Media, Interaction and Integration
Media, Interaction and Integration:
Cross-Cultural Dialogues in the Baltic Sea Area

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MEDIA, INTERACTION AND INTEGRATION. CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUES IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

is a fruit of collaboration between The Doctoral Programme on Integration and Interaction in the Baltic Sea Region and the Family Federation of Finland. This is the second time the two organisations combine their interests in a form of a book, the first one being the volume of articles concentrating on the themes of power and control in 2004 (Power and Control. Perspectives on Integration and Multiculturalism in Europe). For the Doctoral programme this is already the 10th book, which proves that the questions of cultural integration and interaction have not lost their relevance. Indeed, new researchers have continued to emerge in this important field of scholarship.

I would like to thank the Family Federation of Finland and its director, Dr Ismo Söderling, for the co-operation, which made the publication of this book such a pleasant undertaking.

Finally, it is of course our own doctoral students that have made this book possible by contributing their articles. Doctoral students Heli Hyvönen and Tuomas Räsänen, and Janne Tunturi, the coordinator of the Doctoral programme, have done a great job in editing the book. We have good reason to be grateful to all of them.

Turku
10th of June 2009

Keijo Virtanen
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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea area has witnessed many rapid social and economic changes. Some of these have reflected global trends, while others have been of a more local nature. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed northern Europe: in wiping away the border between East and West, it once again allowed us to see the Baltic Sea as a sea of cooperation and interaction; of disagreement as well, but in any case as an entity. Now, twenty years later, people living around the Baltic Sea have been able to observe the area by travelling to nearly every corner. At the same time, the media – the Internet, newspapers, television, film and radio – transmit news and information within seconds, thus influencing our awareness of events around us.

Whether the media have challenged or supported our own observations, their role has been vital in creating the modern conception of the Baltic Sea Region. The media have shown us how circum-Baltic societies resemble each other and face the same problems. The media have also constructed boundaries and borders of different kinds, enabled communication between the citizens of various nations, and participated in the social, cultural and intellectual revolutions of the 1990s and 2000s.

The articles in this book illuminate the role of the media in unmasking and creating a present and past reality in the Baltic world of the twentieth and twenty-first century. The first section of the book addresses the involvement of the media in building regions and human networks in the Baltic Sea area. The second section focuses on immigration and the exchange of ideas, and how they have been presented and negotiated in the media.

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The Baltic Sea area is far too diverse and scattered to be recognized as a genuine region. No-one identifies themselves as being a ‘Baltician’. If one uses the word ‘Baltic’, the reference will not be to the sea but to the
three Baltic states. During the past century there has been no shortage of attempts, by political and cultural elites, to build the Baltic Sea area as a region. Any real and shared political commitment to regionalism, however, has so far been lacking and initiatives have remained vague if not artificial. On the one hand, regionalism within the Baltic Sea area has been suppressed by the long-term goal of all-European unification. This has been counterbalanced by a strong and growing tendency towards decentralization, most visibly expressed in the strengthening and re-establishing of historical regions. These conflicting ideas and concepts of regionalism, however, do not necessarily rule each other out. Rather, regions can and do overlap: the Baltic Sea area is today a rich mosaic of regions and human networks, and has been such for decades if not centuries.

The media are powerful allies for those who wish to advance regionalization processes and lobby regions to the outside world. At the same time, irrespective of changing political currents the media strengthen the sense of togetherness among those who receive them. Thus it can be said that the media contribute to consolidating existing regions and creating new ones. The close connection between the media and regionalism is highlighted, as Tapio Peltomaa’s article demonstrates, at the local and provincial level. The local newspapers are often amongst the most visible regional actors and symbols, and even their area of circulation may correspond with regional borders. Nevertheless the media also familiarize wider communities and even people with each other, and by so doing are in position to illustrate the possible benefits of closer interaction. Although in the context of this book it is possible to present only fragmented case studies on the theme in question, we hope that the articles in the first section prove that in building regions the media matter; in fact, they matter a great deal.

Karri Kiiskinen focuses on the media images of EU-funded cross-border cultural cooperation in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, an area with a very specific past and present cultural diversity and heritage. By presenting two examples of Polish border localities and cross-border actors, Kiiskinen shows how the media have contributed, by situating culture in cross-border interactions and cooperating with the projects, in transforming these localities and framing transnational flows and agency. In terms of the quality of cross-border relations, in these images the materiality of cultural flows implies the boundedness of culture (the possibility of being out of place; cross-border cultural non-sharing), while immateriality rather
suggests borderlessness (locality as the interconnected, global, symbolic presence of a shared culture).

Tuomas Räsänen examines the coverage of Baltic Sea environmental problems in the Finnish media in the early 1970s. Räsänen argues that the media contributed significantly to creating an awareness in Finnish society of the environmental crisis, which in turn pushed Finnish politicians to initiate environmental cooperation among the Baltic Sea states. During the Cold War, environmental cooperation was the first concrete sign of a re-emerging regionalism in the Baltic Sea area; for the first time since the 1930s, all the Baltic Sea states participated as equal partners in international cooperation.

Tapio Peltomaa examines the role of the media in regional lobbying in three administrative and economic regions in the Baltic Sea area (Southwest Finland and the Tampere Region in Finland, the Skåne Region in Sweden). The traditional news media have served as effective lobbying forums for regions, as well as strategic allies. Peltomaa argues, however, that regional lobbyists have not employed all the potential the media could provide. The use of new internet-based media applications, for example, might lead to wider attention to regional interests and thus a better result.

Pauli Heikkilä looks at the history of European integration during the interwar period from the Estonian point of view. His analysis of the public discourse on foreign policy compares cooperation among immediate neighbors by the Baltic Sea to aspirations for a continental union. These two regions could be seen as complementary alternatives; eventually, however, on the eve of an unprecedented economic depression, the pleasant language of solidarity and brotherhood was easily dismissed and a commitment was made to narrow, short-sighted national interests.

In the age of the modern technology we can receive news from the other side of the world in a few seconds and it takes only 90 minutes to fly from the Danish straits to the other end of the Baltic Sea. We can thus participate in many concrete and virtual social settings. Sometimes people move between places so frequently that it is becoming challenging to draw the line between international mobility and immigration. On the other hand, the number of migrants has increased during the last thirty years. People leave their home country, whether willingly or otherwise, to seek a
better life elsewhere. The second part of the book turns to people in exile and ideas that float across natural, social and national borders.

In order to understand and analyze these processes, we need to consider a few key terms. First, it is necessary to point out that in ordinary life national boundaries are rather vague. It is better to speak of the social location, which refers to a “person’s positions within inter-connected power hierarchies created through historical, political, economic, geographic, kinship-based and other socially stratifying factors”.

Secondly, the writers argue that there are other characteristics which are as strong as nationality. One’s gender and family, or one’s social and political goals, may dictate the level and objects of interaction and integration.

The first article in this section introduces the study of the exchange of people and ideas in the Baltic Sea Region from an exciting vantage point. Silja Laine discusses ways in which the architectural discourse of the 1920s constructed the Finnish capital, Helsinki, following the principles of an idealised American city. Laine shows how the interest in the skyline of the city reflected dreams of a new kind of urbanity. She reminds us of how the media create and enlarge expectations concerning the future cityscape, which ultimately can be more significant than the actual buildings.

Next, the focus turns to refugee movements. In the second article Sari Sirva discusses the right to family life. In principle, this is one of the fundamental human rights under the international human rights law and must thus be treated globally in a fair and equal manner irrespective of the jurisdiction in which it is materialized. The article discusses the approach of EU law to the question of universality. It analyzes the protection of the right of refugees to family reunification, whose understanding of a family may differ from that adopted within the EU. The core question discussed is how and to what extent decision- and law-makers have protected – or should protect – families transcending the scope of the European nuclear family.

In the third article, Jonathan H. L’Hommedieu looks at the role played by the psychological warfare of American foreign policy during the Cold War in the potential development of alternative media outlets for the Soviet-occupied Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Radio

Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America, despite being used as a means of psychological warfare, were intended to be viewed as legitimate sources of truthful information. To help the Baltic republics gain access to the broadcasts of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, Baltic exiles residing in the United States lobbied on their behalf. The article further looks at the way Baltic exiles perceived these radio stations as a means of maintaining contact with their homelands.

After that the section looks at gender issues. Heidi Kurvinen discusses gendered norms in the Finnish media sphere during the late 1940s. She argues that despite the increasing number of women entering journalism in Finland, female journalists faced various problems in defining their place. She approaches the theme by analysing the minutes of the meetings of the Association of Women Journalists in Finland, which was established in 1946. In addition, she uses newspaper articles which shed light on the overall atmosphere among journalists.

Finally, Heli Hyvönen focuses on the varied situations of contemporary female immigrants in a historical context. The role of men and women as immigrants is different. She argues that in order to comprehend the impact of social location and diverse forms of migration, we have to regard such factors as the political and historical context and the immigrant’s social class, ethnicity, level of education, religious views and personal characteristics. The article discusses traditional (gender-blind) theories, asking whether they still have any value in explaining immigration.

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This is the tenth volume in the series of the Graduate School on Integration and Interaction in the Baltic Sea Region. The School has almost as long a history as the new ‘Baltic Sea Region’. During the past fourteen years its doctoral students have attempted to gain a scholarly grasp of these changing societies. Through the books and articles they have written, and as persons who have travelled widely in the region, these scholars have themselves been part of the processes of integration and interaction. Among many others, their works and lives have been part of the process which has created the Baltic Sea area we know today. The articles in this volume are based on the papers given in the colloquium entitled Media, Culture, Integration, which took place in September 2007 in Turku, Finland. The writers have since then worked faithfully to expand their original
papers into more extensive articles. We are very happy they have found the time to participate in this book project.

We want to express our thanks for the help we have received from the *Graduate School on Integration and Interaction in the Baltic Sea Region*. Its Director Keijo Virtanen and the coordinating committee has enabled the continuation of the series over the years. We thank the Director of the *Family Federation of Finland*, Ismo Söderling, who is also a member of the committee, for accepting our book as part of the series published by the Federation, and for all his help. Special thanks go to Ellen Valle for the language revision of the articles and to Leila Koivunen for showing us how to make a book using a renowned (and complicated) editing programme. Both have been extremely patient.

Turku and Lappeenranta, 2 December 2008

Heli Hyvönen
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I Building regions
Borderless form or bounded substance: Media images of cultural cooperation in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland

Karri Kiiskinen

Situating ‘culture’

In the Polish national newspapers, symbolic acts of reconciliation (pójednania) have been discussed since Ukraine became independent in 1991. It was, however, not until 2004 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that a connection was made in the media between Ukrainians fighting against their “Soviet-type” regime and the “spontaneous solidarity” of the Poles. It has been noted that the Polish media played a significant role in contributing to this “cross-border intercultural dialogue and cooperation”,¹ for example by disseminating images of demonstrations and concerts where Poles wore the orange symbols of the Ukrainian opposition. Thus various cultural events also gained importance in a political context and in terms of ethnic cultural heritage; the Orange Revolution even created a space for discussing the Polish past of Lwów.² On the other hand, actual cultural cross-border cooperation in the borderland, which has been partly financed by the EU, has not been mentioned in this context; particularly

² Lwów/Lviv was part of independent Poland during the interwar period and currently has a population of 735 000. Historically, most Poles regard Lwów as a Polish town, but it also has significance in the history of the Jews and the Ukrainians; see John Czaplicka, “Lviv, Lemberg, Leopolis, Lwów, Lvov: A City in the Crosscurrents of European Culture,” in Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture, ed. John Czaplicka (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, 2005), 13–46.
in the local press we find only few reports concerning this new connection between the two peoples.

In studies concerning borderland cooperation, the relationship between the cultural dimension of cross-border cooperation and the media has been a neglected subject. These are both discursive terrains which bind border peoples within their states as well as linking them across borderlines. Cross-border cultural cooperation can be seen as a process that delineates both this continuity and this disjuncture in border regions. In this article, I consider the relations between EU-funded Polish-Ukrainian cultural cross-border cooperation projects and the local media in terms of how Polish newspapers are involved in the “culture of cooperation” and “cooperation on/through culture”. These two strategies have been used as a way of problematizing the diverse roles played by culture in cross-border cooperation. It has been suggested that these intersections of cooperation and culture create new forms of shared memory and experience, new ways to communicate, new expectations of individuals and groups regarding their own behavior as well as the needs and actions of political and social

3 I understand culture as a culture of all humanity, formed in individually based processes. However, the “cultures” in this article relate to different ways of freezing, packaging and delimiting culture in a globalized world; in other words, it is at present utilized in creating new spaces for action and new senses of belonging due to its power to mark differences and shared values, especially in the form of “cultural heritage”. These affect the flows of ideas as well as practices across borders, but not without reference for example to the materiality of the ceded borderland.


6 This article is based on interviews with Polish cultural cooperation actors (interviews, PL/07/04 and PL/07/09, conducted and in possession of the author; author’s translations) and digitally archived articles from seven local/regional and two national newspapers. The “local” newspapers cover most of the border area in the Polish Lubelskie and Podkarpackie voivodeships. Local/regional: Echo Dnia (ED), Sztafeta Stalowa Wola (SSW), Kurier Lubelski (KL), Nowy Tygodzien (NT), Nowiny (N), Super Tydzień (ST), Dziennik Wschodni (DW); National/regional: Gazeta Wyborcza (GW), Tygodnik Powszechny (TP). In the case of the national newspapers, the GW was founded in 1989 by a group of journalists and activists belonging to the underground democratic opposition press and is known for critical journalism. TP, which is a Roman Catholic weekly magazine, has also had many articles (in special supplements) concerning Polish eastern relations, and has provided space for “intellectual discussions”; see Stanisław Stepień, ed., Buletyn Ukrainoznawstwo, Vol. 9 (Przemyśl: Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy w Przemyślu, 2003).
formations and institutions. By looking at the writing in the local print media on cultural cooperation and its actors, my aim is to illuminate the ways that this cooperation itself, involving actors crossing national boundaries, is preconditioned by the changing role of the local media. In the media, ‘culture’ here serves as a “marker and agent of tradition and change.” By linking different “cultures” of cultural cross-border co-operation (practices and contents), the media seem to make a significant contribution in this cross-border interaction.

Although the Polish-Ukrainian border is still (or again) a strictly guarded border, it is also a permeable external border of the EU (and since December 2007 of the Schengen area). We should therefore look for “ambiguous dealings”, rather than simple dichotomies between acts that support the state and acts that subvert it. I believe that a closer look at “culture”, and its mediated images, may also reveal how local cultural project actors are affected by the processes of transnationalization and Europeanization. Although the official politics of culture typically conceives culture in terms of “non-political” cooperation, we see that via media images Polish localities in the borderland are very much engaged in issues of identity, cultural practice and ethnic relations. Media images, however, do not merely simplify cultural complexities; they also disseminate new optional (or strategic) attitudes towards “culture” and “cultural heritage”, offering a form of escape from the asymmetries inherent in this ceded borderland. It is here that we can observe how Europe really happens. In the borderland these conceptualizations of culture vary in terms of how the actors locate themselves in the transnational interactional space. In the case of actors in cooperation, the strictly local and past-based, hierarchical “cultural heritages” seem to give way to cultural fields of interaction that

are transnational and contemporary, democratized and economized. In order to understand how this game between metaphors, media and project actors is played out in the case of locally based cultural institutions, we need to look at how cultural diversity is defined, first in the context of local institutions and then in that of the transnational project.

Local multiculturalisms

The Polish-Ukrainian borderland has been described as peripheral and rural. It is also a ceded borderland. On the Polish side the region is still, even after the border changes and population movements caused by the Second World War, one of the most diverse regions in Poland in terms of ethnic cultural heritage and minority cultures. However, to a large extent this diversity originates in and remains an issue of the past; in other words, it is represented by the material remains originating from the period before the Second World War. At the time national identifications were not yet well established, despite political attempts for example at Polonization. The war resulted in border changes; in terms of population, it resulted in homogenized national territorial spaces on both sides of the new border. Although official propaganda after the war emphasized “fraternal” cooperation with the neighboring Soviet republics, no free movement was allowed across the border. The USSR regarded its formerly Polish eastern territories in terms of total annexation, and thus Polish attempts to recover the material cultural heritage from these areas, as compensation for wartime losses of “Polish culture”, were not realized. In these attempts, private and national interest found “common ground”, and this was further strengthened by a nationalistic propaganda that emphasized the anti-Polish feelings of Poland’s eastern neighbors. The local Polish communist authorities, for example, manipulated local fears, warning that the former

11 The estimated number of Ukrainians working in Poland as of the time of writing (February 2008) was 1.5 million, but geographically they seldom stay in the borderland area (Przekrój Magazine 7/2008).
inhabitants would come back to reclaim their property. It was particularly the Ukrainians who were described as the natural enemies of the Poles. Barriers between ethnically diverse groups grew stronger with a censorship that prohibited open discussion, and a lack of joint activities that might have promoted social integration. The social and cultural activities of the few minorities left on the Polish side were controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{13}

After 1989, public funding for culture in Poland shifted gradually from the central to the local administrative level. Many Polish local cultural institutions are nowadays involved in local politics as well as carrying responsibilities in international cooperation and promoting their municipalities.\textsuperscript{14} The local, mostly political elites have to meet not only the challenge of sustaining the social and cultural past of their towns but also the needs of the present cultural diversity, resulting from the border location and movement across it. It is still common for these “elites” to refer to the multicultural traditions of the past; this is a multiculturalism without conflicts, which often has no correspondence in the present-day local population and is only loosely based on experiences of good neighborhood and tolerance.\textsuperscript{15} This seems understandable, in that multiculturalism, \textit{wielokulturowosc}, in the Polish sense of the term, has not had a distinctive meaning in a context of identity politics. It usually refers simply to objectively defined cultural attributes.\textsuperscript{16} Apart from this lack of political multiculturalism, Polish cultural policy has also sustained the continuing myth of culture as a \textit{sacrum}, detached from reality: culture is seen as a non-productive sector, further aggravating the perception of a conflict between “heritage” and “development”. Any change would require recognition that

cultural heritage too nowadays has a twofold symbolic dimension: it is at the same time a *sacrum* and a *commoditum*.17

The borderland context seems to reflect this re-adjustment, because the applicability of the “traditional” multiculturalism concept here seems too narrow. The borderland situation also reveals something about the uses of this concept outside the ‘national’. It has been noted that for example “traditional” representations of Ukrainian folklore can be seen as a natural part of the Polish locality, but at the same time non-folklore projects (with elements from mass culture) may cause controversy.18 Sometimes the local inhabitants not only do not understand the intentions but also have prejudices and stereotypical opinions about the institutions engaged in so-called multicultural local projects.19 The cultural institutions in the borderland, however, have to face the challenge of engaging with EU funding (in this case especially cross-border cooperation) and at the same avoid losing touch with the local community. In this respect the usefulness of multiculturalism seems to relate to the boundedness of culture it implies. In a local and touristic sense this has obvious benefits in terms of exoticism, but it seems to arouse controversy and a need for new options in the wider context of cross-border cooperation and related practices. It has been suggested that instead of “multiculturalism”, the concept of “neighborhood”, conceived as the sphere of everyday contacts based on a common system of meanings in the framework of a jointly created culture, would better help to focus on actual local contacts, thus creating possibilities for overcoming otherness.20 This sort of conceptual movement seems to be taking place in the transnational space. Private and national interests seem to be taking different paths.

Defining transnational “cultural commons”

Transnational practices require a view of culture that is less bounded to place and national collective inheritance in order to find overall legitimation. By looking at the intersections of cultural and cross-border cooperation, the instrumental uses of culture are revealed and these reflect the diverse understandings of culture available. Here ‘cultural commons’\textsuperscript{21} are required for legitimating cooperation. At the policy level these are used as a motivation for the projects implemented, but in local communities too there is need to justify cooperation across the border. In modern societies the management of cultural commons is ‘outsourced’, and is often the responsibility of the local or national government. Culture has also been an important argument for international cooperation in local Polish communities,\textsuperscript{22} but often this cultural argument means simply the elimination of asymmetries: that is to say, the other side is defined as \textit{existing} in terms of having culture. The EU-funded cross-border cooperation program realized during 2004–2006, the Polish-Ukrainian Neighborhood program,\textsuperscript{23} defines the role of cultural institutions – including those in the borderland – mainly as a question of ‘access to culture’. In a self-contradictory manner, the program documents state that the projects should aim at “promoting cultural identity, strengthening cultural exchange and the creation of new cultural products”, \textit{but also} at increasing cross-border “people-to-people” cooperation and at “deepening mutual understanding”. Here notions of ‘common culture’ or ‘common heritage’ are used instead of ‘multiculturalism’. It is not only cultural actors that use these cultural commons as an argument in their projects; they also serve as flexible symbols in terms of the mediated images of the culture of cooperation. Especially ‘common cultural heritage’ serves as a label for very diverse projects simply as a way of emphasizing their character as common projects (N2003). The significance of this rhetoric for border localities can be

\textsuperscript{21} This expression refers to the use of ‘culture’ to suggest shared practices and provide a value basis for cooperation, or at least an image of such.

\textsuperscript{22} Adriana Skorupska, ed., \textit{Współpraca Międzynarodowa Samorządu Gminnego} (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2005), 48.

disputed; not only is it sometimes criticized in the media (DW2004), but it also has some obvious limitations.\(^{24}\)

After 1989, the processes of democratization in both countries forced the dominant, culturally privileged Poles to face the cultural and ethnic diversity in their regions: the physical traces (such as cemeteries, churches and synagogues) could no longer be regarded simply as remnants of a blurred past, but increasingly had to be seen in terms of their cultural belonging and ownership. Luckily, other processes have also been under way. The privatization of property is still problematic in Poland, but the cultural heritage has also been profoundly affected by the changing rules of the game. Thus a heritage monument becomes a \textit{commoditum} rather than a \textit{sacrum}. This also tells of a conflict between individual and public interests in matters concerning heritage, since private interests and commercial actors also see opportunities in this ‘common heritage’. The Polish position towards the ceded borderlands has also changed: repatriation is not only seen as less important for the integrity of Poland’s national cultural heritage, but as actually harmful, since this heritage now serves as “tangible evidence of the Polish input in the culture of this multicultural region of Europe”.\(^{25}\) The formerly displaced location of Polish heritage has become beneficial. This involves the idea that here the national cultural heritage functions as a source of value, is valuable as such, and that restitution, now conceived as a ‘cultural cleansing’, would be ethically dubious as it would go against the idea of ‘common European heritage’ (which is a responsibility of the Council of Europe).\(^{26}\) The increasing number of Poles living in Ukraine has further diminished the need to restore this heritage.

It was as late as 2003 that the Polish legislature recognized that cultural heritage has not only a national dimension, but that it is also part of the ‘common European heritage’. In the case of museums the gap is still widening between those emphasizing cultural safeguarding rather than viewing culture as a development factor. As the Polish art historian J. Purchla has noted:

\(^{24}\) For example the notion of a common history is a delicate subject: one project aimed at “bringing closer the histories of the borderland” resulted in anger when the Ukrainian partners described Poles as occupiers (DW2004).


\(^{26}\) Ibid.
this is not the end but the beginning of a new era in which heritage will cease to be a burden or a problem that triggers conflicts between peoples and nations. Instead it may prove to have development potential albeit on one condition: that it will be our common heritage.\textsuperscript{27}

Since the Second World War, controversies in European countries over displaced cultural heritage have increasingly been resolved in terms of redefining it as a common heritage. When objects belong to more than one national heritage, for instance, a collection can be created representing a common heritage.\textsuperscript{28} In a similar manner, the role of EU-funded projects has to do with making these ‘common heritages’ available to the public even without repatriation. This conclusion seems too partial; from the perspective of local actors, these considerations of a ‘European multicultural heritage’ either remain an intellectual exercise or can be used to represent the interwar period and national cultures in idealized form. Here ‘common heritage’ sounds like no one’s heritage. I argue that actors cooperating across borders in the local environment have to find other arguments to support their practices; that is, other ‘cultures’. Although these projects may be based on very pragmatic and logical financial arguments and practices, they still have to find some ‘culture’ to match their personal or institutional interests. And it is in this process that the local media also have a role to play.

In the EU project documents, cultural matters relate mainly to tourism in the borderland, and thus to the material legacy of the region.\textsuperscript{29} Conveniently, however, the concept \textit{spuścizna kulturalna}, referring to cultural legacy in terms of cultural output (as well as to the personal archives of deceased artists), is used instead of the notion \textit{dziedzictwo kulturalne}, meaning something that has been inherited as part of a collective inheri-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[27] Purchla 2005, 12–17.
\item[28] Kowalski 2005, 173.
\item[29] These include palaces, castles, historic city centers, religious architecture (Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim), engineered constructions, and wooden village architecture. It is worth noting that these also include the ‘places and buildings’ of minorities (Tatars, Ormians and Jews) as well as the Nazi concentration camps. Władza Wdrażająca Program Współpracy Przygranicznej PHARE, \textit{Program Sąsiedztwa Interreg IIIA/Tacis CBC Polska-Białoruś-Ukraina 2004–2006}, 12.
\end{footnotes}
This implies that cultural heritage is no longer regarded simply as something to be protected as a collective responsibility in the framework of multiculturalism. In principle, the role of any kind of border or boundary between the localities is diminished and it also simplifies the enactment of cross-border agency. Thus defining cultural commons seems to be a way of addressing the new transnational flows of ideas and practices. The ‘culture of the past’ is selectively emphasized. This raises questions as to what happens when particular kinds of transnational flows, such as projects concerning popular culture or material culture, become part of this interactional space framed by the ‘cultural commons’. In essence, these projects deal with the present neighborhood or directly involve culture understood in a past national or ethnic framework. First, however, let us take a look at the setting where these flows are to be received and transmitted: the local media.

Mediated project results

What happens to the images of cultural commons in the local media and project environment? Project guidelines emphasize the role of project promotion in creating a demand for program funds (for this purpose the use of EU emblems and program logos is crucial). This is true to the extent that “reporting the project is as important as managing it”. Thus these cultural projects, as ‘soft projects’, have to cooperate with the media; to a large extent it is these media relations that define the hard-to-measure suc-


cess of the projects. Sponsored articles\(^{34}\) have reversed local relationships: previously the newspapers functioned as media patrons for cultural institutions, but now it is the projects that pay for the newspapers.\(^{35}\) This means more or less that the results are negotiated with the local media rather than with the local or regional program authorities. For cultural actors the EU-inspired media interest seems to create the possibility of professionally and personally fulfilling working lives, but also economic risks, as well as a new understanding of the relationship with the local public, especially youth culture. A remark by a museum director is rather revealing:

\[
\text{I am not afraid of competition, it is this money from the [European] Union, I can now also be competitive, competition is GOOD. Then we all start to do it ... you can't be afraid. (PL/07/04)}
\]

There seems to be a need to get rid of preconceived categories, such as divisions between culture, marketing, and public funding, but there are also risks if the proposed project is not accepted as ‘theirs’ it is supposed to be.\(^{36}\)

At the local level, the public places the responsibility for providing information about neighboring countries on the shoulders of journalists, but it is also expected from local cultural institutions.\(^{37}\) Since the projects and the media are so closely interdependent, the issue of legitimacy\(^{38}\) seems to be of particular relevance. It has been suggested that the Polish local media are often influenced by the local (political and economic) elites, and that this is also a reason why the media do not play a bigger role in


\(^{35}\) PL/07/09.

\(^{36}\) Paweł Łuczecko, Zrozumieć Własną Kulturę. Antropologia Współczesności w Polsce (Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy NOMOS, 2006), 142.


\(^{38}\) Katarzyna Pokorna-Ignatowicz, “Etyka we Współczesnym Polskim Dziennikarstwie,” in Media a Integracja Europejska, eds. Sasińskiej-Klas and Agnieszka Hess (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2004), 188.
community development. It is, however, the local print media that report on the projects, and it is usually the local town mayor or the director of the cultural institution that gets interviewed. No comments are requested from the Ukrainians, even if they are partners in the projects. The local newspapers also often focus on the negative aspects of cross-border interaction in general (smuggling, corruption), but in the case of cultural cooperation projects such issues do not arise. On the other hand, media images of local economic and cultural interconnectedness seem to help narrow the gap between ideal and reality. The local papers, for example, focus on reporting new cultural projects, and they never fail to point out how much EU money these activities are bringing to the locality. They promise a ‘European’ change. Most recently, the internet has provided projects with a modern and a relatively independent channel for disseminating information, one which also enables them to remain alive after implementation. So far these websites have had a rather formal structure and are often “under construction”.

Local perspectives on cultural flows

Speaking of cultural flows in this case does not mean that there are no boundaries or borders involved. On the contrary: I am attempting to delineate the new limits and excitements related to these ‘cultural movements’. It has been suggested that the changing role of the state, due to globalization and regionalization, enhances local/cultural definitions of borders rather than state/political ones. In terms of institutions, old values are rapidly encountering new ones that are being imposed by European and global innovations. In this process the local communities are active participants; now they can define the borderland from their own

41 For example in the EU ‘culture’ is seen as no longer in need of protection from the normal laws of economics but is instead a set of commercial industries and commodities Cris Shore, Building Europe. the Cultural Politics of European Integration (London New York: Routledge, 2000), 22.
perspective, and organize their individual and collective lives according to these definitions. In the Polish-Ukrainian borderland this kind of adaptation, or culture-creating subjectivity, has increased, and recently for example ‘national’ popular culture (music) has begun to take form on the Ukrainian side, just as the use of the Ukrainian language has increased.

Since the local media are such an integral part of the project setting, they have to be taken into account in assessing the cultural flows along which cultural ideas and practices, especially heritage and popular culture, move across national boundaries. As a particular culture of communication, the media affect the categorization of the modern world and the reification of subjects and perspectives; in other words, how we perceive reality and cultural difference. To take a simplified example: a local Polish journalist, writing about her trip across the border, in a single phrase managed to describe her perception of the cultural distance: “Ukraine, it is just half an hour away, but a totally different world and culture.” (DW 2004)

Typically the local media seldom ask cultural actors about the event; with the Ukrainians this never takes place. Instead, the city leaders present the ‘official version’ of the meaning of the event for cross-border cooperation, which is usually an economic one. In the local borderland context, where we find interaction between the culture of cooperation and what is seen as ‘one’s own culture’ as sensed in everyday life, the media matter; this is because at a distance from the centers the local socio-political processes operate outside the official media-political realm, and media images show an interconnected image of the locality, for example when it is associated with European presence and funding.

In terms of materialized cooperation, the meaning of the symbols of national reconciliation (pojednania) as well as the notions of common heritage should not be overestimated, as they are frequently opposed to

44 Y. Hrycak (TP2005), T. Snyder (TP2006).
46 Some articles criticize this simple rhetoric of breaking stereotypes and building bridges (N 2003).
the experience of interaction and the asymmetrical disputes over cultural heritage that still lurk under the surface, “in terms both of property and of cultural belonging”.\(^{47}\) I next present two cases which show how cultural institutions have drawn the attention of the media particularly due to their contribution to these cultural flows. These cases are successful in terms of structuring these flows anew despite the border, and since these institutions have applied for EU funding ever since the first PHARE calls.

The profiting *House of Culture*\(^{48}\)

In Poland, the Houses of Culture were previously run by state enterprises, but today they are creating a new image for themselves as shelters for amateur art and various programs aiming at broadening participation in cultural life.\(^{49}\) In the case of this particular House of Culture, the focus of the local newspapers has been on the political connections of the director and how she has managed to rescue her institution with EU funding. In 2003 the financial situation was serious. The media reported that due to the financial changes in the operational environment, certain organizational changes were necessary, including the adoption of entrepreneurial practices such as the use of marketing (ST, NT, DW, KL 2003). Later this kind of business management in general was seen as the reason for its success (NT, ST 2007), and now EU funding has even become a measure of success in the media (NT). Culture has become profitable.\(^{50}\) This has at the same time stabilized the position of the director, as was observed when the director led an election campaign for the mayor (although the latter was in the end not re-elected). The media first prophesied that her days were counted, but were surprised the same time stabilized the position of the director, as was observed when the director led an election campai


\(^{48}\) One fourth of the annual budget of this institution derives from EU funding. It is situated in a town of 70000 inhabitants less than 100 km from the border, and has a very present Orthodox legacy.

\(^{49}\) Ilczuk and Drela 2007, 50

\(^{50}\) The director was one the first two local actors to receive ‘large-scale EU funding’, i.e. 150000 euros, for the renovation of a building that was to be a “Polish-Ukrainian center for cultural cooperation” (ST 2004, KL, ST 2005). Poverty and culture are not juxtaposed in the local media.
gn when she was able to remain in her position (ST, DW). This was again seen as a result of her success in acquiring EU funding. Thus these articles not only moved from a critical to a supportive stance in writing about her, but also created an image of the local society and culture as connected – internally, externally, and across the border – with EU funding.51 In this context, ‘culture’ means local economic and social development.52 The ‘transborder’ aspect is clearly in the background.

1. EU funding has enabled the renovation of this large House of Culture building. The framed posters of implemented EU projects occupy a prominent place next to the Exhibition/Ball Room.

The increasing local independence of the House of Culture has not meant that it has become transnational. It has simply found a new option for funding its cultural services, which are still based on a simple cross-

51 Although they are not reported in the press, financial and practical risks are common in these projects with the Ukrainian partners. For example, they may not come to an event as agreed; but a bigger problem is that the Ukrainians simply choose and send their participants to Poland, but Poles never get to visit the Ukrainian side because funding for that is not available.
52 Cultural activities “are not only culture anymore”, but result in the increasing demand for services as well as bringing income to artists who lead workshops. For the Ukrainians, however, it simply means “they can come here and sell their products”. (PL/07/09)
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border character. However, for the director (PL/07/09) this has meant a new way of working because of all the foreign contacts and responsibilities towards the media:

We do significant things, I am personally very responsible for what we do, I strive to make sure the event is good, and announced in the media accordingly, so that it does not go unnoticed, and will continue to exist after the event, in publications...

On the other hand she also sees how the local newspapers

... compete with each other … we have to be diplomatic … everyone should be happy because then everyone makes money on the projects. In all projects we allocate money for promotion so that … they are satisfied.

If the media are not happy, the director will expect some negative comments in that newspaper on the work of the institution. In this particular local context, however, critical newspaper writings seem to concern only malpractices in the regional Euroregion office and thus do not directly concern the actual projects (NT, KL, DW, GW).

The images of the projects support the view that EU funding has (mostly) been applied simply as an extension of cultural services and is based on the logic of presenting cultural activities as ‘traditions’ from the other side of the border. EU projects, since 2003, have been focused around the most important local cultural event, the City Days, where Ukrainians too are invited as guests (ST, ED, DW, KL). EU funding does not apply for this type of cyclical cultural event; but the director emphasizes that “even if all projects have a common goal, to learn about culture in its different aspects, they are all different.” In practice, this EU-funded part of the program during the City Days concerns a traditional handicrafts market and folklore groups, while the rest of the program, often financed
by local sponsors, involves more popular forms of culture, such as popular Polish music stars. The latter has attracted most of the media attention. In articles concerning the projects, differences across the border (whether institutional, i.e. in relation to the public, or conceptual – culture as part of economic development53) do not come up, even if the director considers them both obvious and subject to change, as the Polish side may act as an example for the Ukrainians.

