PERCEPTION IN KANT’S MODEL OF EXPERIENCE

Hemmo Laiho

University of Turku
Finland
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Above all else, I want to express my gratitude to the supervisor of this dissertation, Olli Koistinen. Not only am I greatly indebted to you, but simply glad that I have been working with you all these years: your constant striving for clarity has definitely improved the product, your unfailing support and encouragement has made the effort easier. At the same time, everybody at the department deserves recognition for keeping up such a great working environment. Specifically, I would like to thank the linchpins of our history group, Arto Repo, Tapio Korte, and Valtteri Viljanen; and also Markus Nikkarla, Juha Räikkä, and Hanna-Mari Salonen.

Elements of this study have been presented in various events held at the University of Turku, University of Tampere, University of Jyväskylä, University of Helsinki, Sibelius Academy, University of Iceland, University of California Los Angeles, University of California San Diego, and University of Oslo. As I would probably forget some names anyway, let me just extend a big thank you for everyone for their valuable comments and support.

Defending the licentiate’s thesis on the same topic was an important step in the process. I would like to thank Sami Pihlström and Arto Repo (again) for their inspection of that piece of work a couple of years ago.

The dissertation manuscript was finalized at UCLA. What a great winter that was. First and foremost, I would like to thank John Carriero for perceptive comments on the text, and for the research carrel that turned out to be one particularly inspirational place to work. I would also like to thank Tyler Burge and Sheldon Smith for sharing ideas on Kant.

I appreciate greatly the effort of the two referees, professor Lucy Allais (University of the Witwatersrand) and professor Robert Hanna (University of Colorado Boulder). Your insightful remarks on the manuscript were both generous and valuable. Moreover, you kindly provided some very useful suggestions for the future.

For language consultation when preparing the manuscript for the printing press, I would like to thank Heikki Lehtonen, Suzanne Collins, and Susanne Uusitalo.

The following institutions and their representatives are to be acknowledged for funding and making this research possible: Turku University Foundation, Turun Suomalainen Säästöpankki, Finnish Cultural Foundation, Finnish Doctoral Programme of Philosophy, and the Academy of Finland project Era of Judgment.

Thank you, Silja. I could dedicate this book to you, but let me dedicate it to our one-year-old, instead. Pilvi, I don’t know whether you’re ever going to read it, yet I’m sure you’ll find it necessary to pull it off the bookshelf anyway.
## CONTENTS

1. **INTRODUCTION** .................................................................................................................. 7  
   1.1. The Questions ........................................................................................................................... 7  
   1.2. The Sources ............................................................................................................................. 9  
   1.3. The Progression .......................................................................................................................... 15  
   1.4. The Results ................................................................................................................................. 16  
   1.5. The Faculties............................................................................................................................... 18  

2. **KANT’S DUALIST VIEW OF THE MIND** ........................................................................... 20  
   2.1. Sensibility and Understanding .................................................................................................. 20  
   2.2. Space and Time ......................................................................................................................... 24  
   2.3. *A priori* and *a posteriori* ..................................................................................................... 27  
   2.4. Inner Sense and Outer Sense ................................................................................................... 32  
   2.5. Further Remarks ......................................................................................................................... 34  

3. **SPECIES OF REPRESENTATION** ...................................................................................... 39  
   3.1. Sensation .................................................................................................................................. 39  
   3.2. Empirical Intuition ...................................................................................................................... 46  
   3.3. Intensive and Extensive Magnitude ............................................................................................ 54  
   3.4. Concept .................................................................................................................................... 58  
      3.4.1. Empirical Concept ............................................................................................................ 58  
      3.4.2. Category............................................................................................................................. 65  
      3.4.3. Idea .................................................................................................................................. 69  
   3.5. Judgment .................................................................................................................................. 71  
   3.6. The Initial Portrayal of the Perceiver: Perceptivity ................................................................. 75  

4. **THE MIND AS SYNTHESIZER** ............................................................................................ 76  
   4.1. Imagination ............................................................................................................................... 76  
   4.2. Kinds of Synthesis ..................................................................................................................... 80  
   4.3. A Note on Schematism ............................................................................................................. 84  
   4.4. The Problems Unfold ............................................................................................................... 88  
   4.5. On Empirical Concept Formation ............................................................................................ 92  
   4.6. Object...................................................................................................................................... 100  
      4.6.1. Objects as Conceptual Unities ........................................................................................... 100  
      4.6.2. Objects as Preconceptual Perceptual Wholes .................................................................... 106  
   4.7. On Cognition ............................................................................................................................ 115  
      4.7.1. Intuitions and Concepts ..................................................................................................... 115  
      4.7.2. Blindness of Intuitions ....................................................................................................... 121  
      4.7.3. The So-called Discursivity Thesis ..................................................................................... 127  
   4.8. The Second Portrayal of the Perceiver: Varieties of Perception ............................................ 132
5. PERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS ................................................................. 140
  5.1. On the Unity of Apperception................................................................. 140
  5.2. Varieties of Consciousness ................................................................. 144
  5.3. On Clarity and Distinctness ................................................................. 149
  5.4. On Differentiation ............................................................................... 155
  5.5. Methodological Concerns .................................................................... 161
  5.6. Unities and Synthesis, Again .............................................................. 172
  5.7. The Third Portrayal of the Perceiver: Perceptual Awareness ............... 181

6. PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCE .................................................................. 184
  6.1. Experience as Judgmentsal .................................................................. 184
  6.2. From Perceptions to Experience ......................................................... 189
  6.3. Objectively and Subjectively Valid Judgments ....................................... 198
      6.3.1. Determining Judgments of Experience ........................................ 198
      6.3.2. Judgments of Perception ............................................................ 201
      6.3.3. Aesthetic Judgments of Sense .................................................... 205
      6.3.4. Objectivity and Necessity ........................................................... 208
  6.4. The Subject of Experience in the Critique of the Power of Judgment ... 211
      6.4.1. Judgment of Taste and the Lack of Concept .............................. 211
      6.4.2. The Aesthetic Quality of Objects .............................................. 213
      6.4.3. Aesthetic Reflection .................................................................. 215
  6.5. The Fourth Portrayal of the Perceiver: A Judging Perceiver .................. 217

7. REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES .......................................... 224
  7.1. On Some Kantian Themes in Philosophy Today .................................... 224
  7.2. Was Kant a Conceptualist, Non-conceptualist, Both, or Neither? ...... 228
  7.3. Between Subjectivity and Objectivity ................................................ 234
  7.4. Epilogue: Perception and Transcendental Idealism ............................. 237

8. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 239

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 242
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Questions

Suppose someone claims that the table before us is red. Thereby he or she makes a certain kind of judgment about our everyday environment. Indeed, if we ask what it is to have experience, or to have understanding of how some cognitive agent like us is related to the world, we are soon dealing with issues conveniently approached through this notion. It is this stance towards judgment that sets the framework of this study.

It can be claimed that having any kind of cognitive access to our surroundings is equivalent to making judgments, or consists of judging. If we think this way, we suggest that our relation to the world, or our being in cognitive touch with our environment, is judgmental in character. We could add to this that experience is conceptual. In the example above we referred to a piece of furniture known as the table, describing it as red. Without concepts this mental act would not have been possible.

On the other hand, we are perceptual beings. We are in touch with our environment through perceptions, and perceiving seems to be very different from judging. To press the point, we could claim that perceiving requires considerably less from the cognitive agent than making judgments does. We might want to continue that perceptions differ from judgments in kind. A way to put this is that perceptions as such do not involve concepts. Instead, they are pre- or non-conceptual, or “aesthetic.” Even so, perceptions give us a firm grip on reality, or even a firmer one than judgments can ever provide, as we could argue further that through perceptions things become presented in such a rich way that no conceptual characterization whatsoever can possibly match or capture it.

So it appears that while the notion of judgment can be used to explain important aspects of our cognitive undertakings, it cannot do the task alone. Moreover, it could be claimed that perceptions, not judgments, are fundamental for having experience in the first place. Consider the table again. It could be claimed that regardless of the various ways we may conceptualize it, or whether we happen to do so at all, it is nevertheless there in our visual field, looking red, having a certain shape, feeling solid to the touch, making a sound when scratched, smelling, perhaps, of fresh varnish. Conceiving the table as being this way or that is another thing altogether. Hence, to really understand judgment from the given stance, we must first ask what it is to be a perceiver.
The main question of this dissertation is how to understand the division between perception and judgment in Kant’s account of cognition.\(^1\) In order to answer this question we must look into Kant’s views of representation, perception, cognition, judgment, and experience in general. As suggested, special focus will be on perception. This may sound unorthodox, since Kant does not really present anything that could be said to be a theory of perception in the strict sense of taking into consideration every aspect required by such a comprehensive explanation.

However, Kant lays the foundation of his model in the Transcendental Aesthetic,\(^2\) which can be read as an analysis of the most fundamental conditions of sense perception (among other things). Moreover, turning to other texts beside the *Critique of Pure Reason* will be revealing in our search for Kant’s conception of perception. The analysis of Kant’s philosophy from the perceptual standpoint is reasonable and needed also because such an approach can be used as a touchstone of the meaningfulness and coherence of the Kantian model as a whole. This way it may also turn out that it has been “intellectualized” too much on a regular basis. These things concern not just Kant scholarship. One important offshoot of Kant’s critical project is how the objectivity and intentionality of perceptual cognition should be understood. This is a big contemporary issue as well, and it may well be that by laying emphasis on perception in Kant we gain a lot in this respect, too.

Further questions, implied by the main one, are: Does perception necessarily require concepts? What does it mean that perception involves or does not involve concepts? How do empirical concepts, on the one hand, and non-empirical concepts, on the other, differ from each other in this respect? How are the Kantian categories supposed to be featured in perception? How is objectivity constituted? What does Kant mean by experience after all?

The motivation for these questions is twofold. The first is a scholarly issue that concerns the interpretation of Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding. Since these are described by Kant as “two entirely different sources of representation,”\(^3\) there seems to be a definite gap between them. If so, what kind of a gap is it? How do these apparently heterogeneous elements relate to each other? What is the distinction supposed to explain? There is also a methodological concern involved: To what extent can we make sense of them independently from each other?

The second motivation has its roots in recent discussions on the nature of human experience. One particularly interesting instance of this grand topic is the debate on the conceptual status of representational contents. Within this debate some thinkers claim that only conceptual content is possible, thereby suggesting that even the simplest perceptual experience requires concepts. Others deny this by claiming that there is no necessary connection between concepts, or conceptual

1 From this on, I will be simply referring to ‘Kant’s model’ or ‘Kantian model’ by which I mean Kant’s views of human experience and related topics taken collectively.

2 *Die transscendentale Ästhetik*, A19–49/B33–B73. More about references to Kant’s works in the next section.

3 A271/B327: “zwei ganz verschiedene Quellen von Vorstellungen[.]”
capacities, and perceptual experience. Thus here, too, we find the question we are going to approach the Kantian model with: Is perception conceptual or not?

1.2. The Sources

The main sources of this study are the first and third of Kant’s three Critiques: the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, original publication 1781) and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, original publication 1790). The first Critique is referred to as A and/or B, following the standard usage. All other Kant sources will be referred to by giving the abbreviated title of the text together with the volume and page numbers of the *Akademie* edition (“Akademie-Ausgabe”) of Kant’s collected writings (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, henceforward *AA*).

Here are the abbreviations:

- **A/B** *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/1787, *AA* 4/3)
- **An** *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798, *AA* 7)
- **Br** *Briefwechsel; letters written by Kant or to Kant* (*AA* 10–13)
- **D** *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral* (1764, *AA* 2)
- **EEKU** *Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (ca. 1790, *AA* 20)
- **FS** *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren* (1762, *AA* 2)
- **GMS** *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785, *AA* 4)
- **GUGR** *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume* (1768, *AA* 2)
- **ID** *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* (1770, *AA* 2)
- **KpV** *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788, *AA* 5)
- **KU** *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790/1793, *AA* 5)
- **LB** *Logik Blomberg* (1770s, *AA* 24)
- **LD-W** *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken* (1792, *AA* 24)
- **LJ** *Logik Jäsche* (1800, *AA* 9)
- **LW** *Wiener Logik* (ca. 1780, *AA* 24)
- **MAN** *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786, *AA* 4)
- **MD** *Metaphysik Dohna* (1792–1793, *AA* 28)
- **MK2** *Metaphysik K₂* (1790s, *AA* 28)
- **MK3** *Metaphysik Vigilantius (K₃)* (1794–1795, *AA* 27)
- **ML1** *Metaphysik L₁* (1770s, *AA* 28)
In the main text, quotations are taken from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. As these include the AA page numbers in their margins, and as the original text is cited in the footnotes, only the AA references are provided. The usual ‘AA’ or ‘Ak’ is omitted, but section numbers are given when available. I have underlined the terms and sentences of the original text I want to emphasize; these are followed by linguistic or terminological points (some of which concern the translations which I have left intact). The orthography is from the AA, and is thus neither the original nor has it been modernized according to current standards.

As the list of abbreviations shows, several texts are consulted in addition to the two Critiques. Indeed, textual evidence is brought out from the whole Kantian corpus relevant to the questions. This already defines my approach. I take it that in the topics elaborated in this study Kant’s views can only be extracted by searching for them collectively by taking many, and often seemingly separate, texts into consideration. This way we will meet a thinker who would not be familiar to us through a narrower approach. Accordingly, this study is not a focused interpretation of some specific work, or some specific part of some specific work. This does not mean that some texts would not be of extraordinary importance, of course, but that none is taken as excluding everything else.

I acknowledge that Kant had big plans and aims which transcend such down-to-earth issues as perception, non-moral action, and the application of empirical concepts in our everyday life. In the first Critique, for example, Kant presents more than anything else a theory of a priori cognition, the ultimate purpose of which is to secure the limits of the critical use of reason (and to put metaphysics into line thereby). Within such endeavor questions concerning ordinary human experience can be seen as making only a subproject. Several of these subprojects are, however, not only absolutely necessary for Kant to pull his main project through, but valuable as such. Moreover, some of them are to a great

---

4 Since there are a lot of citations the majority of which are in American English, I have used American English spelling in writing this book.
extent self-supporting. I take it that Kant’s analyses of experience, its perceptual basis, and their ultimate conditions, make up a subproject that is both.

It is often said that there are many inconsistencies in Kant’s works. However, often what seems to be one turns out to be not. The reader may not just have been attentive enough to Kantian subtleties. It is good to notice that Kant’s approach is often very sensitive to the context: the terms and claims are brought out against a specific background which determines their exact meaning. These context-sensitive points of view do not change just from one work to another, but also within the same text, of which the *Critique* is a telling example.

Unfortunately, Kant was not very good at such “contextualist” writing method because in many places it is anything but evident what the context itself is. Often it is left for the reader to dig out, possibly requiring some extensive reading between the lines. In the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant remarks, though, how “apparent contradictions can be ferreted out if individual passages are torn out of their context and compared with each other.” This, however, is just a general comment, possibly written with the unfair Garver–Feder review in mind. But it is also a small reminder for not trying to “patch” Kant too eagerly.

I do not want to insist that there are no inconsistencies in Kant’s writings, but I do want to emphasize the principle of charity. Neither do I see Kant as a poor philosopher who first claims this or that, and then some dozen pages later denies it, or renders the idea incompatible with the earlier formulation. In terms of this study, I see Kant as a thinker who sometimes has sensibility in mind, sometimes understanding, or reason, writing accordingly. This makes certain concepts such as cognition, perception, and object a lot more demanding in some contexts compared to others. Several of these terminological variations or “apparent contradictions” will be pointed out and explained in what follows.

From the viewpoint of this study, the most important sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* are the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, in this order. However, to say that we will only be interested in these parts of the *Critique* would be false. Even though the main topics of the latter sections of the *Critique* are left untouched, when it comes to Kant’s model as a whole, there are many important items in them as well. A good example is the division of representations into various types in the so-called *Stufenleiter* in the Transcendental Dialectic.

The Preface to the A-edition of the *Critique* suggests that the keystone of Kant’s system is the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, whereas the Preface to the B-edition emphasizes the problem of freedom, although setting the boundaries for well-grounded metaphysics remains the

---

Bxliv: “scheinbare Widersprüche lassen sich, wenn man einzelne Stellen, aus ihrem Zusammenhange gerissen, gegeneinander vergleicht[.]” See also P 4:376.
I skip the elaboration of these grand issues, as they would constitute lengthy studies on their own. Instead, I begin with an assumption that Kant’s system is successful at least in the sense that it manages to show that we do have a priori concepts which do relate to the sensible stuff.

This approach reminds of Kant’s own “analytic” method in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, original publication 1783). There Kant takes it as uncontested that we are in possession of legitimate synthetic cognition a priori, in contrast to the “synthetic” method of the Critique, which, as Kant claims rather boldly in the Prolegomena, did not rely on any facts.

The Prolegomena will be used, as it was intended to, as a tool to understand Kant’s critical philosophy better. Once again, however, my approach will be exclusive. For instance, I will not decide on the fate of metaphysics in any way. Instead, I will bring forward a certain case from this work, namely, the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience. It is not entirely clear what Kant means by this distinction; an answer is given below. It will also be shown that this distinction has some illustrative connections to Kant’s view of subjectivity as presented in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.

The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, original publication 1786) and What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking (Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren? original publication also in 1786) receive an exclusive treatment as well. Although these are minor sources, they are worth pointing out because also in these texts, despite the fact that their main arguments lie elsewhere, Kant now and then concretizes his claims by appealing to the actual world of an actual subject. He analyzes, for example, tactile experience and intuition in some revealing ways.

It is easy to approach the third Critique as a theory of aesthetics and/or teleology. This may suggest that it has no real bearing on issues covered in the first Critique. I do not share this view. Accordingly, the third Critique will not be approached as a work on some self-contained topics. Rather, it will be shown that it contains many important things concerning Kant’s model as a whole. This should be emphasized also because the book is often regarded as a classic in the philosophy of art. I do not want to deny that it is such a classic; it is, of course, that (although in all likelihood Kant’s chief intentions lay elsewhere). It is just that I endorse an approach that differs from the usual ones, thus taking part of the “renaissance” whereby the third Critique is receiving wider-ranging attention.

---

6 Axvi–xvii; Bxiv.
7 P 4:274. Kant refers to this factual aspect in the second edition Critique, too (B127–128).
8 See Kirwan 2004, 1–2, 12.
9 See Kukla 2006, 1–4; see also pp. 14–16 for several ways to relate the first Critique with the third.
Surely it is natural to approach the third *Critique* from the standpoint of aesthetic evaluation. Optionally, one could concentrate on some specific notion, such as form, sublime, or purposiveness, and relate that to Kant’s views there and elsewhere. One strategy would be to consider the relation between judgments of taste and moral judgments. The most comprehensive approach would be to show how the third *Critique* brings the first and the second *Critique* together. This could be regarded as no less than the culmination of Kant’s critical project: to bridge, to possible extent, the gap between the deterministic-mechanical view of nature and human freedom as demanded by moral responsibility.\(^\text{10}\)

Such approaches to the third *Critique* are not followed but simply bypassed. Instead, the book is approached through the questions how Kant understands the human subject in general, and how that subject shows itself in relation to perceptual experience, consciousness, and judging. Hence the analyses of the third *Critique* given in this study are not aesthetics, supposing that one means by that philosophy of art, environmental aesthetics, or some other branch of contemporary aesthetics. However, everything that follows *can* be described as aesthetics as long as one takes the term in the original meaning.\(^\text{11}\) Consequently, whenever we refer to aesthetic (*ästhetisch*) representations or some such, they must be taken, unless stated otherwise, as sensory or sensible (*sinnlich*) representations in the literal sense of the word.

Mostly “critical” texts have been consulted. Notable (albeit not the only) “pre-critical” exceptions are *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (*Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren*, original publication 1762), *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (*Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral*, original publication 1764), and *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* (*De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*, original publication 1770). The latter, Kant’s inaugural dissertation, will be of some value especially when elaborating on the notion of intuition, but all three are worth mentioning because they contain views that not only shed light on Kant’s intellectual development, but on his model in general, as some of the basic ideas presented in them survive the critical turn.

As to the originally unpublished texts, some personal and lectural notes close to the beginning of the critical period will turn out to be very informative. The lengthier introduction to the third *Critique* that did not find its way to the printing house in 1790 is considered as a very important source. From

\(^{10}\) See KU 5:195–196.

\(^{11}\) The first appearance of the term in the contemporary sense, or close to it, is in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s (1714–62) dissertation (see Baumgarten 1735/1954, § 116). Baumgarten derived the term from the Greek word *aisthetikos*. Kant clearly did not like this new use and did not want to renounce the original meaning that refers to sense perception generally, not to a theory of taste (see A21*/B35*; MM 29:832; EEKU 20:221–223, 247).
time to time, Kant’s personal notes from the critical period play an equal role. Kant’s lectures, especially the later ones, are consulted often.

I recognize the danger of relying heavily on work that was not written for publication, and I will thus not take any of it at face value without reflection. On the other hand, I am strictly against any such view which proposes that only canonical texts should be consulted. When the published texts give only sparse information on what Kant’s view really is, why not review them with unpublished texts in hand? Besides, with some delicate issues we do not have but the latter to lean on, and I believe that they are to be trusted quite far. If reservations of any kind arise as to their legitimacy, these will be stated.

Let me also point out that I do not try to understand Kant’s philosophy as a whole. The main reason for this is to keep the monograph as compact as possible. Another good reason is Kant’s diversity. His works have many paths to follow, many of which must be ignored for obvious reasons. For example, ethical matters, explicit in many and implicit in most of Kant’s writings, are not covered. For similar reasons, I will not do much contextualization with regard to Kant’s predecessors, contemporaries, or to predominant ideas of the 18th century Europe. In this sense this study is not that much history of philosophy. Instead, I will concentrate upon some specific questions found in Kant, and I take these to have a life of their own also independently of Kant. It is, then, the questions themselves that set the ultimate framework of this study. In other words, my goal is to understand something that transcends Kant’s life, Kant’s texts, Kant’s era, and also the kind of scholarship that has no focus aside the great Kant at all. This should not be seen as a permission to set aside textual evidence, however. Quite the contrary, each text will be carefully inspected and evaluated, and a high standard of source criticism will be maintained. Consequently, I am by no means taking full interpretative liberties by changing Kant to someone I just happen to call Kant. Rather, I am on a mission to set the record straight: what kind of claims about perceptual experience are really Kantian, and what kind of claims are not.

I have mostly used new, or rather new, second hand literature on Kant. As far as I know, some of the problems present in this study are explicitly treated only recently. As to the other sources consulted, I have used contemporary analyses on perceptual experience. Those finding explicit support in Kant are naturally of special value. From time to time, I will examine what people closer

---

12 While in some of the recent work on Kant the issue on conceptual element in perception is taken up explicitly (e.g. Allais 2009; Griffith 2012; Grüne 2009; Hanna 2005; Tomaszewska 2008; Wenzel 2005), I think it is quite safe to say that it is implicitly present in myriad interpretations of Kant. In any case, the focus will be on the former.

13 Among Kant scholars, Robert Hanna was the first to read Kant through the controversy on the possibility of non-conceptual representational content, and he has done that in favor of the latter (Hanna 2005; 2006, 81–139; 2008; 2011a). Earlier, even if outside Kant scholarship, Kant has been put in use in favor of the opposite position – according to which there are no such contents – most notably by John McDowell (1996; 2009). Thanks to such
to Kant’s time have to say on the subject matter. This will usually take place in the footnotes. If there is a standard way to refer to these thinkers, it will be followed.

1.3. The Progression

The starting point is Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding. Besides this fundamental distinction, the elaboration of which will continue through the book, most of the technical terms needed later are introduced in chapter 2. We will start with ‘representation’ and continue with its species in a more detailed manner in chapter 3.

Clarifying the problems in detail takes some time; until chapter 4 to be exact. Hence, although we will already have some partial solutions at that point, most questions can be given legitimate answers only in the later parts of the book. In other words, we have to have the basics worked out in detail (and also broken up, so to speak) before we have a good enough setting for bringing it all together. To put it figuratively, chapters 2 and 3 act as curtain-raisers, and the real drama begins in chapter 4, the main goal of which is to explicate how the individual elements introduced earlier relate with one another (although further clarifications of this will be given in the subsequent chapters as well).

The focus of chapter 5 is on the notion of consciousness, which, as we will see, comes in varieties, too. This will be important in establishing that perception can play different representational roles (a topic begun in the previous chapters). In this chapter we will also focus on such methodological issues as the place of introspection, and the possibilities and limitations of theories concerning human experience. Methodological concerns as such run through the whole book, however.

In chapter 6, the emphasis is on Kant’s account of experience, culminating in the notion of judgment. Here we will elaborate on some of the distinctions Kant makes as he analyzes different mental operations he calls by this one word. Not only is Kant’s account of judgment broader than the one given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but these additional distinctions help us better understand Kant’s model as a whole. In this chapter we will also take a closer look at some subtle, but extremely illuminating, details found from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. By the end, we should have a good view on the perception-experience and subjectivity-objectivity distinctions.

Chapter 7 consists of brief reflections on contemporary views on perceptual experience. At the center is the issue of non-conceptual representational content. This debate is of special interest to us seminal work there is already a good basis for reading Kant this theoretical setting in mind, and one may also evaluate how well it applies to Kant himself.
because it revolves around the key question of this study, namely, whether or not perception should be understood as conceptual in character. Besides, not only is Kant’s influence tremendous here, too, but this 21st century problematic helps us understand Kant’s accounts of perception and experience. Equally importantly, it allows us to put them in the wider context.

Together, the chapters can be seen as one big argument, which is divided into several branches. Each of these is put forward while keeping in mind such supposedly Kantian claims that cognition requires concepts, that all mental activity whatsoever is somehow mediated through the categories, or that perception itself is grounded on the categories. The individual arguments are given conclusions of their own along the way to keep the text approachable. Thus the concluding chapter 8 is more than anything else a place where the key claims are summed up.

1.4. The Results

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to understand perception (or the perceiver) both in itself, or for its own sake, and as the key to understanding Kant’s account of cognition as a whole. In the process, we will not only explicate Kant’s views of the human subject (from the given standpoint which ignores the practical side to that subject), but will undermine any such reading of Kant that puts too much emphasis on concepts and understanding in perception. Generally, this means that claims of the sort that intuitions cannot play their role without concepts, that sensibility cannot bring anything to cognition without being mediated through the functions of understanding, or that there is no such thing as concept-independent perception, will be shown to be either plainly false or misleading at best.

More specifically, it will be claimed that perception is not, primitively or fundamentally speaking, a conceptual affair for Kant. On the contrary, what will be eventually called perception per se (that is, the primitive but also the fundamental level of perception which can be found from Kant’s model, and which will be specified in what follows) is shown to be utterly non-conceptual mode of representing. This makes it both non-categorical and non-judgmental as well. Indeed, according to Kant the most basic function of perception is getting into cognitive touch with individual things merely in perceptual terms, and for that no concepts whatsoever are necessary. Also apprehensive perception (which, it will be claimed, depends on the former function) can take place at the non-conceptual level. In fact, as we will see, perception does not need to involve thinking at all, which is why it could not even be necessarily conceptual.

This being the core, one can also expect to find from what follows (and thus from Kant) two kinds of sensible representational contents, which not only shows the ambiguity of the subjectivity of perception, but leads us to re-think the whole distinction between what is subjective, and what is
objective. More generally, it will be claimed that there is nothing problematic with the notion of merely sensible or aesthetic representation, whether in actual representing or within Kant’s model. Together with the contemporary topics examined towards the end of the book, these findings will give us a good reminder of how the role of conceptual thought in human cognition has been exaggerated partly because of a misplaced interpretation of Kant, which not only turns the categories into something far more complex than they were intended by Kant, but also distorts Kant’s dualist account of cognition.

Besides anticipating the results as such, a couple of preliminary remarks on how perception is approached in this study are in order. This is because the approach itself may have some effect on the results we get; at any rate it affects the route to them. Firstly, although the focus will be on visual perception, serious attention will be paid to other sense modalities as well. Also feelings or inner perceptions are included to avoid too coarse a picture; indeed, these will provide an extremely important point of contrast. The perception of outer objects will nevertheless be the main case.

Secondly, it is characteristic to a great part of this study that Kant’s model is approached without a fuss about transcendental idealism. The prevalent stance is common sense realism taken more or less for granted. As I will explicate later, this is actually necessary to get things rolling, and not at odds with Kant. There is also a practical reason involved: to keep the focus on Kant’s multidimensional notion of perception. In addition to this, what follows is written under the assumption that transcendental idealism is a valid doctrine that legitimates the chosen stance, or what Kant would call empirical realism. Even then, the transcendental approach as such, without which the idealism of critical variety could not be argued for, is with us straight from the start.

Thirdly, I should point out the importance of keeping in mind an actual perceiver located in some living environment confronted with concrete things. Although most of the problems ahead require a transcendental solution (basically, what conditions must be fulfilled to make sense of the possibility of some cognitive situation or achievement) everything will be tried out, as it were, with real examples with real subjects (one may call this the real subject method). This is not to say that I will simply found my analyses and arguments on introspection, or on some other empirical-psychological evidence. The point is, rather, that the following question is taken seriously. What do all these theoretical building blocks, such as intuition and sensation, mean when examined from the standpoint of some actual cognizer like myself? Even though this will sometimes take us away from the source texts, this will help us, I hope, to really get into the underlying ideas.

---

14 See A370–372.
1.5. The Faculties

Finally, let us situate the level of perception (or, indeed, cognition) we take to be non-conceptual in the context of the Kantian subject as a whole. In that context, and for Kant in analyzing human being in general, the basic notion is faculty (*Vermögen*). Each faculty stands for a certain capacity or certain capacities. In other words, when we are equipped with some faculty, it is within our power to do or achieve something; at least we are then dispositionally able to function, or be influenced, in some specific manner.

According to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and its unpublished introduction, there are three fundamental faculties of the mind to which all the others can be reduced. The three are the faculty of cognition (*Erkenntnißvermögen*), faculty of pleasure and displeasure (*Gefühl der Lust und Unlust*), and faculty of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*). Kant also makes it clear that he is viewing them in respect of the higher faculties, namely, understanding (*Verstand*), power of judgment (*Urtheilskraft*), and reason (*Vernunft*). Not only does this suggest that there are lower faculties as well, but that even though Kant is not examining the three fundamental faculties in this respect he *could* just as well do so. And this, especially when backed up with the following remark by Kant, gives our case a push in the positive direction:

> The exercise of all of them, however, is always grounded in the faculty of cognition, although not always in cognition (since a representation belonging to the faculty of cognition can also be an intuition, pure or empirical, without concepts).

But let us not get ahead of ourselves. The lower faculty of cognition is called sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*). Our focus will be on this sensible capacity of the mind. Obviously, the intellectual capacities cannot be simply put aside. However, already at this point it can be underscored that we are not after something that could be regarded as an extraordinarily sophisticated, or distinctively human, achievement. Instead, we are after something quite primitive, mundane, animal even. This is not to say that we will be dealing with sensible matters in general, however. On the contrary, we bypass

---

16 Even though the literal translation would be ‘feeling of pleasure and displeasure’ – or to underline the “striving” factor involved, ‘feeling of appetite and non-appetite’ – this is nevertheless one of the faculties of the mind.
17 EEKU XI, 20:245: “Der Ausübung aller liegt aber doch immer das Erkenntnißvermögen, ob zwar nicht immer Erkenntniß, (denn eine zum Erkenntnißvermögen gehörige Vorstellung kann auch Anschauung, reine oder empirische, ohne Begriffe sein) zum Grunde.” (My emphases.)
18 LW 24:806; An §7, 7:140.
affection, appetite, desire, inclination, and passion as something that belongs to the faculty of desire.\footnote{See e.g. An §§ 73–86, 7:251–275.}

We do the same with (dis)pleasure as such, whether sensuous or intellectual, enjoyment or pain, a matter of palate or taste.\footnote{See e.g. An §§ 60–72, 7:230–250.}

Then again, these things and sense perception converge in an important way which reveals how Kant sees the human situation in general. A lot of it builds on the idea that we are creatures constantly under influence of something that is beyond our control. Some of it necessitates the way we behave; some of it determines the way we are as human beings. Generally speaking, this reflects what Kant calls receptivity (Receptivität). This spans all the three fundamental faculties when regarded as “lower.” The higher, or the intellectual cognitive faculties, on the other hand, show spontaneity (Spontaneität) or self-activity.\footnote{See e.g. MM 29:877, 888.}

The latter is not something that turns up only in thinking or reasoning as such, but in setting ends, examining motives, deciding what to do; basically in anything that involves not only acting but approving. This calls for will (Wille, voluntas), the capacity of which suggests that we are free agents;\footnote{See e.g. GMS 4:446; MM 29:896.} at least relatively speaking, that is, as there is always something sensible going on, possibly influencing our power of choice (Willkür, arbitrium), and thus our actual choices and actions. Indeed, we would otherwise be wholly self-determining or self-dependent beings which we are not.\footnote{See e.g. MK3 29:1014–1016.} The level of representation we plan to examine, on the other hand, does not suggest much freedom at all. Nor does it indicate the kind of higher viewpoint on our thoughts and feelings as willing seems to always involve. This notwithstanding, let the lower cognitive faculty not be straightforwardly identified with sheer receptivity either.

\footnote{See e.g. An §§ 73–86, 7:251–275.}
2. Kant’s Dualist View of the Mind

2.1. Sensibility and Understanding

The most basic concept in the Kantian model is representation (*Vorstellung, repraesentatio*). While it is quite easy to divide this concept up, as will be shown later, it is not that easy to say precisely what *representing* is as such. A convenient way to avoid dwelling too much on this question is to take representation as an elementary item that does not require further explanation. Kant adopts this method, not entirely without warrant. In the *Inquiry* Kant states that the concept of representation is “scarcely capable of analysis.”24 He repeats the point in his lectures on logic, and he also appeals to regression there.25 By this Kant probably wants to emphasize that there is no representation which could be reduced to something that is also not itself a representation. Indeed, if we try to analyze ‘representation’ we will soon realize that this calls for another representation, the explanation of which would require another one, and so forth.

Moreover, were we divested of our representations, not much would be left, as our whole consciousness can be regarded as consisting of a train of representations. Perhaps we could still have primitive feelings, a constant awareness of overwhelming pleasure, for example, and surely the structure in which representing takes place would remain. However, mere feeling would not refer to anything, since there would be nothing which that particular state could be related with, and the empty structure, with all its potentiality, would be nothing for us without something going on, namely the representational stuff our mentality consists of. Thus we may say that the concept of representation is an inevitable starting point; at least in the Kantian story it is.26

Let us move on to the conditions of representation, beginning with sensible representations. To have these in the first place, or to get any sense-based representing going, something has to have an effect on us. This is their ultimate foundation, and it presupposes what Kant calls *sensibility* (*Sinnlichkeit, sensualitas*). This would also be the first of the “two entirely different sources of

24 D § 3, 2:280: “beinahe gar nicht aufgelöset werden können.” It is noteworthy that among such unanalysable concepts Kant also lists here *being next to each other* and *being after each other* – concepts that will be, at least in their fundamental form, intuitive representations instead of concepts in Kant’s later philosophy.

25 Kant makes the point about regression in LJ 9:34, while LB 24:40 and LD-W 24:752 repeat the point about inexplicability of ‘representation.’

26 By this I mean that while it is not impossible to lay out an account of perception, cognition, experience, or some such, without resorting to the concept of representation, the option was not available for Kant, and is not for anybody who is even loosely Kantian. For Kant, of course, the importance of the concept of representation is also epistemological: we cannot cognize things in themselves as these do not belong to our cognitive sphere – only representations do (e.g. A190/B235).
representation” mentioned in Introduction. In 1770, in his inaugural dissertation, Kant explains this fundamental capacity of the human mind as a follows:

Sensibility is the receptivity of a subject in virtue of which it is possible for the subject’s own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence of some object.\textsuperscript{27}

In the next decade, in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, sensibility is explained in a similar vein:

The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility.\textsuperscript{28}

The two quotes share the main idea that the subject is being affected. In other words, human beings (or any sensory beings) are receptive creatures under external influence. In this sense, we “acquire” representations just like we “acquire” pain when we accidentally hit our finger with the hammer.

To use both a technical term and a metaphor, when we sense, and are thus being affected, impressions (\textit{Eindruck, impressio}) spring up in us. They are, as it were, imprints in the mind.\textsuperscript{29} It is essential to them that they cannot be invented. “One can never represent in thought any impression of a new kind,” Kant writes in one of his notes to Baumgarten’s \textit{Metaphysica}.\textsuperscript{30} However, Kant uses ‘impression’ very seldom. His usual critical notion to explain the empirically given in representing is sensation (\textit{Empfindung, sensatio}).\textsuperscript{31}

It is perhaps possible to find good reasons for distinguishing impressions from sensations. It is also possible to take them as synonyms.\textsuperscript{32} Neither of these options, however, is of immediate importance for us because even though our story can begin from either, it can continue only with the latter. For now it is enough that we have this pillar of Kant’s model in place: where there is no affection, there cannot be sensation, and because sensations are given, not produced, the subject is to

\textsuperscript{27} ID § 3, 2:392: “\textit{Sensualitas est receptivitas subiecti, per quam possibile est, ut status ipsius repraesentativus objecti alicuius praesentia certo modo afficiatur.”

\textsuperscript{28} A19/B33: “Die Fähigkeit (Receptivität), Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenständen afficit werden, zu \textit{bekommen}, heißt Sinnlichkeit.” To my ear, the German verb ‘bekommen’ has much more passive tone to it than the English ‘acquire.’ Mail, for example, is ‘bekommen’ – received, not acquired.

\textsuperscript{29} Compare the German verb \textit{eindrucken} (‘to print’ in the Gutenbergian sense) with \textit{eindrücken} (‘to leave a mark’ in general).

\textsuperscript{30} R 4634, 17:618–619 (1772–73): “Man kann sich keine Eindruck von einer neuen art niemals in Gedanken vorstellen.” (Struck out words omitted.)

\textsuperscript{31} See e.g. A42/B59–60. Kant’s notion of sensation is treated in detail in section 3.1.

\textsuperscript{32} In KU § 51, 5:321, Kant identifies sensation with external sensory impression (\textit{Sinneneindrück}). As we will see eventually, sensations can be taken either as internal or external, so it is possible to identify impressions with external sensations without identifying them with the internal ones. For an alternative way to regard the two as synonyms, see Grüne 2009, 62n59. Instead of taking them as synonymous at all, one could emphasize that sensations are \textit{representations} of impressions (see MM 29:829).
Kant's Dualist View of the Mind

this extent totally on the leash of sensibility. Accordingly, there is a lot going on which we cannot help but to take in as long as our senses are not shut down.

On the other hand, Kant puts great emphasis on the idea that we are not just receptive automata, but have to process and refine the empirically given data in many ways. To begin with, the mind must put everything into some kind of order, or have it presented in an orderly manner; only then can sensibility begin to exhibit a coherent structure. There is deep controversy over whether this is due to sensibility at all, or solely the business of the other source of representation, namely, understanding (Verstand, intellectus). This question will be at the core of this study, but before going into it, there are more Kantian fundamentals to lay out.

By appealing to sensibility-understanding distinction, Kant goes, in a sense, back in time. In doing so he dissociates himself strongly from many of his predecessors such as Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz, together with their followers. Traditionally speaking, it is rather Aristotle and the scholastics whom Kant leans on. These thinkers held a strict dualism between sense and intellect. Those temporally closer to Kant put everything in gradual terms: representations come as more or less clear and distinct with respect to the intellect. While Kant did not abandon this early modern terminology (instead, he used it in his own way) he committed himself strongly to the view that representations come not only in different degrees, but also in different kinds. Basically, there are two kinds of representations, from two separate sources. The representation peculiar to sensibility is called intuition (Anschauung, intuitus). The representation peculiar to understanding is called concept (Begriff, conceptus). Kant also makes it clear that “these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions,” which has the implication that no intuition can ever be reduced to concept (and vice versa) no matter how “obscure” or “confused.”

We will elaborate on these newly introduced notions later, but already from this it is clear that in whatever way the Kantian model is interpreted, one must either somehow overcome the dualism there is to it, or explain why it should be accepted. Even then, it can be claimed, one must be able to show how the two sides to the human mind are brought together, unless they are to remain as if they were two separate worlds. Initially, we could appeal to what appears to be phenomenologically true. As was

---

33 Compare e.g. Falkenstein 1995, 54 with Hanna 2008, 62.
34 A concise version of this story is given in Falkenstein 1995, 29–35.
35 Or, rather, between sensing or perceiving (aisthesis) and thinking (noesis) (De an. III.3.427a15–427b10; see also A21*/B36*; MM 29:832).
36 See e.g. AG 23–24. This has, among other things, the implication that sensible representations as such are to remain confused. For Kant’s general criticism of this view, see e.g. A270–271/B326–327.
37 See e.g. ID § 7, 2:394; B414–415*; EEKU 20:227*; JL 9:61–63. We will get back to clarity and distinctness in section 5.3.
38 A51/B75: “Beide Vermögen oder Fähigkeiten können auch ihre Functionen nicht vertauschen.”
39 See MK3 29:954.
suggested in Introduction, there simply is a big difference between sense perception and full-blown thought about something.

Kant, too, was fully aware of this. Early on in the *Critique* he points out what in a representation of a body belongs to understanding (substance, for example), and what to sensation (hardness, for example). For the time being, we can forget the rest of what is said in these passages. All that matters now is that it is understanding’s business to *think*. When we touch a body, say, the red table, we do not necessarily think of anything; we might simply feel its hardness, or the smoothness of its surface, knock it and hear a sound, and so forth. This requires sensibility because nothing is sensed through understanding. To be sure, we can only think with concepts, and these belong to understanding. Then again, having some such sensible or *aesthetic* representation of the table is something else than representing the table as a substance; the difference is vast, indeed.

Certainly the hardness or the color of the table can be taken as concepts, too (as will be explained later). As sensations, however, they are utterly non-conceptual. Even a creature equipped only with sensibility may have these kinds of aesthetic representations. According to Kant, animals are such creatures. They can perceive, yet they do not possess the higher faculties of understanding and reason. One could say that they do not understand the world they live in, and this is mostly because they lack the ability to *judge* (*urtheilen*). I, on the other hand, recognize the computer screen in front of me as one, realize that it is rectangular in shape, and know that this feature is characteristic of such gadgets. Through such acts I make sense of my world by classifying it into appropriate blocks and relations. In other words, I apply concepts to whatever there is in my perceptual field, or to put it in a more Kantian way, subordinate or subsume an object (*Gegenstand, Object*), or several objects, under concepts, and connect them with one another. Thereby, applying concepts informed by sensible content, I judge how things stand. For example, if I entertain the thought “The monitor in front of me is black,” and accept it, I have just made a *judgment* (*Urteil, iudicium*) that is supposed to be true of the world. Indeed, understanding as a whole may be titled as the faculty of judgment:

---

40 A20–21/B35.
41 E.g. A19/B33.
42 To be more specific, non-human animals lack concepts (ML2 28:594) and the capacity to set ends for themselves (KU § 83, 5:431; MS 6:392). However, they are similar to human animals in that they do have feelings (KU § 5, 5:210), intuitions (ML2 28:594), imagination (ML1 28:277; MM 29:884), and act in accordance with representations (KU 4:464*), which they can also compare (MM 29:888). They even have, just like human beings, what Kant calls the sensible power of choice (*arbitrium sensittivum*). This affection driven capacity, however, necessitates the actions of animals, which is not the case with human beings (A534/B562). Human beings are thus seen as exceptional rational animals who can overcome impulses arising from their sensible side. Although we will concentrate on human experience, the view of animals being sensibly or perceptually speaking not that different from us will be argumentatively important from time to time.
We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty of judging.\(^{43}\)

There are other appropriate names for understanding: the spontaneity of cognition (Erkenntnis), the faculty of thinking, the faculty of concepts, and the faculty of rules.\(^{44}\) In the so-called A-deduction Kant implies that the last one is the most informative.\(^{45}\) We will get back to this later, but a couple of general remarks about the idea behind it are in order already. Understanding has to put the perceptual material under rules to be able to judge on the basis of it. This, however, would be impossible unless understanding did not exhibit a stable structure in its own functions. Eventually, this idea will bring us to the notion of category (Kategorie), also known as the pure concept of understanding (reiner Verstandesbegriff). As the latter name indicates, such concepts lie solely in the understanding, which makes it all but obvious how the connection between sensibility and understanding should be understood (recall the gap mentioned in Introduction).

In any event, it is noteworthy that the main distinction at hand is not old-fashioned or outdated but valid as we speak. One just needs to keep in mind that Kant does not (at least he does not have to) refer to any concrete compartments of the mind. All these notions referring to separate faculties of the human mind are, more than anything else, instruments for clarifying different elements in our cognitive undertakings.\(^{46}\) For example, we do have something from without; something which we cannot come up with by ourselves (hence receptivity). Understanding is limited and restricted, that is; it is not a sovereign king. On the other hand, we are not mere slaves of receptivity either (hence spontaneity). However, to simply define sensibility and understanding in these terms, or in terms of passivity and activity, can be somewhat misleading. A more illuminating way to give a preliminary explanation of Kant’s dualist view of the human mind is, I think, to emphasize that the sphere of sensibility is non- or preconceptual, whereas that of understanding is conceptual to the core.

### 2.2. Space and Time

Let us imagine any object that deserves to be called a body. What is its most salient feature for achieving this status? That cannot be its color, the sound it makes, its taste, smell, or how it feels to

\(^{43}\) *A69/B94*: “Wir können aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtheile zurückführen, so daß der Verstand überhaupt als ein Vermögen zu urtheilen vorgestellt werden kann.”

\(^{44}\) *A126.*

\(^{45}\) *A126.*

\(^{46}\) Kant also has a concept of mind – or the human mind, *das menschliche Gemüth* – in his repertoire. Thus his approach is not faculty sensitive through and through, nor should any of the individual faculties be identified with the mind as a whole. This seemingly small point will be of some importance later.
the hand. This is because it could be anything, or at least endlessly variable, in these terms. Obviously, a simple point will not do either. That would not be an object of the kind that each and every body is. Bodies allow a sensible relation to them (potentially speaking; we might need a microscope, telescope, or some other device for this). The absolutely simple, on the other hand, would be a purely intellectual representation that refers to something that is not really experienceable at all. Unlike bodies, it lacks extension. Now, that is what we were looking for. Indeed, all outer objects share this feature. Only thereby do they have a shape (Gestalt) or figure (Figur). Whatever the object is, it must necessarily be spatial in this fundamental sense to be called a body.

Let us then imagine two simple bodies, say, a red cube and a green ball. If we perceive both at the same time, there are several aspects on the basis of which we can distinguish them from each other. Color is one such aspect. However, it is easy to see that the color would be irrelevant if both turned out to be green on closer inspection. Shape would be another candidate, but this time it could suffer a similar fate. Perhaps we were looking at the objects through some weird mirror; perhaps they are both cubical. Indeed, all their qualitative aspects could suffer the same fate; maybe they are no less than identical in this respect. One difference has to remain, however, and that is location. Two objects may cause identical sensations in us, but it is impossible for them to occupy the same place simultaneously. Hence, despite all their similarities, they do differ spatially after all.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues for the ideality and subjectivity of space in a similar way. The conclusion is that spatial features are not in or given by the objects; they are not, in themselves, “real” or “objective” but “subjective” or “ideal.” Time receives a similar treatment, and an important aspect of this was already suggested above: even though objects can be present simultaneously, each in its own location, they can fill the same place only before or after one another. Such temporal features are no less than absolutely necessary for representation: the objects must not only be represented as located somewhere, but the representations must follow one another in some order, or take place at the same time, in order to take place at all. Moreover, there is always duration to them. For example, the red cube is not only there, but it persists there for some time. If it moves, it fills one place first, then another, and so forth; this could not be represented without time either.

The basic idea, which Kant had already in place by the time of his inaugural dissertation, is that alterations must be represented through time, not the other way around, since time itself cannot be represented through changes. In a similar vein, extension and location, or spatial relations in general, must be represented through space, not vice versa, because space cannot be represented through bodies. Instead, space is the condition for representing them spatially, and thus as bodies, since bodies are necessarily spatial.

---

47 A26–28/B42–44. See also ID § 15, 2:403.
48 ID § 14, 2:401.
Kant calls space and time pure intuitions. By this Kant appeals to rudimentary spatiality and temporality that underlies all representation, wholly irrespective of what the particular empirical content might be. It is in this respect that both are independent of experience (hence purity). They are also known as the forms of appearance.\footnote{A20/B34.}

The notion of appearance (Erscheinung) brings together all empirical representation rooted in the senses. What can appear is potentially perceivable, depending on the constitution of the subject and the cognitive context, which underlines the necessary impact of our sensible constitution on any possible perceptual content. This notion is thus not so much used by Kant to explain the phenomenal character of actual perception, but to emphasize that whatever it is that is acquired through sensory routes is mediated through space and time. If these were different, also the appearances would be. But even then it would hold that “we cannot perceive anything except insofar as it appears.”\footnote{A540/B568: “wir nichts wahrnehmen können, als so fern es erscheint[].”}

More than that, perception would continue to have formal restrictions.

Form (Form) contrasts with matter (Materie). Space and time are called forms because they are the basis of any kind of spatial or temporal relation or configuration. They contain no matter at all by themselves. This can be conceived in two ways which do not exclude each other. First, we may think of space without anything in it. But as we could not think of an extended body without space, space has to be primary. It is, then, the ground for representing anything spatial. Secondly, we may think of a body in space that has nothing but a certain extension (including impenetrability) and shape to it. But we cannot get rid of these unless we get rid of it altogether. It simply has to be spatially represented to have any such features, and since this is due to the representation of space, which precedes the object, the form is not only fundamental, but different from the matter. The same applies to time.

Space and time are, accordingly, the basis of all human cognitive undertakings. There are no other ways objects could be given to us but spatiotemporally. This is also the only possible starting point for us to make further sense of those objects in experience. We could also dub space and time, as Kant did in his inaugural dissertation, as absolutely primary and universal principles of sensible cognition. Or to use another term borrowed from Kant’s dissertation, they are prior to everything else in shaping up the subject’s phenomenal universe.\footnote{See ID § 13, 2:398.}

The forms are not variable. Only the matter is. Certainly the latter comes in all kinds of spatiotemporal configurations that go through changes. But that is not Kant’s point. Even though objects alter spatially, their being extended and having some kind of shape and location remains constant. Likewise, time is “behind” any kind of alteration. That is, all change takes place in time, yet
time itself does not go through changes; only that which is in time does. Thus the main idea is that space and time are the ultimate sensible conditions of human cognition; there is no experience but under these conditions.

As such ultimate preconditions, space and time refer to the necessary cognitive basis that is wholly independent of what some actual subject happens to think of space and time as such. Indeed, in order to really understand Kant’s model, space and time must be seen as transcendental principles. The transcendental aesthetic as a whole is but a science of these principles from the standpoint of sensibility. Here are two illuminative explications, both from 1790:

A transcendental principle is one through which the universal a priori condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition at all is represented.

[A] transcendental principle must determine something a priori in regard to objects and their possibility.

In practice, such principles refer to what we must necessarily presuppose in order to make sense of being an object without resorting to actual sense experience. This takes us to the notion of a priori, the keyword in both quotes.

2.3. A priori and a posteriori

It is commonplace in philosophy to explain the distinction between a priori and a posteriori from the standpoint of propositions and their justification. For example, if we wonder, after hearing bad news, how badly our car got damaged, this thought of ours has necessarily a posteriori content through which it is possible to entertain it. Either we have to get to the car and check the damage at first hand, or we must produce the representation of the damaged vehicle on the basis of descriptions concerning this particular situation. In both cases, we must rely on empirical evidence and the specific empirical

---

52 A41/B58.
53 Cf. Falkenstein 1995, 153, where space and time are stated to be “necessarily conceptual” representations. It should be emphasized that this holds only when the two are taken as actually entertained representations in one’s thinking. It does not hold when they are considered – from a transcendental point of view – as the basis of all sensible representing.
54 A21/B35. See also MM 29:802.
55 KU V, 5:181: “Ein transcendentales Princip ist dasjenige, durch welches die allgemeine Bedingung a priori vorgestellt wird, unter der allein Dinge Objecte unserer Erkenntniß überhaupt werden können.”
56 ÜE 8:194: “[Ein transcendentales Princip über die Objecte und ihre Möglichkeit etwas a priori bestimmen müsse.]”
qualities on which it is based. An *a priori* proposition, on the other hand, is utterly independent of such things. A typical example would be the tautology “Unmarried males are bachelors” the verification of which does not require any kind of experiential knowledge (assuming that we are competent language users).

In Kant’s model, however, the issue of *a priori* representing is not simply about the grounds of our assertions; whether empirical evidence is needed, or whether it is enough to realize what was already included in the concepts. The question is, rather, what in all representation that is supposed to be about experience is on our own part and knowable to be of such origin, being thus representable “from ourselves, i.e., *a priori*. 

Most importantly, this question extends to sensibility. We saw above that the two forms of appearance are those through which all sensible representing must take place. Now, ‘sensible’ does not straightforwardly indicate a representation that is acquired through the senses (taken physiologically). To have the latter happen literally, the subject must be affected through its receptivity, but sensible representations are possible also independently of that. Indeed, sensible representations themselves can be both *a posteriori* and *a priori*. Kant implies in the *Prolegomena* that this was no less than a novel idea on his part: “it did not occur to anyone that the senses might also intuit *a priori*.”

For a geometer (or for anyone with some years of schooling) coming up with a representation of some geometrical figure (a cone, for example) is obviously possible without the aid of any concrete three-dimensional objects, such as a cardboard model of one, or any kind of requisite (say, a pen, dividers, a piece of paper, or the fine sand of some Greek beach). In other words, it may take place fully *a priori* in the sense of ‘independently of experience,’ or ‘without any help from experience.’ The representation is nevertheless a sensible one, not a purely intellectual representation. In a word, the geometer *intuits* the cone in the process of constructing it, and according to Kant, all human intuition is sensible.

Because the geometer’s cone is nevertheless an *a priori* representation (in the sense of being not aided by experience) nothing is received from without. Instead, he or she constructs the figure voluntarily, or spontaneously. As such, it is not a perception of any kind, but a mental operation which requires above all understanding for a rule for constructing such an object, *imagination*

---

57 P § 11, 4:284: “aus uns selbst, d.i. *a priori*, vorgestellt werden.”
58 See e.g. B146–147.
59 P 4:375*: “man sich gar nicht eingefallen ließ, daß Sinne auch *a priori* anschauen sollten.”
60 Kant speaks of such mental constructions e.g. in A220–221, 224, 713/B268, 271, 741; ML2 28:532.
61 E.g. A35/B51.
(Einbildungskraft, imaginatio) for producing any such “mental imagery,” and sensibility for having spatially structured content in the first place.

To count as perception (Wahrnehmung, perceptio) the intuition would have to be accompanied by sensation. An actual cardboard model of the cone before one’s eyes would make such a case. Kant’s technical term for this is empirical intuition (empirische Anschauung). Accordingly, whereas intuitions may be either a priori or a posteriori, perceptions are always empirical representations and thus a posteriori. Indeed, where there is even a tiny amount of sensation involved, representing can never be wholly a priori. Thus, for an experience to be in any sense perceptual (as it must) it has to have an a posteriori component to it. On the other hand, since the forms of appearance (or forms of sensibility, as they are also called) play a necessary role in all experience, and since they are not a posteriori but a priori, there must always be an a priori component to experience, too.

Accordingly, the two a priori forms define our way of perceiving without exceptions. In other words, they are the sensible conditions peculiar to us; this is how we are constituted as perceivers. This constitution must ultimately be the same within a class of similarly-structured subjects, which would in this case be human beings. In the bigger picture, this makes it conceivable how people can communicate their perception-based experiences with each other. Moreover, this reveals how there can be something shared between a posteriori representations and the wholly a priori ones. Again, consider what there is in the geometer’s mind: a geometrical object known as a cone. It is, in a sense, a perfect representative of its class of objects. Although we cannot say the same of the cardboard version, both are nevertheless represented formally speaking in like manner.

Consequently, also within sensible representing of a posteriori variety everything takes place a priori in the sense that it is necessarily in accordance with space and time as forms of appearance (which are ‘prior to experience’). Sensations, being wholly a posteriori, provide the empirical data, but intuition, playing the spatiotemporalizing function with an a priori basis, provides order and organization. Were that not so, the mind would not have a grip on its material, one could say.

We are now in a position to define sensibility itself with intuition: it is a way of intuiting. However, we must not forget that sensations are equally important in our story. It is because of them that some thing (Ding) can be perceived in the first place:

---

63 Although one could add to this that nothing really appears here, even appearing can be taken to be a priori in the sense of being in one’s imagination – before the mind’s eye, so to speak (see e.g. A124).
64 ID § 12, 2:397; A20/B34.
65 A42–43/B39–60. To be sure, other kinds of subjective constitutions are possible, but we are destined to cope with our humanly structured subjectivity. This point is important also in the sense that the constitution of objects “as such” cannot be the object of our cognitive capacity. Once again, we have to cope with our representations – ultimately, with how things appear to us.
66 More on this in chapter 6.
67 See e.g. A43/B60.
The matter of appearances, however, through which things in space and time are given to us, can be represented only in perception, thus *a posteriori*.

The *form* can well be represented independently of perception. Not only is this important for arguing that space and time are not properties of things, but for making theoretical room for sensible *a priori* representing that is formally like any actual perception would be (as we just saw). It is just that in actual perception there cannot be things present without the matter provided through sensation. Nor can things be perceptually represented but spatiotemporally. This makes sensations the necessary material conditions of perception, space and time its formal conditions.

There is a grand methodological setting involved in Kant’s notion of *a priori*. To begin with, we do not need to draw any conclusions about the physiological facts of our mental constitution from anything that has been said so far. Argumentatively speaking, the story is basically of what remains when we think of objects without material presence. Time and space cannot be removed in a similar vein. As Kant writes in *On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One* (1790):

> But now I am instructed by the *Critique* to omit all that is empirical or sensibly real in space and time, and thus to abolish all things in their empirical representation, and I then find that space and time remain over, like single beings, whose intuition precedes all concepts of them and of the things in them.[70]

Although Kant calls space and time *a priori* representations because they are independent of particular experience and knowable to precede its actual content,[71] this should not be taken too literally to mean that the mind could simply be detached from all empirical stuff, however. Surely nothing would be going on without the latter.[72] Kant’s point is rather that an *a priori* structure underlies everything empirical in the sense that whatever the latter is, it necessarily accords with that structure. From the standpoint of sensibility, intuiting under the formal conditions of space and time

---

68 A720/B748: “Die Materie aber der Erscheinungen, wodurch uns Dinge im Raume und der Zeit gegeben werden, kann nur in der Wahrnehmung, mithin *a posteriori* vorgestellt werden.” Things in this sense can also be described as *things as phenomena* (see e.g. MM 29:832).

69 A20–21, 31/B35, 46; P § 10, 4:283.


71 See A42/B60.

Kant’s Dualist View of the Mind
typifies this. From the standpoint of understanding, the structure-providing functions independent of particular empirical content would be the categories.

One meaning of ‘pure’ is “legislative a priori.”\textsuperscript{73} Again, the basic idea behind this formulation is that the mind itself plays the role of the organizer and lawgiver (instead of some mind-independent reality which would be inaccessible to us anyway). However, although the notions of pure and a priori go hand in hand, a cognition that is a priori can be either simpliciter or relatively so.\textsuperscript{74} It is only the former which does not contain anything empirical. The latter is nevertheless a priori, only in relation to something empirical. In these kinds of cognitions there is, accordingly, something of a posteriori and something of a priori origin mixed together.

Such cognitions are also called principles.\textsuperscript{75} A good example would be “Every alteration has a cause.” Even though cause is an a priori concept, and alteration an a posteriori one, their interconnection is nevertheless cognized a priori. This kind of cognition also makes a universal claim that the fact that some alteration has a cause is not simply a contingent one, but that things must be in accordance with this rule no matter what the particular circumstances are. Indeed, necessity is the distinctive mark (Kennzeichen) of a priori cognition.\textsuperscript{76}

Only that which lies on a priori ground (Grund) is necessary whereas a posteriori ground leads to mere contingency.\textsuperscript{77} As the goal of Kant’s method is to seek out the transcendental principles through which representing the necessary conditions of experience (or of cognition from experience) becomes possible, their ground cannot be empirical. This is why they are in need of a deduction, that is, a legitimation for presuming any such principles.\textsuperscript{78} This way the issues concerning human mind are also taken out of the context of empirical psychology; one is practicing transcendental philosophy instead.\textsuperscript{79}

Finally, one should notice that when we speak of the necessity of some principle, or the a priori status of, say, space, we are of course speaking through understanding and reason (Vernunft, ratio). Certainly not could we cognize such things were the higher faculties put off. But one should not conclude from this that whatever the a priori condition is, its ultimate basis lies in the higher faculties.

\textsuperscript{73} KU III, 5:179: “a priori gesetzgebend[,]”
\textsuperscript{74} R 5668, 18:324 (1780s); MM 29:750.
\textsuperscript{75} R 5670, 18:324 (1780s). Both Princip and Grundsatz can be translated as ‘principle.’ For Kant, the two terms are not necessarily synonymous, however. In fact, some texts (see especially A149/B188) suggest that the first term serves the kind of principles Kant has in mind in the Aesthetic as opposed to those, say, in the Analytic of Principles (Die Analytik der Grundsätze).
\textsuperscript{76} R 5668, 18:324 (1780s). See also MM 29:767 for the ”must” an a priori cognition carries with it.
\textsuperscript{77} See e.g. KU § 31, 5:281.
\textsuperscript{78} See e.g. KU § 30, 5:279. Because there are such principles both in terms of sensibility and understanding, both need a deduction of their own. Thus there is a deduction not only in the Analytic, but also in the Aesthetic. Actually, there is one in the third Critique as well, namely the deduction of judgments of taste (KU §§ 30–38, 5:279–290).
\textsuperscript{79} See KU § 29, 5:266.
Just like it was important in the previous section to notice that space and time can be taken in two senses, and that it is the one that refers to the concept-independent framework of all sensible representation which matters to us, the *a priori cognition* must be separated from the formal *a priori* basis of cognition. The *a priori* cognition is only the means by which we represent that basis to ourselves in some principle. Had Kant’s philosophical system never seen daylight, that basis would still be there; only the principles would be not.

2.4. Inner Sense and Outer Sense

It seems obvious enough that our experience is to some extent “external,” and to some extent “internal.” Kant extends the idea into the forms of sensibility themselves. Space is the form of *outer sense*, time the form of *inner sense.*[^80] Not only is this distinction of utmost importance in arguing for transcendental idealism[^81] (which is something we will pass), but it illuminates how Kant understood perception.

Let us use as our example a simple body known as a football. It is something extended, and it has a spatial relation to other three-dimensional things, including our own bodies. To be able to represent this, we must necessarily represent the ball as an object that is located somewhere, and as something separate from ourselves. This depends on outer sense and its constitution. As Kant writes in the Transcendental Aesthetic:

> By means of outer sense (a property of mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their form, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable.[^82]

To represent anything “as outside us” points not only to outer objects, but to us as subjects capable of representing ourselves. As we are, according to Kant and many others, some kind of mind-body unions[^83], that can mean two things. First, as already hinted, I can be an object of my own outer sense myself, or to quote one of Kant’s notes:

[^80]: A26/B42; A32/B49.
[^81]: For this, consult the Transcendental Aesthetic together with the Refutation of Idealism (Widerlegung des Idealismus, B274–279).
[^83]: For Kant’s (critical) view on mind-body relation, see e.g. MM 29:907–909.
Kant’s Dualist View of the Mind

We are first object of outer sense for ourselves, for otherwise we would not be able to perceive our place in the world and to intuit ourselves in relation to other things.\(^8^4\)

Secondly, I can take myself as a non-extended entity that has mental states. To represent myself this way I must be able to intuít my own mind and the state it is in. Inner sense is required for this.\(^8^5\) Outer sense will not do because inner representations are not spatial or external in character, but stand only in temporal relations; and time, Kant remarks in the Aesthetic, “can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us.”\(^8^6\)

To refer to oneself in the non-extended sense, one must be able to take one’s mental states as one’s object (or rather, oneself as being in some state or another), which, however, would be impossible without consciousness of that who has those states, namely the self. A consciousness of this kind is called apperception (Apperception), which could also be dubbed as “the simple representation of the I.”\(^8^7\) This is a yet another topic to which we will return (although only briefly).\(^8^8\)

For our current purposes it is sufficient to point out the following. First of all, perception (and accordingly, intuition) comes in two types: inner (internal) and outer (external).\(^8^9\) This reflects not only the distinction between inner and outer sense as two different properties of the mind, but also a phenomenological distinction which everybody would make: it is one thing to sense (to continue with our example) the ball through vision, and quite another thing to sense, say, joy that lasts for two seconds as the ball comes near. Secondly, inner perceptions have appearances as their object, too.\(^9^0\) As we remember, according to Kant there cannot but sensible intuition, and this extends also to apperception. Indeed, it is crucial to notice that the subject can only intuit (or perceptually represent) oneself as one appears to oneself (not only as a body, but as a soul as well).\(^9^1\)

Besides, one’s states go through changes. This requires inner sense because the relation between those states is necessarily temporal. In contrast to this, to represent things in outer perception, both outer and inner sense are required.\(^9^2\) Let us imagine the ball flying through the field from one place to another. In whatever particular way this representation takes place, it has not one but two formal conditions, both familiar from above. Now there are not only changes of inner states, but changes of

\(^8^4\) R 6315, 18:619 (1790–91): “Wir sind uns selbst vorher Gegenstand des äußeren Sinnes, denn sonst würden wir unseren Ort in der Welt nicht warnehmen und uns mit anderen Dingen im Verhältnis anschauen können.”
\(^8^5\) See A22/B37; A33/B49.
\(^8^6\) A23/B37: “Äußerlich kann die Zeit nicht angeschaut werden, so wenig wie der Raum als etwas in uns.”
\(^8^7\) B68: “die einfache Vorstellung des Ich[.]”
\(^8^8\) See section 5.1.
\(^8^9\) For explicit references to these two types of perception, see A347/B465; KU § 37, 5:289. For inner/outer intuition, see e.g. R 6315, 18:619 (1790–91).
\(^9^0\) A107; KU § 89, 5:460; R 6360, 18:688 (1797).
\(^9^1\) B69.
\(^9^2\) See A34/B50–51; B427.
location. All these relations that are represented in that situation are mediated, accordingly, through outer and inner sense. In this sense, motion “unites” space and time.\(^93\)

We could claim further that one could not perceive different outer objects as different without temporal dimension. In the absence of the latter, each and every representation would be as if new in relation to the former ones, popping out of nowhere one by one, because the very relation to what was before requires time. In a similar vein, it is only because of the temporal continuum that an object can be predicated at \(t_1\) as being in position \(a\), and at \(t_2\) in position \(b\), so that it can be taken as one and the same object.\(^94\) Spatial dimension is required, on the other hand, to have something somewhere to be related with other things and oneself according to time in the first place, which locks the two senses, and their respective domains, tightly together.

### 2.5. Further Remarks

It was shown in section 2.1. that Kant’s view of the human mind is a dualist one. We have sensibility, on the one hand, and understanding, on the other. Sensible empirical representations are given to us through external motivation. We are being constantly affected; only thereby can we have material (sensations) for perception. Then again, if we are to think anything, we must use our understanding (concepts, judgments). This is possible because we are spontaneous creatures: even though we cannot help but receive, we may conceptualize the intake in various ways, judge over it, make all kinds of generalizations and abstractions.

Still, we should stick to Kant’s fundamental idea that the formal *a priori* framework provides structure with respect to both sensibility and understanding (analyzed above mostly in respect of the former). Methodologically speaking, we must struggle to keep them to their own camps, as it were. Indeed, Kant’s description of them as “two entirely different sources of representation” should be taken seriously. Although this does not by itself refute a reading according to which full-fledged representation is possible only in their interconnection,\(^95\) we must initially reserve room for something less, too (to put it equally figuratively at this point). This reflects my general strategy to push things in sensible terms as far as possible; it is only this way that we can make justice to perception in Kant’s model.

---

\(^{93}\) A41/B58.

\(^{94}\) Kant presents a similar argument in B48–49. To be sure, being at \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) requires time, but the point is that with mere momentary “pop-ups” there would be no such phenomena as object constancy, persistence and duration. In the end, this presupposes that that there are, in fact, enduring objects – or, rather, something subsisting that grounds transtemporal existence. For this latter topic, which is beyond the scope of this study, see especially the so-called First Analogy (A182–189/B224–232).

\(^{95}\) E.g. Allison 1985, 26.
We discussed the notion of principle to some extent in sections 2.2. and 2.3., but mentioned only in passing reason, the faculty of principles itself.\footnote{96} This was deliberate, and I will continue with this trend. Although reason obviously plays a key role in Kant’s system as a whole, the present issues really concern understanding (in relation to sensibility). True, Kant does say that the coherent use of understanding requires reason,\footnote{97} that reason is the faculty of inferences,\footnote{98} that explanation is its business,\footnote{99} and many other things that promote the importance of this faculty (two of his famous \textit{Critiques} has the word written in the cover, after all). Then again, just like one may by reason mean “the entire higher faculty of cognition,”\footnote{100} one may take understanding, the power of judgment (\textit{Urtheilskraft}), and reason collectively as the “powers of mind, which are comprehended under the broad designation of understanding in general.”\footnote{101} Thus whenever we refer to any “intellectual” matters, ‘understanding’ will do nicely.

