

Rebuilding Defenses

Explorations in Norman Fairclough's Theory of Critical Discourse Analysis

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Tutkielmassa eritellään Norman Faircloughin kriittisen diskurssianalyysin teoriaa ja siihen kohdistettua kritiikkiä. Pyrkimyksenä on sovittaa näitä erilaisia näkemyksiä keskenään ja tarjota ratkaisuja yhteen kriittisen diskurssianalyysin keskeiseen ongelmaan eli emansipaation (sosiaalisten epäkohtien tunnistamisen ja ratkaisemisen) puutteellisuuteen.

Teoriaosuudesta esiin nousevia mahdollisuuksia sovelletaan tekstianalyysiin. Tutkimuksen kohteena on teksti *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* ja jossain määrin sen tuottanut järjestö *Project for the New American Century*. Näitä tarkastellaan ennen kaikkea sosiaalisina ilmiöinä ja suhteessa toisiinsa.

Faircloughin mallin suurimmiksi ongelmiksi muodostuvat perinteinen käsitys kielestä, jonka mukaan kielen järjestelmän abstraktit ja sisäiset suhteet ovat tärkeimpiä, sekä ideologinen vastakkainasettelu kritiikin lähtökohtana. Ensimmäinen johtaa kielellisten tutkimustulosten epätydyttävään kykyyn selittää sosiaalisia havaintoja ja jälkimmäinen poliittiseen tai maailmankatsomukselliseen väittelyyn, joka ei mahdollista uusia näkemyksiä.

Tutkielman lopputulema on, että keskittymällä asiasisältöön kielen rakenteen sijasta ja ymmärtämällä tekstin tuottaja yksittäisenä, rajattuna sosiaalisena toimijana voidaan analyysiin saada avoimuutta ja täsmällisyyttä. Kriittinen diskurssianalyysi kaipaa tällaista näkemystä kielellisten analyysien tueksi ja uudenlaisen relevanssin löytääkseen.

Asiasanat: Fairclough, Norman; CDA; kriittinen diskurssianalyysi; diskurssin-tutkimus; tekstianalyysi; kielitiede; kriittinen teoria

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I. Introduction

Critical discourse analysis, or CDA for short, has become a popular branch of language studies over the last few decades since its inception. The approach, as its name indicates, combines a critical stance with analyses of language data at the level of discourse, thus bringing the social and political into linguistics. Many students find this appealing: from purely abstract dealings with language there is now a possibility to move to an approach that is problem-oriented and claims social and ethical relevance (Wodak & Meyer 2001).

One of the main driving forces behind CDA is the concept of emancipation. The idea is that a combination of linguistic analysis, social science, and political commitment can be used to expose and even repair many of the problems of today's society. Power and its abuses have been an especially prominent theme for critical discourse analysts, as language has become to be seen as an essential part of social studies (van Dijk 1990). Emancipation and the role of politics in academic endeavors are also contested issues that easily polarize opinions, and many academics have voiced strong criticisms against the project of CDA which they see as endangering scientific objectivity.

This is the starting point of this thesis. A relatively young academic approach with an ambitious objective has been the target of many critics, from various fields. The approach itself is likewise a multi-faceted phenomenon, drawing freely from many sources. In order to be effective, it has to be theoretically sound and especially critical of itself, something that I feel is not the case. This lack of "self-discipline" often

results in findings that do not offer any new insights into the studied phenomena, and leave the analyst feeling anything but emancipated.

To tackle this situation, I have set two aims for myself. The first is to analyze certain theoretical origins and premises of this approach, including major criticisms voiced against it. To achieve this, more has to be left out than included: due to the complex nature of CDA and its implicit and explicit multidisciplinary and "intertextual" nature, only one theoretician of the field is chosen for close analysis, namely Norman Fairclough. His selection should be justified by the fact that he has been involved with CDA ever since it came to being (Fairclough 1995), contributing tremendously.

The second aim is to see whether the theory and its criticisms can be in any way reconciled. Fairclough's model has had about two decades to evolve, and during that time has also received plenty of critical attention. Due to its interdisciplinary character, Faircloughian CDA and its critics draw from fields as diverse as linguistics, social theory, political science and philosophy in general, providing a wide range of problematic concepts and theoretical joints that can and should be discussed. I argue that from this extensive network of academic traditions there emerge a number of interesting topics that do not prove anyone right or wrong, but rather provide new directions for CDA.

In order to demonstrate this, I provide an analysis or a reading of a text. Due to the theoretical orientation of this thesis, no pre-existing methodology has been chosen to guide said reading. Instead, I will formulate certain principles from

the synthesis of Faircloughian CDA and its criticisms that retain their academic heritage while also adding something new. I will claim that by so doing the textual analysis inherent in CDA gains a new kind of validity that makes it more viable in today's world, even at the cost of analytic specificity.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: in section 2., Fairclough's model is outlined. Issues covered are grammar and text analysis, the concept of discourse, and theories of society. Most importantly, these various "levels" present in the model should be understood as a whole, which presents certain problems in itself. Section 3. covers various explicit criticisms that have been aimed at Fairclough, including issues of pragmatics, descriptive linguistics, analytical problems and aspects of discourse and the social. In section 4., I present my materials and method of analysis, as well as attempt a synthesis of the ideas of Fairclough and his critics. By formulating an understanding of CDA that takes into account both sides of the debate, I will have something new to say about linguistics, politics, text analysis, and society. In section 5. the actual analysis or reading takes place, and in 6. I attempt to bring together the various strands of this thesis, claiming that in order to emancipate, CDA has to be better aware of its theoretical limitations and possibilities.

2. Fairclough's model for CDA

The purpose of this section is to offer a comprehensive overview of the various aspects and components that constitute Faircloughian CDA. As was stated above, it is made up of three levels of analysis, all of which constitute a different set of theories and criticisms. While it is possible and even necessary to deal with each

level separately, it is also essential to bear in mind that the model, in its entirety, has to be understood as a whole. This means that not only the three levels of analysis, but also the points at which these levels come to contact and interact become meaningful and problematic, as they can hold the model together or cause it to fall apart.

I begin by looking at the textual level first, move on to discourse practice and the level of society and culture, and finally take a look at Fairclough's model as a whole.

2.1. The level of text analysis

The first level of doing Faircloughian critical discourse analysis is that which makes the model most relevant for students of language: linguistic analysis (i.e. description) of language and texts. While the model has, obviously, undergone changes and revisions over time, there are certain basic assumptions that have mostly remained unchanged and thus need to be outlined here.

First, there is the idea that the concept of *text* has to be understood broadly: it consists not only of language produced specifically in written form for the purpose of being read. While such "traditional" texts are of course good material for discourse analysts, they fail to capture the diversity of language in use. For this reason, Fairclough suggests that for example transcripts of spoken language and the various kinds of *semiosis* of advertising etc. be included in the definition of text, i.e. all relevant symbols that carry meaning (Fairclough 1989: 27-8, 1992: 4,

2003: 3). This echoes the recent view that *discourse* is not only language above the sentence but also and more so language in use (Cameron 2001).

Secondly, texts are seen as products of the process of discourse (Fairclough 1989: 24, 1992: 3). This places them in between actual text production and text reception/interpretation, giving the analyst an opportunity to "go back," as it were, from his own interpretation of a text to see what motivations or, especially in the case of CDA, social structures and practices have influenced its inception. The negotiation of the meaning(s) of a text is thus seen as an interplay between its production, the text itself, and its interpretation (Fairclough 2003: 10-11); or, to make a rough generalization, its context, linguistic forms, and whatever comments are possible to make about text reception and deemed necessary for the purposes of the research in question. Interestingly and understandably, the main focus of Faircloughian CDA seems to be on text and its production: the idea is not to analyze text reception but to determine what conditions of production resulted in certain properties of the text, i.e. linguistic forms.

This idea of doing linguistic analysis of texts to obtain relevant insights into the nature of society is the bread and butter of Faircloughian CDA: formal properties of texts are traces of production and serve as cues how to interpret these texts (Fairclough 1989: 24). In other words, texts are full of presuppositions, implicit or explicit world views and so on and so forth, or, to use Fairclough's word of choice, they are *ideological* (Fairclough 2003: 9). The question thus becomes, how do we, as analysts, find what kind of ideological work a particular text does? What linguistic properties must we analyze in order to reveal their hidden agenda?

The answers to these seemingly innocent and straightforward questions are, in fact, far from simple. In the first place, Fairclough himself has not been able to compose a comprehensive checklist for linguistic features that are always relevant, despite his best efforts. For this reason no such exhaustive account can be given here, but instead I will briefly outline the direction his work has taken in this regard: in the earlier stages, Fairclough was probably more concerned with developing his theory, and methodology was somewhat preliminary as a consequence. Thus, Fairclough 1989 gives us ten features to work with, dealing with vocabulary, grammar, and text (110-2), whereas in Fairclough 2003 we find a list of almost forty such properties (191-4). More interesting than lists of linguistic features, however, is the fact that there has been a shift from highly detailed formal analysis towards concepts such as intertextuality (Fairclough 1992), genre (Fairclough 2003), and transdisciplinarity (Fairclough 2005). Linguistic analysis is still present, justifying this discussion, but the main focus is now elsewhere.

The second reason why I cannot simply list the means by which ideology can be uncovered in texts has to do with the fact that, as Fairclough himself points out, the findings of any particular study depend on the perspective of analysis (2003: 16). The diversification and deepening of theories related to CDA reflects this: instead of having a methodology set in stone, the analyst must choose whatever seems relevant to the particular "problem" at hand (Wodak & Meyer 2001).

There is, however, one more strictly grammatical approach that has influenced Fairclough's work quite heavily and for this reason has to be included here. It also gives good insight into the basic premise of CDA that was mentioned above:

linguistic structures can be analyzed to find out about what has influenced them. This is a central idea of all critical discourse analysis, and as such will be outlined next.

2.1.1. Halliday's systemic-functional grammar

As the name *systemic-functional* implies, Hallidayan grammar consists of two parts: the systemic view of language, and a functional approach to explaining why actual language in use consists of the grammatical forms that it does (Halliday 1973: 51; 1985: xiv). These two obviously go together, but are here dealt with separately, at least initially; the systemic approach is thus first.

The view of language as a system is, at least on the surface of it, rather straightforward. It means that a language should be seen as a set or network of options, various grammatical structures that can be chosen from by the user (Halliday 1985: xiv). In other words, the system of a language is choices or resources for making meaning, and the user selects whatever structures are needed to accomplish that which is desired (Halliday 1985: xxvii). From this notion of language as meaning potential that becomes realized in use it is possible to move on to the concept of functionality, which requires somewhat more elaboration.

Halliday begins his account of functionality from the language of children. He claims that for a child language is first and foremost a rich instrument for the realization of intentions (1973: 10-11), or, to put it more simply, a means of getting things done. In the first place, this is simply a matter of satisfying whatever needs

the child might have, but is later broadened to include more, and less material, functions: Halliday identifies seven of these (1973: 11-16). In this way the meaning of language is broadened from just pure representation of the world to include purposes, functions, and contexts, finding their realization in the various forms of grammar (Halliday 1973: 18, 20). The structure or system, i.e. grammar, of a language is therefore determined by what functions that language has evolved to serve, and the question becomes how are these functions expressed by various forms (Halliday 1973: 7; 1985: xiv).

This applies to the language of adults as well, only with certain modifications. As we grow up, claims Halliday, the simple *protolinguistic* strategy of expressing meaning (most likely a material need) directly by whatever utterance seems to work becomes insufficient. This reflects the development of abstract thinking: we first become aware of words as representation, then as abstractions and finally as metaphor, and it is because of this complication that we mediate the link between expression and meaning by *wordings*, or in other words lexico-grammar. (Halliday 1985: xvii-xviii)

What remain, however, in the language of adults as well, are the functions served by language, only now in a more complex form due to the above-mentioned lexico-grammatical abstraction. These *macro-functions* are the ideational, interpersonal and textual, reflecting the purposes of language as expressing own experience, interacting socially and composing linguistic messages or texts (Halliday 1973: 37-42).

As was mentioned above, these functions are reflected in the grammar of a language, or, as Halliday himself puts it, "language is as it is because of what it has

to do” (1973: 34). And herein lies the importance of systemic-functional thinking for Faircloughian CDA: if the linguistic forms of language are so closely tied to its functions, which are learned social behaviour (Halliday 1973: 23-4), then an analysis of language in use (i.e. text or discourse) yields information about the society by which the functions have been handed down. In discourse analysis, this grammatical ”groundwork” is supplemented by interpretation at the level of social theory to attain whatever goals the analyst has set for herself (so for Fairclough exposing ideology and inequality in relations of power). An understanding of the functional language system is the base, however, as it enables a decoding of semantics that manifests itself in the various grammatical features of the language in question. In this way, discourse becomes not only the product of this system but also a process of the system ”in action,” so to speak (Halliday 1985: xvi-xvii, xxii-xxiii).

2.2. The level of discourse/social practice

As the theory moves up to the second, intermediary level, there can be identified a definite deepening and complication of concepts. This has to do with the fact that in Fairclough’s model this level of discourse or social practice attempts to ”bridge the gap” between pure linguistics or text analysis and society, an undertaking that has to be commended for its fearlessness. Linguistic or grammatical analysis might be rather straightforward, even in all its complexity, whereas here the analyst has to constantly negotiate the borders with both the lower and the higher level of the model, resulting in a kind of ”fuzziness” at times. There are, however, certain

central and relatively unchanged concepts in Fairclough's model, at this level too, that are outlined next.

To begin with, the concept of *discourse practice* itself requires attention, and one has to move up to the societal level to make sense of it. For Fairclough, like many others, society is organized as three levels: the highest is that of social structures, followed by the level of social practices, and social events or situations being the lowest (2003: 23-4). The first level of "deep" structures operates as a network of choices, setting the potential for what is possible and what is not in a particular society, the level of social practices is the various institutions (i.e. political, spiritual, educational, familial etc.) of that society that limit and constrain what potential becomes actualized, and social events or situations are then the concrete manifestations of the actualized potentials. These might be congressional hearings, church services, examinations and family dinners, for example; Fairclough does not go into much detail here but the general idea is relatively clear.

From the stereotypical examples given above one can then move back into the realm of language. As all such social events have a linguistic dimension to them, and as all of them are results of the higher levels of social organization, so Fairclough generalizes language use on corresponding levels as well. Thus, language itself becomes the structure of meaning potential, discourse practice assumes the place of social practice and actual texts, in the broad sense outlined earlier, become the realizations of these potentials as actual language in use (Fairclough 2003: 23-4). Discourse practice can also be called an *order of discourse*, a term coined by Michel

Foucault; his ideas however operate on a level even more abstract than this and as such will be looked into at a later stage.

To reiterate, Fairclough's discourse practice is the discursive side of a social order (1989: 29), action as well as representation (1992: 63-4), discursive processes as parts of social practices (1992: 80) and a social ordering of linguistic variation (2003: 24). The point that these different definitions all try to make is that both discourse and discourses are socially determined: their production, distribution and consumption are all socially influenced. In the case of production, a text is always produced in a certain environment for certain purposes; in the case of distribution, there always has to be a medium and an audience; in the case of consumption, a text is read in a certain situation (Fairclough 1989: 24; 1992: 71-2, 78-80). Furthermore, all actions, linguistic or not, have a human component: it is people who produce and interpret texts, and, as is generally agreed, people's ways of acting, thinking and viewing the world and reality itself are at least partly conditioned by social factors.

What has been said above is, as was mentioned, related to the third, higher level of Fairclough's model in the sense that it attempts to link the structures and practices of society to the structures and practices of discourse. What has not been touched upon yet is the relationship between actual texts and discourse practices, or how the first level of the model is related to the second. As I move on to do that, I have again adopted a roughly chronological approach, moving from Fairclough's earlier work to more recent and identifying changes and consistencies. This has more to do with actual analysis of texts as parts of discourse practices, or the linguistic

dimension of social practices, but again the complexity of issues dealt with here make such generalizations more useful for orientational purposes rather than actually demarcating a specific domain for discussion.

In his earlier work, Fairclough's approach to this second level of CDA is rather straightforward: language is discourse, which is determined by orders of discourse (or discourse practices of institutions), and involves *members' resources* (the cognitive environment of individuals, MR for short) in production and interpretation and which are likewise socially construed, at least to a certain extent. Furthermore, these discourse practices are in a dialectical relationship with actual language use: although social structures and orders of discourse determine actual discourses, their nature as language in use also leaves room for individual creativity and struggle (Fairclough 1989: 17-20, 24-5, 30-1, 37-8). In interpretation, which is what this stage is concerned with, the analyst should then look at the production and interpretation of texts in the context of the relevant discourse(s) and participants' MR (Fairclough 1989: 140-1). Fairclough provides a six-level, "black box" model that relies heavily on MR to help the analyst determine which MR are drawn upon to interpret a particular text and its context, which results in the text being then assigned to a certain discourse, which in turn tells the participants how to interact or interpret the text (Fairclough 1989: 142-6). *Discourse types* are essential here: by linguistic analysis one can identify which elements have been drawn upon in constituting a certain discourse, for example conversation or interview (Fairclough 1989: 30-1, 162).

In more recent work, there is a shift towards an approach more dynamic and historical, which focuses on changes in discourse types and processes as reflecting changes in society (Fairclough 1992: 35-6). Here the discourse types that were mentioned above rise to prominence, only now under the term *intertextuality*, referring to the production of new texts, genres and discourses by combining existing ones in ways that either maintain or challenge existing configurations of power in society (Fairclough 1992: 102-3). Of these aspects of intertextuality, genre becomes central to Fairclough's theorizing: this is because it can be understood as not only a certain text type, but also as having particular ways of production, consumption and distribution (Fairclough 1992: 125-6). For example, the discourse of news can be understood in terms of genre as having certain linguistic features that are relatively easy to distinguish, but also as being distributed by distinct means (e.g. broadcasting or in newspaper form) and consumed in certain contexts and according to certain presuppositions (e.g. news as "objective"). Thus, it is possible to arrive at a better definition of discourse practice or order of discourse than that given earlier in this section: orders of discourse can be seen as societies or institutions with certain systems of genres in particular relationships with each other (Fairclough 1992: 126). As the order of discourse changes, for example due to changes in the structures of society, so do the genres and their relations, giving the analyst an opportunity to gain insights into the nature of these changes by looking at the manifestations of intertextuality, i.e. texts (cf. Fairclough 2003: 34-5, 39-61, 65-7).

What follows next is a short peek into that which has occupied much of Fairclough's thinking recently, namely the ideas of genre and intertextuality as the essentials

of discourse practice. These ideas come mainly from Mikhail Bakhtin, and, interestingly enough, are also applicable to criticizing Faircloughian CDA as well as supporting it. For this reason they will come up again in section 3..

2.2.1. Bakhtin's genres and intertextuality

For Bakhtin, all the diverse spheres of human activity involve language. Language in use, or *utterances*, consist of content, style and structure, which are largely determined by the particular sphere within which that language is used. These utterances associated with a particular sphere Bakhtin labels *speech genres*, which are outlined as complex and extremely heterogeneous constructs, and for this reason are hard to define. At this point, it suffices to say that utterances consist of simple or *primary* genres, which may or may not be absorbed into complex or *secondary* genres. As an example we could think for example about casual conversation: it exist in itself, as a primary genre, but also for example in fiction as part of and subsumed into the complex genre of literature (Bakhtin 1986: 60-2).

