



**UNIVERSITY
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Taking China Seriously

The Positioning Towards China in Finnish Printed Media 1950–1953

Centre for East Asian Studies

Master's thesis

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This thesis makes sense of how two Finnish politically affiliated newspapers positioned themselves towards the PRC between 1950–1953 via the lens of critical discourse analysis. The 1950–1953 period included the early nation-building years of the PRC; the beginning and end of the Korean War; and the PRC and Finland's establishment of diplomatic relations and signing of a trade treaty – PRC's first with a capitalist, Western nation. Therefore, both newspapers discussed China extensively throughout the period. By critical dissection of the language and form of these two newspapers, this thesis answered three research questions: how *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat*'s China discourses diverged from one another, what discourse hegemonizing strategies were implemented to create these discourses, and how Finland's bilateral exchanges with the PRC affected these discourses. The research shows that the two newspapers depicted the conditions of PRC nationals, and the nature of the two Chinese regimes, the PRC and the ROC in exile, in diverging ways. The 1952 Helsinki Olympics and the 1953 cultural delegation led by Sylvi Kekkonen were found to have influenced these two discourses. The newspapers' differing affinities with the Cold War superpowers were also recognized as important building blocks of the discourses. Beyond adding to the anglosphere-dominated corpus of historical China discourse studies, this research promotes the combining of linguistic methods with historical primary literature.

Key words: Critical discourse analysis, China–Finland, linguistic history, Cold War

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Disclosure

This research has utilized artificial intelligence (ChatGPT) to assist in proofreading some of the Finnish-to-English translations. All translations are done by the author, who remains solely responsible for their accuracy.

1 Introduction

“The Communist China has become a major power. [--] it has already started to practice aggressive politics.” – *Uusi Suomi*¹

“The friendship between the USSR and China bears enormous impact for peace in the whole world.” – *Työkansan Sanomat*²

The early 1950s was an eventful period in world history, not the least because the PRC (People’s Republic of China, hereafter also China) started its first full decade in power after successfully sending the Nationalists packing to Formosa (Taiwan) after the 1946–1949 Chinese Civil War. Furthermore, the 1950–1953 period included the beginning and the end of the war on Korean peninsula – the first hot war of the Cold War; the vigorous arguing which government should represent China in the UN Security Council; the United States being forced to recalibrate its foreign policy in Asia; the Soviet Union figuring its own cooperation model with the PRC; and the last years of Josif Stalin’s rule. The myriads of events explain why China was endlessly discussed by Finnish press.

1.1 Background of the Topic and Research Objectives

This master’s thesis seeks to make sense of how Finnish political press positioned themselves vis-à-vis the PRC between 1950–1953 by a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of two party-affiliated newspapers: *Uusi Suomi* (the National Coalition Party’s newspaper) and *Työkansan Sanomat* (the Finnish Communist Party’s newspaper). Together they represent both the bourgeoisie and communist press landscape in Finland at the time. Altogether 1200 China-related articles were collected and analyzed from these two newspapers manually from the National Library of Finland’s digital archives.

This thesis builds upon the foundation laid by the author's earlier bachelor's thesis. This earlier thesis focused on the Chinese Civil War years 1946–1949. This master’s thesis is an independent study and focuses on a new time-period, but it should be noted that decisions regarding the research questions, methodology, and the primary data chosen for this study have been influenced by this earlier thesis. Furthermore, this foundational work allows a broader analysis and a longitudinal approach where comparisons between the 1946–1949 and 1950–1953 dataset are introduced when deemed relevant.

¹ Kiinan uudet diktaattorit [China’s new dictators], US 13.1.1951.

² Kiinan ja SSSR:n ystävyydellä on valtava merkitys koko maailman rauhalle, TKS 22.1.1950.

To shine light on the nature of historical news coverage on China, three research questions were chosen with critical discourse analytical (CDA) serving as the main methodology: 1) in what ways Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat's China discourses have differed from one another; 2) what kind of discursive hegemonizing strategies have been utilized to hegemonize these different discourses; and 3) did bilateral exchanges between Finland and the PRC bear any effect for the China discourse.

Beyond these three research questions themselves and the overall objective of bringing clarity to historical media discourse on China in Finnish press – a topic scarcely researched so far except for a few non-historically oriented theses,³ this study serves an additional purpose that is partially independent of the chosen research data and questions – that is to advocate and promote the usage of linguistic approaches in historical research. Therefore, besides aiming to contribute to severely lacking research on Finnish printed media history from the specific viewpoint of China, I have also demonstrated how linguistic methods can be incorporated to historical research in order to encourage more extensive utilization of similar methodology in all future historical research.

Several different time periods could have been picked to provide a snapshot of the historical discourse development, but the timeframe 1950–1953 was chosen for the following reasons:

1. Relation to the previous thesis. Since the author has collected data of the development of the China discourse from the years 1946–1949, resuming right after the Chinese Civil War years allows to draw comparisons how the China discourse was (dis)similar before and after the establishment of the PRC.
2. A distinct Chinese history period. 1950–1953 comprise the first period of PRC's history, also named "the New Democracy Period." The PRC was going through multiple domestic and internationally newsworthy developments in its early nation-building efforts and seeking international legitimacy.
3. International relevance. The period also includes the Korean War in which China was complicit, as well as the last years of Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union.

³ Jalmari Polari, "Kiina ja Taiwan Suomen koronauutisoinnissa 2020: Tapaustutkimuksena Turun Sanomat" (Master's thesis, University of Turku, 2021); Reetta Niinimäki, "Media Image of Chinese Companies in Small Developed Economies: Case: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden" (Master's thesis, University of Turku, 2014).

4. Watershed period for Finland–PRC relations. Finland recognized the PRC already on January 13th, 1950. In June 1953 Finland also became the first Western capitalist country to sign a bilateral trade agreement with the PRC.
5. Limitation caused by the primary data. Työkansan Sanomat merged with the other less belligerent communist publication *Vapaa Sana* in 1956 into a new newspaper titled *Kansan Uutiset*.⁴ To produce a properly comparative research based on the foundational work of 1946–1949, it is vital that the studied newspapers remain the same, and therefore choosing timeframes where the original two newspapers cannot be analyzed was not deemed worthwhile for this study.

The secondary literature referenced in this thesis is heavily methodologically oriented and will be discussed extensively in 1.3, which also functions as the literature review of this study. Overall, the nature of this thesis can be characterized as CDA per “method van Dijk,” as the CDA scholar van Dijk’s work is most extensively referenced. Secondary literature from the field of history has also been examined particularly to juxtapose the events portrayed by the newspapers with the events as canonized by historians. From the Chinese side, the leading Chinese Korean War and Cold War historian Shen Zhihua has provided important background knowledge of this period for his exclusive access to Soviet and Chinese archival evidence on Sino-Soviet decision-making and communication regarding the Korean War. Shen’s works *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s* (2012) and *Mao and the Sino-Soviet partnership, 1945–1959: A new History* (2015) by Shen and Xia Yafeng, were particularly invaluable. Xu Guoqi also stands out as one of the only historians to have researched PRC’s participation in Helsinki Summer Olympics 1952. Xu’s *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008*. (2008) was a tremendous help in understanding the rationale behind PRC’s participation in the Helsinki Games. From the Finnish side, Soikkanen et al.’s *Sylvin Matkassa: Yksityiset Päiväkirjat Kiinasta* (2020) was a pivotal book to comprehend the significance of Finland’s cultural exchange visit to the PRC in 1952 which, like Helsinki Games, will later be discussed in its own chapter.

The objective of this first introductory subchapter has been to lay bare the rough framework of this thesis. In the following introductory chapters, I will first offer a summary of the

⁴ Pertti Hemánus et al., *Suomen lehdistön historia 3: Sanomalehdistö sodan murroksesta 1980-luvulle*. (Kuopio: Kustannuskiila, 1988), 122.

historical context against which these discourse utterances have been produced. After the historical review, I will discuss the chosen methodological framework of this thesis in broader detail. Finally, before moving to the analysis, I will briefly introduce the nature of my primary data, and how CDA can be applied to newspapers in particular.

To provide the analysis of the primary data itself, I have separated the analytical chapters thematically into three main chapters. The first focuses on PRC's domestic development and discussions around the Chinese people themselves, as well as the discussion surrounding the winning and losing camp of the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the CCP) and Kuomintang (hereafter the KMT), in the first post-Civil War years. The second chapter will steer deeper into the specific Finnish context: how Finland stands out from the international press discourse, and the two selected case examples of Finland's unique China discourse – The Helsinki Summer Olympics 1952 and Finland's culture delegation visit to China in 1953. Lastly, I will assume a more global outlook by directing gazes at the brewing Cold War dynamics by discussing the press' China discourse in relation to the US, the UK and the Soviet Union (hereafter also the USSR), including the Finnish newspapers' positioning vis-à-vis news sources from Eastern and Western Cold War blocs.

1.2 The historical context in China and Finland between 1950–1953

The PRC did not have the easiest early years. Amidst its early nation construction efforts and societal reordering, Beijing found itself in its first major international conflict the very next year when the conflict in Korea escalated into a war on June 25th, 1950. Even though this meant having to postpone PRC's number one priority – the takeover of Taiwan to finish its reunification – the PRC felt obliged to comply with Stalin and Kim Il-Sung's wishes by sending troops to support North Korea. Although PRC's decision-making vis-à-vis the Korean War has remained a controversial and debated topic, Shen Zhihua has argued based on later revealed archival evidence that PRC leadership felt pressured to join the war in October 1950 as Stalin and Kim had already agreed on it, turning PRC's participation into a *fait accompli* much to the dismay of Mao.⁵

⁵ Shen Zhihua, "Reconsidering China's Decision to Enter the Korean War — Seventieth Year after the Korean Armistice," *The Chinese Historical Review* 30, no. 2 (2023), 166–170.

Establishing an allyship with PRC's most important ally of the 1950s, the Soviet Union, was not indeed a simple or seamless process. Stalin had always been doubtful of Mao's character and feared Mao would turn into Asia's Tito.⁶ In revisiting the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty originally signed between the Nationalist government and the USSR, Stalin and Mao had conflicting interests in how this treaty with the previous Chinese government should be handled, and whether a new treaty needed to be formulated. Stalin wanted a close relationship with the PRC and simultaneously to protect Soviet interests in Northeastern China, whereas Mao targeted a more independent relationship, hoping that Stalin would agree to a new treaty that would better protect the interests of the PRC.⁷

The Sino-Soviet treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance was eventually signed in Moscow in February 1950, but initially Stalin had objected to signing a new treaty. Mao, who had felt neglected and frustrated over Stalin's dismissals, had to resort to strategizing and threatening to end his stay at the USSR early, and even isolating himself behind closed doors to purposefully cause US observers reason to speculate about turbulence in Sino-Soviet relations.⁸ Shen Zhihua argues the reason behind Stalin's eventual consent to a new treaty was Stalin's realization that Mao could not be allowed to leave the USSR empty-handed, for that could easily jeopardize Soviet strategic interests in Asia.⁹ In conclusion, negotiating the new treaty was prolonged because the two leaders quarreled over the terms of their alliance.

To offer a pre-taste of how these historical events were handled in the press,¹⁰ the Finnish Communist Party's newspaper *Työkansan Sanomat* evidently acknowledged no quarrels. The paper reported that the Sino-Soviet negotiations for the new treaty had been handled "in the atmosphere of a heartfelt and mutually friendly understanding,"¹¹ and was furious that

⁶ Shen Zhihua, "Reconsidering China's Decision to Enter the Korean War — Seventieth Year after the Korean Armistice," *The Chinese Historical Review* 30, no. 2 (2023), 164–166.

⁷ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 47–48.

⁸ Shen Zhihua, "Reconsidering China's Decision to Enter the Korean War— Seventieth Year after the Korean Armistice," *The Chinese Historical Review* 30, no. 2 (2023), 165.

⁹ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 47–48.

¹⁰ Note on article translations: the English translations of Finnish news titles are included in square brackets in footnotes unless the translation is already included in the body text. The Finnish original text of translated pull-out quotes will be included in footnotes, but the original Finnish of the shorter quotations that are embedded in paragraphs have not been included to reduce the amount of text in footnotes.

¹¹ Suurta maailmanhistoriaa: Ystävyys-, liitto- ja avunantosopimus solmittu Neuvostoliiton ja Kiinan välille [Grand world history: A treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance signed between the USSR and China], TKS 16.2.1950.

newspapers from the “imperialist camp” had published “lies and provocations of Mao and Stalin’s alleged “disagreements.”¹² Työkansan Sanomat never explained what these alleged disagreements in the “imperialist press” were. The paper only acknowledged this news when the new treaty had been drafted, which they could then utilize as “proof” that Stalin and Mao never had disagreements. Uusi Suomi said what Työkansan Sanomat could not and often reported on Stalin and Mao’s arguments,¹³ bringing Uusi Suomi more in line with other Western press, which was speculating that Mao had been placed under house arrest in Moscow.¹⁴ However, despite these clashes between Mao and Stalin, Mao and the PRC accepted the intense Soviet influence and models in this period, and criticism of said models would not emerge in the PRC until around 1957.¹⁵

Besides establishing an allyship with the USSR and entering the Korean conflict, the PRC had much housework to do at home – particularly to finalize the land reform it had begun already during the Chinese Civil War. The land reform was as much a political campaign as it was economic. The reform was aimed to mobilize the people for economic production; crush any remaining resistance against the Party; and later also to aid China’s war efforts in Korea. The CCP quickly abandoned its initial plan of a more peaceful approach to the reform, especially when the Korean War offered a convenient cause to reinforce aggressive class struggle. Although it did not collectivize or end private small ownership of land yet, it was a campaign of terror characterized by beating, humiliating and killing landlords in mass rallies.¹⁶

During the time Finnish newspapers were discussing these events in China, Finland was dealing with its own aftermath of wars fought and lost against the Soviet Union in 1939–1940 and 1941–1944. These wars had elevated the Finnish Communist Party to a high position in national politics, causing worry over potential Sovietization of Finland. Although the most turbulent postwar years had passed by the 1950s – the Finnish communists had lost their

¹² Kiinan ja SSSR:n ystävyyssojimus [China and the USSR’s friendship treaty], TKS 17.2.1950.

¹³ Mao-Tse-Tungin vierailu Moskovassa pitkitty – molemminpuoleisia vaatimuksia [Mao Tse-Tung’s visit to Moscow prolonged – demands from both sides], US 31.1.1950; NL:n ja Kiinan neuvottelut – erimielisyyksiä Maon ja Moskovon kesken [USSR and China’s negotiations – disagreements between Mao and Moscow], US 11.2.1950.

¹⁴ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 49.

¹⁵ Lucien Bianco and Krystyna Horko, *Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions*. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018), 53–54.

¹⁶ Jeffrey A Javed, *Righteous Revolutionaries: Morality, Mobilization, and Violence in the Making of the Chinese State* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2022), 27–31, 36–38.

political momentum, and the immediate threat of Sovietization had receded – Finland nevertheless had to conduct a cautious, *realpolitik* policy towards the USSR.¹⁷

Despite the decline of communists' political influence, the Finnish Communist Party remained active and built relations with other communist parties abroad. Further, Finland's foreign policy was still subordinate to the conditions laid by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, which required careful balancing between East and West. Yet Finland was very skillful in balancing its position between the two Cold War blocs: Finland was recognized as a Western and Nordic nation, yet the country's close relationship with the USSR also made it similar to the small Eastern European socialist nations.¹⁸

This unique position enabled Finland to be among the first Western nations to recognize the PRC in January 1950 – fourth after Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden – followed by formal establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1950. The Finland–China Friendship Society was founded in Helsinki in June 1951, with Sylvi Kekkonen, wife of then-prime minister, later-president Urho Kekkonen, among its founding members. Finland's unique geopolitical position also facilitated PRC's first bilateral trade treaty with a Western capitalist country – Finland.¹⁹

In conclusion, during a time when the West's perception of the PRC quickly soured due to its allyship with the Soviet bloc and involvement in the Korean War, ending any hopes of a nonconfrontational relationship between the PRC and the US, Finland was busy building its own bilateral relationship with its Eastern neighbor's newest fellow. This paved way for Finland and PRC's own bilateral exchanges that provided the Finnish press unique news events and eyewitnesses to utilize aside from reporting on the events regarding the superpowers of the Cold War. As I will later demonstrate in chapter 2, these Sino-Finnish exchanges steered the development of Finland's China discourse.

The function of this subchapter has been to briefly introduce the historical context of these two countries and the establishment of their bilateral relations. It is purposefully non-exhaustive as relevant historical details have been spared for the analytical chapters. While

¹⁷ Henrik Meinander, *A History of Finland* (London: Hurst Company, 2011), 215–217.

¹⁸ Timo Soikkanen et al., *Sylvin matkassa: yksityiset päiväkirjat Kiinasta* (Helsinki: Otava, 2020), 11–13.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 11–13.

this chapter has been but a brief overview of history, the next chapter on the methodology will dwell in-depth into the methodology and primary data of this thesis to fill in the needed outlines of this study and explore the question of how to combine discourse analytical methods with historical sources.

1.3 Methodology

This chapter will dive deeper into the methodology of this thesis. To summarize and therefore help the reader to orient themselves towards this chapter: critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the chosen methodology, and a hegemonizing strategy the most pivotal conceptual framework. Rhetoric and news discourse are also central concepts to this research, but a hegemonizing strategy will be the practical tool to extract analysis from the discursive practices and the rhetoric used in the press. As mentioned above, this thesis adopts a linguistically oriented approach to historical research and assumes the objective of encouraging more frequent utilization of linguistic approaches to study history. This thesis is, therefore, fundamentally methodologically oriented, and a more extensive discussion of said methodology is therefore warranted.

The objective of this methodology chapter is twofold. First, I will introduce the background of linguistic approaches and CDA particularly in the context of historical research. Second, I will discuss hegemonizing strategies in more detail.

First, let us briefly explain what we mean by “linguistic methods”, which CDA also falls under, and how these methods have emerged and taken root in historical research. The linguistic approaches became more significant in humanities and social sciences, including the study of history, after the linguistic turns²⁰ between 1960s and 1980s, but has nevertheless remained more marginal of a method in all historical research in comparison to other fields such as political science. Indeed, the linguistic breakthrough within Finnish history discipline only emerged in early 2000s. However, as Kenneth Partti states in their dissertation on linguistic turns in Finnish and Swedish history dissertations, linguistic approaches should be relevant to any field of historical study as it challenges us historians to analyze the political

²⁰ Partti talks about linguistic turns in plural rather than in singular due to the diversity in scholars who influenced the linguistic turns between 1960s and 1980s. Kenneth Partti, “Taking the Language of the Past Seriously: The Linguistic Turns in Finnish and Swedish History Dissertations, 1970–2010” (PhD diss., University of Jyväskylä, 2022), 12.

nature and historicity of language in its original context – to take the language of the past seriously. However, Partti notes that less than 10% of Finnish and Swedish history dissertations between 1970–2010 have included any reference to linguistic turns.²¹ Therefore, further promotion of linguistic methods in historical fields is warranted worldwide and specifically in the Finnish academic context.²²

Then how did these linguistic approaches challenge and develop – depending on the outlook – historical research? Since the 1960s, a handful of notable scholars, such as Michel Foucault, Reinhart Koselleck and Quentin Skinner, began rejecting the notion that language could be a neutral transmitter of historical knowledge or any knowledge for that matter. Therefore, the language of primary sources was now seen as a creator and constructor of the reality itself, rather than as a neutral medium of past realities.²³ Furthermore, scholars criticized the notion that the questions historians ask are strictly dictated by their sources, and promoted instead the centrality of a historian’s own ability to think – the capability of being able to argue based on one’s own thinking “what lines should we make history speak to us.”²⁴ However, to this day, focus on discourse and language have been perceived by some to threaten the institutional foundations of historical research, including historians’ ability to construct objective, all-embracing narratives of history.²⁵

How to respond to this threat? That is, what are historians ultimately supposed to do if the language of primary sources should not be viewed as a neutral transmitter of past knowledge? Christoph Reinfandt sees that historians survive the onslaught of this linguistic challenge because although the reality of the past remains unobtainable in its ultimate meaningfulness and totality, historians do not need to abandon the belief in historical truth as long as historians acknowledge that “interpretations are all we have.”²⁶ However, this thesis survives this onslaught with even more ease since what Reinfandt refers to is historical research that

²¹ The word reference is crucial here because Partti not only includes dissertations that are linguistically oriented but also the ones that only mention linguistic turns without applying a linguistic method in the thesis itself. The number of dissertations that include a consistent linguistic approach is most likely even smaller than 10%. Ibid, 21.

²² Ibid, 11–19, 62.

²³ Ibid, 11–13.

²⁴ Kari Palonen, *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 22–25.

²⁵ Christoph Reinfandt, “Reading texts after the linguistic turn: approaches from literary studies and their implications,” in *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann and Miriam Dobson (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 41–42.

²⁶ Ibid, 47–51.

seeks to claim something about the past based on archival evidence, whereas I am more interested in the past language – the act of reality-constructing itself – and how past events concerning China were constructed to Finnish readership, rather than making any new claims about historical events in China or Finland per se. Furthermore, I also adapt the notion that linguistic approaches are a means to develop historical research and approach said research with new perspectives, rather than threaten its meaningfulness.

Although it is vital to have this background of linguistic methods' impact on history as a discipline in mind to comprehend why I aim to promote these methods, it is even more important to discuss the chosen methodology itself – CDA, and what exactly do CDA scholars analyze. It is not a simple task to define CDA, as CDA is a rather heterogeneous framework, and is not even fixed by a set of methodological tools, and therefore it is sometimes challenging to find a definition that is all-encompassing.²⁷ For example, although CDA emerged from these linguistic turns and is defined by textual analysis, multimodal CDA which also pays attention to the visual, has been developed and implemented in this thesis (see chapter 2.1).²⁸ However, what unites all CDA-oriented research, and also separates it from descriptive discourse analysis, is its interest in broadening analysis from purely describing the discourse to the socio-political context of the discourse and exposing power structures constructed through the discourse.²⁹

Indeed, ideology is at the center of CDA – it is a methodology used to expose (re)production of ideology.³⁰ CDA is also interested in the ideological *consequences* of discourses – that is what versions of truth are being legitimized in primary sources.³¹ Like van Dijk writes: “[--] even if the listener or reader has understood perfectly well what we meant [--] this is half of the intent of communication. We also want him or her to accept what we say, that is, believe

²⁷ David Block, “Class and Class Warfare,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2018), 345–346.

²⁸ Jiayu Wang, “Criticising Images: Critical Discourse Analysis of Visual Semiosis in Picture News,” *Critical Arts* 28, no. 2 (2014).

²⁹ Peter Teo, “Racism in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reporting in Two Australian Newspapers,” *Discourse & Society* 11, no. 1 (2000), 12.

