new cultural unit where communication and mobility is easier and more fluid. Or as Anderson puts it: “So often in the ‘nation-building’ policies of the new states one sees both a genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm and systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth” (2006, 113–14).

Nevertheless, it must be said that to view nations as imagined, inventions, or constructions is not the same as to suggest them being not real, or that even if “nationalism is part of a social imaginary is not to say that nations are mere figments of the imagination” (Calhoun 2007, 41). The importance of the ideas behind the concepts of nation and nationalism cannot be overstated as they provide the framework through which the societies of today are mostly organised. They are thus extremely powerful in constituting our societies and thus must be examined with utmost criticality. The constructivist agenda is to clarify these processes of construction of nationalism and “to identify the mechanisms through which they are sustained and, just as importantly, resisted or challenged” (Özkırımlı 2010, 198). An efficient and felicitous way of doing this is to identify the central concepts most crucial to the phenomenon and around which it operates and from which it draws its strength to have a clear as well as deep understanding of its power over society and human life in general.

1.2 Analysing nationalism conceptually

Using concept analysis, this thesis is able to critically study what are the concepts, notions, and ideas that the phenomenon of nationalism actually consists of. The
underlying feature of political theory, political philosophy, and politology in general, is to look at the various ways how key concepts are and can be understood, i.e. *what is x*, so to speak. This requires ontological theorisation (Guzzini 2013, 522), in other words, reflective communication with the key concepts themselves, which provides and offers the scholar understanding of that of which exists, in addition to where and how. This, in turn, allows the conceptualisation of the phenomenon under examination by naming and attaching meanings to its various traits, those of which the phenomenon ultimately and essentially consists of (Berenskoetter 2016, 11). In this sense, it can be considered to be constitutive theorisation, as it primarily functions as theorisation regarding a certain central phenomenon which thus constitutes the whole subject under investigation.

Concepts are irreplaceable when building theories. One cannot know of what they are talking about unless they can first be able to define it. Concepts are not thus only ontological building blocks, or basic assumptions for theories and theorisation, they are also components out of which theorists form their claims and arguments. Guzzini has put it well when he states that concepts “are the words in which, but also for which, our theorizing is done” (2013, 535; emphasis added). It is most important to realise that while concepts function as the means through which theories and understanding is possible to achieve in the first place, they are also the location of where this understanding resides. If we get down to brass tacks, to use such an idiosyncratic phrase, concepts are the only possible way of understanding the various political phenomena and the theories related to them, epistemologically speaking.

For instance, in the context of this thesis, only through its constitutive concepts can we truly grasp what nationalism consists of, how it is thought and spoken of. Of course, one must be aware of the co-constitutive process of it all; the concepts used mould the theories simultaneously while the theories mould the concepts. Concepts thus provide us not only the language through which we can form the phenomena we want to explain and understand, but also the frameworks that are built to explain and understand them in the first place (Berenskoetter 2016, 2). The objective of concept analysis is thus to build a dictionary that can never be exhaustively completed and will always thus be chronically unfinished (Guzzini 2013, 523),
simply because of the fact that the society and the world we inhabit is in a constant state of flux itself, never reaching finality.

Be that as it may, this in no way hinders or undermines the purpose of concept analysis. It allows us to examine how things are spoken of and how it is even possible to talk about them. Through it, we can try to find the common thread out of which we can create new knowledge and understanding. This happens dialectically via thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and by taking account and utilising the intellectual history and anchoring of the concepts in question. Concept analysis in this way is very much connected to the linguistic turn that happened within social studies which allowed more analytical philosophy to seep into the bloodstream of the science. In this sense this thesis aims to compile a dictionary of nationalism, or nationalism studies at least, with its key concepts and the understanding of them and how incomplete it will turn out to be in the end, only future studies and research can show.

As it would be impossible to review the thousands and thousands of studies concerning nationalism done in the past, this thesis’ main interest resides in finding out the central or key concepts that are generally found to be present in it. Following the framework presented by Michael Freeden in his book Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (1996) which enables the morphologic study of ideologies and where it is said that ideologies consist of concepts spread around three levels: central, medium and periphery. Drawing from previous research and their findings, this thesis aims to identify those central concepts around which the discussion of nationalism, at least in an academic setting, has been revolving and then compile them in such a way that could aid further research in excavating and identifying even more concepts that could be introduced to further our understanding of the phenomenon.

Concepts are permeated by an underlying feature of abstractness, in that they are complex and highly malleable. No single concept – even the concept of ‘concept’ – is just one singular notion because concepts never just ‘are’ or ‘exist’. They are social constructions, coined and developed by humans, and their form is not only internally complex but it also varies significantly, and any attempt to grasp this form
of a concept is a form of conceptualisation in itself. Following Ophir (2011), just the act of defining a concept includes talk of its appearance and with it a reflexive approach, which in turn leads to concept analysis. Concept is thus always a complex, intricate, and open-ended formation, highly dependable by its surroundings.

To be exact, a certain concept is talked about as a ‘concept’ exactly and only then when that which it fundamentally refers to is tried to be explained and expressed. Because of this, we need to be clear that when theorising about nationalism, we are actually dealing with the concept. Empiricism behind the concept that is derived from the phenomenon allows other concepts to be attached to it. The meaning of this process is explicitly to create an ontological category of the phenomenon, so that discussion about it and even the very understanding of it could even be possible. Concepts can thus only appear through conceptualisation. This also draws the line between a term and a concept, where the first is only a general instrument of everyday language use while the latter is brought about only when a term is removed from its everyday usage and its meaning is started to be analysed more thoughtfully. In other words, a term lacks the deeper, critical understanding of the phenomenon that it refers to that a concept requires.

As a general starting point it could be said that a concept is an abstract frame which helps in creating knowledge about the world around us by organising, naming and giving meanings to its features (Berenskoetter 2016, 4). Or, in the words of Max Weber, concepts are a way to overcome “the extensively and intensively infinite multiplicity” that is the empirical reality (cited in Burger 1987, 77). They are nodes that we attach ourselves epistemologically while providing the ontology that they constitute. Goertz has stated this quite comprehensively in his statement of how “[c]oncepts are about ontology [...] [t]o develop a concept is more than providing a definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity” (2006, 27; emphasis in the original). The process of naming something conceptuality is not thus just mere description but also interpretation and characterisation (Connolly 1993, 23).

Every attempt of defining a concept thus includes some kind of a selective process and even a seemingly exact definition can still have multiple meanings and is thus left open to a myriad of interpretations, of which to discuss and thus constantly
sharpen the concept even more. It is left to the interpreter, namely the scholar who is doing the research, to make their choices visible and transparent as possible and justify their choices in a manner that can stand up to critical dissection of their peers regarding the subject at hand. This allows us to move forever closer to the dictionary definition of a concept, even if it cannot be reached in its totality.

As it is an abstract and a heuristic tool, a concept cannot be regarded as an exact, unconditional rendering of reality. It is more of a mental image, that has the capacity and ability to organise the sensory, perceived reality in a meaningful way. This organisation happens primarily through language because it is in language where concepts reside in their most basic form. But there is a more cognitive aspect to it all as well because even if there was some fixed, irremovable, almost ‘pure’ form of a concept, it can never be reached, as its examination always happens through language, which makes them social and intersubjective constructions which derive their meanings through “language games” as Wittgenstein (2010, 8) would have it.

Through these language games, it is usual to attach concepts to words, to further the understanding surrounding the issue at hand. But to exactly which words the concept is attached to, varies. This is why a concept is always more than the word which is uttered, when we want to refer to the socio-political phenomenon to which it is connected to. In other words, and in the context of this thesis, the phenomenon of nationalism is more than the word ‘nationalism’. A single word points to just one certain thing whereas a concept seizes and connects various elements, views and experiences and binds them together to form a new cohesive whole.

Much like Jacques Lacan’s point de capiton (1993, 268) through which signifiers and signified are tied together, so does a concept function as a nodal point of this kind as well. This does not, however, mean that a concept is an all-encompassing umbrella term, the meaning of which that could just be derived by simply connecting all its constitutive elements, because the concept in itself is required a priori to make possible the connections and orders of these elements that the concept consists of. As Reinhart Koselleck has said, a concept is not just a simple explanation of the relationships involved within it, but an intrinsic part of the whole process of explanation (2004, 86).
Even though we have established that concepts, and especially politological concepts, cannot be defined in a completely exhaustive manner as they can only be interpreted, it is important to notice that through concepts we are able to move away from the referential word that the concept is attached to, and approach the sphere of empiricism where different context are taken into account in the explaining process and how this affects the understanding of the concept. This has much to do with the fact that concept analysis is not a strict, singular method, in a traditional sense of the word, as a way of doing analysis, but rather a stance, a temperament, a way of asking, if you will. One way to approach this issue is the approach of conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) suggested by Koselleck in his aptly named book *Begriffsgeschichten* (2006). Its starting point is the treatment of a concept in a historical manner by tracing its development through the ages and excavate as many interpretations regarding it as possible.

The point of conceptual history is to find out how a concept has been understood and used in the past in addition to how it or its use has developed or evolved. These processes in turn can lead to those meanings and interpretations that are currently in use today. However, the purpose of it is not just a historical examination but also to create and offer a better understanding of how concepts make us think or guide us to think through certain ways, which, in turn, enables the construction of alternative definitions. The nature of concepts being highly malleable and open-ended, as previously established, this basic principle guides the historical treatment as well. Through this, four different stages of a concept’s formation can be identified: (1) the genesis of a concept or how a new concept is created in a distinct historical context; (2) the reification of the concept and the way it is used as it is; (3) transformation or how the concept’s meanings alters; and (4) disappearance if the use of the concept is ceased and it slips out of the vocabulary altogether.

But conceptual history is not only interested in describing these dynamic relationships as it also aims to explain why certain concepts appear where they do and when they do, and why they change and/or disappear. The emphasis lies in studying the change of concepts and their use, and according to conceptual history, that change always happens through certain events at certain times. This leads to a search for balance between synchronic analysis where a concept is studied in a
certain time and place and diachronic analysis where a concept is looked at through time and space. The research question defines to which of these one should focus on and in the context of this thesis a certain synthesis of the two would prove to be most fruitful. Without a doubt, we are looking at the concept of nationalism from a contemporary point of view and setting which would hint at a more synchronic analysis but to attain a more holistic approach it is certainly useful to look at nationalism and its constitutive concepts in a more wider historical context, which leads to a diachronic handling of the issue.

This thesis does not follow conceptual history and its suggestions for analysis point by point but nevertheless has much to draw from it. The aim of this thesis is to identify the concepts most crucial and irreplaceable that make up the phenomenon of nationalism. This inevitably leads to a whole network of concepts that nationalism is connected to, where each concept could be subjected to a conceptual history handling. But because of space limitations, as it would be impossible to deal with the whole oeuvre that is nationalism studies throughout all its history, this thesis’s focus is on the concept of nationalism and to explain that super- or macro-concept of nationalism through the micro-concepts that are present in it. The point here is to show how these particular concepts fit and work in the context of nationalism itself. Of course, if and wherever these processes of change and transformation are identified they and the reasons for them will be taken into account in the analysis.