As for intertextuality, the basic idea here is that not one linguistic feature enters a language without going through the long pattern of generic modification or testing, as Bakhtin himself puts it (1986: 65). In other words, all utterances are responses to other utterances, and all that has been heard and understood surfaces in the hearer's own language use at some point, in some shape or form. This applies to secondary genres as well as primary ones: words or ideas in casual conversation spread and re-emerge, as do the ideas and complex thoughts in scientific writing (or discourse). Thus all utterances, whether spoken or written, simple or complicated,

transient or recorded, are seen as links in a chain that respond to previous utterances and predict (or hope for) future ones (Bakhtin 1986: 68-9, 75-6, 93-4).

The relevance of such ideas for Fairclough's model for CDA is roughly as follows: first, there are genres, constructs or "building blocks" of language as social practice that can be used to join language together with other narrowly social or broadly human practices and activities. By so doing it is made possible to even use ideas such as language as social practice in the first place: if language is associated with and even determined by certain spheres of human activity, then it must be concluded that human existence, i.e. society, is in fact at least partly discursive or, to be more specific, linguistic. Secondly, the concept of intertextuality lends credibility to the idea that discourse (in this case in the guise of genres) is socially constructive. Because all language is built on past utterances and gives life to new ones, then those (orders of) discourse or genres that manifest themselves at a society's level of discourse practice must contain within them a certain real past and also a possible future. Thus, for Fairclough, language is both a social practice and socially constructive.

2.3. The level of society/social theory

As the student of CDA moves up to the third and highest level of Fairclough's model, it quickly becomes quite clear that another dimension has been entered. Here is no room for discussions about language as linguistic structures or even as genres related to certain social situations, but instead one finds concepts that deal with politics, power, and other structures of human society. While this seems to be

irrelevant to language studies, there can be no holding back: one must boldly enter this realm, for it determines so much of what Faircloughian CDA entails.

All romanticism aside, this section is organized as follows: first, I will give a brief account of the field of social theory itself to contextualize the debate. I will then attempt to pinpoint Fairclough's location on this field in conjunction with discussion of the relevant theories, namely Marxism and Foucault's discursive view.

2.3.1. Structure vs. agency in social theory

According to Jones (2003), the field of social theory can be divided into three categories that include various thinkers and theories: structural-consensus theory, structural-conflict theory, and action theory. Theorists in the first category maintain that the rules, norms, and structures of society have come to being in order to facilitate peaceful co-existence. The core values of any given society are geared for this ultimate purpose and are built and spread by various socializing institutions, such as family and education. In other words, the structures of society determine us (at least to a certain extent), and they should: shared roles and norms make society possible in the first place (Jones 2003: 6-10).

Structural-conflict theorists share one crucial aspect of consensus theory: structures of society have tremendous influence upon us. However, in conflict theory these structures are not in place because they benefit all members of society, but instead because they maintain an unequal distribution of advantage

and the resulting relationship of conflict or dominance between certain segments of society. Socialization is thus aimed at maintaining this inequality, and, if for example education fails, force takes its place (Jones 2003: 11-14). Marxism is the best known example of conflict theory.

The final category, that of action theory, takes a different approach. Instead of claiming that societal structures completely determine individuals, it is claimed that individuals, when engaging in various activities and interacting with each other, shape and create the structures of their society. Furthermore, this action is intentional and based on individual or collective interpretation of surroundings, which means that social reality is what it is perceived to be (Jones 2003: 17-21). In terms of theory, this means that the nature of society cannot be reduced to structures that can only be identified correctly by enlightened (Marxist) theorists; instead, the human agent is recognized and even empowered. Such post-structural thinking is (somewhat) typical of Foucault.

2.3.2. Fairclough's social theoretical position

To determine where Fairclough stands in terms of social theory, I will refer mostly to Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999), as it offers the most comprehensive overview of the various influences that have affected his theory. I will attempt to keep in mind the discussion above about the overall field of social theory, but also look at individual theories in more detail, if the situation calls for it.

In earlier work, Fairclough explicitly identifies Marxism as a main influence (1992: 5-6). Later it has been reduced somewhat, to the status of just one theory among others, but it is still quite heavily present, implicitly at least. This is reflected in the fact that Fairclough puts quite a lot of emphasis on the structures of society, and in true structural-conflict manner sees them as sustaining the inherently unequal distribution of advantage in a capitalist system. For example, concepts such as ideology, a new nature of work, or colonization are all derived from Marxism, if not in its classical form: instead of claiming that the economic base determines the superstructure, there is a shift towards emphasizing the role of the superstructure as the locus of struggle for domination (Jones 2003: 72-6). Gramsci's *hegemony*, a mainstay in Fairclough's writing, is likewise a redefinition of the relationship between the base and the superstructure.

The other important social theoretical foundation of Faircloughian CDA is of course Foucault, whose concept of discourse is difficult to pass by when dealing with discourse analysis that claims to have social relevance. It is necessary here to go into some detail about Foucault's ideas, on the one hand because his work is considerably more obscure and less known than Marxism, on the other because many important points will emerge that have import on Fairclough's CDA.

First, Foucault is what Jones (2003: 124) calls a "sociologist of the body," referring to the fact that much of his work deals with the way modern (as opposed to medieval or postmodern) Western societies have turned the physical body of the individual into an object of scrutiny and control. For example, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault traces the history of the prison system, which in turn reveals another

important aspect that is central to his studies: history, or the genealogy of ideas. In other words, Foucault is interested in how certain ideas have come to being at a certain point in time, and how these ideas have influenced the lives of the people that have been affected by them. The prison system mentioned above is one very concrete example of how ideas of punishment have been applied to prisoners, but modern medicine is perhaps a better known and more illuminating example of this *bio-power*: in *The Birth of the Clinic* Foucault demonstrates how medicine is comparable to incarceration in the sense that in both discourses power is applied to subjects, in order to control not only their environment but also their ideas of who they are.

Secondly, there is the idea of discourse. Above, it was used in conjunction with the prison and the hospital, reflecting the fact that Foucault is a historian: he has to rely on documents to construct an order of discourse, whether it relates to truth, science or, indeed, prisons and hospitals. The idea of discourse, however, has broader social theoretical relevance as well: as Rabinow (1984: 12-14) points out, for Foucault all concepts (madness, truth, justice, good society etc.) are discursive, and for this reason they become questions of politics and power. This is precisely how Jones understands post-structuralism as well: discourses, or what is perceived to be for example healthy or right, are analogous to languages in the sense that they determine how we see reality, and talk or think about it. Because of this, the discursive practice (i.e. discourse in conjunction with concrete activities) that is the dominant one constrains our knowledge, or in other words determines what we can or cannot talk about (2003: 125-6; 145-6). Thus, social change is no longer a matter of replacing unjust (e.g. neoliberal) practices with just (e.g. leftist) practices

or replacing a "bad" president with a "good" one, but an emergence of new discourses and discourse practices in different power relations (Jones 2003: 147-8).

Finally, it is possible to sum up Fairclough's view of society and its relevance to CDA. This is perhaps done best by using the concept of *critical social science*, which, according to Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999: 30), is the study of the dialectic between objective structures and subjective practices. Here one can sense echoes of both structural-conflict and action theory, in the sense that instead of resorting to the outdated classical Marxist view of society as two-tiered and economically determined or without giving individuals all the power over their lives, there is recognition of both. In other words, Fairclough optimistically thinks that people can in fact influence their lives for the better, but also is aware of the fact that structures of political institutions, ownership, economics, labour and so forth have a real impact on us as members of societies.

2.4. Summary

Before moving on to section 3., I will offer a brief summary of Fairclough's model for CDA, and present my own observations about it. Beginning from the highest level of theory, the fundamental factor here is discursivity. Because society or even reality can be seen as analogous to language, it can also be analysed and changed linguistically. In between the discourses of society and existence and actual texts there are practices, the generic and specific institutions and situations that produce and reproduce the various discourses that either maintain or aim to change the power relations between people and segments of society. Finally, texts can be

analysed as specific instances of these discourses, using the enormous range of linguistic tools available to us in order to make a difference in the eternal struggle of discourses.

On the surface of it, this model is self-sufficient and whole. All of the three levels are logically linked, and are based on existing theories: on the linguistic level there is Hallidayan grammar, on the discursal level Bakhtin's ideas and the social variation of language in use, and on the social level we find an understanding of society that combines the major currents of political science instead of rigidly favouring one over the other. However, I have identified certain problematic issues in all of the above and discuss them next.

First, Hallidayan grammar says very little about how society or a hegemonic ideology influences our grammar. Instead, it presents a theory about how children learn to express cognitively more complicated ideas linguistically, and how adults' language use can be categorized under three macro-functions. As such it is perfectly fine, but its application in social or political scientific analyses seems limited, which might be why Fairclough moved to discuss genre and intertextuality.

This leads to the second problem. While the sociolinguistically and generically inspired view of language in society, especially as reflecting changes, is promising, it does not do much in terms of actual analysis. This seems to be so because even if changes in discourses are linguistically identified, the actual explanations for these changes have to come from social theory. The production of new genres that can be noticed by analyzing texts should probably be understood as a social phenomenon,

not linguistic: Fairclough understands individual freedom as the ability to produce new discourses from existing genres, but such power is almost negligible. After all, I can spend the rest of my life creating new subversive discourses without making any significant difference, and, in the worst case scenario, I will receive a first hand demonstration of tangible power when the police lock me up. At the very least, the conditions of production of any particular text that is analyzed should be examined much more rigorously; it hardly suffices to say that advertisements are the way they are because neoliberalism is the “dominant ideology,” contaminating all aspects of society. Foucault claims that everything is a question of power, including our individual freedom, and power has to be understood as a social phenomenon instead of linguistic.

Finally, Fairclough’s view of society is problematic in two ways: first, he sees it as analogous to language. Because of this, there has to exist an abstract “deep structure” beyond the institutions and other manifestations of said structure, but the existence of which cannot really be observed. I would suggest that the manifestations themselves should be the object of analysis and whatever lies behind them should not be *a priori* assumed. Second, he deals with society in terms of a Marxist discourse, by which I mean emphasizing ideology and the conflict between oppressive structures and oppressed people. This is especially problematic because Fairclough wants to emancipate, but Marxism has become almost synonymous with failed revolutions. I suggest that a new view of society is needed, one which does not insist on seeing everything in terms of struggle against unequal structures of power or as ideological.

Such is the patchwork, drawing from philosophy, sociology, politics and linguistics. On this scale of ambition opportunities for criticisms and difficult questions are numerous, and it is to these that I now turn my attention.

3. Criticisms of Faircloughian CDA

The situation with Fairclough's model might be such that a coherent picture can be difficult to sketch, but as I move on to dealing with its critics and their ideas, the situation does not get any easier. On the contrary, actually: when thinkers from all the various fields mentioned above start to make inroads into CDA from within their own discipline, and without any concern for the integrity of Fairclough's model, a wide range of new concepts and viewpoints emerge. The resulting network is very nebulous in nature, and as a result no specific or conclusive taxonomy can be offered.

3.1. The Widdowson-Fairclough debate

Critics with at least some background in linguistics commonly begin their explorations by drawing attention to the concept of discourse itself. This has to do with the fact that the concepts of discourse and discourse analysis can mean two different things: first, there is the sense of *language above the sentence*, and its analysis by extending the means of traditional, descriptive linguistics. The second sense refers to the idea of discourse as coined by Foucault, namely as means for doing social analysis.

This is the starting point for Widdowson as well. When reviewing Fairclough's work, he points out that Fairclough attempts to combine these two senses of discourse, the sociological and the uses of language, but fails because he has to resort to fiat in the absence of any solid scientific argument (Widdowson 1995a: 510-1). Of course, this criticism is aimed at one single work and its shortcomings, but Widdowson builds on this in later writings by introducing pragmatics into the debate.

Thus, in Widdowson (1995b: 160), the point is made that discourse analysis was originally the study of formal regularities in combinations of sentences. This view, however, results in confusion between the concepts of text and discourse, because units of language that are clearly "below" the sentence, such as the letters "WC" on a door, obviously carry meaning as well. While pointing this out might seem like splitting hairs, Widdowson insists that it is much more: a text becomes discourse with the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation, when the social context of semiosis is activated by linguistic symbols (1995b: 161-4). As a result, the meanings any one receiver finds in a text are not necessarily the meanings that the author or sender of the text wanted to be found there. Widdowson continues by pointing out that the *perlocutionary effect* of a text is hard to determine, because it involves personal issues of values, identities, and so forth, whereas reference (locution) and force (illocution) are usually socially shared. Because of this, the full meaning of a text can never be decided: the discourses we construct in reading a text are, at least to a certain extent, individual (Widdowson 1995b: 164-5).

What Widdowson argues, is, eventually, that critical discourse analysis is in fact not analysis. If a text can be studied to either describe the system of a language or to find evidence for language use as social action, then Fairclough's project of explaining social inequalities as something to be found in texts instead of pragmatically negotiated discourses is unfounded. For Widdowson, analysis should attempt to explain the various interpretations that are possible in a text, not insist on an ideological position as uncovering any final truths (Widdowson 1995b: 166-9). To all this, Fairclough in turn has the following to say: the point of interpretation in CDA is to make meaning from and with texts, and the explanatory stage then looks at connections between both text and interpretation, and between the social and cultural properties of the context in which this interpretation takes place (Fairclough 1996: 49-50). This does result in admittedly political analysis, but ideology cannot be escaped, not even by resorting to science, which is likewise an ideological position. Furthermore, pragmatics seems to suggest that people and their contexts are outside of discourse and as such not necessarily socially constructed, something that would (wrongly) disconnect language from the social (Fairclough 1996: 52-4).

In Fairclough's defense, it has to be said that the idea of bringing the social into processes of interpretation and pointing out that science is not necessarily any more right than any other ideological view of the world are both valid points. However, it seems that Widdowson has the last word here: he argues that, first, the idea of discursively constituted subjects is an abstraction. People are not made of language only, and retain some degree of freedom because social and linguistic constraints not only limit the range of possibilities but also create the space in which social and

linguistic activities are possible (Widdowson 1996: 58-9). Secondly, the concept of explanation offered by Fairclough does nothing but preconceive the existence of separate discourses that belong to certain social groups, and then “prove” this by describing texts linguistically, from the same preconceived position. At the very least, says Widdowson, this should be called interpretation and not analysis (1996: 66-7).

3.2. Inadequacies of descriptive linguistics

The idea that language has a system that operates according to laws of its own is an old one; so too is the notion that its rules can be listed and described, with reasonable accuracy. This view considers language in use to be manifestations of those rules and laws in operation through the hapless language user, who may or may not have power over the way in which he utters the particular sounds. This view is also what Jones (2007: 338) calls “segregational” because it forces apart the system and its manifestations, the *langue* and the *parole*. For him, such an understanding of language can never claim to have any critical purchase over it, and because of this CDA is a failed project.

Jones’ view is derived from the idea that communicative acts always involve certain individuals engaging each other over certain matters, and constantly critically evaluating the utterances of others (2007: 341). In other words, the production and reception of language is human and individual, and communication is behaviour by individual human beings towards other human beings. Because of this, communication is subject to broad moral evaluations, and, perhaps more

importantly, subject to continuous judgements about its accuracy, truth value, etc. by the people involved in the communication. This is where traditional linguistics break down: analyzing the system of a language cannot tell us about how accurately an utterance describes something or whether it is true or false in the current context; these things are beyond linguistics, there is no fixed correlation between observable behaviour and particular meaning (Jones 2007: 346-9). As such, relevant criticism of anything requires knowledge of the subject matter, not of linguistics.

Jones' view is supported by Bakhtin (1986) and Blommaert (2005). The first, as was mentioned earlier, was concerned with issues of genre and intertextuality, lending mental ammunition to Fairclough, and the latter points out that linguistics does not have any monopoly on meaning and is ill-equipped to deal with absences in and events before or after actual discourse (Blommaert 2005: 34-5). This is straightforward enough, but Bakhtin's ideas deserve more attention; a quote might indicate why: "[a] purely linguistic (and purely discrete) description and definition of various styles within a single work cannot reveal their semantic (including artistic) interrelation" (Bakhtin 1986: 112). And another: "[i]ndividual signs, the language system, or the text can never be true, false, beautiful, and so forth" (Bakhtin 1986: 123-4). This is a direct stab at Fairclough's assumption that it is possible to evaluate the inequalities and power relations in a society by linguistically describing its texts, and something that he seems to have missed completely. Bakhtin is talking about aesthetic evaluation here, but all of this is applicable to for example social criticism as well: the shortcomings of an economic, political, or even patriarchal system cannot be linguistically exposed or repaired.

3.3. Analytic redundancy

This particular criticism is noted by Widdowson (1996) and Blommaert (2005). The former, as was mentioned in 3.1., has to do with the idea of preconception, or the pre-analytic assumption about the nature of society, ideology, and their existence in texts. Fairclough is offering, as he mentions, leftist analysis that sets out to expose the inequalities inherent in the current capitalist system and manifest in the texts that are under scrutiny. For Widdowson, such an endeavour is not analysis, but interpretation and an imposition of a presumed “truth” on texts that supposedly obscure this reality by means of ideology. There is more here, however, than just argument about what is analysis and what is not: one issue is the nature of Marxist theories, which will be looked at later, and the other is discussed by Blommaert.

For him, the presence of what he calls “symptomatic analysis” is not an issue of science and objectivity versus politics and interpretation, but one of neglecting context and failing to understand its full reach. Blommaert argues that context in CDA is usually very limited and naive, and also *a priori* assumed. This then leads to simplified models and thus analyses that do not seem to have anything more to say after they are conducted than they did before (Blommaert 2005: 50-3). Without going into much detail about Blommaert’s extensive dealings with context, he does however seem to advocate an approach that would result neither in the analyst as the owner of a final truth, nor in a “Widdowsonian” insistence in making the participants of communication and their interpretations as the favoured party. Instead, a *re-entextualization* of, for example, a conversation transcript as an

object of study would be valuable in itself, as a new discourse of the “same” text (Blommaert 2005: 53-7).

3.4. The concept of discourse

The ambivalence inherent in the concept of discourse itself is, as has been mentioned in passing, due to the fact it has been used in applied linguistics to refer to samples of language larger than single sentences, and in a broader sociological and philosophical sense to refer to the ideas of Foucault. Pennycook (1994: 115-6) frames the issue in different terms: the first meaning of discourse refers to language as a system, the uses of which can be explained by the immediate context of the text/discourse itself, and the other to meanings produced by socio-cultural factors and realized in language. CDA attempts to put these two senses together by expanding the notion of context, and by analyzing discourse as both “chunks” of language in use, and as one socially determined social practice among others. According to Pennycook, this leads to trouble because the explanations put forward tend to assume a Marxist truth and clarity that is obscured by ideology, and because no language can escape its inherently ideological nature (1994: 121-6).

