Matti Kamppinen

UBIQUITOUS ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE DESCRIPTION OF CULTURAL SCENES[1]

Tools for describing and interpreting cultural scenes are needed not only in ethnology, folklore studies or comparative religion, but in all research and development activities where human beings are involved as study objects. This basic or constitutive ethnography is ubiquitous, and in this article I intend to outline its contours and relevance, especially in comparative religion. Ubiquitous ethnography is based on intentional systems theory and I will look at how it was framed and used by such ethnographers as Émile Durkheim, Bronislaw Malinowski, and E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Another central theoretical tool for describing cultural scenes is the notion of cultural model that enables us to grasp the complex cultural blueprints or cultural software enacted in cultural scenes.

Cultural scene

Why is it that the same cultural scene can be studied from different viewpoints? Why ethnography lies at the foundations of ethnography, folklore studies and comparative religion? What we are doing when describing a cultural scene? Let us look at an example.

The game of soccer (European football) is a cultural scene where there are actors following rules, publicly articulated roles for players, shared mental scripts for all players and for audience, and the typical venue where the game takes place. There are elements that are required for that scene to be a game of soccer, and there are elements that can be changed into others without the game losing its individuating character. The venue, for example, can be a soccer stadium or a plain field, the goals can be made of steel or wood, or the goals can be marked with rocks or tin cans. The players can use high-end soccer shoes or play barefooted.

One of the required elements is that the actors are playing with mental soccer models, beliefs and desires, that enable them to identify the ball, the players, the goal, and to act accordingly: keep the ball, kick it and score goals when the opportunity emerges. If the actors had no clue to what they were doing, the process would not be a game of soccer, even though they would succeed in moving themselves and the ball according to the rules of soccer. The beliefs and desires of the players constitute the game, and we can successfully describe, explain and predict their behaviour on the basis of these beliefs.

(We could carry out thought experiments with different constituents of soccer. If, for example, one of the players had no idea what soccer is about, that would not warrant us to call it something else. How many

players without appropriate mental contents would do?)

Our intuition concerning the soccer players is solid. What it means to play soccer is to have players with suitable beliefs and desires. We treat the players as *intentional systems,* to use the term introduced by the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, in his article 'Intentional systems'[2]. An intentional system is a system that can be understood (described, explained and predicted) by means of ascribing beliefs, desires, intentions and other representations to it.

Intentional systems are required for identifying social processes. Intentional systems equipped with suitable soccer beliefs and desires and situated in the right environment are playing soccer. Religion, like other cultural activities, is very much like soccer. Intentional systems furnished with adequate religious beliefs and desires and embedded in the right context are practicing religion. In order to describe, explain, predict or critically assess their behaviour we need to look at their systemic characters, that is, their composition (beliefs and desires), structure (how beliefs, desires and actions are linked together) and environment (what there is to perceive, to learn about, to influence and so on).[3]

Dennett distinguished the intentional level of system description from the physical and the design levels. The physical level description of the human actor would refer to physiological and other biological systems, and the design level would refer to structures of neural information processing, for example. Intentional systems are realized in, and emergent in relation to, lower level material systems, where the intentional vocabulary of mental states is not used. Intentional systems are assumed to form a lawful level of their own, and intentional systems theory is an attempt to systematise the patterns at that level.

In the foundations of ethnography, intentional systems theory outlines the ubiquitous ethnography, the preconditions for identifying human thought and action, answering the notorious 'bridgehead question', namely, what are the shared properties required for understanding other cultures[4]. Understanding human thought and behaviour requires that humans be treated as intentional systems. It is important to notice that the intentional systems theory and the generic assumption of rationality built in are assumed also in the cases of 'irrational' human behaviour. When, for example, people refuse to wear a shirt that belonged to a notorious murder, they fulfill a set of criteria of intentional systems, the criteria by means of which we are able to understand that they are dealing with shirts in the first place[5]. Thus intentional systems theory and its generic assumption of rationality are used also in the understanding of irrational behaviour. The analysis of these 'bridgehead' foundations by means of intentional systems theory will expose the field of ubiquitous ethnography.

