

Securing forests, development and interests

A governmentality analysis of the EU's positions on REDD+

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In this thesis, I study the EU's positions and views on how deforestation could be reduced in developing countries. I study this by analysing what kind of practices the EU sought to establish at the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ which took place from 2006 to 2014.

The thesis relies on the theoretical framework provided by Foucauldian governmentality studies. I apply the idea of governmentality to study how the EU problematized deforestation, what kind of solutions it proposed and in relation to what goals. As a method, I apply Mithcell Dean's analytics of government to study four aspects of governmentality: visibility, rationality, technologies of power and subjectivities. The main material consists of submissions the EU made at the REDD+ negotiations and a Commission communication on deforestation. I supplement these with other EU documents and texts.

In addition to analysing the EU's positions, I use previous governmentality research on REDD+ to outline the main debates and controversies of the REDD+ negotiations. These include attempts to modify the mechanism as well as arguments which rejected the rationality. The previous research has argued that a market rationality is dominant in REDD+ practices.

My results show that the EU's governmentality differed in many ways from the dominant rationality. The EU argued that lacking governance is the main driver of deforestation. It tried to connect REDD+ to a wider climate agreement and emphasized states' responsibility in climate mitigation and its reconciliation with low-carbon development. Despite these significant differences, the EU supported REDD+ and tried to define the technical elements of the mechanism to enable governing according to its rationality.

Previous governmentality research have missed these nuances in the EU's rationality. Furthermore, there are similarities between the EU's rationality, the proposal other actors made at the negotiations and how REDD+ has been implemented in some countries. Thus, future research could take another look at the negotiations to study whether the economic rationality really was as dominant as previous research has argued. Another direction would be to study the influence of different rationalities of current practices in the countries where REDD+ is being implemented.

Keywords:

Deforestation, climate change, REDD+, European Union, climate negotiations, international climate policy, international environmental policy, governmentality, analytics of government

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Tässä tutkielmassa tutkin EU:n kantoja ja näkemyksiä siitä, miten kehitysmaiden metsäkatoa olisi mahdollistaa vähentää. Tarkemmin sanoen tutkin sitä, minkälaisia käytäntöjä EU kannatti metsäkadon vähentämiseksi osallistuessaan REDD+-mekanismeja koskeviin neuvotteluihin kansainvälisissä ilmastoneuvotteluissa vuosina 2006–2014.

Teoreettisena viitekehyksenä käytän foucault'laista hallintamentaliteettitutkimusta. Sen avulla tutkin, minkälaisena ongelmana EU hahmotti metsäkadon, minkälaisia ratkaisuja se ehdotti sille ja suhteessa mihin päämääriin. Käytän metodina Mitchell Deanin hallinnan analytiikkaa, joka auttaa operationalisoimaan hallintamentaliteetin neljän käsitteen kautta: näkymä, rationaliteetti, vallan teknologiat ja subjektiviteetit. Pääasiallisena aineistona käytän EU:n ilmastoneuvotteluissa tekemiä esityksiä sekä komission metsäkatoa käsittelevää komission tiedonantoa. Näiden lisäksi analyysia täydentävät muut EU:n julkaisemat dokumentit ja tekstit.

EU:n kantojen lisäksi esittelen tutkielmassa aiempaan hallintamentaliteettitutkimukseen perustuen REDD+-neuvottelujen pääasialliset keskusteluaiheet ja kiistakohdat, mukaan lukien yritykset muokata mekanismin rationaliteettia tai kiistää sen toimivuus kokonaan. Aiempi tutkimus on katsonut markkinarationaliteetin hallitsevan REDD+-mekanismin käytäntöjä.

Tulokseni osoittavat, että EU:n hallintamentaliteetti erosi monella tavalla vallitsevasta REDD+-rationaliteetista. EU piti metsäkadon pääasiallisena syynä huonoa hallintaa. Se pyrki myös yhdistämään REDD+:n vahvasti laajempaan ilmastopöytäkirjaan ja korosti erityisesti valtioiden vastuuta sekä ilmastomuutoksen torjunnassa että sen yhteensovittamisessa vähähiiliseen kehitykseen. Näistä eroavaisuuksista huolimatta EU kannatti REDD+ mekanismeja ja pyrki määrittelemään mekanismin teknisiä elementtejä, siten, että ne mahdollistaisivat EU:n rationaliteetin mukaisen hallinnan.

Aiempi hallintamentaliteettitutkimus ei ole huomionnut näitä EU:n rationaliteetin nyansseja. Muidenkin toimijoiden rationaliteeteissa sekä siinä, miten REDD+ on käytännössä toteutettu eri kehitysmaissa, on yhteneväisyyksiä EU:n kantoihin. Siksi jatkotutkimuksissa olisi syytä tarkastella uudelleen, kuinka hallitseva markkinarationaliteetti lopulta oli REDD+ neuvotteluissa, ja missä määrin erilaiset rationaliteetit vaikuttavat tämänhetkissä REDD+:n toteutuksen käytännöissä.

Asiasanat

Metsäkato, ilmastomuutos, REDD+, European Union, ilmastoneuvottelut, kansainvälinen ilmastopöytäkirja, kansainvälinen ympäristöpolitiikka, hallintamentaliteetti, hallinnan analytiikka

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Abbreviations

ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (UNFCCC)
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UNFCCC)
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity (UN)
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC)
COP	Conference of Parties (UNFCCC)
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
ETFRN	European Tropical Forest Research Network
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FPIC	Free, Prior and Informed Consent
GCF	Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GPP	Green Public Procurement
MRV	Measurement, reporting and verification
NCB	Non-carbon benefits
NGO	Non-governmental organization
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (UNFCCC)
SIS	Safeguards information system(s)
UN	United Nations

UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-REDD United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) in developing countries

WPIEI/CC Working Party on International Environmental Issues/Climate Change (Council of the European Union)

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2005 Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea proposed to develop a mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to incentivize developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation with monetary payments. This proposal became widely popular even though just four years earlier “avoided deforestation” had been excluded from another incentive scheme, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol (Stephan 2014, 76; den Besten et al. 2014, 42; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 36–38). During the following ten years, a framework known as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) was negotiated. Even before any agreement had been achieved, pilot projects were initiated to test the initiative (see eg. Sills et al. 2009). The World Bank set up its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the United Nations its UN-REDD programme to help countries in “readiness activities” so that they would be eligible for payments (see e.g. van Asselt & McDermott 2016, 79; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 161, 163). All in all, REDD+ received significant global attention.

The European Union (EU) had opposed including avoided deforestation in the CDM (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 61, 64) but now supported REDD+ in the UNFCCC negotiations. In the period 2008–2015 the EU institutions and Union member states committed a total of over 824.8 million euros to fund various pilot and capacity building projects related to REDD+ (Olesen et al. 2018, 113)¹. Most of it came from Germany and the United Kingdom which were the biggest funders of REDD+ after Norway (Atmadja 2018, 32).

In this thesis, I study the EU’s positions in the debates concerning this international instrument to tackle deforestation and climate change. I do so by applying the Foucauldian governmentality studies strand of discourse analysis. I use governmentality analysis to interrogate *how the EU thought that it was possible to govern deforestation*. I approach the UNFCCC negotiations as a site of problematization, where various actors made proposals about how it would be possible to govern deforestation in an effective

¹ Olesen et al. also report indirect support which they define as activities in the forestry sector in general, biodiversity or forests and climate change (Olesen et al. 2018), 274–275). With the inclusion of these indirect activities the sum committed by the EU and its member states adds up to over 7 billion euros. This makes up over a third of the global public direct and indirect funding reported Olesen et al. (ibid., 113).

and desirable manner. The proposal that introduced REDD+ to the negotiations was based on what governmentality studies call a rationality, a specific way of reasoning based on specific constructions about the world and the subjects that inhabit it (Rose & Miller 2010, 276–277; Haahr & Walters 2005, 6). It included a particular problem formulation and promised a solution that would make it possible to govern deforestation (Hjort 2015, 126–217; Stephan 2014, 114–115). In the negotiations, actors commented on and provided alternatives to this proposal. Some of the actors rejected the original proposal completely while others wanted to use some elements of it as parts of a different regime. Governmentality theory which focuses on how objects are constituted in practices and discourse (Walters 2012, 18), provides a useful tool for analysing the different ways in which actors imagined deforestation, how it could be known, how and by whom they thought the issue could be governed, and in relation to what principles. To understand the practices various actors are engaged in, and how they could be different, it is crucial to study how they are rationalized (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, 522).

I use Dean’s analytics of government to do a “bottom up analysis” (Stephan 2014, 17). Studying governmentality through the four concepts of visibility, rationality, technologies and subjectivities (Dean 2010, 41–44) enables me to uncover the small differences that the EU’s position had in relation to proposals of other actors in the UNFCCC negotiations. For example, talk about a market-based mechanism is wide-spread in REDD+ discourse but arguments about what they should accomplish as a part of the regime vary significantly. A governmentality perspective is able to catch these differences as it does not suppose that markets or any other objects can have only one stable and universal function in environmental governance (Walters 2012, 17).

I will analyse a range of documents that the EU produced during the negotiations and ask how questions based on them. The goal is to understand how the EU sought to render deforestation governable (see Rose & Miller 2010, 283–284; Okereke et al. 2009, 71)? More specifically, this includes questions such as: How is deforestation known as a problem in a way which makes it amenable to government? In relation to what other goals is the problem posed? Who should act and in what ways to reduce deforestation? What do these things say about how the objects and subjects of government, humans and non-humans are conceived? In other words, I analyse deforestation as a problematization and a governmental rationality

Previous research has covered some aspects of the EU's governmentality but there is no research concentrating on the EU's position on REDD+. Focusing the analysis on just one actor allows me to do detailed analysis to uncover a fuller picture of the EU's governmentality. This way, I will be able to recognize some nuances that have not been discussed in previous studies analysing REDD+ discourses from a wider array of sources (e.g. Stephan 2014; Hjort 2015; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017). I will show that the EU's rationality for reducing deforestation differed from the dominant market rationality of the original proposal. The EU conceived the problem differently, proposed a somewhat different solutions and tried to incorporate them into the REDD+ framework in a specific manner. Thus, it was able to support the mechanism although it did not, for the most part, agree with its basic rationality.

Since previous research has missed these characteristics of the EU's rationality, it is also worth asking whether this has happened with other actors, too. Has previous research glossed over the differences in the rationalities of other actors as well? Thus, the results of this thesis warrant another look at REDD+ discourses to see whether other actors made similar arguments and whether the discourses of these actors have been shifting in some ways over the past few years.

The kind of detailed study of rationalities undertaken in this thesis can also help us understand how the practices associated with REDD+ may vary from one context to another. Whether one is a proponent of REDD+, or against it, it is important to understand that different actors can engage with the mechanism to realize different aims. This is also important if we want to understand the challenges and resistance that REDD+ may face.

1.1. Previous research on REDD+ discourses and the contribution of this thesis

There is now considerable literature employing discursive approaches to REDD+. Their focus ranges from the international negotiations to analysing national policies and local implementation as well as academic discourses and private sector practices. I will first discuss studies that have used discourse frameworks and then concentrate on what governmentality studies have said about REDD+.

Den Besten et al. (2014) trace the development of REDD+ in the negotiations. They show how new ideas were articulated during the negotiations and how some of them were

institutionalized while others were excluded. Similarly, Pistorius (2012) looks at how the initial perception about the simplicity of curbing deforestation was challenged and the discourse split into subdiscourses concerned with specific problems. Nielsen (2014) identifies nine story lines which he connects to the two broader discourses of ecological modernization and civic environmentalism. He concludes that the former has been dominating and institutionalized. Similarly, Hiraldo & Tanner (2011) find that in addition to the dominant market-liberal approach, there are institutionalist governance, bio-environmentalist and social green discourses at play in REDD+ debates. They find these differences even between proponents of REDD+, for example between big donor countries such as Norway and USA and between the FCPF and the UN-REDD programmes (ibid.,48). Diversity is also highlighted by Okereke & Dooley (2010) who concentrate on eight “key proposals” of “the most vocal parties [countries] or coalitions” (2010 86) in the UNFCCC negotiations (Norway as the only developed country) and analyse the principles of justice they embody. They categorize only two of those proposals as embodying a market justice approach (ibid., 92). More recent research has studied the emerging discourse promoting a landscape approach to REDD+. This would mean that REDD+ would consider not only forests but also other land-use emissions. (Nielsen 2016; Turnhout et al. 2017.)

Studies employing a governmentality approach have taken, I would argue, a somewhat more systematic approach to REDD+ studying the assumptions and knowledge constructions behind the mechanism. Benjamin Stephan’s dissertation (2014) utilizes Dean’s analytics of government to analyse the visibilities, rationality and forms of knowledge, technologies and subjectivities to study REDD+. His corpus includes a broad range of documents including research papers, policy proposals, press releases, UNFCCC negotiation documents and interviews with stakeholders and experts. He provides an excellent depiction of the market rationality of REDD+ and its effects. Mattias Hjort’s (2015) dissertation combines Dean’s analytics of government with the actor network theory to study how REDD+ was developed in the UNFCCC negotiations. Similarly to Stephan, he studies the market rationality and its effects. However, Hjort also explores critiques expressed in the negotiations. Some of them (concerning markets and safeguarding co-benefits) modified the rationality without subverting it while others were side-lined (ibid., 137–143; see also Lahn 2016, 78–107).

Both Stephan (2014, 55, 120) and Hjort (2015, 60–61) consider REDD+ to embody a payments for ecosystem (PES) approach which is supposed to deliver cost-efficient emission reductions through the market while also contributing to sustainable development and biodiversity protection. However, neither Hjort nor Stephan discuss the fact that the finalized REDD+ rules, known as the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, leave ample room for countries in implementing REDD+. Stephan recognizes that there “variety of possible ways in which REDD+ could be funded” and policies through which it could be implemented but concentrates on carbon market integration or similar fund-based PES arrangements because “the majority of proposals recommend” it (*ibid.*, 136). Stephan’s work provides an excellent description of the market rationality of REDD+ but mentions alternative proposals only in brief.

Hjort’s work has a similar focus. In the article version of his dissertation Hjort (2020, 144) notes that “countries decide themselves whether and where to implement REDD+, with domestic laws structuring the relationship between citizens and sovereign”. Still, in the examples Hjort provides he explores how REDD+ is “likely” (*ibid.*, 145; Hjort 2015, 167–178, 186) to govern citizens, particularly local communities through payments and inculcation of entrepreneurial subjectivities – practices which are in line with market or PES rationality. This argument can be substantiated by the dominance of the market rationality in the negotiations. Even if the rules leave room for different practices, actors can think that the market option is the most beneficial. However, I will argue below that neither Stephan nor Hjort sufficiently take into account rationalities which may combine incentives with different kinds of problem formulations.

Simon Wolf’s (2012; see also 2014) dissertation studies the governmentality of climate investments. He uses REDD+ as one of his cases (*ibid.*, 193–203). He too, stresses the cost-efficiency argument as the reason for the popularity of REDD+ (*ibid.* 199). His story differs from those of Hjort and Stephan in that he stresses that in REDD+ forests and forestry are treated as a problem of directing investments to these fields (*ibid.*, 200–203). Wolf’s depiction of REDD+ discourse is close to the one I find from the EU’s materials. However, Wolf does not concentrate on how this government of investment was rationalized in relation to the definition of the REDD mechanism and its rules.

Sam Adelman has published an article on REDD+ with the subtitle “a critique on green governmentality” (2015). In addition to rehearsing the argument describing REDD+ as

neoliberal PES programme, it also discusses how REDD+ could influence and be influenced by debates on sovereignty over national resources. He also discusses alternative forms of governance such as the rights of the Mother Earth or New Commons. Yet, he does not engage in empirical analysis to study whether or how these issues were articulated in the UNFCCC negotiations or REDD+ practices.

Lovera-Bilderbeek's (2017) dissertation studies REDD+ discourse in terms of what have been called (Angelsen 2009, 5) the three E:s of REDD+: effectiveness, efficiency and equity. While her work does not employ the governmentality approach, she, too, analyses REDD+ as a PES arrangement studying its elements and assumptions behind them in a similar way as Hjort and Stephan. She does mention that some of her interviewees preferred regulations and policies for transformative change instead of compensating for foregone economic opportunities and argued that such policies had been successful (Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 64, 79). She also mentions Brazil preferring "national policy approach over a project-based approach" (ibid., 140). These could be linked to the institutionalist discourse identified by Hiraldo & Tanner (2011, 46) but she does not study such approaches in detail or in a systematic way.

Scholars have also employed governmentality approaches to study country and local practices. These studies have presented a more diverse picture showing how state and other actors integrate various elements in their REDD+ strategies. Public awareness campaigns, environmental education, logging moratoriums, land-use plans and mapping, land reforms are among the policies used by countries (McGregor et al. 2015; Collins 2020; Asiyambi et al. 2017; Boer 2017; 2018; Li 2014; see also van der Hoff et al. 2019; Salvini et al. 2014). At the same time, some of these studies too, describe the international level REDD+ practices of the UNFCCC, FCPF, UN-REDD and international NGOs as market, PES or generally neoliberal approaches (e.g. McGregor et al. 2015, 143–145; Collins 2020, 327, 340; Boer 2017, 800; 2018; Li 2014, 45; Fletcher et al. 2019, 1073).

This raises the following questions: If many national and local practices, to a considerable extent, rely on methods other than markets or PES, were they not articulated in the discourses of the international level? Did these discourses emerge entirely in the local contexts and never spread to the international negotiations? One answer to this could be provided by Nielsen (2016) who has studied a new discourse which proposes a landscape approach as a solution to the problems of REDD+. This discourse attempts to govern

forests in relation to the broader landscape and in relation to land-use in general (ibid., 180). Nielsen notes that the approach has gained popularity and recognition at the UNFCCC only recently and could have emerged from local practices (ibid., 182). However, my analysis below will show that the EU proposed practices which could be compatible with the landscape approach from the beginning of the negotiations.

While several of the studies mentioned above refer to the EU's positions, there is no study focusing on the EU in particular. By focusing on one negotiation actor, I will be able to detail the EU's rationality more thoroughly. This enables me to note the subtle differences of the EU's vision compared to the dominant PES discourses as well as the critical discourses on REDD+. My analysis shows that the way in which the EU tried to render deforestation governable does accept the use of payments to incentivize countries to reduce deforestation but differs in how it conceptualized the problem and the policies it proposed to govern deforestation within countries. In addition to outlining the EU's position, this can also help us identify the nuances in the conceptions and governing arrangements of other actors engaged in REDD+. Furthermore, since the EU and its member states are among the big funders of REDD+, they may be able to circulate their conceptions and thus influence how countries implement the scheme.

1.2. Outline of the thesis

The following chapter discusses governmentality as a way of conceptualizing power and as a toolbox for analysis. I will discuss the Foucauldian understanding of government as productive power and the role of knowledge. Governmentality studies often start from practices or events and thus do not privilege agency. I will show that the detailed study of a single actor is compatible with the governmentality approach and can provide us with useful insight. In the latter part of Chapter 2 I will introduce Mitchell Dean's analytics of government which I use as a conceptual toolbox for the analysis of the regime of practices that the EU argued for. I will elaborate the four central concepts: visibility, rationality, technologies and subjectivities. Chapter 3 introduces the material I have used to study the EU's positions: submissions to the UNFCCC, Commission communications and other background documents. I will also discuss how the analysis was carried out in practice. Chapter 4 relies on previous research to trace the development of the REDD+ negotiations in the UNFCCC. It discusses the rationality of REDD+, how the original proposal was modified throughout the negotiations as well arguments which were critical of the

mechanism. I will also discuss how REDD+ was institutionalized in the international UNFCCC rules known as the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and how this relates to the different rationalities.

Chapter 5 presents my analysis of the EU's positions and how they developed during the negotiations. It is divided into three sections: governing forests, governing states and governing subjects. The first section considers the problem formulation. The EU framed deforestation as a problem of lacking governance and increasing pressure to log and convert forests into agricultural land. The second section discusses how countries should be governed in the international context. The third section explores how countries should conduct themselves when they govern their subjects. It traces how the EU emphasized engaging "stakeholders" to find the best solutions and ways to govern investments. This three-part division is somewhat artificial as the elements of the EU's governmentality are linked to each other. The division is rather intended to make the analysis clearer and increase the readability of the chapter. The last section of Chapter 5 summarizes the results and connects them to a larger picture. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the empirical results together with the analysis of previous research. I hypothesize that the rationalities that supported REDD+ may have been more varied than previous governmentality research has argued. I also point out how governmentality studies could engage the role of knowledge and sovereignty in ways which has not been done in previous research. Lastly I suggest that future research could take another look at the REDD+ negotiations as well as study the REDD+ processes in which the EU is engaged.

2. GOVERNMENTALITY: PRODUCTIVE POWER AND A TOOLBOX TO ANALYSE IT

In this chapter, I introduce the idea of governmentality in more detail. The first section describes it as a theoretical framework which conceptualizes power as productive and relational. I will elaborate on the understanding of government as the conduct of conduct and on what it means to study the rationalization of practices. Lastly I will discuss how the analysis of a single actor fits into the governmentality approach. The second section concerns method. It introduces Mitchell Dean's (2010, 30–37) analytics of government as a way to analyse governmental practices. I will elaborate on the four concepts with which to analyse governmentalities: visibilities, rationalities, technologies and subjectivities. After this, I will discuss how I will be applying analytics of government in this thesis.

2.1. Government and productive power

2.1.1. Government

We often tend to think about government as the business of the state and other public authorities. Governmentality studies, on the other hand, approach government (or governance) as something that is not limited to the institutions and bureaucracies of the state but is done by various actors. One can govern, not only the citizens of a state, but employees at the workplace, children at school or at the dinner table, a congregation in its confessional practices, a peripheral village as a community of internal relationships or a population as a living and more or less healthy totality. (see Walters 2012, 11, Dean 2010, 17.) Following Foucault, governmentality studies generally define government in a broad sense as “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon 1991, 2; Dean 2010 17). Dean gives a little more depth to this definition:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (Dean 2010, 18.)

The plural understanding of government means that state power is not limited to bureaucratic commands and laws. Rather, public authorities can also govern through other entities. That is, it can govern by shaping how other actors conduct themselves. (Rose & Miller 2010, 275–275.) Life is of course not only a matter of human relations. On the contrary, government also concerns the non-human world. Yet, as action towards

the non-human world happens through humans, the way people relate to the former is crucial to government. (Foucault 1991, 93; Adams 2009, 28–29; Grove 1992)

The emphasis on working through others illuminates how governmentality studies view power. Power is understood to be productive. It is not treated as an attribute or resource in a zero-sum way. Instead, power treated as diffuse and constitutive of social relations. It does not merely restrict or control, it produces objects and subjects. That is, it constitutes fields and objects where government can intervene as well as subjectivities i.e. actors with certain identities, qualities and capacities. (Barnett & Duvall 2005, 55–56; Okereke et al. 2009, 70.)

Power works by shaping “actors’ self-understandings and perceived interests” (Barnett & Duvall 2005, 55). This is something that happens not only by authoritative statements telling people or organizations what they and their interests are like but in social relations themselves. Engaging in practices with other actors, people can come to think of themselves and their relations to other humans and non-humans in certain ways. (Okereke et al. 2009, 64; Walters 2012, 18.) In other words, the transformation of subjectivities does not necessarily happen through ideological persuasion. Rather, people “become implicated in neoliberal [and other power] strategies at the level of practices, routines, habits and little technologies; ... it is their very ubiquity, banality, and embedding in mundane material objects and arrangements that is the key thing here.” (Walters 2012, 64.)