In addition to the historical handling of concepts, another approach with which to analyse them is the “political/critical approach” suggested by Berenskoetter (2016, 17–20). It is based on the notion that knowledge equals power, and as concepts fill a certain cognitive gap, they are a central part in the production of knowledge and in this capacity function as instruments in constructing and maintaining power structures. The political/critical approach to concept analysis has a Foucauldian objective to identify and demolish the power structures that are found disproportionate, which are maintained via established concepts and patterns of thought, and as such to open doors to alternative interpretations which could lead to more understanding or even usher in a more profound social change (Foucault 2003, 7).
According to this kind of approach, when dealing with concepts, there is always an inherent politically loaded element to it all, because there is always a reason for someone to use a concept the way they do. This is what needs to be examined in order to reveal its problematic nature. In other words, the political/critical approach is interested in finding out how a certain kind of knowledge is produced, i.e. how concepts are used in the society and what kind of outcomes they deliver. It is crucial, for this approach, to keep in mind that by giving meanings to things, concepts are not only making them more understandable but also systematically forming the objects which they are talking about, as it is only through these concepts that the talking and understanding is even possible in the first place (Foucault 2002, 49). This is why this thesis treats the concept of nationalism in itself neutral, while still acknowledging that the very phenomenon it is attached to is multifaceted and value-laden.

In the political/critical approach nothing is taken as a given and it is thus opposed to the view that concepts could have just one single exhaustive definition. It is connected to the historical approach in the sense that it also examines the development of concepts within socio-political constructs. Where the approaches differ, however, is that the historical one is interested in just pointing out the change that a concept can undergo in time while the political/critical view wants to show how a concept constituted in a certain manner is just one possible way of looking at it. No matter how fixed the power structure, which interest is to uphold the view it would like to represent, it is possible to shed light on the illusionary aspect of it through this critical viewing. In addition, where the historical approach is attuned to find the alternative interpretations of a concept in history, the political/critical one is able to create brand new interpretations, even if some of its cognitive fuel would stem from history in some way or another. It aims to deconstruct the historical narrative of a concept and reconstruct it anew by connecting to it new, possibly marginalised, suppressed or forgotten views and interpretations.

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Now that we have established what we are aiming to do in examining the phenomenon of nationalism, we are ready to turn to the phenomenon itself. In the
next three sections of the thesis, the three dimensions that make up the phenomenon of nationalism are analysed respectively in detail. It is within these dimensions that the concepts, notions, and ideas inherent to them are based and thus require a critical examination what that truly entails and means. In Chapter 2, the psychological dimension, concerning questions of e.g. identity, group formation and ethnicity is analysed. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the examination of the political dimension, where another essential part of nationalism resides, i.e. the action-based behaviour which makes nationalism what it is. Chapter 4 deals with the discursive dimension, in which the notions, ideas, and concepts presented by the other two dimensions are collected into a socially and politically viable whole that can be further transmitted to the public arena as a narrative so that it could gain support as well as legitimacy for its existence in the first place. Chapter 5 functions as the discussion part of this thesis and in it the interdependence and interconnectedness of the three dimensions is further elaborated in addition to arguing how nationalism functions as an apparatus which moulds a pluralist world into a monistic worldview. The thesis concludes with Chapter 6 where the findings of this thesis are summarised and further suggestions for using the framework identified and advocated by this thesis are presented.
2 DECEIVING APPEARANCES – THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Before venturing further into the dimensions, let us remind ourselves of our task of proving how the phenomenon of nationalism functions as an instrument in forming a political collective. It is in this collective and what is meant with it where we start our analysis. We already hinted earlier that the collective is based on the psychological dimension this we elaborate now. When discussing about nationalism, one cannot help but to consider the questions of identity, especially the question of national identity. As this thesis claims, the question of this kind of identity formation is nothing but basic group formation and the identity building that stems from that. It only becomes truly national when the other dimensions are introduced to it.

Nevertheless, the psychological dimension is where all the possible ideas, notions and concepts that allow this sort of identity construction to happen reside and this is also why it is most suitable that we start our analysis from there. In essence, the psychological dimension deals with the question of ‘what’ the nation is. This is because its purpose is to define the appearance of the nation, what it looks like as well as what it does not. This way the psychological dimension is very much identity-based and can be subjected to critical examination which deals with such issues.

2.1 Identity and group formation

To posit a national identity, or any other kind of identity for that matter, always involves drawing certain and particular distinctions that inevitably form divisions and contrasts between the newfound ‘me’ and the ‘other’ consisting of ones unlike me. Rée (1992, 7) has even suggested that it is an inherent part of the concept of identity to presume an ‘other’ that is different. To make the issue more collective, this personal identity construction evolves into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ formation where those identifying and fitting with the given identity can gather around one description and prescription. These distinctions are always subjective and value-laden in the sense that they can ever manifest only in the consciousness of individuals no matter how far reaching, spread or shared they might be. They can appear to be objective and neutral in their broadness, but can also differ between
individuals who identify with the same kind of (national) identity as no two individuals can ever be identically alike. Thus identity is nothing else but a pack of abstractions.

This is also what Benedict Anderson means with his highly influential and widely cited “imagined communities” which is also the name of his book of 2006 (first published in 1983). Imagined is exactly what this common identity is, because no matter how small a nation, the members of it cannot ever be acquainted with every single one of each other. This means the identity is essentially formed in the minds of people as abstractions. Because of this, and also because of Breuilly’s (1996, 162) view of calling this nationalism as sentiments, consciousness, or common-sense ideas and feelings, it is suitable to call it the psychological dimension because of its psycho-physical nature of being something cerebral as well as emotive. In addition, already in 1985, Anthony Giddens used the word “psychological” to describe the phenomenon of nationalism, highlighting its mental capacities (219).

2.1.1 A question of choice – creating arbitrary lines of demarcation

The attributes, qualities, characteristics etc. that one wishes and chooses to ascribe to their identity, were it personal or collective by nature, might not be looking to create divisions in the first place, only to search for some sort of belonging and positioning. One is always trying to attach positive inclinations to one’s self, because the opposite, to fix negative attributes would be irrational, illogical and absurd. However, irrespective of how well-intended or benevolent the preliminary intention might be, the process of choosing these characteristics is nevertheless just that – a choice.

When choosing these seemingly positive qualities, there will inevitably be unwanted qualities left out of the equation, which then make up the putative and negative ‘them’ that is in opposition to the positive ‘us’ (Billig 1995, 18). The formation of a group identity requires a certain process of categorisation so that one is able to distinguish between those who are similar enough to be included and those who are different and must thus be excluded. That is why this process of categorisation must be looked at as a two-way process, i.e. as Zolberg has noted, “to understand the
process of inclusion, we must consider it simultaneously as a process of exclusion” (1996, 57).

Before looking more closely into the qualities and characteristics that can be ascribed to identity it must be said that once these attributes are established, they can become quite implicit and covert, or “banal” as Billig states in his book of 1995, aptly named Banal Nationalism. His claim is that the prevalence of the national identity becomes so ubiquitous, established and mundane through different institutions, e.g. weather forecasts, newspapers, broadcasting and sports, that it goes unquestioned most of the time in people's lives. This inevitably leads to a sort of hierarchy between one's own nation and those foreign, which once again is closely connected to the inherent nature of the us/them construction altogether. Because of this fetishistic character of it all where we are constantly bombarded with “flags, uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, national flowers, national cuisines and architectures” (McClintock 1996, 274) and other spectacles, it becomes more and more easy to see how people could start to look at nations and national identity with it as something natural and organic as it is, after all, all around us, which makes it all but impossible not be affected by it.

This reification of the national identity leads to treating it as something fixed, closed and immutable (Handler 1994, 27) even if, epistemologically and ontologically speaking, “identity and memory are political and social constructs” and that they “are not things we think about but things we think with [and as] such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories” (Gillis 1994, 5; emphasis added). Of course, this does not mean that everyone who becomes in contact with this is influenced in such a way that they become automatically adjusted and indoctrinated. In a similar manner that the national identity chooses its qualities, so can its receivers select what they choose to hear and draw different meanings from them. This is, however, against the wishes of the nationalists as they seek to create and build an exact and single representation of a nation with its distinct identity, and to which no alternatives can be suggested. One only needs to look at the populist demagogues of e.g. Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, Russia, and even China to see how they use nationalist rhetoric and constructions of a single nation to attain popularity to advance their cause.
As identities are not fixed but fluid, in that they have the capacity, ability and potential to change over time, it is better to look at them as processes of identification (Hall 1996, 1). Identities and with them national identities are thus open-ended in the sense that they can change according to in any manner that is deemed suitable. This is opposite of what the nationalists have to say as their claims and arguments are based on the alleged rootedness and security of the fixed and normative national image, which is an important aspect when considering the appeal of the phenomenon (Finlayson 1998, 145).

As the process of forming one’s identity is anything but an easy task, with all the above mentioned fluidity and flux involved, identifying with the image of the nation a person can reach some sense of closure and stability about themselves. National identification offers simple answers and solutions to complex questions and problems that can ultimately be answered only by the individual (ibid.). Not only does the psychological dimension include the concepts that make up the national identity or image, it also takes into account how these concepts can be used in a deceptive manner (usually by nationalist leaders) to evoke and share potentially very powerful feelings including but not limited to love, hate, resentment, fear and anger (Vogler 2000, 30), which are a key part of the lure of it all.

National identity or consciousness is not something that comes from within people ex nihilo, as some sort of psychological accessory they are born with and which is perpetually within reach. It must first be established as something that people can attach themselves to because “people must know what that identity is” (Özkırımlı 2010, 172). In this way, the nation really is just assumptions that are based on externalities which are given from above. Identity construction and the psychological dimension of nationalism with it is thus the search for common denominators between individual and groups, were they language, ethnicity, religion or other cultural indicators or symbols of being, existing, and behaving. Historically this has been seen as including but not limited to a collective proper name, a shared myth of common ancestry, certain elements of differentiating common culture, historical memories (such as the heroes and adoration of war narratives), homeland, and solidarity.
Actually, these symbols do not differ much from how a family is constructed, mentally at least. They are only a part of group consciousness and formation, and do not yet consist of nationalism by itself but what matters is that these beliefs exist and are effective no matter how rational or irrational they might be. Smith, an ardent advocate of ethno-symbolism, has acknowledged this as well:

For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been and can be rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias (1999, 9).

Nationalism draws power from history, yes, but it is the modern nationalists who use these historical myths, memories, traditions and symbols as devices for their own creations. Without nationalism, these traditions would not be used, which makes it a choice made by the nationalists while creating their own version of the invented ‘common past’. These myths, symbols, invented pasts etc. are not required for nationalism, but they can be used and often are, and very saliently and effectively at that. The particular common past or history is by no means an unquestionable, inherent element of the nation but it is nationalism which materialises the histories and retrospectively constitutes them as ‘national’ (Calhoun 1993, 229). In other words, ethno-symbolism only has identified the seeds to be sown while nationalism makes the harvest. The customs, traditions, beliefs, shared or common past, public gatherings, rituals, ceremonies, symbols, emblems etc. are used instrumentally by nationalism to create, recreate and reify the nation day in and day out.

2.1.2 The need to differentiate

Anderson (2006, 7) has stated that “no nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind”. This equals that there ought to be some differentiating elements between people or groups of them at least. The purpose on nationalism is thus to find the sameness in difference. As with the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights of Man it produced, there is talk of universal rights in humankind but it also holds the implication that there are other people who do not hold these views and this is why we (meaning the French) must distance ourselves, with these identity categories of being French, from other identities and nations. There is always a
dimension of difference, of exceptionality, hierarchy, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as in being something equals to being somehow better than being something else. These boundary formations of inclusion and exclusion are central to nationalism.