The notion of appearance was introduced in section 2.2. Whatever is in our intuition appears to us. Take the football, for instance. It is something that is there to be kicked at. It is a body. However, as we saw in section 2.4., this use of the term cannot be all-embracing because also the object of inner intuition is an appearance. Hence appearances must not be identified outright with bodies. Although the latter are appearances from the transcendental point of view, so is any kind of perception, whether outer or inner, and whether it has as its object something suitable for the term ‘body’ or not.

Unsurprisingly, it has been pointed out in the literature that appearance is an ambiguous notion.\footnote{102} I do not think there is a real problem involved, however, since whatever we call a sensible object is necessarily in accordance with our sensible conditions. Consequently, whether appearance has “private” or “public” flavor to it,\footnote{103} Kant’s main point remains: we do not represent things as they are in (or by) themselves because we cannot. Accordingly, whatever is in our sensibility is nothing but appearance to this extent, and “appearances, as such, cannot occur outside us, but exist only in our sensibility.”\footnote{104} However, this does not mean that whatever there is, exists merely in our sensibility, but that appearances as such do.

\footnote{96}{See e.g. A299/B356; KU § 76, 5:401; MD 28:674.}
\footnote{97}{A651/B680.}
\footnote{98}{LD-W 24:693, 703. Kant also speaks of the inferences of the understanding (LJ 9:114–119) and of the inferences of the power of judgment (LJ 114, 131–133), though.}
\footnote{99}{EEKU VI, 20:218.}
\footnote{100}{A835/B863: “das ganze obere Erkenntnißvermögen[,]”}
\footnote{101}{A131/B169: “Gemüthskräfte [...] die man unter der weitläufigen Benennung des Verstandes überhaupt begeißt.” See also An § 42, 7:199, where the power of judgment is described as the second intellectual faculty, and EEUK VIII, 20:220, where Kant refers to understanding “in a wider sense.”}
\footnote{102}{Allison 1974, 122.}
\footnote{103}{Ibid., 122–124.}
\footnote{104}{A127: “Erscheinungen können als solche nicht außer uns statt finden, sondern existiren nur in unserer Sinnlichkeit.”}
As was implied in section 2.3., *a priori* intuition plays a crucial role in Kant’s model. One thing to keep in mind was that while perception is necessarily a kind of intuition, intuition is not necessarily perception. Perception can only be empirical, but intuition can also be non-empirical (which is nevertheless sensible, at least for us). Now, it is possible to interpret intuition, or the intuitive element of our cognition, as physical input.\(^{105}\) However, although such an idea might do well in some other kind of approach to the ultimate conditions of experience, I cannot see how that could ever be made compatible with Kant’s key idea of *a priori* sensibility or, as it was put earlier, “that the senses also intuit *a priori.*” Even *sense* (*Sinn*) does not necessarily denote a physical capacity for Kant.\(^{106}\) Although the sense of vision, hearing, and so forth, can of course be considered physiologically, in Kant’s model the term refers mostly to a certain kind of potentiality that allows the mind to have a certain kind of sensible content that has an *a priori* element to it, too.\(^{107}\) Physical senses have no such elements. Also recall from above one of the quotes from the Aesthetic: the term ‘outer sense’ is in singular, not plural, and refers to a property of mind, not body.\(^{108}\)

One may also consider what Kant writes in the *Metaphysical Foundations.* Objects of outer sense belong to what was known back then as the doctrine of body (which deals with extended nature), whereas the object of inner sense belongs to the doctrine of the soul (which deals with thinking nature).\(^{109}\) Transcendental philosophy, however, does not belong to either of these doctrines. It is not physics, physiology, nor psychology, but the ultimate explanatory foundation of any such doctrine.

---

\(^{105}\) Falkenstein 1995, *passim* but especially 123, 140, 359.

\(^{106}\) Kant does explain the senses quite explicitly in physiological terms at some points in the *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View.* However, in that book Kant’s approach is also thoroughly different from the *Critique* and other theoretical work. Kant’s anthropological considerations are pragmatic and aim to explain human conduct and behavior (see An 7:119; § 20, 7:157; § 37, 7:189). For a commentary in which much weight – too much in my mind – is put on the *Anthropology,* see Falkenstein 1995. Falkenstein goes so far as to claim that “[t]he distinction between the intuitive and the intellectual in Kant is properly to be seen as a distinction between the physiological and the psychic or, more exactly (if we do not want to presuppose dualism), between the physical and the cognitive.” (Ibid., 123.) If the point about the *a priori* sensibility did not already refute this claim, that will be done on many occasions in what follows. Briefly put, in my opinion the so-called intuitive and intellectual are two sides to a single mind, both equally ”psychic” if they are to be anything for that mind or, rather, for the cognitive subject.

\(^{107}\) Yet another option would be to offer an account of forces that make perception possible (see OP 22:100–101).

\(^{108}\) See the first quote in section 2.4.

\(^{109}\) MAN 4:467, 470. Notice that the doctrine of body deals with many objects, which implies that it deals with all kinds of objects observable through outer sense(s), whereas the doctrine of the soul has but one special kind of an object, namely the soul, which is observable through inner sense – as the subject appears to itself, one could add. Both are nonetheless equally natural objects. The same distinction is formulated in the *Critique* as between corporeal and thinking nature (A846/B874). See also KU § 79, 5:416 and § 84, 5:435, where things are put literally: thinking nature is inside, material nature outside of us.
Certainly sensation, as the matter of intuition, can be taken in physical terms within Kant’s model.\textsuperscript{110} Then again, unlike intuition, it has no \textit{a priori} element to it. Compare this with some empiricist model in which everything is thought as received through the senses as such. Then there is, for sure, no room for any \textit{a priori} element left. In Kant’s model, on the other hand, although sensations have material and thus also physiological ground, intuition and thus experience itself has formal ground, too, and that cannot be taken merely in the physical sense unless we transform the whole story from philosophy proper to something else.\textsuperscript{111}

There are of course many other problems in interpreting Kant (ones inherent either in Kant’s thought, expression, or in his reader’s wit) not yet mentioned, albeit perhaps implicitly contained in the previous sections. In any event, we cannot tackle them all at once, and we have already listed enough items to get back to at a later point. One further anticipation, however, is still in order, concerning Kant’s notion of object. Given the questions and the context of this study, much relies on this seemingly simple concept, which we have so far used without problems as if there were not any. But there are.

I proposed earlier that \textit{Ding} (as phenomenon) denotes any concrete object there is to be perceived and experienced, and that its existence, as such an object, requires sensation. So far so good. \textit{Object} or \textit{Gegenstand},\textsuperscript{112} however, does not need to be a thing in this sense (just like \textit{Erscheinung} did not have to refer to a body). For example, we may think of some fantasy creature, say, a dragon, even though we have never really experienced one. God is even better example because we can see dragons in motion pictures, video games, and comic books, there are all kinds of dragon statues and figures available, and we all know the ones from Chinese celebrations. Certainly some pagan god such as Thor is easily depicted in a similar manner, but if we think of a divine being of more abstract quality, we lack the means.

\textsuperscript{110} See A723/B751.

\textsuperscript{111} Here one may also consider the notes in which Kant refers to Locke as the physiologist of reason (R 4866, 18:14) or understanding (R 4893, 18:21) and to Tetine’s work as an empirical analysis of human nature, whereas his own is transcendental (R 4901, 18:23).

\textsuperscript{112} Kant’s use of two terms suggests a semantic difference, but if there is one, it is nothing but clear what it is. One possibility is to take \textit{Object} as an “abstract” notion. Several examples may be provided as evidence: the highest end is \textit{Object} (KU § 84, 5:435), morality has \textit{Object} (KU § 87, 5:452; § 91, 5:472), so does history and geography (KU § 91, 5:469). \textit{Gegenstand} would then be the term for more “concrete” objects that are “really there.” Here are some examples: \textit{Gegenstand} of experience in contrast to supersensible \textit{Object} (KU 5:484), \textit{Gegenstand} of nature (EEKU V, 20:200, 211) and sense (B305), whereas satisfaction has \textit{Object} (KU § 3, 5:206). However, such a reading is not watertight because there is also \textit{Object} of sense (B66), outer \textit{Object} (A48/B66), \textit{Object} that is seen (A644/B672), \textit{Weltobject} (A773/B801), and \textit{Naturobject} (EEKU XII, 20:250). There is even \textit{Gegenstand} of pure reason (KU § 91, 5:469) and religion (KU § 28, 5:263). In the end, it seems that perhaps sometimes a distinction is made, but the two are also regarded as synonyms – and used accordingly even within one and the same sentence (as in WDO 8:135). I will not pursue the point further, but I do think that in some passages Kant’s terminological variation might be significant.
Now, the ultimate question is whether such an object can or cannot be sensed and represented in the spatiotemporal world (excluding artistic or imaginary representations). If we cannot do that, but nevertheless manage to represent something, whatever the means, there must be at least some kind of an object, namely the object of our own thought. Recall the geometer’s *a priori* representation of the cone. Nothing was being literally sensed, but an object there was. Thus we must be careful with the notion of object. For now, we can proceed with this firmly in mind: whenever there is an object of perception, it cannot be an object merely in this latter sense. One may compare a thought of dragon’s fire with a hot stove as an object of one’s tactile sense; again, the difference is huge.

Already on the basis of the preliminaries given in this chapter it is obvious that Kant’s account of perception is many-sided, and certainly not graspable in few quick definitions which one could then break down for further elaboration. To begin with, there is a grand-scale terminology involved. It is not even obvious which terms are the really important ones, as there are several that relate to perception in one way or another. Rather surprisingly, or perhaps very much so, *Wahrnehmung* (or *perceptio*) is not a good starting point. It is an ambiguous notion that Kant uses rather loosely (examples will be provided). It is best to begin from the notions of sensation and intuition, instead. We have already said something about them in general terms; a detailed analysis will come next.
3. Species of Representation

3.1. Sensation

Sensation is absolutely required for perception. Sensations, and sensations only, make up the matter of sensibility. In a way, sensation is the most immediate kind of representation, or as it is put in one of Kant’s lectures: “The representation of the impression of the object on us is sensation.” Take a field of grass, for example. It looks the way it does because a certain kind of affection is being entertained in the perceiver’s mind. Stimulation (Reiz) is probably the most general alternative for ‘sensation’ in this sense. Accordingly, in having sensation, my mind is being stimulated via my senses in some specific way (here, “greenly”) which I cannot modify at will. Instead, it is my mental state which is being modified due to external factors beyond my choosing. Well, I could put colored glasses on, for example, shaping the input thereby, but that would only show how the sensation itself depends on my exact sensory condition.

On the other hand, emotions (Rührung) are sensations, too. Kant’s notion of sensation is actually very diverse. It goes from simple sensory stimulation to loathing (Ekel) and moral sensation (moralische Empfindung). What, one may reasonably ask, is really common to all these? To answer the question, a good starting point is the so-called Stufenleiter in which Kant classifies representations. Here is the first half of it:

The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio).[1]

---

113 LW 24:807.
114 MM 29:829: “Die Vorstellung vom Eindruck des Gegenstandes auf uns ist Empfindung.” (Emphases omitted.) This formulation supports what was noted earlier: sensation, not impression, is the necessary item in elaborating the perceiving subject as Kant saw it. While the “imprints” per se may have an independent causal role, the story of there being anything present for the subject begins from sensations.
115 LW 24:807.
116 LW 24:807; KU § 14, 5:226. A very general alternative would be Gemütsbewegung, i.e., ‘a movement of the mind’ (An § 66, 7:238). At one point Kant also uses Gefühl der Rührung (An § 68, 7:243).
118 A320/B376: “Die Gattung ist Vorstellung überhaupt (repraesentatio). Unter ihr steht die Vorstellung mit Bewußtsein (perceptio). Eine Perception, die sich lediglich auf das Subject als die Modification seines Zustandes bezieht, ist Empfindung (sensatio).” As far as I know, Kant uses ‘Perception’ only in the Stufenleiter, for unknown reasons. Also note that the translation misses the adjective lediglich, i.e., it should read ”solely to the subject.”
To paraphrase, perception is a representation accompanied by consciousness (*Bewußtsein*). As sensation itself is stated to be a kind of perception here, it, too, has to be conscious to count as one. One must be careful with the *Stufenleiter*, however, because generally these two terms should not be identified in the Kantian model. At this point, the safest way to deal with this reservation is to put things this way: “Perception is consciousness of sensation.”

Basically, when one is having a sensation, one’s mind is being modified in a certain way, and if one is aware of that modification one has a perception. According to *Stufenleiter*, such a perception refers solely to the subject, or as Kant puts it in another passage, “sensation in itself is not an objective representation.” But in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant makes a further distinction which appears to be in full conflict with this. There Kant suggests that there are also objective sensations. This is something we must clear up pronto because a lot depends on it.

First, one should notice that Kant claims in the *Critique* that sensation is *in itself* non-objective. This allows a reading that if something is added to sensation, or if something accompanies it (in addition to consciousness), the sensation might as well count as objective. Secondly, the *Stufenleiter* does not have to be read as an exhaustive explanation, but as one in which only the subjective variety of sensation is being considered. Thirdly, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ are themselves misleading terms, as we will see on more than one occasion. For now, let us consider the following.

We can well say that sensation is, no matter what, subjective, if we consider it in perfect isolation. In other words, if sensation as such is but a mere effect one is aware of, it obviously does not relate to anything by itself. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between calling, say, a feeling of weight “subjective” and calling any representation that is dependent on the constitution of the subject “subjective.” Moreover, in the *Stufenleiter* it is also suggested that some perceptions are objective. Such perceptions are clearly not subjective in the former sense, although they, too, are necessarily that in the latter sense. It is rather that they are called objective because they have contents that have relation or reference beyond themselves.

As we remember, every perception has to be accompanied by sensation; an objective perception cannot be an exception. This either blurs the subjective-objective distinction further, or we have to end

---

119 We will focus on the notion of consciousness in chapter 5.

120 MM 29:794: “Bewußtseyn der Empfindung ist Wahrnehmung.”

121 A165/B208: “Empfindung an sich gar keine objective Vorstellung ist[.]”

122 KU § 3, 5:206. For an example of a secondary source focusing on ‘sensation’ where one would expect to find something about this distinction but instead finds out that it has been completely overlooked, see George 1981.


124 The point is well put by Reid in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, II.XVI: “The agreeable odour I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the rose, or any other object. This sensation can be nothing else than it is felt to be.”

125 A320/B376. Sensation, as presented in the *Stufenleiter*, could thus be defined as subjective perception (see Kant 1781/1787/2006, 1010).
up saying that some element in objective perception is subjective, some objective, or that some element in it can be taken as subjective, some as objective.\textsuperscript{126} Here, I believe, we come to the point Kant wants to make in the third \textit{Critique} when he describes ‘sensation’ as ambiguous and distinguishes subjective sensations from the objective ones. The main reason for making the distinction is that \textit{some} sensations simply cannot be considered objectively in any sense of the word. Thus, to avoid double-talk, Kant decides to call this kind of sensation \textit{feeling} (\textit{Gefühl}).\textsuperscript{127}

Kant thinks that feeling is not a kind of cognition at all.\textsuperscript{128} One way to put this is that feelings as such do not represent anything in the object, and thus do not have any real cognitive function to play. Feelings do not even belong to the faculty of cognition, as every other sensible representation does, but to a faculty of their own, namely to that of pleasure and displeasure (\textit{Gefühl der Lust und Unlust}). They are, accordingly, nothing but manifestations of a \textit{subjective aspect} (\textit{Subjective}) of some representation, or as Kant puts it in the introduction to the third \textit{Critique}:

\begin{quote}
However, the subjective aspect in a representation \textbf{which cannot become an element of cognition at all} is the \textbf{pleasure} or \textbf{displeasure} connected with it; for through this I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it can well be the effect of some cognition or other.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

Then again, Kant clearly suggests here that the \textit{Subjective} in this sense differs fundamentally from those aspects of representation which \textit{can} be taken as merely subjective, but which nevertheless do have cognitive potential. It is the latter, then, that are objective at least in the primitive sense that through them one may cognize (unlike through feelings) something “in the object of the representation.” Take the sensation of green color, for instance. We perceive the green in some object.\textsuperscript{130} To borrow Kant’s term from the quote, it acts as an element or piece of cognition (\textit{Erkenntnissstück}) in our representation of that object.

Kant was well aware of the ambiguity of the subjective aspect of representation, as the following passage (which precedes the previously quoted passage in the source text) reveals:

\begin{quote}
In the sensible representation of things outside me the quality of the space in which we intuit them is the \textbf{merely subjective aspect} of my representation of them (through which what they might be as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} Loose aspect talk of this kind is practiced by Kant himself in MD 28:673.
\textsuperscript{127} KU § 3, 5:206. See also KU 5:266, where Kant speaks explicitly of considering a representation of sense or sensation objectively, which implies the possibility of considering it subjectively, too.
\textsuperscript{128} See e.g. B66.
\textsuperscript{129} KU VII, 5:189: “Dasjenige Subjective aber an einer Vorstellung, \textit{was gar kein Erkenntnissstück werden kann}, ist die mit ihr verbundene \textit{Lust} oder \textit{Unlust}; denn durch sie erkenne ich nichts an dem Gegenstande der Vorstellung, obgleich sie wohl die Wirkung irgend einer Erkenntniss sein kann.”
\textsuperscript{130} Certainly, one can deny that colors are really in the objects. However, from the standpoint of the perceiver they are – the ontological status of color properties does not matter one little bit.
objects in themselves remains undetermined), on account of which relation the object is also thereby thought of merely as appearance; space, however, in spite of its merely subjective quality, is nevertheless an element in the cognition of things as appearances. **Sensation** (in this case external) likewise expresses the merely subjective aspect of our representations of things outside us, but strictly speaking it expresses the material (the real) in them (through which something existing is given), just as space expresses the mere *a priori* form of the possibility of their intuition; and the former is likewise used for the cognition of objects outside us.\(^{131}\)

This emphasizes further the point that every sensible representation reflects our constitution as subjects, which makes them all “subjective.” At the same time, however, this shows how something merely subjective from one point of view can be the necessary ingredient of an objective representation from another. In this particular passage, Kant refers to space as such a thing, namely both as a subjective quality and as *Erkenntnisstück*. So it is with sensation, too.

Moreover, we can find from the passage yet another distinction concerning sensation, which also illuminates the subjective-objective distinction: some sensations are *external*, some *internal*.\(^{132}\) This distinction, which Kant also puts out in the first *Critique*,\(^{133}\) stresses the phenomenological difference between, say, seeing the green grass and entertaining a feeling of well-being on the sight of it. To quote Kant:

> The green color of the meadows belongs to **objective** sensation, as perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to **subjective** sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it).\(^{134}\)

Indeed, sensation can play a double role. As something that comes through an object of sense (*Gegenstand der Sinn*), making it appear and contributing to how it is taken by the subject in outer

---

\(^{131}\) KU VII, 5:189: “In der Sinnenvorstellung der Dinge außer mir ist die Qualität des Raums, worin wir sie anschauen, das bloß Subjective meiner Vorstellung derselben (wodurch, was sie als Objecte an sich sein mögen, unausgemacht bleibt), um welcher Beziehung willen der Gegenstand auch dadurch bloß als Erscheinung gedacht wird; der Raum ist aber seiner bloß subjectiven Qualität ungeachtet gleichwohl doch ein Erkenntnisstück der Dinge als Erscheinungen. *Empfindung* (hier die äußere) drückt eben sowohl das bloß Subjective unserer Vorstellungen der Dinge außer uns aus, aber eigentlich das Materielle (Reale) derselben (wodurch etwas Existirendes gegeben wird), so wie der Raum die bloße Form a priori der Möglichkeit ihrer Anschauung; und gleichwohl wird jene auch zum Erkenntniss der Objecte außer uns gebraucht.” See also MS 6:212.

\(^{132}\) Or can be so considered, as literally speaking every sensation is of course in us (see e.g. A378).

\(^{133}\) A374.

\(^{134}\) KU § 3, 5:206: “Die grüne Farbe der Wiesen gehört zur **objektiven** Empfindung, als Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes des Sinnes; die Annehmlichkeit derselben aber zur **subjektiven** Empfindung, wodurch kein Gegenstand vorgestellt wird: d.i. zum Gefühl, wodurch der Gegenstand als Object des Wohlgefallens (welches kein Erkenntniss desselben ist) betrachtet wird.”
perception, sensation is the necessary ingredient of the representation of the object (remember, “it expresses the material,” or the real, “through which something existing is given”).

The subject’s feeling in the presence of some object is something else (one does not mean a tactile feeling here, but satisfaction, enjoyment, displeasure, fear, excitement, and so forth). A sensation of this kind is not used for the cognition of the object. Being wholly “inward,” it concerns nothing but the subject, and what is subjective in this sense cannot be “external” in any sense (just like it was destined to remain non-cognitive). Here we may also consider the next passage, again from the third Critique, right after the Introduction:

Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

Now, one might claim that agreeableness, or any subjective and in every respect internal sensation, has much to do with how the subject takes the object. For example, if somebody suffers from arachnophobia, there is a fear present when there is a spider present. Or to put it slightly differently, feelings are quite relevant when we consider how the person in question sees and takes certain things. A line of thought of this kind has made some thinkers doubt, and even abandon, the distinction between cognition and feeling, suggesting cognitive function to feelings.

Although this makes some sense, Kant can be defended here (not to mention that we are presenting the preliminaries of Kant’s line of thought). Assuming that feelings do contribute to one’s outlook on things, they are still not represented as being there in the world, or as features of some object itself. One could also speak of intentionality or, in this case, the lack of it. Surely the feeling is directed at or about something, too, which may question such terminological choice (the spider is the object of fear, one may think of one’s pleasurable state, one may compare one’s feeling with other people’s feelings, and so forth). Then again, Kant’s ultimate point would be that feelings are inherently incapable of representing any states of affairs beyond the subject.

---

135 All such sensations can be put quite comfortably under ‘feeling’ or ‘emotion’ – unlike sensations of color, sound, touch, smell, and taste. Sometimes Kant does use the same word (Gefühl) for the “outer” feelings of tactile sense, though (MAN 4:510; MM 29:882).
137 KU § 1, 5:203–204: “Alle Beziehung der Vorstellungen, selbst die der Empfindungen aber kann objectiv sein (und da bedeutet sie das Reale einer empirischen Vorstellung); nur nicht die auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, wodurch gar nichts im Objecte bezeichnet wird, sondern in der das Subject, wie es durch die Vorstellung afficirt wird, sich selbst fühlt.”
138 A good example is Goodman 1976, 245–252.
139 See e.g. George 1981, 230.
This does not refute the status of external or objective sensations as modifications of states of mind. Even as elements of cognition, they are nevertheless qualitatively dependent on our sensible constitution. As sensations, they are not literally there in the world, of course. All sensations are merely private in this respect. Moreover, perceivers can differ in their sensations in the presence of the same object.\footnote{A29/B45; KU 5:345–346; R 6355, 18:681 (1796–98).} This is easy to imagine because sometimes the sensations differ even within one and the same subject. To give an example: hot tap water feels drastically different when your hand is cold, compared to when your hand is warm. And one can always wonder whether someone else sees, say, the red color in the red carpet exactly the same way. Still, even then that what we call red belongs to the sensation which, as it were, attaches itself to the representation of the body known as the carpet. To press the already familiar point further, contrast this with its agreeableness: certainly not does that belong to the representation of the carpet \textit{qua} body, but to the representation of the subject’s inner state in the presence of this particular body.

If sensation is “with consciousness” it is nevertheless perception, or a necessary element of one. Now it is easy to explain the fundamental difference between the two types of perception further. Not only are internal and external perception phenomenologically different, but they concern sensation in different senses. Some perceptions have to do with the subject’s mental states and only that. This kind of perception is useful for answering such questions as “How do I feel?” or “Do I like this?” or “What happens in my mind?” Compare these with questions like “What is that green spot?” or “What happens there?” or “Is the lion bigger than the tiger?” Perceptions that are required for answering the latter kind of questions do not concern the subject’s states (although there must be modifications of those states involved, of course, and I am not saying that mere perception is sufficient for answering these or any questions). Most certainly they may have various emotional effects on the subject. Then again, these would be secondary to the absolutely necessary requirement for perceiving something external in the first place, which requirement would be that the subject has objective sensations in the sense described above.

In general, the distinction between two types of sensation implies two basic ideas Kant held about the human subject. Firstly, it reflects Kant’s psychological or anthropological views on perception according to which the senses themselves differ in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. The \textit{more} objective senses have to do with the cognition of external objects, whereas the \textit{more} subjective senses are lacking in this respect.\footnote{An § 16, 7:154. In addition to the five \textit{organ senses} or \textit{fixed senses}, Kant also mentions \textit{vital sense} or \textit{vague sense} which appears to be a some kind of general sense of one’s inner sensations (see MM 29:882).} The tactile (touching), visual (seeing) and auditory (hearing) senses are the more objective ones. This makes the olfactory (smelling) and gustatory...
(tasting) senses the more subjective ones. At one point in his lectures Kant’s explanation for this is that with “some [senses] we represent more alterations of the subject than of the object, and vice versa.” A little later he adds that through mere smelling or tasting “one can not yet distinguish one thing from another. I cannot know color, shape, etc. Therefore these also affect us most.” Another difference given in another lecture is that while the more objective senses are “productive of cognition,” the more subjective senses are only for “providing sensation.”

On the basis of these explanations it is evident that Kant thought that some senses give better cognitive input for grasping outer objects. What will be important later, through the more objective senses the subject can distinguish things from one another. Here one could compare a sound so loud it “pierces the ears” with the neighbor’s little poodle barking. With the latter, our attention is directed at something in the direction of the sound. With the former there is only sensation; it is really nothing but an unpleasant feeling. Even if the barking was very annoying, there would still be more to it cognitively speaking. This connects quite straightforwardly with what has been said above. The excessively loud sound is not a proper external sensation the way the barking sound heard from across the street is. Like all pain, it is (mostly at least) an inner sensation. Although it is acquired through a sense that is “productive of cognition” it so happens here that the sense itself is not as objective as it could be (remember, the senses were more or less objective/subjective according to Kant). It would also be thus if I did not entertain anything else in my mind except the disagreeableness of the barking: the cognitively functioning objective sensation would then have turned into an utterly subjective one.

Secondly, the distinction at hand points to the “double form of sensibility.” As space and time are, as it were, realized through the two basic properties of our sensible mind, namely, outer and inner sense, it follows that sensations, as the very material of those senses, are represented either spatially or temporally (or both). But as we saw, some sensations simply do not attach or belong to objects represented in space. Thus there must be an inherent trait to some of them that allows them to be thus represented. Certainly not are they intrinsically spatial; that feature of theirs is on our own part. Nor are sensations as such in space; it is the objects and their features that are represented so. However, the latter are phenomenally the way they are because certain kinds of sensations had by the mind

---

142 MM 29:882. In these lectures, Kant also points out that the tactile sense or “outer feeling” is the basis of all others (883).
143 MM 29:882: “bei einigen stellen wir uns mehr Veränderung des Subjects als Objects vor et vice versa[.]”
145 MD 28:672: “Erkenntniss hervorbringend[.]”
146 MD 28:672: “Empfindung schaffend[.]”
147 See section 5.4.
148 ML1 28:231: “in die Ohren dringt[.]”
149 For a somewhat similar example by Kant, see An § 19, 7:156–157.
150 MM 29:799: “doppelten Form der Sinnlichkeit[.]”
make them appear that way. Since we cannot choose which of that sensory stuff appears entangled in external objects, and which not (nor the way it appears), it must be due to external factors working on our sensibility. Accordingly, although each and every sensation is a mere modification of the state of mind, subjective and objective sensation cannot be that in the same sense of the word. There is a difference in the input provided; it is impossible to not attribute some sensations to externally appearing objects.

3.2. Empirical Intuition

To tie the previous section tightly with this one, let us begin with the following passage which not only reflects Kant’s empirical realism, but shows that his view of the two types of sensations is already present in the first Critique:

> Whether we take sensations, pleasure and pain, or even external sensations, such as colors, warmth, etc., it is certain beyond doubt that it is perception through which the material must first be given for thinking objects of sensible intuition. This perception thus represents (staying for now only with outer intuitions) something real in space.\(^{151}\)

As pleasure and pain are feelings, one may deduce from the text that they would also be the representatives of the internal variety of sensation that plays no cognitive function. External sensation, on the other hand, may be (and is all the time, obviously) in service of cognition of outer objects. However, as Kant points out, whatever the sensation-based stuff is, it is provided through perception, which, as we remember, must involve awareness of sensation. Only this way “something real” is being represented to the subject. In addition to this, that something cannot be anywhere in sight (quite literally in the case of visual perception) unless it is in accordance with the form(s) of sensibility. Or to put it as it is expressed in the quote, only then is it in space.

So, the basic idea seems to be that the perceptual material based on sensation is placed in spatiotemporal configurations in (or through) intuition. Not only does this reflect Kant’s major distinction between matter and form, but also Kant’s tendency to think that nothing ever becomes cognition by itself. The first thing to do to explain this becoming is to separate sensation and intuition, just as Kant ends up saying in the following passage from his lectures on metaphysics from the 1790s:

\(^{151}\) A374: “Dieses ist ungezweifelt gewiß; man mag nun die Empfindungen Lust und Schmerz, oder auch der äußeren Sinne, als Farben, Wärme etc. nehmen, so ist Wahrnehmung dasjenige, wodurch der Stoff, um Gegenstände der sinnlichen Anschauung zu denken, zuerst gegeben werden muß. Diese Wahrnehmung stellt also (damit wir diesmal nur bei äußeren Anschauungen bleiben) etwas Wirkliches im Raume vor.”
Insofar as sensation is referred to an object, it can produce cognition. So far as it can become no part of cognition, sensation is called feeling of pleasure and displeasure. That wine is red becomes cognition, that it will be pleasant, not at all. With all sensations we distinguish sensation from intuition.\textsuperscript{152}

This suggests that in order to contribute to cognition, sensation must be “referred to an object.” As we saw above, and what is also being repeated in the quote, this cannot happen with all sensations. Here the pleasantness of the wine would make such a case. Its redness, on the other hand, can play its part in (or be a part of) cognition when that particular color is perceived in some location, and in certain relation to other qualities that occupy other places, follow one another, and so forth. Or simply, when it is taken to belong to some object (say, a glass). In addition to the sensation itself, this calls for intuition, and since wholly inner feelings can be represented only in temporal sequences, sensations must be of the external variety in the case of outer intuition and, respectively, in the case of perception of external objects.

In the presence of sensations, one means by intuition always empirical intuition (in contrast to an \textit{a priori} intuition which does not require empirical input):

That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called \textbf{empirical}.\textsuperscript{153}

With this item in our story, it is finally possible to begin to speak of concrete things such as bricks and houses being present to some subject (although the story is still partial). As Kant puts it in the \textit{Prolegomena}, having empirical intuitions is the same as having “perception of actual objects.”\textsuperscript{154}

It must be in this sense that intuition is an objective perception, or to quote the other half of the \textit{Stufenleiter} to the extent it concerns intuition:

\begin{quote}
[A]n objective perception is a \textbf{cognition} (\textit{cognitio}). The latter is either an \textbf{intuition} or a \textbf{concept} (\textit{intuitus vel conceptus}). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular[.]
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{152} MD 28:672: “Empfindung kann in sofern sie auf ein Object bezogen wird, Erkenntniß hervorbringen. Empfindung so fern sie kein Erkenntnißstück werden kann heißt Gefühl der Lust und Unlust. Daß der Wein roth ist, wird Erkenntniß, daß er angenehm wird, gar nicht. Bei allen \textit{Sinnen} unterscheiden wir die Anschauung von der Empfindung.” The translation does not really capture the point made in the last sentence, namely, that all \textit{senses} have both sensuous and intuitive element to them.

\textsuperscript{153} A20/B34: “Diejenige Anschauung, welche sich auf den Gegenstand durch Empfindung bezieht, heißt \textit{empirisich}.” See also B146–147.

\textsuperscript{154} P § 10, 4:283: “der Wahrnehmung wirklicher Gegenstände[.]” In the \textit{Critique}, there is a passage (B164) which indicates a difference between empirical intuition and perception, though. We will get to this in section 4.8.

Through intuition, the relation to the object is direct. As such, it is not mediated or interpreted through some other representation. Another telling passage on the immediacy of intuition is in the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic:

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them [...] is intuition.\(^{156}\)

The singularity of intuition, on the other hand, means that an intuition picks out one and only one object at a time.\(^{157}\) One may compare this with the singularity of space and time as \textit{a priori} intuitions.\(^{158}\) As “all-encompassing receptacle”\(^{159}\) and “flow of moments”\(^{160}\) space and time are unities; there is only one space and one time in this sense. In contrast to this, the singularity of empirical intuition is probably best captured through the notion of \textit{thisness}.\(^{161}\) What is being represented through it is this or that individual thing with its distinguishable way of being sensibly present to the mind.

That could be an \textit{a priori} representation in the sense of being represented without any help from immediate experience, but that would not count as perception. The latter requires a representation of some actual (\textit{wirklich}) object, which is only possible when the relation takes place through sensation. As intuition is nevertheless immediate and direct, this must mean that empirical intuitions and sensations are reciprocal in empirical representing, or even that empirical intuitions are ways of co-ordinating sensations. This formulation brings us to the language Kant used in his inaugural dissertation:

Time is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation. Time is rather the subjective condition which is necessary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the co-ordinating of all sensible things in accordance with fixed law. It is a pure intuition.\(^{162}\)

---

\(^{156}\) A19/B33: “Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntniß auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, so ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, [...] die \text{Anschauung}.”

\(^{157}\) On singularity of intuition in this sense, see e.g. A713/B741; ML 28:546; MK3 29:975.

\(^{158}\) On singularity of intuition in this sense, see e.g. A24–25/B39; MK3 29:981.

\(^{159}\) MM 29:830: “ein alles befaßendes receptaculum[.]”

\(^{160}\) MM 29:830: “Ein Abfluß von Augenblicken.” Note the non-technical sense of the term translated as ‘moment’ – literally, time is a flow of the blinks of an eye.

\(^{161}\) This links Kant’s notion of intuition loosely to the scholastic notion of \textit{haecceity} (see Wolter 1990, 76n26).

\(^{162}\) ID § 14, 2:400: “Tempus non est objectivum aliquid et reale, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio, sed subjectiva condicio per naturam mentis humanae necessaria, quaelibet sensibilia certe lege sibi coordinandi, et intuitus purus.” (Emphases omitted.)
Space is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; it is, rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the nature of the mind in accordance with a stable law as a scheme, so to speak, for co-ordinating everything which is sensed externally.\textsuperscript{163}

These passages obviously point to non-empirical intuitions, or to space and time as the formal basis of sensible representation, but they also remind us that even if the particular picked out in intuition is strictly of empirical origin, there is nevertheless an \textit{a priori} element connected with it, or indeed with any representation.\textsuperscript{164} Thus even something called empirical intuition “is possible only through the pure intuition (of space and time).”\textsuperscript{165}

In the inaugural dissertation, we are also given a couple of telling examples of the cognitive achievements that stem ultimately from intuition. One is the realizing of the fact that between two points there is only one straight line. This cannot be deduced from the concept of space, but must be “apprehended” in (or with) intuition instead.\textsuperscript{166} The other example concerns distinguishing so-called incongruent counterparts.\textsuperscript{167} For example, the left and right hand make such counterparts (at least assuming that they are intrinsically identical). If we asked Kant what grounds their difference, Kant could answer with a single word: intuition. Indeed, if we could not resort to that which Kant calls intuition, we would end up with identical descriptions of the hands. But this would be false, of course, because we are perfectly aware that they are of the same size and figure, except for the very noticeable fact that they are like mirror images which not only occupy different locations, but are incapable of occupying the same location in the exactly same manner. If one is asked how they get their identities, the straightforward Kantian answer would be that the thisness of this and that other hand simply presents itself to us. In other words, and more generally put, it is through intuition that we find out the immediate differences in spatial layouts even in otherwise seemingly identical things. This points to something that is both cognitively primitive and utterly indispensable at the same time.

Another indication of the primitivity of intuition in Kant’s model is that intuitions, as representations peculiar to sensibility, precede or can precede thinking (which would be the act

\textsuperscript{163} ID § 15, 2:403: “Spatium non est aliquid obiectivi et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed subjectivum et ideale et e natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens veluti schema omnia omnino externe sensa sibi coordinandi.” (Emphases omitted.)

\textsuperscript{164} Partly because of this, Kant should not be dubbed as sensationist (pace George 1981). The name overlooks Kant’s core idea of the interconnection of sensations and intuitions in empirical representing. The notion of objective sensation as a piece of cognition gives another reason for not dubbing him so. In this respect, it is too strongly put that sensations are not “suited to designate anything” (ibid., 230).

\textsuperscript{165} A165/B206: “Die empirische Anschauung ist nur durch die reine (des Raumes und der Zeit) möglich[.]

\textsuperscript{166} ID 2:402–403. ‘Apprehend’ is taken from David Walford’s translation (Kant 1770/2003, 396). Lewis White Beck uses ‘discern’ (Kant 1770/1992, 138). The original reads \textit{cerni}. The notion of apprehension, as used in Kant’s critical works, will be analyzed in sections 4.2. and 4.6.

\textsuperscript{167} See ID 2:403; P § 13, 4:285–286; MAN 4:483–484. See also the section 5.4. of this study.
peculiar to understanding). Here one may consider the following passages, the first two of which are from the *Critique*, the third from Kant’s personal notes from the early 1770s:

Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition.]^{168}

That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition.]^{169}

One can intuit something without thinking something thereby or thereunder.]^{170}

The idea of intuition preceding (or being not necessarily dependent on) thinking connects directly with the previous example. The most fundamental difference between the two hands is not given in our thinking of them under some such labels as ‘left’ and ‘right’ but intuitively. Moreover, it presses the point that intuition is a non-intellectual, aesthetic manner of representing of its own kind. To put it bluntly, to think is quite another thing than to intuit.

The basic function of empirical intuition could be said to be, then, to provide examples for thought. A way to elucidate this is to say that via intuition something is being presented to the mind in concreto.]^{171} Even though this is somewhat inexact talk (both on my and on Kant’s part), it becomes more illuminating when we think of something of the sort we cannot perceive in one glimpse, or perhaps cannot even dream to see in its entirety, now or ever. Take the world, for example. Representing that in sensible terms is something we cannot do; there is no intuition available to be supplied for our thought. Yet we can easily think of such a totality. However, that is something we manage to do only in abstracto. There are thus different routes to grasping things.

As to the concreteness of the intuitive kind of grasping, we may consider the following example from the third *Critique*:

Thus one says of an anatomist that he demonstrates the human eye when he makes the concept that he has previously expounded discursively intuitable by means of the dissection of this organ.]^{173}

---

168 B67: “Nun ist das, was als Vorstellung vor aller Handlung irgend etwas zu denken vorhergehen kann, die Anschauung[.]


170 R 4636, 17:620 (1772–73): “Man kann etwas Anschauen, ohne etwas dabey oder darunter zu denken.”

171 Note that this is not limited to empirical intuiting (A715/B743; P § 7, 4:281).

172 See MM 29:851–852. Here a straightforward point of comparison is the scholastic distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition (see Day 1947, passim; Wolter 1990, 98–122, especially 104–105).

173 KU 5:343: “So sagt man von einem Anatomiker: er demonstrire das menschliche Auge, wenn er den Begriiff, den er vorher discursiv vorgetragen hat, vermittelst der Zergliederung dieses Organs anschaulich macht.”
It is easy to imagine how the lecturer in so doing shows the audience what he meant with his abstract disquisition on the human anatomy. After that even a person not qualifying as a medical doctor might come to realize what the jargon was all about. The anatomist simply made things intuitive; more or less.\footnote{See LJ 9:108, where Kant refers to his own presentation – he tries to make it more intuitive ("anschaulicher machen") with diagrams.}

The quote also tells us that intuitive contrasts with discursive (diskursiv).\footnote{To continue with brief reflections on the scholastic tradition, on which Kant undoubtedly leans to some extent: "It is not called ‘intuitive’ because it is not ‘discursive,’ however, but rather because it is distinguished from that abstractive knowledge, which knows a thing in itself through a species.” (Duns Scotus, Lectura II, d. 3, nn. 285, 287–288, quoted from Wolter 1990, 107.) I do not try to interpret the Subtle Doctor’s subtleties but content myself with this plain terminological point: in the Kantian view, “intuitive” does contrast with both “discursive” and “abstractive.” See also KU § 59, 5:352*.} This yet another distinction points back to the fundamental difference between sensibility and understanding. The former is aesthetic and intuitive.\footnote{See e.g. Axxii–xviii.} As the latter is not, we may conclude that it must be discursive (or that it is the understanding that operates discursively). We may also consider the following passage from the so-called Jäsche Logic:

From the side of the understanding, human cognition is discursive, i.e., it takes place through representations which take as the ground of cognition that which is common to many things[.].\footnote{LJ 9:58: “Das menschliche Erkennen ist von Seiten des Verstandes discursiv, d.h. es geschieht durch Vorstellungen, die das, was mehreren Dingen gemein ist, zum Erkenntnissgründe machen[.]”}

Although we will have to wait for the further analysis of discursivity until we have examined conceptual representations, this one little quote is enough to help us locate and emphasize the role of intuitive representations from the side of sensibility (to switch the stance) as those that take as their ground of cognition that which is not common to many things. This cannot mean but particulars or individual things (or their particular aspects).

We could also speak of appearances here. The following formulation from the Critique will do nicely; what is more, it introduces the notion of something being undetermined, which, together with determination (Bestimmung), will be important at a later stage in our story:

The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.\footnote{A20/B34: “Der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung heißt Erscheinung.”}

Accordingly, whenever we speak of appearances, we speak of (possible) objects of empirical intuition. But what are these objects? Since empirical intuition is sense-based, any such object must be an object...
of sense, only spatiotemporally modified. In other words, whatever is intuitable is, in principle, perceivable, and that cannot be but an appearance.

Before moving on, I should address a couple of worries that may arise concerning Kant’s use of ‘intuition.’ One is the alleged ambiguity of the notion. At least three senses have been suggested: intuition can be taken to mean either a mental content, an object, or an act. While this is all true, I do not see it turning into a real problem (at least not in the context of this study). To be in a direct relation to an object is to have an intuitive mental content. But also the intuition itself, or the intuitively achieved representation, may be taken as an object. On the other hand, the prerequisite for there being an object of intuition in the first place is that the subject intuits, either a priori (“non-perceptually”) or through sensation (which makes it a perception).

Another issue is how “visually” the Kantian intuition should be understood. Etymological considerations do point quite directly to looking. However, one would be too eager if one saw (here we go again) intuitions merely as mental images or acts of sense perception. Granted, representing time as a line would come very close to forming a mental image. We have also seen that the general meaning of empirical intuition is sense perception. Moreover, Kant does identify intuition with an image representation (bildliche Vorstellung) at one point. Still, one could say that these do not capture all of Kant’s intentions, especially those belonging strictly within the transcendental methodology (beginning from space and time as a priori intuitions).

179 Allison 1985, 21; 2004, 82 (Lewis White Beck is acknowledged for pointing this out).
180 Most interestingly, Duns Scotus, for example, terms ‘cognitio intuitiva’ also as ‘visio’ (Day 1947, 102).
181 The Latin verb intueri – a derivative of tueri, ‘to look at’ – means ‘to gaze upon.’ Kant obviously turns intuition into a technical term. Descartes does exactly the same in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind. At some points Descartes’ “novel use of the term” (CSM I, 14) is not that alien to Kant’s – especially the editors’ formulation ‘immediate mental apprehension’ (13n1) comes very close. At other points, however, what is intuiting for Descartes would not be that for Kant. The main difference between the two appears to be that for Descartes pretty much anything counts as thinking, intuition included. For the Cartesians’ very wide notion of thought, see Simmons 2001, 34–35.
182 WDO 8:133. However, Kant also uses image (Bild) (see section 4.1).
183 Here one could also consider ÜE 8:211–212, where Kant criticizes Eberhard for thinking that a pentagon – as something that is easy to imagine – is a sensible object, whereas a chiliagon – as something that is presumably impossible to depict in one’s imagination just like that – is not. As Kant points out, not only are both equally sensible objects, but it would be absurd to require that if an object is grounded on intuition, the representation of it must actually be accompanied by an exact image of it.
Then again, identifying intuitions with singular terms would be simply misleading. The above considerations have shown explicitly that for Kant intuitions have more than anything to do with spatiotemporal representing and being directly acquainted with objects. More broadly put, the notion refers to what one could call human perceptuality in general (especially when considered together with the notion of sensation). To be sure, we have also seen that intuitions aid thinking, and are thus certainly needed for using singular terms, too (assuming that using singular terms amounts to thinking). However, that would capture only one aspect of Kant’s multifaceted account of intuition and exclude, among other things, the possibility of intuition as preceding thinking. When promoting the perceptual side of (empirical) intuiting, on the other hand, the most obvious slip would be to take intuition too visually. Certainly not does the notion refer merely to visual perception, but to all kinds of sense perception.

Finally, let us look briefly into the question what really is contained in our intuition. It is possible to go very far in this respect. It has been claimed, for example, that whatever is in the same universe with us is being intuited by us because it all has an effect on us. But is something that we do not perceive (and never will) really in our intuition? I think not. I have never actually intuited a real space alien because I have not met one. But I do have intuited many of those fictive ones I have seen in the movies. I can also imagine one myself, and thus come up with an intuition of an alien without perceiving one. But then I do not receive any effects; rather, I affect my representational capacity.

---

184 Cf. Hintikka 1969; 1972. One finds textual support for a reading along these lines from a couple of Kant’s lectures. There Kant uses sun and earth as examples of intuition, and the reason for dubbing them so appears to be the fact that there is only one instance of each (LW 24:905; MK3 29:971). However, nowhere in these passages is it explicitly stated that the term itself acts as an intuition – or indicates an intellectual entity which we might be more inclined to call a concept. As I see it, Kant simply means that such words associate with certain representations used in pointing at singular objects. To single out the sun, for example, is to intuit or to have an intuition of the sun. When we use the term in this sense we do refer to a possible intuition. But it does not follow from this that the term itself does not indicate a general representation, that is, a concept (see section 3.4.1.). Color sensations make a similar case. ‘Red,’ for example, marks in some context a particular sensation with its unique qualitative character. But it does not follow from this that the application of the term is limited to this or any other particular instance. It simply is not – even a term indicating an individual shade with an exact number in some color chart is not thus limited. And even if we allowed that intuitions are in fact identifiable with singular terms in some sense – perhaps according to the line taken in George 1981, 244 – this cannot be their only nor the main role in Kant’s system. In fact, since even animals have intuitions but cannot possibly have singular terms, it is better not to force such a reading at all.

185 That there is representing that is not thinking should be the first thing to observe in Kant’s model. In this sense, Falkenstein is quite right when he emphasizes that “to intuit is not to have a thought of something” (1995, 359). However, he goes too far in this by implying that if we interpret intuition as a psychic phenomenon, denying that intuition is not thinking remains as our only option.

186 MM 29:800.

187 Langton 2001, 196: “Human bodies and their sensory organs therefore receive effects from everything in the physical universe. That is why Newton’s lamallae are already represented in our intuition, even though we are not conscious of them.” Receiving effects is not the same as having intuitions, however, but Langton seems to identify the two when she continues: “Magnetic matter, the inhabitants of the moon, gravitational force, all these, if they coexist with us, are already present in our intuition in virtue of the effects they produce in us[].”
myself. Moreover, in these cases I represent something (or let it present itself) to myself. I do not constantly do that with phenomena like gravitational force, although I am most certainly effected by it all the time. Instead, I only intuit it when I make it into an object (say, when dropping things of different weight from my tower or comparing my situation on Earth with that on my space station). It is true that Kant’s account of intuition is compatible with the claim that were our senses finer, novel kinds of representations would come up. But his fundamental point is nevertheless that whatever the latter were, they would come up in accordance with space and time, not that we actually intuit all of it. Or to repeat a recently-made point in different words: what is being empirically intuited by us is being actually perceived by us, and what is not actually perceived by us, but could be, is intuitable by us. This is so because both actual and possible perception share the same forms of appearance as their ultimate basis.

3.3. Intensive and Extensive Magnitude

An important point of contrast between intuition and sensation is that the former has extensive magnitude (extensive Größe), the latter intensive magnitude (intensive Größe). The following quote from one of Kant’s notes from the late 1790s gives us the basic picture behind this distinction:

The empirical element in the consciousness of an intuition is called perception (animadversio) and has a degree, i.e., intensive magnitude; pure intuition has merely extensive magnitude (space and time). Space and time in which nothing is perceived (no empirical representation of the object encountered) are empty.

To paraphrase, all perception comes in degrees and is thus gradual. It must have some intensive magnitude to it, no matter how small; otherwise nothing is being perceived. As we have identified perception of actual objects with empirical intuition, and since the latter is concomitant with sensation, we can conclude that this kind of magnitude belongs to sensations; indeed, this is also confirmed by the Critique. We may also call intensive magnitude “a degree of influence on sense.”

---

188 Ibid.
189 R 6358 (1796–98), 18:684: “Das Empirische im Bewusstseyn einer Anschauung heißt Warnehmung (animadversio) und hat einen Grad, d.i. intensive Größe; die reine Anschauung blos Extensive Größe (Raum und Zeit). Raum und Zeit, worinn nicht wargenommen wird (keine empirische Vorstellung des Gegenstandes angetroffen wird), sind leer.”
190 A169/B211.
191 B208: “ein Grad des Einflusses auf den Sinn[.]”
With non-empirical intuition there is no such influence (thus the two magnitudes contrast not only sensation with intuition, but also empirical with *a priori* intuition). In the quote, Kant speaks of space and time as having merely extensive magnitude. We may also recall the geometer’s cone which is a spatial representation that has a figure, but which lacks sensation (if it did not, it would be perception). Now, let us picture ourselves doing all kinds of tricks with this object in our imagination (as if using our mind like a computer drawing program). We may grow the diameter of the base, tilt it, morph the whole thing, draw some new lines, and so forth. Basically, in so doing we play with extensive magnitudes. Or picture a ball traveling from point A to point B at two velocities: the longer the time, the greater the extensive magnitude. Actually, if we represent these two events on a timeline drawn on a piece of paper, we have the two extensive magnitudes quite literally in front of us.

Extensive magnitude is no less than a necessary feature of every appearance: whatever is represented spatially and/or temporally, there is always extensive magnitude to it. Kant also suggests with this notion that spatiotemporal representing is successive, or proceeds from the parts to the whole. This might not be obvious when one thinks of something that one can examine in an instant, but bigger things illustrate Kant’s point well. For example, to represent the length of some colossal bridge one must keep up representing the parts before achieving the whole representation (say, two miles). This not only takes time, but requires a mediator (say, a yard). Indeed, what Kant has in mind here is representing objects as being of certain magnitude through a numerical basis, which does not, however, preclude the possibility of intuiting something (one of the individual yards, for example) as a whole without representing any parts first (or through any numerical mediator).

In all, the distinction between the two magnitudes can be used to illustrate crucial things about the subject of perceptual experience. For example, although it is possible to represent a mere shape that has only extensive magnitude, in the case the shape is filled with some stuff, so to speak, there must be sensation involved. Then the representation must have intensive magnitude, too. In outer perception there are thus both. That is to say that there must be some material presence in some spatiotemporal layout for there to be anything “in the consciousness of an intuition” that can count as a perception of an empirical object. Or to use the notions of body and reality:

---

192 Accordingly, it is not an empirical representation but an *a priori* representation. This illustrates one use of *a priori* peculiar to Kant, as one could well say of such a representation that it is nevertheless empirical, albeit in some other sense than perception is that.

193 B203; MM 29:834.

194 A162–163/B203–204. We will return to this topic when we analyze Kant’s notion of synthesis (section 4.2.).

195 These points will be argued for in sections 4.6. and 4.7.
Each body has extensive magnitude insofar as it is in space and time, and also intensive magnitude or a degree of reality.\textsuperscript{196}

Since we do not perceive mere shapes, the most fundamental condition of perception of concrete objects seems to be the presence of intensive magnitude. Consider again seeing the green ball. Even though the subject must have the relevant sensations represented in spatiotemporal form to represent the ball itself (which then has an extensive magnitude), the subject would have no object at all unless there were those sensations that allow him or her to cognize the ball as green in the first place (whatever the additional requirements for that are). In other words, if those “greenly” affecting sensations ceased to be, so would the perception itself. Otherwise, there would be a materially empty frame left after the intensity of the color reached zero.

On the other hand, we saw that having extensive magnitude is the fundamental feature of every spatiotemporal representation, whether of empirical origin or not (with or without sensation). The latter has no intensive magnitude, the former has both. Thus it appears that we have here touched upon two separable conditions of having a sensible object: one reserved exclusively for the objects of sense perception, one for any sensible object. This might make it easier to see how it is sensation that allows a relation to an empirical object in empirical intuition: the ultimate prerequisite of that very relation is some degree of intensity the consciousness of which arouses the subject.

Equally importantly, we get a methodological reminder. There might be all kinds of novel qualitative aspects (flavors, odors, sounds, colors, textures) waiting to be found in the world, but we really do not have a clue what they are before we perceive them. But we are not that clueless about extensive magnitudes. Quite the contrary, we can be sure that any object will show up in such a way that we could have produced, merely by ourselves, the same extensive magnitude it presents itself with. Take any measure, for example.\textsuperscript{197}

Then again, nor are we utterly dependent on empirical input regarding intensive magnitudes. We can be sure that those unknown qualities would come in degrees. That much we can assert of any possible perceptual content whatsoever, or to quote the concluding passage from the Anticipations of Perception:

All sensations are thus, as such, given only \textit{a posteriori}, but their property of having a degree can be cognized \textit{a priori}. It is remarkable that we can cognize \textit{a priori} of all magnitudes in general only a

\textsuperscript{196} MM 29:863: “Ein ieder Körper hat extensive Größe, sofern er im Raume und in der Zeit ist, und auch intensive Größe oder einen Grad von Realitäet.”

\textsuperscript{197} Note that infinity is not an option here: a yet another magnitude – e.g., a mile – can always be added to any measured magnitude, and while progress to infinity is possible, one cannot represent that in any object – e.g., a railway of infinite length (see MM 29:836–837).
single quality, namely continuity, but that in all quality (the real of appearances) we can cognize a priori nothing more than their intensive quantity, namely that they have a degree, and everything else is left to experience.\textsuperscript{198}

Consider, for instance, two spots of light of different brightness. We cannot cognize them in terms of their characteristic qualities without actually perceiving them. But let us suppose that we make a graphical presentation of them by drawing a scale going from 0 to 10, to represent the degree as such, and two graphs reaching a certain level on it. Then, even if we have no first-hand experience of the two lights, we can easily figure out which one is supposed to be brighter. If we could not do that without consulting actual experience, no such graphical representation would be possible (to give a practical example of what Kant is after with cognizing having-a-degree non-empirically). To be sure, as sensations, the two intensities are not reducible to any such intellectualized presentation; perception itself is, of course, directly dependent on the first-hand experience.

We can even exemplify the differences among perceivers through the notion of intensive magnitude. The light could be bright for one, dim for another. Perhaps the latter person just forgot his or her glasses, but the difference may also lie deeper in the perceiver’s condition. As we have seen, the sensible constitution of the subject is contingent in regard to the qualitative features of perception. But we cannot say the same thing about representations having intensive magnitude or degree \textit{per se}; that is not something variable. The same applies to extensive magnitude: even if someone perceived shapes and lengths wrongly (through distorting lenses, for example), the capacity of representing extensive magnitude \textit{per se} is not affected. The case is analogous with (and also a consequence of) having objects represented necessarily in space and time. But here an important distinction rises. Whereas one is compelled to represent things spatiotemporally to represent them to oneself at all, one clearly does not have to represent, say, a line as or in terms of extensive magnitude, or a light as having intensive magnitude or in terms of degree (or continuity) in order to represent it in the first place.\textsuperscript{199}

Yet we \textit{can} do those things, and that is an important aspect of our capacity of representing, both \textit{a posteriori} and \textit{a priori}. However, in laying out Kant’s system as a whole, the latter is even more

---

\textsuperscript{198} A176/B218: “Alle Empfindungen werden daher als solche zwar nur \textit{a posteriori} gegeben, aber die Eigenschaft derselben, daß sie einen Grad haben, kann \textit{a priori} erkannt werden. Es ist merkwürdig, daß wir an Größen überhaupt \textit{a priori} nur eine einzige \textit{Qualität}, nämlich die \textit{Continuität}, an aller Qualität aber (dem Realen der Erscheinungen) nichts weiter \textit{a priori}, als die intensive \textit{Quantität} derselben, nämlich daß sie einen Grad haben, erkennen können; alles übrige bleibt der Erfahrung überlassen.” See also P § 24, 4:306–307.

\textsuperscript{199} In his lectures on metaphysics, Kant speaks of thinking something as a magnitude, and of thinking the magnitude of an object (ML2 28:562; MK3 29:999). That is, Kant does not mean that appearances are literally magnitudes or that we always represent them that way. Also the general context of the Axioms and Anticipations shows that it is all about explicating the possibility of mathematical (numerical) representability of appearances.
important. In a non-Kantian model that allowed only *a posteriori* representing, all sensible features of representations would have to be acquired through sensation. Consider seeing the green ball once again, or any round object. For that we must have certain sensations that allow us to perceive it. In this sense, even its roundness is given through sensation. All true, but at this point Kant’s model shows its strength. To begin with, we can represent roundness without sensations. Furthermore, the roundness represented this way is not in itself any different from the roundness represented in the presence of the actual round object. In both cases, it is the same formal side to our capacity of representing that is being manifested. Otherwise, we would have to end up claiming, among other things, that the sensation-based representation features a different kind of spatiality from the sensationless representation. In short, sensible representing is formally speaking homogeneous regardless of the source material. This pertains also to the two magnitudes, and especially to the extensive magnitude, because each and every sensible representation must be representable in terms of it to be representable at all. Still, the *quality* (*Qualität*) of sensation (the green color in our most recent example) is something we cannot come up with *a priori*. If the intent is to analyze perception, this is something that cannot be put aside ever.

### 3.4. Concept

#### 3.4.1. Empirical Concept

From the standpoint of understanding, representing means thinking, which can also be described as “cognition through concepts.” Concepts are thus necessary for any intellectual activity. As representations, they differ from intuitions in several ways. We can have an initial view of most of the differences by quoting just one short passage from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*:

> For I know that intuitions are given to the human senses, and brought under a concept and thereby under a rule by the understanding; that this concept contains only the common characteristic (leaving out what is particular), and is thus discursive[.]

---

201 A175/B217. That Kant does not mean here the category with the same name is made clear by his explication of the quality in question as *not* representable *a priori*.
202 A69/B94: “Denken ist das Erkenntniß durch Begriffe.”
203 KU 5:484: “Denn ich weiß, daß Anschauungen den Sin nen des Menschen gegeben und durch den Verstand unter einen Begriff und hiermit unter eine Regel gebracht werden; daß dieser Begriff nur das gemeinsame Merkmal (mit Weglassung des Besondern) enthalte und also discursiv sei[.]” As to the translations of the
First of all, it is being implied here that that which is particular (das Besonder) belongs to intuition, whereas concepts contain only what is common (gemeinsam) to many representations. The technical term for such shared characteristics or features is also given: Merkmal (translated as ‘characteristic’ in the quote, but I will use ‘mark’). Secondly, the quote suggests that to bring intuitions under concepts means to bring them under rules. Thirdly, concepts are described as discursive. Let us elaborate on these one by one.

If we examine a concept in relation with a particular object, we can see that the concept indicates a way of representing the object through marks, which is to say that the representation is based on features shared also by other objects. For example, hardness is the mark of stone.204 Certainly several stones differ greatly from each other in many ways, but to belong under the same concept they have to share at least this one mark through which the thinker can arrive at or use that concept appropriately.

Being “mediated by a feature”205 or mark, a concept is not immediate like intuition:

Since no representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept).206

The former [intuition] is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter [concept] is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things.207

Indeed, since concepts indicate common features among things, how could they be but mediate? To use a simple example, if we are to cognize two things as stones, we cannot manage to do that without representing the two with a common denominator between them. Our thought must necessarily go through that. Even cognizing one thing before us as a stone requires that we represent it through some other representation for the simple reason that although an immediate representation can provide the representation of hardness as such, as singular it cannot provide anything as common or shared.

\[\text{Cambridge Edition, Merkmal is a consistently used technical term that be} \text{s for consistency in translation as well. But there is ‘mark,’ ‘feature’ and ‘characteristic.’ Besides, the latter two fit other notions equally well (e.g. Beschaffenheit and Eigenschaft). Sticking with ‘mark’ would definitely have been the best option.}\]

\[\text{204 LW 24:931.}\]

\[\text{205 MM 29:888: “mittelbare durch ein Merkmal[.]”}\]

\[\text{206 A68/B93: “Da keine Vorstellung unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand geht, als bloß die Anschauung, so wird ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar, sondern auf irgend eine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie sei Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen.”}\]

\[\text{207 A320/B377: “Jene [Anschauung] bezieht sich unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand und ist einzeln, dieser [Begriff] mittelbar, vermittelst eines Merkmals, was mehreren Dingem gemein sein kann.”}\]
Because of this, the title *general representation* (*allgemeine Vorstellung, repraesentatio communis*) fits concepts especially well.\textsuperscript{208} Or to put it in terms of consciousness:

> A concept is the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one representation as in another, or that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained.\textsuperscript{209}

Concept formation can be understood along similar lines as bringing together the common features of particular representations to get a general representation out of them:

> He who wished to have a representation of the color red first had to see the color red. When he compared the color red in the red of cinnabar, *carmoisin*, and *ponceau*, however, he became aware that there is something general in the color red, that is contained along with other things in other representations of the color red, and he thought by red that which was common to many objects, and this was a concept.\textsuperscript{210}

What really happens here is that the subject comes up with a way to classify several things as red. Accordingly, a concept is more than anything else a rule.\textsuperscript{211} As we remember from above, in terms of faculties it is the understanding that proceeds through rules. Or to quote Kant’s lectures on logic:

> The understanding has the faculty of concepts, and one can also define it thus. We said above that the understanding is the faculty of rules. But this is the same thing, for when I give a concept, I always give a foundation for rules.\textsuperscript{212}

The concept red, for example, serves to group together whatever things that will satisfy the rule implied by it.

But red can also be considered as a sensation without which one could never arrive at such a rule of classification. A person completely blind from birth is a living example of this. More specifically,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{208} A713/B741; LW 24:904.

\textsuperscript{209} MM 29:888: "Der Begriff ist das Bewußtsein, daß in einer Vorstellung desselben dasselbe enthalten ist als in einer andern, oder daß in mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen einerlei Merkmale enthalten sind."

\textsuperscript{210} LW 24:904–905: "Wer von der rothen Farbe zuerst eine Vorstellung haben wollte, mußte die rothe Farbe sehen. Als er aber bey der rothen Farbe Zinnober, carmoisin und ponceau roth verglich: so wurde er inne, daß in der rothen Farbe etwas generales ist, das auch in anbern Vorstellungen von der rothen Farbe mit enthalten war, und dachte er sich unter roth das, was vielen Gegenständen gemein war, und das war ein Begriff." See also B133*.

\textsuperscript{211} This is well put in Allison 2001, 239, where ‘concept’ is explicated as "a determinate set of marks that provides a rule or decision procedure for the recognition of what falls under it."

\end{flushleft}
since empirical concepts are “drawn from empirical intuition,” \(^2\) and empirical intuitions are “related to the object through sensation,” sensation must be a part of the ground that makes the concept possible. Here is a passage from Kant’s lectures of metaphysics that serves to illustrate the point:

The concept has matter, i.e., content, representations, data, which are given – the form is the reflection of the understanding, by which it brings the sensations together in such a way that it thinks something general through it. The concept is a sum of sensations processed by the understanding. The empirical constitutes the matter in the perceptions and intuitions and concepts.\(^3\)

To paraphrase, the empirical element provided by sensation constitutes the matter of representation while the form comes elsewhere. No news here. However, unlike with the forms of appearance, this time the form is on the part of the understanding. Here Kant coins it as *reflexion*, the primary function of which appears to be to bring the sensation-based material together to allow the subject to think in general terms on the basis of it.\(^4\)

This defines the human understanding in three important ways. The first is clearly a positive thing since such a mode of operation allows us to overcome the diversity of sensation. Here one may consider, for example, the fact that there is a huge amount of distinguishable shades of red each of which looks a bit different not only in itself, but also in different lighting conditions. Against this background the rule of classification also known as the concept of red comes very handy indeed. The usefulness of concepts is further emphasized by the fact that these rules hold despite any remaining differences among objects.

Secondly, one must remember that in all their generality, abstractness, and usefulness beyond immediate experiential situations, empirical concepts must be applied (or be applicable as the need arises) to empirical intuitions. Without this we could not know what satisfies the criteria implied by the rule in question. The technical term for such application is *exhibition* (*Darstellung, exhibitio*). One could also speak of ostensive reference or demonstration. Unless you can do that successfully, your concept lacks reference. This makes the human understanding a dependent understanding.

Thirdly, we have discursivity. This takes us back to the already familiar passage from the *Jäsche Logic*, but let us quote the whole sentence this time:

---

\(^2\) P § 57, 4:350; “durch empirische Anschauung [...] gezogene Begriffe[.]”

\(^3\) MM 29:795: “Der Begriff hat Materie, d. i. Inhalt, Vorstellungen, Data, die gegeben sind – die Form ist reflexion des Verstandes, wodurch er die Empfindungen so zusammen bringt, daß er Etwas allgemeines dadurch denkt. Der Begriff ist eine durch den Verstand bearbeitete Summe der Empfindungen. Das empirische macht die Materie aus in den Wahrnehmungen und Anschauungen und Begriffen.” Here understanding is pretty much seen as a subconscious processor – especially when ‘bearbeiten’ is translated that way – but see section 5.5.

\(^4\) More on reflection below (see especially section 5.5.).

\(^5\) See KU 5:343.
From the side of the understanding, human cognition is discursive, i.e., it takes place through representations which take as the ground of cognition that which is common to many things, hence through marks as such.\textsuperscript{217}

What we have here is an explanation of discursivity as a manner of cognition that makes its way with things through their shared features. Accordingly, cognition through concepts can be called \textit{cognitio discursiva}.\textsuperscript{218} We should also recall what was stated in the first quote of this section: concepts are discursive because they contain only the marks and leave out the particular. This underscores not only the generality of concepts, but contrasts them sharply with intuitions (which indicate relation to particulars or individual things). Moreover, by having always some set of marks as the ground of cognition, understanding grasps nothing completely or perfectly at once, which emphasizes not only the mediacy of concepts, but illuminates the mediate character of the intellect itself. This makes the human understanding a limited understanding.

Finally, just like with intuition, I should address a couple of issues that arise from Kant’s use of ‘concept.’ One concern is basically the same that we found with ‘intuition.’ How to represent singular things in thought if the understanding can only represent in general terms? The obvious answer is through (or with the aid of) intuition, but what about using notably singular terms (assuming that these indicate concepts used for referring to individuals)? Given the generality of concepts, and our refusal to interpret intuitions as (or even as resembling) singular terms, there seems to be no place for singularly functioning concepts in Kant’s model. But there is. For example, even though ‘Mickey Mouse’ refers only to one specific thing, I take it that to really grasp the thought of him we have to do more than merely use that term or sign like it was nothing but a nametag. In the latter case, the so-called concept application would turn out as a mere association (for example, hearing ‘Mickey’ brings along a memory image that depicts this one eccentric mouse).

In other words, to really \textit{conceptualize} an individual thing, we must \textit{understand} the thing to some extent and in some respect, and for this we must have other representations available. Good candidates under which to \textit{subsume} (\textit{subsumiren}) the representation of Mickey to really grasp the thought of him are the concepts of cartoon character and animal. As \textit{subsumption} (\textit{Subsumtion}) means basically that a representation is understood by fitting it into a wider class of objects with the aid of another representation,\textsuperscript{219} this makes the thought of Mickey necessarily a mediate representation. This

\textsuperscript{217} LJ 9:58: “Das menschliche Erkennen ist von Seiten des Verstandes discursiv, d.h. es geschieht durch Vorstellungen, die das, was mehreren Dingen gemein ist, zum Erkenntnißgründe machen, mithin durch Merkmale als solche.”

\textsuperscript{218} LJ 9:91.

\textsuperscript{219} The latter would be the concept under which the first one is subsumed, providing the criteria of belonging to that class. A neighboring notion is \textit{extension} (\textit{Umfang}): the wider the extension of a concept, the more things can
is very different from intuiting Mickey (consider somebody simply pointing at the mouse, for example). Furthermore, since we may conceive, more or less fittingly, many things as “Mickey-ish,” we actually come to use that representation as a general representation. In this sense, it is not that different from the more ordinary concepts like mouse or red.\footnote{Kant suggests this when he emphasizes that despite the fact that concepts can be used singularly or particularly or in concreto – whereby they come close to individuals – they are, as such, always abstract and general or universal in character (LJ 9:91, 99–100).}

Another issue concerns marks. While there are clearly “partial conceptions,”\footnote{Allison 1973, 63; 1985, 18.} is it so that there are also sensible partial representations, namely intuitive marks?\footnote{Smit 2000, 254–260; Grüne 2009, 65–71.} For one thing, Kant uses two terms to refer to the idea of a partial representation: Partialvorstellung and Theilbegriff.\footnote{LJ 9:58, 95.} While the latter is easily identifiable with the notion of mark as an indicator of a common characteristic among several things, the former leaves more options open. Secondly, Kant does seem to refer to intuitive marks in one of his notes.\footnote{R 2286, 16:299–300 (1780s). I think too much emphasis has been given on this one note in Smit 2000. Firstly, it does not indicate explicitly that Kant means that intuitings are based on special kind of marks. In fact, this seems highly improbable in light of Kant’s consistent use of Merkmal in other places as that which provides the ground of cognition of shared features, which grants it a place only in discursive thought. Secondly, I do not think that ‘intuitive mark’ really contrasts with ‘conceptual mark’ but, instead, with ‘analytic mark’ (cf. R 2289–2291, 16:300–301). Whereas all concepts, including concepts such as that of God, contain analytic marks, only those concepts that can be given an instance in intuition contain marks that can be represented synthetically. Hence, I think, the distinction is supposed to explain the difference between using conceptual marks synthetically (intuitively) and merely analytically (non-intuitively).} So the question is, are there intuitions and partial intuitions just like there are concepts and partial concepts?