In this respect one project has had particular importance. Initially begun in 2003 as a local rock band competition, this event has attracted attention, and not only from the local media; since 2006, as a ‘project event’, it has also had participants from the Ukraine “due to EU funding” (ST 2006, KL, GW) and has attracted media attention in the national press (GW). However, the problems related to this cultural flow do not surface in the articles.54 Instead, the director emphasizes that what is common and shared in culture nowadays are trends that concern young people, and that this project has also resulted in changes in the cooperating Ukrainian provincial border town: now they too have started to emphasize ‘Ukrainian-language popular culture’ rather than ‘folk cultures’.

The dynamic museum55

In the second case, the institution – a regional museum – is also very prominent in the town where it is located, although it has operated only for a few years. In the articles it is again the changing environment (now TV and the internet) that is seen as demanding changes in the way the museum provides services, but not necessarily as an economic necessity

53 For example the director describes how they asked the Ukrainians to send “local creative artists” to sell their handicrafts, but they sent a person from the museum with museum objects. In the case of music, they were asked to send other than folk music groups, but they only wanted to send their “national groups”.
54 The Ukrainian House of Culture had difficulties in finding these bands (PL/07/09), but the Polish director was also afraid of such an event: “rock music, I was also afraid because the youth, they need double security…but everything went fine…although we expected that everyone would be dressed in black… (PL/07/09)
55 Two thirds of the annual budget comes from EU funding and it operates in a provincial town, previously 80% Jewish, which from the 1930s onwards was transformed into a mining town. The Jewish quarters have barely survived.
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(ED, GW 2004), but as opportunity to be ‘European’: “Before Ukraine joins the European Union, it wants to get to know its culture and will not spare the expense of presenting it”. (N 2005)

This has actually offered the director the possibility of rejecting some local sponsors, although they have been increasingly interested in the museum due to the media presence in connection with its EU projects. When this museum organized “the largest project on Ukrainian culture in Poland during the year 2005” (at a cost of 150000 €), in the media it gave the local mayor, a historian by training, the opportunity to express how “this cultural cooperation, to which also the town can contribute, will lead to economic and research cooperation” (ED 2005, 2006) and “support town promotion” (SSW 2006). The old manor house, which was built in the eighteenth century for the Lubomirski family and which under Communism housed a school, has also been restored with EU funding to serve as the main building of the museum. As it is located in the midst of the deteriorated old Jewish quarter, it dramatically emphasizes, in a public space, the benefits of EU funding. In relation to both the local and the media appeal of the museum the profitable relationship between culture and economy is obvious,56 but the national framework of media images is still crucial.

In this case the director has long been one of the most popular persons in town.57 Media images do not focus on local politics but on her personal success story. Already when she started “her museum” she was selected by the local newspapers as one of the most “important individuals” (N 2002); since then she has won prestigious national museum prizes. She emphasizes her good relations with the similarly-minded town mayor and that the city administration contributes to administering her EU-funded projects.58 The funding aspect of the projects attracts some media attention here as well, but it is actually the materiality of the cross-border cultural flows that makes this museum exceptional. Without any institutional his-

56 The Ukrainian partner institutions in Lwów seem to be ready to combine culture and economy. (PL/07/04)
57 Even the national newspaper has reported that “this director does not stop surprising us: she shows that it is possible to organize outstanding exhibitions – even in this region”. (GW 2004)
58 EU funding has been a crucial motivating factor for the director: even the national media have recognized her museum. On the other hand, there is no permanence in this funding: in applying for funding, everything depends on her ideas. She has visited the USA, but the museum has no western partners. (PL/07/04)
tory of its own, it has been able to focus on benefiting from the cultural flows linked to ‘universal art’ as well as to the asymmetries of the ceded borderland heritage. The peculiarity of this ‘museum’ is that it has almost no collections of its own: the director has managed to make use of the collections in Lwów, where “90 percent of the collection are Polish”. Polish museums have usually asked for these in vain; but now this provincial museum, with EU funding, and a director with no prior Ukrainian contacts, have managed to establish good personal relations on the other side of the border. Thus in the media the director’s achievements are ascribed particular importance, especially as she places these ‘Polish collections’ next to

2. Two thirds of the funding for this museum comes from cross-border EU funding. Despite the transnational projects, local and regional history (regionalia) is a necessary part of the museum “in order to meet the local demands”. The photograph shows the ‘Jewish section’, which is due to be expanded. The regionalia section is promoted especially during the local “Noc Muzeów” (the Long Night of Museums)

59 Especially in the beginning the museum was accused by other museum professionals of being “merely a gallery” and not interested in the region itself, but the director considers that the popularity of the museum has proved that this museum can work in this “different way”: other museums have to change too. (PL/07/04)

60 According to the director, the Ukrainians are “not that willing” to cooperate with “national galleries”, but by cooperating with this provincial museum the Ukrainians can obtain benefits, including modern catalogues (although due to EU regulations these cannot be sold), media publicity, and visits to Poland.
the work of world-renowned artists. As a result the museum has an image in the media of being ‘innovative’, ‘universal’ and ‘dynamic’.

3. At the entrance to the Rzeszów Regional Museum, visitors see a map prepared by the EU-funded tourism project of the Regional Museum in Stalowa Wola, presenting part of the ‘Lubomirski Family Path’. It shows the estates and places that belonged to the Polish magnate family and extends to the Ukrainian side of the border.

The ‘common heritage’ approach of the director also seems very pragmatic with regard to the controversial material heritage of the borderland.

61 Such names as Chagall, Warhol, Miro, van Gogh, Matisse, Dürer, Picasso, Dali etc. have attracted publicity all over Poland, but this ‘universal language of art’ is also localized when ‘self-portrait’ competitions, inspired by these ‘great artists’, are organized.

62 This pragmatic approach also seems to have convinced the Ukrainians. She considers that
although she recognizes that the museum is strongly rooted in the locality and has to have a section of regionalia to satisfy local expectations (PL04). Thus the second floor is dedicated to objects of regional folk culture and religious items.

In a newspaper interview, the director indicates that the choice of a certain Polish magnate family (the Lubomirski family) as the theme of an EU-funded tourism project was “merely a pretext”. She continues: “The focus of the exhibition is not on the power exercised by Polish magnates, but on their contribution to the development of culture in the region.” (GW 2004, 2006)

This cultural heritage is clearly detached from its past political and cultural context; it is this which seems to enable claims of a ‘common heritage’. This means presenting a certain image of this ‘heritage’: “to show that it does not divide but … may connect us” (PL/07/04). In a very practical way it simply presents the properties of this Polish family by constructing a cross-border tourism product. For the local media, however, Ukrainian culture still means folk/religious songs and the Orthodox heritage, which is located on a European scale, between Western and Eastern cultures, as a ‘common culture’ (N 2007). In this museum context, culture means that which is Polish, as reflected in the common use of the term ‘Kresy’ (N 2007, ED 2006, DW 2003). These local interpretations are revealed in the articles dealing with the exhibitions ‘Beautiful Lwow’ and ‘Back to Lwow’ (ED 2005), which were based on the Polish past of the city. These exhibitions were part of a large EU project, entitled Transkultura. The articles report that “actually only the Poles are interested in these

the traditional form of museum management is no longer possible (PL/07/04). For her the new way seems to mean good local and international cooperation with the partners (Polish as well as foreign); ‘high quality’ means that the project idea has to precede the actual program announcement.

63 The Lviv Lubomirski Museum collection has been one of the collections disputed after the war.

64 The director considers that the projects aim at “liquidating the emotional tensions that result from history and at building, rather than hiding the common heritage”; in her view, “no other institutions show this cultural heritage, which was left there, but which was our common heritage”. She “seeks to transcend the nationality” of a particular artist or a historical leader (such as Jan Sobieski) and see him as part of a ‘common heritage’. (PL/07/04)

65 This Polish term, meaning ‘borderland’, refers to the ‘former’ Polish territories that nowadays belong to Ukraine and Belarus.

66 In this way the ‘Polish past of Lwow’ is taken up in the media, but safely on Polish ground.
collections in Lwów”, and that “they offer an emotional trip to interwar Poland” (ED, SSW 2006). The exhibitions are also considered to be of national importance, and not only in terms of media attention; one of the exhibitions based on the Lwówian collections won fourth place in the competition for ‘Best Polish Exhibition’.

In principle the focus here is on the transnational common culture, or transkultura, but the national and local frameworks of experience prevail. In the first case, the House of Culture, the conflicting aspects were located (in the media) in the local political-institutional context, but in case of the museum they concern actual cross-border practices (GW, ED). In a way, the media images imply what the director confirms: many visitors have asked that these “Polish” objects not be given back to the Ukrainians. Media images now also include problems at the border (N 2002) as well as those concerning the exhibitions. For example the authenticity of the art works is questioned (GW, ED, N 2004). All in all, this perhaps gives a more engaged, or legitimate, view of the common heritage as suited to the local perception: Culture is bound to a national framework, rather than being a matter of transnational flows or borderless altogether.

Images of boundary crossings: between commoditum and sacrum

In cultural cooperation across national boundaries, culture can be assigned many meanings and interests. In a borderland context, cultural institutions are expected to support local identity as well as to show what the neighbors have in terms of culture. This may lead to an objectification of the process of cultural communication in the quest for preservation of the authentic. This easily results in an image of bounded territorial cultures. This type of objectified cultural communication, as a form of deeper meaning of cultural cooperation, is reflected by the focus on the contents rather than the practices of cooperation. This process of defining the ‘own’ culture is related to the rhetoric of multiculturalism. It is a common denominator for most cross-border cultural cooperation projects. However, media images of cultural cooperation seem to blur rather than celebrate the ethnic framework by drawing new connections. Categorizations and hierarchies

67 Nic Craith 2007, 281
of culture, for example those related to cultural heritage as a *sacrum*, are difficult to sustain in a borderland context. On the one hand there is the move towards individualization, on the other that towards ‘Europe’. Instead of simple rhetoric, we need to look at what actually is going on.

Projects with a simple cross-border character, and even those with more ambitious aims (based on the notion of cultural commons), seem to be categorized in the local media in terms of folklore or cultural exchange. Furthermore, as in the case of the House of Culture, the simple economic impact of culture is emphasized. Clearly this kind of ‘cross-border character’ does not draw the attention of the media across the border, as images focus on local institutional and political changes rather than on the practices and aims of cross-border cultural cooperation. Cooperation remains a matter of preserving and presenting cultures. The rhetoric is often based on a ‘common culture’ approach, which does not allow the projects to be associated with conflicts or disjuncture because it would go against the image of good relations and a common basis for cooperation. The problematic issue here is that the vast amount of negative media writing dealing with the institutional context, along with other types of border interactions, leads to a perception that nothing significant happens in these projects. This may actually be part of the reason why cultural cooperation, while abundant in projects, has often been downplayed in importance.\(^{68}\) In this context the local perspective of the media means a focus on ‘cooperation on/through culture’, which means ritualistic cultural exchanges. The focus is on substance rather than form, and the others across the border are simply granted an *existence* in terms of ‘culture’ (the financial benefits also remain in the locality). Recently, however, the focus has moved towards popular culture on the Ukrainian side as well (where it is more and more based on the national language). This creates a basis for understanding it as common culture. This is also appreciated by Polish actors and media more than the previous folkloristic or heritage projects. The media seem to be interested in projects that blur the picture, rather than celebrating a neat and tidy one. In this way, the local media contribute to cross-border and transboundary interaction in terms of focusing on new cultural contents.

\(^{68}\) This may also reflect a stage of development in which officials are already used to dealing with the cultural and symbolic content of cooperation. For them, crossing borders is not that special.
In principle, EU funded cross-border projects aim at supporting new kinds of actions across the border (actions that transcend negative stereotypes), but the results remain few. This mismatch between argumentation and results, however, does not cause anxiety among the actors because the media environment allows them to function within their niche. For project actors the responsibility towards their project means the practice of cooperation (form rather than substance) but media writings do not deal with these except when specific material cultural flows are involved. The museum, with its focus on ‘commodities’ – a combination of asymmetrical cultural heritage as well as local political and economic interests – has found a resonance in the Polish mediascape. Its projects place the local institution on the map of Poland and of Europe. It is the locally defined ‘asymmetries of cooperation’ that favor this institution. This change concerns the increasing role of the ‘culture of cooperation’, i.e. new forms of meaning and action, and these also surface in the media. The recently multiplied transnational cultural flows are interesting for the press, and the papers now focus more on the conditions of this kind of interaction: not only in terms of logistics but also of cultural belonging and sensations. This seems to mean that the boundaries and borders of cooperation are being addressed in a novel way. However, it seems that the kind of cross-border interaction that attracts the media has to be asymmetrical or a one-way traffic (in comparison to cyclical cultural exchanges). Now that there is in cultural/ethnic terms either no ‘other side’ or a highly imaginary one (European or universal art), the media deals with the ‘own’ collective heritage (still perceived very much as dislocated: it is multicultural, but it is Polish material heritage placed rhetorically on a European scale). Now it is crucial that the project actors can negotiate their relationship with the local media, since for the latter commodities, conflict and controversy suddenly seem to be an essential part of reporting these flows and the institu-

69 In comparison, some Church organizations have acted on their own when it comes to intensifying local level cross-border interaction and dealing with the region’s difficult past. By adopting many of the practices related to popular culture, these organizations are accustomed to promoting dialogue due to the emphasis on “the evil which each and every individual has to confront”. What is in focus, rather than ‘utopia’ (multiculturalism), is individual responsibility. (DW 2004) It is perhaps symptomatic that religious organizations now also have the possibility of acquiring EU funding.

70 A term used by the museum director (PL/07/04).
tions providing them. In the background is perhaps a need for promotion and legitimacy.

EU funding has so far been used solely on the Polish side of the border; the Ukrainians have usually added a cross-border character to these projects. The perspectives of the media and the actors in cultural cooperation have become increasingly similar, which requires a new look at the dialectic between cultural actors and the media across the border. This may narrow the gap between the experience of interaction (culture as a matter that both prevents and supports outbound cooperation) and the culture of cooperation. Although it is the local and national level that prevail in media images, the increasing focus on practices and limitations may also help to subvert boundaries and bring more legitimacy to cultural cooperation as a whole. Further changes can be predicted as soon as genuinely common projects (with balanced financing on both sides of the border) are enabled in the programming period of 2007–2013.

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Tuomas Räsänen

Introduction

The Dutch jurist and statesman Hugo Grotius famously argued in his *Mare Liberum* in 1609 that the high seas should be free to all, for sailing and benefitting from the bounty provided by nature. Since Grotius the idea of the freedom of the seas has been, if not a universally accepted principle, a dominant interpretation for the exploitation of trading routes and fish stocks.¹ Grotius said nothing of the sea as a disposal site for waste. In practice the concept of the freedom of the seas has also been translated into the freedom for humankind to discharge into the sea every drop of waste it produces. For centuries the exploitation of the sea had no dire consequences for marine ecology or biodiversity. Except for certain fish stocks and cetaceans, the human impact on the living resources of the sea was very limited, and the amount of waste produced by pre-industrial societies never exceeded the capacity of the sea to dissolve it. According to the persisting image, the sea was eternally unchangeable and its resources inexhaustible.

It was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that rapid changes began to take place.² As the century drew to a close, many of the world’s

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² The former lack of awareness on marine environments is reflected in the fact that the first marine national parks were established only in the 1970s, more than a hundred years after the founding of the first terrestrial national park, Yellowstone. Sylvia A. Earle, *Sea Change: A Message of the Oceans* (New York: Fawcett Books, 1995), 329.
leading oceanographers warned that even the great oceans were on the brink of ecological disaster. It was the small sea areas that were hit first and hardest. The shallow and semi-enclosed Baltic Sea was a dumping ground for nearly 90 million people, most of whom by the second part of the twentieth century were living in an affluence unparalleled by anything in history. In retrospect it is no wonder that already in the early 1970s the Baltic Sea was labeled the most polluted sea in the world. At the dawn of the age of ecology, the Baltic Sea was yet another manifestation of the environmental crisis which threatened human well-being and therefore demanded an immediate alteration in human activities.

In the case of the Baltic Sea, the first comprehensive attempt to change the disastrous course was the signing of the Convention for the Protection of the Baltic Sea Marine Environment in Helsinki in 1974 (henceforth the Helsinki Convention). However, it is clear that to accomplish such an agreement is never a straightforward process, in which politicians come together and agree upon the means to combat a given problem. In most cases the successful completion of an effective treaty requires years of negotiations, which are enmeshed by multiple competing proposals and varying efforts at lobbying by a number of advocacies. What is more, there must be strong support for the agreement within the participatory states, since measures to protect the environment are likely to constrain economic and personal freedom of their citizens.\(^3\) It is thus of vital importance to examine the social and mental dimensions of the civil society at the birth of international environmental protection. The purpose of this article is to explore the influence of the mass media in creating an awareness of the marine environmental crisis and their contribution to the construction of the environmental regime for the Baltic Sea. The article deals with the Finnish media, since it was Finland that initiated the process of negotiating the treaty and thereafter in 1974 hosted the conference where the Helsinki Convention was finally brought to completion. My main questions are: how did the three leading newspapers in the two largest Finnish coastal cities at the time portray the Baltic Sea environment to their audience, and how did they promote the protection of the polluted sea?

\(^3\) In totalitarian states, in contrast, it is possible to ignore the opinions of citizens, but nevertheless it is necessary for the ruling elite to be behind the planned treaty.
The nation’s largest newspaper was *Helsingin Sanomat*. Although non-aligned since the interwar period, *Helsingin Sanomat* had traditionally been relatively conservatively oriented. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, the paper actively sought to abandon any ideological positioning, and by the early 1970s, according to Esko Salminen, *Helsingin Sanomat* was a genuinely independent, liberal-minded newspaper. In the capital city of Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat* had a rival in *Uusi Suomi*, which was affiliated with the rightist Coalition Party; its editorial policy stressed conservative values and stark opposition to socialism. In fact, as the Coalition Party during the 1970s shifted to favor the Soviet-friendly policy of President Urho Kekkonen, *Uusi Suomi* was the fiercest critic of the party’s new outlook, demanding reversion to true conservatism. *Turun Sanomat* was the main newspaper in Turku in southwestern Finland, at the time the second largest coastal city in Finland. *Turun Sanomat* had in the past had close ties with the predecessors of the Coalition Party. In the early 1970s *Turun Sanomat* continued to endorse a moderate rightwing world view, but its editorial policy was nevertheless officially independent of any party. The circulations of these three newspapers at the time were approximately 300,000, 85,000 and 120,000 respectively, which meant that these three newspapers captured a considerable part of the Finnish coastal population.

The media and the environment

The media have often been seen as a fourth state power, acting between the government and the public. It can thus be viewed from two different perspectives – top-down and bottom-up – according to which this article is organized. Speaking of the significance of communication networks in the building of an effective public and thus of democracy, John Dewey once


wrote that “no man and no mind was ever emancipated merely by being left alone.”6 Dewey’s words are echoed in the thoughts of many historians of modern environmentalism, who have referred to a so-called diffusionist model: in societies as large as those of the modern world, only the mass media are capable of interconnecting the entire public in a shared sphere of communication. The media create knowledge about problems and generate an awareness of their origins and consequences.7 The first perspective in this article must therefore be one of mental history and of the media’s role in ‘emancipating’ the public.

Human beings confront environmental problems mainly in their immediate environment. Through the mass media, however, local problems become a matter of national, international or even global concern. Moreover, journalists often tend to highlight the apocalyptic nature of environmental problems, thereby creating a discourse of profound crisis.8 This discourse of crisis is likely to pervade wide circles of the community, since the mass media are often the only means for the public to make sense of the environmental sciences. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which the Finnish public actually absorbed the media discourse merely by reading the newspapers. For the purposes of this article, however, this uncertainty poses no problem, since my aim is not to study public attitudes per se but to analyze the process whereby these attitudes were constructed. In this process the mass media are perhaps the single most potent factor, and therefore a critical source for the historian of environmentalism.9

9 It is worth noting that sociological surveys conducted in the 1960s and 1970s elsewhere suggest a strong correlation between the intensified media coverage of environmental problems and the growing public concern over the environment at this time. For the increase in articles dealing with the environment in many western newspapers in the late 1960s see Pertti Suhonen, Mediati, me ja ympäristö (Helsinki: Hanki ja jää, 1994), 69–70. For a summation of sociological sur-
The second perspective is political. Following the tradition of the communication studies of Dewey and Robert Park, I believe that the media do not merely transmit messages to the receiver but also contribute to the creating of a community, with more or less shared attitudes.\textsuperscript{10} If a certain issue is persistently enough chanted in the media, politicians cannot but assume that at least a considerable part of the voting public share the same opinions. This was foregrounded in the early seventies by the lack of contemporary sociological surveys on environmental matters in Finland, leaving the mass media the most effectual channel through which politicians could sense the changing mood of the public. As the public attitude, whether real or imagined, turned dramatically in favor of protecting the Baltic Sea, great pressure was created for politicians to act in accordance with the wishes of those whom they were supposed to serve. Studying the media coverage of the Baltic Sea environment in the Finnish press thus also shows how the media interpreted public attitudes towards the Baltic Sea, and how they (whether deliberately or not) transformed these attitudes into pressure on politicians.\textsuperscript{11} Ultimately, these two perspectives on the media coverage of the issue offer one explanation, though by no means the only one, of why the Finnish government in the early 1970s began to push for an international agreement on the protection of the Baltic Sea.

Emancipating the public

In Finland the Baltic Sea marine environment became a matter of environmentalist concern during the late 1960s, when a number of environmental

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} For a concise introduction to the ideas of Dewey and Park see Veikko Pietilä, \textit{Joukkoviestintätutkimuksen valtaellä: Tutkimusalan kehitystä jäljittämässä} (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2005), 117–139.

\textsuperscript{11} The media do not have independent power without reference to the voting public. There would be no reason to alter the course of current policy merely because of the ideas of journalists. Media influence is based on the notion that the media reflect how the public feels and thinks.
\end{flushleft}
problems were discovered simultaneously by marine scientists. Of these the most pressing were oil pollution,\textsuperscript{12} toxic chemicals,\textsuperscript{13} and the eutrophication and oxygen deficit of deep waters (the latter two being closely interrelated phenomena).\textsuperscript{14} Environmental problems are typically particularly science-centered phenomena that do not lend themselves to being easily observed or even understood by the general public. Toxic chemicals are measured in the environment and in the tissues of animals in parts per million, and their negative effects often cannot be evaluated until decades after they are discharged into the environment; there is nothing unnatural in eutrophication or deoxygenation, making it extremely difficult for scientists to judge whether human activities were to blame for exacerbating them.\textsuperscript{15} Thus the input of the mass media provides a means to supply people with popularized knowledge about environmental changes beneath the sea surface and to highlight their links to socio-economic reality.

It was not until the advent of the new decade, however, that the Finnish media started to pay close attention to the problems of the Baltic Sea. This apparent inertia of the Finnish media corresponds to the findings of many sociologists, according to which it takes from several years up to several decades for the discovery of a particular environmental problem by scientists to be transformed into recognition of that problem among the

\textsuperscript{12} Tanker accidents are the best-known form of oil pollution. In the early 1970s, however, it was estimated that only 10 percent of the oil in the sea originated from these accidents; the other 90 percent came from normal (and often intentional) operations. Oil entered the sea for example from tankers and other ships emptying their ballast and leaking their bilge water, from operations in oil terminals and refineries, and from riverine runoff from land-based sources. Roger Revelle et al., “Ocean Pollution by Petroleum Hydrocarbons,” in \textit{Man's Impact on Terrestrial and Oceanic Ecosystems}, ed. William H. Matthews, Frederick E. Smith, and Edward D. Goldberg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971), 297–302.

\textsuperscript{13} The most dangerous toxic chemicals in the marine environment at the time were chlorinated hydrocarbons (such as DDT and PCB compounds) and certain heavy metals.

\textsuperscript{14} In most cases eutrophication and oxygen deficit are two sides of the same physico-chemical phenomenon, which is why I speak of them as a single problem. To simplify: nutrients, whether of natural or human origin, accelerate primary production, which in turn increases biomass. The decay of biomass near the seabed consumes oxygen, to the point of total absence. Under oxygen-free conditions, nutrients are released from the sediment instead of being assimilated by it. This means that huge amounts of nutrients stored in deep waters and sediments are once more ready to nourish biological production. The vicious circle is thus complete.

\textsuperscript{15} The nature of oil pollution can be very different from the other problems mentioned here; no-one can help observing if the seashore is tarnished by tons of oil.
The threshold year in Finland seems to be 1970, when the Baltic Sea finally broke through into the mainstream media. Yet the manner in which the issue was presented changed only gradually even after the media had adopted the deterioration of the Baltic Sea environment as a newsworthy topic. A few headlines will suffice to demonstrate this.

4. In the late 1960s the Finnish authorities awakened to the need to prevent oil pollution. The picture, from 1971, depicts a rehearsal: the workers of the oil company Neste are practicing the use of emulsifiers to dissolve oil slicks. At the time scientists already knew that the combined effect of oil and emulsifiers was more fatal to marine life than that of oil alone. *Turun Sanomat* 22.6.1971, 5.

In 1970, *Turun Sanomat* forewarned that “the Baltic Sea is prone to pollution”. Three years later the tone in the same newspaper had changed radically: “the Baltic Sea will soon be like a sewer.” Cautious warnings had given way to certainty: pollution was not merely a possible threat of the future but a harsh reality of the day. The other papers chimed in in a similar strain. That same year, in 1973, *Helsingin Sanomat* wrote that “the Baltic Sea is already a sea of waste.” In 1970 *Uusi Suomi* addressed the...
pollution of the Gulf of Finland with the toothless headline “The Water of the Gulf of Finland”. In the text we read that “with respect to most forms of contamination, pollution is so far restricted to the coastal zones”. Three years later the same newspaper had no hesitation in headlining the article as “Pollution of the Gulf of Finland”; the text itself gives no indication whatsoever that pollution was merely a matter of local concern. The Baltic Sea, which was formerly perceived as a fathomless water mass, was now seen as a shallow cesspool at the mercy of human activity.

It is true that the state of the Baltic Sea environment had been the subject of discussion in the press long before the 1970s. Pertti Suhonen has found tens of articles about the pollution of the seas in *Helsingin Sanomat* during the 1950s and 1960s (without specifying the content as referring to any particular sea). On the other hand, Simo Laakkonen and Antti Lehmskoski have shown that since the Second World War journalists have been there with their pens and cameras whenever an oil spill has occurred in the Finnish marine area. Until the late 1960s, however, the crucial problems of the Baltic Sea environment had been eutrophication near to coastal cities and accidental spills of oil and other hazardous substances from ships, refineries and industrial facilities. In the early 1970s, newspaper reports on these old-style problems were suddenly overshadowed by dozens of articles echoing (and supposedly engendering) the fear of an all-out environmental crisis. *Turun Sanomat* proclaimed that “there is not a single fish, bird, seal, snail, eel or micro-organism in the Baltic Sea that does not contain toxins in amounts nearing or even surpassing the limits of tolerance.” Referring to the oxygen content of the seawater, *Turun Sanomat* chillingly stated that there is no life in the deep waters; instead “there prevails only death”.

*Helsingin Sanomat* cited the prestigious American Geographical Society in its doomsday prophecy: “If the prevail-

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25 In fact the amount of articles focusing on ‘old-style’ pollution also increased during the sixties. Needless to say, the increased emphasis on coastal pollution also demonstrates the increasing awareness of environmental deterioration in Finnish society as a whole.
ing trend continues, in the course of time the Baltic Sea will become a new Dead Sea. In the early 1970s coastal pollution and oil spills were still very much part of the story, but they were no longer the whole story. What was new was the concern that the whole sea would become so severely polluted that it no longer could sustain life.

The oxygen deficit in particular was most acute in the Gulf of Finland, provoking a great deal of discussion in the Helsinki newspapers. They warned that up to then pollution had predominantly affected only coastal waters, but that continued urbanization and industrialization threatened the self-purification capacity of the whole sea area. The whole of the Gulf of Finland coastline was densely populated, with three large cities and numerous smaller population centers. These urban areas discharged the bulk of their wastewater into the sea without proper treatment. Furthermore, rivers – including the Neva, the largest in the Baltic Sea drainage area – carried increasing amounts of nutrients from inland areas covering hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. Municipalities and factories were by far the greatest but not the only source of nutrients and organic matter. Ships discharged all their waste directly into the sea, arousing indignation in the newspapers: “seagoers report that the compass is no longer needed on the Baltic Sea. Sailing routes and ports can be found by following the trails of waste left behind by other ships.”

Perhaps most outrageous for the media were the plans to discharge wastewater from several inland cities by pipeline directly into the Baltic Sea. While the Gulf of Bothnia might have been able to receive even more nutrients, the Gulf of Finland was seen as already far too stressed by the impact of coastal cities and industry. Only ten years previously such plans

29 The capital is located on the south coast of the country, on the Gulf of Finland.
30 In contrast to current knowledge, the agriculture was seen as a relatively insignificant source of nutrient compared to municipalities and industry. The main reason for that was lack of scientific researches.
32 Itämeri on jo likameri, HS 22.7.1973, 7.
might well have been viewed as a rational means to solve pollution problems in lakeside cities. However, this was no longer the case: the Gulf of Finland was rapidly turning into the same algae-filled cesspool as in the case of many Finnish lakes in the previous two decades.

Other large-scale planning projects also triggered a fierce debate in the Finnish media. Until the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, provincial politicians in Turku had advocated constructing a road to connect the Åland Islands to the mainland. The plans consisted of a combination of causeways and bridges via dozens of sparsely populated or uninhabited islands and islets. The construction of a road was perceived as meeting the needs of the island communities, which were virtually isolated from the mainland at two times during the year.34 Supporters of the scheme also saw it as a great opportunity to boost island tourism. Opponents, however, argued that the archipelago’s greatest value lay precisely in its isolation and its relatively pristine nature. The ‘Road of the West’, as the plan was called, would have destroyed these qualities once and for all.

5. The supporters of the ‘Road of the West’ tried to justify the plan by painting a miserable future for the Turku Archipelago if it were to be abandoned. Sometimes they resorted to dubious means. The caption alleges that the cottage in the picture was located in the outer archipelago, where “doors and windows have been shut, the residents gone”. Later it was shown by their opponents that the picture had in fact been taken just outside Turku. *Helsingin Sanomat* 20.9.1970, 24.

The plan was eventually abandoned in the early 1970s. It was not torpedoed, however, by appeals to conserve the islands’ pristine nature or the traditional way of life of the fishing communities. Instead, a passionate media campaign, in the local but also the national media, by a single individual, in combination with increasing scientific knowledge of the vulnerability of the sea, convinced national leaders of the evils of the planned

34 In the fall and spring, when the ice either has not yet formed or is weakening.
road. Scientists warned that the causeways would lead to the continuous depletion of oxygen and thereby worsen the process of eutrophication, as they would block the supply of oxygen-rich water flowing from the open sea into the waters of the archipelago. Osmo Kivivuori, a law student at the University of Turku, adopted this warning as one of his main weapons, and with the support of a number of academics and environmentalists he fought against the road plan. His ideas were eloquently and powerfully articulated in a number of scientifically grounded newspaper articles. He accused the supporters of the plan of failing to even consult marine scientists, and pointed to numerous defects written into the plan. With sense of irony he claimed to understand such a negligent attitude, since “the expert opinion [of marine scientists] would render them jobless”. His campaign proved successful and provides an excellent example of media influence in environmental decision-making. By raising the public awareness of certain environmentally destructive practices and projects, the media and even ordinary people can and do have access to environmental decision-making.

The debate over the ‘road of the west’ demonstrated the existence of a strong need for expert knowledge in helping ordinary citizens comprehend

35 For the debate over the ‘Road of the West’ see for example Lounais-Suomen Seutukaavaliitto, Kiihtyvä tieyhteytys. Ahvenanmaa–Manner-Suomi, appendix 21.8.1969, Personal archives of Rauno Tenovuo (RTA), Vesiensuojelu – saaristomeri, Archive located at the School of Biology in University of Turku, Finland; a letter from the Society of Nature Conservation in Varsinais-Suomi 10.11.1970, RTA, Vesiensuojelu – Saaristomeri; Osmo Kivivuori: Lännentiesuunnitelmalle saatava sulku, HS 13.9.1970, 17; Vastaus Osmo Kivivuorelle: Lännentie palvelisi sekä Suomea että sen saaristoa, HS 20.9.1970, 24; Lännentien puolustus ei pidä eikä päde, HS 27.9.1970, 19; Suomen Luonto, No. 4, 1971, 100–106; Sosiaalidemokraattien sulku Lännentie-suunnitelmalle, Turun Päivälehti 16.4.1971; A rather similar plan was revived in the Kvarken area in the closing years of the 1960s to bridge the Gulf of Bothnia between Vaasa and Umeå. It is likely that the discussion was as lively in the Kvarken area during the first years of the 1970s, before the plan was eventually abandoned. Both road plans mentioned here have occasionally attracted interest down to the present, although marine scientists have decried them as environmentally destructive. In Kvarken in the early 1970s some of the comments by supporters of the plan resembled, in their arrogance, the gigantic projects in the Soviet Union. One supporter for example rejoiced that once the causeways were built and the water exchange with the Gulf of Bothnia cut off, the Bay of Bothnia would become the seventh largest lake in the world. Merenkurkun tieyhteyden vaihtoehto, HS 15.4.1972, 8; Merenkurkun pengertie tuhoa Perämeren, TS 8.8.1971, 7; Tunneli merenkurkun halvin tievaihtoehto, TS 28.3.1972, 3; Merenkurkun maayhteyden rakentamista puolustettaa, US 14.6.1971, 8; Tieyhteydet merkittävästi Perämeren saastumista sekä kalastuselinkeinon kuolemää, US 25.3.1973, 10; Merenkurkun tunnelisuunnitelmalla valmis, US 17.11.1973, 3.

the environmental impact of human activities. However, it is interesting to note that Finnish oceanographers rarely spontaneously descended from their ivory towers to popularize their work to the wider public. They were repeatedly consulted by the media, but in such short interviews that it was impossible to convey a detailed analysis of the nature and causes of the problems facing the Baltic Sea. Consequently journalists had to extract the information wherever they could find it. Keeping in mind the media practice of leaping at the most shocking news available, it was no surprise that a voice was given to ecologically minded scientists and to civic organizations with despairing predictions regarding the Baltic Sea. This in part explains why the prevailing attitude in the media was that the Baltic Sea was indeed dying.37 Despite a lack of firm evidence, there is no reason to doubt that many readers began to think in a similar manner.

