

Appetite as Activity

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Leibniz holds that the realm of monads is a realm of final causes: monads evolve by appetites directed towards ends.¹ In this paper I consider an objection by Jonathan Bennett to Leibniz's way of spelling out this doctrine. According to Bennett, Leibniz commits himself to "reversing the order of nature" – to treating effects as causes. In section 1, I outline Bennett's objection and consider a natural, but (it seems to me) unsatisfactory, response to it, which relies on a distinction between the order of deliberation and the order of actuality. I will instead suggest that for Leibniz the end, properly understood, is prior to the means *in the order of actuality*. This may sound like a strange idea, but I believe it receives support from, and can be made somewhat plausible in light of, Leibniz's conception of appetite in terms of what I will call *nested activity* (section 2). I will also briefly indicate how this involves rethinking what it is for monads to represent ends (section 3).

1. Bennett's Objection

In "Metaphysical consequences of the principle of reason" Leibniz elaborates on the appetitive nature of monads as follows:

"[S]ince the nature of a simple substance consists of perception and appetite, it is clear that there is in each soul a series of appetites and perceptions, through which it is led from the end to the means, from the perception of one object to the perception of another [*per quam a fine ad media, a perceptione unius ad perceptionem alterius objecti ducatur*]."²

Bennett's assessment of this passage is harsh:

"The monad, we are told here, is led 'from the end to the means,' *a fine ad media*. That seems to imply that appetition involves genuine teleology, in which ends, or anyway thoughts of them, help to explain means. If that were Leibniz's

¹ See e.g. *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace* par. 4; GP VI, 599. *Monadologie* par. 15, 79; GP VI, 609, 620.

² *Conséquences métaphysiques du principe de raison*; C, 14. Translation from G. W. Leibniz: *Philosophical Writings*, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson and transl. by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, London 1973, p. 175.

point, something would be seriously wrong. In his metaphysics the move from one perception to the next is a matter of efficient causation; if it were also a move from end to means, that would subject teleology to Spinoza's jibe that it absurdly 'reverses the order of nature,' treating effects as causes. Of course Spinoza was wrong about that: in treating ends (or thoughts about them) as explanatory, teleology does not treat effects as causes; it does not imply that when I stretch out to pluck the apple from the tree, the plucking causes the stretching. Yet that is what Leibniz commits himself to if we hold that the efficient-causal move from one perception to the next involves going 'from the end to the means.'³

These remarks are part of a general criticism of Leibniz's talk of 'appetite', mainly focusing on the thesis that every change in a monad is spontaneous, i.e. caused from within. Bennett claims that such spontaneity undermines a distinction essential to the notion of appetite: the distinction between what is "endogenous" to a being and what is "forced from without."⁴ The relation between Leibnizian spontaneity and appetite has been extensively discussed in the literature.⁵ Here I will, however, focus on the distinct point Bennett makes in the passage just quoted – the point concerning Leibniz's characterization of the nature of appetite. (For present purposes I will set aside difficulties about spontaneity.)

Bennett's point has not received much attention, which is perhaps understandable. To begin with, it is a bit obscure what he takes the problem to be. Is it that Leibniz here commits himself to some mysterious "backwards causation"? Or is it rather that Leibniz's formulation implies that what seems to be the effect (the plucking) literally exists before, and brings about, what seems to be the cause (the stretching)? And at any rate, it is not clear that there

³ Jonathan Bennett: "Leibniz's Two Realms," in Donald Rutherford/J. A. Cover (eds.): *Leibniz. Nature and Freedom*, Oxford 2005, pp. 135–155, here p. 140.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁵ There is some disagreement among commentators about how these ideas fit together. Some have argued that the problem is only apparent: Martha Bolton: "Change in the Monad," in: Eric Watkins (ed.): *The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature. Historical Perspectives*, Oxford/New York 2013, pp. 175–194. Jeffrey K. McDonough: "Leibniz on Monadic Agency and Optimal Form," in: Arnauld Pelletier (ed.): *Leibniz's Experimental Philosophy (= Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderhefte 46)*, Stuttgart 2016. Others take there to be a real problem, but argue that it is solved by distinguishing between different notions of spontaneity, appetite, and ends: Donald Rutherford: "Leibniz on Spontaneity," in: Id./Cover (eds.): *Leibniz. Nature and Freedom*, pp. 156–180. Julia Jorati: "Three Types of Spontaneity and Teleology in Leibniz," in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 53/4 (2015), pp. 669–698.