To answer the question, let us begin by explaining what is Kant’s point in making the distinction between Begriff and Merkmal, given that he is also claiming that marks are concepts, and that all concepts are marks.\footnote{LJ 9:58–59.} There is no question of it that hardness, for example, is not only a mark of stone, but also a self-standing concept just like the concept of stone is. Of course, this holds also the other way around: the concept of stone can be taken as a mark of medieval castles, for example. In the end, it all comes down to how a general representation is being used, whether as a ground for bringing several objects together or as that which is being represented through shared features. In the first case, hardness explicates or describes “stonehood.” The second case would involve explicating the concept of hardness itself (say, through the concept of quality). In both cases, the concept helps the subject to understand the thing, or to achieve the concept of it in the first place. Or, reversing the order, one may come to think of a feature shared by all stones, and end up with hardness, now considered as the concept contained in the concept of stone. Moreover, since concepts are analyzable this way, their
contents must reflect the partial concepts, which also explains why Kant can well maintain that “all thought is nothing other than a representing through marks.”\textsuperscript{226}

There is not really an analogical story to tell with intuitions. Even if we allowed a place for partial intuition in Kant’s system, it cannot be but a summary way to explain how a part of an intuition can in turn be made into an intuition of its own. Consider, for example, intuiting a car first, then one of the tires. In so far as we claim that the tire-intuition is contained in the car-intuition as one of its intuitive marks, we simply describe a counterfactual case. Certainly, there is a number of representations obtainable in any representation on closer inspection, and having certain parts affects the way how the whole thing can be taken (perceptually or not). But it does not follow from this that the subject intuits anything through such “partial” representations. Instead, such a possibility points to the fact that also sensible representations can be (or can be made) more or less distinct.\textsuperscript{227} Then again, this does not take place through analysis or further determination of the marks as such because as in itself intuition is already wholly determinate like no concept can ever be.\textsuperscript{228}

In other words, intuiting does not require any mediators; it is as immediate as it gets (indeed, if “whole intuitions” did depend on representing “partial intuitions,” the distinction between mediate concepts and immediate intuitions would melt away). Only discursive thought “takes place through representations which take as the ground of cognition that which is common to many things, hence through marks as such.” Accordingly, a representation must always be entertained through some general feature to count as thought. This means, to continue with our example, that to understand what stones are, or to cognize certain things as stones, one has to think of them at least through one mark (such as hardness). However, if we translate the sentence into intuition-talk again, we get a manner of cognition that takes place through representations that have as their ground of cognition that which is not common to many things, namely a particular.

Last but not least, it has been remarked in the literature that ‘concept’ can mean two things for Kant (leaving now aside the mark-concept distinction). On the one hand, the notion refers to a rather stable intellectual entities easily (but not wholly) identifiable with words like motion, fast, horse. In this sense, concepts are but rules of classification. On the other hand, ‘concept’ appears to indicate a rule that allows us to grasp or seize something in the sensible stuff as constituting an organized whole

\textsuperscript{226} LJ 9:58: “alles Denken ist nichts anders als ein Vorstellen durch Merkmale.”
\textsuperscript{227} See section 5.3.
\textsuperscript{228} See LJ 9:99. Notice that here ‘determinate’ does not mean ‘conceptually determined.’ Nor has this anything to do with the impossible scenario of having all the different perspectives on the object (cf. Grüne 2009, 59). Rather, the idea is that the very relation to an individual can be fully “fixed” (bestimmt) through intuition. See also A32/B48, which suggests explicitly that only conceptual representing is tied to partial representations.
or unity.\textsuperscript{229} As we will see, this distinction opens two paths to our research questions (not necessarily to the answers, though).

### 3.4.2. Category

The most important concepts in Kant’s model are the non-empirical concepts called \emph{pure concepts of understanding}, also known as the \emph{categories}.\textsuperscript{230} They generate the most difficult problems, too. But let us put those on hold and concentrate on laying out the general picture first.

The pure concepts of understanding are already present in Kant’s inaugural dissertation. However, there is no clear statement of their significance in that short text from 1770. There appears to be but a conviction that they are somehow necessary, accompanied by an incomplete listing: “possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause \textit{etc.}, together with their opposites or correlates.”\textsuperscript{231} In the \textit{Critique} and \textit{Prolegomena}, the categories are presented systematically in a table, reconstructed here according to both sources.\textsuperscript{232}

\begin{itemize}
    \item Longuenessee, from which the apt verbs in italics are borrowed, coins the two as ‘universal and reflected representation’ and ‘consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis’ (Longuenesse 2000, 46, 50). Allison’s formulation of the latter is as follows: “concepts [in this sense] serve as rules of sensible synthesis, guiding the imaginative apprehension of particulars: for example, projecting the sides and back of a house seen from the front. To have the concept of a house is, among other things, to have a rule in the sense of a schema for organizing the sensory data given in perception.” (Allison 2004, 79.)
    \item Other names for the categories are \textit{elementary concepts} (\textit{Elementarbegriffe}) (A64/B89), \textit{ancestral concepts} (\textit{Stammbegriffe}) (A81/B107) and \textit{concepts of synthesis} (\textit{Begriffe der Synthesis}) (A80/B106).
    \item ID § 8, 2:395: “possibilitas, existentia, necessitas, substantia, causa etc. cum suis opposites aut correlates[.]” Already here Kant emphasizes that these concepts are not innate but acquired. This is further emphasized in the critical works. Sometimes Kant uses a somewhat discordantly sounding \textit{original acquisition} (\textit{ursprüngliche Erwerbung}) (e.g. ÜE 8:221). Generally, this suggests that while Kant is strictly against any kind of innate representations, he supports strongly the idea of “innate cognitive mechanisms or innate dispositions” (Falkenstein 1995, 85).
    \item A80/B106; P § 21, 4:303. Kant emphasizes in the \textit{Critique} that although he borrows the term from Aristotle and shares his goal, his usage of the notion is not only wholly different, but manages to avoid the pitfalls of the latter as well. That Aristotle’s approach is haphazard whereas his own is systematic and carried out from a single principle is pretty much what Kant says about this, however. (A80–81/B105–107; see also P 4:260–261, 323.) I leave it for others, or to another occasion, to explain what Kant has in mind here. For my purposes, Kant’s most important point is that some of the Aristotelian categories are in fact no concepts at all (A81/B107). Among these \textit{modi} of sensibility Kant counts \textit{when, where, position, priority and simultaneity}. For a complete list of Aristotle’s ten categories, consult \textit{Cat.} (§ 4, 1b25–2a4) or \textit{Top.} (I, § 9, 103b20–23) – or P § 39, 4:323*, 323**.
\end{itemize}
Species of Representation

1. Quantity (Quantität)
- Unity (Einheit, Maß)
- Plurality (Vielheit, Größe)
- Totality (Allheit, Ganze)

2. Quality (Qualität)
- Reality (Realität)
- Negation (Negation)
- Limitation (Limitation, Einschränkung)

3. Relation (Relation)
- Inherence and Subsistence (Inhärenz und Subsistenz)
- Causality and Dependence (Kausalität und Dependenz)
- Community (Gemeinschaft)

4. Modality (Modalität)
- Possibility–Impossibility (Möglichkeit–Unmöglichkeit)
- Existence–Non-existence (Dasein–Nichtsein)
- Necessity–Contingency (Nothwendigkeit–Zufälligkeit)

There are thus twelve categories in all. If someone were to ask why this number, an easy answer would be to point at another table, namely the table of the logical functions of understanding or thinking. These functions represent the possible forms judgments can have. There are twelve of these, too. Not unexpectedly, each finds its counterpart among the categories.

This, of course, is not a very good answer. Indeed, one may have hard time believing that the Table of Categories can be derived so smoothly from the Table of Judgments. Is there really a “complete coincidence” here? Is the so-called metaphysical deduction as successful as Kant thinks it to be? While these are good questions, I will not pursue nor offer any solution to these grand old worries in what follows. I will simply ignore the tables together with their origin, generation, derivation, or completeness. But let me make the ignoring a bit easier before moving on.

We should notice that even though there are strictly twelve concepts in the table, the number of a priori concepts applicable in (or to) experience is not limited to twelve. Indeed, “a great multitude” of a priori concepts can be derived from the categories (presumably with the help of intuitions). Kant names these derivative concepts the predicables of pure understanding. For example, under the genus of Cause belong the concepts of force and action. The point is, the general idea of

---

233 There is more textual variation here. In addition to Inherence and Subsistence Kant uses substantia et accident and Substance (Substanz), Causality and Dependence is also called Cause and Effect (Ursache und Wirkung) or simply Cause (Ursache), and the longer or optional name for Community is Reciprocity between Agent and Patient (Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelnden und Leidenden).

234 A70/B95; P § 21, 4:302–303.

235 B159: “völlige Zusammentreffung[.]”

236 B159. The metaphysical deduction refers to §§ 9–12 of the B-deduction.

237 For commentaries on the topic, consult e.g. Allison 2004; Longuenesse 2000.

238 A82/B108: “eine große Menge[.]”

239 A82/B108.
providing \textit{a priori} content or guidance “on our own part” to the empirical stuff is not limited to exactly those concepts Kant put on the table. It is this insight of the role of such concepts that is by itself of utmost importance for our purposes. I have already emphasized the ingenuity of Kant’s notion of \textit{a priori} sensible representing. In a similar vein, Kant realized that there must be conceptual forms that provide underlying structure for empirical thought. Together, the categories represent that structure.

Here, let me exemplify the function of the categories with the concept of Substance (to use the short form), or rather with the conceptual relation of \textit{substantia et accident} (to use the Latin title).\textsuperscript{240} Basically, it allows the subject to think of something as bearing a property.\textsuperscript{241} Or to avoid property-talk, there is something that inheres in something that subsists (just as the longer German title says). We could also talk of predication: by thinking $Fx$ the subject predicates $F$-ness of $x$. Its being a mere form indicates that the matter is from elsewhere; the category only provides the generic structure regardless of the peculiarities of the matter.

First, consider a gray, heavy animal that makes tuba-like sounds. Although its grayness, heaviness, and the kind of sound it makes all depend on experience, representing any such features on this particular thing is itself something that stays constant whatever the thing is, or whatever it is like. It could be pink, light-weight, and sound like a flute. In both cases the structure of thought does not go through any changes, only the matter does. Due to the formally identical contents of these two thoughts, we may compare them, or indeed each and every thought of the same form. Just like with space and time, Kant claims that this form itself is independent of experience. Thus Substance refers to something that must be included in all possible experience independently of its accidental features whenever the subject is to think of something in terms indicated by this conceptual relation or, for that matter, any other category. Basically, Kant backs this claim by implying that were everything merely of empirical origin, there would be no constant structure whatsoever to our cognitive undertakings (at least not in a recognizable form). That would also lead to the absurd position that such intellectual entities as inherence or necessity appear to us; but certainly not can we perceive such things.

Next, consider two plates, one blue, one white. The difference in color does not make them fundamentally different kinds of objects. Rather, they share a common ground conceivable independently of their respective colors (or, say, changes in lighting conditions). That ground is something that makes us not to think “plateness” through blueness or whiteness as the property of these colors. On the contrary, we think something as being of some color through its “somethingness” (here, “plateness”). In this respect, Substance represents that spontaneous element that necessitates the

\textsuperscript{240} I will give a hands-on example of how all twelve categories feature together in perceptually informed thinking in section 6.5.

\textsuperscript{241} See ML 28:563; MM 29:769–770.
“plateness” as being the subject in our thinking of the plate as blue or white (or whatever it is that is predicated of it). This makes the categories very different from the forms of judgment. In terms of the latter, we might as well claim that the blue is “roundy.” It is a formally valid thing to do. However, by sticking to such pattern we would never come to think of the plate. If it were painted red, for example, then the red would be “roundy,” not the plate. Or if the round shape played the part of the subject, a broken plate would lose its identity as a plate; being a plate would have been merely an accidental feature of a certain shape. Most certainly the usual round shape has helped me to learn the concept of plate in its current form. Equally certainly, things could be otherwise; being a plate might not have anything to do with roundness. However, the point is that were there freely reversible logical structure to our intellectual history, how come could we have ever ended up with such conceptions as plateness or thingness, or even better, accidental feature or property?

Categories are also known as the concepts of an object in general.242 This is a delicate topic which will be considered more closely when we examine Kant’s notion of object.243 For now, let us just say that the categories can be called that because they represent the fundamental ways to represent an object in thought. Having something stand as a substance with properties is one of those ways. It is general because it is not tied to any particular instance. Actually, it is, as such, detachable from all experience (indeed, it is because of this that we are led to the metaphysical errors from which Kant wants to rescue us). There are certain limitations to its use, however.

To have the pure concepts of the understanding, which by themselves only represent “the laws inherent in the mind,”244 activated, there must empirical data. As we have seen, the data is provided through sensation. We have also seen that when there is spatiotemporal structure to it, one can have empirical intuitions onto which empirical concepts can be applied. However, there is no such structure without a priori intuitions. In a similar vein, a priori concepts must not be excluded from the application of empirical concepts.245

Consider the elephant again. Its substancehood cannot be realized without intuiting an elephant. In this sense, intuition offers a case for the application of categories, too.246 But neither do we think of anything we experience in terms of mere substances, but in terms of creatures, animals, elephants, African elephants, and Dumbos. The category in question would be just an empty slot or mere formula without both empirical intuitions and empirical concepts. Earlier, we had an analogical case with empirical intuitions and sensations: there were neither green balls to be perceived without

242 E.g. B128.
243 See section 4.6.
244 The phrase – or as it reads in the original, legibus menti insitis – is from ID § 8, 2:395, but it fits the “critical” Kant, too.
245 See e.g. MM 29:798.
246 B149.
“greenly” affecting sensations nor empty frames after those sensations ceased. We can, of course, imagine or recall the mere shape of the ball, but that representation lacks something fundamental, namely the actuality of the green thing.

The concept of substance is similarly lacking without empirical stuff. In other words, it has no cognitive significance by itself. Therefore, when we operate with concepts (categories included) in so far as they are supposed to be about some concrete objects of cognition, something must be the ground of their application. If this is not the case, they lack objective reality and concrete (objective) use. This can be overcome only by applying the concept to an intuition that fits it. Hence the ground must always be something sensible or representable in sensible terms.

In one of his notes, Kant identifies the objective reality of a concept with the possibility of giving an example of a corresponding thing. In the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant speaks of a “certificate” (Beglaubigung) of objective reality. There are two of them: that the representation is presentable in intuition, and that it does not contradict itself. In the Discovery, the same idea is put like this: “to no concept can its objective reality be secured, save insofar as it can be presented in a corresponding intuition.” A little later in the same text, objective reality comes down to “the possibility that a thing with these properties can be given.” Briefly put, objective reality requires demonstrability.

3.4.3. Idea

The demonstrability demand distinguishes a category strongly from an idea (Idee). The latter is a pure (non-empirical) concept, too, but without the corresponding intuition which could verify its referent, or through which it could be exhibited. To use object-talk, and to quote Kant:

---

84 For Kant’s own formulation that comes very close to this, see MM 29:762.
85 A357; A670/B698; P § 8, 4:282; LD-W 24:752.
86 R 5688, 18:327 (1780s? 1778–79?).
87 MAN 4:472. Later in the same text, objective reality is being explicated in terms of having a meaning (Bedeutung) or truth (Wahrheit) (MAN 4:478).
88 ÜE 8:188–189: “keinem Begriffe seine objective Realität anders gesichert werden könne, als so fern er in einer ihm correspondirenden Anschauung […] dargestellt werden kann[.]”
89 ÜE 8:191: “die Möglichkeit, daß es ein Ding von den genannten Eigenschaften geben könne[.]”
90 Here we find a major terminological difference between Kant and many of his predecessors. Descartes, for example, uses the same term to indicate anything from sensory sensations (see e.g. CSM I, 216) to abstract concepts (see e.g. CSM I, 60). Locke’s use of the term is very wide, too (see his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I.i.8). For Kant’s complaint over using the same term for very different representations, see A320/B277.
For just because they are ideas, they have in fact no relation to any object that could be given congruent to them.\textsuperscript{254}

In contrast to the concepts of understanding, ideas are representations or concepts of reason (\textit{Vernunftbegriffe}). As such, not only is their origin neither in the senses nor in experience, but they lack objective reality altogether.

God is a typical idea. The object of this concept is not an object of experience (understood as something with a spatiotemporal location and extension). We may think of God, but he or she does not thereby succeed in exhibiting or demonstrating the God-object. Someone might represent God as a bearded old man in a white gown. That does count as an object of possible experience, but for all I know, Kant means by the separateness of the idea of God from intuition that our \textit{conception} of God, in its developed form, is not based on (or matchable with) any intuition.\textsuperscript{255}

This is not to say that ideas are unimportant in Kant’s system. Quite the contrary, they have an important regulative function and play a major role in shaping up the human condition as a whole. One should also notice that such concepts as the totality of the world and absolutely simple are ideas.\textsuperscript{256} Thus ideas do not in any sense stand for mere fantasies or nonsense. Since our focus is on sense perception and experience, these themes can be skipped, however. But let us not be too hasty. The Kantian notion of idea may be revealing for our purposes in other respects. The following point proves that.

Merely the presence of the concepts of reason in Kant’s model makes it obvious that there is not a necessarily holding relation between concepts and sense experiences (except in the sense that without the latter there would be nothing going on in the first place). With empirical concepts the relation is necessary in that there cannot be, say, color concepts without certain sense experiences. The categories, on the other hand, have cognitive significance only when accompanied by intuitions. Yet there remains, through ideas, the possibility of mere thinking without intuiting.\textsuperscript{257} This may not seem to mean much, but it does.

\textsuperscript{254} A336/B393: “Denn in der That haben sie keine Beziehung auf irgend ein Object, was ihnen congruent gegeben werden könnte, eben darum weil sie nur Ideen sind.” Similar formulations can be found e.g. in ÜE 8:226\textsuperscript{*}; KU § 77, 5:405; An § 43, 7:199; LJ 9:92.

\textsuperscript{255} It is also in this sense that God cannot be represented as a body. Here we may quote Spinoza’s \textit{Ethics} instead of Kant: “That He cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by ‘body’ we understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth, limited by some fixed form; and that to attribute these to God, a being of absolutely infinite, is the greatest absurdity.” (E1p15s.)

\textsuperscript{256} MK2 28:773; A437/B465. See also A407–408/B434.

\textsuperscript{257} In other words, if one cannot be in a position to claim objective reality for one’s concepts, then one entertains a mere thought. Of course, Kant does not mean that one must always be directly acquainted with things to be in that position, but that the reality-check is at least possible to make (see e.g. MK3 29:967).
3.5. Judgment

The last species of representation to cover is *judgment*. Indeed, judgments are representations, too.\(^{258}\)

Of course, judgments can also be said to contain representations that make up the matter of judgments, or we could claim that representations are put into certain relations with each other in (or through) the acts of judging. But it is easy to see why the outcomes of such acts are also by themselves representations. What one gets by representing individual representations together in a certain way is a novel thought content, and every such mental entity counts as a representation for Kant. Moreover, every such representation can be made into a part of the content of some other judgment.

As we have seen, thinking is cognizing through concepts. However, Kant also points out that thinking and judging come to the same thing: “We can only think through judgments.”\(^{259}\)

Understanding, on the other hand, can be described not only as the faculty of thinking, but as the faculty of concepts and judgments as well. It should be clear, then, that judgments, as acts of thinking, belong to understanding, or as Kant puts it in the lectures: “All actions of the understanding reduce to judgments.”\(^{260}\) But there is also the faculty known as the power of judgment, which, too, is identified with thinking.\(^{261}\) It is not unfair to ask why postulate such overlapping notions. Then again, I believe that this apparent complexity merely reflects the same point that was made earlier, namely, that understanding can be taken either generally, in which case it includes the power of judgment and reason, or more specifically, in which case there are three separable intellectual faculties with their own unique functions.

When individuated, the power of judgment can be regarded as “the faculty of representing the particular under the universal […] or the faculty of subsumption.”\(^{262}\) For now, let us consider a very basic kind of judgment, “The table is red.” There is one concept (table) that acts as the subject of the judgment, and another (red) that acts as the predicate, and the two are represented as being in a certain relation with each other through “the little word ‘*is*.’”\(^{263}\) The latter is also known as the *copula* of the judgment.\(^{264}\) Although seemingly trivial, it makes a huge difference: without it we would have but a sequence of isolated concepts, whereas with judgment we have an instance of concept application of special importance. But is judgment the only instance of such activity? Given that we think through

---


\(^{259}\) R 5650, 18:300 (1785–88): “Wir können nur durch Urtheile denken[.]”

\(^{260}\) MM 29:802: “Alle Verstandes Handlungen reduciren sich auf Urtheile.”

\(^{261}\) KU IV, 5:179. In addition to *Urtheilskraft*, Kant uses *Vermögen zu urtheilen*. Both can be translated as the ability to make judgments, although only the first is literally a *power* or *force*. In Longuenesse 2000 (see e.g. 7–8), great emphasis has been given to this distinction. I choose to remain indifferent to its importance.

\(^{262}\) LD-W 24:703: ”das Vermögen das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeinen vorzustellen […] oder Vermögen der Subsumtion.”

\(^{263}\) A598/B626: “das Wörtchen *is* t[.]”

\(^{264}\) B142. See also e.g. L] 9:105–106.
judgments, it seems that it indeed is, which narrows the role of concepts into subjects and predicates of judgments.\textsuperscript{265} One way to put it is that whenever there is conceptualization going on, there must be judging going on, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{266} Because of this tight interconnection between concepts and judgments, it is safe to extend some of the familiar features of concepts onto judgments. Accordingly, judgments may be explicated as indirect complex representations that represent things discursively through features shared (or shareable) by many things.

As hinted above, every such representation has a certain logical form out of twelve possible ones. In terms of Quantity, the judgment must be either Universal (\textit{Allgemeine}), Particular (\textit{Besondere}), or Singular (\textit{Einzelne}).\textsuperscript{267} According to Quality, it must be either Affirmative (\textit{Bejahende}), Negative (\textit{Verneinende}), or Infinite (\textit{Unendliche}).\textsuperscript{268} In terms of Relation, it must be either Categorical (\textit{Kategorische}), Hypothetical (\textit{Hypothetische}), or Disjunctive (\textit{Disjunctive}).\textsuperscript{269} Finally, as to Modality, it must be either Problematic (\textit{Problematische}), Assertoric (\textit{Assertorische}), or Apodictic (\textit{Apodiktische}).\textsuperscript{270} This classification makes a lot of sense. Pick any simple judgment, and it will instantiate one and only one form from each of the four main classes. It cannot be, say, both universal and particular. Some of the forms also make it evident that individual judgments can take the place of the subject and predicate of a more complex judgment.\textsuperscript{271}

In addition to formal differences, judgments differ in respect of their contents. In Kant’s model, this is highlighted by the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.\textsuperscript{272} In an analytic judgment the predicate is included in (or implied by) the subject concept.\textsuperscript{273} For example, the judgment “An automobile operates without a horse or bull” only explains what is already known (assuming that the knower is in possession of the subject concept): being an automobile just means that it does not need to be pulled. Such judgments are thus merely clarificatory (\textit{Erläuterungsurtheile}).\textsuperscript{274} One does not need to turn to experience to confirm them. As such, they are \textit{a priori} and non-perceptual. Because of this, we may overlook them in what follows.

With synthetic judgments the case is different; with (or through) them we do not simply clarify our present conception of something, but establish reference to the experiential world. Now we are not

\textsuperscript{265} A68–69/B93–94. Despite the textual support, there are some reservations involved – we will bump into these here and there in what follows. Another issue is whether or not intuitions can take the place of the subject in judgments. For this, see Korte & Repo 2011.
\textsuperscript{266} Allison 1985, 22–24.
\textsuperscript{267} Or \textit{Every S is P}, \textit{Some S is P}, or \textit{This one S is P}.
\textsuperscript{268} Or \textit{It is so that S is P}, \textit{It is not so that S is P}, or \textit{S is non-P}.
\textsuperscript{269} Or \textit{S is P}, \textit{If S then P}, or \textit{Either S or P}.
\textsuperscript{270} Or \textit{S is possibly P}, \textit{S is actually P}, or \textit{S is necessarily P}.
\textsuperscript{271} For example, “If it rains then the grass gets wet.” Or see e.g. LJ 9:105.
\textsuperscript{272} For a detailed analysis on this distinction, consult e.g. Allison 2004, 89–93.
\textsuperscript{273} A6/B10.
\textsuperscript{274} A7/B11.
dealing with conceptual analysis, but “go beyond our concept of the object.” That is why they are called judgments of amplification (Erweiterungsurtheile). They quite literally widen the scope on things. But this can only happen if one makes use of intuition. In the case of synthetic a posteriori judgments, this means that one judges, more or less directly, on the basis of perceptions.

However, it is the synthetic a priori judgments that occupy the place of pride in Kant’s critical thought. Once again, the basic idea is that something a priori makes the corresponding a posteriori use possible. We have already examined this in respect of intuitions and concepts. With synthetic a priori judgments, the view extends to judgments. This also makes it evident that the use of intuition in synthetic judgments in general must be regarded as having possible experience as the ground of judging. We can access that ground only because some things can be judged to hold true of the experiential world regardless of the peculiarities of the particular instances of actual experience. Synthetic a priori judgments reflect that possibility by stating something that holds necessarily of that world.

More generally, every amplificatory judgment claims that a certain empirically or intuitively governed state of affairs holds. In other words, the subject represents the world as being this way or that through the judgment. To use a technical term, the judgment is supposed to have objective validity. This is the way Kant approaches the notion of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason. Judging in this sense aims at having thought contents that are about objects. For example, if I take it that the stone house before me has three floors, I “objectify” my perceptions so that I represent things as being exactly that and not any other way. Unlike my mental states as such, this stance on the state of affairs is also something I can communicate to others.

The judgment can, of course, be false about the object. Maybe the house has four floors. Maybe it is but a façade with no floors at all. But it is just because of this possibility that one can claim something about the object itself. One may contrast this with personal preference. It is irrelevant to emphasize that the claim “Coffee tastes better than tea” is true of me. I just happen to like coffee better. The possibility of being true or false adds something more to the object-talk: that we can establish something about how things in fact are. At one point, Kant exemplifies this with the

---

275 A764/B792: “über unsern Begriff vom Gegenstande hinausgehen.” Analytic judgments may, of course, consist of empirical concepts which one could not have in one’s repertoire without having “gone beyond” at some point in one’s life. The distinction is thus supposed to hold for the manner of judging, not for the components of judgments as such (see P § 2 (b), 4:267).
276 A7/B11.
277 See e.g. P § 2 (c), 4:269.
278 See e.g. MM 29:794.
279 See especially B142.
280 More on this in chapter 6.
281 This general point is well put in Moser 2004, 72: “Indeed, any truth-valued judgment presupposes a notion of how things really are and thereby illustrates the intelligibility of a notion of objectivity.”
judgment “Bodies are heavy.” In such assertion the representations of body and weight are connected so that their relation is not dependent on the judger’s state in the sense that some particular feature of the judger would determine the content of the judgment. Rather, being a universal judgment, it has nothing to do with the personal characteristics of the judger. Or so it claims. The judger’s very own feeling of weight when he or she lifts a body makes an opposite example. This brings us to Kant’s account of judgment as he developed it after the first edition of the Critique.

Indeed, intellectual activity aiming at objective validity can be distinguished not only from maintaining something that concerns only the contents of concepts, but also from establishing thoughts about one’s current state. The former (analytic) judgment could consist of mere concepts of reason; it might make sense logically, yet it would fail to establish reference to spatiotemporal objects. The latter judgment does not even aim there; in Kant’s terms, it has merely subjective validity. But it, too, looks like any other judgment. “I am pleased” is formally like “Table is red” (and both are certainly synthetic a posteriori). It is even possibly eye-opening to its maker (imagine someone who has been feeling down and is surprised to find out the new happier state of mind). Thus we have here yet another way how judgments differ from one another, namely, in how they function (in addition to the differences in their form and content). This boils down to questions what the judgment does in fact signify, and how it fulfills its signifying function. Here let me put out but the following point.

By judging (or intending to judge) objectively we cognize things as being of certain kind and having certain features both with respect to themselves and other objects. There are no less than four elements here: the thing taken to be as something, the thing taken to be like something, the relations within the thing, and the relations between several things. What Kant calls judgments of cognition aim to explicate things in these respects. They give us “that representation what a thing is.” However, as we do not represent mere things in our thinking, but things under sets of features, this kind of representing takes place through predicates. Predication allows us to maintain that things have certain properties (which make the thing what it is). We have seen that much of this depends on the category of Substance. But what about judgments that do not extend to being about objects in the strict sense? One has reason to wonder whether these merely subjective judgings really predicate anything about anything in terms of properties (even though it all looks that way). As we will see, this leaves much hanging on how the role of the categories should be understood.

---

282 B142: “die Körper sind schwer.”
283 Cf. Strawson 1968, 73: ”Judgements about objects, if valid, are objectively valid, valid independently of the occurrence of the particular state of awareness, of the particular experience, which issues in the judgement.” (My emphases.)
284 For these later developments, see especially the Prolegomena and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, or consult the sections 6.3. and 6.4. of this study.
285 KU § 31, 5:280: “welches vorstellt, was eine Sache ist[.]”
286 See e.g. P § 46, 4:333.
3.6. The Initial Portrayal of the Perceiver: Perceptivity

It is already possible to (partly) portray how perception works in Kant’s model. Let us do that by quickly summing up the most necessary ingredients. Suppose that all our five senses have been turned off, but the capacity for internal sensations remains intact.287 All we can do is to entertain (or be in) a certain state of mind. It either lasts or gets replaced by another. This calls for time (or temporality), the precondition of representing duration and change (to be sure, in this case representing the change would also require that the two states are qualitatively different from each other).

Then suppose that we have an external sensation through the sense of touch. We do not just feel it; we feel it somewhere. This implies location and thus calls for space (or spatiality), the other (or indeed the ultimate) precondition of perceptual representing. What is more, such a sensation is able to provide information of outer objects as such (assuming that a single tactile sensation can do that).288 Unlike internal sensation, it suggests something beyond itself.

In reality, there is, of course, an enormous amount of spatiotemporally ordered sensations. The point is, however, that some of them are necessarily state-oriented, some thing-oriented. For example, we may be in a joyous state; that is the way we feel. But we do not represent the joy in those things around us (which, to be sure, may have caused it) because we cannot. Instead, we localize them, those things, spatially (not just temporally); they are there, we are here.

Another crucial point is that this much is up to empirical intuiting, which is an immediate and direct manner of representing. To understand anything of those things (or of our feelings, for that matter) we must apply concepts, subsume, judge. There is generality and mediacy to these representings. There are marks and predication. The list of preconditions grows to cover the forms of judgment and the categories. These are the conceptual or discursive representational elements that belong to understanding. The former were perceptual representings; they belong to sensibility, or to perceptivity (perceptivitaet), as it is aptly called in one of the lectures.289

287 A more realistic example would be closing one’s eyes or turning away from the source of sensation (cf. KU § 53, 5:330). I choose the fictional route only in order to clarify the picture with as few items as possible.
288 Factually speaking, that would presumably require continuous exposure to tactile feelings, but we do not need to worry about such empirical matters here. For Kant’s views on the primacy of the tactile sense in making the representation of external objects possible, see MAN 4:510; An § 17, 7:154–155.
289 MK3 29:982.
4. THE MIND AS SYNTHESIZER

4.1. Imagination

Kant regards imagination as no less than necessary for perception. For our current purposes, the most crucial idea behind this is that to keep perception going the mind must be able to access its earlier representations. As this requires time, it links imagination with inner sense and memory. It should be emphasized, though, that this reproduction, or *recollection* (*Erinnerung*), as it is also called, takes place in representing in general, however primitive. It is most certainly not the case that there must be choice or active remembering involved. Indeed, the reproductive imagination can only be called memory when it is “accompanied by apperception.” In the more rudimentary sense, imagination is more like a mental processor. As reproductive, imagination invents nothing and is tied to the laws of association.

Visually tracking an object in motion is probably the best example of the necessity of imagination in perception. Without reproduction there would be but a series of disconnected “still images” (if anything). Each of them would pop out of nowhere, as it were. But there is continuity to any such sense experience. For this to be possible, the mind must have some of its previous representations available while it acquires new ones. In other words, it must have the ability of “calling back a perception.” This allows the subject to represent, say, the ball moving across the field. Only then can there be representation of ongoing perceptual episodes, involving, in Kant’s terms, “exhibiting entire series of perceptions.”

Kant does not tell what kind of a processing unit imagination actually is. Nor is there a need for such an explanation. The introduction of imagination does not serve to explicate actual psychological events, but the possibility of perception and perceptual (or sensibly governed) thought in the first

---

290 See A120*, where Kant implies that this is a novel idea. However that may be, it was already a long-standing idea in Kant’s time that imagination is not just for make-believe and such. For example, Aristotle writes in *De an.* III.3.427b10–15: “For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it.” In any case, imagination serves *also* any kind of imagining one may come up with – like the geometer’s cone, not to mention fantasies or fiction, in which case one represents objects without their immediate presence (see e.g. B151).

291 See e.g. MM 29:881, 884.

292 R 6315, 18:618 (1790–91).

293 MM 29:884: “mit Apperception begleitet[.]”

294 For productive imagination, see e.g. B152; KU § 49, 5:314; An § 28, 7:167–169.

295 E.g. A121; B152. Even inventive imagination takes advantage of the material provided through the senses, though (An § 28, 7:168–169).

296 A121: “eine Wahrnehmung [...] herüber zu rufen[.]”

297 A121: “ganze Reihen derselben darzustellen.”
The Mind as Synthesizer

place (in addition to any mental imagery one may come up with). For this it suffices to say that imagination is but “a blind though indispensable function of the soul […] of which we are seldom even conscious.”\(^\text{298}\) One may also consider the following passage from the third Critique. While its context (the ideal of beauty) is irrelevant to us, what Kant has to say on imagination is most relevant:

> It should be noted that the imagination does not only know how to recall for us occasionally signs of concepts, even after a long time, in a way that is entirely incomprehensible to us; it also knows how to reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an immense number of objects of different kinds, or even of one and the same kind; indeed, when the mind is set on making comparisons, it even knows how, by all accounts actually if not consciously, as it were to superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean that can serve them all as a common measure.\(^\text{299}\)

To underline the key thing here for our current purposes: although it is possible to assert what we can accomplish through imagination, its inner workings themselves can be (or indeed are) something that we simply do not know or understand.

For the fact that the question of the exact character of the latter does not really concern the transcendental philosopher, consider what Kant writes just before the quoted passage: “we shall attempt a psychological explanation.”\(^\text{300}\) It is something that he just tries out, that is. He does not aim to establish how things really are when he speaks of “a dynamic effect, which arises from the repeated

\(^\text{298}\) A78/B103: “einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Function der Seele [...] der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewußt sind.”

\(^\text{299}\) KU § 17, 5:233–234: “Es ist anzumerken: daß auf eine uns gänzlich unbegreifliche Art die Einbildungskraft nicht allein die Zeichen für Begriffe gelegentlich, selbst von langer Zeit her, zurückzurufen; sondern auch das Bild und die Gestalt des Gegenstandes aus einer unaussprechlichen Zahl von Gegenständen verschiedener Arten oder auch einer und derselben Art zu reproduizieren; ja auch, wenn das Gemüth es auf Vergleichungen anlegt, allem Vermuthen nach wirklich, wenn gleich nicht hinreichend zum Bewußtsein, ein Bild gleichsam auf das andere fallen zu lassen und durch die Congruenz der mehrern von derselben Art ein Mittleres herauszubekommen wisse, welches allen zum gemeinschaftlichen Maße dient.” The notion of sign (Zeichen) suggests a difference between representing signs of concepts and conceptual representing as such. Think of words, for instance. Then add a parrot called Polly to the picture. It is not that surprising that Polly, being a parrot and all, can say ‘biscuit.’ Perhaps it utters the word always at the right moment – say, when a biscuit is shown to it, or when someone asks what Polly wants. But it does not follow from this clever looking ability that the bird masters the concept of biscuit. Indeed, it might well be that Polly has not the minutest idea of biscuits as such. If so, it is only Polly’s imagination which “knows” (see the passage) how to make use of certain visible and audible signs without the least concept. Cf. KU § 59, 5:352, where Kant speaks of sensible signs (sinnliche Zeichen). The latter include words and visible signs, which suggests that spoken words are meant. As such, they are only expressions for concepts (Ausdrücke für Begriffe). Also this text implies that Kant thinks that it is possible to apply signs and make expressions without conceptualizing anything thereby.

\(^\text{300}\) KU § 17, 5:233: “wollen wir eine psychologische Erklärung versuchen.”
apprehension of such figures on the organ of inner sense.”³⁰¹ This may happen to be a well-informed opinion, but it is nevertheless only that. More generally speaking, by doing so, Kant makes a brief departure from his usual non-psychological approach.

Still, this illustrates how there is plenty of room for subpersonal or rarely/barely conscious mental operations in the Kantian model. But what exactly are those individual representations that are being processed by the imagination? Some passages suggest that they are intuitions.³⁰² This suits well the proposed “still image” picture in one sense. If the mind could not reproduce representations, there would be momentary intuitions, alright, but no continuum of consecutive singular representings. This would make the perception of genuine objects and events impossible. Then again, when one contemplates the perception of the ball flying across the field, the intuiting of it appears more like fixing a single spatiotemporally structured relation to an object, rather than entertaining a set of successive intuitions that collectively make up such a representation. The former indicates genuine perception of the ball, the latter subconscious processing underlying the actual perception of the ball. As we have seen, Kant generally identifies empirical intuition with perception, which he takes to be conscious. This suggests that perhaps ‘intuition’ does not fit the “still image” picture so well after all.

As if to avoid giving too many roles to intuition, Kant often uses Bild in contexts centering on imagination, suggesting that the latter deals foremostly with images.³⁰³ Unfortunately, the texts do not really reveal in what respect images in fact differ from other sensible representations (assuming that images can only be sensible). Moreover, as should be evident by now, imagination deals also with signs and shapes. Perhaps Kant wanted to reserve a specific term for empirical representations that belong exclusively to imagination. The primary class of such representations would comprise of imaginings, that is, representations of objects of intuition without the presence of any real object (the relation to the object being not through sensation, that is).³⁰⁴ The other class would then contain those representations that the imagination makes use of as a subconscious processing unit. Then again, as was mentioned in passing in the foregoing, Kant also explicates intuitions as image (bildliche) representations. This makes it possible to claim that also images are some kind of intuitions.

This is not to say that I am identifying the two. Kant himself is reluctant to do that.³⁰⁵ But nor does he really explain the difference. One might emphasize here the role of empirical intuitions as those representations that fix singular reference to objects. The image would then serve the

---

³⁰¹ KU § 17, 5:234: “einen dynamischen Effect, der aus der vielfältigen Auffassung solcher Gestalten auf das Organ des innern Sinnes entspringt.”
³⁰² R 6315, 18:618 (1790–91); An § 28, 7:167.
³⁰³ E.g. A120–121; A141/B181; An § 28, 7:167–168.
³⁰⁴ B151; R 6315, 18:619 (1790–91). In the beginning of the note (18:618), Kant uses Phantasma for such objects.
³⁰⁵ See ÜE 8:222.
presentation of the concept that fits the intuition. One could also use the distinction to highlight how the referent, or the intuited, can be taken in a fixed manner despite its varying qualitative features. Consider some rotating object; a mirror ball, for example. We intuit the ball despite the constant changes on its surface. The exact perspective on the object seems to be more relevant for the image than for the intuition. I am confident that Kant meant (also) something like this with the image-intuition distinction, but one cannot be absolutely certain given the sparsity of textual evidence.

In any event, there appears to be no specific explanatory role for Bild in Kant’s account of perception. In perception, the sensible changes would be up to sensations under time; the individuation of the mirror ball would be up to an intuition having an outer object (given through objective external sensations). There is no need for any static “pictorial” items in that story, except in the sense that the mind makes use of earlier perceptual encounters with objects through the “imagery” it has stored along the way.

On the more positive side, the notion of image can be used to illustrate an important feature of the mind’s intuitive side. As forms of sensibility, space and time are represented as the preconditions of the representation of objects. But certainly we can represent the two as objects themselves. Take space, for example. One may describe it as three-dimensional. One may even ask what all spaces have in common, and come to the same conclusion. Here space is being represented conceptually; what one really asks is what its marks are. Asking after all of them would be an extremely demanding task. Fortunately, there is the option of representing (or indeed depicting) space in one’s imagination. That produces an image or formal intuition of space.

Formal intuition exploits the form of sensibility by turning it into an object of intuition. “The space of the geometer” would be just that. Probably Kant had in mind the 3-D version of the Cartesian coordinate system. It both illustrates space as a form of sensibility (which is also the precondition of the meaningful interpretation of that image) and lays the framework for imagining three-dimensional geometrical figures on it (which cannot but be in accordance with that form). It is not exactly the physical space of outer objects, after all. Nor is it a concept thought through marks (say, x-y-z-ness), but a sensible representation. This does not mean that concepts such as three-dimensionality and coordinate system were not important (or even necessary) in coming up with this geometrical construction, of course, but that it would be absurd to imagine any figures in the concept of space.

All this talk of intuitions, signs, figures, shapes, and images indicates that imagination is first and foremost a sensible capacity. Thus it comes as no surprise that imagination “belongs to

---

306 See ÜE 8:222.
307 P 4:287. See also B160–161*.
308 P 4:287; “Raum des Geometers[.]”
309 One could also emphasize that such a representation is hardly required for perception (Allais 2009, 403-404).
sensibility." This is not unexpected also because of the status of imaginings as kinds of intuitions, and because all human intuition is limited to sensibility. Furthermore, this reflects Kant’s general idea of the human understanding as image-dependent (Bilder bedürftig). Without sensible representations fuelling its operations it could not play any cognitive role.

4.2. Kinds of Synthesis

Kant’s general term for connecting and conjoining representations is synthesis (Synthesis) (hence the word ‘synthesizer’ in the chapter heading). Depending on the source, the notion divides into two or three classes. According to the first edition Critique, there are synthesis of apprehension in the intuition, synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, and synthesis of recognition in the concept. In the second edition, we have figurative (figürliche Synthesis, synthesis speciosa) and intellectual synthesis (Verstandesverbindung, synthesis intellectualis).

Although Kant’s primary viewpoint in the Transcendental Analytic is not perception, I take it that at least his explications of the more primitive-sounding syntheses are there to explain the possibility of perceptual representation to some extent. The following passage from the second edition Critique confirms that this kind of approach is in the right direction:

First of all I remark that by the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible.

The quote suggests that perception involves a synthesis in which a manifold (Mannigfaltige) is put or considered together. As apprehension itself can be explicated as a kind of grasping (Auffassung,

---

310 B151: “gehört [...] zur Sinnlichkeit[.]” The same is asserted e.g. in ML2 28:585.
311 KU § 77, 5:408.
312 A98–110. In German, the three are: Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung, Synthesis der Reproduktion in der Einbildung, and Synthesis der Recognition im Begriffe.
313 B151. Why did Kant modify the distinction? Why did he change almost everything in the Deduction? Perhaps Kant found out that there was something wrong in the earlier account, perhaps the improved deduction could do with less distinctions, or perhaps the detailed notion of synthesis was not that important after all. While the notion of synthesis is present throughout Kant’s writings, the special types are rarely mentioned after the first edition Critique. In fact, B160–164 and B204 seem to be the only exceptions. However that may be, while these are interesting questions in their own way, it is more informative for our purposes to ask what might motivate these distinctions in the first place.
314 B160: “Zuvörderst merke ich an, daß ich unter der Synthesis der Apprehension die Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer empirischen Anschauung verstehe, dadurch Wahrnehmung, d.i. empirisches Bewußtsein derselben (als Erscheinung), möglich wird.” The passage also confirms that the notion of the synthesis of apprehension was not abandoned by Kant after the first edition Critique and, more generally, that the two different classifications of syntheses need not be mutually exclusive.
The Mind as Synthesizer

The quote suggests further that perception comes very close to representing sensory “packages.” The explanatory role left for the manifold, in the quote at least, is to ground any such composition (Zusammensetzung). Optionally, one could take the text to assert that it is the manifold itself, grasped in a certain way in empirical intuition, that is the object of perception (or the appearance).

Either way, there appears to be a representation of ‘unity in a multitude’ or ‘unified multitude’ already at the level of perception. This is further supported by the idea that apprehension must be successive. Consider the colossal bridge again. Estimating its magnitude had a beginning and end. There were parts (yards) and a unity of parts (two miles). It took time. The synthesis of apprehension suggests a similar picture; the example certainly points to that direction. Then, to have a perception of the bridge requires building up one’s representation out of simpler elements belonging to the whole thing. First one represents, say, a rail, then another. While keeping these in mind, one carries on to the deck, then to the beams. Through the unification of these components, a composition arises.

This makes it obvious that the synthesis of apprehension must go hand in hand with the synthesis of reproduction (the basic idea of which should be clear from the previous section) to the extent that it would not make much sense to speak of mere apprehension without reproduction. As Kant puts it, the two are “inseparably combined.” Accordingly, whenever the subject apprehends there must be recollection of earlier representations going on, too. Indeed, to go through the manifold from A to C, in order to take A, B, and C together, A and B must be held in mind as the apprehending arrives at C. Otherwise, the composition A-B-C would be impossible, and the synthesis of apprehension would be doomed to fail.

Also association depends on the reproductive synthesis. It could be, for instance, that on the occasion of seeing red, I think of cinnabar. Then my mind simply links (associates) the two representations; it just happens that my mental machinery brings about the latter representation when confronted with the former. Thus, even if I may well expect that the same will happen when I see red next time, I do not produce (in the relevant sense of the word) the representation of cinnabar in that associative connection. This suggests that synthesis does not need to involve any distinct work on my part. In most cases, all I need to do is let the imagination do its work. For textual support, we may consider the following explication from the Critique: “Synthesis in general is […] the mere effect of the imagination.”

Generally speaking, this helps us to recognize that synthesis (most notably, that of

---

315 E.g. KU 5:189; An § 67, 7:243.
316 A163, 189/B203–204, 234; R 6313, 18:614 (1790–91).
317 A102: “unzertrennlich verbunden.”
318 See A101.
319 A78/B103: “Die Synthesis überhaupt ist […] die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft[.].”
The Mind as Synthesizer

apprehension and reproduction) can be merely sensible and thus non-conceptual.\textsuperscript{320} In terms of faculties, it could be claimed that representing a perceptual unity in a multitude (as described above and dubbed by Kant as \textit{Zusammensetzung}) depends on imagination, and is necessarily dependent on that only.

To be sure, when Kant speaks literally of \textit{unity} (\textit{Einheit}), it often appears as a unity of (or in) a concept.\textsuperscript{321} This brings us to the synthesis of recognition which must, accordingly, provide another kind of a unity in a multitude. In fact, it provides no less than “the consciousness of [the] unity of the synthesis.”\textsuperscript{322} Kant elucidates this with the act of counting, the possibility of which requires not only that I keep the numbers in mind when adding them to one another, but also that it is all done by the same unchanging me all the way.\textsuperscript{323} Furthermore, this suggests that there must be a recognition of the sameness of the mental act (and of its representational constituents) involved in unifying the manifold.\textsuperscript{324}

As this quite clearly involves some kind of reflective consciousness, and as we will not deal with the notion of consciousness until the next chapter, this overview will have to suffice for now. However, two things should be made clear from the outset concerning this obviously intellectual type of synthesis. One, it involves \textit{thinking}.\textsuperscript{325} Two, as should be clear from this already, it \textit{presupposes} concepts (just like Kant’s example which does not explain forming the concept in the consciousness of which the subject acts, but the unity of the synthetic activity grounded on that concept). Generally, this reflects the obvious difference between synthesizing certain elements, say, according to the concept of house, and simply making some kind of sense of the complex of bricks and windows even without the relevant recognitional capacity provided by the rule implied by the concept in question.\textsuperscript{326}

As perception is necessarily empirical, also the (non-intellectual) syntheses in question must be empirical. However, all syntheses are also possible \textit{a priori}.\textsuperscript{327} For example, to represent a triangle without any empirical support involves non-empirical or pure apprehension. Indeed, any synthesis “in

\textsuperscript{320} See e.g. Rohs 2001, 215, 220; Waxman 1991, 150n28.

\textsuperscript{321} E.g. KU § 9, 5:217. Not that this is always the case, though (see the section 4.6.2. of this study).

\textsuperscript{322} A103: “dem Bewußtsein dieser Einheit der Synthesis.”

\textsuperscript{323} A103.

\textsuperscript{324} See Koistinen 2011, 161.

\textsuperscript{325} See the very beginning of A103.

\textsuperscript{326} In all, the first two of the three syntheses of the A-deduction appear as very basic non-intellectual operations that are based on mere imagination. In the B-deduction, the new classification itself suggests this. Indeed, it would not make any sense unless the intellectual synthesis did not differ in kind from the figurative variety. As the reciprocity between the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction suggests, there is a line to be drawn between the second and third syntheses of the earlier classification. Presumably, the new classification does just that. This reading can be supported by the fact that Kant continues to speak of the synthesis of apprehension in the second edition.

\textsuperscript{327} A100–101.

82
regard to representations that are not empirical"\textsuperscript{328} requires that. And certainly keeping the parts in mind in order to represent the whole requires reproductive imagination in this case, too. Together, these reveal an \textit{a priori} ground of representing common to any act of representing, and can thus be called the transcendental faculty of imagination, as Kant does in the first edition \textit{Critique}.\textsuperscript{329} Basically, and what I take to be enough for our purposes, transcendental imagination refers to the constant factor in the actions of imagination, just like the forms of intuition refer to the constant factor in any sensible representation. In other words, imagination, too, must have a fixed structure of ordering or connecting representations irrespective of what is being ordered or connected.

The method is the already familiar one of coming up with an \textit{a priori} element that stands as the necessary condition of something \textit{a posteriori} without presuming anything empirical in the process. Recall when removing everything empirical from the representation of a body, extension and location remained. Analogically with time, “there is still always a connection, since either something is concurrent or one succeeds the other."\textsuperscript{330} Also recall that time provides only the framework or form for representations. Thus we do not speak of the \textit{a priori} possibility of an individual representation this time, but of the \textit{a priori} element in mental operations. Not only does the notion of synthesis in general bring out the idea that the work itself is up to imagination, but through \textit{a priori} representing one can also make the action (\textit{Handlung}) explicit to oneself.\textsuperscript{331} This is especially important with respect to the rule implied by the concept, as this gives the opportunity to recognize the way how some unified whole is to be composed, whereas in perception the subject can presumably be totally blind to the synthesis itself without this having any effect on his or her success as a perceiver.

Briefly put, Kant deals foremostly with the notion of \textit{pure} or \textit{transcendental synthesis} in the \textit{Critique}.\textsuperscript{332} No more than this little contextual remark is needed for realizing that one should not be too keen to draw far-reaching conclusions concerning perception from what Kant says about the syntheses in the Analytic. It is pretty clear that in that context Kant’s aim is to explicate how the sensible syntheses serve the intellectual synthesis.\textsuperscript{333} If so, what becomes established in the process are not so much preconditions of perception, but those of sensibly informed thought in general.\textsuperscript{334}

\textsuperscript{328} A99: "in Ansehung der Vorstellungen, die nicht empirisch sind[]."

\textsuperscript{329} A102.

\textsuperscript{330} MM 29:797: "so ist doch immer eine \textit{Verknüpfung} da, da entweder etwas zugleich it, oder eines auf das andre folgt." This kind of connection must be very primitive and thus also very different from, say, the kind of connection that takes place in judgments. It does not come as a surprise, then, that Kant uses different terms for connecting. In terms of faculties, \textit{Verknüpfung} links with imagination (see e.g. B233) rather than anything else, which suggests that it does not need to be “intellectual” in any sense.

\textsuperscript{331} See e.g. B153–155.

\textsuperscript{332} See e.g. A77–78/B103–104; B151.

\textsuperscript{333} This happens elsewhere, too. For example, although Kant regards apprehension generally as a very primitive capacity, at one point he identifies it with the faculty of the presentation of concepts (KU § 30, 5:279). As I see it, in this case Kant is simply explicating apprehension in terms of its final end within the bigger
4.3. A Note on Schematism

Kant owns a whole section in the Critique for the notion of schema (Schema). With this item Kant aims to explain, to put it broadly, how the elements peculiar to sensibility, on the one hand, and those peculiar to understanding, on the other, can be interrelated. Recall that the former are aesthetic and particular in character, the latter intellectual and general. Schema acts, then, as the “mediating representation” that allows the subject to fit sensible and non-sensible representations together.

In other words, schema is for establishing the possibility of a non-perspectival conceptual representation finding a match in a relatively (or wholly) perspectival sensible representation. In this respect schema contrasts with images, as these escape all generalization. Kant exemplifies this with a triangle:

No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere.

The schemata, on the other hand, operate regardless of such specificity:

scheme of things. I am certain that several similar cases can be found from the Kantian corpus given his “contextualist” writing method (see Introduction) – the Transcendental Analytic is surely not an exception.

To be sure, the a priori ground suggested by the notion of transcendental synthesis could still be claimed to extend in its entirety to the most primitive perceptual level, but let us decide on that later.


Although Kant’s true goal in the Schematism chapter lies in the pure concepts of understanding, let us figure out what Kant means by this notion by using – like Kant does himself – a geometrical figure and an empirical concept as our examples. This will be enough for motivating the current section, the conclusion of which is that the representational role of schemata lies outside perception per se. Let me remark, though, that schemata are nonetheless sensible factors in representing, and that the sensible manifestation of the categories can only take place through them (see A136/B175). In this sense, we should speak of schematized categories whenever we speak of the categories having anything to do with spatiotemporal objects. Even so, as it is not the category as such but the very operation guided by it through the relevant schema that is being imposed on to some appearance, the category can retain its independence of the particular input to which it is being applied. At the same time, as the appearance in question brings along its own sensible factors on which the schema operates, also the application of the category is thereby sensibly limited and restricted. (See A146–147/B185–187.)

Among the commentators, this core idea is clearly put by Allison (2004, 209) as he refers to “the possession of a schema” as “a capacity to interpret the sensible data as sufficiently instantiating the criteria thought in the concept to warrant the subsumption of the intuition under the concept.”

Among the commentators, this core idea is clearly put by Allison (2004, 209) as he refers to “the possession of a schema” as “a capacity to interpret the sensible data as sufficiently instantiating the criteria thought in the concept to warrant the subsumption of the intuition under the concept.”
The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space. Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain concept.\footnote{A141/B180: “Das Schema des Triangels kann niemals anderswo als in Gedanken existiren und bedeutet eine Regel der Synthesis der Einbildungskraft in Ansehung reiner Gestalten im Raume. Noch viel weniger erreicht ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung oder Bild desselben jemals den empirischen Begriff, sondern dieser bezieht sich jederzeit unmittelbar auf das Schema der Einbildungskraft als eine Regel der Bestimmung unserer Anschauung gemäß einem gewissen allgemeinen Begriffe.”}

This may raise some eyebrows, as schemata appear as neither sensible nor intellectual in character. As purely sensible representations they would not be up to the generality demand, and would thus be not any different from images. As purely intellectual they would turn out as rules of classification, which would leave little difference between them and concepts. What really are they, then?

An initially telling way to ease the tension is to dub schema as a special kind of \textit{perceptual rule} to distinguish it from the rule implied by each and every concept.\footnote{Allison 2004, 210.} The problem is that this is not much more informative than simply stating that there are two sets of rules. Kant himself is the one to blame here, of course, as he uses the phrase “signifies a rule” interchangeably while moving from the schema of the triangle to the concept of a dog:

The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit \textit{in concreto}.\footnote{A141/B180: “Der Begriff vom Hunde bedeutet eine Regel, nach welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfüßigen Thieres allgemein verzeichnen kann, ohne auf irgend eine einzige besondere Gestalt, die mir die Erfahrung darbietet, oder auch ein jedes mögliche Bild, was ich in concreto darstellen kann, eingeschränkt zu sein.”}

Even if the text read ‘schema’ in place of ‘concept’\footnote{That this must be what Kant really means is suggested in Allison 2004, 208.} the example would not add anything substantial to the point made with the triangle. Certainly, it makes the basic idea quite clear already: that there must be a route from general representation (“doghood”) to individual representation (a particular dog). But the most wanted explanation appears to be missing, namely, how the actual interconnection of the particular and general elements takes place.

It would be easy to accuse Kant of \textit{ad hoc} argumentation, or raise some major worries about the gap opened by the sensibility-understanding distinction. But that would lead us nowhere. What I want to do is raise a methodological point. Is it not so that the specification involved is largely something to
which we do not possess first-hand access? Can we really represent “shapes in general” to ourselves? Kant suggests a negative answer in the quote, at least if the shape or image is to be taken in concreto. This also explains why the schema “can never exist anywhere except in thought.” One cannot see or feel a shape in general. It cannot be drawn or sculpted. Moreover, it would be quite unfair to demand an explanation of the actual fitting of the general and particular elements with the help of the shape in general, as Kant’s aim is not to offer such explanations. He should not, therefore, be required to do more than offer a basis for the explanation of the possibility of any such transfaculty matchmaking. And that he does.

It is explained how individual shapes or images cannot do the trick. They are too specific, or too tied to particular points of view. Concepts cannot do the trick without sensible content provided in (or through) intuition. The intuition itself is singular and cannot account for the required rule-like aspect. So, as long as concepts are to refer beyond or irrespective of particular points of view, while retaining the connection to the sensible level at the same time, there must be something that “can specify the shape […] in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape.” Imagination seems to be just the right kind of vehicle for the task, and what Kant calls schema expresses the representation of the shape in general. How far should the explanation continue? Consider how the text continues:

This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.344

Surely, Kant does not admit being totally unarmed before the phenomenon. Neither are we. We know what Kant is after. We know the operations in so far as we know the outcome, the possibility of which they are supposed to explain. We know that were there no such intermediary representational entities, or a capacity to represent in the manner suggested by them, we would not be the cognitive agents we are.

A practical example is easy to give. We are perfectly capable of representing a triangle universally without this way of representing being reducible to representing its marks (say, having three corners with the angle sum of 180°). Think of doing geometry. It would be impossible if all we could do was to describe figures conceptually (one may also consider here the absurd idea of constructing them in the concept of space). Nor would geometry be possible if we could stick only to concrete images with their unique characteristics (say, a triangle with the angles of 50°, 80°, and 50°.

---

drawn with a black marker pen on a white cross-ruled paper). Briefly put, geometry depends on the ability to represent figures independently of such contingent features.

To be sure, as manifestations of spatiality they would still have to be sensible representations. However, to be manifestations of non-contingent or generic features at the same time (as required by geometry) they cannot be represented merely sensibly.\textsuperscript{345} Indeed, because of this even that very specific depiction of a triangle just described can be used to reflect on features of all triangles. The concept finds a match in it because the features unique to that particular figure can be considered irrelevant. This requires abstraction from those features; it is the rule involved, not the particular figure, that provides the required universality to the representation.\textsuperscript{346}

Those exact sensible features nevertheless make it a triangle in the first place, or allow it to be represented as one. The reciprocity between the two representational grounds is possible because the intermediary representation known as the schema kicks in: when representing the triangle this way we schematize. Then the ground of representation is not so much the individual figure or the concept itself as it is both (hence the \textit{schema})\textsuperscript{347} which makes it possible to think of something particular in universal terms.

This brings us to another point I want to raise. With schemata, the order of explanation is from general representations to particulars, not the other way around. It is the intuition that is supposed to be determined “in accordance with a certain concept” through the schema. The notion is thus supposed to explain the possibility of the exhibition of concepts. Thereby one makes the concept intuitive in a direct manner.\textsuperscript{348} The point is, this presupposes the concept.

From this we may conclude that schemata are not supposed to explain perception \textit{per se}, but the possibility of sensibly informed \textit{thought}. In terms of faculties, schemata allow our image-dependent understanding to go beyond particular images while retaining the connection to sensibility; only that guarantees the objective reality of its concepts. And as we remember, it is understanding’s business to think. But schemata also involve the power of judgment.\textsuperscript{349} This suggests that schematization is supposed to explain further the possibility of synthetic judgment, the paradigm of world-oriented thought. More precisely and technically, the power of judgment is required for subsuming an object under a concept, which would be impossible without a schema.\textsuperscript{350} Besides this, the link with judgment

\textsuperscript{345} As argued in section 4.7.2., this holds true only of figures as they are featured in the construction of geometrical concepts. To simply see or feel some figure is an entirely different matter.
\textsuperscript{346} See A714/B742.
\textsuperscript{347} See A714/B742.
\textsuperscript{348} KU § 59, 5:351–352. If the exhibition is indirect, it is called \textit{symbolical}.
\textsuperscript{349} In the \textit{Critique}, this is most explicitly stated in the beginning of the second chapter of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment (A148/B187), the first chapter of which is the Schematism.
\textsuperscript{350} A247/B304. See also EEKU V, 20:212, for the fact that schematizing answers for the possibility of judgment with sensible reference.
makes it evident that the exhibition is not simply supposed to happen but made to happen. Indeed, the option to check whether the intuition is in fact determinable according to the concept (or the rule) in question must be secured. This, however, points again to judgment, not to perception as such.

4.4. The Problems Unfold

We ended section 4.1. by pointing out that imagination belongs to sensibility, also known as perceptivity. It was also shown in that section that imagination can operate on its own, even in ways which are quite incomprehensible or “blind” to us. In section 4.2. we proposed that the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction are, as such, non-intellectual syntheses. This confirms the necessity of imagination for representing perceptual manifolds, but leaves it at that. Most recently, section 4.3. should have made it clear that imagination and understanding must be connectable in order to establish sensibly informed thought. Schemata play a fundamental role in this; yet without implying anything about perception per se thereby.

Together, these claims point to what could be called the interconnection problem. It manifests itself in several ways, the common ground being the question concerning the relative autonomy of the two fundamental representational capacities. In terms of synthesis, the competing views would be those that claim that all synthesis depends on understanding and its functions, as opposed to views that claim that some synthetic activity is up to imagination without being dependent on the higher faculty. In other terms, either sensibility merely provides the stuff to be connected by the understanding, which implies that all connection is up to the latter, or that there must be some connection already at the level of sensibility itself.

Let us begin by providing textual evidence for the reading according to which pretty much everything rests on the understanding and its categories because all synthesis (connection) depends on them:

Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience.

---

354 B161 (§ 26): “Folglich steht alle Synthesis, wodurch selbst Wahrnehmung möglich wird, unter den Kategorien; und da Erfahrung Erkenntnuß durch verknüpfte Wahrnehmungen ist, so sind die Kategorien Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung und gelten also a priori auch von allen Gegenständen der
The Mind as Synthesizer

Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, which depends on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis and on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension. Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the categories.[355]

It is possible (almost too easy) to read these passages as claiming that even perception is grounded on the categories because so is the very synthesis that makes perception possible.[356]

However, the provided evidence comes with major qualifications. The text does not say that all synthesis is up to understanding. Nor does it say that perceptions as such stand under the categories. Instead, Kant links the dependency on understanding with the unity of intellectual synthesis, and the dependency on categories with the combination (Verbindung) of perceptions.[357] Furthermore, it is not self-explanatory what ‘to depend’ (abhängen) and ‘to stand under’ (unterstehen) mean here.

Whatever form the reading of such passages takes, it defines the relation between perception and conceptual thought. When taken to the extremes, the former is simply impossible without the latter.[358] This kind of view makes the line between perception and judgment very thin. Certainly, there is textual support for this. To give an example:

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding.[359]
The passage may suggest that not only does judgmental unity depend on a category, but that the same holds also at the level of intuition. It is not a big step to take from there to equate having any kind of object with the possibility of making judgments.\(^{360}\) A variation of the claim is that there cannot be reference to anything except through judgments.\(^{361}\) Or if `judgment’ seems to be too heavy a term, one may claim that all representation depends on the very same function as judgment does, implying that perceptual experience itself is a manifestation of conceptual capacities.\(^{362}\) Another variation of this idea is that one cannot perceive anything without the categories. If this is so, perception is only possible, for example, through the category of Reality.\(^{363}\) In any such reading, whatever the perceptual elements provide, they cannot play an independent role. For our purposes, the most telling consequence of this type of reading is that unconceptualized intuitions are deemed to be impossible.\(^{364}\)

Our task is to undermine this kind of interpretation. However, we will also try and give a positive explanation of “mere” or “bare” perception.\(^{365}\) In order to succeed in this, we have to show that there is in fact no necessary connection between perceptions and conceptions in the Kantian model.

At this point, let me make things more concrete. Think of two simple perceptual situations: looking at a sports car and listening to a birdsong. The red car shines and feels smooth to the hand. There are variations of pitch and rhythm to the birdsong. Then suppose the following. We do not care whether the car is a Ferrari Testarossa or not, or how it stands in comparison with some other Italian car (say, my mint green Fiat Punto). Nor do we try to figure out what kind of a bird is making the sound, or try to analyze what we hear (in musical terms, for instance). We just admire the car and simply listen to the birdsong (let us say, only to entertain ourselves).

Is it really so that everything that we take in in these two situations (all these shapes, colors, patterns, sounds, and feelings) is somehow delivered through or put under concepts (or principles) to be anything to us? I find the positive answer as extremely odd (and I think that Kant would, too). Recall how far we got earlier with sensations and intuitions. There seems to be no need for postulating

\(^{360}\) Allison 2004, 234; George 1981, 245.

\(^{361}\) George 1981, 243–244.

\(^{362}\) See McDowell 2009, 11–13, 127.

\(^{363}\) Caygill 1995, 345: “perception is not prior to the category of reality [...] but requires that the category be given in order to take place.” Or to put the same in terms of principles, “perception itself is only possible when anticipated by the principle that ‘the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree’” (ibid.). This is indeed strongly put inasmuch as this suggests that one should be able to represent to oneself the principles themselves in order to perceive something.

\(^{364}\) Allison 1973, 71: “a completely unconceptualized intuition [sic] could, for Kant, not even be brought to consciousness, and the empirical intuition of a not further determined ‘spatio-temporal somewhat’ [a term Allison borrows from Manley Thompson] is itself the result of a synthesis according to pure concepts.”

\(^{365}\) Note, however, that I do not mean ‘sensation’ by this – as Kant himself seems to do occasionally (e.g. A170/B212). Rather, I mean non-conceptual perception which involves – or is, for that matter – intuiting.
any extra items to explain, say, how one directs oneself at the birdsong and listens to the melody. And when operations are added to the picture, apprehension and reproduction seem to be quite enough.

Then think of an ox that walks into its stall.\textsuperscript{366} Does it not perceive the doorway? Does it not distinguish that from the fence? Of course it does. But the animal cannot have concepts of any kind in its cognitive repertoire because Kant denies non-human animals understanding. Thus no category or any other intellectual item in our story makes its representations happen in any sense. The ox perceives stalls, doorways, hay bales, cows, and many other things without concepts or category-based synthesis, that is. It does not need those for relating its body to the objects of its domestic environment. It does not need them to have an environment with spatial features. No category or any other intellectual representation makes its perceptual field organized in this fundamental sense.

To press the point, suppose that the ox stops and begins to stare at something in wonder. In so doing it represents \textit{that there}. It does not need concepts for that. Then it recognizes its keeper and continues to the stall. Again, there is no need for conceptual representations or capacities. It most probably does not even matter whether the keeper wears white or green (but wearing red might be a bad idea). The ox can well recognize him or her regardless of such variations in sensation. If so, all this particularizing (some of which is not even fully perspectival) is already possible at purely non-conceptual level.

Of course, as a non-intellectual animal, the ox is not capable of thinking any of the particulars of its environment \textit{as} this or that. This is because it does not think at all; it merely feels and senses. However, this should not be underrated because it does not just receive sensory data but intuits and perceives things. Certainly, we cannot be too sure how the ox actually represents its environment. But we can be quite sure that the animal does not live in a “representational muddle”\textsuperscript{367} any more than we do. There must be some coherence and stability to its perceptual encounterings. In a word, there must be structure.\textsuperscript{368} What is more, we human beings are, presumably, in many respects just like that ox when it comes to mere perception. In short, none of that perceptual success depends on concepts (to speak of representations), intellectual synthesis (to speak of operations), or understanding (to speak of faculties). Indeed, Kant must have had something else in mind with these notions and their roles with respect to perception.

\textsuperscript{366} Cf. FS 2:59.
\textsuperscript{367} Burge 2009, 312.
\textsuperscript{368} See Allais 2009, 407–408.
4.5. On Empirical Concept Formation

As can be anticipated, the answers to the issues summed up in the previous section depend on what one means by concepts, the empirical ones or the categories. In this section I will show in detail that perception *per se* cannot presuppose the former. This will clear the table for the more complicated issue concerning the role of categories in perceptual experience.

Let us begin by quoting one of Kant’s notes:

> The action of the imagination in giving an intuition for a concept is *exhibitio*. The action of the imagination in making a concept out of an empirical intuition is *comprehensio*. 370

The note clarifies that both concept application and formation require imagination. Even more importantly, it suggests that the action Kant calls *comprehensio* makes use of empirical intuition before the concept is available. Indeed, the concept is made “out of an empirical intuition.” The action in question must thus have, in some sense or another, an unconceptualized intuition at its disposal.

