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Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933, From the Notes of G. E. Moore, edited by David G. Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. lxxiv + 420.

Wittgenstein's Whewell's Court Lectures: Cambridge, 1938–1941, From the Notes by Yorick Smythies, edited, introduced, and annotated by Volker A. Munz and Bernhard Ritter. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017. Pp. xxv + 366.

Wittgenstein published only one philosophical book, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, during his life, which makes him a curious figure among the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. With the exception of *Philosophical Investigations* Part I, which he prepared for publication, most of Wittgenstein's work has been transmitted to readers in the form of editions, produced by his literary executors Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Georg Henrik von Wright from Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* of some 20,000 pages. The editorial decisions made by the literary executors have also shaped the way in which this material has been presented. The controversies around the production of *Philosophical Grammar* are well known. In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein's remarks on culture and art have been isolated from their original contexts in the manuscripts and presented as 'notes which do not belong directly with his philosophical works' (CV, p. ix). Seen against this background and the resulting challenges for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy, the two recently published collections of lecture notes, taken respectively by G. E. Moore (1930–33) and Yorick Smythies (1938–41), are an extremely welcome addition to the corpus of Wittgenstein's thought.

Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in some respects the two collections of notes give a more vivid account of Wittgenstein's thought in action than can be discerned from the edited manuscripts. Wittgenstein's personal writing style does not always make his philosophical goals easy to see, as shown by the dramatic contrasts between different interpretations of his thought. These lecture notes, however, introduce Wittgenstein as a teacher who engages with his audience and explains his views in an explicit and forward manner. And the fact that Moore's notes are written in telegraphic style prevent the reader from appreciating Wittgenstein's train of thought. Moreover, unlike the previous generations of editors, both Stern, Rogers, and

Citron, editors of *Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933*, and Munz and Ritter, editors of *Whewell's Court Lectures, Cambridge 1938–1941*, have succeeded in preserving the integrity of the original documents by avoiding unnecessary editorial intervention.

When considering the status of these collections as evidence of Wittgenstein's thought, it is important to bear in mind that Wittgenstein himself treated his lectures as a form of publication (Malcolm 1984, p. 48). Besides, he was all but indifferent to who kept records of his lectures (Mays 1967, p. 81). As a note taker, Moore was quite exceptional: a professor fifteen years Wittgenstein's senior, a friend to whom Wittgenstein had dictated notes already in 1914, and based on the published notes, someone who was immensely dedicated to the task. Smythies, while still a student at the time, also aimed at producing as faithful a record of Wittgenstein's words as possible. Accordingly, the detail of the notes gives a significantly more comprehensive account of the content of Wittgenstein's lectures than is available in the previously published, heavily edited and condensed notes, some of which are based on the same lectures (cf. AWL, LWL, LC, LFM). Moreover, the main body of *Whewell's Court Lectures* covers material that has not been previously documented.

While his essays summarizing and commenting on Wittgenstein's lectures were published in *Mind* already in 1954 and 1955, Moore's full lecture notes have not been previously available. (See PO, pp. 45–114.) They cover the period from January 1930 to May 1933, beginning a year after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and ending before he started to dictate the *Blue and Brown Books* to his students. The lectures start from a position that still bears echoes of the *Tractatus*, reveal a gradual abandonment of some of its key assumptions, and introduce several themes that are later developed into core ideas of Wittgenstein's mature thought.

A case in point is Wittgenstein's discussion of logical form. In January 1930, Wittgenstein addresses the Tractarian idea of a proposition as a picture to be compared with reality (M 4:1–3, 6; cf. TLP 2.12, 2.223, 4.01). In accordance with the *Tractatus*, he claims that language and thought represent the world in two distinct ways: by true or false propositions and by having logical form in common with it. Moreover, he still concedes that language, thought, and reality have a logical rather than empirical relation and that the shared form of thought and reality is necessary for thought (M 4:18; cf. TLP 2.18, 3.03, 4.0141, 5.4731). However, while affirming the Tractarian view of an ineffable harmony between language and world, Wittgenstein adds: '[W]hat language must have in common [with the world] is contained in rules of grammar' (M 4:18; see M 5:32, 5:36, 8:9, TLP 4.12). This seemingly innocent addition and the ensuing reflection on grammar contain the seeds of an expansion of the *Tractatus*' rigid notion of logical form.