³⁰ Monika Bednarek and Helen Caple, “Why Do News Values Matter? Towards a New Methodological Framework for Analysing News Discourse in Critical Discourse Analysis and Beyond,” *Discourse & Society* 25, no. 2 (2014), 136.

³¹ Arja Jokinen, “Diskurssianalyysin kuvakulmat,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016); Arja Jokinen & Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

our assertion, perform the actions requested, and execute our commands.”³² Therefore, what is essential is the functions and power relations of the discourse, and what consequences we can speculate to occur when actors participate in the discourse. These functions can include justifying, making light of or excusing something or someone’s actions.³³ These power relations can be exposed by researching what is allowed to be said within the discourse; what is allowed to be said about the object of said discourse; who holds the power to speak; are speeches coming from other positions taken seriously in the analyzed material et cetera.³⁴ Indeed, power relations between competing discourses, or competing versions of truth, often warrant critical discourse scholars’ attention, and any speech acts possess the political capability to alter existing discursive power shares.³⁵ To once again offer a pre-taste and help contextualize power relations and discourse, we can see that *Työkansan Sanomat* did not take speeches coming from other positions seriously when it accused another newspaper *Ilta-Sanomat* for participating in a “holy war” against the PRC, and maintaining “a distant outpost for Chiang” in Finland.³⁶

Moving from CDA to the exact conduct of analysis in this CDA-oriented thesis, the objective of CDA research interested in hegemonized discourses is to study whether the primary sources include narratives of reality that supersede all other versions of truth, and how such hegemonized narratives are (or are attempted to be) produced.³⁷ Moreover, a hegemonizing strategy is a rhetorical device that critical discourse analysts are often interested in locating in different speech acts. These strategies, be it for example simplifying naturalization (e.g., expressing phenomena as naturally self-evident), tactical usage of passive (e.g., to obscure someone’s agency), extreme expressions (e.g., every time, never, completely etc.) overlexicalization (e.g., Stalin becomes “Stalin the savior of Chinese”), usage of authority voices, metaphors, consensus building (e.g., “everybody knows that this thing happened like this”), or numeral affirmation, intent to convince the reader or listener to form a specific view on an

³² Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 82.

³³ Arja Jokinen, “Diskurssianalyysin kuvakulmat,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

³⁴ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

³⁵ Kari Palonen, *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 58.

³⁶ Mutkan kautta suoraan [Straight ahead through a curve], TKS 27.1.1950.

³⁷ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

issue, or in our case the nation-object of China.³⁸ These linguistic conventions are the core focus of this thesis, and pinpointing their existence exposes in what instances the China discourse has been ideologically motivated. To tie with the general aim of CDA, detecting hegemonizing strategies expose the power relations of a discourse, and especially help us understand *how* different versions of truths are being legitimized.

Finnish discourse analysis scholars Arja Jokinen et al. are one of the few that speak of these strategies as hegemonizing strategies.³⁹ Due to my own familiarity with Jokinen et al.'s work, I have adapted the same name for this concept. However, it should be noted that CDA scholars speak of such hegemonizing strategies with different names – for instance, Teun A. van Dijk, a name that is familiar for anyone concerned with CDA and whose work is also consulted extensively in this thesis, calls the same rhetorical phenomena “persuasive features or tactics” in his book *News As Discourse* (1988), which is one of the most important methodological books for this thesis. “Legitimation strategies” is another name that has been used by CDA scholars.⁴⁰ However, I have decided to use the term “hegemonizing strategy” for it implies that *the aim* of said linguistic persuasion is to hegemonize a certain narrative within a discourse, and therefore I believe it encompasses the meaning of said strategies best.

Identifying different hegemonizing strategies in argumentation and rhetoric of media discourse will become known throughout the highlighted examples in the following analytical chapters. However, before we move on to this analysis, I will not only introduce my own primary sources, but also the adaptation of CDA and hegemonizing strategies to historical newspaper sources in general in the last chapter of this introduction.

³⁸ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016); Arja Jokinen, “Vakuuttelevan ja suostuttelevan retoriikan analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016); Peter Teo, “Racism in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reporting in Two Australian Newspapers,” *Discourse & Society* 11, no. 1 (2000). 18–21.

³⁹ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

⁴⁰ Steve Oswald, “It Is Easy to Miss Something You Are Not Looking For: A Pragmatic Account of Covert Communicative Influence for (Critical) Discourse Analysis,” in *Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. Christopher Hart and Piotr Cap (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 102.

1.4 Historical Journalism as Primary Data

Why apply CDA tools to historical newspapers? The answer is simple: newspapers and magazines are a very natural and fruitful data type for studies of argumentation and rhetoric.⁴¹ Them being historical does not alter this fact. Moreover, as Stephen Vella has noted, the critical analysis of newspapers, a sort of chronicle of contemporary events, reveals to us how these events were made aware to readers, and how societies have come to understand the world around them.⁴²

Although we cannot access individual journalists' intentions for their writing, approaching their writing as something that always possesses strategic ambitions is warranted for conducting critical discourse analysis.⁴³ Indeed, the explaining of events by journalists is hardly a quest of neutrality, but of constructing the reality: journalists have a chance to produce narratives (with hegemonizing strategies) by addressing why something has happened, what are the causal reasons that explain these events, why should readers care about this news and so forth. A news article or a story follows a certain structural organization in which rhetoric tactics can be embedded. There are slightly different views between newspaper discourse scholars how this structure or schemata of news is constructed,⁴⁴ but nevertheless they explain why news are usually constructed in certain patterns, and what functions headlines, evaluations, reactions/comments, consequences, background et cetera, are serving in newspapers. Unfortunately, we cannot access the *reception* of these news stories in readership directly, but we do have the *content* to work with⁴⁵ – the language in historical newspapers which allows us to gain insight how events far away in Asia were portrayed and explained to Finns, most of whom hardly had any other sources besides local newspapers and radio to rely on to learn about China, as television broadcasts only begun in

⁴¹ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, "Retorisuus ja responsiivisuus," in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

⁴² Stephen Vella, "Newspapers," in *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann and Miriam Dobson (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 217.

⁴³ Arja Jokinen, "Diskurssianalyysin kuvakulmat," in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016)

⁴⁴ See e.g., Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1998); Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

⁴⁵ Stephen Vella, "Newspapers," in *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann and Miriam Dobson (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 217–220.

Finland in 1955. Indeed, with news rhetoric, what is at stake is not the truth on China itself, but the *illusion* of what is true, which journalists aim to make readers embrace.⁴⁶

In other words, the journalists behind these China articles did not simply mirror the real-life events on paper objectively, but rather shaped the news and concomitantly the views of their readers. Journalists present, choose and frame information from specific viewpoints and sources, and neglect other news topics. They create stories. Indeed, Allan Bell, a prominent newspaper discourse scholar whose work I will also consult extensively in this thesis, notes that speaking of news stories rather than articles is more suitable when referring to the work of journalists, as a story includes a direction, a structure, and a viewpoint, which “an article” can lack.⁴⁷ However, I will be using the terms news story, news article, and news item, interchangeably.

Furthermore, the visual context also matters greatly, such as whether the news on China were printed as the main title on the frontpage or buried as a small clip on the last page, what is the graphic display like, what photos have they perhaps chosen, and what title have they given to the piece of news⁴⁸ – oftentimes *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* utilized the exact same article verbatim from outside sources, yet gave the articles distinctly different headlines, guiding the reader to interpret the text in different ways and emphasize different aspects of a news text (see chapter 3.1). A headline has intensive discursive power since they also function as summaries of the news content.⁴⁹ With all these visual cues in mind, if a scholar only has access to newspaper clippings or reformatted PDFs of the original printed articles, the quality of analysis suffers greatly. Therefore, it is essential to have access not only to the specific piece of news on China, but the whole publication in its original layout. I have accessed all three papers consulted as primary data in this study via the digital archive of the National Library of Finland, so I have had access to the original layouts.

A traditional focus-area for mass communication research specifically concerned with national images is how an object-nation, such as China, is presented in chosen mass

⁴⁶ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 86.

⁴⁷ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 147.

⁴⁸ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 225–227.

⁴⁹ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 53.

mediums.⁵⁰ When it comes to such research in discourses on China in Western newspaper coverage, using discourse analysis or other linguistic methods as the theoretical framework is not unheard of in previous research literature. Yan (1998), Tang (2021) and Hu (2024) are only a few scholars that have contributed to China-oriented analysis in Western newspaper media.⁵¹ Myriad others exist, although methodologies vary. However, there are significant gaps in this previous research corpus.

First, the existing English-written research has, quite naturally, concentrated on newspapers from English-speaking countries, such as the US and the UK. Therefore, the coverage on China in particularly Finnish newspapers is still, according to my literature review, untouched territory. Moreover, although Finland is usually viewed as part of the West, Finland also has its own unique circumstances affecting its news discourse. Besides filling the obvious research gap by incorporating newspapers from more countries to this largely Anglosphere-focused research topic, I argue that studying newspapers from less researched countries such as Finland also allows us to reveal to what extent the overseas news discourse on China has influenced the Finnish journalists, and, vice versa, in what aspects Finnish news coverage on China has been unique and individual from that of American, English or Soviet news discourse. Since this thesis does not consult non-Finnish newspapers as primary data, there are obvious barriers to how much this perspective can be explored, but constant references to sources from foreign newspapers and news agencies in *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi* allows constrained yet integral discussion of Finland's position in the world news discourse.

If the first research gap this thesis fills is the inclusion of Finnish newspaper data into the Anglosphere, the other research gap lays in incorporating discourse analysis as a methodology to *historical* newspapers. As seen in the examples mentioned above, most critical discourse analyses that utilize newspapers use contemporary papers. As already discussed above, critical discourse analysis and linguistic methods are marginalized in historical research. Discourse analysis – alongside other linguistic methods – in the discipline of history have been discussed already in detail in the previous chapter, but the still rather weak status of

⁵⁰ Wenjie Yan, "A Structural Analysis of the Changing Image of China in the New York Times from 1949 through 1988," *Quality & Quantity* 32, no. 1 (1998), 47.

⁵¹ Wenjie Yan, "A Structural Analysis of the Changing Image of China in the New York Times from 1949 through 1988," *Quality & Quantity* 32, no. 1 (1998); Liping Tang, "Transitive representations of China's image in the US mainstream newspapers: A corpus-based critical discourse analysis," *Journalism* (London, England) 22, no. 3 (2021); Xiaojing Hu, "China's Image in the GCC Mainstream English Newspapers: A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis," *Critical Arts* 37, no. 6 (2024).

discourse analysis as a historical methodology in particular, combined with the lack of research on China discourse in Finnish newspapers (historical or otherwise), leaves the author a natural research gap to fill. To my knowledge, besides the bachelor's thesis by the same author, the positioning towards China in Finnish historical newspapers is still uncovered.

As mentioned above, the selected newspapers to be analyzed here are *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat*. A brief introduction of these two papers is warranted before moving on to the analysis. *Uusi Suomi* was affiliated with the National Coalition party, and especially between 1946–1949 its China discourse was heavily influenced by Finnish and Western missionaries operating in China. The role of missionaries as sources of information in China decreased in the 1950–1953 period, but the publication's bourgeoisie and Christian value background combined with this history of allowing missionaries to explain events in China aids us to understand why its attitude towards communism in China remained quite negative, although the news rhetoric of *Uusi Suomi* is much less direct and confrontational in contrast to *Työkansan Sanomat*.

Literature published by Finnish missionaries can be speculated to have influenced greatly how the Finnish right positioned themselves towards communists and China turning red. A Finnish missionary E. A. Auno, who served at the oldest Finnish mission center in Jinshi, Hunan province, wrote a book on China published by the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission in 1930. In this book, Auno is concerned that the threat of communism, an ideology completely opposing to Christianity to him, is much greater in China than elsewhere since the Chinese are easily taken advantage of, and easily bring the “dictatorship of poverty” to extremes due to their superstition, jealousy, brutality, and criminal capability, and that without the Great Britain China would not have obtained “the already few bits of goodness it has.”⁵² Auno was not a journalist for *Uusi Suomi*. However, it is important to highlight the attitudes missionaries published on their positioning towards China to comprehend the over-arching context in which right-leaning papers openly upholding Christian values oriented themselves towards the spread of communism in China.

⁵² E. A. Auno, *Punainen hirmuvalta Kiinassa: verta, tulta ja raunioita* (Helsinki: Suomen lähetysseura, 1930), 6, 10, 47–49, 82.

The rhetoric expressed in Finnish Communist Party affiliated Työkansan Sanomat can be characterized as rather different in contrast to Uusi Suomi. Before 1956 when these two papers merged, Finnish far-left published two major newspapers, Työkansan Sanomat and Vapaa Sana. These two communist papers enjoyed similar sales figures, yet Vapaa Sana aimed to be less dogmatic and less loyal to communist party phraseology and speech patterns common in communist rhetoric, which were the exact aspects that Työkansan Sanomat had built its own success upon.⁵³ In other words, when comparing Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi, the former is clearly more open in its ideological alliances and therefore its hegemonizing strategies in news discourse differ from that of Uusi Suomi, which refrained from such direct political bias in its language.

Any discourse analyst who researches news struggles with the challenge of accessing news perception – that is firsthand data of how people have judged, interpreted, and absorbed the news they consume.⁵⁴ Moreover, traditionally, all research on news perception has focused on TV news, which are less complex than newspapers.⁵⁵ Furthermore, because this thesis is concerned with newspapers that are over 70 years old, any chance to access to how Finnish readers of Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi reacted to these news, is close to nil. Nevertheless, even though direct responses are unobtainable, critical reading of historical newspapers shines light to how the Finnish society came to perceive China via newspapers.

As mentioned in 1.1, around 1200 news items, articles, causeries, and editorials were collected for analysis. The majority is from Työkansan Sanomat because the paper included more news stories from China than Uusi Suomi did. These items were collected by using the keyword “China” in Finnish National Library’s digital archive search engine from the years 1950–1953. To maintain a scope that is feasible for a master’s thesis, I only included pieces where the main news topic is China, and excluded news where China is mentioned, but is not the main theme or actor. For instance, news pertaining to the Korean War have been included if China is mentioned in the news headline or has its own paragraph, but taking in all the news

⁵³ Pertti Hemánus et al., *Suomen lehdistön historia 3: Sanomalehdistö sodan murroksesta 1980-luvulle*. (Kuopio: Kustannuskiila, 1988), 120–121.

⁵⁴ Stephen Vella, “Newspapers,” in *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann and Miriam Dobson (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 219.

⁵⁵ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 140.

where China is mentioned even once would have multiplied the number of news items up to a scale that is not feasible for master's thesis.

In the following three analytical chapters, I will explore the positioning towards China as indicated in these items from the two newspapers through different discursive themes. The thematical disposition can be separated into 1) domestic China discourse, 2) China–Finland exchange, and 3) Cold War powers discourse. Evidently, all the 1200 pieces cannot be included, but the author's review has allowed the recognition of discourse patterns, and what themes have emerged in the discourse. Based on this review, the following thematical structure, as well as the news to be highlighted as examples, were drafted. However, it should be noted that discourse analysis is never mechanical logging of text – it is interpretation based on the researcher's own dialogue with the data. Similarly, discourse is the after-product of analysis, not something that exists in data independently.⁵⁶ Thus, what I have decided to highlight here is a manifestation of my review and interpretation – which begins with analysis of positioning vis-à-vis the domestic Chinese discourse.

⁵⁶ Arja Jokinen, "Diskurssianalyysin kuvakulmat," in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

2 New China Rises

Thousands of Chinese are fleeing to Hong Kong to escape New China's heavy taxation, forced loans and unemployment. Many of the refugees are business owners, while others are workers that have been left unemployed. – *Uusi Suomi*⁵⁷

Lan Tien [a 62-year-old railway engineer], tells us, that he has become physically stronger during the last few years. “[--] the rebirth of my own and nation and people, which gives personal hope, is better medicine than retiring [--] there is but one way to pay the debt: work harder and better.” – *Työkansan Sanomat*⁵⁸

Uusi Suomi remained unconvinced the CCP could win the Chinese Civil War until the Nationalists had been sent packing. Even when the new regime was declared on October 1st, 1949, Finnish right-leaning media believed the Chinese communist regime would be short-lived. After Mao's proclamation of the founding of the People's Republic, the Finnish communist press congratulated themselves not only for China turning red, but also for their better ability to predict world events compared to the bourgeoisie newspapers, all the while Uusi Suomi's journalists tried to make sense of how the war could have ended so differently from their own predictions.⁵⁹

But when PRC's first year in power began in 1950, the outcome of the Chinese Civil War could not be disputed in media any longer and answering who should govern China ceased to be a relevant question. Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist troops had been in exile in Formosa (Taiwan) for several months by then, and Finland had also formally recognized the PRC on January 13th, 1950. Therefore, the news content gradually shifted from war assessments to answer the question: what was it like to live in this New China? And what about the Chinese living now in exile in Formosa? In this chapter, I will discuss the China discourse regarding how the conditions of the Chinese were portrayed, particularly by focusing on the usage of images in discourse. I will predominantly focus on discourse

⁵⁷ ”Tuhansia kiinalaisia pakenee Hongkongiin uuden Kiinan raskaita veroja, pakkolainoja ja työttömyyttä. Useat pakolaisista ovat liikkeenomistajia, osan ollessa työttömiksi jääneitä työläisiä.” Tuhansia kiinalaisia pakenee Hongkongiin [Thousands of Chinese fleeing to Hong Kong], US 30.3.1950.

⁵⁸ “Lan Tien kertoo, että hän on viime vuosina tullut fyysillisesti vahvemmaksi. ”[--] oman maan ja kansan uudelleen syntyminen, joka antaa uutta henkilökohtaista toivoa, on parempi lääke kuin eläkkeelle meno [--] on vain yksi tapa maksaa tämä kiitollisuuden velka: työskennellä kovemmin ja paremmin.” Elämä alkaa 62-vuotiaana [Life begins at 62 years old], TKS 6.12.1953.

⁵⁹ Salla Kenttä, ”Kun kiina vaihtoi väriä: Asemoituminen kiinalaisia ja Kiinan sisällissotaa kohtaan suomalaisessa painetussa mediassa 1946–1949 [When China switched colors: Positioning towards Chinese and the Chinese Civil War in Finnish Printed Media 1946–1949] (Bachelor's Thesis, University of Turku, 2022).

regarding the ordinary Chinese, for 2.2 and 2.3 will take a closer look at descriptions of the political entities and leadership of both the CCP and the KMT.

2.1 The New Chinese and Photojournalism as Discourse

Between 1946–1949, the Chinese were rarely granted their own voice in Finnish news coverage. *Uusi Suomi* utilized Finnish and other western missionaries to gain insight into war-ridden conditions in China, and even *Työkansan Sanomat*, which often claimed to be the real advocator who spoke on behalf of the Chinese, barely included Chinese voices, and the Chinese that were cited were often unnamed. Photos were also extremely rare – Finnish readers were not only unable to hear from Chinese, but also to see the Chinese.⁶⁰

One of the most eye-catching differences when comparing the China news coverage between 1946–1949 and 1950–1953 was that the usage of pictures increased. Moreover, often there would be no news story to accompany the picture or indication which source the photo was taken from – only a brief caption. Van Dijk has argued that although people remember domestic news better than international ones, the frequent occurrence of pictures allows the readership to recall foreign news in significantly better detail.⁶¹ Although CDA is traditionally confined to verbal text, and linguistic approaches to discourse are more standardized than research of the visual,⁶² multimodal CDA, which also takes photographic discourse into account, has been explored and developed.⁶³ Therefore, although CDA as a method is more characterized by text, the pivotal role of photos for foreign news recall supports my standpoint that the increased usage of China photos deserves close attention.

Työkansan Sanomat's image content vis-à-vis China was found to be the most extensive out of the two newspapers. Based on these photos' content and discursive function, I have divided these photos in *Työkansan Sanomat* into two groups: wounded soldiers and smiling citizens. It should be noted that besides these images of people, *Työkansan Sanomat* also included a plethora of photos of different PRC buildings, Chinese cities, and countryside landscapes. However, I was particularly drawn to these images depicting people.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 154.

⁶² Nick Malherbe et al., "Visually Negotiating Hegemonic Discourse through Photovoice: Understanding Youth Representations of Safety," *Discourse & Society* 27, no. 6 (2016), 591.

⁶³ See e.g., Jiayu Wang, "Criticising Images: Critical Discourse Analysis of Visual Semiosis in Picture News," *Critical Arts* 28, no. 2 (2014).

First, by wounded soldiers I refer to the pictures of wounded Chinese and North Korean soldiers from the battlefield in Korea. These photos were tied to the communist newspaper's anti-American discourse. Showing the wounded Chinese People's Volunteers (CPVs) was a hegemonizing strategy for the Finnish communists to create an image of the US soldiers as cruel, evil, and unnecessarily violent towards their POWs. This violence was further emphasized by showing the other sign of the coin – UN soldiers that were smiling and being treated humanely by their Chinese and North Korean captors. See for instance the photo of American POWs smiling together by a dinner table (figure 1) with a caption assuring that these UN soldiers “seem healthy and, based on their facial expressions, are not harboring any hateful feelings towards their guards.”⁶⁴ Compare this to the second photo showing a Chinese soldier with an angry facial expression and pointing at a scar on his arm (figure 2). The caption explains that the American guards are inflicting these wounds on their POWs in Korea to complicate any potential escape attempts, which is a “descriptive sample of the American invaders' cruelty.”⁶⁵



Figure 1 KIINALAISET vapaaehtoiset ja pohjoiskorealaiset kohtelivat 'YKn joukkoihin' kuuluvia sotavankeja hyvin ja humanisesti koko näiden vankeusajan. [CHINESE volunteers and North Koreans treated the POWs that belong to "UN forces" well and humanely throughout their imprisonment] TKS 2.9.1953.

⁶⁴ TKS 2.9.1953.

⁶⁵ TKS 5.7.1953.




Figure 2 Amerikkalaisesta sotavankileiristä pohjois-Koreaan palautettu kiinalainen vapaaehtoinen näyttää käsivartensa arpea. [A Chinese volunteer who was returned from an American prison camp to North Korea showing a scar on his arm] TKS 5.7.1953.