is a real problem here.⁶ We could, it seems, easily make sense of the passage by reading talk of being "led" from the end to the means in terms of a thought having as its content some end (plucking an apple) being the efficient cause of a thought that has as its content a means to that end (stretching out). Indeed, we may even say that the thought of the end is the efficient cause of the (perception of the) act of stretching out. None of this entails backwards causation, or the end's existing before the means. The relevant priority is a priority within the order of deliberation; not within the order of actuality or occurrence. Another passage appears to give support to such a reading: in describing "the series of appetites" as a transition "from end to means [*a fine ad medium*]," Leibniz adds that "in fact, one can say that the representation of the end in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation of the means in the same soul [*repraesentationem finis in anima causam efficientem esse repraesentationis mediorum in eadem*]."⁷ This response to Bennett reflects a common interpretation of Leibniz's notion of appetite: appetite is understood as aimed at a represented end (a non-actual state or event); it is in the nature of appetite to be determined by representation.⁸

⁶ A more simple response to Bennett's worry than the one I sketch below would be to say that last sentence of the "Metaphysical consequences [...]" passage should be read as making two distinct claims: one about appetite and another about perception. However, as is clear from the context, as well as from the comments on Stahl quoted below, Leibniz does seem to see the claim about being led from the end to the means as connected to the progress of perception or representation.

⁷ *Animadversiones Circa Assertionem aliquas Theoriae Medicae verae Clar. Stahlii*; Dutens II, 2, 134. Incidentally, this passage also shows that, contrary to what Bennett suggests ("Leibniz's Two Realms," p. 139), Leibniz's talk of being led from the end to the means was *not* a slip of the pen.

⁸ For elaborations along what seems to be such lines see e.g.: Bolton: "Change in the Monad," pp. 180–181. Marleen Rozemond: "Leibniz on Final Causation," in: Samuel Newlands/Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.): *Metaphysics and the Good. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams*, Oxford/New York 2009, pp. 272–294, in particular pp. 291–292. Stephan Schmid: *Finalursachen in der frühen Neuzeit. Eine Untersuchung der Transformation teleologischer Erklärungen*, Berlin/New York 2011, pp. 339–347. It also seems to me that John Carriero commits himself to something like the deliberative model (a determination of appetite by representation) even though – in contrast to Bolton and Rozemond – he does not think this is to be understood in cognitive terms. See Carriero: "Substance and Ends in Leibniz," in: Paul Hoffman/David Owen/Gideon Yaffe (eds.): *Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Vere Chappell*, Peterborough 2008, pp. 115–140, in particular p. 131. My issue here is not simply with the question whether monads are cognitive or not, but with a picture that, I believe, underlies both "cognitivist" and "non-cognitivist" readings. My talk of "the order of deliberation" should not only be understood in cognitive terms, but is to be heard broadly so as to apply also to the appetites of lower-level monads.

I believe such a response to Bennett is too quick. His worry can, it seems to me, be substantiated by considering Leibniz's commitment to a *parallelism* between the representational order and worldly occurrences:

The representation of the present state of the universe in the soul [...] produces in it the representation of the subsequent state of the same universe, just as in the things represented the preceding state actually produces the subsequent state of the world [*comme dans les objets l'état precedent produit effectivement l'état suivant du monde*]. In a soul, the representations of causes are the causes of the representations of effects.⁹

Representation R_1 has as its content the present state of the physical world (W_1). R_1 produces a subsequent representation R_2 that has as its content the subsequent state of the world (W_2), in parallel with the way in which W_1 produces W_2 .¹⁰ Here a worry akin to Bennett's arises. Given this parallelism, the claim that we are led from the end to the means or that the representation of the end causes the representation of the means *does* seem to commit Leibniz to the strange view that plucking is actual before, and brings about, stretching out.

Now, it is of course possible to maintain that Leibniz must distinguish between two forms of representations: those that have as their content an actual state (perhaps only these should strictly speaking be called 'perceptions'), and those that are of non-actual states. Such a distinction could be used to separate the order of deliberation from the order of actuality. It may also be pointed out that Leibniz famously insists that "the present state is pregnant with the future," which seems to imply representation of something non-actual.¹¹ However, a distinction between different forms of representation does not seem to be clearly in view in the passages about appetites considered earlier. More importantly, I do not think that we need to rely on such a distinction in order to make sense of Leibniz's claim. That is, I believe that we can take

⁹ Extrait du Dictionnaire de M. Bayle article *Rorarius* [...]; GP IV, 533. Translation from Leibniz's 'New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts, ed. by R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks, Oxford 1997, p. 78. Cf. Leibniz to Arnould, October 9 1687; A II, 2, 243.

