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Far Right Partisanship and Confidence in the United Nations and European Union Across the Nordic Countries

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ABSTRACT

Research finds a link between far-right political partisanship and attitudes towards transnational institutions among European citizens—mainly in relation to the European Union (EU). Citizens that support far-right parties tend to view the European Union as unjustly subverting national sovereignty, which leads to a higher level of Euroskepticism when compared to supporters of most mainstream parties. In this study, our contribution is that we explore whether the negative attitudes far-right party supporters have towards the European Union extend towards the United Nations (UN). We utilize the joint Wave 5 European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 7 to estimate multiple regression models predicting confidence in the EU and UN across the Nordic countries. The results confirm previous studies showing that confidence in the EU is lower among far-right partisans. In addition, the results demonstrate that although smaller in size, there are many instances where far-right partisans also have less confidence in the UN. The analysis shows that far-right partisans' lack of confidence in supranational organizations also extends to transnational institutions, which is an important area of inquiry given the UN's role in mitigating current global crises.

1 | Introduction

Transnational institutions make member states' cooperation to address global issues and resolve conflicts between nations less challenging. Institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) operate under the view that international cooperation and the transfer of competences yield sounder results by embedding member states in decision-making and enforcement. Although the EU and the UN both promote multilateral cooperation and share core values such as democracy and human rights, they operate at different levels of governance and influence. The EU, as a regional entity, directly affects the policies and regulations of its member states, often leading to significant sovereignty debates. In contrast, the UN's influence is more global and indirect, rooted in diplomatic consensus and international norms. By examining confidence

in both institutions, we can better understand how far-right partisanship shapes attitudes toward varying forms of transnational governance. To maintain institutional legitimacy, these institutions require either baseline confidence or outright support from citizens, as their ability to function effectively is often tied to public perception and acceptance. The perceived loss of sovereignty renders them susceptible to attacks from far-right movements that claim these institutions threaten national autonomy.

In this study, we examine whether the negative views widely held by far-right partisans toward the EU extend to other transnational institutions, namely the UN. The Nordic countries provide a distinctive context for understanding transnational skepticism, given their reputation as models of liberal democracy and multilateral cooperation, yet also displaying significant

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variation in their integration with and attitudes toward transnational institutions. This blend of high welfare-state support, small-state status in global affairs, and differences in EU membership creates an ideal environment to explore how far-right partisanship influences confidence in institutions like the EU and UN. Additionally, the prominence of the UN in addressing current global crises, such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, conflicts that are salient to the Nordic governments and populations, combined with the recent electoral success of far-right parties across the region, underscores the importance of this investigation. Our study fills a gap in the literature by providing a cross-national comparison that adds depth to our understanding of transnational skepticism among Nordic voters and offers insights that may inform broader theories about public attitudes toward supranational governance.

To investigate this topic, we utilize the joint Wave 5 European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 7 (EVS 2017) to estimate multiple regression models predicting confidence in the EU and the UN across the Nordic countries. We explore confidence in the EU to provide a baseline relationship, as well as to show that the data and results are comparable to other studies. Then, we extend the literature by providing an exploration of far-right partisanship and confidence in the UN.

We confirm the finding of previous far-right partisan research that these individuals have lower levels of confidence in the EU. In addition, we uncover that these partisan gaps are also present when investigating confidence towards the UN in some Nordic countries. The analysis shows that far-right partisans' lack of confidence in supranational organizations also extends to transnational institutions, which adds to our understanding of the attitudes of far-right partisans. However, we do find that the gaps are not uniform throughout the Nordic region. We find that the partisan gaps are largest in the Nordic countries where the far-right parties are notably further right on the left-right ideological spectrum. The finding is most likely caused by these far-right parties in Denmark, Finland and Sweden sending clearer populist signals regarding views on institutions that they view as subverting national sovereignty.

1.1 | Far-Right Partisanship and Euroskepticism

Euroskepticism broadly refers to having a negative stance toward the EU (Arzheimer 2015), with some scholars even opting to use the term “EU-skepticism” (Karner 2013). This concept encompasses both the ‘hard’ anti-integrationist exiteers and the ‘soft’ reformists who support some form of European cooperation but resist further centralization, rejecting the idea of an “ever closer union” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 7–8). While “hard” Euroskepticism remains rare (Taggart 2019), Euroskepticism in general has grown across Europe, fueled by the rise of populist and far-right parties. Importantly, a broad understanding of Euroskepticism does not necessarily imply that individuals hold racist or nationalist anti-immigration sentiments. However, studies such as Lubbers and Jaspers (2011) have shown that perceived ethnic threat can be a significant predictor of Euroskepticism, indicating that populist undertones are present in some contexts. Overall, a Euroskeptic

perspective views the EU as a threat to national autonomy and sovereignty, advocating for the ‘re-nationalization of decision structures’ (Berbair et al. 2015, 170) and taking back control from the EU to recover national sovereignty, or at the very least, not giving any more sovereignty away (Roch 2023).

Armingeon and Ceka (2014) highlight that economic crises and austerity measures have eroded trust in the EU, but more importantly, this distrust is significantly influenced by low trust in national governments. Their analysis emphasizes that Euroskeptic attitudes are often rooted in domestic disillusionment rather than specific grievances against the EU itself. As Hix (2007) notes, citizens' Euroskeptic views are often tied to the belief that the EU undermines domestic policy preferences, reinforcing the idea that national concerns are paramount. Anderson (1998) similarly finds that opinions about the EU are shaped by perceptions of the domestic political context, with dissatisfaction directed toward both national and EU institutions. This broader understanding of Euroskepticism reveals that individuals who are Euroskeptic do not necessarily harbor racist, nationalist, or xenophobic sentiments. Instead, Euroskepticism is often centered on issues of national sovereignty and autonomy, resisting perceived EU encroachments on domestic decision-making (Berbair et al. 2015; Roch 2023).

As Hansen and Olsen (2019, 2024a, 2024b) argue, the EU serves as an ‘issue cleavage’ that far-right politicians strategically exploit, positioning themselves in the electoral marketplace to mobilize voter discontent. This “issue exploitation strategy” is evident in the Nordic context, where most competitor parties are pro-EU. Consequently, far-right parties present themselves as anti-EU alternatives, emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty and opposing deeper European integration, whether the issue at hand is economic crises or immigration. While the Sweden Democrats, Danish People's Party, and the Finns Party have moderated their demands for EU exits, parties like Norway's Progress Party and Iceland's Independence Party continue to oppose EU membership from a less extreme ideological standpoint, highlighting the diversity of Euroskeptic sentiment.

The emotional dynamics behind these attitudes are further illuminated by Erisen and Vasilopoulou (2022), who explore the role of anger in far-right voting. The authors' findings indicate that anger, particularly regarding immigration, strongly correlates with support for far-right parties and Euroskeptic views. Notably, this anger is exacerbated by low political trust, amplifying anti-EU sentiments and support for far-right agendas. Similarly, Erisen et al. (2020) demonstrate that emotional reactions to immigration influence preferences for EU-level policies, with anger leading to a preference for national solutions over EU cooperation.