In 1932, Wittgenstein singles out the Tractarian notion of analysis as a mistake, resulting from a confusion between the scientific and the philosophical method. In the *Tractatus*, the analysis was supposed to reveal the simple

constituents of a proposition and their referential relations with simple and unalterable objects of reality, thereby grounding Wittgenstein's requirement of determinacy of sense (TLP 2.02–2.027, 3.2–3.25). Having purported to hold a distinction between natural science and philosophy already in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein now confesses to failing on precisely this point: 'There was a deeper mistake – confusing logical analysis, with chemical analysis' (M 7:39; cf. TLP 4.111). Later, elaborating on the mistake, he states, 'I & Russell falsely supposed this. If we'd been right, there would have been an experiment which told us something about logic' (M 7:43, underlining in original). But to explain logic by reference to empirical facts, uncovered by experiments, would obviously contradict the view of logic Wittgenstein held throughout his life (TLP 6.1–6.113; PI §§ 90, 109). He thus admits that he has had to change his opinions most about the idea of elementary propositions (see M 6:1). The mistake, again, had been to assume that one could enumerate objects in the world and thus give all possible elementary propositions without actually delivering on that promise (M 7:92; see TLP 5.55).

In addition to the failure to comply with the *Tractatus*' self-proclaimed view of philosophy, Wittgenstein identifies another mistake in his earlier approach: 'If you look at Russell & at *Tractatus*, you may notice something very queer – i.e. lack of examples. They talk of "individuals" & "atomic propositions", but give no examples' (M 7:84–85). Eventually, Wittgenstein rejects the *Tractatus*' key idea of a general propositional form as the essence of language: 'Language is not a simple game; I oughtn't to start from a definition of proposition, & then build up logic from that' (M 7:96; cf. TLP 4.5). For 'it is more or less arbitrary what we call "proposition", therefore Logic plays a part different from what I, Russell & Frege supposed it to play' (M 7:99). These critical insights serve to initiate one of the main differences between Wittgenstein's early and later views, namely, a return to 'rough ground' provided by examples drawn from actual ways of using language (PI § 107; cf. TLP 2.0124, 2.026, 4.221, PI §§ 71, 75, 135, 208–209). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's position remains similar to that of the *Tractatus* in one important respect. While he no longer requires that all meaningful propositions must conform to the general propositional form, he still takes logic to be that which makes meaning possible: 'A word has only meaning in a grammatical system' (M 5:33, underlining in original; cf. TLP 3.3).

A noteworthy aspect of Wittgenstein's reflection on the *Tractatus* is his candid acknowledgement of his earlier mistakes. For not only does he present the requirements of analysis and uniformity of propositions, traditionally attributed to the *Tractatus*, as views he had previously held, but some of his criticisms – for example, of the Tractarian treatment of general propositions, which he now characterizes as a 'most important mistake in *Tractatus*' (M 7:37) – take the form of careful reconsideration of the Tractarian views (TLP, p. 4). Equally importantly, Wittgenstein still endorses certain commitments of his earlier view, such as the distinction between the empirical and

the logical/grammatical and the corresponding distinction between what can be meaningfully said and what amounts to nonsense. He states ‘I was right in thinking that there can’t be hypotheses in logic’ (M 7:90; see M 7:103–104, 113, TLP 6.111, PI § 109); and ‘Way in which nonsense is produced is by trying to express something in propositions of language, which ought to be embodied in the grammar’ (M 8:9, underlining in original; cf. TLP 4.12–4.1212, PI §§ 252–253, OC §§ 10, 35, 58–59). These remarks present a challenge to those interpretations that treat the *Tractatus* as a book intended as mere gibberish, containing no philosophically informative distinction between saying and showing, nor any genuine attempt to provide an account of language.

In addition to revisiting some of the *Tractatus*’ central assumptions, Moore’s notes introduce a number of ideas familiar from the *Investigations*. We find first formulations of thoughts which were later developed into the rule-following discussion, the role of criteria in the use of psychological concepts, and the limitations of ostensive definition (M 4:51, 5:22, 6:12, 6b:51). And we get comparisons between ways of using words and the various handles in the cab of an engine, between the use of words and money, and between ways of using language and the multiplicity of different games (M 7:91, 8:66, 8:13; cf. PI §§ 12, 23, 120). Like ordinary games, whose variety resists a definition of ‘game’, language games may be described as being constituted by rules (M 6b:38; cf. PI §71). Wittgenstein also emphasizes the arbitrary nature of grammatical rules: ‘Thus we’re led to think the rules are responsible to something not a rule, whereas they’re only responsible to rules’ (M 7:2, underlining in original). The autonomy of logic was a requirement stated already in the *Tractatus* (TLP 5.473). The difference is, however, that while in the *Tractatus* the shared form of language and reality was meant to be fixed by the forms of unalterable objects as the termini of analysis (TLP 2.026), Wittgenstein now denies that grammar owes anything to reality. Moreover, he illustrates rules by reference to practical purposes and actions, which are notions missing almost entirely from the *Tractatus*. Yet, Wittgenstein is careful to stress that rules are not dictated or justified by practices: the rules of grammar do not stand in need of justification, as they provide the standard of justification (M 5:87; cf. PI § 497).