¹⁰ Or perhaps "is conceived to produce" since talk of "physical producing" is in some sense not ultimately basic for Leibniz.

¹¹ *Monadologie* par. 22; GP VI, 609. Translation from G. W. Leibniz: *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and transl. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1989, p. 216. Cf. e.g. *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace* par. 13; GP VI, 604. *Discours de métaphysique* par. 9; A VI, 4, 1542.

both Leibniz's parallelism *and* the claim that monads are led from the end to the means at face value, so that the latter is a claim about the order of actuality. Part of the reason why this need not be so strange at it sounds is, I will argue, that the relationship between appetite and end does not have to be thought of in deliberative terms, in terms of a determination by a representation of something non-actual.

2. Nested Appetite and Activity

Before turning to ends, I will first consider three ideas central to Leibniz's conception of appetite: (1) appetites have (what I will call) a nested structure; (2) appetites are conati or tendencies; (3) nestedness applies to activity.

(1) *Appetites have a nested structure*. In the course of elaborating on the pre-established harmony between body and soul, Leibniz explains that perceptions and appetites have to involve "a perfect detail of everything that happens in the organs, in order for the appetites to be executed." Otherwise "it would not be a perfect and entire appetite of this whole object, but only something that would come close to it [*un appetit parfait et entier de tout cet objet, mais seulement quelque chose d'approchant*]." He goes on to distinguish appetites in which understanding and will are involved from "confused appetites":

"And since our understanding and consequently our will is not capable of this detail, our simple will (if the appetite tends to the end without tending to the means and the means to the means [*si l'appetit va à la fin sans aller aux moyens et moyens des moyens*]) is not an appetite that the body has to follow and execute; the body has to do so only in the case of the internal voluntary, unimpeded, movements, where the confused appetite supports the will or the distinct appetite with a perfect detail, given that our organs are purposely made in that way [...] Thus, ends and means always have to be joined in the soul, as causes and effects are in the body, in order for the desired effect to be executed."¹²

I will set aside the question of the status of the will, and its exact relationship to "confused" appetites. What I am interested in is Leibniz's gloss on the nature of full appetite: it is such that it tends to the end by also tending to the means to that end, and to the means to the means, and so on. In having an appetite for end E, a monad also has sub-appetites for means M_1 , as well as

¹² Leibniz to Hartsoecker, October 30 1710; GP III, 509–510, emphasis added.

for means M_2 to M_1 , and so on. A full appetite is not merely specified in terms of an endpoint (my having plucked an apple), which can be realized in different ways, but is an appetite for E-by-way-of- M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n (plucking-by-way-of-stretching-out-by-way-of-raising-my-arm-etc.). Conversely, the appetite for stretching out is an appetite for stretching-out-in-order-to-pluck-an-apple. By having such a nested structure Leibnizian appetites are *determinate*.¹³

Now, appetites are for Leibniz dynamic: there is a progression of appetites. Commentators have taken this to mean that appetites are momentary existents, directed at bringing about a next state.¹⁴ However, this does not seem to fit well with the nestedness of appetite. But in what way is the latter dynamic? Perhaps we need not take the point to be that having an appetite for plucking-by-way-of-raising-my-arm implies that the presence of the appetite for plucking requires the constant presence of the appetite for raising. There is a point when I am done raising my arm, but not done plucking, so that I still desire to pluck, but no longer to raise. This is not to say that a new desire has come into existence – my desire for plucking remains, but it has, as it were, unfolded. Instead of a series of momentary appetites, the relevant progression can be seen as a matter of an internal unfolding of continually present appetites.¹⁵

The dynamic character of appetite can be better understood given that (2) *appetites are conati or tendencies*. This means, Leibniz explains, that they are to be conceived in terms of force, active power, or activity (he uses these terms roughly interchangeably).¹⁶ Again, “force or activity [is] a state from

¹³ It is important to note that this need not imply the odd thesis that success is somehow built into the notion of full appetite – that a full appetite has to involve all the means required for succeeding. Determinateness of appetite seems compatible with distinguishing between “appetites” that fail internally (I may have a “desire” to jump to the roof of the cathedral, but there is no way in which this can be determinate given the nature of my body) and those that fail externally (I have a determinate appetite for crossing the street, but get run over by a car).