Even though not all European far-right parties are Euroskeptic (Taggart and Andrea 2021), and Euroskepticism spans both ends of the political spectrum (Marks et al. 2007; Van Elsas et al. 2016), it remains more prevalent on the far-right end of the political party spectrum in Nordic countries. Nordic far-right parties, such as the Sweden Democrats, Danish People's Party, and the Finns Party, collectively view the EU as a constraint on national autonomy (Treib 2021). Halikiopoulou and

Vlandas (2020) emphasize the strategic coalition-building employed by far-right parties, which unites voters with both economic and cultural grievances against immigration. The authors' analysis shows that far-right success hinges on mobilizing these grievances and tying them to broader Euroskeptic narratives. An emphasis on both economic and cultural grievances helps explain why Nordic far-right parties have been particularly successful in framing the EU as a threat to national sovereignty, thus consolidating a broad base of Euroskeptic support. While these Nordic far-right parties may no longer actively campaign for exiting the EU, they remain Euroskeptic, prepared to oppose further EU integration if it "threatens" national sovereignty.

Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou (2024) add nuance to the understanding of far-right support, distinguishing between core and peripheral far-right voters. Their research shows that while peripheral voters are motivated by general discontent with democratic institutions, core nationalist voters are driven more by immigration concerns and issues of sovereignty. This intrapartisan heterogeneity helps explain why, even though far-right voters differ in their motivations, with some driven by democratic discontent and others by nationalist concerns, many remain committed to Euroskeptic positions, even when they have positive evaluations of democratic processes. Vasilopoulou and Zur (2024) argue that public salience of EU issues, rather than changes in party positions, is key to far-right electoral success. The authors' find that emphasizing EU integration can yield greater electoral gains for far-right parties than focusing solely on immigration. Thus, the far-right parties' ability to exploit Euroskeptic sentiments, emotional reactions like anger, and strategic issue framing illustrates the complex interplay between domestic and EU-level grievances, driving their sustained electoral performance in Europe.

1.2 | United Nations and European Union

The UN is the only truly global organization with almost universal membership of 193-member countries. Since its foundation in 1945, it has provided a forum for international diplomacy and multilateral negotiations in terms of maintaining peace and security, human rights, and development. After its establishment, the UN has been under constant review and faced demands to be more legitimate, democratic, and representative. The scrutiny is mainly due to the Post-Second World War structure and ideas of diplomacy, but also because of the UN being first and foremost an intergovernmental organization. While a foundational principle of the UN has always been a respect for the sovereignty of member states, increasing nationalist and populist sentiment has led to concerns over threats of multilateralism. Thus, the UN has been seen or framed by some as a threat. The tension between the UN and populist governments could be explained by the idea that these governments would be less eager to be responsible for "global public good provision" in comparison to non-populist governments (Destradi and Plagemann 2019, 712). While contestation of the UN's authority mainly derives from members state governments (Hirschmann 2021), a new feature of this strengthening contestation is the role played by public attitudes as demonstrated in scholarly work (Ghassim et al. 2022, 1).

How is the UN similar to the EU? The EU, while primarily a regional organization, shares several fundamental similarities with the UN. Both institutions are staunch supporters of multilateral international cooperation, promoting values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. First, in terms of governance structure, both the EU and the UN are intergovernmental organizations that bring together member states. These member states act as both supporters and potential impediments to the institutions' agendas, driven by domestic constraints and differing views on the benefits of international cooperation. Second, regarding authority and decision-making, both institutions possess specific areas of influence: the UN has authority primarily in international peace and security, while the EU has significant regulatory power over economic, social, and political matters within its region. Despite these differences, both organizations have the capacity to shape policies and diffuse norms that affect member states (Park 2006), ranging from the UN's standard-setting and codification of international law to the EU's legislation at the supranational level. Third, in the provision of public goods, both the UN and EU are involved in addressing transnational issues, such as climate change, human rights, and development, aiming to deliver benefits that extend beyond individual states. The role of both institutions makes them targets for criticism from far-right partisans, who are often skeptical of organizations that emphasize transactional and multilateral cooperation. Given these systematic similarities, we expect that far-right partisans will be more critical of both institutions compared to other partisans.

Given the similarities between the UN and EU:

H₁. *The expectation is that far-right partisans will have less confidence in both institutions when compared to the partisans of competitor parties.*

Despite these shared principles, the nature and extent of their influence differ significantly. First, the scope and intrusiveness of authority differs. The EU wields more binding authority over its member states through its legislative powers, which have a far-reaching impact on national sovereignty and domestic politics. For example, in Finland, the parliament has established a dedicated committee solely for EU affairs. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the sole body that can make binding decisions under the UN Charter, typically related to international peace and security. In contrast, the EU exercises jurisdiction over a much broader range of policy areas. These policy areas include economic, social, and environmental regulations that directly impact member states and their citizens. Second, the two institutions have contrasting policy impact. The EU's influence is felt through binding legislation and regulations that shape everyday life, from trade laws to consumer protections, a level of influence that the UN does not have in member countries. In contrast, the UN's impact is generally less direct and more focused on international norms and humanitarian missions, which do not usually interfere with domestic policies. Third, the EU incorporates mechanisms for democratic input and governance, such as the European Parliament (EP), where members are elected by EU citizens. Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EP has gained substantial legislative powers, enhancing the EU's transnational governance framework (Lopez-Claros et al. 2020, 72). The UN lacks comparable mechanisms

for direct democratic involvement, as its General Assembly and other bodies are made up of state representatives rather than being directly accountable to the global public. Consequently, the EU's ability to influence national sovereignty is more tangible and often perceived as more intrusive compared to the UN, whose influence is more indirect and less likely to be seen as a threat to individual nations' autonomy.

The overarching difference between the UN and the EU lies in the nature of their institutional frameworks and the preferences of their member states. Most UN member states appear committed to maintaining the organization's intergovernmental structure (see Vrailas 2017), resisting shifts toward a supranational or transnational organization that would necessitate extensive structural and political changes. While both the UN and the EU possess distinct forms of legitimacy and play significant roles as global and regional actors, their capacities to define norms and enforce rules vary considerably. Lopez-Claros et al. (2020, 66) articulates this distinction by noting that the UN remains grounded in traditional notions of national sovereignty, whereas the EU represents "the most comprehensive experiment in supranational economic and political integration." He further emphasizes that this experiment reflects a diversity of opinions among member states regarding the benefits and costs of integration (ibid. 73). Given these structural differences, it is anticipated that far-right partisans will demonstrate smaller confidence gaps toward the UN than the EU compared to supporters of other political parties, as the UN's less intrusive and indirect influence on national sovereignty is perceived as less threatening.