Intentional systems theory will also provide resources for critical assessment of religion, since it allows the use of not only descriptive rationality but also of normative rationality, as both variations of rationality stem from the same set of assumptions. It can be further argued that the critical assessment of religion is in fact built in any scientific enterprise that commits itself to the optimality of scientific method[6]. I have dealt with these commitments elsewhere[7] and will not tackle them here.

Intentional systems and common sense

Intentional systems are assumed in daily interactions. When, for example, we wish to predict the future behaviour of our colleague Simon, we base our predictions on his assumed beliefs and desires. If Simon were a university professor active in feminist research, we would predict that he promotes feminist research when the opportunity shows itself. If Simon would not promote feminist research, we would be obliged to search for further contextual evidence that would make his action intelligible. Perhaps he had been converted to exact systems philosophy, or was promised later even bigger price if he would wait.

Intentional systems are central in ubiquitous ethnography, or commonsense psychology of beliefs, desires and actions. Ubiquitous ethnography can be characterized as the system of ideas that guide our conduct with respect to other persons. As a brand of folk psychology it belongs to he family of folk theories together with folk biology, folk sociology, folk medicine and others. Ubiquitous ethnography contains at least the following assumptions:

- Human persons have beliefs, desires and other mental states.
- Beliefs contain contents that are directed towards their objects. Therefore beliefs can represent the world and its various aspects.
- Beliefs can represent possible (and impossible) states of affairs and courses of events as well.
- Beliefs are formed on the basis of perception, other beliefs and experiences.
- People usually believe what they see.
- Beliefs are expressed by means of words and deeds.
- Desires are directed towards value objects. The same content (for example, the next summer vacation) can be contained in a belief or a desire. When contained in a desire, the summer vacation is valued and expected.
- Desires are expressed in words and deeds, and together with beliefs they generate further,

instrumental desires and direct human action.

- Desires are generated from other desires coupled with suitable beliefs.

- Humans desire food, shelter and social company, and after these needs have been fulfilled, various other things, circumscribed by their cultural and other resources.

- Human action is steered by intentions to do things. Intentions have contents that direct the actions.

- Intentions are generated on the basis of beliefs and desires. The intention and action to book a summer resort could stem from the belief that it would make the vacation enjoyable and the desire to have an enjoyable summer vacation.

- Beliefs, desires and actions interact and constrain each other.

- Beliefs, desires and other mental states are identified functionally— that is, by means of their functional roles in the holistic system of mental states, behaviour and surrounding environment.

- Humans are generally rational: their beliefs, desires and actions are coherent and calibrated to their environments.

Ubiquitous ethnography, used in daily human interactions, commits itself to the above assumptions, approximately. By the same token, it specifies the constituent properties of intentional systems: systems made of beliefs, desires, actions and rationality assumptions.

Ubiquitous ethnography in the works of Durkheim, Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard

In anthropology and ethnography of religion, even when paving the road to social theory of religion, intentional systems theory has had a strong hold. Émile Durkheim, most known for his idea that religion boils down to the sacralisation of the society, defined his basic concepts by means of intentional systems theory. In his book *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915) he proposed that religious phenomena come in two forms: beliefs and rites. Beliefs consist in representations and rites are determinate modes of action. How to identify a religious rite? Durkheim's answer is revealing since it commits him to intentional systems theory:

"The rites can be defined and distinguished from other human practices, moral practices, for example, only by the special nature of their object. . . Now it is in the beliefs that the special nature of the object is expressed. It is possible to define the rite only after we have defined the belief."[8].