Not only does this kind of grasping differ from exhibition, which presupposes the concept, but it must also be quite different from the kind of comprehension (*Zusammenfassung, apperceptio comprehensiva*) introduced in the following passage in the so-called First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment:

To every empirical concept, namely, there belong three actions of the self-active faculty of cognition: 1. the *apprehension* (*apprehensio*) of the manifold of intuition; 2. the *comprehension*, i.e., the synthetic unity of the consciousness of this manifold in the concept of an object (*apperceptio comprehensiva*); 3. the *presentation* (*exhibitio*) of the object corresponding to this concept in intuition. For the first action imagination is required, for the second understanding, for the third the power of judgment, which, if it is an empirical concept that is at issue, would be the determining power of judgment. 371

---

369 This is well recognized in Griffith 2012.
371 EEKU 20:220: “Zu jedem empirischen Begriffe gehören nämlich drei Handlungen des selbstthätigen Erkenntnisvermögens: 1. die *Auffassung* (*apprehensio*) des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung 2. die *Zusammenfassung* d.i. die synthetische Einheit des Bewußtseins dieses Mannigfaltigen in dem Begriffe eines Objects (*pperceptio comprehensiva*) 3. die *Darstellung* (*exhibitio*) des diesem Begriff entsprechendem Gegenstandes in der Anschauung. Zu der ersten Handlung wird Einbildungskraft, zur zweiten Verstand, zur dritten Urtheilskraft erfordert, welche, wenn es um einen empirischen Begriff zu thun ist, bestimmende Urtheilskraft sein würde.” The last sentence suggests that in the case of *non*-empirical concepts the power of judgment that makes the exhibition of the concept possible is the reflecting power of judgment. The
First of all, this kind of “grasping-together” requires more than imagination, namely understanding, the faculty of concepts. Secondly, it suggests a synthetic unity “in the concept of an object.”

But then consider how the note (the one we began the section with) continues:

The apprehension of the imagination, \textit{apprehensio aesthetica}. The composition of it, \textit{comprehensio aesthetica} (aesthetic comprehension): I grasp the manifold together in a whole representation and thus it acquires a certain form.\footnote{R 5661, 18:320 (1788–90): “Auffassung der Einbildungskraft, \textit{apprehensio aesthetica}. Zusammenfassung derselben, \textit{comprehensio aesthetica} (ästhetisches \textit{Begreifen}), ich fasse das Mannigfaltige zusammen in eine ganze Vorstellung und so bekommt sie eine gewisse Form.” \textit{Begreifen} suggests ‘conceptual grasping’ but I do not think that would be a good translation here. I am confident that Kant did not have \textit{Begriff} – understood as a general representation thought through marks common to several things – in mind when he wrote the note. Besides, also the preconceptual action of the imagination targeted at an empirical intuition in order to make an empirical concept out of it was called \textit{comprehensio}.}

Since Kant suggests here that the composition (also \textit{Zusammenfassung} but not \textit{apperceptio comprehensiva}) is up to aesthetic comprehension, it makes perfect sense to take its end-product (the manifold grasped together in a whole representation) as different from the end-product of the \textit{Zusammenfassung} presented in the previous passage. In other words, Kant must think that it is possible to come up with such a whole without it being necessarily a conceptual unity in the strict sense, whereby we would not only represent the thing in general terms through some common characteristic, but also in a rule-like fashion, recognizing (more or less implicitly) the way the whole is \textit{to be} composed.\footnote{Also recall the \textit{Zusammensetzung-Einheit} distinction from section 4.2.}

There are two further things to notice here. One, the passage from the \textit{First Introduction} aims to explain what actions are required for empirical concepts. It is plain that mere imagination cannot be enough in that context. Two, as the synthesis of apprehension was shown to be perfectly capable of producing a composition (\textit{Zusammensetzung}),\footnote{Section 4.2., again.} the higher kind of comprehension does not seem to be at all necessary for producing composition as such. \textit{Apperceptio comprehensiva} might as well exploit what the imagination has already composed. Actually, it is hard to see how some wholly novel empirical concept could be acquired unless something like this was possible. For example, in a process of making sense of something we are totally unfamiliar with, we might be quite dumbfounded in respect of describing, naming, and classifying it, while still being capable of getting some kind of a figurative grasp of it.
It must also be quite possible to go through something simply “aesthetically” without grasping anything “in a whole representation” in the process. In Kant’s terms, apprehension, as presented in the note (\textit{apprehensio aesthetica} in contrast to \textit{comprehensio aesthetica}) seems to mean just that. Indeed, elsewhere Kant speaks of mere apprehension “without any rationalizing”\textsuperscript{375} which fits this reading perfectly. Concepts may (and often do) guide apprehension, of course, but the point is that the two are not necessarily joined.

More generally, this suggests that it makes sense to distinguish plain apprehension from the synthesis of apprehension. Only the latter suggests a result: the composition of the manifold. That is, the synthesis aims at grasping something as a whole, or as a unity, unlike mere “running through” which can go on aimlessly, or infinitely. And even if it does not, it may lead up to a point where aesthetic comprehension becomes extremely difficult or simply impossible. In the third \textit{Critique}, Kant exemplifies such a situation with St. Peter’s in Rome. The cathedral is so huge and complex that anyone new to it cannot grasp it, at least not as a whole.\textsuperscript{376}

In addition to this, the way Kant explicates aesthetic comprehension points at the possibility of grasping something merely formally as a perceptual composition. Think of an abstract painting, for example. To take in its visual elements one by one would be the task of aesthetic apprehension. To take the elements collectively, as representing one complex form, would be the task of aesthetic comprehension.\textsuperscript{377}

Together the two passages imply that exhibition requires both imagination and the power of judgment. This makes sense. Not only must there be a figurative process involved, but a kind of decision-making on the part of the cognizer. The same point was illustrated with the schematization. Then again, at that point one would have a notably more intellectual cognitive achievement than what a mere sensible “grasping-together” is. Among other things, one would be able to demonstrate how the rule implied by the concept in fact fits the intuition (thereby one would also be in a position to question that). But then one would be in the possession of the concept already.

Generally speaking, the possibility of coming up with novel empirical concepts calls for ascension from non- or preconceptual “grasping-together” to conceptual “grasping-together.” The former allows a distinguished view on something, but nevertheless in a particular fashion, whereas the latter always proceeds through generalization. In terms of syntheses, there must be a kind of independency at the level of apprehension. As it takes place in time, the synthesis of reproduction

\textsuperscript{375} KU § 23, 5:245; “ohne zu vernünfteln[.]

\textsuperscript{376} KU § 26, 5:251–252. The same example is used in a similar vein in ML1 28:236. Also the alternative term used for apprehension in B68 (\textit{aufsuchen}) suggests the difference between really seeking something out apprehensively and simply going through something in apprehension.

\textsuperscript{377} This reading is further supported by Kant’s theory of taste, according to which that formal structure and its effect on the mind would be the only proper ground of the aesthetic evaluation of the object in the contemporary sense of the word (see section 6.4.1.).
must be involved, too. In terms of operations, these two make the foundation of empirical concept formation. In terms of representations, that foundation consists of empirical intuitions not yet conceptualized. From this we may conclude that representing things under empirical concepts cannot be the necessary condition of perception.

This line of thought comes up quite often in the Kantian corpus. To begin with, consider the following passages from the lectures on logic:

He who sees his first tree does not know what it is that he sees.\(^{378}\)

Something precedes, of course, before a representation becomes a concept.\(^{379}\)

Concept formation, on the other hand, is explained like this:

A *conceptus empiricus* is one that is produced through the comparison of objects of experience. A *repraesentatio empirica* is one that arises from the senses. This can become a *conceptus*, if I take that which is common to various empirical representations.\(^{380}\)

Or to repeat the quote that served us earlier in explaining how concepts are kinds of rules:

He who wished to have a representation of the color red first had to see the color red. When he compared the color red in the red of cinnabar, *carmoisin*, and *ponceau*, however, he became aware that there is something general in the color red, that is contained along with other things in other representations of the color red, and he thought by red that which was common to many objects, and this was a concept.

Most importantly for our current topic, these quotes refer to non- or preconceptual empirical representations as the ground of making comparisons and noticing common features that make the acquisition of empirical concepts possible.

Kant also presents a more detailed account of empirical concept formation:

To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able to *compare*, to *reflect*, and to *abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first

---

\(^{378}\) LW 24:905: “Der, der den ersten Baum sieht, weiß nicht, was das ist, was er sieht.”


\(^{380}\) LW 24:905: “Conceptus empiricus ist der, der durch die Vergleichung der Gegenstände der Erfahrung erzeugt ist. Repraesentatio empirica ist, die aus den Sinnen entspringt. Diese kann zum conceptus werden, wenn ich das nehme, was mehreren empirischen Vorstellungen gemein ist.”
The Mind as Synthesizer

comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.³⁸¹

As it is put in the quote, there are three acts involved: comparing, reflecting, and abstracting. Basically, this must mean that an empirical concept is formed by attending to similarities and differences found among objects in a reflective way so that only certain features are taken as relevant through abstraction. Let us elaborate on these stages one by one.

Comparing could not be possible without the ability to differentiate, or without the faculty of distinguishing or the power to distinguish.³⁸² In Kant’s example, a spruce is distinguished from a willow and linden. They have different looks due to their different-looking trunks, branches, and leaves. One could also say that it is only because of this that it is possible to compare them in the first place. But Kant has acts in mind here. To form concepts, the mind must be set into what could be called a goal-oriented comparison mode, equipped with an active aim for finding the differences.

Likewise in reflecting, one must actively try and realize what things have in common. In this context, reflection could also be coined as separation, as is done in the Vienna Logic.³⁸³ The terminological variation makes sense. Not only must one focus on the individual features of the three trees in order to find out whether they have any shared features, but to accomplish that one must also keep the parts separate from the wholes. This makes it possible to note how the things have similar structural aspects regardless of their many differences as a whole.

By abstracting Kant means abstracting from something. Thereby one leaves aside some of the possible determinations of a thing. For example, one does not take size into account when representing the three trees. Instead, one takes into account the fact that they all have trunks, branches, and leaves (conifers such as spruces really do not have leaves, though). As Kant puts it in the Discovery, “one abstracts in the use of a concept from the diversity of that which is contained under it.”³⁸⁴ In other words, abstraction is a limiting or guiding factor in the process: “the philosopher

³⁸¹ LJ 9:94–95: “Um aus Vorstellungen Begriffe zu machen, muß man also compariren, reflectiren und abstrahiriren können, denn diese drei logischen Operationen des Verstandes sind die wesentlichen und allgemeinen Bedingungen zu Erzeugung eines jeden Begriffs überhaupt. Ich sehe z.B. eine Fichte, eine Weide und eine Linde. Indem ich diese Gegenstände zuvörderst unter einander vergleiche, bemerke ich, daß sie von einander verschieden sind in Ansehung des Stammes, der Äste, der Blätter u.dgl.m.; nun reflectire ich aber hiernächst nur auf das, was sie unter sich gemein haben, den Stamm, die Äste, die Blätter selbst und abstrahiriren von der Größe, der Figur derselben u.s.w.; so bekomme ich einen Begriff vom Baume.”
³⁸² In the Critique, Kant only mentions this faculty (A654/B682) or power (A648/B676) – we will make a bit more out of it in section 5.4.
³⁸³ LW 24:907.
³⁸⁴ ÜE 8:199*: “man abstrahirt in dem Gebrauche eines Begriffs von der Verschiedenheit desjenigen, was unter ihm enthalten ist.”
abstracts from that which he does not wish to take into consideration in a certain use of the concept.”385 Indeed, it seems that this kind of a mode of consideration must be, as it were, preprogrammed into concept formation, since otherwise comparing and reflecting would just go on, and one would never get to any general representation.

The explanatory success of the three-part process has been questioned.386 One of its failures seems to be that it does not really explain how the subject arises from non-conceptual perceptual representations to concepts. Rather, the claim goes, it only explains reforming and refining the conceptual grasp of objects. For example, in order to achieve the concept of a tree the way just described, one must already be in possession of the concepts of trunk, branch, and leaf. Or so it seems. It might as well be that Kant did not in fact mean the marks of trees by these features, but those things that one eventually particularizes when one begins to make sense of these three objects. At least the marks need not be ready-made; they could also be the byproducts of the process. Indeed, one might well possess a simple concept of tree without knowing what leaves are. It is just that one has to go through these features (which one might later learn to be leaves) in order to catch them as relevant (dis)similarities among trees.

Another way to soften the criticism would be to emphasize that the three-part process does not entail anything about the origin of concepts as to their matter, but only as to their form.387 This could be turned into the already familiar methodological point. Is Kant explaining how we actually learned the concept of tree? To answer this question we should have access to the very origins of our cognitive undertakings, including the different sensations and intuitions involved. But do we have that? Perhaps in some cases we do, but our intellectual history is full of examples which suggest that we do not. However that may be, the point is that Kant should not be expected to explain psychological facts like that.388

Most importantly, the previous points illustrate that the subject must have particulars present to him or her in order to come up with empirical concepts like red or tree. What they also imply is that perceiving is not always perceiving-as. But there is a tendency to think otherwise. Let me paraphrase an example from Nelson Goodman’s writings.389 There is a room with books, plants, and a stereo system. Then a person from the jungle enters the room. He finds no books nor the stereo system there.

385 ÜE 8:199*: “der Philosoph abstrahirt von demjenigen, worauf er in einem gewissen Gebrauche des Begriffs nicht Rücksicht nehmen will.”
386 Ginsborg 2006a, 38–40.
388 In Hatfield 1990, 107, the same point is made with respect to spatiality: “Kant’s doctrine of outer sense was mute with respect to the genetic psychology of visual space-perception.”
389 Goodman 1984a, 35. I have chose to use an example outside Kant scholarship because it captures the core idea of perceiving-as so well.
This is because he is unable to recognize such things. Maybe he takes the plants as food, the books as fuel (unlike Goodman and we would).

In a sense, the example goes straight to the point, as it exemplifies how people from different backgrounds conceptualize their environment differently. In another sense, however, the example misses a fundamental point when it moves directly from the fact that the jungle dweller does not recognize the stereo system to the claim that “he does not recognize as a thing at all that which I know to be a stereo system[].”

Since this jungle dweller does not have the concept of stereo system (or of any technical device) it is obvious that he cannot pick up the stereo system from the room. Of course he cannot find it as one since he has no idea what such a thing is. Then again, if he were to spend more time in the room it is equally obvious that he would eventually wonder what that is. Even if he only thought for a second whether it is something edible or not, he would already have picked up an individual object in the room. It does not matter what he knows of it, or what we happen to call it. The point is that the example overlooks the possibility of an object being the same for the two subjects as an object of perception despite its being different as an object of understanding (or language, for that matter). If this was not possible, the jungle dweller would never learn the concept. And even if he did not, he would still pick up the same object as we do in the primitive sense that both representings refer to the same particular thing.

There is a similar example in the Kantian corpus. Kant just does not take the lack of concept so far. In fact, that does not seem to be even a real issue because there are intuitions, too:

In every cognition we must distinguish matter, i.e., the object, and form, i.e., the way in which we cognize the object. If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time.

To paraphrase, this “savage” sees the house as the next person. He just does not see it as a house. In other words, he is not aware of the representation of house. This, however, does not have an effect on

---

390 Goodman 1984a, 35 (my emphases).
391 LJ 9:33: “In jeder Erkenntniß muß unterschieden werden M a t e r i e , d. i. der Gegenstand, und F o r m , d. i. die Art, w ie wir den Gegenstand erkennen. -- Sieht z.B. ein Wilder ein Haus aus der Ferne, dessen Gebrauch er nicht kennt: so hat er zwar eben dasselbe Object wie ein Anderer, der es bestimmt als eine für Menschen eingerichtete Wohnung kennt, in der Vorstellung vor sich. Aber der Form nach ist dieses Erkenntniß eines und desselben Objects in beiden verschieden. Bei dem Einen ist es b l o ß e A n s c h a u u n g , bei dem Andern A n s c h a u u n g und B e g r i f f zugleich.”
his awareness of this object *per se*. The empirical intuition, which makes the latter possible, can be said to be the same in both cases because it is the same particular that is being singled out (with or without the concept that fits it). Certainly, the *way* of being aware of the object is different. The person unfamiliar with houses cannot *determine* the object the way the Königsbergian can. Still, the mere intuition (*bloße Anschauung*) is enough to guarantee that the object of the representation is the same.

To be sure, this person would have other concepts in his cognitive repertoire. Some of them might even be marks of a house (a dwelling place, for example). Presumably mastering one concept requires mastering many. However that may be, the thing is that we have already provided quite a lot of textual evidence according to which there is no necessary connection between empirical concepts and simple object cognition. But let us provide one more:

For there is also a *distinctness* in the intuition, and hence also in the representation of the individual […] which may be called *aesthetic* and is quite different from *logical* distinctness through concepts (supposing an Australian aborigine, for example, were to see a house for the first time, and was near enough to distinguish all its parts, though without having the least concept of it)[.]

This example confirms, among other things, that Kant thought that the concept of house is not necessary even for being conscious of the parts-whole structure of the thing (known to be a house by those who possess the concept). In other words, the person in question has not only picked out (and thus distinguished from other things) that which we would call a house, but established a composition of the manifold as well. Importantly for our purposes, both are possible without having the relevant empirical concepts in one’s cognitive repertoire. Indeed, both are quite possible merely on the basis of preconceptual empirical representations. At best, the Australian (New Hollander, really) has successfully established an aesthetic comprehension of the thing.

From this on, one argumentative strategy would be to show that in empirical representing there cannot be wholly categorical concept-use, but only categorically grounded empirical concept-use. As perception is already shown not to be necessarily dependent on empirical concepts, then it cannot be necessarily dependent on the categories either. This would close our case completely. However that may turn out, it is evident that one cannot think and judge about empirical matters without empirical

---

392 Brandom 2002, 274; McDowell 2009, 38n23.
393 ÜE 8:217*: “Denn es giebt auch eine Deutlichkeit in der Anschauung, also auch der Vorstellung des Einzelnen […] welche ästhetisch genannt werden kann, die von der logischen, durch Begriffe, ganz unterschieden ist (so wie die, wenn ein neuholländischer Wilder zuerst ein Haus zu sehen bekäm und ihm nahe genug wäre, um alle Theile desselben zu unterscheiden, ohne doch den mindesten Begriff davon zu haben)[.]”
394 We will get to the other things in section 5.3.
concepts. This takes us to the other strategy. If there is any sense to the application of categories in perceptual cognition without empirical concepts, it cannot be identified with making judgments consisting of empirical concepts. So we must clarify what such an application could mean, and what it has got to do with perception. We will begin this by returning to the notion of object.

4.6. Object

4.6.1. Objects as Conceptual Unities

The whole issue about the Kantian notion of object can be found in a very concise form in the following short explication of what an object is:

An **object**, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is **united**.\(^{395}\)

As such, ‘object’ refers to a product of understanding because it is really a manifestation of a unity grounded on a concept. Certainly, given Kant’s critical stance, an object could in no way be some independently dwelling entity belonging to a ready-made order of things.\(^{396}\) Instead, as commentators have emphasized, it must be seen as a complex of appearances that corresponds to, or follows from, conceptual construction or connection.\(^{397}\) In short, an object is achieved through (or indeed is) a synthetic unity.

In this sense, it is plain that ‘being an object’ depends on synthesis. Moreover, as the unity achieved through the connecting activity in question is a conceptual one, it must depend on understanding. This leads us directly to the categories, also known as the concepts of synthesis (*Begriffe der Synthesis*).\(^{398}\) Indeed, the twelve pure concepts of understanding can be seen as the universal aspects of objecthood, or the ways according to which any object can be understood, as each of them expresses a specific manner of connecting representations into one (hence *synthesis*).

This is why they are also dubbed as the concepts of an object in general. Methodologically speaking, in order to understand ‘object’ in the most generic sense possible, one must abstract from the differences between actual empirical objects (and/or the sensory contents in question). What

\(^{395}\) B137: “Object aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung **vereinigt** ist.”

\(^{396}\) Once again we may consult Allison 2004: “it is the very essence of Kant’s ‘transcendental turn’ that the meaning of ‘object’ must be explicated in terms of the conditions of the representations of objects” (233) and that the “first-order talk about objects is replaced by the second-order talk about the *concept* of an object and the conditions of the representation of an object” (173).

\(^{397}\) Allison 2004, 173; Henrich 1994, 158.

\(^{398}\) A80/B106.
remains is the concept that explains ‘being an object.’ Since the categories collectively express that concept, it is really them that remain as the basis of objecthood itself.

Regarding our questions, what we have here is another instance of the interconnection problem. We have already noticed this with the notion of the synthesis of recognition, or intellectual synthesis in general, which suggested that the unity proper is only achievable “in a concept.” Now it becomes evident that a category is being meant by the latter. It is that concept in which representations are unified, or more closely to the point, an expression for that rule according to which representations are unified. So the claim goes that only thereby can one have an object.

To put the same in terms of faculties, consider the following passage from the third Critique:

Now there belongs to a representation by which an object is given, in order for there to be cognition of it in general, imagination for the composition of the manifold of intuition and understanding for the unity of the concept that unifies the representations.

Here it is put quite explicitly that the unity of representations is up to understanding. To this one could add that this must necessarily be so because only understanding, the faculty of concepts and rules, can provide “the concept [or the rule] that unifies the representations.” One way to put the general idea behind this is that there is no combination in the senses as such. Again, it can be claimed that all unification is category-dependent.

Then again, to assert only that on the basis of this (or some similar) passage is to overlook the crucial function of “bringing-together” appointed to imagination (not to mention the qualification ‘cognition of it in general’ where ‘it’ refers to an object as given). But before going (or returning) to any of this, let us carry on to other explications of the notion of object:

The concept that contains the synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold (what might pertain to it) is the concept of an object. It is also the subject of a judgment that has many predicates.

399 Accordingly, we may speak of “one generic concept of an object of which all our empirical object-concepts, i.e., concepts of particular kinds of objects (books, houses, trees, pencils, etc.) are specifications.” (Rosenberg 2005, 135.) The method is similar to the one in the Aesthetic, where spatiotemporality as such is shown to remain after the omission of everything empirical.

400 KU § 9, 5:217: “Nun gehören zu einer Vorstellung, wodurch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, damit überhaupt Erkenntniß werde, Einbildungskraft für die Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung und Verstand für die Einheit des Begriffes, der die Vorstellungen vereinigt.”

401 See A120.

402 R 6350, 18:676–677 (1796–98): “Der Begriff, der die synthetische Einheit der Apperception des Manigfaltigen (was dazu kommen möchte) enthält, ist der Begriff von einem object. Er ist auch das Subject eines Urtheils, das viele Prädicate hat.”
The subject of a judgment, the representation of which contains the ground of the synthetic unity of a manifold of predicates, is an object.\textsuperscript{403}

This time Kant speaks explicitly of objects as subjects of judgments. When understood this way, their dependency on the categories appears as quite straightforward. Moreover, the link with judgment suggests that ‘being an object’ comes with the idea of being something shareable and communicable among judgers. This must involve classification of things and predication of properties. But this is something that we should not even expect from mere perception. A further thing is that the first passage implies that the synthetic unity involves “the apperception of the manifold.” This suggests some kind of self-consciousness (we remarked the same thing when we introduced the synthesis of recognition) or explicit awareness of the manifoldness as such, which is again something that should not be expected from mere perception.

Furthermore, as has been shown, perception does not require empirical concept application. Then it is certainly the case that perception does not necessarily involve making a judgment either.\textsuperscript{404} Two options remain: one must either conclude that there are not any kinds of objects at all without judgments, or make something else out of the idea of the category-based unifying of representations. It should be clear that the former conclusion cannot be true. Recall the two persons who cannot recognize the house. From this cognitive limitation it follows that nor can they make their representation into a house-object fit for a judgment that concerns such objects. But since they nevertheless have an object, making a judgment (understood as an indirect complex representation that makes use of features shared by many things) cannot be the necessary condition of having it.

A way that allows keeping the strict category-dependency intact is to argue that the categories guide the unifying activity already at the prejudgmental level.\textsuperscript{405} Certainly, there is a point to this. How on earth could we make sense of, say, a house as opposed to a car, unless there was a certain model of operation built into the very act of making sense of any object whatsoever? To exemplify this as briefly as possible: both are like something, and to figure out what kind of a thing the house is must exploit the same “like something” structure as when we figure out what kind of a thing the car is. This way we can also entertain a representation of a thing both without sensation and without referring to the particular features of some specific instance of its kind. This allows, among other things, that we can speak of its properties in a general manner without having to see the thing for ourselves. A concrete example would be speaking of houses and cars over the telephone.\textsuperscript{406} Indeed, here we come

\textsuperscript{403} R 6350, 18:676 (1796–98): “Das Subject eines Urtheils, dessen Vorstellung den Grund der synthetischen Einheit einer Manigfaltigkeit von Prädicaten enthält, ist Object.”
\textsuperscript{404} Pace e.g. George 1981, 244–245; Falkenstein 1995, 412n17; Dickerson 2004, 30.
\textsuperscript{405} Allison 1973, 64–65; Longuenesse 2005, 23–24.
to Kant’s core idea of the categories as the generic ways of thinking an object, which collectively
ground the thinking of actual objects.

But notice how we were led to the notion of thinking of objects. There was a stealthy shift from
an object of perception (two persons seeing the house without recognizing it as one) to a genuine
thought-object (two persons speaking of the house over the telephone). I should emphasize that this
was not a trick on my part, but reflects Kant’s approach as a whole. A central thing to notice is that
when Kant emphasizes the role of the categories in contexts centering on ‘being an object’ he speaks
not of perception: he speaks of thinking. Here is a telling example of this from the second edition
Critique:

We cannot think any object except through categories; we cannot cognize any object that is thought
except through intuitions that correspond to those concepts.\textsuperscript{407}

Accordingly, the categorical framework is the necessary condition of thinking of objects. If that is
supposed to be world-oriented cognitive activity, it must presuppose objects in some sense. Indeed, a
sensible object must be somehow available for the thinking subject (as a target, as it were).

Recall that in perception objects appear through sensation. Kant would call such an instance
either an object of sense (Gegenstand der Sinne, also Sinnenobject) or an object of perception
(Gegenstand/Object der Wahrnehmung).\textsuperscript{408} Or to press the point from another direction, objects that
cannot be targets of world-oriented activity are nevertheless objects; any object of pure reason would
make a perfect example. However, as a non-intuitable object that lacks objective reality, it cannot
have anything to do with the unification of “the manifold of a given intuition” either. So, basically, the
‘object’ we started the section with cannot be all there is to the notion.

Another telling explication of the categories is that they are “fundamental concepts for thinking
objects in general for the appearances.”\textsuperscript{409} This suggests that the categories are not for perceiving; and,
moreover, that they depend on appearances (or even that ‘appearance’ is just another name for an
object for the category-driven activity). Here, we could recall the definition of appearance as an
“undetermined object of an empirical intuition,” or turn to formulations such as this one: “natural
appearances are objects that are given to us independently of our concepts.”\textsuperscript{410} Or as it is put in one of

\textsuperscript{407} B165: “Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien; wir können keinen gedachten
Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen.” See also A62/B87;
A93/B126.

\textsuperscript{408} If the object is sensible, but without sensation, then the proper term would be an object of intuition (see e.g.
ÜE 8:240).

\textsuperscript{409} A111: “Grundbegriffe, Objecte überhaupt zu den Erscheinung zu denken[.]”

\textsuperscript{410} A480/B508: “die Naturerscheinungen Gegenstände sind, die uns unabhängig von unseren Begriffen gegeben
werden[.]”
the lectures, intuitions “provide the object,” \(^{411}\) to which it is added that “our understanding reflects, but does not intuit.”\(^{412}\) As the latter assertion is clearly made to press the point, we may interpret Kant as emphasizing here that the understanding must have something before it, namely that on the basis of which it reflects (as it were, mirrors through its spontaneity), but which it does not in any way produce.\(^{413}\)

This may seem to build a divide between perceptual objects (appearances) and objects as units of sensibly informed thinking belonging to synthetic judgments (genuine thought-objects). This could be called the object problem, which would be yet another instance of the interconnection problem. An easy way to ease the tension would be to claim that the undetermined object is not anything by itself. However, then one overlooks the starting point: that something appears. Likewise, if one claims that objects are possible only when determined through concepts, one misses the very foundation, namely the object of sensibility (Gegenstand der Sinnlichkeit).\(^{414}\)

There is, of course, a point in claiming that ‘being an object’ requires that perceptual material is being determined according to concepts. We do conceive things in some way. We understand that they are qualitatively and quantitatively of some kind, and that they show up in various relations to each other. Again, the categories explain the possibility of this. Indeed, if the object is the way we think of something (in a unified manner, one could add), and if certain concepts are the only ways of doing that, ‘being an object’ must depend on the determining activity in accordance with such concepts. In this sense, understanding does make its objects. Then again, if one is (as we are) after the necessary conditions of perception (not thought), one should ask what is it that is being so determined; it cannot be that understanding makes the object in that unrefined sense, too.

To press the point further, let us look at the notion of determination as it appears in contexts centering on categories. To begin with, let us consider the following passage:

The perception of an object can be immediately combined with the concept of an object in general, for which the former contains the empirical predicates, for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced. Now this is grounded in \textit{a priori} concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold, in order to think it as the determination of an object\[.\]\(^{415}\)

\(^{411}\) MM 29:796: “liefern das object[.]”

\(^{412}\) MM 29:796: “unser Verstand reflectirt, schaut aber nicht an.”

\(^{413}\) See MM 29:797. See also P 4:290.

\(^{414}\) A27/B43.

\(^{415}\) KU § 36, 5:287–288: “Mit der Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes kann unmittelbar der Begriff von einem Objecte überhaupt, von welchem jene die empirischen Prädicate enthält, zu einem Erkenntnißurtheile verbunden und dadurch ein Erfahrungsurtheil erzeugt werden. Diesem liegen nun Begriffe \textit{a priori} von der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung, um es als Bestimmung eines Objects zu denken, zum Grunde[.]”
For our current purposes, the important thing here is that Kant aims to explain how something is thought “as the determination of an object.” This has nothing to do with “the perception of an object” as such, although it certainly has everything to do with producing a judgment. One should also notice the word *can* in the beginning of the passage. It suggests that there is no necessary connection between producing the judgment and having the perception. Indeed, in terms of perception, the passage claims only that “the determination of an object” presupposes perception. Similar inferences can be drawn from the following:

Motion, like everything that is represented through the senses, is given only as appearance. For its representation to become experience, we require, too, that something be thought through the understanding – namely, besides the mode in which the representation inheres in the *subject*, also the determination of an *object* thereby. Hence the movable, as such a thing, becomes an object of experience, when a certain *object* (here a material thing) is thought as *determined* with respect to the *predicate* of motion.\(^{416}\)

The motion as such is given, or “represented through the senses.” Determining implies that something is thought through a predicate (here, motion). In this sense there is object-determination only when something is thought as determined with respect to something, the capacity of which has its ground in the pure concepts of understanding. Here we have also an exemplification of a conceptual unity: motion combined with a material thing through predication.

Then again, the moving thing as such is nevertheless *over there and there*. In short, what Kant aims to explain with the notion of determination is genuine understanding (active conceptualizing) of appearances, not representing them in the first place. It is thus something that should not even be expected from mere perception. Admittedly, there is a further complication hidden in the notion of becoming an object of experience. But as we will deal with experience later,\(^{417}\) this initial analysis will have to suffice for now. The basic setting is nevertheless firmly in place already; let us begin the next section by stating it briefly.

---

\(^{416}\) MAN 4:554: "Bewegung ist so wie alles, was durch Sinne vorgestellt wird, nur als Erscheinung gegeben. Damit ihre Vorstellung Erfahrung werde, dazu wird noch erfordert, daß etwas durch den Verstand gedacht werde, nämlich zu der Art, wie die Vorstellung dem *Subject* inhäriert, noch die Bestimmung eines *Object* durch dieselbe. Also wird das Bewegliche als ein solches ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung, wenn ein gewisses *Object* (hier also ein materielles Ding) in Ansehung des *Prädicats* der Bewegung als bestimmt gedacht wird."

\(^{417}\) Chapter 6.
4.6.2. Objects as Preconceptual Perceptual Wholes

In a sense, an object is a product of understanding through the synthetic activity peculiar to this faculty of the mind. In another sense, however, an object is that to which the pure concepts of understanding are applied.\footnote{B87.} In this latter sense, objects are given as they appear or “come before us.”\footnote{A69/B94: “uns vorkommende Erscheinungen.”} This makes them necessarily objects of sensibility. To be sure, these must be objects for understanding as well (actually, sensibility as a whole must be such an object).\footnote{See A664/B692.} But it is also exactly at this point that one should hold one’s horses in order to understand perceiving. What one must do is to make as much as possible out of the idea of \textit{givenness} in Kant, and we shall do that next.

One could start from the faculties. Faculty-talk would not make much sense unless the faculties themselves were given to the subject in some primitive sense through various mental acts. However, for our purposes the givenness built into the idea of the priority of spatiotemporality is even more fundamental. In terms of perception, the most important aspect of this is what is nowadays called egocentric space. That is something which we are simply equipped with; it is no less than the ultimate starting point that comes with outer sense.\footnote{See section 2.4.} We are located subjects in a very rudimentary way; we do not need to think ourselves as located, or as having an egocentric stance, to be such subjects. This is crucial in understanding what it is to be a perceiver.

In terms of actual representing, sensation plays the key role here. This should be clear from above, but a lot of it can be recapitulated by quoting the following passage from the Doctrine of Method, where it is stated that

\begin{quote}
there are two components to the appearance through which all objects are given to us: the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined completely \textit{a priori}, and the matter (the physical), or the content, which signifies a something that is encountered in space and time, and which thus contains an existence and corresponds to sensation.\footnote{A723/B751: “in der Erscheinung, als wodurch uns alle Gegenstände gegeben werden, zwei Stücke sind: die Form der Anschauung (Raum und Zeit), die völlig \textit{a priori} erkannt und bestimmt werden kann, und die Materie (das Physische) oder der Gehalt, welcher ein Etwas bedeutet, das im Raume und der Zeit angetroffen wird, mithin ein Dasein enthält und der Empfindung correspondirt.”}
\end{quote}

As given, an object of perception (in the quote, the appearance) is merely something encountered. We can safely speak of macroscopic bodies here.\footnote{For the fact that bodies are Kant’s prime examples of sensible objects and make, besides space and time, the main topic of the Transcendental Aesthetic, see A357; A490–491/B518–519; P 4:289; ÚE 8:209.} Of course, the object does not have to be a body; it

\[\text{106}\]
could be a mere Gestalt. But even then it would be something that can be encountered over there with its unique thisness. More generally, this suggests that the object of (outer) perception is a particular, namely, that particular something encountered in one’s egocentric space.

The crucial factor is the immediate presence (Gegenwart) of that something. Indeed, the basic idea is that something quite literally stands before the subject. We could contrast this with the conceptual representation of an object, which does not require anything standing before anything. To be sure, something must have stood before the subject for there to be empirically meaningful concepts in his or her cognitive repertoire. But this only underlines the mediacy of concepts in contrast to intuition that allows the object of perception through sensation immediately. We could use here the telephone example again, but let us quote Kant instead: “in intuition the object can be represented insofar as it is given, but through the concept the object is representable insofar as it can be thought as given mediately.”

In short, the immediate spatial presence grounds the conceptual representation of perceptual objects. Genealogically speaking, the sense of touch plays probably the ultimate role here; this is Kant’s opinion in the *Metaphysical Foundations* and *Anthropology*. However, the point itself is not about development of perception in human beings. Moreover, it has nothing to do with the perceptual mechanisms themselves. Thus we should not identify the immediacy of intuition with anything that concerns the psycho-physical distinction between immediate and mediate perception in the *Anthropology* (and also implicitly in the *Metaphysical Foundations*). There the mediacy means that the sense organ in question has a certain physical medium (air in hearing, light in vision).

These things do not belong to our set of questions. The immediacy we are concerned with indicates a possibility of having something stand before oneself without conceptualizing it thereby, just like we can think of something that will never present itself to us. As Kant writes in the third *Critique*,

we can always have something in our thoughts although it does not exist, or represent something as given even though we do not have any concept of it.

---

424 See A29/B44; Allais 2009, 405.
425 See e.g. A50/B74; B18, 151.
426 MK3 29:971: “in der Anschauung der Gegenstand vorgestellt werden kann, insofern er gegeben ist, durch der Begriff aber das Object vorstellbar ist, insofern es als gegeben mittelbar gedacht werden kann.”
429 KU § 76, 5:402: “wir nämlich etwas immer noch in Gedanken haben können, ob es gleich nicht ist, oder etwas als gegeben uns vorstellen, ob wir gleich noch keinen Begriff davon haben.” See also An § 19, 7:157, where Kant speaks of persons who cannot find the concept of the object.
We should pay attention to Kant’s careful choice of words here. That which does not exist, but is nevertheless represented by us, is “something in our thoughts” whereas that of which “we do not have any concept” is merely represented. This underscores that there are two manners of representation, aesthetic and intellectual. Indeed, we do represent through mere intuition; that which is immediately encountered in our egocentric space is necessarily represented that way. This makes sensibility both the necessary and sufficient condition of primitive perceptual representing (the German verb vorstellen would suit better here, as it indicates more explicitly something standing before someone). Moreover, whatever is represented that way is necessarily represented the way it is represented because sensibility as such is beyond one’s control in perception.430

‘Being an object’ as described in the previous section cannot be limited in this sense. This may be exemplified with this note: “An object is that in the representation of which various others can be thought as synthetically combined.”431 Now we are also in a position to emphasize further how that requires not only thinking, but a higher stance on the synthetic unity itself. As already pointed out, we should not expect either from perception. To have anything taken as synthetically combined calls for an altogether different manner of representing. We should also keep the idea of the possibility of representing an object in various ways through various predicates away from the notion of perception per se. The latter is a representation of that or that way, as that something is given in sensibility. In other words, it is necessarily particular or singular in character.

An alternative way to underline the role of the given in Kant’s model is to show that appearing is not dependent on the functions of understanding. There are several passages, both in the Critique and other places, that are illuminating in this respect:

The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions.432

[A]ppearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding.433

430 See An §§ 11–12, 7:146.
431 R 6350, 18:676 (1796–98): “Object ist das, in dessen Vorstellung verschiedene andere als synthetisch verbunden gedacht werden können.” (My emphases.)
432 A89/B122: “Die Kategorien des Verstandes dagegen stellen uns gar nicht die Bedingungen vor, unter denen Gegenstände in der Anschauung gegeben werden, mithin können uns allerdings Gegenstände erscheinen, ohne daß sie sich nothwendig auf Functionen des Verstandes beziehen müssen, und dieser also die Bedingungen derselben a priori enthielte.”
433 A90/B122: “ohne Functionen des Verstandes können allerdings Erscheinungen in der Anschauung gegeben werden.”
Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking.  

[T]he manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it.  

One can intuit something without thinking something thereby or thereunder.

To paraphrase, objects can indeed appear (that is, there can be undetermined objects of empirical intuition) without their having to be necessarily related to the functions of understanding. Although Kant’s explication of function (Funktion) as “the unity of action of ordering different representations under a common one” does not say it directly, this must include the categories. Indeed, they are no less than fundamental concepts in this respect. Recall the gray elephant and the blue plate. Making the predications had as their ultimate condition the concept of substantia et accident. This would also express what is common to both predications. In other terms, the concept of substance indicates the universal categorical feature which ultimately makes the “exhibition of an object by virtue of a feature common to several objects as a ground of cognition” possible. Not only are all concepts common in character, but they take necessarily some common feature (including any such categorical feature) as the ground of cognition. But to demand that of perception would be a confusion.

This reveals a crucial aspect of the kind of unity Kant has in mind when he suggests that it is only possible “in a concept.” Such a unity is always mediate, through some common ground. Also the notion of the (intellectual) synthesis of recognition suggests this. Moreover, consider what is said about understanding in the lectures: “it thinks a many, i.e., parts, and connects these into a unity, i.e., to a whole, i.e., it thinks things through a concept.”

What we encounter in the egocentric space cannot be like that at all; we do not encounter ‘a many’ there. That is something we cannot see or hear. As Kant puts it in his notes:

---

434 A91/B123: “Erscheinungen würden nichts destoweniger unserer Anschauung Gegenstände darbieten, denn die Anschauung bedarf der Funktionen des Denkens auf keine Weise.”

435 B145: “das Mannigfaltige für die Anschauung noch vor der Synthesis des Verstandes und unabhängig von ihr gegeben sein müsse.”

436 R 3636, 17:620 (1772–73): “Man kann etwas Anschauen, ohne etwas dabey oder darunter zu denken.” See also A49/B67; B132.

437 A68/B93: “die Einheit der Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen.” (My emphases.)


439 MK3 29:980: “er sich ein vieles, d. i. Theile denkt, und diese zu einer Einheit d. i. zu einem Ganzen verbindet, d. i. sich die Dinge durch einen Begriff denkt.”
One cannot be immediately conscious of the intuition of something composite as such.\textsuperscript{440}  

In the representation of the composite the composition is always our own work.\textsuperscript{441}

Still, we do encounter many things there (or rather, wherever we are, as otherwise we would not really be anywhere). We intuit those things. In so doing, we represent continuous wholes and episodes. Not a single one of them is ‘a many’ more than ‘a composite.’ But this is not to say that we cannot perceive them without representing them as composites. Quite the contrary, it only means that we can represent them as such through thought by taking as our ground of cognition the concept of many.\textsuperscript{442}

In other words, then we represent what we perceive in (or through) a concept, which would in this case be ultimately the category of Quantity.

We should also notice that Kant does not reserve the term Einheit exclusively to conceptual unities. There is unity of intuition (Einheit der Anschauung), too. In the Jäsche Logic, this contrasts with the unity in the concept, and is said to lie not with understanding, but “with the senses.”\textsuperscript{443} This confirms that not all unity is that of understanding. The context in question (perfection of cognition) does not really help us here, though. Fortunately, what Kant says of such unities in the first edition Critique is more informative for our purposes:

Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis.\textsuperscript{444}

Earlier, when we gave an initial analysis of the synthesis of apprehension, it seemed that this synthesis makes perception itself possible because perception (as we pointed out back then) involves representating composites.\textsuperscript{445} Thus it may seem that we cannot have particulars (understood as

\textsuperscript{440} R 6360, 18:689 (1797): “Man kann sich nicht der Anschauung eines Zusammengesetzten als eines solchen unmittelbar [...] bewusst werden.” See also Br 11:347–348.

\textsuperscript{441} R 6314, 18:616 (1790–91): “Die Zusammensetzung ist in der Vorstellung des Zusammengesetzten immer blos unser eigenes Werk.”

\textsuperscript{442} Indeed, as Kant points out in the first Critique, composition (Zusammenhang) as such is not a thought (A358).

\textsuperscript{443} LJ 9:39: “bei den Sinnen[.]” See also KU § 27, 5:258.

\textsuperscript{444} A99: “Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes), so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung derselben nothwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne, weil sie gerade zu auf die Anschauung gerichtet ist, die zwar ein Mannigfaltiges darbietet, dieses aber als ein solches und zwar in einer Vorstellung enthalten niemals ohne eine dabei vorkommende Synthesis bewirken kann.”

\textsuperscript{445} See section 4.2.
The Mind as Synthesizer

preconceptual wholes) immediately intuited because those particulars themselves are composites. If this is so, then to have a perception of a thing requires building up a whole representation out of simpler elements that collectively make a perceptual whole. This, in turn, makes perception appear as an action imposed on the given because the composition itself cannot be given or perceived directly, as Kant’s notes suggest.

Certainly, the apprehensive synthesis aims at composition (with the help of reproduction). But there is more to the picture. To begin with, in the previously quoted passage, as I read it, Kant is not in fact speaking of intuitions as such, but of intuitions to be taken as manifolds. Intuiting as such, as wholly determinate singular representing, could not even be a representation of a manifold as a manifold.

This is not to say that intuitions do not come with a manifold. On the contrary, “the intuition […] to be sure provides a manifold.” The crucial factor is that intuiting, by itself, is but a manner of particularizing which takes wholes as its objects. Thus Kant must speak of representing the intuition as a manifold in the passage. Similarly in the notes we quoted the point must be that the representation of composition comes from ourselves. Certainly that cannot come directly from perception. It does not follow from this, however, that we cannot be immediately aware of composite things in perception. It only follows that in mere perception we do not represent them as composites. The same must apply to perceptual unity or composition (Zusammensetzung). That is, there is no reason to expect that it requires representing anything as composed either. Only the higher stance on the unity (as described earlier) would require that.

When we introduced the synthesis of apprehension, we used a bridge as our example. The idea was that a whole (bridge) was composed out of simpler elements (rails, deck, beams) taken together and as belonging to the whole. As we saw, this depends on intuition and imagination. Indeed, the most fundamental preconditions of representing that must be the forms of sensibility, also known as the “forms for the composition of the manifold in a sensible intuition.” However, we did not yet ask the million dollar question what kinds of representations those simpler elements are. While we made things easy earlier, the answer is anything but obvious. This is especially so if one chooses another example, say, a black spot on a white background. What would the composition amount to in this case? Does the making of a background-foreground distinction count as one? Or is it that we have to

446 See A164/B204; A358. See also MK3 29:984, where the perception of objects is distinguished from the perception of the composition of objects, the point being that the latter is impossible. But of course this is not to say that it is impossible to merely perceive anything complex, but that the composition itself – as a representation of something complex – cannot be directly perceived.
compose the spot itself out of successive impressions? If so, the operation would not only be lightning fast, but would indicate subpersonal processing of information, certainly not perception.

If the individual impressions involved in such a composition were perceptions themselves, they would have to be perceptual atoms that collectively make the perception proper. This, however, can be refuted off-hand because there is no place for “petite” or “minute” perceptions in the Kantian model. Thus either we interpret the synthesis of apprehension as subconscious processing of sensory information that allows us to have perceptions, but in respect of which the latter (the end-products themselves) are explanatorily neutral, and leave it that. Or we take it that the composition in question requires that some kind of building blocks are in fact available to the conscious subject. If they cannot be unconscious perceptual atoms, they must be spatiotemporally organized particulars given in intuition.

In the former reading, there is much to speculate but little to verify from the armchair. Latter reading can be backed up with concrete examples. Recall the bridge. First one apprehended a rail, then another, and while keeping these in mind one carried on to the deck, and finally to the beams. Now there was a composition of a manifold. However, there had to be something given besides just the sensory input. Indeed, not only was there a manifold all along, but also particulars which collectively instantiate this another particular known as the bridge when grasped that way. The apprehension could have gone to another direction, but the end-product would have been the same as long as the same particulars were used in the process. If not, the chances are that no bridge was in fact represented (similarly in the spot case, one might have managed to perceive the spot, spot-and-the-background, just the background, or nothing at all).

To put it in short, the synthesis in question aims to produce a unified complex out of perceptually presented particulars. It does not follow from this, however, that this synthesis is the precondition of all kind of perceptual success. Notice, for example, when Kant explicates in the second edition Critique that the possibility of simultaneity requires that the synthesis of apprehension is indifferent as to the order of things. While this is somewhat irrelevant to our current topic, Kant’s example is most revealing. Not only can the synthesis go either from A to E or from E to A, but the text suggests that these A’s and E’s are perceptions themselves, and indeed perceptions of things.

448 According to Leibniz, these unconscious partial perceptions make together the perceptions proper of which we are aware (see his New Essays on Human Understanding, passim but especially the Preface, AG 295–299). Such entities cannot belong to Kant’s notion of perception at least for two reasons. Firstly, as we have seen, for Kant perception is conscious empirical representation, which rules out by definition any unconscious representations as perceptions in his model. Secondly, if one means by minute perceptions obscure sensations, they would still not be perceptions – nor would they belong to philosophy, but rather to physiological anthropology (see the end of the section 5.3.).


450 A211/B258.
Accordingly, apprehension begins from a perception of something. Needless to say, the rail of the bridge could be A, B one of its beams, and so forth. In other words, these A’s and B’s are there already at the apprehender’s disposal. The synthesis of apprehension does not create them; it creates something out of them. Most importantly, it is not the constitutive factor of particularizing.

Since perceptions are conscious representations and spatially modified when they have outer objects as their relata, they are outer intuitions at the same time. Thus we could also say that the synthesis of apprehension consists of intuitings. Apprehension takes place in intuition, after all.\textsuperscript{451} Indeed, the explication of apprehensive synthesis as “the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible” emphasizes that to become conscious of the composition requires successive apprehension. In other words, it does not take a stand on the possibility of perception in the first place, but on having a perception of something that is represented to consist of parts (even if not as consisting of determinate parts; unless thinking enters the picture, that is). This something is what it is because it is represented to consist of those and not any other parts, depending on how the manifold in question is being grasped.

In a single moment, there cannot be apprehension. The consequence of this, however, is not the lack of representation (just like the lack of “grasping-together” does not indicate the lack of particularizing), but the lack of the complexity of representation. This is suggested in the passage the latter part of which we have quoted already:

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness[].\textsuperscript{452}

In fact, all that Kant claims here (with the emphasis on temporality and all) is that each and every intuition can be taken as a manifold because every intuition can be “run through” (\textit{Durchlaufen}). Only then can there be the representation of the manifoldness “to take together” (\textit{Zusammennehmung}).

\textsuperscript{451} A97.

\textsuperscript{452} A99: "Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit in der Folge der Eindrücke auf einander unterschiede: denn als in einem \textit{Augenblick} enthalten kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes), so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben nothwendig[.]") \textit{Augenblick} suggests that Kant speaks in mental terms all along – i.e., ‘moment’ is not a theoretical term here.
Not only is the synthesis of apprehension “aimed directly at the intuition,” but apprehension itself is dubbed by Kant as an “action exercised immediately upon perceptions.” If we are to be conscious of any such exercise, the target has to be something concrete for us (not to mention that perceptions are conscious representations basically by definition). What could that target be, one may ask again, but a spatiotemporally presented particular? It must be something representable as a manifold, but nothing can be represented as such unless it is first run through and then taken together. More generally, this suggests that there must be an underlying structure on which the “grasping-together” depends. The manifold is not a chaos or perceptual mess. In fact, if it were that, the synthesis of apprehension could not succeed because it could not begin. Again, the lesson is that the apprehender must have individual objects of perception at his or her disposal. If there were no such things available, there would be regress, and the apprehending could not get a grip of anything. Again, it simply could not begin.

Here we may consider an example from the third Critique involving “looking at the changing shapes of a fire in a hearth.” While the topic itself (imagination sustaining a free play when charmed by beautiful views of objects) can be skipped, it is important to notice how Kant describes the fire in the hearth. He refers to it as a “manifold which strikes the eye.” The formulation is revealing: the manifold simply introduces itself to the watcher. Not only does this indicate the possibility of “aimless” apprehension (which may have aesthetic significance), but implies how the sensible manifoldness takes place within one and the same intuition: it is the fire that is being intuited, not its manifoldness as such. This suggests that an object of perception can provide content that is irrespective of the variations in the manifold it comes with. This kind of content would be the one that accounts for the singling out of an object (here, the fire). All the changes “inside” that content would be up to sensations and their constant flux.

In other words, intuitions are not only manifolds (not that they are represented as such through mere intuition, though), but they can be quite independent of the specifics of the sensible content as a whole. To stick with the hearth example, it does not matter in which configuration of all the possible ones the fire is in when we intuit it. We may particularize that thing regardless of such details. Also from this we may conclude that particularizing does not need to involve “running through” more than it needs to involve “grasping-together.” The relation between the three is, to be sure, necessary for

---

453 A120: “deren unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeübte Handlung ich Apprehension nenne.” (My emphasis.)
454 KU 5:243: “Anblick der veränderlichen Gestalten eines Kaminfeuers[.]”
455 KU 5:243: “Mannigfaltigkeit, auf die das Auge stößt[.]”
higher cognitive achievements, but not for perception in its most primitive form as particular provider, which would also be its most fundamental function.\textsuperscript{457}

We may conclude that objects, as given, must be preconceptual particular wholes. These should be seen as the perceptual primitives in the Kantian model. One should just not be fooled to take them as ready-made building blocks in the concrete sense of the word. It is the very possibility of \textit{representing} and \textit{perceiving} (with an extra emphasis on the ‘-ings’) individual things which is the primitive factor here.

\section{4.7. On Cognition}

\subsection{4.7.1. Intuitions and Concepts}

A way to challenge what we have established so far is to claim that we cannot have \textit{cognition} without concepts. That is, even if particularizing and representing perceptual unities is granted to be possible without concepts, it cannot bear any cognitive significance unless brought under or guided by understanding through its general representations.\textsuperscript{458} In other words, a mere perceptual representation of a particular, or a wholly perceptual “grasping-together,” could be claimed to be either arbitrary, meaningless, or “in vain”\textsuperscript{459} without the functions of understanding.

To a certain extent this must be true. To know what one perceives (what it is, what it is like, how it relates to other things, and so forth) requires representing the thing under a bigger scheme of things, or at least through some general features, which would be impossible without concepts. Textually speaking, it is a plain fact that in some places Kant takes the concept-requirement of cognition very strictly. “All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be,”\textsuperscript{460} he writes in the first edition \textit{Critique}. Not only does this indicate the necessity of concepts for cognition, but points out how the concept in question does not need to be fully worked out, or precisely determined, by the cognizer. So, just as we should expect only so many things from perception, we should not expect too much from concept-use either.

In faculty-talk the claim goes that cognition requires spontaneity. However, since mere concepts lack objective reality and concrete use, the more precise way to put it would be that sensibility and understanding must operate together for cognition. Indeed, as Kant also puts it,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{457} Kant comes close to explicating perception this way in the introduction to the third \textit{Critique}, when he speaks of particulars \textit{offered} (darbietet) to understanding by perception (KU V, 5:186).
\item \textsuperscript{458} See Allison 2004, 164.
\item \textsuperscript{459} A103: “vergeblich[.]”
\item \textsuperscript{460} A106: “Alles Erkenntniss erfordert einen Begriff, dieser mag nun so unvollkommen oder so dunkel sein, wie er wolle[.]”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity.\textsuperscript{461}

This indicates quite explicitly that just like concepts are not cognitively significant without the representational element provided by sensibility, the latter functions cognitively only when supported by the representational element provided through understanding. In terms of representations, and also as it is most famously put by Kant:

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.\textsuperscript{462}

Or in a somewhat more explanatory manner:

Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition.\textsuperscript{463}

In short, both intuitions and concepts are required for cognition. Together and only together they make the representational components of human cognition.

Given our set of questions, the issue is whether there is any sense to take concept-independent perception as cognition, or at least in some sense cognitively relevant or meaningful. In scholarly terms it is all about how the famous “togetherness principle”\textsuperscript{464} ought to be interpreted. Is it really valid as it stands or is there more to the picture?

That there is more to it should be plain. Recall from above that we referred to intuition as a kind of cognition. That was a valid thing to do. According to the Stufenleiter, cognition can be either an intuition or a concept.\textsuperscript{465} There are similar formulations in Kant’s lectures on logic.\textsuperscript{466} Given the principle that intuitions and concepts cannot be cognitions independently of each other, there must then be either a contradiction in the Critique (and in any other text that suggests otherwise) or the principle is not as straightforward as it appears.

One thing that the principle does not refute is the possibility of the presence of particulars without concepts. If such presence is claimed to be cognitively insignificant on its own, we should ask in what sense it is so. Certainly, it cannot amount to a full-blown thought; but in some cases it must

\textsuperscript{461} A97: “die Receptivität kann nur mit Spontaneität verbunden Erkenntnisse möglich machen.”
\textsuperscript{462} A51/B75: “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.”
\textsuperscript{463} A50/B74: “Anschauung und Begriffe machen also die Elemente aller unserer Erkenntnisse aus, so daß weder Begriffe ohne ihnen auf einige Art entsprechende Anschauung, noch Anschauung ohne Begriffe ein Erkenntnisse abgeben können.”
\textsuperscript{464} Hanna 2005, 255.
\textsuperscript{465} A320/B376–377.
\textsuperscript{466} LW 24:805–806; LJ 9:36, 91.
also differ drastically from a mere feeling. Recall the following three distinctions: feeling-cognition, subjective-objective sensation, and subjective-objective perception.\textsuperscript{467} Although feelings are of zero value cognitively speaking, the same cannot be said of perceptions that are based on objective sensations. As we saw, the latter are subjective in the sense of being necessarily dependent on the constitution of the subject, but objective in the sense of having contents that imply reference beyond themselves. In fact, we could go as far as claiming that they have the capacity to \emph{force} or at least \emph{inevitably suggest} an object of outer perception. Not only is this something that feelings cannot do, but this indicates that there is built-in cognitive value to such perceptions. The sensation in question was called \emph{Erkenntnissstück}, after all.

Any such piece of cognition reflects the givenness in perceptual encounter of things in egocentric space. Concepts cannot account for that. Indeed, what kind of a concept could establish that? As we have seen, at least not an empirical one. Would it be, then, Unity, Totality, Reality, or Substance, or all these together, perhaps? I think not. Substance implies predication of properties. We do not need that in order to see, say, a red ball on a snooker table. We need that in order to think the ball as red (or more generally, to think of something persisting as having certain accidents, which is ultimately a temporal determination). Reality suffers a similar fate. We would need that to establish that there is an existing object with a certain quality that comes in degrees as any other quality would. To see the ball is only to entertain certain spatially fixed external sensations, or \textquoteleft{}something real in space.\textquoteright{} It is, to be sure, representable under Unity (say, as a manifestation of a certain magnitude). But it is also representable under Totality (say, as a bunch of a certain amount of polymers). Neither establishes \emph{that thing there}, however; that task is reserved for intuition. The two concepts under Quantity only allow that spatiotemporal particular to be thought as being of a certain kind quantitatively speaking.

Moreover, in a single moment of thinking, the two thoughts are mutually exclusive ways of representing. This reflects the basic idea that each category is a possible way to think of an object. There is freedom to this.\textsuperscript{468} One may choose to represent the ball first as a totality, then as a unity. In perception, on the other hand, nothing is represented as a unity (or as one) or totality (or as many). Nor is there any choosing to do (except in the trivial sense that one can look at another direction, focus on some detail, and so forth). The perceiver either successfully particularizes something or not. If this cannot be properly done in one glance, he or she must do some \textquoteleft{}grasping-together.\textquoteright{} But here, too, nothing indicates that it would necessarily require representing anything \textit{as} or \textit{under} anything.

Certainly, one could well claim that cognition requires a strive for establishing the order of things in the manner just described with the help of the pure concepts of understanding. However, that

\textsuperscript{467} See section 3.1.

\textsuperscript{468} See P 4:290; Butchvarov 2002, 300.
would be a mere stipulation. What one really claims is that this is what we should mean by ‘cognition.’ One could also emphasize the choice involved, and insist that simply registering non-conceptually whatever there is to register cannot count as cognition because in that case the subject cannot really understand any of it. As Kant puts it in the lectures, “without understanding we would have no concepts, and we would gape at everything.”\footnote{MM 29:762: “ohne Verstand würden wir keine Begriffe haben und alles würden wir anstaunen.”} This is a good point, but there are reservations to any such claim. For example, it makes a huge difference whether one means an imaginary scenario in which we do not possess the intellectual faculty at all (and thus never had any concepts whatsoever) or the more (or, in fact, the very) realistic scenario in which we do have concepts, but also the possibility of not always applying them. Kant makes his point about gaping at everything, quite clearly, with the former possibility in mind.

One way to put the issue is the following. It is one thing to have knowledge of objects, and require that for cognition, and quite another thing to have representations of macroscopic objects that can be perceived and manipulated in one’s environment, and take that as a kind of cognition as well (and thus not as mere registration of sensory information). In terms of Kant interpretations, the general question would be what Kant’s model is supposed to establish, and on what terms. Basically, one can take it as explaining understanding as a processing unit that has the kind of sensory information as its working material which is totally unavailable to the subject,\footnote{Falkenstein 1995, 77.} or one can take as its starting point spatiotemporal particulars present to the subject.\footnote{Allais 2009, 412; Hanna 2005, 282.} Were the former the case, then every possible mental undertaking, primitive perception included, would be a byproduct of the application of the functions of understanding. As should be obvious by now, I am supporting the opposite view.

We have already provided arguments and textual evidence against the former view. Perhaps the most important of them is that apprehension must begin from a perception of some particular or another. In other words, apprehension, which indicates the most primitive variety of synthesis, by no means accounts for the presence of perceptual particulars in the first place, but is based on particularizing per se, the most fundamental function of perception. Whatever underlying processes are involved in this, and whatever it is that they involve, are beyond the topic.\footnote{We will have a little bit more to say on these matters in sections 4.8. and 5.5., though.} Briefly put, Kant’s account, as developed under the name of transcendental philosophy, must begin with given particulars.

This ultimate starting point can be used to illustrate Kant’s view of cognition, too. Let us begin with what is nowadays called animal cognition (from which we will gradually move towards human cognition). Also Kant could talk of such a topic, as he takes creatures totally lacking in intellectual
capacities to be perfectly capable of some kind of cognition of objects. Here, we may consider this short remark from the Vienna Logic:

For animals also cognize their master, but they are not conscious of this. ⁴⁷³

Although the point is as simple as it can be, it brings along a critical blow to any such reading that takes macroscopic objects of perception necessarily as products of intellectual processing. A similar example can be found from the Jäsche Logic:

Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them. ⁴⁷⁴

Interestingly, this time Kant uses not the verb ‘erkennen’ but ‘kennen’ to describe the cognitive situation of animals. Whatever can be made of this distinction, this much is nevertheless certain, and shared by both quotes: that the animal has got an object and thereby participates in object perception. ⁴⁷⁵

A circle closes. What we have here is an indication of the idea (which I take to be fully Kantian) that the wholly sensible representational capacities of animals must involve the same kind of particular providing function as ours. What is more, it is not that we human beings go through our perceptual lives as creatures who constantly conceptualize (judge, subsume, represent through marks, categorize). Quite the contrary, we cope with our environment simply by perceiving and manipulating macroscopic objects (among which we constantly orient ourselves) like any other animal equipped with representational capacities would.

In the lectures we find other instances of ‘cognition’ that cannot meet up the demands of the notion as it is used elsewhere. In the Jäsche Logic, for example, Kant presents degrees of cognition according to “the objective content of our cognition in general.” ⁴⁷⁶ Of these, cognizing “something through the understanding by means of concepts” ⁴⁷⁷ is preceded by lesser modes of cognition. Accordingly, ‘to cognize’ can mean not only concipere, but also percipere, noscere, and cognoscere (to use the Latin equivalents). ⁴⁷⁸ The point is, these three are inherently non-conceptual modes of cognition.

⁴⁷³ LW 24:846: “Denn Thiere erkennen auch ihren Herrn aber sind sich deßen nicht bewußt.”
⁴⁷⁴ LJ 9:65: “Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie nicht.”
⁴⁷⁶ LJ 9:64: “des objectiven Gehaltes unserer Erkenntniss überhaupt[,]” (My emphasis.)
⁴⁷⁷ LJ 9:65: “durch den Verstand vermöge der Begriffe erkennen oder concipiren.” (Emphases omitted.)
⁴⁷⁸ LJ 9:64–65. In German, these are wahrnehmen, kennen, and erkennen. See also LW 24:845–846.
To press the point further, consider the way Kant brings up his concern that the notion of cognition is too limited in the handbook (G. F. Meier’s *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*) he used in his logic classes:

*To comprehend, i.e., to cognize through concepts, is what the author calls concipere. This is not very good, however. For we have no expression in German for comprehendere, i.e, to cognize through intuition [by apprehension].*

Indeed, Kant finds both Meier’s expressions and German language in general lacking because there is no proper term for apprehensive cognition through intuition (*durch die Anschauung per apprehensionem erkennen*). Not only does this indicate that Kant critically evaluated the views of the authors he consulted in his lectures, but also, and also more importantly, that a proper theory of human cognition must account for cognizing that is *not* through concepts.

There are two major conclusions to be drawn from all this. The first is a terminological one: there are primitive perceptual undertakings that can be put under ‘cognition’ although they are unsuitable for ‘cognition’ in the stricter sense. The second concerns the (in)famous principle: it cannot hold universally that there is cognition only through intuition and concept. Instead, the principle must refer to a special case of cognition.

Once again, it is all up to the context. And this time Kant is explicit on this at least at one point, namely early on in the Analytic:

*Synthesis in general is [...] the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we could have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.*

---

479 LW 24:845: “Begreiffen, d. i. durch Begriffe erkennen nennt der autor concipere. Dies ist aber nicht sehr gut. Denn wir haben für comprehendere d. i. durch die Anschauung per apprehensionem erkennen, im Deutschen keinen Ausdruck.” The fact that Kant uses comprehendere for intuitive cognition, and blames Meier for using begreiffen for conceptual cognition at the same time, suggests not only that the two are easily – and wrongly – mixed up, but that begreiffen is ambiguous, too. In section 4.5., we touched upon this with the notion of aesthetic comprehension (see especially footnote 372). As to translation, for some reason The Cambridge Edition misses completely the quite informative *per apprehensionem.*

480 A78/B103: “Die Synthesis überhaupt ist [...] die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft, einer blinden, obgleich unentbehrlichen Function der Seele, ohne die wir überall gar keine Erkenntniß haben würden, der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewußt sind. Allein diese Synthesis auf Begriffe zu bringen, das ist eine Function, die dem Verstande zukommt, und wodurch er uns allerkurst die Erkenntniß in eigentlicher Bedeutung verschafft.” (The last emphases are mine.) See also KU § 90, 5:466, where Kant adds that he is speaking of cognition in the specific sense of enlarging of concept (*als Erweiterung des Begriffs*).
What seems to be a mere side note in its original context is both extremely revealing and important for us, as it shows that Kant explicates cognition in one sense in the Analytic.

After recognizing this, it begins to make sense why Kant can elsewhere speak of a person cognizing a house through mere intuition. That is one way to cognize an object (die Art, wie wir den Gegenstand erkennen). Indeed, it should be noticed that Kant does not refer to a way of thinking in this case because the “savage” only intuits the house. Thinking of the house would require concepts or, more specifically, thinking of the object through a predicate.\textsuperscript{481} Obviously, that cannot take place in mere intuition.

The contextual variation of ‘cognition’ also makes it easy to understand why Kant sometimes holds on to the view that not all thinking is cognition, and sometimes speaks even of ideas as belonging to cognition (and of reason as a faculty of cognition).\textsuperscript{482} The first point is made in the context the purpose of which is to establish (at least partly) the bounds of experience. When looked from this stance, cognitively functioning concepts must be denied, first of all, the possibility of being empty. In that context, only thought with content provided through intuition counts; only such contentful thought is cognition “in the proper sense.” In the latter context, on the other hand, a concept of reason that cannot find a match in intuition is still some kind of cognitive product, even if only a mere thought.

After this, it should not be that difficult to see that all three are not only ways of representing, but kinds of cognitive undertakings: (1) through intuition, (2) through intuition and concept, and (3) through concept. It is just that the mode of cognition Kant is concerned with in the Analytic would be the one which calls for both intuitions and concepts (and also bringing the synthesis to concepts). And this, it should be underscored, leaves plenty of room for perceptual cognition the requirements of which need not satisfy the requirements of that famous dictum.

4.7.2. Blindness of Intuitions

What does Kant mean by claiming that intuitions without concepts are blind, then? He cannot mean that they are simply nothing by themselves.\textsuperscript{483} None of the previous examples suggests that. To this

\textsuperscript{481} See e.g. R 6350, 18:677 (1796–98).
\textsuperscript{482} B146; A702/B730; MM 29:875. See also A151/B191, where Kant speaks of analytic cognition in contrast to synthetic cognition; A789/B817, where he refers to kinds of cognition; and A795, 816/B823, 844, where he asserts that there are cognitions of pure reason as well.
\textsuperscript{483} Or “bogus” or “meaningless” (Hanna 2005, 257). In the Critique, a passage that suggests “nothingness” can be found on p. A111. However, there the claim seems to be just that totally unlawful appearances would be unthinkable and thus nothing for us, not that mere intuitions are nothing for us unless actually brought under concepts.
we could add that appearing is not dependent on thinking. Actually, this is all we need to remark to come close to what Kant must have in mind: that there is, when examined from a certain point of view, something relevant missing from such intuitions, not that such intuitions are impossible. The point can be tellingly captured by quoting the sentence that follows the most famous expression of the famous dictum in the Critique:

It is […] just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).\textsuperscript{484}

In short, blind intuitions are not understood by the subject. And if something is not understood, it cannot be cognition as required by the stipulative proper sense of the term. In other words, such non-understood intuitions are not judged upon.\textsuperscript{485} Indeed, how could they if they are not brought under concepts? However, since the lesser modes of cognition introduced in the previous section cannot be literally blind, Kant must only mean by this that in such cases the subject cannot (or does not, for some reason) establish what is it that he or she cognizes, how or on what grounds it differs from other things, or what it is for. In fact, this is what the classifications themselves suggest as they ascend to higher cognitive achievements (starting from intelligere, which is preceded by percipere, noscere, and cognoscere).\textsuperscript{486}

Hence the somewhat metaphorical expression ‘blind’ does not indicate perceptual blindness in any way: not only is the manifold there to be perceived, but also particularizing and apprehension can take place without any such higher modes of cognition. Instead, the expression suggests cognitive blindness under the further presupposition that we mean by ‘cognition’ something along the lines just described. Basically, shedding light on this kind of cognitive blindness requires that we make our mental contents clear to ourselves, at least to some extent. Now, that requires both representational elements, as it is only then that we can obtain knowledge of objects and really understand whatever it is that we are representing. But this is not to say that we cannot represent and perceive in the absence of such knowledge.\textsuperscript{487}

\textsuperscript{484} A51/B75: “Daher ist es eben so nothwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen (d.i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen), als seine Anschauungen sich \textit{verständlich} zu machen (d.i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).” (My emphasis.)