Given the differences between the UN and EU:

H₂. *The expectation is that the gap in confidence between far-right partisans and other partisans will be smaller when comparing the UN to the EU.*

2 | Nordic Countries

The Nordic countries share common values and norms and, to some extent, a shared identity. The countries are generally perceived as welfare states with liberal democratic principles and histories, often categorized as "small states" in international relations. The Nordic region stands out for its exceptional level of regional cooperation, institutionalized through the Nordic Council (established in 1952) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (established in 1971). These institutions enable extensive collaboration on social, economic, and political issues. Even in the face of potential conflict, the Nordic countries demonstrate a strong commitment to mutual support. An example of this is Finland's commitment to defend Sweden if attacked while Sweden was waiting for its acceptance into NATO, illustrating the depth of security ties and mutual defense arrangements among the Nordic countries, even in the absence of formal NATO membership for all. Despite the EU gradually overtaking these institutions in terms of judicial and political relevance (Strang 2016, 2), this cooperative framework has solidified a shared identity emphasizing welfare states and multilateral governance. However, despite their overarching commitment to regional and international cooperation and

close cooperation within the institutions, the Nordic countries vary significantly in their integration with transnational institutions like the EU and UN. For instance, differences in EU membership status and opt-out agreements reflect varied national sovereignty concerns and distinct levels of engagement. This variation makes the Nordic region a uniquely valuable context for examining how shared identities interact with differing degrees of transnational integration and skepticism.

While the Nordic countries share a strong commitment to multilateral cooperation, they exhibit notable differences in their attitudes toward transnational organizations. Theories of European integration, such as neo-functionalism, neo-institutionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism, provide frameworks for understanding why states either seek EU membership, maintain formal autonomy, or support deeper integration (Haugevik and Rieker 2017, 214). Previous literature suggests that small states tend to demonstrate a stronger willingness to engage in international cooperation and participate in both European and global institutions (ibid. 216). However, the cases of Norway and Iceland illustrate that this pattern is not universally applicable.

Typically, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are considered to have more common characteristics than Finland and Iceland, illustrating the long-term diplomatic, administrative, and political histories of these three countries (Nedergaard and Wivel 2017, 3). Overall, there are differences among the Nordics, including foreign policy (Haugevik and Sending 2020) and their policies towards transnational institutions. According to Grøn et al. (2017, 269), the Nordics have not been neither homogeneous nor consistent with their approaches to EU integration. Instances of skepticism towards transnational attempts to further integration have often emerged when such attempts are perceived as diminishing national sovereignty or autonomy. According to the latest Eurobarometer (Spring barometer 2023), there are also differences of how much trust people have in the EU among the Nordic countries.¹ The numbers vary from 73% (Denmark) to 67% (Sweden) to 57% (Finland and Norway). Iceland was not included here. The level of trust in transnational institutions varies among Nordic countries, with notable differences in trust levels between the EU and the UN. For example, in Finland the percentage of trust in the UN is less than to EU, according to the Eurobarometer's national report in Fall 2023.

Finland stands out for its supportive stance toward EU integration compared to Denmark and Sweden, having adopted the EU's common currency (i.e., the euro) (Ojanen and Raunio 2018). Apart from integration, there has been a lack of consistency regarding the adherence to different EU laws and policies within the three EU member states (McCallion Stegmann and Brianson 2018, 6). In general, the three Nordic EU member countries tend to support policies that are linked to maintaining the welfare state (including health and labor policies) but are more divided in respect to policies with greater sovereignty-related/threatening potential within the EU (Grøn et al. 2017, 269). For example, Denmark has opt-outs from the EU in home affairs and justice related issues, and previously also regarding common security and defence policy.

The two non-EU-member countries, Norway and Iceland, have maintained a “reluctant” stance toward EU membership, despite their participation in the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA grants them access to the EU’s single market but excludes them from decision-making processes. Consequently, the EU’s influence in these countries is primarily economic and regulatory, making it less visible to the average citizen compared to the political and legislative impact experienced in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, where EU membership entails deeper integration and more direct encroachments on national sovereignty.

In both Norway and Iceland, this reluctance stems from domestic politics, political elites, and party dynamics. In Norway, the country’s stance is shaped by factors such as domestic structures, societal and economic interest groups, and the activism of anti-EU movements (Gänzle and Henökl 2018, 89, 92, 93). However, a government-appointed review of Norway’s agreements with the EU observed that Norway, despite being a nonmember, is as deeply integrated into the EU as some member countries (Haugevik and Rieker 2017, 214). There can be significant differences between a nation’s actual autonomy and its perceived autonomy. Norway’s reluctance can also be attributed to the rise of euroskeptic parties in parliament, the two past negative referendum results on EU membership, and the functionality of its existing agreements with the EU (Græger and Haugevik 2022).

Similarly, Iceland’s approach to EU membership reflects its unique domestic context, influenced by different factors compared to Norway. This approach has been analyzed through “new variables,” including the size and characteristics of its national administration and the specific features of its political elite, alongside traditional factors such as national identity and security (Thorhallsson 2004). The Conservative Independence Party, which heavily influences Icelandic domestic and foreign policies, has roots in defending freedom and independence. EU membership is perceived as contradictory to these values, a sentiment that contributed to Iceland’s withdrawal of its EU membership application when the Conservatives were in government in 2015 (Thorhallsson 2018, 109).

While Norway and Iceland lack voting powers and formal representation within the EU, they actively participate in the United Nations. Norway, for example, recently served as an elected member of the UN Security Council from 2020 to 2022, while Denmark and Finland are seeking membership for the 2025–2026 and 2029–2030 terms, respectively, as part of a Nordic rotation.

Strong support for multilateralism, international cooperation, and the UN system is shared by the Nordics. The countries also cooperate within the UN, for example, by having a rotation of memberships, including the main UN bodies and by giving joint statements (Tuominen and Kronlund 2023). While the Nordic EU members states are bound to follow the EU positions in the UN coordinated by the United Nations Working Party (CONUN), Norway and Iceland have more leeway. The Nordic countries also differ in the extent of parliamentary and civil society involvement in unrelated issues and the domestic visibility of UN debates (Tuominen and Kronlund 2023, 9). Commitment to certain policies, or the overall global orientation, among the Nordics have varied in connection to changing

governments (ibid. 12). Overall, the view of the Nordics towards the UN has become more instrumental (Jakobsen 2017), thus reflecting their own specific national interests. Despite having similar attitudes towards transnational institutions, including the UN and EU, there are also differences in political commitments and resources due to the domestic politics and constraints and these are both visible in the EU and UN contexts.

Beyond general differences in how the Nordic countries approach transnational institutions, there are specific reasons why far-right partisanship may impact confidence in these institutions differently across the region. Typically, far-right partisans espouse Euroskeptic, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Mudde 2007). While far-right parties across the Nordic countries align with Pirro’s (2023) broad categorization of “far-right,” which includes both “radical” and “extreme” right parties, important distinctions exist among them. In Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, far-right parties are generally positioned further to the right compared to their counterparts in Iceland and Norway. The parties in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden exhibit both populist and radical elements, aligning more closely with Mudde’s (2007) classification of “populist radical right parties,” characterized by overt anti-immigration rhetoric and a strong emphasis on preserving national identity. In contrast, the far-right parties in Iceland and Norway are better described as “nonradical populists” (Mudde 2007, 47), with a less extreme focus on anti-immigration and nationalism. Consequently, it is likely that far-right partisans in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are exposed to more intense party signaling that emphasizes negative framing and suspicion of transnational institutions, compared to those in Iceland and Norway. Additionally, the lower salience of the EU issue for far-right partisans in the two non-EU member countries, Iceland and Norway, may further contribute to fewer partisan differences in attitudes toward these institutions.