Religion, for Durkheim, consists in beliefs and rites (action), and the beliefs are the ones that determine whether the actors are practicing religion or playing football. Religious beliefs, for Durkheim, differ from other beliefs in that they are directed towards sacred objects, and establish the difference between sacred and profane things as well as between sacred and profane areas of life. Religious practice can be individuated only on the basis that it is preceded by religious beliefs concerning the sacred and the profane. Hence a description and explanation of religious behaviour would refer to these specific beliefs. Consequently, Durkheim constitutes the actor in line with intentional systems theory, as a system that is directed by its beliefs, desires and other mental contents. The intentional system constructs, with other systems, the social reality where the distinctions between the sacred and the profane, as well as other distinctions, are made and maintained.

Durkheim and his followers proceeded to study the social dynamics of the sacred and the process of sacralisation, and left the intentional systems theory in the role of an assumption. The implicit intentional systems theory comes up in his argumentation, though, for example, when Durkheim argues (against E. B. Tylor) that animism is not the 'natural' interpretation of dream experiences. If it were, it should be either the only possible explanation or the most economical one, from the viewpoint of the intentional system studied:

"But if this hypothesis of the double is to be able to impose itself upon men with a sort of necessity, it should be the only one possible, or at least, the most economical one. Now, as a matter of fact, there are more simple ones which, it would seem, might have occurred to the mind just as naturally."[9]

Durkheim's argument assumes that his study objects are intentional systems that obey the rules of rationality. Rationality involves the idea that of two explanations (with equal explanatory powers), intentional systems choose the more economical one. His argument is plausible only if the assumption of intentional systems theory holds.

As said, Durkheim's main interest focused on the social dynamics of the sacred, and therefore his statements relating to intentional systems theory are not explicit. Much more interesting in terms of intentional systems theory are the ethnographic theories of Bronislaw Malinowski and E. E. Evans-Pritchard.

Malinowski's *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1932) has functioned as an exemplary of ethnographic fieldwork, whether focusing on folk medicine or religion. One of the central tenets in Malinowski's ethnography was the importance of ethnographic fieldwork: by means of participant observation and even more importantly, by means of sharing the daily lives of the study objects, the culture as a system of meanings was to be studied. Malinowski's study object was a complicated system of meanings and practices that he set

out to document and interpret by means of interview and other techniques that treat humans as intentional systems. The ethnographer studies the totality of cultural knowledge, behaviour and artifacts, focusing on the mental attitudes behind them. Especially important are the practices of everyday life that Malinowski called 'the inponderabilia of actual life':

"Here belong such things as the routine of a man's working day, the details of his care of the body, of the manner of taking food and preparing it; the tone of conversational and social life around the village fires, the existence of strong friendships or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people . . . All these facts can and ought to be scientifically formulated and recorded . . . with an effort at penetrating the mental attitude expressed in them."[10]

That is, the ethnographic records of religious rituals, for example, are of no use if the intentional system behind them is not known, if the central beliefs and desires, that bring about the cultural material, are not systematised. Malinowski goes on to argue that beliefs and desires are typically expressed in spoken words, behaviour and cultural systems that interact with individuals, providing them public models for storing and processing mental contents:

"we are interested only in what they feel and think qua members of a given community. Now in this capacity, their mental states receive a certain stamp, become stereotyped by the institutions in which they live, by the influence of tradition and folklore, by the very vehicle of thought, that is by language."[11]

Here Malinowski points out not only the importance of intentional systems in ethnography, but also the relevance of the systemic environment of intentional systems: mental contents are conserved in public models, from where they can be extracted and adapted for particular uses.

Malinowski's assumption concerning intentional systems can be seen, for example, in his treatment of Trobriand magic.[12] He summarises magic as a system that is based on the fundamental belief to the effect that words and rites have causal powers. Thus Trobriand magic is a system that requires the existence of intentional systems equipped with certain beliefs.