Governmentality studies consider power dispersed and something that is produced through social relations. This means that “its exact form remains ethnographic”. (Okereke et al. 2009, 64.) The governed actors always have some room for resistance. They may question how they themselves, others, or non-human objects are represented. This is to say that government always assumes that those who are governed maintain a certain degree of freedom. They are not subject to complete domination. (Dean 2010, 21–24; Triantafillou 8–9). Their freedom may be limited in various ways but it may also be encouraged, channelled, fortified, ensured or, in general terms, produced. In fact, one of the main contentions of governmentality studies is that for liberal government freedom is not only an end it also a means of governing (Foucault 2008, 63–65; Okereke et al. 2010, 64).

2.1.2. Practices

When we govern people, we govern the things they do, their practices. That is why Dean suggests to study governmentalities as *regimes of practices* which he defines as “more or less organized ways, at any given time and place, we think about, reform and practice such things as caring, administering, counselling, curing, punishing, educating and so on” (Dean 2010, 31). Walters notes that while it is possible to study practices with ethnographic methods (e.g. Li 2007), governmentality scholars tend to study texts and other material sources (Walters 2012, 11). This is because governmentality research intends not only to describe the practices but to show how those practices are thought. Actors, think, reason or (to use a term preferred in governmentality studies) rationalize practices in relation to different goals and draw from different forms of knowledge and expertise. (Dean 2010, 39). In other words, “power and government are never exercised in general terms” (Haahr & Walters 2005, 6) and the task of the analyst is to study the underlying rationalities to understand why and how they attempt to constitute certain practices (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, 521).

There are various regimes of practices relevant to the topic of this thesis: practices of mitigating climate change, accounting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing deforestation, conserving ecosystems, and practising forestry, agriculture and other productive activities. REDD+ can also be conceived as its own regime of practices, bringing together some or all of these other practices.

In this thesis I concentrate on the UNFCCC negotiations where practices were rationalized. There are certain practices which can be considered to happen at the UNFCCC level. For example, the UNFCCC decisions define how countries have to measure and monitor their forests to be able to receive results-based payments (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 43–44; for a governmentality analysis, see Gupta et al. 2012; 2014).

On the other hand, there are practices which only materialize on the national or local levels. For example, the decisions do not specify how countries should achieve the reductions in deforestation (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 34). They may be linked to international practices through reporting and plans (Gupta et al. 2014, 191). This does not mean that those national and local practices would have not been rationalized at the negotiations. On the contrary, actors presented various arguments about how deforestation should be governed (see Hjort 2014; 2020 143–146; Okereke & Dooley

2010; den Besten et al. 2014, 43) even if they did not argue that all of them should be institutionalized into REDD+ rules. In this thesis I am studying the thought and representation of the practices which actors sought to constitute in order to reduce deforestation (Hjort 2015, 58). This is relevant because the rationalities articulated at the negotiations may still travel and materialize in various locations, especially because of the attention the negotiations receive in the media and the vast number of governmental and non-governmental actors who attend the Conferences of Parties (COPs) and their side events.

2.1.3. Studying a single actor

Governmentality studies have been critiqued for ignoring agency. (see Stephan et al. 2014, 61, 65–66; Collier 2009, 98; Death 2014, 83). There are a couple of reasons why agency does not figure prominently in governmentality studies. First, this can be attributed to the focus on how-questions. A common focus is on how government is achieved in practical terms and the differences and commonalities of various practices (e.g. Paterson & Stripple 2012; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019; Oels 2005, 2013; Gupta et al. 2014). Such studies often do not seek to explain why change has occurred or why certain practices are widespread, just to show that rationalities differ or have changed and that they have political consequences.

Another explanation for the lack of concentration on agency is that governmentality studies tend to reject “any a priori understanding of the distribution of power or location of rule” (Lövbrand & Stripple 2014, 32). Governmentality studies often seek to identify common discourses, and their conditions of possibility to understand what are the underlying assumptions or principles (ibid., 32–33; Collier 2009, 100). Since it is discourses and practices that constitute, not only what is desirable and possible, but also who can act, starting with actors assumed to be powerful may prove unproductive. (Lövbrand & Stripple 2014). Furthermore, as power is treated as productive and practices take form in the relations between actors, the powerfulness of an actor can vary from context to context (Okereke et al. 2009, 64–65).

This raises some questions for this thesis: Why use governmentality theory to analyse a single actor? What may we gain from this? Is such an analysis even compatible with governmentality theory? I will first answer the last question.

Joseph Collier (2009) has argued that lack of attention to agency in governmentality studies partially stems from Foucault's methodology. He argues that Foucault worked with concepts that treated thought as a passive thing functioning in a coherent system. While Foucault referred to the thought of specific writers, they functioned as exemplars, working in distinct times and distinct epistemes. (Ibid., 94). Collier goes on to argue that in his late work on governmentality, Foucault shifted to a mode of inquiry in which his exemplars had more active role. He studies actors who write in times and places "in which existing forms [of governance or rationality] have lost their coherence and their purchase in addressing present problems, and in which new forms of understanding and acting have to be invented" (Ibid., 95.) In this mode of analysis, thought is active. It problematizes and suggests new ways of approaching issues (ibid., 95). Responding to the same criticisms about lack of agency, Rose et al (2006, 99), point out that as a genealogical approach, governmentality research emphasizes the creativity of actors who try to make sense of the world and devise ways achieving certain goals.

Rose & Miller (2010, 279) maintain that "the history of government might well be written as a history of problematizations, in which politicians, intellectuals, philosophers, medics, military men, feminists and philanthropists have measured the real against the ideal and found it wanting." The UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ can be considered a site of such problematizations. Although the problematizations and solutions articulated at the negotiations may have originally been formulated elsewhere, the negotiations were the place where they were disseminated and defended. Actors proposed different ways in which they thought deforestation could be known and governed and problematized the proposals of other actors. For example, they articulated problems that could result if REDD+ is funded from funding REDD+ should be funded from the carbon market (see 4.2.4 below).

There is, then, arguably a role for active subjects in governmentality theory. The other question remains: what may we gain from concentrating on just one actor? I am not focusing on the EU in isolation. In Chapter 4, I will go through previous research to show that actors problematized the issue in different ways, based on different truths about the nature of deforestation, and provided different solutions. In the second part of that chapter I will show that while the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ govern certain practices of providing payments for reduced deforestation, they leave ample room for different ways

to implement REDD+ nationally. My empirical analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the EU problematized the issue in a way that has not been analysed properly in previous governmentality research. Focusing on one actor I will be able to look at the EU's positions in more depth and show how they differed in small but crucial ways. In his study on the negotiations, Hjort has argued that although the negotiations modified the original REDD+ proposal, the changes did not alter the basic economic rationality. Proposals that would have done so have been marginalized. (Hjort 2015, 158; see also den Besten et al. 2014). I will show that although the EU's problematization and rationality were different, it still thought that result-based incentives could be used as a part of the solution and was able to support the mechanism.

In the final chapter, I will discuss the possibility that other actors have problematized the issue in more or less the same way. My main goal is not to assess how powerful or successful the EU was, but merely to point out that a different regime of practices in REDD+ has been outlined and may materialize because the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ leaves ample room for different ways of implementing the mechanism nationally.

Scholars applying governmentality theory often justify the approach by stating that it can show the contingency of the practices of government to question their inevitability and show that things could be differently (e.g. Dean 2010, 48; Lövbrand & Stripple 2014, 38). Applying the approach to a single actor has allowed me to uncover a different rationality and its relation to REDD+ as an incentive scheme. This highlights, not only that REDD+ could be different in the future, but also that REDD+ practices may already be more variable than previous studies on governmentality would suggest (e.g. Hjort 2015; 2020; Stephan 2014). This is important if we wish to understand the way REDD+ works, how it may be taken up in various ways in different contexts, and the various effects it may produce in various locations (cf. Collier 2009, 99–100).

2.2. Analytics of government

In this section, I will discuss how to operationalize the theoretical framework by applying what Dean (2010, 30–37) has called the analytics of government. I will first go through the four concepts Dean suggests we can use to know regimes of practices: visibilities, rationalities, technologies and subjectivities (ibid., 33). I will use his four aspects of

government to help me think about the deforestation as a governmentality. In the final subsection, I will discuss how I will be using the analytics of government in this thesis.

2.2.1. Visibilities

The first aspect of government concerns the “ways of seeing and perceiving” (Dean 2010, 33). Here the question is what aspects of the world does a governmentality highlight and what it leaves out, or treats as peripheral concerns. In other words, what are the objects of government, what qualities do they have and how do they relate to each other? (Ibid., 41.)

Looking at environmental discourses, we can analyse how nature or the environment is conceived. For example, they can be thought of as purely material resources or as providing immaterial goods. (Dryzek 2013, 59-60, 198-199). We can also look at the environment in different scales. Natural resources and their scarcity can be assessed on the global level, picturing their overall consumption. On the other hand, natural resources can be thought of as a commons problem which ought to be solved by slicing it up for private ownership. Another view might conceive the environment as nested ecosystems ranging from local to global. (Ibid., 40, 124-129, 156.)

These visibilities often take some material form e.g. a map, a chart a graph (Dean 2010, 41). Greenhouse gases can be pictured globally by sectors or attributed to countries, individuals or businesses (see eg. Lövbrand & Stipple 2011). These forms also show us the relations that are put to the fore. Climate governance can concern itself only with carbon amounts or it can be linked to other goals such as growth, development, needs or justice. The qualities of land may be inscribed in maps along with economic activities practised in the same areas. To picture the potential and costs of various options to mitigate climate change a graph can be produced (see Figure 1 in 4.2.2 below). Informed by climate justice a different graph or map may visualize the historic emissions of countries to establish responsibility for funding climate mitigation (UNFCCC 2009c 7–8) REDD+ itself can be pictured in a chart showing the different elements of the mechanism and responsibilities actors (Hjort 2015, 118; Martius et al. 2018, 21, 24).

Concerning this aspect of government, the following questions guide my analysis: As what kind of problem did the EU represent deforestation? How did the EU conceive of

forests and the climate? To what other objects did it draw attention to? How did it describe and differentiate them?

2.2.2. Rationality

Gordon defines a rationality as

a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable (1991, 3)

Such systems of thinking necessarily draw from certain forms of knowledge (Rose 1999, 27–28). To take the example of Rose & Miller, if law-breakers are known to be bandits or rebels, the ways to govern them are likely to be different from those used to govern law-breakers known to be “transgressors of norms motivated by defects of character” (2010, 278). Governmentality studies do not intend to judge the truth value of claims of knowledge but to acknowledge their crucial role in government and understand how they are used in government (Triantafillou 2012, 11–12). To govern subjects and objects one has to make some judgements about their nature. In other words, political rationalities have an *epistemological character* (Rose & Miller 2010, 277). Rose (1999, 27–28) elaborates:

It is partly that government continually seeks to give itself a form of truth – establish a kind of ethical basis for its actions. ... To govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority. It is also that, in order to govern, one needs some ‘intellectual technology’ for trying to work out what on earth one should do next – which involves criteria as to what one wants to do, what has succeeded in the past, what is the problem to be addressed and so forth.

Governmentality studies can delve into knowledge production practices in and outside the academia to see how they represent things in ways that make them amenable to government and enable various governing strategies (see eg. Lövbrand & Stripple 2011; Oels 2013). The materials of this thesis, the submissions to the UNFCCC and the EC’s communications, are not written with the aim of producing knowledge. Rather, they take certain things as known. Thus, I am looking at how the EU represented objects, subjects and their relations. The EU acts as if these things are known – at least to the extent that governing is possible. In this sense, the EU and other actors are, if not creating knowledge, at least disseminating certain ideas they consider to be known. At the same time, the EU’s texts articulate needs to know certain things so that government can make the necessary differentiations for governing to be possible. For example, we shall see below (5.1.3. and

5.1.4) that the EU's texts take sustainability as a real and desirable thing. To be able to govern sustainability, ways to differentiate it from unsustainability need to be devised. Furthermore, this knowledge has to be made visible to the right actors so that they can govern themselves and others properly.

Political rationalities are not just a matter of truths. They also have a moral form (Rose & Miller 2010, 276–277). Political rationalities make claims about the legitimacy of authority as well as “ideals or principles that should guide the exercise of authority: freedom, justice, equality, responsibility, citizenship, autonomy and the like” (Rose 1999, 26). Yet, these ideals are not disconnected from knowledge production. Governing evolves through problematizations, perceptions that government is failing in one way or another. Knowledge, then, can identify these problems, threats, deficiencies, unethical practices such as unrest, lacking productivity or competitiveness, deforestation, changing climate overconsumption etc. (Rose & Miller 2010, 279; Haahr & Walters 2005, 6). These are all problems for something, for example for the achievement of the principles just mentioned. My analysis will not only look into the means of governing but also in relation to what objects and ideals rationalities seek to govern.

Relevant questions include: In relation to what objects is do actors calculate and rationalize government? What things are treated as known for government to work and be effective? What things do we need to know to govern (and what is impossible to know)?

2.2.3. Technologies of power

Governmentality research also calls attention to the technical aspect, or *techne*, of government. To govern, it is not enough to have certain ideals and knowledge, one must also have the technical means to achieve governmental goals. (Dean 2010, 42.) Technologies are not approached as simply the implementation of thought or a distinct material realm to put ideas into practice (Walters 2012, 62; Rose & Miller 2010, 28). It is more an angle of inquiry “that draws our attention to the myriad devices, artefacts and objects that mediate power relations” and highlights “that thought itself does not exist outside the realm of the apparatus” (Walters 2012, 62). Analysts ask questions like “by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished” (Dean 2010, 41).

Technologies do three things. They “undertake practical forms of governing”, operationalize rationalities and construct objects and subjects as knowable (Hjort 2015, 34). We can elaborate these three aspects by looking at two technical elements associated with REDD+. Establishing a market in environmental services governs its subjects by providing incentives. It operationalizes such rationalities as efficiency (finding the best place to do harm for the environment), free choice and impartiality (Felli 2015, 653–654). The thought and language drawn from and employed in establishing markets constructs subjects as choosing between options, as capable and willing to compare land-use options to monetary compensations, markets as guaranteeing efficient production and impartial government (Stephan 2014, 123).

Setting reference levels and the task of monitoring forests are another technical aspect of REDD+. They operationalize the desire to reward achievements by making it possible to define what counts as additional and to record what has happened. They are part of practical governing as they determine who should be paid. (Hjort 2015, 102–105.) Satellite monitoring can also enact government by convincing subjects that deforestation and its reduction will be noticed (Stephan 2014, 122; see 4.2.4. below). The ways to determine reference levels construct future deforestation (see 4.2.1 below). Satellite monitoring constructs forests as areas and the language of carbon calculations constructs these areas as carbon quantities (Gupta et al. 2012, 727). Through these technologies forests can be turned into tradable commodities (Stephan 2014, 144–147).

Satellite imaging is also a good example of how technologies make government possible but also pose its limits. The inability of satellite imaging to catch forest degradation or carbon stored underground posed problems for monitoring REDD+ (Hjort 2015, 219–247 see also Gupta et al. 2014, 188–189). Markets, on the other hand, pose their own limits as they depend on the ability to render objects tradable, i.e. on commodification (Stephan 2014, 135–154). This can be comparatively easy if only a singular quality (e.g. carbon) of an entity is the object of governance but can be harder when there are interlinkages and multiple values which governance tries to take into account (e.g. species interacting with each other in an ecosystem) (Dryzek 2013, 143).

All this does not mean that technologies can only be used in the context or in relation to the ideal or goal to which they were developed (Collier 2009, 95). While satellite imaging

can be used to determine whether someone should be paid for reducing deforestation, the produced visibility can also be used to highlight illegal activities or the scale of the different activities in driving deforestation (Gupta et al. 2012, 729; McGregor 2015, 150).

Looking at government from its technical aspect of, I will be asking: In what ways the EU sought to govern states, people, corporations or other subjects? On what kind of practices of inscribing and depicting the world does the EU's rationality depend on?

2.2.4. Subjectivities

Governmentality research also concentrates on how actors, the governed and those governing, are perceived and acted upon. Governing actors are understood broadly not only as state actors but anyone who tries to conduct the conduct of others or oneself (Dean 2010, 17–18; Rose & Miller 2010, 272–273). Dean poses the following questions:

What forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority (from politicians and bureaucrats to professionals and therapists) and those who are to be governed (workers, consumers, pupils and social welfare recipients)? (Dean 2010, 43)

For example, people can be thought of as citizens with certain rights, needs, interests and responsibilities which government should take into account and operate through when it tries to govern (Dean 2010, 177). In environmental politics, one might conceive of people as utility maximizers pursuing their own (economic) interests. Government might respond to this by trying to control them in various ways to limit their self-interested actions (Dryzek 2005, 29–41; Barry 2007, 132). If such control is seen as impossible, excessively costly or unethical, a governmental rationality might propose privatizing natural resources or land and constructing markets to enable government through these interested subjects and markets (Dryzek 2013, 134–136). If, on the other hand, the cooperative abilities of people were emphasized, the proposed strategies would be different. The business sector may be seen as part of the solution and corporatist cooperation between government, expertise and enterprises as crucial to pursue better policies, innovations and a greener economy (Dryzek 2013 174–175).

Subjectivities are by no means universal categories. A governmental rationality might divide people, for example, according to their capacity to self-governance. Those thought

to be capable of responsible conduct can be subject to different government than those thought to be in need of education or incapable of responsibility altogether. (Larner & Walters 2002, 396–397; Li 2014, 38.) The possibility of educating people also highlights that subjectivities are not necessarily conceived to be fixed; they can be transformed. One might find that communities are key to resolving social problems yet diagnose them as lacking certain characteristics to carry out this key role. Devising ways to improve such communities can then become an object of government. (Li 2007, 246.)

We should also note that the distinction between governor and governed is not clear cut (Dean 2010, 38). Government may attempt to inculcate responsible green buying habits in consumers. If it succeeds those consumers are in part governing the companies producing goods (Carter 2007, 232). A climate justice discourse may seek to mobilize (govern) people to “assert democratic control over” (govern) the economy and greenhouse emissions (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, 527).

On this aspect my analysis asks: Who did the EU represent as the subjects and agents of deforestation governance? What characteristics and attributes it thought they had?

2.2.5. Applying analytics of government

These are the four concepts which helped me think about how the EU sought to render deforestation governable. Chapter 4 traces the development of REDD+ in the negotiations as depicted in previous governmentality research and Chapter 5 presents my empirical analysis of the EU’s documents. Neither of these chapters is structured around the four concepts introduced here (for such analysis see Stephan 2014). There are two reasons for this.

First, as the above subsections perhaps illuminate, the four aspects of analytics of government presuppose one another while also being irreducible to each other (Dean 2010, 33, 41). Thus, I find that strict differentiation between these concepts is not useful for presenting the results of analysis. We can illustrate this with one of the classic examples of governmentality analysis, the population (Foucault 1991, 99–101; Dean 2010, 113–115). Population is a field of visibility as it is a field in which government can intervene, and a form of subjectivity as it constitutes subjects as part of that population and with particular characteristics in relation to the whole of the population. It is a

technology as it needs to be inscribed in statistical form and enables intervention based on these statistics. It is also a rationality and a form of knowledge as certain knowledge arises and certain problems and questions can be posed when the population is discovered this way.

Second, REDD+ is not only one problematization or a completely coherent mechanism. It consists of various smaller issues: How to fund the scheme? What should the relation between REDD+ and other mitigation activities be? What information is needed, how to make sure it is available and who should have access to it? What is the role of sovereignty of countries in the scheme? And so on. On different issues, the EU and other actors construed different visibilities, rationalities, technologies and subjectivities. Having a section for each of these issues with subsections for each of the four concepts would result in an unnecessary long text with significant overlaps. It would probably also make presenting connections between them hard and undermine reconstructing the big picture.

Thus, I have opted for a different structure. In Chapter 4, I draw on previous research to trace how REDD+ developed in the negotiations. I will first present the original rationality which conceives REDD+ as an incentive or a payments for ecosystem services scheme and go through ways of implementing such schemes. I will then discuss critiques and alternatives articulated in the negotiations which still relied on incentives but modified some part of the rationality or visibilities in some ways. I will also show that there were completely different problematizations which rejected the rationality altogether. My intention is to illuminate the “heterogeneity and ‘messiness’ of governmental regimes” and “the role of contestation and resistance” (Stephan et al 2014, 59). Finally, I will look at how these ideas have institutionalized in the REDD+ rules and the ways in which countries are implementing the scheme.

The empirical analysis of the EU’s positions in Chapter 5 will be structured around the problems the EU posed, the solutions it proposed and the way it related these. The chapter is divided into three broad sections: governing forests, governing states and governing subjects. The first section concerns mainly the visibility the EU presented. What benefits forests provide and what threatens them? What issues should REDD+ address? The second section concentrates on the international level. I look at how the EU rationalized REDD+ as part of global climate change mitigation and how it subjectivized countries as responsible actors. The section also discusses agreement, reference levels and safeguard

information systems as technologies of government. The third part discusses the EU's arguments on how countries should engage the stakeholders of forest issues. It shows both the similarities and differences of subjectivities in relation to the original REDD+ proposal. Despite these significant similarities, the EU linked to a different rationality. In the concluding section of Chapter 5, I will draw these issues together into a schematic table structured around the four concepts analytics of government.

The concepts of analytics of government are a tool for helping me think about the material from various perspectives. They help me build a "bottom up analysis" (Stephan 2014, 17) to see how the EU brought different understandings about the world and the desirability of certain goals together into its own governmentality. The EU took some proposals from the negotiations and redeployed and combined (Collier 2009, 80) them with its own proposals and the priorities and goals it considered crucial. This way I aspire to get beyond ideal-typical classifications of governmentalities. While the EU's understanding about the world and the issue of forests were in many ways similar to other actors', as a whole the program it presented was quite different.

3. MATERIAL AND THE FORMATION OF THE EU'S POSITION

This chapter introduces the material I used to analyse the EU's governmentality. I will also briefly discuss the context in which they were created and presented. The second part provides instructions on how to find these materials from the references sections. In the final part, I will elaborate on how I read and analysed the documents.

3.1. The material

The European Union (as the only regional organisation) and its member states are Parties to the UNFCCC (2022) and as such can make submissions to the different bodies of the Convention. Formally, the submissions are made in the name of the member state holding the European Council presidency². The data of this thesis consists mainly of such submissions to three bodies of the UNFCCC. Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea introduced their REDD+ proposal at the 2005 Conference of Parties (COP). The COP debated which body of the UNFCCC would be the proper forum for discussing the issue. Both the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) were proposed and the latter was chosen. The topics discussed in this body are considered to be "technical" in nature. In the first years of REDD+ the main focus was on "methodological issues" such as how to construct reference levels and monitor forest emissions. Later other things like drivers of deforestation, guidance on safeguards and non-carbon benefits were also discussed. (Wilson Rowe 2015, 68, 71–72; Hjort 2015 62–64; Lahn 2016, 37–38.)

REDD+ issues considered "political" were discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) from 2008 onwards. The body had started its work in 2007 and was to negotiate a successor agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. Agreement was to be reached in 2009 in Copenhagen and would have come into effect in 2012, the year Kyoto Protocol ended. After the negotiations in the Copenhagen COP fell apart and no agreement was reached the mandate of the body was extended to 2012. (Hjort 2015 64–65; Wilson Rowe 2015, 68; Lahn 2016, 39–40.)

² The exact wording defining the formal authorship changed slightly with the Lisbon Treaty. Using examples from the materials of this thesis, before the treaty they read .: "Submission by Austria on behalf of the European Community and its member states" (SBSTA 2006) and after the treaty "Submission by Poland and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its member states" (SBSTA 2011)

The AWG-LCA could not agree on all the issues in 2012 either, and thus, another temporary body, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was established to continue the work. (Hjort 2015, 65). It had two “workstreams”: one on post 2020 agreement and another on pre-2020 ambition mitigation. The work of the former culminated whose work culminated in the 2015 Paris Agreement. (UNFCCC 2021) The ADP did not discuss REDD+ as a separate agenda item but the mechanism was part of the discussions on a new climate agreement (Hjort 2015, 65).