Given these differences, we expect:

H₃. *Gaps in confidence between far-right partisans and partisans of other political parties will be more frequent and larger in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden than in Norway and Iceland.*

3 | Data and Methodology

3.1 | Data

The joint Wave 5 European Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 7 is utilized to predict citizen’s confidence in the EU and UN across the Nordic countries (EVS 2017). The EVS and the WVS are two large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research studies. The EVS is responsible for planning and conducting surveys in European countries, using the EVS questionnaire and EVS methodological guidelines. Overall, the purpose of the EVS was to investigate the values of populations in European countries on several issues, such as politics, governmental institutions, happiness, social trust, and several other topics. While the survey was not designed specifically for the exploration we conduct here, it represents the only instance in recent years where a cross-national survey agenda asks about views towards the EU and UN in all five Nordic countries.

The survey is a random sample survey where face-to-face interviews were conducted in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In Denmark and Finland, the survey is either a face-to-face survey or self-administered online survey. Post-stratification survey weights were calculated and provided to account for survey sampling bias in all five countries. The survey weights are utilized in all correlational statistical tests provided here. The study surveyed 3362 respondents in Denmark, 1199 in Finland, 1624 in Iceland, 1122 in Norway, and 1194 in Sweden. After accounting for nonresponses on all important variables necessary for the multiple regression analyses, there are > 900 respondents for models predicting confidence in Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In Denmark, the number of respondents is around 2800. We provide variable coding and descriptive statistics in Appendices A and B, Tables B1 and B2 for all variables of interest by country. There exist no anomalies in the data when comparing across countries.

3.2 | Dependent Variables

There are two survey questions that represent the dependent variables of interest in the empirical analyses. The survey questions ask the level of confidence the respondent has in “the European Union” and “the United Nations.” We explore confidence in the EU for two reasons: (1) to confirm the findings in the literature and demonstrate the quality of the data and (2) to establish a baseline level of partisan differences to compare to results on confidence in the UN. Our main contribution is the exploration of far-right partisanship and confidence in the UN. The survey questions do not use abbreviations to represent the institutions, ensuring the reliability of the survey instruments.

The variable is coded as follows: 0 = “not at all,” 1 = “not very much,” 2 = “quite a lot,” and 3 = “a great deal.” We treat these variables as continuous and estimate multiple linear regression models to predict the relationship between confidence in the institutions and partisanship. We acknowledge that, ideally, a discrete, ordered variable would warrant the use of ordinal logistic or probit regression models. However, model convergence issues arose due to the inclusion of control variables and the numerous categories of the partisanship variable and limited variance on the dependent variables.

As a robustness check, we estimated ordinal probit regression models (see Appendix Tables F1 and F2). The results displayed are substantively identical to the linear regression output. However, due to degrees of freedom limitations, we lack confidence in the preciseness of these estimations. For reliable estimation, ordered probit or logistic regression models require at least 50 observations per category, which is not met in our case. In addition, we have concerns regarding whether the probit models violate the parallel regression assumption. We also conducted logistic regression models where categories “not at all” and “not very much” were combined (= 0), and “quite a lot” and “a great deal” were combined (= 1), as well as other category combinations. The results were mostly consistent, with a few exceptions, which are detailed in Appendices D (Tables D1–D3) and E (Tables E1 and E2). Therefore, we present the linear regression models, as they provide more accurate estimates of the relationships while avoiding issues related

to model convergence and the arbitrary collapsing of response choices into groups.

3.3 | Independent Variables

There are several control variables included in the empirical analyses that are necessary for inclusion in studies on political attitudes, behavior, and/or assessments. All models include the respondent’s age at the time of the survey, the self-identified sex of the respondent, the respondent’s highest education level attained at the time of the survey, and the respondent’s total yearly household income category. Additionally, we include a measure of self-reported political ideology on a continuous scale from left (liberal) to right (conservative). Since the present study is focused on the role of partisan identification, and political ideology and partisanship are in many instances correlated, political ideology must be controlled for in regression models to not overinflate the impact of partisanship on the dependent variables. That being said, we expect partisanship, and not ideology, to play a role in views on the EU and UN because partisan actors are the entities conveying clear signals about these institutions. As Hansen and Seppälä (2024) show, for some issues partisanship is a better predictor of attitudes than is political ideology due to partisan messengers and these issues not plainly tracking on an ideological spectrum. As stated, the coding schemes and descriptive statistics by country for these variables are provided in Appendices A and B.

The main independent variable of interest is a national-level partisanship measure. The survey question asked, “Which (political) party appeals to you most?.” Respondents were provided a list of political parties that would conceivably run for election in their country. The partisanship variable was coded so that any party with at least 40 respondents selecting the party was included as a category of the variable. If a party received < 40 selections, the selections for the party were coded as “other” and included in the models. The choice to code parties with only a few selections as other was made to limit degrees of freedom issues when estimating multiple regression models. In addition, any respondent indicating that none of the offered party choices appealed to them was also coded as “other.” The partisanship variable is coded as a nominal level choice to reflect the assumption that the categories (e.g., political parties) represent theoretically distinct and statistically meaningful groups. Collapsing all non-far-right parties into a single “other” category would undermine this assumption by implying that these diverse groups are homogeneous and interchangeable, despite evidence to the contrary. Instead, the chosen coding strategy maintains the distinctiveness of each party, enabling a more accurate and nuanced analysis of partisan differences. That being said, as a robustness check we estimated additional linear (Appendix C—Tables C1 and C2), logistic (Appendix E—Tables E1 and E2), and ordered probit (Appendix G—Tables G1 and G2) regression models with the partisanship variable as a binary choice. The results confirm the findings here. In Table 1, the top line represents the furthest right party on the ideological spectrum in the country. The furthest right parties are utilized as the reference category for the country partisanship variables so that regression output directly shows how confidence levels in the two institutions differ between these parties and each competitor party in the five countries.

TABLE 1 | Abbreviations for political parties by country.

Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
<i>DF – Danish People’s</i>	<i>PS – Finns Party</i>	<i>IP – Independence</i>	<i>FrP – Progress</i>	<i>SD – Sweden Democrats</i>
S – Social Democrats	SDP – Social Democratic	XS – Social Democratic	Ap – Labor	SAP – Social Democratic
SF – Socialist People’s	vas – Left Alliance	VG – Left-Green Mov.	SV – Socialist Left Party	Left – Left Wing
RV – Danish Social Liberal	VIHR – Green League	FSF – Progressive	Sp – Center	MP – Greens
EL – Red-Green Alliance	CP – Center Party	LR – Reform	LP – Liberals	L – Liberals
KC – Conservative People’s	Kok – National Coalition	PP – People’s	KrF – Christian Democratic	M – Moderate
V – Venstre, Liberal		Cp – Center	H – Conservative	C – Center
ALT – The Alternative		Pir – Pirate		
LA – Liberal Alliance				

Note: Furthest right party in italics.