Promoting international protection for the Baltic Sea

Sovereign states are motivated for various reasons to participate in international environmental treaties. They can enhance their prestige in the international arena, for example, by presenting the nation as an environmentally friendly actor. International treaties are also often used as bargaining chips. A state may promise to take part in a treaty in order to ensure that other states or actors declare their willingness to support its principal purposes.38 Environmental considerations, however, remain the paramount reason for signing treaties, since an individual state is utterly impotent when seeking to protect international environments such as the Baltic Sea.39

In a pluralistic democracy the free media are capable of exerting considerable pressure on politicians to protect the environment. In Finland in the early 1970s such pressure was certainly growing, with a number of

37 There were also some articles reporting scientists downplaying the role of human societies in the current deoxygenation. See for example Hapen vähenninen Itämerestä onkin luonnon oma oikku, TS 7.5.1971, 5, 28. Nonetheless these were rare exceptions compared to the many articles discussing the catastrophic condition of the sea. Furthermore, no marine scientist denied that oil pollution and toxic chemicals constituted a serious threat to the marine environment.
38 One of the latest examples of this kind of bargaining has been the Russian participation in the Kyoto Protocol in return for an EU promise to support Russian membership of the WTO.
39 Very often these different purposes are intertwined, and it is impossible to identify a single most important reason for joining international institutions.
eminent scientists, the conservation movement and the media all portraying the Baltic Sea as an endangered ecosystem. Finnish society had already in the early 1970s began to curb its own discharges, although it must be said that these measures fell well short of what these pressure groups had been calling for. Yet there was absolutely nothing the Finnish authorities could do to stop pollution flowing from other littoral states. Up to this time Finland had only signed a single agreement concerning the Baltic Sea environment: a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, covering only the Gulf of Finland. The purpose of this agreement, however, was merely to study pollution; it did not seek to reduce discharges.40 Furthermore, the Gulf of Finland could not be protected by Finland and the Soviet Union alone: unlike the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland is not separated by sills from the Baltic Sea itself, allowing water to flow freely between the two sea areas.

The need for all states to act in concert was also very well known by the Finnish media. *Helsingin Sanomat* perceived the conference on the protection of the Baltic Sea as an absolute necessity: “without standardizing the protective measures of all the littoral states there [was] no hope of improving the ecological state of the Baltic Sea.”41 *Turun Sanomat* wrote in its editorial in the summer of 1971 that “for every Baltic Sea state it is clear that only cooperative actions can save the Baltic Sea.” At the time, however, the non-recognition by the western powers of the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic thwarted the organizing of any governmental conference involving all the littoral states. The NATO countries (along with Sweden) refused to accept the GDR as a contracting party, which was a categorical condition on the Communist side for any agreement. In its editorial, *Turun Sanomat* wishfully hoped that since “the [pollution of the Baltic Sea] was a rather serious matter”, the Nordic states should proceed to plan the meeting even without official acceptance by every littoral state, since the other states would sooner or later join in.42 In other words,

Turun Sanomat placed remedying the Baltic Sea environment over Cold War politics.

The same attitude, though radically diverging in tone and motives, can also be seen in other newspapers, particularly in discussing the absence of the Communist states, due to the non-recognition of the GDR, from the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972. The Finnish media were well aware of the novelty and significance of the Stockholm conference, which in retrospect is often seen as the beginning of an era of global environmental diplomacy, and hopes were high on the eve of the conference during the spring and early summer of 1972. Turun Sanomat predicted that the Stockholm conference “may prove to be the most important conference ever held on our planet […] the future of the earth is now being truly discussed for the first time.”

Uusi Suomi warned that a delay of a single year in the fight against the environmental crisis may prove calamitous, but in the best-case scenario the conference can help to secure “a life worth of human dignity for all the peoples on earth without destroying the crucial conditions imposed by nature”.

Since two of the gravest dimensions of the global environmental crisis, the population ‘bomb’ and air pollution, were not particularly critical issues in a sparsely inhabited and only recently industrialized country like Finland, the Finnish media held that from Finland’s point of view it was water pollution and especially the deterioration of the Baltic Sea to which the Stockholm conference should pay attention. Yet, if the Communist states were to be absent from Stockholm, there was little the states actually present could do to advance Baltic Sea protection.

44 Ensimmäinen keskustelu maailman tulevaisuudesta, TS 4.6.1972, 6, 11.
47 A phrase made famous by the book by the same name, by the zoologist Paul Ehrlich, published in 1968.
Esko Salminen has argued that the Finnish media in the seventies unashamedly censured itself when it came to reporting on the Soviet Union and the Finnish *ostpolitik*.\(^\text{49}\) In that light, it is interesting to note that the danger of a fiasco at the Stockholm conference aroused virtually no reaction in *Helsingin Sanomat* or *Turun Sanomat*. Meanwhile the rightwing *Uusi Suomi* trumpeted that the ‘question of Germany’ was but a minor and “grotesque” problem compared to the on-going environmental crisis;\(^\text{50}\) as the spring passed by and the absence of the Soviet Union and its allies became ever more probable, the paper lamented that “[the prospective boycott] shows how rigidly the eastern bloc has stuck to its policy to bring political conflicts into the forum of pollution issues that are of the utmost importance for all humanity.”\(^\text{51}\) Where *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Turun Sa-


\(^{\text{51}}\) Tukholman kokous yhä vaakalaudalla, US 2.4.1972, 8; See also Itäryhmän tulo Tukholmaan yhä ajankohtainen ongelma, US 6.6.1972, 8. The boycott was also noted in *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Turun Sanomat*, but the tone of their comments was somewhat conciliatory, perhaps because of the delicate relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. See Kestääkö Tukholman ympä-
nomat leveled their charges at no particular country (whether or not this was due to their alleged self-censorship), the target in Uusi Suomi was self-evident. Uusi Suomi clearly kept up its antagonism towards the Soviet Union and its allies, and the planned but endangered Baltic Sea cooperation gave the newspaper an opportunity to once again disparage them.

In the end the Communist states lived up to their threat. One might have expected this failure to address the problems of the Baltic Sea to increase anger in the media. However, the optimism as to human ingenuity to solve any oncoming crisis that prevailed underneath the gloomy declarations was not that easily brushed aside, and the papers easily turned their eyes to the future once again. Even Uusi Suomi declared that “the Stockholm conference had been a significant step in the history of the Baltic Sea.” For the Finnish media the fact that such a conference had taken place showed that the peoples of the world were deeply concerned about the state of the living environment. There would always be another meeting, where the mistakes of the past could be corrected.

Negotiations for international cooperation among the Baltic Sea states gained momentum after the German question was resolved at the end of 1972, after which Finland immediately invited the other Baltic Sea states to convene in order to draft – and later, it was hoped, sign – a treaty on the Baltic Sea environment. These negotiations continued throughout 1973, during which time the press continued to highlight the gruesome state of the sea, at the same time monitoring the progress made in the meetings of the seven littoral states. This incessant media interest must have sent politicians and officials a clear message: that failure in the negotiations would have grave consequences. The longer the Baltic Sea question was put off, the more difficult it would be to find solutions.
Conclusions

On 22 March 1974, the Helsinki Convention was signed by representatives of all seven Baltic Sea states. The success of constructing an environmental regime for the Baltic Sea was enthusiastically received in the Finnish media. Subsequently the manner in which the media reported on the Baltic Sea also changed, with the previously dominant discourse of doom and gloom replaced by a sense of clear optimism about the future of the Baltic Sea. Even though the media had been well aware of the political differences between capitalist and communist states in the Baltic Sea area before the signing of the Helsinki Convention, the press somewhat naively assumed that once an agreement had been reached, the signatories would direct all their energies to enforcing the protective measures agreed on.55

Environmental historians have retrospectively pointed out that in spite of a number of catastrophic prophecies, the general mood during the first shockwave of the environmental crisis in the 1960s was surprisingly optimistic. Environmentalists and ecologists imagined that once the public became aware of the evils of modern industrial societies, they would change their way of life to correspond with the new circumstances. The wider public, on the other hand, was not especially concerned with the need to find a solution to the environmental crisis by changing their own behavior. This was perceived as something to be tackled by scientists, politicians and industrial managers. To use a present-day phrase, ordinary citizens were not worried about their own ecological footprint but about that of the surrounding society.

This mentality of adjusting the means of production but leaving systemic or cultural structures untouched correlates rather well with the media attention directed at the Baltic Sea and its environmental problems. The Finnish media never recommended that ordinary people should stop buying goods, nor did it expect the economy to restrain its growth. The media could tell their audience that they should stop using certain polluting detergents, but they never dared to suggest that people should give up washing machines altogether.

55 Itämeren sopimus jo melkein valmis, TS 20.3.1974, 9; Itämeren suojelun sopimusteksti valmis, TS 21.3.1974, 9–10; Itämeri voidaan pelastaa, US 24.3.1974, 11. This attitude was also fostered by some scientific findings suggesting that the deep sea areas had begun to recover. Unfortunately, as we now know, this improvement was only temporary.
When scientists discovered the changes in the marine environment, the Finnish media reported it in almost the same vein as the most radical environmentalists. Unlike many Finnish oceanographers, the media perceived the environmental crisis as a very real threat. It was felt that where the global crisis threatened to wipe out the whole human race, the crisis in the Baltic Sea would lead to the total destruction of the marine environment.

Between the mid 1960s and early 1970s, the environment emerged in the western democracies as one of the dominant domestic political topics. Many polls indicated that concern for environmental problems temporarily even surpassed economic growth in people’s minds. This raised environmental consciousness was undoubtedly due in part to the increased media attention. However impossible it is to know the extent to which the public came to view the Baltic Sea environment in a similarly pessimistic manner as the Finnish media, it is unimaginable, in view of the blanket coverage, that this media attention failed to generate any concern for the sea.

The media’s message was also directed at politicians. Although the media rarely suggested any detailed plans for remedying the state of the sea, by describing the gravity of the environmental crisis they forced municipalities, industry and the national government to modify their policies and their means of production. Certainly, as I have noted elsewhere, the media attention and the environmental awareness it helped to create were not the only reasons, perhaps not even the most pressing ones, for Finnish politicians to promote the protection of the Baltic Sea in the chambers of international diplomacy. But it is also likely that it would have taken far longer to initiate the negotiation process if the media in Finland and the other democratic littoral societies had remained silent. This in turn would have meant a delay in the final outcome, i.e. the creation of an environmental regime for the Baltic Sea.

Yet, the Finnish media shared the conception of environmental problems with the wider public. In other words, the problems in the Baltic Sea were seen as merely an ephemeral side-effect of industrialization and urbanization, which would be easily remedied by scientific planning and wise political decisions. As soon as wastewater purification and methods of industrial production were improved and institutions established for the

56 See Räsänen and Laakkonen 2007a; Räsänen and Laakkonen 2007b.
protection of the sea, the environment would once again be fine. Unfortu-
nately they were all wrong. In spite of the temporary recovery of the oxy-
gen content and decrease in toxins in the Baltic Sea water in the late 1970s,
the condition of the Baltic Sea environment has continued to decline.

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Regional lobbying and media are two separate, often indefinite or even contentious elements that contribute to shaping modern societies. Neither can be explained by clear-cut definitions, and both are constantly evolving and expanding to embrace wider social connotations. The English word ‘lobbying’ has a long and controversial history. Its origins and etymology are commonly associated with the parliamentary corridors of Westminster Palace or Capitol Hill. This parliamentary connection continues to be a central theme in defining lobbying:

Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of communication by someone other than a citizen on his own behalf, directed at a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision. (Milbrath, 1963, 8)

Distinguishing the representation of regional interests from other forms of lobbying is again a controversial issue. Indeed, the levels of complexity involved in territorial representation are perhaps greatest of all:

[A] territorial level can be a channel of influence for private interests, and a set of interests within itself, and because [sic] what constitutes a region means different things in different Member States. (Greenwood, 2003, 233)

In this article the concept of regional lobbying is interpreted broadly: its definition encompasses activities from attracting and promoting business interests to various regional development, planning and networking.
responsibilities. In short, it means the pursuit of regional interests in different decision-making forums, from individual citizens to supranational political arenas.

From the regional or territorial standpoint, lobbying entered a new, more prominent phase as a response to decentralisation\(^1\) processes in Europe. Stimulated by the progress of EU regional policy, sub-national administrations in Europe began to pursue their interests also on a supranational and above all a European level. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the subsequent enlargements of the EU in 1995 and 2004, sub-national administrations have been challenged to participate, collaborate and compete in an new and integrative environment. The complex concept of ‘region’ / ‘regional’ refers in this article predominantly to sub-national administrative entities and actors. The geographical focus will be on Finland and Sweden, where empirical work has been conducted comparing the regional lobbying practices in the county of Skåne in Sweden and the regions of Southwest Finland and Tampere in Finland.

Outlining a clear definition of the media is not a simple task either. Ignoring the rather trivial debate over ‘media’ versus ‘medium’, the term ‘media’ is commonly used in wide-ranging circumstances and contexts. According to most dictionaries the word refers to means of communication such as radio and television, newspapers, magazines etc. that reach very large numbers of people (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 1994). Other widely used expressions are ‘mass media’ and ‘medium’ (singular form of media), which in the latter case can be defined as a method for giving information (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1987). In the early 1990s, however, the entire media situation begun to evolve and explore new avenues of expression. The term ‘new media’\(^2\) was introduced, today encompassing electronic communications tools such as websites and advertisements, streaming audio and video, chat rooms, e-

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\(^1\) The transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs/PVOs (Rondinelli, et al., 1981)

\(^2\) A generic term for the many different forms of electronic communication that are made possible through the use of computer technology. The term is in relation to “old” media forms, such as print newspapers and magazines, that are static representations of text and graphics. (http://webopedia.com/TERM/new_media.html)
Media, Interaction and Integration

mail, DVD and CD-ROM, virtual reality environments, the integration of digital data with the telephone, digital cameras and mobile computing. (http://www.webopedia.com/).

With this electronic and digital expansion, the evolving media increasingly elude definition and placement within set boundaries. This applies equally to its relationship with regions and regional lobbying. For a function or an organisation that focuses on collecting, distributing and presenting information, the changing media offers an enormous combination of challenges and opportunities. Within these changing circumstances the sub-national balance of power and the regional pecking order is being updated; and the ever more omnipresent media is playing an important part in this reshuffle.

The growing presence and influence of the media also gives grounds for broadening its definition. While the (electronic) media naturally encompasses expanding sectors such as film, video, audio recordings and the Internet, it is nevertheless rather surprising how deep into the entertainment industry and the cultural sector as a whole it has penetrated. This coming together is well illustrated by the coordination of media affairs in many national governments. Although media issues are still in some cases divided among different ministries or fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Finland, Norway, Latvia) it is becoming increasingly common to govern it with greater weight on coordination with cultural policy and affairs. This formation is used at least by the governments of Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany has an appointed minister of state and a commissioner for cultural and media affairs in the Federal Chancellery. Consequently, the indisputable link between media and various cultural phenomena and trends is viewed in this paper as an integral part of the impulsive ‘new media society’.

I also attempt to evaluate the media association with regional devolution and lobbying in terms of the somewhat experimental concept of

3 The Danish ministry of culture’s domain stretches from sport to libraries, museums, education and training in the arts; theatre and music; all the creative arts; and the entire electronic media landscape. In France, the ministry for culture and media studies is responsible for matters such as architecture, art and media studies, fine arts, libraries, cinema, culture, French language, history, humanities, museums and cultural heritage. In Sweden, the ministry of culture is responsible for cultural policy and media policy as well as bears responsibility for sports issues. Finally, in the U.K. the media fall under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.
‘multi-level-media’, derived from the well-known yet debated theory of multi-level-governance. In the last part of the article the connection between media and regional lobbying is illustrated through an analysis of their relationship in three cases in Finland and Sweden.

The new regionalism: reviving regional interests

Regions and regionalism have a long history in Europe. Regions predated the rise of nation-states and helped shape the emergence of the state system. (Keating, 1998). Although the popular slogan from the 1980s – A Europe of Regions – has gradually been laid to rest, regions and regionalism continue to play an important part in European politics and integration. Now that the nation-state is being squeezed by European and global integration, regionalism has evolved into a new phase. For Hettne, the ‘old regionalism’ was a Cold War phenomenon: the ‘New Regionalism’ took shape in a multipolar world order, forming part of a global structural transformation (Hettne, 2005, 549). Within this concept or theory of a new regionalism, two closely linked phenomena – ‘Regionness’ and ‘Actorness’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 38) represent important yardsticks for measuring the process of regionalisation or decentralisation.

During the last decade or so, regional decentralisation processes have taken place and even accelerated widely across Europe. Although the federal Europe(an Union) was crushed by the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005, the processes of regionalisation and devolution have continued to move forward in most member states. The federal models of Austria, Belgium and Germany have been emu-

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4 Explaining the dispersion of central government authority both vertically, to actors located at other territorial levels, and horizontally, to non-state actors. (Bache and Flanders 2004, 4)
5 ‘Regionness’ defines the position of a particular region in terms of regional cohesion, which can be seen as a long-term historical process, changing over time from coercion to voluntary cooperation (Hettne 2005)
6 Actor capability implies a unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relations to other actors. However, ‘actorness’ is most commonly applied at the EU and supranational level.
7 The Federal Constitution of Austria was formulated in 1920 (with important amendments in 1925 and 1929) after the disappointing outcome of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Belgium became a federal state in 1993. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany was ratified in May 1949 and amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990.
lated in Italy and Spain, where historic regions enjoy considerable regional autonomy and devolved decision-making powers. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 granted the right of autonomy to nationalities and regions. Since 1983, two types of autonomous community have been distinguished – seven communities with high-level powers and ten with low-level powers – but all share a common constitutional position and similar institutions. The asymmetric devolution of Spain has also often been described as a model for pursuing devolution policies in traditionally centralised Britain. The moods and suggested strategies towards devolved regional self-governance, however, vary considerably in the British Isles:

The English are content with continued, centralised government from Westminster and were nowhere persuaded of John Prescott’s (Deputy Prime Minister of Blair’s Labour government) plans for regional government – excluding the GLA\(^8\) in London where a similar model of regional government was established in 1999. In the absence of a prospect of devolution to elected regional bodies the government has continued to decentralise administrative functions to appointed bodies in the regions. The growth of “administrative governance” has brought with it as yet unresolved problems of accountability, duplication and inefficiency. (Final Report of the Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme, 2006).

On the other side of the English Channel, France has an official policy of decentralisation and regions that are larger than English counties; but a powerful central government and executive continues to dominate in Paris.

Within the Baltic Sea Region, regional devolution – or, more commonly, decentralisation and regionalisation processes – have also been on the political agenda. The localist versus centralist debate did not correspond neatly with the communist elite/opposition cleavage in all post-communist

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8 Created by the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Mayor and the London Assembly constitute a strategic citywide government for London. The London Assembly holds the Mayor of London to account and investigates issues that matter to Londoners. Its 25 members are elected at the same time as the Mayor.
cases, but it has done so in Poland, argues Jennifer Yoder (2003). In her view the Solidarity movement favoured more local autonomy on grounds of democracy and accountability. The three Baltic states are all centralised unitary states, and the process of administrative regional reform has in all three countries been relatively gradual. Especially in the cases of Estonia and Latvia the dominant position of the capital region (Tallinn / Riga), and small size in terms of both population and geography, continue to work against a successful regionalisation process.

In the Nordic countries the restructuring of the regional administration has become a major political issue, with conflicting interests and potentially far-reaching consequences. The process has been led by Denmark, where in 2004 the Liberal-Conservative government agreed on a structural reform. The local government reform came into force in January 2007; it overnight reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 and that of counties from 25 to 14. In Sweden the process has been more gradual. The Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities (Ansvarskommittén) began its work in 2003, with the aim of clarifying the division of responsibilities and tasks between different levels of the administrative system. Although the final outcome remains undecided, the Committee report (published in February 2007) proposes that the existing 21 counties be merged into perhaps six to nine regional parliaments. The regional model has already been applied on a trial basis in the counties of Gotland, Kalmar, Skåne (all three since 1997) and Västra Götaland (since 1999). The principal duties of the regions include responsibility for health care and medical treatment, duties in the spheres of culture and public transport, and in the case of Skåne and Västra Götaland also growth and development.

In Finland the sub-national restructuring project was launched in 2005. While the Swedish reform focuses on the regional level, the Finnish process is targeting the local, municipal level. All the Nordic countries share a long tradition of strong municipal self-governance, but Finland has in the past taken a more cautious line in reorganising its local administration. While Denmark and Sweden trimmed down the number of municipalities through mergers already in the 1970s, Finland has postponed deep-seated local government reform and has chosen the alternative of inter-municipal cooperation rather than municipal mergers. Due to the political sensitivity of the issue, the government has promoted merger grants and has preferred a policy of voluntary mergers over the radical Danish model. Although
several mergers have already been decided, the strategy based on voluntary amalgamation appears to be ill-suited for the municipalities surrounding the larger cities and growth centres. In the capital region, Helsinki is not only struggling to incorporate with the wealthy city of Espoo, but has also gained plenty of negative publicity with its successful lobbying to take over some territory from the neighbouring municipality of Sipoo. Two other major growth centres, the cities of Tampere and Turku, have been unable to attract any serious merger interest among neighbouring municipalities. At least for the time being, it seems that municipal reform will focus on consolidating the outer tiers of urban regions.

As the above mentioned examples illustrate, different processes of decentralisation and regionalisation continue to gain ground across Europe. At the same time, the cases show how diverse the processes can be in various parts of one continent. At the EU level this has proved to be a major obstacle. While the decentralisation process as a whole has resulted in active EU regional players (Greenwood, 2003, 231), the positive impact has been overshadowed by the consistent issue of the regional-local divide (Jeffery, 1995a, 252-54). For Finnish and Swedish regions, this divide is causing concern at both the national and the European level. At the domestic level, regional reform is challenging the traditional model of strong municipal self-governance. In international arenas, the relatively small Nordic cities need their potential domestic rivals as regional partners in order to compete against European metropolitan regions. This multi-level confrontation is a genuine challenge for the region’s cohesion – regionness – as well as for regional actors’ capacity to lobby for the region’s interests – actorness.

Emergence of ‘multi-level media’?

Although regional devolution processes have gathered considerable speed in many countries, it is nevertheless changes regarding the media that have probably had greater overall impact in present-day societies. During the last decades the media has been transformed by the technological revolution and by entirely new ways of using media and its applications. In the process of this transformation the media sector has been divided into ‘old’ and ‘new’ media. In fact, the division between the old or traditional media
and the ‘new media’ has become a menacing boundary between success and failure:

Newspaper publishers, book publishers, movie studios, music companies, ad agencies, television networks -- they're all trying to figure out how they fit into a new-media world. Their old way of doing business isn't as profitable as it used to be, but they haven't found a new way that's as profitable, either. (Wall Street Journal, 23 May 2005)

The traditional media is anxiously trying to cross this murky borderline and enter the magic world created by Tim Berners-Lee in 1989. His invention of the World Wide Web paved the way for the Internet and laid the foundations for applications such as blogging, podcasting, YouTube and wikis. The web continues to penetrate deeper into the layers of contemporary society. In the course of this evolutionary process, the Internet is both challenging and luring the traditional media. Newspaper corporations are chasing advertisers to the net and trying to earn extra revenues without cannibalising the ad income from the print edition. Paradoxically, the media sector has both fragmented, to serve more and more fractured target audiences, and converged, to link state-of-the-art technology with the traditional communications media (in the plural).

One distinctive feature of the evolving media has been its capability to be re-fashioned, re-produced and re-targeted to serve different audiences and consumer groups. This flexibility, combined with ongoing technological advancement, has transformed the media from a communication tool into a key factor in spreading globalisation and world-wide integration. While the loss of advertising revenues has been a long-term concern in the newspaper industry, it appears that newspapers are compensating for at least some of their print ad losses by gains in online advertising. A study released by the media-investment firm Veronis Suhler Stevenson predicted that by 2010 spending on Internet advertising, including ads on the websites of traditional media outlets, will overtake print-newspaper advertising as the largest advertising category. (VSS Forecast, 2007). According to James Rutherfurd, Executive Vice President and Managing Director of VSS:
We are in the midst of a major shift in the media landscape that is being fueled by changes in technology, end-user behaviors and the response by brand marketers and communications companies. We expect these shifts to continue over the next five years, as time and place shifting accelerate while consumers and businesses utilize more digital media alternatives, strengthening the new media pull model at the expense of the traditional media push model. (VSS Forecast, 7 August 2007)

This shift from traditional to new media is transforming the entire business sector, and its repercussions are evident at all geographical and sectional levels of the media industry. At the global level, media giants like the News Corporation, (AOL)Time Warner, Bertelsmann, Walt Disney and Viacom have extended their reach from broadcasting and publishing to business sectors such as the Internet, games, music, sports and telecoms.

From the regional perspective, sports and recreational operations are particularly influential. Although Time Warner, Walt Disney and News Corporation have recently sold their majority holdings in the professional league franchises of the NFL (American football), NBA (basketball), MLB (baseball) and NHL (ice-hockey), the association between media companies and professional sports remains close throughout the world. Outside North America, football (soccer) is clearly the dominant sport, attracting the most media attention. Although there is strong tradition of sports press (such as *El Mundo Deportivo, Kicker, La Gazzetta dello Sport, L'Équipe* and World Soccer), especially in the most passionate football nations, it is nevertheless the combination of television and sponsorship that has raised the popularity and visibility of sports and football in particular.

For advertisers, sponsorship deals with G14⁹ members like Liverpool, Bayern Munich or Inter Milan offer almost nonstop exposure on the countless television networks broadcasting different league matches all over the world practically throughout the year. Although the G14 was disbanded in 2008 after a compromise deal with the UEFA, the top sport

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⁹ A European interest group created by 14 leading football clubs in Europe. The Group was founded in 2000 and disbanded in January 2008. The dissolution was part of a deal to compensate clubs when their players appear for national teams. (*The Guardian*, January 16 2008)
clubs in most popular spectator sports continue to invest in international networking (and lobbying). In both basketball and ice-hockey, the leading clubs have on the one hand been emulating the UEFA’s highly successful Champions’ League trademark, on the other setting up smaller regional competitions. Up to now, the overall success and media presence of various European level ice-hockey schemes (European Cup, European Hockey League, IIHF European Champions Cup) have been modest, and basketball’s European competitions have similarly been troubled by conflicting interests and changing competition formats. In the Baltic Sea Region, cross-border ventures like the Royal League, the Baltic Basketball League and the Baltic League pursue the same goal of responding to international challenges and attracting wider audiences.¹⁰

The present trend of multi-level markets and intense collaboration between sports club and media is also benefiting the cities and regions hosting these clubs. There is little doubt that Manchester United, arguably the most famous football club in the world, has had an impact on Manchester’s recent rise from a rather bleak and declining industrial town to Britain’s best city for business in 2006 (OMIS Research, 2006).¹¹ Measured in international championship trophies, an even more successful regional combination of media and football was created by Silvio Berlusconi, who cunningly named his political party – Forza Italia – after the chant used by fans of the AC Milan, the football club he owns. With the help of his media empire, the “football-mad” Italians have voted in Berlusconi three times as prime minister.

Televised football’s success in replicating the viewer base has to a certain extent been emulated in the hugely successful global broadcasting and distribution of so-called reality-TV series. Usually with relatively low production costs, this type of television programming avowedly aims at showing how ordinary people behave in everyday life or in situations – often created by the programme-makers – which are intended to repre-

¹⁰ The Royal League was founded in 2004 by the National Football Associations and the Associations of the Professional Leagues in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The Baltic Basketball League was founded in 2004 for Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian clubs; it consists of the Elite division and the Challenge Cup division. Finally, the Baltic League, comprising the top four clubs from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, was established in 2007 in emulation of the Scandinavian Royal League.

¹¹ OMIS Research charting the views of senior executives on the best locations for business in the UK, 2006.
sent everyday life (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary, 2004). Although sometimes based on the ‘charisma’ or marketing value of ‘celebrities’ such as Ozzy Osbourne or Paris Hilton, the majority of reality shows is still created for non-celebrity participants and contestants. In recent years, reality TV formats such as American Idol, Big Brother and The Apprentice have illustrated the ‘multi-level structure’ of the new media and this specific type of format production. The format is produced for global markets, distributed to perhaps dozens of countries, and then launched with a massive media campaign exploiting the hype from ‘sister programmes’ and the financial resources of a global network. As a result the programme becomes a number-one media event for weeks, and in the course of a contest previously unknown competitors become celebrities. The formats also appear to have an interesting regional characteristic. As the contestants are initially virtually anonymous, the importance of regional background and a possibly recognisable accent become important factors. In Finland, for example, such programmes have ensured that a majority of Finns know that Antti Tuisku comes from Rovaniemi, Hanna Pakarinen used to drive a forklift in Lappeenranta, and ‘Kaki’ from Big Brother is a Turku-born ex-chauffeur for the Turun Sanomat newspaper. In the city of Lahti, the 2007 Idols winner, ‘Heavy-Ari’, was invited to the mayor’s reception and rewarded with a Lahti wristwatch, a memory stick with a Lahti video, and a illustrated book commemorating the city of Lahti (Ilta-Sanomat, 12 April 2007). This ‘regionalisation’, or perhaps even the application of the famous principle of subsidiarity in TV programmes, is also being extended to the administrative organisation of television networks. Music Television – MTV – which introduced music videos in the early 1980s, illustrates this development. The network was launched in New York in 1981 and the European subsidiary started broadcasting from London in 1987. The next phase, MTV Nordic, was introduced in 1998; since 2005 all Nordic countries have had their own national versions of MTV. In addition to understanding the importance of being close to the consumer, the ever expanding web of MTV networks has been at the forefront of applying new media technologies and transforming the media:

In 2007 TV will have its first “music moment” – the realisation that a core audience (the 18-34-year-old male) has moved online, possibly for good. The rise of YouTube and
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an army of other free video-hosting services has created a phenomenon of short, user-created videos. These clips are creating a new kind of watching experience, one more about “snacking” than half-hour sitcoms. (The Economist – The World in 2007)

Changing Media moulding regional lobbying

The print media are struggling on the one hand with the convergence of ownership, on the other with the simultaneous fragmentation of media services and application. In a multi-level society with increasing interdependence, these global processes have repercussions on the national and regional level. This part of the paper focuses on the impact of media evolution in the Nordic countries, with particular focus on the Skåne region in Sweden and the Finnish regions of Southwest Finland and the Tampere Region.

Despite the widespread decline of the print media, the newspaper continues to be a major media format in the Nordic countries. Although total circulations declined over the five year period of 2002–2006 in Denmark (-11.5%), Finland (-1.94%), Sweden (-3.95%) and Norway (-10.1%), the newspaper tradition remains strong especially in Norway, Finland and Sweden. The three nations in fact occupy positions 2 (Norway), 3 (Finland) and 4 (Sweden) in world standings (Japan holding the top position). Respect for the traditional printed press remains particularly high in the case of the regional dailies in Finland and Sweden. This trend is also evident in the selected case regions. While the decline in the circulation of the national dailies has continued, these regional papers have been able to maintain or even modestly improve their circulation figures (see table 1).

In all three regions the leading media companies participate actively in both developing and promoting the region. According to interview findings, the family-owned Turun Sanomat (TS Group) is considered to play an active role in lobbying for Southwest Finland (see table 2.1). Although

13 Even the impressive growth of the Swedish tabloid Aftonbladet is rapidly evaporating – 2008 (Feb) corresponding figure 388,500, Tidningsstatistik Ab
the bulk of the media group’s revenues comes from its successful printing division (Hansaprint), the regional presence of the TS Group is enhanced by a regional cable network (Turku TV) and by its close cooperation with other regional actors. The rectors of the University of Turku (Keijo Virtanen) and the Turku School of Economics (Tapio Reponen) belong to the supervisory board of TS Group, where Virtanen holds the position of chairman. In addition to a natural role in printing regional brochures and publications, the TS Group has launched TPS Maximum TV on the Internet with the football club TPS and is also providing the HANSA-BASE Mediabank for the City of Turku’s promotional and administrative purposes. As a safeguard against flagging circulations the TS Group is promoting newspaper subscription in regular road-shows (TS Treffit) in the sub-regional centres of Southwest Finland. The TS Group has also consolidated its position as the leading regional media corporation by

7. The turmoil within the media industry has perplexed the newspaper corporations also in the Nordic countries. Especially the national daily newspapers have felt the growing pressure of the Internet and free papers. In Denmark, the largest-selling newspaper *Jylland-Posten* has in recent years been facing both plunging circulations and the global Muhammad cartoons controversy.
acquiring local papers\textsuperscript{14} in the sub-regions of Salo, Loimaa Region and Vakka-Suomi (Uusikaupunki Region). Although the new ownership has brought the supplements of \textit{Turun Sanomat} to sub-regional readers, the local papers have maintained their editorial independence in these sub-regions with a relatively strong local identity.

In facing the other universally expanding challenge of a subscription newspaper, \textit{Turun Sanomat} has already since the early 1980s distributed its own free newspaper. \textit{Aamuset} (136,000 copies) is also targeted to compete with \textit{Turkulainen} (137,495 copies), another regional free paper belonging to the rapidly expanding media group \textit{Suomen Lehtiyhtymä}.\textsuperscript{15} Although politically independent, \textit{Turun Sanomat} has kept the process of regional restructuring visibly on the news agenda, and it is clear from past editorials that the media group is in favour of reducing the exceptionally high number of municipalities in the region through mergers.\textsuperscript{16}

While Southwest Finland is a historic region\textsuperscript{17} dating from the Swedish era, the Tampere Region (\textit{Pirkanmaa}) is a regional construction with a much shorter history. Although the region’s geographical origins can be traced to the northern parts of the historic \textit{Satakunta} region, the background of the Finnish name \textit{Pirkanmaa} is rather unclear. In fact, when the Region (\textit{maakunta}) was established in 1956, the name \textit{Pirkanmaa} was selected almost by accident (Seppälä, 2002, 24). Consequently the name \textit{Pirkanmaa} has been more or less ignored, and the more familiar ‘Tampere Region’ is used internationally by all regional actors, including the Regional Council of \textit{Pirkanmaa}.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Salo Seudun Sanomat} (since 1988, circulation 22,177 in 2007), \textit{Uudenkaupungin Sanomat} (1988, 7,244) and local papers of Priimus Group (since 2006: \textit{Loimaa Lehti}, 8,725; \textit{Auranmaan Viikkolehti}, 8,894; and \textit{Kaarina Lehti}, 4,594)

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Suomen Lehtiyhtymä} (The Finnish News Paper Consortium) is a privately owned printing company which publishes a large number (22 in 2006) of regional newspapers, free papers and trade magazines.

\textsuperscript{16} Southwest Finland is comprised of 53 municipalities (2007), but several negotiations on municipal mergers are on progress. In 2009 the merger of ten municipalities in the Salo region and a few smaller mergers will be completed.

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Southwest Finland’ is the name and translation used internationally by the regional actors of the historic ‘Varsinais-Suomi’ region. The usage has been criticised for inaccuracy – the term also refers to a larger area, consisting of the historic regions of Varsinais-Suomi and Satakunta. The Finnish name Varsinais-Suomi hides the original reference to the fact that a large part of Finland’s cultural origins are associated with the region surrounding Turku – the ‘Real Finland’. However, the occasionally used literal translation, ‘Finland Proper’, has generally been found ill-suited for promotional purposes.
Aamulehti, the leading daily newspaper of the Tampere Region, was established in 1881 as a counterforce to the Swedish-speaking industrialists in Tampere. It supported the National Conservative Party until 1992, but is today officially non-aligned. By means of an aggressive expansion strategy its publisher, Tampereen Kirjapaino-Osakeyhtiö, acquired another Conservative-aligned newspaper, Uusi Suomi, and in 1988 became a clearly national media house under the name of Aamulehti Corporation. In 1997 the Aamulehti Corporation and the first Finnish commercial network MTV – the leading private television network in Finland – merged to form the Alma Media Corporation. In 2005, Alma Media sold MTV3 and its sister networks (MTV3+, Subtv, Radio Nova and a minority share of the Sports Channel, Urheilukanava) to the Swedish Bonnier (owner of Sydsvenskan) and Proventus. By selling its broadcasting division, Alma Media's annual turnover was reduced to 302 MEUR (2006), and the TS Group (2006 turnover 339 MEUR) bypassed it as the national number two media concern.