This sort of differentiation can happen through reissentiment where an identity is based solely on the notion of resenting some other identity and the will to create a new identity via that resentment that we can call ‘schismogenesis’ (Bateson 1972, 68). One illustrative example of this is how the newfound American states started modifying their lives and e.g. language to differentiate themselves from their former British colonial masters. Not only limited to this, the use of reissentiment and schismogenesis can lead to conflicts and revolutions in general and also to the emergence of nation-states that separate or at least try to secede from an earlier political entity.

A very recent example is the case of Scottish nationalism where ethnic divisions within the population are pretty much non-existent and the primary drive for independence is to separate the polity of Scotland from the one of the United Kingdom and create a new sovereign nation-state. The psychological dimension in this context does not necessarily have to have anything to with ethnicity (a term discussed next) or the like but only reissentiment and schismogenesis are enough. In a similar manner, in the context of Finnish nationalism and Finland’s strive for independence in the early 20th century, one frequently used example is the quote attributed to the Finnish nationalist Adolf Ivar Arwidsson: "Swedes we are not, Russians we do not want to become, let us therefore be Finns."

As not only limited to external appearances, nationalism in this psychological dimension also provides obligations and commitments (Gellner 2006, 1). They can even be considered as concrete rules; things to adhere to and live by. It tells people what is expected of them if they wish to be a part of this group – the nation. Through it, normative statements and claims are made which further proves that always linked to this psychological dimension is the element of choice. This is most true with symbols of tradition as it is ultimately a choice between which sort of events and habits are incorporated into the national canon and which are not.
Following Renan (1990, 11), “forgetting, and [...] historical error are an essential factor in the creation of a nation”, as some things are kept and valorised while others are left unrecognised. This is why traditions are the most concrete and dearest to nationalists, even if they are invented, or especially because of it (Hobsbawm 1983, 1). One example is the current situation in Poland where the conservative government has made it illegal to acknowledge the involvement of Polish people or institutions in the Shoah during the Second World War, which has led to censorship in e.g. schoolbooks. Traditions can thus be manipulated to suit better the means of the elite and as such offer means of handling the masses or even subdue them which leads them to look at these glorified and mythified practices uncritically while simultaneously giving legitimacy to them. They function also as a red herring as it draws the masses attention away from other possible dealings the ones in power might have.

Somehow, all of these features and symbols matter and therein lies the socio-constructivist argument: because of an attribute, one can be accused of being more (or less) capable of doing or achieving something. This is why the dimension is called psychological. Even if the attributes would be more physical by nature, it is the idea that these attributes of people matter, and that idea resides in the psychology of humans. Like discussed earlier, someone is ‘white’ only because they are not ‘black’ or of some other tone. If everyone were of the same skin colour, the issue would not even come up as everyone would be unmarked. It is only by the markedness of someone or some people that the issues residing inside the psychological start to take hold.

2.2 Deconstructing ethno-symbolism

The symbols, we have seen, which offer lines of division between identities are very salient in the construction of nations, just as ethno-symbolists claim. This does not mean, however, that they could not be critically examined as they are inherently nothing but choices and means of differentiation, which is done next. We start our analysis of these with the concepts of race and ethnicity as they are important to the psychological dimension of nationalism in that they offer arbitrary categorisations in defining what the appearance of the hypothetical nation is. The two terms are...
distinct from each other but not without overlapping as the latter can be seen to have been derived from the former. Essentially, they are nothing more than just tools and instruments in the quest of defining the nation in question. They are concepts that offer a base for an identity to attach itself into which, in turn, offers a fruitful breeding ground for nationalism to take advantage of and cultivate itself in. It is not far-fetched to claim that a majority of nationalism, while not all, have at least some ethnic characteristics in them, and thus nationalism and ethnicity can be seen as “kindred concepts” (Eriksen 1993, 118).

2.2.1 Race

Before moving on to the more contested concept of ethnicity, we start by looking at the more ‘concrete’ concept of race, meaning that it offers more clear-cut (while still arbitrary) distinctions between groups of people, and is thus very applicable to nationalism and its psychological dimension. The racial categorisation and racist discourses can be a part of nationalism and most certainly are at least in a right-wing context, as they offer hierarchical division between people and groups. For instance, the construction of the immigrant as an undesired other has almost always a racial basis, undertone or even bias. Spencer and Wollman (2002, 65) have noted how the “Australians in the UK, Swiss in France, Austrians in Germany have never been seen in the same way as Bangladeshis, Algerians, or Turks”.

The colour of one’s skin is still only a visual cue of a probable difference although the difference is only that colour and nothing else. It does not tell us anything about the person themselves and surely nothing about why the difference should even matter. The point here for the racists or perhaps populists is to paint a picture of a totally different race from the ones they seek to address, while we know that there is only one race: the race of humans. By creating these divisions, they seek to legitimise hierarchy, of how people should and could be treated in different ways just on the basis of their ethnicity. It all adds to the narrative that the right-wing populist want to build of a “proper” collective of a nation and the search for racial divisions are just tools in trying to accomplish that.
Nationalism can have racist elements in it, and it might not even be that rare to see it happening, but we must also keep in mind that it is just an element that is chosen because the presenter or performer of this sort of nationalism deems it fit and assumes it to go well with their target audience. This boils down to the ‘inclusion-exclusion’ construction that group formations – including nations – have inherent in them. This is what Castles (2000, 174) has also acknowledged when he states that racism plays “a crucial role in consolidating nation-states by providing an instrument for defining belonging or exclusion”.

Still, we must be aware that there can be nationalism without a racial tang, even if it is not that prominent in the current discourse surrounding the phenomenon. For instance, Guibernau (1996, 89–90) has suggested that while racism, as it is driven by fear and hatred, is destructive, nationalism, on the other hand, is actually constructive as it is inspired by feelings such as creativity and even love. This view we do not have to wholly accept but it still adds to the claim of this thesis of how the complex nature of nationalism allows it to attach to it various sorts of affects, racism being only one possible element.

2.2.2 Religion

Race offers clear-cut divisions in appearances between groups to base differentiation and different treatment with it. In a similar manner, religion does exactly this as well. How this kind of racism can be treated as nationalism as well, demands deeper inquiry. One way of looking at it comes from a Finnish context, where the most prominent right-wing anti-immigration populist Jussi Halla-aho, leader of the Finns Party, formerly known as True Finns, has suggested that one basis for granting asylum seekers residence would be their religion, namely Christian faith. From this it is not difficult to deduce how he wants to differentiate the desired immigrants from the undesired ones, them being those coming from the Islamic world, whose ethnicity including but not limited to their tone of skin can be perceived as threatening to the white European who the populists hold to be the normative archetype of a person, the ‘person-to-be’ even.
If we look more closely, religion seems to be an intrinsic element for other authoritarian nationalist leaders as well. In each of the aforementioned examples, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, Russia, and China, religion has been a key factor in deciding who and what can constitute as the respective nation. In Hungary, not dissimilar from Finnish right-wing discourse, immigration from non-Christian countries is framed as a threat to their distinct way of life by Viktor Orbán. In Poland the Catholic church holds immense power over the attitudes of the people and which the PiS controlled government capitalises on when passing their conservative legislation. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transformed the country from secular to Islamist. India’s Narendra Modi is a well-known Hindu-centrist who does not care much for civil rights of other groups, namely Muslim, just look at what is happening in Kashmir. In Russia, Vladimir Putin uses conservative and Orthodox values to base policies on, and in China Uyghurs (i.e. Muslims) are sent to concentration camps.

2.2.3 Ethnicity

The term ‘ethnicity’ emerged in the twentieth century (McCrone, 1998, 22) to replace the term ‘race’ so that the different basis for the mistreatment of people or groups could now be identified without reproducing them in a normative manner, i.e. that these differences were somehow immutable or deeply rooted and thus a legitimate basis for inequality (Malik 1996, 91). The point of this new term is to transcend the racist logic of ‘there being people who are different because of x, y or z, and thus deserve to be treated differently from other groups, usually in a negative manner’ to the logic of ethnicity that ‘there are people who are allegedly different which can lead to the mistreatment of them’. The term thus acknowledges that the normativity presented is based on arbitrary, illogical, and anti-intellectual divisions when creating these collectives.

However, the concept of ethnicity is not without its problems either because no two people are alike. So, even this well-meant concept allows for divisions to be made, but how big of a hindrance this ultimately is, can be contested because as long as there are those that claim these divisions matter, there surely is a way to critically point it out, and this is why the concept of ethnicity is useful. People are different
and that is what makes us human. Differences in appearances should not matter. Still, this has not stopped nationalists, especially ethno-nationalists (hence their name), from using ethnicity as a tool in their construction of a collective national narrative. Actually, it might have made their overt racism more covert when they have adapted their language more ‘politically correct’.

For ethno-nationalists, the key argument is that national identity has an ethnic basis and that ethnicity actually precedes the structuring and development of national identity, which leads them to make verbatim the same claims that racists would too, namely that differences in ethnicity are basis for different and unequal treatment. Fortunately, this drawing from pseudo-biology or -genetics has been rebutted, for instance by Chapman (1992, 81–2), when he states it to be “naive” to think that, at least in a European setting, these ‘ethnic’ groups would have any kind of “privileged biological connection” as the movement of people for the last 2000 years and well-before that has made sure of people mixing with each other, and with it their genes as well.

2.2.4 Cultural markers

In academia, this rebuttal of biology as a central part of ethnicity has led scholars to turn to culture in their search for the crux in the concept (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 66). Stanley Tambiah, an anthropologist, has summarised the view:

Ethnic identity above all is a collective identity [...] It is a self-conscious and vocalized identity that substantializes and vocalizes one or more attributes – the usual ones being skin colour, language, religion, territorial occupation – and attaches them to collectivities as their innate possession and their mythico-historic legacy. The central components in this description of identity are ideas of inheritance, ancestry and descent, place or territory of origin, and the sharing of kinship, any one or combination of which may be invoked as a claim according to context and calculation of advantages. These ethnic collectivities are believed to be bounded and to be self-producing and enduring through time. (1994, 430)

Even if we were to look at ethnicity not as biological but cultural, and as such as a basis for a (national) identity, it inevitably leads us to nevertheless see it as an identity construction, something that does not exist outside our society or societies without human input. All these traits, were they skin colour, language, religion,
ancestry etc. are, in the end, *arbitrary*. They have no innate property to be treated as some all-encompassing truth before which people should just kneel down. It all comes down to what sort of elements one chooses to adjoin to one’s consciousness of themselves. This element of choice has also been identified and emphasised by Barth already as far back as 1969 where he states that the “features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant” and that “some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down or ignored” (14).

Smith (1991, 14) is of the mind that different ethnicities or ‘ethnies’ do exist and that they can be identified, but only if we remember to look past the racist view of biological traits allegedly determining people’s mental attributes, capacities, or capabilities. Being an ethno-symbolist, Smith has identified six main attributes central to the identification of an ethnic community:

- a collective proper name;
- a myth of common ancestry;
- shared historical memories;
- one or more differentiating elements of a common culture;
- an association with a specific ‘homeland’;
- a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (1991, 21).