E. E. Evans-Pritchard devoted most of his *Witchcraft—Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (1937) to the description of the Zande practices and beliefs. Evans-Pritchard backed his description with the following argument:

"the inquiring mind is not content to know bare facts but seeks to discover uniformities in them and to relate

one fact to another. Only by so doing can we understand Zande beliefs and compare them with our own . . . What are the motives of Zande behaviour? What are their notions of reality? How are these motives and notions expressed in custom? I have tried to keep these major sociological problems always before me so that my account may be a purposive description, rather than a bare record, of fact."[13]

His strategy could be summarized as follows: first, identify the contents of mental states (notions of reality like spirits, witches, ancestors, health, illness, plants etc.); second, identify how they are represented or cognized (are they believed, entertained, joked about, desired, feared, suspected, doubted, or acted out; do they constitute beliefs or desires or actions expressed in custom); and third, look for other mental states that would account for or explain the attitudes thus formed.

Evans-Pritchard formulated a special type of explanation for ethnography of religion, a type of explanation where the elements of intentional systems function in the role of *explanandum* and *explanans*:

"I have sought to provide it [i.e., explanation] from the statements of Azande themselves and by bringing into the orbit of a fact all other facts that are closely related to it in thought and action. For example: I offer no explanation of why Azande attribute happenings to witchcraft and magic, but I have tried to discover uniformities in the reasons they give for the occurrence of the phenomena. . . . Explanations, therefore, will be found embodied in my descriptive account and are not set forth independently of it. My interpretations are contained in the facts themselves, for I have described the facts in such a way that the interpretations emerge as part of the description."[14]

Ethnographic explanation for Evans-Pritchard is thus a process where social facts are described so that their connections to beliefs, desires and actions are made explicit. Therefore the *explanandum* of ethnographic explanation is a social fact constituted by intentional systems, and the *explanans* consists in further properties of the intentional systems.

Durkheim, Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard built their special theories on the basis of intentional systems. Durkheim investigated more deeply the special properties of religious beliefs, namely the division of reality into sacred and profane. Malinowski concentrated on the practical and technical character of magic as well as on the holistic integration of religious items into the totality of culture. Evans-Pritchard's detailed description of Zande ethnomedicine is perhaps the style of explanation where intentional systems are constantly utilized in the organisation, presentation and interpretation of the materials.

How would Durkheim, Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard have explained the game of soccer with which we

started this article? All of them would have admitted that the game is constituted by soccer beliefs, desires and actions: otherwise it would not be a game of soccer. Durkheim would have concentrated on the beliefs concerning the physical boundaries of the game, the totemistic vestige of the players and their supporters, the rituals accompanying the game and the sacralization of the soccer team. Malinowski would have participated himself in the game, and would have studied the players' technical skills as well as their native terms for different aspects of soccer. Evans-Pritchard would have extracted the explanations of soccer facts in terms of beliefs, desires and actions, and would have provided native accounts of 'good game', 'soccer fan' and so on.

Amazonian folk religion

My ethnographic research has focused on folk religion and folk medicine in the Peruvian Amazon.[15] The fieldwork took place in late 1980s and again in 2004 and 2005. I interviewed members of the Mestizo population in the riverbank villages near the city of Iquitos. Most of the interviews were done in the villages of San Rafael and Nuevo Progreso, by the rivers Amazon and Napo, respectively. Interviews were carried out also in the outskirts of urban Iquitos. The interviews focused on the models of supernatural entities in folk religion and folk medicine.

The central supernatural entities that figure in illness explanations are various spirits, good and evil, humans with supernatural powers like healers and witches, and plants and animals equipped with powers. The illness *mal de aire,* for example, is caused by an intruding or colliding evil spirit. Its symptoms can be treated only by a traditional healer. Hence its origins and treatment involve supernatural entitites.

Witchcraft that stems from envious people (called *mal de gente),* is typically caused by a witch—that is, a human person who has various supernatural powers. He can shoot invisible magical projectiles into his victim, or he can cast a spell on animals that then harm the victim. The healer has supernatural powers as well. He is able to travel distant places while in trance, and he can communicate with the spirits that inhabit medical plants. He can also see and manipulate the magical projectiles that are invisible for others. Cases of witchcraft stem typically from envy, and they involve revenge. For example, the victim could have been in bad terms with some people who then have hired a witch to get even. Some animals are also equipped with supernatural powers. The pink river dolphin, for example, is believed to be a powerful animal that can cause specific illnesses (mal *de agua).* It can harm people for no specific reason, or it can harm people who break 'river norms' by taking a bath during menstruation.