\textsuperscript{485} Grüne 2009, 31–32.

\textsuperscript{486} LW 24:846; LJ 9:65.

\textsuperscript{487} It is common to read too much into cognitive blindness. For example, as it is put in Falkenstein 1995, 222: “The \textit{Critique} holds that intuitions that have not been processed into intellectual representations cannot be known by us.” (My emphases.) While this is true in the sense that one cannot have reflective stance on one’s intuitions without concepts, it also blurs Kant’s notion of cognition by forcing an epistemic flavor to it – assuming that ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognition’ are replaceable here. One could also criticize this account for blurring the notion of intuition by having it turned into an intellectual representation. Human intuition is never
Let me concretize this by an example. I am throwing a ball with a friend. A ball is thrown at me. I catch it. I throw it back. This goes on and on. But we are also speaking politics. Quite trivially, having a conversation requires entertaining all kinds of thoughts through all kinds of concepts. At the same time, however, we successfully cope with the ball by means of perception and bodily orientation. In so doing, we do not have to think of it. Actually, that might have a negative effect on throwing and catching, not to mention that now our thoughts are occupied elsewhere. In this sense, we do not cognize or have any knowledge of the ball. Yet, in another sense, we manage to cognize the ball-object because we are both perceptually aware of it and able to manipulate it in a proper way. Again, the lack of thought of something does not indicate the lack of perceptual representation of that something.

Presumably, those who take Kant to mean that understanding is basically a processor of sensory information under the guidance of conceptual capacities would object to this that to have the ball represented even in this minimal sense requires intellectual synthesis. But now recall that the ball is, in fact, “blinded” in this case, as its intuition is not made “understandable” (brought under concepts). What could this mean but that the understanding is not really present at all in our dealings with things in such situations? While this may sound odd, the oddity dissolves when we take understanding in the technical sense as a special feature of the mind alongside with sensibility and imagination. As I see it, there is nothing strange in this; in fact, everything so far suggests that this must be the correct reading of Kant in the majority of contexts.

Reconsider the way Kant explicates synthesis early on in the Analytic. He states that synthesis is generally speaking a “mere effect of the imagination.” This suggests that imagination can evoke synthesizing operations of the mind also by itself, independently of understanding. Indeed, as such, it is stated to be “blind” just like non-understood intuition (except that now Kant speaks of functions or operations instead of representations). Since Kant puts it explicitly that understanding only comes into play when the synthesis is brought “to concepts,” we may conclude that to bring the synthesis to concepts means that the synthesis is made understandable in a similar fashion as intuitions when these are brought under concepts. However, given our perceptual viewpoint, we should not rush from this to remark that only then can there be “cognition in the proper sense.” Instead, it must be emphasized that there can be synthesis going on independently of this more sophisticated manner of cognition.

Moreover, what we really cognize in everyday perception are things, not intuitions. Animals do that, too. It is just that they cannot take their intuitions as objects of thought. In this sense objects remain unknown to them.

See e.g. Falkenstein 1995, 224–225, 243.

Cf. MM 29:923, where Kant speaks of chance as blind accident, or as something that cannot provide sufficient ground for understanding why and what for it took place. See also ML1 28:199.
Moreover, at this point in the *Critique* Kant has already stated that the “blind though indispensable function of the soul” known as imagination is the fundamental prerequisite of cognition. As this precedes the remark on “cognition in the proper sense,” there is a good reason to think that there Kant does not yet mean cognition in the more demanding sense. If so, he must refer to it as he speaks of it elsewhere, namely, in that same sense that we have been after in this and in the previous section. In all, this strengthens the implication that whatever the mind’s role is in the lesser modes of cognition, these do not have to involve intellectual synthesis. Hence not all synthesis (or connection) is up to understanding.

The conclusion finds further support from a seemingly small point in Kant’s explication of blind imagination. Notice how Kant speaks of the “function of the soul.” That is, he refers to the mind as a whole, not to understanding. The latter is needed for bringing the function to concepts, not for synthesis in general. This, too, underscores the diversity of the notion of synthesis. Another telling example is the generation (Erzeugung) of time, which would be something that can be made representable through the schema of magnitude. Yet it is already a synthesis.\(^{(490)}\) Indeed, the generation of time is presumably one of those mere effects of imagination that often simply take place. As such, it is something we do not (have to) bring to concepts; unless we are thinking of time, or something that requires representing a succession, that is. However, that would already be more than just being aware of the generation (or flow) of time in the more primitive sense. The passage we have been focusing on verifies this. The remark that “we are seldom […] conscious” of the synthesis refers to synthesis in general, not to synthesis that has been brought to concepts. In short, this implies that it is possible to be aware of the mere effects of imagination, which is not that different from claiming that it is possible to be aware of objects given through blind intuition.

In a similar vein, Kant must mean that the spatial configurations of objects simply generate in perception through imagination, as the subject examines the objects from different angles, measures them by eye,\(^{(491)}\) and so forth. Since this generation comes necessarily in spatiotemporal form, independently of whatever additional cognitive maneuvers the subject makes, it can be claimed to be valid of all appearances. In fact, this is what Kant must mean when he asserts of space and time that “the synthesis in them has objective validity.”\(^{(492)}\) That is, there is no need for *intellectual* synthesis to achieve that; the mere effect of the imagination taking place under the restrictions of sensibility must be quite enough. Indeed, otherwise perceptual objects would get their necessary spatiotemporal form only when conceptualized, which would be absurd given Kant’s insistence that intuition is prior to concepts.

\(^{(490)}\) A145/B184.
\(^{(491)}\) See KU § 26, 5:251, and the section 6.4.2. of this study.
\(^{(492)}\) A89/B122: “die Synthesis in denselben hat objective Gültigkeit.”
Here, we may also consider the following characterization of the conditions of cognition (in the proper sense, one could add):

The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the **manifold** of pure intuition; the **synthesis** of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yet yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis **unity**, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.  

Although there is quite a lot to this passage, let us only point out the reference to “an object that comes before us.” That is, whatever yielding a cognition (again, in the proper sense of the term) is supposed to include, there is nevertheless an object that presents itself. As such, it must be “blind” only in a very special sense of the term.

A further thing to notice is the usual order of explanation in contexts where the famous principle is at the center. What Kant really aims to establish is that “sense and significance” must come from intuitions, not the other way around. In other words, concepts void of **content** (Inhalt) make the real issue when one is criticizing speculative metaphysics, as the whole point is to show that concepts can become “serviceable for experiential use” only by hooking (hängen) them onto sensible representations. The lesson to be drawn is that concepts that cannot find examples from some possible experience cannot be used to establish anything about the world of experience.

Indeed, given the project of showing the bounds of experience, and the analysis of cognition in the demanding sense of the notion, intuitions being blind without concepts begins to appear as the more trivial claim of the two in its original context. In the end, the cognitive relevance is that of concepts, as it all comes down to the possibility of enlarging and amplifying them through synthetic judgments. That would be something which can be achieved no more through mere analysis nor through mere intuition. In the former case, the link to experiential circumstances would be missing. In the latter, there would be no concepts at all, in which case it would be absurd to even ask whether they are empty or not. So, only one option remains: the two taken together.

---

493 A78–79/B104: “Das erste, was uns zum Behuf der Erkenntniß aller Gegenstände a priori gegeben sein muß, ist das Mannigfaltige der reinen Anschauung; die Synthese dieses Mannigfaltigen durch die Einbildungskraft ist das zweite, giebt aber noch keine Erkenntniß. Die Begriffe, welche dieser reinen Synthesis Einheit geben und lediglich in der Vorstellung dieser nothwendigen synthetischen Einheit bestehen, thun das dritte zum Erkenntnisse eines vorkommenden Gegenstandes und beruhen auf dem Verstande.” Indeed, the verb ‘vorkommen’ suggests not only presentness and instantiation, but also independency of the three-step process described.

494 B149: “Sinn und Bedeutung[,]” Exactly the same expression is used in WDO 8:133.

495 WDO 8:133: “zum Erfahrungsgebrauche tauglich zu machen.”

496 See ÜE 8:189.
An alternative way to put this is that it is only through the two that we can determine an experiential object. Nothing can be determined through mere analysis because then only concepts are being clarified (for which no experiential object is needed, nor is the possibility of one shown). Blind intuitions, on the other hand, are called blind because their referents are not thought or determined conceptually. The animal did not think of its master. The “savage” could not manage to determine the house “as a dwelling established for men” because he managed to intuit it only.

As it is put in the *Critique*, cognitions (in the proper sense) “consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object.” But here determining implies that something is not only thought, but thought through a predicate. This involves judging. Accordingly, the subject of a judgment is the determinable (which would also be the object of thought). This can be said to contain the predicates through which it is determined. For example, a rectangle “contains” four-sidedness as one of its predicates. To think it as four-sided not only determines it accordingly, but it is determinable this particular way only because it is what it is. However, nothing indicates that perception per se would require representing any such determinate relations to (or in or between) objects. Perceptually speaking, what we refer to as rectangular is but a certain spatial configuration with its unique thisness, not a subject-predicate structure realized through the relevant thought. In other words, in merely perceiving the thing it is all about what our senses teach us.

Indeed, it cannot be the case that we have to predicate four-sidedness to the figure to perceive it in a rectangular manner. It is rather that we do not need to know anything at all about the thing to have it represented that way because it is not the case that we think it as rectangular. Instead, we see or feel it as rectangular (not as in ‘seeing-as’ which presupposes the concept, but in the minimal sense of having that particular kind of look presented to us). Here the mode of cognition would be intuition (through sensations). When the shape of the object is thought as rectangular (through predication), then the mode of cognition would be intuition and concept together. This would also be a mixture of particularizing and generalizing: we would have to abstract from the sensible features as such in order to get that which is universally present in the object, namely the very feature shared by all rectangular objects.

Certainly, it is only in the latter case that we refer to the object in the sense that we realize that this predicate, in fact, fits the thing. Thereby we might even end up thinking that all rectangular-shaped objects have necessarily four sides. Later we might realize that we saw only the top of a

---

497 B137: “Diese bestehen in der bestimmten Beziehung gegebener Vorstellungen auf ein Object.”
498 Cf. P § 13, 4:286.
499 Cf. Burge 2010, 36: “It is crucial that one not assume that perceiving something as such and such entails anything about conceiving or thinking of it as such and such.” Indeed, this is a good reminder also for anyone doing Kant scholarship.
500 Cf. A714/B742. Also recall the main function of schematization: to establish the possibility of taking as the ground of representation neither the individual thing nor the abstract concept as such.
rectangular-shaped body, and that three-dimensional rectangular shapes have more than four sides. The philosopher in us tells that the first inference was not valid, and we become more careful in establishing what kind of an object we are referring to. All this requires not only the interplay of intuitions and concepts, but several acts of judgments of several kinds.

Once again, however, we have glided away from perception, or from ourselves as perceivers. In other words, if we keep focusing on judgment, things are pushed towards full-fledged thought too soon. That rectangular-shaped body is also something that we necessarily relate ourselves to by particularizing the thing. To ask why we particularize that (instead of a complex consisting of a box and a barrel, for example) would be beside the point. In contemporary terms, that would be doing cognitive psychology. To ask why we see it as sharply rectangular (and not as slightly rounded, for example) would be a similar question.

The objection that mere particularizing does not yet count as genuine reference fares a little better. It does make sense to say that we establish reference only through judgments.\(^{501}\) Only then are we in a position to verify the reference (at least to some extent).\(^{502}\) But again there is something stipulative in this. As far as I know, Kant never says that we manage to refer only through judgments (which would also imply, wrongly I think, that reference requires representing things under some description or another). Quite the contrary, for Kant, Beziehung indicates a referential relation already at the level of sensibility.\(^{503}\) To intuit is to (constantly) relate oneself to things. It is just that it is, by itself, not only immediate but “blind” because it has not (yet) been reflected through concepts. However, it is not the case that there is then but a representational muddle, or nothing at all, as there can be well-established perceptual reference to that over there.

### 4.7.3. The So-called Discursivity Thesis

In the literature, the supposedly Kantian idea of the necessary interconnection of intuitions and concepts has been coined as the discursivity thesis.\(^{504}\) According to it, human cognition requires not only both representational elements, but is discursive because of this. However, according to what we

---

\(^{501}\) Cf. George 1981, 245.

\(^{502}\) Kant comes close to this idea in the so-called Dohna-Wundlacken Logic, when he suggests that cognition requires both intuition and concept but also – in the same breath – that objective reality is something we search for (suchen) (LD-W 24:752). This kind of activity implies, quite clearly, judging, and thus establishing and verifying the concept’s fit with intuition, which should not even be expected but of cognition “in the proper sense.” Still, there must be objects acting as targets for that.

\(^{503}\) For Kant’s explicit use of Beziehung or beziehen in this way, see e.g. A19/B33; B72; MK3 29:971–972. See also the editorial footnote to the Cambridge Edition of the first Critique on p. 156 regarding the difference between Verhältnis and Beziehung.

\(^{504}\) Allison 2004, 13.
have established thus far, the thesis can hold only of the cognition “in the proper sense.” This makes it misleading. In fact, it is that even in the latter case because such a cognition should be actually called both discursive and intuitive.

First, recall the key feature of discursive cognition: that it is based on shared features. More specifically, as it is put in the Jäsche Logic, “it takes place through representations which take as the ground of cognition that which is common to many things, hence through marks as such.” Then contrast this with the key feature of perception: to fix perceptual reference to spatiotemporal particulars. Everything so far indicates that this can take place immediately.\(^{505}\) Indeed, intuitions are just the kind of immediate representations that take as their ground of cognition that which is not common to many things.

Secondly, recall that Kant calls understanding discursive: he does not claim that human cognition is discursive as such, but that it is that from the side of understanding.\(^{506}\) This is further supported by Kant’s explications of thinking and conceptual cognition as discursive modes of cognition.\(^{507}\) Then contrast this with the other mode of cognition: through intuition by apprehension (durch die Anschauung per apprehensionem erkennen).\(^{508}\) Everything so far indicates that this does not necessarily involve concepts. In fact, as soon as we recognize that understanding in a technical sense must be meant, we can go as far as claiming that cognizing through intuition by apprehension does not even necessarily involve understanding; or, more precisely and perhaps less strikingly, its paradigmatic functions.\(^{509}\) All we need to accept is that not all our representings are thoughts (or genuine thoughts, or conceptualizations). As we have seen, this is no less than one of the cornerstones of the Kantian model.

When a representation is discursive, it is necessarily dependent on something else. This makes the representational capacity in question dependent as a whole. In the case of world-oriented thought, understanding is dependent (and thereby also limited) in two ways. Firstly, it is dependent on marks, as it can only fulfill its representational capacity through some general feature or another. Here, we may recall the two stones, the conceptual cognition of which had to be mediated through a common denominator such as hardness. Only then can there be (to borrow again one of Kant’s explications of

\(^{505}\) To be sure, perception can be claimed to be “mediate” in some sense in successive apprehension or perceptual “bringing-together” but even then the mediacy in question cannot be the kind of mediacy Kant means by discursivity (cf. Falkenstein 1995, 225).

\(^{506}\) As we have seen, this is how it is explicitly stated in the Jäsche Logic (LJ 9:58) but see also e.g. A68/B92–93, which clearly indicates that there is cognition both through intuition and concepts, after which Kant’s emphasis that the human understanding operates discursively through concepts should be read as indicating that this is how the whole representational mind operates on the part of understanding. More on this right below.

\(^{507}\) See A131/B170; MAN 4:484; LJ 9:91.

\(^{508}\) Kant suggests already in his inaugural dissertation that intuitive apprehending contrasts with discursive conceiving (ID § 10, 2:396).

\(^{509}\) Cf. EEKU, VIII 20:223. It is also possible to distinguish the conceptual or discursive understanding from the preconceptual or prediscursive understanding (Waxman 1991, 34, 80) which, I think, comes to the same thing.
concept) “the consciousness that [...] in multiple representations one and the same features are contained.” More generally, only then can the thinking subject really understand something about stones.

Secondly, understanding is dependent on sensible representations. However, it does not follow from this that we cannot perceptually represent, say, one of the stones, or even the set of two stones, without having the representation being mediated through some general feature (just like we can represent things through general features analytically without reference to intuition). Quite the contrary, although concepts make possible the cognition of the stone as a stone (through the concepts of hardness and Substance) and the representation of a complex of such objects (through the concepts of stone and Plurality), we do not need any of that for perceptual individuation. This is because it is not up to concepts to produce the object in sensibility. Also the claim that we sometimes do apply concepts in particularizing would be beside the point because concepts are not the necessary but contingent features here.

That we can represent things conceptually only under a set of features severely restricts thought content. We are as if doomed to give out descriptions without ever achieving a really good one. Think of describing a parking lot, for example. The more complicated description we aim for, the more difficult it gets. It might be easy to count the number of cars, but trying to achieve a total account of all the car colors and models, traffic signs, pavement, the way the parking boxes are painted, who went to which car at what time, and so forth, leads us eventually to despair, unless we simply settle with some good enough description.\footnote{510 It must be because of this that we operate with rather crudely determined concepts in our everyday lives. We determine them only so far as is useful for our daily routines, that is. Kant refers to this kind of conventionality involved in determination in the Jäsche Logic (LJ 9:97).}

As sensible, cognition is not limited in the same way. Even when we have gotten tired of thinking of the parking lot, and forgotten our incomplete description of it, it may well be that our intuition of it remains clear as ever. This can be underscored by comparing the situation with the one where someone else describes the parking lot to us. As we cannot in this case see, hear, or smell it, there is certainly something missing from our representation of it. Admittedly, the point cannot be that now we do not operate through our sensibility and imagination at all, because if we did not, we could not make sense any of the sensible features that are being described to us. In this way, the two situations are not that different and the discursivity thesis hits the mark. Then again, in the latter case the discursive mode of cognition not only leaves out what is particular, but loses the characteristic particularity of the representation with all the plentifulness it comes in. The intuition through sensation, the \textit{perception} of the parking lot, is something more, something different; something that we can never fully capture discursively.
Here, we may consider the following explication of understanding (and of discursivity at the same time) from the lectures:

The intellectual cognitive faculty is the faculty for thinking or for making concepts for ourselves. It represents only the object in general, without looking to the manner of its appearance.\(^{511}\)

Of course, in the perception of the parking lot it is not the case that “looking to the manner of its appearance” is somehow lost when the discursive mode of cognition takes it as its target. The point is, rather, that representing gets going in two ways. However, as Kant seems to well allow that it is possible that the representational capacities that answer for the discursive mode of cognition can be “offline,”\(^{512}\) or in a stage that does not yet count as conceptualization, there is no point in emphasizing the discursivity thesis when Kant’s model is examined from the viewpoint of perception. Rather, that would be a mistake, or overlooking what there is in the core of Kant’s project: namely, the positive revaluation of sensible cognition.

Indeed, this time the real point of comparison is not in fact sensibility at all, but an altogether different kind of understanding, as Kant is showing the limitations of human understanding, not in the slightest mocking the senses.\(^{513}\) Thus Kant’s concern with discursivity is not to support the famous principle as such, but to show that human understanding is not an intuitive intellect (intellectus intuitivi, intellectus archetypus) capable of intellectual intuition (intuitus intellectualis).\(^{514}\)

If there was such a divine or mystical dimension to understanding, Kant speculates, it would cognize things as they are; it would get behind the appearances, as it were.\(^{515}\) We, on the other hand, have to live with the fact that things are modifications of our subjective constitution, which rids us of access to things in themselves. Another major advantage of the intuitive intellect would be, presumably, that it would simply “see” everything in concreto without having to progress from parts to wholes. We, on the other hand, have to think everything through such a progression: not immediately through intuition, but synthetically through combination with the help of concepts. Because of this, the end-products of such activity are necessarily dependent on how the parts are...

---

\(^{511}\) MM 29:888: “Das intellectuelle Erkenntniss Vermögen ist das Vermögen zu denken oder sich Begriffe zu machen. Es stellt sich nur das Object überhaupt vor, ohne auf die Art seiner Erscheinung zu sehen.”

\(^{512}\) See Hanna 2005, 265, 284n19.

\(^{513}\) This way Kant sets himself against the long tradition of taking senses as inferior. See also Kant’s explicit defense of sensibility in An §§ 8–11, 7:143–146.

\(^{514}\) For more on intuitive intellect and intellectual intuition in Kant, see ML1 28:206, 241; P § 34, 4:316*, § 57, 4:355–356; B145, 308–309; MM 29:797, 800, 880, 888; KU § 77, 5:408; MK3 29:953, 974. While Kant denied humans intellectual intuition, some other famous figures did not. Duns Scotus, for example, not only admitted its possibility and conceivability, but went back and forth between admitting only that much and the actuality of such intuition either in our everyday life or in afterlife (Pasnau 2003, 297–300; Wolter 1990).

\(^{515}\) See e.g. ML1 28:206, 241.
represented and connected; in this respect the achieved constitutions are to remain contingent. In contrast to this, when the intuitive intellect would represent a whole, it would represent the possibility of the parts necessarily dependent on the whole at the same time.\textsuperscript{516} Not only would there be no need for synthesis, but there would not be any alternative ways to represent the thing left.

In a way, everything would be really simple for the intuitive intellect (this may not sound that surprising given that God is the foremost candidate for an entity with such capacity). Then again, things are not that easy for us. In this sense, discursive connotes laborious; our thinking is not only partial and lacking, but requires work (even though things become easier through habituation). Recall the parking lot. We can be literally exhausted after we have described it completely enough. It might even be painful (like doing some extremely difficult mathematical task can be). So is the knowledge that no humanly possible description of it will ever be the absolutely final one (further supported by the fact that there are a lot more complex cases around).

To be sure, human understanding is still quite a tool. As we remember, concepts are handy things to have around. Thanks to them we are not thoroughly tied to sensory material, but have means to rise above the particularity of perception. It is, after all, only through understanding that we can represent an object “without looking to the manner of its appearance.” The fact that human understanding is image-dependent or, as it is also called, \textit{intellectus ectypus}\textsuperscript{517} (instead of \textit{intellectus intuitivi} or \textit{archetypus}) does not take anything away from this. Rather, the latter only indicates that any experiential understanding requires that something must be (quite literally) \textit{engraved} on the mind before the business of understanding is up and running.

However, for our purposes the most important consequence of all this is not that our understanding is dependent on the senses, but that we do have a glimpse of that divine and direct intuitive way of cognizing \textit{in ourselves}. It is only that it comes in a sensible form (and thus remains quite mundane after all). But this does not take its most important feature away: that we can represent wholly determinate wholes in (or through) intuition without having to rummage our representations from parts up. In addition to what we have established above, we may consult the following footnote from the \textit{Critique}:

\begin{quote}
We can intuit an indeterminate quantum as a whole, if it is enclosed within boundaries, without needing to construct its totality through measurement, i.e., through the successive synthesis of its parts.\textsuperscript{518}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{516} See KU § 77, 5:407.
\textsuperscript{517} KU § 77, 5:408.
\textsuperscript{518} A426/B454*: “Wir können ein unbestimmtes Quantum als ein Ganzes anschauen, wenn es in Grenzen eingeschlossen ist, ohne die Totalität desselben durch Messung, d.i. die successive Synthesis seiner Theile, construiren zu dürfen.” See also A32/B48.
Although the passage concerns measurement, the point itself holds generally and can be put in use here as well. The limitation of always advancing from the parts up belongs to discursive thought. In fact, it is this recognition of the advantage of intuition alongside with the possibility of sensible \textit{a priori} representation that brings full force to Kant’s revaluation of sensible cognition.

What is sensible or aesthetic is inherently non-discursive. Unlike with discursive thinking, with intuiting it is not the case that the subject must represent things through some mediator or another. Nor does it involve “consciousness that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained” more than it involves taking “that which is common to many things” as the basis of representation. Indeed, to intuition (and thus to sensibility in general) “belongs essentially the immediate representation of objects, and indeed of a single object, and a feature of a concept can never underlie it.”

The case is analogical with representing extensive magnitudes. It is not that we have to necessarily represent, say, a line \textit{as} or \textit{in terms of} extensive magnitude, but that we \textit{can} do that with every possible spatial representation. Or to put it slightly differently, it is not that the representation of extensive magnitude is an underlying feature of all spatial representations, through which the latter can be represented in the first place, but that each of them is of the kind that it is possible to represent extensive magnitude as its necessary feature. In short, we do not immediately \textit{perceive} in terms of extensive magnitudes; instead, we \textit{think} mediately in such terms. Now, \textit{that} is certainly discursive, whereas mere perception does not require any such mediators.

\textbf{4.8. The Second Portrayal of the Perceiver: Varieties of Perception}

As we saw in the preceding chapter, the notion of sensation accounts generally for the fact of affection, and more specifically for the fact that some of the perceptual content is state-oriented, some thing-oriented. Likewise, the notion of intuition accounts generally for the fact that sensation-based representing has spatiotemporal confines, and more specifically for the facts of orientation and directedness to perceptual objects.

In the present chapter, we have added two more general preconditions of perception to the picture: the faculty called imagination, and the operation called synthesis. More specifically, we have been speaking of apprehension and perceptual composition, both of which belong fundamentally to imagination and depend on its reproductive function. We have also introduced the notion of manifold,

\footnote{MK3 29:975: “gehört wesentlich die unmittelbare Vorstellung der Objecte, un zwar eines einzelnen Objects, dazu, und nie kann ein Merkmal eines Begriffs dabei zum Grunde gelegt werden.”}
which grounds the set of possibilities of perceptual grasping (or of manipulating the formal intuition of space).\footnote{In the current context, one could add, as there are also manifold of concepts (A644/B672) and laws (KU § 71, 5:388).}

As we apprehend some particular set of such perceptual possibilities, we go from one thing to another in a successive fashion in order to establish a perceptual composite. As argued throughout the chapter, this or any other outer perception must necessarily have as its object some spatiotemporally distinguishable particular or another. We have also remarked that intuiting, as that which makes perceptual reference to particulars possible, can be fully determinate in the sense of establishing a determinate relation to an individual thing, and thus cannot be by itself a representation of a manifold (or of a manifold as a manifold). Indeed, otherwise we could not pick out an object through intuition unless we ran everything through, which is obviously something we cannot do. And if regress is not an option, neither are perceptual atoms. So, basically, there must be an initial grasp on some object or another, and what we called perceptual primitives are just the kind of targets that immediate perceptual grasping can take as its object.

To be sure, any such object of particularization remains conceptually undetermined (together with its place in the greater order of things) through mere intuition, but as we are after the necessary and sufficient conditions of perception, that does not matter one bit. Nor does it matter, say, if something we take as a genuine thing turns out as only an image of the thing in further inspection, as we would still have initially perceived an object recognizable as such a thing because this is what the spatial configuration and the objective sensations in question suggested to us. If this were not the case, we would never perceive the thing before examining it through, which would again turn perception into an exceedingly demanding endeavor (besides, that would presuppose an object anyway). Certainly, that kind of examination (even if only partial) may be necessary for verifying what or what kind of a thing we are in fact perceiving, but that does not put it among the necessary and sufficient conditions of perception.

There are two important consequences to be drawn from all this concerning the synthetic character of the human mind. The two intertwine: establishing conceptual unities cannot be the necessary feature of perception because perception (as particular provider) does not even necessarily require (or depend on) representing perceptual unities. Hence there is, strictly speaking, no necessary connection between particularizing and any kind of combination Kant speaks of in his theoretical philosophy.\footnote{\textit{Pace} Falkenstein 1995, 243, according to which combination extends even to processes that make up “many given matters into a shape.”} Whereas the former consequence concerns specifically the interconnection problem (the further elaboration of which will be continued in the next chapter), the latter involves a general, yet an extremely important methodological point.
First we must remind ourselves on what terms Kant’s model explains what it is supposed to explain. As I see it, Kant does not aim at establishing anything in terms of empirical facts of perceptual processing. In other words, he is not doing what we would call cognitive psychology. He may occasionally be doing something along those lines in his anthropological writings and lectures, but not as a true transcendental philosopher (to which one could add that in that role the rare flirt with psychology does not count since it is never the crux of the matter).

Suppose we see a bottle on the shelf. Why do we particularize exactly that thing? In my view, that is something Kant’s model cannot account for. We might as well have particularized anything else in the provided manifold. Indeed, it could as well have been the label of the bottle, the word on the label, or one of the letters of the word on the label. Then again, to explain why we saw the whole bottle just like that, thereby overlooking its details and other possible objects and their details, would be giving an empirical answer to an empirical question.

The lesson is that we cannot answer from the armchair which or what kind of actual objects first and foremost manifest the primitive function of particularizing in some actual empirical subject. A philosophical theory, including the Kantian one, should not be supposed to answer such questions. In other words, it should not be expected to establish how or why some exact spatial configuration is taken up by the subject instead of another possible one, and under what empirical conditions.

This kind of contingency holds also of apprehension because the initial particular on and from which the successive apprehension can continue could equally well be, say, A of the then-to-be-apprehended A-B-C as it could be the A-B-C in the first place. In the former case, we would (quite literally) build up a complex perception out of individual components. In the latter case, we would particularize a thing which could then be examined through part by part (as if by chopping the initial representation into pieces). This time the starting point would be perceiving, in an instant fashion, the whole thing, or rather that which is knowable to be a complex thing in further inspection. Now the apprehension works in the opposite order: from the whole towards the parts (remember, intuition is not limited to progressing from parts, only discursive thought is). But again there is contingency, since the whole could as well be the A of the then-to-be-apprehended A-B-C, where A stands for the bridge, B for the river, and C for the sky, for example. Or perhaps we intuited the scenery first, and then through apprehension found a bridge in it.

The possible objection that there are still parts to any such A, B and C (like there are pixels on the computer screen), and that these, too, contribute to the perception of the object, would be beside the point. The key function of intuition is pinpointing individual things (or their aspects) and thus

---

522 This is not to say that apprehension does not operate from part to part also in this case. The point is, rather, that whatever it is that the subject begins to apprehend is possible to take as a whole. But nothing is ever represented as a whole – or, for that matter, as a manifold – in mere perception.
fixing perceptual reference to them. This is something we do all the time, and can well recognize doing if we pay attention to it. Accordingly, intuiting is a manner of actual representing, not of putting together some bulk of sensory information (which would be something that we cannot recognize taking place in us no matter how much we pay attention to our experience).\footnote{Pace Falkenstein 1995, 77, where it is stated that “an experience of thousands of black and white dots is merely an unintelligible mass until it is brought to an absolute unity under the concept ‘triangle’.” According to my view, there are three implicit flaws in this claim. One, it is possible to merely intuit a triangular shape without recognizing that it falls under the concept of triangle. Two, intuiting the triangle is not a matter of sensory processing of “dots” but simply of pinpointing the thing. Three, strictly speaking, there would not be an experience of those presumably invisible dots (see chapter 6.).}

Because of this we may well claim that an object of perception is not necessarily grounded on \emph{any} synthesis that Kant analyzes in the \textit{Critique}. It is rather only \textit{when} run through and grasped in a certain manner, as a certain kind of composition, that the syntheses kick in. It is not that the object must be \textit{intuited} part by part before perceptual reference can be fixed to it. Quite the contrary, its parts (as parts) can remain totally unobserved by the subject because particularization can take place regardless of how complex a thing (or part of a thing) the object of perception turns out to be in further inspection, or how complex an array of \textit{sensations} it comes in.

Of course, all this \textit{could} be explained in terms of bits of sensory information there is to our sensory system when we perceive something. But again, Kant is not presenting a theory on such terms. In fact, this simple reminder should be enough here: for Kant, the key feature of perception is that it is \textit{mit Bewußtsein}.

Certainly, perception is an intermodal phenomenon. If we grab the bottle from the shelf, we do not just see its shape through eyesight, but feel it through tactile sense as well: both sense modalities contribute to the representation of the object. Historically, the faculty that was supposed to answer for this was known as \textit{sensus communis}.\footnote{Notice, though, that Kant himself uses the notion in a different way (see KU § 40, 5:293–296).} But again, Kant’s model takes no sides in such issues.

This is not to say that I am denying that there are underlying unifying or binding processes involved in perception. Nor am I suggesting that Kant denies that. The point is, rather, that if perception in the most rudimentary sense involves synthesis or combination, it must be something that takes place on a level that is inaccessible to us. Granted, in everyday perception, the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction are, if not wholly inaccessible to us, at least not usually actually accessed by us. Then again, as the argument goes that neither of these two syntheses answers for particularizing as such, and as they were the only possible candidates, any synthetic operation more primitive than them must be beyond our topic in this regard.\footnote{It should be pointed out that this is just a part of my general argumentative strategy and made only in order to really press the point. That is, I am \textit{not} claiming that in making sense of things, even if only perceptually, all we need to do is to singularize objects through intuition. Certainly there must be apprehension and reproduction going on, which grants the notion of synthesis a prominent place in perception.} Presumably, then, if there is some kind
of synthesis going on in terms of information processing, it must be in the senses themselves, understood as physical organs. In fact, Kant himself suggests this in the *Anthropology* when he speaks of “the sensation produced by the five senses in their synthesis.” Even so, this level of inspection would exploit just the kind of explanatory resources that have already been thrown overboard.

Even so, Kant’s “anthropological” opinion has a positive place in our argument. Recall Kant’s claim in the *Critique* that there cannot be combination in the senses. Is there a contradiction, then? Given the radically different stances in these two radically different texts, this does not need to be the case. It seems rather that very different things are meant by the idea of synthesis in the two contexts. The latter claim is made in the Analytic, which Kant states to be an “analysis of the faculty of understanding itself” in “its pure use in general.” This suggests that the combination Kant speaks of there is the one understanding is for. In fact, the terminology itself hints at this. In the Analytic the name of the operation is *Verbindung*, in the *Anthropology* it is *Zusammensetzung*. The emphasis on the necessity of *Verbindung* seems to be just another way of saying that the senses do not judge or reflect. This does not even remotely refute the possibility of there being some kind of “putting-together” going on in the senses as such. What we also have here is another indication of the diversity of the notion of synthesis in support of our reading that not all connection should be imputed to understanding.

Before moving on, let us look at the variations of the term ‘perception’ itself. The distinction we have tackled with through the previous sections shows the most important variation: there is perception as immediate particularization, on the one hand, and perception as successive apprehensive grasping, on the other. In the big picture, the two are interdependent (although strictly speaking the latter builds on the former), and both fit under the notions of empirical intuiting and perception (or perception *per se* as we have been calling it in order to distinguish perception from perceptually or sensibly informed thought).

This two-level picture would be quite enough to show that ‘perception’ has more than one meaning. But there is more. In fact, one can find a whole variety of perceptions (or uses of the term)

---

526 An § 28, 7:168: “die Empfindungen aus denselben [fünf Sinne] in ihrer Zusammensetzung[,]” In a similar vein, Kant implies in MM 29:800 that the unification (vereinigen) of impressions is necessary for intuiting whole objects.

527 A65/B90: “Zergliederung des Verstandesvermögens selbst[,]” (My italics; original emphases omitted.)

528 A66/B90: “dessen reinen Gebrauch überhaupt[,]” (My emphasis.) See also LJ 9:15.

529 A120; An § 28, 7:168. Again, the German name for intellectual synthesis (Verstandesverbindung) is a good point of comparison. Also notice that on p. 120 of the A-deduction the topic is the unity of apperception – not perception. In fact, Kant’s focus is hardly ever precisely on the latter, given his statement about the aims of the Analytic. Indeed, how much room can there be for the analysis of perception in the analysis of the pure use of understanding?

530 MM 29:762; An § 11, 7:146.
from the Kantian corpus. Let us elaborate on some of these while keeping in mind the question how well they fit the picture provided.

Recall first that even if blind intuitions are not understood by the subject they can nevertheless play their representational role of singling out things (without having any concepts under which to bring them, that is). Although we would in this case have, cognitively speaking, quite a restricted access to the object, it would still be something localizable; something that can be perceptually referred to. Indeed, in order to have this kind of representation nothing has to be understood, just like pleasure is “felt, not understood.” However, whereas the latter is a feeling, and thus not a cognition in any sense of the term, the particularization of an outer object is not like that at all. In this sense, the two are not in the least on the same par; they are that only in the sense of being not necessarily dependent on concepts.

Obviously, there are cases of perception that are strictly dependent on concepts. The most plain example in the Kantian corpus would be the explication of concept as common perception (perceptio communis). However, it is equally plain that Kant cannot mean by this what we have been discussing so far. There is, of course, nothing strange in having higher cognitive achievements enter the notion of perception: it only shows that the term is not used in a systematic fashion.

There are other telling examples in Kant’s writings that stretch the notion. In the First Introduction, Kant asks: “How can the technique of nature in its products be perceived?” In his answer (the details of which we can pass) he refers to the purposiveness perceived (nehmen) in the power of judgment itself, to which he adds that the perception in question is an inner one (innere Wahrnehmung). In the third Critique, Kant speaks of perceiving “genius without taste” (and vice versa) and of “the admiration of a purposiveness perceived in the essence of things.”

The list could be continued, but the point would stay the same. Such instances of perception suggest something very different from the two-level picture. We do not simply intuit genius or taste in an artwork more than we find nature purposeful through mere perceptual apprehension. Further reflection on what we are perceiving, or figuring out what happens to us when we perceive, would be needed, calling for ‘perceptually informed thought’ rather than ‘perception.’ Indeed, switching the

---

531 EEU, VIII 20:232: “gefühl, nicht eingesehen[.]”
532 MM 29:889. Also the Stufenleiter (A320/B376–377) can be read as suggesting that a concept, too, can be an objective perception. Given this, it would not be that far-fetched to claim that when Kant seems to assert in the Analytic that perception requires the categories, he actually means perception in this sense. In that case, the perception of a house, for example, would not only presuppose the relevant concept, but would be all about finding a perceptual verification for this particular concept.
533 EEU, VII 20:219: “Wie läßt sich die Technik der Natur an ihren Producten wahrnehmen?”
534 EEU, VII 20:220.
535 KU § 48, 5:313: “Genie ohne Geschmack[.]”
536 KU § 62, 5:364: “der Bewunderung einer, obzwar in dem Wesen der Dinge […] wahrgenommenen Zweckmäßigkeit[.]”
word from the latter to the former would mean avoiding a possible confusion with far-reaching consequences.

When we speak of perception in such an intellectual vein, we are speaking of paying heed or observing rather than of mere perception. Sometimes Kant uses that fitting term *observation* ([Beobachtung]) himself. Generally, this notion appears as closely tied to the experiential method.537 Once it is explicated more specifically as “experience of the kind that is methodically undertaken.”538 Again, this is quite enough to show that it must stand on a higher level than the more primitive varieties of perception suggested by the two-level picture.

Now is a good time to reconcile the notions of empirical intuition and perception as they are used at one point in the second edition *Critique*. There the two are not identified, which suggests yet another contextual variation (or a contradiction if you like). As should be clear, our starting point has been that the two should be identified, which has been perfectly in line with what Kant usually says. Perception just is “the intuition of something actual.”539 Empirical intuition just is objective perception or “perception of actual objects.”

Here is the passage according to which this does not seem to be the case:

Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space.540

To paraphrase (ignoring for the time being other important things the passage might contain), empirical intuition of a house is made into perception, which seems to indicate that an intuition of a house is not yet a perception of a house. Either this is a contradiction in terms, or perception in some special sense must be meant. As the latter is the presumable option, that special sense is quite evidently perception through apprehension (the second variety in our two-level picture). This leaves for the empirical intuition the role of particular provider (the first variety of perception in the same picture). As simple as this may sound, there is nothing odd in this given Kant’s tendency towards non-systematic use of the notion of perception. Furthermore, this makes it evident that we may either examine perception as a singular representation or as a continuous episode of spatial representing.

538 KU § 66, 5:376: “Erfahrung […] derjenigen, welche methodisch angestellt wird und Beobachtung heißt[].”
539 ML2 28:557: “die Anschauung von etwas Wirklichem, oder die Wahrnehmung.”
540 B162: “Wenn ich also z.B. die empirische Anschauung eines Hauses durch Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen derselben zur Wahrnehmung mache, so liegt mir die nothwendige Einheit des Raumes und der äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung überhaupt zum Grunde, und ich zeichne gleichsam seine Gestalt dieser synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen im Raume gemäß.”
However, as the wider context of the passage shows, we are also faced with the implication that the synthesis of apprehension and the category must “be in thoroughgoing agreement.”\footnote{B162: “durchaus gemäß sein muß.” Kant’s example is Größe, which is another name for Vielheit (or Plurality) (P § 21, 4:303). For some reason, The Cambridge Edition has ‘quantity’ here, which is misleading because Größe is a subcategory of Quantität.} What is more, there is the indication that perception itself “stands under the categories” because it is only possible through the very synthesis that is itself subject to them. This is a dilemma for which we have not yet provided a proper answer. On the other hand, a partial solution can already be given. All we need to do is to point out that the necessity of “thoroughgoing agreement” only makes a claim on perception as apprehensive synthesis, not on perception as particularizing \emph{per se}. Since the latter is not necessarily dependent on any of the three syntheses, perceptual individuation cannot be up to \emph{any} concepts whatsoever (except contingently). Hence we may already conclude that perception does not \emph{necessarily} require concepts according to Kant.
5. PERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS

5.1. On the Unity of Apperception

The self is a complex issue both in general and within the Kantian boundaries. In the latter, the issue centers on the notion of the unity of apperception. It is not completely clear what this means; in the literature, that is a topic in itself.\(^{542}\) My strategy is nevertheless simple and straightforward. After pointing out in what respect this notion is (and is not) significant for our purposes, I will relate that to what we have established about perception so far.\(^{543}\)

As I see it, one of Kant’s implicit but central premises in contexts centering on the self is that to end up with coherent experience there has to be a constant element in the sequence of representings. As we have seen, spatiotemporality provides that on the part of sensibility, categories on the part of understanding. This time the constant element would be the one by whom all the representing takes place. Again, the basic idea is very simple: the subject has to stay the same within and in between of his or her representings.\(^{544}\) If this was not the case, representations would be useless, as they would not only be completely lost over time, but completely untraceable in the first place. Accordingly, even the simplest series of representations would be impossible, and thus nothing complex would ever be represented. In short, representations would turn out as being nothing for nobody; there would be no “potential autobiography.”\(^{545}\)

As Kant puts it in the B-deduction, in the very beginning of § 16:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.\(^{546}\)

This is doubly analogical with the point made with time. Just like there cannot be changes without time, I would not really be in possession of representations if I could not think of them. Their

\(^{542}\) See e.g. Dickerson 2004, 80.

\(^{543}\) This will do, as there is no reason for developing a detailed account of the Kantian self within the boundaries of this study. This is because some of it would be beside the point anyway, and also because a thorough analysis of the transcendental deduction of the categories is beyond our topic. For interpretations of the latter and the role of the unity of apperception in it, see e.g. Allison 2004; Henrich 1994; Longuenesse 2000.

\(^{544}\) In terms of the Anthropology, this makes the subject a person (An § 1, 7:127).

\(^{545}\) Strawson 1968, 163.

\(^{546}\) B131–132: “Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel heißt als: die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein.”
thinkability is no less than their ultimate precondition as *my* representations. And just like time itself must remain constant through all change, the “I think” must endure through each and every act of representing. That is, even though my representational states change all the time, I, as the ground of this “I think,” cannot be changing with them to have them count as *my* representations. In fact, what Kant must mean in the passage is that it would not be possible for me to *claim* that I am in possession of all those representations without the “I think.”

Now, someone might argue that this is not exactly what the text says. But then consider how the passage continues:

That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called *intuition*. Thus all manifold of intuition has necessary relation to the *I think* in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered.547

This apparent change of topic from thought to intuition would not make any sense unless Kant’s real aim was to establish that the ultimate precondition of self-conscious object-related thought is that it has a *route to intuitions*.548 This already reveals that Kant does not want to assert that all representing is necessarily accompanied by the “I think” but that all representations must be thinkable.

Kant is quite explicit on this. In the beginning of the passage he emphasizes that it must be so that the “I think” *can* “accompany all my representations.” A little later, as he points out how the representations given in intuition “would not all together be *my* representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations,”549 he also makes the important addition: “even if I am not conscious of them as such.”550 That is, we do not have to let the “I think” accompany all our representations in order to have something represented more than we need to entertain any of those representations *as mine* in order to do that. This is again analogical with time and change, as we do not need to represent the changes themselves (at least not as changes) in order to represent temporally.

What has all this got to do with perception? Recall first that nothing so far indicates that perception necessarily presupposes more than spatiotemporally organized *perceptivity*, certain “blind” operations of imagination, and sensation. It appears that the issue with the “I think” does not add

547 B132: “Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heißt *Anschauung*. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine nothwendige Beziehung auf das: *Ich denke*, in demselben Subject, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird.”

548 In the A-deduction, the same point is implied in A116–117.

549 B132: “würden nicht insgesamt *meine* Vorstellungen sein, wenn sie nicht insgesamt zu einem Selbstbewußtsein gehörten, d.i. als meine Vorstellungen[.]”

550 B132: “ob ich mich ihrer gleich nicht als solcher bewußt bin[,]” And even later, Kant refers to the possibility (i.e., not necessity) of uniting representations in self-consciousness (B134) and of becoming (i.e., that one *can* become) conscious of the identity of the subject (B408).
anything substantial to the picture. Actually, we have been able to quickly refute any such reading according to which perceiving is for Kant necessarily apperceptive in character.\textsuperscript{551} Indeed, that would turn every possible perception into a perceptual thought or judgment; but successful coping with environment through perception and intuitive orientation does not require thinking at all. Presumably, then, it does not require any actively-held link to this “I think” either. After all, the latter is “the vehicle of all concepts”\textsuperscript{552} and “serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness.”\textsuperscript{553} Kant also refers to it as a judgment and proposition (\textit{Satz}).\textsuperscript{554} Briefly put, it is an intellectual (mode of) representation reserved for intellectual purposes also within Kant’s model itself.

To be sure, “I think” may express “the perception of oneself,”\textsuperscript{555} but it does not follow from this that the subject must perceive himself or herself at the same time as he or she perceives something else (say, as he or she singles out that thing over there). And even if this was the case, it would still not follow that the subject must think or express such self-perception at the same time.\textsuperscript{556} Again, animals make a good point of comparison, since they do not have any intellectual capacities at all, yet they are perceivers. Moreover, Kant makes it clear in his lectures that in the case of human beings the “cognitive faculties can be accompanied by apperception or not.”\textsuperscript{557} Generally speaking, then, primitive object-consciousness does not entail self-consciousness.

To press the point, we should also remark the distinction between this “I think,” which can be called a judgment, and the “I” which “is not a concept at all.”\textsuperscript{558} The latter is, rather, “a feeling of an existence without the least concept.”\textsuperscript{559} This gives us another reason for not to interpret the Kantian “I” too intellectually. In fact, Kant explicitly refers to intellectual consciousness a couple of times,\textsuperscript{560} thereby suggesting the possibility of non-intellectual consciousness as well. Whereas the former is that through which “we represent ourselves,”\textsuperscript{561} we can take the latter as that through which we simply represent something. Accordingly, we can either be conscious of some object or another or ourselves. Furthermore, the latter is possible either by thinking or feeling ourselves.\textsuperscript{562} It should be clear that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{551}Pace Dickerson 2004, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{552}A341/B399: ”das Vehikel aller \textit{Begriffe[,]}” (My emphasis.)
\item \textsuperscript{553}A341/B399–400: ”nur dazu dient, alles \textit{Denken} als zum Bewußtsein gehörig aufzuführen.” (Again, my emphasis.)
\item \textsuperscript{554}A341–342/B399–400.
\item \textsuperscript{555}A342/B400: ”die Wahrnehmung seiner selbst ausdrück[,]”
\item \textsuperscript{556}Cf. Strawson 1968, 98; Allison 2004, 477n17.
\item \textsuperscript{557}MM 29:884: ”Erkenntniß Vermögen können mit Apperception begleitet werden oder nicht.” (My emphasis.) Alternatively put, animals do not have apperception but share many cognitive faculties with human beings regardless of that. In this particular lecture, Kant refers to sense, imagination and the faculty of anticipation as such faculties (ibid., 882–884).
\item \textsuperscript{558}P § 46, 4:334: ”ist gar kein \textit{Begriff[,]}” See also MAN 4:543.
\item \textsuperscript{559}P § 46, 4:334*: ”Gefühl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten \textit{Begriff[,]}”
\item \textsuperscript{560}Bxl; Kant 2005, 364 (Leningrad Fragment I).
\item \textsuperscript{561}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{562}See An § 1, 7:127.
\end{itemize}

142
these ways of being conscious do not have to be simultaneous, or interdependent, in perception. It is rather that when we really concentrate on something, we cannot be representing ourselves at the same time, and this includes cases of intellectual activity, too:

E.g., a human being who is reckoning is conscious of numbers, but not at all of his subject during the time he is reckoning.\(^{563}\)

Methodologically speaking, it is important to realize that the ground of the unity of apperception (or original apperception) is a transcendental condition. Such a condition is supposed to explain or establish the possibility of something; with the unity of apperception that would be self-conscious thought or objective judgment. The condition or ground itself is not, however, something that needs to be constantly held or entertained by the conscious mind as it represents something. Quite the contrary, an actual empirical subject may come and go without ever thinking of such a ground. Besides the “I think” the spatiotemporality of all sensible representing and the syntheses of imagination (as mere effects of it) make telling examples. The realizability of these representational grounds in thought is one thing, their actual application another.

Moreover, although certain such grounds can be said to make together the preconditions of experience, it does not follow from this that each and every empirical representing is actually grounded on them all. Kant clearly wants to avoid these kinds of possible confusions involved in understanding transcendental argumentation when he points out in the A-deduction “that the mere representation I in relation to all others (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is the transcendental consciousness”\(^{564}\) only to add that “it does not matter here whether this representation be clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, even whether it be actual,”\(^{565}\) which pretty much concludes what we have just said.

---

\(^{563}\) ML1 28:227: “Z. E. ein Mensch, der da rechnet, ist sich der Zahlen bewußt; in der Zeit aber, da er rechnet, seines Subjects gar nicht.” Kant calls the former (i.e., being conscious of the numbers while counting) logical consciousness, whereas the latter (i.e., being conscious of oneself) is psychological consciousness. Although it may well be that Kant’s view on the matter is not yet complete here – this lecture is from the 1770s – we may take the distinction at face value empirically speaking. To this we could add that even though original apperception must be involved in an act of thinking, this is so only transcendentally speaking. That is, it is not the case that the subject must be actually aware of oneself while thinking.

\(^{564}\) A117*: “daß die bloße Vorstellung Ich in Beziehung auf alle andere (deren collective Einheit sie möglich macht) das transsidententale Bewußtsein sei.”

\(^{565}\) A117*: “Diese Vorstellung mag nun klar (empirisches Bewußtsein) oder dunkel sein, daran liegt hier nichts, ja nicht einmal an der Wirklichkeit desselben[,]” (My emphases.) See also R 5708, 18:332. What is more, in the additions to the Aesthetic in the B-edition the spontaneity of apperception culminating in the “I think” is stated to be preceded by what is sensibly given (B68).
5.2. Varieties of Consciousness

Let us call to mind that perceptions are representations “with consciousness.” As the apperceptive self-consciousness can be ruled out as their necessary feature, our next task is to clarify in what sense perception is necessarily conscious. This already allows us to speak of consciousness in plural. That is, there are at least two kinds of consciousnesses: self-consciousness and “plain” consciousness. Granted, that was hardly informative. In fact, there are several explications of consciousness in the Kantian corpus that blur this distinction:

Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.\(^{567}\)

Consciousness is the faculty for grasping representations so that we can reproduce them[].\(^{568}\)

Consciousness is really a representation that another representation is in me.\(^{569}\)

Although such passages may contribute to our understanding of what Kant means by consciousness by spelling out the important link with reproduction or, more generally, with time, it is not clear whether they do this in terms of higher order consciousness, or merely in terms of the possibility of simply keeping something in mind.

This distinction (which I think can be found from Kant although he does not explicate it) can be put as follows. In the former case, to be conscious of \(x\) depends on the ability to think \(x\) at \(t_2\) through (or in combination with) the representation that \(x\) was thought at \(t_1\). In the latter case, to be conscious of \(x\) requires only that the representation of \(x\) carries on from \(t_1\) to \(t_2\) through reproduction (not through any higher order thoughts or any thoughts at all). It should be clear by now that perception per se cannot require the former. The latter, on the other hand, necessarily involves reproductive synthesis only as a mere effect of imagination, and can thus take place without the awareness of the connection itself. Hence the subject must have its representations accompanied by something else than the consciousness of the unifying operations that contribute to perception in order to have those representations count as perceptions. In other words, although reproduction contributes to perception, reproduction itself does not have to be represented in order for that contribution to be possible.

---

\(^{566}\) Since there are different kinds of perception, this may not apply to all cases, of course.

\(^{567}\) A103: “Ohne Bewußtsein, daß das, was wir denken, eben dasselbe sei, was wir einen Augenblick zuvor dachten, würde alle Reproduction in der Reihe der Vorstellungen vergeblich sein.”

\(^{568}\) MD 28:674: “Das Bewußtseyn ist das Vermögen Vorstellungen so aufzufassen daß wir se reproduiren können[.]”

\(^{569}\) LJ 9:33: “Eigentlich ist das Bewußtsein eine Vorstellung, daß eine andre Vorstellung in mir ist.”
This suggests that the reproduction of representations can be successful without the subject recognizing the identity of \( x \), and that it is “in vain” without recognition only from the viewpoint of self-conscious thought. Thus in this case the lack of being conscious of the identity means only that the subject does not successfully end up representing anything as maintaining an identity over time. But we should not even expect that from mere perception. Accordingly, what Kant means by Recognition in the A-deduction cannot refer to recognizing \( x \) perceptually, but to the possibility of representing \( Fx \) at one moment, and \( Gx \) at another. In other words, the synthesis of recognition is not the precondition of tracking an object over time. Recall the animal recognizing its master. It cannot represent its master as nice (or not so nice), or think of him as wearing a green shirt today, but it certainly can perceptually track him over time. And we human beings are perceptually speaking just like that animal when we simply intuit or perceive something “without thinking something thereby or thereunder.”

It might be emphasized here that ‘recognition’ in a primitive sense is meant, but the main point would stay the same: perceptual reference does not require thinking. What the animal lacks is the possibility of being conscious of recognition. As it is put in the Vienna Logic, “animals also cognize their master, but they are not conscious of this.” That is, they do not have the capacity to reflect on what they perceive. It is in this sense that they lack access to the object (but an object there still is). That is, they cannot cognize what their cognition is about. Indeed, this comes close to what is asserted in the Jäsche Logic on the same topic: namely, that animals do not cognize objects (not that there are no objects in animal cognition).

What we have here is basically the distinction between being conscious of the identity of \( x \) over time and simply individuating \( x \) over time. The claim goes that only the latter is necessary for perception understood as successful coping with one’s environment. Given his views on animal cognition, Kant must have held this view. But let us elaborate further what the minimal kind of consciousness featured in perception, presumably shared by both non-rational and rational animals alike, must be like.

From the fact that perception is empirical representation, we may infer that the consciousness in question must be empirical. As trivial as this is, it leads to an important notion of empirical consciousness which Kant sometimes identifies with apprehension.\(^{570}\) It is possible to infer from this that the kind of consciousness that is built into the notion of perception is supposed to be apprehensive in character. Or to put it the other way around: any empirical representation that involves apprehension counts as perception as long as there is consciousness involved.

\(^{570}\) B202; R 6313, 18:614 (1790–91). Kant also links empirical consciousness with the consciousness of existence (A601/B629; A614/B642). As this is implicitly contained in the notion of perception itself, we may skip further elaboration on the topic.
This makes sense. To perceptually run through a house, for example, is to apprehend a house. This is not that different from saying that one is being conscious of the house; or, in the lack of relevant concept, being directed at the thing which is possible to conceptualize as a house. The same applies to perceptual “grasping-together.” To apprehend the house in a way that involves taking the walls and windows together would be upholding a certain kind of consciousness. This suggests, in turn, that for Kant consciousness is not identical with the subject’s collection of representations (as if consciousness were a container). It is rather the case that also each and every representing is a consciousness. If so, it seems that intuitions and concepts, as different kinds of representations, can be regarded as different kinds of consciousnesses as well.

Let us recall the explication of concept as “the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one representation as in another, or that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained.” Not only are concepts mediate representations (in contrast to immediate intuitions), but this mediacy of theirs also reflects the kind of consciousness involved. Compare, for example, the apprehension of the house with the thought of God as omnipotent and omniscient. In the latter case there is no apprehension (at least not in the same sense as before) since the “grasping-together” involved cannot be perceptual or intuitive anymore. Accordingly, the consciousness necessarily linked with perception could be coined as perceptual awareness in order to distinguish it from other kinds of consciousnesses.

We may also try an analogy to intuition. Whereas concepts are consciousnesses of shared features, intuitions must be consciousnesses of particulars. There would be no news here. As intuitions are also immediate, there cannot be any other consciousness through which they represent the particular. But let us also recall the major point of the previous chapter: perception as particularizing differs from perception as apprehensive grasping. Now this same basic distinction suggests that the kind of consciousness necessarily tied to perception is not necessarily apprehensive in character, but can be immediate itself. To be sure, perception is on the whole a continuous endeavor, so we could add that at least in principle perceptual awareness is not necessarily “through-going.” In the Kantian corpus, the empirical intuining of a house as preceding its apprehension would make an example of this.  

While we could content ourselves with this solution, there is more to the notion of consciousness in relation to perception (just like there was to the notion of perception itself). What we have been mostly concerned with so far would be, in Kant’s words, “intuition of which I am conscious, i.e.,

---

571 Also the Anticipations (especially A167–168/B209–210) verify this possibility, although the context is a bit different. Besides the textual evidence, we could point out that were it not so that not all perception is actually through-going we would end up with only one continuous and indefinitely modified perceptual apprehension instead of many discrete perceptions (cf. Falkenstein 1995, 361). In my opinion, that would be against Kant’s general outlook on human cognition.
perception (perceptio)”\footnote{P § 20, 4:300: “die Anschauung, deren ich mir bewu ßt bin, d.i. Wahrnehmung (perceptio)[.]” See also e.g. ÜE 8:217 for the fact that the intuition in question must be empirical.} or “the faculty of empirical intuitions for becoming immediately conscious of existence in space or in time.”\footnote{MD 28:672: “das Vermögen empirischer Anschauungen, unmittelbar sich bewust zu werden des Daseyns im Raum oder in der Zeit.”} However, Kant also presents us with explications like this: “Perception is consciousness of sensation.”\footnote{MM 29:794: “Bewußtseyn der Empfindung ist Wahrnehmung.” See also e.g. A225/B272.} This suggests that we have here two to some extent distinct notions of perceptual awareness, as being perceptually aware of a particular through intuition is quite another thing than being aware of the sensations themselves.\footnote{The latter reflects Kant’s narrow use of ‘perception’ as “consciousness just of sensation” in distinction to the broader use as “any kind of consciousness that contain something empirical” (Falkenstein 1995, 161).}

I propose that this yet another distinction should be understood as follows. Perception as particularizing and successive apprehension gives (or takes place in) a kind of intuitive consciousness.\footnote{See An § 7, 7:141.:156.} This should not be seen as utterly perspectival. Recall the mirror ball, or the fire in the hearth. It is not the case that for every change in the reflections on the surface of the ball, or in the looks of fire, there is a new intuition. Instead, the phenomenal variation takes place within one and the same intuition as the subject keeps on representing the object. In short, what particularizing really provides is intuitive content rather than sensuous content.\footnote{In Hanna 2005, ‘intuitional cognitive content’ (248) is distinguished from ‘phenomenal’ or ‘sensory content’ (254) in a similar fashion.} An example of the latter could be so loud a sound that it feels like it fills the whole mind; indeed, it could be anything that does not suggest anything beyond itself.

Kant’s makes an informative remark on this kind of consciousness in the Anthropology:

\begin{quote}
A representation through sense of which one is conscious of as such is called sensation, especially when the sensation at the same time arouses the subject’s attention to his own state.\footnote{An § 15, 7:153: “Eine Vorstellung durch den Sinn, deren man sich als einer solchen bewu ßt ist, heißt besonders Sensation, wenn die Empfindung zugleich Aufmerksamkeit auf den Zustand des Subjects erregt.”}
\end{quote}

With particularizing, however, understood as the most fundamental function of outer perception, we do not necessarily have the latter, namely, attention to our own state. Nor is there a need for that. Or as Kant also remarks,

\begin{quote}
sight comes nearer to being a pure intuition (the immediate representation of the given object, without admixture of noticeable sensation).\footnote{An § 19, 7:156: “Der Sinn des Gesichts […] hiemit also einer rei ßen Anschauung (der unmittelbaren Vorstellung des gegebenen Objects ohne beigemischte merkliche Empfindung) näher kommt.”}
\end{quote}
In this case very “noticeable sensation” would ruin what we must have: namely, attention to an outer object. This basic kind of difference must also be Kant’s reason for making the distinction between subjective and objective sensation. The former cannot help us in particularizing things. Indeed, with mere subjective sensations we would never have any perceptions of such objects.

For similar reasons, intuitive content cannot be thoroughly tied to the configuration of sensations it comes in; it is not principally the case that the subject is intuitively conscious of the sensations themselves. Rather, the latter allow the subject to be immediately aware of something without thereby necessarily becoming the constituents of the conscious representational content itself (unless, perhaps, the subject aims to singularize them instead of that over there). Certainly, the sensuous content is still “there” in the sense that it contributes to how things look, sound, smell, taste, and feel to the subject. When considered this way, the two kinds of contents are, of course, necessarily complementary and overlapping. It is just that the sensations themselves do not necessarily enter the representing, although they are, to be sure, its ultimate preconditions.

Attention (Aufmerksamkeit, attentio) seems to be the crucial factor here. In other words, it all depends on what the subject focuses, and how much he or she pays attention to it. Most importantly, sometimes there are only so many options open. In sleep, for example, impressions cease, as the senses themselves rest but imagination keeps going. From this we may infer that in that case we are not really perceiving anything. However, we are not necessarily aware of this while at sleep. Indeed, Kant thinks that “a dream suspends all consciousness of our state.” While this is an “anthropological” opinion, there is also a more general point involved, which is that none of this rules out the awareness of all those things that the dream consists of. Analogically with outer perception, it might well be that we cannot (for whatever reason) focus on the sensuous content of our perception, but only on the objects themselves. In fact, achieving this kind of direct awareness must be the main function of outer perception.

We should also remark that attention can be simply forced on something. This must be how things stand in dreaming as well. In a dream, however, it is inherently like that. In cognition in general, on the other hand, “attention […] can be drawn from the object to the subject” (and vice versa) and directed at such things as the “influence of sensibility.” Not only do such cases mean lesser “application of power of the understanding,” but they have hardly anything to do with the subject’s success as a perceiver. For one thing, where there is no thought there can still be perception.

---

580 See MM 29:885–886.
581 MM 29:886: “der Traum hebt alles Bewußtsein unseres Zustandes auf.”
582 See An § 3, 7:131–132.
583 LJ 9:38: “die Aufmerksamkeit vom Object auf das Subject kann gezogen werden[.]”
584 LJ 9:54: “Einflusse der Sinnlichkeit[.]”
Secondly, such cases are obviously cases that involve reflection on one’s representational contents, not cases of mere perception. Thirdly, and most importantly, it must be that being aware of something is not tied to a specific kind of consciousness, but covers intuitions and concepts alike. Our next topic verifies this.\textsuperscript{586}

### 5.3. On Clarity and Distinctness

We have met above a whole variety of representations, perceptions, and, most recently, consciousnesses. Next we will turn to the idea that consciousness comes in degrees.\textsuperscript{587} Since the notions of consciousness and perception are intimately connected, this must mean that perception itself comes in degrees in terms of consciousness (as it does in terms of intensive magnitude). But since also a concept is a kind of consciousness, it too must share this feature. So, the idea that there are degrees of consciousness extends to both kinds of representations, or modes of cognition.

In technical terms of the time, this means that both can differ in \textit{clarity} (\textit{Klarheit}) and \textit{distinctness} (\textit{Deutlichkeit}).\textsuperscript{588} If a representation is not clear (\textit{klar}), then it must be \textit{obscure} (\textit{dunkel}). Lack of distinctness is simply \textit{indistinctness} (\textit{Undeutlichkeit}).\textsuperscript{589} At first glance, this seems to mean the following. The clearer the representation is, the better the grasp of it is. The analogy with vision is evident: a clear representation is vivid, not blurred, and thus well visible to the mind. An obscure representation must then be, to take the analogy further, one on which the light does not shine that well (if at all). Basically, then, clarity seems to indicate the general level of awareness of a representation, the decrease of which comes to the same as saying that it gets “obscured.”

However, already at this point the distinction gets confusing. Sometimes Kant identifies clarity with (empirical) consciousness, which suggests that an obscure representation is not conscious at all.\textsuperscript{590} On another occasion, Kant maintains that a representation is clear if it can be consciously differentiated from other representations:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{586} Here one might also want to consult the beginning of Kant’s third note in P 4:290.
\textsuperscript{587} According to Kant, consciousness may also gradually change from being empirical to being pure (i.e., without any empirical content) (B208). Here we are only concerned with empirical consciousness, and thus only with degrees in empirically (perceptually) conscious representational content.
\textsuperscript{588} In terms of perfection, the more distinct a cognition gets, the more perfect it gets (LJ 9:38).
\textsuperscript{589} Usually ‘confused’ was taken as the opposite of ‘distinct.’ Kant, however, thinks that ‘confused’ would be an improper expression here, as its opposite should be ‘order’ rather than ‘indistinctness’ (LJ 9:34). For Kant, it is thus not orderliness that distinguishes intellectual representations from sensible ones.
\textsuperscript{590} A117*; MAN 4:542; LJ 9:33.
\end{quote}
[A representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a consciousness of the difference between it and others.⁵⁹¹

Consciousness of one’s representations that suffices for the distinction of one object from another is clarity.⁵⁹²

In that case, an obscure representation is such that it (or its referent) is not consciously differentiated from others, which, however, does not necessarily turn it into an utterly unconscious representation. But it is hard to see what exactly Kant means by this, and whether this is compatible with his other explication: namely, that obscure representations are conscious only indirectly through inference.⁵⁹³

What is more, at one point distinctness is just another term for a higher degree of clarity.⁵⁹⁴ Generally speaking, then, the distinction is hardly informative, as it does not really tell us the difference between these gradual ways of being conscious. Still, it seems that at least this must be certain: that clear representations can be indistinct. Otherwise, it would not make any sense to hold on to the distinction at all.

Fortunately, a good deal of this confusion can be cleared away when we return to the idea that the clarity and distinctness of a representation is relative to the kind of representation it is, depending on the faculty it belongs to. As we pointed out early on, whatever happens to an intuition in terms of its clarity or distinctness, it nevertheless remains as a sensible representation. Similarly with conceptual representations, there is no way of transforming them into intuitions.⁵⁹⁵ Accordingly, “the two essentially different basic faculties”⁵⁹⁶ known as sensibility and understanding present things through their own kind of clarity and distinctness through their own kind of representations.

Thus we have both clarity (Klarheit) through intuition and clarity through concept.⁵⁹⁷ These allow, respectively, sensible or aesthetic distinctness (Deutlichkeit) and intellectual or logical distinctness.⁵⁹⁸ The former is distinctness in intuition, the latter through concepts. One way to explicate this is that whereas logical distinctness is discursive in character, aesthetic distinctness is

---

⁵⁹¹ B414*: “eine Vorstellung ist klar, in der das Bewußtsein zum Bewußtsein des Unterschiedes derselben von andern zureicht.” As the beginning of the footnote implies, Kant’s reason for making this clarification is that it would be false to define clarity merely in terms of a consciousness of representation.


⁵⁹³ MM 29:879; An § 5, 7:135.

⁵⁹⁴ LJ 9:62.

⁵⁹⁵ Analogically, an appearance never ceases to be an appearance, no matter how sharp the intellectual grasp of it is (see e.g. ÜE 8:210).

⁵⁹⁶ LJ 9:35: “beiden wesentlich verschiedenen Grundvermögen[.]”

⁵⁹⁷ LJ 9:62.

⁵⁹⁸ Axvii–xviii; ÜE 8:217*; LJ 9:35, 62. Kant pointed out the distinction already in the 1770s (ML1 28:229, 240; LB 24:130) but had to keep on emphasizing it as late as 1790s (ÜE 8:217*, 220). Here one should be especially careful with the translations, as sometimes also Deutlichkeit has been translated as ‘clarity.'
achieved “through intuitions, that is, through examples or other illustrations in concreto.” In more general terms, we may speak of perceptual and conceptual distinctness.

Conceptual distinctness, or the distinctness of concepts, comes down to being conscious of their marks. So, the more we pay attention to its marks, the more distinct a concept we get or possess. In other terms, then we determine the concept further (determining can also be understood as linking or adding marks to a concept). This kind of determination does not have to bear any (direct) relation to sensibility, as one can simply analyze the concept to make it more distinct by finding out what is already contained in it, which emphasizes the difference in kind between intuitions and concepts once more. Given our questions, further elaboration on conceptual distinctness would thus be a dead-end, so let us stick to the other kind.

For our purposes, the fundamental difference between the two is this:

Logical distinctness is also totally different from aesthetic distinctness, and the latter can obtain even though we do not represent the object to ourselves by means of concepts at all.[.] While keeping this in mind, let us recall the passage from the *Discovery* on the perception of a house without concepts. There we have canonical Kant talking of non-conceptual perception. Even more importantly for our current purposes, the New Hollander distinguishes (unterscheiden) all the parts of the house, and thus succeeds in representing the object distinctly, although he is not conceptually aware of what he is perceiving.