The major building blocks of the REDD+ mechanism were agreed in the SBSTA and the AWG-LCA. (Hjort 2015, 65) where REDD+ was discussed as a separate agenda item. I included all EU submissions to these agenda items in the corpus. I also included three of its submissions to both the AWG-LCA and the ADP which briefly discuss REDD+, deforestation or forest policy, as well as one strawman decision the EU submitted during the AWG-LCA negotiations.

To complement the submissions, I included a 2008 Commission communication *Addressing the challenges of deforestation and forest degradation to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss* as it discusses in detail how the EU problematized tropical deforestation and includes a section on the REDD+ mechanism. The communication was accompanied by an annex discussing causes of deforestation.

The main corpus I analysed in detail consists of

- 10 submissions to the SBSTA (2006–2014)
- 8 submissions to the AWG-LCA (2008–2012), of which
 - o 4 concern only REDD+
 - o 3 concerning larger subjects but with relevant sections
- 3 submissions to the ADP (2012–2014) discussing larger subjects with sections relevant for REDD+
- The 2008 Commission communication on deforestation
 - o Annex 2: Causes of deforestation

The EU’s submissions are formed by expert groups in a body called the Working Party on International Environmental Issues/Climate Change (WPIEI/CC). The WPIEI/CC functions under the Environmental Council and its members as well as the members of

the expert groups comprise of representatives from the member states and the Commission³. (Costa 2012, 388, 392). In contrast to the more formal WPIEI/CC, the expert groups' work is characterized by "an 'expert culture' which permits 'freer discussions' in which national interests play no role" (Costa 2012, 389).

The submissions have been called the EU's "technical positions" on specific issues. (Van Schaik 2010, 262; Delreux 2018, 29; Van Schaik & Egenhofer 2005, 3). The WPIEI/CC sends the submissions to the UNFCCC (Van Schaik & Egenhofer 2005, 3) without Council adoption. Van Schaik & Egenhofer (*ibid.*, 3) state that "the technical submissions have sometimes pre-empted the official EU position and are otherwise specifications of the EU position" and should therefore "be considered an integral part of the EU's position." Thus they are a good source to study the EU's positions although they do not stand at the top of the EU's formal decision making hierarchy.

As for the communications, they are documents where the Commission "outlines its positions and suggestions to the Council" (Van Schaik 2010, 262). Actors involved in the EU's climate policy regard the Commission as an expert authority (Birkel 2009, 66–68) and it is seen in the Council as, and acts like an extra member state (Groenleer & Van Schaik 2007, 987; Delreux & Van den Brande 2013, 123). So, although the communications do not bind the Council, they can influence the EU's positions. They are also commonly used as sources in climate policy research (e.g. Schunz 2014; Costa 2008; Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008; Van Schaik 2010; Birkel 2009).

In addition to this main material (submissions and the EC communication), I also used other relevant documents to contextualize the issues discussed in the primary corpus. These documents are listed in the Complementary material of the references section and include, *inter alia*, Commission communications on climate negotiations and a scientific review to which the EU referred in one of its submissions.

3.2. Material key

In addition to the EU's submissions which I analyse in Chapter 5, I refer to a few UNFCCC submissions by other actors in Chapter 4. To differentiate the EU's

³ Originally from DG Environment but, since its creation in 2010, from DG Climate Action (Costa 2012, 388, 392).

submissions included in the main material I refer to those documents with the abbreviation of the relevant body as it is written in the document filing system (SBSTA, AWGLCA, ADP). E.g. the EU's first submission is SBSTA 2006. To other EU documents I refer with the author institution's name.

I refer to the other actors' UNFCCC submissions as UNFCCC documents, e.g. UNFCCC 2005. These and other documents by the UNFCCC and related institutions are listed in the section title Other supporting material. The REDD+ decisions also have their own section. I refer to them with the abbreviations used in the UNFCCC decisions themselves, e.g. 1/CP.16. Here, the number one refers to decision number, and "CP.16" to COP 16 in Cancún.

3.3. Reading the documents

I carried out the analysis by carefully reading the documents in the material and contextualizing them with the negotiation process and other EU documents. In this way, I was able to reconstruct a more complete picture from the submissions and other texts, which were, at times, quite brief.

I coded the main materials (submissions and the deforestation communication) at the level of sentences or paragraphs with the qualitative text analysis program ATLAS.ti. Most coded segments (quotations in ATLAS.ti) were assigned several codes.

Initially I divided the codes according the four concepts of analytics of government, but other than that the coding was open. I used it merely to mark the objects the EU talked about. In total, I used 94 codes, several of which did not end up having significant role in the analysis. I eventually found that strict usage of the categories was not helpful (especially for rationalities and technologies). Nevertheless, this preliminary classification of codes did help me structure the coding process. They helped me pose questions to the texts from different angles and keep in mind the codes I had used previously. Still, more important was that the codes allowed me to grasp the materials as a totality. They enabled me to return to the contexts in which the EU discussed certain objects and analyse the relations the EU articulated between these objects. For example, I could move between the texts to see where the EU talked about participation or co-

benefits. I could then see how the EU related them to other objects and why they were important. This allowed me to grasp the nuances of the EU's governmentality.

Reading the documents, I also tried not to assume that the objects the EU writes about has fixed functions or mean the support of certain values (Walters 2012, 17; Dean 2010, 45–46). Instead, I reconstructed the importance of objects in the totality of the discourse from the text. For example, the analysis in Chapter 5 shows that, for the EU, the function of carbon markets, safeguard information systems or participation was somewhat different from the discourses identified in previous research (Hjort 2015, 126–131, 149–153; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 76–77; Nielsen 2014 269–270). With this open reading style I am able to extract the subtle differences even in the mundane practices or procedures which nevertheless have important political consequences.

4. AVOIDED DEFORESTATION IN THE UNFCCC

This chapter describes the development of REDD+ in the negotiations (2005-2015), and how the mechanism was institutionalized in UNFCCC decisions as well as country practices. In the negotiations Parties and other actors presented various views about how deforestation could be addressed. Although the REDD+ received broad support and the early negotiations progressed smoothly compared to the general negotiations at the time (Lahn 2016, 59; Lovera-Bilderbek 2017, 43) debates about what issues REDD+ should take into account and govern did emerge.

This chapter introduces the main questions and arguments in the REDD+ debates as they have been presented in previous research. The aim is to help the reader contextualize the EU's arguments presented in the following chapter.

I will start with a brief overview of the CDM debate on avoided deforestation which preceded REDD+. I will then move on to the articulation of REDD+. I will start with the general rationality of REDD+ as an incentive mechanism. I explore what this means for how REDD+ attempts to change behaviour and how it represents the drivers of deforestation. Next I concentrate on the argument that REDD+ would be an efficient way of mitigating climate change. I introduce the two kinds of efficiency arguments: the efficiency of different mitigation options and the efficiency of markets. As REDD+ has been described as a PES scheme, I will then take a step back from the negotiations and analyse what different kinds of PES arrangements could mean for the efficiency arguments and the role of expertise in such arrangements. This is followed by a section in which I look at alternative proposed at the negotiations. Some of these stayed within the rationality only slightly modifying the incentives but others presented entirely different problematizations of forests. Finally I will look at the framework institutionalized in the UNFCCC rules for REDD+ as well as the policies countries have implemented to see how they reflect the conceptions actors articulated in the negotiations.

4.1. Avoided deforestation in the Clean Development Mechanism

The REDD+ negotiations were not the first time tropical deforestation was considered in the UNFCCC negotiations. The Convention endorses the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” which recognizes that developed countries have historically emitted more greenhouse gases and, thus, have greater responsibility for

mitigating climate change. In 1997, in accordance with this principle the parties negotiated the Kyoto Protocol in which only developed countries had emission reduction targets. (Carter 2007, 251.) While developed countries were to take responsibility, the protocol also included flexibility mechanisms which would allow mitigation activities implemented in developing countries to be counted towards developed country targets. The rationale behind this was that they should be enabled to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way. (Carter 2007, 253; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 58; Stripple 2010, 69).

One of the flexibility mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project based market mechanism. Project developers could, for example deploy renewable energy plants or improve energy efficiency could claim carbon credits for Certified Emission Reductions and sell those credits to developed countries who could count them as their emission reductions (Paterson & Stripple 2012, 574). It was under the CDM that the inclusion of forestry and deforestation projects into the Kyoto Protocol was discussed as greenhouse gas sinks (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 59).

Three kinds of projects were considered in CDM sink-projects: afforestation, reforestation and avoided deforestation. The first two, which are tree planting projects, were eventually included in the CDM whereas avoided deforestation, i.e. the conservation of existing forests, was left out. (Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 36) I will first look at the arguments in favour of forestry projects and then criticisms directed at them.

Alongside the cost-effectiveness argument, the CDM was also legitimized on the basis that it made possible the incorporation of non-state actors and thus private investment into sustainable development and climate mitigation in developing countries (Wolf 2013, 51; Stripple 2010, 69). Bäckstrand & Lövbrand write that the CDM forestry projects were legitimized with a broader ecological modernization discourse: “In contrast to the call for a treaty with strict targets and timetables for a stabilization of greenhouse gases” corporate investors from the North and local communities in the South could join hands to provide market-driven and flexible mitigation alternatives (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 60). In this framing, forestry projects would also bring about other sustainable development “co-benefits” such as poverty-reduction, sustainable forest management and biodiversity protection (ibid., 61).

There were various arguments against including avoided deforestation. The criticism included claims that avoided deforestation were a loophole for developed countries to avoid domestic emission reductions and long-term solutions, hard to monitor accurately, an impingement on developing country sovereignty, may lead to exclusion of local communities and a sign of carbon colonialism ignoring local cultures and needs. For the first issue forestry projects were considered particularly problematic as they could have been cheap and widely available, there were fears that they could flood the carbon market and make fossil fuel reductions redundant. (Stephan 2014, 87-88; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 59–64.)

The effects forestry projects on biodiversity benefits were also questioned. Critics “feared that project developers would be able to claim credits for reforesting recently deforested land through plantation and monoculture” (Stephan 2014, 96). Furthermore, plantations of non-native species could also disturb hydrological circles, increase the use of fertilizers and pesticides and endanger local flora and fauna (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 65).

To address these social and ecological concerns project participants had “to consider and report the social, economic and environmental impacts of the proposed project activity” (ibid., 69). Sovereignty concerns were addressed by leaving the assessment of those impacts to the host countries. Similarly monoculture plantations were allowed as long as they fit the host country’s development priorities. (Ibid., 69.)

In 2001 Parties reached a compromise in which reforestation and afforestation were included in the CDM while avoided deforestation was excluded (Stephan 2014, 76). Furthermore, developed countries were allowed to offset only one percent of their emissions (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 59). Four years later, the issue of avoided deforestation was reintroduced under a different moniker.

4.2. Articulation of REDD+

In 2005, negotiations started for a new agreement on climate change which would replace or continue the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. It was hoped that these negotiations could be concluded in 2009 at the COP 15 in Copenhagen (Stephan 2014, 76-77.) The same year Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, working together with a number of countries (later

known as the Coalition for Rainforest Nations), made a submission on “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries” (UNFCCC 2005). This proposal brought avoided deforestation and funding it through an international carbon market back into the climate negotiations. The proposal also framed REDD+ as a developing country contribution to climate mitigation according to common but differentiated responsibilities: developing countries would take the responsibility of implementing REDD+, developed countries would fund it (Hjort 2015, 129-130; Stephan 2014, 82-83). It discussed only deforestation but as the negotiations progressed, first forest degradation and later three other “plus” activities were included (den Besten et al. 2014, 42-43; Hjort 2015, 109-110). In the Cancún Agreements of 2010 REDD+ was defined as

- (a) Reducing emissions from deforestation;
 - (b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
 - (c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
 - (d) Sustainable management of forests;
 - (e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks;
- (1/CP.16)

I will be generally referring to the mechanism as REDD+ although the acronym was first RED, then REDD and finally REDD+. I will also be using the word deforestation to refer to all these activities as deforestation was the general object that the REDD+ actions sought to address.

This section details how REDD+ developed throughout the negotiations. I will first go through the technical matters necessary for rendering REDD+ governable as a performance based mechanism. Second, I discuss how the original REDD+ idea problematizes deforestation and how it represents the drivers of deforestation. Then I will discuss the presumed cost-effectiveness of REDD+ and how it could be enacted by implementing REDD+ as PES scheme within countries. After that I will look at critiques and alternatives proposed in the negotiations. Section 4.3 then discusses how these ideas are reflected in the REDD+ rules and what that says about the prevalence of the ideas and how REDD+ is likely to govern. Table 1 presents a timeline of key debates, decisions in the UNFCCC and related EU documents.

Table 1. Timeline of key UNFCCC debates and decisions on REDD+ and EU documents analysed

	UNFCCC context	REDD+ discussions and important decisions	EU materials
2005 COP 11	Negotiations on successor to the Kyoto Protocol begin	Costa Rica & Papua New Guinea make a submission on Reducing emissions from deforestation. Scope: RED	
2006 COP 12		RED discussed in SBSTA Focus on technical issues	SBSTA 2006
2007 COP 13	AWG-LCA begins work, Bali Action Plan	Degradation included. <i>Scope: REDD</i> Focus on technical issues	SBSTA 2007a; 2007b
2008 COP 14		Focus on technical issues Funding discussed in AWG-LCA	Commission communication on deforestation (EC 2008a), SBSTA 2008; AWGLCA 2008a; 2008b; 2008c
2009 COP 15	No Copenhagen Agreement, instead Copenhagen Accord. AWG-LCA work extended	Participation and rights of indigenous peoples. <i>Scope: REDD+</i>	SBSTA 2009; AWGLCA 2011
2010 COP 16	Cancún Agreements Green Climate Fund established	<i>Cancún Agreements</i> : the basic framework for REDD+: technical requirements, Results-based payments, safeguards, safeguard information systems (SIS)	AWGLCA 2010
2011 COP 17		SIS	SBSTA 2011, AWGLCA 2011
2012 COP 18	AWG-LCA work closes, ADP begins work	drivers of deforestation, SIS	SBSTA 2012, AWGLCA 2012; ADP 2012
2013 COP 19		<i>Warsaw Framework for REDD+</i> : MRV, reference levels, SIS, results-based finance, “key role” of GCF	SBSTA 2013; ADP 2013
2014 COP 20		non-carbon benefits, SIS and non-market approaches	SBSTA 2014a; 2014b; ADP 2014
2015 COP 21	The Paris Agreement	The Paris agreement mentions REDD+ and defines new market mechanisms. <i>REDD+ concluded</i>	
2021 COP 26	Article 6 rulebook	REDD+ is included in Article 6 carbon markets from 2021 onwards	

4.2.1. Technical matters

The original submission by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea proposed that REDD+ could be funded from the carbon market. Other actors proposed that incentives could be paid by an international fund (Hjort 2015, 126–137). These approaches are similar in that the actions are taken voluntarily by those who the incentives target and payments are made in relation to materialized benefits. In other words, payments are results-based. (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 34–35.) A number of “technical” issues had to be addressed to render avoided deforestation tradable in the market or rewardable by a fund. The first years of the negotiations concentrated heavily on these technical issues, namely additionality, leakage, permanence and monitoring. (Wilson Rowe 2015, 68; Lahn 2016, 60–68.) As these are quite fundamental to understanding REDD+ as a performance based mechanism, I will begin by briefly introducing them and how they were addressed in the negotiations.

First, there is the question of additionality. To grant an actor carbon credits, it has to be shown that the climate benefits would not have materialized without the actions of that actor. For afforestation and reforestation activities this is quite simple as new trees are planted. For avoided deforestation counterfactual reference levels must be constructed to estimate what would have happened in the absence of the project. A business-as-usual reference level is constructed and performance is measured against that baseline to determine the amount of emissions that has been avoided. (Hjort 2015, 103.)

Second, reducing deforestation in one area might simply increase deforestation in another area if the pressures driving it are not addressed. This is also called leakage. (Hjort 2015, 106-107.) When Costa Rica & Papua New Guinea re-introduced avoided deforestation into the UNFCCC negotiations they proposed that leakage could be addressed by addressing deforestation on the national level instead of smaller scale projects. (UNFCCC 2005, 9.) They did not mention international leakage, i.e. that deforestation might be increased in another country. In the negotiations it was argued that this could be addressed by having a broad participation of Parties. If all tropical forest countries were in, deforestation could not be leak from one country to another. (Hjort 2015, 195-196.)

In accordance with the country level approach reference levels also had to be constructed nationally. Three options were presented: levels based on historical data, levels based on modelling which takes into account drivers of deforestation, and a combination of the

former with “national circumstances”. Problems and critiques were articulated regarding all three but the last option was adopted at Copenhagen in 2009. (Ibid., 204-217.) The decision states that reference levels should be constructed “taking into account historic data, and adjust for national circumstances” (4/CP.15).

National circumstances were important because in some countries deforestation was expected to rise significantly due to population growth or economic development. A purely historic reference level would not accurately account for these factors. (Hjort 2015, 207, 212.) This would also make it very hard for these countries to participate in REDD+ (ibid., 207) which, again, would risk international leakage (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 39). Hjort notes that countries from the Congo Basin made a different argument for the inclusion national circumstances. They wanted to base reference levels on common but differentiated responsibilities “to allow for social and development needs”. (Hjort 2015, 213.) This, as Hjort notes, bases the reference levels on equity instead of accuracy of predictions about the future (ibid., 213-214). It remains unclear what exactly national circumstances designate (ibid., 212; Angelsen 2017, 248; Herold et al. 2012, 283; Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 39) and to what extent equity concerns could be included. Allowing needs or equity to be taken into consideration in reference levels would mean that REDD+ would not function purely on the basis of predictions.

Third, forest emissions have to be monitored accurately to evaluate performance. Monitoring was thought to be possible by remote sensing from satellite data, if not in at the present, then in the near future. Problems were however highlighted in the ability of satellites to detect accurately forest degradation or the carbon in peatlands. Monitoring could also be done and complemented by local ground surveying but that raises costs significantly and thus threatens the cost-effectiveness of REDD+. (Hjort 2015, 219-247.) The COP adopted a “step-wise” approach where more inaccurate measurements could be used initially and improved over time but refrained from specifying if these more accurate measurements are a requirement for results-based payments. (Hjort 2015, 240-241).

Finally, permanence was also considered in the negotiations. The carbon stored in trees could be released by unintended events such as illegal logging, fires, pests or dieback due to warming climate (Stephan 2014, 89; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006, 64-65). Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea’s proposal suggested that permanence can be dealt with by insurance markets. This would mean that part of the carbon credits produced, could be

withheld to ensure that the conserved forest would not be harmed later. (Hjort 2015, 197.) One can also argue that permanence is not a concern for REDD+ as the scheme measures performance in a determined accounting period. After that the forest could be cut down or maintained for another accounting period to obtain another round of payments (Skutsch & Trines 2010). The word permanence does not appear in the REDD+ decisions. One of the adopted safeguards calls for “[a]ctions to address the risks of reversals” (1/CP.16) but no standards for the safeguards have been elaborated (see 4.3.2. below).

4.2.2. The rationality of REDD+: incentives and efficient climate mitigation

In the Costa Rica & Papua New Guinea’s submission and in REDD+ in general the problem of deforestation was framed as one of missing economic valuation of standing forests. If the opportunity cost, i.e. the benefit that an individual, a community or a country gets from deforesting, can be monetarily compensated, deforestation can be avoided. (Hjort 2015, 126-127; Stephan 79-82.) Through this economic incentive the conduct of people or countries can be governed. Here the governed are assumed to be rational utility maximizers, *homines economici* calculating and choosing from different options the ones best suitable to their interests (Stephan 2014, 123; Hjort 2015, 168-169). The original REDD+ proposal and many submissions in the negotiations proposed to constitute these economic incentives by integrating REDD+ to the global carbon market in a manner similar to the CDM (Hjort 2015, 127-128).

A strong win-win-win narrative made REDD+ attractive for many actors. Reducing deforestation was thought to be cost-effective way to mitigate emissions as well as contribute to other benefits such as poverty reduction, sustainable development and biodiversity protection. These became known as co-benefits. Providing funds to countries with poor people and biodiverse forests was a highly attractive way to combat climate change. (Nielsen 2014, 270; Hjort 2015, 130). However, the main rationality and legitimizing principle was the cost-efficiency of emission reductions (Stephan 2014, 86–88; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 75–97; Hjort 2015, 128)

While it was not present in the 2005 proposal by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, the cost-effective emission reductions argument, familiar from the CDM debates, was soon brought into the discussion (Hjort 2015, 128-129). There are two kinds of cost-effectiveness or efficiency at play in REDD+ discourse. First, there is the cost of different

options to reduce emissions. These options have been made knowable and commensurable through the concept of opportunity costs, i.e. “the value of something that must be given up in order to obtain something else” (McAfee 2012, 120). It was through opportunity cost estimates that reducing deforestation was identified as a cost-effective way to reduce emissions. The report of the Stern Commission (Stern 2006) commissioned by the UK was particularly influential in this (Stephan 2014, 86; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 40) and Parties cited it frequently in the negotiations (Hjort 2015, 128). Different drivers of deforestation such as agriculture (for subsistence or boom crops such as palm oil or cocoa), logging and firewood gathering can be compared by estimating how much value people get from them. This can be used to estimate the amount of money an actor has to be paid to compensate for the foregone economic opportunities that they engage in. (Hjort 2015, 126; Stephan 2014, 80-81.)” This idea of compensating actors for environmental gains is called payments for environmental/ecosystem services (PES) (McAfee 2012). It can be thought of as the opposite of the “polluters pay” principle as the “providers get” payments (Vatn 2010, 1247).

A way to visualize opportunity costs is the McKinsey & Company’s Abatement Costs Curve (Figure 1) which according to Stephan (2014, 86) “amplified the notion of REDD+ as a cost-effective mitigation measure”. As the McKinsey figure shows, not all drivers of deforestation were thought to be cheap to compensate for. In the negotiations it was acknowledged that curbing deforestation from highly profitable land-uses would not be possible with funding available from carbon markets or a REDD+ fund (Hjort 2020, 142-143). This leads Hjort (ibid., 142-143) and Stephan (2014, 126-128) to argue that REDD+ is likely to target only local forest-users who engage in low profit activities such as slash-and-burn agriculture or firewood gathering and ignore commercial agriculture or logging.

The other kind of efficiency in REDD+ discourse is the efficiency of the market in distributing scarce resources. This is thought to minimize the need for government intervention and information. Government does not have to know where and by whom reducing deforestation would be most beneficial. Instead, once a market has been established, market actors will do that on their own and provide optimal allocation of resources (McAfee 2012, 120, Nielsen 2014, 270; Hjort 2015, 137).




Figure 1. McKinsey's Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve (Version 2.1) as reproduced in Stephan (2014, 87).

While the market is thought to direct REDD+ where opportunity costs are cheapest, academics have pointed out it is not necessarily the case that opportunity costs are stable and remain as low as experts estimate. A community which has practised a low opportunity cost activity like subsistence agriculture might change to profitable boom crops. They might even use previously received REDD+ payments to invest in profitable crops or logging equipment. Second, successfully reducing deforestation globally might drive up the prices of land and agricultural products if consumption persists. If the people that REDD+ targets buy products from markets instead of producing or harvesting them themselves, it could drive opportunity costs up. (Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 83; see also McAfee 2012, 122.) Rising prices are of course in the core of the argument that carbon cap-and-trade type (which REDD+ is not) carbon markets (or taxes) can stop climate change by internalizing the costs of emitting greenhouse gases, i.e. making emissions expensive (Barry 2007, 224-225). Yet, if cost-effectiveness is the primary goal as in REDD+, this can result in a tensions. Rising opportunity costs can also mean that carbon markets buying carbon credits from renewable energy projects instead of curbing deforestation.