This is not to say that the views expressed in Moore’s notes are identical with Wittgenstein’s mature position. However, the striking parallels between some of the formulations and the care Wittgenstein takes in dealing with potential objections to his emphasis on rules imply that the difference is not as dramatic as has sometimes been suggested. A typical way of cashing out an allegedly principled difference between Wittgenstein’s so-called middle period and the *Investigations* is to claim that while the middle Wittgenstein still championed a ‘calculus conception’ of language, a formal system of fixed rules, he later abandoned it in favour of a more flexible account. Yet, according to Moore’s record, in 1933 Wittgenstein explicitly states that, first, the rules of grammar do not have to be explicitly formulated (M 8:41–42; cf. PI §

208). Nor do we have to ‘think of the rules according to which the words we use are used’ (M 9:1). Second, the rules can be changed and abandoned as we go along, though ‘if we change them, we can’t use them in this way’ (M 5:88; see M 9:1). Third, the rules accepted as the framework of a language game vary from one context to another (M 8:78). Finally, treating language by reference to a calculus is a matter of *comparison* that will help avoid certain philosophical confusions, such as the confusion of treating meaning as an object (M 9:1; cf. PI § 81). We read:

If I say meaning of word is determined by its grammar – by rules, I’ve been asked do I mean that the meaning is a list of rules. Of course, not. You wouldn’t be so tempted to ask the question whether I do, unless you supposed that when you have a substantive ‘the meaning’ you have to look out for something at which you can point & say ‘this’ is the meaning. (M 8:66, underlining in original)

While we may, for certain purposes, draw the boundary of a concept by reference to rules, the boundaries of its actual usage are typically blurred (M 9:2; cf. PI §§ 71, 109).

Moore’s notes from 1933 also cast new light on Wittgenstein’s conception of aesthetics, an area of his thought that has remained in the margins of scholarship and is sometimes deemed irrelevant to his philosophy (cf. Schroeder 2016). Continuing his discussion on meaning and rules, Wittgenstein introduces the analogy between propositions and melodies, familiar from the *Brown Book* and the *Investigations* (M 8:66; cf. BB, p. 167, PI § 527). The point, again, is that meaning and sense are fluid. What makes the comparison significant is the discussion that ensues. This is because Wittgenstein approaches the topic from a perspective that bears unmistakable echoes of the Kantian tradition of aesthetics, appealing as he does, for example, to the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful. This distinction has its origin in Kant’s aesthetics, where the agreeable marks causally induced feelings of liking, elicited by pleasurable smells and tastes (CPJ § 3). The beautiful, in turn, carries a normative force distinct from claims about the agreeable, even if its claim to necessity cannot be conceptually justified. Instead, judgments of beauty rely on the feeling of the subject, arising out of disinterested contemplation of a limited, purposive whole (CPJ §§ 2, 6, 11, 22). Wittgenstein uses the notions in precisely this way. He states ‘But if we meant by “beautiful” “giving me stomach-ache / pleasure/”, then it would be merely a symptom: experience would tell us whether it does or not’ (M 9:18, underlining in original; see also M 9:13–14; cf. LC II:3). And:

When I say ‘This bass moves too much’ I don’t merely mean ‘It gives me such an such an impression’, because if I did I should have to be content with the answer ‘It does not give me that impression’. (M 9:28, underlining in original)

Instead of relying on causally induced pleasures or mechanically applying explicitly formulated rules, aesthetic investigation aims at getting closer to

an 'ideal' (M 9:18–22, 9:30; cf. CPJ § 17). In communicating such ideals we evoke reasons rather than causes. However, in aesthetics, our reasons take the form of a description rather than an explanation.