¹⁴ Bennett: “Leibniz’s Two Realms,” p. 138 f. Cf. also e.g. Robert Adams: *Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, New York 1994, p. 380. Donald Rutherford: *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 161 f. For an interesting criticism of attributing instantaneous states to Leibniz see John Whipple: “The Structure of Leibnizian Simple Substances,” in: *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 18/3 (2010), pp. 379–410.

¹⁵ For sake of simplicity, I have represented such unfolding as taking place through discrete steps, but this conception of appetitive progression seems consistent with taking the unfolding to be continuous.

¹⁶ On appetite as conatus or tendency see e.g. *Nouveaux essais* II, 21.5, 36, 39; A VI, 6, 172 f., 189f., 192. *Table de définitions*; C, 491. *Responsiones ad Stahliaans observationes*; Dutens II, 2, 155. On conatus or tendency understood in terms of active power, force, or activity see e.g. *De primae philosophiae Emendatione*; GP IV, 469–470. *Nouveaux essais* II, 21.1; A VI, 6, 169. *Leibniz gegen Descartes* XI; GP IV, 395 ff.

which action follows naturally unless it is impeded,” where action is a change resulting from force or activity.¹⁷ The relevant notion of resulting is *immanent*: the activity is somehow constitutive of the action, in line with how my having run five miles is the result of my being engaged in the activity of running five miles, where the former consists in my having done the latter for a certain time.¹⁸

For Leibniz appetite then *is* acting – it is a matter of activity, of actually doing something. In this respect his view differs from a Cartesian one, according to which – very schematically speaking – appetite is a matter of the will’s being directed towards some represented end, and its role is to bring about some bodily movement realizing that end.¹⁹ Given Leibniz’s well-known rejection of the Cartesian picture of the relationship between mind and body, it should not come as a surprise that he proposes a different conception of the nature of appetite.

Let us then consider how (3) *nestedness applies to activity*. On Leibniz’s view, an action seems to be a temporally extended process that consists of parts: the action of plucking as a whole is only in place once the apple has **been plucked**, but the whole of the parts of plucking – e.g. raising my arm and **stretching out** – can (indeed must) be present prior to plucking.²⁰ In contrast, Leibniz insists that force “exists wholly at each moment [*existe tout entier à chaque moment*].”²¹ I take it that the point here is that doing in the sense of

¹⁷ Leibniz to Rémond, November 4 1715; GP III, 657. Cf. references in the previous note.

¹⁸ Leibniz to Hermann, September 9 1712; GM IV, 379: “[...] potentia sit id, cujus exercitium temporale actio est [...]” Cf. Leibniz to Hermann, February 1 1713; *ibid.*, 389. Leibniz to De Volder, April 3 1699; GP II, 174.

¹⁹ It is not clear to what extent this was Descartes’s own view, since his conception of both the relationship between will and intellect, as well as **between mind and body**, is **much richer** than what I call the “Cartesian view,” see Lilli Alanen: *Descartes’s Concept of Mind*, Cambridge, Mass. 2003. I do, however, suspect that Leibniz himself thought of Descartes along the lines of the schematic picture I present. Notice also that the Cartesian view seems to be alive in contemporary theories of action: while dispensing with the will, they typically construe desire as a prior mental state – a favourable attitude towards a represented future state of affairs – causing a subsequent act (certain bodily movements).

²⁰ When I talk of “an action’s being present,” this is just a way of speaking: it does not imply that actions or changes are particulars. Nor do I believe that activities or forces are particulars. Instead they are to be seen as nested in, or ways of being, of the life (or rather *living*) of a monad (see below). But this point is not crucial to the issue at hand.