Accordingly, he does not have a conceptually distinct representation at all; there is only perceptual distinctness to his representation. Or to rephrase the previous quote, he does not represent the object to himself “by means of concepts at all.” In terms of consciousness or awareness, we may infer from this that perceptual awareness (or intuitive awareness in general) is irreducible to conceptual awareness. This also indicates that it is possible that there is no clear representation through concept at all while there is still clarity through intuition. In fact, since Kant points out that

---

599 Axviii: “durch Anschauungen, d. i. Beispiele oder andere Erläuterungen in concreto[.]”
600 EEKU 20:226–227; LJ 9:61–62. To continue from the footnote 224, although Kant may seem to equate concept and intuition in this respect, I do not think that he really means that intuitions have marks as such. Certainly that which through conceptualization is taken as a shared feature (mark) and predicated of an object must be intuitable as well – the hardness of a stone, for example. In this sense, the mark can be said to be found in intuition and called “intuitive” because of this. But in terms of perception, this would only mean perceptually representing some aspect of a thing thanks to a distinct and attentive enough an intuition – the mark itself would still be a part of the conceptual representation in question and represented only if one represents the object in terms of shared features.
601 See LJ 9:35.
602 EEKU 20:227*: “Die logische Deutlichkeit ist auch von der ästhetischen himmweit unterschieden, und die letztere findet statt, ob wir uns gleich den Gegenstand gar nicht durch Begriffe vorstellig machen[.]”
603 See section 4.5., footnote 393.
the New Hollander manages to represent the house *distinctly* because he manages to distinguish its parts, there is a good reason to think that it could have been possible for him to represent the house indistinctly (without distinguishing the parts) yet *clearly* through intuiting the house in the first place. A distinct intuition must hence mean an intuition in which there is awareness to detail in the object perceived. But even if this kind of awareness is missing, the representation must be clear to count as conscious. Actually, if we follow the recent explication of clear representation, this means that the person in question is aware of the house (which he does not recognize as one) in a way that allows him to regard it as different from something else (say, the fence, and again whether or not he recognizes it as one, which, too, underscores that not all perceiving is perceiving-as for Kant).

Perceptual (or sensible) distinctness can also be coined as “the consciousness of the manifold in intuition.” Now, equipped with the clarity-distinctness distinction, we may conclude that singling out gives us clear representations of objects. These can be distinct or indistinct. If they are distinct, there is a consciousness of a manifold. If they are indistinct, there is no such consciousness present. As it is put in the *Jäsche Logic*:

> If we are conscious of the whole representation, but not of the manifold that is contained in it, then the representation is indistinct.\(^6\)

Indeed, to have an indistinct but clear representation is still to be conscious of a whole representation. As we remember, this is something that we can do immediately in a determinate fashion in intuition, but not discursively through concepts. We touched upon this also when we claimed that we do not need to perceive a thing *as* a manifold in order to perceive it, however complex it may turn out to be (or is already known to be, for that matter).

In the same lecture notes, Kant exemplifies this with a perception of a house (which seems to be his favorite example):

> We glimpse a country house in a distance. If we are conscious that the intuited object is a house, then we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, the windows, doors, etc. For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus itself an indistinct representation.\(^7\)

---

\(6\) LJ 9:35: “dem Bewußtsein des Mannigfaltigen in der Anschauung.”

\(6\) LJ 9:34: “Sind wir uns der ganzen Vorstellung bewußt, nicht aber des Mannigfaltigen, das in ihr enthalten ist: so ist die Vorstellung undeutlich.”

\(7\) LJ 9:34: “Wir erblicken in der Ferne ein Landhaus. Sind wir uns bewußt, daß der angeschauete Gegenstand ein Haus ist, so müssen wir nothwendig doch auch eine Vorstellung von den verschiedenen Theilen dieses Hauses, den Fenstern, Thüren u.s.w. haben. Denn sähen wir die Theile nicht, so würden wir auch das Haus
Although Kant’s choice of words (assuming that this is precisely what Kant said in the lectures) can be a little confusing here, the example is most revealing in respect of the notion of consciousness on closer inspection. We should notice especially the following. The necessity of representing the parts comes from being conscious of the object as a house, or “that the intuited object is a house.” This is because houses do have doors and windows; if we saw just a big rectangular block in the distance, we could not be said to be conscious of a house. In this sense, the representation of a house is clear (and thus conscious) only if the relevant house-components are seen.\(^{607}\) But it does not follow from this that the manifold \textit{as such} was consciously represented in the process. Indeed, here Kant wants to make an example of a case in which we do not do that, as “we are not conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts.” In other words, we just take a glimpse of the house without going through all the relevant components that together make a house. If we did that, \textit{then} we would have a distinct representation of it. As Kant puts it in the \textit{Anthropology},

\begin{quote}
when their clarity also extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then called \textit{distinct representations}, whether of thought or intuition.\(^{608}\)
\end{quote}

But that consciousness by means of which the \textit{composition} of representations also becomes clear is called \textit{distinctness}.\(^{609}\)

Sometimes we cannot achieve that. This time Kant’s example would be seeing the Milky Way without a telescope.\(^{610}\) Even then, we would perceive it, and thus be conscious of it.

This clarifies the role of apprehension in conscious representing. Composing a manifold equals finding out and being aware of a structure of distinguishable parts in some plurality. The house, for example, with windows and doors as its parts, makes such a plurality. However, that does not mean (as should be clear by now) that there is only obscurity before representing the house as a unified parts-whole structure. It is just that through “grasping-together” the subject possibly arrives at a more differentiated view on the house; yet that same house can well be perceived without such a view, albeit only indistinctly.

\(^{607}\) Likewise with the ”savage” of the \textit{Jäsche Logic}, Kant’s main point must be that the ”savage” is not conscious of the representation of a house, not that he is not aware of the object knowable as a house (see LJ 9:33).


\(^{609}\) An § 6, 7:137–138: “Dasjenige aber, wodurch auch die \textit{Zusammensetzung} der Vorstellungen klar wird, heißt \textit{Deutlichkeit}.”

\(^{610}\) See LJ 9:35.
It is also different to apprehend an object under the influence of a relevant concept than it is to do it merely perceptually. For example, the concept of house provides a convenient rule for recognizing a certain kind of organization of doors, windows, roof, and so forth. Because of this, it is easy to draw a house or explain (up to a certain point) what kind of a house one’s neighbor has to somebody who has never seen it. But sometimes there is no such guide available for apprehension. Recall again the New Hollander and his only aesthetically distinct representation of the house. As he has no concept of house, neither can he have a ready-made rule that would provide a convenient way for organizing the plurality in question in the correct manner (as required by the concept of house). Thus he cannot apprehend the house under the consciousness indicated by the concept. Instead, he must simply go through the object perceptually. To ask how he manages to represent the house distinctly (instead of something else, or anything at all) would be a wrong question to ask here. Certainly, there must be something in him and in those empirical circumstances that makes him succeed in that. But to carry on with this kind of explanation would be loosing the point and changing the set of questions.

Also recall that the synthesis of apprehension can be a mere effect of imagination. Indeed, it is not the case that going through something perceptually is necessarily an apperceptive act. What makes it a perception in the first place is that there is clarity to the representing itself. Similarly, there can be perception of composition without consciousness of composition, or without reflective stance on the composition itself (in fact, that would already be a thought, not perception). As even animals have imagination and the capacity of recognizing objects (such as their masters and the doors of their stalls), but not the capacity of being conscious of any of this, perceptual “grasping-together” should be seen, minimally, simply as spatiotemporal generation with a focus.

The last point suggests that representations do not become clearer and more distinct just like that. Rather, it all depends on the amount of attention paid to them.\(^{611}\) Thus we may explicate a subject having a clear representation as being (more or less) attentive to it to the extent that he or she can be (more or less) conscious of its difference from other representations. Having a distinct representation means, then, being (more or less) informed of its representational content, or being (more or less) attentive to its complexity. However, as we have seen, neither is identical with being conscious of it according to a concept. On the contrary, the clarity and distinctness involved may well reside in mere intuition.

All this underscores that for Kant sense perception is not unclear or confused thinking because it is not thinking at all. But Kant (unlike Leibniz) also regarded perception as always accompanied by consciousness. Hence a representation that is not a thought may still be conscious. Does this mean that

\[\text{See EEKU 20:226–227*. Here Kant seems to speak of only conceptual distinctness, though. But as we have seen, the same idea can be extended to perceptual distinctness.}\]
unconscious representations do not bear any relevance to the Kantian model? Yes, it does mean that, and in a double manner. If we refer to the “immense” amount of obscure representations that we are not conscious of, then the answer must be (trivially) positive because we do not consciously represent anything through such representations. We can only infer that they are in our minds, or that they have the potential to engage in conscious representation through the refinement of our senses (either contrafactually or factually with the help of some device such as telescope). But the answer is (not so trivially) positive also because the theory that concerns such representations belongs to what Kant calls “physiological anthropology.” This presses further the methodological point that we have made some times already: transcendental philosophy is not supposed to provide an account of such matters.

5.4. On Differentiation

It seems obvious enough that it is one thing to see, hear, touch, smell, or taste, and another thing to understand what is being seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. In like manner, it is one thing to distinguish things from each other, and quite another thing to understand on what basis (or simply how) they differ from each another. In other words, the ability to entertain the thought that certain things are different from each other in this or that respect is very different from having them represented as different merely on the basis of their different qualitative (such as texture) or spatial features (such as location).

As to Kant, recall from above that the mind, through its faculty of imagination, can be “set on making comparisons,” and that this was possible “actually even if not consciously.” Also recall the idea that the subject can distinguish things from each other thanks to the objective senses. Thus at least the senses themselves and imagination must contribute to object differentiation (within the spatiotemporally limited confines, of course). What is more, this indicates that object differentiation does not have to be conscious in any relevant sense of the term in order to be successful. At least the subject does not have to be conceptually conscious of an object in order to distinguish it from something else (this was suggested most recently by the New Hollander case).

In the False Subtlety Kant makes a distinction between logically and physically differentiating (unterscheiden):

---

612 An § 5, 7:135: “unermeßlich[.]”
613 An § 5, 7:136: “physiologischen Anthropologie[.]”
Differentiating logically means recognising that a thing A is not B; it is always a negative judgement. Physically differentiating means being driven to different actions by different representations. The dog differentiates the roast from the loaf, and it does so because the way in which it is affected by the roast is different from the way in which it is affected by the loaf (for different things cause different sensations).\[614\]

This suggests that to logically differentiate two things requires that the subject recognizes that they are different from each other. Physically differentiating, on the other hand, does not require that. Rather, it is based on being affected in different ways when confronted with different things. In the passage this is exemplified with a dog, but I would like to add to this that we human animals are not always any different from that, although we do possess the capacity which allows us to be also quite different in this respect.

In any case, in this early text Kant’s main point is that judgment is not the necessary condition of differentiating, since

it is one thing to differentiate things from each other, and quite another thing to recognise the difference between them. The latter is only possible by means of judgements and cannot occur in the case of animals, who are not endowed with reason.\[615\]

Accordingly, it is possible to differentiate prejudgmentally, and thus without thinking of different things as different, or without having the capacity of thinking at all. Indeed, if the dog differentiated the two things by recognizing “the difference between them,” it would be judging already, which is something it cannot do. Still, what it can do is “to differentiate things from each other,” although without the ability to figure out in what sense they are different (or simply, that they are different).

But suppose that the dog could suddenly do that. This would mean that it has got new faculties; at least understanding and the power of judgment. Let us also suppose that it has received a rich

\[614\] FS 2:60: “Logisch unterscheiden, heißt erkennen, daß ein Ding A nicht B sei, und ist jederzeit ein verneinendes Urtheil, physisch unterscheiden, heißt, durch verschiedene Vorstellungen zu verschiedenen Handlungen getrieben werden. Der Hund unterscheidet den Braten vom Brote, weil er anders vom Braten, als vom Brote gerührt wird (denn verschiedene Dinge verursachen verschiedene Empfindungen).”

\[615\] FS 2:59: “es ist ganz was anders Dinge von einander unterscheiden und den Unterschied der Dinge erkennen. Das letztere ist nur durch Urtheilen möglich und kann von keinem unvernünftigen Thiere geschehen.” I believe that from this follows that the dog’s object differentiation involves consciousness. In other words, it is not mere behavior (Ameriks 2000, 242). See also ibid., 295n10, according to which Kant’s occasional claims about animals lacking consciousness mean just that animals do not judge.
Perception and Consciousness

repertoire of empirical concepts overnight.\textsuperscript{616} Now it may think: “But how lovely this roast smells!” Then it notices the loaf and adds, cunningly: “This roast is much better than that loaf, so I am going to eat the roast and leave the loaf to the cat.” However, although the dog’s cognitive situation has changed dramatically, as its options for grasping things have been multiplied, it can be claimed that the foundation of distinguishing the two foods from each other has not changed one little bit. Indeed, all the perceptual differences are still represented in those very same objects of perception, not in (or between) the newly acquired conceptions of those objects. That is, it does not matter in how complicated or intellectual a manner the dog becomes aware of the differences between the roast and loaf; their difference is nevertheless ultimately \textit{grounded} on sensations with their distinct qualitative impacts on the subject. In short, differentiating \textit{per se} continues the same canine ways as it did before the dog’s cognitive transformation.

Such a primitive sensationally-grounded awareness of difference is close to a feeling. For example, we could say that red differs from green by having its own kind of feel to it. Indeed, it would not be that far-fetched to claim that we are perfectly aware of the difference in the affection itself. Certainly, such a claim has a subjective and inward echo to it, but is there a problem with that? There might be if we stuck exclusively, say, to qualities like smells. But a similar point can be made in respect of distinctly spatial features as well. This is an important move, as it not only adds spatial orientation to the picture, but switches the viewpoint from sensuous to intuitive content.

It can be claimed that merely qualitative or sensational differences could not be enough for object differentiation because then qualitatively identical things would be indiscernible.\textsuperscript{617} Object differentiation must thus lay ultimately on differences in location. Given that these depend on the forms of sensibility, object differentiation itself must do so, which links it (and the faculty of distinguishing with it) necessarily to intuition. Like physically differentiating, this is not (foundationally speaking) a conceptual matter, or something that is based on our concepts, or on our characterizations of objects. In terms of spatial orientation, the differences \textit{as such} are only intuitable. This is something that Kant recognized already in his inaugural dissertation:

\textsuperscript{616} This is just for the sake of argument in order to show the irrelevance of empirical concepts here. The conclusion would be even more obvious under the presupposition that the dog is only just forming its first empirical concept ever.

\textsuperscript{617} Obviously, this can be considered as a part of the attack against the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles (see A271–271/B327–328). However, I am here simply pointing out the foundation of perceptual differentiation while ignoring what extends to grand-scale metaphysical matters, for which the Kantian answer is ultimately based on the necessity of taking things as appearances instead of things in themselves.
Which things in a given space lie in one direction and which things incline in the opposite direction cannot be described discursively nor reduced to characteristic marks of the understanding by any astuteness of the mind.\textsuperscript{618}

This also reflects that it is one thing to distinguish objects from each other perceptually in intuition (or on the basis of one), and quite another thing to base the difference on one’s knowledge of them. Indeed, however much and however precisely we analyze or describe them, the sensible basis of differentiation does not change.\textsuperscript{619} So, here we have it again: that there are two kinds of representations that are not just fundamentally different but mutually irreducible.

To borrow an apt term from the secondary literature, intuitions are “essentially indexical.”\textsuperscript{620} This can be exemplified with incongruent counterparts. Recall the two hands, the point being that the thisness of this and that other hand is ultimately grounded on intuition.\textsuperscript{621} Not only would it be impossible to pinpoint the hands without turning to intuition, but it would also be impossible to notice their ultimate difference if the sensible information provided through intuition were unavailable. This is because the two hands differ only spatially (not only in location but also in their exact spatial configurations through their specific manner of occupying their location). In Kant’s words, the difference between any such otherwise identical objects “reveals itself only through the outer relation in space.”\textsuperscript{622}

Someone might object to this by claiming that the counterparts had to be identical, which would be an idealization, and conclude that it cannot actually be the case that the two hands make such counterparts. However, not only is the identicalness claim made for the sake of argument, but Kant’s ultimate point would be even stronger for our purposes under the assumption that the two hands are simply perceived to be otherwise identical. This is because then all we need is that the two representational contents in question are indistinguishable in terms of consciousness, and thus in terms of perception, and thus for the perceiver himself or herself, unless they are grounded on intuition. That is, the noted difference is not up to the knowledge of those objects more than it is up to any obscure sensations involved. So, from the viewpoint of the perceiver, it is enough that the left hand appears like the right hand, except for its different location and the way it occupies that, the recognition of which would be something that can only be grounded on intuition.

\textsuperscript{618} ID § 15, 2:403: “Quae iaceant in spatio dato unam plagam versus, quae in oppositam vergant, discursiv e describi s. ad notas intellectuales revocari nulla mentis acie possunt[.]”

\textsuperscript{619} In other words, it is one thing to compare concepts, and another thing to compare appearances or things (Longuenesse 2000, 137, 144). More than that, there are always “sensible determinations” (ibid., 137) still left.

\textsuperscript{620} Hanna 2005, 266.

\textsuperscript{621} See section 3.2.

\textsuperscript{622} P § 13, 4:286: “sich nur durch das äußere Verhältniß im Raume offenbart.”
Accordingly, ‘right’ and ‘left’ are just nametags for the two intuitions, and the absolutely necessary cognitive input provided through the latter is independent of the former. What is more, we can be perfectly aware of this, just like we can be aware of being affected.\footnote{See e.g. R 5661, 18:319 (1788–1790); An § 19, 7:156.} In fact, Kant thinks that we are aware of the dualist character of our mental constitution itself:

\begin{quote}
I notice in my experience a duality: intuition, which rests on the senses and is called empirical intuition; and concept, which does not rest on the senses but [...] on the understanding.\footnote{MM 29:795: “Ich bemerke in meiner Erfahrung zweyerley: Anschauung, die beruht auf den Sinnen und heißt empirische Anschauung und Begriff, der beruht nicht auf den Sinnen sondern [...] beruht also auf dem Verstande.” (Original emphasis omitted and replaced with my own.)}
\end{quote}

Also Kant’s definition of congruence in the \emph{Metaphysical Foundations} is revealing here, as it shows that it (and thus presumably incongruence, too) is cognizable “only in intuition.”\footnote{MAN 4:493: “nur in der Anschauung erkannt werden kann[.]”} In the bigger scheme of things, this must mean that we can well be aware of things and their differences on merely sensible terms.

However, this is not all there is to the story. To intuit is not simply to particularize objects but, at the same time, to orientate oneself in relation to objects. As it is put in one of Kant’s notes we quoted above: “We are first object of outer sense for ourselves, for otherwise we would not be able to perceive our place in the world and to intuit ourselves in relation to other things.” In this sense, differentiation is fundamentally linked to our capacity of locating ourselves in the environment in relation to anything that there happens to be in it. To this belongs more than just outer relations as such. In his another short text, \emph{What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking}, Kant uses the notion of the feeling of difference (das Gefühl eines Unterschiedes). With this notion Kant aims to show that orientation in general is also based on the even more fundamental capacity than the capacity of outer intuitions:

\begin{quote}
I also need the feeling of a difference in my own subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these two sides outwardly display no designatable difference in intuition.\footnote{WDO 8:134–135: “Zu diesem Behuf bedarf ich aber durchaus das Gefühl eines Unterschiedes an meinem eigenen Subject, nämlich der rechten und linken Hand. Ich nenne es ein Gefühl: weil diese zwei Seiten äußerlich in der Anschauung keinen merklichen Unterschied zeigen.” See also GUGR 2:380–381 – it seems that nothing changed in this respect between 1768 and 1786.}
\end{quote}
Presumably, Kant calls it a feeling because the directionality itself is supposed to be totally independent of objects. We have, as it were, a built-in compass in us, which allows us to represent right, left, up, down, and so forth, wholly from ourselves.

Kant’s first example of this features an astronomer. Here is the passage in full:

If I did not have this faculty of distinguishing, without the need of any difference in the objects, between moving from left to right and right to left and moving in the opposite direction and thereby determining a priori a difference in the position of the object, then in describing a circle I would not know whether west was right or left of the southernmost point of the horizon, or whether I should complete the circle by moving north and east and thus back to south. Thus even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically only through a subjective ground of differentiation; and if all the constellations, though keeping the same shape and position relative to one another, were one day by a miracle to be reversed in their direction, so that what was east now became west, no human eye would notice the slightest alteration on the next bright starlit night, and even the astronomer – if he pays attention to only what he sees and not at the same time to what he feels – would inevitably become disoriented. But in fact the faculty of making distinctions through the feeling of right and left comes naturally to his aid – it is a faculty implanted by nature but made habitual through frequent practice. If only he fixes his eye on the Pole Star, he will be able not only to notice the alteration which has taken place, but in spite of it he will also be able to orient himself.627

The passage contains several interesting details. For our current purposes, we should notice especially the following. As Kant sees it, the faculty of distinguishing can operate without the need for the objects (and hence sensations) providing the basis for its operation. That is, the ground of differentiating can also be provided from within (a priori, that is). This makes it subjective. But it can be operative simultaneously with the object-dependent differentiating. In the passage, the astronomer

627 WDO 8:135: “Ohne dieses Vermögen: in der Beschreibung eines Cirkels, ohne an ihm irgend eine Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände zu bedürfen, doch die Bewegung von der Linken zur Rechten von der in entgegengesetzter Richtung zu unterscheiden und dadurch eine Verschiedenheit in der Lage der Gegenstände a priori zu bestimmen, würde ich nicht wissen, ob ich Westen dem Südpunkte des Horizonts zur Rechten oder zur Linken setzen und so den Kreis durch Norden und Osten bis wieder zu Süden vollenden sollte. Also orientire ich mich geographisch bei allen objectiven Datis am Himmel doch nur durch einen subjectiven Unterscheidungsgrund; und wenn in einem Tage durch ein Wunder alle Sternbilder zwar übrigens dieselbe Gestalt und eben dieselbe Stellung gegen einander behielten, nur daß die Richtung derselben, die sonst östlich war, jetzt westlich geworden wäre, so würde in der nächsten sternhellen Nacht zwar kein menschliches Auge die geringste Veränderung bemerken, und selbst der Astronom, wenn er bloß auf das, was er sieht, und nicht zugleich, was er fühlt, Acht gäbe, Acht gäbe, würde sich unvermeidlich desorientire. So aber kommt ihm ganz natürlich das zwar durch die Natur angelegte, aber durch öftere Ausübung gewohnte Unterscheidungsvermögen durchs Gefühl der rechten und linken Hand zu Hülfe; und er wird, wenn er nur den Polarstern ins Auge nimmt, nicht allein die vorgegangene Veränderung bemerken, sondern sich auch ungeachtet derselben orientire können.”
either “pays attention to only what he sees” or “at the same time to what he feels.” Indeed, in this imaginary scenario disorientation is supposed to follow when the latter ground of differentiation is gone, from which we may infer that this very primitive foundation of directionality is something quite necessary for our successful coping with our environment. Furthermore, as a mere feeling and all, there is not the slightest indication on Kant’s part that it would be dependent on concepts.

Kant then goes on to make a similar point with a dark room where the locations of furniture have been changed while the protagonist was sleeping, the point being that the ability to orient oneself is not affected thereby. In other words, this ability is ultimately based not on empirically (re)locating the furniture through the sense of touch, but on the subject’s sense of directions that lies in himself or herself independently of the locations of empirically given objects. With this example Kant aims to claim something universal of orienting oneself “in any given space in general,” the ultimate point still being that this is all up to “the faculty for determining position according to a subjective ground of differentiation: for I do not see at all the objects whose place I am to find.”

In this section, we have gone through three non-conceptual grounds of differentiation. The first concerns differentiating things on the basis of different sensations through different affections. The second concerns differentiating things due to their different locations in intuition, even if they are otherwise identical. The third concerns differentiating directions themselves, even without the presence of things. Together the three allow the subject not only to sensibly distinguish things from each other, but also position himself or herself in the environment as a whole (or in the world if you like).

5.5. Methodological Concerns

The notion of consciousness leads to some tricky methodological and metatheoretical issues (some of which we have touched above). I will deal with two such issues in this section. The first is what I call intratheoretical blindness. The second can be dubbed the transparency problem. Whereas the former concerns the consistency of Kant’s thinking in constructing his model, the latter concerns the possibility of assembling any such model in the first place. I will be brief with both and keep the focus on perception.

628 WDO 8:135: “in einem gegebenen Raum überhaupt[
h]”

629 WDO 8:135: “das Bestimmungsvermögen der Lagen nach einem subjectiven Unterscheidungsgrunde: denn
die Objecte, deren Stelle ich finden soll, sehe ich gar nicht[,]” (Emphases omitted.) Kant aims at a systematic representation of the notion of orientation here: the former example concerned orienting oneself geometrically, this one concerns orienting oneself mathematically, which is followed by orienting oneself logically (WDO 8:136).
When Kant is read in a certain way, he can be criticized of establishing notions or postulating theoretical items that are beyond the actual reach of an actual subject depicted by his model. Blind intuitions make a perfect case: if we follow such a reading, we are not allowed to speak of them in isolation as anything for the subject. So, basically, either we have Kant making claims within his own theory that cannot be sustained by the very same theory (at least when regarded from the point of view of an actual cognizer), or we interpret him in a way that shows that there is no such grand-scale confusion going on.

What we have established so far indicates that blind intuitions do not pose a real problem to Kant’s approach. Accordingly, intratheoretical blindness is a pseudo problem generated through reading too much into the infamous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind. As I have argued, blind intuitions should be seen simply as non-understood representations, but as genuine representations nonetheless. After examining Kant’s multidimensional notion of consciousness, we may add to this that blind intuitions need not even be obscure, but can be as clear and distinct as any conscious representations. It is not that concepts make them conscious; indeed, concepts have nothing whatsoever to do with the kind of perceptual awareness provided through aesthetic clarity or distinctness in intuition.

There is nothing strange in this. When I see a tree I intuit a tree. Surely I know what trees are. In fact, I think that I possess quite a specific concept of tree. Then again, the point is that there is no necessary relation between having a clear (and possibly distinct) perceptual view on the tree and possessing the concept in question. A further point is that I may think of the tree as I like. There is no such freedom to perceiving the tree. Indeed, I would continue to perceive it in a tree-like manner even if I lost the concept just like the imaginary dog would continue to differentiate between the roast and loaf ultimately the same way as before.

Certainly, I may not think of the tree as I like if my concept and intuition are to match in some cognitively fruitful way. But again, that would be beside the main point: namely, that intuiting the tree is not up to concepts. To be aware of the tree in perception through empirical intuition is one thing. To be aware of it through a concept, or to think of it under one, is another thing. The two do not fuse, one could say. Nor are the two interdependent from the viewpoint of perception per se, but from the viewpoint of perceptually informed thought. To be perceptually aware of the tree would be possible even if I never had any concepts whatsoever and would be gaping at everything. In this particular case, I would still be gaping at the tree.

Why is it so easy for some to conceive that we can possess and use concepts without intuitions, but so hard to conceive that we can intuit without concepts? In other words, what makes it so that the

---

630 For a reading in which a lot is made of this supposed “blindness thesis,” see Falkenstein 1995. For criticism, see Dickerson 2004, 127n57.
“emptiness” claim is seen as referring to the acceptable case of experientially non-verifiable thought content, whereas the “blindness” claim is seen as referring to the impossible scenario of non-conceptual representation? I do not have an answer ready because to my mind both possibilities are not only plausible but commonly actual. Of course, if this turns into a battle of competing introspections, it is fair to ask whether there are any prospects of winning it.

In any event, to Kant the isolation of the faculties was not only absolutely necessary, but most likely unproblematic as well. In fact, as we have seen, Kant does not see problems in “isolated” representing as such. Rather, it is just that with blind intuition and empty thought we cannot end up with cognition “in the proper sense.” To this we should add that these are not intratheoretical problems peculiar to the Kantian model, but generalizable explanations of actual cognitive limitations of the human subject in possible cognitive situations where there is either no concept or intuition available.

In terms of the conscious mind as a whole, the possibility of “isolated” representing suggests that just as representing is not limited to understanding, consciousness itself is not owned by the latter (or any other faculty for that matter). Instead, it is something common to both sensibility and understanding. Kant comes very close to saying this in the following passage:

If one says: the understanding is a faculty of more distinct cognitions, then this is falsely defined, for sensibility still rests ultimately on consciousness. But consciousness is necessary for all cognition and representations, accordingly sensible cognitions can also be distinct.

Here it seems that it is due to this dualist character of consciousness itself that “sensible cognition can also be distinct.” This indicates not only that the two faculties have their own manners of providing awareness of things, but that the two are parallel to each other. In the bigger scheme of things, this suggests that nor are the two faculties themselves fused together. Again, there should be nothing too odd in this, as it only means that whatever is represented sensibly or aesthetically is not reducible to (or exhaustible by) an intellectual representation. Take a feeling of pain, for example. One’s concept of pain is never equal to the peculiar sensible character of the outcome of hitting one’s finger with a hammer. Indeed, we could go further and claim that we are perfectly aware of the difference to the extent that in the end our mediate knowledge of pain has nothing whatsoever to do with being aware of the immediate feeling itself.

---

631 See e.g. A51–52/B75–76.
632 ML1 28:240: “Wenn man sagt: der Verstand is ein Vermögen deutlicher Erkenntnisse; so ist dieses falsch definiirt; denn sie Sinnlichkeit beruht doch zuletzt auf dem Bewußstseyn. Das Bewußtseyn ist aber zu allen Erkenntnissen und Vorstellungen nöthig; demnach können sinnliche Erkenntnisse auch deutlich seyn.”
633 ML1 28:240.
What is more, this kind of awareness is not limited to empirical representation. As Kant puts it in one of his lectures, right after introducing the forms of intuition:

Consciousness teaches that they are present in us, and they are cognized preexisting before all intuition of sensible objects, therefore present necessarily and generally.\(^{634}\)

This suggests that we can be aware of space and time as \textit{a priori} forms as well. That is, it is not just that these must be presupposed to account for the differences in and between objects, but that we can represent the “objectlessness” itself that grounds those differences and makes representing actual spatiotemporal objects possible (although, to be sure, we could not do this if there was nothing real in the first place).\(^{635}\)

Positively speaking, this is just to say that we can verify the presupposition and ask whether or not it makes sense to establish such a transcendental ground. Perhaps otherwise the status of space and time as \textit{a priori} forms could not even be argued for. On the negative side, however, it can also be argued that at points like this Kant resorts to introspection, which makes the basis of his theory “psychological.” And this, it can be claimed, has the problematic consequence that it is then grounded on what “our consciousness […] teaches us” which would be just the kind of method that cannot carry any necessity and universality with it.

This leads to a huge issue, the elaboration of which would either lead us to a side-track or extend the book too much.\(^{636}\) So, let me point out simply the following. As should be clear at this stage, we have adopted an anti- or non-psychological reading of Kant. However, to completely deny the obviously “psychological” sound there is to some of the claims made by Kant (and by me) would be a delusion (here we go again). In fact, I would like to go as far as to say that it would be nonsense to claim that some such model could be assembled without leaning on the introspective level at all. Take perception, for instance. How could we ever establish anything about this common phenomenon without consulting what we know about it personally and hence psychologically? The answer should be plain: we just could not. If this makes the model “psychologist” then so be it because in the end any such model must be that to some extent.

Even then, Kant’s approach is very different from establishing something about perception by simply taking heed of what goes on in us when we perceive and experience things. In this sense, the model is not psychological. Nor is the method experiential. Indeed, that would be the worst option

\(^{634}\) MK3 29:974: “Daß sie in uns vorhanden sind, lehrt das Bewuβtseyn, und sie werden praexistirend vor aller Anschauung sinnlicher Objecte erkannt, mithin nothwendig und allgemein vorhanden.”

\(^{635}\) See A292/B349.

\(^{636}\) For more on the supposed “psychologist” character of Kant’s method, consult Hatfield 1990, especially 77–87, 110, 243–244.
because then we would have but a list of psychological states, possibly with some law-like connections between them, all based on particular empirical situations. This, however, is not the case with Kant’s transcendental method which succeeds in making reasonable claims that are quite independent of the unique circumstances of actual perceptual experiences.

There is also the option to do it all “psychologically” but in another sense, namely, in terms of subconscious sensory processes or subsystems underlying conscious perception. Evidently, some of Kant’s followers took this route, most notably Helmholtz. Then again, such approaches, however Kantian they are supposed to be, take the issue to a wholly different level (perhaps even to the extent that they have practically nothing to do with the original Kant anymore). In addition to what we have established about the topic so far, this should be clear from the fact that there is barely nothing on perception as informed by optics (such as distance perception) or physiology (such as eye movements) in the Kantian corpus. Furthermore, even if there was something significant on such topics, it would only reflect Kant’s opinion within physiological anthropology or some other body of empirical research.

This is not to say that unconscious operations underlying perception have no role in the transcendental vocabulary. We have seen that they have, and that their role is of great importance. Take reproduction, for example. It is not the case that it involves active remembering (or anything like that). Rather, it is a capacity that keeps perceptual experience going, whether or not we are conscious of its operations. As such, the reproductive synthesis is just a mere effect of imagination. Still, it is one of the absolutely necessary items in the Kantian model.

How does this differ from the underlying sensory processes in the data processing model? In the important way that all these operations (or representations) Kant speaks of as a transcendental philosopher must nevertheless be open for introspective verification. That is, although such operations (or representations) can well be unconscious in actual representing, they must be realizable by the conscious mind in its representings, in one way or another. If they were not like that, then they would have to lie beyond the transcendental method as well because then they would not be representable a priori either. In other words, the theoretical items of the Kantian model must be traceable to some conscious representing or another. Subconscious sensory processes are not like that.

637 See Hatfield 1990, 167, 199–208. Most interestingly for our purposes, even though Helmholtz wanted to break down the sensibility-understanding dualism by showing that intuitions reduce to thoughts – or that both reduce to the same processes governed by the laws of association (ibid., 204, 216) – at least he got his Kant right in regarding that for Kant intuitions were not only non-thoughts but – to use Hatfield’s phrase – “arose without the activity of the understanding” (ibid., 203).

638 Cf. Falkenstein 1995, 71: “The way to successful reading of the first parts of the Critique begins with taking intuitions to be just immediately given data for the cognitive process.” In terms of the present section, such a reading could be criticized for pushing intuitions into the middle of the data processing story and thus out of the reach of the subject’s personal level representational content by definition.
Light rays hitting our eyes and producing retinal images are not like that. Perceptual atoms (were there such things) would not be like that. As such, these should not be even called obscure because to be that they would have to be potentially clear as representations (which they are not; it is rather that they are not representational at all).

Let us take again the reproductive synthesis as our example. What can be (and basically is) a mere effect of imagination can be applied a priori as well. Kant’s own examples would be drawing a line in thought, thinking of the time from noon to noon, and representing a number.\(^{639}\) To do these, it is required that we can keep track of the previous representation (say, the line drawn so far) while we proceed to the next one (say, a further addition to the line). As we remember, reproduction answers for this. However, methodologically speaking, the point would be that we do not need any empirical stuff for this. Indeed, the synthesis itself is being carried out in an a priori manner here, as it must be “in regard to representations that are not empirical.” To be sure, one could claim that in Kant’s examples at least noon is an empirical concept, but Kant’s point must be that the representing in question can be carried out without turning to actual empirical data, thereby revealing an a priori synthesis.\(^{640}\)

As we have seen, there must be reproduction of representations going on in mere perception, too. Even if we did not actually (consciously) reproduce anything when we perceive, say, a turtle strolling from the starting line to finish, we can make the operation representable to us. All we need to do is take the effort of taking notice how the turtle was first there, then here and not there, then there and not here, and so forth. Cutting the perceptual episode into individual scenes in this way allows us to represent the reproduction itself (which, to be sure, would be operative also without representing it). In faculty-talk, if something like this was not possible, it would mean that we do not have a priori imagination. But we are perfectly aware that we do have that. Even more importantly, this shows that the synthesis going on in a posteriori representing is formally identical with the one carried out wholly a priori (just like an imagining and perception are formally identical, although now we are speaking of operations instead of representations).

Hence, imagination is not just a subconscious processing unit. Rather, imagination is a representational unit that can operate at both a priori and a posteriori levels, the operations themselves being anything from unconscious to conscious (including barely/rarely conscious) and thus possibly something for the subject. In other words, imagination and its operations are potentially conscious in a commonsensical manner, whereas any scientific facts about the sensory system, or the strictly subpersonal processes underlying our representational activity, must be found out through a totally different kind of (say, inductive) method that has nothing to do with philosophical investigation.

---

\(^{639}\) A102.

\(^{640}\) Cf. A713–714/B741–742, where Kant’s example is constructing the geometrical concept of triangle.
What I am suggesting here is that we should take a concrete or robust approach to all these building blocks Kant uses in assembling his model. As such, they are not simply theoretical constructions, mere postulates, or the best possible explanatory assumptions made in order to build as coherent a theory as possible. Instead, they are something that everyone can verify in his or her own representational undertakings.

I am, of course, well aware that it is possible to take a lot more critical or skeptical stance towards Kant’s model. For example, it could be claimed that even though there might be some truth to it, in the end it is nevertheless arbitrary or ad hoc. Why postulate this instead of that as necessary? Is the catalog of faculties and their operations complete? Is it not so that it only reflects the body of knowledge of its time? Then again, whatever the answers to these questions are, there are reasons for not being too severe here. To begin with, without some set of assumptions some such theory would be simply impossible. Secondly, what may appear as implausible in itself can well have important heuristic purport. Take the faculties, for example. Even if we took them as concrete compartments of the mind (not that we do or Kant did) they might still show value in explaining human cognition (most explicitly by showing its many-sidedness). If so, it would not be that relevant whether we actually committed ourselves to the faculty psychology, or whether we just took the faculties in purely theoretical terms as convenient names for different mental operations and outputs. Thirdly, and most importantly, if one really tries to figure out Kant’s way of thinking (as we do) one might as well try and be a true believer of the transparency of mind.

That Kant was, to some extent, such a believer can be displayed by the following passage:

I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this. In such acts the understanding always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination that it thinks, to the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly affected by this means, everyone will be able to perceive in himself.641

Here, Kant comes very close to saying that everybody can first-handedly perceive how the faculties relate to one another. It is as if by paying attention to something one is at the same time opening the possibility of paying attention to the faculties themselves, and to the representations peculiar to them. We could also turn to previously quoted passages. For example, we were recently presented with the idea that we can notice the duality in our experience, which implies that we can first-handedly see that

---

our senses (and thus intuitions) are distinct from our understanding (and thus from concepts). Earlier we were confronted, among other things, with the “hidden art in the depths of the human soul” which is nonetheless something that can be dug out, even if “only with difficulty.” In a more general vein, we can find Kant speaking rather optimistically of “a priori cognition, the supply of which, since we do not need to search for it externally, cannot remain hidden from us.”

The same positive tendency continues with reflection (Überlegung, Reflexion). There has only been some loose use of the notion above, so let us give it a closer look. In the Critique, reflection is given two explications. According to the first one, reflection is

the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts.

In this sense, reflection plays a key role in concept formation. A similar explication is given in the First Introduction:

To reflect (to consider) […] is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible.

But reflection serves a more general purpose as well, as the second clarification of the term in the Critique reveals:

It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition, through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly determined.

This kind of awareness-talk refers to the possibility of finding out from which of the faculties (sensibility or understanding) some given representation originates, and hence to the possibility of attending the faculties and the representational grounds as such. The kind of reflection involved is known as transcendental reflection:

642 A13/B26: “Erkenntniss a priori […] dessen Vorrath, weil wir ihn doch nicht auswärzig suchen dürfen, uns nicht verborgen bleiben kann[,]” See also e.g. A210/B256.
643 A260/B316: “der Zustand des Gemüths, in welchem wir uns zuerst dazu anschicken, um die subjectiven Bedingungen ausfindig zu machen, unter denen wir zu Begriffen gelangen können.”
644 EKU V, 20:211: “Reflectiren (Überlegen) aber ist: gegebene Vorstellungen entweder mit andern, oder mit seinem Erkenntnissvermögen, in Beziehung auf einen dadurch möglichen Begriff, zu vergleichen und zusammen zu halten.”
The action through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I call **transcendental reflection**.\(^{646}\)

Here ‘transcendental’ indicates that the faculties are approachable (and approached) as pure, without having anything empirical in them. This is further supported by ‘representations in general’ which implies that no particular empirical representations are meant. Even then, the reflection in question deals with the content of representations in the sense that it takes into consideration whether they are intellectual or sensible; otherwise reflection would be merely *logical*.\(^{647}\)

This indicates that transcendental reflection must play an important role within transcendental philosophy itself. The latter would not be a possible enterprise unless we could not “see to which power of cognition a cognition belongs.”\(^{648}\) In this sense, reflection must have something to do with introspection as well.\(^{649}\) To be sure, it is not easy to be certain to what extent this is so, partly due to the fact that Kant does not spill ink on explicating what he means by reflection.\(^{650}\)

Fortunately, nothing depends on that. And we should keep the focus on perception in any case. So, is reflection necessary for perception? I think not. In addition to playing a necessary role in concept formation, reflection is explicitly stated in the *Critique* to be judgment-oriented activity:

> But all judgments, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e., a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong.\(^{651}\)

---

\(^{646}\) A261/B317: “Die Handlung, dadurch ich die Vergleic hung der Vorstellungen überhaupt mit der Erkenntnißkraft zusammenhalte, darin sie angestellt wird, und wodurch ich unterscheide, ob sie als zum reinen Verstande oder zur sinnlichen Anschauung gehörend unter einander verglichen werden, nenne ich die transscendentale Überlegung.”

\(^{647}\) See A262–263/B318–319.

\(^{648}\) LJ 9:73: “sehen, zu welcher Erkenntnißkraft ein Erkenntniß gehöre[,]” For the fact that understanding and sensibility are meant by these powers, see A261–261/B317–318; LJ 9:76. That the distinction between intuitions and concepts itself is achieved through reflection is suggested by LJ 9:35–36.

\(^{649}\) Pace Longuenesse 2000, 113–114n22, according to which Kant does not refer by ‘reflection’ to any kind of transparency of the mind or introspection. I disagree: at least in some instances of representation – including those involved in doing transcendental philosophy – reflection involves necessarily a kind of introspection and the possibility of discovering which of the faculties is responsible for a given kind of content.

\(^{650}\) In fact, reflection seems to be one of those notions that we continue to use today without worrying over its exact meaning. Cf. Sosa 2004, 149, according to which reflection involves “some combination of introspection and memory, along with intuition and inferential reason.”

\(^{651}\) A261/B317: “Aber alle Urtheile, ja alle Vergleichtungen bedürfen einer Überlegung, d.i. einer Unterscheidung der Erkenntnißkraft, worzu die gegebenen Begriffe gehören.” That the comparison in question must be of the judgmental variety is supported by Kant’s view that animals are capable of comparing but not of judging.
This makes sense because it is up to judging to decide (possibly mistakenly) whether something is the case, which is not possible directly or immediately. Indeed, it must be in this sense that reflection “must precede all judging.” Moreover, the possible error is in the judgment anyway, and thus in the faculty of understanding; accordingly, reflection must have something to do with noticing such faculty-related affairs from a higher vantage point.

The common example of an oar looking bent in the water serves well here. Suppose that we judge that water has the capacity to bend oars (we might back this up with the additional judgment that air has the capacity to make them straight). If we do so we let the sensibility lead the way. The confusion itself is nevertheless in our judgment, not in the appearances. In other words, we have not reflected enough on the issue, or have taken “a false step of judgment,” as we have not come to realize that things only look that way. But perceptually we got it right from the start; it would be incorrect (nonsensical even) to claim that we saw them wrongly. Thus reflection does not concern perception as such, but taking notice of the representational ground on the basis of which to pass judgment. Here that would be sensibility, although it should be understanding.

Kant does seem to speak of the necessity of reflection also in perception at one point, namely, in the lectures on metaphysics from mid-1770s, where he is reported to have said this:

> We must not believe that all cognitions of the senses come from the senses; but rather also from the understanding, which reflects upon objects which the senses offer us, through which we then obtain sensible cognitions. In such a way there arises with us a fallacy of subreption, in that because we have been accustomed since childhood to imagine everything through the senses, we do not notice the reflection of the understanding upon the senses, and take cognitions to be immediate intuitions of the senses.

To be sure, Kant makes here an apt point of the significant role of habituation in all our cognitive undertakings, perception included. Through habituation certain things just become too obvious to us. What he does not say, however, is that all perception is necessarily intellectually reflected. In fact, as he goes on, it becomes clear that he does not really have perception in mind at all. This is especially

---

652 LJ 9:76: “allem Urtheilen vorhergehen muß.”
653 See P 4:290.
654 A376: “einem Fehltritte der Urtheilskraft[.]”
655 ML1 28:232: “Wir müssen nicht glauben, daß alle Erkenntnisse der Sinne aus den Sinnen kommen; sondern auch aus dem Verstande, der über die Gegenstände, die uns die Sinne darbieten, reflectirt, wodurch wir denn die sinnlichen Erkenntnisse erhalten. Auf solche Weise entspringt bei uns das vitium subreptionis; indem, weil wir uns von Jugend auf angewöhnt haben, uns alles durch die Sinne vorzustellen, wir die Reflexionen des Verstandes über die Sinne nicht bemerken, und die Erkenntnisse für unmittelbare Anschauung der Sinne halten.”
evident when he moves directly from pointing out that we get “the matter and the stuff”\textsuperscript{656} from the senses to emphasizing that “the form of concepts”\textsuperscript{657} comes from the understanding. In the process, he not only forgets the matter-form structure of intuition (which was to become the keystone of his model), but keeps the focus on concepts all along. Accordingly, what is really meant in the passage is that we should not be fooled to take our “automated” applying of empirical (sensible) concepts as mere intuiting, and thus of only sensible origin.

This is not to say that our perceptual undertakings are all free of reflection. Quite the contrary, I am willing to grant an important role to reflection in perceptual experience in general (as I think Kant would, too). The point is, however, that this should be done with two reservations. The first is that reflection should not be taken as necessary for perception (or to really press the point, for particularizing and apprehension as such). The second reservation is that the very moment perception becomes reflective, it turns into observation.\textsuperscript{658} And that is already perceptually informed thought, not mere perception.

We should also notice that even animals are capable of reflecting, “although only instinctly.”\textsuperscript{659} This piece of evidence could be used to argue that there is no necessary connection between reflecting and understanding and its concepts (because animals do not have the latter). That is, it could be claimed that even if there is reflecting going on, it does not need to be conceptual in character (perception and bodily orientation being the best candidates for such non-conceptual activity). But as textual evidence is so minimal, it is better not to take a stand on this. Even then, we may establish the following. Transcendental reflection provides for mere perception a vantage point thanks to which it can be judged upon. This vantage point goes far beyond empirical representing into the very roots of the transcendental method itself.\textsuperscript{660} This, however, does not make it necessary for actual perception more than any of the transcendental considerations have to become part of the subject’s actual cognitive undertakings, the possibility of which they are supposed to explain.

\textsuperscript{656} ML1 28:232: “die Materie und den Stoff[.]” (Emphasis omitted.)
\textsuperscript{657} ML1 28:232: “die Form der Begriffe[.]” (The latter emphasis mine.)
\textsuperscript{658} Cf. KU § 10, 5:220, where Kant speaks of observing purposiveness, which cannot take place but through reflection.
\textsuperscript{659} EEKU V, 20:211: “obzwar nur instinctmäßig[.]”
\textsuperscript{660} In the Critique, the title of the section in which reflection is discussed is in itself a good indication of this: On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental (Von der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe durch die Verwechselung des empirischen Verstandesgebrauchs mit dem transsscdentalen, A260–292/B316–349).
5.6. Unities and Synthesis, Again

The methodological (and other) considerations of the previous section bring us directly back to the categories. While the latter are obviously possibly realizable by the subject, it must also apply to them that even if they are not explicitly thought of, they might still be being somehow utilized in the subject’s mental undertakings. For example, Substance is necessary for property predicating, whereas actual thinking in terms of such a highly abstract concept is definitely not. Or to really press the point, Kant cannot mean that we must subsume, in a self-reflective manner, the ordinary objects of our environment under Substance (or any other category) in order to have thoughts of them. Even then, Substance, or rather the categorical consciousness to which this highly abstract concept refers, can be said to enter these representings.

From this one could go on to claim that the categories are the preconditions of the possibility of (meaningful) representation, whether or not we are conscious of them in our actual representings. A similar point can be made with the unity of apperception: it is not that we have to explicitly add “I think” to every thought of ours (or utter it as we think), yet such a possibility preconditions our thinking. In terms of operations, this line of thought may suggest that all syntheses are preconditioned by the categories, which would make every possible synthesis categorical. In terms of faculties, the point would be that since understanding is the categorical faculty, not only all synthesis but imagination itself depends on the categories. Finally, in terms of perception, this would have the consequence that also perceiving is always grounded on the categories.

Let me recapitulate why (and in what sense) this cannot be so, followed by some further additions. To begin with, there is nothing in the Kantian corpus that indicates that perceptual singling out has necessarily something to do with concepts, the categories included. If any such aspirations arise, it is probably because one does not take Kant’s dualist model of cognition seriously. But such a neglect leads to a distorted picture of Kant’s thinking because recognizing both intuitions and concepts as genuine representations also independently of each other is no less than the absolutely necessary first step to take in order to understand the role of perception in the Kantian model. As we

661 Cf. the following editorial note to the Cambridge Edition of the third Critique (372n47): “Anyone making a cognitive judgment about an object is bringing these concepts [the categories] to bear on his sensory inputs, whether he is aware of this or not.” Although the claim is about judging, the point – and my worry – is the same: that the subject applies certain concepts which precondition other representations, even though he or she is only aware of the latter, and, moreover, that such concepts are supposed to feature in something that he or she cannot even in principle be aware of, namely, in the sensory inputs as such.

662 E.g. Griffith 2012, 214.
have seen, the most primitive function of perception is non-conceptual particularizing that is grounded on the aesthetic mode of cognition.\textsuperscript{663}

Admittedly, it is possible to read Kant as suggesting that the notion of \textit{transcendental} synthesis entails that there is an \textit{a priori} ground to every possible synthesis. This may suggest in turn that all synthesis, whether possible or also actual (and however primitive), must be governed by the categories because they make up that \textit{a priori} ground. But is this really so? I think not. And would that make perception \textit{itself} categorical and hence conceptual? I do not think so. The following passage serves to show that even \textit{a priori} imagination and its \textit{a priori} synthesis is, as such, \textit{sensible}:

For in itself the synthesis of imagination, although exercised \textit{a priori}, is nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it \textit{appears} in intuition, e.g., the shape of the triangle.\textsuperscript{664}

Indeed, appearing \textit{cannot} be conceptual in character. What is more, perceiving some shape, or even coming up with one \textit{a priori}, is not necessarily tied to any concept whatsoever. In other words, none of the categories lets us represent spatial configurations as such more than they provide us with particulars.

The same has to apply to the apprehensive synthesis when seen merely as perceptual composing. Take the triangle, for example. As a spatial configuration, it can be simply intuited. Likewise, it must be possible to simply apprehend it successively. In other words, it cannot be that now we must represent the shape with the help of some concept (say, Limitation or Unity) in order to run through the object. Genealogically speaking, the case is analogous to particularizing in the sense that Kant’s model is not supposed to explain why we tend to apprehend the three sides of the triangle instead of something else (in which case we would end up with a different representation). Moreover, the end-product is a particular, too. In fact, it is because of this that it could as well have been singled out (intuited) as a determinate perceptual whole without the need of going through the three lines one by one. In the end, apprehensive synthesizing is nothing but reframing what can be, in principle, particularized \textit{also} without such composing.

To be sure, perception is tied to a point of view, and thus we never perceive an object completely in an instant fashion. But that would hardly count as an objection here because we do not

\textsuperscript{663} Granted, apprehensive perception makes a harder case. In fact, it is because of this that our case is still partly open in respect of the notion of unity, as we have not yet answered the following question: What exactly is the cognitive output of perceptual composition, and what does the conceptual unity add to it, after all? A full answer to the latter question will be postponed until next chapter, but the former will be answered here as we continue on.

\textsuperscript{664} A124: “Denn an sich selbst ist die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, obgleich \textit{a priori} ausgeübt, dennoch jederzeit sinnlich, weil sie das Mannigfaltige nur so verbindet, wie es in der \textit{Anschauung erscheint}, z.B. die Gestalt eines Triangels.”
actually do that in a successive fashion either. For example, it can well be that we run through a house from a fixed viewpoint, apprehending only two of its walls in order to perceive it, even as a house. That might not be enough for ascertaining that the object really is a house, but then again, we just have to cope up with such limitations as perceivers. More straight to the point, there are always only so many parts that we are able to grasp together in the process of apprehending an object, and even if we could apprehend it completely (within the humanly possible limits) that would still not become the necessary condition of perceiving it.

Admittedly, the ultimate purpose of the formative capacity known as imagination in apprehension is to form concepts on the basis of appearances. However, not only does this imply that appearances can well be present without conceptualizing, but it does not follow from this that the apprehensive awareness itself is always conceptual or intellectual, or even necessarily intellectually guided or informed. Quite the contrary, as Kant’s explication of synthesis in general suggests, perceptual images simply get generated, and surely the categories cannot be passively applied to any given perceptual material? They depend on spontaneity, after all. Indeed, even if their obscurity in one’s actual empirical representing is allowed, it cannot be allowed that when one is not thinking (conceptualizing) at all, they still enter one’s representations. As we have seen, the categories are exclusively for thinking, but perceptions are not thoughts (conceptions) unless we mean by ‘perception’ genuine observation, and are in fact speaking of perceptually informed thought.

We can concretize this by taking an example from the Kantian corpus (even though from the lectures before the Critique):

My mind is always busy with forming the image of the manifold while it goes through [it]. E.g., when I see a city, the mind then forms an image of the object which it has before it while it runs through the manifold. Therefore if a human being comes into a room which is piled high with pictures and decorations, then he can make no image of it, because his mind cannot run through the manifold.

The point I want to make with this passage is that none of this involves the application of the categories, conscious or not. In other words, it is not that the mind is making use of any intellectually restricted rules in such perceptual situations. Simply put, the mind is not conceptualizing or categorizing anything when it just goes through something perceptually. Another major point is that

---

665 See A224/B271.
666 ML1 28:235: “Mein Gemüth ist jederzeit beschäftigt, das Bild des Mannichfältigen, indem es es durchgeht, sich zu formiren. Z. E. wenn ich eine Stadt sehe, so formirt sich das Gemüth von dem Gegenstande, den es vor sich hat, ein Bild, indem es das Mannichfältige durchläuft. Wenn daher ein Mensch in eine Stube kommt, die mit Bildern und Auszierungen überhäuft ist; so kann er sich kein Bild davon machen, indem sein Gemüth das Mannichfältige nicht durchlaufen kann.”
this kind of “running through” and “grasping-together” leads possibly to a perceptual unity, such as that of the view of a city. But again, that does not need to involve the categories because nothing is (necessarily) being thought (conceptualized) here.

Certainly, it might as well be that our understanding “is always busy pouring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them.” However, that cannot mean that understanding, through this rule-finding activity, produces in any sense of the word the possibility of having this particular apprehensive perception of the city. Instead, the only “producers” here are perceptivity and the sensible operations of imagination. And again, if we ask why one manages to achieve a unified image of the city, we are making a question that should not be given an answer in the present context with its philosophical implements.

Furthermore, even as merely perceived that view of the city can be held in (or be a) consciousness in a precise fashion. This is what aesthetic distinctness is all about, and as we remember, that “can obtain even though we do not represent the object to ourselves by means of concepts at all.” If the object is being represented in this way, also the categories must be ruled out from the representational content because they are not needed for anything. Take Totality, for example. As it is now not the case that the city is being thought as having certain quantitative features (and still as one) this category has no role to play. This is because in perception per se nothing is represented through any (general) features. In mere perception, it is all sensible, non-mediated, particular.

We should also point out this explication of apperception from the lectures: “In this I represent to myself a one in a manifold.” I read this as implying representing something as a unity in plurality in a self-conscious fashion. Basically, this adds a higher stance to representing. However, to repeat an already familiar point, the lack of this does not mean that there is not representing going on at all. On the contrary, not only can there be aesthetic representing going on, but this can be as clear and vivid as it gets, which is to say that it can be as conscious as the clearest of all thoughts. In all, this gives us another argument against the necessity of categorical consciousness in apprehensive perception. Just like we may simply be conscious of something without thinking ourselves thereby, we may as well be conscious of a perceptual unity without thereby representing it to ourselves as one or, say, as consisting of a plurality.

Surely the latter would involve the categories, but the point is that it is not necessary for perception. One way to put it is that nothing is represented “in a concept” in mere perception because there is no consciousness of the rule of the unity of synthesis involved. Recall the view of the city. Let

\[\text{A126: “ist jederzeit geschäftig, die Erscheinungen in der Absicht durchzuspähen, um an ihnen irgend eine Regel aufzufinden.” See also P § 57, 4:355.}\]

\[\text{MM 29:889: “Darin stelle ich mir eines im Mannigfaltigen vor.” (My emphasis.)}\]
us suppose that it contains a church, a town hall, and a market square. To think these as a many, we must represent them in a certain way. This is where Plurality comes in. If they are represented as one under the concept of city, then Unity is called for. Together the end-product of these acts of thinking is a complex and a whole at the same time, which means that Plurality and Unity must be combined. Accordingly, the ultimate precondition of this third kind of thought, where the three are represented together in yet another way, is Totality. The point is, in all three cases a certain rule is being imposed on the view of the city (the appearance). Now, that is what the categorical synthesis is for: any such synthesis grounds any such sensibly informed thought. And we can well be conscious of both, namely, the actual representation (say, the city taken as a plurality) and its transcendental ground (any such ordering of representations, or the rule involved).

Kant comes close to saying this when he explains the role of the categories in one of his notes:

One cannot be immediately conscious of the intuition of something composite as such, but only of the composition (synthesis), i.e., the self-activity of composition. Hence the categories.\(^{669}\)

The important thing to notice is that this does not rule out the possibility of being immediately conscious of something composite in so far as it is represented not as complex but as this or that. This, of course, would be up to intuition. The categories, the concepts of synthesis, on the other hand, are ways of taking what is given in intuition. In the last example, that would be representing a bunch of three particulars as belonging together in a certain way. The self-activity part in this is that this certain way cannot be given. If it were, not only would representing it as a transcendental ground be impossible (as it would be an empirical representation instead of an a priori one), but there would not be optional ways of representing a composition of the same material. But there are; we just saw three such ways, each indicating a different kind of synthesis and categorical consciousness, respectively. Even then, what is there in our perceptivity remains the same (assuming that we are still looking at the city from the same vantage point). In other words, the categories do not order, structure, or organize that in any sense. Perceptivity is, rather, on its own, showing either no spontaneity at all or in a very different sense.\(^{670}\)

\(^{669}\) R 6360, 18:689 (1797): “Man kann sich nicht der Anschauung eines Zusammengesetzten als eines solchen unmittelbar, sondern nur der Zusammensetzung (synthesis), d.i. der Selbstthatigkeit der Zusammensetzung bewusst werden. Daher die Categorien.”

\(^{670}\) This qualification is in order because of the apparent “lower-level spontaneity” (Hanna 2008, 62) or “nondiscursive spontaneity” (Waxman 1991, 80) present in Kant’s model. More generally, it can be claimed – to put it very simply – that the mind has to do something in mere perception as well. I do not think that a big issue should be made of this, however. For starters, talking in these terms is ambiguous. Certainly we can say that when we think we are being spontaneous and thus active. But we can also say that when imagination does its job independently of our thinking, it shows activity, and because it is our imagination, in some sense we must be active then as well. But certainly not are we willing to admit that we are active in the same sense in both
But what about Kant’s insistence that perception must stand under the categories? As I see it, this grand-sounding consequence has little to do with actual empirical representing known as perceiving. What Kant aims to do in the Deduction of Pure Concepts is not to end up claiming that perceptions are necessarily carried out through the categories (whatever that means). Instead, he wants to secure the correspondence between category-driven thought and sensible intuition because otherwise synthetic judgments would not be possible. This, however, does not make perception itself categorical more than it makes concepts themselves sensible.

In fact, if perception were categorical in the sense of being necessarily carried out through the pure concepts of understanding, there would be no room left for mere perception, but only for perceptually informed thought or judgment. And were this the case, plenty of what Kant says elsewhere about perception would be incompatible with the Deduction. So, we could argue for the kind of reading I am proposing by claiming that it simply cannot be, given the above considerations, that Kant thought that perception necessarily requires the categories. For further evidence, we could point out that Kant often speaks in conditional when it comes to categories and intuition (perception) showing mutual match. That is, it is all about if we apply categories to sensibility (perceptions). But since mere perception is not thinking, it cannot even be such an application on its own.

Accordingly, it is not the case that the categories ground perception, make perception happen, or that any of them is a necessary condition of perception. Instead, categories and perceptions must be in line with each other in the sense that whatever we perceive is such that it is possible to form a thought about it. Certainly, in this sense perception can be said to be “categorical.” But this does not make perception conceptual more than it makes the categories intuitive.

As my goal is not to analyze the intricate argument of the Deduction, this will have to do. Let me clarify certain things, however. Firstly, this is not to say that the categories are not the preconditions of experience. As we will see in the next chapter, they are just that but still not the preconditions of perception per se. Secondly, I think that the Analytic should be read as an explication of reflective and self-conscious sensibly informed thought, which is to say that it is all about synthetic judgments (especially about the a priori ones with the specific aim of showing how far our a priori cognition can reach in so far it is to have relation to intuition). This explication presupposes cases. Secondly, saying that the mind is active does not add anything substantial to the idea that it has capacities or powers. So we could just as well say that the mind is – or we are – operative in perception and leave it that.

671 See e.g. B163 (§ 26).
672 Cf. Koistinen 2008, 85: “all perception is necessarily in accordance with the categories but not governed by the categories.” (My translation.)
673 Accordingly, also the so-called togetherness principle concerns judgments and judgments only (Hanna 2001, 46; 2005, 256–257). More specifically, or as it is put in Hanna 2011b, 405, “intuitions and concepts are cognitively complementary and semantically interdependent for the specific purpose of constituting objectively valid judgements.”
perceptual particulars being present for the subject, and in the *Critique* it is the Aesthetic that is supposed to deal with that. In other words, the Analytic has practically nothing to do with giving out the conditions of perceptual “presentness of objects to subjects in intuition.”

Thirdly, Kant should not be expected to explain what we cannot explain, and there is one such thing involved in the outcome of the Deduction as well. For this, we may consult the last part of the *Discovery*:

"But we could still provide no reason why we have precisely such a mode of sensibility and an understanding of such a nature, that by their combination experience becomes possible; nor yet, why, as otherwise fully heterogeneous sources of cognition, they always conform so well to the possibility of empirical cognition in general, but especially […] for the possibility of an experience of nature under its manifold particular and merely empirical laws, of which the understanding teaches us nothing *a priori*, as if nature were deliberately ordered for our comprehension; this we could not further explain (and neither can anyone else)."

If it were really so that the categories structured perception from bottom up, Kant would hardly make such a humble statement. Instead, he could make the claim that sensibility shows confusion which gets rectified by understanding through its categories. But this is something he does not do. If he did, he would not only contradict himself (as that would be taking the rationalist route he opposed), but should admit that it is impossible to get a grip of sensibility on its own. However, the statement Kant makes requires just that: namely, that we know that we have this kind of sensibility and this kind of understanding with their unique and recognizable features (although we do not know why).

In a similar vein, in his letter to Marcus Herz on May 26, 1789, we find Kant admitting this much:

"But we are absolutely unable to explain further how it is that a sensible intuition (such as space and time), the form of our sensibility, or such functions of the understanding as those out of which logic..."
develops are possible; nor can we explain why it is that one form agrees with another in forming a possible cognition.\textsuperscript{676}

What Kant wants to say here is that we cannot explain the fit itself that must hold between sensibility and understanding (or between the two \textit{kinds} of forms involved in “forming a possible cognition”). This, however, does not rid us of the possibility of legitimately arguing that without such a fit we would not be the cognitive agents we are.

Let me also bring up what Kant adds a little later in the \textit{Discovery} about sensibility and understanding: “the \textit{Critique} teaches that for the \textit{a priori} cognition of things they must stand in a reciprocal relationship to one another in the mind.”\textsuperscript{677} This comes very close to saying that such \textit{a posteriori} cases are possible where there is no need for actualizing this kind of reciprocity, presumably because only the resources of the other source of cognition are being utilized. As we have seen, undetermined or “blind” intuitions would be such representations. So, given their possibility, the reciprocity demand must refer to the actual application of the categories, in which the sensible manifold (itself being in accordance with the forms of intuition) is being determined in accordance with the logical functions.\textsuperscript{678} However, as we have also seen, this does not mean organizing the sensible manifold itself, but regarding it in different ways in one’s thinking (logically, not aesthetically, one could add). Not only is this where the spontaneity of understanding presents itself, but that would be impossible were there no \textit{a priori} cognition because then representing would be thoroughly tied to the empirically given. Moreover, as there are two sources of cognition, if the other had no \textit{a priori} element to it, they could not have the required “reciprocal relationship” (at least it could not be shown). Then again, most importantly for our purposes, the argument involved is not for showing that for perception to be possible it has to draw on the intellectual resources known as the categories. Instead, the argument is for avoiding the unwanted consequence that objectively valid synthetic judgments are impossible.

This brings us back to the notion of combination (\textit{Verbindung}, \textit{Verstandesverbindung}). Categorical combining calls for judgment, and thus it must be carried out in accordance with the logical forms or functions. However, nothing indicates that also actual perception must be carried out through such forms. Indeed, if we simply take a glimpse of that city, for example, it seems natural to think that there are no predicative thoughts of the kind “S is P” or “If S then P” involved. This must be

\textsuperscript{676} Br 11:51: "Wie aber eine solche sinnliche Anschauung (als Raum und Zeit) Form unserer Sinnlichkeit oder solche Functionen des Verstandes, als deren die Logik aus ihm entwickelt, selbst möglich sei, oder wie es zugehe, daß eine Form mit der Anderen zu einem möglichen Erkenntnis zusammenstimme, das ist uns schlechterdings unmöglich weiter zu erklären[.]"

\textsuperscript{677} ÜE 8:250: “die Kritik lehrt, daß sie zum Erkenntnisse der Dinge \textit{a priori} im Gemüthe gegen einander in Verhältniß stehen müssen.”

\textsuperscript{678} See B143 (§ 20).
the way Kant saw it, too. The same applies to perceptual composition through apprehension, which calls for gradual spatial synthesis rather than categorization. A mere perception of an object comes close to depicting it. This contrasts with thinking of it through a set of shared features (which would involve finding some kind of a rule in it). Perception also contrasts with intellectual combination thereby, as the latter is something that is reversible through analysis. With mere perception there is not an analogical story to tell because the very moment we begin to analyze what we perceive we are already thinking of things categorically on the basis of our perceptions. The intuitive content is, of course, necessary for that, but it is never that in itself which is being combined; it is only being categorically judged upon.

In light of this, let us return to one of those passages that suggest that all perception depends on the categories:

Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the categories.

As the sentence I have italicized indicates, it is really the combination of appearances that matters in the Deduction of Pure Concepts. Hence it is only in this respect that perception is supposed to stand under the categories. Moreover, the point is not this as such, but rather this: were appearances not combinable in accordance with the categories, the fit between sensibility and understanding would be lost, which would have the alarming consequence that we could not think what we perceive. However, as we have seen, this cannot mean that perceptions themselves are given in categorical form. Rather, perceptions are provided for combination, which is to say that the latter operates with (or on the basis of) perceptual particulars (such as the town hall over there). Accordingly, ‘depends’ indicates that whenever perceptually given particulars are being combined, and thus thought of and judged upon, it has to be done in accordance with the categories, not that perceptions require such concepts to be perceptions.

For example, if we perceive that a bottle has a cork, this perceptually informed judgment is an act of combining the representation of the bottle with that of the cork in a unified manner. That which can be represented merely as a perceptual unity is then considered as an object “in the concept of which the manifold of [this] given intuition is united.” This is a conceptual unity by definition, and involves a consciousness of the unity of recognitional synthesis, thanks to which this thought can be

\[679\] B130 (§ 15).
verified, analyzed, and taken out of its immediate context. Indeed, this is possible because then we draw on those resources of the mind which allow us to do even the following:

We can make concepts of things in general only through the understanding, even if no object is given, because we are representing to ourselves only the manner in which we can think an object.\textsuperscript{680}

In perception \textit{per se}, however, none of this should even be supposed to take place because not only is perceiving not thinking, but inherently singular and bound to the particular experiential situation.

\section*{5.7. The Third Portrayal of the Perceiver: Perceptual Awareness}

As we have seen in this chapter, to perceive is to be conscious. More precisely, to perceive something is to have a representation accompanied by empirical consciousness. This means, basically, that we are aware of something through sensations, given that they are spatiotemporally instantiated in our perception.

There are, however, two ways of being perceptually aware. One gives sensuous content. For example, the brightness of a color, or the agreeable quality of a tone, represents such a content. This kind of content is strictly phenomenal and perspectival. If the lighting conditions change, the brightness changes. If we move, the shadows move, affecting the exact look of the color. If the sound varies, its phenomenal characteristics change, and it might not be that nice anymore. All these changes affect perceptual awareness.