The ethno-symbolist view is most present in these attributes as they have got nothing to do with biology but symbols, namely names, myths, and memories. What is of utmost importance to note, however, is that while this view moves away from the biological and ‘racial’ divisions, i.e. those that have got to do with appearances, and towards these wholly cerebral as well as emotive, and as such *psychological* concepts. These are things that occur in people’s minds and hearts, adding to the view of nationalism being a most complex phenomenon, because there are myriad potential issues which might add to making nationalism seem enticing. This is exactly why we must move on from mere descriptive ethno-symbolism to explanatory modern social constructivism as it is instrumental that we ask
according to who these attributes matter and why they should even matter in the first place.

The appeal of history, especially ‘common’ history, is an important factor to consider in observing the overlapping of ethnic and national communities. Still, it is de facto not a criterion that can be used to distinguish one group of people from another. To claim this is, once again, a choice (Appiah 1991, 51). Take, for instance, those in Finland who wear shirts reminding people of the Winter and Continuation Wars of 1939–1945 and simultaneously wear crest-pendants with the ‘Finnish’ lion on them. These are symbolic choices to make in forming one’s identity and to claim them all-encompassing is a performance which objective is to mould the national identity to be as one way and not perhaps some other. Similarly, if one, perhaps a right-wing ethno-nationalist, was to claim: “we have always been like this”, ‘we’ being the hypothetical national unit with common ancestry, it still remains just an arbitrary choice.

The theme of choice continues here in the manner that someone in a position to do so has done it and deems it to matter in a way that precedes many other attributes. Nevertheless, it is still only fiction and a narrative that has certain things it wants to achieve and has decided that this sort of route is the best to take. This kind of reification process must continually be redone and adjusted to be successful and echo with the public. Of course, as this putative ‘common’ history is a creation which inherently means a process of selection, it is simultaneously entails forgetting as in not choosing certain elements deemed unfit to the grand narrative of the history. The reification, construction, and reproduction process, of course, is not without powerful salience because it does echo with the public. As this reification can lead to the indoctrination of its recipients by those producing it, the experience of ethno-symbolistic symbols, values, and claims can appear to be natural, primordial, and even essential by nature (Comaroff 1995, 250).

Culture is not an unproblematic concept either, nor is it a fixed, static, coherent, or harmonious whole. It is fluid, dynamic and thus deeply contested, and in turn is under constant negotiation, revision and reinterpretation. It has also much to do with power because of its contested nature as people seek to overlook those things
in common to them over those they choose to fight over (Eley and Suny 1996, 9). For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to say that even if culture is a very complex and contested concept, it always has something to do with behaviour and ideals. Were they tied to tradition, symbols, language, beliefs, religion etc. is not of much importance, when the point is to understand that culture is a way for people to feel connected to themselves and to each other as it provides boundaries for patterned behaviour of the individual while taking part of a “universe of shared ideals and customs” (Keesing 1994, 301).

Nationalism is very much connected to these processes as creating a distinct culture is a very visible demarcation line between collectives. It can be argued that nationalism tries to monopolise culture within the collective in order to create a ‘common’ one which all its members could and should adhere to and accept without criticism in a ‘one nation, one culture’ sort of juxtaposition. The stricter this definition becomes, the more critical we can be in its examination as the more apparent its arbitrariness becomes which can be seen in the popular (or populist) conceptions of race, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture in general. They seek to take advantage of nationalism by obscuring the fluidity in order to promote fixedness and homogenisation of a ‘proper’ culture in the collective.

2.2.5 Language

Language can be seen as a key cultural marker or factor when it comes to building a national identity and definition of a ‘people’ whether we consider the importance of establishing a vernacular (see e.g. Hastings 1997) or it as an enabler of communication like Karl W. Deutsch (1966, 96). Granted, it is easier to belong or feel belonged if you can talk to the members of your group and share with them whatever is on your mind and reciprocate. But by itself it lacks the explanatory potential required when it comes to describing nationalism and its power as a sole creator of social solidarity and togetherness. It cannot hold under critical examination as there are multilingual nations as well. However, this does not mean that language is insignificant. We have already touched Gellner’s concept of ‘high’ culture in and regarding it, the more the people use (or can be put to use) the same
language, the easier it is to disseminate the homogenous culture which in turn provides a sense of attachment to the national sentiment.

A common language certainly helps in the creation and sustenance of the nation-state with its public administration and mass education, which one objective is to reinforce this national sentiment. But, following Kedourie, "there is really no way of showing that people who speak one language have to unite into one state" (1967). Rather it is the standardisation process under which nationalism subjects the language and its vernacular(s) to promote unity and solidarity and thus a sense of togetherness that should interest us as critical analysts of the phenomenon. This happens primarily through schooling in which certain unified practices and ideas could be inculcated in all individuals, and these practices had to be national in nature, attaching the individual further into it (Durkheim cited in Mitchell 1931, 101).

The Romanticist thinker Johann Gottfried von Herder is one of those early proponents of cultural nationalism who equated language with the nation. His belief in national cultures being unique and incommensurable, fixed on language, led to him define nation’s “tradition, history, religion and principles of life, its whole heart and soul” (cited in Ergang 1966, 258). This sort of thinking we can rebut as erroneous as nations are not natural, fixed, or unchangeable. It is an inherent property of languages to change and nations and states do so alongside it. Even if much of human life has developed through these lines does not mean that we can infer that it is inevitable to be so. This does not make Herder’s nationalism exclusive however, he believes in diversity and pluralism, and most of all the mutual respect of nations regarding their own and other’s cultures, and where no one is above the other (Özkırımlı 2010, 13).

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Because of the element of choice inherent with nationalism, what the actual national identity turns out to be is constructed in the discursive phenomenon (discussed later in Chapter 4) but it is in this psychological dimension that the fuel or the building blocks, i.e. the ideas, notions and concepts for such a thing to happen is provided. This way Durkheim’s definition of nationality as a “group of human beings,
who for ethnical or perhaps merely for historical reasons desire to live under the same laws, and to form a single state” (cited in Mitchell 1931, 96) becomes too restrictive as it emphasises ethnical (a problematic term as we have established already) or historical reasons for nodal points to which people can attach themselves while the only thing to consider is that people only have the desire for togetherness and for some sort of mutual and collective government.

Regarding the historical reasons, we can ask who has the power to define us, if not us ourselves. The sins of our fathers are not ours and thus neither are their histories, even if there were some shared genes. We make our own history and even if we were to accept that we are part of a continuum, what has happened before does not tie us into following it. The continuum only serves as a vessel to summon inclusion (and exclusion with it), used by those in power to do so to gain political goals, in that the belief in a common ancestry is actually a consequence of political action and not a cause of it (Weber, 1978, 904). This is instrumental to keep in mind when looking critically at those processes that construct and maintain national identifications.

Nationalism can certainly be based on those issues presented by Durkheim but they are definitely not a requirement. What we can gather from Durkheim, however, is that for this collective identity to be national in nature, it must be politically viable in the sense that it must be able to join itself to already existing institutions or even create them if they do not exist, which makes nation simply “a politically conscious ethnie” (van den Berghe 2001, 273). As this thesis claims, there cannot be nationalism without some sort of politics involved, it seems, and what is meant by this is what we turn to examine next.
3 A SENSE OF PURPOSE – THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

We now turn to examine what makes the nationalism’s collective(s) *political*, i.e. why it has a political dimensions attached to it. What the political dimension of nationalism does, is that it provides the nation with the idea that it comes first and it is the only thing which truly matters no matter what. If the psychological dimension gives the nation its definition(s) of appearance, whether physical or mental, the political dimension provides it with a sense of purpose, as we can only talk of nationalism when something is actually done (or at least tried) with it. Nationalism thus is not limited only to questions of identity or sentiment even if it always is characterised with a sense of solidarity, belonging and togetherness.

In addition, the psychological dimension has to do with helping to envisage a certain group that has the capacity to become national, while the political dimension in turn offers the notions, ideas and concepts to help it come to fruition. It answers the questions why it matters to be a nation and why even be one in the first place. This can be seen for instance in Hroch and how nationalism is “that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests” (1993, 6), and in Gellner where nationalism promotes the view that the “obligations to the nation override all other public obligations” (2006, 1).

3.1 Self-government through self-determination

Following Breuilly, nationalism becomes *nationalism* only when there is a political element involved (1996, 148). It is thus action-based and it is just in these actions, which are politically motivated, where nationalism can really be seen in our society. Thus, it is not sufficient just to look at different nations through the lenses of e.g. culture or ethnicity, but we need look deeper into their nature and the power, the potential, capabilities, and capacities they hold. It cannot be overemphasised that critical and holistic nationalism studies examine the phenomenon not only as something within society to be described but also as a constitutive part of it to be explained. The collectiveness, solidarity, togetherness and loyalty has manifested itself throughout history in e.g. families, clans, tribes, cities, provinces, or polyglot empires and nationalism is only another step in this continuum in expressing human
sociality and definitely neither more natural nor more latent than the previous incarnations.

We can now expand an already touched claim of Anderson that a nation “is an imagined political community” (2006, 6, emphasis added) and say that an inherent part of nationalism is its fixation on politics, in that it has the need, the ability, and the potential to draw up and achieve political goals, ultimately meaning the formation of a nation-state where the sovereignty is complete and total. From the idea of sovereignty, and especially a sovereign people, we can see the link between nationalism and democracy. It is the view that a particular people inhabiting a particular territory should have the ultimate say in things. Through it, the democratic idea of self-government and the nationalistic idea of self-determination become connected.

3.1.1 Democracy and the social contract

One way of approaching this issue is to define democracy as rights and nationalism as national identity. Through these processes it is defined who can rule and what. The question becomes then, who are the demos (i.e. the collective) in democracy which nationalism offers to answer. It seeks and wants to qualify to whom the rights advocated by democracy actually belong. Democracy can this way be seen as universalist and inclusive while nationalism is particular and exclusive (Beetham and Boyle 1995, 25). But, in contrast to Ringmar where it is claimed that democracy clashes with nationalism in their concepts on representation, where the former’s is interest is in rights and the latter’s in identity (1998, 545), nowhere is it said that nationalism could not be based on rights as well, as it so did during the French Revolution, for a time at least. It is when these rights are wanted to be limited to a certain part of the population, whether of the world or the territory at question, is when nationalism becomes a powerful tool; when someone wants to qualify who is to be represented in the first place. In summary, it can be said that nationalism serves the people for its needs, while democracy serves the people for their needs.

Originally, however, the idea of self-determination derives from Immanuel Kant, who claimed that morality and knowledge could and should be separated and thus
morality was contained and found within the individual themselves and not the outside phenomenal world. This led to the evolution of the concept of ‘free will’ which ultimately led to self-determination and its becoming the supreme political good. Of course, we cannot claim Kant to be a nationalist or even a theorist of nationalism but his ideas did contribute significantly to its genesis (Kedourie 1993, 14–23).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose was influenced by Kant, took the concept of self-determination towards the collective and away from the individual. According to Rousseau, after people (meaning many individuals) have established and entered the social contract between each other which allows them to transcend the ugliness of natural life, they are not totally rid of dangers as people could still gang up on each other (2001, 75). Rousseau’s solution for this was for people to put the common ‘general will’ first in favour of their selfish wills as individuals and to instil a sense of loyalty and togetherness via the concepts of citizenship (ibid.) and, derived from that, patriotism (Barnard 1984, 246). For Rousseau, however, this came to mean citizenship in the manner of creating a political collective able to protect people from the unstable behaviour of others, and patriotism to evoke a sense of unity which is needed for this to be achieved. Now, Kant’s ideas of the autonomy of the individual merged with that of the collective which proved to be a fruitful breeding ground to nationalism which evoked a shift in thought to occur where the will of the individual came to correspond with the one of the nation.