²¹ Leibniz to Pellisson, July 1691; A II, 2, 434. Cf. Leibniz to Jaquelot, March 22 1703; GP III, 457. Note that “momentary” in this context is not to be read as “instantaneous.” I discuss this point further in connection with motion in “Leibniz on Motion and Force: The Problem of Non-Coexistent Parts” (manuscript).

force or activity does not require any particular change to have occurred, and that force is such that it can continue to exist wholly throughout some process of change. I am engaged the activity of plucking an apple (or running five miles) throughout the process that leads up to the apple's getting plucked (or my having run five miles).²² This also means that while I'm raising my arm or stretching out, I'm still (wholly) plucking.²³ The former are not constitutive parts of plucking, but *ways* of being engaged in plucking. Activity displays a nested structure in that subactivities (e.g. stretching out) have their place within an overall activity (e.g. plucking) that exists at every moment.

However, there may seem to be a problem here. In the case of appetite we can generally say that, in having an appetite for a means M to an end E I also have an appetite for E. But can we always say that, in ϕ -ing as a means to ψ -ing I'm also ψ -ing – that ϕ -ing is a way of ψ -ing? This does not seem to be the case: I am plucking an apple in order to eat it, but it sounds odd to say that, in plucking the apple I am eating it (plucking is not a way of eating). Now, we need to remember that for Leibniz a monad's various appetites or particular activities are modifications of its nature or primitive force, which he often characterizes as *life of living* (the latter seems more appropriate, since he is talking about force).²⁴ Thereby Leibniz seems to provide us with a picture of the basis of appetites and how they are related to each other, namely as ordered to sustaining the activity of living (or perhaps, more precisely, to sustain the life of the organic body which the monad expresses). This allows us to develop the idea of nestedness in the case of activity along something like the following lines.²⁵ At any point in my life I will have various appetites and sub-appetites, some of them plausibly said to be things that I am *doing* in doing something else (in stretching out I am plucking), whereas others are such that

²² I am drawing on a linguistic difference – the difference between the imperfective and perfective aspects – but the idea is not to say that Leibniz somewhat draws a metaphysical conclusion from a linguistic distinction, but rather that the linguistic distinction can help to illuminate the nature of force. One way of putting the idea would be to say that, while from a purely linguistic perspective it would make little sense to think of one of the aspects as prior to the other, when we consider the situation from the point of view of metaphysics, it turns out that there is a priority of 'acting' over 'acted.'

²³ One may easily take it to be the case that if x exists wholly, then x may also exist partially (x may be more or less complete). However, it is clear that in this context 'wholly' connotes non-completable, i.e. something that cannot be more or less complete.

²⁴ Leibniz to Bernoulli, November 18 1698; GM III, 552: "[...] entelechiaeu seu activitatis primitivae, animae, vitae." Cf. e.g. *Leibniz gegen Descartes* XI; GP IV, 396. Leibniz to Wagner, June 4, 1710; GP VII, 530

²⁵ I develop the connection between force and living, as well as the point concerning the nature of representation discussed in next section in "Leibniz on Force as Life" (in progress).

I'm *tending* or *striving* to do them in doing something else (in plucking I am striving to eat). But all of them will be nested within my activity of living: they are all such that in doing them I am living. It is of the nature of both plucking and tending to eat to be activities, in that they are ways of living (of sustaining living).

By now it should appear less strange to take the claim that monads are led from ends to means as a claim about the order of actuality. To begin with, given the determinateness of appetite, the way in which an endpoint is reached seems to be integral to the endpoint itself. "Apple plucked" will be an abstract characterization of something like "the apple's being plucked by my plucking it by way of stretching out, etc." Now, the way in which we reach some endpoint is through our activity, and so the activity is somehow integral to the endpoint. Secondly, to the extent that appetite is ultimately a matter of sustaining living, the end is not an endpoint to be brought about by activity, but *is* in a certain sense the activity itself. In this manner, the end can even be said to be an efficient cause of the means: activities directed at means depend on the presence of – and thus inherit their "efficacy," their nature as forces or activities, from – the overall activity.²⁶ And, as we just saw, this activity *is* (in a certain sense) the end. Moreover, being engaged in that overall activity is also temporally prior to completing the means: I have to be plucking before having raised my arm or stretched out.

In order to understand what it is to be led from the end to the means there is thus no need to introduce a deliberative order distinct from the order of actuality. In a way, I am proposing a reversal of the deliberative picture of monadic change: instead of starting from appetite as determined by a general representation of something non-actual, we begin with activity.

3. Activity and Representation

This leaves us with the question of how to account for the connection between ends and representations, emphasized by Leibniz: "one can say that the representation of the end in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation of the means in the same soul."²⁷

²⁶ For this sense of 'efficacy' see e.g. *De Ipsa Natura*; GP IV, 507.