4.2.3. Implementing REDD+ as a PES scheme

At this point, I will take a step back from the climate negotiations to consider how to translate the PES idea into practice. How to implement REDD+ as a market or another kind of PES arrangement? What kind of representations PES schemes make about the role of expertise and the market and what kind of subjectivities of the governed do they assume? As both the original REDD+ proposal and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ based incentives on national approaches (see 4.2.1. above) I will limit my discussion to such national approaches⁴.

I am doing this because PES and market efficiency were central ideas in REDD+. Furthermore, one of the core arguments of governmentality analysis on REDD+ is that the mechanism assumes or tries to create entrepreneurial subjects who govern themselves (Stephan 2014, 121–124; Hjort 2015, 167–178; Li 2014 43–47; Boer 2018, 9). Governmentality studies have considered reliance on entrepreneurial behaviour, self-governance and market-like mechanisms as well as scepticism about the ability of experts and public authorities to be common characteristics of neoliberal or advanced liberal government (Dean 2010 174–204; Rose 1993, 294–296).

First, let us consider how to implement a national PES market funded from an international carbon market or fund. The state would approximate the price of carbon credits or the price a fund pays for avoided deforestation. It can then set up a “reverse auction” (Pirard 2012, 63) to ask for bids from those who own land or have been granted carbon rights or logging, agricultural or mining concessions. These actors could put forward proposals defining at what price they would be willing to conserve a part or all of a forest they manage, or change their activities so that they do less damage to the forest. To maximize cost-effectiveness, this would have to be combined with an estimation on how much these actors would deforest under a business-as-usual scenario (Pirard & Karsenty, 2009, 442–443; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 56–57). The government would then negotiate contracts with those actors that provide the best bargains (and possibly evidence about the credibility of their plans to reduce deforestation). Payment would be conditional on results. If the conservation efforts failed, the state would not pay and could offer higher prices the next time around. (Sattler & Matzdorf 2013, 7.) Alternatively, it could conclude that it is better to reduce deforestation in other countries.

⁴ Some Parties proposed project-based approaches (Okereke & Dooley 2010, 87–88) which would link individual avoided deforestation projects directly to the carbon markets.

The general point is that, in this arrangement, the “exercise of political power [would be] modelled on the principles of a market economy” (Foucault 2008, 131). How much emission reductions cost, what are the best ways to reduce emissions and where emission reductions (as well as emissions) yield optimal outcomes (maximizing forest carbon and commodity production) would be determined by the market in a decentralized manner, not by expertise defining some areas or activities as cheap to compensate for. Governance depends on the entrepreneurship and choice of the governed as they maximize their benefits weighing payments and deforestation.

We can contrast reverse auctions with other kinds of PES arrangements which do not share all of the goals or assumed benefits of a market system but still rely on the choice of the governed. Opportunity cost analysis presumes that expertise can identify actors who would be willing to reduce deforestation if payments or other benefits are provided to them. Payments could target these people only. As a voluntary scheme, this would still rely on the forest users’ choice, but here the choice is something that can be known or at least estimated. It would not be assumed that good outcomes are not something that can only be revealed in a market setting (see Felli 2015, 652; Pirard 2012, 63). Rather, expertise can suggest to which actors payments should be directed to achieve the most efficient mitigation outcomes (Li 2014, 43). Of course efficiency is not the only possible criteria for directing payments, other political priorities can influence the decisions too (see e.g. Boer 2017, 799-880).

In such an arrangement, the state would still approach the governed primarily as entrepreneurial in the sense that they weigh their own priorities, benefits and costs. As Li points out, these priorities are not necessarily material or economic:

...populations (often described as ‘communities’) have different values, desires, and calculations. The role of expert knowledge about specific populations in assemblages formed through this rationale is to explore the ends such populations pursue, the calculations they adopt, and the most effective way of using incentives to achieve governmental or ‘improving’ ends.” (Li 2014, 43.)

In this construction, although people are thought to be entrepreneurial, it is not their entrepreneurial behaviour at the market that brings about the best solutions to deforestation. Rather, it is expertise that identifies where reducing deforestation would be most beneficial and efficient by engaging the governed to find out their priorities.

This kind of knowledge can be at play in a market REDD+ too. A carbon market professional (Stephan 2014, 166) wishing to set up an avoided deforestation project could identify and engage a community to tell them that they could benefit from the carbon market. In the end, however, the viability of the project would be tested by the price the project could offer in the reverse auction. Again, it would be the market, not expertise that decides where REDD+ projects would materialize or survive.

It should be noted that those who participate in market or non-market PES systems do not necessarily have to own the land on which they conserve forests. In several countries even though the state owns a forest it has given use or management rights to municipal authorities or local communities (Pham et al. 2013). Setting up a PES systems might still be considered an easier and more effective way of reducing deforestation than revoking those rights.

As a third possibility, countries could implement REDD+ by simply restricting certain or all activities in a forest. At first glance it may seem that this would contradict the core PES principle that “providers get” (Vatn 2010, 1247). Yet, this depends on who is considered the provider of the environmental service. Take the example of a state-owned forest used by local people. REDD+ payments could go to local people who themselves use a forest sustainably to incentive them to protect the forest from outsiders, for example illegal loggers (Luttrell et al. 2012, 146.) Stephan points to the disciplinary potential of such an arrangement:

“[a]n illegal logger has to be afraid not only of the state and its [satellite] remote sensing observation capacity, any other person in proximity with an interest in getting returns from emissions reductions has an incentive to report him and thus becomes part of the panopticon⁵, too.” (Stephan 2014, 122).

Additionality, in this case, would be improved enforcement of forest governance, relying at least in part on the actions of local people. The role of expertise would be to identify

⁵ Panopticon refers to Jeremy Bentham’s idea of a prison where every action of the prisoners can be seen from the middle. This is thought to discipline the prisoners to behave well without direct control. This can be generalized as a formula for the government of society. (Gordon 1991, 25–27.) The concept has been used also to describe satellite remote sensing to detect deforestation as the technology allows the state to “see” and “master forest carbon flows at all times (Stephan 2014, 122; Hjort 2015, 198–199).

who and under what conditions can be incentivized to be this kind of entrepreneurial forest guard.

States do not necessarily need to rely on the self-regulation of the governed. They can try to reduce deforestation by other means and use the REDD+ payments to cover the costs. Central governments could also pay subnational or municipal governments to do this locally (Angelsen & Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008, 12). In this case, it would be the public authorities, not so much the local people themselves, who are thought to be responsive to incentives. If the governments are thought to act in the interest of their people, this could still be seen as benefiting forest users. Such arrangements could incorporate various ways in which the people are conceived of as subjects and various kinds of expertise telling what is in the interest of the people.

Although the last approach differs quite a bit from a PES system in which attempts to govern deforestation as a market, all the above approaches share the conviction that the success of REDD+ depends on benefits accruing to local people. Yet, the non-market arrangements put a greater emphasis on expertise suggesting what those benefits could be and who would be likely to accept them.

Governments could of course disregard PES ideas altogether and govern deforestation without trying to provide benefits for local people or forest users. Governments could for example set up new protected areas and use the state apparatus (instead of local people) to enforce protection. This is sometimes referred to as “fortress conservation” (Brockington 2004, Khan & Lynch 2013). This could include outright exclusion of people who have previously used a forest for subsistence.

The above examples show that there are many ways in which the incentives could be used to address deforestation. They resemble PES schemes to different extents and presuppose different roles for expertise and active subjects. It is important to keep this in mind when one analyses the REDD+ framework. If some aspects of REDD+ rules resemble PES or market mechanisms, it should not be mistaken as a wholesale materialization of a market rationality.

4.2.4. Alternative incentive structures

We can first look at alternative proposals on the funding REDD+. As with the CDM, certain actors, notably Brazil and other BASIC countries (South Africa, India and China) countries as well NGOs, resisted including REDD+ in the carbon market because they did not want to enable developing countries to offset their emissions (Hjort 2015, 138). This was not the only reason to oppose carbon markets. NGOs argued that market-based conservation tends to benefit those with suitable knowledge and resources, such as corporations and investors, (ibid., 136) and could marginalize already disadvantaged social groups (ibid., 132). This critique was picked up by a group of “nearly fifty” LDCs which favoured a fund-based system as they saw it to be “less dependent on the investment decisions of market actors” and as a way “to counter market monopolisation, volatility and uneven access” to funding (ibid., 136–137). They also argued that their ability to participate in the scheme was hampered by lack of capacity and forest data needed to measure performance in REDD+. (Ibid., 136-137.)

Next I will turn to alternative ways to achieve reduced deforestation in developing countries. Norway advocated for an incentive mechanism resembling the government centred approaches explored in the previous subsection. Norway’s proposal (UNFCCC 2009a, 18–24) was based on a report (Angelsen. et al. 2009) it had commissioned from the Meridian Institute (den Besten et al. 2014, 44; Lahn 2016, 68–69). The report presented a “phased approach”. Phase 1 would include national strategy development. In Phase 2 countries would implement “policies and measures” which would be compensated based on proxy indicators (not direct carbon performance). In phase 3 countries could continue the policies and measures (and develop new ones) but payments would be made based on carbon performance against agreed reference levels. (Angelsen et al. 2009, VII–VIII.) As for the policies, the report mentions, inter alia, land tenure reforms (crucial for PES as well), forest management planning, forest law enforcement, wildfire prevention, agricultural modernisation and “payments for environmental services to indigenous peoples, local communities, farmers, and/or municipalities” (ibid., 5). The subjectivities of this proposal differ from the original REDD+ idea. In this mechanism people and corporations could be governed in various ways while states would be governed by incentives. Norway’s submission was not as explicit on policies but still referred to “reform of land tenure with due regard to collective land rights, land use planning and forest governance” (UNFCCC 2009, 23; see also Okereke & Dooley 2010, 90–91).

It is worth noting that in terms of rationality the approach is not that different. Countries could still reduce deforestation only as far as it is economically beneficial in light of the provided economic incentives. In fact, this is what the Meridian Institute's report explicitly assumed (Angelsen et al. 2009, 14). However, the benefits would be evaluated by the implementing countries trying to assess the impacts of the different measures, not by market actors deciding in a decentralized manner whether deforestation or forest protection is beneficial in a particular area. The countries could still offer payments or other benefits to people to make the policies and measures more acceptable but the distribution of benefits would not be determined by actors responding to market opportunities. As such, the proposal differs from the idea of markets as an optimal and fair way to distribute goods and burdens (see Okereke & Dooley 2010, 85; Dryzek 2013, 124-128; Felli 2015, 654) and corresponds to the non-PES arrangements explored in the previous subsection.

Pre-Copenhagen submissions indicate that similar approaches emphasizing policies seem to have been supported at least by Colombia, the EU, Japan, Malaysia and Brazil (Parker et al. 2009; Okereke & Dooley 2010, 89–92). Furthermore, Okereke & Dooley have analysed eight “key proposals as advanced by the most vocal parties or coalitions” (Okereke & Dooley 2010, 86). They categorize only two proposals (by the Coalition for Rainforest Countries and another by a group of Latin American countries) as advocating a market ethos (ibid., 96). This is not to say that PES schemes would not have been advanced as well (Corbera et al. 2010, 366–369; Angelsen 2008, 122)

Above I mentioned that the original rationality assumed that REDD+ would result in social and environmental co-benefits. This was also questioned in the negotiations (Hjort 2015, 131–132; den Besten et al. 2014, 44). Below I will explore a solution that proposed that co-benefits could be ensured by establishing a set of safeguards. Another solution relying on incentives was developed later in the negotiations. Certain developing countries, particularly ones forming the Central African Forest Commission, and NGOs wanted to go further than the safeguards. They advocated for non-carbon benefits (NCBs). (Wilson Rowe 2015, 71; Hjort 2015, 153.) In addition to previous concerns about biodiversity and livelihoods NCBs were seen to include such things as “(reduced) number of land conflicts, and local perceptions on the cultural services performed by the forests conserved” (UNFCCC 2014a, 21; quoted in Hjort 2015, 153). This discourse highlighted

“that there is nothing ‘co-’ with these benefits” (Hjort 2015,153) and that the various forest issues should be governed in unison because they were essential for the sustainability of REDD+. This entailed larger changes in the management of forests and land in countries. Under this mechanism payments could be made in relation to improvements in livelihoods as well as such things as governance stability or forest management strategies. While the NCB idea fits into the rationale of REDD+ in that it is based on economic valuation of the benefits, a key difference is that NCBs were not envisioned as tangible commodities which could be used as offsets. (ibid., 154-156.) Nobody is thought to create conflicts or destroy cultural livelihoods and then compensate for them in another place.

NCBs were widely opposed, particularly by developed countries. The safeguards were seen to be enough to ensure the materialisation of benefits and it was also argued that incentivizing NCBs would complicate monitoring further and put additional burdens on implementing countries (ibid., 156). Some actors also considered NCB to fall outside the mandate of the UNFCCC and argued that they could be addressed in other forums such as the CBD. (Wilson Rowe 2015, 71; Savaresi 2016, 138; Hjort 2015, 156.)

4.2.5. Rejecting the rationality

Actors in the negotiations also questioned the problematization on which REDD+ was based. Indigenous peoples’ organisations were strongly involved in bringing their rights to the REDD+ agenda (Wallbott 2014; Lahn 2016, 81). Instead of a forest threatened by economic activity they presented an alternative visibility, “the inhabited and traditionally managed forest” as the object of government for REDD+ (Lahn 2016, 81). Indigenous peoples’ organizations and environmental NGOs argued for recognizing and strengthening indigenous peoples and local forest users’ rights to the lands they use as a way to reduce deforestation. They asserted that local forest users and indigenous peoples were already good forest stewards regardless of economic incentives and attributed this to their close and cultural relationship with forests. (Ibid., 81; Hjort 2020, 145-146).

Indigenous peoples’ organisations and NGOs also condemned offsets and carbon markets as an unjust solution to climate change, one which should not be allowed regardless of its cost-effectiveness. Objections, for example by Bolivia and indigenous people’s organisations, were also directed towards monetary valuation of ecological resources and

capitalism in general. (Hjort 2015, 138-139). Such arguments were opposed to the commodifying of nature, and saw different, holistic world views with various ways of valuing forests and eco-centric principles as ways to address deforestation. For these actors the the problem “is not that standing forests are not valued, but rather that REDD+ tries to construct such a valuation, because this would be to reduce ecological objects to little more than ‘resources to be exploited’” (Hjort 2015, 139). The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change recommended educating policy makers and key actors on the different world views of indigenous peoples and on alternative, non-economic ways to value nature (Hjort 2015, 139).

In 2014, Bolivia proposed an alternative mechanism to reduce deforestation. It advocated for a mechanism of joint mitigation and adaptation to combine performance in reducing emissions with a needs-based approach. The concerned developing country and the Green Climate Fund (see 4.3.1) would agree on performance indicators beyond carbon and funding would cover the expenses instead of being based on a fixed or market determined carbon price. (UNFCCC 2014b, 9–10.; Hjort 2015, 141; see also Okereke & Dooley 2010, 88.) Instead of independent action by market actors or countries this approach emphasizes cooperation and funding to address needs. Furthermore, Bolivia had earlier proposed that funding should be based on the concept of climate debt of developed countries (Long et al. 2010, 236-237; Okereke & Dooley 2010, 88). This would have meant decisions about the amount and sources funding would be made on the basis countries’ historical greenhouse gas emissions, not the choices of market actors.

In the first years of negotiations some actors also problematized deforestation as an international issue. While the economic valuation and missing incentives narrative articulates actors in developing countries as drivers of deforestation, some Parties and NGOs “articulate[d] a field of visibility in which the causes of deforestation are in part global and deterritorialised from nation states” (Hjort 2015, 162.) This problematization highlighted the role of things such as biofuel subsidies, rising meat consumption and high prices of agricultural and timber products in creating pressure to deforest. (ibid., 162; Hjort 2020, 140) However, during the first years of negotiations most actors did not suggest ways to address these international drivers of deforestation. Hjort mentions Tuvalu’s proposal to raise public awareness about deforestation in the Global North as an exception. He considers it a “mild disciplinary” strategy trying to cultivate a proper way of conducting oneself. (Hjort 2020, 140; 2015, 162.)

The issue of drivers of deforestation resurfaced in the negotiations in 2012⁶. This time, a variety of concrete proposals to govern international drivers were made (Hjort 2020, 141). NGOs proposed policies and regulations to redirect public investments away from deforesting industries. Along with the EU and Norway they also argued for enforcing regulations that restrict the import of illegal forest products. A disciplinary strategy was articulated by Norway and Switzerland as they suggested developed countries could make profitable activities more sustainable by voluntary initiatives and guidelines. (Hjort 2020, 141). Hjort states that although this time roughly half of the country submissions articulated international drivers, only one Party submission by Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Monaco possibly (the language is ambiguous) suggested addressing international drivers within the REDD+ mechanism. (Hjort 2015, 178-183.)

Some developing countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil were strongly against policies addressing international drivers as they would interfere with their export-led growth strategies (Hjort 2020, 142; 2015, 165, 183-184). As decisions in the UNFCCC require consensus, no measures were put in place to address international drivers. Negotiation decisions (2/CP.13, 1/CP.16; 15/CP.19) merely “encourage” all countries to address drivers whereas decisions referring only to developing countries use the verb “request”, which is considered a stronger formulation. (Hjort 2020, 140, 142.)

4.2.6. Safeguards

I already mentioned that the idea that the co-benefits would result automatically from REDD+ was challenged in the negotiations. NGOs expressed criticism similar to the CDM debate that REDD+ might exclude and marginalize poor and disadvantaged people and result in “perverse incentives” to replace natural, biodiversity rich forests with secondary forests or plantations (Hjort 2015, 136)

While these worries led some to reject the rationality of REDD+, reformist actors argued that they could be addressed by establishing a set of safeguards. In other words, countries would have to ensure that certain things would not happen as a result of REDD+. Lahn calls this “a procedural arrangement of plans and reports” instead of governance

⁶ Hjort attributes this to the insistence of a Tuvaluan negotiator (Hjort 2020, 141).

arrangements that would have “fundamentally challeng[ed] the understanding of the issue of deforestation” (Lahn 2016, 87).

Environmental concerns were addressed with safeguard seeking to conserve natural forests and biodiversity. The two social safeguards pertain to stakeholder participation and indigenous peoples’ rights and knowledge. The rest concern governance, transparency, the risk of reversals (permanence) and displacement of emissions (leakage). These are not co-benefits but issues which were considered essential for the effectiveness of REDD+. The safeguards were promoted both because they were thought to be essential for the effectiveness of REDD+ and because the co-benefits had been key in legitimizing REDD+. (Hjort 2015, 146–152; den Besten 2014, 46; Wallbott 2014, 9; Lahn 2016, 83–84.)

I will further discuss the social safeguards because they have implications for how REDD+ governs people. The decisions define the two social safeguards as follows:

When undertaking the activities referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision, the following safeguards should be promoted and supported:

...

(c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

(d) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this decision; (1/CP.16)

How would these safeguards make REDD+ effective and how do they relate to the government of subjects? Hjort’s interpretation is that true to the market rationale participation was considered essential for effectiveness because it would ensure broad uptake of REDD+ projects. He shows that participation was framed as a way to increase local people’s sense of ownership of REDD+ and understanding about land-use changes which would lead to broad uptake of REDD+ projects. (Hjort 2015, 147–148, 171–173; 2020, 144.) He goes on to point out how the participative practices can act as a disciplinary power. Teaching people how to measure carbon in forests will show them how their behaviour influences it. In this way participation facilitates enacting technologies of performance and: enabling people to assess their actions in relation to carbon so that they know that by changing their behaviour they can obtain payments from

the carbon market. In this way, REDD+ could activate them to act in an entrepreneurial manner ensuring that they benefit and that the mechanism is effective in reducing deforestation. (Hjort 2020, 145; see also Stephan 2014, 120–121.)

On the other hand, as a part of the policies and measures approach, submissions referred to participation as a procedural right, i.e. participative processes such as consultation and engagement of local stakeholders by government bodies who design and implement the policies and measures (den Besten et al. 2014, 44; Jodoin 2016, 168–171). Participation could, then, ensure that REDD+ does not harm local communities and indigenous peoples (den Besten 2014, 44; Hjort 2015, 148, 172; see also Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 109-115) and make REDD+ effective by increasing the acceptability of the scheme (Wallbott 2014, 9). Such participative processes could also be used if REDD+ is implemented as a local PES project where publicly owned forests are used commonly by local people. Participative processes could be used to determine the actions taken to reduce deforestation and how REDD+ payments or other benefits should be shared (Luttrell et al. 2012 Okereke & Dooley 2010, 90). Submissions also argued for participation in MRV to improve MRV data and make it less costly (Hjort 2015, 171; Walbbott 2014, 9).

The other social safeguard concerns respect for the rights and knowledge of indigenous peoples. When discussing the issue NGOs and certain Parties advanced the affirmation of the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Hjort 2015, 145-147) which is a non-legally binding soft law document adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 2007 (Atapattu 2016, 190). Wallbott (2014, 1) summarizes the declaration as follows:

[UNDRIP] recognizes IPs’ [Indigenous Peoples’] inherent substantive rights, including the right to self-determination, collective rights to lands, territories and resources, and cultural rights, but also their procedural rights and the provision of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). Importantly, the plural of the term “peoples” denotes IPs’ collective rights and their status beyond aggregated indigenous individuals or communities.

As mentioned in the previous subsection, Indigenous peoples’ organisations presented their alternative vision of forests to argue that the recognition of their land rights would in itself be an effective way to reduce deforestation and made normative claims for their rights. There were also other arguments for UNDRIP. As with participation, respect of indigenous peoples and local communities’ rights were seen to increase the acceptability of REDD+. (ibid., 9; Hjort 2015, 146; Lahn 2016, 83–84). Furthermore, indigenous

peoples, NGOs and their knowledge were also seen to be crucial for the implementation of REDD+ on the ground which gave their arguments prestige (Wallbott 2014, 9; Lahn 2016, 83).

While participation was broadly supported, including a reference to the UNDRIP also faced resistance (Wallbott 2014, 5; Hjort 2020, 146; 2015, 151–152). Hjort points out that affirming the UNDRIP and its principle of free, prior and informed consent would bestow upon forest users the right to choose whether they want to participate in REDD+ – that is they would have the power to reject the scheme on their lands. (Hjort 2020, 145–146.) According to Hjort’s interviewees some Parties resisted referring to the UNDRIP precisely because the ability to reject REDD+ would mean that the mechanism would become “patchy”, i.e. it would not incentivize forest protection in all areas (Hjort 2015, 151–152). He also points out that as the REDD+ decisions (1/CP.16) only “note” the UNDRIP they do not institute a right for indigenous peoples to reject REDD+ (Hjort 2020, 147). What Hjort does not discuss, is that this means that REDD+ would not function like a PES system based on voluntary uptake and choice. If people cannot choose whether to protect or cut a forest, then the market cannot find the places where production and conservation would be optimal. Also, if a REDD+ project relies, in line with Hjort’s example above, on the agency of the governed in transforming their activities so that they can obtain payments, the governed would not need to reject the REDD+ project. They could just continue their activities disregarding possible payments.

Indeed, Lahn is more explicit about the reason some countries resisted the UNDRIP and the safeguards in general: they thought that “how REDD+ was implemented ... was a matter of national sovereignty” (Lahn 2016, 85; see also Nielsen 2014, 273⁷). Hjort, too, writes that the majority of countries favoured formulations which did not refer to the UNDRIP and would make “obtaining informed consent conditional upon domestic regulation” (2020, 146). This calls into question the extent to which the PES market rationale had support in the negotiations. While the carbon market was supported as the funding mechanism, countries’ sovereignty and flexibility were emphasized in national implementation.