The other way gives intuitive content. This kind of content is not strictly phenomenal but, rather, strictly referential. Whatever happens to the brightness of the color, for example, whether because the lighting conditions change or because we move our body, we nevertheless keep visually tracking the colored object (at least as long as there is some light, and even after that there would be other ways to track it). In so doing, we keep singling out \textit{that} regardless of the changes to the sensuous content. In this sense, perceptual awareness is not bound to the immediate changes in the way we get affected.

Both kinds of awarenesses are something that can be simply forced upon us. We cannot choose whether to perceptually locate something that comes before us more than we can escape loud sounds. It is also possible that one kind of awareness steals the show from the other, so to speak. For example, if a sound is loud enough, it might loose its directionality and become a wholly inner sensation. In a similar vein, it is possible that we do not pay any attention to that which belongs to sensation in our

\textsuperscript{680} MM 29:798: “Wir können uns Begriffe von Dingen überhaupt nur durch den Verstand machen, wenngleich kein Gegenstand gegeben ist, indem wir uns nur die Art vorstellen, wie wir den Gegenstand denken können.”
perception. For example, we might simply locate something, in which case it might totally escape us how it looks: we just take notice of that as if it had no colors or a peculiar look to it. To be sure, sensations are as much the ultimate preconditions of seeing it as intuitions are; it is just that they do not enter the representational content clearly in such a situation. Hence we are not really aware of them, although we are well aware of that thing over there.

This suggests the following distinction in terms of object cognition. On the one hand, there is cognizing something about an object of representation. On the other hand, there is cognizing an object or a thing in the first place; for example, cognizing that something over there. As we have seen, the requirements of cognition “in the proper sense” extend to the former, but not necessarily to the latter. Even animals can be said to cognize in the latter sense. It is only in the former sense that the subject has to really work his or her way into the object. For example, we cognize the thing over there as having a cork. This kind of cognition would in turn function as an indication that it is, in fact, a bottle. Even if we did not know what kinds of things bottles are, by doing so we would still be figuring out what kind of a thing that is, which would be an instantiation of a cognition of an object in general. This is because then we have to cognize the object through shared features, or in such a way that takes common features (whatever they might be) as the ground of cognition.

Then again, to cognize objects in particular is simply to single them out or focus on them merely sensibly. We may follow the outline of the bottle, for instance. By doing so, we obtain an aesthetic grasp of that over there. This gives us an intuitive ground of distinguishing bottles from other kinds of objects. That does not need to involve passing a judgment. In fact, no concepts at all are necessarily required; the consciousness does not need to be categorical. Rather, it can all take place in perceptual awareness in this respect, involving only what could also be called prejudgmental empirical consciousness or apparentiality.681

This can be concretized as follows. Suppose that we were already well into a conversation with someone when we began to apprehend the bottle. Visually speaking, we are focusing on the bottle. We even manage to make our representation of it aesthetically distinct. Yet intellectually speaking we are actually doing something else.682 In theoretical terms, this would include utilizing the categorical framework, although not necessarily with logical clarity.683 Still, the bottle does not become “blinded” thereby, except in the intellectual sense that we do not entertain self-conscious reflective thought of it. Indeed, it remains there in our intuition, and thus in our perceptual awareness, as clearly as before.

---

681 I have derived the latter from the Latin word apparentia, which Kant used in his inaugural dissertation (ID § 5, 2:394).
682 For a similar but more detailed example, see Hanna 2011a, 355.
683 See A196/B241.
Generally speaking, this suggests that sometimes representing is not so much doing as it is undergoing something consciously.\textsuperscript{684} At least it can be something we manage to do well without concepts.

In all, the above considerations suggest the following picture of the relationship between sensibility and understanding. Not only is sensibility itself an object of understanding, but whatever there is in sensibility stands against the understanding. As we put it earlier, the two are not fused or mixed. However, this is only constitutively so, since the subject may well err in this respect in his or her personal level representings. As Kant puts it in the lectures, “although [intuition] sometimes misleads the understanding, the understanding is itself culpable for not investigating it better.”\textsuperscript{685} In practice, this means that sometimes we do not judge upon what is there in our sensibility carefully enough. We exemplified this with the famous case of oars looking bent when put under water. When we realize that they are not really bent, but only appear that way, we pass judgment upon what is being represented through our sensibility. But such acts never transform the content of sensibility itself, or melt the two representational grounds together. What is in sensibility must remain there. Indeed, were this not so, then we would not be able to decide whether we should follow the lead of sensibility or understanding in such cases.

We could also emphasize that for Kant the representational mind and the intellect are not the same.\textsuperscript{686} On the contrary, our mentality is not reducible to any of the faculties. In a similar vein, awareness encompasses all of it; it is the mind that is conscious, not some aspect of it. This leaves room for the idea of a whole mind that has various resources that need not be drawn all the time for every possible representation. Mere perception and pure thought make perfect examples. Furthermore, understanding, whose concepts “are nothing other than actions of reflection,”\textsuperscript{687} reflects upon appearances, or the “objects of the senses.”\textsuperscript{688} I think that this should be read in the simplest possible way: sensibility is like a mirror where there are things under the gaze of understanding. However, given that perceptual awareness does not reduce to the latter, it does not follow from this that those things have to be unconscious when the paradigmatic functions of understanding are not being applied. Rather, in that case the things are not being actively understood, yet it is possible to keep on representing them non-conceptually not only clearly but distinctly as well.

\textsuperscript{684} See An § 24, 7:161.

\textsuperscript{685} LW 24:806: “Und ob sie [Anschauung] gleich zuweilen den Verstand verleitet: so ist doch eigentlich er selbst Schuld, daß er sie nicht beßer untersucht.”

\textsuperscript{686} Cf. Locke’s Elements of Natural Philosophy according to which “[t]he lowest degree of [human understanding] consists in perception” (Locke 1824, 439). As should be clear from above, this kind of explication would not fit Kant’s technical notion of understanding. See also Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz on May 26, 1789 (Br 11:50), where Kant refers to understanding as a special faculty (besonderen Vermögen) in his system.

\textsuperscript{687} MM 29:762: “sind nichts als Handlungen der reflexion.” Cf. the explication of concept as reflectirte Vorstellung (LJ 9:91).

\textsuperscript{688} MM 29:761: “über Gegenstände der Sinne reflectiren.” See also ML1 28:207; MM 29:833.
6. PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCE

6.1. Experience as Judgmental

At last, we get to experience (Erfahrung). This has been deliberate, as beginning from this notion would have easily distorted the big picture with regard to perception. This is ultimately so because for Kant experience and perception are not the same. Accordingly, many of the findings above are of the kind that even though they apply to perception, they do not necessarily apply (as such) to experience. In other words, not all the criteria for experience are shared by perception. As this may sound somewhat puzzling, let us begin by showing what Kant means by Erfahrung.

Generally, experience is empirical cognition. However, given Kant’s loose use of ‘cognition’ this formulation is possibly misleading. Still, it serves to give the initial grip on the matter, as it underscores that experience is supposed to be objective, not subjective. As we remember from above, feelings are the ultimate representatives of Subjective, and thus not cognitions at all. In other words, feelings (unlike cognitions) are not about objects. This already takes the focus from what could be called “felt” or “lived” experience (Erlebnis) to something else.

Any such “lived” experience may come and go. Kant, however, wants to emphasize the unity or wholeness of experience. There is only one; there are no experiences, although there are perceptions. We could say the same about those “lived” experiences: namely, that they come and go within one and the same experience. Sensibly speaking, this means that they are all bound to space and time. Accordingly, only that which can be spatiotemporally instantiated (whether actually or possibly) belongs to (actual or possible) experience; only then can it be a part of that one experience. In this sense, the unity of experience is really nothing else than spatiotemporal unity.

This makes sense. We must be able to position everything in one space and time. This is where the structure of experience ultimately stems from. It is not just that our perceptions are preconditioned by space and time, but we also think of things as having places in space-time. For example, I represent myself as being in an office now, and I know that the office is located in a building that is in the university campus. These things have their specific locations in respect of other things: the neighboring buildings, towns, countries, Aura River, the Baltic, the Atlantic, Moon, Jupiter, Sun. I also happen to know that the moon was in the sky long before this building came into existence, and I

689 B147, 165–166.
690 Although a fitting term here, Erlebnis does not really belong to Kant’s vocabulary. As far I know, Kant never uses the substantive and the verb erleben only a couple of times.
691 A110; OP 22:104. There are exceptions to this formulation, though (e.g. A2; KU VIII, 5:194; § 61, 5:359).
692 See EEU IV, 20:209.
have been told that the Baltic Sea was not always an inland sea. When I represent this, I give its existence in its current form a duration (although my representation lacks specificity). I may also imagine how its shape must have been very different from the shape a map represents it as having now.

All this contains an implicit demand that all experience (whether yours or mine) must have reference to that in which all these things are related and relatable to each other. That something is a world (Welt). This, in turn, points to intersubjectivity. Indeed, that world must be a shared or communal (gemeinschaftlich) world; it cannot be just my world. When seen in this light, mere perception lacks something, namely the shareability between the subjects of experience (the inhabitants of that communal world). As the main vehicle for communicating anything at all is judgment, intersubjective experience must require that, too. This makes it judgmental.

Accordingly, to experience belongs that we claim (or are in a position of claiming) something of the communal world. In practice, we ask what properties objects have, how they are related to one another, where they came from, what purpose they serve, and so forth. In so doing we explicate the world and its objects (and ultimately the whole world as an object) to ourselves; we are not mere spectators but active interpreters.

As Kant puts it in one of his notes, “the judgment which expresses an empirical cognition is experience.” In a similar vein, in the lectures on logic from the 1770s, Kant links experience to the capacity of description:

Anyone who can describe the objects of his experience has experience, for description involves not merely sensation but also a judgment.

The remark is made in order to explicate the deficiency of non-rational animals in this respect. Together, such formulations indicate that when we simply undergo something, it does not amount to experience. Nor is representing by itself enough for experience. Because of this, animals who cannot express or describe their representations cannot have experience. This does not need to sound that alarming, however, since Kant does not deny them perceptions. Rather, this underlines that experience is, for Kant, a technical term.

---

693 See Hatfield 1990, 79–80, 82.
694 See MM 29:885. Here Kant distinguishes the communal world from the dream world, though.
695 See Koistinen 2011, 158.
696 R 5661, 18:318 (1788–90): “das Urtheil, welches eine empirische Erkenntniiß ausdrückt, ist Erfahrung.” (My italics.)
697 Burge 2009, 295; 2010; 155.
These kinds of demands also suggest the possibility (and even the actuality) of a higher stance towards one’s representational contents in experience. As we have seen, mere perceptions do not require that. We could say that one must really own one’s representations in order to be an experiencing subject. Then also the possibility of being in a position to recognize oneself as such a subject must be secured, which links experience with self-consciousness. Thus it comes as no surprise that Kant sees experience as a reflective endeavor.⁶⁹⁹

This, too, emphasizes that Erfahrung is not a loose term for everything that happens in the mind, or what the subject goes through (or experiences in the minimal sense that would entitle us to say that animals and infants are subjects of experience, too). For Kant, experience is quite a demanding cognitive endeavor limited to subjects who can (and do) evaluate their epistemic position. In other words, Erfahrung is short for what could be called reflective cognitive experience. As such, experiencing involves necessarily thinking. This distinguishes it from mere intuiting, or as Kant puts it in the lectures:

To intuit does not mean to have experience. Experience is a cognition that we have of an object of intuition. Thus that requires thinking, which can be considered separately. Thinking constitutes one part of experience, [i.e.,] insofar as the understanding plays a part in it. Intuiting [is] a part of experience insofar as sensibility participates in it.⁷⁰⁰

Briefly put, experience calls for thinking in addition to intuition; or, rather, to have experience is to have thoughts the contents of which are achieved on the basis of intuiting.

This entitles us to say that the “savage” did not experience the house. However, this does not entitle us to say that he did not perceive the house. Certainly he did that. Hence, although both representational elements are required for experience, the same does not apply to cases of mere perception. It is here that we meet the famous principle again:

But there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is possible: first, intuition, through which it is given, but only as appearance; second, concept, through which an object is thought that corresponds to this intuition.⁷⁰¹

---

⁶⁹⁹ See e.g. ID § 5, 2:394; R 2743, 16:494–495; An § 7, 7:142.
⁷⁰¹ A92–93/B125: “Es sind aber zwei Bedingungen, unter denen allein die Erkenntniß eines Gegenstandes möglich ist, erstlich Anschauung, dadurch derselbe, aber nur als Erscheinung, gegeben wird; zweitens Begriff, dadurch ein Gegenstand gedacht wird, der dieser Anschauung entspricht.”
When linked with the previous quote, any passage like this one implies that the interconnection in question is required for what we just titled reflective cognitive experience. As that interconnection is also required for cognition in the proper sense, this gives us a good reason to maintain that not only does ‘the cognition of an object’ indicate here just that, but that full-blown experience consists of these kinds of cognition. This, too, makes experience judgmental, or the co-product of perceiving and judging.\(^{702}\)

Indeed, the cognitive limitations of mere perception can be overcome only through such an intellectually guided activity resulting in judgments; mere intuitions could certainly not be enough. For one thing, intuitions are not thoughts at all and thus cannot, as such, be communicated. Secondly, they are strictly dependent on particular perceptual situations, whereas reflective cognitive experience is all about establishing thought contents that are supposed to be to a great extent independent in this sense (although still sensibly informed, to be sure).

Categories are, of course, the necessary ingredients in achieving all this. On the one hand, this is so because basically all cognitive activity of this kind consists of making (or being in a position to make) synthetic judgments that are supposed to be objectively valid. On the other hand, this is so because it is only through the categories that we can represent the possibility of experience to ourselves, or as Kant would like to have it: “All synthetic a priori judgments express nothing more than the conditions of a possible experience.”\(^{703}\) Hence, although we have not come across a good reason to maintain that the categories are required for being perceptually aware of things, there is no reason to think that they are not required for experience (at least as long as the latter is taken in the technical sense). Given this, it comes naturally that experience requires more than what mere perception could establish. As Kant sums it up in the lectures,

experience is not possible through perception alone, but rather concepts must be added to it, so there must be underlying a priori concepts through which I can bring perceptions under concepts.\(^{704}\)

But again, this does not indicate anything of perception per se, which does not need to amount to experience more than it must amount to thought (not to mention to representing the preconditions of experience). Rather, we are once more confronted with two routes to grasping things. Particularizing and apprehending (or even comprehending but aesthetically) is one route. Overlooking plain singling out now, there is then a composition of the manifold based on the non-intellectual operations of

\(^{702}\) See P § 20, 4:300.

\(^{703}\) MM 29:822: ”Alle synthetische Urtheile a priori drücken nichts aus, als die Bedingungen einer möglichen Erfahrung.”

\(^{704}\) MM 29:798: “Erfahrung nicht allein durch Wahrnehmung möglich ist, sondern Begriffe noch dazu kommen müssen, so müssen Begriffe a priori zu Grunde liegen, wodurch ich Wahrnehmungen unter Begriffe bringen kann[.]”
imagination in intuition. The other way is to come up with representations that give recognizable unity for the composition. This is based on understanding, the faculty of rules and judgments. This way of grasping things is necessarily general in character. It deserves to be called conceptualizing as long as one actively understands what one represents. Now the same thing can also be called experiencing as long as there is empirical sensible content to it.

Accordingly, thinking as such counts as experiencing as little as (or even less than) mere perception does. This is actually quite illuminating: although there is certainly something going on in our minds when we entertain empty thoughts, intellectual activity of this kind cannot count as the kind of experience we are dealing with here.\(^705\) So it is with merely associative ways of representing, including associative application of words (or concepts used merely as nametags). Not only would that be non-judgmental, but something that some non-human animals are perfectly capable of (in which case it does not amount to judging even potentially). Thus we must add association and associatively generated representations to those things that cannot count as experience. But we must also avoid drawing the wrong kind of conclusions from this, as this does not in the slightest mean that Kant rids the human subject of the capacity of association. It is just that merely associative representings do not meet the demands of reflective cognitive experience.

It should be kept in mind, though, that at times Kant does make (either explicitly or implicitly) the notion of experience more allowing.\(^706\) This is unsurprising given that Kant also allows kinds of perception and cognition in his model. However, this does not make experience in the demanding sense escape us, just like the loose use of ‘perception’ and ‘cognition’ did not render the different senses of perceiving and cognizing unrecognizable. It is rather that there is a proper place for different usages depending on the context. Let us provide some examples of this.

For one thing, Kant distinguishes experience in general (Erfahrung überhaupt) from particular experience (besondere Erfahrung).\(^707\) We can safely assume that it is the former that matters most and mostly to Kant, for its possibility is no less than “the possibility of empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments.”\(^708\) Particular experience, on the other hand, comes close to perception (of which there can be multiple instances).\(^709\) Optionally, we could speak of my experience in contrast to that in which all experiencers partake (or represent themselves as partaking), or what we take as the empirical ground

\(^{705}\) See R 5661, 18:318–319 (1788–90), titled as “Beantwortung der Frage, ist es eine Erfahrung, daß wir denken?”

\(^{706}\) For more on the ambiguity of the notion and its consequences for interpreting Kant, see Guyer 1988, 79–81.

\(^{707}\) E.g. EEKU II, 20:203.

\(^{708}\) EEKU II, 20:203*: “die Möglichkeit empirischer Erkenntnisse als synthetischer Urtheile.”

\(^{709}\) This pretty much explains the exceptions mentioned in footnote 691.
of our intersubjective assertions.\footnote{For ‘my experience’ (meiner Erfahrung) see e.g. MM 29:795; R 2743, 16:494–495. In the latter, ‘meiner’ is inked out by Kant, though.} Then again, it is only because of the latter that we can lean “on the testimony about the experience of others.”\footnote{R 5645, 18:293 (1785–88? 1760–84?): “Zeugnisse von der Erfahrung anderer[.]” For more on testimony, see LJ 9:68, 70; A\textsuperscript{n} § 2, 7:129.}

On the more personal side, Kant not only distinguishes between outer and inner experience, but refers to experience as a kind of storehouse of one’s cognitions when he speaks of “the daily increase of my knowledge through an ever-enlarging experience.”\footnote{ÜE 8:239: “die tägliche Vermehrung meiner Kenntnisse durch die sich immer vergrößernde Erfahrung.” For inner and outer experience, see e.g. A49/B66; Bxli*.} To be that, experience cannot refer to the phenomenal episodes themselves, but rather to that what the subject makes out of them over time. In a similar vein, but now on the more interpersonal side, Kant wants to distinguish common experience (gemeine Erfahrung) from the kind of experience the possibility of which he aims to establish in his theoretical works. It seems that the former can deviate from the scientific view of the world.\footnote{See e.g. MAN 4:526.} At one point Kant also implies that there is a difference between experience as such and experience that is being carried out systematically through observation.\footnote{KU § 66, 5:376.} To this one could perhaps add that common experience is hardly ever like that.

However that may be, it should be clear by now that the notion of experience is possibly misleading, and especially so with Kant. One of the basic points of this section has been that the Kantian experience should not (at least not generally) be taken as referring to anything like the subjective human experientiality as such. It is mainly because of this that perception should not be seen as experience. But there is more. As we have seen, non-conceptual perceptions can be object-directed and aesthetically well-informed (distinct, that is). This suggests not only that they can be genuine representations on their own, but that the kind of judgmental experience Kant is after is built on perceptions. Accordingly, it is not the case that the possibility of perception would be the consequence of there being experience. More specifically, and to connect this outcome with our earlier findings, experience presupposes spatiotemporally organized particulars, not the other way around.

### 6.2. From Perceptions to Experience

I presume that we have established the following. Perception that does not count as experience provides representational content that is not being judged upon and thus not taken into spontaneous consideration according to the categories. Accordingly, experience takes us further than mere...
particularizing and apprehension. Even then, perception *per se* preconditions experience and is actually possible without amounting to experience in the technical sense. This is necessarily so with creatures capable of perception but incapable of conceptual thought, and contingently so with us human beings capable of both. Such an outcome can be derived from above, given especially that experience is judgmental (unlike perception), and because cognitive blindness, although a restricting factor when looked from the generalizing viewpoint of understanding, does not imply that non-conceptual perception is impossible.

However, the distinction between perception and experience can be coined also as follows. Whereas the latter is supposed to be objective, the former is subjective. This is put neatly in the lectures on logic from the 1790s, where Kant verifies that perception is possible without being experience, but also that it then lacks objectivity:

Perception is only subjective – not yet experience. This is cognition with consciousness of the relation to the object.\(^{715}\)

According to this, experience requires “consciousness of the relation to the object.” The rest can be guessed: mere perception does not come with this kind of consciousness. One could also put it like this: to have experience is to get one’s merely subjective perceptions *objectified*.

Admittedly, this could be used as a counterclaim against what we have established so far, as this makes it possible to assert that mere perception (or merely perceptual awareness) is something totally subjective, and thus cognitively lacking altogether. Then again, on the basis of our earlier findings, the distinction between subjective perception and objective cognition is way too straightforward to be the whole truth about Kant’s account of perception. First, recall objective sensations: it is not the case that all sensations are subjective the way feelings are. Secondly, recall that merely intuitive particularizing can establish perceptual reference. Indeed, it is rather that perception can be both subjective and objective. As objective, perception can be called cognition (although it is not that in the more restricted proper sense of the word). Here, we may turn to another lecture on logic:

All cognition, that is, all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts.\(^{716}\)

---


716 LJ 9:91: “Alle Erkenntnisse, das heißt: alle mit Bewußtsein auf ein Object bezogene Vorstellungen sind entweder Anschauungen oder Begriffe.” (Emphasises omitted.) It should be remarked here that whereas the previous quote suggests that the kind of cognition that deserves to be called experience involves consciousness of the relation or reference itself, this latter quote implies only that cognition is conscious object-related.
What to make of claims that indicate the subjectivity of perception, then? Actually, there is a swift solution available. Not only does experience indicate a special case of judgmental cognition, but Kant occasionally identifies perception with sensation (and hence with sensuous content as opposed to intuitive content). Consider the following passage from the Vienna Logic, for example:

In perception we do not relate our cognitions to the object. Through sensation, good feeling, pain – one does not cognize an object. This is only a mode of representation. But the representation is not distinguished by a particular object. In general, the relation of representation to the subject is called sensation, to the object, cognition.\footnote{LW 24:904: “Wir beziehen bey der perception unsere Erkenntiße nicht auf Gegenstand. Durch Empfindung, Wohlbefinden, Schmerz – erkennt man keinen Gegenstand. Es ist nur eine Art von Vorstellungen. Aber sie wird nicht von einem besondern Objecte unterschieden. Ueberhaupt die Beziehung der Vorstellung aufs subject heißt Empfindung, auf das Object, Erkennniß.”}

As I read this, a special case of perception is being meant here, namely the one that has to do with subjective sensations only. As we remember, perception like this can be called subjective perception. Objective perception, on the other hand, is not about entertaining sensations in this sense at all (at least not consciously or clearly). This brings us to the end of the quote, which, in light of this, should be read as a broad explication of the sensation-cognition distinction, not of the perception-cognition distinction. Analogically, the passage which suggested that perception is subjective should be read as saying that perception is subjective as mere consciousness of sensation, which is very different from the “perception of an object\footnote{MK3 29:999: “Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes[].” (Emphases changed.)} understood as “a consciousness of the object through sensation.”\footnote{MK3 29:999: “das Bewußtseyn des Gegenstandes durch Empfindung[].” (Emphases changed.)}

Importantly for our purposes, the ambiguity of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ extends even deeper than this. Pure intuitions of space and time, the ultimate preconditions of experience, are subjective in the sense that they reflect the subjective constitution of the kind of intuitters and perceivers we are. But certainly not does Kant mean that space and time are subjective the way feelings and other subjective sensations are that. Indeed, from another point of view space and time do not appear as subjective at all, but as the preconditions of objective representation itself. This is especially so with space which alone can guarantee the objective reality of appearances.\footnote{See A376–377; B275–276.} More generally, whatever pertains necessarily to the empirical cognition of objects deserves to be called objective, and pure intuitions represent just that.

To press the point, we may turn to the following passage in the first edition of the Critique:
Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition.\textsuperscript{721}

In the bigger scheme of things, this means that without intuition there could be no such thing as object cognition. It is in this sense that perception is inherently objective. To be sure, mere sensation is never that. Then again, things are this straightforward only when sensation is considered in isolation. As we remember from above, as something that belongs necessarily to outer perception, sensation may act as Erkenntnißstück and be objective in the minimal sense of being the very thing that provides the way an outer object is taken in perception. Recall the field of grass, for example: it is the objective sensation of green color on which its recognizability is based upon.

In another sense, the way the field looks like is necessarily subjective, of course. This can be shown by transforming the quoted passage into sensation-talk: that in the appearances which is immediately related to the subject is called sensation. However, this is only to say that colors (together with sounds, smells, textures, and tastes) are dependent on our subjective constitution. But how is that any different from the claim that spatiotemporal manner of representation is dependent on that very same constitution?

At this point, the answer should be obvious enough: space and time reflect the necessary features of every possible perception. Sensations, on the other hand, reflect the contingent features of perceptions. As Kant puts it, using colors as his example, “each of us may have his own sensibility”\textsuperscript{722} in regard to sensation, since to this extent we are only “contingently organized in the same way.”\textsuperscript{723} Hence, when it comes to the conditions of representation, there are private conditions, on the one hand, and those presupposable in everyone, on the other.\textsuperscript{724} Accordingly, color perception would reflect the former. To use a typical example, I cannot know for sure that you perceive the color of that green field exactly the same way as I do. Or to really press the point, and to switch to another sense modality, “to someone who lacks the sense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated.”\textsuperscript{725}

Still, it would be weird to say that sensations such as colors do not belong to cognitive experience. “That wine is red becomes cognition,” said Kant in his lectures. After all, it is sensation that is the most fundamental prerequisite for there to be any kind of experiential cognition at all.

\textsuperscript{721} A108–109: “Erscheinungen sind die einzigen Gegenstände, die uns unmittelbar gegeben werden können, und das, was sich darin unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand bezieht, heißt Anschauung.”

\textsuperscript{722} R 6355, 18:681 (1796–98): “jeder seine eigene Sinnesart haben mag.” As ‘sensibility’ is a technical term, the translation is misleading here. What the note says literally is that people can differ in their mindset or mentality – i.e., they can have personal ways of taking in sensations qualitatively speaking.

\textsuperscript{723} KU 5:345–346: “zufälliger Weise gleichförmig organisirt seien[.]”

\textsuperscript{724} See KU § 6, 5:211.

\textsuperscript{725} KU § 39, 5:291: “So kann dem, welchem der Sinn des Geruchs fehlt, diese Art der Empfindung nicht mitgetheilt werden[.]” See also MM 29:794.
Moreover, we can give testimonials on the basis of sensations. We can even make generalizations (that all pine trees have rugged texture, for example) on the basis of such “merely subjective” representations. In fact, if this was not possible the intersubjectivity of experience would indeed become very limited in scope. In all, not only does this underscore the ambiguity of subjectivity, but brings us back to the ambiguity of sensation. There is one passage in the third Critique that illustrates this perfectly, so let us quote it again:

Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject feels as it is affected by the representation.

This repeats nicely the point made earlier. Mere perception can be called objective when (or if) the sensations involved designate something “in the object.” Only mere feeling is totally lacking in this respect, and must thus be called subjective in all circumstances.

Now, there is a sense in claiming that mere perception cannot be objective. This becomes especially evident from Kant’s aspiration to secure that experience is thoroughly representable in mathematical terms (numerically). In actuality, we only achieve that when something is represented merely in terms of its extensive magnitude or value of intensity. To this we could add that the kind of content that is not represented in this manner is too vague to count as anything but subjective. The phenomenal character of the red color would be just the kind of content. Hence, true objectivity must reflect that which remains beyond any such phenomenal aspects. For Kant, classical mechanics must have been one particularly successful way to represent the world in this manner. In that picture, the so-called secondary qualities can go. Only add motion and there you have it: a genuinely objective representation of nature.

After this, we are confronted not just with one but two ambiguities concerning the notion of objectivity. First we had the distinction between objective experience and objective perception. Accordingly, there is objectivity that comes with the categories, and objectivity that comes with (outer) intuitions. Experience, reflecting the former, could be said to be objectivity-intending with

---

726 See e.g. A165/B206; A178–179/B221.

727 In his letter to Kant on November 11, 1791, Jacob Sigismund Beck recognized this ambiguity (Br 11:311). However, Kant does not address the issue. In fact, it seems that he did not even answer that letter, but continued the correspondence on January 20 next year from a letter Beck sent on December 9, 1791 (see Br 11:313). Even more interestingly, Beck makes the same remark once more on May 31, 1792 (Br 11:338) but Kant avoids the issue again.
its aim of establishing intersubjectively holding states of affairs that can be communicated. As we have seen, certain types of judgments are just the kind of vehicles to do this kind of objectifying. Non-judgmental perception, on the other hand, can be objective only in the minimal sense of establishing perceptual reference to individual objects (overlooking now the fact that when viewed from a higher stance every such perception reflects the forms of intuition as the preconditions of all objective representation). But now we have also the distinction between the kind of intersubjectivity that belongs to our everyday experience and one that requires abstraction from basically everything that makes that experience the kind of experience it is. This even higher sense of objectivity makes the former kind of objectivity into something subjective, too.

Of course, we do not need to go this far, and Kant was clearly aware of this. In another sense, it is quite enough for the higher kind of objectivity that there is the possibility of speaking of facts along the following lines (notice especially the moderation made by the last sentence):

Objects for concepts the objective reality of which can be proved (whether through pure reason or through experience, and whether in the first case through theoretical or practical data for reason, but in all cases by means of intuitions corresponding to the concepts) are (res facti) facts. The mathematical properties of magnitudes (in geometry) are of this sort, since they are capable of an a priori presentation for the theoretical use of reason. Further, things, or their properties, which can be established by means of experience (one’s own experience or the experience of others, by means of testimony) are likewise facts.

However, the previous point still holds and gives us a firm reminder of the ambiguity of the notion of objectivity and its dependence on the point of view. This could also be used to press further the point that it is not that odd to speak of non-conceptual perception as objective. Certainly, perception cannot establish any facts by itself, or be objective on its own in either of the latter senses just described. Still, perception can be objective in the fundamental sense of providing objects as appearances for experience in a way that can be presupposed to be shared, formally speaking, by all human subjects, thus maintaining its own kind of intersubjective normativity. It is just that this does not amount to objective experience by itself. But as the latter requires, among other intellectual things,

---

728 On the importance of the possibility of communication in establishing objectivity, see A820–821/B848–849; KU § 21, 5:238.
729 KU § 91, 5:468: “Gegenstände für Begriffe, deren objective Realität (es sei durch reine Vernunft, oder durch Erfahrung und im ersteren Falle aus theoretischen oder praktischen Datis derselben, in allen Fällen aber vermittelt einer ihnen corrispondirenden Anschauung) bewiesen werden kann, sind (res facti) Thatsachen. Dergleichen sind die mathematischen Eigenschaften der Größen (in der Geometrie), weil sie einer Darstellung a priori für den theoretischen Vernunftgebrauch fähig sind. Ferner sind Dinge, oder Beschaffenheiten derselben, die durch Erfahrung (eigene oder fremde Erfahrung vermittelst der Zeugnisse) dargethan werden können, gleichfalls Thatsachen.”
730 See A827/B855, where Kant speaks of objective and subjective points of view.
that we are able to *express* our cognition, we should not even ask after something like that when we are merely analyzing perception.

All this has the consequence that an *object of experience* (*Gegenstand/Object der Erfahrung*, also *Erfahrungsgegenstand*) must be distinguished from an object of perception. Even though the presence of the latter is the necessary condition of the possibility of the former, that is by no means sufficient. To begin with, to become an object of experience the intuited object must be thought of.\(^{731}\) Moreover, objects of experience can be taken out of their immediate context of appearing and considered regardless of their manner of appearance (although they cannot be objects that can be *only* thought).\(^{732}\) Objects of perception, on the other hand, always indicate actual confrontation of things (or some spatiotemporal presence) in their particular manner of appearing regardless of how they are thought, or whether they are thought at all.

A way to put these two differences together would be that whereas the objects of perception are private, the objects of experience are supposed to be public. The publicity demand requires that there must be conceptual predication going on. For example, we cannot make a book’s rectangular look itself public, but have to do that by claiming that the book is rectangular in shape. Thus, in a sense, an object of experience becomes such a thing through predicative determination. A passage from the *Metaphysical Foundations* illustrates this nicely, so let us quote it again:

> Motion, like everything that is represented through the senses, is given only as appearance. For its representation to become experience, we require, too, that something be thought through the understanding – namely, besides the mode in which the representation inheres in the *subject*, also the determination of an *object* thereby. Hence the movable, as such a thing, becomes an object of experience, when a certain *object* (here a material thing) is thought as *determined* with respect to the *predicate* of motion.

The passage reminds us also of the ambiguity of ‘object.’ The material thing is, as such, an object in a different sense than when being conceptually determined with respect to motion. It is simply perceived; its motion simply something that “our outer senses can *transmit* to us.”\(^{733}\) So, as Kant suggests here, more is needed for it “to become experience.” In terms of Kant’s inaugural dissertation, it is not until appearances have become reflected by the understanding that they become objects of

---

731 See e.g. MAN 4:554; B126.

732 See e.g. R 4674, 17:647 (1773–75).

733 A358: “*uns äußere Sinne nur liefern können[,]"* (My emphasis.) Besides motion (*Bewegung*), also extension (*Ausdehnung*), impenetrability (*Undurchdringlichkeit*) and composition (*Zusammenhang*) can be transmitted to us. The last one also suggests that Kant did not try to answer any kinds of binding problems related to perception.
experience, or *phenomena*. Most importantly for our purposes, however, the latter are preconditioned by particular sensible representations, not the other way around.

It is like this with event perception, too. Consider the Second Analogy, for example. Kant’s point with the ship is not to show that one could not perceive it moving from one place to another without Cause. Quite the contrary, the latter is for thinking that an event of this kind is taking place. In other words, the category has nothing whatsoever to do with the actual perceiving of that particular thing known as the ship sailing downstream. Instead, it has all to do with regarding the whole episode as a unified occurrence, or rather as an object in itself. This, however, is a case of possible determination or possibly applying a category to sensibility. Thus an alternative (and perhaps at first sight alarming) way to put the underlying idea is that when there is no categorical determination going on, there is really no experience going on. In this case, we would not be representing the occurrence in causal terms. But even then we would surely perceive the ship as it distances from us.

In other words, the kind of experience that is achieved through categorical determination does not entail representability as such (after which the lack of experience should not sound that alarming anymore). Nor is this to say that then representing becomes subjective in all possible senses of the term, as if the mind would suddenly turn onto itself. Granted, then the possible dispute whether that something belongs merely to one’s private experience (or appearance) or to objective experience is lost. Then again, to require that from mere perception would be forcing things unjustly into the field of thought, which would blur the distinction between perception and experience once and for all. It is rather that only the objectifying stance built into judging is lost thereby.

More generally, experience is all about understanding what one perceives (but can also perceive without). As evidence of this, there are several passages we may turn to:

One can, to be sure, see much but understand nothing that appears unless it is brought under concepts of the understanding.

Experience is perception that is understood.

---

734 ID § 5, 2:394. Although this is not really the language of the “critical” Kant, the basic picture is quite the same: appearances, preceding the logical use of understanding, are made into objects of experience through the co-operation of sensibility and understanding. Cf. Longuenesse 2000, 25.

735 Zweite Analogie, A189–211/B232–256.

736 Methodologically speaking, the most important thing here is that we can come up with the formal features – everything besides sensation and motion, that is – of any such causal occurrence completely a priori.

737 See B163.

738 See MAN 4:555.

739 R 4681, 17:667 (1773–75): “Man kan zwar vieles sehen, aber nichts verstehet, was erscheint, als wenn es unter Verstandesbegriffe [...] gebracht wird[.]”

740 R 4679, 17:664 (1773–75): “Erfahrung ist eine verstandene Warnung.”

196
Concepts of reason serve for *comprehension*, just as concepts of the understanding serve for *understanding* (of perceptions).\(^{741}\)

I can no doubt be immediately certain of my perception, but not of experience, i.e., of the objective validity of judgments from perception; to experience belongs frequent comparison in order to distinguish what the understanding does from what is sensible. And often agreement with the judgments of others as well.\(^{742}\)

As we have seen with blind intuitions, the lack of being understood should not be taken dramatically. Non-understood representations are not just properly worked out intellectually. To be sure, in order to count as an object of experience the object must be understood by the subject. This, however, underscores more than anything else the technicality of the notion, as this has nothing to do with the possibility of perceptual representation as such. And this holds irrespectively of which perceiver we happen to choose: canine or human, New Hollander or Königsbergian.

Obviously, understanding perceptions does not provide us with the higher kind of objectivity required or suggested by Kant’s technical notion of experience just like that. It is rather that then we are *possibly* in a position to state how things stand objectively speaking. But we can err in this. To borrow from the last quote, this can happen if the doings of the understanding are not distinguished “from what is sensible” carefully enough. There is then lack of reflection. It might also be the case that the “agreement with the judgments of others” is missing right there where it would be needed mostly. Moreover, and this brings us to the topic of the next section, sometimes objectivity in the higher sense is simply unobtainable. This is the case with judgments Kant calls subjectively valid. Although this topic takes us away from perception *per se*, it provides tools for clarifying further the role of the categories in perceptual experience.

---

\(^{741}\) A311/B367: “Vernunftbegriffe dienen zum Begreifen, wie Verstandesbegriffe zum Verstehen (der Wahrnehmungen).”

\(^{742}\) R 2743, 16:494–495 (1780–89? 1776–79?): “Ich kan mir wohl meiner [Erfahrung] Wahrnehmung unmittelbar Gewiß seyn, aber nicht der Erfahrung, d. i. der objectiven Gültigkeit der Urtheile aus Wahrnehmung; dazu gehört oftere Vergleichung, um das, was der Verstand thut, von dem sinnlichen zu unterscheiden. Und oft auch die Einstimmung des Urtheils anderer.” Notice the first ‘Erfahrung’ put in brackets in the AA. As odd as it may seem at first sight, leaving it there actually strengthens our case, as it implies how experience from *my* point of view lacks what experience proper must necessarily reflect: namely, that it cannot be just about my perceptions and private experiences, but must be about something common and shared instead.
6.3. Objectively and Subjectively Valid Judgments

6.3.1. Determining Judgments of Experience

Let me begin by explaining the section title. As I see it, the kind of judgment that is called judgment of experience (Erfahrungsurtheil), most notably in the Prolegomena but elsewhere as well,\textsuperscript{743} is just the kind of judgment that is called determining judgment (bestimmende Urtheil) in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. If this is so, then it comes naturally to call it determining judgment of experience. That this must be the right reading becomes evident from the fact that both refer to the same kind of mental operation (as we will see soon) and must thus belong to the same faculty, namely, to the determining power of judgment.\textsuperscript{744} We could also point out that the contrast Kant wants to make is different in the two texts, which explains the apparently drastic change in terminology.

The Prolegomena suggests the following. The characteristic mark of judgments of experience is their objective validity, which calls for the categories.\textsuperscript{745} Objective validity, in turn, carries it with the idea that

\begin{quote}
if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another, and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience signifies nothing other than its necessary universal validity.\textsuperscript{746}
\end{quote}

In general terms, this suggests that such judgments are supposed to be about objective states of affairs. In terms of consciousness, this means (to follow Kant’s somewhat awkward terminology) that in such judgments perceptions are connected “in a consciousness in general.”\textsuperscript{747} As the opposite of this is connecting them “in a consciousness of my state,”\textsuperscript{748} this suggests that judgments of experience are inherently intersubjective in character. That is, their contents can be evaluated publicly, tested through “the judgments of others,” and also obtained through testimony.

\textsuperscript{743} In the Prolegomena, the term is first mentioned at § 2 (4:268). In later texts, it appears at least in A8/B11, 41; KpV 5:70; EEU K V, 20:212; ÜE 8:241; KU VII, 5:191; § 36, 5:287–288; § 61, 5:360; LD-W 24:767; LJ 9:113.
\textsuperscript{744} For this further distinction concerning the power of judgment, see section 6.3.3.
\textsuperscript{745} P § 18, 4:298:
\textsuperscript{746} P § 18, 4:298: “wenn ein Urtheil mit einem Gegenst ande übereinstimmt, so müssen alle Urtheile über denselben Gegenstand auch unter einander übereinstimmen, und so bedeutet die objective Gültigkeit des Erfahrungsurtheils nichts anders, als die nothwendige Allgemeingültigkeit desselben.” At § 19, Kant calls objective validity (objective Gültigkeit) and necessary universal validity (nothwendige Allgemeingültigkeit für jedermann) changeable concepts (Wechselbegriffe).
\textsuperscript{747} P § 20, 4:300: “in einem Bewu ́ßtsein überhaupt[.]”
\textsuperscript{748} P § 20, 4:300: “in einem Bewu ́ßtsein meines Zustandes[.]”
The third *Critique* suggests the following. In determining judgments of experience, perceptions of objects must be connected with the category, or “the concept of an object in general.” Thus, for example, in order to determine a body as heavy one must not only predicate the concept of heaviness of the body, but must do that through the relevant category (here, Substance) which is just another name for the universal ground of representing any possible object in these terms (indeed, this is what being “an object in general” is all about). Assuming that the empirical circumstances that provide the material ground for the predicates (through which the determination is carried out) in fact gives support for this kind of synthetic unity (in which the heaviness is attributed to the body), the object of perception is being determined not only successfully but correctly as well.

To bring the two notions together, let us begin from the fact that Kant not only continues to use the notion of judgment of experience after the *Prolegomena*, but identifies it with the notion of determining judgment. For this, we may consult the following passage from the third *Critique*:

> An individual judgment of experience, e.g., one made by someone who perceives a mobile droplet of water in a rock crystal, rightly demands that anyone else must also find it so, since he has made this judgment, in accordance with the general conditions of the determining power of judgment, under the laws of a possible experience in general.

Besides proving the textual point, the passage illustrates well how such a judgment is supposed to represent things in a way which can be expected to be shared by all subjects of experience. It is also implied here that representing “in accordance with the general conditions of the determining power of judgment, under the laws of a possible experience in general” makes representing objective, not that the empirical circumstances as such make it so.

Moreover, the two notions are both coined as *judgments of cognition* and *theoretical judgments* in the third *Critique*, as the following passage shows (in addition to giving a nice synopsis of one of the central issues of the first *Critique*):

> The perception of an object can be immediately combined with the concept of an object in general, for which the former contains the empirical predicates, for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced. Now this is grounded in a priori concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold, in order to think it as the determination of an object; and these concepts (the

---

749 KU § 36, 5:287–288: “der Begriff von einem Objecte überhaupt[.]”


751 One could also emphasize coherence here (Falkenstein 1995, 317; Stapleford 2008, 106). See also B279.
categories) require a deduction, which, moreover, was given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by means of which the solution to the problem “How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?” was provided. This problem thus concerned the *a priori* principle of pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.\textsuperscript{752}

In all, we see now that experience being judgmental means basically that it consists of what can be called determining judgments of experience. Such predicative assertions\textsuperscript{753} have a genuine truth-value: the judgment either holds or does not hold true of its object. More generally, through (possibly) objectively valid judgments we determine how things really stand. Concerning perception, this has the major consequence that perception is, *by itself*, truth-free. In other words, truth (*Wahrheit*), error (*Irrtum*), and illusion (*Schein*) do not lie in the intuition itself (or in the appearances), but in the judgments made on the basis of intuitions (or appearances).\textsuperscript{754}

However, as should be clear by now, this should not be interpreted too drastically. Not only is sensibility “the source of real cognitions,”\textsuperscript{755} but Kant does not mean that intuitions (perceptions) cannot be object-directed or genuine representations on their own; all he means is that through mere sensible cognition we could not have the kind of *stance* on our representings which allows us to establish something about the world in terms of objective truth. But as there are even synthetic judgments that are deficient in this respect (as we will see next) it is rather that this reveals a kind of experientiality within Kant’s model that does not meet up the demands of the technical notion of experience contained in the very same model.\textsuperscript{756} This, too, makes space for non-conceptual perception in it.

\textsuperscript{752} KU § 36, 5:287–288: “Mit der Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes kann unmittelbar der Begriff von einem Objecte überhaupt, von welchem jene die empirischen Prädicate enthält, zu einem Erkenntnisurtheile verbunden und dadurch ein Erfahrungsurtheil erzeugt werden. Diesem liegen nun Begriffe *a priori* von der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung, um es als Bestimmung eines Objects zu denken, zum Grunde; und diese Begriffe (die Kategorieen) erfordern eine Deduction, die auch in der Kritik der r.V. gegeben worden, wodurch denn auch die Auflösung der Aufgabe zu Stande kommen konnte: Wie sind synthetische Erkenntnisurtheile *a priori* möglich? Diese Aufgabe betraf also die Principien *a priori* des reinen Verstandes und seiner theoretischen Urtheile.”

\textsuperscript{753} Although this might not require explicit linguistic description on the part of the subject, Kant does seem to think that proper understanding – i.e., determinate thought and thus judging – depends on the possibility of verbal expression of one’s representations (see A277/B333; ÜE 8:193–194*; KU § 49, 5:314; cf. An § 39, 7:192).

\textsuperscript{754} A293/B350.

\textsuperscript{755} A294/B351*: “der Quell realer Erkenntnisse.”

\textsuperscript{756} Cf. Zammito 1992, 104: “Here we have an indication of our capacity to ‘experience’ prior to and separately from cognition.” Although the quote is pulled out of its context, it serves exceptionally well here, especially if ‘cognition’ is taken in the demanding sense of the term.
6.3.2. Judgments of Perception

In the *Prolegomena*, Kant contrasts judgment of experience with *judgment of perception* (*Wahrnehmungsurtheil*). As the book was intended as an explanatory introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and as the distinction cannot be found in the *Critique* itself, it is admittedly quite odd. However, it comes up occasionally in originally unpublished texts, and can also be found from the second edition *Critique* in a disguised form. Because of this, it is hardly a confusion on Kant’s part, or made only for the specific purposes of the *Prolegomena* in mind. As far as I see, nor does the notion of judgment of perception represent the mistaken (empiricist) view of judgment, but a certain variety of judgment that belongs to the cognitive repertoire of the Kantian subject. Besides, the distinction is of utmost importance, as it can advance our understanding of Kant’s conception (and separation) of experience and perception.

But what kind of judgments are we dealing with here? Their most conspicuous feature is the lack of category and objective validity, or as Kant clearly puts it:

*Empirical judgments* [...] that are only subjectively valid I call mere JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION. The latter do not require a pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject.

As examples of such only subjectively valid judgments, we get these:

[T]hat the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant[.]

---

757 The term is introduced at § 16 (4:295), the distinction itself not until § 18 (4:298). I cannot hope to discuss every aspect there is to this complex distinction and its interpretation. For more, consult e.g. Allison 2004; Longuenesse 2000; Prauss 1971; Sassen 2008.

758 B140–142 (§ 19); MM 29:815; LD-W 24:767; LJ 9:113; R 3146, 16:679 (1790–1804). Besides the distinction itself appearing in lectural and personal notes, also the numerous appearances of ‘judgment of experience’ in Kant’s published writings after the *Prolegomena* indicate that Kant did not abandon the distinction.

759 *Pace* Sassen 2008, 274n15; see also Allison 2004, 180–182. Here is a short argument for interpreting the notion the positive way. For one thing, as we will see, judgments of perception come very close to aesthetic judgments of sense. Since the latter clearly belong to the cognitive repertoire of the Kantian subject, the similarity between the two gives a good reason for thinking that the former do, too. Secondly, Kant obviously allows for the subject the possibility of committing a fallacious inference known as *vitium subreptionis*. As I see it, in so doing the subject judges from the wrong kind of ground or otherwise defectively (see e.g. A643/B671). An example of such a case would be taking as a judgment of experience that which is actually a judgment of perception (LD-W 24:767). Then one mixes up subjective and objective (MAN 4:555). Thirdly, as far as I know, Kant never says anything that suggests that the notion belongs to a flawed theoretical position. But he certainly says things that explicitly indicate that judgments of perception belong to his very own model of a judging subject – most notably, perhaps, in LJ 9:114.

760 P § 18, 4:298: “*Empirische Urtheile* […] so nur subjectiv gültig sind, nenne ich bloße *Wahrnehmungsurtheile*. Die letztern bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, sondern nur der logischen Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmungen in einem denkenden Subject.”
The air is elastic.\(^{762}\)

If the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm.\(^{763}\)

This may appear puzzling for various reasons. To give an example: if the role of the categories, as concepts of objects in general, is taken to mean that to have any objects in the first place we must somehow let these concepts influence all that which appears to us, then it certainly seems strange that there are non-categorical judgments, as there should be no such thing as non-categorical representation at all. Then again, if what we have established so far is right, this kind of reading should be abandoned. Even then, one may wonder, and quite rightly so, how there can be judgments that leave the categories out of the picture. Is it not so that to make judgments about objects we must “bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception”\(^{764}\) through the categories?

Or to put the same worry somewhat more concretely with the help of the category of relation called Inherence and Subsistence: to make a claim about an object of experience manifesting a certain property requires that we understand something as the basis of some possible determination of it. In so doing we apply this pure concept of understanding (whether or not we put things in such abstract terms during our act of thinking). Hence, for example, in making the judgment “Air is elastic” this particular concept of synthesis is implicit in our experience from the very start, grounding the possibility of such property-talk.

Then again, it cannot be denied that we have in front of us a special class of judgments that “do not require a pure concept of the understanding.” But is this so puzzling after all? I do not think so. Let us begin by considering briefly what objective unity is all about. There is such a unity in place when we have achieved a complex representation of, say, the representations of table and heaviness in such a way that the thought content is necessarily represented this way. Then it is not about our mental states as such, as our private feeling of weight would be, but about the object itself (the table having the property of heaviness).\(^{765}\)

To this we may now add two things. First, the object must be regarded as a public object, or as something established (and verifiable) through a conceptual synthesis in what Kant calls consciousness in general. Assuming that the preconditions of conceptual synthesis itself are shared by every subject, the judgment carries with it a normative claim: this is how everybody else must (or should) judge in these circumstances.

\(^{761}\) P § 19, 4:299: “daß das Zimmer warm, der Zucker süß, der Wermuth widrig sei[.]”

\(^{762}\) P § 19, 4:299: “die Luft ist elastisch[.]”

\(^{763}\) P § 20, 4:301*: “wenn die Sonne den Stein bescheint, so wird er warm.”

\(^{764}\) B141: “gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objektiven Einheit der Apperception zu bringen.” See also R 3054, 16:633–634.

\(^{765}\) See B142.
This explains Kant’s emphasis that judgments of perception are only subjectively valid. They are not even supposed to hold generally, but only privately, or as Kant puts it,

they express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and this only in my present state of perception, and are therefore not expected to be valid for the object: these I call judgments of perception.766

In other words, what judgments of perception express is not how things stand objectively in the world, but how things stand in respect of the cognizer himself or herself in some particular perceptual situation. But as we have seen, Kant uses ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in two (or even three) senses; that very same relation of sensations could be called objective in so far as “it signifies what is real in an empirical representation.” And here it does just that, as Kant is clearly not speaking merely of subjective feelings when analyzing judgments of perception.

Second, the object in question is not really the intuitable as such, but the intuited taken under the relation of the subject (the table) and predicate (heaviness) in a judgment. Recognizing this paves the way for understanding what Kant means by the lack of category in such acts of thinking. In “Room is warm,” for example, the objective relation holding between the room and warmth is missing from the representation, as the judgment is not made in accordance with (or grounded on) Substance (or, more precisely, the relation of Inherence and Subsistence, or substantia et accident).

This is basically all that is claimed in the Prolegomena about such judgments. Moreover, it should be noticed that Kant uses the indefinite article when he introduces the judgments of perception: they “do not require a pure concept of the understanding.” It may as well be that other categories are required to have a subject capable of such thoughts.767

There should be nothing too strange in this. It is simply that in this case the categorical relation is not present in the thought content. Similarly with “If the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm” even though the judgment is made in accordance with the hypothetical form, it is not made in accordance with Cause (or rather, Causality and Dependence). In other words, the dependency relation between the heat of the sun and the warm stone is simply not being figured out by the cognitive agent. But when he or she realizes the causal connection, then the situation changes into something like this:

\[\text{766 P § 19, 4:299: “sie drücken nur eine Beziehung zweier Empfindungen auf dasselbe Subject, nämlich mich selbst und auch nur in meinem diesmaligen Zustande der Wahrnehmung, aus und sollen daher auch nicht vom Objecte gelten; dergleichen nenne ich Wahrnehmungsurtheile.”}

\[\text{767 Cf. Prauss 1971, 163–164; Sassen 2008, 277. See also Zammito 1992, 74–76, for a concise reflection on several positions taken in the secondary literature that suggest this.}\]
But if I say: the sun *warms* the stone, then beyond the perception is added the understanding’s concept of cause, which connects *necessarily* the concept of sunshine with that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes necessarily universally valid, hence objective, and changes from a perception into experience.\(^{768}\)

Here, it should be clarified that Kant does not mean to say that it is really perception as such that changes into experience. It is a judgment of perception, expressing perception subjectively, that becomes a judgment of experience, doing the same objectively. In other words, perception must mean here a *verbalized* perception, like in this personal note:

> “I sense warmth in touching the oven” is a perception; “The oven is warm” is a judgment of experience [objective judgment from perceptions].\(^{769}\)

This helps us to recognize that what Kant means by “Room is warm” in the *Prolegomena* is really (or close to) “I sense warmth in the room.” This is not thinking of the room as having a certain property (although it looks that way in the first formulation), but an expression of “a relation of two sensations,” namely, the warmth sensed in one’s body and the warmth sensed in the room.

This explains the possibility of judgments of perception that can become judgments of experience.\(^{770}\) With “Air is elastic,” for example, there are two possibilities. Either we express through this judgment that we sense elasticity in touching the air, or we express the objective states of affairs according to which this element has the property of being elastic.\(^{771}\) In the former case, Substance is missing from the thought content. In the latter case, it is there making such a judgment possible in the first place. Accordingly, when a judgment expresses only what we perceive it does not express the objective states of affairs and is to this extent non-categorical. Or to use the distinction we made early on in this chapter: my or Kant’s private sensation when touching the hot oven does not have the capacity of establishing how things are in the communal world, but in my or Kant’s personal world only.

---

\(^{768}\) P § 20, 4:301*: “Sage ich aber: die Sonne *erwärmt* den Stein, so kommt über die Wahrnehmung noch der Verstandesbegriff der Ursache hinzu, der mit dem Begriff des Sonnenscheins den der Wärme nothwendig verknüpft, und das synthetische Urtheil wird nothwendig allgemeingültig, folglich objectiv, und aus einer Wahrnehmung in Erfahrung verwandelt.” As I see it, it is the genuine understanding of the dependency relation that matters here, not the linguistic form of the judgment. That is, similar-looking judgments may express quite different things, which also explains away a couple of apparent inconsistencies in Kant’s own examples (see P § 19, 4:299; LJ 9:114; R 3146, 16:679).

\(^{769}\) R 3146, 16:679 (1790–1804): ”„ich empfinde Wärme in Berührung des ofens“, ist Wahrnehmung; „der Ofen ist warm“, ist Erfahrungsurtheil.”

\(^{770}\) See P § 19, 4:299, 299*; § 20, 4:301*.

\(^{771}\) For a scientific description of this, see Longuenesse 2000, 174.
Also recall that the object of perception can be connected with the concept of an object in general. It is not that this must always happen; it is not the necessary condition of representing. In the Prolegomena, Kant writes how

> beyond the empirical and in general beyond what is given in sensory intuition, special concepts must yet be added [...] under which every perception can first be subsumed and then, by means of the same concepts, transformed into experience.\textsuperscript{772}

And how

> pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve in judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of perception is represented as necessary and universally valid.\textsuperscript{773}

By now it should be clear that the transformation process into experience is not something that simply happens because we possess the categories. Instead, it is all up to the way things are being represented by us. Equally importantly, it has been revealed that not only can perceptions be genuine representations without categorical subsumption, but that the latter can be missing even in a judgment. It is just that then the judgment cannot be a determining judgment of experience, but must be either a judgment of perception or (as I will explain next) an aesthetic judgment, instead.

### 6.3.3. Aesthetic Judgments of Sense

The central distinction in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is the one between determining and reflecting judgment (reflectirende Urtheil). Not only can instances of judgment be distinguished accordingly, but also the power of judgment itself is (or can be taken as) either determining or reflecting. As Kant puts it in the First Introduction, determining judgments call for “a faculty for determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation.”\textsuperscript{774} Reflecting judgments, on the other hand, depend on the “faculty for reflecting on a given representation, in

\textsuperscript{772} P § 18, 4:297: “über das Empirische und überhaupt über das der sinnlichen Anschauung Gegebene noch besondere Begriffe hinzukommen müssen […] unter die jede Wahrnehmung allererst subsumirt und dann vermittelst derselben in Erfahrung kann verwandelt werden.” (My emphasis.)

\textsuperscript{773} P § 22, 4:305: “Daher sind reine Verstandesbegriffe diejenige, unter denen alle Wahrnehmungen zuvor müssen subsumirt werden, \textit{ehe} sie zu Erfahrungsurtheilen \textit{dienen können}, in welchen die synthetische Einheit der Wahrnehmungen als nothwendig und allgemeingültig vorgestellt wird.” (My emphases.)

\textsuperscript{774} EEKU V, 20:211: “ein Vermögen, einen zum Grunde liegenden Begriff durch eine gegebene empirische Vorstellung zu bestimmen[.]”
accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible.”\textsuperscript{775} Or as it is put in the third Critique itself, showing an alternative way to present the distinction:

If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it […] is \textit{determining}. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely \textit{reflecting}\.\textsuperscript{776}

It is not utterly clear what this means, especially given that there are several kinds of reflecting judgments that do not seem to resemble each other that much.\textsuperscript{777}

Fortunately, it is not this complex notion as such that is important for our purposes, but what Kant says in passing while examining it. This leads us to the notion of aesthetic judgment, which can be assimilated to a great extent to judgment of perception. This time, however, we cannot identify the two (like we could do with determining judgment and judgment of experience). The main reason for this is that there are two kinds of aesthetic judgments: aesthetic reflecting judgments and aesthetic judgments of sense.\textsuperscript{778} The former are judgments of taste, which make a special class of subjectively yet universally valid judgments concerning the beautiful.\textsuperscript{779} Here, we will concentrate on the \textit{aesthetic judgment of sense} (\textit{ästhetische Sinnesurtheil, Sinnenurtheil}). This kind of judgment has to do with feeling of (dis)pleasure, as it expresses (dis)agreeableness.\textsuperscript{780} Judgments of perception, on the other hand, are not about (dis)pleasure, but about the sensuous side to the human subject in a more general way. Then again, this is exactly where these two notions meet.

When introducing the two Kant clearly wants to emphasize two things. First, not all synthetic judgments, although empirical, are judgments of experience. Second, not all judging aims at determining objects conceptually according to a category. Indeed, the special feature of aesthetic judgment of sense is that it is not grounded on concept but on \textit{sensation}:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{775} EEKU V, 20:211: “Vermögen, über eine gegebene Vorstellung, zum Behuf eines dadurch möglichen Begriffs, nach einem gewissen Princip zu reflectiren[.]”
\item \textsuperscript{776} KU IV, 5:179: “Ist das Allgemeine (die Regel, das Princip, das Gesetz) gegeben, so ist die Urteilskraft, welche das Besondere darunter subsumirt […] bestimmt. Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben, wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteilskraft bloß reflectirt.” See also R 3287, 16:759.
\item \textsuperscript{777} Generally, there are two main types of such judgments: aesthetic and teleological judgments – and hence aesthetic and teleological power of judgment, respectively (KU VIII, 5:193). But there seems to be a third main type as well, namely the kind of reflecting judgment that is for finding a \textit{system of scientific concepts and laws} (Guyer 2003, 2). Furthermore, as there are different types of aesthetic and teleological judgments, at least five kinds of reflecting judgments can be distinguished (ibid.). At one point Kant also makes a distinction between theoretical and practical power of reflecting judgment (KU § 88, 5:456) which implies even greater complexity.
\item \textsuperscript{778} It is not uncommon in the literature that aesthetic judgment is identified straightforwardly with the reflecting variety (see e.g. Kukla 2006, 6n10; Pillow 2006, 255; Longuenesse 2000, 168–169n4).
\item \textsuperscript{779} See section 6.4.1.
\item \textsuperscript{780} EEKU VIII, 20:224; KU § 14, 5:223.
\end{itemize}
An aesthetic judgment in general can therefore be explicated as that judgment whose predicate can never be cognition (concept of an object) (although it may contain the subjective conditions for a cognition in general). In such a judgment the determining ground is sensation.\textsuperscript{781}

This explains their subjective validity: since mere sensations are intrinsically subjective, judgments based merely on them must be that, too. More generally, this implies that whereas determining (theoretical) judgments of experience (cognition) contain empirical predicates, aesthetic judgments actually do not (although it certainly appears that they do). This is because in them the usual place of the predicate concept is taken up by a non-conceptual feeling, which gives us yet another distinction concerning judgment: logical (cognitive, intellectual) judgment as opposed to aesthetic (non-cognitive) judgment.\textsuperscript{782}

An important implication of this is that it is not the words themselves, but how the words are used and understood in the act of judging, that matters (it is all about semantic, not grammatical relations, as one could put it). Indeed, in an aesthetic judgment there is a predicate of judgment but not a predicate of object.\textsuperscript{783} This gives us another important implication: in this kind of judgment that which acts as the predicate grammatically speaking is not a genuine predicate because it is not represented as (or does not act as a means to represent) an objective property. And this takes us directly back to the judgments of perception. In them, too, the predicate of judgment is not taken as the property of the object (although it may appear that way).

Accordingly, judgments of perception and aesthetic judgments of sense are very similar in respect of their contents. That is, both are all about expressing how the subject happens to sense in some perceptual situation. As such, both require first-hand perceptual experience. In fact, I would like to claim that both are instances of what Kant at one point calls judgment of sensation (Empfindungsurtheil).\textsuperscript{784}

However, a thing to keep in mind is that it does not follow from this mere subject determination (as one could call it) that the judgment in question could somehow be not about any object at all. Of course it is, as Kant himself puts it:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{781} EEKU VIII, 20:224: “Ein ästhetisches Urtheil im Allgemeinen kann also für dasjenige Urtheil erklärt werden, dessen Prädicat niemals Erkenntnuß (Begriff von einem Objecte) sein kann (ob es gleich die subjective Bedingungen zu einem Erkenntnuß überhaupt enthalten mag). In einem solchen Urtheile ist der Bestimmungsgrund Empfindung.” Cf. KU § 17, 5:231, where the determining ground of an aesthetic judgment is stated to be a feeling instead of a concept, and EEKU XI, 20:245, where it is implied that although all the faculties depend on the faculty of cognition, it does not follow from this that their use is necessarily grounded on cognition – which I take to imply conceptual cognition in this context – because the representations of the faculty of cognition can be non-conceptual as well.


\textsuperscript{783} See EEKU VIII, 20:224.

\textsuperscript{784} KU § 36, 5:288.
\end{flushright}
By the designation “an aesthetic judgment about an object” it is therefore immediately indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an object but that what is understood in the judgment is not the determination of the object but of the subject and its feeling.\textsuperscript{785}

Not only does this suggest that a judgment may actually be, as a representation, more complicated than it appears (what its verbalized form itself suggests, that is), but that it all depends on “what is understood in the judgment.” In other words, what matters or becomes expressed through “an aesthetic judgment about an object” is not an objective state of affairs. This is because the determining ground of such a judgment is mere sensation. However, in some cases this ground of judging may change. For example, when we realize the causal connection between the sun and the warm stone, we do not represent just according to our sense perception anymore, but (also) according to a universal rule that goes by the name Causality and Dependence.

\textbf{6.3.4. Objectivity and Necessity}

What do we learn from the notion of subjectively valid judgment, understood as judgment of sensation? For starters, that only certain kinds of judgments belong to experience, or are about objects of experience, strictly speaking. Although they may all look the same, they are that only formally. There should be nothing new about this. Nor do analytic judgments belong to experience like determining judgments do. Indeed, it is easy to see how, for example, categorical judgments that are merely analytic cannot count as acts of contentful property predicing. So it is with formally similar-looking judgments of sensation, too: the relation that is being figured out in such thought acts does not count as genuine predication of properties of objects.

However, this does not mean that it is only through determining judgments of experience that we can represent things in the first place, or even being in a certain way. Instead, the kind of objectivity Kant has in mind when he distinguishes between objectively and subjectively valid judgments is tightly linked with the notion of necessity. This suggests universality, or rather that the judgment is made “in accordance with the general conditions of the determining power of judgment.” Only then is there a chance that the judgment in fact represents how things are, which is to say that “all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another.”

This cannot be the case with judgments that are grounded on sensation, as sensations reflect the human condition only to the extent it is contingent (and, moreover, from the first person point of

\textsuperscript{785} EEKU VIII, 20:223: “Durch die Benennung eines ästhetischen Urteils über ein Object wird also sofort angezeigt, daß eine gegebene Vorstellung zwar auf ein Object bezogen, in dem Urtheile aber nicht die Bestimmung des Objects, sondern des Subjects und seines Gefühls verstanden werde.”
view). There must thus be a universal ground of cognition that makes the judgment made in accordance with it true. Obviously, this does not mean that every judgment that has the capacity to reflect that ground is necessarily correct, since we can well err in our judgings and grounds of judging. Still, this makes it possible that a judgment can at least be up to a dispute from a universal point of view.

It is trivially true that mere perception is not up to that. Subjectively valid judgments, on the other hand, may easily seem to be up to that: it might be that we do not recognize (or refuse to recognize) that our judgment is deficient in this respect. As we have seen, one way to describe this deficiency is that then our cognition is non-categorical. In other words, if it is the objective validity of judgment that we are looking for, then we are judging from a wrong kind of ground: not, say, in accordance with the rule expressed by Substance but, say, in accordance with how we happen to feel.

Here, we may recall Kant’s water droplet example: “An individual judgment of experience, e.g., one made by someone who perceives a mobile droplet of water in a rock crystal, rightly demands that anyone else must also find it so.” In this situation, a judgment of sensation would be, for example, about the droplet’s shine or glitter. Then the target of judgment is the droplet’s effect on our senses, not the predication of the movement of the droplet as something that represents the objective states of affairs. Because of this, the demand “that anyone else must also find it so” cannot be legitimately made.

This fundamental difference shows that it is one thing to think our perceptions through the concepts like Substance, Magnitude, or Cause, and quite another thing to be aware of the contents of our sensibility. It should be obvious enough that no concepts whatsoever can be responsible for perceiving, say, colors or the droplet’s glittering quality as such. As it is put in one of the lectures: “Representation, if it arises from the understanding, is always a concept. But the intuition of red does not yet give any concept of the understanding.” However, as judgments of sensation are nevertheless judgments, it would appear as contradictory to claim that judging, and thus thinking of such qualities, could somehow be non-conceptual as well. Then again, this is hardly the point Kant wants to make with subjectively valid judgments being non-categorical, as opposed to objectively valid judgments.

---

786 Nor does this ever grant access to noumenal reality, but rather to that which is the same in all judgings, providing not only the concept of an object in general, but reference to what Kant calls transcendental object = X (A104–110). I have chosen to skip the elaboration of this notion in this study. For more, see e.g. Allison 2004, 60–63; Hanna 2001, 43–45, 107–108, 110–112.

787 LD-W 24:752: “Die Vorstellung, wenn sie aus dem Verstande erspringt, ist allemal ein Begriff. Aber die Anschauung von rot gibt noch keinen Verstandesbegriff.” (The first emphasis mine.)
What Kant wants to emphasize is the difference between judging “on the basis of what he has before his sense”\textsuperscript{788} and judging “on the basis of what he has in his thoughts.”\textsuperscript{789} Although Kant uses this distinction for other purposes in the third Critique, we can safely put it into use for our purposes here. If one just happens to think of the glittering quality of the droplet while apprehending it, then no conceptual relation in which something is taken as a bearer of properties, and something as its property, is being established. Accordingly, the pure concept of understanding is neither expressed nor is the relation it stands for being understood, as the category in question is simply not needed for that kind of activity. Substance, on the other hand, stands just for the kind of relation in which something is taken as a property of an enduring object. Furthermore, the individuation of the droplet (as an object of perception) is up to intuition.

In more general terms, Kant is trying to explicate the sensible side there is to judging. The judgments of sensation are vehicles for conceiving things as being this way or that sensibly or aesthetically speaking. This involves taking perception as the ground of judging. That could be the droplet’s glittering quality, or the elasticity of air inside a balloon when the balloon is pressed, or the warmth of the room. In all these examples what is required is that we direct our attention to the perception itself and, indeed, express it: “A judgment from mere perception is really not possible, except through the fact that I express my representation as perception.”\textsuperscript{790}

Since it is the very content of perception that is being represented in such a judgment, it is hardly shareable or communicable. In fact, if one were supposed to share it, one would have to share the particular phenomenal characteristics of one’s representational content at a given time, namely, one’s “present state of perception.” Then again, if only determining judgments of experience could be made, we could not even refer to those present states. But certainly we can do that: just press that balloon. This would be one way to represent elasticity, even if it is only because of the other way that we can start to build a scientific world-view and the like. Hence, in the end Kant explores through the notion of subjectively valid judgment the difference between representing a world consisting of necessarily holding facts and how it all appears to the subject.\textsuperscript{791} But this time it is the latter that reveals something very important of Kant’s model: namely, that the possibility of judgments of sensation depend on the possibility of having purely aesthetic (sensible) features available to the judging mind.