Pennycook goes on to suggest a “different” reading of Foucault from that of e.g. Fairclough. Whereas the latter seems to understand discourse as a linguistic phenomenon that is separated from ideology and only constraining instead of being constitutive as well, Pennycook (correctly) sees it as systems of power/knowledge, linguistic and others, within which we assume subject positions and which create as well as limit our possibilities (1994: 128). Seen this way, discourses emerge from

a multitude of sources, not just economics or political debates between the left and right, and even constitute that which can be seen as “right” or “wrong.” Meaning, then, including that which Fairclough uncovers by his interpretation/analysis of texts, is not produced by free individuals or economic structures of domination, but by a range of systems and institutions that both create and constrain (ibid.). Textual meaning cannot thus be said to exist in either form or context, but in discourse itself, which derives its meaning-inducing capabilities from the various sources mentioned previously. The meaning we read into a text is, in other words, not “our” meaning, but the range of meanings that are discursively possible (Pennycook 1994: 128-30). Pennycook concludes by applauding CDA’s commitment to social context, but sees as wrong the assumption that some absolute reality exists behind a distorting screen of language. A more fruitful object of study would be the mechanisms of how meanings are produced in discourses (Pennycook 1994: 133).

The concept of power/knowledge mentioned above is in itself a worthy object of attention, but not something that I can go into in much detail. I begin my brief exploration with a lengthy quote:

Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows,

the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. *In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, (...) but power-knowledge, (...) that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.* (Foucault 1977: 27-8, emphasis added)

Keeping in mind the argument made by Pennycook above, the significance of Foucault's power/knowledge and other ideas can be roughly paraphrased as follows: what matters is not that which is hidden or left unsaid, but that which "is there." Fairclough begins with the assumption that his purpose is to defend the powerless, and he does so by relying on linguistics to prove his point. The problem is, as was discussed above, that linguistics does not expose or right social wrongs, so Fairclough has to choose a political stance. This stance is however external to actual analysis and unaffected by it, and can only be justified by making the point that everything is equally biased. This then results in a lack of emancipatory potential which could be overcome by understanding the constitutive essence of discourse and analyzing the object which is in and by discourse constituted.

3.5. The importance of being critical

Discussing the philosophical origins of the various critical sciences, Hammersley points out that the term *critical* came into being in the USA, as an euphemism for taboo Marxism (1997: 240). As a direct result, the critical theorists of the early 20th century maintained that the good society is a socialist society, and that such a society is inevitable as it emerges from the mechanisms of history and social organization themselves. Without criticizing such an obviously problematic

statement in any detail, it should suffice to point out that a socialist/Marxist/leftist ideology is no more neutral or apolitical than any other, and thus a Marxist CDA is no more neutral or no better positioned to clear the distorting haze of ideology than any other “committed” approach. The point is that critical science allows for evaluation, as opposed to the purely descriptive/objective stance of “traditional” science.

Critical Marxism is thus one of the foundations of CDA, and, according to Hammersley (1997), *decisionism* and Habermas’ *universal pragmatics* are the two others. The first refers to the impossibility of justifying values, claiming that they are always a matter of individual choice and involve a “leap of faith,” as opposed to the “inevitability” of Marxist thinking (Hammersley 1997: 242-3). Habermas’ idea on the other hand is based on the assumption that communication is more fundamental in modern societies than labour, and thus politics should be governed by rules that would aim at agreement in an “ideal speech situation” (Hammersley 1997: 243-4). In other words, there seems to be in Habermas’ framework a philosopher-king of sorts who would codify the norms of discourse, ruling that there must always be an ideal speech situation in which all interaction is aimed at agreement. This appears to be pure philosophical abstraction that has little practical import, and is based more on imagined concepts rather than anything observed. As such, I will not consider this theory any further, but decisionism does deserve further discussion.

The criticism against decisionism presented in Hammersley (1997: 243) is based on the idea that freely choosing the values one would accept must result in either

"objectionable" politics or a political "quietism." When any commitment is allowed to govern research, then all commitments must be understood as equally irrational. This results in impossibility of rational politics advocated by Habermas and undercuts emancipatory claims by preventing their rational justification and dissemination. In politics, this would mean that the only way to justify certain views would be to coerce and manipulate those who do not share those views. Foucault is mentioned in Hammersley as embodying these problems: if there are only different power-knowledge relations instead of more and less oppressive power-knowledge relations, then there can be no reason to demand change (1997: 243).

There are a few interesting points here that may not have any direct influence on the main points of this study, but I will nonetheless take this opportunity to address them briefly. First, the assumption that manipulation or coercion should have no place in politics is false. By definition, politics always includes (but is not limited to) the attempt to achieve desired outcomes through whatever means are necessary (Heywood 2007: 11). This requires influencing others to a certain extent, even if coercion is fortunately relatively rare. Secondly, the claim that there can be no emancipation or reason for change if all political or ideological means of government are seen as equal is, likewise, completely false. On the contrary, I would argue: Foucault's idea of liberation is much more profound and far-reaching, as it does not claim to free us from some "wrong" or "oppressive" system of exercising power by replacing our leaders with others from the opposite end of an ideological spectrum, but shows how all political systems are using power over someone. By realizing this it becomes obvious that it is not capitalism or socialism that we must

overcome, but our eternal struggle for power, or, in other words, politics. This revelation might make one understand that there is no fundamental imperative in human beings to control or dominate, whether it is aimed at our conversational partners, nation-states, social classes, ethnic groups, nature and so on and so forth. Emancipation would then emerge from the realization that we, as individuals, can choose not to dominate or exercise power over others, and the basic "ideology" behind this change would be awareness of facts and empathy. To use Bakhtin's terminology, a certain appreciation and recognition of the other, or expansion of consciousness in dialogue is the key, not monologic top-down systems of objective science or politics (1984). When we realize, as Foucault did, that everyone and everything has a (social) history and a (social) context, we can begin to understand people and phenomena better, without the need to fight them as the perpetually threatening other. For him, the concept of ideology that is central in Fairclough's work is problematic precisely because it has to stand in opposition to something and is artificially separated from concrete and quantifiable manifestations of a system of social organization (Foucault 1980: 118).

3.6. Analytical shortcomings

In 1990, in the first editorial of the journal *Discourse and Society*, Teun van Dijk called for systematic and explicit discourse analysis based on serious methods (van Dijk 1990). In 1997, his wish had not come true: instead, commentary based on "common-sense" assumptions and a sense of "anything goes" were pervasive, especially among the more socially oriented analysts (van Dijk 1997). These analytical problems are reviewed in an article co-authored by Michael Billig

(Antaki et al. 2003) , in which six discourse analytical shortcomings are identified. The starting point is social scientific, and the aim to demonstrate that qualitative analyses should follow the same principles as quantitative analyses.

The first problem is called *under-analysis through summary*. Antaki et al. (2003) point out that providing a prose summary of the discourse under analysis or listing its main themes does not qualify as analysis. At best, summary can point the way for analysis, but even then runs the risk of over-simplifying and even changing the object of analysis before actual analysis takes place. For example, this could mean assigning beliefs or policies to a text or transcript or its sender/producer, effectively and almost off-handedly skewing analysis.

Under-analysis through taking sides refers to the phenomenon of the analyst offering his own moral or political stance towards the summarized data (Antaki et al. 2003). This can take the shape of sympathizing with the powerless or critically distancing from the powerful, but in either case can easily flatten the complexity of human discourse, especially if not accompanied by careful analysis. Antaki et al. (2003) also point out that they are in disagreement as to whether analysts should take positions in general, but emphasize that if aligning oneself with the material becomes primary then analysis is bound to suffer.

The third shortcoming is the opposite of summary, namely *under-analysis through over- and isolated quotation* (Antaki et al. 2003). Where summary does not take the text into account, over- and isolated quotation fails to go beyond the text: in the former case, a list of quotations is compiled from the text to defend a single

observation the analyst has made, and in the latter case a single quote is taken as proof of some observation. Quotes are fine as examples, but negligence of the textual context as a whole can seriously harm analysis.

The fourth problem is more abstract. Discussing analytic usefulness, Antaki et al. (2003) say that compiling quotes can be called analysis if they are used as evidence of socially shared “discourses” or “ideologies.” Examples are not simply pointed out, but serve as evidence of shared patterns. Problems emerge if the analyst only identifies a discourse and uses it as a summary of these patterns: as such, they add nothing to the analysis, and at worst can result in *under-analysis through circular discovery*. This refers to the analyst giving examples as evidence of a certain discourse or ideology, and then explaining these quotes as manifestations of said discourse or ideology; in the case of Fairclough this might be proving the existence of a neoliberal discourse by linguistically analyzing university prospectuses as examples of neoliberal discourse. Antaki et al. (2003) suggest that to overcome this circularity the analyst would examine how discourses or cultural patterns of language use have come to being and how they are employed in the material under analysis.

The fifth problem of *under-analysis through false survey* is not relevant to me, so I will discuss the sixth, *under-analysis through spotting*. This refers to the insufficiency of simply noticing features in texts according to whatever theory or method is chosen. Instead, there should be “unpacking” of these features and constant movement between the general and the specific (Antaki et al. 2003). This applies more to original research however, so its significance in this study is limited.

3.7. Summary

To attempt a summary of these criticisms, a rough division into three categories is put forward: linguistic, social/philosophical, and methodological criticisms. The first category refers to the failure to take pragmatics and subject matter into account as argued by Widdowson and Jones. As a result, Faircloughian analysis demonstrates a certain circularity, because any given grammatical construct receives much of its meaning from context and individual use, not its linguistic properties as part of the language system, and for this reason can be used as evidence of almost anything. Thus, the analyst's preconceived alignment towards any issue usually becomes the proven point.

The second type of criticism is aimed at the ideological view of society. Derived from Marxism, it claims that everything that takes place in society is determined by an ideology, which however cannot be adequately explained. It could be defined as a "deep" structure that determines much of the way individuals act in their surroundings, without them even being aware of this influence. When tackled by assuming a political stance, the result is usually a view characterized by conflict that rarely is solved because the "enemy" is everything but concrete and defined. As Pennycook points out, in analysis the focus should be on that which is constituted in discourse, not on the ideology or political system that can be called responsible for the numerous social problems we see every day.

Finally, there are the methodological problems. Those were outlined in 3.6. and do not need to be repeated here, although it is interesting to note that the idea of circularity emerges there as well.

4. Materials and method

4.1. Principles of analysis

In order to formulate the research questions I seek to answer and the methodology I want to follow, a synthesis and clarification of the above is in order. First of all, Fairclough's model has been criticized for ignoring perlocution and subject matter. Accommodating these two in the same analysis where the primary focus has been on description of the system of language is demanding, because as mentioned in 3.2., our view of language separates the system and its manifestations, implying an inherent incompatibility between them. In order to solve this perceived conflict, I resort to a redefinition of the concept of discourse: as per Foucault, I see society, its institutions, members, and texts as constituted and constrained discursively, by a (possibly) infinite number of sources and power-knowledge relations. This means that it is not only the discourse of which the analyzed text can be said to be a part of that has to be accounted for, but also my discourse of interpretation. In other words, the analysis does not have to set out to expose anything, but rather be explicit about its own discourse and the resulting constraints and possibilities that determine the results. In this way, it is possible to sidestep the segregational view and bring together the systematic aspects of a text and the social.

Secondly, the methodological shortcomings of 3.6. have to be avoided. In this study the depth and breadth of analysis is of course limited, so that these methodological issues are somewhat secondary. The points I emphasize are: using summary as a guide for analysis and assigning policies or beliefs to it only if these are explicit in the text; using quotes only in conjunction with the broader textual context; identifying patterns and explaining these not in terms of the patterns themselves or by an ideological opposition, but by the text and its social or intertextual links. I will also “take sides,” but only to demonstrate that my view of society allows for criticism and is not “quietist.”

This leads then to the final point, which is my understanding of society. Because my starting point in this thesis is Fairclough’s model and its criticism, this social view is also characterized by what Fairclough believes, what others think he is wrong in believing, and how these views can be reconciled. Thus, the main issue I have with his understanding is the insistence on seeing the world today as an abomination, something to be resisted where possible, an ideological opposition. The ceaseless fighting against this “new capitalism” or “new labour” is self-defeating, not because it is wrong to identify these forces in our societies, but because the wish is that they were not there. I feel that for CDA to be emancipatory, it has to accept the fact that the world today can be defined in many ways, some political and some not, and that this “way things are” is not only a threat but also an opportunity. My view could thus be called “positive,” because it focuses on that which is or could be, instead of the negative: that which is not or should not be. It could possibly also be called “Foucauldian,” because this dualism of the constraining and the constitutive is derived from Foucault, as well as my rejection of ideology.

To conclude, I do recognize the world I live in as organized by global capitalist principles, oppressive to billions, negligent of the environment, economically unsound and so on and so forth. This means that there are many opportunities for criticisms, in discourse analysis and elsewhere, but it does not mean that analyzing vocabulary or grammar is the first step in anything other than description of the object of analysis. Nor does it mean that an economic theory born in the 19th century is an answer to the kinds of social problems I encounter.

4.2. Methodology

Keeping in mind what has been said above about the segregational view of language, the emphasis here is not on compiling a detailed inventory of the mechanisms of the system of the English language that have been used in this particular text. As was mentioned, when the focus is on the socially relevant, the analysis has to take place at the level of the discourse. This means that discourse cannot be understood only as a text consisting of systematic features, or as a collection of texts and such features, and the social or institutional aspects that are seen as relevant, which are then analyzed from a political or ideological opposition, or, in a sense, from the outside. Instead, the analyst should make explicit the discursively constructed position from which the analysis takes place. Furthermore, such socially shared discourses of interpretation are in themselves interesting windows into social issues.

Following from this, my analysis is three-fold: first, I outline the organization that has produced the text under analysis. This includes presenting their statement of

principles as an indicator of values and goals, and also a brief overview of some well-known signers of the statement. In this way, certain obvious and explicit social and political connections are brought into the analysis, which serves as non-ideological and easily accessible information about the discourse of which the text is a part of. This takes place here in section 4., but should be seen as part of the actual analysis regardless.

Second, I present an overview of the text. This is meant as a “non-critical” reading that does not attach any explicit ideological or political bias to the text or the discourse, but rather tries to simply understand what is being said. In other words, the text is taken as evidence of the same discourse as the organization, and as such it seems important to not skew it by being overtly political. Opportunities for critical comments will present themselves here as well, but I think that it is important to avoid adopting a specific political or ideological stance at this point. Instead, such criticisms should be preserved until the text has been at least preliminarily outlined and the analyst’s point of view can be made explicit.

Finally, I will go somewhat deeper into the text. By this I mean an investigation into the “discourses of interpretation” not as sets of linguistic features or as political alternatives, but as socially possible discourses or ways of understanding the text among others. The things I am thus looking for are not defined in terms of the language system, but are rather aspects of globalization, the balance of power in the world after the Cold War, American superpower status, the so-called “Pax Americana,” the events of September 11, and even ideas such as the New World Order or global government. The questions I am asking thus are, what possible

ways are there for understanding the text? What is the reading that I can offer, and where do my interpretations come from? No decisive answers can be offered here, but asking the right questions in itself can be a rewarding enterprise.

4.3. Material

The material for this study is a 90-page text called *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* (RAD), issued in 2000 by the organization The Project for the New American Century (PNAC). In this section I will discuss first why I chose this document, and then present PNAC's principles and participants. All information including RAD has been obtained from the organization's website, accessible at www.newamericancentury.org. It is not indicated on the site when it has been last updated, but the latest writings issued by them are from 2006. Furthermore, the search function of the website does not work, suggesting that the site has been inactive for some time. Parts of the text are included in the appendix, namely the excerpt from PNAC's Statement of Principles and Chapter V in its entirety.

4.3.1. About the text

I came across RAD on the Internet and in conjunction with what are usually called conspiracy theories. The text caught my attention because it was offered as evidence that the World Trade Center disaster of 2001, better known as 9/11, was an "inside job." I feel that this adds an interesting dimension to the analysis or reading, because these more marginal explanations are often excluded from

academic studies, and well-established but not necessarily very applicable theories such as Marxism are favoured. The Internet is likewise a somewhat inadequately understood phenomenon due to its novelty, but raises interesting questions about context, access to information, and understanding or interpreting texts in general. It should not be expected that these issues can be dealt with in this thesis, but they should nonetheless be understood as influencing the analysis in some meaningful way.

4.3.2. About PNAC

According to their website, PNAC was established in 1997 as a “non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.” On the front page, William Kristol, chairman of the organization, elaborates on this: American leadership is “good both for America and for the world,” and this leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principles. PNAC’s Statement of Principles, dated June 3, 1997, is even more explicit and identifies problems with the contemporary administration, lessons of the past, and guidelines for the future. I will look at these in more detail next.

The Statement begins by arguing that American foreign and defense policy is “adrift” because of the Clinton administration. It is said that conservatives have been aware of this and have voiced their discontent while resisting “isolationist impulses,” but have allowed tactical differences outweigh the benefits of strategic agreement. PNAC then attempts to “rally support” for American leadership, recognizing that the US led the “West to victory in the Cold War” and that this

position of pre-eminence is in jeopardy because of cuts in defense spending, bad leadership, and favouring short term commercial interests over long term “strategic considerations.” Ronald Reagan’s administration is then mentioned as a good model: a strong military, bold foreign policy and national leadership accepting of America’s “global responsibilities” are needed. Moving finally to discuss the future, it is said that America has to maintain peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and that the 20th century should have taught that it is important to “shape circumstances before crises emerge.” The four consequences of this are: Americans need to increase defense spending significantly, strengthen ties to allies and challenge regimes hostile to their interests and values, promote political and economic freedom abroad, and accept America’s “unique role in preserving and extending an international order.”

The Statement of Principles is “signed” by a number of people, that is, there is a list of names after it. Of the 25, I recognize a few immediately, and will list them briefly: Jeb Bush (member of the Republican Party, brother of President George W. Bush, 43rd Governor of Florida), Dick Cheney (Republican, 7th White House Chief of Staff, 17th US Secretary of Defense, 46th Vice President, CEO of Halliburton 1995–2000, co-founder of PNAC), Francis Fukuyama (professor, known for the “end of history” -argument according to which the end of the Cold War marks an end to ideological struggle), I. Lewis Libby (assistant to President G. W. Bush and to the Vice President, known because had to resign after charged with obstruction of justice, perjury, and making false statements), Dan Quayle (Republican, former US Representative and Senator, 44th Vice President), Donald Rumsfeld (Republican, 13th and 21st US Secretary of Defense, Chairman of Gilead Sciences [developer of

Tamiflu] 1997–2001, resigned in 2006 due to public pressure related to the war in Iraq), and Paul Wolfowitz (25th US Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10th President of the World Bank). All this information is from Wikipedia, which might raise questions about validity. I have, however, limited myself to public and commonly shared knowledge only to avoid such issues. The list is also very incomplete, and it would be interesting to outline the careers and connections of all the people mentioned; this would deepen the understanding of the context of analysis greatly.

5. Reading and analysis

5.1. Overview

RAD begins with a title page, followed by an extract from the Statement of Principles and PNAC's contact information. This places the text firmly into the context of the organization and its explicitly stated assumptions about the importance of an international order led by the US. After the table of contents the reader finds an *Introduction* and *Key Findings*, which are distinct from the other six chapters as they are not numbered and the page numbers are roman numerals.