As the brief look at Aamulehti's history reveals, the Tampere-based media company has a long record of pursuing national, not just regional aspirations. In this sense it was logical that in 1998, following the founding of Alma Media, the company headquarters were moved to Helsinki. This strategy was reinforced by the decision in 2007 to open their own editorial office in Helsinki, with ten journalists. (Aamulehti, 30 September 2006). Until 2006 Aamulehti and Turun Sanomat had a smaller joint office in Helsinki. Although Alma Media continues its strategic aim of challenging SanomaWSOY, the leading media company in Finland, it has nevertheless also strengthened its presence in the Tampere Region. In addition to Aamulehti, Kauppalehti\(^\text{18}\), Iltalehti\(^\text{19}\) and a group of northern newspapers,\(^\text{20}\) Alma Media owns fifteen local papers in the Tampere Region and the leading regional newspaper of the neighbouring region of Satakunta (Satakunnan Kansa). As a regional actor, Aamulehti is widely respected (see table 18 Largest business daily in Finland (circulation 81,363, 2007)
19 National tabloid paper with the third largest circulation of all newspapers in Finland (131,150, 2007)
20 The regional dailies Lapin Kansa (Province of Lapland, circulation 34,738, 2007), Pohjolan Sanomat (Kemi-Tornio, 22,228, 2007) and Kainuun Sanomat (Kainuu Region, 22,129, 2007); two local papers (Koillis-Lappi and Kuriri); and three free sheets (Koti-Kajaani, Meri-Lapin Helmi and Uusi Rovaniemi)
According to the paper’s managing director Juha Ruotsalainen, a regional paper has a role in resisting the threat of regional decline:

In many regional newspapers’ strategies the paper is the voice and the economic engine of the region. In practice this means lifting the spirit and profile of the region. (*Kauppalehti Optio*, 27 October 2005.)

Just like Turun Sanomat, *Aamulehti* has fostered its regional role with regular promotional “Face-to-face” road shows in the regional municipalities (*Kasvokkain Kiertue*). (*Aamulehti*, 25 August 2006). Free town papers have gained foothold also in the Tampere Region. *Tamperelainen* (owned by Lehtiyhtymä, circulation 145,337) is Finland’s oldest free paper (published since 1957) and in 2006 Alma Media launched its own free paper *Tori* with a circulation of 144,000 copies. Interestingly, the editor-in-chief Mikko Honkala revealed that the new free paper was bringing the nationally well-known “This Side of the River – The Other Side of the River” – a feature of the Turku identity – to the banks of the Tammerkoski, the familiar landmark in Tampere (*Aamulehti*, 2006). Honkala also bluntly sums up Tampere’s relationship to the identity of the Pirkanmaa region:

> When they visit Turku, people from Pirkkala tell everybody that they come from Tampere. (*Aamulehti*, 25 August 2006)

Unlike the Tampere region, the Swedish region of Skåne has a long and vivid history as a regional administrative centre. Due to this rich history, however, there is some confusion regarding Skåne’s regional terminology. In the Swedish system of regional governance the county is often contiguous with the district served by the regionally elected county council, which is responsible for medical care, regional traffic and transit planning, and other matters too large in scope for individual municipalities. A third type of region is the historical province, which has no political significance but is important for people’s sense of regional identity. (The Swedish Institute,

21 This is an untranslatable idiom. In Finnish “Täl puolel jokke - tois puolel jokke” is a widely used expression underlining the historic division of the former capital city and the overall importance of the cultural landscape on the banks of the River Aura.
In the case of Skåne, the construction of a regional identity has in recent years been complicated by the European integration process and even more by the deepening of Øresund cooperation. As table 3 illustrates, the term Øresund is rapidly replacing Skåne as the lobbying and promotional name for the region. Further regional confusion was added by the influential regional Chamber of Commerce, which in 1988 started to use the name Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Southern Sweden.

The media landscape of Skåne is dominated by the Bonnier Group, which is the largest media company in Sweden and the leading business publisher in the Baltic Sea Region. The Skåne presence of the family-owned, Stockholm-based company is provided by the region’s largest newspaper Sydsvenskan and the subsidiary Skåne Media. While the marketing region of Sydsvenskan focuses on the Malmö-Lund axis, the four newspapers of
the Skåne Media have their own markets in northeastern Skåne (*Kristianstadsbladet*, circulation 29.500, 2007), in southeastern Skåne (*Ystads Allehanda*, 24.000; *Österlenmagasinet*, 20.000) and southwestern Skåne (*Trelleborgs Allehanda*, 10.000). As the media markets of northwestern Skåne (Helsingborg Region) are dominated by *Helsingborgs Dagblad* (circulation 78.800), it is clear that the Skåne media landscape is considerably more fragmented than that of Southwest Finland or the Tampere Region. This media fragmentation is also enhanced by the recent difficulties of *Skånska Dagbladet*. Malmö-based newspaper has traditionally challenged *Sydsvenskan* with a relatively strong position especially in central Skåne, but declining circulation figures and job reductions are bound to weaken its role as a regional media power. In fact, leading regional politicians have raised concern of possible Bonnier-owned media monopoly in Skåne (*Journalisten*, 22 April 2008). The regional defiance towards the Bonnier empire is nevertheless encumbered by lack of natural power bases: the four geographical sub-regions of Skåne possess no more regional identity than those of the artificially constructed Pirkanmaa Region.

Despite these regional characteristics and focus on the Malmö-Lund axis, *Sydsvenskan* has nevertheless taken an active role in promoting Skåne’s regional interests. When the proposal of the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities was published, a *Sydsvenskan* editorial came out with a suggestion whereby Skåne, Blekinge county, the southern part of Halland county, Kronobergs county and parts of Kalmar county would form a new, enlarged region. In the same editorial, romantic and enthusiastic references to a historic ‘Skåneland’ and a ‘Scaniaregion’ were dismissed as “yellow-red chauvinism” (*Sydsvenskan*, 2007). In this context, it is interesting to note that the *Sydsvenskan* website pays tribute to the 1676 Battle of Lund, which crushed Danish hopes of regaining Skåne and secured Sweden’s control over the region. The delicate issue of the Danish heritage and the Skåne identity resurfaces regularly in the Skåne media.

22 Although Northwest Skåne (Skåne Nordväst) has in the past decade activated its regional interest representation around Helsingborg, the level of actorness in the three remaining sub-regions of Skåne remains considerably lower than for example in Southwest Finland.

23 Yellow and red are the traditional colours of Skåne symbolism, as represented in their flag.

24 Skåne and the entire Øresund region have been the battlefield for many conflicts between Sweden and Denmark, and Skåne has been an attractive area in the eyes of Swedish and Danish sovereigns for centuries. Both sides have had their victories, and Skåne has been part of either Denmark or Sweden during different periods in history. Since 1658 Skåne has remained Swedish.
In a public debate regarding the reconstruction plans of Malmö's largest marketplace, the Stortorget, many citizens expressed their dislike for the equestrian statue of King Karl X Gustav - who took Skåne from the Danes through the Roskilde Treaty of 1658 – and demanded its removal from the marketplace (Stortorget's Diskussionsforum).

Rather fascinatingly, the connection between history and identity in Skåne lobbying – in this case at the local level and directed at citizens – bears a resemblance to Southwest Finland and the city of Turku in particular. As in Malmö, the reorganisation plans for the main marketplace have roused public opposition, and in the case of Turku at least indirectly triggered the dismissal of the recently appointed editor-in-chief of Turun Sanomat.25 Another sensitive issue shared by Malmö and Turku is that of sub-regional relations. While Turku has, at least so far, failed to lobby its merger plans to the neighbouring municipalities, the rapidly growing city of Malmö has opened up the discussion for redrawing the municipal borders. In the summer of 2007 Sydsvenskan provided a forum for heated debate over the possibility of creating a ‘greater Malmö’ (Sydsvenskan, 2007). Despite the official focus on the regional administration, it seems that in Sweden too the question of municipal mergers and the relationship between large cities and their neighbouring municipalities will become part of the political debate.

Conclusion: more fragmented media empowering stronger regions?

What is the overall impact of the changing media for regions which are themselves in the middle of an extensive transformation process? Although it may not be wise to attempt to answer a question with so many changing variables, we can nevertheless draw certain conclusions from the changing

25 Several media sources (Journalistilehti, Rannikkoseudun Sanomat, Turun radio/Yle) have suggested that it was Markku Salomaa’s hard line against the “Our Turku” association that triggered his dismissal. “Our Turku” is critical of the underground parking plans of the marketplace restructuring, and Salomaa has sent the association an e-mail in which he banned “Our Turku” from appearing in any of TS Group controlled newspapers, radio channels or tv channel.
relationship between media and regional lobbying. First of all, as the empirical study illustrates, media as a whole is an important tool or channel for promoting regional interests. Only personal contacts matter more in getting the message across.

Secondly, the fragmenting but at the same time expanding use of different media applications gives regional actors a much wider tool kit for lobbying. Instead of relying on expensive and easily out-dated publications, regional actors could – and should – today use their own websites, with multiple language options, regional portals, DVD/CD-multimedia, bloggs, videofeeds and many more novel media utilities. Even the traditional media forms are offering extended possibilities to promote the region. Films, television series, books, even comic books can be used for promotional purposes and for expressing and boosting the regional identity. The international Wallander boom is a prime example of taking advantage of a fictional character in regional lobbying and promotion. Henning Mankell’s books, set in the small town of Ystad in Skåne, have been transformed into a series of films, and in January 2008 it was revealed that the well-known British film-maker Kenneth Branagh will start filming his own Wallander series in English – again set in real-life Skåne locations. In Southwest Finland, Reijo Mäki’s fictional private eye Jussi Vares has gradually been following in Wallander’s footsteps. In addition to two films set in southwestern Finland, Vares is ‘starring’ in regional sight-seeing tours and promotional catalogues; and in the summer of 2008 he took centre stage at the Emma Theatre – located in the Moominworld themepark in Naantali!

Merely emulating other regions’ success formulas or investing in state-of-the-art technology is nevertheless no guarantee for success in regional lobbying or promotion. Regardless of emerging techniques and expanding options, it is ultimately the content which separates success stories from run-of-the-mill regions. In a world of increasing competition, benchmarking successful regions is no longer enough. In order to thrive in a situation of multi-level competition, regions need to identify their genuine assets and develop a regional strategy on that foundation. This challenge requires a strong regional identity (regionness) as well as smooth cooperation, skills and an active approach by key regional actors (actorness). The role of the media is also expanding, stretching from a communications tool to a lobbying forum, a sparring partner and a strategic ally. Although the influence
of the ever-present media is virtually impossible to measure, it is nevertheless evident that shrewd media relations are a growing asset in successful regional lobbying.
Table 1: Top national and selected regional daily newspapers in the Nordic countries: circulation trends 1995–2007 (figures in thousands)

<table>
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<tr>
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Sources: NORDICOM, Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulations/Statistics Finland, MediaNorway, Danske Dagbladet Forening
Key Regional Actors: most capable regional lobbying organisations in Southwest Finland

Table 2.1.

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<tr>
<th>Regional MPs</th>
<th>Regional Council</th>
<th>University of Turku</th>
<th>Mayors of Turku</th>
<th>Turun Sanomat Newspaper</th>
<th>Turku Science Park</th>
<th>Entrepreneurs’ groups e.g. “Caribia”</th>
<th>City Board (Turku)</th>
<th>Turku Touring</th>
<th>TPS</th>
<th>City Council (Turku)</th>
<th>No capable lobbying organisation</th>
<th>Turku School of Economics</th>
<th>Åbo Akademi</th>
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<td>1st Place nominations</td>
<td>2nd Place nominations</td>
<td>1st Place nominations</td>
<td>2nd Place nominations</td>
<td>1st Place nominations</td>
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</table>

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Table 2.2.

Key Regional Actors: most capable lobbying organisations in the Tampere Region

1st Place nominations

2nd Place nominations

Regional Council
Tamperes University
Mayor(s) of Tampere
Tamperes Chamber of
Regional MPs
Tamperes Science
Aamulehti newspaper
Entrepreneurs of
Table 3.

<table>
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<td>South Sweden</td>
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<td>Malmö-Skåne</td>
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Narrowing the alternatives:
Regional aspects in the Estonian discussion of European unification during the interwar period

Pauli Heikkilä

The dominant direction in the foreign policy of many European states has been European integration. Recently, however, regional aspects have gained more popularity, and regions have re-emerged within the European Union. The best-known and also most effective examples have been the Baltic Sea Region and the Northern Dimension.

Rather than treating regionalism and Europeanism as opposites, I understand the latter as an example of the former: Europe too is a region. Regionalism has to do with the reference group in identity politics: with whom ‘we’ want to be associated and from whom we want to be distinguished. It also addresses the question of how an independent, sovereign state can connect itself to a larger community or, in other words, how a larger community, consisting of individual nations, is possible.1 This was an even more delicate question during the interwar period, when many nations in Central Eastern Europe had gained their independence.

Likewise individuals belong simultaneously to several groups, groups (in this article nations) strive to various references (regions), for divergent reasons and with changing levels of commitment. Estonia, for example, is part – among its other affiliations – of the West, of Europe, of the Baltic Sea Region and of the Baltic states.2 The interests of these regions can

1 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 113; Luisa Passerini, “The Last Identification: Why Some of Us Would Like to Call Ourselves Europeans and What We Mean by This,” in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, ed. Bo Stråth (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004), 58.
2 The Baltic Sea Region refers to states bordering on the Baltic Sea; the Baltic states comprise
sometimes be contradictory and can be used against each other. In this article, I explore the relationship between the Baltic states/Baltic Sea region and Europe, as that relationship was constructed in the public debate over foreign policy in the Estonian newspaper press during the interwar period (1926–1934).

A preliminary statistical analysis implies a correlation between European and Baltic issues. According to the catalogues of the Estonian National Library and the Literary Museum, interest in the Baltic states decreased considerably after 1927 and reached a low point in 1931. At the same time articles dealing with the question of Europe were at their most frequent. After this, interest in Europe seems to have declined rapidly and the Baltic states recovered their previous popularity. The article is accordingly divided into three sections: rise, climax and decline.

It would be oversimplifying matters, however, to claim a direct correlation between European and Baltic issues. Rather, the focus here is on newspaper articles dealing with European unification, and how they referred to the more immediate region and cooperation between neighbours. How was the Baltic region related to prospects of continental unification? What were the reasons for the popularity of a particular regional approach, and why did it change over time?

Promise and problem of Baltic cooperation

Baltic cooperation had started already under the Russian empire as a way to establish the independence of the three states. Between the declarations of independence in 1918 and de jure recognition by the greater powers in

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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
3 The catalogue of the Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu has a category 32(474), entitled “Balti riikide välispoliitiline olukord ja välispoliitiline olukord ja välispoliitika. Eesti suhted molema Balti riikidega. Teiste riikide politiika Baltimaade suhtes – Balti küsimus. Balti Liit”; the National Library in Tallinn has a category 327 E:474 – Eesti Baltimaade poliitilised suhted. The number of references in these categories by year are as follows: 1925, 75; 1926, 85; 1927, 75; 1928, 22; 1929, 27; 1930, 18; 1931, 11; 1932, 25; 1933, 58; 1934, –130.

4 The newspaper sources for my article “The Pros and Cons of Paneurope. Estonian Discussion on European Unification in the Interwar Period” in Acta Historica Tallinnensia 2008 consist of the following numbers of articles per year: 1925, 3; 1926, 5; 1927, 24; 1928, 6; 1929, 17; 1930, 31; 1931, 43; 1932, 16; 1933, 11; 1934, 5.
the early 1920s, the usefulness of cooperation in reaching these goals was acknowledged already by contemporaries. After that cooperation faded out, and the defence union between Estonia and Latvia in 1923 remained its culminating point; talks and meetings of foreign ministers, however, continued till 1925.5

Meetings continued at a lower level and led to the signing of a customs treaty between Estonia and Latvia in autumn 1926, which, however, was never ratified. At the same time the first Pan-European conference took place in Vienna. This led to what was probably the clearest relationship between Europe and a region: they were treated as opposite and mutually exclusive. Päevaleht demanded “less Europe, more Baltic” in Estonian foreign policy. At the moment this policy was aiming at too high an ideal; thus “hands and feet would grow too big at the expense of head and stomach”. Accordingly, diplomatic efforts in the League of Nations and the major western capitals could not replace intimate relations with close neighbours. “All help does not indeed come from Europe.” A common Baltic foreign policy was possible and desirable because of the common enemy. “The Baltic states form a separate wall between West and East, a barrier between two such distinct worlds.”6 Soon afterwards the socialist Ühendus also criticized the Pan-European idea as the latest capitalist defence union; it preferred a truly Pan-European project, which would also include the USSR and Great Britain. This seemed to be too far in the future; until that it recommended “facilitating relations between individual states”.7

Such juxtaposition was avoided by Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883–1964). Pusta had belonged to the foreign delegation which demanded recognition of Estonian independence in 1919. Later he acted as Foreign Minister in 1920 (for three days) and during 1924–1925; the end of the meetings between Baltic foreign ministers obviously resulted from his resignation. Subsequently Pusta’s main posting was as envoy in Paris until 1932.8

6 Päevaleht 2.10.1926, 2. Rba.: Kus on meie välipoliitika raskuspunkt?
8 which has the most significant private organization promoting unification “Pusta’s minibiography can be found for example on the webpages of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.vm.ee/est/kat_397/3435.html].
Meanwhile he became the most prominent Estonian advocate for a Pan-
Europe. He joined the Council of the Pan-European Union, which was
the most significant private organization promoting unification, holding
this position until his death in 1964.

In Pusta’s writings, different regions were not mutually exclusive alter-
natives but complementary entities. Each nation and state ought to pri-
marily help itself but at the same time improve the general conditions for
peace. Consequently cooperation with neighbours did not prevent action
towards national sovereignty. Later Pusta presented the Baltic League, in
combination with the League of Nations, as the cornerstone of Estonian
foreign policy.9

On the other hand, regional cooperation did not narrow Pusta’s per-
spective to merely the country’s immediate neighbours, as the coalition
with Latvia was open to other Baltic Sea Region states (Lithuania, Poland
and Finland were mentioned): “the more distant, the more European our
aim is, the more certainly and rapidly we will achieve something in a nar-
rower sphere.”10 At the same time, Pusta denied any kind of universal citi-
zenship or borderless humanism: “As global citizens we consider ourselves
first as Europeans.”11

In the first Pan-European Conference Pusta advocated regionalism,
giving a presentation “on the blueprints of a Baltic Union, aimed at as-
sembling one part of European nations within a narrower regional area.”12
Soon afterwards he presented Baltic cooperation as an example for other
new European countries, instead of waging economic wars against each
other. In addition, as he said, “I am confident that it can be regarded and
hailed as a pioneer of a forthcoming Pan-Europe”.13 In founding the Of-
vice of the Estonian Pan-European Union in August 1929, Pusta suggested
that the Bulduri protocols of 1922 would easily “construct a blueprint of
a small European federation”. He claimed that these conferences and talks

9 Kaarel R. Pusta, “Paneuroopa liikumine ja selle lähemad ülesanded,” in Kontrastide aastasada,
ed. Hando Runnel (Tartu: Ilmamaa 2000) (Original in Postimees 16.8.1929, 4 and 17.8.1929,
4.), 110–111.
in Paneuroopa Liit (Tallinn: Paneuroopa kirjastus, 1929).
12 Kaarel R. Pusta, Saadiku päevik. (Tallinn: Olion, 1992), 117; Also Kaja 10.10.1926, 5. Pildi-
kesi Pan-Euroopa kongressilt.
had aroused lively interest in Europe, and were seen as a model and prototype for cooperation on a larger scale. This seems to have been followed by years of silence; as late as 1933, however, Pusta once again stated that Baltic consolidation and a common declaration of peace would contribute to a genuine European peace.

Pusta stressed that European unification had diplomatic, economic and cultural dimensions; cooperation between Estonia and Latvia similarly had more than one dimension. A customs union was intended to accompany the defence union. In 1927, Pusta referred to two roads of negotiations for future plans: “a general political road, with many diplomatic agreements, and an economic-political road, which has started with the Estonian-Latvian customs union.”

Pusta lived up to his words of Baltic cooperation in the Pan-European Union. Together with Aleksander Skrzynski, the former Polish prime minister, he managed already in 1927 to include collaboration among agricultural states in feeding Europe in the program of the union. A striking instance of Baltic cooperation within Pan-Europe took place on Pan-Europe day 17.5.1931: P. Bergis and F. Michelson arrived from Riga to talk about small states and borders in Tallinn, while Ants Piip, professor of international law at the University of Tartu, travelled to Riga to talk about international peace.

Other diplomats from the Baltic states also practised some cooperation in their international missions and within the League of Nations. This was probably at its most intensive in the general meeting of 1930, where a study commission for a European union was established. This, however, was not the reason for cooperation; that arose from a vacant seat in the Council of the League. An unofficial rotating system of seats had evolved in the League, and the diplomats wanted the Northern European seat, previously occupied by Finland, to go to one of the Baltic states. Nevertheless their cooperation was eventually futile, and the seat was inherited by

14 Pusta 2000, 117.
15 Postimees 9.1.1934, 4. Balti merele eri statuut. Pusta’s article was published in Les Cahiers de l’Union Européenne, which included also other texts on Baltic issues.
In January 1931 the legations of the five Baltic Sea states in Paris started to have monthly ‘Baltic lunches’ to advance their joint problems with the French government. The first such lunch was held at the Estonian embassy. The monthly schedule was later given up; subsequent lunches were organised in March 1931 by Latvia and in June 1931 by Poland.

During the interwar period there was considerable expression of Baltic and also practical cultural cooperation, at various levels. Even the military Sõdur wrote about the new dimension of international politics. Treaties were no longer entered into between emperors but between nations and peoples. Political agreements therefore had to be supported by immaterial friendship between the parties. As a small state Estonia required alliances, and the struggle shared with Latvia during the liberation war established the necessary basis for a Baltic Defence Union: “The defence forces and nations of both member states are bound with friendship and esteem.” Furthermore, the Chambers of Commerce of the three states started to hold conferences, which dealt with plainly commercial issues but also with economic policies and the need to bring them closer to each other. When director Joachim Puhk visited Kaunas in 1927, he gave a report to Päevaleht, which used a bold and quite irrelevant headline: “The idea of a Pan-Baltic is materialising”.

The concept of the Pan-Baltic, or ‘Kõik-Balti mõte’, in fact became popular only in the early 1930s, but it must have existed silently in the background. It was based on mass support, and the people thus needed to be educated about neighbouring nations. This required a common language; and rather than choosing one out of three, a foreign language had a better chance. Even this was not easy: Russian was no longer acceptable, nor was German (or not yet), and English thus seemed to prevail, partly

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22 Karjahärm 2003, 70–73; For example Kaja 3.6.1930, 7. Balti vendluse mõtte edendamine.
24 Pihlamägi 2004, 86–89.
due to Scandinavian expectations.\textsuperscript{26} The need for a common language became evident on the above-mentioned Pan-Europe day 17.5.1931, when Bergis spoke in Russian and Michelson in German.\textsuperscript{27}

The elusiveness of membership was another distraction to the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{28} Ants Piip wanted to include Finland and Poland as well. Despite the diversity of these countries, Piip defined the area in terms of a common culture, derived from western civilization, and location between greater neighbours. Surprisingly, he could also use the term in an even broader sense, encompassing all the states bordering on the Baltic sea, including Germany and Russia.\textsuperscript{29} At the first Baltic lunch, Pusta also wanted to include Sweden, Denmark and Norway as Baltic states.\textsuperscript{30}

These mutual relationships also affected relations between other states. Estonian relations with Poland were traditionally warm, but Lithuania and Poland quarrelled during the whole interwar period over border issues and especially over Vilnius, which was occupied by Poland in 1922. Estonian relations with Lithuania were therefore bad as well, and deteriorated further when the Elder of State Otto Strandman visited Vilnius on his way back from Warsaw. This led to anti-Estonian demonstrations in Kaunas of allegedly no fewer than a thousand participants.\textsuperscript{31} This relationship later improved, and an Estonian-Lithuanian Friendship Society was established a year later.\textsuperscript{32} Despite the polite rhetoric of Baltic friendship, destiny and common space, practical cooperation was easily hampered by nationalistic claims.

As the figures show (see footnotes 3 and 4), at the turn of the thirties interest in the Baltics decreased close to zero. Even articles such as Ants Piip’s review on Independence Day of 1928 referred to the Baltic League in the past tense, although Piip acknowledged that the problem remained un-

\begin{footnotes}
\item 27 \textit{Vaba Maa} 19.5.1931, 3. Pan-Euroopa päev Tallinnas.
\item 28 Neumann 1999, 162; Medijainen 2001, 123; Karjahärm 2003, 60, 70–73.
\item 29 Piip 1932, 96–97.
\item 31 \textit{Kaja} 15.2.1930, 1. Eestivastane meeleavaldus Kaunases.
\item 32 \textit{Kaja} 18.2.1931, 5. Asutati Eesti-Leedu ühing.
\end{footnotes}
answered.\textsuperscript{33} In similar fashion the idea of a customs union was kept alive,\textsuperscript{34} but in practice Estonia had difficulties even in extending commercial treaties toward both the south and the north. Contemporaries connected these issues. For example \textit{Päevaleht} announced abruptly in October 1930, in reporting on troublesome negotiations: “The idea of a Estonian and Latvian customs union has at the moment been definitely abandoned.”\textsuperscript{35} The Finland-Estonia federation was occasionally referred to, but curiously these references originated from Finland.\textsuperscript{36} The official Finnish stance of isolation was accepted by Estonian politicians, who usually refrained from suggesting otherwise. In the negotiations over the renewal of the trade treaty, however, Finland desired to protect her agriculture, while Estonia wanted to lower or even abandon customs payments, thus raising the idea of a customs union. As negotiations continued, cracks started to appear in other issues as well.\textsuperscript{37}

Practical difficulties became an easy target for Euro-sceptics. K.A. Hindrey was the first to compare the setbacks in Estonian and Latvian relations to European unification, thus demonstrating the magnitude and expected difficulties in the latter.\textsuperscript{38} At a public meeting on 23 October 1929, General Johan Laidoner referred to the worsening relations with Latvia as an example of how hard it was for states to enter into alliances.\textsuperscript{39} Similarly, Harald Tammer, foreign news editor at \textit{Päevaleht}, described the new, small nation-states as instinctively timid and cautious to engage in ‘kombinatsioonidega’; as an example, he mentioned the Latvian customs union.\textsuperscript{40}

The leader of the Pan-European Union, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, tried to contact other Estonian politicians and wrote a letter to another former foreign minister, Friedrich Akel, in late 1928. Unlike Pusta, however, Akel was not enthusiastic about Pan-Europe and as an excuse referred

\textsuperscript{34} Piip 1932, 108; Pihlamägi 2004, 85.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Päevaleht} 23.10.1930, 2. –s.: Balkan Baltist ette jõudnud.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Vaba Maa} 29.2.1928, 3. Eesti-Soome riikide unioon; \textit{Vaba Maa} 22.1.1929, 2. Soome-Eesti ühiriikideks?
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Päevaleht} 13.5.1927, 2. K.A.H.: Pan-Euroopa.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Vaba Maa} 25.10.1929, 10. Paneuroopa poolt ja vastu.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Päevaleht} 22.5.1930, 2. H. T.: Pan-Euroopa ja väikerahvad.
to the unhappy situation between Estonia and Latvia to point out the practical difficulty on the way towards the idealistic goal. Although due to historical, political and economic similarities they could be called ‘Zwillingsstaaten’, their actual cooperation had not improved for the past five years.\(^41\)

The promoters of European unification were also naturally aware of the problems in Baltic cooperation. For example in 1926 Pusta almost apologized that the wreck of the Baltic League had also done harm to the fulfilment of the Pan-European idea. The two regions remained in interaction: “it is not possible to completely arrange one part of Europe independently of the rest of Europe...On the other hand, a Pan-Europe is not feasible without these (Baltic) states.” Pusta went as far as linking their national sovereignty to some kind of continental organisation: “Outside Europe, Estonia and other Baltic states are not independent politically, not to mention economically.”\(^42\)

Likewise in his opening speech at the meeting of the Estonian Office of the Pan-European Union, Pusta had to acknowledge that “we retreated from the realisation of the Baltic Union ... Even now the idea has not been abandoned, but has been laid aside, waiting for its opportunity.” Nevertheless these problems could not be used as excuses for turning away from Europe.\(^43\)

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\(^{41}\) Historical Archives of EU. PAN/EU 30. Fr. Akel to Coudenhove-Kalergi 10.12.1928.
\(^{43}\) Pusta 2000, 110.
An economic expert of the Pan-European Union, Otto Deutsch,\(^4^4\) who visited Tallinn in June 1929, was also aware of problems in regional cooperation. However, he did not become disillusioned but turned the situation for the best for Pan-Europe. According to him, the Estonian-Latvian customs union was basically a political agreement, and this was the key to problems. Within Pan-Europe, economic experts alone would solve economic questions. Problems in smaller circles could be solved when they were brought into a larger context.\(^4^5\)

As a foreigner Deutsch differed from Estonian Euro-enthusiasts, above all Pusta, who did not have such preferences: the two regions were in constant interaction and thus there was no need to focus on either region. Eurosceptics at the time on the other hand had preferences – but opposite ones. They doubted the prospects of continental unification, considering the problems with immediate neighbours. At the moment, closer regional cooperation was not proposed as an alternative; but implicitly the road to Europe had to be taken by way of the next door neighbours.

**Turn of the Tide: The Warsaw Agriculture Conference and the Austro-German Customs Union**

In June 1930 the idea of European unification was in its heyday. French Premier Aristide Briand had made an official proposal to study and establish a European federation within the League of Nations. The proposal was under consideration by the European governments when Poland brought an initiative for closer cooperation in the field of agriculture among the countries of Central Eastern Europe.\(^4^6\) The Polish initiative was a consequence of the economic depression, which had started half a year earlier in the USA.

The first conference was held in Warsaw, 28–30 August 1930, and even Hungary and Finland participated as observers – but Lithuania refused to come. Estonia was represented by Minister of Agriculture August Kerem

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\(^4^5\) *Päevaleht* 9.6.1929, 4. Eestis Pan-Euroopa komitee asutatud.

and local envoy Karl Tofer. Naturally, the Agrarian Kaja paid much attention to the conference and to the creation of an ‘agraarblokk’. It stressed relieving the difficulties of basic agriculture, which should bypass the contemporary political dispute. Although Kaja was delighted by the attention the conference had received in the rest of Europe, it did not present it as model for further European unification. Instead, the development of European agriculture was presented as a complementary response to American wheat. The next conference was held already in October of the same year, in Bucharest. But the question faded away shortly thereafter, for various reasons. For one thing, the Balts disliked the Slavonic majority, and there were conflicts in other areas as well; but most importantly every state was concerned to protect its own agriculture.

Concurrently with the meeting in Bucharest, six Balkan countries held their own conference in Athens, which seemed to promise a full federation. Agreement was arrived at only as to subsequent regular meetings, but eventually none of them took place. Both conferences were embarrassing for Estonia and the Baltic states; the ‘uncivilized’ Balkan appeared to have overcome the problems which had prevented a Baltic union. The title of a ‘northern Balkan’, and any resemblance to South-East Europe, were easily denied.

Although these conferences did not yet challenge the idea of a Pan-European federation proposed by Briand, they exposed the difficulties of Baltic cooperation, which previously could be ignored in view of the fact that other regions had even less cooperation. Furthermore, they were first regional conferences especially in the field of agriculture, which became popular in subsequent years. For example Vienna hosted a series of such meetings in March 1931, where even Germany participated.

49 Kaja 23.10.1930, 5. Bukaresti konverentsi lõppes.
51 päevaleht 23.10.1930, 2. –s.: Balkan Baltist ette jõudnud; Also Postimees 23.9.1927, 2. Ida-Euroopa ja Balti liit; Kaja 15.10.1930, 5. Esimene Balkani konverents Ateenas.
A more serious blow for Briand and European unification came in March 1931, when Germany and Austria took Europe by surprise and announced a customs union to relieve their economic emergency. (The treaty was actually meant to be declared on 21 March, but the information was leaked two days earlier.) The information gave rise to protests in France, which claimed that the treaty violated the Peace Treaty of St. Germain. In other words, it threatened Austrian independence, which was under French protection. As a provisional solution the treaty was sent to the General assembly of the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The latter found the treaty illegal in September, but Austria and Germany withdrew the treaty before the verdict to guarantee foreign credit to Vienna. Although this proposal too failed, it can be regarded as the turn of the tide in European plans – the shift from a continental federation to regional solutions.53

From the beginning both the Germans and the Austrians had announced the treaty as a step towards the economic unification of Europe in the principles of Pan-Europe. Additionally, the treaty stole the attention in a meeting of Briand’s European Study Commission a few weeks later.54 When the whole commission met in May, the German foreign minister Julius Curtius recalled the failure of the universal Customs Truce Conference in February 1930. While the economy was worsening rapidly, it was appropriate to focus on more limited customs unions.55

In Estonia, Päevaleht, which had doubted the Pan-European idea, welcomed the new sidetrack. A long article by the pseudonymous Majandusmees proclaimed: “Europe is not yet ready for a general economic agreements. This has become ever clearer ... Therefore it is surely wise to endorse regional agreements.” But Majandusmees calculated correctly that European customs barriers would in fact rise when the higher tariff of


55 Päevaleht 18.5.1931, 1. Saksa soov pääsis Genfis võidule.
Germany or Austria expanded. On the other hand, *Päevaleht* also kept in mind the long-term aim: “This would be a realistic opportunity and in the current situation a practical path towards the United States of Europe.”

But Harald Tammer, who had opposed Briand’s continental plan, opposed the customs union as well. His analyses focused on relations between small and big states. It seemed that a large industrial country was swallowing up a small agricultural one. Although he had opposed the Briand proposal, he now preferred a Pan-European arrangement of centralising agricultural trade; the industrial West should buy their bread from Eastern Europe rather than from America. This arrangement would lead to the same result as regional customs treaties.

Nor did *Kaja* understand Germany’s bid for regional customs unions; it preferred continental cooperation. In fact, Europe was already unified in many ways and this unofficial development continued to develop. Thus the treaty was a step backwards and diplomatic work in the League of Nations was preferable, even though it was a long and winding road: “Of course such a movement is not easy to realise, and perhaps we like many other generations will die before European unification materialises.”