\textsuperscript{788} KU § 16, 5:231: “nach dem, was er vor den Sinnen […] hat.”
\textsuperscript{789} KU § 16, 5:231: “nach dem, was er in Gedanken hat.”
\textsuperscript{790} LJ 9:113: “Ein Urtheil aus bloßen Wahrnehmungen ist nicht wohl möglich als nur dadurch, daß ich meine Vorstellung, als Wahrnehmung, aussage[.]”
\textsuperscript{791} Cf. KU I, 5:171, where the categories are stated to be for making theoretical cognition of nature possible.
6.4. The Subject of Experience in the Critique of the Power of Judgment

6.4.1. Judgment of Taste and the Lack of Concept

In the first book of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant’s focus is on the notion of judgment of taste (Geschmacksurtheil). As previously noted, it is both a kind of reflecting judgment and a kind of aesthetic judgment; “This rose is beautiful” would be a typical example. In comparison to aesthetic judgment of sense, aesthetic judgment of taste could be described as a judgment of “finer feeling” (das feinere Gefühl). It resembles determining judgment in the sense that it, too, carries with it the aim at universal validity. There is thus an implicit demand in making such judgments that everyone else (at least those capable of good judgment) ought to end up with similar judgments in similar circumstances. Still, judgments of taste differ from determining judgments in being at best only subjectively universal. As such, they lack any kind of antecedent rule by which an object could be deemed to be beautiful, which suggests also that they cannot be based on testimony. “One wants to submit the object to his own eyes,” instead, as Kant writes in the third Critique. Indeed, one must do so because it is only when there is a proper kind of feeling in place that a (pure) judgment of taste can arise. Although the object is then examined as if beauty was its objective property, it cannot really be that, given these limitations.

There is more to the judgments of taste. However, as I am not planning on analyzing Kant’s theory of taste (or aesthetics in the contemporary sense), I will get straight to the point I want to make with this complex notion. First, let us recall the conclusion we reached by the end of the previous section: for certain kinds of judgments it must be possible that the judger has purely aesthetic features available to him or her, acting as grounds for these ways of judging. Secondly, let us introduce another key feature of judgments of taste: disinterestedness. Suppose we are in a forest carrying a chainsaw, about to fell a tree. In that case, we have a practical interest towards the forest and that tree.

---

792 This is how Kant put things in Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764) (2:208). As the title of this little book suggests, such a feeling includes both the beautiful and the sublime. In a similar vein in the third Critique judgment of taste is analyzed in respect of the two. For the sake of brevity, I will simply skip this distinction.

793 KU §§ 6–7, 5:211–216. Indeed, one of the big questions of the third Critique is to show how subjectively universal judgment is possible.

794 KU § 8, 5:215–216; § 33, 5:284–285. For the role of testimony in judgments of taste then and now, see Meskin 2004.

795 KU § 8, 5:216: “Man will das Object seinen eignen Augen unterwerfen.”

796 E.g. EEKU VIII, 20:224; KU VII, 5:190–191; § 14, 5:223–226. What this proper kind of feeling must be like is a complex topic and would get us sidetracked. Let us only say this much: it cannot be a mere sensation, as then the judgment in question would be an aesthetic judgment of sense.

797 KU § 6, 5:211.

798 For a comprehensive commentary on the subject, consult e.g. Allison 2001, 67–192.
As Kant would have it, this ruins the possibility of a judgment of taste about the tree, as it should be approached for its own sake for that, not for the sake of providing some firewood. In other words, its usefulness for this or some other external purpose (Zweck) does not count one little bit when it comes to judging over its beauty. Rather, its purpose must be wholly overlooked.799

Importantly for our purposes, in establishing this Kant claims that also concepts are utterly irrelevant as the ground of this special type of judgment:

Hence the judgment of taste is merely contemplative, i.e., a judgment that, indifferent with regard to the existence of an object, merely connects its constitution together with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is also not directed to concepts; for the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a practical one), and hence it is neither grounded on concepts nor aimed at them.800

This seems to suggest that it does not matter whether we represent the tree, say, as a palm or spruce in order to judge over its beauty.801 In fact, it may even appear as irrelevant whether or not we represent it through any concepts at all.

Granted, this cannot mean that the conceptualization of the object is somehow simply bypassed in such a judgment.802 After all, we are thinking of that tree as beautiful. However, as we have seen, it may still be so that what matters in the judgment is not the conception of the object in question. So it must be here as well: a judgment of taste cannot be grounded on our concepts of the object, nor does it express one, as it is not a cognitive judgment.

This makes sense in two ways. First, for a judgment to be aesthetic just means that its ground must be something sensible. If I incidentally hit my finger with a hammer, for example, it is not the concept of pain upon which I base my judgment “Oh, that hurt.”803 Indeed, the pain itself is something utterly non-conceptual, sensible, aesthetic. In a similar vein, if I aim to judge something as beautiful

799 KU §§ 2–5, 5:204–211; § 11, 5:221; § 13, 5:223. To be precise, Kant distinguishes free beauty (freie Schönheit, pulchritudo vaga) from dependent beauty (anhängende Schönheit, pulchritudo adhaerens). When the judgment is about the latter, the purpose of the object matters, actually. However, then the judgment is not pure but applied. (KU § 16, 5:229–231.)
800 KU § 5, 5:209: “Dagegen ist das Geschmacksurtheil bloß contemplativ, d.i. ein Urtheil, welches, indifferent in Ansehung des Daseins eines Gegenstandes, nur seine Beschaffenheit mit dem Gefühl der Lust und Unlust zusammenhält. Aber diese Contemplation selbst ist auch nicht auf Begriffe gerichtet; denn das Geschmacksurtheil ist kein Erkenntnissurtheil (weder ein theoretisches noch praktisches) und daher auch nicht auf Begriffe gegründet, oder auch auf solche abgezweckt.”
801 In other words, concepts are not necessary for taking an object as beautiful. Here is a nice expression of this idea: “Aesthetic appreciation of a bird’s song appears to be the same before and after you learn which type of bird it is, or whether you know it is a song thrush, say, and how a song thrush looks, at rest or in flight.” (Budd 2002, 11n14.) Cf. Kant’s explication of representing objective purposiveness in KU §15, 5:227.
803 Cf. LD-W 24:936.
on the basis of my conceptions of the thing, I am doomed to fail. Secondly, and even more importantly, by insisting that a judgment of taste can be universally valid, Kant clearly refers to the possibility of regarding objects only in those respects or in such ways that we can presuppose to be shared by all judges. It is, after all, the form (Form) that grounds such a judgment. In other words, if we manage to base our judgment only on the formal features of (taking of) objects, there is a chance that we achieve (at least humanly speaking) a universal standpoint on them. Since the judgment in question is nevertheless an aesthetic one, Kant must have thought that it is possible to have merely sensible features of objects available to the judging mind, as otherwise no such judgment (nor the required effect on the mind) would be possible.

6.4.2. The Aesthetic Quality of Objects

In the representation of a sensible object there are two relations present: relation to the subject and relation to the object. The first is based on its aesthetic property or quality:

What is merely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its relation to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetic property; but that in it which serves for the determination of the object (for cognition) or can be so used is its logical validity. In the cognition of an object of the senses both relations are present together.

What is important in the passage is that this aesthetic property or quality is present in every sensible representation. Another important thing is that here establishing the relation to the object must refer to the possibility of determining the object conceptually through a determining judgment; this is where “its logical validity” comes from. That this must be the correct reading is suggested by Kant when he points out, as the passage continues, that both space and sensation are subjective but in different senses. As we have seen, outer intuition can well establish relation to the object in perceptual terms, without amounting to determining judgment.

This reveals yet another aspect of the ambiguity of ‘subjective.’ Everything merely sensible can be called subjective. But that this has nothing to do with the possibility of perceiving outer objects as such is further revealed by what Kant calls aesthetic estimation of magnitude:

804 KU VII, 5:189–190; § 11, 5:221.
805 KU VII, 5:188–189: “Was an der Vorstellung eines Objects bloß subjectiv ist, d.i. ihre Beziehung auf das Subject, nicht auf den Gegenstand ausmacht, ist die ästhetische Beschaffenheit derselben; was aber an ihr zur Bestimmung des Gegenstandes (zum Erkenntnisse) dient oder gebraucht werden kann, ist ihre logische Gültigkeit. In dem Erkenntnisse eines Gegenstandes der Sinne kommen beide Beziehungen zusammen vor.”
806 For the quote, see section 3.1., footnote 131.
The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic.\textsuperscript{807}

When linked with the following passage, this shows how ‘subjective’ can mean just that which is not being represented from the necessitating or objectifying point of view of determining judgment. In this case, the latter would require not merely the estimation of an object’s magnitude, but its determination in accordance with numerical concepts, or with mathematical precision, as even the estimation of the magnitude of the basic measure must consist simply in the fact that one can immediately grasp it in an intuition and use it by means of imagination for the presentation of numerical concepts – i.e., in the end all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively determined).\textsuperscript{808}

What matters in aesthetic estimation is how things are (or seem) sensibly speaking. However, in a conceptual determination by exact measure we would not merely do that; instead, we would claim, for example, that the pyramid is 50 meters tall. This is not really a perceptual matter anymore, as now we represent how things stand beyond our sensible point of view (although, to be sure, we could not understand any measures were that view gone).

More generally, this takes us back to the possibility of viewing things sensibly, regardless of the way we happen to think them. When explicating the sublime, Kant tells us how we must not take the sight of the ocean as we think it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge (which are not, however, contained in the immediate intuition), […] rather, one must consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance shows[.]\textsuperscript{809}

To do this, we have to be able to grasp what there is “in mere intuition.” In the bigger picture, this reflects the important distinction between a representation through which the object is given and a

\textsuperscript{807} KU § 26, 5:251: “Die Größenschätzung durch Zahlbegriffe (oder deren Zeichen in der Algebra) ist mathematisch, die aber in der bloßen Anschauung (nach dem Augenmaße) ist ästhetisch.”

\textsuperscript{808} KU § 26, 5:251: “Also muß die Schätzung der Größe des Grundmaßes bloß darin bestehen, daß man sie in einer Anschauung unmittelbar fassen und durch Einbildungskraft zur Darstellung der Zahlbegriffe brauchen kann: d.i. alle Größenschätzung der Gegenstände der Natur ist zuletzt ästhetisch (d.i. subjectiv und nicht objectiv bestimmt).”

\textsuperscript{809} KU 5:270: ”Eben so den Anblick des Oceans nicht so, wie wir, mit allerlei Kenntnissen (die aber nicht in der unmittelbaren Anschauung enthalten sind) bereichert, ihn denken; […] sondern man muß den Ocean bloß, wie die Dichter es thun, nach dem, was der Augenschein zeigt[,]” As ‘appearance’ is a technical term and thus not the best possible translation of Augenschein, it might be in order to emphasize that what Kant really has in mind here is the way the ocean looks to the eye and, further, what that arouses in us.
representation through which the object is thought.\textsuperscript{810} What is more, we have here the possibility of entertaining in one’s mind just the other.

6.4.3. Aesthetic Reflection

In his analysis of reflecting judgment, Kant distinguishes between two ways of reflecting (or using the reflecting power of judgment): aesthetic and logical.\textsuperscript{811} As the following explication suggests, the former indicates the possibility of regarding one’s representations independently of concepts or conceptual determination,

since for the logical power of judgment intuitions, even if they are merely sensible (aesthetic), must first be raised to concepts in order to serve for cognition of the object, which is not the case with aesthetic power of judgment.\textsuperscript{812}

The latter kind of possibility comes very close to the possibility of representing objects according to their aesthetic distinctness, which, as we remember, “can obtain even though we do not represent the object to ourselves by means of concepts at all.” We could also infer from this that it is through the logical power of judgment that we obtain logical distinctness.

In any event, and even more importantly, the two ways of reflecting are not necessarily intertwined. Suppose we are on a lake on a sunny day, watching the reflections of light on the water. Let us also suppose, for the sake of argument, that we explicitly judge that we are perceiving water, that the sunlight makes it sparkle, and that there are thousands of spots of light in a constant flux. In so doing, we conceptualize what we see in a complex manner. However, no matter how distinct a concept we obtain thereby, it never captures all those delicate variations there is to the surface of the lake. So, we might just as well try not to do that but simply enjoy the sight; all we need is to look.

There are basically two ways of doing that. One is to simply stare, perhaps in the manner suggested by Kant himself in the following passage in the \textit{Anthropology}:

If one who fixes his glassy stare on the same point for a while is asked what he is thinking about, the answer obtained is: “I haven’t been thinking of anything.”\textsuperscript{813}

\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{810} KU § 16, 5:230. In German, the verbs in question are \textit{gegeben} and \textit{gedanken}, respectively.

\textsuperscript{811} See EEU IX, 20:235.

\textsuperscript{812} EEU XI, 20:247: ”denn für die logische Urtheilskraft müssen Anschauungen, ob sie gleich sinnlich (ästhetisch) sind, dennoch zuvor zu Begriffen erhoben werden, um zum Erkenntnisse des Objects zu dienen, welches bei der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft nicht der Fall ist.”
The other way is to apprehend the surface, go through it, follow the changes on it, find all kinds of shapes on it, and so forth. Nor does this have to involve any thinking. But let us suppose that after doing all that we end up judging the view as beautiful, which requires not only aesthetic reflecting but an explicit thought about the view. Certainly intuitions "must first be raised to concepts" for that to happen. However, this would be a hasty conclusion because as to the perceptual content itself, none of those aesthetic ways of regarding the view requires raising intuitions to concepts. Only the last part, thinking of the view, does. Before it, or in the case we are not representing the view in that manner, what we have here is either a mere perception or what Kant calls "mere reflection on a perception" or "mere reflection on a given intuition."

In such situations it is as if the thoughts about objects as such escape us (but certainly not that the objects themselves escape us: the case is analogical with the one in which we do some serious thinking while perceiving something at the same time). Alternatively, this can mean that we have problems conceptualizing what we perceive. This brings us to the notion of aesthetic idea. Whereas ideas of reason are concepts that lack intuition, with aesthetic ideas it is the other way around: they are representations of imagination (intuitions) for which no adequate concept can be found. Although the notion serves greater purpose in its original context in the third Critique, its most interesting feature for us is that these special kinds of representation are not really graspable and made understandable through language. Furthermore, when explicating the notion Kant identifies concept with determinate thought (bestimmter Gedanke).

Not only does this leave room for thinking that fails to achieve determinate or precise conceptual representation, but also, and also more importantly, for indeterminate representational content for which that kind of representation is unavailable. Accordingly, a representation can have something to it that the subject cannot express, or something more than he or she can express. Indeed, whereas ideas of reason are indemonstrable concepts, aesthetic ideas are inexponible intuitions. Accordingly, the representational content in question is, as a whole, more complicated than what can be worked into (or captured in) a determinate thought.

813 An § 31 (A), 7:175: "wo man auf die Frage, was der mit starrem Blicke eine Weile auf denselben Punkt Gehettierte jetzt denke, die Antwort erhält: ich habe nichts gedacht.” Cf. An § 61, 7:233*.
814 EEUXX, 20:220: “bloßen Reflexion über eine Wahrnehmung[.]”
815 KU § 49, 5:314. A thorough analysis of this notion would require reflection on such nearby concepts as spirit (Geist), attribute (Attribut) and genius (Genie) (see KU § 49, 5:313–319). Fortunately, nothing depends on them here, so we can skip that.
817 KU § 49, 5:314.
818 In Makkreel 2006, 240, this is described as “surplus of meaning.” One could also use ‘ineffability.’
819 KU 5:342–343.
The basic idea behind this can be applied to the distinction between perception and experience as well. Perception does not end when there are no determinate thoughts in place (indeed, it does not have to end when there is no thinking involved at all). Forming determinate thoughts about objects of experience, on the other hand, requires not only perception but successful logical reflection on them. For that, intuitions “must first be raised to concepts,” which is to say that one has to capture one’s intuitions in a determinate fashion through concepts. Now, since aesthetic reflection does not require that (if it did, the distinction we began the section with would not make any sense) it must depend on the possibility of orienting oneself towards objects merely in sensible terms. In other words, its possibility depends on the possibility of non-conceptual perceptual representation.

6.5. The Fourth Portrayal of the Perceiver: A Judging Perceiver

In this section I show how the categories are featured in perception when they are. As we have seen, establishing perceptual reference to particulars by singling things out, differentiating between objects of perception, and going through them as perceptual unities in order to build a more distinct view on them, does not need to involve any concepts at all. Indeed, none of these ways of representing is by itself an act of thinking; hence they could not even be conceptual ways of representing on their own. Perception that features application of the categories does involve thinking, of course, which is why it is better to call it (as we have done) perceptually informed thought rather than perception per se. Assuming the demanding notion of experience, we could also coin perceptually informed thought as perceptual experience. This, however, should be done with extreme precaution, since such a formulation is easily misleading. Presumably, then, it is safer to stick either to the former or to perception that is being judged upon and thus understood in one way or another. In fact, the latter would be more illuminating, as each category reflects one way of understanding perceptions.

We have examined some of these ways above, but let us do that in a systematic fashion now that we have all the relevant pieces of Kant’s model together. As our example, let us use the following picture which we can take as depicting a tiled wall (let us also suppose that we a have a whole view of it all the time):

---

821 Since Kant is far from explicit in these terms himself, what follows is largely a reconstruction on the basis of what we have established so far and what Kant gives on the topic not so much in the Critique but in the lectural and personal notes.
This minimalist image is all we need to exemplify what kind of a contribution the categories give to mere perception (which, as should be clear by now, is also perfectly possible without such a contribution).

For starters, recall that “by these concepts alone can it [understanding] understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it.” It is not that by the categories we would particularize the wall or apprehensively go from one tile to the text (whether aimlessly or in order to obtain a perceptual unity). Nor do the categories ground the associative representings we might come up with in these circumstances (giving rise, say, to a representation of a puzzle game). The same applies to judgments like “I feel good” or “The wall is not that nice.” Instead, the categories are for the kind of intellectual grasp required for obtaining an objective stance on things. Thereby we understand what we perceive in a certain necessitating way beyond our private view on those things. What is more, it is this certain way of understanding that cannot be given empirically in mere perception. As there are several of these ways, and as these can be applied interchangeably to a perceptually identical situation, it would indeed be odd were that so.

Let us begin from Quantity. Under it we have three concepts: Unity, Plurality, Totality. What we have with these together is the possibility of “representations of one and many.” Kant also puts it like this: “Quantity is thus nothing more than determination, how large something is.” Hence, basically, these pure concepts of understanding answer for representing such things as the number and size of objects.

There are two things to be noticed of these explications in terms of perception. As no concept whatsoever answers for perceptual particularizing, Unity cannot refer to any such thing as (the possibility of) representing that over there. Instead, it must answer for understanding something as one. That could be the whole wall or one of its tiles in so far as it is represented as a magnitude (understood as a mathematical measure) or “used for the measure of other magnitudes.” Suppose that the size of each tile is (not so realistically) one square meter. When we represent this to ourselves, we think what we perceive in terms of Unity. In so doing, we make a judgment according to a rule represented through this particular magnitude, the representation of which is made possible by the
relevant category (when schematized with the help of intuition). This kind of representation we can also put in use outside these or any other particular circumstances. But if we just perceive the wall, or estimate it sensibly (even in terms of magnitude but as in aesthetic estimation), we do not do any of this.

Likewise, Plurality must answer for representing something as many. In our example, any number of several tiles could be represented accordingly. But we could as well simply single out some set of them in intuition; it is just that in so doing we would not represent a many but an individual. To put it in terms of synthesis, as Kant does in the following passage (part of which we have quoted already):

We can intuit an indeterminate quantum as a whole, if it is enclosed within boundaries, without needing to construct its totality through measurement, i.e., through the successive synthesis of its parts. For the boundaries already determine its completeness by cutting off anything further.  

Indeed, representing according to the relevant category here would involve representing those tiles “through measurement,” and thus through synthesis (which would be, in turn, reversible through analysis) that goes from tile to tile following the rule of recognition expressible through the concept of many.

Totality would add oneness to this representation of multiplicity or “indeterminate multitude.” For example, if we count the tiles, and get the exact number of nine as a result, or regard the wall as being of nine square meters, we obtain a one consisting of a determinate many. That could be called a unity in a plurality, or a “comprehension of the multitude.” In philosophical jargon of the time, the achieved representation would be quantum dabile, a “magnitude which can be exhibited entirely (in its totality) in intuition.” But to simply intuit that which can be regarded as a quantum is one thing, and to regard it as one quite another.

Let us proceed to Quality. Here we have Reality, Negation, Limitation. When considering an object according to its quality, one of the most basic kind of questions to ask is “whether it is hard or...
soft." In so doing, we wonder how the object is like; or, more specifically, what kind of a reality this particular object has. But how it feels haptically speaking is something that is up to sensation; indeed, this would be something that can take place totally independently of any such thoughts. In fact, thinking in accordance with Reality has to do with representing an object in terms of degree, also known as “quantity of quality.” In mere perception we do not represent like that; it is only when we think in such terms that Reality finds application. Then we try and understand what we perceive according to a degree as such, which is something we can do a priori as well. However, since we cannot perceive anything a priori, this must mean that then we do not represent the degree of the sensuous impact itself, but instead figure out how it stands in respect of other sensations (and not just sensuously speaking but, as we put it earlier, on some scale going from 0 to 10, for example, and thus with mathematical precision).

Negation, on the other hand, simply means that we deny a reality from an object (or its being) as we determine it (say, when we find out that it does not have a certain quality to it). For example, we see that the wall is white. If we think that it is not yellow, then Negation finds an application. Obviously, mere perception could not give us this kind of representation. Furthermore, this category implies that we could not understand opposites in case we could not represent in accordance with the rule implied by it.

Limitation makes a harder case. At one point in his lectures Kant exemplifies the three concepts under Quality with light, darkness, and shadow. The basic idea behind the first two, taken as opposites, should be clear enough. But how is shadow an instance of Limitation? The question is worth asking given that at another point in the same lecture Kant is reported to have stated this:

One calls limited only an object of reason, but bounded an object of intuition: likewise unlimited and unbounded, according to whether it is an object of mere reason or of the senses.

Boundedness and boundary are thus always something positive in appearance, but not limitation.

In other words, any boundary (Gränze) seems to be up to intuition, whereas being limited (beschränkt), or limitation (Einschränkung), is a matter of reason, and thus of thought (I think we

---

830 MK3 29:991: “aber ob es hart oder weich[.]”
831 MM 29:834: “Quantitas qualitatis ist Grad[.]”
832 See A291/B347; MK3 29:998; R 6338a, 18:662 (1794–95).
833 MK3 29:998.
834 MK3 29:994: “Beschränkt nennt man nur einen Gegenstand der Vernunft, begränzt aber einen Gegenstand der Anschauung: eben so auch unbeschränkt und unbegrenzt, je nachdem es ein Object bloßer Vernunft oder der Sinne ist.”
835 MK3 29:995: “Begrenzung und Gränze sind also immer etwas positives in der Erscheinung, nicht aber Einschränkung.”

220
could safely use ‘understanding’ here as well). Shadow, however, can be seen as the limit between light and darkness, which seems to blur this distinction. Then again, in this case at least shadow makes a perfect example of something that relates to both light and darkness. In terms of (infinite) judgment, this is to say that neither it is really so that shadow is light nor that shadow is darkness. Instead, shadow is thought as something that lies between the two extremes. Now, this is an application of Limitation, whereas having a sensible representation of a bounded object such as the tiled wall in front of us is not. The latter is also “something positive in appearance” (which I take to reflect indirectly the fact that “we can never see that something is not”\textsuperscript{836}) whereas the former requires determining the appearance partly positively, partly negatively (and thus in both perception and thought, not just in perception, one could add).

Next we have Substance, Cause, and Community (or Reciprocity). That each of them stands for a certain kind of relation should be clear by now, not to mention the very title of this third main category: Relation. For example, if we consider the wall as white, we apply Substance, which means that we think that whiteness relates to this wall as a property or accident relates to its bearer. We could also say that the former inheres in the latter. Of course, it may turn out in scientific inspection that the wall does not in fact have color properties. But even in that case its physical structure would be represented as having the property of causing a certain kind of sensation in us, which would be another instance of the application of Substance. Indeed, it is this thing-property relation that is thus thought through (or in) the category and related to the perception of the wall, which is to say that the category is being not only applied but demonstrated as well. But the wall itself, with all its perceivable features, is something that is given to us in sensibility. In other words, neither of the two applications of Substance just described makes us perceive the wall the way we perceive it. Instead, they make us think of it in a certain way, and (to repeat it once more) it is this certain way that cannot be given in perception, as opposed to the way the wall looks and feels.

In a similar vein, perception does not simply give raise to representations of causal occurrences. If it did, Cause would be an empirical concept. Even then, perception does provide us with representations of movements and happenings. It is through Cause that we think moving objects as causally efficacious, and as belonging to some causal chain or another (or to the whole physical world as one extremely complex causal structure). In so doing, we regard them under the rule of cause and effect. Suppose that the wall moves (say, as we are on a construction site) and we look for a reason for this occurrence. Whether or not we find one, we apply Cause, which is “nothing other than a synthesis (of that which follows in the temporal series with other appearances) in accordance with

\textsuperscript{836} MD 28:673: “Wir können nie sehn daß etwas nicht sey.”

221
But we do not have to represent in accordance with any concepts in order to see the wall moving in the first place. Moreover, through Cause we do not really represent the wall, but the episode of wall movement as an event as we take the whole happening itself as our object of thought.

As everybody knows, the tiles must be connected to each other (there is probably some grout between them), and each of them is also fixed to some background. By representing just this simple common fact we come to think of the wall as a structure of reciprocal relations, supporting forces, and interaction (although usually people do not put it in terms like these). Certainly not could mere perception provide us with that. Indeed, as every possible physical object, and every possible way of interaction between objects (including agents), can be represented this way, it is hardly the case that the representation could be merely up to the empirical circumstances either. There must thus be something that is on our own part in representing the wall in this manner, and Community (Reciprocity) expresses just that.

Finally, we have Modality. Under it we have, together with their negations, Possibility, Existence, and Necessity. That these have nothing to do with perception per se should be easy to see. For example, if I simply look at the wall, this representing is as actual as it gets. If I wonder whether there is really a wall in front of me, I am already a way beyond mere looking in my representing activity. Likewise, if I regard the possibility that the wall could be of another color than white, I am way beyond perception again. Needless to say, mere perception could not provide us with these kinds of thoughts, nor the kind of reflective stance required to entertain them.

This concludes our case nicely, as that stance is synonymous both with self-conscious thought and the kind of reflective cognition needed for experience in the technical sense. Having that depends, among other things, on the possibility of separating what in our representational content is provided through sensibility, and what through understanding. In fact, this is one of the most salient features of a judging subject. Accordingly, having the categories featured in the perception of the wall means basically that we make judgments on the sight of it, maintaining a reflective stance on our representing activity, thereby securing the possibility of finding error in our representings. It is here that our spontaneity really shows itself. Then again, the spontaneous representation must be strictly distinguished from the involuntary representation of mere perception.

We should also notice the possibility of applying several categories in forming a judgment. For example, “There is a white wall made of huge tiles” features Substance, Reality, Plurality, and Existence simultaneously. “Are the tiles bright or not?” features first Substance and Reality, then Substance and Negation. “Well, I really cannot decide” would add Limitation to the thought content.

A112: “So ist der Begriff einer Ursache nichts anders, als eine Synthesis (dessen, was in der Zeitreihe folgt, mit andern Erscheinungen) nach Begriffen.”

See GMS 4:451.
In a similar manner, the inference “As the size of that tile is one square meter, and as all the tiles are of equal size, the size of the whole wall must be nine square meters” features (at least) first Unity, then Totality. “Did you not know that the wall is actually moving all the time as long as Earth itself keeps on moving?” would be representing the wall first in causal terms as such, calling for Cause (or its predicable Force), then as reciprocically dependent on the movement of Earth, calling for Community. In addition to this, given the implicit idea of Earth standing still involved, also Possibility is featured in this thought content.

Obviously, the amount of examples is unlimited, so we can just as well stop here. Let us only make the following additional remark. All these judgments aim to establish how things stand objectively speaking (as public objects in consciousness in general), and the possibility of judging this way is the possibility of experience itself, and this calls for the categories. This, however, has nothing to do with the possibility of perception. If we simply perceive the wall, we do not represent anything through the categories. As we just saw, with the help of the latter we represent things in a way more abstract and general fashion (and also mediately, which is especially clear with Negation and Possibility) just like with any other concepts. But this is not how perception per se works. Nor do we represent mediately (or base our representing on a common ground) if we reflect on the wall aesthetically, estimating it merely sensibly. Or if we think of the tiles being hard only to the extent how they feel to the touch. This is because then we are not establishing how things stand objectively speaking (in the higher sense, one could add). Instead, we are only leaning on what we perceive. But as those things we lean on are the three-dimensional macroscopic objects we manage to deal with in various ways in our everyday environment even when not thinking of them, the cognitive blindness involved in non-categorical representation is not that dramatic after all.

Now, if the kind of uniformity, coherence, and order we meet in so doing would be up to the categories as well, then there would indeed be a mess without their application. We have already given reasons for not accepting such an interpretation. Let us offer one more. If the categories did work that way, it would be impossible to judge upon what is simply perceived, and the distinction between what is provided through sensibility and what through understanding would be lost. This, however, would be unacceptable for two intertwining reasons. One, the possibility of objectively valid judgment depends on just that, namely, on the possibility of figuring out and distinguishing “what the understanding does from what is sensible.” Two, then the distinction between subjectively valid and objectively valid judgment would be lost as well.
7. REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

7.1. On Some Kantian Themes in Philosophy Today

If we look back at Kant’s model as portrayed in the previous chapters, and try to discover some contemporary topics there, we meet plenty. To list a few: sense perception, cognition, givenness, intentionality, reference, awareness, (non-)conceptual representation, objectivity. Conveniently, all of these have, today, a common denominator: the mind-world relation. This widespread issue is especially interesting to us because much of the work done on it builds (either implicitly or explicitly) on Kant. Things get even more interesting when it becomes apparent that there might be several Kant-related misunderstandings involved. I will now turn to two topics in which this comes up exceptionally well. What is more, these two topics relate directly to what we have established so far about Kant’s account of perception.

The first topic concerns the conditions of perceptual representation. Here, the tendency has been to take those conditions as very demanding. The second concerns the relationship between perceptual representation and thought. Here, the tendency has been to give little room for the idea of perceptual representation that is neither sensory registration nor propositional thought. The two issues are not only intertwined but reflect the exaggerated role given to concepts in perceptual representing. In the first case, concepts are made into the preconditions of perception itself. In the second case, perception is identified straightforwardly with perceptually informed thought, due to the further assumption that concepts (somehow) turn what is otherwise mere sensory intake into representational content.

Together the two blur the distinction between perceiving and judging by forcing concepts into perceptual representation from two directions. This brings us back to the question with which we started the whole study. Is perception concept dependent or not? In contemporary terms, the issue centers on the status of representational content, although more generally speaking the question is really about the (non-)conceptual character of perception and experience as such. This keeps the Kantian model well in the vicinity. Besides, the terminology involved is not altogether foreign to Kant. However, before we get to that let us focus on this particular topic from a present day perspective.

During the last decades there has been plenty of discussion on perceptual experience. With respect to the issue at hand, some thinkers claim that it necessarily involves concepts, thereby denying

839 See Burge 2010, 111–288; Hanna 2011a, 326–327. I will be very brief and will not (re-)argue for this multidimensional problematic here. All I want to do is to point out how – along what kind of lines – Kant’s model should be interpreted, whether for its own sake or in relation to contemporary issues.
the possibility of non-conceptual representational content once and for all. Not unexpectedly, others
do not accept this. Relatively recently, the former have been labeled as conceptualists, the latter as
non-conceptualists.840 Because of the “aesthetic” character of my interpretation of Kant offered above,
let us approach the debate from the non-conceptualist point of view.

Mental content is supposed to be about something; or, as it is sometimes put, “intentional.”841
This makes it representational content. That could be, for example, the visual representation of the
computer screen in front of me. This is possible, as one might want to put it, because some of my
mental states function to indicate that thing instead of something else (if anything). Accordingly, the
representational content in question allows me to have the world present itself this particular way to
me. Or to put it differently, the content just is the way of representing.842 If the thing becomes
represented correctly (without being an illusion or some such) then the perception or experience can
be called veridical. As the non-conceptualist would have it, no concepts are necessarily needed for this
kind of representational success.

More specifically, a representational content can be stated to be non-conceptual if one of the
three following conditions are fulfilled. One, the content cannot be represented (or fully captured, so
to speak) conceptually at all. Two, the subject in possession of the content cannot, for some reason,
grasp the concepts required for articulating the content. Three, the subject in possession of the content
does not, for some reason, grasp the concepts required for articulating the content. Accordingly, the
non-conceptuality of the representational content comes in degrees of strength.843 Further to which,
the lack of concepts can be either due to the fact that the subject in question (say, the ox) does not
have the required cognitive capacities at all, or that they are not being actually exercised in regard to
the content in question. In other words, even if the subject in possession of the content (say, an adult
human being) could grasp the concepts required for articulating the content (whether by simply
applying the relevant concepts already in his or her possession or by acquiring them first) this does not
need to be actually the case. Optionally we could say that the content is non-conceptual either
necessarily (absolutely, essentially) or contingently (relatively).844

At this point things already get tricky to discuss, as even talking about non-conceptual mental
content may have an odd ring to it. Whatever our mental contents may be, they, and the things they
relate to, call for the possibility of forming thoughts of them, which in turn requires just the kind of

840 Compact stories of the evolution of this controversy can be found from Bermúdez & Cahen 2011; Hanna
2005, 248. As a sidenote, by conceptualism one does not thus mean here the position according to which, in the
long-running discussion on the possibility of universals, the latter are concepts.
841 Gunther 2003, 4.
842 Burge 2010, 73.
843 Hanna 2005, 260–269. See also Allais 2009, 386.
artication that is supposed to be missing from entertaining non-conceptual content. Furthermore, the possibility of any such articulation seems to require that the content must be conceptually structured. If not, it is at least difficult to give an explicit account of something that is not so structured, even if there seems to be some truth behind the notion of non-conceptual content.

On the other hand, there is nothing too strange in something like this taking place when one is dealing with philosophical problems. Take the distinction between propositional and non-propositional, for example. It is not only something commonly used, but something that can be used to make a point about certain fundamental differences between perception and thought. Even then, the distinction itself may be extremely hard to explain satisfactorily. Similarly with non-conceptual content (which, for that matter, seems to be almost identical with non-propositional content), we may very well have an idea of such a content, although it may not be that easy to explicate it in a straightforward fashion.

There are other ways, however. Actually, it is not that difficult to argue for the existence of non-conceptual content negatively or indirectly. To use a typical example, it seems that almost any given perceptual content is such that we cannot come up with a propositional thought that would be precise enough to fully capture or match it. The content provided by perception is simply too dense or rich; therefore we explain by non-conceptual content something that our concepts are not up to in our representings.

But then things again get tricky. To give an account of that which the concepts cannot account for depends on what we mean by concepts. Hence, if our conception of conceptual mental content itself is loose and unrefined, we might end up explaining nothing with its counterpart (or so little that it has no notable consequences). Then, fittingly for the conceptualist, there would be no theoretical room for non-conceptual content. Then again, this is only so at first sight because the conceptualist does not fare any better in the end if he or she does not provide a plausible account of concepts. Consequently, in case we do not have such an account, we might just as well conclude that the debate itself is too unrefined to be an actual debate; or, in case we do have one, that it all depends on our notion of concept.

---

845 Cf. Goodman 1984b, 6: “Talk of unstructured content or unconceptualized given or a substratum without properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, conceptualizes, ascribes properties.”
847 See e.g. Burge 2010, passim. One could also use the analog-digital distinction here (see e.g. Dretske 2003, 25–30).
848 Cf. Dennett 2002, 484.
850 For accounts of concepts in support of non-conceptualism, see Gunther 2003, 8–14; Hanna 2011a, 345–354.
There are other issues that indicate that the prospects for a clear-cut account of non-conceptual content are not very good. Metatheoretically speaking, perhaps some of the questions involved belong to cognitive sciences rather than philosophy. Some generate further complexities; for example, it is one thing to speak of the non-conceptuality of mental states, and another thing to speak of the non-conceptuality of mental contents. Maybe the states themselves involved in, say, perceptions and beliefs are very different by their nature. That, however, does not by itself tell us anything about the contents that do the work of specifying those states; perhaps the former are not that different by their nature. Be that as it may, this leads to several possible positions to take in the debate, including mixed positions (one could argue for state non-conceptualism but deny content non-conceptualism, for example). Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how various positions taken in the debate relate to this further, but often overlooked, distinction. Yet there are more (possibly overlapping) distinctions, such as the composition of the content as such in contrast to the role concepts (possibly) play in the possession of that content, and concept-possession in contrast to concept-use. In the end, it is quite evident that not all the work done on or around the notion of (non-)conceptual content deals with exactly the same subject matter.

Undoubtedly, establishing a successful theory of non-conceptual content would have grand consequences for several long-standing philosophical issues. The foundation theory of knowledge would be one. Everything on the topic touches the myth of the given. Moreover, it seems to me that many philosophers in the non-conceptualist camp are after something very important with regard to understanding the common phenomenon known as perception, and this is independent of the debate itself. The crucial point is then that there is something to perceptual representation that distinguishes it strongly from what can be called conceptual or propositional thought. In this sense, the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representational content is informative even when unrefined, and it certainly sets an aim to us. The lesson is that if we ignore, or try to dissolve, that fundamental difference we end up getting things wrong in one way or another with respect to human cognition. And this, if not everything else, takes us back to Kant.

---

852 Bermúdez & Cahen 2011.
854 See BonJour 2004, 130–137.
856 For theories of perception that support the possibility – and would undoubtedly prospect from a successful theory – of non-conceptual content, see Alston 2004, 232–233.
7.2. Was Kant a Conceptualist, Non-conceptualist, Both, or Neither?

In this section we will take a brief look at how Kant fits into the debate between the conceptualists and the non-conceptualists. As implied by the section title, the case might not be that clear. This is partly because of the vagueness found in the issue itself, but also because it may not be that simple to throw Kant in the middle of this (or any other) contemporary debate. Even then, it has not been too hard for the conceptualist to do so, thanks to the famous principle that intuitions without concepts are blind.857

However, as noted above and as pointed out by others,858 the blindness claim does not mean what it has been commonly taken to mean: namely, that concept-independent perception is impossible. What Kant really wants to underline with the principle has nothing to do with perception as such, but rather with this: that it cannot be so that our understanding can freely go on its own ways “on the wings of the ideas,”859 nor so that concepts such as cause or necessity are acquired through the senses. Instead, understanding must constantly turn to sensibility to keep its feet on the ground and have something non-contingent to its representings in order to establish world-oriented thought (objective judgment, that is). Obviously, mere intuition could not do that by itself. This is both because the senses do not judge, and because our understanding cannot intuit. In the end, overlooking these apparent mistakes of taking either rationalism or empiricism too far results in our view of human cognition being wrong.

As we have seen, the consequences of not fulfilling both of the conditions suggested by the principle need not be that devastating with respect to perception, even within Kant’s own model. On the contrary, since those conditions are set for objective judgment, whereas perception does not need to draw on the paradigmatic resources of the understanding at all in order to take place, the cognitive blindness involved in mere perception does not have to have any negative effect on perceptual, but in any case representational, success as such.

Given this, it is possible to provide a very simple argument for non-conceptual perception within Kant’s model. Perception is possible without thinking. Concepts are necessary only for thinking and judging. Therefore, concepts are not necessary for perception. As this limitation of the conceptual domain must include the categories as well, this makes non-conceptual perception both non-categorical and non-judgmental. Furthermore, as perception is a conscious mode of representing for Kant, one does not mean by non-conceptual perception some kind of a merely sensory (and thus presumably subpersonal and subconscious) process, but concrete grasping of things in the egocentric

---

857 Gunther 2003, 1; McDowell 1996, 4.
859 A5/B9: “auf den Flügeln der Ideen[.]” Kant refers with this to Plato, but the basic idea fits anyone who gives – uncritically, one could add – too much room for understanding or reason.
space. Although there are different senses of ‘perception’ in Kant’s texts, the latter is nevertheless the fundamental level.

All of this serves nicely the non-conceptualist camp. In fact, we have been able to quickly show that it would be wrong to label Kant as a conceptualist on the grounds of the blindness of non-conceptual intuition (understood as referring to the impossibility of non-conceptual perception). So, let us focus on the possibility of regarding him as a non-conceptualist in a positive way; besides showing in general terms that too much has been read into the famous principle, on what more specific grounds can we do this?

For one thing, appearing (one could also use Gegenwart here) is not dependent on the functions of understanding. Secondly, sensibility must provide structure on its own; for Kant, understanding is not a rectifier of confusion. Thirdly, objects (as perceptual particulars, preconceptual wholes, or things) can be represented (and referred to) directly through intuition. Indeed, intuitions are not only the non-conceptual representations of the Kantian model by definition, but should be interpreted as genuinely intentional and representational (in their own way) even on their own (especially when backed up with objective sensations). Accordingly, intuitions could be described as the non-conceptual mental contents of the Kantian model simply in virtue of being just this.

More generally, by granting that perception does not necessarily require thinking, such contents are granted (also) an autonomous role in relation to the latter, which leads to the same conclusion.

As a matter of fact, this should not come as a surprise given the fundamental difference between sensibility and understanding, the separation of which is not only something a well-developed account of human cognition demands but something that the subject must have access to in his or her cognitive undertakings. Thus it appears as far too extreme to take the former as not making “an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation” between the two. To be sure, if perceptions were grounded or carried out through the categories (instead of being necessarily subsumable under the latter because otherwise they could not be judged upon) then this might hold; but as we have seen, that is hardly what Kant means by perceptions standing under the categories.

---

861 This relates to the previous point, as mere appearing does not imply confusion. It seems to me, however, that a strongly conceptualist interpretation would have to depend on such an idea to some extent.
862 Hanna 2005, 257–259. Although not a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant, see also Longuenesse 2000, 24, for the notion of preobjective object.
864 McDowell 1996, 9. To be precise, McDowell uses ‘receptivity’ and ‘spontaneity’ instead of ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding.’ But I think that does not really matter. In fact, this could be said to be all the worse for his supposed Kantianism, since he seems to deny everything from sensibility, except for sheer receptivity. If so, his Kant appears as a stranger to me. For a detailed criticism of McDowell’s account in this respect, see Allais 2009, 387–392.
Kant’s views on animal cognition provide another very simple argument. Animals are perceivers. Yet animals do not have understanding and concepts. Therefore, animal perception is necessarily non-conceptual. Since there are no good grounds for interpreting Kant as regarding animal perception fundamentally different from human perception, we may conclude that human perception cannot be necessarily conceptual either. Hence it must be non-conceptual in so far as it fits the confines of what we have been calling perception *per se.* \(^{865}\)

As we have argued for these points above, and as there is no reason to repeat them here, seemingly we might as well conclude that Kant was a non-conceptualist; at least we can do so if the possibility of non-conceptual perception is enough to establish it as so. However, there are other considerations to be made, and these make the issue increasingly murky.

Let us take a quick look at the two central terms, *state* (*Zustand*) and *content* (*Inhalt*). The former should not give any problems. Certainly there must be a state involved in any modification of the mind; even a mere feeling would be one. Even totally obscure sensible representations depend on such modifications, and thus track different states. Briefly put, the states themselves are hardly conceptual for Kant, and the object-indicating function of mere intuition implies that they need not be conceptually specified to fulfill a representational function either. It is thus ‘content’ that complicates things.

The famous principle suggests, rather straightforwardly, that it is indeed *intuition* that brings content to thought. If so, it may seem that there should not even be an issue: if Kant defines contentful representation this way *and* allows for non-conceptual intuitions that are representational even on their own, the case should already be closed. Then again, in another sense Kant’s terminology leads us to this: if intuition merely *provides* content, it must surely do that *for* something, which suggests that it brings content to the representation as a whole. If this is so, a mere intuition turns into a “half-representation.” Indeed, in the contemporary use of the term someone might be (and certainly is) inclined to say that what Kant calls intuition only provides the required link to the sensible stuff.

In Kant-talk, there is only one good candidate for the full-fledged representation implied by the “half-representation,” and it is judgment. Accordingly, it can be claimed that for Kant “minimum content”\(^{866}\) equals judgment. Now, if this is taken to mean that it is only through judgment that we can represent in the first place, then this is something that we cannot accept given our findings above. Furthermore, the claim is not in line with the terminology that suggests explicitly that content comes from the representations of sensibility. Still, there is a point in such a claim, and it is certainly in line with Kant’s general standpoint (that being, unsurprisingly, on judgment) in contexts where the famous

\(^{865}\) In other words, as long as we mean by perceiving particularizing as such and/or apprehending without representing conceptual unities – certainly the ways of perception human beings are capable of sometimes involve more.

\(^{866}\) Dickerson 2004, 133.
principle makes its appearance. That is, purely terminological issues aside, representational content can be said to get its sensible link from intuition, yet there are also other contentful-making factors. Obviously, these other factors are conceptual. Indeed, given certain things Kant says it might just as well be that Kant himself would go as far as to require a reflective self-conscious stance over a representation in order to have it count as a contentful representation, properly speaking. On this construal of representational content, Kant appears as a conceptualist.

If we allow for this not to be at odds with the non-conceptualist reading, for the simple reason that now we mean by representational content genuinely judgmental content, we end up with Kant who can be regarded both as a non-conceptualist and conceptualist. This may be acceptable, but also unwanted. Certainly, this helps us distinguish between two kinds of representational contents in Kant: (non-conceptual) representational contents in which there is relation to individual things, as opposed to (conceptual) representational contents that draw from the former some criteria for the kind of representing that takes “as the ground of cognition that which is common to many things.” Indeed, since the categories also function this way, here the demarcating factor cannot be the difference between them and empirical concepts. Accordingly, insisting that the categories (even if not empirical concepts) make non-conceptual perception impossible seems not to be the right way to interpret Kant in respect of the contemporary debate at hand.

Even then, however, the problem is that, strictly speaking, there does not seem to be room for two kinds of (possibly mutually supporting) contents in Kant’s model. Since merely conceptual representations are empty, it is hardly the case that in sensibly informed judgmental content we have non-conceptual content together with conceptual content. What we have at best is a representation aided by something particular, and guided by something that reflects that which is beyond the particular, the contentful representation being in fact the reflected judgmental cognition as a whole. For Kant, the issue would then be the fit between the “two entirely different sources of representation” in judging, and not about two different types of mental contents. As such, if taken literally, Kant’s model does not really allow for a unique kind of non-conceptual content more than it allows for a unique kind of conceptual content. There is no such dichotomy; there is either judgment with or without content. This does not serve either the non-conceptualist or the conceptualist agenda.

868 Pace Griffith 2012, 194. A further option is to draw the line between clear and obscure concepts (Grüne 2009, 27). But as it appears as impossible for the application of concepts – however dim and unclear – to be independent of thought, it is difficult to see how they could be necessarily featured in a representational content that can be independent of thought.
869 This appears as contrary to what is suggested in Hanna 2005, 248, although not contrary to what is also suggested there, namely, that Kant’s sensibility-understanding distinction can be identified with the contemporary distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual cognitive capacities.
Certainly, we may choose to call a mere intuition a manifestation of non-conceptual content as opposed to conceptual content. It is a way of representing, after all. In this sense, there is room for different kinds of representational contents in Kant’s model (indeed, we have used the term ‘representational content’ accordingly all along). But then, to be fair and consistent in transcending Kant’s terminology, one might want to point out that we would also have to assert that there must be some kind of non-sensible content to mere thoughts as well. If so, there would then have to be a third kind of both sensible and non-sensible content reserved for the kind of representation that is neither mere intuition nor mere thought. A downside of this move is that the issue about Kant being a conceptualist or non-conceptualist becomes a terminological one. Moreover, it seems that we end up with a notion of content that is not very informative in respect of this debate, as it must surely be the case that a mere thought does not count as a contentful representation for the contemporary conceptualist more than it does for Kant.

All this leads to what could be called the issue of partial content, or to the idea that perceptual experience must be, at least to some extent, non-conceptual. In its most trivial form, if we accept even a minimal non-conceptual contribution to representational content as a whole, we must allow both conceptualists and non-conceptualists to be partly right. In fact, even though this would not solve the contemporary debate, it may actually fit Kant quite well: if we are allowed to speak of partially (non-)conceptual contentful representation, any perceptually informed thought necessarily reflects a kind of hybrid content for Kant.

A full-blooded conceptualist would not accept this, however, since what he or she wants to secure (for the sake of justification and whatnot) is that the contribution of intuition itself must be seen as conceptual. The non-conceptualist, on the other hand, might be required to show that there is non-conceptual component that simply cannot be represented conceptually. Otherwise, he or she defends at best only contingently non-conceptual content, which makes way for a conceptualist counterattack.

Now, if the reading we have proposed is right, then what the contemporary conceptualist wants hardly represents Kant’s position anymore. The idea of the fundamental aesthetic representational contribution, which only intuition can make, is absolutely crucial for Kant. It is also something that concepts are just not up to, culminating in what can be coined as “essentially indexical cognition.” Moreover, as sensibility and understanding “cannot exchange their functions” (nor do they fuse), when the content provided through intuition is being reflected through an intellectual representation, the former is not in any sense turned into something conceptual, for the simple reason that it cannot

---

870 See e.g. Bermúdez & Cahen 2011; Crowther 2006, 253.
872 See Hanna 2011a, 344.
873 Hanna 2005, 266. See also Tomaszewska 2008, 69–70.
be. In this sense, Kant’s model is compatible even with the notion of essentially (absolutely) non-conceptual content, at least with the reservation that we read the idea of partial content into it.\footnote{Although not strictly speaking an interpretation of Kant, this seems be the Kantian route taken in Hanna & Chadha 2011, 188–189, where it is allowed that “the presence of this essentially non-conceptual content does not necessarily exhaust the total content of [perceptual] acts or states.” (My emphasis.) The same point can be found from Hanna 2011a, 332; see also 363–364.}

In any event, labeling Kant as a non-conceptualist depends on how we construe the contemporary notion of content in relation to Kant’s model. This outcome is further underscored by Kant’s notion of experience, which again turns things upside down. As experiencing in the strict sense calls for judging (and thus for the constant realization of the co-operation of intuitions and concepts) it is necessarily conceptually informed. This makes Kant reappear as a conceptualist, especially if one holds on to the idea that genuinely contentful cognition has judgmental content, and refuses to accept this as consisting of both conceptual and non-conceptual content. More precisely, Kant’s position could then be coined as experience conceptualism.\footnote{See Siegel 2010.}

Then again, this does not mean that we cannot distinguish reflective cognitive experience (as Kant saw it) from what can loosely be called perceptual experience (as we may see it) even within Kant’s own model. It is just that Kant wanted to reserve the notion of experience for something more, whereas others may be content with identifying an intuitive representing in the Kantian sense with having an experience. For example, when perceptually confronted with a particular thing, someone might well claim that he or she experiences the thing regardless of any higher kinds of representational factors that are (or are not) present or involved in the situation.\footnote{See Dretske 2002; Martin 2003, 239–242.} This is not in any sense incompatible with Kant’s model as such (although Kant would prefer different terminology). Accordingly, even if Kant himself identified the possibility of experience with “the possibility of empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments,” it would be absurd to overlook what is clearly there in his model (namely, non-conceptual perceptual representation) just because one of his highly technical notions suggests otherwise (namely, that genuinely contentful representation can only be achieved through a determining judgment of experience).

So, in the end, it seems that it is the conceptualist who wants to push things too far with Kant, thereby ending with a reading that is too demanding. For example, it is one thing to represent something sensibly by simply locating it, and quite another thing to represent it through the categories as an object understood as a unified causally efficacious structure of properties.\footnote{See Allais 2009, 405.} If the conceptualist wants to put everything in terms of this higher level of representing, he or she runs the risk of trivializing the former. Alternatively, the conceptualist can be seen as making a stipulation: we should require explicit self-conscious reflected thought from a contentful representation. Granted, there might
be something similar happening in Kant from time to time, but this would be unfair in respect of the contemporary debate. This is because it is plainly obvious that we cannot represent in such intellectual terms merely by those means which the non-conceptualist (and Kant, for that matter) takes to be sufficient for some kind of representing.

It is true that without concepts we would not be able to recognize, say, houses as houses, understand that a red house is different from a yellow house, or make it clear to ourselves on which grounds they are different, and so forth. These kinds of cognitive achievements require “objectification” that can happen only through conceptualization in certain kinds of judgments. From this it does not follow, however, that the house would not become represented in any way without the latter. On the contrary, in that case it is just that the rule on the basis of which that rectangular-shaped object could be recognized as a house is either missing completely or has not made its way into the grounds of cognition.

If this is so then the object surely remains conceptually undetermined, as for such determination the input from both of the two fundamental representational faculties is definitely called for. But there is certainly not an empty spot in place of the house if that mutual input is missing. And as we have seen, Kant himself (unlike some of his commentators) has no problem speaking of “one-sided” representing. Thus it is just that the representational content is then brought about by only some of the representational capacities of the mind. In this case, these would be those that answer for perceptually representing a particular thing. This, however, does not require (or depend on) conceiving the thing in any way. To be sure, the content in question might be cognitively speaking very limited on its own (excluding now the fundamental factor that it makes indexical representing possible in the first place), but this would be the lesser point to be made and beside the big one.

7.3. Between Subjectivity and Objectivity

If one brushes aside the fundamental representational function of intuition, both Kant’s dualist account of cognition and his view of human mind in general become distorted. In this section, I will explicate this by looking at the tendency to put Kant’s (or one’s Kant-inspired) account of perception into a two-level picture instead of a three-level one. In the two-level picture, there is first non-representational sensory input, and then genuine representation (presumably effected by the conceptual capacities on the basis of the former). However, to use Kant’s own terms, the story should not go directly from sensation or impression to concept (the latter being the only candidate left for the...
genuine representation in the two-level picture). Instead, it must go from sensation to concept through the notion of empirical intuition, as also that indicates (the capacity of) genuine representation. Briefly put, the latter is a way of representing; not sensory input, but not thought either.

Mere intuition is not, furthermore, just differential responsiveness. When we intuit we are not like thermometers, or some other technical sensory device, that can be said to be representing (in the one very allowing use of the term). This is because we do refer to things in so doing; there is more than mere sensing, information registration, or response to stimulus. In other terms, we establish a relation (call it intentional if you like) between things and ourselves; there is not only perception but constant orientation going on. Indeed, that is no less than an ineliminable part of establishing perceptual reference through outer sense (in addition to the five basic sense modalities, nowadays we might also want to speak of kinesthesia, proprioception, and others). It is just that we are not necessarily self-reflexively aware of all (or any) of this, because we do not need to: we do not need to conceptualize anything in order to achieve this level of representational success.

If this is compatible with Kant’s model, as I believe it to be, the categories do not (have to) enter the picture here. Nor do they then stand for “conceptual capacities that are passively drawn into play in experience.” In fact, if they did function that way, the fundamental distinction between sensibility and understanding would become blurred; in actual representing, the two outputs would become fused. Since this is not the case, however, the categories must be reserved for something that only enters the picture when actual and genuinely spontaneous thought does.

Undoubtedly, this kind of reading must appear too simplistic and straightforward to anyone who thinks that the categories structure perceptual experience itself. Then again, if what we have proposed is right, it could be used to reveal how in that case the categories are turned into something far more complex than they were intended by Kant. As we have seen, Kant is fairly modest with his model (except when it comes to criticizing speculative metaphysics). It may even be that he did not think that the apparent gap between conceptual and non-conceptual is in need of a full-blown

---

881 See Burge 2010, 325.
882 Cf. McDowell 1996, 89, according to which “movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings[.]” This kind of approach overlooks the middle position between genuine thought about one’s actions and mere behavior, which is excellently captured in the following example of driving a motorcycle: “I was knowingly making micro-adjustments of my speed all the time in response to changing road conditions. These micro-adjustments weren’t simply behaviors, the output of some unknown causal process. They were, instead, epistemically sensitive adjustments made by me, and for which I was as epistemically responsible as I was for my judgments.” (Cussins 2003, 150.) As we see here, exactly the same kind of dismissal takes place in understanding the domain of perception.
883 McDowell 1996, 12.
884 E.g. Ginsborg 2006b, 62 (see also 99n4, for a brief statement of the “trivial” view which, I would say, better represents Kant’s view); McDowell 2009, 127.
Reflections on Contemporary Issues

There just is a fit between intuitions and concepts; showing that we can come up *a priori* with any such representational content that shares the formal structure with any possible perceptually informed thought seems to be quite enough for Kant himself.

That does not make perception itself conceptually structured, however. But overlooking the three-level picture does mean that mere perception is either forced unjustly onto the level of thinking or onto the level of subconscious sensory processing. Either way, Kant’s position becomes distorted. The former reflects the stubborn idea that only genuine thought can be representational, whereas mere perception offers at best only phenomenal content; as if Kant meant by sensation and empirical intuition one and the same thing. The latter way, on the other hand, reflects not only insensitivity to sensible representational content, but transforms the whole issue into something that would belong more properly to physiological anthropology or some other empirical doctrine. At the same time, we would get Kant’s notion of *perception* mixed up (to begin with, for perception there has to be some degree of awareness involved, not just proper behavior of sense organs).

Such aspirations lead easily to a view that mere perception would be subjective in any case, and that only full-fledged thought can make it objective (or is alone objective in the first place). However, as we have shown several times from several directions, this cannot be the whole truth about Kant’s view. Although the latter does come with quite a high-flown idea of objectivity in terms of experience, we have also found from it such notions as objective sensation and objective perception. After placing these in the bigger picture we have before us a model according to which it would be utterly misleading to simply state that only certain intellectually achieved representations count as objective. On the contrary, a mere perception can be stated to be objective as long as it has to it a material component that is only attributable to an (outer) object, given that it also provides what we have called intuitive content. Most importantly, there is no indication that concepts play any necessary role in either achievement.

In this sense, mere perception (or even mere sensibility if imagination is being included and sensibility is not taken as sheer receptivity) is already representational, indicating what can be called perceptual objectification. It is just that the kind of objectivity implied by this should not be identified (or even compared) with the kind of objectivity that only a thinking subject can achieve through judgment. Rather, it should be compared with the representational power of a mere feeling, which would be, on this construal, zero. Of course, one might still claim that the higher kind of

---

885 See Allais 2009, 400n49.
887 Burge 2010, *passim*. I only borrow this core idea from Burge’s theory, as the latter surpasses what Kant ever accounted for – or even could have accounted for – in his model.
objectivity is nevertheless the proper kind of objectivity. But even then, identifying the former kind of objectivity with subjectivity would involve just the kind of confusion the two-level picture depicts.\(^{888}\)

Besides, already the second level provides non-perspectival representational content. There is nothing fancy in this: every time we track some object we make use of those capacities that make such content possible. To be sure, this is not to say that perception is not bound to a point of view. The point is, instead, that something independent of both concepts and the exact phenomenal characteristics of sensations must make it possible for us to keep on perceptually referring to things in our environment. This includes not just perceiving them as such but, for example, putting them in pockets, taking them out, hiding them, remembering the way they look, missing them, digging them up, using them. What is more, someone else might want to do that, too. Indeed, that other person is directed at the same things, looking for ways to manipulate them; certainly not is he or she then completely locked up with the contingent phenomenal characteristics that come with his or her private viewpoint.

What is it that makes this kind of fundamental perceptual and representational success possible? The answer would have to be to a great extent empirical (or “anthropological” as Kant might want to put it) so we better not try to answer it here.\(^{889}\) I have also tried to be careful enough to avoid explaining too closely how some actual subject actually perceives, or is prone to perceive. Most likely, that has something to do not only with the peculiarities of the perceiver’s sensory system, but with conceptual schemes, cognitive history, perhaps even cultural conventions. Even then, there must be some conditions that are beyond such contingent factors; conditions without which we would not have any of that success in the first place. If there is a lesson to be drawn from Kant’s model in this respect, however, it is that those conditions are not to be identified with the functions of understanding. Basically, then, a lot more is loaded into Kant’s notion of sensibility and its forms as is often thought.

7.4. Epilogue: Perception and Transcendental Idealism

We have examined Kant’s model from the standpoint of empirical realism and established what we have established about perception accordingly. To be sure, we might just as well keep it that way, given that we did not aim to argue for transcendental idealism more than we aimed to argue for the deduction of the categories. However, even then a question would rise: What (if anything) does Kant’s

\(^{888}\) Besides, there are many types of objectivity in any case (see e.g. Burge 2010, 46–54, 158, 201, 401). Thus we would not have one clear-cut notion of objectivity even after such a terminological restriction.

\(^{889}\) A prominent way of explanation would be through the so-called perceptual constancies (Burge 2010, passim but especially 274–275, 397, 408–410, 413–414, 466). These would also explain why there can be all kinds of changes to what we have been calling the sensuous content of perception while its intuitive content stays the same or at least continues to play its role independently of those changes.
mature philosophical doctrine known as transcendental (or formal or critical)\textsuperscript{890} idealism have to do with the account of perception we have put together?

For starters, one could claim that whatever the former brings along, it must leave the latter intact. Then one implies that transcendental idealism is a way of establishing empirical realism. If this is so, what we have asserted from the latter point of view must hold together from the former point of view as well. Although there should not be nothing odd in this way of seeing Kant’s system as a whole, it does bring along a problem. This is because transcendental idealism can also be claimed to depend on the idea that perception itself must be conceptually structured. In other words, transcendental idealism can be seen as an explanation of the fit between appearances and concepts, and one may well ask how the latter could be compatible with the former if they did not share the same structure or the same kind of content. Hence, if empirical realism allows non-conceptual perception, it may seem that there is either something quite schizophrenic to Kant’s system as a whole, or we must conclude that it all depends on the point of view. Obviously, neither is a very satisfactory option.

There are other options.\textsuperscript{891} Let me point out only the following. Perhaps when one approaches the two so-called viewpoints as contradictory, one tries to force together two very different accounts. Suppose that the other account allows for non-conceptual perception while the other does not. Then suppose that the following two characterizations of transcendental idealism are correct. One, transcendental idealism aims at displaying the fundamental a priori grounds of experience in general. From this point of view we do not only establish preconditions of actual representing, but explain how it is possible to represent those very conditions themselves.\textsuperscript{892} These are very different things to argue for; more than that, they present the phenomenon of representation itself in very different lights (one of which is a lot more demanding than the other). Two, only transcendental idealism depends on the notion of appearance (as the counterpart of the thing in itself). Accordingly, when regarded from the transcendental idealist point of view, we would have to state that what we perceive are appearances (which we just took as necessarily conceptually structured for argument’s sake). But of course we do perceive actual things, not appearances. Thus it might just as well be that prescribing the actual character of some actual representational content from the transcendental idealist point of view (which transcends all such content) should appear as odd (or, say, too idealistic) to Kant himself, given that he does allow that the actual empirical representation of actual things can be such that it does not involve any concepts.

\textsuperscript{890} P 4:375.
\textsuperscript{891} Perhaps Kant’s system was not as complete as Kant thought it was – most importantly, perhaps his empirical realism does not require transcendental idealism (Westphal 2004). The possibility of the so-called rogue objects that do not fit or totally escape our conceptual schemes pose a further issue (Hanna 2011b).
\textsuperscript{892} See Burge 2010, 156n7.
8. Summary

The main task of this study has been that of locating perception in its most fundamental and primitive form within Kant’s model. Although Kant’s loose use of *Wahrnehmung* (and other terms) has occasionally given us hard time, I believe we have been able to successfully isolate the level of perception *per se* from that of perceptually informed thought. In the process, we have managed to elaborate on the latter as well.

All this has taken place through several arguments, many of which have run in parallel. What could be called the argument from empirical concept formation not only paved the way for the more difficult issue of the role of the categories in perceptual experience, but made room for the general idea that there is nothing strange to the notion of non-conceptual perception in Kant. This was followed by the argument from particularizing, which served the task of showing that the most fundamental function of perception is to establish perceptual reference to individual things independently of concepts. Equally importantly, it was shown that apprehensive perception depends on such a capacity, not the other way around. At this point we could already conclude that no concept whatsoever can be the necessary condition of perception; or, more precisely, of every kind of perceptual success.

We also found out that it is one thing to speak of objects as conceptual unities established through the functions of understanding, and quite another thing to speak of objects as preconceptual perceptual wholes or particular things. Similarly, what were dubbed perceptual unities differ from unities “in a concept.” Whereas the former are inherently “blind” and particular in character, the latter contain a general element and, moreover, some kind of (even if only quite obscure) consciousness of how such a recognizable unity is to be formed. This let us conclude that only the latter requires concepts and, eventually, that the kind of “grasping-together” required for the kind of apprehensive perception that aims at merely perceptual composition cannot be necessarily conceptually governed either.

After this we could establish that together these two primitive levels of perception represent the domain of non-conceptual perception in Kant’s model. Furthermore, we became convinced in the process that not all perception is really “through-going” after all. It is rather that if perception is stated to be “combinatory” to the core, the kind of synthesis involved must be something different from the kinds of syntheses Kant deals with in the Analytic. This, in turn, led us to methodological considerations that helped us in showing that Kant’s model is not supposed to account for any genetic and/or psychological facts of perception. In other words, it is not supposed to answer such questions as why we individuate this instead of that, or how the different sense modalities work together. To be
Summary

sure, there must be sensory processes that answer for such things, but for Kant these would not belong to philosophy proper but to physiological anthropology and psychology. Indeed, at this point we had established enough to conclude that not all connection can be up to understanding also because some of it would be beyond the topic anyway and definitely not intellectual in any sense of the word.

We found further support for non-conceptual perception in Kant’s model from his views on differentiation and distinctness. These aided us in isolating not only apperception-free awareness, which must be very different from any kind of meta-level consciousness, but also two kinds of perceptual contents. What we called intuitive content is grounded on intuition, and is thus for fixing perceptual reference as such. What we called sensuous content is grounded on sensation, indicating the phenomenal characteristics of perception. This reinforced our earlier claim that intuition can indeed provide wholly determinate relation to particulars, which in turn got support from the idea that not all representing must proceed from parts to wholes. More generally, this underscored the difference between speaking of what there is in the perceptual content and what answers for such a content; not all that belongs to the latter really belongs to Kant’s account of perception. After all, perception is a way of conscious representing.

There have been other findings, all intertwined. For example, we have found out that some sensations function necessarily so that the input in question is only attributable to an outer object, which ties the representational function of perception firmly to empirical circumstances. Another important outcome has been that not all perception is perception-as, or rather that there are two ways to understand perceiving-as; only the usual way indicates conceptual grasp of things. In like manner, representing composites is very different from representing objects as composites; only the latter way depends on the categories.

At the same time, we have found out important things about judgments as opposed to perceptions. For example, judging objectively depends on the possibility to reflect what in our representings relates to sensibility and what to understanding. Perception, on the other hand, does not require any such thing; just like it does not depend on representing objects in terms of shared objecthood which lets us take them away from their particular contexts and exploit them in communication. Indeed, in merely perceptual cognition (in contrast to judgmental cognition) we cannot do that because it has only the manner of appearance as its ground.

However, this does not make it utterly subjective. Nor is perception, as such, experience. The latter, in the demanding sense of the term, calls for the possibility of expressing and describing the contents of cognitions, which is only possible through judgments. In all, the basic idea is that a human being is a subject who can judge, not that the poor being cannot but judge. And because we can judge, there are optional things to do with what we perceive. In this sense, although perceptivity carries with it a kind of necessitating normativity, perception is truth-free on its own. The higher kinds of
objectivity can only be established at the level of intersubjective thought. However, there is also judging that does not satisfy the criteria of determining how things stand in the world objectively speaking. This had a positive consequence in our argument, as this revealed the possibility of reflective orienting of oneself towards things in merely sensible terms.

There is a tendency to regard Kant’s view of human cognition as exhausted by the conceptual side to representing. In that case a lot is being required from the categories. We, on the other hand, have offered a view that is both robust and modest in this respect. At the same time, we have taken part in making way for genuine non-conceptual representation in Kant’s model (although we have been moderate in labeling Kant himself one way or another). There are, definitely, several good reasons for approaching Kant’s model from a stance that avoids overlooking the special role of sensibility; and, moreover, Kant’s dualist tendencies. The two fundamental representational capacities are not intertwined in a necessary way. Most plainly, the paradigmatic functions of thinking need not enter perception because perception *per se* is not thinking at all. This, however, does not turn it into mere sensory input. In general, if we belittle the aesthetic side to representing, we misrepresent Kant’s model as a whole.

To be sure, if we take the dualism to the extremes, we open up a gap. However, we may also approach it as a way to elaborate on the ultimate differences between perception and thought as two routes to grasping things (one particular, one general). This is not to say that sensibility and understanding are disconnected. On many occasions, all we tried to do was explain what is and remains *perceptual* in full-blown experience, although we did back this up with the possibility that the perceiver is in a position in which he or she does not judge or conceptualize (for whatever reason). This, however, is not any different from claiming that not all the capacities of the human mind must be operative at the same time. Perception, for example, requires imagination but not make-believe; yet the latter would be one of the uses of this very same capacity. Nor have we purposely downplayed the human subject as a thinker. Quite the contrary, I believe that the judging stance is always there. But again, it is something that can be in reserve, thus being always potentially there. In other words, it is not something that *constitutes* our mental activity or access to things.

Even though I trust that everything we have established (partly on Kant’s behalf) holds as it stands, there is room for further consideration. Admittedly, obviously even, the topic would benefit from detailed elaborations on transcendental idealism and deduction of the categories. Also some of the notions could be worked out more carefully. The last chapter as a whole has been but a brief glance on complex issues. One thing should be fixed for good, however. The revaluation of sensible cognition carried out by Kant is to be seen as the bedrock of the Kantian model. This is something that is not always appreciated. But it should be, and I do hope that this study contributes to that end in respect of Kant and beyond.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