FIGURE 1 | Confidence in the European Union and United Nations.

The partisanship variable is utilized as a nominal level variable with multiple party categories. As stated, the variable is not collapsed into a binary variable (i.e., far-right partisanship = 1 and all other parties = 0) for two important reasons. First, by combining all other parties into a single group there is the potential that partisans for one outlier party could be driving statistically significant differences between far-right partisans and the competitors. Essentially, the results would not convey whether statistical differences between far-right partisans (1) and competitor parties (0) were caused by differences between far-right partisans and a single party, a few parties, or all competitor parties. Second and related, coding the variable as binary would not allow us to evaluate whether there are unique in-country partisan differences between far-right partisans and

each of the competitor parties. As the results show, there are meaningful differences that would only be captured using the nominal level variable and a binary measurement would lead to inaccurate inferences.

4 | Results

4.1 | Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics convey that there is meaningful variance worth exploring in confidence levels. In Figure 1, density plots are provided for the variables measuring confidence in the EU and UN. A few trends are worth highlighting. First, between

15% and 20% of respondents indicated the level “not at all” confident in the EU, while between 6% and 13% provided the same response for the UN. Second, between 10% and 15% of respondents indicated they had “a great deal” of confidence in the EU, while between 15% and 25% of respondents provided the same response for the UN. Third, when comparing across countries the variance in responses in confidence are larger when exploring the UN. Although confidence in the UN is on average higher for each of the countries, the density of

responses is more varied—i.e., does not follow an identical response curve. The descriptive statistics convey that there is meaningful variance worth exploring in confidence levels.

4.2 | Regression Analysis

Table 2 presents regression outputs for the models predicting confidence in the EU. The results provide support for H₁ and H₃.

TABLE 2 | Model output predicting confidence in the European Union.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	1.15** (0.08)	0.94** (0.14)	1.42** (0.15)	1.37** (0.16)	0.88** (0.16)
Age	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Education	0.04** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Income	−0.01* (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	−0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	−0.06** (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Party	S 0.40** (0.05)	SDP 0.57** (0.10)	XS 0.65** (0.09)	Ap 0.31** (0.10)	SAP 0.46** (0.10)
	SF 0.42** (0.07)	vas 0.29* (0.12)	VG 0.20* (0.09)	SV 0.14 (0.14)	Left 0.17 (0.13)
	RV 0.64** (0.06)	VIHR 0.74** (0.10)	FSF 0.02 (0.09)	Sp −0.15 (0.11)	MP 0.54** (0.12)
	EL 0.13 (0.07)	CP 0.41** (0.09)	LR 0.60** (0.10)	LP 0.39** (0.13)	L 0.61** (0.11)
	KC 0.57** (0.07)	Kok 0.66** (0.09)	PP 0.02 (0.11)	KrF 0.25 (0.14)	M 0.62** (0.09)
	V 0.53** (0.05)		Cp 0.28* (0.12)	H 0.28** (0.09)	C 0.59** (0.10)
	ALT 0.40** (0.08)		Pir 0.30** (0.10)		
	LA 0.43** (0.08)				
Party—Other	0.01 (0.08)	0.16 (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	−0.04 (0.12)	0.50** (0.14)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
R ²	0.10	0.14	0.19	0.08	0.11
Adjusted R ²	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.07	0.09
Residual std. error	0.24	0.40	0.09	0.43	0.55
F statistic	22.55**	13.88**	22.16**	7.17**	9.41**

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; far-right party is party reference category.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Overall, across countries far-right partisans have statistically significant lower levels of confidence when compared to a large number of competitor party partisans. In addition, there are more frequent partisan gaps in confidence between far-right partisans and supporters of competitor parties in the three EU member countries. In Denmark, respondents identifying with seven out of the eight competitor parties have a higher level of confidence in the EU when compared to the Danish People's Party (DF). In Finland, identifiers for all other competitor parties have greater confidence in the EU when compared to Finns Party (PS) partisans. In Iceland, respondents identifying with five out of seven competitor parties have more confidence in the EU when compared to Independence Party (IP) identifiers. In Norway, partisans for half of the parties have a greater level of confidence when compared to Progress Party (FrP) identifiers. Finally, in Sweden, partisans for all other partisans except the Left Party have a greater level of confidence in the EU when compared to Sweden Democrat (SD) partisans. The fewer partisan differences in Iceland and Norway are most likely a product of the fact that neither country is a member of the EU, which makes the EU a less salient institution in those countries.

In Figure 2, we plot predictions by partisan groupings in each country for levels of confidence in the EU. The first party in each plot is the far-right party, followed by other parties arranged broadly from left-wing to right-wing. The predictions

were calculated holding all other variables at their survey-weighted mean values. On average, the results in Figure 2 lend support for the argument that supporters of far-right parties view the EU more negatively than do supporters of most competitor parties in each country. For example, in Denmark, DF partisans have a lower level of confidence in the EU of between 0.25 and 0.5 points on the 0–3 point scale when compared to partisans for seven out of the eight competitor parties. A similar trend exists for Finland and Sweden. In Norway and Iceland, results are mixed. In Iceland, there are several partisan gaps, but these gaps do not follow a clear left/right trend. In Norway, the partisan gaps are much smaller in size due to greater variance in responses among the partisan groupings.

In Table 3, regression outputs are presented for the models estimating confidence in the UN. The results are similar to those predicting confidence in the EU; however, the partisan gaps are fewer and smaller. Notably, more frequent partisan gaps are observed in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, based on the coefficients and statistical significance. The results provide support for H₁, H₂, and H₃. Notably, there is only one instance where partisans for a competitor party are predicted to have a lower level of confidence in the UN when compared to partisans for the far right. In Iceland, identifiers with the People's Party (PP) have a statistically lower level of confidence in the UN when compared to IP partisans. The result could be explained by the fact that the PP is itself a populist party that




FIGURE 2 | Partisan impact on confidence in the EU. 95% confidence bounds are displayed.

promotes ideas of skepticism for transnational institutions. In all other instances where statistically significant, partisans for competitor parties are predicted to have a greater level of confidence in the UN when compared to far-right partisans. In Denmark, identifiers with seven out of eight competitor parties have more confidence than do DF partisans. In Finland, identifiers with four out of five competitor parties have a higher level of confidence in the UN when compared to PS partisans.

In Iceland, partisans for one out of seven competitor parties have more confidence than do IP partisans. In Norway, there are no partisan differences. Finally, in Sweden, partisans for all other competitor parties have more confidence in the UN when compared to SD partisans.