⁷ Lahn refers to his interviewee and does not specify countries. Nielsen writes of developing countries. On the other hand, according to Wallbott, Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand were also initially against any reference to rights-language concerning indigenous peoples but later reversed their positions (Wallbott 2014, 5, 8).

4.3. Institutionalisation of REDD+

In this section, I analyse to what kind of arrangements and REDD+ rules that translate the ideas into practice. I will first examine the funding of REDD+ and its implications for who is governed and how. Second I will look at how the international REDD+ framework governs developing countries who implement REDD+ and what kind of policies countries have implemented so far.

4.3.1. Funding avoided deforestation

The original vision for REDD+ funding was that the scheme would be integrated to the carbon market as a part of new climate agreement which was to be negotiated in the 2009 Copenhagen COP. A reformed CDM was also a part of the discussions about the new agreement (Stripple 2010, 76). Three options for funding REDD+ were considered: market, fund and a combination of the two. Coming to Copenhagen REDD+ negotiators had outlined these options but since they considered the issue to be political they deferred it from the REDD+ negotiations to the wider negotiations on the Copenhagen Agreement. (Lahn 2016, 61, 89–91.) The Copenhagen negotiations eventually broke down. No agreement was reached and thus no new carbon market set up. Instead the US and the BASIC countries drafted a text which became known as the Copenhagen Accord (Schunz 2014, 220). The Accord, which was only “noted” by the COP, stated that developed countries would “commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries” (2/CP.15). It also introduced the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to fund activities under the UNFCCC. The GCF was officially established in 2010 in Cancún (UNFCCC 2020). In 2013 Parties decided that the GCF would have a “key role” in financing REDD+. Market funding was not excluded at any point (Hjort 2014, 140-141; Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 48-51.) According to Hjort, because of the breakdown of the Copenhagen negotiations it is hard to ascertain to what extent the critique of market funding influenced the results (Hjort 2015, 140). Funding from the GCF is to be results-based, which means it still entails economic valuation forests through their carbon content. As such it is unlikely to be acceptable to those objecting to commodifying of nature (Hjort 2015, 141).

In 2015 a new climate agreement was negotiated in the Paris COP. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement specifies carbon market mechanisms but the exact rules for the market mechanisms were deferred to subsequent COPs. In the 2021 Glasgow COP the rulebook for Article 6 was finally agreed upon. According to the rules developing countries can claim credits from REDD+ actions from 2021 onwards. (Carbon Brief 2021.)

What does this mean for the subjectivities of governmentality? With the carbon market established, those with emission reduction targets (countries, businesses or other emitters) are governed through choice. They can choose to reduce their own emissions or buy carbon credits.

How about public funding, then? Have the parties agreed on how to distribute the financing burdens of fund-based REDD+ or the GFC? Beyond the general principle that developing countries should provide financial resources for mitigation and adaptation of developing countries and lead the mobilization of climate finance (1/CP21, Article 9; for REDD+ specifically 1/CP16, para 76) there is no decision on the matter. It is also worth noting, that a fund-based approach could also be linked to the government of emitters but the choice of the latter would be limited. If emission permits are auctioned or emissions taxed, those funds could be used to fund REDD+. (Streck & Parker 2012, 119.) I will discuss this further below (5.2.3).

What happened with the other alternatives? In Paris the COP adopted decisions on non-market approaches promoted by Bolivia and non-carbon benefits. The NCB decision states that countries may provide information on NCBs “for consideration by interested Parties and relevant financing entities” but they “do not constitute a requirement” for results-based payments (18/CP.21). The negotiations thus retained the carbon focus of REDD+. Of the organizations involved in preparatory activities UN-REDD has not differentiated carbon and non-carbon benefits whereas the FCPF has defined NCBs but does not require monitoring or quantifying them (Savaresi 2016, 138-139; FCPF 2020). As for the GCF, it has decided not to assign economic value to NCBs although they “can help a funding proposal to receive a better score” when the fund considers proposals made by countries for results-based payments (Recio 2019, 128). To conclude carbon has remained the primary object governed in REDD+.

The decision on non-market approaches states that “methodological aspects” (reference levels, monitoring etc.) have been addressed by the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ in essence treating non-market approaches as another mode of a results-based approach. Furthermore, it contains no reference to the needs-based funding that Bolivia argued for. (16/CP.21.) Thus, these two decisions did not modify REDD+ in any significant way (see also Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 30–31). As for the GCF, it has not yet decided on rules whether or how to fund joint mitigation and adaptation in the context of forests but its board has requested a document on options to implement joint mitigation and adaptation from the fund’s secretariat and will consider the issue in the future (GCF 2020, 24).

4.3.2. Producing avoided deforestation in developing countries

How did the critiques and alternative arrangements discussed above influence the way host (implementing) countries should conduct themselves when reducing deforestation? The Cancún Agreements (1/CP.16) specify the requirements for developing countries to participate in REDD+. Paragraph 71 of the decision requests developing countries to develop “a national strategy or action plan”, a reference level, a monitoring system for verifying emission reductions and a safeguard information system (SIS⁸) to report on the safeguards defined in the annex to the decision. In 2015 these elements were linked to results-based financing along with “the most recent summary of information” on the safeguards (9/CP.19).

Paragraph 72 of the Cancún Agreements requests developing countries to also address a range of issues when implementing REDD+:

Also requests developing country Parties, when developing and implementing their national strategies or action plans, to address, inter alia, the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and the safeguards identified in paragraph 2 of appendix I to this decision, ensuring the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia indigenous peoples and local communities; (1/CP.16, italics in original)

⁸ The negotiation decisions refer to the safeguard information systems in plural. Although the SBSTA discussed guidance on the systems, which might have resulted in a uniform system which each country would have to apply, the negotiations concluded that the systems should be tailored to national circumstances. Therefore there is also the singular term safeguard information system, and the abbreviation SIS can refer to either the plural systems of different countries, or the system of a certain country.

This paragraph seems to incorporate a lot of ideas into REDD+ rules but in practice countries' approaches to the national strategies have varied significantly (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 38; see also Salvini et al. 2014). Furthermore, the 2015 decision on results-based finance does not refer to this paragraph nor is there any guidance on how countries should address these issues or how the strategies should be assessed⁹. That is to say that the development and implementation of national strategies is not governed with the formal rules.

The Cancún Agreements decision also states that REDD+ developing countries should implement REDD+ "in phases". The phases correspond to the phases in the Norwegian proposal except that countries can choose their starting phase. (CP 1/CP.16; Lahn 2016, 73–74) Furthermore, the phases contain no eligibility criteria as Norway's proposal did. Instead, the seven safeguards were defined and the SIS linked to results-based payments. (9/CP.19; Lahn 2016, 85-88). Instead of eligibility criteria, the safeguards have a similar functioning as they were to secure the co-benefits and the effectiveness of the scheme.

In their SIS, developing countries should provide "information on how the safeguards ... are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation of the activities" (1/CP.16 para. 71). Despite this, the status of the safeguards is uncertain. The annex to the Cancún decision that lists the safeguards (1CP/16, Appendix I) states that they are to be "promoted and supported" while an earlier draft text (UNFCCC 2009b,2) used the word "shall" (ensure, promote or respect depending on the safeguard) before listing the safeguards (Jodoin 2016, 171; Hjort 2015, 149). Although the SIS paragraph uses the stronger wording "addressed and respected" it is worth noting, as Hjort (2015, 150) has done, that the SIS paragraph only requests that information is provided, not that certain standards are upheld with regard to the different safeguards."

⁹ Both paragraphs 71 and 72 of the decision use the word request when describing what developed countries should do. This would imply equal importance for the action plan or strategies and the issues listed in paragraph 72. However, a later decision on results-based finance (9/CP.19) maintains that, "to obtain and receive results-based finance ... developing country Parties should have all of the elements referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 71, in place" but does not refer to paragraph 72. The decision also states that a developing country "should provide the most recent summary of information on how all of the safeguards ... have been addressed and respected before they can receive results based payments" (ibid., para 4). Thus only the action plan or strategy, information on safeguards and the methodological components are a requirements for payments. The decisions do not stipulate any assessment of the actions in paragraph 72.

After the Cancún agreements there were discussions on the need for further guidance on the SIS in 2011, 2012 and 2014. A 2011 decision agreed that the SIS process should be country driven, .i.e. no international standards were set up. In 2014, although the majority of countries were in favour of more international guidance (as opposed to country driven approaches) and some in favour of setting or harmonizing standards used by different organizations (Menton et al. 2014), due to the consensus based decision making the country-driven approach remained in place (Palmujoki, 2016, 35). This meant that no definition on how to evaluate and sanction compliance have been elaborated in the UNFCCC decisions (Savaresi 2016, 131).

While the UNFCCC did not define standards for the safeguards, other international organizations and private actors have done so. Of the two big entities funding REDD+ readiness activities, UN-REDD has adopted standards but the World Bank's FCPF has not (ibid., 146-150). As for the GCF, when providing results-based payments it "requires demonstration" that the Cancún safeguards have been addressed and respected. The Fund has also adopted its own environmental and social safeguards and policies which are stricter than the UNFCCC safeguards. Furthermore, the use of the funds countries obtain from these payments must demonstrate compliance with the Fund's safeguards. (Recio 2019, 130–132.) Actors in voluntary carbon markets have also developed safeguard standards (Jagger et al. 2012, 307). To conclude, Jagger and colleagues' (ibid., 303-304) description of the UNFCCC safeguards as non-binding principles or norms guiding actors' expectations is thus perhaps quite accurate.

Despite the uncertain status the safeguards they may have power effects. The SIS is a tool for transparency (Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 43). In governmentality terms it can also be thought of as a technology of performance (Dean 2010, 197-198). It gives actors a chance to see how countries and other operators are acting when they engage in REDD+ activities and to evaluate these actors in light of the information they provide about the safeguards. There are also some indications that it was thought to function as a technology of agency (ibid., 196–197). NGOs and IGOs argued that SIS could provide feedback on REDD+ implementation. Another argument was that the SIS would "reassure potential REDD+ investors, thereby increasing opportunities to receive REDD+ finance." (Menton et al. 2014, 5). Here, countries are represented as actors that have to attract investments and the SIS can function as a technology of agency, helping the countries to align their actions

with investor demands. In this way the SIS can possibly govern the actions of developing countries.

Looking at the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ it seems that despite the prevalence of market ideas in REDD+ discourse, the international REDD+ framework does not in any way try to establish a market or a PES mechanism within developing countries to address deforestation. On the contrary, the decisions put far more emphasis on national sovereignty and flexibility. Indeed, in addition to the elements which make the measuring results in carbon possible (reference levels and monitoring systems), the safeguards are the only element in the decisions regulating how countries should conduct themselves when governing deforestation. This in mind, we may note Lahn's (2010, 11) observation that the Cancún Agreements decision on REDD+ contains "no less than 11 references to 'national circumstances' and national 'sovereignty' as principles that should allow for flexibility in its implementation". If we look at all the REDD+ decisions (compiled in UNFCCC 2016) the number goes up to 45.

This leads to me to question, whether the market rationality was as dominant as previous research has suggested. In the decisions, developing countries are not in any way encouraged to set up PES systems. Keeping in mind the productive nature of power we must note that the lack of international rules does not mean that the market discourse has no effects. Countries could still choose to implement REDD+ as a market or other kind of PES system and rely on entrepreneurialism of the subjects to reduce deforestation. Yet, in their analysis of REDD+ readiness activities Salvini et al. (2014) find that only 26% of countries intended to use PES systems. Benefit sharing (related to PES systems) scores the same 26%. Economic incentives were more common, as "financial incentives" were planned in 40% of the analysed countries. Still, stakeholder involvement and participatory forest management were even more popular. Both were planned in 46% making them the most popular interventions after the broader categories of "good governance" (86%) and "policies" (51%). (Ibid., 10.) Salvini et al. also analysed interventions which address specific drivers. Sustainable forest management (62%), fuel wood efficiency (47%), agroforestry (44%) and protected areas (41%) were the most common (ibid., 4). The wide set of policies and practices enacted by countries seems to suggest that the PES rationality is in no way dominant globally.

The emphasis on sovereignty and flexibility in the UNFCCC rules and the spectrum of policies enacted by developing countries puts Stephan and Hjort's arguments that REDD+ is likely to govern local communities through incentives and entrepreneurial conduct (see 4.2.2 above) seems to be questionable. Although countries are still governed with economic incentives, their sovereignty is emphasized and the government of people and corporations relies on a wider spectrum of practices. This warrants exploring articulations of other rationalities and technologies of government in the UNFCCC negotiations. This is the task I turn to in the next chapter as I analyse how the EU sought to render deforestation governable.

5. ANALYSIS OF THE EU'S POSITIONS

In this chapter, I analyse how the EU problematized deforestation, the solutions it presented and how it sought to link them to the REDD+ mechanism. Although the EU was supportive of a results-based payments, the analysis reveals a picture different from the PES or market rationality. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers the visibility and problematization of deforestation. In it I discuss how the EU described the benefits forests provide, the drivers of deforestation and what objects should be governed to address the issue. I show that the EU had a considerably more state-centred approach than PES schemes.

The second section concentrates on the international level. First, I analyse how the EU conceptualized climate change as a problem of global collective action. I show how it sought to use the technical issue of reference levels as an object through which responsibility for mitigation could be divided among countries. Second, I analyse the EU's problematization of market funding and the options it presented. The third part of this section is not strictly limited to interstate relations. It discusses the safeguard information systems which, for the EU, were not only a way to ensure that countries would conform to UNFCCC rules but also a way to ensure that REDD+ would attract funding from various sources. The last part of the section discusses the EU's stance on non-carbon benefits. While the EU recognized these various benefits, it also stated that attaining them was the responsibility of countries.

The last section concentrates on what the EU said about how countries should govern their subjects when they implement REDD+. First I discuss the issue of participation which reveals a cooperative emphasis. Second I will look at how the EU argued that redirecting investment could help combine emission reductions and development aspirations.

5.1. Governing forests: benefits, drivers and sustainability

This section has four subsections. The first part briefly discusses the benefits the EU thought forests would have for countries and the climate regime while the second part discusses the drivers of deforestation. The EU emphasized the complexity of the issue and lacking governance as a driver of deforestation. The third section explores the

rationale for including sustainable forest management in REDD+ instead of limiting the mechanism to deforestation and forest degradation. The EU's visibility included a global *pressure* to deforest which could risk the effectiveness of REDD+ if it concentrated only on compensating forest-users. Instead, in the EU's view, REDD+ should aim to increase sustainable production to counter this pressure. The last part links to this issue as it considers governing consumption. The EU argued that consuming countries differentiate sustainable from unsustainable production to make governing possible.

5.1.1. Forests: benefits for countries and the climate

After Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea's proposal in 2005, REDD+ was discussed for the first time in the SBSTA the next year. The EU engaged in the negotiations from the beginning. Throughout the negotiations, the EU stressed the role of forests in two ways. On the one hand, it highlighted the contribution of deforestation to global greenhouse gas emissions. It stressed that "[c]limate change requires an urgent global response" and noted that deforestation in developing countries "contributes to global greenhouse gas emissions by about 20 percent" (SBSTA 2006, 6). Including deforestation in climate mitigation was essential, not because it would be cheap but because "[w]e shall not, in the EU's view, succeed in limiting global warming to 2C without efforts in all sectors" (SBSTA 2008, 51). On the other hand, the EU emphasized the multiple benefits forests provide for people: "...reducing deforestation can result in significant benefits (water, air, soil, plants, animals, livelihoods, biodiversity etc.) to developing countries at national and local levels" (SBSTA 2006, 9). The deforestation communication estimated these benefits in economic terms stating that, "[u]nder business as usual the value of the forest-related goods and services lost by 2050 has been projected at 5% of global GDP".

In a similar vein the EU started several of its early submissions (SBSTA 2007a, 2007b, AWGLCA 2008a) by affirming the need to address emissions from deforestation and the role of forests in sustainable development. As the negotiations progressed the EU adopted the negotiation language of co-benefits, often mentioning poverty reduction or livelihoods and biodiversity as examples. It did not see them as resulting automatically. Rather, they were to be ensured or even maximized (SBSTA 2007b, 46; AWGLCA 2008c, 127). The 2008 Commission communication on deforestation even considered incentivizing them if they could be assessed (EC 2008a, 11). The EU also called for pilots projects and technical work on REDD+ could "enhance co-benefits e.g. sustainable land

use and protection of biological biodiversity” (SBSTA 2007b, 48-49). The main objective was still to “facilitate efficient channelling of carbon based payments” (ibid., 49). Climate change, then, was the primary global issue but other aspects of forests at the national and local level were to be taken into account.

5.1.2. National drivers: governance underlying economy

What drives deforestation according to the EU? How did it problematize the issue? Referring to the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, the first submission described deforestation as

...the result of a number of interlinked national and international factors, which are complex, operate over different spatial and temporal scales, vary in importance among nations and regions, and have a socio-economic context. It is evident that any approach to avoid deforestation must be based on an understanding of the underlying drivers. (SBSTA 2006, 7.)

This plurality and complexity of drivers was characteristic of the EU’s submissions. In 2008, the EU noted that “deforestation rates can be understood causally in terms of socioeconomic factors (commodity prices, tenure rights, forest policies, law enforcement)” (SBSTA 2008, 49). As commodity prices are just one of the drivers, this can be seen as contrary to the simple economic narrative of opportunity costs and missing economic incentives discussed in the previous chapter. Profitability and governance were both articulated as drivers also in the 2008 deforestation communication which had a short section on the drivers of deforestation:

Drivers of deforestation are diverse, complex and act in various combinations in different geographic locations. The most important direct cause of forest destruction is typically changes in land use. Profitable alternative uses of land with a high market value, such as obtaining commodities, provide incentives for deforestation. In many cases infrastructure development can also contribute to deforestation. *The most important underlying cause is ineffective governance, linked to poorly enforced land -use policies and uncertain land-tenure regimes. To be effective any global approach to deforestation will have to address these drivers directly.* (EC 2008a, 4, italics added)

An annex of the communication was also dedicated to the causes of deforestation. It had a paragraph on “harvesting of forest products” which linked economic drivers directly to governance:

Commercial or subsistence exploitation of forests does not compromise the long-term existence of forests provided it is sustainable and legal. However, *if*

there is no effective regulation, it is often more profitable in the short term to harvest trees without practising any form of forest management. In certain parts of the world, particularly Africa, forests are lost because fuel wood is harvested at unsustainable levels. (EC 2008b, 3, italics added.)

In the EU view, then, economic drivers were an effect of lacking governance. This emphasis on governance is not surprising as the EU has concentrated on it before REDD+. In 2003, the EU started a foreign policy instrument called Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) which and complemented it with the EU Timber Regulation in 2010. These are policies which seek to make sure that timber products imported to the EU are legally harvested and intend to do this by improving governance in third countries. The EU conducts voluntary partnership agreements with third countries to improve governance in them and sanctions the import of timber products with due diligence requirements in Timber Regulation. (see EC 2022a; 2022b.)

Still, the Commission communication recognized that governance was not the whole story. The annex on drivers had a paragraph on the “[l]ack of valuation of forest ecosystem services and market failures” which pointed out that “[f]orest owners rarely receive payment for conserving and providing forest services, so forests tend to be less attractive economically than other types of land use” (ibid., 3). The communication itself asserted that

...it should be explicitly recognised that one of the main drivers for deforestation is economic. Forests are destroyed because it is more profitable in the short run to use land for other purposes than to keep them standing. An effective policy has to reward the value of the services provided by forests. (EC 2008a, 6.)

The problematization of missing economic valuation was not entirely missing. However, the EU did not complement this problematization with arguments for PES systems.

Another way to investigate how the EU problematized deforestation is to look at the solutions it put forward. The EU’s first submission welcomed Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica’s suggestion to address deforestation at the national level as “an interesting basis for considering methodological issues” such as baselines, additionality and leakage (SBSTA 2006, 7). However, it was not the only reason why the EU favoured a national level arrangement. The first submission stated:

The EU believes that reducing deforestation can result in significant benefits (water, air, soil, plants, animals, livelihoods, biodiversity etc.) to developing countries at national and local levels. However, it is recognised that in many

cases, developing countries have neither the capacity nor the financial resources to establish national mechanisms to address the issue.

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Identification of incentives should be based on the contribution to long-term sustainable land and forest management, while reducing pressures towards unsustainable land use or land-use changes. Incentives should be defined in a way to help each participating Party overcoming obstacles to implementing measures for long-term sustainable forest management. (SBSTA 2006, 9.)

Because of the benefits forests provide, the EU implied that developing countries would be willing to address the issue voluntarily, the problem was their ability to do so. When the drivers of deforestation re-emerged as a topic in the negotiations after 2011, the EU again emphasized national capacity and governance:

Causes of deforestation and forest degradation operate at various levels, from the local level to domestic and global markets. However, deforestation and forest degradation are *to a large extent driven by national circumstances, including insufficient law enforcement and institutional capacities* (notably as regards governance and tenure). For this reason, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation should best be identified and prioritized at national level in a transparent and participatory manner. (SBSTA 2012, 15, italics added)

The EU also emphasized the complexity of the issue and argued that no single policy would be a panacea:

Appropriate strategies to reduce emissions from deforestation will largely depend on, social, economic and regulatory factors at both national and international levels. Therefore, a range of instruments has to be considered to enable these strategies and measures to be tailored to specific regions, countries and localities. (SBSTA 2006, 9.)

It also stated that REDD+ activities should address drivers “across sectors and focus on land and resource governance”, and called for “efficient design and implementation of national forest related policies” (AWGLCA 2012, 30). For the EU, this was not the simplest of tasks. The perceived complexity of the issue is reflected in the EU’s statement that, “designing REDD+ results-based actions” should rely on “[e]xperiences from sectoral policy changes in developing countries, the *synthesis* of evolving modalities and procedures of multilateral and bilateral REDD+ initiatives, *lessons learned* from voluntary carbon markets, and demonstration activities” (ibid., 30, italics added). Again, it is policies that are needed, and they need to be carefully designed to be effective. This is quite a different story compared with simply establishing PES markets.

These references to policies and governance are not especially specific. As the EU did not propose specific policies, one might think it considered PES schemes to be the solution after all. However, the EU argued that the policies should contribute to “long-term sustainable land management, and reduc[e] pressures leading to unsustainable land use or land-use changes” (SBSTA 2007a, 53). It also called for “long-term action” (SBSTA 2006, 7, AWGLCA 2008a, 7) and “permanent mitigation of emissions” (AWGLCA 2008b, 18) Are PES schemes long-term or permanent? PES schemes reward emission reductions within a certain accounting period. After that a forest could be cut down, or a new time frame established for the next accounting period. (Skutsch & Trines 2010, 4–5.) While the EU discussed temporary credits and banking of credits (other actors also proposed these, see Hjort 2015, 197; Lovera-Bilderbeek 2017, 57–58) as a way to deal with this permanence issue, it also stated that “transition from unsustainable to sustainable land use management reduces the risk of increases in emissions from deforestation” (SBSTA 2007a, 55). The payments that would be made to countries were not to merely incentivize the avoidance of deforestation during a certain period but rather sustainable resource management. This is the issue I will discuss next.

5.1.3. Pressure and sustainable production

Although the EU linked the economic drivers of deforestation to underlying governance issues, it also articulated the economic nature of the issue in another way. As some of the quotes above illustrate, the EU wrote about *pressure* towards deforestation or unsustainable land use. For the most part, this did not lead to considerations about opportunity costs¹⁰ or compensations. Rather, it led the EU to argue that REDD+ mechanism should include the “plus” elements: sustainable management of forests and enhancement of carbon stocks. In its early submissions the EU mentioned sustainable forest management (SFM) in lists of important measures and policies but in 2008 it discussed explicitly incentivizing it along with re/afforestation and enhancement of carbon stocks. (SBSTA 2008, 48; AWGLCA 2008b, 18.)