To contrast these disaster images of Chinese soldiers far away from their homes, photos of happily smiling Chinese living in New China served a different discursive function: to help the Finnish communists justify their position that people who live in communist regimes are happy people. *Työkansan Sanomat* published dozens of these photos between 1950–1953.⁶⁶ On rare occasions when the person in an image was not shown smiling, they were shown hard at work with captions assuring the reader that the person being photographed feels inspired, happy and grateful to live in the PRC. Besides workers, photos of children were frequently

⁶⁶ Although most of these photos do not indicate where they had been taken from, some of these photos were actually taken by Finns: see e.g., the smiling photos taken by the communist radio broadcaster Unto Miettinen during his travels in the PRC in 1950. Unto Miettinen, *Päivännousun maa: Kiina eilen, tänään ja huomenna* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1951). The rest are likely to have been taken from Soviet sources like TASS and Pravda, which likely obtained the photos from PRC's propaganda institutions like The China Information Bureau (CIB).

used as an emotional appeal strategy: see the photo of two smiling kids captioned “YOUNG CHINA SMILES” (figure 4) with capital letters.

Evidently, just like Työkansan Sanomat’s China discourse did not allow the inclusion of any news where citizens of New China had something negative to say – especially of Stalin or of the USSR⁶⁷ (see chapter 4.1) – photos of sad, frustrated, angry or even neutral people were also never shown. In other words, now that the Chinese population was ideologically aligned with communism, they were granted a new high degree of visibility – but only if their photos aligned the Finnish communist press’ pro-communist rhetoric – which was first and foremost loyal to Moscow, not Beijing.



Figure 3 Nykypäivän Kiina on kokenut valtavan nousukauden kaikilla aloilla, myös maataloudessa. [Contemporary China has experienced a huge takeoff in all industries, including agriculture] TKS 11.8.1950

⁶⁷ See e.g., Suuria mielenosoituksia Tshungkingissa eilen [Big protests in Tshungking yesterday], US 23.2.1946.



Figure 4 NUORI KIINA HYMYILEE. [YOUNG CHINA SMILES] TKS 29.7.1951.



Figure 5 Kiina saa tänä vuonna todellisen ennätys sadon. [China achieves a real record-breaking harvest this year] TKS 30.7.1953.



Figure 6 KUN KANSA OTTI VALLAN. [WHEN THE PEOPLE TOOK POWER] TKS 29.1.1953.

It is pivotal to news discourse who and what is allowed to be seen, that is whose existence the reader is being reminded of. An image makes events and people feel more real than mere text, which is why Työkansan Sanomat would not include a single photo of Chiang Kai-shek or any other exiled Chinese in Formosa. The communist paper wrote dozens of articles where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang or Formosa are discussed yet never accompanied by photographs. I argue this is because the People's Republic was at an early stage of establishing its rule in the mainland, and with Chiang's government still expressing that the Civil War was still on-going and their intent to return to mainland, it was in Työkansan Sanomat's best interest to also hegemonize the rightful rule of the CCP by beginning to obscure the existence of any counterforce.

Indeed, the reader could only find photo evidence of the existence of Chiang and the Nationalists in other more right-leaning papers like Uusi Suomi. Uusi Suomi would include a couple photos taken from Formosa between 1950–1953 – Chiang and his wife greeting with General MacArthur and other American visitors; Chiang smiling and waving; Nationalist

soldiers staring at the camera – plenty of evidence to remind the reader that an opposing force was still alive and kicking across the Taiwan Strait.⁶⁸

Uusi Suomi's photos are a sharp contrast to Työkansan Sanomat's total lack of such photos. Uusi Suomi's pictures are also interesting for they usually show the masses of Kuomintang soldiers rather than individual people, directing the reader's attention to the power of Chiang's existing armies, whereas Työkansan Sanomat's photos from the PRC are always of individuals. Indeed, while Uusi Suomi subtly suggested through its photos that a Chinese force that might one day reclaim the mainland still existed, the communist narrative positioned themselves – and the PRC – as representing “the peaceful people.”⁶⁹ In that context, a propaganda image of a smiling worker aligned more closely with the official discourse than one showing large numbers of People's Liberation Army's (PLA) soldiers.

*Uusi Suomi's photos from Formosa*⁷⁰



Figure 7 Formosan armeijan sotilaita. [Soldiers of Formosa's army] US 14.8.1950.

⁶⁸ US 11.8.1950; 14.8.1950; 9.11.1951; 23.10.1952.

⁶⁹ Rauhanviesti eteenpäin [A message of peace sent forward], TKS 21.2.1950; Tshou En-Lai korostaa Neuvostoliiton ja Kiinan liiton merkitystä rauhan turvaajana [Tshou En-Lai highlights the significance of the alliance between Soviet Union and China to maintain peace], TKS 31.12.1952.

⁷⁰ US 14.8.1950; 20.2.1953.



Figure 8 Kansalliskiinalaista ratsuväkeä paraatissa Formosassa. [Nationalist Chinese cavalries in a parade in Formosa] US 20.2.1953.

One discursive contest between *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* that extended to photo discourse was whether the people of New China were starving, or enjoying the fruits of rapid development. The topic of austerity was portrayed in highly contradictory ways in both the textual and visual discourse of *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* (See also table 1. below). Note the following two photos which were both published on each paper's first page, both on January 17th, 1953. Figure 9 shows *Työkansan Sanomat*'s picture of an urban train station in Dalian, and figure 10 is *Uusi Suomi*'s image of a row of trees.⁷¹ The photo of trees cannot be clearly placed to one country, but the caption explains that the photo was taken in China where "hungry Chinese peasants have carved the bark off these trees [to eat]."



Figure 9 Rautatieasema Dairenissa Kiinan kansantasavallassa. [A railway station in Dairen, the People's Republic of China] TKS 17.1.1953.

⁷¹ TKS 17.1.1953; US 17.1.1953.




Figure 10 Kun peltomaan kasvovoima ehtyy, on pakko käyttää ravinnoksi puiden kaarnaa. [When the growth power of arable land dries up, tree bark needs to be used for nutrition] US 17.1.1953.

As the saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words. Yet, it is perhaps more accurate to say that both the verbal and the visual discourse can disseminate the same message, but they do that in their own way.⁷² Nevertheless, it makes sense when we speculate over news reception to assume that Finns who read these newspapers might not have always read the China news in detail, but even then, they were likely to glance at these photos. One paper builds a mental picture of the New China with grand new infrastructure, the other shows plain peeled trees. Although the rest of this thesis will focus on the textual news articles, I want to first point out this visual disparity between the two newspapers, and how differently the conditions of the people living in the PRC were portrayed.

Moving to CDA's home turf of textual discourse, let us examine this example of famine news as one discursive discrepancy between *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi*. In March 1950, the threat of severe famine caused by environmental challenges and the loss of farmers in the Civil War broke the news. *Uusi Suomi* published several news stories on this famine news, usually on the front page. Besides a few articles claiming that news on the famine were propagandist and untrue, *Työkansan Sanomat* usually opted to instead publish stories on positive development in people's lives. For clearer demonstration on how differently the

⁷² Nick Malherbe et al., "Visually Negotiating Hegemonic Discourse through Photovoice: Understanding Youth Representations of Safety," *Discourse & Society* 27, no. 6 (2016), 591.

conditions of the Chinese population were depicted in the two papers, see the following table of news titles and leads in the two newspapers.

Table 1.

Date	Työkansan Sanomat	Uusi Suomi
4.3.1950	<i>“Agricultural production has increased in China”</i>	<i>“Famine in Shanghai – relatives are being sold”</i>
19.3.1950 & 20.3.1950	<i>“China’s food supply maintenance”</i>	<i>“Massive famine in Northern China – millions of people facing the threat of dying”</i>
21.3.1950 & 22.3.1950	<i>“Construction of New China as the basis in the program of the country’s trade unions”</i>	<i>“Grass and clay consumed by millions in the famine-ridden areas of Northern China”</i>
23.3.1950	<i>“Industry and agriculture growing rapidly in liberated China”</i>	<i>“China’s famine – attempts to import rice from Siam”</i>
14.4.1950	<i>“Production of grain increasing in China”</i>	<i>“10 million people hungry in China”</i>

As this table demonstrates, Työkansan Sanomat applied an omitting strategy when it came to famine news. The paper rarely acknowledged that other newspapers were publishing news about hungry Chinese and instead defended their position by hegemonizing an opposing discourse of China as a prosperous and abundant nation. Työkansan Sanomat would only switch its omitting strategy to a more aggressive rhetoric where it directly spoke to those “spreading famine allegations” when an elite enough eyewitness was available to counter this famine discourse.

This rare occurrence took place in June 1953, when the Finnish communist and Työkansan Sanomat’s editor-in-chief Mauri Ryömä was travelling in the PRC alongside Sylvi Kekkonen’s diplomatic delegation. In April 1953, Uusi Suomi had featured article in its front page titled “FAMINE in Southwestern China”, with the word famine capitalized. The article informed several Chinese to have deceased after eating inedible plants to feed and some having committed suicide.⁷³ Työkansan Sanomat did not address this news when it originally surfaced in April, but once Ryömä had travelled to China, an item titled *“The Chinese laugh*

⁷³ NÄLÄNHÄTÄ Lounais-Kiinassa [FAMINE in Southwestern China], US 2.4.1953

at *bourgeoisie news agencies' stories about "China's famine"* appeared. In this item Ryömä writes:

The people in Beijing were amused to receive the news spread by some bourgeoisie news agencies – apparently published also by some Finnish newspapers – that there is supposedly a famine occurring in China. “Even horses are laughing at those famine stories”, said one Beijinger when I discussed this with him. And a foreigner who moves around Beijing can easily be assured that there is no famine. Those estimated 700 000—800 000 people who participated in Beijing’s Mayday parade could not have jumped and waved happily for hours had they been famished.⁷⁴

Ryömä’s article is an interesting case because it is applying several different discourse hegemonizing strategies at once. First, although addressing the famine, it is still applying an omitting strategy – the news which *Uusi Suomi* communicated were not describing conditions in the capital city of Beijing, but in the Southwestern parts of China. Second, both the quote from an anonymous Beijinger about laughing horses and Ryömä’s own observations from the Mayday parade work as an eyewitness strategy. As eyewitnesses they are also appealing to emotions by ridiculing those who would believe the news stories about a famine.

Third, Ryömä’s usage of the anonymous Beijinger’s quote is also a hegemonizing strategy – although direct quotes are valued higher than indirect speech, journalists rarely present quotes verbatim like this, and instead turn them into indirect speech, allowing them to be in control of the story. Allan Bell notes that the more elite the speaker, the more likely their quotes are included verbatim.⁷⁵ Van Dijk adds that quotations are used to protect the journalist from libel accusations.⁷⁶ However, an anonymous Beijinger is hardly an elite authority if not by nationality only, nor is *Työkansan Sanomat* usually worried of being accused of lying. Instead, Ryömä has deviated from turning this quote into indirect speech because it fits so

⁷⁴ “Pekingin väestön keskuudessa on otettu vastaan hilpeydellä eräiden porvarillisten tietotoimistojen väittämiä – kuuleman mukaan myös joissakin suomalaisissa lehdissä julkaistu – tieto siitä, että Kiinassa olisi nälänhätä. ”Tuollaiselle nälkäjutulle hevosetkin täällä nauravat”, sanoi eräs pekingiläinen, kun keskustelin hänen kanssaan asiasta. Ja ulkomaalainen, joka liikkuu Pekingissä, voi helposti vakuuttua siitä, että täällä ei ole nälänhätää. Ne 700 000–800 000 ihmistä, jotka arviolta olivat mukana Pekingin vappukulkueessa, eivät olisi voineet tuntikaupalla iloisesti hyppiä ja huiskutella, jos olisivat olleet nälissään.” Kiinalaiset nauravat porvarillisten tietotoimistojen jutulle ”Kiinan nälänhädästä” [The Chinese laugh at bourgeoisie news agencies’ stories about “China’s famine”], TKS 10.5.1953.

⁷⁵ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 205–209.

⁷⁶ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 87.

seamlessly into Työkansan Sanomat's usual aggressive rhetoric of ridicule and humor to attack opponents.⁷⁷

As noted by van Dijk, news stories tend to be consistent with existing opinions, attitudes, values and norms of journalists and their readership. Such news is not only easier for readers to understand but also accept as true. Yet there is always news that is about events, nations and people that do not comply with our pre-existing attitudes. But these news items are commonly discarded by the press.⁷⁸

However, Työkansan Sanomat cannot always resort to discarding such news. The newspaper is very adamant on winning the discourse war on China, hence its sensitive to what China-related news are picked by other newspapers as well. This sensitivity sometimes materializes in accusing papers like Uusi Suomi of spreading lies, but also, as is the case with this famine news, in vigorously painting a completely opposing discourse on the conditions of the Chinese by redirecting readers' focus to the country's economic development.⁷⁹

I also argue that for Uusi Suomi, famine news from China were frequently featured on the front page because it fit their existing situational image of China as disaster-ridden and underdeveloped. This famine image that clearly affected Uusi Suomi was, however, more widespread in the West and had its roots in the Interwar period when China was commonly characterized as "the land of famine."⁸⁰ Further, this famine narrative simultaneously painted Uusi Suomi's ideological villain, communists, in bad light: potential news stories about happy PRC citizens did not fit Uusi Suomi's existing attitudes. Moreover, disasters serve better as news as they provide readers with a simulation of an incident that could also disrupt *their* lives,⁸¹ thus the famine news also offered Uusi Suomi a rhetoric tool to implicitly warn against communists: A Chinese peasant carving a tree could be followed by a hungry Finn turning to wood for food should Finland turn red too. Indeed, the two newspapers' China discourse was not only about addressing whether the citizens of China were hungry or happy

⁷⁷ Rosvohyökkäys [bandit attack], TKS 1.7.1950; Kuomintangin naurettava veto [Kuomintang's ridiculous stunt], TKS 14.7.1950.

⁷⁸ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 118–123.

⁷⁹ Kiinassa lisätään maataloustuotantoa [Agricultural production increased in China], TKS 4.3.1950; Teollisuus ja maatalous kohoavat nopeasti vapaassa Kiinassa [Industry and agriculture increasing fast in free China], TKS 23.3.1950; Kiina kykenee jo lisäämään tuotantoa [China already able to increase production], TKS 26.1.1951.

⁸⁰ See e.g., Walter H. Mallory, *China: Land of Famine*. (New York: The American Geographical Society, 1926).

⁸¹ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 123.

– and which China’s people even existed. It was also intricately linked with the question: are the (Chinese) communists devils or heroes?

2.2 Chairman Mao and Communist Discourse

In the fashion of international communist press, Työkansan Sanomat also caught the Mao fever. Curiously, sense of humor became a new way how Työkansan Sanomat began to develop a positive image of the CCP and PRC leader Mao Zedong for Finnish readership. Indeed, one discursive hegemonizing strategy often used in press rhetoric is appealing to readers’ emotions. By providing information embedded with language that evokes strong emotions in the reader, the overall information of the article is then better represented, and the reader also later recalls the information from the article better. This appeal to emotions in ideological news rhetoric is often solely discussed as appeal to negative emotions in readers, such as outrage over conflicts, disaster, and crime.⁸² However, I would argue that also the aim of evoking positive emotions, such as amusement or entertainment, could be included in the hegemonizing strategy category of emotional appeal.

In fact, Mao was by no means described as an overtly serious man in Työkansan Sanomat. Quite the opposite, commentary on Mao’s witty personality, skills in sarcasm and sense of humor frequently surfaced: in one article about a Soviet author’s visit to the PRC, the author described how Mao allegedly commented on PLA’s heavy armament with US-originated, Kuomintang weapons with “eloquent words filled with calm irony:” “Washington is our armory, and Tshiangkai-shek [*sic*] is the head of our [weapon] transportation department.”⁸³ Even more revealing is the causerie written by the Finnish communist politician and author Mauritz Rosenberg⁸⁴ headlined *Mao Tse-tung has a sense of humor*, where Rosenberg is quoting and commenting on the Italian communist journalist Velio Spano’s report on his visit to Beijing and his interview of Mao Zedong. The report includes four quotations of Mao’s humorous remarks, which had apparently been met with laughter from the audience. One of Mao’s comments to Spano read

⁸² Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 84, 123, 159.

⁸³ Konstantin Simonov in kuvaus Kiinan kansantasavallan julkistamispäivältä [Konstantin Simonov’s depiction from PRC’s declaration day], TKS 16.1.1950.

⁸⁴ Mauritz Rosenberg wrote these causeries under a penname “Pentti Pouttu.” See e.g., Mauritz Rosenberg ollut yritteliäs, *Sosialisti* 13.2.1930.

Have you got wild bees in Italy? In Asia there are almost a billion [bees] and if they are attacked, they all turn against the assailant and sting him. And worker and peasant bees sting harder than bourgeois bees.⁸⁵

The causerie concludes by celebrating, in a Finnish wordplay, “a sense of humor that can conquer.”⁸⁶ Indeed, humor is commonly used to validate dominant views on political topics.⁸⁷ I connect this phenomenon of building up a picture of Mao as a “man of good humor” to what van Dijk describes as the strategy of evoking emotions, and concomitantly I argue that humor also belongs within the realms of discourse hegemonizing strategies. However, it is interesting that Mao’s capability as a witty orator was utilized as a rhetoric strategy, considering that Mao has been described by historians to not have been the best speaker, not the least due to his stark Hunan dialect.⁸⁸

Beyond wittiness, another attribute given to Mao was the image of a leader who is shy, from a humble background, and highly aware of the size of the responsibility he carries. On another piece *Työkansan Sanomat* published, Velio Spano writes how Mao’s voice sounded like singing as it reached people’s emotions, but at the same time he “had never encountered such shyness. It is as if he [Mao] is a bit afraid of the fact that he has conquered such a high place in the whole humanity.”⁸⁹ Further, another news item depicting Wang Qishan’s visit to Mao’s home village, the Finnish translation of Wang’s describes “the room in which Mao Tse-tung has lived, was dark and small. Here he was reading till late at night in the dim light of a kerosene lamp, so his father would not notice the light and intervene with his studies.”⁹⁰ Indeed, Mao’s acuity and appeal for leadership was partially built on his sympathetic ordinariness and youth as a common peasant.⁹¹ Even the last photo the communist paper included of China between 1950–1953 was an image of Mao with a gentle, smiling

⁸⁵ “Onko myös Italiassa villimehiläisiä? Aasiassa on niitä lähes miljardi, ja jos hyökkää niiden kimppuun, kääntyvät ne kaikki hyökkääjää vastaan ja pistävät häntä. Ja työläis- ja talonpoikaismehiläiset pistävät kipeämmin kuin porvarilliset mehiläiset.” Mao Tse-tung on huumorintajuinen, TKS 5.2.1950.

⁸⁶ “Eläköön siis valloittava huumori! Eläköön, kauan eläköön valloittava huumorintaju!” Ibid.

⁸⁷ Villy Tsakona and Diana Elena Popa, *Studies in Political Humour in between Political Critique and Public Entertainment* (Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub., 2011), 2.

⁸⁸ Lucien Bianco and Krystyna Horko, *Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018), 294.

⁸⁹ Tämä on Kiinan johtaja – Toveri Maotse-tung [This is China’s leader – Comrade Maotse-tung], TKS 23.6.1950.

⁹⁰ Käynti Mao Tse-tungin kotikylässä [Visit in Mao Tse-tung’s home village], TKS 29.9.1951.

⁹¹ Arif Dirlik, “Mao Zedong: Charismatic Leadership and the Contradictions of Socialist Revolution,” in *Charismatic Leadership and Social Movements: The Revolutionary Power of Ordinary Men and Women*, ed. Jan Willem Stutje (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 126–127.

expression.⁹² However, these images of Mao as a humble peasant with a modest background were part of a wider effort of creating a personality cult of Mao in the PRC and relied heavily on fallacious and exaggerated descriptions of his early years.⁹³

If Mao was a humble, sympathetic and witty character in Työkansan Sanomat, his communist forces were, paradoxically, described as victorious in war but never violent. Aggressive was an over-lexicalization preserved for descriptions of Americans and could not extend to Chinese.⁹⁴ Negative signifiers, such as aggressive or violent, are often attached to the out-group, and positive implications, such as tough or strong, are attributed to the in-group in press.⁹⁵

Työkansan Sanomat implemented several hegemonizing strategies to ensure consistency with this ideology. To show how strong the Chinese communists were, a quantification strategy was implemented by keeping readers up to date on American casualty numbers in the Korean War. Only publishing numbers and congratulating Chinese soldiers' successes in Korea obfuscates the violence that preceded those casualty and success stories.⁹⁶

Agentless sentence structure is more common when we-group's violent act is discussed,⁹⁷ which explains why Työkansan Sanomat tends to obscure the agency of PLA soldiers. Take the following news title "*An American plane that flew over China crashed.*"⁹⁸ Besides bypassing *who* caused the plane to crash, it also cuts most of the original news dispatch out. Contrast that with Uusi Suomi's significantly longer news item "*A flying battleship destroyed by Chinese anti-aircraft fire.*"⁹⁹ Further, Uusi Suomi included the *Xinhua* (新华) news dispatch that out of the 14 soldiers who evacuated the plane, 11 were captured by Chinese and 3 died when attempting to evacuate. Työkansan Sanomat single-sentence news vaguely reads "most of the crew was captured"¹⁰⁰ but leaves out specific numbers or any mention of the

⁹² Kiinan kansan vapaustaistelun johtaja, marxilainen filosofi Mao Tse-tung 60-vuotias [The leader of Chinese people's fight for freedom, Marxist philosopher Mao-tsetung 60 years old], TKS 24.12.1953.

⁹³ Lee Feigon, *Mao: A Reinterpretation* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 13–14.

⁹⁴ Amerikkalaiset loukkaavat häikäilemättömästi Kiinan rajoja [Americans ruthlessly violate China's borders], TKS 26.1.1952; Amerikkalaiset uhkaavat Kiinaa [Americans threatening China], TKS 5.9.1950.

⁹⁵ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 71, 82.

⁹⁶ 730,000 amerikkalaista kaatunut Koreassa [730,000 American casualties in Korea], TKS 3.1.1953.

⁹⁷ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 81.

⁹⁸ Kiinan ylle lentänyt jenkkipone putosi [An American plane that flew over China crashed], TKS 23.1.1953.