In Figure 3, predictions are plotted for confidence in the UN holding all other variables at their survey weighted mean

TABLE 3 | Model output predicting confidence in the United Nations.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	1.56** (0.08)	1.59** (0.15)	1.74** (0.14)	2.19** (0.15)	1.51** (0.17)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.18** (0.05)
Education	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income	0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Ideology	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Party	S 0.22** (0.05)	SDP 0.38** (0.10)	XS 0.17 (0.09)	Ap 0.03 (0.09)	SAP 0.52** (0.10)
	SF 0.19** (0.07)	vas 0.19 (0.13)	VG 0.12 (0.08)	SV 0.02 (0.12)	Left 0.37** (0.14)
	RV 0.33** (0.06)	VIHR 0.51** (0.10)	FSF -0.02 (0.08)	Sp 0.09 (0.10)	MP 0.49** (0.13)
	EL 0.02 (0.07)	CP 0.35** (0.10)	LR 0.32** (0.09)	LP 0.13 (0.12)	L 0.49** (0.12)
	KC 0.33** (0.07)	Kok 0.29** (0.09)	PP -0.30** (0.10)	KrF 0.14 (0.13)	M 0.48** (0.10)
	V 0.29** (0.05)		Cp -0.14 (0.11)	H 0.09 (0.08)	C 0.53** (0.11)
	ALT 0.10 (0.08)		Pir -0.07 (0.09)		
	LA 0.24** (0.08)				
Party—Other	-0.14 (0.07)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.26* (0.11)	0.41** (0.14)
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982
R ²	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.08
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.07
Residual std. error	0.23	0.42	0.08	0.40	0.58
F statistic	10.01**	8.48**	6.50**	4.30**	6.74**

Note: standard errors in parentheses; far-right party is party reference category.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.




FIGURE 3 | Partisan Impact on Confidence in the UN. 95% confidence bounds are displayed.

values. Again, the first party in each plot is the far-right party, followed by other parties arranged broadly from left-wing to right-wing. In Iceland and Norway, there are almost no partisan differences in confidence in the UN when accounting for the 95% confidence intervals. In contrast, in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden there are meaningful partisan differences in confidence. On average, the partisans of the far-right parties are predicted to have a lower level of confidence in the UN when compared to partisans for competitor parties. In fact, there are no instances in the three countries where partisans for competitor parties are predicted to have a statistically lower level of confidence in the institution. The results provide support for the idea that far-right partisans view more negatively transnational institutions beyond just the EU.

5 | Conclusion

To maintain institutional legitimacy, transnational institutions may rely on citizens' support and confidence. In recent years, transnational institutions have come under attack from far-right politicians, political parties, and movements that argue that these institutions subvert national sovereignty and harm the nation. The Brexit movement and similar "exit" movements in European countries have been directly connected to the far-right

political parties in those countries. The result has been a festering Euroskepticism among far-right partisans and party supporters. In this study, we explored whether the negative views among far-right partisans towards the EU extends to transnational institutions.

Our findings align with previous research, showing that far-right party supporters exhibit lower levels of confidence in the EU. On this topic, we built upon the current research by showing that far-right partisanship and lower levels of confidence in the EU are not static across the Nordic countries. In addition, we find that partisan gaps in confidence towards the EU are also present when investigating confidence towards the UN. There appears to be a consistent skepticism of institutions beyond the nation-state. The results provide pause for concern as the UN is an important transnational institution at the forefront of efforts to resolve the crises in Ukraine and Gaza. However, the frequency and magnitude of these partisan gaps vary across the Nordic countries. We found that confidence is lowest among far-right partisans in the Nordic countries where the parties are considered more populist and further right on the ideological spectrum.

These findings not only shed light on partisan attitudes in the Nordic countries but also raise important questions about the future of transnational cooperation amidst rising far-right sentiment. Countries rely on transnational institutions to combat a host of global issues, as well as mitigate

conflict between one another. As far-right parties gain support across Europe, especially more extreme and populist far-right parties, their entry into government might lead to less support for these important transnational institutions. Therefore, the ability to handle global issues might be hampered and relations between countries might strain. Thus, it is important for future research to explore these partisan gaps cross-nationally. The results also challenge the premise that populations of the Nordic countries uniformly support multilateral cooperation.

Future research could build on this study by addressing several important areas. First, improving the measurement of confidence in institutions could yield more nuanced insights. Utilizing a feeling thermometer or a larger response scale would allow researchers to capture greater variance in responses, enabling a more precise calculation of confidence or support. Second, incorporating measures of individuals' knowledge about these institutions would be valuable. Examining whether partisan differences are influenced by varying levels of institutional knowledge among respondents would provide a deeper understanding of the factors driving these differences.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Data Availability Statement

Code and workspace will be made available upon request.

Endnotes

¹The question is outlined as followed: "QA6. How much trust do you have in certain institutions? For each of the following institutions, do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? (%)." (Euroopan Komissio 2023) <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3052>.

²Both education and income are treated as continuous measures for each of model output presentation purposes. As a robustness check, models were estimated with these two variables treated as ordinal measures. The results are consistent.

³Political parties with < than 40 respondents choosing the party were coded as "other" to avoid degrees of freedom issues that would negatively impact model estimation.

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Appendix A

Variable Coding

Age - continuous, age at the time of the survey.

Gender - binary, self-identified sex of the respondent: 0 = man; 1 = woman.

Education - continuous, 0 = less than primary; 1 = primary; 2 = lower secondary; 3 = upper secondary; 4 = postsecondary, non-tertiary; 5 = short-cycle tertiary; 6 = bachelor or equivalent; 7 = master or equivalent; 8 = doctoral equivalent.²

Income - continuous, 1 = A-1st decile; 2 = B-2nd decile; 3 = C-3rd decile; 4 = D-4th decile; 5 = E-5th decile; 6 = F-6th decile; 7 = G-7th decile; 8 = H-8th decile; 9 = I-9th decile; 10 = J-10th decile.

Political Ideology - continuous, 1 = left – 10 = right.

Partisan Identification - nominal, survey question asks, "which party appeals to you most?"³

European Union - continuous, survey question asks the level of confidence the respondent has in the European Union, 0 = not at all; 1 = not very much; 2 = quite a lot; 3 = a great deal.

United Nations - continuous, survey question asks the level of confidence the respondent has in the United Nations, 0 = not at all; 1 = not very much; 2 = quite a lot; 3 = a great deal.

Appendix B

Descriptive Statistics

TABLE B1 | Descriptive statistics—Independent variables by country.