Tammer was also concerned about the treaty provoking even greater distrust between Germany and France. This was alarming to *Postimees* as well. *Postimees* had been a warm supporter of Pan-Europe and the Briand proposal, and now it worried about the effect of deteriorating relations on the Study Commission. The bright side was that Briand and France were forced to make a counterproposal in the economic field.

The counterproposal eventually was published on 1 March 1932. The short-lived Tardieu plan for a Danube Federation included Austria and Hungary in addition to the Little Entente of Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. This too was presented as a first step towards the economic reconstruction of Europe. The plan was discussed in London among

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representatives of Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain. The meeting as such placed the smaller countries in the position of passive objects, and this was noticed in the Estonian newspapers. However, this did not concern them as long as Estonia was not particularly mentioned. The papers primarily wrote about saving and helping Eastern Europe.61

Harald Tammer had in the meantime moved to Paris and frequently mentioned the Tardieu plan in his reports. Although he considered the plan impractical, more importantly he recognised a clear change in the European policy of both France and Britain: the continental Briand proposal was ultimately rejected, and plans limited in territory but with greater impact were promoted. The great powers had bigger interests in the Balkans, but in addition the earlier Balkan cooperation had attracted them. Consequently, Tammer advised greater Baltic cooperation to turn the British and French focus to the Baltic Sea.62

In addition to these European, theoretical considerations, not directly involving Estonia, the German-Austrian customs treaty immediately evoked conclusions related to the unsuccessful Baltic customs union. Vaba Maa pointed out that the Germans of two countries had managed in few months to come to a resolution, while the Balts had been trying in vain for the last ten years.63 This was a deliberate provocation, as the German upper class was the significant ‘other’ in the Estonian national narrative. Postimees hoped explicitly that the Baltic states would follow and bring their economies closer together. Although the position of pioneer in constructing regional cooperation was lost, the last place had to be avoided. Päevaleht expressed similar aspirations.64 Postimees also gave space to a humorous column which maliciously prophesied blessings for Germany and Austria on the basis of Baltic experience. It also criticized the newspaper

63 Vaba Maa 25.3.1931, 5. Saks-Austria tolliunioon hakkab maksma tulevast aastast.
64 Postimees 24.3.1931, 2. Balti merest kuni Brennerini; Päevaleht 24.3.1931, 2. Majandusmees: Uus ajajärk Euroopa kaubalepingute poliitikas; Päevaleht 26.3.1931, 5. Üks unenägu tõeks saamas?
itself and other Europeanists, who rejected the regional attempt at their general goal.65

The initial Latvian response to the Estonians appeared in *Brihva Seme*. Comparison of the two treaties was unfair, since the Germans had agreed on many more reduced clauses. Nevertheless the treaty was a good model for the Baltic states, especially since it included some ideas which Latvia had earlier proposed to Estonia.66

In the next two years there were many suggestions of greater cooperation, more frequent conferences, a Baltic study commission to follow in Briand’s footsteps, and the unification of legations for instance in the Baltic Sea region. The cultural Pan-Baltic idea and other expressions of a common destiny also gained more popularity in this period: “Without further explanation it is undoubtedly clear that these states stand and fall together. If one of them disappears for reasons of foreign policy, the others will be finished as well.” The turn of the year 1931/1932 was the most active time for such proposals, and along with private persons representatives of the Latvian Foreign Ministry also spoke publicly of such ideas.67

In Estonia, it was *Vaba Maa* that the most receptive: with *Jaunakas Šinās*, it launched an inquiry among leading Baltic businessmen in the three states concerning economic cooperation, with the idea of making it closer. *Päevaleht* commented with an assurance of Estonian innocence in the imbalance of trade with Latvia; on the contrary, it accused Latvia of misusing the transition trade.68 Likewise *Postimees* replied bitterly to Latvian proposals, ignoring charges that Estonia had ruined the mutual customs union. It did not bother even to mention where the problems and difficulties had originated: it was common knowledge they came from Latvia. Despite this, *Postimees* did not want to remain in the past but hoped the customs union would come true, on Estonian terms of course.69 One proposal by Estonia in February 1932 was to refrain from elevating mutual tariffs, fol-

65 *Postimees* 4.4.1931, 4. K.: Austria-Saksa “kolhoos”.
66 *Postimees* 28.3.1931, 4. Lätleded tolliliidust Eestiga.
68 *Vaba Maa* 25.10.1931, 2; 27.10.1931, 2; 29.10.1931, 2. Eesti, Läti ja Leedu majanduslik koostöö; *Päevaleht* 31.10.1931, 2. Balti majandusblokk.
following the example of the Oslo group. After three months, when nothing had happened, a frustrated *Postimees* returned to the issue once again.

Most of the proposals derived from Latvia. The Latvian zeal for “Baltism” becomes evident in the case of the Thunder Cross (Pērkonkrust), which openly endorsed a political, economic and military Baltic union. Amidst the right-wing movements of the interwar period, this kind of regionalism was exceptional. As the geographical centre, Latvia would have obviously dominated the prospective Baltic union.

**Low water: Regional treaty without regionalism**

When Ants Piip wrote his popular work on world politics in 1932, he stressed the new beginning of Baltic relations and rapprochement between Lithuania and her neighbours. He trusted that regional cooperation would come to life almost by itself. The border state plans had failed with the Warsaw Protocol in 1924, but that disappointment had since vanished. Although an alliance was not possible between states, attitudes among the people had grown warm.

Hitler’s coming to power in early 1933 created shock waves in international politics. *Lietuvos Zinias* initiated the discussion in the Baltic states on 15 March, but it soon ended in the same deadlock. Estonia and Latvia were in principle ready for an alliance but wished to stay out of the Lithuanian border dispute with Poland over Vilnius, which on the other hand was primary for Lithuania. In addition, Lithuanian goals were considered too pro-German.

70 Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg signed the treaty on convention of economic rapprochement in Oslo in December 1930. Finland joined the treaty in 1933.
71 *Postimees* 24.2.1932, 3. Balti tollirahu; *Postimees* 22.5.1932, 2. Mis saab Balti riikide tollirahust?
73 Piip 1932, 109–110.
At the same time the idea of a ‘Baltoscandia’, as an entity between East and West, emerged in the lectures of professor Edgar Kant, and Carl Lindhagen, former Chief Magistrate of Stockholm, introduced his initiative on cooperation across the whole Baltic Sea region. Lindhagen included the Vilnius question: since it could not be resolved bilaterally, it should be discussed among a larger group.

The chief editor of Kaja, Hans Oiderman, had already a week earlier anticipated and dismissed such broad, “fantastilised” plans. His advice was to focus on practical cooperation in the field of the economy. A relationship did already exist; it was only necessary to organize it properly. As if to confirm this claim, the front page the next day anticipated a customs union between Estonia and Latvia in the steel industry.

Päevaleht followed along similar lines. Despite problems, the three countries should strive first towards the union of their own. This was not nevertheless enough: “The final aim should nevertheless be at Skandinaavia-Baltic cooperation, at least on the economic questions. But the road to that destination appears to be very long and take via other stations.”

Postimees recognised that the rest of Central Europe had already reacted to the Nazi ascension by increasing their cooperation. Without fear of exaggeration, it focused on the even brighter future: “The new commonwealth does not merely possess greater weight in the family of nations, but

75 Päevaleht 23.3.1933, 2. Baltoskandia – kõige põhjapoolsem kultuurmaa.
76 Kaja 28.3.1933, 5. Rootslase arvamine Balti liidust; Vaba Maa 30.3.1933, 2. Väikeriikide kontsert.
77 Kaja 17.3.1933, 2. Hans Oiderman: Praktiline Balti poliitika; Kaja 18.3.1933, 1. Tolliunioon Lätiga kõigepealt metallitööstuse alal.
78 Päevaleht 15.3.1932, 2. R.: Skandinaavia-Balti liit.
in the hands of capable diplomacy it could easily develop into the nucleus of an even larger union.” To make sure that the Estonian foreign ministry understood the hint, the editorial concluded: “We will do well to follow developing events carefully.”

Already at the time of the Tardieu plan, Tammer had stressed that the countries’ own activity toward increased regional cooperation would make the great powers interested in supporting individual countries. Although preliminary action was needed to avoid being relegated to a passive position, the great powers were necessary as guarantors. Tammer’s concern increased after Hitler gained power. Neutrality was no longer an option, and the Western powers could no longer offer their assistance in establishing a Baltic union. Instead Tammer looked for model groups and found them in Scandinavia and Central Europe. The three Baltic states were too small and thus far had not managed to form an alliance. Tammer’s solution was to use the Baltic as a mediator between these groups; instead of the traditional east-west bridge, it meant opening doors in a north-south direction. This would bring about the creation of an adequate economic and political unity. As a sign of desperation, Tammer appealed to the communication routes of the Viking era as the basis of the alliance.

Sõdur returned to the theme in the summer of 1934. It was disappointed both in the League of Nations, for its failure to create a general peaceful atmosphere, and in Sweden and Finland as potential allies. Everyone was looking for an ally for national security, and this was especially vital for a small state like Estonia. This was not, however, to refrain from an active defence policy. In the end it was proposed to “create closer cooperation among the three purely Baltic states and at the same time to finally dismiss those moral obstacles which to some extent hamper the good concord of Baltic nations.”

79 Postimees 19.2.1933, 2. Euroopale taotakse uut saatust.
In September 1934, after Poland had entered into non-aggression pacts with Germany and the Soviet Union, the Baltic Entente of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was signed in Geneva. The treaty was consultative in nature, without mutual guarantees, and therefore could not become a basis for defence. The treaty allowed other states to join in later; this was intended primarily for Poland and Finland. This may have been wished in Estonia but it was unsurprisingly denied by the Lithuanian press. The ‘silent era’ of the Päts regime had already begun, and the four major newspapers published without comment the same news of the interest in the event shown by international journalists located at the League of Nations. Only *Päevaleht* interviewed H. Laretei, the Permanent Secretary (the highest-ranking civil servant) of the Estonian Foreign Ministry, who considered the treaty to foster the international position of the three countries and potentially to deepen peace in Eastern Europe. Above all, however, it was “proof of our endeavours to consolidate our independence and peace.”

Conclusion: Narrowing the alternatives

This article has dealt with the public discussion concerning Estonia’s place in Europe with respect to more limited cooperation among neighbours. Although Baltic cooperation was practised and was represented as vital for national independence, its popularity faded rapidly. During the tranquil 1920s it remained an ideal picture, which could be seen as a first step towards Europe – as an example of cooperation on a broader scale. At the same time there was no need to take action towards these miscellaneous visions.

Even the economic depression as such did not intensify talk about regionalism; this happened only after the external program started to prefer regional unions and the tide shifted from the continental Briand proposal.
to customs unions between Austria and Germany. As a result the poor state of Baltic cooperation was revealed, but Estonia could still support it within the European framework. Nevertheless even these initiatives were held back by mutual complaints. The sceptics of European unification had earlier cited the Baltic case as an example of the futility of practical measures in international cooperation; but the new situation did not increase receptivity to regional solutions. Instead, the European dimension diminished as the perspective of future allies and prospective influence waned: such plans were mentioned less often and in more limited form. Within three years the scope for relations among neighbours had shrunk, first from a continental European plan to the Baltic Sea region and subsequently to the Baltic states alone. In the end, the Baltic Entente was the last resort and served almost entirely national interests.

The discussion of European unification during the same period showed a remarkable sustainability of preferences at an economic, diplomatic or cultural level. In contrast, opinions regarding regionalism were very elusive. This was due above all to the elusiveness of the concept of the Baltic. One problem was the lack of definition of the countries belonging to it. Secondly, its role as a mediator was emphasized; thus it was defined by non-members rather than actual members. Although this clearly implicates the exclusion of Russia, there were only few articles specifically mentioning the threat of the Soviet Union as a reason for Baltic cooperation or even referring to any kind of defence union.

On the eve of an unprecedented economic depression, and situated between two rising great powers, the pleasant words of solidarity and brotherhood were easily dismissed and a commitment was made to narrow, short-sighted national interests: not just in Estonia but in other Baltic – and European – states as well.

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Literature
II Exchange of people and ideas
A. Kangasmaa, an engineer from Helsinki, had made a trip to the United States in 1928, and back home he gave his colleagues a speech about American building practices. He had visited New York and wanted to share his experiences with his colleagues, but found it difficult:

The first impression that a traveller to America gets, when he looks at the enormous stone walls and skyscrapers as the ship approaches New York, is impossible to describe in the prosaic language of a technician.

The problem, however, was not only that of an engineer or his technical language. Although America was in many ways familiar to Finnish people and had become a reference point in many fields, from film to architecture and city planning, describing it to a Finnish audience was still a demanding task. One of the reasons for this problem was that although there had been a flux of immigrants moving to the United States, most of the professionals working in the media or with urban issues during the twenties had not themselves visited the country. At the same time there were more and more images and stories about America available in the increasingly international field of newspapers, magazines and films.

1 The speech was later published in Rakennustaito, the leading professional journal of building engineers. A. Kangasmaa, “Amerikanmatkalta” Rakennustaito 4/1928.
In this article I analyse texts and images occurring in the Finnish press in the 1920s that focused on America and Americanism in an urban context. My interest lies in the experience of urban phenomena that were considered new and foreign, whether they were called ‘modern’, ‘American’, or simply ‘new’, and in the ways these experiences were seen in relation to Finnish urban culture at the time. My purpose, in other words, is to contextualise the terms ‘Americanism’ and ‘America’ in a broader cultural setting. I first take a look at some of the main questions surrounding the construction going on in the capital city of Helsinki in the twenties. I then analyse writings and imagery produced and circulated in the Finnish media.

In this analysis, I am aware that questions revolving around the urban past have puzzled Finnish historians and writers in earlier times as well. Already in 1914, V. A. Koskenniemi, an eminent writer and literary critic, pondered the weak literary tradition of the Finnish urban novel. He attributed this in part to what he called the “American atmosphere” of Helsinki. According to Koskenniemi, most foreigners saw Helsinki, despite its small-town attractiveness, as somehow “American, unpsychological, as cities that are too new often are”. This ‘newness’ was an issue that Helsinki, when it became the national capital after Finland gained its independence from Russia in 1917, had to take seriously. Most European capitals of the time had a historical, often medieval, centre; this was something Helsinki lacked.

In the same essay Koskenniemi took up another subject, which was to be frequently repeated on different occasions during the 1920s: “Helsinki is quickly evolving into a metropolis.” This hovering between a small-town past and an imaginary metropolitan future is a frame within which most ideas about the future of Helsinki were situated during the interwar period.

2 The texts analysed here are selected from a corpus of writings and images in Finnish newspapers, magazines, films and literature in the 1920s. This corpus forms the basis of my forthcoming dissertation, *The Skyscraper Question: Imagining and Debating Modernity in 1920s Helsinki*. In this article I confine myself to writings on urban issues; I ignore debates in the field of film production and importing, which would give a different perspective.

3 I am explicitly talking about ‘America’ as a cultural concept, not about the United States as a nation or political entity, since I am trying to use the same term as contemporaries.

4 V. A. Koskenniemi, *Runon kaupunkeja ynnä muita kirjoitelmia* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1914), 96

5 Ibid., 93.
Building a Capital City

The Helsinki of the 1920s was the capital of a new nation: one which politically was still recovering from a civil war but which at the same time was undergoing rapid modernisation. Independence had been followed by the Civil War, during which the country was split between the White and Red regimes. Helsinki was under the Red regime from the end of January of 1918 to April, when the German troops and soldiers of the White army marched into the city. Already before the war there had been an attitude of political distrust towards urban industrial workers; the war, and especially the brief period of Red power in Helsinki, strengthened this attitude not only towards workers but toward urban areas as a whole. The Civil War also reaffirmed the political status of the peasant figure as the most ‘authentic’ representative of Finnish culture.

Architecture played an important role in the process of nation-building and in the construction of the capital city in particular. The profession of architect was almost self-evidently a bourgeois profession, and architects were indeed – without exception – on the victorious White side during and after the war; but they were also often quite concretely the key figures dealing with the consequences of the war in the cities. For example Otto-Iiwari Meurman’s task as Municipal Architect in Viipuri was to rebuild the parts of the city that had been destroyed during the war,6 while Birger Brunila was assigned the task of designing the gravestones in The Old Church Park (Vanha kirkkopuisto) for the Finnish and German soldiers who had died in the war. Brunila was also in charge of decorations for the notable military parade, when the ‘White General’ Mannerheim arrived in Helsinki with his troops in May 1918 to celebrate the end of the war.7

In Finland, as elsewhere in Europe, the architecture of the so-called ‘Modern Movement’ of the twenties and thirties was sensitive to social issues, as poor living conditions in cities were seen as a major reason for social disorder. In the late 1920s international issues gained prominence along with national, social issues. Architecture was a way to appropriate foreign influences in the cityscape itself; indeed, both the field of architectural practice and the stylistic discourse of modernism have been interna-

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tional from the outset. Architecture was also a visible and powerful way to communicate the success of this appropriation to the outside world. “Having something to show foreign guests” is an expression often found in the newspapers and magazines of the 1920s. This ‘something’ often turned out to be a building.

The process of building a city to impress visitors, however, was problematic. The population of Helsinki was constantly growing, and opinions about this were quite varied. Attitudes towards the future cityscape were affected in many ways by class, gender, language, ethnicity and political position, but these influenced the perception of historical buildings as well.

The architectonic and aesthetic values of the Senate Square, the administrative city centre planned by Carl Ludwig Engel in the nineteenth century, were not questioned. In the view of the contemporary architect Juhani Vikstedt, who was an enthusiastic advocate of urban architecture, the Square gave the city a dignified and solemn atmosphere. On the other hand, since the monumental Senate Square had originally been commissioned and built by the Czar, it also reminded Finns of their history under Russian reign and was politically problematic as a centre for the newly independent state. According to Ture Janson and Erkki Kivijärvi, authors of the book *Hyvä Helsinkimme* (Our Dear Helsinki) published in 1926 – whose aim was to celebrate the urban atmosphere of the new, independent capital – the political climate from the beginning of the century until Independence was transforming Helsinki into a Russian garrison town, where the dominant sound was that of the jackboot.

One consequence of the memories of the Russian era embodied in the Senate Square was that the new House of Parliament (J. S. Sirén, 1926–1931), the most prestigious and demanding building project of the interwar period, could not be conceived of as being built in the same area. The planning of the Parliament building had started in 1923; after long debate over its location a site was found west of the the city centre, adjacent to the modern residential area of Töölö. The area was still quite sparsely built; it was characterised as a site “between deserted rocks”. The area was intended as the new centre for the capital, but this was a future project, and the area

around the Parliament house was to remain almost empty for a long time. In a book presenting the architecture of Helsinki published in 1931, the architect Carolus Lindberg noted that “the choice of the location cannot be understood, if one did not know that in the future this area will be the most impressive place of the city”.10

Building a capital city in modern times, however, is not merely a question for the state administration or the professional field of building and architecture. Alongside official government buildings there were a growing number of spaces for purposes of entertainment and business. The downtown area was increasingly filled with typically modern spaces, such as cinemas, cafés and restaurants, but also with florists, barbershops and specialised grocery shops. Smaller-scale technologies could also be seen at street level. Trams and street-lights were obvious novelties, but there were even requests to the City Council to put up scales and perfume dispensers on street corners.11 The public was interested in new developments and changes in the cityscape, and a glance at the press of the 1920s reveals a vast amount of commentaries and articles – often in the form of the ‘causserie’ – devoted to such changes.

**Coming to terms with ‘America’**

Commercial activities of different kinds thus increasingly affected the everyday lives of people living in Helsinki. This commercialisation was often interpreted in terms of Americanisation. As the architectural critic M. Christine Boyer has noted, “[s]ince the early twentieth century, architecture has been a commodity as well as a form of publicity”.12 While her comment was written in the context of American architecture, which was commercialised in a way that could hardly be thought of in Finland and certainly does not capture the reality of architectural production as a whole in Finland, it does give insight into how the new, consumer-
oriented architecture of Helsinki was presented in the Finnish media. It may be worth considering that even in Finland architecture has not always been presented in terms of an architectural, art-based aesthetic, but also in terms of fashion and consumption.

The terms ‘Americanism’ and ‘Americanisation’, and various references to America, occur in the twenties in numerous writings and varied contexts; a closer look, however, reveals that their usage was not coherent, but on the contrary rather vague. Many phenomena that were considered American, especially the skyscraper, which was the most talked-about subject in the field of architecture and building, had no equivalent as such in Finnish culture; or if they did, the scale was somewhat different. For example, when *Arkkitehti*, the leading Finnish journal of architecture, opened up a debate as to whether a building permit should be issued for a ‘Kino-Palatsi’ skyscraper in Helsinki, it started with the following words: “An American skyscraper – that new dinosaur of our times, which blinds our European brains with horror, derives from a desperate need for space, and has nothing to do with embellishing the cityscape or with the drawings presented here. Its inner essence is from completely different worlds of ideas.”

Despite this strangeness, America was an important factor to be taken into account politically, economically and culturally in Finland as elsewhere in post-war Europe. America as a concept was referred to in texts that dealt with new – or modern – phenomena and their adjustment to national, local or European life. It is, however, almost impossible to talk about Americanisation without considering its counterpart, Europe.

When the topic is Americanism, the concept of Europe is involved in numerous ways. The problem, as put for example by Mats Björkin, who has written on Americanism in Sweden, is not only that ‘America’ is vaguely defined, but also that Europe is just as difficult to perceive as a single, coherent entity. Björkin suggests that along with Americanisation there was Europeanisation; an effort to understand European culture as something that can transcend national differences. This concept of Europe was of course not only a cultural one; along with its cultural meanings it also became politicised, especially later in the 1930s. The shift to a more politicised understanding can be read for example in Olavi Paavolainen’s

13 “’Pilvenpiirtäjää’ vai ei?” *Arkkitehti* 2/1928, 32.
Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana (Visiting the Third Reich), now seen as a conflicting but very perceptive report from Nazi Germany in 1936: “All along in the Nuremberg Rally I became aware of a new slogan in the national socialist terminology: European.”\textsuperscript{15} In the 1920s Paavolainen had been an advocate for a Europe-oriented Finnish culture, but this shift was something that obviously puzzled him.

In the twenties attitudes towards America were not fixed or solid. From the point of view of an urban Finnish identity, Europe and America acted as counterparts that could serve as ideals, audiences, or competitors. The engineer A. Kangasmaa, cited at the beginning of this article, in continuing his speech found that he could only describe the skyscrapers by comparing them to the European mentality: “For the traveller who has a chance to cheerfully climb up to the top deck of first class, who can look at this view free of care, and who has fresh in mind the beautiful and elegant great European cities that have grown and developed steadily over centuries, these strange heaps of rocks and columns remain a huge question mark.”\textsuperscript{16}

In the debate over urbanity, building and architecture, America came to play an important role in Finland as elsewhere in Europe. In fact, America had been an important source of inspiration for European architects during the nineteenth century, and this influence was further strengthened after the Chicago exhibition in 1893.\textsuperscript{17} In Finland a surprising number of buildings bearing American stylistic features were built around the turn of the century, for example the Art Museum in Turku (Gustaf Nyström, 1904) and the Finnish National Theatre in Helsinki (Onni Törnvist-Tarjanne, 1902). These buildings have been traditionally classified as belonging to the Finnish national-romantic genre, and have not usually been thought of as American.\textsuperscript{18} As important national institutions (both of them have recently been renovated) they are considered part of the Finnish national heritage; their roots in American style are, if not hidden, at least rarely mentioned or remembered. Americanism, understood as an attitude, a de-

\textsuperscript{15} Olavi Paavolainen, Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana. (Helsinki: Otava, 1993 orig. 1936), 120.
literate way to make an American impression, is thus a product of a later period. Americanism in the field of architecture is, I suggest, more related to popular imagery in the media than to specific building practices.

During the 1920s America – due to its visibility in media – became an increasingly important reference point in urban issues both for architects and for the general public, who now had access to more detailed information. This was due above all to the emergence of film, but also to the increasing visuality of other media. In many newspapers, for example, photographs were starting to replace drawings. In the professional field of architecture this meant an increasing number of architectural reviews and a growing amount of photographs. Press photos of American images, styles and building forms, such as skyscrapers, were introduced to the public imagination. *Suomen Kuvalehti* was the first weekly magazine to acquire a rotogravure printing press from Germany in 1921, but in the following years many other magazines followed its example. The skyscraper was probably the single most frequently recurrent image referring to urban America.

**Americanising Helsinki**

For many people living in Helsinki, images from the media formed the context of understanding when skyscraper projects were introduced in Helsinki. In the late twenties there were three notable plans for skyscrapers: a tower for the department store Stockmann, Kino-Palatsi on the Northern Esplanade for a film company (Suomi-Filmi), and the Hotel Torni (‘Tower’) on Yrjönkatu for a fire insurance company. Of these three

21 The tower had been part of the original plan for Stockmann by Sigurd Frosterus in 1915, but it was dropped in later versions.
plans, Torni was the only one to be eventually built (Valter Jung & Bertel Jung, 1931). The planning process itself was extensively discussed in public, and was drawn into other current debates on the cityscape, on modernisation – and on Americanism. Although the scale of these ‘skyscrapers’ was quite modest – the highest one, Kino-Palatsi, would have been sixteen stories and Torni only twelve – ‘skyscraper’ was indeed the word that was used in the 1920s. In the following decade the term ‘skyscraper’ gradually vanished from usage and was replaced by ‘tower’.

11. A miniature model of the Kino-Palatsi skyscraper imagined here as if it had been built on the Northern Esplanade behind the Swedish Theater, shows how peaceful the center of Helsinki still was in 1928. Suomi-Filmi/KAVA.

Already the idea of having skyscrapers in Helsinki aroused heated debate and divided public opinion. Yrjö Harvia, a politician from the Liberal Party involved in many building activities, was quite bluntly negative in his opinion that building skyscrapers would only be a waste of time and effort that could be used for better purposes.22 Most opinions, however, had

22 Yrjö Harvia, “Helsinki saanee sittenkin pilvenpiirtäjän”. Helsingin Sanomat 5.10.1929.
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relatively little to do with the material, economic conditions of building. What mattered to most commentators, whether professional architects or ordinary citizens, was the appearance and skyline of Helsinki – and especially how they would appear to foreigners.

For some, building a skyscraper meant the degradation of Helsinki and its national heritage. An anonymous comment in a newspaper in 1928 sums this up in a few sentences: “I think that it is ridiculous, dare I say childishly foolish, to plan an expensive skyscraper only to be able to say that we too have one, because its redundancy should be quite self-evident to any sane person. Because of the speculators there are enough ugly buildings breeding. If it is really necessary to have such an awful thing, it should rather be built on a deserted island so that it would not, like many others already, disfigure our Helsinki, which has already been raped.”

For many others, an American spirit would give Helsinki just the international and progressive atmosphere that was needed. Another anonymous writer pleaded with the authorities: “Dear City Fathers, could you please give us this modest skyscraper. It will not cause you any unsurmountable difficulties or costs to us taxpayers, but for our city it would be a gift that might not be offered twice. It would be a place that everyone could be proud of.”

Many writers were seriously trying to domesticate the skyscraper, describing it, like this writer, as something everyone could enjoy, but this did not quite succeed. Despite the initial enthusiasm raised by the projects, the majority of architects as well as the authorities were ultimately against raising the permitted building height in the downtown area, with the exception of the hotel Torni.

Along with the local debates about the suitability of the skyscrapers to the cityscape of Helsinki, there was a vein of describing the American skyline in a highly romantic way that lifted the debate to a whole new level, recalling the “skyward trend of thought” linking skyscrapers to a long tra-

dition of spirituality in high buildings. Aino Kallas was one of the most international writers in Finland, and as a professional writer she was not confined to “the prosaic language of the technician”. In describing the New York skyline, she was puzzled by what she saw as something completely different from any building she had seen before. She describes her experience in powerful, vivid words, which remind us that skyscrapers have also been sites of powerful sensations:

I thought there was no such thing as American architecture. I was mistaken. There exists a poetry of steel, iron, practicality, commerce and business: the American skyscraper. When I stood at the pinnacle of the world-famous ‘Woolworth’ commercial building, on the sixtieth floor, a building like a temple to mammon with its arched vaults and Madonna-like nymphae of commerce, I felt that for the first time I had a faint sense of a soul until now strange to me. I didn’t know whether it was smaller or greater than the soul of the old world, nor whether it was forbidding or responsive. I could only feel that it existed and that I was becoming open to a new element.

Americanism, or vague references to America, were thus used in a positive, progressive and even romantic sense, but also in referring to more sinister images of the urban future. It can also be argued that ‘America’ was used almost as a synonym for modernity. According to Jean-Louis

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Cohen’s useful distinction, ‘Americanism’ refers to individual and collective attitudes and representations, whereas ‘Americanisation’ means the actual transformation of societies in the American image. The discourses of Americanism, Cohen adds, were rarely neutral, for they often involved a sense of backwardness or inferiority *vis-à-vis* the modernity of the new world.29 This sense of inferiority may provide a key to understanding why skyscrapers had such a great impact on the fragile and contradictory urban identity of Helsinki, which was struggling with problems of urbanisation and modernisation. With its roots in the popular press and media, the skyscraper may have been more accessible to people than other large buildings, such as churches and administrative buildings, which had traditionally belonged to the leading elites.

**Imagining America**

Although there were many people immigrating to America and travellers like Aino Kallas writing about their impressions, who thus had firsthand experience, the image of urban America in the Finnish press was in many ways imaginary, and many well-known European descriptions of America were written by people who never actually set foot there. This was true of many European writers and architects who were famous for writing about America, such as Charles Baudelaire, who translated the works of Edgar Allan Poe, or Franz Kafka, whose novel *Amerika* was published posthumously in 1927. Although America was an important reference point for many, it is worth noting that most of the Finnish architects who actually went to America – with the important exception of Eliel Saarinen, who moved there in 1922 after his success in the skyscraper competition for the *Chicago Tribune* – did so later on, in the 1930s. German architects started going to America already in the twenties, but Finns at that time usually headed for continental Europe.

For Finnish architects, a trip to Europe, usually to Italy, was an important part of their professional training already in the 1920s. The countries most commonly visited were Sweden and Germany. Most Finnish architects could speak Swedish fluently (in the 1920s two thirds of architects

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were Swedish-speaking), and most of them probably at least understood German. English was still very rarely spoken or understood.30

The image of urban America – or American imagery – was thus an image mediated through press, films, and advertisements. However, it was not merely a question of showing new buildings, but also about new ways of seeing or looking at cities. Beatriz Colomina has argued that the birth of modernist architecture was so connected to that of the mass media that they are almost inseparable. She bases her argument on the fact that international modernism in architecture became known to the world through the media and was presented in a visual style developed in films, advertisements etc.; this in turn affected architectural solutions, for example the creation of screen-like windows.31

Already at the turn of the century the skylines of New York and Chicago invited looking at the city from an aerial perspective. This postcard view, nowadays so familiar, replaced the scenographic view, the Renaissance veduta,32 and gradually became a typical point of view for other cities as well, whether or not they actually had a silhouette of skyscrapers. It is also worth noting that at a time when air travel was unavailable to the general public, this now so familiar view was imaginary to ordinary people.

After the First World War German-American relations were strengthened, as could be seen in the planning of Berlin. German architects and other cultural commentators and artists now had a better chance to see America for themselves. This is reflected in the imagery, which was now less imaginary or idealising and gave more space to contradictions in the American urban reality. Attitudes ranged, according to Jean-Louis Cohen, from irony to hostility.33

A good example of this new way of looking is the photographic travel book by the German architect Erich Mendelssohn, Amerika: Bilderbuch

30 The writer Elsa Enäjärvi was a spokesperson for the English language, which she saw as a key to a true internationality. The old language debate between Finnish and Swedish was rekindled in the twenties, and Enäjärvi’s strong opinions reflect the importance of the question of foreign languages. See for example E. Evi, “Suomalainen – Eurooppalainen?” Tulenkantajat, first issue 1928, 10–12.
ones Architecten, published after his voyage to America in 1924. Mendelsohn made his trip to America with the film director Fritz Lang. The book consisted mainly of photographs of American cities, often skyscrapers. The dramatic angles and dark contrasts of light and darkness soon became familiar all over Europe (and in the Soviet Union, where the book had an enthusiastic reception). The Bilderbuch itself became famous and was frequently reprinted, but similar images are also found in Fritz Lang’s later films. Especially Lang’s Metropolis (1926; released in Finland 1927), a powerful dystopia of a mechanised city and a model for many subsequent science-fiction landscapes, redistributed, although in a fictional context, the sinister views of skyscraper cities that leave no room for humanity.

Both Mendelsohn’s book and Lang’s film were familiar in Finland, but they were apparently understood more as fictional or artistic images of the future than as social commentaries on the contradictions of the contemporary urban condition. These two works are also good examples of how modern urban imagery has circulated in different media and in different countries.

The Bilderbuch is not an exception: a great deal of urban American imagery came to Finland via Germany, in particular Berlin. This is not surprising, as Americans were quite concretely present in the rebuilding of Berlin after the war. Berlin had been considered to be the most Americanised place in Europe, the “Chicago on the Spree” already in 1893. In 1928 Berlin was, in the words of Olavi Paavolainen, “the most modern city in Europe, a piece of America in the middle of the old world”. Another Finnish author and journalist, Erkki Kivijärvi, who visited Berlin around the same time, shared Paavolainen’s view of Berlin as the most Americanised place in Europe, but did not share his enthusiasm. In Kivijärvi’s words, “Berlin has become the New York of Europe. In no other part of our

34 Erich Mendelsohn, Amerika: Bilderbuch eines Architekten. (Berlin: Rudolf Mosse Buchverlag, 1926 (orig. 1924.))
36 This was the expression used by the promoters of Berlin at the Chicago exhibition of 1893. Wolfgang Shivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, orig. Die Kultur der Niederlage, 2001 (London: Granta Books, 2004), 277.
37 Olavi Paavolainen, Nykyaikaa etsimässä: Esiteit ja pakinoita. Orig. 1929 (Helsinki: Otava, 1990), 316.
continent has Americanisation burst out in such brutal forms. Ruthlessness determines the rhythm of visible existence.”

The political and cultural connections between Finland and Germany had traditionally been strong, but they were particularly so in the fields of architecture and the emerging town planning. The surviving documents of journals commissioned for SAFA (Finnish Association of Architects) in the interwar period show that of foreign architectural reviews twenty were from Germany and only three from America. The German reviews, or at least some of them, presented American architecture. Individual architects could of course have other publications of their own, but the number is still quite revealing.

The media, and especially the visual media of the era, played a leading role in shaping attitudes towards America and American architecture, in both the popular and the professional press. It can be argued that ‘America’ was often a product of the popular, mediated imagination rather than a specific geographical or a cultural site. Pictures or photographs of a skyscraper casting a dark shadow over the neighbourhood, for example, needed no explanation; indeed, images of this kind were often considered to speak for themselves. From the examples I have drawn here, it can also been seen that urban America was usually equated to New York. If the ‘America’ referred to in the writings turns out to be vaguely defined, the imagery seems on the contrary to point directly to New York.