⁹⁹ Lentävä taistelulaiva tuhoutunut kiinalaisten it-tulessa [A flying battleship destroyed by Chinese anti-aircraft fire], US 23.1.1953

¹⁰⁰ Kiinan ylle lentänyt jenkkipone putosi [An American plane that flew over China crashed], TKS 23.1.1953.

three casualties. In similar fashion, Työkansan Sanomat also ignored news reports of communists' attacks on Western ships,¹⁰¹ as well as Chinese Volunteer Army soldiers' military actions in Korea.¹⁰² This is because the positive *us* and negative *them* strategy works only as long as the illegitimacy of a such simplifying good–bad divide is disguised and the evidence that could undermine the truthfulness of this divide goes unnoticed by readers.¹⁰³

Another point of divergence for descriptions of Chinese communists manifested in the news concerning the occupation efforts of Tibet starting in January 1950. Työkansan Sanomat aligned its rhetoric with the CCP by justifying CCP's claim on Tibet – an area Mao told Peng Dehuai on 2 January 1950 must be occupied and reformed into the PRC for Tibet's internationally crucial status.¹⁰⁴ Työkansan Sanomat used the same justification strategy as the CCP used: the need to liberate Tibet from foreign imperialists. This claim was not necessarily intentionally fallacious, for Tibetologist Sam van Schaik has argued Chinese communists genuinely believed Tibet's independent attitude vis-à-vis China was caused by foreigners at that time.¹⁰⁵

Further, Työkansan Sanomat justified the takeover of Tibet by how peacefully it was executed. However, although most of the Tibetan government accepted the May 1951 seventeen-point agreement between the PRC and Tibet, the takeover of Tibet had not been executed without military clashes between the PLA and Tibet's army as Työkansan Sanomat would like its readership to believe. Työkansan Sanomat also falsely claimed Tibetans' acceptance for the agreement stemmed from Tibetan people's sincere wish to be reunited with the Chinese, rather than their realized isolation after unsuccessful attempts to reach out for international aid against the communists. Indeed, when Uusi Suomi reported on Tibet's plea to the UN for help on November 4th, 1950, Työkansan Sanomat did not mention it.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Norjalaista laivaa tulitettu Kiinan vesillä [A Norwegian ship fired at China's waters], US 9.8.1950.

¹⁰² Tuhansia tuleen heittää Kiina Koreassa [China throws thousands to fire in Korea], US 10.7.1953.

¹⁰³ Steve Oswald, "It Is Easy to Miss Something You Are Not Looking For: A Pragmatic Account of Covert Communicative Influence for (Critical) Discourse Analysis," in *Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. Christopher Hart and Piotr Cap (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 106–107.

¹⁰⁴ Jianglin Li and Dalai Lama, *When the Iron Bird Flies: China's Secret War in Tibet* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2022), 66.

¹⁰⁵ Sam van Schaik, *Tibet: A History* (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2011), 210.

¹⁰⁶ Tiibetin valitus saapunut TNL:lle [Tibet's complaint arrived to UNSC], US 14.11.1950.

Uusi Suomi had no ideological issue with pointing out altercations between Tibet and the PRC – the frequent coverage of Tibet on the front page could be read as ideological convergence with that of the US discourse on Tibet, in which communists categorically could never liberate anyone and occupation of Tibet was a forceful act akin to war rather than a peaceful or diplomatic process. Uusi Suomi’s lexical choices denoted communists takeover of Tibet as an aggressive act. Table 2. shows both lexical and emphasis variations between Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi news titles.

Table 2. *Emphasis by author.*

Date	Työkansan Sanomat	Uusi Suomi
2.6.1950	Tibet <u>looks</u> for peace	Tibet <u>submits</u> to China’s power
27.10.1950 & 29.10.1950	An artificial border is removed between Tibetan and Chinese people	Tibet must be left alone – India and England’s warning
31.10.1950 & 1.11.1950	PLA <u>advances fast</u> in Tibet	50 000 communists <u>attacking</u> with two salients in Tibet
5.5.1951 & 8.5.1951	Construction of new Tibet has begun	Disturbances in Lhasa – “Chinese must be driven away”

This rhetoric where communists are repeatedly discussed as an attacker in Tibet meant that Työkansan Sanomat needed to use both aggressive and defensive rhetoric. In defensive rhetoric, the newspaper aims to hegemonize its own discursive position to the degree where it cannot be injured by opposition. An aggressive rhetoric attacks opposing arguments.¹⁰⁷ In the same month Uusi Suomi reported Tibet had filed its plea for UN to stop the communists’ attack and disclosed how the CCP was only willing to accept “perfect submission from Tibet”,¹⁰⁸ Työkansan Sanomat attacked right-wing media’s Tibet discourse and used Tibet’s “backwardness” and “feudalism” as a justification for why Tibet ought to be liberated.

¹⁰⁷ Arja Jokinen, ”Vakuuttelevan ja suostuttelevan retoriikan analysoiminen”, in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

¹⁰⁸ Intia tarjoaa välitystään Tiibetin selkkauksen selvittämiseksi [India offers to mediate to solve the Tibet conflict], US 2.11.1950.

An almost forgotten corner of the world, a backward mountain plateau – Tibet has lately been dragged to the spotlight of world politics. Chinese people’s liberation army’s arrival to Tibet has risen “a storm in a teacup” in bourgeoisie press. Western news dispatches convey an image as if China has launched an attack on a nation that is external [of China]. To remove this smoke screen and to obtain the correct picture on what is happening in Tibet, we report on Tibet’s life and the historical background of current events with a couple of facts. [--] the nation’s cultural and economic backwardness is due to medieval and feudal lifestyle and the prolonged oppression by foreign imperialists.¹⁰⁹

As already stated above, whether something is considered newsworthy by the press is also related to the consonance of the story, meaning that the news’ compatibility with preconceptions about the social group.¹¹⁰ China turning red became cemented as the indisputable reality between 1950–1953, thus disproving the legitimacy of communist rule in China was not considered worthwhile for bourgeoisie press. For instance, both *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* acknowledged PRC’s legitimate right to participate in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics.¹¹¹ More obvious anti-communist discourse continued in news coverage of other conflicts like Korea where the outcomes of war with communists was not yet clear.¹¹² But being a bourgeoisie paper, *Uusi Suomi*’s presupposition of Chinese as famished was as prevalent as its presupposition of communists as violent, hence the news titles “mass executions in China during Easter”,¹¹³ “Beijing government accused of killing 15 million people”,¹¹⁴ and “285 people executed in China”¹¹⁵ frequently broke the news threshold.

¹⁰⁹ ”Miltei unohdettu maailmankolkka, takapajuinen vuoristoylänkö – Tiibet on viime aikoina joutunut maailmanpolitiikan valokeilaan. Kiinan kansan vapauttaja-armeijan joukko-osastojen saapuminen Tiibettiin on porvarillisen lehdistön palstoilla nostattanut ”myrskyn vesilasissa”. Länsivaltain uutistoimistojen tiedotuksissa annetaan suurelle yleisölle sellainen kuva, kuin Kiina olisi muka ryhtynyt hyökkäykseen sille ulkopuolista kansakuntaa vastaan. Tämän sumuverhon hälventämiseksi ja oikean kuvan saamiseksi siitä, mitä Tiibetissä tapahtuu, selostamme muutamain asiatiedoin Tiibetin elämää ja sen nykytapahtumien historiikkia. [--] maan taloudellinen ja kulttuurinen takapajuisuus on seurausta keskiaikais-feodaalisen elämäntavan herruudesta ja ulkomaisen imperialismien pitkäaikaisesta sorrosta.” Tiibet – osa Kiinan valtakuntaa [Tibet – part of the Chinese empire], TKS 9.11.1950.

¹¹⁰ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 156–157.

¹¹¹ Miksi Kiinan olympiakutsu lähetettiin Formosalle vaikka Kiinan valtakunta on edelleen olemassa? [Why China’s Olympics invitation was sent to Formosa, even though the Chinese empire still exists?], TKS 31.5.1952; Kiinan kansantasavallalla laillinen oikeus edustaa Kiinaa olympiakisoissa [The PRC has a legal right to represent China in the Olympics], US 14.6.1952.

¹¹² Tulipunainen painajaisuni – kommunistien hävitysraivoa Söulissa [Blood red nightmare – communists’ destructive rage in Seoul], US 26.10.1950.

¹¹³ Joukkoteloituksia Kiinassa pääsiäisenä [Mass executions in China during Easter], US 30.3.1951.

¹¹⁴ Pekingin hallitusta syytetään 14 milj. ihmisen tappamisesta [Beijing government accused of killing 14 m people], US 13.11.1952.

¹¹⁵ 285 ihmistä teloitettiin Kiinassa [285 people executed in China], US 9.5.1951.

2.3 Meanwhile in Formosa

What is interesting is that addressing the violence of both communists and Kuomintang soldiers was equally awkward for Työkansan Sanomat, but for two different reasons. As I argued above, the communist newspaper avoided publishing news of PLA's individual acts of violence because it could tilt the positive "*strong we-group*" presentation too close to a negative "*violent we-group*" presentation. However, Työkansan Sanomat also frequently omitted stories of Kuomintang soldiers' violent acts.¹¹⁶ With the same logic of "good us versus bad them" presentation, one might assume that it would make sense for Työkansan Sanomat to pick news which present Kuomintang as the violent aggressors. However, this hegemonizing strategy is risky to implement as it demands Työkansan Sanomat to constrain the news message in a fashion where the reader would perceive the ideological enemy of Kuomintang as an illegitimate aggressor – but not militarily strong. In other words, it is hard to raise a ruckus of Kuomintang battle vessels attacking others yet without making the reader realize that Kuomintang has battle vessels. As I argued earlier with the case of pictures, Työkansan Sanomat wanted to justify the rule of PRC by eradicating the existence of any newsworthy opposition – just like publishing a photo of Kuomintang soldiers in Taiwan made this opposition too visible, disseminating news of their violent military acts would easily make them look too powerful.

Uusi Suomi had a conflicting relationship with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. Both Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi recognized the shortcomings of Chiang and the Republican period. Yet the Finnish Christian Mission had a history of much more aggressive stance towards communists in China.¹¹⁷ Moreover, Chiang and KMT provided the only seemingly viable alternative to Mao and the CCP, thus Chiang was easily a lesser evil. This is why Uusi Suomi continued to be sympathetic towards Chiang even after the civil war.

In March 1950, a Danish travel writer Aage Krarup Nielsen wrote a piece for Uusi Suomi on his trip to Taiwan and meeting Chiang Kai-shek. In this piece Nielsen describes walking around Taipei and feeling like the city had been brought to life since the end of Japanese occupation, which back then had made Taipei feel "unpleasant and abandoned" to him. Now

¹¹⁶ Formosan merisissit kaappaavat aluksia [Formosa's marine guerrillas hijacking ships], US 12.2.1953; Formosan laivasto upottaa aluksia [Formosa's navy sinks ships], US 8.3.1953.

¹¹⁷ E. A. Auno, *Punainen hirmuvalta Kiinassa: verta, tulta ja raunioita* (Helsinki: Suomen lähetysseura, 1930).

Taipei was full of “smiling and babbling people” where “children with full moon shaped faces pressed their faces against shop windows,” and “steams of fragrant Chinese food flooded from small restaurants.” On meeting Chiang – who Nielsen reports works so diligently he only allows himself one off-day a year – Nielsen describes Chiang’s physical appearance as “having a serious look yet occasionally a boyish smile would lighten up his face,” and how “he is upright and slender, and although he is a few years over sixty, there isn't a single wrinkle on his face, which is brought to life by his bright and wise eyes which reflect a strong will.” Nielsen ends his report for Uusi Suomi:

Day by day the Chinese people learn to see clearer and clearer the true face of communism. [--] “Has the situation in China developed so far that the Nationalist troops could successfully land on mainland right now and start their offense against communists?” I ask Tshiang Kai-shek [*sic*] in the end. He answers me right away: “I believe certainly that the final solution is nearing, and we will win the fight. [--]” Tshiang Kai-shek has spoken calmly and powerfully, which proves his steadfast belief in [his] eventual win. This soldier, who has withdrawn to the last fortress, has not yet given up despite fatal losses.¹¹⁸

The Nielsen piece also mentions how Kuomintang’s guerrilla operations have been successful, and Uusi Suomi proceeded to frequently feature news of these KMT guerrilla operations on their front-page following Nielsen’s article.¹¹⁹ As noted by van Dijk, stories of conflicts and problems require happy ends, and disaster news do not sell well without some positive outlook. It is the journalists’ task to guide the reader to the goals and values vis-à-vis the conflict at hand.¹²⁰ The data corpus shows that before the Finnish cultural delegation’s PRC visit and signing of a Finnish-Chinese bilateral trade treaty in 1953, Uusi Suomi implicitly continued to promote a Kuomintang (re)takeover of mainland China as a desired

¹¹⁸ “Päivä päivältä Kiinan kansa oppii näkemään selvemmin ja selvemmin kommunismin todelliset kasvot. [--] “Onko tilanne Kiinassa kehittynyt niin pitkälle, että kansalliset joukot voisivat tällä hetkellä suorittaa maihinnousun mannermaalle ja ryhtyä taisteluun kommunisteja vastaan?” Tiedustelen lopuksi Tshiang Kai-shekilta. Hänellä on vastaus heti valmiina: ”Varma vakaumukseni on, että lopullinen ratkaisu lähestyy ja että me voitamme taistelun.” [--] Tshiang Kai-shek on puhunut rauhallisesti ja voimakkaasti, mikä todistaa hänen vuorevarmaa uskoaan lopulliseen voittoon. Tämä viimeiseen linnakkeeseen vetäytynyt sotilas ei ole vielä lannistunut kohtalokkaista tapahtumista huolimatta.” Tshiang uskoo vielä voittoonsa – Kiinan kansa tyytymätön kommunistikomentoon [Tshiang still believes in his victory – the Chinese people dissatisfied with communist rule], US 4.3.1951.

¹¹⁹ Yli miljoona sissiiä toiminnassa Kiinassa [Over a million guerrillas active in China], US 13.9.1950; Formosan sissijoukkojen hyökkäys Kiinan mantereelle [Formosa’s guerrilla armies’ attack on Chinese mainland], US 26.8.1952; Kansalliskiinalaiset sissit valtasivat saaren rannikolla [Nationalist Chinese guerrillas seized a costal island], US 18.2.1953.

¹²⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk. *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 123–124.

and, to an extent, a likely scenario. Overall, Formosa continued to have high news relevancy for Uusi Suomi.¹²¹

Although descriptions of regular life in Taipei were not frequent but rather occasional snippets in Uusi Suomi reporting, this portrayal of the hard-working, bright Chiang living in this re-vitalized city of Taipei is a sharp contrast to Uusi Suomi's lack of reporting on Mao Zedong. While Työkansan Sanomat painted Mao in a hero's cape, Uusi Suomi's rarely shared news of Mao, and on the rare occasion Mao was discussed, the Chairman was characterized as a man who rose to his position by sheer luck and coincidence, not by any exceptional excellence.¹²² Indeed, describing someone as lucky is an attribution strategy often used at the ideological outgroup: unlike *us*, *they* cannot be responsible for their good deeds or success.¹²³

Examining word frequency is one common analytical tool to expose ideologies in discourse. The most frequent word and over-lexicalizations I detected in the corpus were the attributes "bandit" and "gang" given to Chiang and Kuomintang, often used together (*fin.* rosvokopla). Rarely was it addressed why exactly Chiang or Kuomintang were bandits. I consider this a flexible signifier that had little to do with the news event itself, but rather a strategy to make sure the reader is always interpreting the actions by Chiang or Kuomintang as that of the unjust enemy.¹²⁴

Although Työkansan Sanomat avoided sharing news from Taiwan to hegemonize a pro PRC discourse, the communist paper frequently affirmed PRC's legal right to Taiwan, calling it PRC's "holy mission."¹²⁵ PRC's right to Taiwan was justified by the miserable life brought to local residents by Kuomintang – a very different picture from Nielsen's praise for Taipei in Uusi Suomi.¹²⁶ However, the most common rhetoric the paper used to justify Beijing's claim on Formosa was by highlighting American presence on the island: "Chinese people's

¹²¹ USA lujittaa Formosan puolustusta [USA strengthens Formosa's defence], US 31.7.1950; MacArthur Saapunut Formosaan – Kuomintangin ilmavoimat pommittaneet Pekingin hallituksen jokialuksia [MacArthur Arrived to Formosa – Kuomintang's air force bombed Beijing government's river ships], US 1.8.1950; Formosan lentokoneet upottaneet kommunistien aluksia [Formosa's airplanes have sunk communist ships], US 7.8.1950.

¹²² Kiinan punainen valtias [China's red lord], US 1.6.1950.

¹²³ Teun A. van Dijk, "Opinions and ideologies in the press," in *Approaches to Media Discourse*, ed. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 43.

¹²⁴ Rosvohyökkäys [Bandit attack], TKS 1.7.1950; USA vahvistaa nyt Tshiangin rosvoarmeijaa [US now strengthens Tshiang's bandit army], TKS 8.8.1953.

¹²⁵ Taiwanin vapauttaminen on Kiinan pyhä tehtävä [Liberating Taiwan is China's holy mission], TKS 27.7.1950.

¹²⁶ Taiwan – Kiinalainen saari, jonka USA aikoo tehdä tukikohdakseen [Taiwan – a Chinese island the US plans to turn into its base], TKS 9.7.1950.

justifiable rage towards American invaders is completely understandable. Indeed, the Chinese people unanimously demand the expulsion of American usurpers from Taiwan – an ancient Chinese island.”¹²⁷ It should be noted that Työkansan Sanomat was already using US interference in Taiwan to support its arguments before Washington’s 180-degree policy shift in favor of Chiang’s regime following the start of Korean War: On January 5, 1950, the day Washington announced they had no intention to intervene in communist China’s takeover of Taiwan,¹²⁸ Työkansan Sanomat still warned about “America’s expansionist pursuits to seize Taiwan.”¹²⁹ Further, “The ancient Chinese island” is also used as a no-alternative strategy to justify PRC’s claim: because Taiwan is historically Chinese, naturally Beijing must seize it – although neither the Republic of China (hereafter also the ROC) nor the PRC had regarded Taiwan as integral part of China before the early 1940s.¹³⁰

Curiously, it had never been in Stalin’s interest to let communist China occupy Formosa. Stalin was fearful if Chiang Kai-shek were to lose his last fort in Formosa and fade into political irrelevancy, the US could then finally recognize the PRC, thus de-escalating US–PRC relations. Indeed, one of Stalin’s motivations to allow Kim Il-Sung to strike South Korea was to delay PRC’s takeover of Taiwan.¹³¹ It is one example where the Finnish communists were mouthpieces to Moscow’s official discourse, yet they were unknowingly going against Stalin’s actual wishes.

The purpose of this first analytical chapter has been to discuss three themes in the China discourse 1) common Chinese; 2) Mao Zedong and the CCP, and 3) Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. We have established that life in the PRC was presented to Finnish readers in altering ways, and photo discourse was one central dimension how these two parallel images of daily life in New China were created. I have also shown that the left-wing Työkansan Sanomat had to consider several conflicts in its discourse: portray the Chinese communists as powerful but not violent, and portray Chiang’s regime as bandits but not powerful. I have also noted how

¹²⁷ Taiwanin (Formosan) saari [The island of Taiwan (Formosa)], TKS 8.12.1950. See also Jenkit pois Formosalta [Americans off Taiwan], TKS 16.7.1950; Kiinan vaatimus: USAn joukot pois Formosalta [China’s plea: US’s armies off Taiwan], TKS 25.8.1950.

¹²⁸ Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (London: Routledge, 2015), 88.

¹²⁹ 6 miljardin dollarin lunnaiksi – havittelee USA Formosaa itselleen [A 6 billion dollar ransom – Seeks to claim Formosa for the US], TKS 5.1.1950.

¹³⁰ Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (London: Routledge, 2015), 10–11.

¹³¹ Shen Zhihua, “Reconsidering China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War — Seventieth Year after the Korean Armistice,” *The Chinese Historical Review* 30, no. 2 (2023), 167–168.

Uusi Suomi paid more attention to Formosa and Chiang than Työkansan Sanomat did, and how Uusi Suomi's situational images and pre-existing values of communists as aggressors, and China as disaster-ridden, influenced which news the paper featured. However, in the following chapters I will turn the attention closer to the news coverage concerning bilateral exchanges between Finland and the PRC, which prove that Uusi Suomi's PRC discourse was influenced by these interactions with New China.

3 China and Finland

What was covered in Finland was not independent of global news discourse: most China news could not be witnessed by Finnish journalists in first-hand and needed to be withdrawn from foreign news dispatches. This means that news events had already been coded and interpreted into discourse by other news agencies before being used as sources by the Finnish press.¹³²

However, although subordinate to this global discourse, *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi* had several rhetorical tactics to ensure these dispatches fit into their own ideology. Further, a couple of bilateral exchanges also allowed Finnish journalists to gain direct access to information about New China. The 1952 Helsinki Olympics and 1953 cultural delegation will be discussed in their own subchapters below as examples of these first-hand news coverages, but first I will address the relationship between Finnish and international China discourse and discuss the methods how the two newspapers were able to shape these foreign news dispatches into their own ideology in the discourse.

3.1 Finland's Position in the World News Discourse

Both *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* used international news agencies to obtain their China news. *Työkansan Sanomat* evidently used more Soviet sources, like TASS and Pravda, than *Uusi Suomi* did. However, Reuters and Suomen Tietotoimisto (STT) were the most common agencies for both *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat*.

However, although both newspapers frequently published identical translated articles taken verbatim from other news agencies, they could still shape their readers to interpret these articles in different ways. A very simple yet telling example of this is when the UK announced their support for the US' suggestion to block the export of critical raw materials to the PRC in May 1951, *Uusi Suomi* titled the paragraph "England accepts",¹³³ when *Työkansan Sanomat* titled their identical article "England submits."¹³⁴ Furthermore, since discourse scholar van Dijk has claimed that especially foreign news production may often take source texts from news agencies literally, I would add to this point that even if we

¹³² Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse*, (London: Routledge, 1988), 96–97.

¹³³ USA vaatii tiukasti lopettamaan sotatavarain viennin rautaesiripun taa [USA sternly demands to halt the export of military supplies behind the iron curtain], US 11.5.1951.

¹³⁴ USA painostaa Englantia lopettamaan heti raaka-aineiden viennin Kiinaan [USA pressures England to stop exporting raw materials to China], TKS 11.5.1951.

assume literal reproduction of source texts to be as commonplace in foreign news coverage as van Dijk suggests,¹³⁵ news headlines are one common way how newspapers construct their own news discourse via seemingly unaltered news agency reproductions.

It should also be noted that international news dispatches were not always published verbatim in the Finnish papers, but information was omitted if it contradicted with the discourse. Especially Työkansan Sanomat would circulate news dispatches where the bits that contradict the discourse have been edited out: bits that only be read in e.g., Uusi Suomi.¹³⁶

Although Uusi Suomi also used Chinese sources such as Xinhua¹³⁷ and transmitted news obtained via Soviet news agencies occasionally, Western, particularly British sources, are more frequently utilized. This is because complete lack of opinions from different perspectives or ideologies would be detrimental to the credibility of the press. Although partial inclusion of Chinese and Soviet sources helps solidify credibility, this is hardly a sign of news content distancing itself from persuasive features – usually news sources that are ideologically close to the publication’s own values are given primary attention, which in the case of Uusi Suomi is Western and particularly British sources, not the least in the form of a UK-based correspondent (see chapter 4.2 for more discussion of Uusi Suomi’s use of sources).¹³⁸ However, due to lack of domestic sources on China, it is only natural that Finnish press should rely on international news organizations and institutions – which themselves had limited access to information from the PRC at the time. However, this dependence on external sources concomitantly creates a more unified and ideological view of the world, and therefore links Finland’s news coverage to that of the dominating ideological views in the world.¹³⁹

That is not to say that an individual newspaper publication does not possess freedom to alternate from their sources – if nothing unique happened when a Finnish newspaper processed source texts into their own articles, this thesis would be senseless. Nevertheless, newspapers that naturally rely on external news agency dispatches become mouthpieces of their source texts and their original organizations to an extent, and these journalistic freedoms

¹³⁵ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 116.