The introduction begins by mentioning that since its inception, PNAC has been concerned with a decline in the strength of America's defenses, and in the resulting problems for exercising American leadership around the world. Two congressional defense studies from 1997 are brought up as examples: both assume that defense budgets will not grow, and as a result America's armed forces can either prepare for the future or take care of "current business" (RAD: i). Such shortsightedness

is seen as detrimental: the US is the world's only superpower and is without a global rival, and this position cannot be extended unless a strong military is in place to deter potential rivals. A "grand strategy" is then called for to maintain US preeminence and to shape the international security order in line with American principles and interests (RAD: ii). After a metatextual overview of the process of compiling the report (individual authors submitting papers on various topics), conditions favourable to its reception are mentioned: the federal budget is running a surplus, the declining state of the military is known to the public and experts, and the 1990s taught much about the post-Cold War world (RAD: ii-iii). The last paragraph warns that the world will not remain peaceful unless adequate military resources are provided. The Introduction is signed by Donald Kagan, Gary Schmitt, and Thomas Donnelly.

Key Findings begins by reiterating the need to maintain the current "American peace" by military strength (RAD: iv). In order to achieve this, four core missions for the US military are given, as well as nine recommendations for how to achieve this. The main ideas are to revise strategy where necessary, modernize and research relevant technologies, and to increase defense spending as well as personnel strength. The chapter concludes by pointing out again that choosing either the present or the future in military affairs instead of both will result in the loss of the current "global security order" (RAD: v).

Chapter I asks the question, *Why Another Defense Review?* The answer is, because the ones before have been dominated by bureaucratic and budgetary interests rather than strategic interests (RAD: 1). This places at risk the global "*Pax Americana*"

as the US military “limps towards exhaustion” without being able to meet their objectives, not to mention the inability to provide careers that meet “middle-class expectations.” This is seen to have resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union: the absence of bipolarity has led to relaxation and military downgrading. As a result, the US is in a position where it cannot effectively secure and expand “zones of democratic peace” or preserve American preeminence. Security is not a question of global nuclear deterrence anymore, but a matter of acting locally and in many places at the same time, against “separate and distinct adversaries” (RAD: 2-3). The chapter continues by identifying problems with the military’s present condition as well as failure to prepare for the future which might be much more dangerous due to information technology, China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The “defense neglect” of the 1990s should be fixed (RAD: 4).

Chapter II outlines the *Four Essential Missions* that were mentioned in Key Findings. These are: first, homeland defense by nuclear deterrence but also taking into account the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their possible use by “lesser states.” Second, maintaining the ability to fight and win multiple simultaneous large scale wars. Third, retaining the “constabulary” forces that preserve the current peace in smaller than large scale theaters, such as the NATO mission in the Balkans. Fourth, transforming the armed forces according to the “revolution in military affairs” brought about by advanced technologies. (RAD: 6) The rest of chapter II then discusses each of these four points in more detail (RAD: 7-13); I will not go into these in any more detail, although these missions would be interesting objects for analysis, especially those relating to the future.

Chapter III, *Repositioning Today's Force*, begins with the assumption that maintaining a “substantial overseas presence” is essential to secure the trust of America’s allies, without which exercising global leadership becomes difficult (RAD: 14). This “American security perimeter” is seen to be based on NATO presence in Europe, coalition forces in the Persian Gulf region, and Taiwan and East Timor in East Asia. While the trend is “for a larger U.S. security perimeter,” the placement of military installations does not reflect this: the “air war in Kosovo” is mentioned as an example of poor execution due to a lack of air bases in Southeast Europe (RAD: 14-15). The rest of the chapter discusses these various regions and US military presence in them, and I will outline them briefly. In Europe, the shift should be permanent and from the North to the Southeast, while still maintaining a presence especially in Germany so that “NATO not be replaced by the European Union, leaving the United States without a voice in European security affairs” (RAD: 15-17). In the Persian Gulf, permanent and semi-permanent bases should be maintained, even if Saddam Hussein were gone: “[o]ver the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has,” and, even if Iran does not become a threat, there are “longstanding American interests in the region” (RAD: 17-18). In East Asia, the forces in South Korea and Japan should be kept in place to “hold together a *de facto* alliance,” and presence in Southeast Asia should be increased to “ensure that the rise of China is a peaceful one” (RAD: 18-19). The chapter concludes by encouraging “deployment bases” in agreement with other nations and calls for “significant changes in Navy carrier presence and rotational patterns” (RAD: 19-21).

Chapter IV is called *Rebuilding Today's Armed Services* and it states that the missions outlined in the previous chapter cannot be carried out if the armed forces are not reformed. Rather detailed suggestions pertaining to budgetary, strategic, deployment, and equipment issues are given here for the army, air force, navy, and marine corps; I do not feel it is necessary to deal with these extensively, although such discourse would probably be interesting for strategists, among others, to analyze. Instead, I briefly present the main points or suggestions, which are in the text in boldface, marking them as distinct from the body text. First, the army's active-duty strength should be increased from 475 000 to 525 000 soldiers, it should modernize current combat systems, improve training and quality of life, reposition its units according to the previous chapters, and increase its budget from 70 billion dollars annually to 90–95 billion dollars (RAD: 23). Second, the air force should likewise be redeployed and realigned, focus on extending the service life of current aircraft and invest in electronic warfare, increase personnel and reform its institutional basis (RAD: 31). Third, the navy should concentrate on the Pacific, reduce its dependence on aircraft carriers, focus on maintaining current aircraft and invest in unmanned aircraft, and increase "surface combatants" and submarines (RAD: 39-40). Finally, the marine corps should be expanded and redeployed with the navy, increase its personnel strength, and refocus on joint operations with other services (RAD: 47-8).

Chapter V discusses the "emerging revolution in military affairs," and is called *Creating Tomorrow's Dominant Force* (RAD: 50). Here as well, reduced spending is seen as putting American dominance at risk in the form of another strategic pause. This revolution should thus be exploited, even though it is shaped by domestic

politics and industrial policy, and is understood to be a long process “absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor” (RAD: 50-1). Three new missions are then outlined: building global missile defenses, controlling space, cyberspace, and the new “international commons,” and adopting a two-stage strategy for the transformation process (RAD: 51). These are each discussed in more detail in the text and outlined as follows: the new global missile defenses are seen as essential in managing the challenges to “the American peace” (RAD: 52). Diplomacy and nonproliferation treaties should be understood as limited, and a system based on “a galaxy of surveillance satellites,” “world-wide command-and-control system,” and space-, land-, and sea-based interceptors should be instantiated (RAD: 52-4). The militarization of space is important to achieve a global defense system. “95 percent of current U.S. Military communication are carried over commercial circuits,” which means that in space “commercial and security interests are intertwined and related.” Thus, adversaries may have access to the same satellites, and control of space cannot be achieved without institutional reorganization (RAD: 54-7). In cyberspace, despite the need to consider “a host of legal, moral, and political issues,” the disruption and paralyzing of military and commercial computer networks is understood as gaining importance (RAD: 57). Finally, the two-stage process of transition and transformation is discussed. On the whole, the “general characteristics” of the revolution in military affairs are summarized as “improved situational awareness and sharing of information,” “range and endurance” of weapons systems, “precision and miniaturization,” “speed and stealth,” and “automation and simulation,” as well as competition for missions and resources between branches instead of bureaucracy (RAD: 59-61). In the case of the army, self-deployment, long-range capabilities, and technologically

and medically enhanced infantrymen, or “Land Warriors,” are mentioned (RAD: 61-3). For the air force, range, precision, development of unmanned and stealthy aircraft, and operating in space are needed to “shift the scope of air operations from the theater level to the global level” (RAD: 63-4). Finally, the navy should move from littoral waters to controlling the oceans, focus on stealth, range, “network-centric warfare,” and find its place in the global missile defense system, while providing support for the marine corps which could then lighten its structure (RAD: 64-8).

The last chapter, *Defense Spending*, discusses the “price of continued American geopolitical leadership and military preeminence” (RAD: 69). The starting point is that the Clinton administration’s reductions in defense spending have created a mismatch between current plans and budgets of 12 to 50 billion dollars annually. However, such calculations do not take into account the suggestions put forward earlier in the report, and as a result American preeminence becomes impossible to maintain after 2010 unless spending is increased (RAD: 70-1). Plans to either modernize at the cost of present dominance or maintaining current readiness at the price of being ill prepared for the future are seen as a “strategy of American retreat” which would result in “allies and adversaries alike” discounting American security guarantees (RAD: 71-4). The chapter concludes by claiming that a new “force posture and service structure” is so different from previous ones that estimating a precise cost is not possible, but a minimum of 3,5 to 3,8 percent of gross domestic product should be adequate. Current power and future modernization are needed because “[g]lobal leadership is not something exercised at our leisure, when the mood strikes us or when our core national security interests are directly threatened; then it is already too late.” (RAD: 74-6)

The report concludes with a list of participants. Again, it would be interesting to look into these people to establish links between the text and the “real world,” but limitations of time and space mean that such analysis has to be excluded. Suffice it to say that there are 27 people listed, who are affiliated with the various branches of US military, Harvard and Yale universities, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Northrop Grumman Corporation, and other prominent institutions.

5.2. Analysis

5.2.1. On social context

In order to come to some kind of preliminary conclusions and to investigate the various avenues of analysis that are present in the text, it is in order to begin from “the top,” that is, at the level of the institution itself, its participants, and the different connections that can be said to exist between them and the society at large. The first thing to notice then, is that PNAC’s political views are conservative, “Reaganite,” and moral. Such a stance is hardly uncommon in the United States, and a rhetoric of boldness and strength seems somewhat typical of US public discourse. A more startling position is claiming that American uniqueness should be understood not only as rhetoric, but as something necessary to maintain the status quo in the global system. This state of affairs is best characterized as unipolar: “the West” won the Cold War, leaving the US in a position to shape the world in ways that best suit their interests. An obvious target for criticism here is the fact that military might is mentioned as one important means of acting in the world; promoting freedom

and prosperity is perhaps an idea more easily accepted, although it has to be kept in mind that words on paper in themselves do not shape their surroundings.

Keeping the above in sight, I feel that it is interesting to look into the people that have been involved in the production of texts that are analyzed. This helps in outlining the “discourse of production” of a text by providing information about the social positions it emerges from, whether these be defined in terms of institutional affiliations, social class, ethnicity, or even personal history. Here such analysis is very limited, as only a few of the signers of the Statement or authors of the report were immediately recognized, but some things can be commented on. First, there seems to be affiliation with the Republican Party which is unsurprising when taken in conjunction with the political or ideological position of the organization and its report. Second, these people are all in what could be colloquially called “high places.” This means careers in big corporations (RAND, Northrop Grumman), in the military, higher education, and of course government, to the extent that Vice Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, and a President of the World Bank are among the signers. Third, based on the names of the signers and authors, most of them are white, male, and quite a few apparently Jewish. Such an ensemble would hardly qualify as a politically correct cross section of the American “melting pot,” but rather could be seen to reinforce views held by some that rich white men are the ones who hold power. However, it is again essential to remember that language alone has no power, and the fact that these particular names are encountered here should be seen as a starting point for more detailed investigations.

Furthermore, the role of civil society in the US could be examined. In CDA, one classic criticism has been to point out inequalities and abuses of power, and such endeavors should benefit from purely social analyses. Power is after all a social concept, so that if RAD were to be criticized on such grounds, it would seem reasonable to begin by locating PNAC in the complex network of power relations that exist in human societies. At the very least, this would result in better aimed criticisms, as relatively powerless social actors could be ignored in favour of those whose actions actually could be predicted to have significant consequences.

5.2.2. America and the world

Moving on to discuss the body of the text, a good place to start is the way the world is understood, or, in other words, what the nature of the international system is seen to be. Selecting a historical point of departure, the Cold War is mentioned in the text a few times. This stage in human history, which still has an enormous impact today, is framed in terms of winning and losing so that “the West” led by the United States came on top. While I am not an expert in history, it seems to me that such a straightforward understanding of a decades-long conflict that apparently almost destroyed civilization as we know it necessarily obscures some complexity, for example the idea that Soviet Union never really presented a credible military threat but was rather left with no choice but to try to keep up as the US maintained the arms race. To put it differently, it is always the winners who have the monopoly on freedom and peace.

The situation after the Cold War is described as unipolar and conducive to American interests, because the US is now the only superpower in the world. In terms of power relations such an assessment seems accurate enough, but it appears also that the significance of nation states has diminished globally and especially after the Cold War. The good news about the global spreading of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005) is of course the greatly reduced possibility of a worldwide nuclear holocaust, kept at bay by the new "*Pax Americana*" that makes the promotion of freedom and peace easier than before. An obvious target for criticism here is the disparity between words and reality: even in 2000, before the tumultuous events of the following years, freedom and peace were concepts taken for granted only by a minority of people, while the rest had to settle for similar living conditions as before. The difference is that now their poverty is a fact allowed by the principles of consumerism and free trade, instead of traditional hands-on colonialism.

In the text, this unipolarity is understood as a precarious position. The peace that results from there being only one superpower cannot last unless that superpower takes the opportunity to shape the world in a way that ensures certain values for all. Such a statement does make sense: if the fact is that one actor has more economic, military, and "soft" power relative to all other actors, then the actions of that one entity surely influence most if not all others. From an "idealistic" point of view, such a situation can turn in humankind's favour, as one leader can use its influence to work together with allies to turn enemies into more allies, thus ensuring that violence, inequality, and the like can be reduced if not eliminated. RAD however seems to be more "realistic:" the "strategic pause" that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union has created strategic vacuums around the world, allowing

regional actors to make bids for power. Such a situation is undesired, not because it can lead to armed conflicts as these powers start to negotiate the borders between spheres of influence, but because it makes it difficult for the US to exercise its global leadership. There could easily be said to exist a certain discrepancy between the ideas of peace and prosperity promoted in the document and the global military containment that is offered as the grand strategy to achieve them.

5.2.3. Finance, politics, and ideology

From this concept of an American peace it is easy to make the transition to money and party politics. Defense spending has a central role in the text, as the whole idea of America's unprecedented opportunity for global leadership depends on it: only by increasing budgets is it possible to control the present as well as the future. Keeping in mind the somewhat schizophrenic attitude mentioned in the previous paragraph about how global military dominance is promoted as the key to global peace, this constant encouragement to spend more and more money on weapons and warfare begins to feel somewhat suspicious. Such feelings are of course commonplace in all communicative processes between human beings, and it should not be enough to simply state them. Instead, if the text appears contradictory to its receiver, it might be a good idea to look "outside" of the text for possible explanations. In my case, it could for example be speculated that the people involved in PNAC and RAD have money invested or careers in the defense industry; this would at least offer a motive for the blatantly militaristic attitudes that I can easily read into the text. However, such investigations have not been

carried out here and as such they should serve only as a suggestion as to what it is possible to do when analyzing discourse, when emphasis is on the social aspect.

Money is often mentioned in the text in conjunction with references to the Clinton administration. It is remembered that it was a Democrat President who held office during the “defense neglect” and has focused more on generating a federal surplus rather than ensuring that America’s greatness is not a passing phenomenon. Based on the text alone, such partisan positions could be criticized for example because they “place the blame” on Democrats or Bill Clinton, which might be an important discovery if one is passionate about politics. However, taking into account the fact that certain prominent individuals associated with this text and the organization that produced it are high-ranking members of the Republican Party, a new way of looking at this political dimension opens up: instead of standing in opposition to the unfair treatment of Democrats at textual level, the whole text as part of some complex social discourse can be seen as situated in the political left-right polarity. As such, it is possible to suggest, for example, that the producers of the text wanted to include a Republican or even anti-Democrat stance in it, because they need to sell it to members of their own party, which is done best by using partisan concepts. There is no analytic necessity to make the observation that the text seems to favour Republicans in some way, because that is after all fairly obvious to anyone fluent in English. It seems more important to ask why politics has been brought into the text in the first place.

Staying a bit longer on this national or political level, the text also contains an interesting ideological dimension. I have been wary of the term “ideology” in

this study, especially when it is used as an essential component of analysis, and I remain so. However, I think that as a starting point for more detailed analysis it is usable, and as such it is used here. I refer to what could be called neoliberalism or equating commercial interests with security interests; in other words, finance and commerce are in the text linked with the quality of life of military personnel, the reorganization of the armed forces, and security interests of the future. I will look at these below.

First, the deteriorating condition of the armed forces is characterized partly by an inability to provide careers that satisfy middle-class expectations. This seems to imply that the military and warfare are not simply necessary evils, but rather permanent institutions that people could and should depend on for their livelihood. Second, the different branches of the armed forces are encouraged to compete with each other for resources and missions. Instead of bureaucratic stagnation there should be active pursuit of possibilities to show what a particular branch is capable of. Third, in the future, more than ever, commercial interests are intertwined with security interests. 95 per cent of military communication is commercially enabled, meaning that other actors have the capability to use the same services if they have enough money. This could all be understood as expanding warfare to commerce or vice versa: in a world where privatization is key, soldiers do not simply fight when no other alternative remains, the military exists as an end in itself rather than as a last hope, and commercial or private entities are not excluded from warfare but play a central role in it. Such an interpretation is of course exaggerated, but not science fiction if one remembers the relatively recent Blackwater debacle in Iraq. These kinds of ideas could be easily criticized by adopting an opposing ideological

position, for example by pointing out that this is a case of neoliberal discourse “colonizing” military discourse. However, given all of the above, that would seem like an unnecessary simplification: in this context, the practical reality of things is probably more complicated and more frightening.

5.2.4. Military strategy and organization

In general, issues pertaining to military strategy and organization are given the most space in the text. From an analytical perspective, this would seem to indicate that these issues are “the most important,” or that they are of most interest to the authors and producers of the text. Sadly, military strategy is not something that humanists in general are very familiar with, and that is the case with me as well. As a result, no in-depth analysis can be carried out, but certain things can be pointed out.

It is probably helpful to deal with these issues on a temporal scale. This reflects the structure of the text itself, in which the repositioning of today’s forces and preparing for the future are dealt with more extensively. Thus, the past is remembered as a straightforward time, when a relatively cheap nuclear arsenal was enough to maintain the status quo against a singular well defined enemy. The present, however, does not allow such luxury: continuous local conflicts, non-state actors, “dirty bombs,” and the rise of regional powers mean that existing forces should be repositioned to make sure that the “security perimeter” extends as far as possible. In the future, this perimeter does not consist only of military bases, navy fleets, and air superiority in areas of interest, but requires militarization of

space, a global missile defense system, surveillance, networking, sophisticated information technologies, and so on and so forth. The branch-specific suggestions for reorganization echo this: from heavy and rigid structures there should be a shift towards speed, flexibility, automation, stealth, and better firepower with lesser troops.