Den Besten et al. (2014, 43) have noted that the inclusion SFM and the enhancement of carbon stocks in REDD+ was promoted by countries with relatively stable levels of forest cover. This can be seen to be in the interest of these countries as it would allow them to

¹⁰ The EU only mentioned opportunity costs once in the submissions (SBSTA 2008, 49).

benefit from REDD+ payments instead of rewarding only countries with present or predicted high deforestation rates (ibid., 43). The EU could not benefit from the payments but it had another reason for promoting SFM. In 2007, it stated that in the context of the International Tropical Timber Agreement SFM “is seen as one prerequisite of achieving reduction of deforestation” (2007a, 58). The next year it argued that “additional action to promote and implement sustainable forest management may be a response to increased pressure that would otherwise lead to deforestation or forest degradation” and proposed defining reference levels for SFM too (SBSTA 2008, 48). The EU’s problematization was not just that there are people who will rather deforest than keep forests standing. The problem was that there exists enduring or even increasing pressure on forests from consumption due to, for instance, the growth of population and/or economic affluence (see EC 2008b, 3).

In the EU’s view we need to address the full range of national circumstances, because *success* in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation *is likely to increase pressure on countries where forest carbon stocks are relatively stable*. Incremental change achieved by additional action to promote and implement forest management in a sustainable manner, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks could be assessed relative to an agreed reference level. (AWGLCA 2008b, 18, italics added.)

Here the EU implicitly pointed out that results-based payments do not govern consumption and that this may lead to international leakage. The EU presented SFM as a win-win solution. The deforestation communication refers to a study which defines forest management in the context of emission reductions as “maintaining or increasing the carbon stocks of a forest, while producing an annual sustained yield timber, fibre or energy from it” (EC 2008a, 6). By managing forests sustainably forest production and carbon sequestration could be reconciled. The pressure itself, i.e. demand for forest products does not have to be governed if production is increased.

Another thing worth noting is that forestry is a highly profitable activity. In the previous chapter, I noted how governmentality studies have argued that REDD+ is likely to govern only forest dependent local communities whose activities are deemed cheap to compensate for according to the opportunity cost logic. Angelsen et al. (2017, 719) have pointed out that “a company would not need to be compensated for the loss of its full business-as-usual profits; it would only need to be compensated for the loss of profit related to switching to more environmentally benign practices”. This means that also more profitable activities, and not just the ones deemed cheap to compensate for, could

be governed by the opportunity cost logic¹¹. So although the EU concentrated on governance, compensating for changed behaviour was not entirely ruled out. However, as already discussed above (4.2.3 and 4.2.4) countries instead of companies can also be compensated. I will explore how SFM could be incentivized by other means below in 5.3.2.

Forestry was not the only sector where sustainable production could be boosted. In the deforestation communication, the Commission made a similar argument regarding agriculture.

There are linkages between demand for agricultural commodities and pressures on land use. There is also a tension between the need to increase food production and the need to halt deforestation. Agricultural production should be increased without further deforestation. This requires substantial investment to increase yields on existing farmland. Stepping up agricultural research to enhance agricultural productivity growth in developing countries in a sustainable manner should be pursued. (EC 2008a, 8.)

In the negotiations, the EU made no direct reference to increasing agricultural yields but wrote several times agriculture as a driver of deforestation, food security and land (not just forest) governance (SBSTA 2011, 55; 2012, 15; AWGLCA 2012, 30; ADP 2014, 12). With these in mind, the EU wanted to “to consider the implications of REDD+ in broader landscapes” (SBSTA 2011, 55). More broadly, the EU also called for REDD+ to be included in what it called low emission or low carbon development strategies for developing countries (AWGLCA 2009a, 11; 2012, 30; see also 2009b, 84-85; 2012, 30; EC 2009a, 5-6; 2010 10; ADP 2014, 13). The EU maintained that these strategies should lead to broader transformations, not merely changes from one land-use to another. For example, in 2012 it wrote that REDD+ should aim at:

Anticipating and encouraging further movement towards sustainable land use and resource consumption patterns as a basis for food, water and energy security, raw material supply and rural income and in the context of low emission development strategies (AWGLCA 2012, 30.)

While the dominant REDD+ discourse conceived of sustainable development as resulting from people participating in carbon markets, the EU argued that bigger transformations

¹¹ This seems to be the assumption behind the NGO critique that the EU wanted to introduce SFM into REDD+ to further its domestic corporate interests (den Besten et al. 2014, 44). This critique claimed that SFM was rarely environmentally sustainable and that corporate SFM did not benefit local people and incentivizing it would only add up to company profits.

were needed to secure these goals. Furthermore, with sustainable forestry and agriculture the EU rationality is not just about allowing the market to find the cheapest way to reduce emissions, nor just about channelling money into carbon sequestration and forest protection. For the EU, REDD+ had to govern other aspects beyond carbon – its rationality had a broader object. Developing countries would have to take an active role in finding sustainable development paths for themselves and this included governing the supply of forestry and agricultural products. States can implement policies and expertise provide better management practices to enhance nature and its productivity. In other words, it is more directly biopolitical¹². The art of governing deforestation is an art that needs to secure and improve the natural processes happening in forests and other lands through improvement of peoples' conduct. This is not an argument for constructing a new market but for transforming existing markets.

In the end, the EU did not elaborate on specific ways to ensure that REDD+ payments would incentivize increased yields and sustainable management. Of course, if one thinks that it is impossible for countries to reduce deforestation without intervening in these things, tailored incentives would not be needed. So the EU may have thought that payments being conditional on results would be enough. Furthermore, as I will discuss below in 5.2.1, the EU tried to use the definition of reference levels to ensure that REDD+ would lead to permanent mitigation of emissions.

5.1.4. Differentiating sustainable consumption

For the EU, sustainable production was something that could be governed in developing countries and could ease the pressure on forests. Still, for the EU, part of complexity of the deforestation issue was that drivers “operate at various levels” (SBSTA 2012, 15). This subsection discusses how the EU conceptualized international drivers and the sustainability of consumption. The deforestation communication asserted that “strengthening forest governance and institutions at local and national level is a pre-condition for any effective policy response” (EC 2008a, 6) while also remarking that “deforestation is *a global issue requiring a global solution*” (ibid., 7, italics in original).

¹² Foucault originally used the concept of biopolitics to refer to a governmentality that seeks to improve and optimize the health and welfare of the population (Dean 2010, 118–121). The concept has been since applied also to the optimization of non-human populations and nature (e.g. Fletcher et al 2019; Cavanagh 2014).

Annex 2 of the communication discussed the aforementioned pressure on forests but mostly attributed it to the developing world: “The growth in the world's population and increased meat and dairy consumption in developing countries are creating greater demand for agricultural commodities” (ibid., 3). The only driver that was explicitly linked to the EU itself was biofuels, for which the Commission had proposed sustainability criteria (ibid., 3; see also Stattman et al. 2018). Apart from this acknowledgment neither the communication nor the submissions in the first years of negotiations really elaborate on international drivers.

How about measures then? In the negotiations, the EU advocated support for the development of both “national and international policies of sustainable land management” and maintained that “[a]ppropriate strategies to reduce emissions from deforestation will largely depend on, social, economic and regulatory factors at both national and international levels” (SBSTA 2006, 9). The first three submissions (SBSTA 2006, 7; 2007a, 55–56; 2007b, 46) also support finding synergies between REDD+ and other international institutions such as the CBD or the International Tropical Timber Organization and the second submission also included an annex explaining how these institutions and the FLEGT framework treat deforestation. Still, in the early years of REDD+ negotiations the EU did not elaborate on mechanisms or policies to address international drivers or consumption.

When the issue of drivers resurfaced later in the negotiations, the EU made more concrete proposals that would govern deforestation outside the territories of developing countries. First, from 2011 onwards the EU also drew attention to the fact that the private sector investments cause deforestation and called for engaging the private sector so that it could address these drivers (AWGLCA 2011, 2; AWGLCA 2012, 31; SBSTA 2013, 27). I will discuss this in more detail below (5.3.2.). Second, the EU wanted to increase responsible and sustainable consumption. In 2012, after comments about national drivers the EU also wrote about FLEGT in more detail:

At the same time, ways to reduce the pressure on forests should be identified and addressed in consumer countries. The EU is committed to develop specific initiatives to address the impact of the EU consumption and production patterns on natural resources. In recent years it has already put policies in place to *address its responsibility as a consumer* towards illegal logging in third countries. [FLEGT] and the EU Timber Regulation provide a number of measures to *prevent illegal* timber products to access markets, to *improve the supply of legal* timber and to *promote the demand for responsible wood products*. The

development of policies to *control the impacts of the overall demand* for products which may drive deforestation and degradation must be seen as an integral and key component of international efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. (SBSTA 2012, 15, italics added.)

In a 2013 submission to the ADP the EU discussed land use in general. It suggested that making sure that better information is available for consumers and companies could bring change and also proposed transparency measures and investment guidance to realize this:

Given the significance of logging and agriculture as drivers of deforestation and degradation, more sustainable production and consumption, plus fair trade of these commodities could leverage significant improvements on the supply side if, on the demand side, consumers and companies received better information on the deforestation impacts of where and what they buy: Traceability, investment guidance, recognition of legality insurance systems, certification and labeling could also be explored, on the model of the FLEGT Action Plan. (ADP 2013, 10.)

The 2008 deforestation communication had discussed similar initiatives mentioning green public procurement (GPP), eco-labelling, forest certification schemes and “developing sustainability criteria for wood and other biomass used for the generation of renewable energy”¹³ as ways the EU could promote sustainable forestry (EC 2008a, 8). The EU has put such policies in place developing criteria for green public procurement (EC 2021a) and eco-labelling (EC 2021b). Certifications play a part in these criteria (EC 2008e, 6; EC 2019) as well as criteria for biofuels (Stattman et al., 2018, 5–6).

Two things about these proposals warrant attention. First, if we look closely at the logic of FLEGT as well as the other initiatives mentioned above, the objects of control are, as the 2012 submission put it, the *impacts* of the overall demand not the demand itself or its distribution. Based on the policies carried out by the EU, I would argue that this is not merely an incidental choice of words. FLEGT and the policies mentioned in the communication rest on making distinctions between good products and bad, i.e. irresponsibly, illegally or unsustainably produced products. With these policies responsible consumption can be increased (compared to unsustainable consumption or even in absolute terms) and the consumption of bad products decreased. Sustainability and responsibility are defined as consuming products produced in a certain way, not as a certain level of consumption by particular countries, sectors, organizations or groups of

¹³ In the REDD+ negotiations these policies were also promoted by Parties and NGOs (Hjort 2015, 182; 2019, 8).

people. Responsibility is about consuming the right products, not about the amount of consumption.

Second, the EU still refrained from elaborating on whether or how to integrate these or similar policies into the REDD+ mechanism. So, although the EU did articulate ways to govern consumption through differentiating production, it did not envision international incentives or other policies to enforce or encourage such conduct. The reason can of course be that incorporating FLEGT or other demand side policies into REDD+ was not considered a realistic goal in the consensus based UNFCCC negotiations (see Hjort 2020, 142).

5.2. Governing states: Incentives, funding and global agreement

Above, I described how the EU emphasized the benefits forests provide for developing countries themselves as well as global climate and how it construed national governance, sustainable management and transformation to low carbon development as the main ways in which deforestation could be governed. This section concentrates on the international level. I explore what relations REDD+, the UNFCCC regime and countries should have each other. In terms of analytics of government, the focus of this section is mainly on rationalities and technologies.

First, I will show how the EU's conceptualization of climate change as a global collective action problem influenced the EU's problematization of REDD+. The EU sought to use the definition of reference levels to determine countries' mitigation shares in the global effort to tackle climate change. The second subsection will discuss the rationale for not paying for non-carbon benefits. The EU considered them an issue that countries should address themselves. In other words, it subjectivized countries as responsible actors in two ways: accountable at the interstate level for their share of mitigation efforts, and accountable at the domestic level for implementing REDD+ in a way that would maximize benefits for their citizens.

As for funding, I will explain how the EU problematized funding sources. I will show that it considered the market in terms of available funding, not as a mechanism to deliver efficiency. Furthermore, the EU saw the market as a possibly threatening ambitious mitigation action and thus preferred, at least before 2020, public funding.

The analysis in the fourth subsection on safeguard information systems is not strictly limited to interstate or state-UNFCCC relations. While originally the SIS were introduced as a technology of transparency to ensure that countries comply with the set safeguards, my analysis shows that the SIS can function as a technology for different constellations. For the EU, the SIS function as a technology of performance but also as a technology of agency which allows countries to assess their activities. This shift is linked to a different rationality concerning funding.

5.2.1. Agreement and reference levels

I will begin by looking at the EU's approach to global mitigation of climate change in general, beyond the role that deforestation plays in it. The EU imagined climate change as "a global collective action problem" which can be tackled by developing a global, legally binding framework (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2019, 524; see also, inter alia, SBSTA 2006, 6; 2007, 52). Part of this field of visibility was lacking ambition in mitigation action. Countries would have to do more to reach the UNFCCC goal of preventing dangerous climate change. (EC 2009a, 2; EC 2010, 2) In short, all the countries had to be part of the agreement, and they had to do more in all the relevant sectors.

As already mentioned, a new agreement on climate change was to be negotiated in Copenhagen in 2009 and would have replaced the Kyoto Protocol after its ending in 2012. The EU sought to increase the ambition of global climate mitigation by including developing countries in the agreement and by having bigger emission reduction targets for developed countries in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities. The EU approached the issue by proposing differing collective targets for developed and developing countries. Developed countries would collectively have taken additional emission reduction targets amounting to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 and developing countries (particularly emerging economies) collectively would have limited the growth of their emissions by 15-30% from business-as-usual levels. The individual targets of each country would have to be determined so that the collective targets of these two country groups would be reached. Developing countries that would have ratified the agreement would have also been able to benefit from international funding for mitigation and adaptation. (EC 2009a, 5–6; Parker et al. 2012, 277; Schunz 2014, 169, 182.) After

the Copenhagen COP failed to agree on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol the EU kept arguing for a binding international treaty with quantifiable emission reduction commitments by all countries. In Warsaw in 2013 the EU finally had to yield as the COP favoured a bottom-up approach where countries would themselves submit their “intended, nationally determined contributions” without reference to a global effort (Oberthür & Groen 2017, 3.)

The EU also advocated a quantified global target on deforestation. As already mentioned above, action on deforestation was essential because the EU thought that limiting climate change to 2 degrees Celsius was not possible “without efforts in all sectors” (SBSTA 2008, 51; see also EC 2008c). The first submission reminded readers that the United Nations Forum on Forests had “agreed on a global objective to ‘reverse the loss of forest cover worldwide through sustainable forest management, including protection, restoration, afforestation and reforestation, and increase efforts to prevent forest degradation’” (SBSTA 2006, 7). From the next year on, the EU argued for a similar goal under the UNFCCC. The exact formulation of this goal varied. Some documents state that the EU wanted halt and reverse emissions “in the next two or three decades” (SBSTA 2007a, 53; 2007b, 46; AWGLCA 2008a, 6; see also SBSTA, 2008, 6 2012, 15; AWGLCA 2008b, 18; 2011, 1; 2012, 30; EC 2008a, 10). In other documents the EU omitted the reversal part and stated a more exact timeframe “to halt global forest cover loss by 2030 at the latest and to reduce gross tropical deforestation by at least 50% by 2020 compared to current levels” (AWGLCA 2008c, 126, see also 2009a, 12; SBSTA 2011, 55; 2014b, 22; EC 2008a, 3, 6, 7, 8).

How did the EU propose to achieve this target? The EU’s positions implicate that it thought that deforestation should be reduced by combining autonomous action by developing countries with international incentives. The first submission stated that “[i]ncentives should be defined in a way to help each participating Party overcoming obstacles to implementing measures for long-term sustainable forest management” (SBSTA 2006, 9). This hints at incentivizing certain actions rather than outcomes. This early view shifted already in the second submission in which the EU supported a results-based incentive mechanism. It promoted a preparatory period until 2012 to build capacity and test policies and incentives, and REDD+ incentives as a part of a global agreement after that (SBSTA 2007a, 53–54; AWGLCA 2008, 7).

The EU argued that as part of the global climate treaty developing countries should commit to emission reductions including in deforestation. Results-based payments would be available for reductions beyond that commitment. The commitment would be implicated in REDD+ reference levels:

One possibility would be for Parties to benefit from the scheme by performing better than the *agreed* emission reduction level. The EU believes that agreed levels should be *ambitious, yet realistically achievable*, taking into account national circumstances including existing policies and initiatives, historical data, current trends and developments in land use. The *agreed* level would be *negotiated* and revised periodically. (SBSTA 2007a, 54, italics added; see also SBSTA 2007b, 49; 2008a, 50; AWGLCA 2008a, 7; 4 2008b, 20.)

The EU argued that historical emissions and causal factors (SBSTA 2007a, 54; 2007b 48, 49; 2008, 49; 2011, 60) should be used to predict the likely rate of deforestation. However, as the quote above shows, the EU also argued that the reference levels themselves should be ambitious and subject to agreement and periodical political negotiations (instead of expert adjustment to predictions). Reference levels would be established by political will reflecting the countries' commitment as a part of a wider agreement. In the AWG-LCA (2008b, 20) the EU also directly referred to "common but differentiated responsibilities" as the basis for reference levels. The EU's position is similar to the Congo Basin countries' proposal mentioned in the previous chapter (see 4.2.1).

Reference levels were also the object through which the EU also sought to ensure that REDD+ actions would contribute to long term mitigation and sustainable management of forests. It wrote that "[t]he sum of emissions represented by the reference levels will need to decline over time, consistent with our shared vision¹⁴" (SBSTA 2008, 49). In other words, over time, fewer emissions would be counted as part of the reference levels which implies that countries would have to find ways to reduce deforestation permanently. They would have to address the aforementioned pressures to deforest.

In Copenhagen the COP agreed that reference levels shall be established based on historical data and adjusted for national circumstances (see 4.2.1 above). After this, the EU dropped the language on ambitious reference levels, but still maintained that "[f]orest reference levels do not establish a basis for the provision of positive incentives per se and Parties may wish to establish separate levels for this purpose" (SBSTA 2011, 57) and

¹⁴ Shared vision refers to the work in the AWG-LCA on collective efforts to mitigate climate change (1/CP.13, article 1.(a); Schunz 2014, 176).

later called for a decision on how “baselines differ from forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels” (AWGLCA 2012, 30). It also maintained that after experts assess the technical validity of a reference level, it should be adopted by the COP (AWGLCA 2012, 31; SBSTA 2012, 13). In other words political actors, not experts would have the final say whether a reference level is accepted. This attempt to bring political considerations into the reference levels did not succeed as the REDD+ decisions establish only that the reference levels are assessed by an expert group (see Voigt & Ferreira 2016, 44). Furthermore, an annex to decision 13/CP.19 takes a negative view on such considerations stating that the technical “assessment team shall refrain from making any judgment on domestic policies taken into account in the construction of forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels”.

As for the quantitative target, in 2009 it was incorporated into AWG-LCA secretariat draft negotiation texts but was eventually dropped during the Copenhagen negotiations (Lahn 2016, 65–66). According to Lahn, developing countries opposed the target because “because it introduced a collective obligation to reduce deforestation without explicitly linking this to the provision of finance” (ibid., 65). The goal was later included in the preamble of the REDD+ part of the Cancún agreements. The decision, however, linked the goal to “the provision of adequate and predictable support” and did not specify any target years (1/CP.16)¹⁵. As mentioned above (4.3.1) no policies have been put in place to ensure a certain level of funding. Nor have the decisions specified any other means to ensure the achievement of this aspiration. As such, the decision remains vague. The EU kept referring to the target as a general goal throughout REDD+ negotiations but did not discuss what should be done if progress on the goal is lacking.

In short, the EU argued that to successfully govern climate change all countries had to contribute and increase their efforts over time. It tried to insert this goal into the REDD+ rules by making incorporating developing countries’ commitments in the REDD+ reference levels. If a country reduced deforestation beyond its commitment, it could receive payments. Before going into the sources of the money for the payments, I will

¹⁵ The Cancún Agreements text reads: “Affirming that, in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support to developing country Parties, Parties should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in Article 2” (1/CP.16) The goal is reaffirmed in decisions 2/CP.17, 9/CP.19 and 13/CP.19

discuss whether the EU thought that payments should be awarded only for carbon or if other benefits should be rewarded as well.

5.2.2. Non Carbon Benefits

Above (5.1.1) I noted that early in the negotiations the EU contemplated whether incentives could be tailored to maximize the co-benefits. In 2014, when the issue of non-carbon benefits was discussed in the SBSTA, it had changed its view. Although it considered NCBs to be important, it opposed paying for them. This section explores the rationale behind this stance.

The EU recognized four kinds of NCBs: social (“including governance”), environmental, economic and cultural (SBSTA 2014a, 27). It also recognized that some NCBs might “catalyse” carbon sequestration and that some might even be essential for REDD+. All in all, the EU characterized them with a language similar to the safeguards and considered the two to be strongly interlinked:

NCBs play an important role in the long-term success of REDD+. In line with the guidance set out for REDD+ activities they promote its social acceptability and environmental integrity and they support and contribute to the provision of diverse ecosystem services such as the mitigation of GHG emissions and long-term carbon storage. Hence, taking them into account *can provide useful help when developing and implementing REDD+ national strategies and action plans*. This is in particular the case for NCBs which are the *result of the implementation of the safeguards*. (SBSTA 2014a, 27, italics added.)

Still the EU made a distinction:

Hence, the safeguards as well as NCBs both aim at and contribute to minimizing the risks and adverse impacts of REDD+ action, thereby contributing to the long-term effectiveness of REDD+ action and the sustainability of its results.

Nevertheless, although strongly interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the REDD+ *safeguards must not be confused with NCBs* following REDD+ action and/or activities. *Safeguards are an inherent, integral part* of REDD+ and therefore *a requirement* that must be fulfilled in order to obtain results-based payments. The *achievement of NCBs is an additional positive result* of REDD+ action above a point which is often not clearly defined. (Ibid., 28, italics added.)

Furthermore, the EU went on to state that “[t]he main incentive for countries to strive for NCBs are the NCBs themselves” (SBSTA 2014, 28).

These quotes show that, once again, it is countries that are acting, and they are assumed to do so in the best interest of their citizens by striving for the various NCBs. The EU did not rule out domestic incentives or PES schemes for NCBs, but *internationally* the EU saw no need “for dedicated payments or price premiums for NCBs under the UNFCCC” (ibid, 29). Still, the EU did “see merit in (encouraging) discussions on NCBs” in other in other international institutions, mentioning the CBD, the GCF and the FCPF as examples (ibid., 29). The last two entities are both engaged in helping countries in preparing for REDD+ and the CBD is a separate international regime. So, even though the EU understood NCBs as ranging from global to local their achievement was relegated either to an issue of domestic good governance (where the GCF and the FCPF can help) or to other international forums (CBD) while carbon remained the issue in need of international incentives under the UNFCCC.

The EU also reminded that REDD+ is to contribute to the primary object of the UNFCCC, climate mitigation, and cautioned that paying for NCBs might complicate and delay the implementation of REDD+ (ibid. 29). To summarize, the EU’s opposition to NCB payments was not because the EU would have considered NCBs less important but because of the country centred approach and the fact that the EU wished to conclude the negotiations on REDD+. In 2014, when the submissions on NCBs were presented, REDD+ had already been negotiated for nine years since the initial proposal by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica.