39 Details of the town planners’ excursions have been studied in Jussi Kuusanmäki: Sosiaalipolitiikkaa ja kaupunkisuunnittelua: Tietoa, taitoa, asiantuntemusta. Helsinki eurooppalaisessa kehityksessä 2, Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1992), 157–208.
The media, of course, were not a single entity, although the same imagery circulated in films, photographs and newspapers. Architecture, and the discussion of architecture, were seen very much as a form of art, and architectural reviews as belonging to the realm of professional art journals. It has been thought that the discussion and visual development in architectural magazines also spread to the daily press as well as to illustrated magazines. In the case of the skyscraper, however, the situation is more complicated. As the editors of the Finnish architectural reviews had not themselves been to America or seen the buildings, they were probably as much influenced by images drawn from films and popular imagery as were ordinary journalists writing about American phenomena. In fact, those who actually went to America were quite likely to describe the skyline and architecture in a visual, filmic way.

What I have tried to do here is to contextualise the ways American urban architecture was discussed in the Finnish media in the 1920s, but a glance at the world of today shows that many of the questions brought up in the twenties still occupy the debate over building projects. Attitudes towards the United States, in Finland as elsewhere in Europe, have changed since the 1920s, but many of the current issues surrounding building projects still revolve around similar questions. To what extent is Helsinki a European city, to what extent a national capital? How much has the built environment absorbed incongruent, unassimilated foreign elements? Is an imaginary ‘America’ still an important ideal against which new plans are considered?

These questions do not have definitive answers, and many of them remain unsettled. I suggest, however, that analysing the roots of the debate might lead to a better understanding of the cultural conditions of building. The questions have not changed drastically, but the media environment that enables the public debate has changed. First of all, the architectural debate has been detached from the political one (except for land use, which has been politicised during the last few years). Secondly, in the Finnish press buildings and architecture often form a visual background

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for advertisements, and sometimes provide newspaper headlines, but they are rarely the theme of extended articles in general magazines, as they were in the twenties. On the other hand, internet websites have proved to be an arena for the debate and for dreams of skyscrapers.

A look at one website devoted to promoting skyscrapers reveals that surprisingly similar questions still arise when new plans for skyscrapers are brought up for public discussion, as for example in the case of Keski-Pasila in Helsinki. One of the perennial topics of the debate is that in order to look interesting and attractive in the eyes of foreign visitors – and perhaps of foreign capital – Helsinki should have more international architecture. According to these discussions, the skyscraper is by far its symbol; architecture still serves as a way to integrate foreign elements into the national culture and cityscape.

International competition can be detected in the writings of the 1920s; but in the twenty-first century the aspect of competition is so obvious that it barely needs ‘detection’. On a website dedicated to high-rise projects in Finland, an anonymous writer is talking about the plan for an observatory to be built in Tampere: “Why only 141 meters? Why can’t it be ten meters more, so we’d finally have the first Finnish skyscraper. It’s ridiculous that we still don’t have a skyscraper in Finland. Other countries have had skyscrapers forever, but not here. P.S. They even have them in Sweden ...”

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Research litterature


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Refugees’ Right to Family Reunification under EU law: Universally Accepted?

Sari Sirva

In this article, I discuss the aspect of universality of human rights within the context of my doctoral thesis, “Refugees’ Right to Family Reunification under International Law”. The right discussed, as laid down in the core human rights instruments,¹ the right to family life, is one of the fundamental human rights, as expressed for example in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 10 (1):

> The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:

> The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the case and education of dependent children. […]

The European Convention on Human Rights, equally, offers protection to family in its Article 8.1:

> 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.

The core human rights instruments, thus, acknowledge and protect family life as a basic human right. As discussed in this paper, this right is, pursu-

¹ For example the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.
ant to the 1993 Vienna Declaration and programme of Action, a universal right. In this article, I discuss the implications of this ‘universality’ in the context of refugees who are seeking legal protection to their right to family reunification within the jurisdiction of the European Union Member States. Their values and understandings of what constitutes ‘family’ or ‘family life’ may differ significantly from the values held in the region where their families are to be reunited. This raises the question, whether it can be correctly argued that in determining the personal scope of application of the right to family reunification, family members entitled to reunification, the respective legislation and decision-making are in fact touching upon the issue of the universality of human rights. In other words, how far should international law respect culturally different understandings of the family in order to protect it in a way that is legitimate and acceptable to everyone, irrespective of their cultural background? What are the factual and legally accepted limitations in determining the family members eligible for family reunification? The article discusses solutions to this question in the context of the case law emanating from the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union Council’s Family Reunification Directive.

In the present, globalizing world, an increasing number of family reunification claims by refugees present a new challenge to decision-makers, be they courts or administrative bodies, which may be obliged to appreciate the cultural differences in terms of the definition of ‘family’ or ‘family life’. The core question, thus, is: to what extent the decision makers are, or should be, obligated, under the respective domestic and EU law, to take into consideration the ‘alien’ understanding of a ‘family’ in order to arrive in a fair and justified decision for the reunification of a refugee’s family.

My aim is, firstly, to introduce a theoretical approach to the issue of universality versus relativism in international human rights. I further discuss the approaches adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union in its law in terms of addressing the issue of the understanding ‘family’ or ‘family life’.

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The Universalism of Human Rights – The Methodology of Respect

The theoretical framework of this paper is based on the essay of Burns H. Weston, in which he discusses the possibilities of overcoming the tension between universality of human rights and the need to acknowledge varying cultural values.⁴ Weston acknowledges the value of respect as the core value of all human rights. In determining the concept of respect, he follows the thinking of Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, who conceive it “as the reciprocal honouring of freedom of choice about participation in value processes.”⁵ He further points out that the universality of human rights is challenged by questions as to how and to what extent various traditions are to be respected in international decision-making, and which of them are not to be accepted at all.⁶

In the context of family reunification in Europe it can be asked, how far is it legally acceptable or possible to accommodate the European understanding of a family to the various understandings that may be represented by refugees in the region. Respect as a core value is also mutual: refugees with family values different from European ones may also, legitimately, be required to accommodate their demands to the limitations due for instance to public order. To give a practical example: the European Union Member States do not accept polygamy, as an institution which is contrary to women’s rights.⁷

The debate over universalism versus cultural relativism has according to Weston been prominent on the agenda since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The international community has revised its commitment to the universality of human rights, pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in the landmark 1993 Vienna Declaration

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⁶ Weston 2006, 39.
⁷ See Recital 11 of the Council’s Directive

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and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights. In its Article 5, the participating states acknowledge the following commitments:

5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

However, the strong commitment to the universalism of human rights, as expressed above, is not shared by all states within the international community. Nor has the discussion on the prevalence of either view been exhausted. Countries such as Iran have repeatedly defended their right to maintain their cultural traditions, such as for instance the rights of women according to shari’a, irrespective of their international human rights obligations. In his essay, Weston wishes to broaden the discussion and avoid “simplistic a priori reasoning” in his defence of universalism. Weston’s understanding of universalism is, as such, clear: “I am much taken by the idea that universalist international human rights law can and should serve as a basis for rendering cross-cultural normative judgments.” However, he makes it equally clear that, rather than just dismissing relativism as morally or legally wrong or unsound,

An analytically neutral approach for deciding when cultural differences are to be expected and when not, the pro-universalist choices and conclusions undermine the credibility and defensibility of their own particularistic objectives and thus make the idea of international human rights law as a basis for rendering moral judgments very difficult, perhaps even unworkable on occasion. One-sided assertions of legitimacy and priority, by definition of discounting the centrality of the value of respect in human rights,

9 Weston 2006, 41.
invite countervailing charges of cultural imperialism (defending against real or imagined claims of cultural superiority – “colonizing”) and cultural ethnocentrism (defending against real or imagined claims of cultural bias-“Westernizing”), and thus defeat the core goals they seek to achieve.¹⁰

The imposition of Western values is an argument often proffered by many non-Western countries in defending the primacy of their cultural traditions when they collide with international human rights. In these collisions, it would be unsound and unjust not to open up the discussion in a mutually respectful way, in order to identify the real problem and determine whether an accommodation is possible. It must be accepted, however, that international human rights may override cultural traditions that are harmful, such as female genital mutilation and child marriage, and never acceptable under any circumstances. Even if this is the case, the community applying international human rights standards is entitled to a fair discussion. This is very important for the legitimacy of the international human rights in a community. Weston writes that the relativist-universalist debate cannot be settled by the invocation of international law:

[… there is no, thus, no escaping that claims of cultural relativism demand and deserve reasoned, respectful response to them.]¹¹

As a plausible solution to the response described above, Weston introduces his methodology of respect. He advocates the possibility of finding a fair balance between competing doctrines: such issues can in fact be assessed objectively without becoming vulnerable to charges of cultural imperialism and ethnocentrism.¹²

As a basis for his methodology, Weston defines what he calls the observational standpoint for a decision maker, which he feels is “required to resolve a relativist-universalist controversy in a genuinely respectful manner.”¹³ Such a standpoint, according to Weston, is
that of rational persons of diverse identity (creed, gender, race, etc.) acting privately (i.e., not as state representatives) and in their personal self-interest relative to the policies and values they believe should define the world public order of which they are a part, but behind a “veil of ignorance” as to the particular circumstances of their own personal condition within that order.\textsuperscript{14}

Weston argues that from such a standpoint it is possible to reach solutions which could guarantee

The fairest distribution of benefits and burdens among all social groups as well as individuals and thereby ensure that groups as well as individuals benefit as much as possible and suffer the least possible disadvantage.\textsuperscript{15}

In the context of EU law and case-law from the European Court of Human Rights on family reunification, discussion of the definition of ‘family’ or ‘family member’ should include an analysis of possible conflicts in understanding them between the Union Member States and the refugees, representing their values in a genuinely respectful manner. This article touches upon the solutions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and the EU, in examining the occurrence of any indications of an attempt to accommodate different conceptions of a family.

Case-law from the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights (henceforth ‘the Court’) has adopted in its interpretation a doctrine which views the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth ‘ECHR’) as a living instrument. This means that changing societal and moral views, for instance, must be taken into consideration as they exist at the point in time when a decision is made. In \textit{Tyrer v. the United Kingdom}, the Court has stated the following:

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
[The Court must] recall that the convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.16

The Court has further acknowledged the constant evolution of European values and morality in *Handyside v. the United Kingdom*:

In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject.17

The Court has also stressed in its interpretation of the ECHR the quest for decisions that protect and guarantee the rights laid down in the ECHR in a practical and effective rather than theoretical manner.18 In its case law, the Court has formulated this interpretative principle as follows:

The Court recalls that the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective […]19

The right to enjoy respect for one’s family life, as laid down in Article 8.1 of the ECHR, has been an illustrative example of how the Court has elaborated this concept following the above-mentioned interpretations. The Court has ample case law where family life is understood to extend beyond formal relationships and legal arrangements. This means, for instance, that children born out of wedlock are, irrespective of the relevant domestic law, recognised as legitimate family members. The cases relevant to my study, however, focus on decisions where family life has also extended beyond the

16 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 26 para. 31.
17 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 1976 Series A No 24, para. 48.
19 Artico v. Italy, European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No. 37, para. 33.
‘nuclear family’ as understood in Europe, i.e. the parents and their minor children.

The Court has not yet handed down any landmark decisions on the family reunification of refugees. There are cases, however, where migrant workers have sought family reunification. To illustrate the Court’s approach to the issue of family reunification, I discuss the case of *Sen v. the Netherlands*; the case is unfortunately not very recent, but it shows how the Court’s understanding of family life in terms of family reunification has evolved.

In the *Sen* case, the Court argued that Article 8 was violated by denying the reunification of a child with her family firmly established in their new country of residence. In particular, the Court took into consideration the situation of the two minor children in the Netherlands, and argued that on the grounds of their needs there were major obstacles to the family returning to Turkey in order to live together as a family. Even if married couples do not have, as a matter of established international law, the right to freely choose their country of residence, there may be compelling reasons not to interfere in their right to live a family life in a country where they have already established firm ties.

In the case of *Nasri v. France*, the Court was confronted with a situation where an adult, hearing-and speech-impaired citizen of Algeria faced deportation from France to his native country. He had lived all his life with his family in France. The deportation order was based on the grave criminal offences for which Mr. Nasri had served his sentences. The Court felt, that given Mr. Nasri’s handicaps and mental state, he could not be separated from his childhood family without interfering in his family life, irrespective of his majority. The Court argued that

46. In view of this accumulation of special circumstances, notably his situation as a deaf and dumb person, capable of achieving a minimum psychological and social equilibrium only within his family, the majority of whose members are French nationals with no close ties with Algeria, the decision to deport the applicant, if executed, would not be pro-

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portionate to the legitimate aim pursued. It would infringe the right to respect for family life and therefore constitute a breach of Article 8.

The Court, unlike some previous cases, emphasised the family life already created in the country of residence as opposed to the previous life of the parents in their country of nationality. More importantly, it touched upon the issue of dependency, which is an important qualification of a family member in the Council of Europe’s Directive on the Right to Family Reunification. The decision opened a way to widen the interpretation of a ‘family’ beyond the nuclear family of a married couple and their minor, unmarried children. This approach, as will be discussed later, has been adopted conditionally in the family reunification directive.

As noted above, the Court aims at accommodating its decisions to present-day values and societal needs. However, based on its case law on refugees and immigrants alike, it can be said that it has taken a cautious approach. It has reiterated the principle of a sovereign state to have the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory. In the competition between the legitimate interests of the individual and the state, the state also enjoys a “wide margin of appreciation”.

If, however, the Court is to take its commitment to accommodating its case law to current values in the society, it must follow the debate in the globalising, multicultural world. In the shaping of values, the core question is who is a stakeholder in the process. If the European Union is to accept its commitment to enhance the legal status and fair treatment of third-country residents in its territory, it must also include them in the value- and policy-making processes. Through these channels, it is possible for the family values of refugees, which may differ from those represented by the Union Member States, to eventually also be legally protected by

22 Gül v. Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 19 February 1996, § 38: “As a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has a right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory. The Court reiterates that the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities. There may in addition be positive obligations inherent in effective ‘respect’ for family life. However, the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations do not lend themselves to precise definition. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts, the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation.”
the European Court of Human Rights. Up till now the Court has not addressed the issue of cultural differences in its decision making. Its own interpretation theories and practices, however, do not prevent such future development.

The Family Reunification Directive of the European Union

In September 2003, the Council of Europe adopted the Directive on the Right to Family Reunification\(^2\) as a part of the harmonization of the Union’s immigration and asylum policy. The drafting of the directive, which started in December 1999, is a direct result of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which gave competence to the European Community to create legislation on immigration.\(^2\) The proposal for the family reunification directive drawn up by the Commission was also influenced by the obligation assumed by the Tampere Council of enhancing the rights and integration of legally residing long-term residents in the Community region.\(^2\) Pursuant to its Article 20, Member States were obliged to implement the directive in their domestic laws, regulations and administrative provisions no later than 3 October 2005. The deadline has, however, not been respected in all Member States: Finland, for instance, implemented the directive only in 2006.\(^2\)

The Directive on the Right to Family Reunification is not only applicable to refugees, but rather focuses on the whole range of immigrants, regardless of their reason for immigration. However, it makes three significant exclusions to the personal scope of application, that are relevant to asylum seekers and refugees understood in the broader sense of the legal term.\(^2\) There are thus three groups which do not enjoy the right to family

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24 Art 63(3) (a) EC Treaty.
26 Act on Amending the Aliens’ Act, 19 May 2006/380.
27 An extended notion of persons benefiting from international protection includes those being protected under UN Convention against Torture, Art. 3, European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 3 or relevant domestic laws, can be referred as persons de facto, refugees as opposed to Convention refugees under the protection of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees.
reunification under the Council’s Family Reunification Directive: asylum seekers whose legal status has not yet been determined by a final decision, persons authorised to reside on the basis of temporary protection, and persons enjoying subsidiary protection.

Chapter V regulates specifically the family reunification of refugees; it will be discussed further in more detail.

In the preamble to the directive the Council of Europe reiterates the international obligation to

Protect the family and respect family life enshrined in many instruments of international law.

This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.28

The centrality of family life to an individual and to the society as whole is likewise expressed:

Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty.29

Chapter V of the Family Reunification Directive lays down the law on refugees’ family reunification. It is in many ways more generous than the provisions regulating the family reunification of migrants. For instance, the integration requirement is not applied. The family reunification directive acknowledges, within certain limits laid down in the directive, the right to family reunification. This is evident in the wording of Article 4(1) of the directive:

1. The Member States shall [italics added] authorise the entry and residence […].

As opposed to the central international human rights agreements, the family reunification directive grants a subjective right to family reunification for those who are defined as ‘family members’, pursuant to Article 4.1 of the directive:\(^30\)

(a) the sponsor’s spouse;
(b) the minor children of the sponsor and of his/her spouse, including children adopted in accordance with a decision taken by the competent authority in the Member State concerned or a decision which is automatically enforceable due to the international obligations of that member State or must be recognised in accordance with international obligations;
(c) the minor children including adopted children where the sponsor spouse has custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given his or her consent.”
(d) The minor children including adopted children of the spouse where the spouse has custody and the children are dependent on him or her. Member States may authorise the reunification of children of whom custody is shared, provided the other party sharing custody has given his or her agreement.

The right to family reunion, pursuant to Recital 11, is established, according to European Union values and principles:

(11) The right to family reunification should be exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, in particular with respect to the

\(^{30}\) Supra, Article 4.1
rights of women and of children; such compliance justifies the possible taking of restrictive measures against applications for family reunification of polygamous households.

The personal scope of the directive in terms of the right to family reunification can be divided into two different categories. Article 4.1 determines those whose entry and residence shall be permitted (see above). The definition follows closely the concept of the nuclear family, thus excluding from the subjective family reunification right the other members of a family. This differentiation between family members, Helen Oosterom-Staples writes, “will mean that who qualifies for family reunification under the non-mandatory provisions of Article 4 – ie paragraphs 2 and 3 – will differ from Member State to Member State. This is apparently the price that had to be paid in order to extend the scope of application of the Directive beyond the nuclear family.”31

The beneficiaries of a non-mandatory family reunification are laid down in Article 4(2):

2. The Member States may, by law or regulation, authorise the entry and residence, pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in Chapter IV, of the following family members:
   first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line of the sponsor or his or her spouse, where they are dependent on them, and do not enjoy proper family support in the country of origin;
   The adult unmarried children of the sponsor or his or her spouse, where they are objectively unable to provide for their own needs on account of their state of health.

The non-mandatory right is firmly connected to dependency. The sponsor has to show that the family member outside the nuclear family is fully dependent on him or her, which may not only be difficult but can be interpreted in a strict manner according to the respective case-law of each Member State. What is worth noting here, though, is the absence of

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31 Oosterom-Staples 2007, 462.
any culture-based grounds for allowing the family reunification for family members outside the nuclear family. Instead, the family reunification directive focuses on compassionate grounds, inability to provide for oneself on account of state of health or dependency and lack of family support.

Refugees enjoy a privileged position in the Family Reunification Directive in terms of personal scope of application. The integration conditions laid down in the directive are not applied to their family members. Accordingly, Article 4 (3) which allows an integration condition to the family reunification of children over 12 years who arrive independently of the rest of their family is not applied to refugee children. This is an important benefit to unaccompanied minors, who could, were the integration conditions applied to them, end up in a situation where family reunification is either delayed pending the required stage of integration or denied altogether. Given that refugee children, pursuant to established refugee law and international human rights law, are entitled to special care and attention, the Family Reunification Directive’s approach is the correct one. Refugee children also enjoy enhanced protection in situations where they have lost their biological parents or all members of their families, or these cannot be traced. Pursuant to Article 10 (3),

3. if the refugee is an unaccompanied minor, the Member States:
   shall authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of his/her first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line without applying the conditions laid down in Article 4(2)(a);
   May authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of his/her legal guardian or any other member of the family, where the refugee has no relatives in the direct ascending line or such relatives cannot be traced.

This option provides a non-mandatory right to widen the definition of the child’s guardian beyond the biological parents when these cannot be

32 E.g. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion no. 84, “Refugee Children and Adolescents” (1997)
33 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Art. 3.1, 9.1 and 10.1
traced or are dead. In refugee situations it is often the case that the child has lost his or her parent or parents during the family’s flight, particularly in cases of civil war (for instance Somalia, Afghanistan or Iraq). This may create a situation where the child is, either *de facto* or *de iure*, in the custody of an adult other than the biological parent. However, as the wording of Article 10 (3) (b) indicates (“*may authorise*”), the Member States are allowed a degree of discretion. The family reunification directive, further, allows Member States to consider family reunification in a third country with which the family member or the sponsor has special links.

In addition to the family members outside the so-called nuclear family defined in Article 4(2), the Family Reunification Directive extends the personal scope of refugee family members in Article 10(2):

2. The member States may authorise family reunification of other family members not referred in Article 4, if they are dependent on the refugee.

The dependency condition, and the fact that the provision allows Member States a degree of discretion, make it possible to interpret this rule according to various interests and established immigration laws and policies. Again, practices vary from one Member State to another.

As mentioned above, the Family Reunification Directive is to be applied in compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States. The definition of ‘family’ in the directive is essentially based on the concept of the nuclear family. Some important extensions, however, are made to the understanding of the family composition of refugees. At the same time, it should be noted that they are further narrowed down by conditions such as dependency. Member States are also allowed a degree of discretion in decisions concerning their domestic laws. Cultural reasons for allowing family reunification for members outside the nuclear family are also missing from the directive and its recitals.

One of the most controversial issues during the drafting of the Family Reunification Directive was the treatment of unmarried couples. As opposed to established international law and national legal systems, the directive placed unmarried partners subject to restrictions which, according to many critics, do not reflect social reality and are incompatible with the
The outcome is the discretion allowed to Member States to choose themselves whether they will allow the entry of an unmarried partner. In the context of many refugee-creating nationalities, this may exclude the possibility of reuniting couples that have lived in traditional marriages without official legalisation of their union. This is a common practice for instance in many West and Central African states.

The Family Reunification Directive takes some important steps forward in terms of consolidating family reunification as an important aspect of respect for family life. It goes further than the international human rights agreements in creating a subjective right to family reunification for members of the nuclear family. It takes, however, only very cautious steps in widening the scope of beneficiaries to members outside the nuclear family. Equally, cultural grounds are not mentioned as reasons for allowing those members to be reunited with the sponsor. What is used, instead are more general compassionate grounds, dependence. Finally, by making the right to family reunification non-mandatory for family members outside of the nuclear family, the Family Reunification Directive sustains the diversity of legal approaches in its Member States regarding this issue.

In terms of the universality of human rights and the need to maintain a respectful dialogue between different cultural understandings and values, the Family Reunification Directive appears to adopt a straightforward European approach to family life. This is written out explicitly in its recitals, as described above. The directive does not preclude the possibility for Member States to adopt a more favourable approach. No harmonised approach, however, was adopted and much is left to the discretion of individual Member States. In the light of what Weston writes about value

34 Oosterom-Staples 2007. “The privileged position of the traditional family, or, in the alternative, the exclusion of unmarried partners form the group of family members who have to be admitted by a Member State, has been severely criticised as being “socially inadequate” and not reflecting the international and national legal systems that treat married and unmarried couples alike. [...] The Family Reunification Directive not only deviates from (inter)national standards, it is also not in line with the Temporary Residence Directive that applies to married and unmarried couples alike, albeit with the important restriction also found in the Commission’s initial proposal for the Family reunification Directive that a Member State has to have recognised partners by law. Along the same lines, the definitions of family members in the Dublin regulations and the qualification Directive include both the spouse and the unmarried partner in Member States where legislation and practice treat married and unmarried couples alike.”
of respect, the voices of refugees in the European Union seem not to have been fully heard. Much is also left for the evolution of case law from the European Court of Justice and the European Court on Human Rights with regard to their understanding of family life.

Conclusions

The prevailing European Union law and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have adopted a cautious approach to defining the ‘family’ outside the values and principles held in the Union territory. The law does not as such exclude interpretations where ‘family’ could be defined and granted legal protection in more extended form than the nuclear family. However, this line of interpretation is subject to conditions and allows a degree of discretion to the Member States. Whether or not this complies with existing societal needs, and can be accepted by refugees themselves, is subject to doubt. However, it should be noted that the Family Reunification Directive became directly applicable as late as 3 October 2005. There is as yet no body of case law from the European Court of Justice to study in order to build a picture of the disputes to which the directive may give rise. The Family Reunification Directive is to be applied in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law emanating from the European Court of Human Rights. Whether the Court’s approach to ‘family life’ has been changing after the entrance into force of the Family Reunification Directive remains to be studied.

The universality of the right to enjoy respect for family life is guaranteed in some ways only partially for those whose understanding of a family transcends the nuclear family. The Family Reunification Directive, however, opens at least a small doorway in its recitals by referring to ‘European values’. These values are currently undergoing change, influenced by the globalization process and by increasing multiculturalism. The question is whether a genuine dialogue will arise between different family values in order to accommodate them in the legislation. As mentioned above, this is a two-way process aimed at finding a common solution legitimate to all parties. The prevailing legislation provides a relatively firm ground from whence to move on.
Bibliography


Cold War Exiles and American Radios: Psychological Warfare During the Cold War and its Impact on Media Outlets in the Baltic Republics

Jonathan H. L’Hommedieu

Introduction

Speaking before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 20 April 1950, American President Harry S. Truman stated that the Cold War was “a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men... Unless we get the real story across to people in other countries, we will lose the battle for men’s minds by default.”¹ With those words, Truman launched the “Campaign for Truth” an initiative specifically designed to demonstrate to the world that the United States had regained the determination to undermine Communism around the globe.

To handle the practical day to day operations necessary to implement the “Campaign for Truth”, the Truman administration organized the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).² The board directly consulted the National Security Council (NSC) on all things concerning psychological warfare. The government organization that benefited most from the PSB and the general increased importance of psychological warfare and propaganda to the administration was the Voice of America (VOA). VOA was born out of the necessity, as perceived by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration to counteract the foreign information services of the Axis Powers during World War II. The radio station became the official global news service

² Hixson 1997, 17.
of the U.S. government in 1942 with its first broadcasts stating that “We shall tell you the truth.”

The conclusion of World War II, however, resulted in a renewed distaste towards propaganda among American politicians, and more importantly the general American population. It was not until the Cold War intensified between the United States and the Soviet Union that it became acceptable again to discuss the role of foreign information services in the making of American foreign policy. By the time Harry Truman left office in 1953, VOA broadcasts had expanded from serving fewer than 20 countries in the immediate postwar period to over 100 countries in 46 different languages.

Although maintaining a mission statement of merely broadcasting factual information around the world was a powerful tool for the United States, there was a hope of offering a more aggressive non-affiliated broadcast service to the Soviet bloc. Immediately following World War II, many members of the American foreign policy establishment, including George F. Kennan, perhaps the preeminent Soviet specialist in the State Department, began discussing the use of private radio stations as a tool in the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such stations, it was hoped, would weaken the Soviet government’s political and social control by promoting the open exchange of news and current events. By utilizing the influx of immigrants to the United States from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the government hoped that members of the émigré communities would be able to address people in the Soviet Bloc as “insiders”, as opposed to U.S. foreign policy operatives.

Ultimately, two private corporations were founded, the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) in 1949 and the American Committee on Liberation (AMCOMLIB) in 1951. The two corporations would operate Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) respectively. Both corporations were created and funded by the CIA from Congressional appropriations until 1971. The façade of private corporations was supposed to establish greater credibility as an independent voice rather than

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an official arm of the U.S. government. Furthermore, due to diplomatic protocol, when the Soviet Union protested the meddling in its internal affairs, the government could point out that private radio companies were not subject to government control or censorship.

Although the two stations broadcast a similar content in a strikingly equivalent manner, the organizations had fundamentally different missions and ideologies. RFE attempted “to promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating factual information and ideas in the various home languages of East European states.”6 Radio Liberty was molded to reflect a more aggressive American policy and rhetoric of promoting the liberation of East Europe from Communism, calling for the “liberation of Soviet Russia from the tyranny of Bolshevism.”7 The most important distinction between the two, however, was RL’s commitment to a policy of non-predetermination. Despite the broadcasting of services in the languages of non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union, broadcasters were not permitted to broadcast any material that might be anti-Russian in nature or promote the national independence of any group. The broadcasts were solely to promote the liberation of the Soviet Union as a whole from the vestiges of communism. RFE, in contrast, represented nationals speaking exclusively to nationals, with no political attachment.

Of all the East European nations and Soviet nationalities, only the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were not served by either RFE or RL. There were two main mitigating reasons for the exclusion of broadcasts in these languages from RFE and RL: the complicated diplomatic status of the Baltic republics and their small populations.

The 1940 American policy of non-recognition concerning the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania survived World War II and became the cornerstone of American policy concerning the Baltic republics during the Cold War. Thus it was difficult to decide what broadcasting unit would best reflect American foreign policy concerning the Baltic republics. The de facto situation in the Baltic republics was not the same as that of the satellite states in Eastern Europe, and therefore RFE was not an entirely appropriate forum for Baltic language broadcasts. The RL policy of non-predetermination, on the other hand, held two major implications


7 Sosin 1999, 18.
for American Baltic policy. First, the inclusion of Baltic broadcasts in RL would mean the tacit acceptance of the Baltic republics as part of the Soviet Union. Second, broadcasts would be aimed at Soviet-Estonians, as opposed to Estonians.

In addition to these political complications, the small populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania created budgetary concerns even if the political considerations were vanquished. In 1953, RFE officials commissioned a study comparing the costs of potential Baltic language broadcasts to those of existing broadcasts to Czechoslovakia. The study found that per annum, RFE spent $.762 per radio set in Czechoslovakia. Taking into account the additional technical requirements for broadcasts to successfully reach the Baltic republics, the total cost to RFE would reach nearly $18.22 per radio set annually.

RL broadcasts to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania finally emerged in 1975 after a major political scandal developed over the covert nature of RFE and RL funding in 1971. A fundamental role in the initiation of such broadcasts was played by the close relationship that developed between Baltic exiles and Baltic-American groups and U.S. Congressional members. These groups perceived such broadcasts as greatly needed, and from 1951 to 1975, they carried out a major lobbying campaign.

In this article I first analyze the relationship between American psychological warfare and viable media outlets to Eastern Europe, specifically the Baltic republics, during the Cold War. Second, I examine the methods and rhetoric of the Baltic diaspora in the United States in their lobbying on behalf of Baltic language RFE and RL broadcasts to demonstrate the different interpretations of the importance of broadcasts to the diaspora and the U.S. government.

Propaganda, Psychological Warfare, and Media

Despite the rapid expansion of VOA services in the latter years of the Truman administration, the ambitious goals set in place by the NSC and

8 "Technical Issues to Broadcast to the Baltic” Harris to Lang, 12 August 1953. RFE/RL Corporate Records, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 152 Folder 11.
9 Ibid. Broadcasting Costs to Estonia were the highest of all three Baltic republics with an annual cost of $26.70 per annum.
Media, Interaction and Integration

PSB fell well short of expectations. This can be attributed to the perceived strengthening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe; the stalemate in the Korean War; increased competition between the White House and the State Department over foreign information services; and the increased pressure placed on the administration by McCarthyism. As a result, of the $115 million called for in the January 1951 budget request to Congress for foreign language information programs, only $85 million was allocated.\(^{10}\)

The major issues that the Republican presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed during the 1952 campaign were the “loss” of China and the associated lack of progress in Korea, along with questioning the morality of Truman’s policy of containment. Despite the limited role played by foreign information services in the actual election cycle, Eisenhower repeatedly denounced his predecessor’s limited notion of psychological warfare. Eisenhower promoted the “skillful and constant use of the power of truth to combat the hideous disease of communism.”\(^{11}\) Further, he emphasized, “The struggle between communism is the struggle of ideas.”\(^{12}\) Through the promotion of truth of ideas, his administration hoped to reduce the propaganda gap that had allegedly emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union. Eisenhower’s view of psychological warfare was total. There were four main methods of psychological warfare initiated by his administration: information services, good governance, regaining the strategic initiative vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and shoring up support within the United States and among allies.\(^{13}\)

As part of his “New Look” initiative, Eisenhower pioneered the practice of psychological warfare as a major component of making foreign policy. Eisenhower viewed psychological warfare considerations as inseparable from other national security issues in a time where total war was viewed as a human catastrophe.\(^{14}\) Although Eisenhower’s psychological warfare initiatives have been addressed in a myriad of writings, it is worth briefly

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10 Hixson 1997, 18.

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addressing his notion of the concept to best understand the potential relationship between propaganda efforts and media outlets.¹⁵

To Eisenhower, information had both offensive and defensive purposes. Offensive programs were designed to weaken Soviet influence, while defensive programs sought to discredit Soviet propaganda. RFE and RL served both purposes with respect to the Soviet bloc. The broadcasting of truthful news by an “independent” radio station offered an alternative to the official news sources that were available to Soviet and East European citizens. Further, the massive Soviet efforts to jam both RFE and RL broadcasts added an impetus to further discredit Soviet information services and related policies.

The term *propaganda* has several definitions, ranging from “the particular doctrines or principles propagated by an organization or movement” and “the deliberate spreading of information, rumors, etc.” to “information, ideas, or rumors deliberately spread widely to help or harm a person, group, movement, institution, nation, etc.” and “the activity of spreading particular ideas, opinions, etc. according to an organized plan.” The term *media* is best defined as “the means of communication, as radio and television, newspapers, and magazines, that reach or influence people widely.” Although *propaganda* typically possesses a negative connotation whereas *media* is more neutral, the terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Particularly in the case of Eisenhower’s concept of psychological warfare and propaganda, VOA, RFE, and RL radio services can be viewed as viable manifestations of media outlets during the Cold War in Eastern Europe.

In fact, VOA and RL services by the mid-1950s began to shift away from hard propaganda and psychological warfare to broadcasting more objective news and cultural information. Letters received by the Eisenhower administration from Soviet citizens expressed a sense that “Soviet audiences would pay careful attention to broadcasts on literary, artistic, and scientific studies”, whereas broadcasts with “antagonistic tones” were dismissed as propaganda and “not as effective”.¹⁶


¹⁶ Hixson 1997, 114.
It is important to note, however, that from the perspective of the American foreign policy establishment, the role of radio broadcasts as media outlets for East European states and the Soviet Union was secondary. The radio stations were born out of the multi-dimensional American policy of containment. Despite the militarization of containment through NSC 68 during the Truman Administration, RFE and RL represented both cultural and economic means of containment as promoted by Kennan. It was argued that the dissemination of factual information to the Soviet Union would question and discredit the Soviet moral authority over the region, causing internal conflicts. These internal conflicts, in turn, would reduce the chances of the Soviet Union seeking to expand its sphere of influence. Further, the Soviet Union would spend much needed capital in an attempt to block the radio broadcasts, adding further economic distress to America’s adversary.