Wittgenstein brings these points to bear on his emerging account of philosophy as the description of language games. Description, he claims, aims at surveying a system as a whole, at gaining a synoptic view of a grammatical system (M 9:33; cf. PI § 122). Here, aesthetics and philosophy come together: 'In Mathematics, Ethics, Aesthetics, Philosophy, answer to a puzzle is to make a synopsis possible' (M 9:39). It is not just that a proposition may be usefully compared with a melody, but also that the very idea of an aesthetic system, such as music, serves as a model for grammatical systems and philosophical investigation thereof. Just as aesthetic investigation aims at showing connections within an aesthetic system, so too the descriptive method in philosophy sets aside the causal model of empirical sciences and describes a grammatical system. In both cases, the description aims at removing our 'intellectual discomfort' (M 5:28–29, 9:32). As reasons in aesthetics and philosophy alike are 'in the nature of further descriptions', they do not force another to accept them (M 9:31). While we can often formulate rules of grammar to serve as justifications or explanations, such explanations come to an end: 'Philosophy may expect to arrive at fundamental propositions. But great event to which we come is the coming to the boundary of language: to: there we can't ask anything further' (M 5:28.).

One way to read Wittgenstein is to take him to be introducing two distinct ways of looking at meaning and grammar. The first is concerned with the task of formulating the grammatical rules constitutive of a particular system – granted, always for a particular purpose (of justification or explanation of meaning). The second aims at gaining a synoptic view of the grammatical system as a whole, at 'taking something in as a whole at a glance' (M 8:59; see M 5:58–59). The first approach to meaning is compared to a calculus that may be conceptually formulated and taught to others; the second approach, illustrated by aesthetic investigation, does not allow for further explication by any other means except comparison and simile (M 9:37). This does not remove the status of grammatical rules as norms. What it does, however, is indicate the impossibility of finding a conceptually determinable foundation for those norms. Wittgenstein describes this double perspective on meaning by reference to a distinction between 'discursive' and 'intuitive' ways of looking at meaning (M 8:59). Incidentally, the same distinction, serving roughly a similar philosophical purpose and elucidated by reference to beauty, may also be found in Kant's philosophy (CPJ §§ 70, 76–77).

The contrast between the empirical and grammatical continues to inform Wittgenstein's discussion in *Whewell's Court Lectures 1938–1941*, given after the first draft of the *Investigations* had already been finished. He characterizes grammatical sentences as a priori, referring to an example familiar from the

Investigations, namely, ‘Every rod must have *some* length’ (WCL, p. 63, emphasis in original; cf. PI § 251). This sentence resembles the *Tractatus*’ illustration of objects’ internal properties by reference to the statement ‘Every note must have *some* pitch’ (TLP 2.0131, emphasis in original). Such necessary propositions differ in status from ordinary empirical statements. But Wittgenstein notes that while necessary propositions state ‘what one is tempted to call an internal relation’, ‘every statement about internal relations is a masked statement about a form of expression’ (WCL, p. 69). Moreover, what is characteristic of grammatical sentences is that ‘They are of very little practical use’ and used only rarely. All the same, they are of interest for philosophy: ‘We want to see what role they play, and why anyone should utter them at all’ (WCL, p. 63).

Wittgenstein makes the suggestion, often associated with *On Certainty*, that explanations ‘oscillate between grammatical rules and statements of facts’ (WCL, p. 19; see WCL, pp. 79–80, OC § 309, 318–321). The way in which a given proposition is used corresponds to its role either as normative or as descriptive: ‘I said the other day that we can best compare a rule to a road. A road can be taken as a way people go through a garden, or as a command “Go this way!”’ (WCL, p. 70). Moreover, it is possible to get someone to give up a proposition he has originally treated as necessary and not dependent on experience. When this happens, the proposition and the game to which it has belonged will lose their point. The overall idea Wittgenstein wants to get across is that propositions treated as necessary are tied to what he calls pictures, that is, broader frameworks of explanation. He is careful to stress that the pictures, too, are arbitrary, just as the choice of a unit of length in measurement is arbitrary (WCL, p. 74). The pictures are neither right nor wrong, but may be used in the wrong way, which is what happens when we fail to pay attention to the role of the proposition and mistakenly treat logical necessity as physical necessity.