Variable	Country	Min	Median	Mean	Max	SD
Age	Denmark	18	53	51.82	82	17.64
	Finland	18	57	53.76	82	19.20
	Iceland	18	49	48.83	82	17.29
	Norway	18	48	48.32	82	17.34
	Sweden	18	53	51.75	82	17.94
Education	Denmark	0	5	4.33	8	1.94
	Finland	0	4	4.15	8	1.96
	Iceland	0	3	4.19	8	1.95
	Norway	0	3	4.29	8	1.86
	Sweden	0	4	4.40	8	1.86
Income	Denmark	1	7	6.15	10	2.83
	Finland	1	6	6.03	10	2.70
	Iceland	1	6	6.05	10	2.62
	Norway	1	5	4.97	10	2.64
	Sweden	1	8	6.81	10	2.93
Political Ideology	Denmark	1	5	5.25	10	2.23
	Finland	1	6	5.88	10	2.22
	Iceland	1	5	5.24	10	2.21
	Norway	1	5	5.36	10	2.16
	Sweden	1	5	5.48	10	2.09
Variable	Country	0	1			
Gender	Denmark	48.66%	51.34%			
	Finland	48.04%	51.96%			
	Iceland	49.32%	50.68%			
	Norway	48.57%	51.43%			
	Sweden	48.24%	51.76%			

TABLE B2 | Descriptive statistics—Confidence in institutions by country.

Variable	Country	Min	Median	Mean	Max	SD
EU	Denmark	0	1	1.41	3	0.74
	Finland	0	1	1.37	3	0.71
	Iceland	0	1	1.30	3	0.83
	Norway	0	1	1.40	3	0.74
	Sweden	0	2	1.46	3	0.72
UN	Denmark	0	2	1.78	3	0.69
	Finland	0	2	1.57	3	0.72
	Iceland	0	2	1.86	3	0.69
	Norway	0	2	1.95	3	0.68
	Sweden	0	2	1.77	3	0.75

Appendix C

Models Predicting Confidence in the UN and EU w/Binary Partisanship Variable

TABLE C1 | Models predicting confidence in the EU w/binary partisanship variable.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	1.41** (0.07)	1.38** (0.11)	1.66** (0.12)	1.50** (0.11)	1.17** (0.11)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
Education	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Income	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Far-right party	-0.44** (0.04)	-0.53** (0.08)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.56** (0.08)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
R ²	0.07	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.09
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.03	0.08
Residual std. error	0.25	0.41	0.09	0.44	0.55
F statistic	33.63**	13.03**	29.12**	5.91**	15.77**

Note: standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE C2 | Models predicting confidence in the UN w/binary partisanship variable.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	1.65** (0.07)	1.96** (0.11)	1.74** (0.10)	2.11** (0.10)	1.98** (0.12)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.18** (0.05)
Education	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Income	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Far-right party	-0.23** (0.04)	-0.32** (0.09)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.50** (0.09)
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982

(Continues)

TABLE C2 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.07
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.07
Residual std. error	0.23	0.42	0.08	0.40	0.57
F statistic	12.33**	9.43**	5.91**	4.94**	12.89**

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix D

Analysis w/Binary Confidence Variables (0 = none at all and not very much; 1 = quite a lot and a great deal)

TABLE D1 | Percentage responding “quite a lot” and “a great deal” by country.

Variable	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
EU	49.89%	49.59%	49.51%	49.88%	50.02%
UN	45.46%	49.66%	43.43%	40.10%	46.03%

TABLE D2 | Logistic regression predicting “quite a lot” and “a great deal” confidence in EU.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	-0.89 (0.73)	-1.02 (0.81)	-0.01 (3.69)	0.03 (0.77)	-1.50* (0.64)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Woman	0.02 (0.23)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.19 (1.05)	0.11 (0.23)	0.27 (0.17)
Education	0.15* (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.10 (0.28)	0.09 (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)
Income	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Ideology	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.35)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)
Party	S 0.89* (0.45)	SDP 1.59** (0.59)	XS 1.69 (2.33)	Ap 0.64 (0.49)	SAP 1.12** (0.41)
	SF 1.12 (0.62)	vas 0.57 (0.72)	VG 0.58 (2.22)	SV 0.03 (0.66)	LEFT 0.19 (0.54)
	RV 1.61** (0.58)	VIHR 2.13** (0.59)	FSF 0.23 (2.16)	Sp -0.35 (0.57)	MP 1.29* (0.50)
	EL 0.18 (0.64)	CP 1.01 (0.57)	LR 1.30 (2.32)	LP 1.01 (0.64)	L 1.51** (0.46)
	KC 1.39* (0.62)	Kok 1.77** (0.56)	PP 0.18 (2.73)	KrF 0.60 (0.68)	M 1.50** (0.40)
	V 1.29** (0.45)		Cp -0.40 (3.19)	H 0.72 (0.45)	C 1.41** (0.44)
	ALT 1.20 (0.70)		Pir 0.77 (2.26)		

(Continues)

TABLE D2 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
	LA 0.98 (0.72)				
Party—Other	0.13 (0.72)	0.53 (0.63)	0.41 (2.27)	−0.06 (0.58)	1.37* (0.54)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
Log likelihood	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−637.08
Akaike inf. crit.	30.00	24.00	28.00	26.00	1300.17

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE D3 | Logistic regression predicting “quite a lot” and “a great deal” confidence in UN.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	0.29 (0.75)	0.67 (0.76)	0.59 (4.01)	1.69 (0.94)	0.38 (0.66)
Age	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.02** (0.01)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02** (0.01)
Woman	0.06 (0.25)	0.08 (0.23)	0.16 (1.13)	0.62* (0.29)	0.60** (0.18)
Education	0.11 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.14 (0.32)	0.04 (0.08)	−0.03 (0.05)
Income	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.23)	0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)
Ideology	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.36)	−0.09 (0.08)	−0.02 (0.06)
Party	S 0.54 (0.41)	SDP 1.08* (0.51)	XS 0.27 (2.55)	Ap 0.18 (0.58)	SAP 1.48** (0.38)
	SF 0.56 (0.65)	vas 0.28 (0.62)	VG 0.28 (2.46)	SV −0.09 (0.82)	Left 0.89 (0.51)
	RV 0.87 (0.62)	VIHR 1.33* (0.53)	FSF −0.07 (2.29)	Sp 0.63 (0.68)	MP 1.18* (0.50)
	EL −0.09 (0.61)	CP 0.85 (0.48)	LR 1.63 (4.41)	LP 0.33 (0.83)	L 1.11* (0.43)
	KC 0.91 (0.66)	Kok 0.88 (0.47)	PP −0.79 (2.57)	KrF 0.03 (0.81)	M 1.29** (0.35)
	V 0.77 (0.43)		Cp −0.64 (2.69)	H 0.23 (0.50)	C 1.64** (0.43)
	ALT 0.31 (0.73)		Pir −0.52 (2.37)		
	LA 0.61 (0.78)				
Party—Other	−0.38 (0.65)	0.12 (0.54)	−0.42 (2.36)	−0.82 (0.63)	1.17* (0.53)

(Continues)

TABLE D3 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982
Log likelihood	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-555.82
Akaike inf. crit.	30.00	24.00	28.00	26.00	1137.64