3.1.2 The French Revolution as the locus classicus

Empirically speaking this shift has much to do with the French Revolution where the despotic rule of the king was overthrown by the people, for the people – even if the decision-making apparatus was still far away from the democratic ideals that we hold in esteem today. Following Jenkins, the French Revolution can be taken as the starting point of nationalism because then “the principle of nationhood emerged from a struggle to redefine political sovereignty” (1990, 6). The French Revolution sought to enforce the newfound idea of togetherness through shared and equal citizenship. Its aim was to politically enfranchise those who were previously excluded. While it certainly was not inclusive by modern standards if we think about
the situation of groups such as women or slaves, the goal and outcome of it was definitely more inclusive than the rule of the Ancien Régime.

That the revolutionaries wanted to remove the power from the rulers to the ruled came to mean the people, which in turn came to be regarded as the nation; consider why General François Kellermann exclaimed “Vive la Nation” at Valmy in 1792. At that time, the word ‘nation’ came to collect the spontaneous emotions of hope, faith and unity which were inspired by the revolution; it equated the nation with the whole social organism. The social content of the concept, however, its concretion, varied extensively. Even if the joint forces of nationalism and democracy did very much in terms of promoting equality, it did little to abolish inequality, and thus the ‘nation’ came to exclude the popular masses. In fact, it was the bourgeoisie’s representatives in the Constituent Assembly who advocated for the equality of rights, namely of property, economic freedom, and profit, to counter against aristocratic privilege, without taking account the popular classes or even political democracy for that matter. It was these masses who had a broader conception of what equality of rights ought to mean: the right to existence. Only after some struggles was this égalité de jouissance advanced as the bourgeoisie were forced to make concessions if they wanted to see a unified nation created. (Soboul 1975, 589)

As we know, the French Revolution was no bed of roses for the people of France, however noble its aspirations were. It has been argued that it came to encounter the problems, such as the Reign of Terror, it eventually did because of the antagonistic nature of democracy and nationalism, their respective conflict, and that their incompatibility was clear from the get-go (Arendt 1966, 230). The argument here is that the inclusionary ideal of democracy where those hitherto disenfranchised would now be included in political processes did not share the exclusionary elements of national awakening. But as the king and the Ancien Régime did not rule the whole world but only the territory of France of the time, a nationalistic ideal of France and the French was needed as well. This is why we talk of the French Revolution.

A side-effect of this, as we have noticed is the creation, whether conscious or unconscious, of the ‘other’, the non-French, the foreigner, with its “psychopolitical”
charge (Brubaker 1992, 47), as a nation is always defined by what it is not via inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the nation needs an ‘other’ which is framed as a threat to be countered with nationalistic means. One must, of course, be aware that neither all of the ‘French’ of the time were revolutionary nor supported the revolution. However, it would be fallacious to argue that democracy as it is based on ideas of inclusivity or diversity, does not a priori require the existence of a different other, one that needs to be excluded and barred, i.e. that it just exists in the world, has done so for who knows how long and will continue to do so. The other for democracy is of course, the dictator or the authoritarian against whom and whose decisions democracy ought to protect.

Still, the concepts of democracy and nationalism are anything but incompatible as they did go, for a time at least, jovially hand in hand. The coinciding interests of them led even the esteemed John Stuart Mill to, perhaps not equate, but nevertheless parallel the concepts and described their coexistence as harmonious or even co-dependent:

> a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others – which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively (2001, 143).

It was only when the nationalism at question came to be transformed did it also transform what it wanted from democracy and only then did the two become conflicted and incompatible. Sieyès had the seemingly noble idea of wanting the people to be equated with the nation, namely to treat them as synonyms (Schwarzmantel 1991, 32). However, his democratic ideals had serious qualifications which limited popular sovereignty as he believed in a sort of enlightened rule of a publicly spirited elite (Sewell 1988, 121). Robespierre was a proponent of more inclusive democracy but even for him ressentiment started to wax, illustrated, for instance, in his declaration of how “I hate the English people” (cited in Hondt 1995, 225; emphasis added), and in turn democracy waned.
3.1.3 Nationalism first

The aforementioned Romanticist movement developed as an opposing force to Enlightenment as it was deemed too cool, calm, and distant with its universalism and rationalism. Romanticism, instead, searched for something emotionally charged, aesthetic, and cultural that could rouse people’s innermost senses of what it means to be a collective. From the Enlightenment nationalism drew its ethos and from Romanticism its pathos. How nationalism was able to draw from two completely opposite movements and accommodate their views in a way that furthers it is a striking example of its adaptive and survivalist nature.

In this context, the relationship between nationalism and democracy was always lopsided to the advantage of the former. Nationalism, in a way, used democracy and when it gained enough of a foothold of its own, it discarded democracy and the ideas it represented. Nationalism is thus also highly opportunistic by nature. It is indiscriminate in its use of complementing ideas, notions, and concepts that advance its agenda but shows no loyalty if they start to drag it down. This is not to say that democracy did not have its vested interest in the collaboration with nationalism, because the creation of nation-states gave birth to and allowed the creation of democratic institutions which were to be seen nowhere else (Held 1995, 48).

This transformation of nationalism allowed for a new expansionist and annexationist manifestation to form, one fuelled by hatred towards other nations. Against Enlightenment values, the enemy was not anymore the despotic ruler but other nations (Spencer and Wollman, 130). The struggle for rights became the struggle of nations and precisely in this moment then the paradox, the “double standard” (Neuberger 1995, 32), of nationalism is revealed: while nationalism can claim to advance the rights of the nation, it sometimes fails (or chooses not to) recognise the rights of other nations, especially if they are thought to oppose its own interests. This corresponds to what Lord Acton had in mind when he advocated for a pluralist state of various nations under one state (2001, 151), although he was a prisoner or a product of his time and thus had some serious racist attitudes about intellectually superior and inferior races.
The point still remains that it is very dangerous to consider the nation and the state commensurate which leads to exceptionalism, and changes the dynamic of respect for others into disrespect, intolerance, and in the worst case, hate:

For at the heart of nationalism as a political project, whatever form it takes, is a logic that tends towards exclusion. There must after all always be people who are not part of the nation; the nation is always framed with the presumption of the existence of the outsider, the other, against which the nation is itself defined and constructed. (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 96)

Democracy has no need for nationalism as it can be achieved with people simply acknowledging that a certain amount of people inhabit a certain geographical location and common rules as a collective must be established for a fruitful existence and co-existence. This collectiveness does not however need to be in any way nationally based. Similarly, nationalism certainly does not need democracy, but if it suits it, it can definitely make use of it. There can even be nationalism without democracy, and it might even happen that nationalism turns wholly against it, like in the case of Nazi Germany, for instance (Breuilly 1992, 16). A more contemporary example, while not as drastic, can be seen once again in the authoritarian regimes already discussed where democracy has had to make way for more and more powerful nationalisms. In Hungary universities have been forced to move; in Poland judiciary systems are going through massive reforms; in Turkey the transparency of voting is losing legitimacy; while in India politically motivated violence looms strong.

The clash between self-determination and national self-determination can be seen in already existing nation-states with secessionist movements. The competing agendas of being sovereign and having the right to form a nation-state in the first place even in the territory of an existing nation-state, is about power. The goal is to overthrow the old rule in place of the new 'better' one, but even it has to be defined or else the identity remains unresolved and the nation is not born anew. It was these coinciding interests of democracy and nationalism and thus their compatibility that paved the way for other national liberation struggles such as those that emanated from post-colonialism (Jenkins 1990, 8; Alter 1989, 143–144), in addition to the fall of the Soviet Union (see e.g. studies done by Diuk and Karatnycky 1993; Karklins 1994; Senn 1995; and Taageperra 1993). The trend is by no means diminishing as
already in Europe with Scotland and Catalonia there are nationalist movements which seek sovereignty via more or less democratic arguments.

3.2 State as the ultimate provider of community and sovereignty

The concept of ‘state’ has proven itself to be an intricate part of nationalism. Continuing with our claim of modernity, a new political form of the state emerged in Europe somewhere in the sixteenth century and the couple centuries after that (Mann 1992, 150). It is novel compared to pre-modern polities because now the state had grown in size and relevance exponentially in relation to society. This lead to competition between states which in turn further accelerated their advance, development and progress. In addition, internal pacification of the territories was also required and for two reasons: so that the new states could have a monopoly over violence in their territory, which leads to the second reason where this monopoly of violence could be directed against external threats as well, i.e. primarily by levying armies. Larger states had more inhabitants which meant that more sophisticated means of promoting community were needed which eventually formed to be national by nature.

The psychological dimension had to do with the choice and competition between ethnic ties and symbols that have the potential to create them. But nationalism is not only competition between ethnic lines and their symbols and traditions etc. but between polities as well, namely states and even factions within them. According to Gellner “the nation and the state should be congruent” (2006, 1) and this is what defines nationalism and distinguishes it from other, less demanding forms of group identification (Hobsbawm 1992, 9). States are the territories where a single polity, no matter its genealogy, has the ability and capacity to make decisions regarding the inhabitants of its territory. In the western world this is mostly seen through a government that has been selected through a process of democratic parliamentarism which is supposed to give the power to decide to the people but which can be contested. But according to nationalism, rule of the people by the people in sovereign states equals the rule of the nation by the nation in nation-states. This stems from the desire to have something to control, or only to have something, period, without outside influence or dictation.
3.2.1 Forming congruence through established institutions

According to Max Weber the term ‘nation’ is ambiguous due to its complex nature not just in “terms of empirical qualities” but a “sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups” as well (2000, 5). Weber continues that this solidarity manifests itself as “a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (2000, 9). The word “normally” here is of importance, as it acknowledges that the state is not necessarily the one thing that all nations desire or must desire, because alternatives do exist. Nations do not necessarily have to even create a new state for their own as they might just seek to subject an already established one to its will.

For Carr though, the ultimate result of nationalism on a global scale is apparent as it claims to make the nation “the sole rightful sovereign repository of political power and the ultimate constituent unit of world organization” (1945, 39). A nation is thus a collective with a political agenda which certainly manifests ultimately in the desire to create its own sovereign state where the will of it could be found and advanced thus leading to complete self-determination without outside meddling. But it does not limit itself only to this goal as there can be many other aspirations in addition to the yearning for a state of its own.

It is important to note that we cannot always equate the nation with the state as there are nations without their own sovereign territories, e.g. the Scots, Catalans or the Kurds just to name a few. Also, there are nations that do not, actively at least, seek a sovereign territory to control but even some sort of decision-making mechanism where they could control the route their nation is heading such as the Sámi. The ability to decide is the crux and it is most executable within a sovereign territory, i.e. the state, which makes it easy to understand why it is such an integral concept regarding nationalism.

Not all nationalist movements want to have total control of the state, but can be content to even be able to influence the state they inhabit according to their wants and needs. Continuing with our example of the Sámi people, who for instance in Finland have their own representative body, the Sámi Parliament, through which they make their voices heard on issues of e.g. culture or language without at least a passionate desire to create a state of their own. This just goes to show that while not
all nations without states are inherently secessionist or separatist by nature, what is common to them all is the need for acknowledgment by the state they inhabit, as a separate polity, with its own characteristics different from the larger *populus*.