To criticize such meditations, one might begin by looking at the more technical side of things from the perspective of, say, military strategy and organization to evaluate the feasibility of the suggested changes. The concept of “enemy” is likewise interesting: some might point out that the communist was the terrorist of the latter half of the 20th century, and the hunt for him either a misguided or naïve game of heroism or a manufactured scare designed to keep power in the hands of certain elements of society. The automation and a certain “depersonalization” of warfare is a new and controversial issue, at least to some: in Pakistan, some four to six hundred people have been killed since 2008 by missiles from unmanned American aircraft in another extension of the so-called war on terror (Times Online 2009). The criticism I would put forward in this case is that terror seems like a poor weapon of choice when the goal is reducing terror, and that acts of violence are very unlikely to reduce overall violence in the foreseeable future.

5.2.5. Discourse of conspiracy

The last thing I wish to discuss is somewhat different from all of the above. This is because it is closely related to so-called conspiracy theories, which do not lend themselves quite as easily to academic inquiries as for example politics or ideology.

It is also perhaps misleading to refer to “it,” because the issue is far from being monolithic. Here the discussion is limited to the text only, but the Internet’s role in disseminating and even creating new ways of seeing the world and understanding texts is very interesting overall.

As was mentioned in section 4.3.1., I became aware of this text on the Internet as part of what are commonly called conspiracy theories. Such theories have usually focused on one sentence in RAD as their starting point: “[f]urther, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing even – like a new Pearl Harbor” (RAD: 51). Taken in isolation, this sentence seems innocuous enough: there is recognition of the fact that reforming the entire military is a long process, and such long-term demanding projects are only sped up if something completely unexpected and shocking happens. However, after September 11 2001 innocence and face value have been in short supply for quite a few people. For them, this statement serves as evidence of the US government being responsible for 9/11, either as the organizer of the entire incident or as a passive bystander that let it happen consciously. Thus, RAD becomes another piece of evidence for a view of the world that is to a great extent characterized by uncertainty, disillusionment, and usually a global enemy that is more or less ill defined but nonetheless untrustworthy.

Keeping in mind the various criticisms that have been presented above about the various aspects of RAD, a “conspiratorial” interpretation is not that far fetched. After all, the text quite frankly suggests that global military domination, unmanned machines that are invisible to the radar, and privatized business-like warfare are

desired now as in the future. If one is willing to throw caution to the wind, people who make such claims could surely be visioned meeting as a global elite, plotting the future course of the entire humankind. However, it is not exactly difficult to be critical about the various conspiracy theories either. The flights of imagination that are sometimes required to explain the world according to a conspiracy are such that one easily risks ridicule, even if common sense is not completely abandoned. In sum, the interpretations offered by such theories should be understood as similar to more acceptable models. They serve as what I have above called discourses of interpretation, or socially shared ways of assigning meaning to language in its various forms. They all have a history and certain conditions of being that should be investigated in order to get socially relevant results.

6. Results and discussion

Due to the theoretical orientation of this thesis, no specific results can be presented. That is, there has not been a well-defined methodology that would have been applied to a well-defined material in order to get certain results, but instead there have emerged a number of problematic or interesting issues that are summarized below. Furthermore, these issues cannot be dealt with very extensively or conclusively, but should nonetheless point the way for future investigations or at least provide a broad understanding of Fairclough's model and its theoretical origins, implications, and shortcomings.

The analysis or reading of the text reflects this: that is where these points of interest best manifest themselves, but do not necessarily become "solved" in any

meaningful sense. This should not be seen as a shortcoming however, as such an overall view of the various processes of Faircloughian CDA, and discourse analysis in general, can be helpful in identifying various more specific parts of the whole that require attention. Because this metaphorical “zooming in” is relegated to secondary status here, the textual analysis becomes a part of all of the following discussion and as such is not separately outlined.

6.1. The language system and discourse

The primary linguistic problem of CDA I have identified in this thesis is the systemic view of language. When this view is adopted, the Saussurean division of language into a structure and its manifestations, or *langue* and *parole*, cannot be avoided. The reason why this is problematic is that such a division creates an unnecessary complication for understanding how meaning is made in language and in human communication: when the system of language, or the internal relations of grammatical constituents, is the focus of analysis, it is hard to make generalizations that have relevance outside of said system. In other words, traditional linguistics is *immanent*, or descriptive and accountable only to itself (Mey 2001). Adopting a philosophical point of view, Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 74-93) criticize the view that meaning is relations between abstract symbols or between an objective reality and abstract symbols, because both views fail to recognize the fact that the neural and cognitive makeup of individuals are inseparable from such considerations.

My solution to the problem of how to account for meaning as social rather than systemic has been to resort to the concept of discourse. The idea was that the *langue*

and parole of the analyzed text come together in my mind, as a whole that does not need to be forced apart. The result of this seems to be that despite the absence of any real method to speak of, the text becomes easily accessible from various social, political, and individual avenues of approach. The price I have paid for this is that the analysis lacks depth and detail, but the broadening of the concept of discourse seems to balance this by providing opportunities for “zooming in” where desired.

Furthermore, it should probably not be assumed that purely descriptive or grammatical analyses have no role in CDA. For example, when doing comparative studies of, say, the manifestos of a certain political party to see how they change over time, there does not seem to exist a substitute for such pure description and quantitative analyses. However, it has to be understood that if “being critical” means having a point of comparison according to which certain usually political viewpoints are evaluated, then subject matter should be that which is evaluated. And, as has been demonstrated, subject matter cannot be reduced to internal language system relations only. It is also worth pointing out that in order to investigate the role of grammar in human communication and society, diachronic and evolutionary analyses might provide better insights than for example Hallidayan grammar which seems to focus more on language acquisition.

6.2. Text and context

For Fairclough, a text is exclusively a manifestation of the language system. That is, all of semiosis can be effectively and meaningfully analyzed in terms of the abstract system of which the particular symbols are a part of. This “grammar first”

-approach is problematic for two reasons: first, it fails to take into account the other aspects of language and meaning as I have argued above. Second, it makes it difficult to socially position a particular text. Fairclough's main area of interest lies outside of the language system, namely in ideology, society and power, which demands that the context and broader social relevance of texts are accounted for. However, this is difficult for him to do, because his analytical tools are limited to describing whatever aspects of an abstract system are decided to be relevant. The interest in intertextuality and genre that were discussed earlier could be seen as emerging from this: such concepts are better suited to social analyses, but should probably be understood more broadly than merely as extensions of the systemic view.

In the methodological and analytical sections of this thesis, I attempted to overcome this issue by simply reversing the process: instead of giving primacy to the text and its specific features, I tried to place it in some kind of social context first. This means looking into the particular organization that has claimed authorship of the text, the people that are associated with said organization, the individual authors of the text, political affiliations and cultural values, and so on and so forth. Because such broadly social factors require extensive analyses in themselves, they have mostly been mentioned only. Even so, it seems that non-linguistic approaches to context are helpful as they reveal aspects of for example status and power that genre and intertextuality might miss. Especially so in this case, as much is explicitly stated, which is of course not the case with all texts.

The issues of text and context are discussed by Schegloff (1997). He points out that it is important to be aware that the analyst's *a priori* assumptions about the world or an object of analysis can predetermine the results, as socially and institutionally disseminated views about what counts as acceptable or correct results influence us, consciously or not. The suggestion by Schegloff to take objects of inquiry on their own terms is something I have tried to implement in this thesis: by pointing out that not only is the text produced by certain people in certain positions in society, but it is also received by a certain individual (me) in a certain context (conspiracy), it is possible to expose both to further investigations. Thus, any insistence on some one final truth can be abandoned in favour of a more fruitful and scientific approach.

6.3. Power and society

Fairclough's abstraction of the society he lives in is similar to his abstraction of language: there is a deep structure or meaning in an unrealized, potential state, an "intermediate" stage of established institutions responsible for production, and finally the physical manifestations of these. As is the case with all abstractions, this formulation attempts to grasp some object that does not really exist in any physical or finite form. However, it seems that Fairclough understands society as he does simply in order to make it compatible with language and especially with the idea that language and society are inseparable. The problem with such a construct is thus not that it is abstract, but that it simply decides that language and society share something fundamental; what is lacking is for example any evidence for the

existence of some deep structure that ultimately decides what is possible and what is not.

As a result of this view, Fairclough's understanding of power is likewise something that I am inclined to be skeptical about. For him, language and society come together in discourse, and, as power is essentially social, discourse is also the location of power. When combined with a view of society that recognizes the individual as having some control and room for maneuver, the result is that power is understood as linguistic. Now, even if it were true that our societies are more and more discursal, as Fairclough claims they are, and even if it is true that individuals in said societies have a relatively new kind of opportunity for recombining and resisting discourses, it remains difficult for me to see how this is helpful. Power, I believe, should be defined as the ability to bring about changes in the world, not in discourses, especially if the focus is on the language system. It is true that I can play with language quite freely, but that seems negligible when compared with for example the power of money, cruise missiles, or institutional and political status. Also, the freedom of individuals should be understood as a part or product of some discourse(s) instead of necessarily opposed to it or some other discourse(s).

In my analysis, I operated first on the premise that society does not have any presupposed underlying structure that sets what is possible or not. Because of this, I tried to limit any speculations about social relevance to the specified social context, that is, related to and explainable by the producer organization and its social position. This means that instead of overgeneralizing socially relevant findings as symptoms of some abstract ideology or *zeitgeist*, they should be seen as firmly

anchored in the context and helpful in better understanding it. Second, I have assumed that the text itself, as language, has no power. This means that there has not been any need or incentive to jump on some particular passage or linguistic structure as evidence of something or someone challenging or maintaining the perceived status quo. What the text's observable effects have been on the world are largely beyond me; the only thing I feel confident enough to say is that the text is associated with certain powerful individuals and is something that some people feel quite strongly about. In order to look further into such preliminary speculations one needs more than just linguistic insights.

6.4. Ideology and emancipation

The idea of emancipation is central to CDA as practiced by Fairclough, and others as well. In fact, it could be said to be the philosophy behind the entire project, determining its values and goals. Such a philosophy is easily appealing: the world is unequal, violent, and polluted, and any means of even slightly changing things for the better is more than welcome. However, the problem identified with Fairclough's emancipatory project is, quite simply, that it fails at worst and seems slightly inadequate at best. He assumes that the world is organized as a polar opposition, with new labour or capitalism with all its problems that we are witnessing at the one end and its 19th century arch nemesis, Marxism, at the other. I think that such an understanding of the world is problematic in two ways: first, as a political project, because Marxism as a political ideology has lost most of its momentum. Second, even with all its theoretical complexity and burgeoning authority accumulated over a century and a half, Marxism cannot properly account

for all societal phenomena. It was designed to be an economic theory that explains the basic mechanisms of capitalism and that is what it does best.

In this thesis, I have identified Fairclough's concept of ideology as embodying this problem. This concept is based on the idea that a political or ideological opposition is the best way to see the world, and, from a political perspective, this is understandable. However, problems emerge when a scientific method is claimed: hence the criticism of Fairclough that his analysis is in fact interpretation and that the results of these interpretations are predetermined because this opposition is not something that is discovered but something that is pre-analytically assumed. An important critic of ideology is Foucault, for whom the concept is problematic because it always stands in opposition to something. This results in a very simplified understanding of power and political struggles, according to which there are two grand narratives or ideological deep structures that explain everything that goes on in human societies. For him, a more useful way of doing social analyses is to focus on more finite objects, such as particular institutions at a particular time, and appreciate the complexity of forces at work, forces that have histories and various other aspects that should be accounted for. For example, language and texts are interesting because they are a part and products of certain power/knowledge relations, not because they reveal a truth that is currently kept hidden.

In the reading of RAD, I took advantage of both views. The ideological approach is useful when there is desire to criticize the text and the various ideas it puts forward. In my case, adopting an opposing stance was not very difficult, as the text seems to advocate more warfare and a continuation of the aspects of the present

world order that I see as at least partly responsible for many of the global problems and human suffering reported today. However, there was also an effort towards a certain “openness” to the text. This means avoiding the reduction of the text to a symptom of some ideology only, and instead trying to expose various discourses or power/knowledge relations that are present there. It should not be assumed that my reading is in any way exhaustive, but at the very least it seems that political or, if you will, ideological commentary and criticism is not in any way incompatible with a more defined or scientific approach. Furthermore, such an approach can be seen only as providing more opportunities for criticisms, which is something that more politically oriented analysts should appreciate.

7. Conclusion

Norman Fairclough’s models and ideas for critical discourse analysis have been hugely influential; in fact, it could probably be said that the entire project would not exist without him. It is therefore difficult to overstate his importance in introducing the social and political to language studies, especially on a general and universally applicable level of power and its abuses. As a result, political and social commitment has become the battle standard of critical analysts, drawing both positive and negative attention.

The appropriateness of political ideologies in academic inquiry might be the most discussed and criticized aspect of CDA. It is not by any means the only one: the inevitable laws of science have made sure that Fairclough’s theory has been subjected to various criticisms and revisions like any other theory. Some of these

criticisms have been outlined in this thesis, and it could be said that they have only one thing in common: they target CDA. This heterogeneity is a direct consequence of the nature of CDA, which builds on descriptive linguistics, social theory, and politics, to name only the most general influences.

In this thesis, I have operated on the principle that it is essential to try to objectively account for the premises and shortcomings of any theory or model, in this case Faircloughian CDA, in order to determine its validity and applicability. Because of such a strictly theoretical approach, the results presented here are somewhat intangible and even inconclusive, but if understood correctly should provide food for thought for anyone interested in trying their hand in CDA. Below, I will summarize briefly the main points that have emerged from my investigation.

1. POLITICS AND ANALYSIS. As mentioned, some have called into question the practice of adopting a political stance when conducting analyses, because that results in biased or subjective findings. For me, this is not a problem: pure objectivity is a philosophical illusion, and my textual analysis showed that ideology and science can peacefully coexist, provided that the analyst is aware of the distinction. Furthermore, criticisms aimed at political issues have to be politically grounded, not linguistically.

2. LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY. For Fairclough, concepts such as power and society are linguistic, in the sense that they are discoursal. I have argued that this is not the case: understanding language as a system means that analyzing it results in findings that have relevance within the system, not

outside of it. Power is not a property of language, but an ability to bring about changes in the world. In my analysis I found out that properly understanding these premises of CDA helps in dealing with a text in a new way: little is predetermined, and society and language might actually be looked at “as they are,” in order to better understand both and their relations.

3. LACK OF EMANCIPATION. The most disheartening aspect of Faircloughian CDA is that it does not deliver. In other words, it actually exposes very little, and remedies even less. I claim that this is because Fairclough fails to understand that as long as you stay within the discourse of opposition, that is capitalism versus Marxism to put it bluntly, you stay locked in the eternal struggle of one versus another. It does not matter where this struggle takes place, because it offers no alternative. I would suggest that Foucault for example seems to at least hint at the possibility that understanding this polarity is the first step towards something better: in analysis there is no need to choose a side, which means that there is the possibility of stepping outside of the butting of heads, which makes textual analysis for example much more productive. A predetermined view of society is thus not necessary, enabling something new to come out of individual analyses.

It might appear from all of this that I have few good things to say about Fairclough and his theory. However, I wish to emphasize that I find appealing his desire to put together various different ideas in order to better explain the world. After all, science in general can only benefit from such drawing of interdisciplinary links, as new fields of inquiry are thus opened. Linguists for example have dissected our

main means of communication into such small parts that it is sometimes difficult to see how it might be helpful. Keeping this in mind, I conclude with a few ideas for possible future investigations.

1. VIEWS OF LANGUAGE. From a linguistic perspective, this is the most important issue. I have argued above that the systemic view is insufficient in explaining how meaning is made because of its inherent immanence. Pragmatics, human cognition, psycholinguistics and the communicative process should be better accounted for, as well as discourse-level mechanisms. Pure interpretation could also be embraced, as long as it is understood for what it is and is not. For example, in literature studies individual readings are a common way of dealing with texts as individual entities.

2. VIEWS OF SOCIETY. When the idea is to do socially relevant analyses, then our understanding of society is obviously important. I have argued in this thesis that Fairclough's view is old fashioned and holding him back, as it does not properly account for a number of phenomena. For example, this "information age" that we live in has repercussions for how we receive information about and understand the world, science, truth, and so forth. Also, Foucault has demonstrated that critical analyses do not require a Marxist point of view, and his ideas deserve more attention.

It seems then, that the debate surrounding and concerning CDA is far from over. My contribution has been that politics is completely acceptable in academic work in general, but also that theorists should be better aware of the various influences on

their models. I feel that discourse analysts would benefit greatly from an updated understanding of the various new and old mechanisms and power relations in today's societies. Such a shift in world view requires new theories, which in turn result in new methodologies. Such revisions should then result in more satisfying results when doing CDA, enabling conclusions that might actually reveal something new instead of just re-proving an existing world order or an old status quo.

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Appendix

ABOUT THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership. The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project. William Kristol is chairman of the Project, and Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson and John R. Bolton serve as directors. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project.

“As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?”

“[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.

“Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.”

– From the Project’s founding *Statement of Principles*

PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

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REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES

**Strategy, Forces and Resources
For a New Century**

DONALD KAGAN GARY SCHMITT
Project Co-Chairmen

THOMAS DONNELLY
Principal Author

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CREATING TOMORROW'S DOMINANT FORCE

To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs. Information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of modern military systems. These information technologies are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence.

The United States enjoys every prospect of leading this transformation. Indeed, it was the improvements in capabilities acquired during the American defense buildup of the 1980s that hinted at and then confirmed, during Operation Desert Storm, that a revolution in military affairs was at hand. At the same time, the process of military transformation will present opportunities for America's adversaries to develop new capabilities that in turn will create new challenges for U.S. military preeminence.

Moreover, the Pentagon, constrained by limited budgets and pressing current missions, has seen funding for experimentation and transformation crowded out in recent years. Spending on military research and development has been reduced dramatically over the past decade. Indeed, during the mid-1980's, when the Defense

Department was in the midst of the Reagan buildup which was primarily an effort to expand existing forces and field traditional weapons systems, research spending represented 20 percent of total Pentagon budgets. By contrast, today's research and development accounts total only 8 percent of defense spending. And even this reduced total is primarily for upgrades of current weapons. Without increased spending on basic research and development the United States will be unable to exploit the RMA and preserve its technological edge on future battlefields.

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a "strategic pause" while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied interests.

The effects of the RMA will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what weapons dominate, and which nations enjoy military preeminence.

A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American

policy goals and would trouble American allies.

Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions. A decision to suspend or terminate aircraft carrier production, as recommended by this report and as justified by the clear direction of military technology, will cause great upheaval. Likewise, systems entering production today – the F-22 fighter, for example – will be in service inventories for decades to come. Wise management of this process will consist in large measure of figuring out the right moments to halt production of current-paradigm weapons and shift to radically new designs. The expense associated with some programs can make them roadblocks to the larger process of transformation – the Joint Strike Fighter program, at a total of approximately \$200 billion, seems an unwise investment. Thus, this report advocates a two-stage process of change – transition and transformation – over the coming decades.

In general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership, tomorrow's U.S. armed forces must meet three new missions:

- **Global missile defenses. A network against limited strikes, capable of protecting the United States, its allies and forward-deployed forces, must be constructed. This must be a layered system of land, sea, air and space-based components.**
- **Control of space and cyberspace. Much as control of the high seas – and the protection of international commerce – defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new**

“international commons” be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the “infosphere” will find it difficult to exert global political leadership.