¹³⁶ See e.g., Tiibet hankkii sovintoa [Tibet seeks an agreement], TKS 2.6.1950; Tiibet alistuu Kiinan valtaan [Tibet submits to China’s authority], US 2.6.1950.

¹³⁷ It should be noted that these Chinese news agencies were rarely directly referred, but taken from e.g., Suomen Tietotoimisto, Reuters, TASS or Telepress which themselves included the Chinese news agency dispatches.

¹³⁸ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 84–85.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, 8.

to structurally transform, for example, a news dispatch from Reuters into their unique text, are versatile yet constrained.¹⁴⁰ Yet, it should be noted that *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* did not only publish new stories, but also columns, causeries and other openly opinionated texts in which foreign news dispatches or authority opinions are not consulted, and the ideology, values and attitudes of the Finnish journalist can be read with greater clarity.

Like *Uusi Suomi*, *Työkansan Sanomat* also began using translated Chinese sources more frequently. The reasoning for this is quite clear: many state-affiliated newspapers and news agencies that emerged in the new PRC published news and articles that sided with the USSR, and justifying the actions of the USSR was the main function of the China discourse for *Työkansan Sanomat*.

Utilizing PRC news dispatches became a significant hegemonizing strategy for *Työkansan Sanomat*, as not only could they include Soviet authority voices to hegemonize a pro-USSR discourse in the Cold War context, but also utilize Chinese authority voices to further consolidate the pro-USSR discourse. Indeed, even if more complicated debates were brewing behind closed doors, Mao and Stalin often ordered statements to be issued which only expressed that the relationship between the two countries were proceeding to a cooperative direction.¹⁴¹ We have already established above that headlines and leads provide the initial summary of a news article. Moreover, they express the most important content in the article and are usually the only content that readers can recall later.¹⁴²

With this information in mind, take into consideration the following *Työkansan Sanomat* article, which headline reads “The actions of Soviet Union in the [UN] Security Council are justified”, followed by the lead “testimonial from a Chinese newspaper.”¹⁴³ In this example, we can easily extract the discursive function of the news article from the headline (justify the USSR), followed by the hegemonizing strategy in the lead (authority voice strategy: a Chinese newspaper). To conclude the arguments thus far, domestic Chinese sources were included in addition to Western and Soviet sources not only because they were quite natural

¹⁴⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 119–129.

¹⁴¹ Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 116–117.

¹⁴² Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 53, 143, 152.

¹⁴³ Neuvostoliiton toimenpiteet turvallisuusneuvostossa oikeudenmukaisia – Kiinalaisen sanomalehden lausunto, TKS 21.1.1950.

source types for news coverage on China, but also because it helps to build credibility for a paper that still might prefer different sources for ideological reasons, or because their inclusion can be implemented as a hegemonizing strategy in the form of an authority voice.

Furthermore, it should also be noted that Työkansan Sanomat would not only utilize international news agencies but also engage in criticism of them and their usage by other Finnish press. For instance, Reuters, which dispatches Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi often used, was accused by Työkansan Sanomat to participate in disinformation and rhetoric manipulation. In its criticism of Reuters for publishing an article of the Chinese famine, Työkansan Sanomat wrote how Reuters' news story was "teeming with journalistic superlatives,"¹⁴⁴ thus criticizing Reuters for practicing the hegemonizing strategy of extreme expressions. Furthermore, Työkansan Sanomat also criticized other Finnish press for circulating American and Swedish newspapers' anti-Soviet articles and therefore hiding behind them instead of criticizing the USSR openly with their own words.¹⁴⁵ That is, Työkansan Sanomat was criticizing them for using an authority voice strategy.

Finnish news discourse would also alter from that of the world's news discourse whenever news on China was connected to Finland's context, that is what does these China-related news mean for us? As Allan Bell puts it: "news is by nature a perishable commodity with a limited shelf life. The next edition renders it obsolete."¹⁴⁶ A farther-looking consequence is needed to make news interesting and justify why the journalist is demanding the reader's attention. Indeed, a consequence, real or speculated, is a major schema of news discourse, and can sometimes be more integral than the actual news topic itself.¹⁴⁷

This is especially true for Työkansan Sanomat, which did not shy away from writing connections between China and Finland. Already during the Chinese Civil War Työkansan Sanomat had compared Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists to the National Coalition – Uusi Suomi's affiliated party.¹⁴⁸ Now that the CCP had won, Työkansan Sanomat began using New China's "awakening" as motivation and as inspiration for the Finnish working class.

¹⁴⁴ Reuters levittää valheutisia Kiinassa muka vallitsevasta nälänhädästä – maassa on viljaa yli oman tarpeenkin [Reuters spreads fake news about a supposed famine in China – the country has more grain than it needs], TKS 24.3.1950.

¹⁴⁵ Mutkan kautta suoraan [Straight ahead through a curve], TKS 27.1.1950.

¹⁴⁶ Allan Bell, "News Time," *Time & Society* 4, no. 3 (1995), 306.

¹⁴⁷ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 54.

¹⁴⁸ Pitkä nenä [A long nose], TKS 27.4.1949.

However, it is not only a task for the explicitly ideological press like *Työkansan Sanomat* to evaluate in their news stories why the story is significant: all news stories must establish why readers ought to pay attention and take events in China seriously.¹⁴⁹ For *Uusi Suomi*, one clear justification why Finns should pay attention to China was the consequences of whether communism will be contained in Chinese borders, or whether it would be spreading elsewhere in the world.¹⁵⁰

In this subchapter, I have offered a concise discussion of the relationship between the Finnish printed media, and the international news dispatches these papers utilized, and how the newspapers also practiced dialogue with these dispatches and processed them into their own publications. I have also briefly discussed how the Finnish discourse separated itself from global news discourse – and we will dwell deeper into this question of Finland’s unique discourse in the following subchapters. I take a closer look at three instances where the Finnish discourse was particularly unique: 1) the Christian missionaries, 2) the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, and 3) the 1953 cultural delegation to the PRC.

3.2 The Christian Mission: Friends or Foes?

“What is joy for one is horror for another; what is justice for one, is wrong for another; and where others drink for victory, others can only swim in the waters of darkness and death. This was the golden age of communist rule in China.” – *1930 Finnish Mission Publication*¹⁵¹

Albeit not a specific Finland-related news event but rather a common eyewitness and rhetorical strategy, the topic of Western churches and missionaries in the PRC is a central theme in the Finnish China discourse, both left and right. Therefore, it feels apt to not only to discuss Finland-specific events like Helsinki Olympics and the 1953 PRC-bound delegation, but also the more all-encompassing discourse of China and Christianity.

¹⁴⁹ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 151–152.

¹⁵⁰ Kiinan ja NL:N sopimus kannustaa kommunismin etenemistä [The China-USSR treaty encourages spread of communism], US 21.2.1950.

¹⁵¹ ”Mikä on toiselle riemua, on toisella kauhua; mikä toisesta on oikeutta, on toisesta vääryyttä, ja missä toiset juovat voitonmaljoja, siellä toiset saavat uida pimeyden ja kuoleman vesissä. Tällainen oli kommunistivallan kukoistusaika Kiinassa.” E. A. Auno, *Punainen hirmuvalta Kiinassa: verta, tulta ja raunioita* (Helsinki: Suomen lähetysseura, 1930), 43.

Uusi Suomi was openly a Christian publication. Fates and events concerning Christians in China thus had enough proximity to interest Uusi Suomi journalists. Therefore, detainments, expulsions and persecution of American, British and other Western missionaries and priests frequently broke news.¹⁵² I argue it is not only the proximity that these news items were so often included, but because they served a function in the anti-communist discourse.

Readership of an openly religious paper would find it harder to find the new PRC government just if practicing Christian faith was not protected and Christians were treated violently. This is likely not an intentional hegemonizing strategy, but Uusi Suomi including photos of Chiang Kai-Shek and publishing news from Formosa close to the same dates when these anti foreign Mission and Christianity also broke news could fill Uusi Suomi readers with hope that Chiang Kai-shek – who himself was a Christian¹⁵³ – could return to mainland China.¹⁵⁴

The close relationship between Christianity and anti-communist discourse is apparent in Uusi Suomi. Indeed, there are several news items which revealed the Christian us-group and Communist them-group divide. People who were both Christian and sympathetic towards the PRC did not fit into Uusi Suomi's ideological script. Take Hewlett Johnson, nicknamed "Red Dean of Canterbury." Johnson was a controversial character in 1950s England for being an Anglican Dean, and a prominent member of the communist dominated British Peace Committee and known communist sympathizer.¹⁵⁵ Johnson also travelled in the PRC and was very vocal of his assertion that the US was using bacterial weapons in China and Korea.

Hewlett Johnson was the most quoted single eyewitness in Työkansan Sanomat. Being both Christian and British, Johnson was invaluable for Työkansan Sanomat's authority voice strategy – Työkansan Sanomat removed the word "red" from Johnson's nickname to obfuscate his communist affiliations,¹⁵⁶ and emphasized the crowds Johnson attracted when

¹⁵² Lähetystyö Kiinassa kohtaa suuria vaikeuksia [Missionary work faces big obstacles in China], US 3.10.1950; Kristittyjen vainoa jatketaan Kiinassa [Persecution of Christians continues in China], US 27.4.1951; Lähetyssaarnaajia pidätetty Kiinassa [Missionaries arrested in China], US 15.8.1951; Mao nimittää nukkepaavin Kiinaan [Mao appoints a puppet Pope in China], US 24.7.1952.

¹⁵³ Lee Feigon, *Mao: A Reinterpretation* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 5.

¹⁵⁴ 13 katolista piispaa pidätettynä Kiinassa [13 Catholic bishops arrested in China], US 1.10.1951; [photo of J. Lawton Collins and Chiang Kai-shek shaking hands in Taipei] US 9.11.1951.

¹⁵⁵ Jeremy Tranmer, "Odd Bed-Fellows: British Christians and Communists in the Struggle for Peace," *LISA* (Caen, France) 9, no. Vol. IX-n°1 (2011).

¹⁵⁶ Canterburyyn tuomiorovasti Kiinan kristittyjen vieraina – bakteerisodasta kumoamattomia todisteita [Dean of Canterbury visiting Chinese Christians – irrevocable evidence of bacterial war], TKS 8.7.1952; "Minä vetoan" – tuomiorovasti Hewlett Johnson kertoo käynnistään Kiinassa ["I appeal" – Dean Hewlett Johnson tells about his visit to China], TKS 2.8.1952.

he spoke of his experiences in China publicly.¹⁵⁷ In one causerie a Finnish journalist writes: “[--] this priest, which has been given the nickname “red” by the servants of the Devil for speaking the truth, travelled to China and Korea to see in person whether Americans using bacterial warfare is true. There he gathered evidence and promised to tell the truth to the Christians of England.”¹⁵⁸

Uusi Suomi only acknowledged Johnson twice during the period he travelled in China and spoke of his experiences in England. In a short news item titled “Red Dean caused a stir again”, the paragraph that starts the item in boldened letters reads “Around 30 people exited the church when “the Red Dean” preached on Sunday night.”¹⁵⁹ Only after this paragraph does the item vaguely refer to what Johnson spoke about China in the church. Considering that news follows a top-down principle where the most relevant information is presented first, it is telling that Uusi Suomi would mention attendees leaving the Church before explaining what Johnson had been talking about in his speech.¹⁶⁰ Johnson’s views and experiences are not considered relevant, but rather the negative reactions to his speeches. In the other news piece titled “Pravda cites the Red Dean,” Johnson’s accusation of bacterial weaponry are not the main news to Uusi Suomi, but rather the fact that the USSR has taken interest in these news.¹⁶¹ The ideology of the reporter is also made apparent by the lexical choice to always call Johnson the “Red Dean”, the nickname coined by his English detractors, in the headlines to downplay his messages.¹⁶² Nothing of Johnson’s travels to China or any other eyewitness experiences are ever discussed. Therefore, Christian authority and eyewitness voices needed to be in ideological alliance with Uusi Suomi’s anti-communist rhetoric to be allowed to speak in China discourse.

Työkansan Sanomat also found Western Christian missions very newsworthy whenever it fit their discourse. Considering missionaries’ historically significant role as eyewitnesses and opinion formulators of anything China related especially in right-leaning press like Uusi Suomi, the communist newspaper felt compelled to use instances of missionaries and Western

¹⁵⁷ Kiinan kristillinen kirkko vetoaa Englannin ja USA:n kristittyihin [China’s Christian church appeals to England and USA’s Christians], TKS 21.7.1952.

¹⁵⁸ Totuuden puhuja ei saa yösiijaa [A truth-teller cannot get a place to sleep], TKS 11.7.1952.

¹⁵⁹ Punainen rovasti aiheutti taas kohua [The Red Dean caused a brouhaha again], US 5.8.1952.

¹⁶⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 43–44.

¹⁶¹ Punaista rovastia siteeraa Pravda [Pravda cites the Red Dean], US 30.7.1952.

¹⁶² Punainen tuomiorovasti ”sotku kirkolle ja valtiolle” [The Red Dean ’a mess to the church and the state] US 17.7.1952.

churches' malpractice in China to weaken their status as authority voices. For instance, when news broke that the PRC authorities had arrested two nuns for child neglect at a catholic orphanage, *Työkansan Sanomat* used this case to justify Beijing's stance on foreign missionaries:

The world is full of a specific type of newspapers which hurry to publish news about the "persecution" of religion and Church-affiliated persons in People's Democracies. These papers could, just like we do, tell the truth regarding the crimes committed in the shadows of the Church. The People's Republic of China has cleansed many other crime nests laid and left in China by Europeans. New China wants to live clean and happy life.¹⁶³

The Christian and communist discourse is a fitting example of van Dijk's concept of the "ideological square" in media discourse. The square consists of four principles: 1) emphasize our good properties/actions; 2) emphasize their bad properties/actions; 3) mitigate our bad properties/actions, and 4) mitigate their good properties/actions.¹⁶⁴ By both choosing what gets reported, and the linguistic choices made in news, causeries and editorials, *Työkansan Sanomat* highlighted the good deeds of their us-group, communists, whereas *Uusi Suomi*'s positive ingroup presentation was focused on Christian missionaries. Both ignored and thus mitigated the visibility of good actions of their outgroup. Further, *Työkansan Sanomat* emphasized the bad actions of the outgroup Christians for example with the case of the child neglect by the Catholic church, whereas *Uusi Suomi* emphasized the outgroup's bad actions by constantly sharing news of the Chinese communists' persecution of Christians.

¹⁶³ "Maailmassa on hyvin paljon määrättyntyyppisiä lehtiä, jotka kiiruhtavat julkaisemaan uutisia uskonnon tai kirkollisten toimihenkilöiden "vainosta" kansandemokratioissa. Nämä lehdet voisivat yhtä hyvin kuin mekin kertoa totuuden uskonnon tai kirkon varjossa suoritetuista rikoksista. Kiinan kansantasavalta on puhdistanut monia muitakin eurooppalaisten munimia ja Kiinaan jättämiä rikollispesiä. Uusi Kiina haluaa viettää puhdasta ja onnellista elämää." "Pyhän sydämen" lastenkoti Kiinassa – eli miten keltainen lehdistö suojelee uskonnon varjoon kätkeytyntä rikollisuutta [The orphanage of "holy heart" in China – so how the yellow papers protect crime hidden in the shadows of religion], TKS 8.6.1951.

¹⁶⁴ Teun A. van Dijk, "Opinions and ideologies in the press," in *Approaches to Media Discourse*, ed. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 33.

Table 3.

The ideological square adapted from van Dijk	Työkansan Sanomat	Uusi Suomi
Emphasize our good properties/actions	“The People’s Republic of China has cleansed many other crime nests laid and left in China by Europeans.” ¹⁶⁵	The church’s mission is to always serve, and the Finnish Mission feels grateful that it has been allowed to serve [in China] and believes that the struggling Chinese Christian church will never disappear.” ¹⁶⁶
Emphasize their bad properties/actions	“Another orphanage of death in Nanjing: 372 children died of neglect and hunger [-] a case has been filed against seven nuns due to the incident.” ¹⁶⁷	“Thirteen Roman-Catholic bishops of multiple nationalities are detained in China [--] Three Chinese catholic priests have been executed, and a fourth is reported to have deceased while imprisoned.” ¹⁶⁸
Mitigate our bad properties/actions	<i>No news coverage of detained, expelled or executed Chinese or Western Christians by the CCP</i>	<i>No news coverage of malpractice of missionaries in China</i>
Mitigate their good properties/actions	<i>No news coverage of Finnish missionaries’ humanitarian aid in China</i>	<i>Limited, almost no coverage of CCP’s improvements in China</i> ¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ ”Pyhän sydämen” lastenkoti Kiinassa – eli miten keltainen lehdistö suojelee uskonnon varjoon kätkeytynyttä rikollisuutta [The orphanage of ”holy heart” in China – so how the yellow papers protect crime hidden in the shadows of religion], TKS 8.6.1951.

¹⁶⁶ 50 vuotta suomalaista lähetystyötä Kiinassa [50 years of Finnish mission in China], US 21.4.1953.

¹⁶⁷ Pyhän sydämen lastenkoti [The Holy Heart orphanage], TKS 9.6.1951.

¹⁶⁸ 13 katolista piispaa pidätettynä Kiinassa [13 Catholic bishops detained in China], US 1.10.1951.

¹⁶⁹ Kustaa Vilkuna’s letters from the 1953 cultural delegation published by Uusi Suomi did include descriptions of CCP’s positive improvements (see chapter 3.4), but this is exceptional when contrasted with the rest of Uusi Suomi’s publications.

Therefore, both *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi* found it important to include news about Western Christians, churches, and missionaries in the PRC. The situation in 1950–1953 was vastly different to 1946–1949, when *Uusi Suomi* could constantly use Finland’s own missionaries to gain insights of China. Now the news coverage shifted to struggles the whole Western missionary and Christian movement was experiencing in the PRC.¹⁷⁰ Thus, Christians and communists became perhaps one of the best examples to show how ingroup-outgroup dynamics in these two newspapers manifested, and how these tensions created altering discourses. Furthermore, the case of Hewlett Johnson shows clear discursive tensions: what is beneficial for *Työkansan Sanomat*’s eyewitness strategy is a categorical contradiction for *Uusi Suomi*: that is someone who claims affinity both with Christianity and communism.

Whereas the question of Christians was a matter of clear divergence in discourse, the following two subchapters highlight aspects where *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi*’s China discourse partially converged. Formosa’s absence from the 1952 Helsinki Olympics and the cultural delegation visit to the PRC in 1953 meant that Finns got to be in touch with the PRC – and only the PRC.

3.3 China Meets Finland: The Helsinki Olympics 1952



Figure 11 Kiinalaisia urheilijoita Suomenlahden aalloilla. Kuvassamme näkyy myös suomalaisen olympiavoimistelujoukkueen neitonen. [Chinese athletes on the waves of Suomenlahti. Our picture also shows a lady from Finland’s Olympic gymnastics team]¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ Salla Kenttä, ”Kun kiina vaihtoi väriä: Asemituminen kiinalaisia ja Kiinan sisällissotaa kohtaan suomalaisessa painetussa mediassa 1946–1949 [When China switched colors: Positioning towards Chinese and the Chinese Civil War in Finnish Printed Media 1946–1949] (Bachelor’s Thesis, University of Turku, 2022).

¹⁷¹ Kotiin lähteneet kiinalaisurheilijat muistavat Suomea lämpimästi [Chinese athletes who have gone home recall Finland fondly], TKS 8.8.1952.

In several instances China and Finland had their own interactions, which freed Finnish journalists from their dependence on foreign news media agencies. Besides Sylvi Kekkonen's cultural delegation to the PRC in 1953 (see chapter 3.4), the discourse around the Helsinki Olympics 1952 was heavily tied to China, as this was PRC's first involvement in the Olympic games. It was also the last time the PRC participated until the 1980s – after this first appearance at the Helsinki Games, Beijing grew increasingly agitated over the two-China issue in international sports and decided to withdraw from the Olympics.¹⁷² Furthermore, it was also the first time the USSR participated – had it not been for Moscow's push for Beijing to use the Helsinki Games as a chance to promote the communist bloc, the PRC likely would not have participated since the government's attention was directed towards Korea and early nation-building, and most cadres remained unaware of the political significance of the Olympics.¹⁷³

The question which China to invite to Helsinki Olympics caused headache for both the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Finland. Despite its determination to participate, Beijing did itself a disservice by not understanding the proper protocol of the IOC and irked the IOC by “talking politics rather than sports.” Then again, the IOC did not understand the political significance of the two-China question and was thus incompetent to handle the issue of two governance bodies claiming exclusive right to represent China, resulting in hasty decision-making in the IOC executive board. After IOC initially concluding that neither Beijing nor Taipei's committees were allowed to participate – awkwardly after Helsinki had already sent invites to both – the IOC board retracted its initial decision and announced that both committees were allowed to participate in the Olympics after all – one day before the closing ceremony.¹⁷⁴

However, Taipei boycotted the IOC's decision by withdrawing out of the games despite initial plans to participate. Chiang's government had decided to stick to its “no two Chinas” principle. This allowed the PRC to represent China uncontested: it was a lost opportunity for Nationalist representatives to travel to Finland and get interviewed by Finnish and other

¹⁷² Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 49.

¹⁷³ Xu Guoqi, “China's National Representation and the Two-China Question in the Olympic Movement: The Significance of the 1952 Helsinki Games,” *China Perspectives* 2008, no. 1 (2008), 19–20; Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 48.

¹⁷⁴ Xu Guoqi, “China's National Representation and the Two-China Question in the Olympic Movement: The Significance of the 1952 Helsinki Games,” *China Perspectives* 2008, no. 1 (2008), 23–26.