The inherent element of choice of nationalism still remains present here as well. Gellner has put this well with his statement of how “nationalism is a phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft” (2006, 74). Whether or not we agree that the nation-state is a bourgeois formation we can surely agree with Rosa Luxemburg in the notion that “the nation as a homogenous sociopolitical entity does not exist” (cited in Forman 1998, 89). This is echoed in Bauer where the claim that national character is not absolute but rather “relative commonality of traits in the mode of behaviour of particular individuals” (1996, 41) grounds us once again towards the sense of togetherness and cohesion of the collective and the using any means necessary to attain and sustain it.

### 3.2.2 Spreading cultural information

While the polity of the state was already forming and in some instances formed when nations started attaining consciousness, it was precisely these nations that appropriated this suitable political form for their own use. States preceded nationalism yes, but that only means that nationalism truly is a modern phenomenon because states are modern as well. When these modern quasi-democratic states did emerge, they did so in national lines thus creating the polities we now call nation-states. It was nationalism which introduced the idea that an institution where the nation can survive and strive must be or be established. This answers the issue of why and how did the state form along national lines in contrast to some other, thus creating the nation-states.

First the states and their respective territories were formed which the nation then saw as a medium through which human progress and civilization is best achieved (Hayes 1931, 302). The states were already formed, but with their vacuous and lacklustre government, a space emerged that nationalism saw an opportunity to fill. Thus we can recognise that states did come first and nations after, or as Wallerstein puts it, “in almost every case statehood preceded nationhood, and not the other way
around, despite a widespread myth to the contrary” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991, 81). By no means, this is to say that states created nations, only that states offered a well-established institution, mainly with its territory and polity that the nations saw and thought could be taken advantage of.

We already touched the key issue of information and communication earlier but Mann (1992, 150–1) drives the point home when he states that while “nationalism is an elaborated ideology shared by many people right across a territory” to spread it needs to be “organized through specific channels of communication”. The nation-state had the capacity to disseminate its prescribed ideology/information/culture to its inhabitants and like a lightning following the path of least resistance, the least resistance for ideology was through ethnic lines e.g. a common vernacular or some other distinct cultural trait.

This had the crucial political implications of mobilising greater number of men for war, because the greater the armies, the greater the odds for success. This led to a circle where the more men were mobilised, the more they needed explanation for their sacrifice, and when the explanation was more nationalism, which offered more unity against a ‘common’ threat, the more aware the subjects became of “their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership might confer” (Held 1995, 57). This corresponds with Kohn and how nationalism is the integration of masses into a political form (1958, 4).

As these nation-states of auld became more and more democratic, the heterogeneous elite fractions vying for power needed to connect with its other inhabitants with increased measures. This competition between the fractions only fortified the young, tentative nation-states to the point where they became strong enough, that the struggle for internal power superseded the desire for external power between states. In that way, things have not changed in the few last centuries, where if one were to want to become a player in the world-stage, they need first the support of their nation. According to Bauman, the nation-state is “the idea of a nation made into the state’s flesh” (1997, 190) and this analogy is what the nationalists seek to take advantage of.
The objectives that nationalists have in their quest for power can vary and Breuilly (1993, 9) has identified three such movements: reform nationalism, that aims to gain control of already existing states, for instance, pretty much any political party in any country that identifies itself as nationalist; unification nationalism that seeks to expand an already existing state such as Russia's nostalgic desire to become an imperial power once more, concretised in the ventures it has done for instance on Ukrainian soil; and separatist nationalism which aims to split the state in order to create a new state, e.g. the already touched Scottish and Catalanian secessionist movements. What these movements all have in common is their dependence on the already established institutions of the state, which adds to the argument of the instrumentality of the state as a key element in nationalism which functions as the means for conveying the power pursued by the nationalists. It is the state that nationalism wants, not the nation per se, as it can already be seen as a given. It is the action that is wanted to be done in the name of the nation that grants nationalism its political dimension.

3.2.3 Citizenship and the right to have rights

The state enables the nation the means to define inclusion as well as inclusion with the concept of citizenship and with it nationality. The only way for you to be a Finn, for instance, is that you are acknowledged by the state-apparatus of Finland. It is not a right one has de facto by simply existing unless certain criteria are met. How this acknowledging is done varies between states as well as within them, the three main instruments being by blood (ius sanguinis), by being born in the state (ius soli), and naturalisation. The two first mentioned notions open up a debate for two different nationalisms and their implications. With ius soli the nationalism in question can be considered more inclusive and ‘civic’ as it welcomes to its nation all those born within its territory, in contrast to ius sanguinis which is more exclusive and ‘cultural’ with its advocacy of blood relations. ius sanguinis is more of a rule while ius soli is an additional way of conferring citizenship (Mertes 1996, 27).

For instance, in Finland which does not ascribe to ius soli like e.g. the United States does, if you are born to a Finnish mother, you automatically are entitled to a Finnish citizenship. Otherwise, certain requirements are needed. Passing on a citizenship
through paternal ties requires often marriage or official establishing of paternity. *Ius soli*, seemingly being more open, is not without its qualifications, however. It is ascribed as the state wants to impose responsibilities to the individual, as it is likely while not inevitable, that a person born in the state will also continue living there. It is a means of drawing loyalty from the subject, and adherence mostly to its monopoly of violence (Weber 1946, 78). Also in common for both of these instruments is that they are mostly juridical by nature and do not reveal much about the nations themselves. In both cases, the nation into which membership is conferred, is treated as a given.

Naturalisation, on the other hand, requires a certain assimilation to the dominant, given, national culture. It prescribes that one has to be or become ‘something’ in order to attain citizenship and thus membership of the nation. For instance, the Finnish Immigration Service provides a list of six requirements for an acceptable naturalisation to occur to an applicant:

- established identity;
- sufficient language skills;
- sufficient period of residence;
- integrity;
- means of support;
- fulfilled payment obligations (2019).

As one can see, these requirements are very arbitrary and indefinite. Terms such as ‘established’ and ‘sufficient’ are not unproblematic. Most revealing is the mention of ‘identity’ which implies that there would be a certain kind of Finnishness which one needs to acquire. But as this thesis handles with conceptual theorisation about nationalism and not critiquing Finnish immigration policies, we will not delve further into this matter. This was just to show the problems one might encounter when dealing with the phenomenon in the framework presented as the conferring of citizenship is an excellent example of the psychological and political dimensions working together in the discourse dimensions as it draws from both dimensions, psychological in the identity building sense and political in the acknowledgment of
citizenship, in a predetermined environment which is decided in the discourse of immigration. To the discursive dimension is where we turn our attention next.
4 THE POTENTIAL REALISED – THE DISCURSIVE DIMENSION

Now that we have established how nationalism has very much something to do with a political collective, we still need to examine just how this political collective is actually formed. The upcoming sections will show how nationalism as a phenomenon happens and is done and performed discursively and in discourses, which leads us to claim that the formation happens in a discursive dimension. We can thus delve into the crux of the phenomenon, of how nationalism is actually used and to what effect, because as we have established, nationalism is not nationalism yet unless something is actually done with it. A connection between the analytical and the practical is thus required. In addition, as no two manifestations of nationalism either are or can be exactly the same, this level of practicality enables us to look at the many diverse nationalisms of how they are performed and produced in concrete terms and this is ultimately done via discourse.

4.1 Nationalism as a discursive formation

We can identify the third dimension of nationalism as discursive as it allows us to answer the questions proposed, for instance, by Day and Thompson of "how, from what, by whom and for what" nationalism is constructed (2004, 107). In the discursive dimension is where the “discursive formation” advocated by Craig Calhoun (1997, 3) of nationalism is constituted. By looking nationalism as an arbitrary formation, it enables us as analysts to maintain our sense of critique without sacrificing objectivity, so that we do not add to the unnecessary reification of the phenomenon.

The two dimensions of nationalism already discussed basically feed the phenomenon with their respective ideas, notions and concepts, and it is in the third, discursive dimension where it is decided which of these notions are viable to form a successful compilation and then become integrated to the nationalism proper (see Figure 1). It is the melting pot of ideas, constantly tempered and reorganised. The discursive dimension is thus aimed at solving the problems and achieving the goals the two other dimensions create. It answers the question of ‘how’, as in how to
advocate for this particular nationalism in the best way possible to reach the goals and solve the problems that come up.

In addition, the discursive dimension also functions as a mediator between the dimensions and also is the dimension that offers the solutions found to the public arena through discourse, hence the name of it. Essentially, nationalism ultimately happens in the discursive dimension because it is the only dimension that has a direct connection to the public arena, with which to affect and influence people as well as their cognition and consciousness. Following Foucault, discourse comes to mean all the “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (2002, 54) and not just spoken utterances or written words but also pretty much every semiotic mean of conveying information.

Continuing with Calhoun, he has identified ten distinguishing features present in nationalist discourse:

1. boundaries, of territory and population, or both;
2. indivisibility;
3. sovereignty, or the aspiration to sovereignty, usually through an autonomous and putatively self-sufficient state;
4. an ‘ascending’ notion of legitimacy, or the idea that government is just only when supported by popular will;
5. popular participation in collective affairs;
6. direct membership, where each individual is a part of the nation and categorically equivalent to other members;
7. culture which involves some combination of language, shared beliefs and values;
8. temporal depth, the idea of a nation extending from the past to the future;
9. common descent or racial characteristics;
10. special historical, sometimes sacred, relations to a particular territory (1997, 4–5).

We have already touched all of the issues on this list in some form or another which just goes to show that we are definitely on the right track in our analysis, that the analytical potential can and will actualise in the ‘real world’. The list is thus an
amalgam of the issues we considered in the previous dimensions and in the
discursive one we can now see them being realised. The list is by no means
exhaustive, so far as that all of these notions presented must be found to be able to
identify discourse as nationalistic, rather they are more general focal points through
which to look at the issue as it is very difficult to think about nationalist
argumentation if it did not contain at least some of the features mentioned.
However, it is worth keeping in mind that these are not definitive features, but
rather claims that are incorporated into nationalistic argumentation because
“nations are constituted by the claims themselves” (Calhoun 1997, 5).

4.1.1 Discourse and nationalism as co-constitutive

The discursive dimension takes into account the issues close to the nationalism at
hand, i.e. those that come up in the psychological and political dimensions. This goes
to show that even if nationalism is first and foremost political by nature, it is not only
that, and as such cannot be considered merely a doctrine, contra Kedourie and
Gellner. This way we are able to incorporate into our analysis all the more basic
ways nationalism affects our talking, acting, thinking, and cognition. It is the
discourse of nationalism that “takes pre-existing [psychological] attachments and
gives them political significance” (Özkırımlı 2010, 202) which is then projected to
the public. It also takes into account the process of selection which is crucial and
inherent to nationalism as it is in the discursive dimension where the ultimate
choices about the collective are done. Considering how we have already addressed
the issue that to recognise a nation, a sense of social solidarity is required, it is
however not enough to constitute a nation as an absolute, because solidarity,
togetherness etc. exists in many other sorts of groupings as well. In almost all that
require even some kind of cooperation, to be frank. Nationalism and especially the
discourse of it is thus to think about social solidarity in a particular way.