- **Pursuing a two-stage strategy for transforming conventional forces. In exploiting the “revolution in military affairs,” the Pentagon must be driven by the enduring missions for U.S. forces. This process will have two stages: transition, featuring a mix of current and new systems; and true transformation, featuring new systems, organizations and operational concepts. This process must take a competitive approach, with services and joint-service operations competing for new roles and missions. Any successful process of transformation must be linked to the services, which are the institutions within the Defense Department with the ability and the responsibility for linking budgets and resources to specific missions.**

Missile Defenses

Ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1991, when an Iraqi Scud missile hit a Saudi warehouse in which American soldiers were sleeping, causing the largest single number of casualties in the war; when Israeli and Saudi citizens donned gas masks in nightly terror of Scud attacks; and when the great “Scud Hunt” proved to be an elusive game that absorbed a huge proportion of U.S. aircraft, the value of the ballistic missile has been clear to America's adversaries. When their missiles are tipped with warheads carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, even weak regional powers have a credible deterrent, regardless of the balance of conventional forces. That is why, according to the CIA, a number of regimes deeply hostile to America – North Korea,

Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria – “already have or are developing ballistic missiles” that could threaten U.S allies and forces abroad. And one, North Korea, is on the verge of deploying missiles that can hit the American homeland. Such capabilities pose a grave challenge to the American peace and the military power that preserves that peace.



To increase their effectiveness, ground-based interceptors like the Army's Theater High-Altitude Area Defense System must be networked to space-based systems.

proliferation, even when backed by U.S. sanctions; in the final analysis, the administration has preferred to subordinate its nonproliferation policy to larger regional and country-specific goals. Thus, President Clinton lamented in June 1998 that he found sanctions legislation so inflexible that he was forced to “fudge” the intelligence evidence on China’s transfer of ballistic missiles to Pakistan to avoid the legal

The ability to control this emerging threat through traditional nonproliferation treaties is limited when the geopolitical and strategic advantages of such weapons are so apparent and so readily acquired. The Clinton Administration’s diplomacy, threats and pleadings did nothing to prevent first India and shortly thereafter Pakistan from demonstrating their nuclear capabilities. Nor have formal international agreements such as the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime done much to stem missile

requirements to impose sanctions on Beijing.

At the same time, the administration’s devotion to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union has frustrated development of useful ballistic missile defenses. This is reflected in deep budget cuts – planned spending on missile defenses for the late 1990s has been more than halved, halting work on space-based interceptors, cutting funds for a national missile defense system by 80 percent and theater defenses by 30 percent. Further, the administration has cut funding just at the crucial moments when individual programs begin to show promise. Only upgrades of currently existing systems like the Patriot missile – originally designed primarily for air defense against jet fighters, not missile defense – have proceeded generally on course.

Most damaging of all was the decision in 1993 to terminate the “Brilliant Pebbles” project. This legacy of the original Reagan-era “Star Wars” effort had matured to the point where it was becoming feasible to develop a space-based interceptor capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the early or middle portion of their flight – far preferable than attempting to hit individual warheads surrounded by clusters of decoys on their final course toward their targets. But since a space-based system would violate the ABM Treaty, the administration killed the “Brilliant Pebbles” program, choosing instead to proceed with a ground-based interceptor and radar system – one that will be costly without being especially effective.

While there is an argument to be made for “terminal” ground-based interceptors as an element in a larger architecture of missile defenses, it deserves the lowest rather than the first priority. The first element in any missile defense network should be a galaxy of surveillance satellites with sensors capable of acquiring enemy ballistic missiles immediately upon launch. Once a missile is tracked and targeted, this information needs

to be instantly disseminated through a world-wide command-and-control system, including direct links to interceptors. To address the special problems of theater-range ballistic missiles, theater-level defenses should be layered as well. In addition to space-based systems, these theater systems should include both land- and sea-based interceptors, to allow for deployment to trouble spots to reinforce theater systems already in place or to cover gaps where no defenses exist. In addition, they should be "two-tiered," providing close-in "point defense" of valuable targets and forces as well as upper-level, "theater-wide" coverage.

Current programs could provide the necessary density for a layered approach to theater missile defense, although funding for each component has been inadequate, especially for the upper-tier, sea based effort, known as the Navy Theater-Wide program. Point defense is to be provided by the Patriot Advanced Capability, Level 3, or PAC-3 version of the Patriot air defense missile and by the Navy Area Defense system, likewise an upgrade of the current Standard air defense missile and the Aegis radar system. Both systems are on the verge of being deployed.

These lower-tier defenses, though they will be capable of providing protection against the basic Scuds and Scud variants that comprise the arsenals of most American adversaries today, are less effective against longer-range, higher-velocity missiles that several states have under development. Moreover, they will be less effective against missiles with more complex warheads or those that break apart, as many Iraqi

modified Scuds did during the Gulf War. And finally, point defenses, even when they successfully intercept an incoming missile, may not offset the effects against weapons of mass destruction.

Thus the requirement for upper-tier, theater-wide defenses like the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Theater-Wide systems. Though housed in a Patriot-like launcher, THAAD is an entirely new system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles earlier in their flight, in the so-called "mid-course." The Navy Theater-Wide system is based upon the Aegis system, with an upgraded radar and higher-velocity – though intentionally slowed down to meet administration concerns over violating the ABM Treaty – version of the Standard missile. The THAAD system has enjoyed recent test success, but development of the Navy Theater-Wide system has been hampered by lack of funds. Similarly, a fifth component of a theater-wide network of ballistic missile defenses, the Air Force's airborne laser project, has suffered from insufficient funding. This system, which mounts a high energy laser in a 747 aircraft, is designed to intercept theater ballistic missiles in their earliest, or "boost" phase, when they are most vulnerable.

To maximize their effectiveness, these theater-level interceptors should receive continuous targeting information directly from a global constellation of satellites carrying infrared sensors capable of detecting ballistic missile launches as they happen. The low-earth-orbit tier of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS Low), now under development by the Air Force, will provide continuous observations of ballistic missiles in the boost, midcourse and reentry phases of attack. Current missile tracking radars can see objects only above the horizon and must be placed in friendly territory; consequently, they are most effective only in the later phases of a ballistic missile's flight. SBIRS Low, however, can see a hostile missile earlier in

its trajectory, increasing times for interception and multiplying the effectiveness of theater-range interceptors by cueing their radars with targeting data. It will also provide precise launch-point information, allowing theater forces a better chance to destroy hostile launchers before more missiles can be fired. There is also a SBIRS High project, but both SBIRS programs have suffered budget cuts that are to delay their deployments by two years.

But to be most effective, this array global reconnaissance and targeting satellites should be linked to a global network of space-based interceptors (or space-based lasers). In fact, it is misleading to think of such a system as a "national" missile defense system, for it would be a vital element in theater defenses, protecting U.S. allies or expeditionary forces abroad from longer-range theater weapons. This is why the Bush Administration's missile defense architecture, which is almost identical to the network described above, was called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). By contrast, the Clinton Administration's plan to develop limited national missile defenses based upon Minuteman III missiles fitted with a so-called "exoatmospheric kill vehicle" is the most technologically challenging, most expensive, and least effective form of long-range ballistic missile defense. Indeed, the Clinton Administration's differentiation between theater and national missile defense systems is yet another legacy of the ABM Treaty, one that does not fit the current strategic circumstances. Moreover, by differentiating between national and theater defenses, current plans drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, and risk "decoupling." Conversely, American interests will diverge from those of our allies if theater defenses can protect our friends and forces abroad, but the American people at home remain threatened.

In the post-Cold War era, America and its allies, rather than the Soviet Union, have become the primary objects of deterrence

and it is states like Iraq, Iran and North Korea who most wish to develop deterrent capabilities. Projecting conventional military forces or simply asserting political influence abroad, particularly in times of crisis, will be far more complex and constrained when the American homeland or the territory of our allies is subject to attack by otherwise weak rogue regimes capable of cobbling together a miniscule ballistic missile force. Building an effective, robust, layered, global system of missile defenses is a prerequisite for maintaining American preeminence.

Space and Cyberspace

No system of missile defenses can be fully effective without placing sensors and weapons in space. Although this would appear to be creating a potential new theater of warfare, in fact space has been militarized for the better part of four decades. Weather, communications, navigation and reconnaissance satellites are increasingly essential elements in American military power. Indeed, U.S. armed forces are uniquely dependent upon space. As the 1996 Joint Strategy Review, a precursor to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, concluded, "Space is already inextricably linked to military operations on land, on the sea, and in the air." The report of the National Defense Panel agreed: "Unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic interest of the United States."

Given the advantages U.S. armed forces enjoy as a result of this unrestricted use of space, it is shortsighted to expect potential adversaries to refrain from attempting to offset to disable or offset U.S. space capabilities. And with the proliferation of space know-how and related technology around the world, our adversaries will inevitably seek to enjoy many of the same space advantages in the future. Moreover, "space commerce" is a growing part of the global economy. In 1996, commercial

launches exceeded military launches in the United States, and commercial revenues exceeded government expenditures on space. Today, more than 1,100 commercial companies across more than 50 countries are developing, building, and operating space systems.

Many of these commercial space systems have direct military applications, including information from global positioning system constellations and better-than-one-meter resolution imaging satellites. Indeed, 95 percent of current U.S. military communications are carried over commercial circuits, including commercial communications satellites. The U.S. Space Command foresees that in the coming decades,

an adversary will have sophisticated regional situational awareness. Enemies may very well know, in near-real time, the disposition of all forces....In fact, national military forces, paramilitary units, terrorists, and any other potential adversaries will share the high ground of space with the United States and its allies. Adversaries may also share the same commercial satellite services for communications, imagery, and navigation....The space "playing field" is leveling rapidly, so U.S. forces will be increasingly vulnerable. Though adversaries will benefit greatly from space, losing the use of space may be more devastating to the United States. It would be intolerable for U.S. forces...to be deprived of capabilities in space.

In short, the unequivocal supremacy in space enjoyed by the United States today will be increasingly at risk. As Colin Gray and John Sheldon have written, "Space control is not an avoidable issue. It is not an optional extra." For U.S. armed forces to continue to assert military preeminence, control of space – defined by Space Command as "the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the

space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space" – must be an essential element of our military strategy. If America cannot maintain that control, its ability to conduct global military operations will be severely complicated, far more costly, and potentially fatally compromised.



As exemplified by the Global Positioning Satellite above, space has become a new 'international commons' where commercial and security interests are intertwined.

The complexity of space control will only grow as commercial activity increases. American and other allied investments in space systems will create a requirement to secure and protect these space assets; they are already an important measure of American power. Yet it will not merely be enough to protect friendly commercial uses of space. As Space Command also recognizes, the United States must also have the capability to deny America's adversaries the use of commercial space platforms for military purposes in times of crises and conflicts. Indeed, space is likely to become the new "international commons," where commercial and security interests are intertwined and related. Just as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about "sea-power" at the beginning of the 20th century in this sense, American strategists will be forced to regard "space-power" in the 21st.

To ensure America's control of space in the near term, the minimum requirements are to develop a robust capability to transport systems to space, carry on operations once there, and service and recover space systems as needed. As outlined by Space Command, carrying out this program would include a mix of re-useable and expendable launch vehicles and vehicles that can operate within space, including "space tugs to deploy, reconstitute, replenish, refurbish, augment, and sustain" space systems. But, over the longer term, maintaining control of space will inevitably require the application of force both in space and from space, including but not limited to anti-missile defenses and defensive systems capable of protecting U.S. and allied satellites; space control cannot be sustained in any other fashion, with conventional land, sea, or airforce, or by electronic warfare. This eventuality is already recognized by official U.S. national space policy, which states that the "Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control and *force application*." (Emphasis added.)

In the future, it will be necessary to unite the current SPACECOM vision for control of space to the institutional responsibilities and interests of a separate military service.

In sum, the ability to preserve American military preeminence in the future will rest in increasing measure on the ability to operate in space militarily; both the requirements for effective global missile defenses and projecting global conventional military power demand it. Unfortunately, neither the Clinton Administration nor past U.S. defense reviews have established a

coherent policy and program for achieving this goal.

Ends and Means of Space Control

As with defense spending more broadly, the state of U.S. "space forces" – the systems required to ensure continued access and eventual control of space – has deteriorated over the past decade, and few new initiatives or programs are on the immediate horizon. The U.S. approach to space has been one of dilatory drift. As Gen. Richard Myers, commander-in-chief of SPACECOM, put it, "Our Cold War-era capabilities have atrophied," even though those capabilities are still important today. And while Space Command has a clear vision of what must be done in space, it speaks equally clearly about "the question of resources." As the command succinctly notes its long-range plan: "When we match the reality of space dependence against resource trends, we find a problem."

But in addition to the problem of lack of resources, there is an institutional problem. Indeed, some of the difficulties in maintaining U.S. military space supremacy result from the bureaucratic "black hole" that prevents the SPACECOM vision from gaining the support required to carry it out. For one, U.S. military space planning remains linked to the ups and downs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. America's difficulties in reducing the cost of space launches – perhaps the single biggest hurdle to improving U.S. space capabilities overall – result in part from the requirements and dominance of NASA programs over the past several decades, most notably the space shuttle program. Secondly, within the national security bureaucracy, the majority of space investment decisions are made by the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force, neither of which considers military operations outside the earth's atmosphere as a primary mission. And there is no question that in an era of tightened

budgets, investments in space-control capabilities have suffered for lack of institutional support and have been squeezed out by these organization's other priorities. Although, under the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the mid-1980s, the unified commanders – of which SPACECOM is one – have a greater say in Pentagon programming and budgeting, these powers remain secondary to the traditional “raise-and-train” powers of the separate services.

Therefore, over the long haul, it will be necessary to unite the essential elements of the current SPACECOM vision to the resource-allocation and institution-building responsibilities of a military service. In addition, it is almost certain that the conduct of warfare in outer space will differ as much from traditional air warfare as air warfare has from warfare at sea or on land; space warfare will demand new organizations, operational strategies, doctrines and training schemes. Thus, the argument to replace U.S. Space Command with U.S. Space Forces – a separate service under the Defense Department – is compelling. While it is conceivable that, as military space capabilities develop, a transitory “Space Corps” under the Department of the Air Force might make sense, it ought to be regarded as an intermediary step, analogous to the World War II-era Army Air Corps, not to the Marine Corps, which remains a part of the Navy Department. If space control is an essential element for maintaining American military preeminence in the decades to come, then it will be imperative to reorganize the Department of Defense to ensure that its institutional structure reflects new military realities.

Cyberspace, or ‘Net-War’

If outer space represents an emerging medium of warfare, then “cyberspace,” and in particular the Internet hold similar promise and threat. And as with space, access to and use of cyberspace and the Internet are emerging elements in global

commerce, politics and power. Any nation wishing to assert itself globally must take account of this other new “global commons.”

The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in warfare and human political conflict. From the early use of the Internet by Zapatista insurgents in Mexico to the war in Kosovo, communication by computer has added a new dimension to warfare. Moreover, the use of the Internet to spread computer viruses reveals how easy it can be to disrupt the normal functioning of commercial and even military computer networks. Any nation which cannot assure the free and secure access of its citizens to these systems will sacrifice an element of its sovereignty and its power.

Although many concepts of “cyber-war” have elements of science fiction about them, and the role of the Defense Department in establishing “control,” or even what “security” on the Internet means, requires a consideration of a host of legal, moral and political issues, there nonetheless will remain an imperative to be able to deny America and its allies' enemies the ability to disrupt or paralyze either the military's or the commercial sector's computer networks. Conversely, an offensive capability could offer America's military and political leaders an invaluable tool in disabling an adversary in a decisive manner.


Taken together, the prospects for space war or “cyberspace war” represent the truly revolutionary potential inherent in the notion of military transformation. These future forms of warfare are technologically immature, to be sure. But, it is also clear that for the U.S. armed forces to remain preminent and avoid an Achilles Heel in the exercise of its power they must be sure that these potential future forms of warfare favor America just as today's air, land and sea warfare reflect United States military dominance.

Transforming U.S. Conventional Forces

Much has been written in recent years about the need to transform the conventional armed forces of the United States to take advantage of the “revolution in military affairs,” the process of transformation within the Defense Department has yet to bear serious fruit. The two visions of transformation promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff – Joint Vision 2010 and the just-released Joint Vision 2020 – have been broad statements of principles and of commitment to transformation, but very little change can be seen in the acquisition of new weapons systems. Indeed, new ideas like the so-called “arsenal ship” which might actually have accelerated the process of

transformation have been opposed and seen their programs terminated by the services. Neither does the current process of “joint experimentation” seem likely to speed the process of change. In sum, the transformation of the bulk of U.S. armed forces has been stalled. Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring mission – worthy of a constant allocation of dollars and forces – it will remain stillborn.

There are some very good reasons why this is so. In an era of insufficient defense resources, it has been necessary to fund or staff any efforts at transformation by short-changing other, more immediate, requirements. Consequently, the attempt to deal with the longer-term risks that a failure to transform U.S. armed forces will create has



threatened to raise the risks those forces face today; this is an unpleasant dilemma for a force straining to meet the burdens of its current missions. Activity today tends to drive out innovation for tomorrow. Second, the lack of an immediate military competitor contributes to a sense of complacency about the extent and duration of American military dominance. Third, and perhaps most telling, the process of transformation has yet to be linked to the strategic tasks necessary to maintain American military dominance. This is in part a problem for transformation enthusiasts, who are better at forecasting technological developments than aligning those technological developments with the requirements for American preeminence. Thus consideration of the so-called “anti-access problem” – the observation that the proliferation of long-range, precision-strike capabilities will complicate the projection of U.S. military power and forces – has proceeded without much discussion of the strategic effects on U.S. allies and American credibility of increased reliance on weapons and forces based in the United States rather than operating from forward locations. There may be many solutions to the anti-access problem, but only a few that will tend to maintain rather than dilute American geopolitical leadership.

Further, transformation advocates tend to focus on the nature of revolutionary new capabilities rather than how to achieve the necessary transformation: thus the National Defense Panel called for a strategy *of* transformation without formulating a strategy *for* transformation. There has been little discussion of exactly how to change today's force into tomorrow's force, while maintaining U.S. military preeminence along the way. Therefore, it will be necessary to undertake a two-stage process of *transition* – whereby today's “legacy” forces are modified and selectively modernized with new systems readily available – and true *transformation* – when the results of vigorous experimentation introduce radically new weapons, concepts

of operation, and organization to the armed services.