It would be a mistake to argue that American foreign policy remained static throughout the duration of the Cold War. Each subsequent presidential administration attempted to distinguish itself from its predecessor and adjust to an ever-changing global situation. The basic tenet of containment, however, was constant.\textsuperscript{17} Further, the initiatives and changes that Eisenhower implemented during his two presidential terms established both the framework and the working bureaucracy that underpinned American commitment and attitudes towards psychological warfare.\textsuperscript{18}

Failed Lobbying and Early Broadcasts through Voice of America

From 1951 through 1975 there was a strong lobbying campaign by members of the Baltic diaspora for RFE or RL broadcasts, particularly by those Baltic exiles who still wished to maintain a virtual presence in their home

\textsuperscript{17} See Gaddis 2005. Gaddis examines and critiques both the approach and means of implementation of containment for each presidential administration from Harry Truman through Ronald Reagan, with additional analyses of the policy’s origin and legacy.

\textsuperscript{18} The only reassessment and overhaul of policy was after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. RFE officials and the empty rhetoric from Washington were seen as major components to the violence that occurred. In an attempt to save face and restore legitimacy to both RFE and RL, major constraints were placed on what was allowed to be broadcast over RFE and RL.
nations. The ability of the diaspora to successfully lobby for broadcasts was dependent upon their ability to function within the foreign policy framework of the United States. If their requests and presentations were within such confines, such lobbying efforts were at least recognized. Once lobbying took place outside of such policy constrictions, however, there was virtually no impact on the situation, and at times a negative backlash. Over the duration of this time period, the form of lobbying shifted from direct contacts between organizations and panels representing the Baltic diaspora and the NCFE and State Department to more public lobbying to congressional representatives.

Due to funding concerns and the complex political situation of the Baltic republics, neither RFE nor RL broadcasts were initiated as planned in 1952. The lack of RFE or RL broadcasts, however, did not mean that the United States lacked a virtual presence in the Baltic republics. Dating back to the Truman administration, the VOA did broadcast in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian languages. The debate between VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts highlights the different perceptions of radio broadcasts by the Baltic diaspora and the U.S. government. The U.S. government viewed VOA as a much more powerful and preferable broadcasting medium than RFE or RL. The establishment of RFE and RL as surrogate radio stations for exiled East Europeans and Soviet citizens was deemed necessary due to diplomatic protocol; since the United States maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and its satellite states, it would have been impossible to create RFE or RL services through an official arm of the U.S. government. The Baltic diaspora, however, viewed RFE and RL as a much more powerful and preferred broadcasting medium than VOA. Unlike VOA, RFE or RL would allow members of the Baltic diaspora to communicate directly to their fellow Baltic citizens without attachment to the U.S. government.

This conflict is clearly visible both in the official policy of RFE concerning the Baltic republics in 1953, and in the prepared responses to Balts inquiring about the lack of RFE broadcasts in Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian. Robert E. Lang, Director of RFE, in a 14 August 1953 memoran-

dum stated: “Had I, or had the members of the RFE staff, the choice of broadcasting over non-official RFE versus official Voice of America, we would not hesitate long in choosing the latter as the more powerful medium.” Further, the prepared responses to inquiries concerning Baltic broadcasts explicitly refer to the unique diplomatic position of the Baltic republics in advocating VOA over RFE or RL:

There is a further consideration: because the United States does not, as a government, recognize the Soviet governments of the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - the US government is not limited by diplomatic protocol: we can state openly and forcefully our disagreement with the status of these countries and their peoples. Because we do recognize the governments in the satellite countries, the US government is hemmed in by diplomatic protocol. Radio Free Europe, as it is not a government operation, can therefore operate here in the same way that the government itself can operate in the Baltic States. It is therefore possible for the Voice of America, which is government operated, to make its facilities available to Baltic exile leaders. They bring the same message of hope to their countrymen as does RFE to the satellites and informs them of efforts in their behalf of the free world.  

Although the main problems that developed between the Baltic diaspora and the U.S. government rested in the interpretation of which group radio broadcasts would mainly represent, it is worth noting that the dispute was also intensified by a conflict between older émigré groups in the United States and new Baltic émigrés. VOA Baltic language broadcasters were members of the older Baltic communities and sought to protect their

20 “Results of Radio Free Europe’s staff study on the advisability of the origination of broadcasts to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.” Robert E. Lang to The President’s Committee, 14 August 1953. RFE/RL Corporate Records Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 270 Folder 8.
21 Radio Free Europe to Antons Tutins, 3 October 1955. RFE/RL Corporate Records Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 270 Folder 8. (underlines original in text)
own interests and careers by promoting the importance of VOA broadcasts over the initiation of new broadcasts through RFE or RL.\(^\text{22}\)

Despite this infighting, in keeping with VOA’s broadcasting protocol in the late 1950s, American-sponsored radio broadcasts utilizing VOA did provide Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with a viable media outlet. A 1959 State Department memorandum assessed the overall effectiveness of VOA broadcasts to the Baltic republics and offered a projection of what needed to be accomplished to improve broadcasts moving forward. According to this document, “Present VOA arrangements appear to be adequate for the broadcasting of both information about the United States and its policies and cultural, scientific, and other ‘non-political’ information, and also to allow for increased commentary on matters of direct concern to Baltic States audiences.”\(^\text{23}\) Further, it suggested that future policy provisions should instruct VOA to devote more attention and commentary to the Baltic republics’ political, economic, and cultural development including national holidays.\(^\text{24}\) Such policy decisions clearly demonstrate a general move by the U.S. government to help create an alternative media in the Baltic republics during the 1950s and 1960s.

Congressional Controversy, Committee Hearings, and the Initiation of RL Broadcasts

Due to the lack of congressional oversight of RFE or RL, the Baltic diaspora was unable to directly appeal to members of Congress to initiate radio broadcasts. The 25 January 1971 outing of RFE funding directly from the CIA by New Jersey Senator Clifford Case offered an opportunity for the Baltic exiles to initiate such lobbying. With Case calling for all ties between the radio stations and the CIA to be severed, the scandal took on

\(^{22}\) Memorandum Hall to Jackson 1 October 1951. RFE/RL Corporate Records Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 270 Folder 7.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.
national importance and Congressional hearings were initiated over the future of both RFE and RL.25

Case was immediately supported by Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright to bring about an open dialogue on the covert nature of RFE and RL, and what effects this revelation would have on overall U.S. policy. Ultimately Case supported the goals of RFE and RL, but wished to have the radios operate as an “open activity by our government.”26 Fulbright, however, viewed the radios’ outing as an opportunity to leave his own personal mark on U.S. foreign policy. In the spirit of détente, Fulbright saw the radio stations as a hindrance to relationships and as “outworn relics of the Cold War.”27

The RFE and RL controversy served as an impetus for the Baltic diaspora to take advantage of the growing relationship between the Baltic organizations and their Congressional representatives. Congressional members with a large Baltic constituency were always sympathetic to the desire of the community’s leaders to gain radio broadcasts, but while these initial contacts developed in the 1960s, there was no way for Congressional members to lobby on behalf of these interests. Thus, the exposure of RFE and RL as covert CIA operations created an opportunity for exceptionally proactive lobbying techniques for Baltic language broadcasts. What ultimately developed between 1971–1973 is a complex symbiotic relationship between the Baltic exiles, U.S. Congressional leaders, and RFE and RL officials.

The Estonian American National Council, the American Latvian Association, and the American Lithuanian Organization commenced an extensive lobbying campaign to both U.S. Congressional members and the RL bureaucracy immediately following the scandal. Initially, the methods utilized were similar to those that had proved unsuccessful during the 1950s. Despite their full knowledge that political constraints had been removed in the 1950s, the Baltic exiles continued to present the historical necessity

25 Initial references in the U.S. media concerning the CIA connection with RFE/RL dated back to 1967. “In the Pay of the CIA: An American Dilemma,” a CBS documentary, for the first time on national television emphasized that RFE was not merely a private undertaking supported by public subscription.
26 Sosin 1999, 135.
27 Ibid., 132.
of radio broadcasts and the importance of the non-recognition policy to American foreign policy.  

After receiving similar responses to such letters from the RL committee, stating that there was ultimately a lack of funding to initiate radio broadcasts to the Baltic republics, a leading member of the American Latvian Association (ALA) and consultant to the Free Europe Committee, M. Berzins contacted Gene Sosin, Director of Planning for RL, stating that the Baltic exiles were willing to take advantage of the compromised position of RFE and RL with regards to the U.S. Congress to push for radio broadcasts. When Sosin inquired as to whether “members of the emigration in the U.S. might be willing to discuss with Congressmen the importance of RL as a powerful force for constructive influence on the Baltic population,” Berzins replied, “This was entirely possible.” Sosin immediately relayed this message to James Critchlow, Director of Information Services for the RL Committee.

To ensure that Berzins’s conversation with Sosin reached the upper levels of the RL bureaucracy, Uldis Grava, President of the ALA, contacted Critchlow directly with a detailed account of what measures the Baltic diaspora were taking to support the future operations of RL. Not only were the national organizations and their 200 local member organizations urging citizens to partake in a letter writing campaign to national newspapers, in particular, those in Fulbright’s home state, but they had already gained the support of House Minority Leader, Gerald Ford, and members of the Nixon administration, including Henry Kissinger. Grava concluded this initial memo by asking whether there was anything that the Baltic community might be able to do on behalf of RL during this most difficult time.

30 Ibid., This confidential memorandum of Sosin was immediately copied to Critchlow’s desk.
32 Ibid.
Such an opportunity to further assist RL occurred during the Fulbright hearings. Ironically, the sole East European nations deprived of radio broadcasts were the only émigré group willing to testify on behalf of RFE and RL. In addition to members of Congress, former diplomats, and other U.S. government officials, the ALA representative Dr. Ilgvars I. Spilners, testified on behalf of the importance of RL and RFE to the citizens of the Soviet bloc and to American foreign policy as a whole.

The state of media outlets in the Baltic republics was a central issue in Spilners’s testimony before Congress. In a Joint Baltic American National Committee report released on 3 July 1973, Spilners is described as explaining the “current situation in the Baltic States under Soviet occupation and indicated, that broadcasts in the Baltic languages would offer these people more accurate information about current events than they receive now.”

Looking at the Congressional Record, there are three specific issues that Spilners addresses: the importance of RL broadcasts to the national survival of the Baltic nations; the general effectiveness of the existing media in the Baltic republics; and the issue of non-predetermination in the context of radio broadcasts.

Perhaps most fundamental to the argument presented to the U.S. Congress to expand Baltic language broadcasts to RL was the issue of the survival of the Baltic languages. Spilners went out of his way to explain how fundamentally different the Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian languages are from Russian, Ukrainian and other languages served by RL. Thus the struggle that existed between the Baltic nations and the Soviet Union was not merely ideological, but was a struggle for linguistic survival. In the context of the Communist Party’s nationality policy outlined at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, it was necessary for the United States to initiate as many Baltic language broadcasts as possible in order to expand the influence of the U.S. government within the region, but also to provide the Baltic people with a means of hearing their native languages.

In an attempt to place potential RL Baltic broadcasts in the larger media landscape in the Baltic republics, Spilners cited available empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of the Soviet press from the perspective

33 JBANC Memorandum, 3 July 1973, RFE/RL Corporate Records Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 179 Folder 7.
of Soviet citizens as well as from that of Soviet policy makers. In various polls, only 20–30 percent of the public were willing to go on record as being satisfied with the Soviet media.\textsuperscript{35} Further, in Estonia, 30 percent of people interviewed regretted even purchasing a radio set or television.\textsuperscript{36} From the perspective of Soviet policy makers as revealed by Kommunist, the main theoretical organ of the Central Committee:

Now, everyone has radio receivers - you listen to whom you want and as much as you can stand. Only some, although very few such, listen and are off: to somewhere ‘there’ - that other, beautiful, life. Simply sometimes he believes the tales, or else even when not believing them, begins to wag his tongue. Some only ‘wag’ but some take it seriously. And after that, from the alien voice, he goes off to convince others, to tell all sorts of fables. So one must clear up all this at the very beginning.\textsuperscript{37}

Quite simply, the Communist Party acknowledged that the information that was being broadcast by foreign radio stations and other media outlets was undermining the ability of the Soviet government to control the flow of information. Expanding RL broadcasts to the Baltic republics would not only help sustain the Baltic languages but would be another powerful offensive tool against the USSR.

Important to Spilners’s argument for promoting Baltic language broadcasts under the auspices of RL was the premise that despite the fact that Russian language broadcasts did deal with news pertaining to the Baltic republics, the overall Russification policy in the Baltic republics, dating back to the Stalinist period was overall rather ineffective. Thus a significant proportion of the Soviet citizenry was not being treated equally by RL. Due to RL’s policy of non-predetermination, it seemed only logical that no single part of the Soviet Union was to be excluded from broadcasts. Even though many members of the Fulbright Committee and the RL committee felt that offering broadcasts to the Baltic languages would give favorable treatment to the Baltic republics, in actual fact the lack of

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 170.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
Baltic broadcasts ultimately treated Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian speakers as disenfranchised Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{38}

The total effect of RFE and RL being incorporated under direct funding control by the U.S. Congress and the strong lobbying mechanism both in Washington during the Fulbright Hearings and in their home Congressional districts, Estonian, Latvia, and Lithuanian RL broadcasts commenced in 1975. Prior to the scandal that erupted over RFE and RL funding, the U.S. Congress lacked oversight of the radio stations. With no oversight, there was no possibility for Baltic exiles to use their most direct contact in government – the U.S. Congress – to push for broadcasts. The willingness of the Baltic exiles to become flexible over what radio station would best benefit the Baltic republics allowed for a deep level of cooperation to develop between the Balts and the RL administration, paving the way for Baltic language broadcasts. Of the two radio stations, the Baltic exiles maintained closer ties with the administration of RL as opposed to RFE. On 7 March 1974, Representative Robert Steele of Connecticut introduced House Resolution 13354, a bill to make an appropriation for RL to provide initial broadcasts in Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian. Functioning as a supplemental budget request, the bill allocated the necessary funding to commence Baltic language broadcasts. Particularly poignant was the first address by RL to Lithuania on 16 February 1975:

\begin{quote}
The independence of Lithuania, which was restored 57 years ago today, was cruelly snuffed out in 1940. But in those 22 years the Lithuanian people have showed great economic and cultural progress, which stands out in modern history. Even in these difficult times, your inner strength and love for freedom give us hope for the brighter future in which we all believe.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

On 8 October 1984, however, Baltic language broadcasts were transferred to RFE with two main reasons given. First, RFE better reflected U.S. policy towards the Baltic republics, i.e. the non-recognition policy

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Congressional Record} 13 February 1974, Thomas E. Morgan, RFE/RL Corporate Record Collection, Hoover Institution Archives. Box 65 Folder 2.
\end{flushright}
concerning the Soviet annexation. Second, the historical, cultural, and religious traditions of the Baltic nations made them part of European and not Soviet experience.  

Landscape of Broadcasts to the Baltic Republics

The initiation of RL broadcasts to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania enriched the landscape of broadcasts sponsored by the United States to these republics. VOA continued to broadcast in the Baltic languages information pertaining to the position of the United States in the world and general international news and developments. RL broadcasts in turn addressed more local and cultural information that was directly related to Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. The first series of Estonian-language broadcasts devoted a significant amount of time to interviews with leading Estonian composers and authors living abroad. The inaugural broadcast, for example, featured interviews with Eduard Tubin, a composer living in Sweden, and the poet Ivar Ivask.  

Latvian broadcasts featured programming such as “Latvia Today” offering comments and conditions on events in Latvia as well as “Latvians Abroad”, reporting on the various activities of Latvians living in the West. Such programming intentionally created an opportunity for the exiles broadcasting over RL to recreate a level of camaraderie and a deeper connection between the Latvian diaspora and their homeland.

Throughout the Cold War, the Baltic republics, as well as the bulk of the Soviet bloc faced a unique and precarious situation in terms of access to media outlets. As demonstrated through the information presented to the U.S. Congress by Spilners in 1973, a large number of individuals residing in the Soviet Union were disaffected by the local media’s ability to provide objective information in a timely manner. Simultaneously, the Baltic republics were subjected to American psychological warfare – first through VOA broadcasts and later through RL and RFE services. Ironically, the in-

42 Ibid.
formation that was presented by American-initiated broadcasts was generally more factual and objective than that provided by the local media. The Soviet political leadership recognized this challenge, and American (and indeed all Western) broadcasts were subject to frequent jamming.

The United States would not have been successful in broadcasting to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (whether through VOA, RL or RFE) without the direct assistance of the Baltic diaspora residing within the country. The relationship that developed between the politically active members of the diaspora and the U.S. government highlights the tensions and different perceived importance of policy initiatives between ethnic diasporas and national governments. Radio broadcasts were seen by the U.S. government as an aggressive means of containing the Soviet Union. Until the 1970s the U.S. government was satisfied with the VOA and highly advocated its use as the sole solution for broadcasting to the Baltic republics. The government was not hampered by diplomatic protocol due to its non-recognition of the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940. Thus the official broadcasting agent of the U.S. government was free to act as it chose. The politically active members of the Baltic diaspora, however, viewed RFE or RL as the most important broadcasting tool to the republics. Although broadcasts over VOA did exist, as an official governmental entity VOA broadcasts would have portrayed the exiles primarily as American foreign policy operatives, and only secondly as fellow nationals. The main goals of the diaspora were to assist the home countries in obtaining objective media information and to forge close ties to their homeland; objectives related to promoting U.S. foreign policy were secondary. These differences, however, did not hamper the creation of a close symbiotic relationship between the U.S. government and the diaspora throughout the Cold War.

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Gender and Journalistic Culture in Finland during the late 1940s

Heidi Kurvinen

Since the Second World War the number of female journalists has increased in Finland, and the profession has gradually become more balanced in terms of gender. Gender inequality, however, continues to be apparent and the profession remains gendered. The long-lived ideal of the male journalist has survived down to the beginning of the 21st century, as can be seen for instance in newspaper articles discussing problem of the ‘glass ceiling’ in the profession.

In this article, I approach the gendered nature of the profession of journalism from a historical perspective. I apply the concept of journalistic culture, which is defined in terms of journalists’ ways of thinking, being and acting at a certain historical time and place. From the perspective of gender, journalistic culture is usually thought to represent masculine values; according to my interpretation, it can also be seen as a mechanism of power which controls the behaviour of working journalists. To my un-

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1 I wish to thank Niina Kuorikoski, along with the editors of this book Janne Tunturi, Tuomas Räsänen and Heli Hyvönen, for their valuable comments on this article. I also want to thank Ellen Valle, who corrected my written English.


derstanding, journalistic culture functions at the level of organisational structures, media texts, and interaction with journalists.  

I approach the theme by analysing certain discussions dealing with gender and the profession of journalism. These discussions are accessible in the minutes of meetings of the Club of Women Journalists (Naistointitajien Kerho). I ask what kind of gendered norms are apparent in postwar Finnish journalistic culture, and how female journalists perceive their position among the profession. The analysis is supplemented by newspaper articles and by the first Finnish journalism textbook dealing with the question of female journalists.

**Historical context**

The Second World War became a major turning point in the Finnish gender system. When men were forced to take up arms, women moved into fields of work that had traditionally been viewed as masculine. In addition, the exceptional conditions of the time led to an increase in both heterosexual extramarital sexual activity and homosexual behaviour. After the war, the loosening of gender roles and sexual behaviour resulted in a strong counter-effect, reflected in social relations as well as in representations of gender in popular culture. The national Finnish cultural hero was now the ‘masculine man’, while femaleness was constructed around

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4 Jenny Kitzinger who has studied gendered nature of news production has stated that gender politics functions not only through structures but also through different discourses, norms, unspoken expectations and emphatic identifications. According to my interpretation, a similar pattern can be argued to exist within a journalistic culture. Jenny Kitzinger, “The gender-politics of news production: Silenced voices and false memories,” in *News, Gender and Power*, ed. Cynthia Carter, Gill Branston and Stuart Allan (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 201.


The transition which took place in the Finnish gender system also impacted on the media sphere, when during the war women entered the profession in great numbers. After the war the number of female journalists remained high, and continued to increase gradually over the next few decades. In this sense the profession in Finland deviated from the journalistic sphere for instance in the United States, where after the war women journalists were either forced to leave the profession or were reduced to a lower level in the editorial hierarchy. We can assume, however, that the pressure for women to return to the private sphere which influenced other fields of work in post-war Finland had some effect on Finnish female journalists as well.

The increased number of women journalists seems to have led to a new form of occupational identity and to solidarity among women working in the profession. An example of this new kind of sisterhood was the Club of Women Journalists which was established on 27 October 1946. Its first meeting was held on 1 December 1946, with a relatively high number of participants: it was attended by 31 female journalists, all of whom were working in the Helsinki area. According to the figures obtained by one of the founding members of the Club from the Union of Journalists in Finland, the number of women journalists increased from the 1930s onwards. In 1937 6.5% of the union members were women, in 1958 the number was already 19.5% and in 1968 24.9%. These figures are indicative of the numbers of female journalists working in Finland, although they do not necessarily include all active journalists. See Union of Journalists in Finland, "The development of the number of members in the union since the year 1925," Union of Journalists in Finland, https://www.journalistiliitto.fi/Resource.phx/sivut/sivut-journalistiliitto/liitto/jasenet/jasenmaara.htm. See e.g. Päivi Malin-Perho, Päällikkönä nainen: paikallis- ja sanomalehtien naispäälliköiden ura. (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 1995), 8.

10 Lähteenmäki 1999, 53.
12 I use the word 'sisterhood' to refer to solidarity among women.

8 Mustola 2007, 228.
9 Based on the membership register of the Union of Journalists in Finland, the number of women journalists increased from the 1930s onwards. In 1937 6.5% of the union members were women, in 1958 the number was already 19.5% and in 1968 24.9%. These figures are indicative of the numbers of female journalists working in Finland, although they do not necessarily include all active journalists. See Union of Journalists in Finland, “The development of the number of members in the union since the year 1925,” Union of Journalists in Finland, https://www.journalistiliitto.fi/Resource.phx/sivut/sivut-journalistiliitto/liitto/jasenet/jasenmaara.htm. See e.g. Päivi Malin-Perho, Päällikkönä nainen: paikallis- ja sanomalehtien naispäälliköiden ura. (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 1995), 8.
11 Lähteenmäki 1999, 53.
Finland, there were at the time a total of 91 female journalists active in the country as a whole.\footnote{13 Minutes of meeting held 27 October 1946. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. City Archives of Helsinki (HKA).}

Based on the minutes of the meeting, the active members of the Club seem to have been aware of their marginal status among the profession. This was the reason for establishing their own club; the minutes in fact demonstrate a clear desire to promote women’s issues. For instance a meeting of female journalists and female Members of Parliament, held on 9 May 1947, was reported as follows:

It was decided that co-operation between female journalists and women Members of Parliament, which has started so auspiciously, would be continued by organizing similar
meetings. Co-operation was considered to benefit both parties, and to promote in a dignified manner the important issues which are common to all women. Members of Parliament will work from the speaker’s podium, journalists at their desks with their pens.\(^\text{14}\)

Producing the masculine norm

According to media researchers, a growth in the number of female journalists does not automatically lead to a more diverse image of gender in the media. In other words, a journalist’s gender does not necessarily entail a willingness to change the structures of the prevailing journalistic culture. This has been seen for example as a consequence of the socializing power of the profession, which causes adaptation to the norms and values promoted by the journalistic culture.\(^\text{15}\) Another explanation for women journalists’ reproduction of the gendered conventions of the profession can be found in the contradictory ‘double bind’ in which the media sphere is argued to place female journalists: on the one hand women are punished if they are too feminine, on the other they are not allowed to be unfeminine. It can be argued that such contradictory demands cause bafflement among women journalists and discourage them from challenging the prevailing journalistic culture.\(^\text{17}\)

17 Linda Steiner has arrived at a similar interpretation in writing about women journalists’ struggle between conflicting identities. See e.g. Linda Steiner, “Newsroom accounts of power at work,” in *News, Gender and Power*, ed. Cynthia Carter, Gill Branston and Stuart Allan (London & New
According to Linda Steiner, British and American female journalists working at the beginning of the twentieth century drew attention to this paradox in their memoirs. Steiner has concluded that at the time unfeminine women were seen as ‘abnormal’, while feminine women were professionally marginalised.\(^{18}\) Discussions among Finnish female journalists suggest that during the 1940s they too had to occupy a middle ground between these contradictory demands. They were expected to act in a feminine manner, but at the same time they were not allowed to be too feminine.

The first part of this ‘double bind’ can be seen in the contribution at a meeting from the sub-editor of *Helsingin Sanomat* Jopi Ruotsalainen\(^{19}\), which included the following message from General Manager Eljas Erkko\(^{20}\):

> Tell them that there is no difference in expectations [for male and female journalists], but express the wish that women should come to work appropriately dressed, in a business-like manner.\(^{21}\)

After summarizing Ruotsalainen’s presentation, the Club’s secretary has added a remark according to which Erkko’s message should be seen as a protest against the trouser suits female journalists had started to wear.

Likewise Editor-in-Chief of *Suomen Kuvalehti* Ilmari Turja\(^{22}\) expected female journalists to act according to their sex,\(^{23}\) as shown by the following remark:

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18 Steiner, 1998, 150.
20 See e.g. *Lehdistön matrikkeli 1954*, 52–53.
23 The term ‘sex’ here refers to the sex-gender dichotomy which was introduced into the feminist theory by Gayle Rubin in 1975. Although the division has been extensively criticised, I see it as useful in a historical context in which the categories of ‘female’ and ‘male’ have been constructed based on biological gender roles. See e.g. Marianne Liljeström, “Sukupuolijärjestelmä,” in *Avainsanat. 10 askelta feministiseen tutkimukseen*, ed. Anu Koivunen and Marianne Liljeström (Tämpe-
What I expect especially from a woman as a journalist. First of all, that she will be natural, intelligent, behaving like an educated, cultivated person, and a warm woman.\(^\text{24}\)

The quote reflects a perception of male and female journalists as mutually complementary, by attaching traditionally feminine features such as ‘naturalness’ and ‘warmth’ to the qualities expected of a female journalist. This has been a typical notion in Western societies, and dominated the perception of gender roles in European countries after the Second World War as well.\(^\text{25}\)

The wish to maintain the values of the prevailing masculine culture can also be seen in Turja’s reaction to the Club of Women Journalists. According to him, there is no difference between a male and a female journalist, and thus all journalists should act in the same organisations.\(^\text{26}\) The fact that the intention of the Club of Women Journalists was not to split off their members from other professional clubs but on the contrary to support women journalists’ activity in professional organisations\(^\text{27}\) makes Turja’s comment confusing. It is, however, probable that women journalists’ way of organising themselves may have caused anxiety among male journalists. Thus Turja’s highlighting of shared organisations can be seen as an endeavour to invalidate the meaning of the Club of Women Journalists and the problems female journalists had become aware of in terms of their marginal status.

However, possessing feminine qualities was not enough. The other side of the ‘double bind’ was that male colleagues also wanted female journalists to have a more masculine touch in their articles. For instance, Jopi Ruotsalainen hoped that his female colleagues would learn to summarize and

\(\text{re: Vastapaino, 1996), 113–120.}\)
\(\text{24 ”Mitä sitten juuri erityisesti naiselta toimittajana toivoisin. Ensiksi, että hän olisi luonnollinen, älykäs, inhimillinen kuin ainakin sivistynyt ihminen ja lämmin nainen.” Minutes of meeting held 24 October 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.}\)
\(\text{25 According to Monika Djerf-Pierre, the idea of the complementary roles of male and female journalists dominated for instance the Swedish media sphere as late as the 1950s. Monika Djerf-Pierre, ”Journalistikens kön. Fältets struktur och logic under 1900-talet,” Kvinnovetenskaplig tidsskrift, no 2 (2003): 37.}\)
\(\text{26 Minutes of the meeting held 24 October 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.}\)
\(\text{27 See e.g. minutes of meeting held 9 May 1947. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.}\)
highlight their stories and he also intervened with their manner of using language too widely. In a discussion in which female journalists considered the pros and cons of the objective and familiar writing styles, Ruotsalainen defended the golden mean; but the minutes, taken by the Club’s secretary, seem to suggest that he associated an intimate writing style with fiction and an objective style with the news genre.\(^2\)

The superiority image of the masculine journalist can also be seen in the highlighting of the poor general education female journalists were considered to have:

Male journalists are usually better informed. They read and follow what happens in the world more than their female colleagues. Due to their character and upbringing, women live in a smaller world. They should purposefully increase their knowledge in different fields, especially in areas like politics, economics, sports and so on, on which have remained alien to them. The best way to do this is to read. At least read your own paper.\(^3\)

The quote reveals Ruotsalainen’s labelling of the feminine way of seeing the world as naturally simpler than the masculine one. It can thus be argued that female journalists were expected to abandon traditional feminine behaviour, and to be willing to transform themselves into ‘real’, masculine-type journalists.

Strategies of female journalists

According to the media scholar Linda Steiner, during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s the lives of female journalists in the United States were a continu-

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28 Minutes of meeting held 24 October 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
ous struggle.\(^\text{30}\) Although her claim cannot be directly applied to a Finnish context as such, it can be claimed that both at the start of the twentieth century and immediately after the Second World War Finnish women journalists too had to struggle against prejudice. Adopting Steiner’s argument, we can ask how these women reacted to the challenges they had to confront in Finnish society.\(^\text{31}\)

According to previous feminist media research, female journalists usually adapt to the masculine values of journalistic culture using one of the following four strategies:

- Being one of the boys
- Playing with their femininity
- Being one of the girls
- Escaping from the field\(^\text{32}\)

Media historian Monika Djerf-Pierre, on the other hand, has applied the concepts of competition, specialization and expansion; the first two resemble the above-mentioned strategies of being ‘one of the boys’ or ‘one of the girls’. Djerf-Pierre’s concept of ‘competition’ refers to a woman journalist’s wish to be accepted as a real journalist, while specialization means a strategy of developing one’s professional identity by concentrating on feminine subjects and genres.\(^\text{33}\)

The views of Finnish female journalists display a strong tendency to be ‘one of the girls’. Although some divergent opinions were presented, the common understanding seems to have been that members of the Club of Women Journalists wanted to develop their professional skills and writings by focusing on areas that were normally seen as feminine.\(^\text{34}\) A tendency to


\(^{31}\) “What is interesting is how women made sense of this, how they responded to it, and how they described how such experiences entered their work.” Steiner 1998, 152.

\(^{32}\) Melin-Higgins 2003, 59–63; See e.g. van Zoonen 1998, 33.


\(^{34}\) See e.g. Minutes of meeting held at October 24 1949. The archive of Women Journalists in
produce an image of women journalists who had a mission of their own in post-war Finnish society exists for instance in the minutes of meetings. This can be seen in the following quotes:

Thousands of people are waiting for their conditions to improve. In particular thousands of homes, women and children are hoping that those disadvantages that darken their lives will be dealt with. Our profession is one of those positions from which one can do a lot to further things, to remove many inequalities.35

Women have the heart to feel disadvantages, and because of that female journalists are in a key position in trying to create a better world for all of us.36

The strategy of being ‘one of the girls’, however, was not the only one adopted by Finnish female journalists. There are a number of clear indications that the female journalists internalised the Finnish journalistic culture, which can be seen as an example of the strategy of ‘playing with their femininity’.37 It was for instance argued that the weaker position of women was their own fault rather than a result of the masculine norm of the journalist, as can be seen in the following quote:

Reporters Viinikainen pointed out that the position of women journalists would be the same as that of men if this was

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35 “Tuhannet ihmiset odottavat oloihinsa korjausta ja ennen kaikkea tuhannet kodit, naiset ja lastat toivovat puuttuttavan niihin epäkohtiin, jotka heidän elämäänsä pimentävät. Meidän ammattimme on niitä paikkoja, joilta käsin voidaan tehdä paljon asiain eteenpäinviemistä, monen epäkohdan poistamisesta.” Minutes of meeting held at December 1 1946. The archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.

36 “Naisilla on sydäntä tuntea epäkohat ja naistojoukolla siten aivan avainasema siinä työssä, jota koetetaan tehdä kaikille paremmalla maailman luomisessa.” Minutes of meeting held at November 13 1949. The archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.

37 According to Margaret A Melin-Higgins, playing with their femininity means subscribing to the gender inequality that prevailed among the profession and accepting one’s role as a feminine journalist. Melin-Higgins 2003, 60–61.
what they really wanted themselves and if they had more natural competitiveness.\textsuperscript{38}

The internalized hierarchy of the profession can also be seen in the avoidance of the possibility that the behaviour of female journalists might irritate their male colleagues. Most of the Club members, for example, were afraid of starting their activities under the term ‘association’, preferring the word ‘club’. This was because they were not prepared to have problems with the Union of Journalists in Finland. Liisa Heini, for instance, argued as follows:

Right now there is a tendency towards the masculinization of newspaper offices. Because of this we should act in a manner which will not irritate our male colleagues.\textsuperscript{39}

Moreover, the members of the Club of Women Journalists were aware of their marginal status within the profession, but there is no trace of any endeavour to challenge the prevailing structures within the media sphere. This was the case even when it was clear, based on the club’s own activities, that these women strongly supported women’s issues. In addition, women journalists implicitly produced the similar kind of rhetoric to their male colleagues according to which women journalists should develop their skills more than their masculine counterparts to become real journalists. This can be seen for instance in the following quote:

If a female journalist does not have a clear goal to start out with, she should take on all kinds of reporting jobs, until she knows what special field is right for her: this means one for which she has inclination and opportunities, and for which she either already has the required knowledge or can acquire it.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} ”Toimittaja Viinikainen huomautti, että jos naiset itse tahtoisivat, jos heillä olisi enemmän terveellistä kunnianhimoa, heidän asemansa olisi täysin sama kuin miestoimittajien.” Minutes of the meeting held at January 26 1947. The archive of the Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
\textsuperscript{39} ”Juuri tällä hetkellä on ilmennyt pyrkimyksää toimitusten miehistämiseen. Näin ollen olisi kartettava miehisiä kollegoja ärsyttävää esiintymistä.” Minutes of meeting held 27 October 1946. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
\textsuperscript{40} ”Naistoimittajan olisi viisainta, ellei hänellä heti alun perin ole selvä päämäärää tiedossaan,
Thus, it can be argued that the strategy selected by Finnish women was one of assimilation rather than of deconstruction of the structures of journalistic culture.

The thinking according to which female journalists should adopt features typical of male ones is also characteristic of the members of the Club of Women Journalists. For example, the norm of masculine writing conventions seems to have been clear to them. The reporter Salama Simonen complained that reporting big stories “may tempt the journalist, especially a woman, to use too many stylistic devices, an overly elaborate language, which she believes to be a vivid style”. Implicit in Simonen’s comment would be for the journalists to “specialize as a writer” as long as they are sure, and without a doubt, that they have the subject, skills and knowledge needed to do so. Minutes of meeting held 13 November 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ub:1. HKA.

14. One of the objectives of the Club of Women Journalists was to guide young women who aspired to enter the profession. They organised, for instance, a discussion where the members of the Club would share their experiences with younger colleagues and young girls who were interested in the profession. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ub:1. HKA.
are two ideas: that vivid language is typical of female writers, and that it is inappropriate in ‘real’ journalism. The sub-editor of Kotiliesi Eila Jokela in turn commented that “in general it can be said that men are actually better at focusing on what they have to say and are more logical than female contributors.” Although these women clearly produced masculine writing conventions as the ideal for a journalist, the minutes of the meetings do not show women journalists trying to be ‘one of the boys’. This of course does not mean that Finnish women journalists might not have used this strategy in their everyday lives.