At this juncture we can look at the so far neglected but central notion of patriotism
which can be seen as a kind of ‘benevolent nationalism’. In fact, ardent nationalists
often frame themselves as patriots who cherish, value and, if necessary, defend their
respective nation. Towards those who view nationalism as something to criticise,
they might ask what is so wrong with patriotism or being patriotic. Consequently,
we could answer that nothing by itself if you accept that being patriotic you are also de facto a nationalist and must thus give reasons to why you think your nation(ality) is such a wonderful thing.

Continuing with Durkheim, patriotism has to do with how an individual considers itself bound to the state via “ideas and feelings [...] seen from a certain viewpoint [...] from the affective angle” (1986, 202; emphasis added). From this viewpoint, we can consider patriotism as an illusion or a mirage, only showing that nationalism has succeeded in its hegemonic endeavour to take unflinchingly at face-value that what it in its endless benevolence deems worthy to offer. Illustratively this led Durkheim, writing in the age of the Russian Empire, to contemplate if “Russian patriotism exists among the Finns” even if Finland is a part of the Russian state (ibid.). We can thus say that essentially, the viewpoint is the discourse of nationalism, patriotism being just one manifestation of it.

National identity, whether or not benevolent, is a construct and it is discourse which constructs it. The political dimension offers and creates the actions wanted for the nationalist movements and again it is in the discursive dimension where they are ultimately done and made. Breuilly has identified three tactics that are required for a nationalist movement to succeed in their task whatever it might be:

- **Co-ordination** is the part ideology plays in bringing a set of diverse political interests into a single movement by providing them with a unity of values and purposes. **Mobilization** is the part ideology plays in bringing new groups into the political process and providing them with political objectives and justifications. **Legitimation** is the part ideology plays in presenting an acceptable image of a political movement to outsiders. (1992, 93; emphasis added)

Quite frankly, these tactics can be said to apply to any political movement whatsoever, but that only adds to the claim of this thesis that nationalism is certainly a political endeavour and thus must be considered as such, which in turn allows for more rigid and critical analysis and discussion like with any other political phenomenon. It also adds to the discursive element of politics as the point lies in the treatment of nationalism as an ideology and as such it can be examined dispassionately, objectively and without bias. The ideological is an intrinsic part of the political which is actualised in the discursive dimension.
4.2 The power of producing and performing nationalism

The discursive dimension is also intrinsically linked to power, as it is those with a status of power that are able to direct the discourse, namely the elite in one form or another. Brass has also identified this when he states that:

ethnicity and nationalism are not ‘givens’ but are social and political constructions. They are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well being [sic] or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as themselves. (1991, 8)

Here we see the already established modernist view in play where both ethnicity and nationalism are not seen as something natural or “given”. Rather, they are social creations and constructions which inherently involves the element of choice and this choosing is done via the elites in powerful positions to do so. That is why we look at e.g. Orbán, Erdoğan and Modi when we want to find out the currents in nationalist populism because they are the representatives of the elite. They are the ones who have the power to set agendas and thus control the issues to be discussed. They are among the ones currently controlling the discourse and presenting the narrative.

Kedourie (1993, 141) states that “it is very often truer to say that national identity is the creation of a nationalist doctrine than that nationalist doctrine is the emanation of or expression of national identity”. We can see the connection to Gellner in that it is nationalism that creates nations and not vice versa. A national identity is thus always constructed by those with the capacity, ability and power to do so and that is always done through discourse and that is why the discursive dimension is the key place to study when examining the use of nationalism as means to influence people’s cognition.

It must be noted that nationalism is not an actor in itself but it offers a script for the actors to follow and the actors are more often than not political by nature. Or are the political actors the screenwriters who draw from nationalism as they wish? Politicians, intellectuals, writers, historians, academics and such make their own choices which are then used by the political actors who make their own choices for
policies which then offer new grounds for research and thinking and so the pattern continues.

The choice how nationalism is portrayed, advocated or argued for is always arbitrary. There is no absolute or unquestionable truth about why nationalism should be portrayed along ethnic lines, it just so happens to be the case in a historical context. But, as Brass suggests, “the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible” (1991, 16). The world and society are in a constant state of flux and the changing political and economic circumstances could lead to a wholly other emphasis entirely from the “symbolic manipulation of cultural forms, values and practices” (ibid.). Again we can turn to the case of Scottish independence and its referendum of 2014, where both sides for and against independence argued solely via socio-economic arguments e.g. currency and weapons of mass destruction, without mentioning anything even resembling ethnicity related issues, further solidifying nationalism as not merely ethnic but much more than that. Ethnicity is just one side of the coin because the agenda can be set along other lines as well, but the agenda is always set in the discourse.

How these choices regarding agenda are then made is another question to think about. The lightning metaphor previously used of the path of least resistance applies here as well. As society is not a vacuum but a complex network of things, the elite are not disconnected from it either. They choose the best options that forward their agenda or in other words, those that can be manipulated to maximum effect. The elites are constrained by the properties already existing and visible in the group but they are nevertheless able to modify, simplify and manipulate those properties how they see fit to further their agenda in a politically useful manner (Brass 1991, 16).

The thing to keep in mind is that the nation, like class, religion, gender, or race, is a system of control, meant to offer divisions through collectiveness. It thus has a manipulative side to it which must be critically looked at in order to find out what exactly is attempted to get done or achieved with this very sort of argumentation, because it is in and through argumentation where nationalism is performed, created and maintained, in addition to the power structures that are caused by it. It is a constant process of selection and de-selection over what matters, what counts as
significant, as well as enforcement, prohibition, and injunctions against alternates. Due to the infinite amount of possible constructions it can be moulded to suit a myriad of purposes. Only when these notions, ideas and concepts of nationalism are deemed to matter, can it have the power it ultimately has as nationalism definitely has historically resonated with much of the global population and continues to do so.

4.2.1 The narrative formed

The incorporation of the discursive element to the holistic treatment of the socially constructed phenomenon of nationalism sets the stage for more postmodern handling of the subject, transcending the need to not only justify historically why nationalism is what it is, but to also include with it a critical element in examining and scrutinising the discourse that goes along with it. In the words of Bhabha, the nationalists’ objective is the production of “the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative national progress” (1990, 3). With the choices that nationalists have in creating this discourse of the nation, they are in fact creating a narrative, a story if you will, meant to influence and ultimately manipulate people to support their invented doctrine, not unlike any other ideology. But it is nationalist as it is about forming a political collective via the ideas and notions stemming from the other dimensions we have discussed. When creating the narrative of the nation, the process of choosing the right ideas, notions and concepts is a totally arbitrary and “not an automatic, spontaneous or organic process” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 57).

Hall (1992, 273) has identified many discursive strategies that the nationalist project applies in its endeavour for power. The ones most salient for this thesis are the one in which how the story of the nation is told in history books and in popular culture in general. Another is the emphasis on origins, tradition and continuity in order to portray the nation as something unchanged and unchanging, thus adding to the view of ‘one true nation’. The point of these strategies is to offer people simplifications and reductions of impossibly complex issues so that they would have no problem in accepting them.
In addition, their goal is not just to make people accept them but to make people *want* to accept them. It can be portrayed as a big stream where everyone (who can be considered to be one of the nation of course) can throw their canoe in and just go with the flow. The power and effectiveness of these strategies cannot be disputed but they still are very problematic. In emphasising one notion or symbol, the nationalist doctrine represses and obscures other notions and symbols that to some might be as vital as the ones chosen by the elite in the effort to construct unity of the nation, which in the end is “impossible” because of just this (Bhabha 1990, 3).

We have acknowledged earlier how the dissemination of information is vital to the spread of nationalism but then the discussion revolved then much around the part of the state as a central feature for this, but now we can see that the nationalists do not need the state for their propaganda. Still, they do compete for the control of the state and its information spreading machine and capabilities which adds to the instrumentality of the state in a twofold manner, it is competed for and it is very powerful.
5 DISCUSSION – FROM PLURALISM TO MONISM

Now that we have identified the three dimensions of nationalism and the ideas, notions and concepts they entail, we can move on to examine more closely their relationships between each other and how that in turn affects and constitutes the phenomenon of nationalism itself. The three dimensions of nationalism are inextricably linked in that we cannot talk of nationalism as such with even one of the dimensions absent. This is why none of the dimensions cannot be overlooked or understated. They must be viewed holistically and constitutionally in order to grasp the fundamentals regarding the phenomenon. All of the dimensions are required for a holistic treatment of the phenomenon, even if the emphasis can vary between how deeply dimensions are looked at or how prominent the dimensions even are in a certain nationalism.

The psychological dimension is required to tell us the appearance of the nation under discussion, whatever that might be, based on ethnicity or something totally else. The political dimension provides legitimacy and orientation for the nation to draw up goals and achieve them. The discursive dimension compiles and sifts the ideas, concepts, and notions stemming from the two other dimensions and creates a narrative that can be presented to the public who then can accept or reject the nationalism provided for them. The dimensions and their relationships are presented in Figure 1.

5.1 The relationships of the dimensions examined

As stated, all of the dimensions have their respective roles to play in the process of producing nationalism. They are linked to each other as all of them are required for us to be able to identify nationalism as well as study it. An interesting thing to point out is that while the idea-dimensions of the psychological and the political are not directly connected to each other, they are connected to their respective nationalism. They are part of the same process while having their own contents independent from each other and thus their relationship is more of an indirect nature. The psychological dimension has no inherent need to transmit its ideas and notions to the political dimension directly while it can certainly draw from it via the discursive
dimension. Likewise, the political dimension has no de facto requirements to draw from the fountain of the psychological dimension while it surely can be very effective to do that but this as well is done via the discursive dimension where it is ultimately decided what matters. The political dimension has no direct connection with or to the psychological as politics being the art of the possible, and the psychological has no inherent need to think about actions because being is what it is all about.

An example of the absent direct connection between the psychological and political dimension and the role of the discursive dimension as a mediator between them can be seen in the much used anti-immigration slogan used in Finland “Suomi suomalaisille” which freely translates to “Finland to the Finns”. Already in this one little extract we can see all of the dimensions working, separately and together. We can see the psychological dimension in the group ‘Finns’, the political dimension in the objective that to this group of ‘Finns’ the state of Finland belongs to and to no one else for that matter, and this is all represented and compiled in the discursive dimension where slogan is ultimately uttered, with the goal to influence the public opinion in the public arena.

Of course, it is important to note that the public arena is not one homogeneous mass where everyone either accepts or rejects the narrative presented to them, but that it is made up of different people with different opinions. Through these opinions the acceptability or rejection of the narrative is fed back to the discursive dimension and through this feedback new or overlooked ideas can make their way even further back into the two farther idea-dimensions where they might once have been marginalised. In doing so, they can with hypothetical newfound ethos and pathos make their way to become more central in the next version of the narrative of the nation. Just like in Christopher Nolan’s movie Inception of 2011, if an idea is planted in the right way it can grow to become an all-encompassing compulsion that affects the soul and shakes the core. In this manner, it is possible that at first a marginal notion or idea can come to play a larger role in the narrative through events or mere re-iteration that can make it more and more legitimate.