5.2.3. Funding incentives

In this section, I turn to the question of how to fund the payments which were incentivize countries who would reduce deforestation beyond their national commitments. The original Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea proposal suggested integration to the carbon market. The EU saw this as one, but not the only option:

The EU believes that any effective approach should provide substantial and sustainable incentives to stimulate long-term action to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries. The EU recognises that well designed market-based approaches can contribute to long term action. However, we believe that there is a need to further assess all financing options with respect to the scale and the sustainability of the financing they might provide, as well as their potential integration to the broader post-2012 climate change agreement.

The EU further notes that financing approaches need not be mutually exclusive. (SBSTA 2007b, 47; see also SBSTA 2007a, 54; AWGLCA 2008a, 7)

Whereas the Commission in other communications on climate change (EC 2009a 11–12; 2010, 11–12) had argued that carbon markets can provide cost-efficient climate mitigation, this justification for markets is missing in the deforestation communication as well as the REDD+ submissions. As the quote above shows, the basis on which to assess funding options was not their cost-efficiency but their “scale and sustainability”¹⁶.

A more detailed explanation of the EU’s position can be found in the 2008 Commission communication on deforestation. For the Commission, public funding was “the most realistic tool with which to provide incentives for combating deforestation over the period 2013 to 2020” (EC 2008a, 12). It proposed “establishing a Global Forest Carbon Mechanism” (GFCM), a public fund for both the results-based payments and capacity-building (ibid., 11). After 2020, the communication argued, “the EU should also be prepared to explore the possible contribution of well designed [sic] market approaches” (ibid., 12). This was, however, conditional on bigger emission reduction targets for developed countries to ensure that they “actually reduce their emissions instead of simply offsetting them with carbon credits”. (Ibid., 12; see also AWG-LCA 2011, 2.) As mentioned above, in the EU’s view action had to be taken in all sectors and an imbalanced offset market would endanger that.

This logic was also applied to the possibility of integrating the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to forest carbon markets. According to the communication, allowing REDD+ credits in the ETS “would result in serious imbalances between supply and demand in the scheme” and compromise its ability to achieve domestic emission reductions. (EC 2008a., 10.) Still, the communication also envisioned that “once other emission trading systems are established and interconnected¹⁷, generating increased demand for emission reductions, it may become feasible to use forestry credits to finance forest protection” (EC, 2008 10). This, too, was to be considered in the year 2020 earliest and only after “a thorough review of the experience of using deforestation credits for

¹⁶ The impact assessment prepared for the deforestation communication estimated “that between € 15 and 25 billion per annum would be needed to halve deforestation by 2020” (EC 2008a, 9).

¹⁷ The EU proposed setting up and linking domestic carbon markets into an OECD-wide carbon market which would by 2020 also be “extended to economically more advanced developing countries” (EC 2009a, 11)

government compliance” (ibid., 12, emphasis removed; see also AWGLCA 2011, 2). Government compliance means that member states, not companies regulated by the EU ETS, could buy the credits to fulfil their non-ETS emission reduction targets¹⁸. The Commission wanted to test this (EC 2008a, 12) but did not elaborate on what exactly would have been tested¹⁹.

The EU (EC 2008a, 10; AWGLCA 2008, 7; see also 2008b, 18) also argued that REDD+ could be funded with what is known as a market-linked approach (Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen 2009, 19). In this approach auctioning proceeds from cap-and-trade²⁰ carbon markets would be channelled to a public fund. In the EU this option was enacted by the directive amending the EU ETS which states that “[a]t least 50% of the revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances” should be used to climate mitigation and adaptation in and outside the EU including “measures to avoid deforestation and increase afforestation and reforestation in developing countries” (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2009). Furthermore, the Commission originally proposed that for deforestation Least Developed Countries should be prioritized (EC 2008f, 23) but did not make it to the final directive. The Commission also argued that an OECD-wide carbon market should be established (EC 2009a, 11; 2009b, 7). Had such a market been established, REDD+ could have been linked to the auctioning revenues of this market.

All these options, the market-linked approach, a public fund as well as the government compliance credits retain government authority to set priorities and conditions on what to fund and what not. A direct market approach, on the other hand, delegates decisions to market actors which supposedly only consider the cost-effectiveness of options.

¹⁸ Angelsen et al. (2012, 377) define a compliance market as a carbon market connected to the emission reduction targets of UNFCCC Parties. As the ETS sector was ruled out, I interpret this to mean trading between governments. This does not rule out that the deforestation emission reductions could be achieved by a market mechanism within a REDD+ implementing country.

¹⁹ Commission memo on the communication states that, “[t]o test the inclusion of deforestation credits for government compliance, a pilot phase should therefore be pursued in the framework of the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism.” (EC 2008d) This could mean that the GFCM would have been largely publicly but also allowed a limited amount of country offsets to be bought from REDD+ results.

²⁰ In cap-and-trade markets, such as the EU ETS, a total emission cap is determined for a sector or sectors and emission permits are distributed by auctioning or for free. Actors with permits can buy more permits if they emit beyond their permits, and sell their permits if they emit less.

The negotiations did not set up a separate forest carbon fund for REDD+, as proposed by the EU. Instead, the GCF was established in Copenhagen and the EU supported including REDD+ in the mandate of the fund (AWGLCA 2010, 5; AWGLCA 2011, 2). In the REDD+ submissions the EU did not discuss how much different Parties should provide funds to the GCF (or the GCFM before Copenhagen). It did discuss the issue of international public support in other documents concerning the climate regime. Before the Copenhagen COP, the EU suggested that common but differentiated responsibilities could be applied to international support with a “formula” combining countries’ “ability to pay”, i.e. GDP per capita, and their “responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions”. (EC 2009a, 9–10; 2009b, 3). It also argued that not only developed countries but also emerging economies should contribute to international support (EC 2009b 3; see also).²¹

To what extent this position shifted after Copenhagen is not entirely clear. Petri & Biedenkopf (2020, 46–47; see also EC 2015, 9) state that the EU argued that international support should be provided or mobilized by countries “in a position to do so”. Although more ambiguous, this is a continuation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. On the other hand, according to Oberthür & Groen in the COPs preparing the Paris Agreement, the EU opposed defining a fixed funding obligation:

On finance, the EU was determined to prevent quantified long-term legal obligations and strongly advocated widening the circle of contributing countries as well as shifting the focus to broader private investment streams beyond public contributions and to improve domestic enabling environments for climate investment. (Oberthür & Groen 2017, 3–4.)

This shift towards private investments and enabling environments for them can be seen in the EU’s REDD+ position as well. I will discuss this in the next subsection as well as in 5.3.2 below.

To summarize the EU’s position on funding, it problematized the use of market funding in terms of whether it would compromise actions in all sectors. It treated the market as a source of funding, not as a mechanism to find the cheapest emission reductions. Second, whereas a market approach insulates funding decisions from political intervention in the name of efficiency or impartiality (Dryzek 2013, 125–127; Felli 2015, 647–648), the EU

²¹ Yet, the EU member states were unable to agree on how much the EU would contribute to supporting developing countries (Groen et al. 2012, 180).

proposed and enacted methods of funding which retain decisions about what to fund within the realm of public authority.

5.2.4. Safeguard information systems

At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that the EU articulated the need to secure the various benefits that forests provide. In the previous chapter (4.2.6), I discussed how the negotiations addressed this by requiring that REDD+ implementing countries promote and support a set of safeguards and provide information on them in safeguard information systems (SIS). As the EU's stances on indigenous peoples and local communities' rights and securing biodiversity did not significantly deviate from the arguments presented for them in the negotiations (see 4.2.5 above) I will not discuss them further. Issues related to participation are discussed below (5.3.1.). This section concentrates on how the EU conceived of the SIS in relation to national activities and funding of REDD+.

Gathering information for the SIS requires resources which could hamper the ability of developing countries to participate in REDD+ (Jagger et al. 2012, 305). Thus, the EU argued that the safeguard information systems should strike a balance between the comparability and transparency of the information on the one hand, and flexibility and low reporting burden on the other hand. This was to be done by defining a core set of information that every REDD+ country should provide, but also for "national indicators, quantified where possible" (SBSTA 2011, 56; 2012, 11; 2014, 23-25). Low reporting burden was to ensure broad participation of countries in REDD+ (SBSTA 2014, 27). Flexibility was needed to allow the prioritization of "country-specific issues and use [of] existing national arrangements as a basis" (SBSTA 2011, 56). Again, we are faced with the complexity of the issue. There was no one-size-fits-all solution and so strict standards for the safeguards were considered difficult to set.

More interesting is the rationalization for comparability and transparency. The EU associated comparability and transparency with confidence and "the credibility and legitimacy of a REDD+ mechanism" (SBSTA 2011, 56). These, in turn, were linked to two things: dialogue and mobilization of resources. Safeguard information had to be transparent and comparable to facilitate dialogue among stakeholders:

Through the implementation of SIS and the information it provides, *a country assesses* whether the social and environmental impacts of its REDD+ actions are

in line with the safeguards as contained in [the Cancún Agreements]. The SIS also contributes to strengthening confidence and transparency, thus *facilitating the dialogue among local, national and international actors...* (SBSTA 2014, 23, italics added).

The country-centred approach I discussed above (5.1.) is present here as well: it is countries that need to assess their own activities. The emphasis on dialogue and confidence relates to the participative practices that I will discuss below and imply a cooperative stance rather than a market where REDD+ projects (and countries) compete.

The EU also envisioned the SIS as a tool for defining, what can be achieved with REDD+, as exemplified in the first point here:

National information systems need to satisfy two distinct purposes: (i) supporting national REDD+ strategies/action plans in defining expected outcomes and showing and helping to verify how they are being delivered, and (ii) satisfying the accountability needs of donors on the use of finance. (SBSTA 2011, 56.)

Here, the SIS were not only a tool for transparency, or in governmentality terminology, a technology of performance which allows outsiders to evaluate the country's performance according to the content of the safeguards. For the EU, the SIS also function as a technology of agency. A country can assess its own activities by looking at the information in the SIS and change course according to how it performs in light of this information.

The second point in the quote above is linked to the mobilization of resources. In 2014, the EU elaborated on this point:

“The EU seeks to *increase mobilisation of resources* to support the full implementation of results-based REDD+ actions ... *This can only be achieved by ensuring broad participation of Parties and the reinforcement of confidence and credibility through transparent communication on the efforts* from Parties to live up to the sound methodologies they have agreed upon, including on the efforts undertaken by Parties to address and respect the safeguards” (SBSTA 2014b, 22, italics added.)

Increased funding was needed but it could only be attained if REDD+ was credible.

The connection between funding and safeguards is of interest here. The SIS were discussed between 2011 and 2014. At this point of the negotiations, it had been agreed that the GCF would have a key role in funding REDD+ (9/CP.19), and as I discussed

above, the EU was in favour of postponing and possibly excluding market integration. The quotes above also assume a broad range of funders. This can be understood in relation to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord (2/CP.15) in which developed countries had committed to jointly mobilizing (i.e. not necessarily donating public funds) USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for climate mitigation and adaptation. In this spirit, the EU also wanted to scale up climate funding from “a wide variety of sources – public finance and private sector finance, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance” (SBSTA 2013, 26).

This kind of funding differs from the original idea of REDD+ with a link to the carbon market. In a compliance market, there should be no shortage of money as long as there are plenty of emissions that need to be offset. Money will come regardless of what its effects are. In this case, safeguards are needed to ensure that the money does what it is supposed to do: reduces emissions and produces co-benefits. In the EU’s new framing the money coming from various sources is not guaranteed but it can be attracted by making REDD+ credible through the safeguards²². Here, the safeguards would not be assessed (only) by a group of UNFCCC appointed experts²³ who determine whether certain standards agreed by the COP have been upheld and whether carbon credits can be sold to the market or payments be made from the fund. Rather, there are various actors who want to fund climate mitigation or sustainable production and will do so if they find REDD+ credible. They might also have different standards or knowledge about the importance of various factors or policies in the various places REDD+ takes place. Safeguards are no less significant, but what becomes important is the availability of transparent and comparable information on them, not determining what counts as compliance. The safeguard information systems still function as a tool of transparency and as a technology of performance but to a wider audience.

The EU also made a similar argument concerning non-carbon benefits stating that they

²² This could mean that the various funders fund REDD+ through the GFC or that they will set up their own REDD+ results-based payments.

²³ The GCF does this kind of assessment to determine whether results-based payments can be made (Recio 2019, 131). Similarly REDD+ reference levels are assessed by UNFCCC appointed experts (13/CP.19).

- are likely to attract increased REDD+ funding (public as well as private²⁴) through the improved sustainability of results and the provision of additional benefits;
- are likely to also attract other sources of funding (e.g. green investments, fair-trade or agricultural investments in forest-friendly supply chains) (SBSTA 2014a, 28-29.)

It went on to remark that NCBs could “receive visibility” through the SIS if the country deemed it appropriate (ibid., 29; SBSTA 2014b, 25).

The EU did not elaborate the motivations of these various funders it imagined. Nor did it specify exactly how this funding would relate to REDD+ to results-based-payments. Still, its framing gives a positive framing about the prospects of REDD+ and the availability of funding. This is not to say that the lack of compliance standards in the UNFCCC rules could not be understood in relation to other rationalities or concerns of various actors, such as the sovereignty of REDD+ implementing countries or maximizing the amount of cheap emission reduction credits for developed countries. Still, this analysis allows us to understand how one can see REDD+ as needing safeguards but functioning without compliance standards for them.

In any case, the EU’s framing assumes a certain kind of subjectivity from the funders: funders who are interested in activities that are sustainable and secure co-benefits. If REDD+ is eventually integrated into a carbon market it is questionable whether all the buyers of emission reductions prioritize projects or countries who do well in the light of safeguards. The same could be said about NGOs, development agencies and the GCF if they perceive a pressure to spend their money (see Angelsen 2017, 242-245). The emphasis the EU put on transparency and participation could, of course, empower actors to block safeguard breaching activities. So far this, too, is contentious as there have already been many allegations of rights abuses related to REDD+ (Sarmiento et al. 2017).

²⁴ The EU did not elaborate the motivations of the private REDD+ funding. Since the quote differentiates green investments from REDD+ funding and the EU maintained its opposition to carbon market integration it seems likely that it meant that private actors would fund the GCF (see also SBSTA 2013, 31), possibly for corporate social responsibility reasons.

5.3. Countries governing subjects: participation and investments

The analysis above has depicted the EU's state-centric vision of REDD+. The dominant rationality of REDD+ conceptualized the mechanism as a way to incentivize rational economic actors, be they individuals or communities. It is, then, worth asking, what is the relation between the state and individuals, communities and other actors in the EU's approach? How should countries conduct themselves when reforming their policies or land and forest management? I will discuss two issues: first participation and then investments and private sector involvement.

This section concentrates on subjectivities, rationality and the role of knowledge. The first part shows that participation was important to obtain knowledge about different contexts and interests of the subjects in them. The second part shows how the EU's governmentality considered people to be entrepreneurial but at the same time maintained that government needs to do more than just establish incentives.

5.3.1. Participation

The EU started talking about participation in its second submission (SBSTA 2007a, 57) where it noted the participative practices were already part of the National Action Programmes of another UN institution, the Convention Combating Desertification. From 2008 onwards the EU stated various times that stakeholder involvement was essential "for any approach to be effective" (AWGLCA 2008, 7). In 2009, when submissions were asked for "[v]iews on issues relating to indigenous people and local communities for the development and application of methodologies" (SBSTA 2009, 3), the EU discussed participation in more detail.

The EU referred to the World Bank's safeguard policies as an example "to ensure that the REDD process respects the *dignity, the human rights, the economy and the culture* of indigenous peoples" as well as made reference to various international agreements and processes pertaining to the rights of people including the UNDRIP (SBSTA 2009, 3, italics added). This indicates that for the EU, engagement was crucial and something that had to be secured by policies.

The 2009 submission also gave more specific examples about the value of participation:

Based on experiences with forest (carbon) monitoring projects, initiated by EU Member States, involving local communities and indigenous peoples in developing countries, the EU thinks that:

- [1] Locally measured data can help countries improve their data quality, reduce uncertainty, fill critical gaps, such as in the case of degradation across all carbon pools, and move up a tier in reporting;
 - [2] Local monitoring is helpful to identify the causes and drivers of deforestation and forest degradation;
 - [3] Local communities should be involved in national systems to monitor the status of forest carbon stocks consistent with internationally agreed guidance, and could reduce the costs of monitoring;
 - [4] Locally measured data should supplement remotely sensed data to provide robust estimates of deforestation and forest degradation
 - [5] Information, awareness raising and capacity building and transparency are the key elements to promote effective participation of local communities into REDD action and monitoring;
 - [6] Assessment by stakeholder consultation of the effects of REDD policies on local communities and indigenous peoples is a useful tool for assessing the effectiveness of actions;
 - [7] Technologies such as Internet, global positioning system (GPS) devices and mapping software can facilitate the participation of local communities and indigenous peoples in the application of methodologies, in particular mapping
- (SBSTA 2009, 4.)

The EU's arguments for participation were in many ways similar to the ones noted by Hjort (2015, 147–148, 171–173; see 4.2.6 above). In addition to making conservation effective, participation can make forest measuring and monitoring cheaper and better (points 1–4 in the list). Information and awareness raising (point 5) were also mentioned. This could be interpreted as support for the idea of encouraging market participation to avoid monopolistic tendencies in a REDD+ market (Hjort 2015, 169, see 4.2.6 above) but the EU linked them to different issues: transparency and monitoring. Furthermore, points 2, 6, and 7 in the list imply that participation is important because local people have information that is useful for designing REDD+. Local people can help identify what causes deforestation and whether the actions addressing it are effective. The reference to mapping points to this too, as mapping is a tool for discovering and inscribing the various functions or values forests have for people (see, e.g. Boer 2018, 9). A certain area might be used for hunting, another for firewood or function as a watershed. A third might not be used at all and be of low biodiversity and carbon content, and thus be considered a potential candidate for deforesting.

The EU made a similar argument concerning safeguard information systems: “involving local communities in the collection and processing of [safeguard] information can enhance cost-effectiveness and ownership” (SBSTA 2014b, 26). The EU also considered the “independent monitoring including broad stakeholder consultation” of the FLEGT program to be an example on how to provide reliable information. (SBSTA 2011, 56; 2014b, 26.) However, stakeholders were not only to provide information. The EU argued that they should be included in the design and implementation of the country’s REDD+ strategy or action plan (SBSTA 2008, 51; 2011, 56; 2012, 12; 2014b, 24, 26) as well as the design of safeguard information systems (SBSTA 2014b, 26).

In addition to representing stakeholders as subjects who possess information, the EU represented stakeholders as having interests which had to be taken into account:

REDD+ actions and activities will only be successful if protecting forests is in the *interest* of local and national stakeholders. The full and effective participation of all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and local communities is therefore required to ensure *a fair and efficient implementation* of REDD+ actions and activities. (SBSTA 2012, 16, italics added.)

In the ADP the EU also gave an example from its own member state²⁵:

Similarly, the Austrian forest policy, based on the "Forest act" provides a strong and stable legal basis, with *clearly defined ecological, economic and social functions*, based on the principle of sustainability, and this *has enabled broad discussions process to balance the various interests of all stakeholders* on forests and has supported new *policies and measures* to maintain or increase forest carbon stocks with sustained mitigation benefits. (ADP 2014, 12, italics added.)

The dominant REDD+ rationality conceived of the interests of subjects as purely economic and sought to establish markets where subjects can realize their interests. As for the EU, it recognized that there are various kinds of local and national interests in relation to forests and argued that the government can discover them through participation and should balance them to ensure that the outcome is fair. One argument for markets as solutions to environmental problems is that they secure economic life from government intervention that could always be used to unfairly serve particular interests and result in suboptimal use of resources (Dryzek 2013, 125-127; Felli 2015, 647–648). Here, on the

²⁵ This quote is from a submission titled “Enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition” from a section discussing the need for coordination between different agencies. Although the quote takes the example of an EU country, it is preceded by another example about a REDD+ project. The EU also notes that Austria’s approach has been taken up by Georgia. In this context I interpret it to be meant as an example for developing countries too.

other hand, the various interests are to be engaged and mediated by government to achieve fairness. Fair forest policies must take into account and accommodate the various interests instead of trying to subject them all to a market logic. So, for the EU, the complexity of the issue did not lead to arguments about letting the market decide where to deforest and where not. Nor was fairness something that could be secured by letting actors pursue their interests in the market.

So, the EU subjectivized stakeholders as active contributors in the design of policies and land-use planning, providing information and representing their interests. Here, the participative processes emerge as a location where power can be wielded as well as resistance exercised. Thus, much depends, not only on the ability of the stakeholders to participate and the availability of information, but also crucially on how open-ended this designing process is. Participative processes can be structured around finding the best way to achieve predetermined goals, such as increasing sustainable forest management or yields of profitable agricultural crops. We should note, then, that the EU's argument was not similar to the argument made by indigenous peoples' organizations (see 4.2.5 above). While the EU often wrote about the interests of local communities and indigenous peoples, it did not argue for simply recognizing indigenous rights and devolving power to the local level. Government had to find policies which take account local and national stakeholders and facilitate dialogue with international actors as well (SBSTA 2012, 16; 2014, 23).

5.3.2. Tenure and investments

The EU's emphasis on governance, country level action and cooperative engagement did not mean that it did not see subjects as rational beings seeking to realize their interests at the markets. Although the EU did not concentrate on PES markets, it did share the view that tenure rights were crucial for REDD+. Lack of clear tenure rights were among the governance drivers the EU mentioned. In 2012, it elaborated why they were crucial for the effectiveness of REDD+:

For example, securing use and tenure provide more certainty for long term investments, it prevents land grabbing and enables a fair allocation of benefits and liabilities. It is in itself a key motivation for many stakeholders to engage into REDD+ activities. (SBSTA 2012, 16.)

As investments and tenure were also considered necessary for REDD+ markets (Hjort 2015, 151) one might ask: was that what the EU was trying to establish a PES system after all? I would argue not. Other references to tenure and land rights link them to a different ensemble. An Annex to the 2008 deforestation communication stated that

Conflicting and unclear land-use policies, land-tenure rights and property and usufruct rights give rise to unsustainable or illegal logging, thereby contributing to deforestation. In addition, economic benefits from forest conversion are often unevenly shared, with policies and land-use strategies often reducing access to the rural communities that depend on forests. (EC 2008b, 3.)

Unclear policies and property rights are a problem, not because they would hinder the functioning of a carbon market, but because they “give rise” to unsustainable or illegal logging. Conversely, if tenure rights were clear, those who use forests would have to use them sustainably. Clear tenure makes the rights holders sustainable. As for the reference to rural communities’ access to land, another passage from a 2014 ADP submission can illuminate us:

EU collaboration with partner countries also confirm the value of integrated approaches, as engaging all public authorities: for instance the Netherlands support to a REDD+ programme in Colombia mobilize all relevant authorities on aiming for better and more rational land use, by improving access to land ownership in particular for the small and landless farmers and reinforcing capacities for animal husbandry so that the pressure on natural forest areas and parks diminishes. (ADP 2014, 12.)

Rational land-use is not about privatizing land so that the market can function and find the best use for each plot of land. The pressure to deforest can be countered, not by compensating opportunity costs where ever they are low, but by targeting certain actors with certain policies to improve their conditions and increase their productivity. By owning land and increasing their capacity, smallholders and landless people can become productive and sustainable and keep off other areas which can then be designated as protected areas.

Productivity and sustainability, in turn, needed investments. The 2008 deforestation communication states:

There are linkages between demand for agricultural commodities and pressures on land use. There is also a tension between the need to increase food production and the need to halt deforestation. Agricultural production should be increased without further deforestation. This requires substantial investment to increase yields on existing farmland. Stepping up agricultural research to enhance agricultural productivity growth in developing countries in a sustainable manner should be pursued. (EC 2008a, 8.)