Western press. The ROC had continued to have high news value to Uusi Suomi in 1950–1953, thus it is probable that Uusi Suomi would have allowed ROC representatives to speak their mind on the two China issue and other political matters if both Chinas had participated. The fact that only the PRC travelled to Helsinki Olympics was a tremendous discursive win for the Finnish communists:

“We feel especially happy that by participating in the Helsinki Olympics, we have a chance to come in broad contact with the Finnish people. [--] Allow me to once again thank you for the tremendous welcome. Long live the friendship between the people and athletes of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Finland! Long live peace!” - *Työkansan Sanomat*¹⁷⁵

The heads of PRC’s Olympic team invited Helsinki-based newspapers to a briefing last night [--] Both interviewees expressed their joy that the PRC’s national team has now been able to arrive in Helsinki, and conveyed Chinese athletes’ greeting for the Finnish sports folk, and were grateful for the welcome they had received here. - *Uusi Suomi*¹⁷⁶

Historian Xu Guoqi sees that once the USSR informed the PRC they should participate in Helsinki Olympics, the PRC was determined to first obtain its international legitimacy via the Olympic family.¹⁷⁷ Against the backdrop of news items and pictures of PRC athletes smiling, waving and expressing their gratitude for allowing them to be present, I can confidently argue that the PRC government succeeded in this aim to some extent in the Finnish press. At the very least the visibility the PRC gained in the press across the political spectrum normalized the PRC as the legitimate new China: Uusi Suomi seldom allowed citizens of the PRC a voice in its China discourse, but the Helsinki Olympics briefly facilitated an exclusive chance for the Chinese from the PRC to reach out to Finnish readers.

¹⁷⁵ ”Erikoisen onnelliseksi tunnemme itsemme siitä seikasta, että osallistumalla Helsingin olympiakisoihin meillä on tilaisuus päästä laajaan kosketukseen Suomen kansan kanssa. [--] Sallikaa minun vielä kerran kiittää teitä loistavasta vastaanotosta. Kauan eläköön Kiinan Kansantasavallan ja Suomen tasavallan kansojen ja urheilijoiden ystävyys! Kauan eläköön rauha!” Vaikka olemmekin myöhässä olemme kuitenkin tulleet [Although we are late we have arrived], TKS 31.7.1952.

¹⁷⁶ ”Kiinan kansantasavallan olympiajoukkueen johto kutsui eilisillaksi Helsingin lehtien edustajia tiedotustilaisuuteen. [--] Molemmat haastateltavat lausuivat ilonsa siitä, että Kiinan kansantasavallan edustusjoukkue on nyt voinut saapua Helsingin kisoihin ja he välittivät Kiinan urheilijain tervehdyksen Suomen urheiluväelle kiittäen samalla osakseen täällä tulleesta vastaanotosta.” Kiinassa yleinen urheiluharrastus valtavasti levinnyt [General sports hobby has spread greatly in China], US 1.8.1952.

¹⁷⁷ Xu Guoqi, “China’s National Representation and the Two-China Question in the Olympic Movement: The Significance of the 1952 Helsinki Games,” *China Perspectives* 2008, no. 1 (2008), 21–22.

The news coverage of the Helsinki Games was particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it is well known that without the direct US-USSR military confrontation, Cold War competition spilled to many other realms, including sports – with Olympics being the biggest battleground. Since Moscow was not present in the 1948 London Games, Helsinki Olympics are usually regarded as the first Cold War Olympiad.¹⁷⁸ Second, since this first Cold War Olympiad was organized in Finland, it was a rare opportunity to obtain news coverage where Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat journalists were witnessing the news events themselves instead of reusing news snippets from international media agencies.

The PRC 40-head athlete team's last-minute arrival on July 29th meant that apart from one swimmer, the PRC could not take part in any of the games. Thus, PRC's participation was mostly symbolical. However, Finland as the hosting country decided to organize unofficial matches between the Chinese and Finnish national teams out of respect for the guests who had travelled far despite their inability to participate in the games. I found it especially intriguing that this Cold War competition and rhetoric also followed to these unofficial games merely meant to respect the late guest. For instance, both Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat sent a journalist to the friendly Finland–PRC soccer game and wrote distinctively different pieces on the match.

In Uusi Suomi's item titled "*Finland beat China 4–0 in a low-level match,*" the reporter writes that "Finland and China's friendly match did not attract audiences anymore, and only 4821 paying spectators showed up," when Työkansan Sanomat in its report "*Finland–China 4–0 – a good-natured match on the sports field*" writes how "sports fans tired from watching the Olympics arrived in relatively large numbers to see a match that is rare in our parts, as 4,821 people had purchased a ticket for the game." The numeral is the same, but Työkansan Sanomat wants the reader to interpret that the number shows high interest in the PRC. Uusi Suomi also chose to emphasize the quality of the game – which both papers acknowledge to have been somewhat poor, but Työkansan Sanomat would rather emphasize the good-naturedness of the match.

Soccer in China – just like all sports activities – are still in green Spring.
International experience is non-existent, which is why their play is rather tender,

¹⁷⁸ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, "The Olympics and the Cold War: A Historiography," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 25, no. 4 (2023), 127, 134.

although sometimes we saw glimpses of beautiful combinational play, signaling that [they] are on the right track. Finland won the match 4–0, but China’s team won the crowd, as the spectators applauded the far-travelled visitors throughout the match for their disciplined style of play. - *Työkansan Sanomat*¹⁷⁹

Although Finland managed to win the game 4–0, still the crowd was not satisfied, because the quality of the game was low, and our team’s indolence soured the audience’s mood. The Chinese side’s game was quite elementary, offering no source of joy from their side either. - *Uusi Suomi*¹⁸⁰

These two reports are interesting to compare for they are sometimes saying the same thing in principle – that the game was not of the best quality for example. However, *Työkansan Sanomat* applies the strategy of metaphors (green Spring) and aesthetic lexical choices (tender instead of weak or low-quality) and over-lexicalizations (beautiful combinational play, far-travelled visitors) to really turn the news into an emotional story of perseverance. Nonetheless, in some sections it feels that one of the parties is also lying, because the two newspapers paint extremely different pictures of the audience’s reaction to the match.



Kiinalaisten maalilla oli eilen tiukkoja tilanteita tuhka tiheään. Kuvasamme ovat pienet terhakat kiinalaiset jälleen selviämässä pälkähästä. Vaihela on kaatunut ja Pelkonen katsoo palloa, joka on karannut meikäläisten ulottuvilta.

Figure 12 kiinalaisten maalilla oli eilen tiukkoja tilanteita tuhka tiheään. [The Chinese team’s goal faced constant pressure yesterday]¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ “Kiinan jalkapalloilu, kuten koko maan urheilutoiminta yleensä, on vasta vihreässä keväässä. Kansainvälinen kokemus puuttuu tyystin, minkä johdosta peli on varsin hentoa, joskin aika-ajoittain nähtiin välähdyksiä kauniista sommittelupelistä merkinä siitä, että olleen oikeilla jäljillä. Suomi voitti ottelun 4–0, mutta Kiinan joukkue voitti yleisön, sillä koko pelin ajan katsomo osoitti voimakkaasti suosiota siistiä jalkapalloilua esittäville kaukaisille vieraille.” Suomi–Kiina 4–0 – sävyisä jalkapallomaaottelu pallokentällä [Finland–China 4–0 – a good-natured match on the sports field], TKS 5.8.1952.

¹⁸⁰ ”Vaikka Suomi pystyikin voittamaan 4–0, niin katselijat eivät sittenkään olleet tyytyväisiä, sillä peli oli tasoltaan heikko ja meikäläisten saamattomuus sai yleisön suorastaan huonolle tuulelle. Kiinalaisten peli oli varsin alkeellista, joten siltäkään taholta ei saatu minkäänlaista ilon aihetta.” Suomi löi Kiinan heikkotasoisessa ottelussa [Finland beat China 4–0 in a low-level match], US 5.8.1951.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

It is curious that when another friendly Finland–PRC match was held in August, this time in basketball but also won by the Finnish team, *Työkansan Sanomat* did not publish any report of the match. This seems odd considering that the paper had been teasing the upcoming match several times,¹⁸² including an interview of one athlete in the Chinese basketball team,¹⁸³ and noting basketball’s popularity both in the PRC and the whole Soviet bloc at the time.¹⁸⁴ Only one picture from the game was featured: a photo of a Chinese athlete throwing the ball in Finland’s basket, and the photo caption mentions that this is indeed a Chinese player that is shown scoring – and only after this mentions that Finland won the match (see figure 13). *Uusi Suomi* instead wrote a longer report of the match, which was relatively kind towards the Chinese team: “The Finns apparently had thought they would win even if they only used half of their energy to play, but the opponent turned out to be stronger than expected. [--] the Chinese deserve full ten points for their enthusiasm.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² *Neuvostoliitto vai USA? Koripallon suuri kysymys* [The Soviet Union or the USA? The big question of basketball], TKS 4.7.1952; *Kiina–Suomi koripallossa tiistaina* [China–Finland basketball on Tuesday], TKS 4.8.1952.

¹⁸³ *Kiinan kansantasavallan olympiajoukkueen jäsen, koripalloilija Chen Wen Pin*, TKS 4.8.1952.

¹⁸⁴ Amanda Shuman, “The Politics of Socialist Athletics in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1966.” (PhD diss., University of California, 2014), 83–84.

¹⁸⁵ *Suomi löi koripallossa Kiinan* [Finland beat China in basketball], US 6.8.1952.




Figure 13 Tilannekuva Suomen korilta, jonne pallo on juuri menemässä kiinalaisen heittämänä eilisestä Suomi–Kiina koripallomaattelesta. [An action shot at Finland’s basket, where a Chinese is about to take a shot, taken during yesterday’s Finland–China basketball match]¹⁸⁶

It seems that although one case of the Chinese team losing could be turned into an emotional story with discourse hegemonizing strategies, *Työkansan Sanomat* later avoided reporting on other lost matches to avoid portraying Chinese as losers. It is also probable that the communist paper felt hesitant to write on Chinese athletes’ losses because the other first timer’s, the USSR’s, outstanding success in Helsinki Games: a central motivation for Moscow’s participation was to promote the superiority of the USSR-led world order and system.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, although a single friendly match could be fit into China discourse by emotional appeal evoking strategies, repetitive stories of Chinese losses was at odds with the paper’s Soviet Union discourse – the superior *gege* could not raise losers.

The Finnish communists might have been hesitant to write on these friendly China–Finland games but utilized the PRC Olympics committee in a myriad other discursive ways. In accordance how the CCP hoped to gain international legitimacy through the Olympics,

¹⁸⁶ TKS 6.8.1952.

¹⁸⁷ Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 77–78.

Työkansan Sanomat used the Helsinki Games as a naturalization strategy for PRC's other international rights as well, writing "Beijing China's membership in the UN as natural as its participation in the Olympics."¹⁸⁸ The Olympic issue was also dragged heavily to the anti-American discourse: "An invite had not been sent to China where 500 million people live, because American warlords said that the Chinese are a lower race than the Americans and deserve to be destroyed with bacterial weapons."¹⁸⁹ Third, the Helsinki Games were an opportune moment to ridicule the Nationalists exiled in Taiwan: "The whole Chinese people have abandoned Chiang's trash clique."¹⁹⁰ Before the IOC's second vote allowed Beijing's participation, Työkansan Sanomat frequently applied inevitability strategies to justify PRC's attendance in Helsinki: "Although Finland is a small country, who is being heavily pressured in this China-related matter, still we are not a nation without honor. Thus, we cannot refrain from sending an invitation to the PRC."¹⁹¹

To conclude, although the PRC arrived too late to be a participant in the Helsinki Olympics, the presence of PRC athletes and other representatives was symbolically significant and allowed first-hand access for Finnish journalists to hear, see and write about the PRC. The absence of ROC's representatives allowed PRC representatives to speak in the discourse without competing voices. Moreover, the friendly matches organized by Finland to respect the PRC athletes did not gain similar crowds or global attention as the official games did, but they allowed a discourse researcher an interesting chance to see how Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat journalists wrote about the Chinese. Further, especially considering Uusi Suomi's lack of photos from the PRC as indicated in chapter 2.1, I argue that the news and the photos of Finnish and Chinese players interacting together normalized the PRC as the new representative of China. Työkansan Sanomat even gained new photos to use that were not only of smiling workers and peasants from the PRC – but ones where Finnish people join these smiles, as depicted in figure 11.

In the next chapter, we look at an equally interesting case: the cultural delegation visit led by Sylvi Kekkonen. This time, instead of PRC nationals arriving to Finland, it was time for

¹⁸⁸ Pekingin Kiinan YK-jäsenyys yhtä luonnollinen kuin sen osanotto Olympiakisoihin [Beijing's China's UN membership as natural as its participation in the Olympics], TKS 27.7.1952.

¹⁸⁹ Eisenhowerin armeijan tappio [Eisenhower's army's defeat], TKS 19.7.1952.

¹⁹⁰ 500-miljoonaisen Kiinan kansan urheilijat mukaan Helsingin kisoihin – Formosa jää pois [Athletes from the 500-million Chinese population to join the Helsinki Games – Formosa is out], TKS 18.7.1952

¹⁹¹ Miksi Kiinan olympiakutsu lähetettiin Formosalle vaikka Kiinan valtakunta on edelleenkin olemassa? [Why was China's invite to the Olympics sent to Formosa when the Chinese empire still exists?], TKS 31.5.1952.

Finnish people to travel to the PRC to witness what the New China was exactly like. Photos of the Chinese playing at Finnish sports fields switched to completely different landscapes, and athletes switched to politicians, researchers and cultural folk.

3.4 Finland Meets China: The Culture Delegation 1953



Figure 14 SUOMALAINEN KULTTUURIVALTUUSKUNTA vierailulla Kao Pei-tienin kylässä Pekingin lähistöllä.
[FINNISH CULTURAL DELEGATION visiting the village of Kao Pei-Tien in the vicinity of Beijing]

Indeed, I detected that *Uusi Suomi* went through a shift in discourse towards the latter half of the 1950–1953 period. By the end of 1953, several PRC nationals had travelled to Finland, a Chinese small yet symbolically significant Olympic delegation had travelled to 1952 Helsinki Olympics, and Finland had become the first Western capitalist country to sign a bilateral treaty with the PRC. Further, by 1953, Finnish observers had travelled to China to witness the conditions of the Chinese population in the PRC in multiple occasions – starting with Unto Miettinen, who claimed to be “the first Finn to travel to the PRC and the first Finn to shake Mao’s hand.”¹⁹² However, Miettinen’s travels in China were scarcely reported in *Uusi Suomi*, for Unto Miettinen was a high-profile Finnish communist journalist, who served prison time during the Winter War and Continuation War for “communist conspiratory actions.”¹⁹³

¹⁹² Unto Miettinen, *Päivännousun maa: Kiina eilen, tänään ja huomenna* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1951), 164.

¹⁹³ Unto Miettinen et al., *Unton tarina: Unto Miettisen vuosikymmenet* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1980).

However, descriptions of life in the New China flooded *Uusi Suomi* pages in summer 1953, when a cultural delegation led by Sylvi Kekkonen travelled around the PRC for a six-week period. This was Zhou Enlai's strategy to strengthen relations with European countries particularly through cultural exchanges – Polish and Swedish cultural delegations were also travelling in China in summer 1953. This trip to China consisted of multiple Finnish politicians, academics and culture folk – some communists, some more politically centrist and therefore more quotable people for *Uusi Suomi*.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, *Työkansan Sanomat* and *Uusi Suomi* chose witnesses that fit their ideologies best: *Uusi Suomi* let the ethnographer Kustaa Vilkuna speak about the delegation, whereas *Työkansan Sanomat* offered most of the space for Mauri Ryömä, their own editor-in-chief.

Near total lack of reporting of the communist Miettinen's travels to China in 1950 in *Uusi Suomi* stands in contrast to the eight, near full-page exclusive travel letters from the ethnographer Kustaa Vilkuna.¹⁹⁵ Vilkuna's academic approach to the delegation's trip fit *Uusi Suomi*, which otherwise paid little attention to the delegation visit.¹⁹⁶ After the famine headlines (table 1) and the photo of naked trees supposedly peeled by famished peasants (figure 10), three years later Vilkuna writes of a very different, more picturesque China where "open shops, booths, workshops, kitchen halls, various small boutiques with adults and children line the streets. Life glides past us dense and multicolored, strange and deep in color [--]."¹⁹⁷ I note the description is quite similar to how Nielsen was describing Taipei for *Uusi Suomi* in 1951. Indeed, this snippet from Vilkuna's eighth China letter encapsulates an interesting shift in how *Uusi Suomi* describes the PRC:

A rather common perception in Western countries is probably that Chinese towns are shoddy, and rural villages more gathering points for rats and trash rather than suitable homes for humans. At least I, who had read snippets of descriptions on China without a bias, had this perception. During this last month of travelling, I have been pushed to check my preconditions and marvel at the cleanliness of villages and towns [--] of course we could assume that we have only been taken to places deemed worthy of being shown [--] but Heikki Savolainen and I, like

¹⁹⁴ Timo Soikkanen et al., *Sylvin matkassa: yksityiset päiväkirjat Kiinasta* (Helsinki: Otava, 2020), 13–20.

¹⁹⁵ Emmi Savonen has written an ethnographic thesis which discusses how Vilkuna's background as an ethnologist manifested in Vilkuna's letters. Emmi Savonen, "*Kulttuurivaltuuskunnan Kiinan matka vuonna 1953: Eettinen julkaisu ja arvonmääritys sekä kulttuurianalyttinen katsaus.*" (Master's thesis, University of Turku, 2019).

¹⁹⁶ Timo Soikkanen et al., *Sylvin matkassa: yksityiset päiväkirjat Kiinasta* (Helsinki: Otava, 2020), 20.

¹⁹⁷ Kiina taistelee tulvia vastaan: tuhansien lapioiden työmaata katsomassa [China fights against floods: checking the site of thousand shovels], *US* 20.5.1953.

others, have frequently sneaked into villages and houses that were not part of this program.¹⁹⁸

Proximity of news is a common news value that pushes journalists to deem an event newsworthy. One method the Finns who wrote to *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* sold their news from China was creating proximity by juxtaposing Chinese events and people to that of Finnish events and people. Beyond making news more tangible for Finnish readers, this was also a convenient hegemonizing strategy to indicate the ideological friends and foes. Unto Miettinen, for example, had compared the destruction of infrastructure by Japanese and Kuomintang he witnessed in Shenyang (Mukden) to how withdrawing Nazi soldiers destroyed properties in Lapland War six years earlier.¹⁹⁹ Communism is *Uusi Suomi*'s ideological foe, thus Vilkuna mitigated any connection of good needs to communism by writing in his piece on PRC's land reform that this "healthy" reform was like Finland's own tenant farmer reform and war refugee relocation program in 1940, and a communist program "by name only."²⁰⁰

As mentioned already before, *Uusi Suomi* gave an exclusionary permission to Finnish and other Western missionaries to describe what the conditions in China were like between Chinese Civil War years 1946–1949. The establishment of the PRC meant that *Uusi Suomi* lost their previous common eyewitnesses. Vilkuna also comments on this lack of missionaries in the travel letter where he marvels at the unexpected cleanliness of Chinese towns and villages, and expresses that he sees the absence of foreign missionaries as a positive thing:

As I was witnessing all this, a 1947 description from an American correspondent's travels to poor Western China came to my mind, [a visit] where he familiarized himself with e.g., hospitals ran by missionaries [--] fed up with both locals' passiveness and the humanitarian efforts by foreigners, which resembled nursing an infant rather than improving people's lives, the correspondent yelled: Can't the Chinese help themselves at all? Now East Asia

¹⁹⁸ "Varsin yleinen käsitys länsimaissa lienee, että kiinalaiset kaupungit ovat rähjäisiä ja että maalaiskylät ovat enemmänkin rottien ja roskan kokoontumispaikkoja kuin ihmiskelpoisia asumuksia. Ainakin minulla, joka olen valikoimatta lukenut pieniä Kiinan kuvauksia, oli tällainen käsitys. Nyt runsaan kuukauden matkan aikana olen joutunut tarkistamaan ennakkomielikuvaani ja ihmettelemään kylien ja kaupunkien siisteyttä [--] Voidaan tietysti sanoa, että retkeläisille on näytetty vain esittämiskelpoisia paikkoja [--] Mutta mm. Heikki Savolainen ja minä, kuten muutkin, olemme olleet hyvin alttiita pujahtamaan kyliin ja taloihin, jotka eivät ole kuuluneet ohjelmaan." Korean bakteerisota ja Kiinan terveystkamppailu – Uudelle Suomelle prof. Kustaa Vilkuna [Korean bacterial warfare and China's health struggle – professor Kustaa Vilkuna for *Uusi Suomi*], US 28.6.1953.

¹⁹⁹ Kiinan porteilla [At China's gates], TKS 12.10.1950.

²⁰⁰ 500.000 vuoden takaisen ihmisen viljelysmaita muokataan uuteen uskoon [The farmland of humans from 500.000 years ago is being reshaped], US 17.5.1953.

seems to have moved back into an era where people helping themselves is the norm.²⁰¹

All in all, Uusi Suomi's reporting on the delegation visit is quite restricted to Vilkuna's travel letters. I argue that Uusi Suomi felt obligated to cover the visit in some capacity since a Finnish delegation travelling in the PRC was evidently newsworthy, but since the delegation itself did not serve any significant discursive value, the paper did not feel compelled to pay attention to the visit beyond Vilkuna's letters.

Instead, Työkansan Sanomat was significantly more active disseminating news and articles related to the visit. The paper's own editor-in-chief Mauri Ryömä, who participated in the delegation, wrote several of these pieces – and often resorted to emotional appeal strategies when describing PRC nationals' living conditions. Besides the use of ridicule in the news item about “horses laughing at famine news” discussed already in chapter 2.1, also written during the delegation visit, Ryömä also appealed to emotions with descriptions of a joyous peasant who had suffered during the Nationalist rule, but whose life was now finally going well:

Finally, we visited one model peasant's home in the village [--] Happily and proudly he told us about his old and current life, as his kindly smiling wife kept filling our cups with hot tea [--] our host told us his life had also been so difficult during Kuomintang rule, that he had not had enough food to eat.²⁰²

Further, not only did the communist paper include pieces written by Ryömä, but also interviews and statements from several other delegation members – every attendee had found something to compliment or wonder about China, which Työkansan Sanomat was eager to utilize as eyewitnesses to portray the PRC as a nation that was developing fast, possessed a flourishing arts and culture department, and which population was eager to welcome guests

²⁰¹ ”Kaikkea tätä katsellessani tuli mieleen 1947 lukemani amerikkalaisen kirjeenvaihtajan kuvaus matkastaan kurjaan Länsi-Kiinaan, jossa hän tutustui mm. lähetysasemien ylläpitämiin sairaaloihin [--] Kyllästyneenä sekä paikallisten asukkaiden passiivisuuteen että ulkomaalaisten avustustyöhön, joka muistutti enemmän sylvävauvan imettämistä kuin olojen kohentamista, kirjeenvaihtaja huudahti: Eivätkö kiinalaiset itse pysty ollenkaan auttamaan itseään – nyt Itä-Aasiassa näyttää siirrytyn jälleen siihen kauteen, jolle on ominaista, että kansat itse auttavat itseään.” Korean bakteerisota ja Kiinan terveyskampailu – Uudelle Suomelle prof. Kustaa Vilkuna [Korean bacterial warfare and China's health struggle – professor Kustaa Vilkuna for Uusi Suomi], US 28.6.1953.