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix E

Analysis w/Binary Confidence and Party Variables

TABLE E1 | Models w/binary EU confidence and party variables.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	-0.28 (0.57)	0.12 (0.55)	0.66 (2.61)	0.20 (0.53)	-0.89* (0.43)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.23)	0.12 (0.22)	-0.20 (1.02)	0.08 (0.22)	0.30 (0.16)
Education	0.16* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.12 (0.27)	0.10 (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)
Income	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Ideology	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.29)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)
Far-right party	-1.08** (0.41)	-1.45** (0.52)	-0.63 (1.55)	-0.57 (0.43)	-1.38** (0.37)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
Log likelihood	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-644.95
Akaike inf. crit.	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	1303.90

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E2 | Models w/binary UN confidence and party variables.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Constant	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)
Age	0.05 (0.25)	0.12 (0.22)	0.20 (1.10)	0.61* (0.28)	0.62** (0.18)
Woman	0.11 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	0.17 (0.31)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.05)
Education	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.23)	0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)
Income	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.31)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.04)

(Continues)

TABLE E2 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Ideology	−0.58 (0.36)	−0.84* (0.42)	0.13 (1.64)	−0.18 (0.47)	−1.35** (0.32)
Far-right party	−0.58 (0.36)	−0.84* (0.42)	0.13 (1.64)	−0.18 (0.47)	−1.35** (0.32)
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982
Log likelihood	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−559.43
Akaike inf. crit.	14.00	14.00	14.00	14.00	1132.85

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix F

Ordered Probit Models

TABLE F1 | Ordered probit models predicting confidence in EU.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Age	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.04)	0.12 (0.07)	−0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)
Education	0.06** (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Income	−0.02** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Ideology	−0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	−0.09** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Party	S 0.62** (0.08)	SDP 0.96** (0.17)	XS 0.95** (0.14)	Ap 0.49** (0.16)	SAP 0.72** (0.16)
	SF 0.66** (0.11)	vas 0.50* (0.20)	VG 0.26 (0.14)	SV 0.22 (0.21)	Left 0.26 (0.22)
	RV 1.01** (0.10)	VIHR 1.24** (0.17)	FSF 0.02 (0.13)	Sp −0.23 (0.17)	MP 0.84** (0.21)
	EL 0.22 (0.11)	CP 0.69** (0.16)	LR 0.87** (0.15)	LP 0.61** (0.20)	L 0.98** (0.19)
	KC 0.89** (0.11)	Kok 1.12** (0.16)	PP 0.03 (0.16)	KrF 0.38 (0.22)	M 0.99** (0.15)
	V 0.83** (0.08)		Cp −0.43* (0.18)	H 0.43** (0.14)	C 0.96** (0.17)
	ALT 0.63** (0.13)		Pir 0.42** (0.14)		
	LA 0.69** (0.13)				
Party—Other	0.01 (0.12)	0.26 (0.18)	0.17 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.18)	0.81** (0.22)

(Continues)

TABLE F1 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Not at all/Not very much	−0.95** (0.13)	−0.69** (0.24)	−1.22** (0.23)	−1.28** (0.25)	−0.55* (0.27)
Not very much/Quite a lot	0.50** (0.13)	0.92** (0.25)	0.01 (0.23)	0.14 (0.25)	0.89** (0.27)
Quite a lot/A great deal	2.20** (0.13)	2.73** (0.26)	1.64** (0.23)	1.84** (0.26)	2.77** (0.28)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
AIC	6000.6	1972.1	2679.8	2044.7	1988.7

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE F2 | Ordered probit models predicting confidence in UN.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Age	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)
Woman	0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	0.28** (0.07)
Education	0.05** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Ideology	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.06* (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Party	S 0.35** (0.08)	SDP 0.61** (0.17)	XS 0.27 (0.14)	Ap 0.05 (0.16)	SAP 0.76** (0.16)
	SF 0.29** (0.11)	vas 0.31 (0.20)	VG 0.20 (0.14)	SV 0.04 (0.22)	Left 0.52* (0.21)
	RV 0.55** (0.10)	VIHR 0.84** (0.17)	FSF −0.04 (0.13)	Sp 0.14 (0.18)	MP 0.70** (0.20)
	EL 0.02 (0.11)	CP 0.57** (0.16)	LR 0.54** (0.15)	LP 0.23 (0.21)	L 0.69** (0.18)
	KC 0.54** (0.11)	Kok 0.47** (0.15)	PP −0.46** (0.16)	KrF 0.24 (0.22)	M 0.69** (0.15)
	V 0.47** (0.08)		Cp −0.21 (0.17)	H 0.14 (0.14)	C 0.77** (0.17)
	ALT 0.17 (0.13)		Pir −0.12 (0.14)		
	LA 0.39** (0.13)				
Party—Other	−0.22 (0.12)	0.03 (0.17)	−0.19 (0.14)	−0.42* (0.19)	0.60** (0.22)
Not at all/Not very much	−1.50**	−0.67**	−1.73**	−2.44**	−1.35**

(Continues)

TABLE F2 | (Continued)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Not very much/Quite a lot	-0.20	-0.20	-0.51*	-1.30**	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Quite a lot/A great deal	1.61**	1.51**	1.26**	0.54*	1.55**
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982
AIC	5679.8	2049.4	2495.31	1886.7	2069.6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix G

Ordered Probit Models w/Binary Party Variable

TABLE G1 | Ordered probit models w/binary party variable predicting confidence in EU.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Age	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Woman	0.01	0.14	-0.06	0.06	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education	0.07**	0.06**	0.07**	0.06**	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	-0.01	0.00	0.04**	-0.02	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology	0.02*	0.02	-0.10**	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Far-right party	-0.69**	-0.86**	-0.29**	-0.33*	-0.89**
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Not at all/Not very much	-1.33**	-1.37**	-1.49**	-1.45**	-0.99**
	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Not very much/Quite a lot	0.08	0.16	-0.31	-0.07	0.44
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Quite a lot/A great deal	1.75**	1.92**	1.24**	1.58**	2.3-0**
	(1.11)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Observations	2849	985	1212	954	975
AIC	6087.1	2028.4	2762.2	2080.7	1993.8

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE G2 | Ordered probit models w/binary party variable predicting confidence in UN.

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Woman	0.00 (0.04)	0.11 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.29** (0.07)
Education	0.05** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Ideology	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Far-right party	-0.37** (0.07)	-0.50** (0.14)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.14)	-0.71** (0.14)
Not at all/Not very much	-1.61** (0.11)	-2.23** (0.19)	-1.68** (0.18)	-2.26** (0.20)	-2.02** (0.20)
Not very much/Quite a lot	-0.34 (0.11)	-0.79** (0.18)	-0.49** (0.17)	-1.15** (0.18)	-0.86** (0.19)
Quite a lot/A great deal	1.44** (0.11)	0.88** (0.18)	1.24** (0.17)	0.67** (0.18)	0.87** (0.19)
Observations	2834	980	1224	964	982
AIC	5724.8	2074.7	2527.0	1893.9	2061.2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix H

See Figure H1.




FIGURE H1 | Histogram of responses by country for confidence in EU and UN.