Not only the causes and diagnosis, but also the healing processes are filled with supernatural entities. The healer invokes helping spirits by means of magical songs, applies tobacco smoke in order to expel evil spirits, and manipulates the invisible causes of illnesses, the magical darts. Plant medicines are attributed supernatural properties and are taken with appropriate rituals.

The reality of folk medicine intertwines with folk religion. The supernatural entities function as causes and remedies of illnesses.[16] As pragmatists, people in the rural and urban areas shop for diagnoses and health services. Often times the traditional, supernatural diagnosis and treatment is the cheapest one, but when given the resources, people utilize modern treatments as well.

The health seeker in the rural Peruvian Amazon is an intentional system, navigating in the world of uncertainty by means of his beliefs, desires and other mental states. Most of the time he is also a religious intentional system, since his central beliefs are about supernatural entities.

Cultural models in the description of cultural scenes

Propositional contents of religious beliefs are composed of concepts. For example, the belief that magical dolphin has bewitched a swimmer combines the following concepts

'magical dolphin' 'swimmer' 'bewitchment'

into a form where the dolphin d and the swimmer s are connected by means of bewitchment b, i.e., b(d,s). b is a relational predicate that combines subjects with objects, and d and s denote the individuals that fill the slots provided by this predicate. The belief with the propositional content b(d,s) is a *model* of the fictional situation where magical dolphin has bewitched the swimmer. The content is a conceptual model that represents the fictional situation. (The belief that the dolphin came close to the swimmer would, on the other hand, represent a concrete situation.) The content succeeds in representing the situation since it orders the components into a relation that would hold in the real world if the fictional story were true. In the case where the belief were about the dolphin that came close, the belief manages to represent the concrete situation because the components of the propositional content are organised in a manner that can be mapped onto the elements of the concrete situation.

When studying the religious intentional system that holds the belief that the magical dolphin has bewitched

the swimmer, the concepts are situated into their contexts, and from these different contexts we generate the explanatory materials. On the basis of the interview and other ethnographic material, we know that the magical dolphin has relations with water people, it can transform itself into a human being, and it can be affected by means of a suitable magical song. To put it in terms of models, the concept of magical dolphin forms various models: the *explicit model* where it connects with the swimmer by means of the bewitchment relation, and numerous other *implicit models* where it connects with water people, human transformation, and magical songs. The relation of bewitchment opens as well into several models. The causal mechanisms of bewitchment and the relation between human and animal witches are just two of the numerous implicit models that provide grounds for the explicit model.

In the ethnographic research process the implicit models, together with explicit models, are put together in order to form large networks of cultural knowledge, usually called mental or cultural models.

Mental models[17] are composed of concepts that enable people to have beliefs, desires and other mental states. For our purposes the notion of cultural model is more suitable. Cultural models are shared systems of knowledge that can be expressed in talking, action or cultural artifacts and provide materials for individual mental models, beliefs and other mental states.[18] The cultural model of the magical dolphin, for example, is expressed in oral tradition, in written accounts, or in the pictorial representations like the paintings sold for tourists. Furthermore, patterned behaviour towards the magical dolphin contains elements of the cultural model. The healing session of an illness caused by the river dolphin is a cultural behaviour that is directed by and expresses cultural models. All these provide resources (conceptualised as systems of contents) for individual intentional systems.