²⁷ *Animadversiones Circa Assertionem aliquam Theoriae Medicae verae Clar. Stahlii*; Dutens II, 2, 134.

At first sight, it is (as noted) natural to read this passage in deliberative terms, but I believe that it can in fact be quite well accommodated within the reading I have presented so far. However, this requires a somewhat different interpretation of the relationship between appetite and representation than a traditional one, according to which appetites and representations are two distinct types of states (or two distinct elements of one and the same state).²⁸ In contrast, I suggest that for Leibniz a monad represents the state of the universe by the force or activity by which it also tends to change; the distinction between appetite and representation is merely an abstraction from force. While I do think that there is both systematic and textual support for my proposal, I cannot pursue this issue here.²⁹ I will limit myself to briefly indicating how such an approach to representation can help to illuminate what it is for a monad to represent an end.

A monad's present state represents or expresses the state of the world, and it does so by expressing the state of its body.³⁰ The present state of the body is a very complex state of motion. Among these motions is for example the transition of my arm from one position to another. From a merely bodily perspective – roughly, what would enter into a mechanist physics account – apple plucking is a rather complex temporally extended process, composed of, and resulting from, a series of states of motion.

My suggestion then is that the present motion is expressed by the present force of the monad. The latter is (as we have seen) not some momentary tendency directed at the next state, but nested within an overall activity – in stretching out I am also fully plucking, because stretching is a way of plucking. More precisely put perhaps, my activity (the activity of the monad that I am) expresses the present motion of my arm as an element in a process of apple plucking. That is, the activity of the monad is such that in representing the present motion of the body, it also represents that motion as an element of a larger process.

I argued earlier that the overall activity (ultimately living) can in a certain sense be seen as an end, and that subactivities (various things that I do or

²⁸ For a helpful overview of some different interpretive positions see Julia Jorati: "Leibniz on Causation – Part 1," in: *Philosophy Compass* 10/6 (2015), pp. 389–397, here pp. 393 f.

²⁹ See Leibniz to Sophie June 12 1700; A I, 18, 123: "Et quant au materiel qui entre dans le cerveau par les sens, ce n'est pas ce materiel même, qui entre dans l'ame, mais son idée ou representation, qui n'est pas un corps, mais une maniere d'effort ou de reaction modifiée." Cf. e.g. *Reponses aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle* [...]; GP IV, 562.

³⁰ E.g. *Monadologie* par. 62; GP VI, 617.

tend to in order to sustain living) stand to it as means. In a similar way we can understand what is represented by the subactivity (my present motions) as standing as means to what is represented by the overall activity (the process of life of my organic body). If we take the order of representation to reflect the priority in activity (overall activity prior to subactivity), the representation of the end will also be prior to the representation of the means. Talk of being led from the representation of the end to the representation of the means – or from the perception of one object to the perception of another – can thus quite readily be understood through the picture of the structure of monadic activity that I have presented here. To make sense of Leibniz's claim that "[o]ne can say that the representation of the end in the soul is the efficient cause of the representation of the means in the same soul," we need not appeal to a deliberative order, but we can instead draw on the sense in which the overall activity is the efficient cause of the means (explained in section 2 above). The expression of the process of life is prior to the expression of my having plucked, eaten, or digested an apple.

4. Conclusion

I have tried to take seriously Bennett's worry about the way in which Leibniz glosses the nature of appetite. My aim in doing so has been to show that we can make sense of the claim that monads are led from (the representation of) the end to (the representation of) the means as a claim about the order of actuality: appetite, end, and representation can be, I have argued, spelled out in terms of actual activity. On this alternative picture, we arrive at something like the following understanding of Leibniz's famous contrast between the order of body as an order of efficient causes and that of monads as an order of final causes. From the point of view of mechanistic physics the order of body is a succession of states of motion, one state being the result of the previous ones. From the point of view of the activity of monads, the present state of body is expressed as embedded in a larger process, a life.³¹

³¹ I am grateful to participants at a session of the *Rationalist Club* at the University of Turku, where I presented an early version of this paper. I have also benefitted greatly from comments on a later draft by Sanna Mattila, Arto Repo, and Valtteri Viljanen. A special thanks to Arto Repo for many helpful discussions about the topics of the paper. My research has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project number 275652).