And as stated above, tenure provides certainty for investments. Tenure, then, is a way to achieve sustainable and more productive agricultural (and forestry) production.

People seeking to fulfil their economic interests are as crucial in this rationality as they are in a PES rationality. Free economic activity is a means as much it is an end (cf. Foucault 2008 63–65). Yet, for the EU, government cannot be content with merely providing positive incentives for environmental services. Rather, expertise needs to be used to direct and aid certain target populations to adopt more productive practices. Additionally, government must at least in some cases ensure people can act entrepreneurially by making sure certain populations have access to land while at the same time limit their access to other, protected areas. Government has to plan land-use to ensure people's entrepreneurial character can work for the best outcomes.

The above passages do not define whether the necessary investments would come from market actors, state or local government or perhaps international organizations. If countries implement REDD+ according to the governance approach envisioned in the EU's documents, they can invest in increased sustainable production and cover the costs from REDD+ results-based payments. However, especially from 2011 onwards, the EU called for the inclusion of the private sector in REDD+. In 2011 the EU underlined "the need to mobilise private sector investment increasingly over time, and the need to promote investments in sustainable land use that address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (AWGLCA 2011, 2, emphasis removed; see also AWGLCA 2012, 31). The funding for increased and sustainable production could thus come from market actors as well as public sources.

Although the EU considered private sector investments to be important, they were not all good. In 2013, when discussing REDD+ funding, the EU made the following statement:

Private sector investments also play a critical role both in *causing and addressing drivers* of deforestation and forest degradation. A recent review from the European Tropical Forest Research Network [ETFRN] compiles practical experiences of the private sector engaging innovatively in sustainable forestry. UNFCCC decisions and national REDD+ strategies or action plans should *facilitate increased involvement* of the private sector in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. (SBSTA 2013, 27, italics added.)

For the EU, investments were both a cause and a possible remedy for deforestation which is why the private sector should be involved. The quote does not specify what is expected of the private sector or what it could gain from this involvement. Taking a look at the preface and synthesis chapter of the ETRFN review mentioned in the above passage can give us some clues. The review, titled *Good Business: Making Private Investments Work for Tropical Forest*, points out that private finance makes up a significant part of the investments going into forestry but laments a mismatch between the interests of the private sector and those of local and public actors:

Private-sector interests are often *misaligned with local and global public interests*, and social and environmental concerns are sometimes far less important to investors than their primary interest in profitability. A crucial challenge for policymakers will be to *somehow reorient, increase and incentivize private finance* to make it flow in adequate amounts *towards sustainable, environmentally sound, and competitive forest management practices* that can support responsible and profitable forest entrepreneurship. (ETFRN 2012, V, italics added.)

How does one reorient finance? For national governments, the review proposes “providing the right incentives to attract the required levels of private investment” (ibid., XVII), which is considered “particularly urgent since the private sector will not invest in forestry without a clear signal of support from the public sector”. The task is to make sustainable forestry an attractive investment. The review defined incentives broadly, including “shared revenue, non-monetary benefits (such as technical assistance), or covering of costs of inputs” (ibid., XV) as well as reducing bureaucratic requirements, removing disincentives and tackling illegal logging to make sure that sustainable forestry can compete (ibid., XVIII-XIX).

Wolf (2013) has noted the rise of this kind of investment discourse in climate politics. He contrasts it with an earlier market offset discourse, evident in the CDM, which saw the construction of a market to be enough. The earlier discourse posited that when an international carbon market is in place, clean technology projects in developing countries can attract investments leading to cost-effective emission reductions. The new investment discourse, on the other hand, proposes an increased role for the state or international institutions. Establishing a market is not enough. Public entities should enable investment into sustainable economic activities by lowering investment risks. Wolf points out that this is not a return to planning or top-down regulation but rather the state is envisioned as an enabler and facilitator. He also observes that big financial actors are the ones that make the final decisions about what activities or projects are realized while the role of

governments is to organize climate protection around these actors' expectations. (Ibid., 50-52.) This depicts well the proposals in the ETFRN review.

The ETFRN review also recommends reforming non-state actors' conduct in relation to investment expectations and market performance. It argues that private forestry business should form alliances and cooperatives to facilitate "efficient interactions among state, industry and private companies". This is considered particularly important for "smallholders who are isolated from each other and from markets, policy influence and financial sources" (ibid., XVII). Small enterprises are also described as lacking "knowledge of markets, understanding how to access them, and negotiation skills" (ibid., XVIII). Development agencies and NGOs could remedy this and act as business matchmakers "to increase access to private investments and build entrepreneurship" as well as develop capacities and share knowledge about forest valuation. (Ibid., XVII–XIX.) Companies should produce more transparent information to help themselves and investors "produce sound business planning that promotes investment" (ibid., XVIII). As in Wolf's example, investor expectations are the central node around which governance is arranged. Still, even the investors' conduct is to be improved: public and private financing institutions should become "more familiar with the business of sustainable forestry", learn "to assess and manage forest-related risk factors" and develop better safeguards (ibid., XVII).

While the recommendations for governments aim to establish a framework where sustainable forest management a viable business option, these other measures aim to help and activate private actors so that they could benefit from markets and investment and avoid risks. They can also be considered disciplinary in that they seek to inculcate a proper way of conducting oneself in relation to the markets: being entrepreneurial, seeking investments, assess and manage investment opportunities. More generally, the objective is to transform practices within a sector, not to determine a limit for emissions and let the market work it out. A PES market could also drive investments into sustainable production but here the government incentives are various and not determined only on the basis of results. Additionally, the transformation requires bringing together various actors and making sure they are equipped with suitable knowledge to profit from the market. To reap the full benefits of forests and lands, one should also spread good business practices, not just leave it to the *homines oeconomici*. People may be rational

utility maximizers but they also lack the necessary knowledge and contacts resulting in poor uptake of sustainable practices.

Although, as I already quoted above, the EU stated that “UNFCCC decisions and national REDD+ strategies or action plans should facilitate increased involvement of the private sector” (SBSTA 2013, 27) it did not propose specific rules or policies to ensure this. It might be that the EU considered setting fixed rules for private sector engagement at the UNFCCC too inflexible. On the other hand, the EU may have considered that the effectiveness of the examples provided in the ETRN review and elsewhere would be enough to convince countries to implement suitable policies and engage the private sector as part of their REDD+ strategies. Furthermore, the Global Environment Facility (GEF, the other financial institution of the UNFCCC alongside the GCF), had a program which included “Sustainable Forest Management/REDD-plus Investment Program” heavily concentrating on SFM (GEF 2010, iii, 48–53). The GEF also had established an Earth Fund with the aim to leverage private sector funds to, inter alia, sustainable forest management (ibid., 58, 79-81)²⁶. In other words, private sector involvement was already being supported and it was a matter of getting countries and people to benefit from this support.

5.4. The EU’s governmentality: Securing forests, development and interests

This chapter has analysed the EU’s rationality for reducing deforestation. The results are represented schematically in Table 2. The EU presented a field of visibility where forests provide various benefits at various levels. These included not just the benefits from forest products but also their ecosystem services (soil quality, watersheds etc.) and cultural values. For climate action, forests were crucial. The EU did not treat deforestation as a “low hanging fruit” (Hein et al. 2018, 9) that would enable quick, simple and cheap emission reductions (Stephan 2014, 81, 86) but as an indispensable part of global efforts to tackle climate change.

²⁶ The EU cautioned against the creation of new funding structures as it could delay coordination of funding and create overlapping structures. Instead, it noted that the GCF and GEF were already providing funds for REDD+. (SBSTA 2013, 30–31.)

Table 2. The EU's REDD+ governmentality

	Global/International	REDD+ implementing country
Visibility	<p>Insufficient mitigation activities. Action needed in all sectors and by all countries.</p> <p>Forest benefits and products, global pressure on forests</p> <p>Sustainable and unsustainable production (and consumption from these sources)</p>	<p>Forests providing various benefits</p> <p>Complexity of drivers of deforestation. Governance as an underlying driver.</p> <p>Sustainable and unsustainable production (and consumption from these sources)</p>
Rationality	<p>Climate change as a global collective action problem: How to raise countries' mitigation ambition according to common but differentiated responsibilities? - global agreement</p> <p>Sustainability of REDD+ funding: How to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding? - market funding only if does not endanger transformation in other sectors - make REDD+ credible to attract funding</p> <p>Deforestation as a problem of (un)sustainable practices: How to increase sustainable production and consumption?</p>	<p>How to ensure development while mitigating climate change? - figure out low-carbon development strategies which maximize various benefits in a fair manner - need for information about local contexts, forest-uses, interests - evaluate what works</p> <p>Overcoming obstacles to good forest governance</p> <p>How to ensure funding? - make REDD+ credible to draw in finance from various sources</p>
Technologies	<p>Global agreement reflected in REDD+ reference levels. Incentivizing additional developing country action with results-based payments from the GCF (possible market integration)</p> <p>Consumer countries: developing criteria for sustainability, e.g. certifications, GPP, FLEGT (no integration to REDD+ proposed)</p> <p>Transparent safeguard information to assure donors and investors</p>	<p>Improved governance: policy reforms, improved enforcement, land-use planning, mapping, sustainable forest management</p> <p>Stakeholder participation so that government can - acquire information about local and national contexts and interests - evaluate effectiveness of activities</p> <p>Transparent safeguard information to - attract funding - enable a country to evaluate its actions</p>
Subjectivities	<p>Countries with a responsibility to mitigate climate change as well as produce and consume sustainably, common but differentiated responsibilities</p> <p>Developing countries willing to improve their citizens conditions, but insufficient capacity to manage forests</p> <p>Donors with accountability needs, various funders</p>	<p>Stakeholders - with information about local contexts - with interests which can be balanced by government - who will understand climate change and the benefits of REDD+ if involved</p> <p>Potentially green investors who need an enabling environment and right knowledge and contacts</p>

While noting the importance of economic drivers of deforestation, the EU emphasized lacking governance as the most important driver. Thus, reducing deforestation was primarily a question of getting countries, not so much forest owners, to do the right things. They would have to put in place policies that would ensure that forests would be managed sustainably. The EU's field of visibility also included sustained pressure on forests from consumption. Because of this, it rationalized the issue, not in terms of compensating forest-owners for lost profits, but in terms of reconciling reduced deforestation and increasing demand for forest and agricultural products. Because of this, the EU argued that to reduce deforestation, one has to also increase agricultural production and manage forests sustainably for production. We may consider this a biopolitical objective: increasing the productive processes in the living organisms.

Because of the forest benefits and the understanding that all countries must act to mitigate climate change, the EU argued that developing countries should reduce deforestation, not only with REDD+ payments, but also as a part of their responsibility in climate mitigation. For the EU, REDD+ was not just about compensating lost profits, it had to lead to larger transformations of practices in forestry and the land-use sector in general. The object of governance was not just the carbon content of forests although that was what countries would be paid for. Countries were to use various policies that would enable transformation into low-carbon development.

To do this, countries had to know the complex contexts and interests of actors in different forest landscapes. This meant that countries had to engage local, national and international stakeholders in participative processes. Through participation countries could find the best and fairest ways to implement REDD+. This included taking into account non-carbon benefits, which the EU considered to be a domestic issue, for which the UNFCCC should not be paying for. In addition to subjectivizing people as cooperative participators, the EU also considered stakeholders to have economic interests. These would not lead to deforestation if the right conditions were present: that is, if tenure rights were clear and stakeholders could obtain investments into sustainable production. Thus, countries would have to facilitate and make the environment suitable for green investments.

We can see that the EU's rationality emphasizes the role and responsibility of countries. For the EU, REDD+ was not a simple case of applying a PES scheme nationally. Their

responsibilities were more complicated. The countries had to identify the drivers of deforestation in their country, find the best policies and take responsibility for climate change internationally and forest benefits domestically.

The EU tried to insert this international responsibility into the definition of REDD+ reference levels. It argued for reference levels which would represent, not only projected future deforestation, but also countries' national commitments reflecting the common but differentiated responsibilities of countries. Successful emission reductions beyond these national commitments would be rewarded with payments. As efforts to reduce deforestation progress, reference levels would have to become more ambitious, meaning that developing countries would gradually take more responsibility without incentives. This, for the EU, would also ensure that REDD+ action would lead to permanent mitigation instead of temporary compensations. For consumer countries, the international responsibility was limited to enacting policies that would encourage or ensure consumption from sustainable sources.

The EU also problematized financing REDD+ in terms of a larger transformation into low-carbon societies. The EU considered an international carbon market a possible funding source but only if it did not endanger emission reductions in developed countries. This would require significantly raised global mitigation ambition and careful design of the market mechanism. Before that, the EU supported the GCF as a funding mechanism for REDD+ as well as directing auction revenues from cap and trade carbon markets to funding REDD+.

The EU maintained that the safeguards were important for the effectiveness of REDD+. However, it also claimed that effectiveness led to credibility which, in turn, would ensure that funding would flow to REDD+. Thus, the EU conceptualized safeguard information systems as a tool to provide transparent information about the effectiveness of REDD+ to potential funders. Furthermore, the EU also conceptualized the SIS as a way for developing countries to assess and improve their own conduct in the implementation of REDD+. The SIS were approached like a technology of agency and performance: they enable a country to see how well they are doing (also in comparison to other countries) and device ways to act on their own actions.

I would propose summarizing all this by applying the concept of security, the way it has been used in governmentality studies. Foucault famously used the term security in a manner that differed from the traditional understanding in international relations (Dean 2010, 29). His “apparatuses of security” “would include all the practices and institutions that ensure the optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital and social processes that are found to exist within [the] population and would thus also include health, welfare and education systems” (ibid., 29). The population, its health and welfare, the processes of the society and economy were things to be secured from threat within these fields themselves (ibid., 29, Gordon 1991, 19–21). This conceptualisation of security has also been used in governmentality research on climate governance. For example, Angela Oels conceptualizes the creation and work of the IPCC and the UNFCCC as attempts to secure climate stability whereas the flexibility mechanisms (particularly the CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol render “economic growth as the entity to be secured from excessive climate protection costs” (Oels 2005, 201).

We can apply this conceptualization of security to REDD+ as well. We can ask, what was it that the EU tried to secure when it argued for certain kinds of arrangements for REDD+? I would argue that we can find four objects. As REDD+ is a climate policy and a forest policy, they are obviously the first two objects to be secured. Government had to intervene so that the development of countries or people pursuing their interests at the markets would not threaten the forests or the climate. On the other hand, development would be at risk from warming climate and the lost forest benefits resulting from unsustainable forest-use. Furthermore, REDD+ policies had to be designed in a way that would not threaten development. This meant that sustainable forestry and agriculture would have to be increased as a part of low-carbon development strategies. Lastly, governments would have to find ways to make sure that REDD+ would not threaten the interests of people. This was thought to be possible by engaging various stakeholders in participative processes. Furthermore, government had to balance conflicting interests and uses of forests and land to ensure a fair outcome. The EU’s governmentality could be conceptualized as a triangle of forests and the climate, development and stakeholders interests. Countries had to know and navigate the interplay between these three elements and secure the proper functioning of each.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter discusses wider conclusions based on the last two chapters and proposes directions for future research.

In Chapter 4 I went through how REDD+ has been treated in previous research applying the governmentality theory and similar approaches. Those studies have highlighted the economic rationality of using incentives to compensate forest owners or users for their lost opportunity costs. They have also highlighted how REDD+ may target those who engage in subsistence agriculture or other activities deemed to be of low economic value as they would be cheap to compensate for. I also discussed other alternatives presented in the negotiations as well as how REDD+ was institutionalized in the UNFCCC decisions and took a glance at the policies countries have implemented in their REDD+ readiness activities. I also argued that previous governmentality studies may have overestimated the dominance of the original REDD+ rationality. I based this claim on the emphasis the REDD+ decisions put on countries' sovereignty and national circumstances and on the spectrum of policies countries presented at the negotiations and have since implemented in their REDD+ readiness activities.

The analysis in Chapter 5 showed that the EU's rationality for reducing deforestation was among those that differed from the original vision of a PES scheme. The EU represented deforestation as a complex issue that would need various policies to secure not only forest carbon, but also development and the interests of stakeholders. The EU wanted to incentivize countries to implement policy reforms as well as transform land and forest management practices into sustainable ones. The goal was not just to channel money into carbon sequestration but to develop low-carbon development strategies by engaging the various stakeholders and encouraging investments into sustainable production.

The empirical results and argument developed in this thesis, make contributions to the application of governmentality theory to REDD+ as well as to our understanding about how REDD+ governs. I will begin with the first, and then move on to the latter.

First, I will look at the role of incentives. Previous governmentality studies have linked the use of incentives to a rationality of markets and cost-efficiency (Hjort 2015, 126–128, 137; Stephan 2014, 80, 86–88; see also Nielsen 2014, 269–270, 275–276). These

elements have also been dubbed a neoliberal governance approach (Fletcher 2017; McGregor 2014, 144; Collins 2020, 333 338, 340; Li 2014, 45). My results suggest that we could look at the role of incentives from a different perspective, that of knowledge. The EU and the UNFCCC decisions both referred to the complexity of the issue and national circumstances. At the international level, performance based payments can be used to address deforestation without needing to know exactly what should be done in every country or local context. It is better to refrain from overly exact regulations because such regulations may end up hindering REDD+ in the various contexts where it is implemented. However, this is not wholesale neoliberal “scepticism over the capacities of political authorities to govern everything for the best” (Rose & Miller 2010, 296) as states retain a prominent role in governance. At most, it is scepticism over the capacities of international institutions to know the circumstances of every country. At least in the case of the EU, this leads to arguments for more detailed efforts of governance by the state, not to arguments for constructing PES systems so that market actors can govern everything for the best.

Sovereignty is another perspective which seems to have been given insufficient attention in REDD+ governmentality studies. I would argue that governing countries through incentives also allows reconciling sovereignty and international governance. Aalberts has noted that in the international realm sovereignty “performs functions which are akin to those performed by the concept of individual liberty in the national context” (Aalberts 2012, 242). She goes on to argue that sovereignty “does not stand at loggerheads with international law and/or governance, but actually is a precondition for disciplining member-states [of the international community] in the name of the common good” (ibid., 243). Leaving it to the countries to decide themselves by which means they wish to reduce deforestation, REDD+ leaves room for sovereignty while also making countries responsible for these actions. For the EU, the safeguard information systems also function in this way. Even though there are no standards for the safeguards in the UNFCCC rules, the EU argued that the safeguard information systems allow countries to assess their own actions. This way, they can act responsibly, i.e. improve their conduct so that they can attract REDD+ funding.

Responsible, sovereign countries could of course still implement REDD+ as a PES system but the analysis in Chapter 5 showed that this is not what the EU was going for.

The alternatives discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.4 and 4.3.2) suggest that the EU was not alone in proposing policies that go beyond PES schemes. Norway, countries of the Central African Forest Commission, Brazil and India made proposals (Okereke & Dooley 2010) that seem to share at least some aspects of the EU's submissions. Thus, it could be fruitful to take another look at the UNFCCC negotiations to look for ways in which other actors sought to combine country level incentives with various policies. If previous governmentality research has missed the peculiarities of the EU's approach, it may have simplified other actors' arguments too. Another look at the negotiations could prove useful to determine whether the market rationality really was as dominant as previous research has argued.

This second look at the rationalities would be justified also on the basis that recent research has identified a new landscape approach to REDD+ (Nielsen 2016; Turnhout et al. 2017, 6–8). Nielsen (2016, 180) describes this discourse as “[p]romoting an integrated and holistic approach to managing landscapes, by focusing on the process rather than predetermined outcomes”. Nielsen's description of the landscape approach shares many aspects with the EU's discourse. It highlights the multi-functionality and multiple values of land and forests. Like the EU, the landscape approach stresses the need for integrating information from multiple actors and tries to create collaborative interactions between stakeholders. The approach also cautions that forests should not be addressed as a separate issue and highlights the role of agriculture as a driver of deforestation. (Ibid., 180)

According to Nielsen, various actors promote the landscape approach. These include the major multilateral REDD+ funders FCPF, UN-REDD and GCF, several environmental NGOs and some private sector actors as well as countries such as the USA, Indonesia, Norway and Australia. (ibid., 181.) All of these countries have been active in the REDD+ negotiations (Wilson Rowe 2015, 70–71). This, too, seems to point to the diversity of approaches in the REDD+ negotiations. Two EU member states, Germany and Finland also made it to Nielsen's list of landscape approach proponents (Nielsen 2016, 181). The EU has also been described as being “supportive of Norway” in Wilson Rowe's (2015, 70) negotiator interviews. Thus, the similarities between the EU's discourse and the landscape approach are not surprising.

Both Nielsen (2016, 178, 182) and Turnhout et al. (2017, 6) state that the landscape approach for REDD+ has gained support more recently. Given that the EU advocated for something like the landscape approach from the beginning of the negotiations, it is worth asking if the EU has been influential in popularizing this approach or promoting certain aspects which have been incorporated into the approach.

Nielsen also provides another possible explanation for the recent popularity of the landscape approach. It is possible that the landscape approach was “already happening on the ground” and that “the UNFCCC is just catching up” (Nielsen 2016, 186). Because governmentality studies conceptualize power as a relation, they should be well positioned to understand this. What is deemed possible and desirable at the various locales where REDD+ is implemented in practice co-constitutes REDD+ together with ideas and policies flowing from the UNFCCC levels.

This is why another direction for future governmentality research could be studying the REDD+ projects and processes in which the EU is engaged. Governmentality has already been applied to national REDD+ contexts countries (McGregor et al. 2015; Collins 2020; Asiyanbi et al. 2017; Boer 2017; 2018; Li 2014; see also van der Hoff et al. 2019). Future research could dig into the REDD+ activities supported by the EU to analyse the actual practices of attempts to reduce deforestation. These include the work of the European Forest Institute’s EU REDD Facility (2021a), REDD+ actions of The Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+ 2021) as well as other development cooperation projects that got funding from the EU’s Global Public Goods and Challenges Thematic Programme (see Adelle et al. 2018).

A preliminary look of the GCCA+ actions concerning REDD+ confirm that the EU is supporting actions concentrating on management and governance. GCCA+ activities aim to, inter alia, improving land management and planning, sustainable forestry, agroforestry and multipurpose landscape management (GCCA+ 2021). The three main topics of the EU REDD Facility’s work indicate a similar focus. The Facility concentrates on three topics: legal frameworks and enforcement, sustainable land-use investment and management, and transparency in deforestation-free production and trade. (EU REDD Facility 2021a) The two latter of these three topics are especially relevant for demand side measures to reduce deforestation as well to the investment discourse identified in

5.3.2 above. The facility also develops tools such as a land-use planner for participative development of land-use scenarios, a land-use finance tool to visualize investments. The facility is also a partner of the Transparency for Sustainable Economies platform which seeks to improve “the transparency, clarity and accessibility of information on the commodity supply chains that drive tropical deforestation” (EU REDD Facility 2021b). It is also working on “making FLEGT and REDD+ work together” (EU REDD Facility 2014)

Another direction could be to apply governmentality to the EU FLEGT policies. This might be particularly fertile as the Commission has proposed import controls similar to the EU Timber Regulation, to be applied to certain agricultural products (EC 2022c). Governing consumption (although only by differentiating sustainable from unsustainable production) may be increasing in importance, at least in the EU.

Studying these other actors and sites of REDD+ practices might give us a fuller picture of how deforestation is problematized and governed by the EU and related actors. It may also help us identify which practices and rationalisations have emerged from below, from the practices “on the ground” in the various locales. Furthermore, it may illuminate how different actors modify, recombine and resist certain elements of the EU’s deforestation governmentality to realize various goals.

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