²⁰² ”Pistäydyimme lopuksi kylän erään mallitalonpojan kodissa [--] Tyytyväisenä ja ylpeänä hän kertoi meille entisestä ja nykyisestä elämästään samaan aikaan kuin hänen lempeästi hymyilevä vaimonsa ehtimiseen täytteli kuppejamme kuumalla teellä [--] Isäntämme kertoi, että Kuomintangin aikana hänenkin elämänsä oli ollut niin vaikeata, ettei ruokaa ollut riittävästi.” Uudestisyntynyt kiinalainen talonpoikaishäädä [Reincarnated Chinese peasant village], TKS 27.6.1953.

from the far-away country of Finland.²⁰³ Engineer Allen Järvenpää, actress Ritva Arvelo, athlete and medical doctor Heikki Savolainen, author Matti Kurjensaari, author Aira Kolola, and communist politician Aune Laurikainen's notes on their visit were all either directly quoted or paraphrased by Työkansan Sanomat journalists.²⁰⁴ Allen Järvenpää for example used extreme expressions (everywhere, all societal circles) and eyewitness strategy (even person like myself can sense) in his descriptions about the PRC:

Construction was on-going everywhere. Everywhere we went, and in every conversation, we witnessed how the new democratic system had been received with excitement in China, and how the work towards comprehensive construction of China was exercised tirelessly. Even a person who has never visited China before, can sense that the political, economic, and cultural development is advancing with a giant's footsteps, supported by all sectors of society.²⁰⁵

Overall, Työkansan Sanomat's discursive aim of including all the positive eyewitness stories about their travels in the PRC is obvious: to use these eyewitnesses to portray the PRC in a positive light, and the Finns are utilized to bring proximity of these China news to Finnish readers. Headlines including phrases like "Finns deeply impressed"²⁰⁶ and "Finnish delegation's greatest of the greatest experiences"²⁰⁷ emphasize that it is not just somebody, but specifically Finnish nationals who are writing these accounts about the PRC.

However, although Uusi Suomi paid significantly less attention to the visit than Työkansan Sanomat did, and Työkansan Sanomat's ideological motives for writing extensively about the visit are detectible, still I see that Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi's reporting on the

²⁰³ Tshou En-lai vastaanotti Sylvi Kekkonen ja Ryömän – Suomen valtuuskunta oli länsä uutta kauppasopimusta allekirjoittaessa [Tshou En-lai received Sylvi Kekkonen and Ryömä – Finland's delegation present at the signing of the new trade treaty], TKS 7.6.1953; Vierailulla Uudessa Kiinassa: Uuden Kiinan kirjallisuus ja taide [On a visit to New China: The literature and arts of New China], TKS 4.7.1953.

²⁰⁴ Kehitys kulkee Kiinassa jättiläisaskelin eteenpäin – osa kiinankävijöistä palannut [Progress moves forward with giant's steps in China – some of China visitors have returned], TKS 10.6.1953; Ihmisyyden leima Uuden Kiinan rakennustyössä kaikilla aloilla suomalaisten voimakkaana vaikutelmana [The mark of humanity across all sectors in the construction of New China, a strong impression within the Finns], TKS 11.6.1953; Kiinan patorakennustyömaat ja valtava kansallinen innostus – suomalaisen kulttuurivaltuuskunnan "suurimmista suurimmat" elämykset [China's dam construction sites and a huge national excitement – "the greatest of the greatest" experiences of the Finnish cultural delegation], TKS 13.6.1953.

²⁰⁵ "Rakennustyöt olivat kaikkialla käynnissä. Ja kaikkialla havaitsimme ihmisten kanssa keskustellessamme, että uusi demokraattinen järjestelmä on Kiinassa otettu vastaan innolla, ja että työtä Kiinan kaikinpuoliseksi rakentamiseksi tehdään väsymättä. Sellainenkin henkilö, joka ei ole Kiinassa ennen käynyt, voi havaita, että Kiinassa kulkee poliittinen, taloudellinen ja sivistyksellinen kehitys eteenpäin jättiläisaskelin kaikkien yhteiskuntapiirien tukemana." Kehitys kulkee Kiinassa jättiläisaskelin eteenpäin – osa kiinankävijöistä palannut [Progress moves forward with giant's steps in China – some of China visitors have returned], TKS 10.6.1953

²⁰⁶ Kiinan valtavat padorakennustyöt tehneet syvän vaikutuksen suomalaisvieraisiin [China's enormous dam constructions have left a deep impression in Finnish guests], TKS 13.5.1953.

²⁰⁷ Kiinan patorakennustyömaat ja valtava kansallinen innostus – suomalaisen kulttuurivaltuuskunnan "suurimmista suurimmat" elämykset [China's dam construction sites and a huge national excitement – "the greatest of the greatest" experiences of the Finnish cultural delegation], TKS 13.6.1953.

delegation visit is not substantially dissimilar. As mentioned above, Vilkuna certainly does not praise communism, or communists, in his letters. Furthermore, Vilkuna seemed to be equally interested in remnants of imperial Chinese history as he was in the country's contemporary circumstances.²⁰⁸ All this considered, he still expresses no discontent or disapproval towards anything he has witnessed: only academic curiosity and the occasional praise. Thus, I argue that all of the eyewitnesses' awed and astonished reactions to things they had witnessed during their visit to the PRC show that this cultural delegation was more a case of convergence than divergence between these two discourses. At the very least, neither paper was accusing anyone of being famished.

This third chapter has taken a closer look at the specific Finnish context of the China discourse, particularly by shining light at the ingroup-outgroup rhetoric in the news coverage of Christian missionaries in the PRC; the Helsinki Olympics 1952; and the 1953 cultural delegation to the PRC. These cases were particularly interesting to analyze. The case of missionaries and Hewlett Johnson exposed the value background of the two newspapers, and especially Uusi Suomi's ideology is indicated more explicitly than in many other discourse topics. Further, the two Finland-linked news events produced news coverage that freed journalists from their dependence on external sources. Obtaining such direct news production was unique in contrast to the other news events in the discourse. However, these other, more global Cold War news events, actors and sources are also seminal to scrutinize – which is presented in the next analysis chapter.

²⁰⁸ Kiinan historiaa kivikaudesta asti [China's history since the Stone Age], US 31.5.1953. Kiinan menneisyyttä näytteillä – Uudelle Suomelle prof. Kustaa Vilkuna [China's past on display - professor Kustaa Vilkuna for Uusi Suomi], US 3.6.1953.

4 China and the World

In the new Cold War dynamics, China was not discussed only in its domestic or Finnish context, but the PRC's relationship with two superpowers – United States and the Soviet Union – also played a significant role in Finnish news. In these last analytical subchapters, I will shine light into two aspects regarding these Cold War rivals: 1) how are the US, the UK and the USSR discussed in the China discourse, and 2) how *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat* utilize American, British and Soviet news sources: that is who is allowed to speak in these discourses. Due to *Uusi Suomi*'s affinity with the UK, I have combined the UK and the US into one chapter, hence “the West discourse,” although the chapter does not strive to represent the whole West. I will first discuss the PRC–USSR discourse, and lastly the PRC–West (the US and the UK) discourse during the 1950–1953 period.

4.1 China and the Soviet Union

The two main functions of the China news discourse of *Työkansan Sanomat* (and therefore of the Finnish Communist Party) was to first justify the authority of the CCP in China by using the Soviet Union as an example, and secondly, to justify the authority of the Soviet Union in the world by using China as an example. Especially for the latter function, the steadfastness of the USSR and Stalin's support for Mao and the CCP had to be depicted as iron-clad and to never have wavered.²⁰⁹ This was deceptive since Stalin had in many instances also supported rivals of Mao; been more interested in the interests of the USSR in the Soviet Far East rather than in the Chinese revolution; and Stalin having originally signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Republic of China in 1945, which Mao perceived as back-stabbing to the revolutionary cause of Chinese communists.²¹⁰ However, the two leaders generally collaborated effectively until Stalin's death.²¹¹ Thus, it was relatively easy for the communist paper to portray the PRC and the USSR as harmonious brothers.

For instance, *Työkansan Sanomat* published an article in January 1950 conveying the words of a PLA General Xiao Hua, who, according to the article, stated that the KMT had barely contributed at all to the resistance movement against imperial Japan, and that the PLA had

²⁰⁹ See e.g., Leninin aatteiden voittokulku [The triumphal march of Lenin's thought], TKS 23.4.1950.

²¹⁰ Lucien Bianco and Krystyna Horko, *Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018), 299–300.

²¹¹ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 69, 85.

carried out most of the resistance fighting. Furthermore, this resistance by the PLA was successful due to them “learning tactics and strategies from the Stalinist school”, and that PLA had been empowered by the previous successes of the Soviet army.²¹² This narrative of the CCP and the PLA carrying the main responsibility of anti-Japanese resistance is in line with the historical narrative enforced by the CCP even today, despite contradicting with real historical evidence suggesting that Kuomintang carried out most of the fighting.²¹³ However, not only does this narrative enforce the superiority of the CCP, but also that of the Soviet Union, which the Finnish Communists naturally were eager to promote and therefore paid extremely keen interest to the new PRC. Everything from workers’ motivation to work hard to the rise in new Chinese culture and arts was credited to common Chinese people’s deep appreciation for their role models in the USSR.²¹⁴ *Työkansan Sanomat* would constantly underline how major of a win China turning red was not only for the Chinese themselves, but for the Soviet Union.²¹⁵ In the 1950–1953 period when the CCP was focusing on returning China to order, this was quite seamlessly done, since 1) the PRC had yet to start criticizing and distancing itself from the USSR influence,²¹⁶ and 2) the Korean War had pushed Stalin to view Mao and the CCP in more favorable light.²¹⁷

One common hegemonizing strategy used to highlight Soviet Union’s success in China was underlining the size of the Chinese population²¹⁸ – a common discourse hegemonizing strategy called quantification.²¹⁹ Constant mention of China’s 500-hundred million population joining USSR’s camp of “democracy and peace” was part of official USSR and PRC victory discourse as well, which the communist paper in Finland seamlessly appropriated. If the same

²¹² Stalinin nimi on Kiinan kansan taistelun symboli – lausuu vapautusarmeijan kenraali Siao Huan [Stalin’s name is the symbol of Chinese people’s resistance – states the General of Liberation Army Siao Huan], TKS 11.1.1950.

²¹³ Lauri Paltemaa and Juha A. Vuori, *Kiinan kansantasavallan historia* (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2012), 18.

²¹⁴ Kirjallisuus ja taide: Ge Bao-Tsian: Kulttuurivälähdyksiä Kiinasta [Literature and arts: Ge Bao-Tsian: glimpses of culture in China], TKS 4.5.1950; Sosialistinen kilpailu päässyt jo erinomaiseen vauhtiin – kommunistit esimerkin antajina kilpailussa [Socialist competition already achieved great speed: communists as models in competition], TKS 4.5.1950.

²¹⁵ Kiinan ja Neuvostoliiton ystävyyssojimus [China and the Soviet Union’s friendship treaty], TKS 17.2.1950.

²¹⁶ Lucien Bianco and Krystyna Horko. *Stalin and Mao: A Comparison of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions*. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018), 53–54.

²¹⁷ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 69.

²¹⁸ 475 miljoonaa [475 million], TKS 30.9.1951; 700 miljoonan yhtenäisyys – kaksi vuotta Neuvostoliiton ja Kiinan liittosopimuksesta [The unity of 700 million – two years since the USSR–China alliance treaty], TKS 14.2.1952.

²¹⁹ Arja Jokinen, ”Vakuuttelevan ja suostuttelevan retoriikan analysoiminen”, in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

number is constantly repeated by the press, it is clearly used for rhetorical purposes and to enhance news value rather than to stress facticity.²²⁰ A population that is not only large, but also governed by a communist regime, was worth the constant emphasis for Työkansan Sanomat: “the legend of Chinese “masses” that can be swung back and forth with dollars and atomic bombs, has irreversibly crumbled down. The reality speaks for an organized Chinese people, which gives its population a new quality and meaning.”²²¹

Also aesthetic metaphor hegemonizing strategy was widely used, especially if the metaphor strategy could be combined with an authority voice strategy by extracting those positive metaphors from Chinese authority voices, such as the translator extraction from a Chinese paper *Guanminshibao* (官民时报) where the Chinese paper supposedly writes that “the Soviet Union is the lighthouse that shows the way for humankind,”²²² how Sun Yat-Sen’s widow supposedly writes in *People’s China* (人民中国) that the USSR has all the light and warmth associated with day and the US is “as negative as a cold winter night,”²²³ and when the aforementioned PLA General Xiao Hua writes, according to Työkansan Sanomat, that “Stalin is the Sun of our [the Chinese] freedom.”²²⁴ It does not matter that quotations are nearly never totally correct, especially if translated from foreign sources, but the rhetorical illusion of truth that the inclusion of quotations adds credibility to is what matters the most.²²⁵

However, a very different picture of the Sino-Soviet relations, and particularly the Chinese’s assessment of Stalin and the USSR, is painted in Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat. Here we must recall that omitting information in newspapers is partially obligatory since journalists cannot report on everything. However, choosing what gets reported on, or in this case *not* reported on, exposes power relations within a discourse. Such bias on what gets reported is highlighted when we compare what was published on Työkansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi on the same dates or close to the same date.

²²⁰ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 203.

²²¹ Lämpimiä numeroita [Warm numbers], TKS 22.8.1951.

²²² Neuvostoliiton toimenpiteet turvallisuusneuvostossa oikeudenmukaisia [The Soviet Union’s actions at the Security Council justified], TKS 21.1.1950.

²²³ ”SSSR auttaa nuoria kansoja, kunnes ne tulevat toimeen omin neuvoin ja siksi Kiina on Neuvostoliiton puolella” Madame Sunjatsenin huomattava lausunto [The USSR aids young nations until they manage on their own, and that’s why China is on the Soviet Union’s side], TKS 16.2.1950.

²²⁴ Stalinin nimi on Kiinan kansan taistelun symboli – lausuu vapautusarmeijan kenraali Siao Huan [Stalin’s name is the symbol of Chinese people’s resistance – states the General of Liberation Army Siao Huan] TKS 11.1.1950.

²²⁵ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 87.

On February 23rd, 1950, *Uusi Suomi* published an article on Chinese higher education graduates, followed by an article by *Työkansan Sanomat* on February 24th also on Chinese higher education graduates. The difference lies in what activity these two news stories depict the graduates to be engaging in: *Työkansan Sanomat* story describes how the students have come out with a declaration encouraging the students in colonized countries to continue their battle against imperialists, and that the struggle against colonialism will end in victory like the battle of the Chinese people ended in victory.²²⁶ Contrast that with the article by *Uusi Suomi*, where ten thousand Chinese students were reported to have participated in massive protests against the USSR, carrying a banner with Stalin's face against the map of China accompanied with the text "down with the new imperialist."²²⁷ Obviously, an imperialist is a curse word for the communists and reserved for Chiang Kai-shek and the Americans in *Työkansan Sanomat*'s news on China.²²⁸

Regardless of what actually happened, this is a prime example of the power relations that exist within *Työkansan Sanomat* China discourse: this news story of anti-Stalin protests go against the ideological position of *Työkansan Sanomat* and therefore cannot be mentioned let alone discussed within the China discourse they seek to hegemonize, whereas *Uusi Suomi* is inclined to include news stories where the PRC–USSR relations are depicted less harmoniously. It is also probably not a coincidence that *Työkansan Sanomat* published a story of Chinese students uttering accusations of imperialism to other directions than Stalin a mere day after *Uusi Suomi*'s story on students hit the newsstands.

Take another date for example of discourse divergence: February 17, 1950, when news of the 1950 PRC–USSR Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance were circulated. As discussed already above, Stalin and Mao had significant conflicts of interest over this new treaty, which prolonged Mao's stay in Moscow, causing Western media to speculate Mao to

²²⁶ Kiinan ylioppilaiden viesti taisteleville siirtomaakansoille: "taistelunne on päättävä voittoon" [China's graduates' message for people fighting in colonized nations: "your fight will end in victory"], TKS 24.2.1950.

²²⁷ Suuria ylioppilasmielenosoituksia Tshungkingissa eilen [Large graduate student protests in Tshungking yesterday], US 23.2.1950.

²²⁸ "Pysyvä rauha, maailmanrauha, tämä on se lippu, jota seuraten Neuvostoliitto ja kansandemokratian maat kulkevat eteenpäin": V.M. Molotovin Moskovan kaupungin Molotovin vaalipiirin valitsijoille 10.3.1950 pitämä puhe ["Permanent peace, world peace – this is the banner under which the Soviet Union and People's Democracies move forward": Speech by V. M. Molotov to the electors of the Molotov constituency of Moscow on March 10, 1950], TKS 16.3.1950.

have been placed under house arrest. Työkansan Sanomat used several hegemonizing strategies to use the eventual signing of a new treaty as proof that the Beijing–Moscow alliance was equal and tensionless. The paper simplifies the issue by indicating that the name of the treaty already exposes all Western “speculations” to have been lies: “[--] the Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty, which mere wording already overturns all imperialists’ claims [--] proves that the PRC is an equal negotiation partner.”²²⁹ The article further shows that it does not take these “Western speculations” seriously by exaggerating their reactions as “hysterical” and “enraged” over the treaty: “The imperialists’ anger is understandable: the Soviet Union and China’s alliance treaty does not leave room for any hopes that they [imperialists] could have a hold on China, so steady is the foundation [the treaty] sets on Soviet Union and China’s collaboration [--].”²³⁰ The article adds quantification strategy to the ridiculing of opponents: “the historical significance of the friendship alliance between the Soviet Union and China – two great states with [combined] population of 700 million – cannot be denied even by the fear-trembling imperialists.”²³¹

Meanwhile, Uusi Suomi would rather use US and UK politicians and journalists’ opinions on the new Sino-Soviet treaty in its discourse. Their February 17th article, titled “*Secret articles in USSR–China treaty: USA foreign minister’s guesses*,” Uusi Suomi included Acheson’s comment how “the 300-million-dollar aid from Soviet Union [--] is surprisingly small. That is not much help for a country on the brink of a famine, Acheson added.”²³² Two days later the paper continued in an editorial “It [the USSR] agreed to a loan, which amount is actually quite small considering China’s enormous needs, but which is complemented by a promise for continuous economic cooperation.”²³³ Two more days later, the paper’s London correspondent wrote that “Here [in London] people are certain that the treaty includes secret articles, which probably are not as beneficial to China as the publicly shared ones. Moreover, the 300-million-dollar loan, which the Soviet Union has assured for five years, is regarded as of little help to Chinese [--] nor does the treaty mention anything of the industrial facilities, which the Russians have taken from Manchuria as spoils of war [--].”²³⁴ Although Shen Zhihua argues that China was actually the one that emerged as winner from the negotiations

²²⁹ Kiinan ja SSSR:n ystävyyssojimus [China and USSR’s friendship treaty], TKS 17.2.1950.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Salaisia pöytäkirjoja NL:n-Kiinan sopimuksessa – USA:n ulkoministerin arveluja, US 17.2.1950.

²³³ NL:n ja Kiinan liitto [USSR and China’s alliance], US 19.2.1950.

²³⁴ Kiinan ja NL:n sopimus kannustaa kommunismin etenemistä [China and USSR’s treaty encourages the spread of communism], US 21.2.1950.

and considered the treaty a success,²³⁵ Uusi Suomi's discourse focuses more on criticizing the USSR's lack of substantial aid for China.

Työkansan Sanomat's whole modus operandi vis-à-vis PRC–USSR news coverage can be characterized as simplifying naturalization. Simplifying naturalization refers to how matters are represented as self-evident, obscuring the socially constructed origins of knowledge.²³⁶ In other words, because the PRC–USSR relationship is simplified into a natural friendship, the actual complexity of the matter is blurred, and the reader is discouraged from questioning whether the issue is more multifaceted. This simplifying naturalization is exercised first and foremost by allowing USSR journalists and politicians to speak in the China discourse uncontested. The case is different for Uusi Suomi. Uusi Suomi does also occasionally use TASS and other USSR news dispatches – for example when TASS confirmed Chinese authorities to have detained Western missionaries²³⁷ – but usually complements them with English or American comments – their own elite sources (see chapter 4.2).

In conclusion, the China discourse Työkansan Sanomat seeks to hegemonize is one where only the USSR is allowed to speak. The paper occasionally mentions imperialists “lies” and provocations” which it usually combines with ridiculing language to further weaken their position.²³⁸ The paper seeks to apply elements of simplifying naturalization to make the PRC–USSR friendship as rock-solid and conflict-free. I argue that because the PRC's function for Työkansan Sanomat is to increase acceptance and appraise for the Soviet Union, their discourse cannot allow any discussion of potential disagreements or conflicting interests. Uusi Suomi's lack of loyalty to Moscow means that this newspaper can and even wanted to point out cracks in the relationship. The following chapter will shine more light into Uusi Suomi's own elite source countries, the US and the UK, as well as Työkansan Sanomat's stance on the PRC–US and PRC–UK discourse.

²³⁵ Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 73–79.

²³⁶ Arja Jokinen and Kirsi Juhila, “Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen,” in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

²³⁷ Lähetyssaarnaajia pidätetty Kiinassa – ”ovat vakoilijoita” [Missionaries detained in China – ”They are spies”], US 19.7.1953.

²³⁸ Kiinan ja SSSR:n ystävyyssojimus [China and USSR's friendship treaty], TKS 17.2.1950.

4.2 China and the West

Moving on from the USSR to the US and the UK, Työkansan Sanomat approached American and English news sources with ridicule. For instance, by utilizing consensus building as a hegemonizing strategy, Työkansan Sanomat would criticize the “English lords and their lackeys” for calling Chiang Kai-shek’s people in Formosa “the nationalist government”, because “it was already clear to everyone that they firstly were not nationalistic, and secondly not even a government.”²³⁹ The function of using extreme expressions and consensus building strategies such as “it is clear to everyone” is to make the reader believe that any meditation whether the people in exile in Formosa can be called a government is ridiculous, unnecessary, or foolish.