Women’s assimilation to the journalistic culture was not total; certain elements can be found that opposed the norms of the profession. As I have stated, along with the ideal of masculine writing conventions, we find comments emphasising the importance of feminine subjects in the writing of female journalists. The clearest example of resistance is the establishment of the club itself, which can be seen as an expression of the wish to organise on the basis of gender. In addition, this can be seen as an attempt to increase the power of female journalists within the profession and especially in the Union of Journalists in Finland by bringing together the forces of individual women working in this field. However, this was not unusual. Monika Djerf-Pierre has noted that for example in Sweden the discussion of the gendered nature of the journalistic sphere has been going on for a century. While changes in the differences in status between Swedish male and female journalists have been slow, such questions as the salary gap, working conditions and the masculine hegemony have been discussed in Sweden to some extent.

In addition, it is important to take into account that female journalists did not constitute an united front in their resistance. This can be seen for instance in the discussion which took place after the presentations by Ilmari Turja and Jopi Ruotsalainen. In discussing the question of femi-
nine and masculine topics, some members of the club commented that in principle all topics are appropriate to both men and women. There were, however, also those who adopted Ruotsalainen’s view, according to which such topics as “technical things, horrifying crimes, top-level politics, sports and battle exercises” were less suitable for female journalists.46

The journalistic culture in a larger perspective

In view of the overall development in gender roles that took place in Finnish society during the 1940s and 1950s, it can be claimed that the prevailing journalistic culture was a product of its own time. This can be seen, for instance, in the public image of female journalists. Both media writings and the minutes of the Club’s meetings point out that working female journalists had to take into account their public image, which was not always very positive. In one newspaper article, for example, an interviewed male journalist described his female colleagues as follows:

When you meet a woman who does not want to get old, who does not enjoy a quiet home life, who sees her husband only as a good subject for a newspaper column and the chairman of the tax committee as a good source of news, you have met a female journalist.47

Describing female journalists as wives, the article’s writer continued:

Those poor men who are married to a woman journalist – especially a newspaper-woman – probably know someone like Rita Hayworth better as a woman than they know their

46 “[T]eknillisiä asioita, karmivia rikosjuttuja, surupolitiikkaa, urheiluasioita ja taistelujohtajatuksia”. Minutes of meeting held 24 October 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
own wife. A newspaper-woman is never either at home or away from home. She is always somewhere in-between.\textsuperscript{48}

In the rhetoric used by Ilmari Turja and Jopi Ruotsalainen, this image of the wild and disengaged women journalist was challenged by emphasizing the traditional male and female roles. Turja, for instance, argued that the feminine qualities of women journalists have an educational meaning for their male colleagues.\textsuperscript{49} In other words, he placed women journalists in a nurturing position in relation to men, who were seen as acting immaturely and irresponsibly. This was a way of thinking typical of its time, lasting for example in Sweden down till the 1950s.\textsuperscript{50}

15. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, co-operation with provincial areas became part of the objectives of the Club. In November 1950 members of the Club made a two-day trip to Tampere. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ub:1. HKA


Newspaper excerpt. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ub:1. HKA.

\textsuperscript{49} Minutes of meeting held 24 October 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.

Furthermore, based on the minutes of meetings of the Club of Women Journalists, it can be argued that female journalists themselves seem to have actively tried to change their public image in a more positive direction. Editor-in-Chief of *Hopeapeili* Ida Pekari, for example, pointed out that:

> In addition, when she is at work the female journalist is in a very conspicuous position and in the public eye. If only for this reason, discretion and impeccable behaviour are demanded of her in relation to her dress, her drinking and her conduct in general.  

The discussion which took place after Pekari’s presentation concurred with her argument. It was seen as important for female journalists to pay attention to their behaviour, to prevent the whole profession from falling into disrepute. By emphasizing the importance of proper behaviour on the part of women journalists, the Club members took part in reproducing the restrictions established by journalistic culture.

The division between masculine and feminine journalists, however, can only partly be explained by the gender system of 1940s Finland. The commercialization of the media which had started at the end of the nineteenth century, and its effect on editorial work, should be also taken into account. It is argued that in the Anglo-American world a split took place at this time between the ‘quality’ newspapers and the yellow press. Light, entertaining journalism started to be seen as a feminine sphere and was thought to please especially female readers. At the same time, the idea of the division between feminine and masculine qualities was strengthened. Female readers were expected to value subjectivity, passivity and emotionality, while the male reader was seen as objective, ironic and non-emotional. This dichotomous division of media texts into feminine and masculine material

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51 See e.g. *Lehdistön matrikkeli* 1954, 197–198.
52 "Lisäksi joutuu naistoimittaja työssään olemaan siksi näkyvällä paikalla ja yleisen arvostelun kohteenä, että jo senkin takia hänetä vaaditaan tahdikkuutta ja moitteettosta käytöstä niin pukeutumisessa, suhteessa alkoholiin kuin kaikessa muussakin käyttäytymisessä." Minutes of meeting held 10 April 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
53 Minutes of meeting held 10 April 1949. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
also led to the idea of masculine and feminine journalism,\(^{54}\) which can be seen as one potential explanation for the gendered nature of the profession in post-war Finland as well.

The minutes of the Club of Women Journalists contain few remarks suggesting that women journalists of the 1940s subscribed to the division between masculine and feminine journalism. The most self-evident demonstration that the dichotomy was present in Finnish journalistic culture, however, is found in Akseli Routavaara’s journalism textbook, which was the first Finnish work of its kind. In writing about women journalists, Routavaara explicitly posits two separate ways of doing journalism: the masculine and the feminine. For Routavaara, women journalists are capable only of feminine journalism, which is entertaining and emotional. Although Routavaara says that women’s stylistic liveliness and lightness have also had a positive effect on the ponderous writing conventions of Finnish journalism, it is masculine journalism, with its severe and non-emotional style, which creates the norm of ‘real’ journalism.\(^{55}\)

Although the arguments presented in Routavaara’s book reveal first and foremost the opinions of the author, his comments can also be seen as reflections of Finnish journalistic culture more generally. Routavaara had worked in journalism since the beginning of the 1920s and at the time of writing the book was Editor-in-Chief of the provincial newspaper *Sisä-Suomi*.\(^{56}\) In addition, his book was used in Finland for years as a major journalism textbook; thus it can be argued that his views are symptomatic of the overall values of the profession. Similar values were visible in women journalists’ support of the ideals of the masculine norm, as can be seen for instance in an article by the woman journalist Irma Karvikko, published in the trade magazine *Sanomalehtimies* in 1943. Karvikko pointed out that the profession no longer consisted only of men; the number of women journalists had increased due to the war. She therefore suggested that women journalists should establish their own association. At the same time, however, she continued to tie the image of the journalist to mascu-


\(^{56}\) *Lehdistön matrikeli* 1954, 221–222.
linity. She wrote, for instance: “It is true that with the return to peacetime conditions, newspaper offices are becoming more masculine again.”

When we analyse Karvikko’s article, we find the same contradictions between reality and the ideal of the masculine journalist which seem to have been typical of the women active in the Club of Women Journalists. This can be argued to reveal a shared value system among these women, in that Karvikko did not take part in the activities of the Club. As mentioned above, in its early days the Club of Women Journalists was concentrated in the Helsinki area; it started to expand its activity only at the beginning of the 1950s. However, it is probable that Karvikko was one of the active women journalists meeting in Turku who are mentioned in the minutes of the Club of Women Journalists. In addition, interaction with her female colleagues seems to have been important for Karvikko and it is likely that she disseminated her ideas among the journalists of her own city. Based on this interaction between Karvikko and the Club of Women Journalists, it can be argued that the conflicting identities of these professional women indicate at least in part the value system shared by women journalists in post-war Finnish society.

In the light of Routavaara’s textbook and Karvikko’s article, it can be claimed that even though women journalists entered the profession during the war, the shift in the Finnish gender system did not really disrupt the gendered foundation of journalistic culture. During the war women had better opportunities to create a professional identity, but the ideal norm of a journalist remained a masculine one. In addition, the tendency at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s toward the masculinisation of Finnish society became visible within the profession of journalism as well. This could be seen for instance in the highlighting of the feminine qualities of

58 See e.g. Minutes of meetings held 28 May 1950 and 6 November 1950. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
59 Minutes of meeting held 2 November 1950. Archive of Women Journalists in Finland. Ca:1. HKA.
60 In this sense Finnish journalistic culture seems to follow the overall pattern of the Finnish gender system, in which the gender hierarchy is not really challenged even though women have been able to enter the public sphere. Liisa Rantalaiho, ”Sukupuolisuus ja Suomen malli,” in Naisten hyvinvointivalio, ed. Anneli Anttonen, Lea Henriksön and Ritva Nätkin (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1994); See e.g. Raija Julkunen, ”Gender, work, welfare state. Finland in comparison,” in Women in Finland (Helsinki: Otava, 1999) 81, 100.
women journalists. Although the tendency to emphasize the dichotomy between the genders followed the general atmosphere, which accentuated traditional gender roles, an explanation can also be found in journalistic practices. While the basic values of journalistic culture had not changed, it is likely that the daily routines in newspaper offices had shifted during the war when women entered this traditionally masculine sphere, giving rise to some tension between the genders when the men returned from active service.

Conclusion

According to media researchers, the profession of journalists is characterised by a dichotomic gender logic which defines relations between the genders. Although gendered practices have varied over time and place, the position of a female journalist has always been subordinate to the masculine norm. Due to the hierarchical structure of the profession, female journalists have had to resolve the conflict between their professional identity and the norms of womanhood. The points made by Monika Djerf-Pierre and Linda Steiner, among others, seem to fit also the context of Finnish female journalists who were active during the late 1940s. Although there are explicit signs of a feminist consciousness among those women, opportunities to destabilize the prevailing structures of the Finnish journalistic culture did not seem to open up. The female journalists’ discussions analysed in this article display a constant negotiation between the professional role and that of a woman.

In addition to relations between the genders, the production of male and female journalists as separate groups in 1940s Finland seems to have taken place according to a particular logic of its own. In producing the masculine norm, the minutes of meetings also construct a homogenous image of the Finnish male journalist. In other words, the image of the Male journalist can be read between the lines. The image of the female journalist, in contrast, is more fragmented and does not consist of the same kind of homogeneous group. Female journalists are seen as individual women,

who have somehow succeeded in learning to work in the profession, but who will never be able to achieve the status of a ‘real’ journalist. In other words, female journalists are seen as figures who are trying to find their place within the profession, while the Male journalist finds his position without any problems.

The manner of producing a divided image of female journalists can be argued to follow the social realities of a certain time period. During the late 1940s the woman journalist was still a marginal figure in Finnish editorial rooms, and it is reasonable to believe that their number was too low to give rise to an image of the Woman journalist. However, the images of women journalists were tied to the values of post-war Finland, which meant that the actual space for different kinds of feminine journalists was limited. Thus, in a situation in which gender roles were moving towards a more traditional understanding of gender, female journalists did not have the opportunity to question their role as feminine actors in Finnish society.

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**Media, Interaction and Integration**

**Literature**


Mistress and maid:
Multifarious processes of contemporary female immigration in the light of historical theories

Heli Hyvönen

Case 1.

Maija Mikkola\(^1\) emigrated from Helsinki to Tallinn three years ago because of her husband’s intra-company transfer at Nokia. Originally she had planned to remain working in Finland, while her husband would commute weekly between Estonia and Finland. However, she became pregnant and gave birth to her first child; she therefore decided to move abroad with him. In Estonia she stayed at home, taking care of her child and the household. Despite the challenges caused by living in a foreign society, her starting point in Estonia was empowered: living conditions were pleasant and the financial situation of the family was good. Due to the short distance between the countries, regular reciprocal visits with family and friends took place. Furthermore, Maija was able to use the health care services in Finland, and she was entitled to enjoy the relatively generous economic benefits of the Social Insurance Institute of Finland. After her second child was born the following year, she hired a full-time nanny to help take care of routine daily work.

Case 2.

Josephina Perera\(^2\) left Sri Lanka ten years ago, moving first to Saudi Arabia, then to Kuwait and finally to Greece. She has worked as a domestic worker,

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1 Maija’s case is based on an in-depth interview carried out for my doctoral thesis in 2005. All names have been changed to protect the respondent’s anonymity.
2 Josephina’s case is based on the documentary film *When Mother Comes Home for Christmas*,

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mainly caring for children and performing other duties in the households of her employers. She left her own three children, aged two, nine and thirteen, in the care of her sister. The father, from whom Josephina had been divorced earlier, has borne no responsibility for the care of the children. During these ten years she has visited her home only once, for two months, but she has written letters to her children every week asking about school and other news, and has sent money monthly to cover their living expenses and school fees. Sometimes she has sent gifts and has been planning to buy a new house for the whole (extended) family. For Josephina, migration has provided the means to escape poverty and the possibility of supporting her children financially; for her children the mother’s absence has caused distress: the youngest has performed poorly at school, while the middle child showed mental ill-being by several suicide attempts.

The cases of Maija and Josephina demonstrate the very different starting points for migration for women from different parts of the world. During the last thirty years, the unequal distribution of resources and capital has grown: rich countries have become richer and poor countries ever poorer. Similarly to Josephina, majority of migrants today move from poor to rich countries to escape either relative or absolute poverty. Like her, an increasing number of Asian and Latin American women leave behind their families and move to Europe or the US, to take on duties that local women are no longer willing to do (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). On the other hand, the number of professional, highly skilled3 female migrants is increasing (King et al. 2004; Kofman 1999; Kofman and Raghuram 2006; Raghuram 2004). As Maija’s case indicates, their position is often affluent; because of their social and human capital as well as their financial resources, they have control over many of the factors affecting their life and experience in the foreign country. Often they can hire nannies and/or maids to help take care of daily routines; these helpers, similarly to Josephina, may be immigrants. Needless to say, the expectations and

directed by Nilita Vachani (see Ehrenreich and Hoschschild 2003).
3 There is no single definition of what is meant by ‘skills’ in speaking of ‘skilled migration’. Rather, they are seen as a combination of educational level, qualifications, and/or working experience. Some scholars have drawn a distinction between the ‘skilled’, who have at least a secondary education, and the ‘highly skilled’, possessing a university degree or equivalent (OECD 2002).
experiences of migration are certainly different for women like Maija and Josephina (Hyvönen 2007).

Since the early 1980s, academic researchers have paid attention to the roles and experiences of women as migrants. It has been recognized that women migrate not only as dependants of their husbands, but also as independent labor migrants for a variety of complex reasons (Boyd 1989; DeLaet 1999; Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003; King et al. 2004; Phizacklea 1983). More often than before, the move takes place on the women’s own initiative and in their own right (Kofman et al. 2000). However, most academic research focusing on female immigration (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003; Herrera Lima 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Lan 2003; Landolt and Da 2005; Phizacklea 1983; Zontini 2004) has focused on women taking jobs in unskilled sectors of the labor market, particularly domestic and sex work. It is often forgotten that not all migrant women are disadvantaged and that entry into the labor market is not always limited to low-paid jobs (Kofman et al. 2000). There has been only little research on the ways in which the presence of migrant women reconfigures family migration.

In order to analyze the experience of migrant women, it is necessary to consider their social location, referring to a “person’s positions within inter-connected power hierarchies created through historical, political, economic, geographic, kinship-based and other socially stratifying factors” (Pessar and Mahler 2003). In this paper I explore the multifarious nature of female migration today. My purpose is to contextualize it in a historical light by looking at (gender-blind) macro-level theories. I also discuss what these theories can tell us about migration today. I argue that in order to

4 As early as 1885, E.G. Ravenstein, one of the first theorists of migration, recognized the active role of women as immigrants. According to him, “woman is a greater migrant than man” (Ravenstein 1885). At that time the role of women was seen as being in the private sphere, yet he argued that women migrate autonomously and for a variety of reasons. He acknowledged that “this may surprise those who associate women with domestic life, but the figures on the census clearly prove it”. However, it took almost a century before women’s migration started to gain scholarly interest (King et al. 2004).

5 It is also noteworthy that skilled women may initially enter through other immigration categories – as spouses, as students, as refugees – and start working later. Those who enter spouses of work permit holders have no restrictions on their labor force participation; since in many countries (e.g. the UK) they do not need a separate work permit, their participation in the labor market can easily be missed (King et al. 2004; Kofman and Raghuram 2006; Raghuram 2004).
understand the impact of social location and different patterns of migration, we have to consider such factors as the political and historical context and the individual immigrant’s social class, ethnicity, level of education, religious views and personal characteristics. (Buijs 1993; Castles and Miller 2003; DeLaet 1999; Forsander 2007; Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Phizacklea 1983.)

I first look back in time to the migration flows following the Second World War, taking as my example the case of Finns moving to Sweden. Hopefully this will help the reader to understand the starting point for the migration models presented later in this article. At the end of the article I turn back to the social location of the migrant in the light of the theories. Throughout the paper, I emphasize the different situation of men and women as migrants. The reasons for and expectations of migration are often different for men and women, and their incorporation and advancement in the country of departure may follow different paths. If gender is not considered, migration by either sex cannot be fully understood (Castles and Miller 2003; Forsander 2007; Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007). Gender is thus a fundamental aspect which needs to be considered in analyzing migration (Kofman et al. 2000).

Historical perspective on female immigration

Between 1945 and the early 1970s, the era of main labor migration, all the fast-growing industrialized Western countries imported labor systematically, especially for low-skilled jobs. During this period the ‘prototype’ of an immigrant was assumed to be a young, enterprising and courageous male, who left his family behind and migrated to seek better-paid work abroad. He sent money back home, and with the savings his wife and children followed him later (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003; Kofman 1999). Although labor was also needed for teaching, nursing and other female-dominated fields, the majority of immigrants were men (Zlotnik 1995). It was taken for granted that women would only move as ‘dependents’: as the wives, mothers or daughters of male migrants. The extent of their involvement was therefore overlooked (Zlotnik 1995). If women’s migration was analyzed at all, it was conflated with the reasons cited for men, and their experiences were fitted into models originally created to
understand, explain, and predict male migration. Women’s role was supposed to be reactive rather than proactive (Castles and Miller 2003; Kof- 
man et al. 2000).

Similarly to many other sending countries, following World War II 
Finland was a typical labor-exporting country. The main receiving country 
for Finnish labor migrants was then Sweden. In Finland half of the popu-
lation was still practicing agriculture, and the standard of living was low. 
The country suffered from the burden of heavy war reparations, and the 
economic situation was unstable. Similarly to other labor-exporting coun-
tries, the migration stream was dominated by young men: almost 65% of 
migrants were male (Kero 1991). However, whole families also migrated, 
since female labor was needed for ‘women’s jobs’. Interestingly, the women 
who migrated were on average younger than the men (Rahikainen 2007).

The decision to migrate was influenced by the poor employment situa-
tion and the low level of wages in Finland, but many were looking purely 
for adventure and freedom. Since Swedish industry was suffering from a 
labor shortage, the Finns easily found jobs. Like labor migrants in other 
countries the Finns mainly took jobs in heavy but low-paid factory work, 
fields in which Swedes no longer wanted to work. The first job was often 
obtained with the help of friends and relatives, who also assisted in find-
ing housing. Besides the easy access to the labor market, migration was 
relatively easy due to the similarities in culture, legislation and customs 
of Finland and Sweden. Finns also enjoyed many rights and preferential 
treatment compared to non-Nordic migrants (Korkiasaari and Tarkiainen 
2000; Rahikainen 2007).

What makes the case of Finns moving to Sweden interesting is the 
lack of traditional barriers: There were no requirements for passports or 
working permits, and because of the short distance between the countries 
migration did not require any considerable capital investment. Finnish mi-
grants were also not expected to speak Swedish. Nevertheless, and despite 
the very large wage gap between the countries, the number of migrants was 
limited, and the absence of official borders did not translate into a mass 
migration of any kind (Korkiasaari and Tarkiainen 2000). On the other 
hand, it is noteworthy that at the same time that Finns were moving to 
Sweden, taking underpaid factory jobs, and joining a pool of immigrant 
labor struggling to achieve better rights, some Swedish companies were
transferring their production to Finland in order to take advantage of the under-employed, cheap female labor force (Rahikainen 2007).

Modeling migration

Similarly to the Finns in Sweden, most other labor migrants in Europe between the 1950s and 1970s took jobs mainly in manufacturing and construction, i.e. in highly gendered fields. The migrants’ wages were poor and conditions underprivileged; yet they were expected to make little demand on the social infrastructure. The idea of the states was to “import labor but not people” (Castles 2006). However, the ‘guest worker system’ did not succeed in creating a functioning model for immigrant recruitment. The ‘rotation’ policy failed: people did not return to their countries of origin after a set period of time. Most countries had therefore abandoned this policy by the 1960s, but allowed migrant entry and family reunion. Especially after the oil crisis in 1973 this was explained by the economic recession and high rates of unemployment; however, as Castles (2006) points out, what was actually involved was a deeper structural level: “temporary workers were being recruited to meet permanent labor demand”. Yet, those migrants who had come in as temporary workers did not leave; instead, they brought in their families. Furthermore, migrant workers joined trade unions, and becoming more aware of their rights they started demanding better conditions (Castles 2006). About ten years later the decline of heavy manufacturing and mining caused a drop in the demand for labor, and thus shaped migration patterns.

To understand and explain these flows, many theories on migration, partly isolated from each other, were developed in different scholarly fields. The oldest and probably best known approach is the neoclassical theory. It assumes that migration is caused by the unequal distribution of economic and natural resources. Based on ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, it expects people to move from densely populated and low-income areas to places with more space, greater resources and higher incomes. Migration is viewed mainly as a question of labor market mechanisms; other factors are not expected to influence migration directly. The model assumes that migration will stop as wage differences vanish. At the individual level, migration is seen as a rational decision based on the calculation of relative costs and benefits.
Personal human capital characteristics, such as education, experience and language skills, are likely to increase the possibility of employment and thus the likelihood of migration (Boyd 1989; Castles and Miller 2003; DeLaet 1999; Kofman et al. 2000; Massey et al. 1998).

The labor market theory aims at explaining migration in terms of pull factors in the receiving countries. It suggests that markets are not likely to function in the rational way indicated by neo-classical theory (Castles and Miller 2003; Kofman et al. 2000). Rather, migration is perceived as a response to a labor shortage in the receiving country. Massey et al. (1998) claim that wage differentials between the countries are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for labor migration to occur. Instead, the demand for immigrant workers derives from the structural needs of the economy and is expressed through recruitment practices rather than through wage offers. Indeed, employers have incentives to recruit workers while holding wages constant (Massey et al. 1998; Siisiäinen 2000).

Along with structural factors in the receiving society, the theory also takes account of individual characteristics such as gender and race (Castles and Miller 2003; DeLaet 1999).

The historical-structural theory (world systems theory), derived from Marxism, assumes that migration will appear when cheap labor from poor countries flows towards capital-rich countries, making the distribution of resources even more unequal. Existing links, for example between colonial empires and their colonies, are likely to accelerate migration due to cultural, linguistic and other similarities. The core of this approach lies in the “unequal distribution of economic and political power in the world economy” (Castles and Miller 2003; Statistics Finland). Yet Massey et al. (1998) point out that international migration is not caused by differentials in employment between countries, but rather by the dynamics of market creation and the political structure of the global economy.

Even though these models play down the role of human agency, their strength is in their emphasis on political economy, which is vital for analyzing migration today (DeLaet 1999). The models were developed during the main labor migration era, and aimed at explaining the situation and experience of working-class male migrants. Therefore they do not consider gender, nor do they take into account the gendered patterns and the role of class in migration today (Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007). The theories tell us about the unequal distribution of resources and capital and its effect.
on migration, but many of them fail to account for the specific patterning of migration routes, nor do they predict future movements (Castles and Miller 2003). The models have also been criticized for explaining international migration in terms of economic factors alone (Massey et al. 1998), and for not considering agency. The greatest problem with neoclassical theory is that it does not take into account the complexity of hierarchically structured social relations and institutionalized constraints (DeLaet 1999). The labor market theory, on the other hand, has gained little empirical support, while the historical-structural approach has been blamed for overemphasizing the significance of capital and downplaying the importance of individual motivations and actions (Castles and Miller 2003).

So far scholars have not succeeded in developing a single model which would explain the diverse patterns of migration today. It is widely accepted that to understand the complex phenomena we need to take into account individual agency as well as broader structural features, intervening institutions and formal agencies. Kofman et al. (2000) suggest a tridimensional model, consisting of a) migration regime (relations between countries of emigration and immigration), b) migratory institutions (formal state structures, mediators and facilitators) and c) individuals, who make their choices based on broader structural conditions. I next turn to these factors.

Patterned migration routes

The most common reason for migration today is to look for a better life. However, empirical studies have indicated that it is seldom the poorest people from the least-developed areas who move to the richest countries; rather, most migrants belong to the middle class and come from areas undergoing economic and social change (Massey et al. 1998).

Migrations are selective and patterned processes (Sassen 1999). The destination is usually the nearest possible relatively wealthy country; similarities in language, culture and religion make it easier for migrants to adapt, but today migrants travel much longer distances than before (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). Interestingly, migrants themselves often consider their migration as an individual or household decision. Rahikainen (2007), who studied Finnish migrants in Sweden during the
main labor migration era, found that none of the respondents saw themselves as part of a larger global movement. Even if their friends or relatives had ‘tempted’ them to move, they saw migration at the individual level only. According to Boyd (1989), migration can be seen as a contingency: a process shaped by the historically generated social, political and economic structures of both the sending and the receiving societies.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the policies of most EU countries are designed to attract highly skilled workers, while opportunities for those with low skills or none are limited to temporary and seasonal labor programs (Castles 2006). Family reunification therefore remains the most common reason for unskilled and low-skilled people to migrate to EU countries (Raghuram 2004). In contrast, large companies that transfer their production to countries where materials and labor are cheaper send managers from the country of origin. This form of migration operates in the opposite direction: from rich countries to poor ones.

The gendered migratory institutions

Today, women form a large proportion and sometimes a clear majority of immigrants in all categories. Moreover, the impact of women’s migration on economic and social life in the receiving societies has also become visible, to such a degree that one of the most prominent trends in today’s immigration is feminization (Castles and Miller 2003). The new division of labor pushes women into domestic and care activities, which have seen the greatest growth in labor demand (Kofman and Raghuram 2006). Where under imperialism it was natural resources that were imported, today the most common trade is ‘love’ (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). This means that in many Western societies lacking a decent system of social services and children’s day-care, the full-time participation of women in working life has been made possible through the global transfer of services (Castles 2006).

Migration is also affected by the social construction of gender in both sending and receiving countries. In some regions it is more typical for men to move than for women and vice versa. Countries where the female role is strictly circumscribed by cultural expectations of a woman’s dependence on her spouse send significantly fewer female than male migrants
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Under other conditions the division of labor may favor the migration of women more than men (Boyd 1989). In the Philippines, for instance, the government actively encourages women to emigrate, and the country’s main export is human capital (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003).

The division of immigrant labor is gendered in the receiving society as well. For example the construction industry, where the work is visibly situated under the public gaze, employs primarily men, whereas women are likely to take jobs in cleaning, domestic work and service occupations, in particular caring and hospitality services (Kofman 1999; Kofman et al. 2000), or in sexual work and prostitution. In these unseen fields, which are sometimes not even recognized as ‘work’, women are often subject to exploitation and abuse (Castles and Miller 2003). The importance of immigrant women in caring for the elderly and for children emphasizes the gendered nature of social services, but has been underestimated. Immigrant women are often seen merely as recipients of welfare services, and their role in providing them has been ignored (Kofman 1999; Kofman et al. 2000). On the other hand, not all reproductive care is produced in the private sphere. However, there has been scant acknowledgement of the presence of skilled international migrant women in the public sphere providing forms of public social reproduction (Kofman and Raghuram 2006). Thus Marxist assumptions are incorporated into a feminist analysis of unskilled female workers in the global economy (DeLaet 1999; Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007).

The individual level: ‘skills’ make the difference

Much of the academic research on gender has focused on women taking jobs in low-wage sectors, for example in private domestic work (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). The majority of these women are single or have migrated alone. For them, migration is an investment: often they have to pay large amounts of money to be transferred or indeed smuggled to the host country, and making up the sum may take years. They are forced to work long hours, but despite their poor working conditions they cannot change employers because of their illegal status. Furthermore, they do not enjoy legal rights, such as protected working conditions or
public health-care services. Migrant women are on average better educated than migrant men, but working as maids these women may earn 15 times more than as teachers in their country of origin (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). Compared to the wage level of the host country, however, their pay is low and insufficient to support their families if the latter join them. However, they contribute or even bear financial responsibility for family and relatives left behind. Furthermore, most domestic workers are expected to take up residence in the employer’s home, which limits their opportunities for family reunification (Raghuram 2004). On the other hand, migration can offer these women opportunities liberating them from oppressive gender roles in the home country, for example caring for older relatives and/or oppressive marriages, and it may also provide a new sense of control (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003; King et al. 2004).

Compared to unskilled migrants, skilled migrants are in a much better situation. Often they enter the country of destination using for example professional organizations, making the process easier (Kofman et al. 2000). Even when these women migrate as spouses, their possibilities of later entering the labor market are relatively good because of their legal status. They are also more likely than unskilled migrants to utilize their privileged position in negotiating their status in the labor market hierarchy (Raghuram 2004). In addition, they can bring their families with them at the time of migration, and if they wish ultimately obtain citizenship. Nevertheless they sometimes encounter a series of barriers in gaining economic autonomy and suitable employment (Kofman and Raghuram 2006).

New order of world system?

The world system (historical-structural) theory anticipated that cheap labor from poor countries would flow towards capital. As noted above, however, today it is more common for companies to transfer their production to countries of cheap labor instead of waiting for people to immigrate. However, management positions are filled with people from the company’s country of origin. This arrangement requires families to “pick up their entire existence” and move to the other side of the world for the benefit of the career of one family member, usually the husband (Hindman 2008).
Usually this type of migration is not a burden but a consciously chosen livelihood strategy. Contracts are for two to five years at a time, but are sometimes extended several times consecutively (Coles and Fechter 2008). For various reasons these women are often limited to the domestic sphere, and cannot take paid jobs outside the home. The social networks of these women consist of other people in a similar situation, often from the same country of origin (Walsh 2008). Life is constructed to resemble the familiar patterns of ‘home’ (Hindman 2008): they live in an enclave, an “expatriate bubble”, a ‘home abroad’. (Fechter 2007)

Many studies (Fechter 2007; Hindman 2008; Hyvönen 2007; Oksanen 2006; Walsh 2008) have indicated that despite the good economic situation and pleasant living conditions of expatriate families, many of these women experience life in a new country as challenging. The husbands work long hours and travel a great deal, leaving the daily responsibilities on the women’s shoulders. Since these women follow their husbands, they often have to adopt a new role as housewife. This is especially difficult for women from countries (such as Finland) where women are seen as empowered actors, earning their own living (Hyvönen 2007). Not being able to work may lower women’s self-esteem and arouse confusing feelings, but it also restricts daily social contacts. From the company’s point of view, women who follow their husbands on intra-company assignments cause extra expense; they are therefore expected to do everything in their power to support their husbands and to create conditions in which the husbands can work as effectively as possible (Oksanen 2006).

When families migrate as a unit, it is clear that it is almost with no exceptions men and not women who are the main actors (Raghuram 2004). A wife’s decision to follow her husband’s career nearly always harms her own labor-market status, even when her socioeconomic status is higher than his. If the move takes place because of the husband’s mobile career, the wife often has difficulty in establishing her own career abroad; furthermore, after returning to the country of origin her prolonged absence from working life may make it harder to find work corresponding to her education (Coles and Fechter 2008). However, women’s interests may also go beyond those of the sphere of employment. Reduced employment may provide a release from the burden of work, and women thus cannot necessarily be seen as ‘self-sacrificing wives’ (Raghuram 2004).
Discussion

The purpose of this paper has been to throw some academic light on the multifarious processes of female immigration. Most of the research done during the last thirty years has focused on a narrow group of women taking jobs in domestic and sex work (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003; Herrera Lima 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Lan 2003; Landolt and Da 2005; Phizacklea 1983; Zontini 2004). Highly educated and affluent migrant women have gained much less attention, even though their number is continuously increasing. Similarly to the case of Maija, who followed her husband on an intra-company transfer, migration may provide a release from the burden of work and an opportunity to stay at home with the children, which would have not been possible in the home country. In this article, I have argued that in analyzing migration it is necessary to consider the migrant’s personal characteristics, such as gender and social class, as well as some of the historical and political factors characteristic of the sending and receiving societies (Buijs 1993; Castles and Miller 2003; DeLaet 1999; Forsander 2007; Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Phizacklea 1983).

To help the reader understand the starting points and larger societal contexts of female migration today, I have briefly presented three macro-level historical migration theories. These theories have been developed in different disciplines, partly in isolation from each other, to explain the situations and experiences of working-class male migrants during the main labor migration era. They aim at explaining international migration mainly in terms of economic factors (Massey et al. 1998), and fail to consider the patterning of agency, social class and gender in migration today (Martikainen and Tiilikainen 2007). Yet they tell us about the unequal distribution of resources and capital and its effect on migration. As in the main labor migration era, most migrants today move from poorer to richer countries, often in the hope of escaping relative or absolute poverty (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003).

The neoclassical theory, based on ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, assumed that migration was caused by the unequal distribution of economic and geographic resources. Even though often ignored, to a certain degree the model is still valid today. Push factors, such as unemployment in the country of origin, are still likely to accelerate migration. Other oppressive life
situations in the country of origin may also ‘push’ women to move: migration can provide liberation from repulsive gender roles, such as oppressive marriages or the responsibility for caring for older relatives. In the Philippines, for instance, migration is called ‘Philippine divorce’ (see Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). On the other hand, it is clear that pull factors, as predicted by the dual labor market theory, are crucial determinants in migrations today. For the low-skilled woman taking a job in domestic work, migration provides a chance to travel to another country, which is often imagined to be a land of promise. The women may have unrealistic expectations of being able to achieve a Western life-style, for example shopping for nice clothes for themselves. ‘Pull factors’ also play an important role for those who move because of mobile careers. Expatriates for example receive better salaries than they would in the home country, and the companies provide substantial incentives packages as part of the job. Their housing conditions are also better than in the home country, and they are often able to enjoy the services of maids and/or nannies that they would not be able to do in the country of origin.

Regardless of whether the migrant resembles Josephina, a single mother leaving her children in the care of others, or Maija, who moved because of her husband’s career, migrations take place along highly structured routes to predetermined destinations (Sassen 1999), in which existing links, for example – as assumed by the historical-structural theory – between colonial empires and their colonies, are likely to increase the likelihood of migration (Castles and Miller 2003). At the individual level, similarities in language, culture and religion make it easier for migrants to adapt (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2003). At the larger macro-level, the routes of companies’ production are also highly structured. By looking at female migration today in the light of historical theories, we can understand the role of societal context in relation to migrants’ expectations and experience. Yet, the factors determining whether an individual woman will leave or stay remain unclear. The women who actually migrate are often exceptional, since they form only a small percentage of the total population (Lindström 1992).
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