Cultural models are hierarchical systems of propositional contents, composed of concepts. The cultural model of magical dolphin contains at least the following propositions (13 main propositions and several minor propositions):

1. Pink river dolphin can assume magical powers at will. 2. Magical dolphin can harm humans. 3. Magical dolphin is alerted by menstrual blood. 4. Magical dolphin shoots projectiles. 4.1. There are various projectiles. 4.1.1. Spine is a projectile. 4.1.2.Worm is a projectile. 4.1.3. Animal bone is a projectile. 4.1.4. Phlegm is a projectile. 4.1.4.1. Phlegm is a magical substance. 4.1.4.2. Phlegm is carried by healers and witches. 4.1.4.3. Phlegm is found also in rivers. 4.1.4.4. Phlegm is generated by healers and witches.   4.1.5. Hairball is a projectile. 4.2. Projectiles can be seen by healers. .4.3 Projectiles are invisible to laypeople. 5. Magical dolphin causes illness *mal de agua.* 6. Magical dolphin emanates radiation that resembles electricity. 7. The symptoms

caused by magical dolphin involve severe abdominal   pain. 8. The correct diagnosis requires traditional healer. 8.1. Healer is a person who has been tutored by an older healer. 8.2. Healer knows magical songs. 8.2.1. Healer has learned magical songs from the plant spirits. 9. Western medicine is of no use against *mal de agua,* but makes the symptoms worse. 10. One can protect himself from the attack by means of tobacco smoke and magical songs. 11. Magical boa snake has similar effects as the dolphin. 12. Magical dolphin collaborates with water people. 12.1. Water people steal humans and put them in slavery. 13. Magical dolphin can disguise itself as a white man, *gringo,* who has a big nose and a large hat.

The cultural model is a knowledge system, it tells its bearer what magical dolphin is, what it is capable of doing, how to avoid it and how to treat the illness caused by the magical dolphin. In short, the cultural model provides resources for the intentional system. When, for example, the intentional system believes that *mal de agua* is best treated by the traditional healer, this activates the cultural model of healer, which has been partially described above. Also, when he believes that the magical dolphin shoots projectiles, this activates the cultural model of projectile, also illustrated in the above model.

Not all contents available in cultural models are activated, but individual intentional systems differ from each other in that the contents of cultural models are unevenly activated. Experts like traditional healers have better access to the resources provided by cultural models, whereas the laypeople have more restricted access.

Here is an example. The projectiles shot into victims are typically described as extensive objects like spines, phlegm, hairballs, insects and other objects. I asked laypeople why it is the case that projectiles cannot be seen or removed is the patient is taken to a hospital and operated. The general answer was that they did not know the reason. Only experts knew the answer, namely that the projectile is magical object and cannot be seen by Western doctors. The projectile has been shot with a magical song, and one who does not know this song, cannot see or remove the projectile.

In ethnography[19] culture is understood as cultural knowledge. Other aspects of culture like behaviour and artifacts are dependent on cultural knowledge. Cultures are thus vast systems of knowledge, organized in cultural models. We have cultural models for illnesses, for weather forecasts, for driving a car, and for shopping in the mall. Cultural models are best described as systems of propositional contents.

Cultural models provide resources for intentional systems. They give building blocks for individual mental models that are then utilized when the contents are processed as beliefs, desires or other mental states. Therefore, cultural models, in contrast with mental models and mental states, are not psychologically present,

but are constructed and maintained in the social interactions. Their ontological status is nonetheless real. Cultural models are part of the social reality, emergent systems that come up as people interact with their environments, most importantly with each other. Like other theoretical entities postulated in ethnology, study of folklore and comparative religion, cultural models result from the operation called inference to best explanation: in order to account for cultural scenes, we have to postulate cultural models.

Ubiquitous ethnography provides the foundations for doing ethnology, folklore studies or comparative religion. Its added value is in explicating the assumptions about intentional systems theory that we commit ourselves to when studying human beings in cultural scenes. Cultural scenes are structured by blueprints captured in cultural models, and therefore our basic toolkit for carrying out cultural research must involve cultural models as well.

Bibliography

Ariely, D. 2008. *Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions.* Harper, New York.

Dennett, D. C. 1981. *Brainstorms—Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.* MIT Press, Cambridge.