Like with all political movements, nationalists do not need to assure every single individual in the public arena of their cause but just enough to help them in
advancing their search for power suffices. Other ideologies are vying for people's acknowledgement in the public arena as well because politics is about competing for people's cognition and ultimately submission to the doctrine presented. The two-way arrows in Figure 1 highlight this interconnectedness of the elements in question. The public arena also feeds back to the nationalism presented to it what it is willing to accept and what not and what kind of ideas it wants in the first place. The nationalist doctrine will then accordingly make the accompanying adjustments to their narrative, drawing from the psychological and political concepts and notions that the two respective dimensions have to offer. The position of the discursive dimension in between of the public arena and the other two dimensions, rather than being level with them, highlights its role as the sole entity which communicates between the dimensions and the public arena. The spherical form of the dimensions highlights the fact of them being the dimensions of nationalism, while the rectangular shape of the public arena functions to illustrate the notion that it is influenced by it as well as influences it and not a part it.

An illustrative way of looking at the dimensions is to draw a comparison with the human body. The psychological dimension is the nervous system which thinks and feels. The political dimension is the muscles and bones, the things that make us able to move and act and thus reach our goals. The discursive dimension, then, is our communication organs, those things which make us human, as it is only through communication that we are able to reach cooperation in the scale that we as humans can achieve the things we have, for instance democracy, intricate infrastructural developments and other components necessary for civilisations to flourish. Together the dimensions create the whole of the phenomenon as they are co-constitutive – they constantly affect and transform each other.

5.2 National awakening

The psychological and political dimensions may not be directly connected but their intricate relationship and dependence on each other in making up the whole of nationalism is nevertheless of utmost importance. This is most evident in the process of how a more general identity or sentiment develops into nationalism. This happens when the identity of the group and its ideal view of how its surroundings
ought to be do not correlate with each other. So something must be done about the issue in order to fix it or at least move closer to a more acceptable situation. This in turn means that some sort of awareness of one’s position in the world and also of one’s agency in it is required, as the next part of the process is the implementation of nationalist claims to the picture.

This means that there must be some sort of cognitive basis for the acknowledgement of nationalism as something that can improve the situation. So, in a way, the process of how an identity develops into nationalism can be traced to the psychological dimension gathering basis for its being the way it is from the political dimension that can aid in making the non-ideal more ideal. However, it is important to notice that this realisation happens through the discursive dimensions as it is the arguments that ultimately have the capability to implement this change in the situation. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.

**Figure 2.** The development of identity to nationalism.

The psychological dimension offers the choice of being a certain kind of a collective while the political dimension offers it the choice of what is to be done about it. The ultimate decision to actualise these choices and potential is then done in the discursive dimension. To each dimension thus is incorporated the element of choice, which adds to the modernist view. Because if it were natural or given like primordialists or perennialists claim, there would be no need for a choice, which would devoid the whole phenomenon of its analytic potential while the opposite is true. We can surely say that nationalism if something has a whole lot of analytic potential, or why else would it be on constant display and under rigid and heated discussion.

Now that we have established that nationalism is political, action-based and goal-oriented in nature, we are faced with the question of from where do these notions stem. The answer resides in the dissatisfaction of how things currently are. This
dissatisfaction then is seen to be able to be resolved best via arguments that have to do with forwarding the nationalist agenda to improve the current situation. This answers how the nationalists not in power see things but what about the nationalist already in power. How are they dissatisfied? This can be answered through their means of trying to maintain their positions in power as they must constantly repeat and renew their arguments, were they concerned with e.g. foreigners or their opponents’ views, in other words the nationalists’ dissatisfaction in this way is the dissatisfaction towards their opponents’ dissatisfaction towards them.

5.3 Pluralism and monism converging

The three-dimensional model presented in this thesis illustrates how different manifestations of nationalism are produced. This is not to say that this model functions as some sort of apparatus through which a single, fixed nationalism is always given. It is the production process that is common to them all while the outcomes differ from each other. The two idea-dimensions of psychological and political offer an infinite amount of possibilities of how to perceive a nation and its goals and the discursive dimension then compiles and compresses the ideas, notions and concepts it wants into nationalism. Seen this way, we can argue that through nationalism pluralism and monism converge.

The difference between monism and pluralism is that the former seeks to find the one true system of good living while the latter aims to make one, holding that there can be many different ways of doing this. Pluralism seeks to take into account each and every individual’s wants and needs while monism aims to define what every single individual ought to want and need. Both of these views are apparent in nationalism as it aims to make a single collective amalgam of values, interests and morals worth pursuing out of myriads of possibilities. In other words, nationalism, or should we say nationalisms, try to impose upon us certain normative ways of how to live a politically good life.

As there are many notions of good, were it living in general or organising society, nationalism gradually moves towards monism from pluralism in its quest to find the best possible alternative. This begs the question, the best for who exactly. The
answer is for the nation at hand, of course, other competing groups or collectives are irrelevant. As it can draw from such a vast pool of possible inputs, nationalism can be used for pretty much anything from justifying genocides to interventionist military campaigns. This high malleability of nationalism means that it is used by those with something to gain in summoning support for their objectives. As such it is not enough to just question the nationalism used but also what is attempted to be gained by using it because nationalism can be accommodated with pretty much every political ideology were it liberalism or totalitarianism, democracy or dictatorship and anything in between.

It must be noted that also pluralism, in concurrence with monism, acknowledges the necessity of imposing limits as not every possibility can be reasonable or desired. Monism just takes this limiting further than pluralism. In the centre of it all is the question of what is valued over what else and why. This inevitably leads to hierarchical divisions being made between groups of people and that is what nationalism pretty much is about, advancing one collective over others. Thus nationalism seeks to limit our understanding of the human condition which makes it such a dangerous tool if left unchecked without criticism. Although an underlying feature in nationalism is to promote a sense social cohesion, solidarity, kinship, and togetherness, this collectiveness can paradoxically be very exclusive. Through nationalism, a collective as a distinct interest group is created that seeks not only to better life for the sake of the group but for the sake of the nationalism itself as well.

Even if we are aware that there can be and are many different nationalisms that try to impose their view of monism to the public, the acknowledgement of this is not to utter a tautology because the model presented in this thesis illustrates how one sort of nationalism seeks to exclude all other variants, otherwise there would not be a need for it to exist. The model allows us to critically examine what it is that the nationalism under scrutiny advocates and how acceptable its monism truly is. It allows us to ask just how does the monism/nationalism portrayed take into account its restrictiveness and examine why it is just this sort of monism/nationalism that is the most useful and best. The conceptual analysis of the dimensions helps us in delving deeper into the essence of the nationalism and identify as well as examine the central ingredients in it. This way nationalisms can be compared and studied
how one can be more pluralistic than another. This is also why it is so important to look at not only what are the ideas and concepts presented but also where they stem from so that we can also know the alternatives and keep a critical stance amidst it all.
6 CONCLUSION

This thesis’ purpose was to show what nationalism is and what makes it such a varied phenomenon it is. This was done by providing a new holistic framework to the study of nationalism. This conceptual approach for viewing and analysing nationalism allows the differentiating of the concept of nationalism from the phenomenon. This way the concept of nationalism can be treated neutrally while the critical energy can be projected to the different manifestations of the phenomenon and not to its process of creation. This process was identified as the attempt to form a distinct political collective using nationalist argumentation. How this process works was argued to be three-dimensional, to which this framework argued here is based on. The separation of the concept and phenomenon allowed the use of concept analysis to scrutinise and identify the underlying features of nationalism.

Through this process, three different dimensions with their respective but separate ideas, concepts and notions, were found. By taking all the dimensions into account, a much more critical and thus analytical stance can be taken when studying the socially constructed phenomenon of nationalism itself. All of the three dimensions identified were found to be irremovable from the phenomenon itself and thus required for the most complete and holistic analysis possible. If even one were to be removed, it would change the phenomenon in such a way that it would not be possible to talk about nationalism as such anymore.

The two dimensions of psychological and political were found to be the sources of ideas for nationalism. They offer projections of what kind of a collective we are dealing with and what is its appearance, in addition to giving meaning to why the collective in question should strive do something with itself. The psychological dimension is the basis for concepts such as identity, ethnicity and culture and while they are important in the process of producing nationalism, they are not enough by themselves. The political dimension is required to offer notions such as self-determination and sovereignty to the imagined community of the psychological dimension. The respective ideas from the two idea-dimensions are concretised in the discursive dimension where the ultimate choice is made of what kind of nationalism is presented.
In the centre of nationalism are the admirable notions of social togetherness, loyalty, solidarity and togetherness. It is thus unfortunate that the process of producing nationalism always includes the establishment of hierarchical divisions and exclusionary boundaries. This way nationalism moves away from the realm of pluralism, with its infinite amount of ideas to pursue, and into the realm of monism where a single normative policy is created and advocated. We must thus always ask every manifestation of nationalism just how pluralistic is its monism, so that we would be able to see how exclusive a view of being human they are claiming as it can lead to wanton claims of racism and xenophobia.

Because it is such a pervasive phenomenon, nationalism should not be shied away from. It cannot be allowed to be appropriated just by those who wish to use it as instruments of division, racism, hate and xenophobia as there is much more to nationalism than that. Like in the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt “the only thing to fear is fear itself”. For us not to end like the nationalists who fear the unknown, we must stop living in the dark and the framework this thesis provides aids in just that: making that which was once unknown and thus feared more approachable and thus less intimidating. There must be alternatives that emphasise the ability of the state to provide well-being to all of its citizens, residents and inhabitants and not just along some arbitrary ethnic lines, and the framework presented in this thesis aids in that. The key lies in talking about issues in their right or correct terms and once this is resolved and clarified we can move on to critically examine them and this is exactly how the framework presented helps us to do this.

Due to nationalism’s overarching capabilities, every political movement or party which wants to be taken seriously should have their own view of and on nationalism and advocate it. Nationalism is such a ubiquitous phenomenon that it cannot be feared or disregarded and thus be given complete access and ownership to those who wish to use it through negative anti-humanist motions and antiques. Nationalism is also not going to go away because as long as there are states that have inhabitants there will be collectives that can be portrayed as nations as well; nations that seek answers to political questions regarding their lives and outlooks of their future, to which political parties must give answers to. As nationalism will continue to affect us for a long time still, it is instrumental to keep studying it and the sounder
the theories, frameworks and tools we can temper, the more enlightening discoveries we can make.

Fortunately, much has been done but still more is yet to be done, maybe infinitely so. As the circumference of the beam of light grows with every discovery so does the circumference of the surrounding darkness with it. Still, as nationalism is not going to go away by turning a blind eye to it, but quite the opposite, we need to look it even more deeply and with eyes wide open so that we can understand its manipulative capabilities in more depth and find ways to counter the inhumane narratives of ethno-nationalist and perhaps move towards a narrative of humanity as a nation.

This thesis also illustrated how nationalism possesses incredible skills of survival and adaptability. It has not only endured the turmoil of the last quarter of a millennium but also shown quite unfathomable tenacity through constant trial and error and also how it succeeds time after time to impose its will upon humankind, of which it has taken such a hold that seems all but inescapable. With its projections of togetherness and social solidarity in people after they have entered into the social contract, nationalism provides an admirable point which we can hardly criticise. What we need to keep in mind, however, is that the only common denominator we have is our humanity. Outside of that and after that everything is up for grabs, and this grabbing we can now analyse in a three-dimensional way. This thesis encourages new critical study and examination of nationalism via the presented framework to further the critical, holistic approach and endeavour presented here as well as in the discovery of new uses for already established concepts and the search and identification of new concepts altogether.
LIST OF REFERENCES