An example worth mentioning is Wittgenstein’s fictional predicate ‘grown’, to which he dedicates an entire lecture in 1940 in order to illustrate the contingent, historical grounds of grammatical rules. Saul Kripke suggested that his reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion by reference to the mathematical function ‘quus’ was relevantly similar to Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’, which was cashed out by reference to the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ whose application is time-dependent (Kripke 1982, p. 58; Goodman 1955/1979, pp. 72–81). Kripke’s puzzle was about meaning and Goodman’s about induction, but both sought to draw a distinction between mere regularities and genuine rules – a central concern for Wittgenstein as well. Strikingly, Wittgenstein introduces the predicate ‘grown’, which stands for either green (if to the left of a drawn line) or red (if to the right of the line) (WCL, pp. 226–232). While the application of Goodman’s ‘grue’ depends on time and Wittgenstein’s ‘grown’ on space, the parallel is unmistakable.

Another piece of new information brought to the fore by *Whewell's Court Lectures* involves a lecture previously published in *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief* (WCL, pp. 126–136; cf. LC, pp. 65–72). The new, historically accurate contextualization of the lecture uncovers its connection to the broader themes that occupied Wittgenstein at the time. Instead of being the focus of attention, religious belief serves as an example of a 'picture'. Just like aesthetic investigation that is not empirical but – as Wittgenstein suggests in 1940 – makes 'apodictic' claims, religious belief does not draw on empirical evidence for its justification. In this respect, it illustrates Wittgenstein's claim that 'The whole *weight* may be in the picture' (WCL, p. 132, emphasis in original). While not subject to empirical verification, the picture will have consequences for the person who adopts it and may go together with certain ideas of, for example, ethical responsibility. Moreover, to acknowledge the character of religious belief as a commitment to a picture thus understood is to make a grammatical remark without questioning the validity of what the person says. Interestingly, the lectures, following the example of religious belief, return to aesthetics as providing a model for experiences that, while elusive, play a role in the recognition of similarities that escape conceptual justification. Like the lecture on religious belief, parts of this discussion have been included in *Lectures and Conversations*, which until now has disguised the philosophical relevance of Wittgenstein's appeal to aesthetics (WLC, pp. 146–151; cf. LC pp. 32, 37–40).

Both editorial teams have done a great service to Wittgenstein scholarship by adopting a conscientious approach to editing and thereby revealing previously obscure aspects of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy. There are also differences in the editorial approaches of the two volumes. *Lectures, Cambridge 1930–33* is accompanied by an accessible and informative introduction and a synoptic table of contents, providing a quick glance of the philosophical substance of the lectures. The broader philosophical contextualization of *Whewell's Court Lectures* is, on the other hand, mostly left for the reader, even if the introductions and footnotes provide very detailed references to parallels with Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* and published material. The editorial approach adopted by Munz and Ritter could be characterized as intellectual micro-history provided in order to justify the historical dating of the material. While not giving the easiest access to Wittgenstein's thought for a reader not already familiar with it, for a scholar the careful attention to minute historical details of the production of Smythies' notes provides a fascinating story behind the production of these notes.*

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- PI — 1953/2009, *Philosophical Investigations*. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte (tr.). Revised fourth edition by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell)
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Tragedy and Redress in Western Literature: A Philosophical Perspective, by Richard Gaskin. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. Pp. ix + 412.

'Do not all charms fly / At the mere touch of cold philosophy?' (John Keats, *Lamia* II, ll. 229–30). 'Only when the charms are meretricious or otherwise misleading' would no doubt be the riposte of Old Apollonius, and ultimately this is no doubt correct. But the protest raises matters of philosophical interest to which Richard Gaskin here shows himself sensitive. He argues that, to a much greater extent than is now usually thought, tragic literature purports to offer 'moral' redress for suffering (p. 9), and that 'typically, tragic protagonists fall through their own fault' (p. 23). This contention is seen as providing the foundation for a (partial) theory of tragedy which is both secularizing and, in a sense, psychologizing, even reductive, for 'the theological is constructed out of the psychological' (p. 135); the Aeschylean trilogy, we are told, is 'an exploration of psychopathology' (p. 107). One of Gaskin's main interlocutors is George Steiner. For the latter 'tragedy is that form of art which requires the intolerable burden of God's presence. It is now dead because His shadow no longer falls upon us as it fell on Agamemnon or Macbeth or Athalie' (1963, p. 353). For Gaskin 'insofar as the sacred and the divine feature in tragedy, they are a superficial crust concealing a molten core of human motivation'; further, 'rationalism in antiquity did not put a stop to tragic art, and it has not done so in the modern age, either' (pp. 139–40). Again, against Hegel's reading of Sophocles' *Antigone* as 'a contest between *polis* and *oikos*' (p. 88), we have Gaskin's debunking claim that it is about 'the wrong choices