Durkheim, E. 1915. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.* Free Press, New York.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1937. *Witchcraft, Orales and Magic among the Azande.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hollis, M. & Lukes, S. (eds) 1982. *Rationality and Relativism.* Blackwell, Oxford.

Hukkinen, J. 1999. *Institutions in Environmental Management—Constructing Mental Models and Sustainability.* Routledge, London.

Johnson-Laird, P. N. 1983. *Mental Models.* Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Kamppinen, M. 1988a. Espíritus incorporados—The Roles of Plants and Animals in the Amazonian Mestizo Folklore. *Journal of Ethnobiology* 2: 141–8.

Kamppinen, M. 1988b. Homo Religiosus Intelligens—Outline for a Cognitivist Theory of Religious Behaviour. *Temenos: Studies in Comparative Religion* 24: 29–38.

Kamppinen, M. 1989a. *Cognitive Systems and Cultural Models of Illness.* FF Communications 244. Academia Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki.

Kamppinen, M. 1989b. Dialectics of Evil—Politics and Religion in an Amazon Mestizo Community. *Dialectical Anthropology* 13: 143–55.

Kamppinen, M. 1990a. Out of Balance—Models of the Human Body in the Medico-Religious Tradition among the Mestizos of the Peruvian Amazon. *Curare: Zeitschrift für Ethnomedizin und transkulturelle Psychiatrie* 2: 89–97.

Kamppinen, M. 1990b. Containers and Boundaries—Metaphors of Illness and the Flow of Knowl- edge in the Peruvian Amazon. In: W. Andritzky (ed.), *Yearbook of Cross-Cultural Psychotherapy.* Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung, Berlin.

Kamppinen, M. 2016. Normative Rationality and the Future Prospects of Religion Education: The Perspective of Scientific Realism. In: P. Antes, A.W. Geertz & M Rothstein (eds.), *Contemporary Views on Comparative Religion*. Equinox, Sheffield.

Luna, L. 1986. *Vegetalismo—Shamanism among the Mestizo Population of the Peruvian Amazon.* Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm.

Luna, L. & Amaringo, P. 1991. *Ayahuasca Visions—The Religious Iconography of a Peruvian Shaman.* North Atlantic Books, Berkeley.

Malinowski, B. 1932. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific.* George Routlegde & Sons, London.

Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A. & Atman, C. J. 2001. *Risk Communication—A Mental Models Approach.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Quinn, N. & Holland, D. 1987. Culture and cognition. In: D. Holland & N. Quinn (eds), *Cultural Models in Language and Thought.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Rescher, N. 1988: *Rationality—A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason.* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Searle, J. 1983. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Shore, B. 1996. *Culture in Mind—Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning.* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Spradley, J. 1979. *The Ethnographic Interview.* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Fort Worth.

Werner, O. & Schoepfle, G. 1987. *Systematic Fieldwork* 1–2. Sage Publications, London.

Wilson, B. (ed.) 1970. *Rationality.* Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

---

[1] This article is based on my book *Intentional Systems Theory as a Conceptual Framework in Religious Studies* (The Edwin Mellen Press 2010).
[2] Dennett 1981.
[3] Searle 1983.
[4] Wilson 1970; Hollis & Lukes 1982.
[5] Ariely 2008.
[6] Rescher 1988.
[7] Kamppinen 2016.
[8] Durkheim 1915, 51.
[9] Durkheim 1915, 73.
[10] Malinowski 1932, 19.
[11] Malinowski 1932, 23.
[12] Malinowski 1932, 427.
[13] Evans-Pritchard 1937, 4–5.

[14] Evans-Pritchard 1937, 5.

[15] Kamppinen 1988a, 1988b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b.

[16] Luna 1986; Luna & Amaringo 1991.

[17] Johnson-Laird 1983; Hukkinen 1999; Morgan *et al.* 2001.

[18] Quinn & Holland 1987; Shore 1996.

[19] Spradley 1979; Werner & Schoepfle 1987.