This two-stage process is likely to take several decades. Yet, although the precise shape and direction of the transformation of U.S. armed forces remains a matter for rigorous experimentation and analysis (and will be discussed in more detail below in the section on the armed services), it is possible to foresee the general characteristics of the current revolution in military affairs. Broadly speaking, these cover several principal areas of capabilities:

- **Improved situational awareness and sharing of information,**
- **Range and endurance of platforms and weapons,**
- **Precision and miniaturization,**
- **Speed and stealth,**
- **Automation and simulation.**

These characteristics will be combined in various ways to produce new military capabilities. New classes of sensors – commercial and military; on land, on and under sea, in the air and in space – will be linked together in dense networks that can be rapidly configured and reconfigured to provide future commanders with an unprecedented understanding of the battlefield. Communications networks will be equally if not more ubiquitous and dense, capable of carrying vast amounts of information securely to provide widely dispersed and diverse units with a common picture of the battlefield. Conversely, stealth techniques will be applied more broadly, creating “hider-finder” games of cat-and-mouse between sophisticated military forces. The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will make it much easier to project military power around the globe. Munitions themselves will become increasingly accurate, while new methods of attack – electronic, “non-lethal,” biological – will be more widely available. Low-cost, long-endurance UAVs,

and even unattended "missiles in a box" will allow not only for long-range power projection but for sustained power projection. Simulation technologies will vastly improve military training and mission planning.

Although it may take several decades for the process of transformation to unfold, in time, the art of warfare on air, land, and sea will be vastly different than it is today, and "combat" likely will take place in new dimensions: in space, "cyber-space," and perhaps the world of microbes. Air warfare may no longer be fought by pilots manning tactical fighter aircraft sweeping the skies of opposing fighters, but a regime dominated by long-range, stealthy unmanned craft. On land, the clash of massive, combined-arms armored forces may be replaced by the dashes of much lighter, stealthier and information-intensive forces, augmented by fleets of robots, some small enough to fit in soldiers' pockets. Control of the sea could be largely determined not by fleets of surface combatants and aircraft carriers, but from land- and space-based systems, forcing navies to maneuver and fight underwater. Space itself will become a theater of war, as nations gain access to space capabilities and come to rely on them; further, the distinction between military and commercial space systems – combatants and noncombatants – will become blurred. Information systems will become an important focus of attack, particularly for U.S. enemies seeking to short-circuit sophisticated American forces. And advanced forms of biological warfare that can "target" specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.

This is merely a glimpse of the possibilities inherent in the process of transformation, not a precise prediction. Whatever the shape and direction of this revolution in military affairs, the implications for continued American military preeminence will be profound. As argued above, there are many reasons to believe that U.S. forces already possess nascent revolutionary capabilities, particularly in the realms of intel-

ligence, command and control, and long-range precision strikes. Indeed, these capabilities are sufficient to allow the armed services to begin an "interim," short- to medium-term process of transformation right away, creating new force designs and operational concepts – designs and concepts different than those contemplated by the current defense program – to maximize the capabilities that already exist. But these must be viewed as merely a way-station toward a more thoroughgoing transformation.

The individual services also need to be given greater bureaucratic and legal standing if they are to achieve these goals. Though a full discussion of this issue is outside the purview of this study, the reduced importance of the civilian secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs of staff is increasingly inappropriate to the

Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring military mission – worthy of a constant allocation of dollars and forces – it will remain stillborn.

demands of a rapidly changing technological, strategic and geopolitical landscape. The centralization of power under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff, and the increased role of the theater commanders-in-chief, products of Cold-War-era defense reforms and especially the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, have created a process of defense decision-making that often elevates immediate concerns above long-term needs. In an era of uncertainty and transformation, it is more important to foster competing points of view about the how to apply new technologies to enduring missions.

This is especially debilitating to the process of transformation, which has

become infected with a “lowest common denominator” approach. “Jointness” remains an important dimension of U.S. military power and it will be necessary to consider the joint role of the weapons, concepts of operations and organizations created through the process of transformation. The capability for seamless and decisive joint operations is an important aspect of warfare. Yet, the process of transformation will be better served by fostering a spirit of service competition and experimentation. At this early stage of transformation, it is unclear which technologies will prove most effective; better to undertake a variety of competing experiments, even though some may prove to be dead-ends. To achieve this goal, service institutions and prerogatives must be strengthened to restore a better balance within the Department of Defense. The essential first step is to rebuild service secretariats to attract highly talented people who enjoy the political trust of the administration they serve. A parallel second step is to reinvigorate the service staffs and to select energetic service chiefs of staff. At a time of rapid change, American military preeminence is more likely to be sustained through a vigorous competition for missions and resources than through a bureaucracy – and a conception of “jointness” – defined at the very height of the Cold War.

Toward a 21st Century Army

There is very little question that the development of new technologies increasingly will make massed, mechanized armies vulnerable in high-intensity wars against sophisticated forces. The difficulty of moving large formations in open terrain, even at night – suggested during the battle of Khafji during the Gulf War – has diminished the role of tank armies in the face of the kind of firepower and precision that American air power can bring to bear. This is an undeniable change in the nature of advanced land warfare, a change that will alter the size, structure and nature of the U.S. Army.

Yet the United States would be unwise to accept the larger proposition that the strategic value of land power has been eroded to the point where the nation no longer needs to maintain large ground forces. As long as wars and other military operations derive their logic from political purposes, land power will remain the truly decisive form of military power. Indeed, it is ironic that, as post-Cold-War military operations have become more sophisticated and more reliant on air power and long-range strikes, they have become less politically decisive. American military preeminence will continue to rest in significant part on the ability to maintain sufficient land forces to achieve political goals such as removing a dangerous and hostile regime when necessary. Thus, future Army forces – and land forces more broadly – must devise ways to survive and maneuver in a radically changed technological environment. The Army must become more tactically agile, more operationally mobile, and more strategically deployable. It must increasingly rely on other services to concentrate firepower when required, while concentrating on its “core competencies” of maneuver, situational awareness, and political decisiveness. In particular the process of Army transformation should:

- **Move ahead with experiments to create new kinds of independent units using systems now entering final development and early procurement – such as the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and the HIMARS light-weight rocket artillery system – capable of longer-range operations and self-deployments. Once mature, such units would replace forward-based heavy forces.**
- **Experiment vigorously to understand the long-term implications of the revolution in military affairs for land forces. In particular, the Army should develop ways to deploy and maneuver against adversaries with**

improved long-range strike capabilities.

As argued above, the two-stage process of transforming the U.S. armed forces is sufficiently important to consider it a separate mission for the military services and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The need for both the near-term and long-term transformation requires that a separate organization within these institutions act as the advocate and agent of revolutionary change. For the U.S. Army, the appropriate home for the transformation process is the Training and Doctrine Command. The service needs to establish a permanent unit under its Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to oversee the process of research, development and experimentation required to transform today's Army into the Army of the future.

With the need to field the independent, combined-arms units described above, this "transformation laboratory" must be established as rapidly as possible. Although many of the weapons systems already exist or are readily available, the introduction of new systems such as an armored gun system, wheeled personnel carrier such as the Light Armored Vehicle or the HIMARS rocket artillery system in sufficient numbers will take several years. Further, the process of "digitization" – the proliferation of information and communications in tactical units – must be accelerated. Finally, the Army needs to increase its investment in selected new systems such as UAVs and the Comanche scout helicopter to field them more rapidly. These will need to be integrated into a coherent organization and doctrinal concept. The process of near-term experimentation needs to be sharply focused on meeting the Army's near- and mid-term needs, and to produce the new kinds of units needed.

Yet this initial process of transformation must be just the first step toward a more radical reconfiguring of the Army. Even while the Army is fielding new units that

maximize current capabilities and introduce selected new systems, and understanding the challenges and opportunities of information-intensive operations, it must begin to seek answers to fundamental questions about future land forces. These questions include issues of strategic deployability, how to maneuver on increasingly transparent battlefields and how to operate in urban environments, to name but a few. If the first phase of transformation requires the better part of the next decade to complete, the Army must then be ready to begin to implement more far-reaching changes. Moreover, the technologies, operational concepts and organizations must be relatively mature – they can not merely exist as briefing charts or laboratory concepts. As the first phase of transformation winds down, initial field experiments for this second and more profound phase of change must begin.

While the exact scope and nature of such change is a matter for experimentation, Army studies already suggest that it will be dramatic. Consider just the potential changes that might effect the infantryman. Future soldiers may operate in encapsulated, climate-controlled, powered fighting suits, laced with sensors, and boasting chameleon-like "active" camouflage. "Skin-patch" pharmaceuticals help regulate fears, focus concentration and enhance endurance and strength. A display mounted on a soldier's helmet permits a comprehensive view of the battlefield – in effect to look around corners and over hills – and allows the soldier to access the entire combat information and intelligence system while filtering incoming data to prevent overload. Individual weapons are more lethal, and a soldier's ability to call for highly precise and reliable indirect fires – not only from Army systems but those of other services – allows each individual to have great influence over huge spaces. Under the "Land Warrior" program, some Army experts envision a "squad" of seven soldiers able to dominate an area the size of the Gettysburg battlefield – where, in 1863, some 165,000 men fought.



The Army's 'Land Warrior' experiments will greatly increase the value of dismounted infantry.

Even radical concepts such as those considered under the "Land Warrior" project do not involve outlandish technologies or flights of science fiction. Many already exist today, and many follow developments in

civilian medical, communications, information science and other fields of research. While initiating the process of transformation in the near term, and while fielding new kinds of units to meet current missions, the Army must simultaneously invest and experiment vigorously to create the systems, soldiers, units and concepts to maintain American preeminence in land combat for the longer-term future.

Global Strikes from Air and Space

The rapidly growing ability of the U.S. Air Force to conduct precision strikes, over increasingly greater range, marks a significant change in the nature of high-technology warfare. From the Gulf War through the air war for Kosovo, the sophistication of Air Force precision bombing has continued to grow. Yet,

ironically, as the Air Force seems to achieve the capabilities first dreamt of by the great pioneers and theorists of air power, the "technological moment" of manned aircraft may be entering a sunset phase. In retrospect, it is the sophistication of highly accurate munitions in the Kosovo campaign that stands out – even as the stealthy B-2 bomber was delivering satellite-guided bombs on 30-hour round-trip missions from Missouri to the Balkans and back, so was the Navy's ancient, slow, propeller-driven P-3 Orion aircraft, originally designed for submarine hunting, delivering precision-guided standoff weapons with much the same effectiveness. As the relative value of electronic systems and precision munitions increases, the need for advanced manned aircraft appears to be lessening. Moreover, as the importance of East Asia grows in U.S. military strategy, the requirements for range and endurance may outweigh traditional measures of aircraft performance. In sum, although the U.S. Air Force is enjoying a moment of technological and tactical supremacy, it is uncertain that the service is positioning itself well for a transformed future.

In particular, the Air Force's emphasis on traditional, tactical air operations is handicapping the nation's ability to maintain and extend its dominance in space. Over the past decade, the Air Force has intermittently styled itself as a "space and air force," and has prepared a number of useful long-range studies that underscore the centrality of space control in future military operations. Yet the service's pattern of investments has belied such an understanding of the future; as described above, the Air Force has ploughed every available dollar into the F-22 program. While the F-22 is a superb fighter and perhaps a workable strike aircraft, its value under a transformed paradigm of high-technology warfare may exceed its cost – had not the majority of the F-22 program already been paid for, the decision to proceed with the project today would have been dubious. As also argued

above, further investments in the Joint Strike Fighter program would be more expensive still and would forestall any major transformation efforts. Therefore, the Air Force should:

- **Complete its planned F-22 procurement while terminating its participation in the JSF program and upgrading the capabilities of existing tactical aircraft, especially by purchasing additional precision munitions and developing new ones and increasing numbers of support aircraft to allow for longer-range operations and greater survivability;**
- **Increase efforts to develop long-range and high-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, not merely for reconnaissance but for strike and even air-combat missions;**
- **Pursue the development of large-bodied stealthy aircraft for a variety of roles, including lift, refueling, and other support missions as well as strike missions.**
- **Target significant new investments toward creating capabilities for operating in space, including inexpensive launch vehicles, new satellites and transatmospheric vehicles, in preparation for a decision as to whether space warfare is sufficiently different from combat within earth's atmosphere so as to require a separate "space service."**

Such a transformation would in fact better realize the Air Force's stated goal of becoming a service with true global reach and global strike capabilities. At the moment, today's Air Force gives a glimpse of such capabilities, and does a remarkable job of employing essentially tactical systems in a world-wide fashion. And, for the period of transition mandated by these legacy systems and by the limitations inherent in

the F-22, the Air Force will remain primarily capable of sophisticated theater-strike warfare. Yet to truly transform itself for the coming century, the Air Force must accelerate its efforts to create the new systems – and, to repeat, the space-based systems – that are necessary to shift the scope of air operations from the theater level to the global level. While mounting large-scale and sustained air campaigns will continue to rely heavily upon in-theater assets, a greater balance must be placed on long-range systems.

The Navy Returns 'To the Sea'

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has made a dramatic break with past doctrine, which emphasized the need to establish control of the sea. But with American control of the "international commons" without serious challenge – for the moment – the Navy now preaches the gospel of power projection ashore and operations in littoral waters. In a series of posture statements and white papers beginning with "...From the Sea" in 1992 and leading to 1998's "Forward...from the Sea: Anytime, Anywhere," the Navy, in cooperation with the Marine Corps, embraced this view of close-in operations; to quote the original "From the Sea:"

Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations allows us to resize our Naval Forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the "littoral" or coastlines of the earth....This strategic direction, derived from the National Security Strategy, represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea—toward joint operations conducted from the sea.

The "From the Sea" series also has made the case for American military presence around the world and equated this forward presence specifically with naval presence. Following the lead of the

Quadrennial Defense Review, the Navy and Marine Corps argue that “shaping and responding require presence – maintaining forward-deployed, combat-ready naval forces. Being ‘on-scene’ matters! It is and will remain a distinctly naval contribution to peacetime engagement....The inherent flexibility of naval forces allows a minor crisis or conflict to be resolved quickly by on-scene forces.” The sea services further have argued that the conduct of these presence missions requires the same kinds of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups that were needed to fight the Soviet Union.

The balanced, concentrated striking power of aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups lies at the heart of our nation's ability to execute its strategy of peacetime engagement. Their power reassures allies and deters would-be aggressors....The combined capabilities of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group offer air, sea, and land power that can be applied across the full spectrum of conflict.

Thus, while the Navy admitted that the strategic realities of the post-Soviet era called for a reordering of sea service mission priorities and a resizing of the fleet, it has yet to consider that the new era also requires a reorientation of its pattern of operations and a reshaping of the fleet. Moreover, over the longer term, the Navy's ability to operate in littoral waters is going to be increasingly difficult, as the Navy itself realizes. As Rear Adm. Malcolm Fages, director of the Navy's submarine warfare division, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “A variety of independent studies reviewing key trends in future naval warfare have concluded that 21st century littoral warfare could be marked by the use of asymmetrical means to counter a U.S. Navy whose doctrine and force structure projects...power ashore from the littorals.” Already potential adversaries from China to Iran are investing in quiet diesel submarines, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise and other shore- and sea-launched

anti-ship missiles, and other weapons that will complicate the operations of U.S. fleets in restricted, littoral waters. The Chinese navy has just recently taken delivery of the first of several planned *Sovremenny* class destroyers, purchased along with supersonic, anti-ship cruise missiles from Russia, greatly improving China's ability to attack U.S. Navy ships.



China's acquisition of modern Russian destroyers and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles will complicate U.S. surface fleet operations.

In addition, America's adversaries will gradually acquire the ability to target surface fleets, not only in littoral waters but perhaps on the open oceans. Regional powers have increasing access to commercial satellites that not only can provide them with detection and militarily useful targeting information, but provide also important elements of the command, control and communication capabilities that would be needed. As Fages put it, “Of concern in the 21st century is the potential that the combination of space-based reconnaissance, long-range precision strike weapons and robust command and control networks could make non-stealthy platforms increasingly vulnerable to attack near the world's littorals.”

To preserve and enhance the ability to project naval power ashore and to conduct strike operations – as well as assume a large role in the network of ballistic missile defense systems – the Navy must accelerate the process of near-term transformation. It must also address the longer-term challenge of the revolution in military

affairs, to ensure that the America rules the waves in the future as it does today. Navy transformation should be a two-phase process:

- **Near-term Navy transformation should accelerate the construction of planned generations of 21st century surface combatants with increased stealth characteristics, improved and varied missiles and long-range guns for strikes ashore. Efforts to implement “network-centric” warfare under the cooperative engagement concept should be accelerated. The Navy should begin to structure itself for its emerging role in missile defenses, determining, for example, whether current surface combatant vessels and a traditional rotational deployment scheme are apropos for this mission.**
- **In the longer term, the Navy must determine whether its current focus on littoral operations can be sustained under a transformed paradigm of naval warfare and how to retain control of open-ocean areas in the future. Experiments in operating varied fleets of UAVs should begin now, perhaps employing a retired current carrier. Consideration should be directed toward other forms of unmanned sea and air vehicles and toward an expanded role for submarines.**

The shifting pattern of naval operations and the changes in force structure outlined above also should show the way for a transformation of the Navy for the emerging environment for war at sea. In the immediate future, this means an improvement in naval strike capabilities for joint operations in littoral waters and improved command and control capabilities. Yet the Navy must soon prepare for a renewed challenge on the open oceans, beginning now to develop ways to project power as the risk to surface ships rises substantially. In both cases, the

Navy should continue to shift away from carrier-centered operations to “networks” of varied kinds of surface ships, perhaps leading to fleets composed of stealthy surface ships and submerged vessels.

The focus of the Navy’s near-term transformation efforts should be on enhancing its ability to conduct strike operations and improving its contributions to joint operations on land by patrolling littoral waters. The Navy’s initiatives to wring the most out of its current vessels through the better gathering and distribution of information – what the Navy calls “network-centric” warfare as opposed to “platform-centric” warfare – should be accelerated. In addition to improving intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and command and control networks, the Navy should, as described above, acquire larger fleets of surface combatants and submarines capable of launching cruise missiles. Expanding the Navy’s fleet of surface combatants primarily should provide an opportunity to speed up research and development of the new classes of destroyers and cruisers – and perhaps new frigates – while perhaps extending only modestly current destroyer programs.

Moreover, the Navy should accelerate efforts to develop other strike warfare munitions and weapons. In addition to procuring greater numbers of attack submarines, the Navy should convert four of its Trident ballistic missile submarines to conventional strike platforms, much as the Air Force has done with manned bombers. Further, the Navy should develop other strike weaponry beyond current-generation Tomahawk cruise missiles. Adding the Joint Direct Attack Munition – applying Global-Positioning-System guidance to current “dumb” bombs – will improve the precision-strike capabilities of current naval aircraft, but improving the range and accuracy of naval gunfire, or deploying a version of the Army Tactical Missile System at sea would also increase the Navy’s

contribution to joint warfare in littoral regions.

However, improving the ability of current-generation ships and weapons to work together is important, but may not address the most fundamental nature of this transformation. The Navy has already demonstrated the ability to operate unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles from submarines and is improving its abilities to communicate to submarines; as long as submerged vessels remain relatively stealthy, they may be able to operate where surface vessels face high risks.

Thus, the Navy should devote an element of its force structure to a deeper investigation of the revolution in military affairs. Beyond immediate opportunities such as conversion of Trident submarines, consideration should be given to employing a deactivated carrier to better understand the possibilities of operating large fleets of UAVs at sea. Likewise, submerged "missile pods," either permanently deployed or laid covertly by submarines in times of crisis, could increase strike capabilities without risking surface vessels in littoral waters. In general, if the Navy is moving toward "network-centric" warfare, it should explore ways of increasing the number of "nodes on the net."