Moreover, a common strategy for Työkansan Sanomat to belittle and attack the plausibility of both American and British politicians and news agencies was to portray them as fools, disoriented, and as comical caricatures of an imperialist that is inherently nonsensical in his thinking. Ornaments of speech like metaphors, irony, metonyms, and hyperbolics that Työkansan Sanomat uses to describe the actions and thinking of both Americans and the British contain significant argumentative value and can shift or even change readers’ view of reality.²⁴⁰ Indeed, when Työkansan Sanomat calls the Americans “hysterical,” unable to learn “their lesson,”²⁴¹ “nervous rumormongers,”²⁴² “drunkards,”²⁴³ and even “werewolves”²⁴⁴ who plan to “stab China in the back,”²⁴⁵ the function is not only to make the text more lively and, in a sense, aesthetic, but this colorful language is also implemented for a persuasive function.²⁴⁶ Yet, the paradox in newspapers’ ideological outgroups is that they are often presented as irrational and crazy, but also as responsible agents who act intentionally and understand the consequences of their actions.²⁴⁷ That is, the reader is enticed to believe that especially the Americans are nonsensical, but that this does not excuse their wrongful actions towards China.

²³⁹ Nostaen silinterihattuja [Tipping top hats], TKS 17.1.1950.

²⁴⁰ Manfred Kienpointner, “Rhetoric and Argumentation,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies*, ed. John Flowerdew and John E. Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2018), 236.

²⁴¹ Aseapua Aasian kansoille [Weaponry aid for peoples of Asia], TKS 19.2.1950.

²⁴² Hermostuneet jenkit levittäivät huhuja [Nervous Americans spread rumors], TKS .2.1950.

²⁴³ Kummallisia selityksiä [Odd explanations], TKS 9.7.1950.

²⁴⁴ Ihmissudet vastuuseen [Werewolves need to take accountability], TKS 18.7.1950.

²⁴⁵ USA hautoo iskua Kiinan selkään [USA plans to stab China in the back], TKS 31.1.1950.

²⁴⁶ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1988), 82.

²⁴⁷ Teun A. van Dijk, “Opinions and ideologies in the press,” in *Approaches to Media Discourse*, ed. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 58.

Työkansan Sanomat found one curious “wrongful action” to agitate readers against the US which was perceived as unequal to both the PRC and Finland: the case of the Finnish tanker *Wiima*, which garnered widespread international backlash for its attempt to sail to the PRC carrying kerosene from socialist Romania in January 1953 despite the US-initiated trade embargo against the PRC. The United States had urged all countries, including non-UN members like Finland, to participate in the embargo and not sell strategic goods to the PRC due to the Korean War. Such goods included kerosene, which *Wiima* was officially transporting as lamp oil, but could also be used for jet fuel. *Wiima*’s voyage to China ended in Singapore. Finnish historian Niklas Jensen-Eriksen has argued that *Wiima* was only the “tip of the iceberg,” and Finnish shipping companies carrying contraband goods to the PRC was more widespread than was known at the time.²⁴⁸ The case of *Wiima* could be discussed in chapter 3 as well for its Finland specific context, but I want to highlight this case more as a unique example of Työkansan Sanomat’s anti-American positioning in the China discourse.

Many Finns, including communists, felt that especially the US’s outrage over *Wiima*’s attempted voyage to the PRC was unfair and that Washington was unjustly harassing small countries. This was also what then prime minister Kekkonen expressed to President Paasikivi.²⁴⁹ Thus, this offered Työkansan Sanomat a perfect opportunity to utilize the fate of a Finnish tanker to aggravate readers against the US: The paper’s news titles of the case included provocative statements like “*the US regards Finland as its colony and objects to our trade with China,*”²⁵⁰ and “*Wiima still in Singapore – Finland first to submit to the China embargo that US insists?*”²⁵¹ Although the language is more belligerent than in other press, it was a unique case where Työkansan Sanomat could also rely on other Finnish media as an authority voice against the US. For example, Työkansan Sanomat vigorously disseminated the USSR, the PRC and North Korea’s propaganda²⁵² that the US was using biological warfare in

²⁴⁸ Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “Lost at Sea: Finnish Government, Shipping Companies and the United Nations Embargo against China during the 1950s,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 38, no. 5 (2013), 568–570.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 569.

²⁵⁰ USA pitää Suomea alusmaanaan ja vastustaa Kiinan kauppamme, TKS 7.2.1953.

²⁵¹ *Wiima viipyy Singaporessa – Suomiko ensimmäisenä alistumassa USAn painostamaan Kiinan saartoon?* TKS 13.2.1953.

²⁵² Whether the US used bacterial weaponry in the Korean War is still a highly disputed and controversial topic. However, several researchers have argued based on archival evidence that these claims were fraudulent and propagandist in nature. See e.g., Conrad C. Crane, “Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Korean War: Rhetoric and Reality,” *Asian Perspective* 25, no. 3 (2001); Milton Leitenberg, “The Korean War Biological Weapon allegations: Additional information and disclosures,” *Asian Perspective* 24, no. 3 (2000).

Korea and China.²⁵³ However, papers like *Uusi Suomi* stayed silent of these allegations, hence *Työkansan Sanomat* could not rely on other Finnish newspapers to raise an alarm of this information. However, Wiima allowed *Työkansan Sanomat* a chance to draw other Finnish papers to the anti-American discourse:

In accordance with all policies of international trade and seafaring, Wiima picked up its kerosene cargo from Constanța and set sail to the PRC. But America has declared a trade embargo against China and tries to force all its vassal nations to follow this. [--] And now we can witness a special division in Finnish press. People's democratic press and some bourgeoisie papers sternly reject America's shameless demands. Some bourgeoisie papers assume a less stern, yet still clearly a rejective stance, including the pitch-black regression paper *Uusi Suomi*. [--] the case of Wiima is one of the most blatant attempts to submit our country to America's authority.²⁵⁴

This quote shows how *Työkansan Sanomat* was able to use the wider disapproval of US pressure to stop Wiima's journey as an authority voice strategy. The constant implying of Finland as a colony or vassal of the US works as an emotional appeal strategy to make the reader view the case of Wiima as a larger resistance battle against US imperialism. As the quote suggests, *Uusi Suomi* was indeed also critical of Washington's outrage towards Wiima to some extent,²⁵⁵ but while *Työkansan Sanomat* was insinuating that the US even wanted to bomb Wiima,²⁵⁶ *Uusi Suomi* emphasized that proceedings considering Wiima's fate were much more nonviolent, and that the Finnish government did not officially see a reason to diplomatically intervene in matters related to Wiima.²⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the Wiima affair was a unique news event where the proximity of the news to Finnish readers allowed the communist

²⁵³ Uusia todistuksia bakteeriaseen käytöstä amerikkalaisten sodankäynnissä Korean ja Kiinan alueilla [New evidence of biological weapon usage in Americans' war efforts in Korea and China's areas], TKS 18.11.1953

²⁵⁴ "Täysin kaikkien kansainvälisen kaupan ja merenkulun säännösten mukaisesti otti Wiima petroolilastin Konstantsasta ja lähti kuljettamaan sitä määräsätamaan Kiinaan. Mutta Amerikka on julistanut kauppasaarron Kiinaa vastaan ja yrittää pakottaa kaikki vasallivaltionsa sitä noudattamaan. [--] Ja nyt saadaan nähdä omalaatuinen rintamajako Suomen lehdistössä. Kansandemokraattinen lehdistö ja osa provarilehtiä torjuu jyrkästi Amerikan häpeämättömät vaatimukset. Osa porvarilehtiä ottaa vähemmän jyrkän, mutta silti selvästi torjuvan asenteen, ja näiden joukossa on sellainenkin patamusta taantumuslehti kuin *Uusi Suomi*." Kun wiima vinkuu [When Wiima whines], TKS 8.2.1953.

²⁵⁵ USA:n kiinnostusta Wiiman tapaukseen kummastellaan Lontoossa [London confused over USA's interest towards the case of Wiima], US 3.3.1953.

²⁵⁶ Pommi Wiimaan! Yllytetään USAssa [Bomb Wiima! USA provokes], TKS 11.2.1953.

²⁵⁷ Wiima taas "vapaa" – sotalaiva poistunut vartiopaikaltaan [Wiima "free" again – a warship has left its guard post], US 24.3.1953; Wiiman tapaus [The case of Wiima], US 22.4.1953.

newspaper a chance to flip a conversation of Finnish companies' right to ignore the anti-PRC trade embargo into a threat of Finland submitting to "American imperialism."

Työkansan Sanomat might have been vigorously anti-American, but Uusi Suomi's China discourse cannot be simplified as one that is explicitly pro-American. Actually, Uusi Suomi preferred its London-based correspondent, British news agencies, and sources from the British colony of Hong Kong in its China news, thus platforming the UK (rather than the US) as its socially validated authority in its discourse.²⁵⁸ Uusi Suomi's China news headline was frequently followed by UK's assessment of the news event, like "USA will not send aid to Formosa – deep relief in London,"²⁵⁹ and "China refused the [Korea] peace proposal – harsh response shocked London's official circles."²⁶⁰ These source hierarchies promote certain sources as opinion formulators for readers. Indeed, this alignment with the UK meant that disapproval was sometimes targeted at the PRC,²⁶¹ and sometimes at the US²⁶² – the US and the UK frequently had disagreements whether to expand war efforts in Korea to Chinese territories, and whether to replace the ROC with the PRC in the UN Security Council. This meant that Työkansan Sanomat was also often able to utilize English quotations whenever it fit their anti-American discourse.²⁶³ Beyond reliability, UK's elite source status also meant that news concerning the UK were deemed newsworthy also for Uusi Suomi – including violent acts from the PRC towards the English.²⁶⁴

Indeed, in Uusi Suomi's hierarchy of sources, the US is not placed as high as the UK. Yet, the US was also allowed to have a loud voice and some elite status in Uusi Suomi's news, even though it occasionally criticized American foreign policy towards China. How was this more implicit elite status detected? Allan Bell has pointed out that "in news, order is everything, but chronology is nothing." That is, the uniqueness of news discourse is that the order of the

²⁵⁸ Oikeudenkäynti amerikkalaisia vastaan Kiinassa [A trial against Americans in China], US 10.9.1952.

²⁵⁹ Presidentti Trumanin lopullinen päätös – USA ei lähetä apua Formosaan – Syvää helpotusta Lontoossa, US 6.1.1950.

²⁶⁰ Kiina hylkäsi aseleposityksen – jyrkkä vastaus tyrmistytti Lontoon viralliset piirit, US 18.1.1951.

²⁶¹ Kiinan hallituksen neuvotteluehdot "selvä kiristysyritys" sanotaan Lontoossa [The Chinese government's negotiation demands "a clear extortion attempt" says London], US 14.11.1950.

²⁶² Washingtonissa tehnyt päätökset jännittävät englantilaisten mieltä [English worried over decisions made in Washington], US 29.1.1952.

²⁶³ Kauppa poikki itään vaatii jyrkästi USA – Englanti vastustaa [The US sternly demands blockage of trade to the East – England objects], TKS 18.9.1951.

²⁶⁴ See e.g., Kiina takavarikoi englantilaisen öljy-yhtiön omaisuuden [China confiscates the property of an English oil company], US 1.5.1951; Peking uhkailee Hongkongin brittejä [Beijing threatens British in Hong Kong], US 27.1.1952; Turvatonta Kiinan vesillä – 40 englantilaista laivaa vastaan tehty hyökkäys [Unsafe in China's waters – 40 English ships have been attacked], US 17.2.1953.

events is not dictated by the actual order of events like in other narrative forms, but rather by the value positioning of the news. A news event is usually introduced and then returned to several times – but the ideological frames of discourse indicates from what or whose viewpoint.²⁶⁵ This unchronological order of news presentation is so commonplace that it is easy for the reader to overlook, for we do not expect news to lay down the events to us chronologically, so, in a sense, objectively. With Allan Bell's notion on news order in mind, Uusi Suomi commonly followed a news event with American reactions, commentary or evaluations rather than Chinese ones. Even when a Chinese reaction, comment or evaluation was included in the news item, the common order of events was to present US statements first. Even in cases where a Chinese source or comment was presented first, an American opposing comment was usually always included and even boldened.²⁶⁶

Being more openly ideological, Työkansan Sanomat's source hierarchy does not need to be extracted from such implicit manifestations of discourse like news chronology. The paper usually platformed PRC sources and rebuked Americans' claims already with headlines like "*China's news agency rebukes Americans' false statements.*"²⁶⁷ However, although less explicitly and less often, Uusi Suomi sometimes also indicated the elite status of US with news titles: "dispute over China's representation – the Eastern bloc's boycott paralyzes UN's operations,"²⁶⁸ clearly asserting that the socialist camp's boycotts are to blame rather than US not recognizing the PRC as the reason why the UN was filled with China related disputes at the time.

All in all, Cold War dynamics greatly influenced Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat's China discourse. The PRC and the USSR were inherently propaganda states, and considering Työkansan Sanomat's source hierarchy where Soviet and PRC sources were allowed uncontested speaking room, the paper was functioning as a satellite of these two nations' propaganda. For instance, Työkansan Sanomat was loyal to both the USSR and the PRC's aim of portraying themselves as harmonious brothers who had no conflicts or quarrels between each other. However, Työkansan Sanomat was firstly loyal to Moscow. Therefore,

²⁶⁵ Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 172.

²⁶⁶ See e.g., Kiina ei pyri rauhantekoon – huhut perättömiä [China does not want peace – rumors baseless], US 8.6.1951; Syytösryöppy USA:ta vastaan – Kiina väittää kaupunkensa pommitetun [Bundle of accusations against the US – China alleges its cities have been bombed], US 13.5.1953.

²⁶⁷ Kiinan uutistoimisto kumoo amerikkalaisten valhetiedonannot [China's news agency repeals Americans' false statements], TKS 3.2.1950.

²⁶⁸ Kiista Kiinan edustuksesta – itäblokin jatkama boikotti lamaa YK:n toimintaa, US 21.1.1950.

no matter if the anti-Stalin protests in China were real or not, the paper still could have never covered any voices of discontent towards Stalin or the USSR, no matter if the nation in question was communist or not. On the other hand, Uusi Suomi frequently pointed out disagreements, discontent, or alleged unfair conduct between the two countries. Uusi Suomi might not have been an extension of US or UK discourse the same as Työkansan Sanomat was with the USSR, but nevertheless the paper's affinity with the UK, and partially the US, is made obvious in the China discourse. However, Uusi Suomi placed the UK on the highest platform in its source hierarchy, which meant both using UK voices as opinion formulators, and considering PRC's actions vis-à-vis the UK as highly newsworthy for Finnish readership as well.

This discussion of the USSR, the UK, and the US ends my analytical chapters. Considering that this time period represents the early years of the Cold War, plenty more could have been said of how these three countries are discussed in the China discourse, and how their sources are utilized in the press. However, to better answer the research questions, I wanted to take an even more all-encompassing take on the China discourse which included also the Finland specific, and domestic Chinese news. With these three analysis chapters, I want to emphasize just how multifaceted, nuanced, and complex the China discourse in these two newspapers was. Next, I will move on to concluding my findings and to the reflection of the research.

4. Conclusion

This thesis embarked on a quest to answer three research questions: 1) in what ways Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat's China discourses have differed from one another; 2) what kind of discursive hegemonizing strategies have been utilized to hegemonize these different discourses; and 3) did bilateral exchanges between Finland and the PRC bear any effect for the China discourse. In this conclusion, I will reflect on three aspects, starting with a summary of how these questions were answered. Second, I will discuss my research process as a whole, including the "lessons learned." Lastly, I will briefly reflect on the horizons for potential future research.

Beginning with the first research question, Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat's China discourses were found to differ in a myriad of ways. Especially in 1950, Uusi Suomi frequently shared news that the ordinary people in the PRC were famished and discontented with their life conditions. In contrast, Työkansan Sanomat disseminated news that PRC nationals were overjoyed from enjoying the fruits of a rapidly developing and flourishing country. Besides the common people, Työkansan Sanomat focused plenty of attention on the CCP and Chairman Mao Zedong but faced the dilemma of portraying the Party as a strong and powerful entity, yet never aggressive and violent. Uusi Suomi frequently covered acts of Chinese communists' violence, especially if it concerned foreign Christian missionaries. Furthermore, Työkansan Sanomat sought to obfuscate the existence of a Nationalist counterforce in exile in Taiwan, whereas Uusi Suomi frequently included both photos and news from the island, and maintained sympathy towards Chiang's cause. Further, besides news texts themselves, photojournalism played a key role in how these two newspapers' China discourses manifested. Lastly, Uusi Suomi and Työkansan Sanomat's different relationships with the US, the UK, and the USSR, and the papers' different source hierarchies regarding these three countries, were found to have contributed to the differences in discourse.

Regarding the second question, the two papers were found to have applied several different strategies in order to hegemonize their China discourse. Especially in cases where a clear outgroup-ingroup dynamic was detected, these strategies were particularly easy to discover. Some of these strategies were extracted from the language itself: be it differing news headlines, lexical choices, extreme expressions, eyewitnesses, choice of opinion formulators, simplifying complex phenomena, consensus building, or metaphors. However, sometimes

detecting these strategies demanded a close comparison between the two papers rather than dissecting the language. This was the case when, for example, I noticed that one of the papers was omitting information that the other newspaper had included, or when the two papers included news information that contradicted the other. Indeed, a hegemonizing strategy was recognized to sometimes be a matter of linguistics, and sometimes more a matter of editing, omitting, or lying.

To answer the third question, exchanges between Finland and the PRC clearly influenced the China discourse. Chiang's government's decision to withdraw from the 1952 Helsinki Games meant that the PRC gained an uncontested position to speak and be visible in the Finnish China discourse. Considering *Uusi Suomi*'s previous active reportage from Formosa, I find it likely that the paper would have given an equally large, if not even larger, speaking room for ROC representatives in its discourse if both Chinas had participated in the Games. From this perspective, it was a lost opportunity for the Nationalist government. Although I cannot directly access the news reception at the time, I argue that the PRC representatives thanking and addressing their Finnish hosts in the media, and the photos of Finnish and PRC athletes playing together and posing for pictures, normalized the new regime in China for Finnish readership. Further, if not already by the 1952 Olympiad, then at the very latest by the 1953 cultural delegation visit and signing of the Finland–PRC trade treaty, *Uusi Suomi* and *Työkansan Sanomat*'s reporting showed greater discourse convergence than divergence, especially when comparing to the news coverage on the PRC in 1950.

Overall, the function of *Työkansan Sanomat*'s China discourse was to promote a Soviet-led communist world order. China was used as an example on how happy people were when they embraced the USSR as their model. Spreading news that did not fit into this function was avoided. The paper principally reproduced Soviet news agencies' China discourse, but the examples where the paper's journalists were accessing their news events first-hand showed the publication's independent interest in the people of a newly communist regime. On the other hand, *Uusi Suomi*'s motivations in its China news were less explicit and dogmatic, yet the paper's Christian values and ideological opponent, communism, dictated how the paper covered China.

Aside from the thematic context of China studies, I believe this thesis has served as a general example on how linguistic methods and CDA in particular can be applied to historical

research. It is not groundbreaking to match the two but underused. Not only do historical primary sources offer us insights into past realities, but also into *constructing* past realities. According to my experiences when creating this dissertation, historical secondary literature, which aids us to understand the context of these historical papers, and literature on CDA and analyzing language-use, which help us uncover the power relations and ideologies rooted in the discourse, complement each other well. Indeed, I share the sentiment that linguistic methods should have a firm place in the list of methodologies commonly applied to historically oriented research. More frequent use of linguistic methods ensures that we keep taking not only the past, but also the language of the past, seriously.

To be transparent, I was surprised by the number of China related articles that I retrieved only from these two newspapers. I had initially regarded picking two newspapers to study with a 1950–1953 timeframe as a rather conservative choice, but quickly realized that this was not the case. Despite limiting the number of articles that I ended up compiling to around 1200 based on relevancy and their connection to the discourse themes discussed in this thesis, the 1200 represent the majority but not all of the China related news pieces. Due to the large quantity of available data, I needed to downscale the news items to those that particularly addressed China first and foremost, thus some news items, for example items focusing more on Korea rather than China, had to be bypassed to keep the research feasible for a master's dissertation. However, I believe potential future research that could also highlight Finnish media's positioning vis-à-vis the Korean War, would be worthwhile.

As put by Eero Suoninen, differences are usually what makes discourse analysis interesting.²⁶⁹ Therefore, comparing a Finnish Communist Party newspaper with the National Coalition's newspaper, composed a fruitful primary data corpus. However, it is challenging to choose which news articles to select for analysis from such large quantity of fruitful data, especially because discourse analysis as a methodology does not bend well to early-stage hypotheses. That is, a scholar should definitely have research questions already thought out, but this does not ensure accurate prediction of what discourse themes end up emerging in the data. This also contributed to my challenge in limiting which articles to analyze and avoiding occasional overwhelm with the amount of data. Further, since Työkansan Sanomat's writing

²⁶⁹ Eero Suoninen, "Kielenkäytön vaihtelevuuden analysoiminen," in *Diskurssianalyysi: teorian, peruskäsitteet ja käyttö*, ed. Arja Jokinen, Kirsi Juhila and Eero Suoninen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2016).

is more dogmatic and engages in more aggressive rhetoric, I had to be careful not place too much emphasis on Työkansan Sanomat purely because Uusi Suomi's hegemonizing strategies were usually more implicit and thus demanded a more careful eye.

Therefore, based on these challenges faced during my own research experience, I assert it is crucial to do three things when analyzing large corpuses of newspaper data manually. First, to keep up a diary for listing themes that appear in the discourse throughout the data collection phase. This way, the eventual disposition of the research will become clearer and clearer the further the researcher digs into the data. Second, my suggestion is to always read the chosen newspapers simultaneously, rather than reading only one paper for a few numbers and then switch to the other. That is because I could have easily bypassed discourse disparities had I not immediately compared one newspaper with the other one from the same date. Third, since I could not set early hypotheses on my dialogue with the data, I always collected at least the title of each China related news item to a separate document. This way, I was able to return to these titles later, and keep a catalog of each paper's news coverage, and, for example, contrast Uusi Suomi's whole January 1950 news coverage with Työkansan Sanomat's January 1950 coverage. This felt sometimes tedious and prolonged the data gathering phase, but proved immensely valuable when moving on to the actual analysis and writing.

To conclude, Finland's positioning towards the PRC in different media outlets remains scarcely researched. However, I want to stress the importance of including Finnish media discourses – and of other countries outside the Anglosphere – to the wider corpus of historical China discourse studies, because although the Finnish discourse was partially subordinate to global news discourses and influenced by broader Cold War dynamics, still I have demonstrated in this dissertation that it is incorrect to assume that Finland's media discourse had no distinct and unique qualities.

My overall objective was to promote CDA as a method for research of history. Nevertheless, considering that Finland's official and mass media's positioning towards the PRC must have gone through new shifts since the Cold War world order, I argue that Finnish media framings of the PRC ought to be a timely topic both for historical and for more contemporary research. However, any potential, more contemporary research of media positionings vis-à-vis the PRC should benefit from my insights on how this China discourse in Finland has historically been constructed to Finnish readers.

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