For the moment, the U.S. Navy enjoys a level of global hegemony that surpasses that of the Royal Navy during its heyday. While the ability to project naval power ashore is, as it has always been, an important subsidiary mission for the Navy, it may not remain the service's primary focus through the coming decades. Over the longer term –

but, given the service life of ships, well within the approaching planning horizons of the U.S. Navy – the Navy's focus may return again to keeping command of the open oceans and sea lines of communication. Absent a rigorous program of experimentation to investigate the nature of the revolution in military affairs as it applies to war at sea, the Navy might face a future Pearl Harbor – as unprepared for war in the post-carrier era as it was unprepared for war at the dawn of the carrier age.

As Goes the Navy, So Goes the Marine Corps

Ironically for a service that is embracing certain aspects of the revolution in military affairs, the long-term pattern of transformation poses the deepest questions for the Marine Corps. For if the survivability of surface vessels increasingly will be in doubt, the Marines' means of delivery must likewise come into question. Although the Corps is quite right to develop faster, longer-range means of ship-to-shore operations in the V-22 and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, the potential vulnerability of Marine amphibious ships is almost certain to become the limiting factor in future operations. While the utility of Marine infantry in lower-intensity operations will remain high, the Marines' ability to contribute to high-technology wars – at least when operating from the ships that they rely on for everything from command and communications to logistics – may become marginalized. Also, the relatively slow speeds of Marine ships limit their flexibility in times of crisis.

Over the next decade, the Marines' efforts toward transformation ought to allow the Corps to lighten its structures and rely on other services, and especially the Navy, to provide much of its firepower. This will permit the Marines to shed many of the heavy systems acquired during the Cold War, to reduce its artillery (the Marines, typically, operate the oldest artillery systems

that are less effective and efficient in combat and more of a logistical burden) and eventually its fixed-wing aviation. Indeed, many Marine F-18s and EA-6Bs spend the bulk of their time on regular aircraft carrier rotations and in support of Air Force operations. Likewise, the long-term future of the AV-8B Harrier is in doubt. The Marines operate a relatively small and increasingly obsolescent fleet of Harriers; while service-life extension programs may be possible, the Corps will soon approach the day where it must contemplate life without fixed-wing air support of its own, especially if the Joint Strike Fighter program is terminated. Consequently, the Marine Corps should consider development of a “gunship” version of the V-22 and pursue unmanned combat aerial vehicles, as well as accelerating its efforts to develop methods of joint-service fire support.

Thus, the long-term utility of the Marine Corps rests heavily on the prospects for true transformation. As with the Army, if the relationship between firepower and maneuver and situational awareness cannot be redefined, then the relevance of land forces and naval infantry in future wars will be sharply curtailed – and the ability of the United States to undertake politically decisive operations will likewise be limited. The proliferation of technologies for delivering highly accurate fires over increasingly great distances poses a great challenge for both the Army and the Marine Corps, but rather than attempting to compete in the game of applying long-range fires, both services would be better off attempting to complement the vastly improved strike capabilities of the Navy and Air Force, and indeed in linking decisive maneuvers to future space capabilities as well.

Finnish summary

Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan kriittistä diskurssianalyysiä (*critical discourse analysis, CDA*). Näkökulma on teoreettinen: Norman Faircloughin kriittisen diskurssianalyysin malli esitellään kokonaisuudessaan samoin kuin useita siihen kohdistettuja kriittisiä näkökumia. Tarkoituksena on sovittaa näitä osittain vastakkaisia näkemyksiä yhteen ja muodostaa uudenlainen synteesi, jossa suurimmat puutteet on otettu huomioon.

Teoreettisen näkökulman tueksi tarjotaan tekstianalyysi. Tarkoituksena on osoittaa, että Faircloughin malli on hyvä pohja tekstianalyysille, mutta vain jos ollaan tietoisia sen teoreettisista lähtökohdista ja rajoituksista. Uudenkaltainen luenta tai analyysi vaikuttaisi tarjoavan mahdollisen ratkaisun ainakin yhteen Faircloughin keskeiseen ongelmaan: emansipaation (*emancipation*) eli yhteiskunnallisten epäkohtien tunnistamisen ja ratkaisemisen puutteeseen.

Faircloughin malli

Norman Faircloughin kriittisen diskurssianalyysin mallin voidaan sanoa olevan kolmitahoinen tai -tasoinen. Ensimmäinen taso koostuu tekstien kieliopillisesta ja lingvistikisistä analyyseistä. Fairclough ymmärtää tekstin käsitteen laajasti: sillä tarkoitetaan kaikkea merkityksellistä symboliikkaa, ja se sijoittuu diskurssin prosessissa (*process of discourse*) tuottamisen ja tulkinnan välille. Tekstien ideologia paljastuu kielen rakenteista, joita analysoimalla on mahdollista tehdä havaintoja tuotannon yhteiskunnallisista piirteistä, esimerkiksi vallasta ja sen käytöstä. Michael

Hallidayn systeeminen-funktionaalinen kielioppi (*systemic-functional grammar*) on keskeinen Faircloughin mallissa. Sen mukaan kielellä on järjestelmä, joka määrittää mitä on mahdollista sanoa, ja järjestelmän aktuaaliset manifestaatiot määrittyvät puolestaan funktioiden eli tosimaailman tavoitteiden kautta. Myöhemmissä teoksissaan Fairclough on siirtynyt kohti genren ja intertekstuaalisuuden käsitteitä, ilmeisesti siksi, että oleellisten rakenteiden määrittäminen on ollut hyvin vaikeaa.

Mallin toista tasoa voidaan kutsua diskursiivisten tai sosiaalisten käytänteiden tasoksi (*level of discourse/social practice*). Sen tarkoituksena on yhdistää tekstien kielellinen analyysi yhteiskunnalliseen. Tässä on apuna eräänlainen kielellinen analogia: samoin kuin kieli voidaan ymmärtää abstraktina järjestelmänä joka määrittää merkityspotentiaalin, tuotannollisina puitteina ja rajoitteina sekä näiden lopputuloksena varsinaisina ilmentyminä (esim. teksteinä), voidaan myös yhteiskunta ymmärtää samankaltaisesti. Tässä tapauksessa potentiaalin määrittää eräänlainen syvärakenne (*deep structure*) tai ideologia, jota muokkaavat erilaiset instituutiot ja joka lopulta ilmenee erilaisina sosiaalisina tilanteina tai tapahtumina. Koska kaikella inhimillisellä kanssakäymisellä on kielellinen ulottuvuus, voidaan se analogiaa käyttäen helposti yhdistää yhteiskunnalliseen ja tarkastella sitä sosiaalisesta näkökulmasta. Genren käsite ja Mihail Bahtinin ajatukset ovat Faircloughille tärkeitä: niiden avulla kieli on helppo asettaa sosiaaliseen yhteyteen ja tarkastella genrejen suhteita toisiinsa yhteiskunnallisten muutosten indikaattoreina.

Mallin kolmas taso käsittelee yhteiskuntaa ja sen teorioita. Yhteiskuntateoriat voidaan jaotella kolmeen: konsensusteorioihin (*structural-consensus theory*),

konfliktiteorioihin (*structural-conflict theory*) ja toimintateorioihin (*action theory*). Fairclough edustaa marxilaisuudessaan konfliktiteoriaa, mutta myös toimintateoriaa, sillä ehkä tärkein diskurssin teoreetikoista, Michel Foucault, voidaan lukea kyseiseen kategoriaan. Foucault edustaa eräänlaista poststrukturalistista näkemystä, jonka mukaan käytäntö ja diskurssi yhdessä ovat tärkeimpiä yhteiskunnallisia ilmiöitä ja vaikuttavat ajattelutapaamme. Esimerkiksi oikean ja väärän tai terveen ja sairaan käsitteet ovaat diskursiivisia: ne määrittyvät poliittisesti vallankäytön kautta, eivät absoluuttisesti tai objektiivisesti. Faircloughin näkemys yhteiskunnasta on kuitenkin yhdistelmä objektiivisia rakenteita ja subjektiivisia toimintoja, jotka ovat osittain auttamatta ristiriidassa keskenään vaikka mahdollistavatkin yksilön toiminnan tiettyjen rajoitusten puitteissa.

Faircloughin kriitikot

Henry Widdowson kiinnittää huomiota diskurssin käsitteen ongelmallisuuteen. Hänen mukaansa se viittaa sekä lausetta laajempien kielen yksiköiden analyysiin että foucaultlaiseen sosiologiseen tutkimukseen. Faircloughin pyrkimys yhdistää nämä kaksi merkitystä johtaa ongelmiin, koska tekstin ja diskurssin käsitteet sekoittuvat: lausetta suppeammatkin kielen yksiköt ovat merkityksellisiä ja merkityksen pragmaattinen puoli on myös otettava huomioon. Vasta kun perlokuutio (*perlocution*) eli kielen yksilölliset vaikutukset otetaan huomioon, voidaan puhua diskurssista. Epätasa-arvo ei siis voi löytyä pelkästään kielen järjestelmää tutkimalla vaan tarkastelemalla myös tekstin mahdollistamia tulkintoja.

Niinsanottukuvaileva kielitiede (*descriptivelinguistics*) on ongelmallinen. Perinteisen käsityksen mukaan kielellä on järjestelmä (*langue*), ja varsinainen kielenkäyttö (*parole*) on tämän järjestelmän ilmentymiä. Tästä syystä tietyn ilmentymän totuusarvoa tai puutteita ja ansioita ei voida määritellä ainoastaan järjestelmää tutkimalla, vaan on otettava huomioon myös varsinainen merkitysisältö (*subject matter*).

Faircloughin malli operoi vasemmistolaisesta näkökulmasta pyrkien paljastamaan nykyjärjestelmässä piileviä ongelmia. Tätä voidaan kritisoida siitä, että se olettaa jo ennen analyysia maailman toimivan tietyn tavoin, ja analyysin keinoin lopulta ”todistaa” olevansa oikeassa. Tällainen esi-analyttinen näkökulma kuitenkin määrittää tuloksia huomattavasti, eikä näin ollen voida puhua varsinaisesta analyysistä. Myös konteksti jää usein rajoittuneeksi ja ennalta määräytyksi.

Kuten mainittu, diskurssin käsite voidaan ymmärtää kahdella tavalla: kielen järjestelmänä, joka selittyy tutkittavan tekstin välittömän kontekstin avulla, ja sosiokulttuurisina merkityksinä, jotka realisoituvat kielessä. Fairclough esimerkiksi ymmärtää diskurssin lähinnä kielellisenä ja rajoittavana ilmiönä, kun oikeampi tapa olisi nähdä se tiedon ja vallan järjestelmien (*systems of power/knowledge*) yhteenliittymänä ja tuloksena, jonka puitteissa me olemme subjekteja. Diskurssit siis syntyvät monista yhteiskunnallisista lähteistä, eivät vain vasemmistosta tai oikeistosta, ja pitkälti jopa määrittävät mikä on oikein tai väärin. Merkitys ei ole muodossa tai kontekstissa vaan diskurssissa, joka syntyy monimutkaisemmin kuin Fairclough myöntää, ja on samalla sekä mahdollistava että rajoittava.

CDA on pohjimmiltaan marxilaista, ja se mahdollistaa arvottamisen puhtaan objektiivisen kuvailun sijaan. Oletuksena on, että vain valitsemalla rationaalisesti voidaan yhteiskuntaa kehittää parempaan suuntaan, ja tästä syystä jotkut näkevät Foucault'n tavan ajatella lähinnä erilaisuuden kautta epäilyttävänä. Jos ei ole hyvää ja paha vaan ainoastaan erilaisia vallan ilmenemisiä, ei voida tehdä kaikkia hyödyttäviä tasa-arvoistavia valintoja. Näin ei kuitenkaan mielestäni tarvitse olla: Foucault'n näkemys on, että valtaa käytetään aina, oli vallassa kuka tahansa. Ideologinen ja poliittinen vastakkainasettelu ei ole siksi väistämätöntä, mikä on ajatuksena paljon vapauttavampi kuin vaikkapa sosialistinen vallankumous.

Myös analyttiset keinot ovat saaneet kritiikkiä osakseen. Suurimpana ongelmana voidaan nähdä eräänlainen kehämäisyys: analyysin tueksi esitetyt tekstin piirteet esitetään todisteina jostain ideologiasta tai diskurssista, ja ne myös selitetään saman diskurssin avulla. Tärkeämpää olisi tarkastella, millaisia kielenkäytön jaettuja tapoja on olemassa ja miten niitä tietyssä tekstissä käytetään.

Tärkeimpinä kritiikin kohteina voidaan siis pitää pragmatiikan ja asiasisällön unohtamista kielen analyysissä, ideologian ja konfliktin korostamista yhteiskunnan selityksessä ja metodologista kehämäisyyttä. Nämä ongelmat on pyritty ottamaan huomioon tämän tutkielman analyttisemmässä osiossa.

Materiaali ja metodi

Tekstianalyysissä noudatetaan seuraavia periaatteita: perlokuutio ja asiasisältö ovat etualalla, tekstin piirteitä pyritään selittämään eksplisiittisesti ja tekstin kautta, ei

siis todisteina mistään ideologiasta, ja sosiaalinen ulottuvuus pyritään näkemään ”sellaisena kuin se on” sen sijaan, että keskityttäisiin vain sen puutteisiin. Ensiksi tarkastellaan tekstin tuottanutta järjestöä, sen arvoja ja tavoitteita sekä tunnettuja jäseniä ja sitä, millaiseen sosiaaliseen kontekstiin nämä eksplisiittiset yhteydet tekstin ankkuroivat. Toiseksi teksti pyritään ymmärtämään ilman ideologista tai kriittistä painotusta. Viimeiseksi tarkastellaan ”tulkinnan diskurssia” eli yhtä mahdollista tapaa ymmärtää teksti. Kielen systemiset piirteet ja poliittiset näkökulmat ovat siis toissijaisia.

Analysoitava teksti on nimeltään *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century* (RAD), ja sen on tuottanut järjestö The Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Teksti on mielenkiintoinen, koska joidenkin mielestä se on yksi todiste siitä, että WTC-iskut vuonna 2001 eivät olleetkaan terroristien suorittamia. PNAC kertoo tavoitteekseen USA:n globaalien johtajuuden edistämisen lähinnä puolustusmenojen lisäämisen ja aktiivisen ulkopoliitiikan avulla. Sen jäseniä ovat muuten muassa Dick Cheney ja Donald Rumsfeld.

Luenta ja analyysi

RAD:in lähtökohta on, että mikäli puolustusmenoja ei lisätä, USA:n sotavoimat voivat joko suoriutua nykyisistä tehtävistään tai valmistautua tulevaisuutta varten, mutta eivät molempia. Tätä pidetään valitettavana, koska USA on tekstin mukaan maailman ainoa supervaltta ja sen tulisi käyttää tilanne hyödyksi. Tekstissä käydään läpi asevoimien nykytila, tulevaisuuden tehtävät ja teknologiat, uudistustarpeet

ja budjetin lisäykset. Monet tekstin tekoon osallistuneista ovat Yhdysvaltojen hallituksen, korkeakoulujen ja aseteollisuuden palveluksessa.

Analyttisemmästä näkökulmasta voidaan kiinnittää huomiota moniin asioihin. Esimerkiksi PNAC:n jäsenistö koostuu pääasiassa valkoisista miehistä, jotka ovat esimerkiksi hallituksen palveluksessa ja poliittiselta kannaltaan republikaaneja. Tällainen havainto mahdollistaa tekstin melko tarkan paikallistamisen sosiaalisessa kontekstissa, mikäli on mahdollista alkaa tällaisia yhteyksiä tutkia. Samoin tekstin sisällä voidaan todeta olevan monenlaisia ”tutkintalinjoja,” jotka eivät rajoitu poliittiseen tai ideologiseen kritiikkiin. Esimerkiksi puolustusmenojen kasvattamista voidaan selittää tekstin sosiaalisella kontekstilla eli sen kytköksillä puolustusteollisuuteen, ja niin sanotut salaliittoteoriat ovat nekin jossain määrin sosiaalisesti määrittäneitä tapoja tulkita tekstejä. Mikäli pysyteltäisiin vain kielen sisäisissä suhteissa, ei vastaavia sosiaalisen kontekstin käsittelytapoja voitaisi käyttää.

Päätelmät

Tutkielman teoreettisesta näkökulmasta johtuen mitään eksakteja tuloksia ei voida esittää. Sen sijaan teoriasta ja tekstianalyysistä nousee esiin eräitä ongelmakohtia, joihin diskurssin tutkijoiden tulisi kiinnittää huomiota.

1. Sellainen näkemys kielestä, johon sisältyy erillinen abstrakti järjestelmä ja sen ilmentymät, on ongelmallinen. Kun analysoidaan kielen järjestelmää, on vaikeaa saada tuloksia jotka kertovat jotakin kielen ulkopuolisesta,

esimerkiksi sosiaalisesta, todellisuudesta. Kielen ymmärtäminen diskursiivisena mahdollistaa merkityksen sijoittamisen sosiaaliseen ulottuvuuteen ja samalla merkitysten käsittelyn moninaisemmista näkökulmista kuin vain kielen yksiköiden suhteista toisiinsa.

2. Konteksti tulisi ymmärtää tarkemmin ja artikuloida eksplisiittisemmin. Tekstien sosiaalinen ulottuvuus ei rajoitu mihinkään tiettyyn ideologiaan, vaan siihen kuuluu myös ja ennen kaikkea tietyt toimijat ja tavat, joilla teksti tuotetaan ja myös luetaan. Näitä ulottuvuuksia tulisi tarkastella myös kielen ulkopuolelta, nimen omaan sosiaalisina ilmiöinä.
3. Yhteiskunnan ymmärtäminen kielellisen analogian kautta johtaa Faircloughin tapauksessa näkemykseen, jonka mukaan valta on pääasiassa diskursiivista. Vaikka tämä pitääkin osittain paikkansa, se jättää huomiotta monet, usein paljon tärkeämmät vallan ilmenemismuodot yhteikunnassa. Olisikin hyödyllistä ymmärtää, että kielellä itsellään ei ole valtaa ja että sosiaalinen konteksti on muutakin kuin ideologiaa.
4. Emansipaatio on Faircloughin keskeinen käsite, ja sen puute keskeinen ongelma. Syyksi tarjotaan ideologian osuutta mallissa: sille on oltava aina vastakohta, jokin jota se vastustaa. Koska tämä asetelma on olemassa jo ennen analyysiä, ei sen jälkeenkään voida sanoa tilanteen mitenkään muuttuneen. Ideologinen näkökulma voi olla hyödyllinen esimerkiksi kritiikin lähteenä, mutta eräänlainen avoimuus tekstejä kohtaan on myös toivottavaa.

Lopuksi todetaan, että Faircloughin pyrkimys yhdistää lingvistinen sosiaaliseen on kannatettavaa mutta se kaipaa tarkennusta. Ylläolevan esitetyn lisäksi esimerkiksi psykolingvistiikka ja uudenlaiset näkemykset yhteiskunnasta tarjoavat materiaalia tulevaisuutta varten.