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The voice of distrust? The relationship between political trust, online political participation and voting

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ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine how political trust is associated with participation in political discussions on social media and voting activity. We explore whether social media can provide platforms for those who are passive in terms of formal political participation. Our data were derived from a representative survey based on a sample collected in 2017 from the Finnish population register (N = 2470). Our key findings were that online and offline participation were highly linked to each other. Those citizens who participated formally by voting were also more likely to participate online. Moreover, we found a moderating effect of political trust on the relationship between online and offline participation. Therefore, we concluded that social media platforms also provide channels for political participation for individuals with low political trust who do not participate formally by voting.

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Introduction

During the past decade, scholars have debated the relationship between online and offline political participation (Halpern et al., 2017; Warren et al., 2014). There are contradicting views regarding whether social media strengthen political participation and supports democracy (Ceron, 2015; Lutz & Hoffman, 2017). Earlier research shows that social media can affect political participation through several mechanisms, including information benefits, political discussion, and cognitive elaboration (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Social media platforms allow citizens to engage with their offline networks and promote their group identities, which is a major explanatory factor for political behaviour (Valenzuela et al., 2013). We argue that the relationship between online and offline participation is also related to citizens' perceived political trust.

In this study, we first explore how offline participation, specifically voting activity, predicts online participation (i.e. political use of social media). Secondly, we examine the extent to which political trust modifies associations between offline and online participation. The study focuses on Finland, where trust in political institutions is relatively

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high and has not declined during the last decade (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016; OECD, 2017).

Social science researchers typically distinguish between the concepts of social trust and institutional trust. Social trust is based on positive expectations about other people's intentions or behaviour (Rousseau et al., 1998), whereas institutional trust relates to expectations about the functionality and fairness of societal institutions (Giddens, 1990; Hetherington, 2005). Trust greatly facilitates social and societal action; it liberates and encourages people to act without need to regulate all social aspects of life, which is reflected, for example, in volunteering and following governmental recommendations (Robbins, 2012). In times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 outbreak, high trust in institutions has been linked to lower mortality rates (Elgar et al., 2020; Oksanen et al., 2020).

In this study, we focus particularly on *political trust*, the central underlying premise of which is that political institutions and actors, such as parliament, political parties, and politicians, act and function in accordance with citizens' expectations. Bennett and Livingston (2018) argued that there has been a global breakdown of trust in democratic institutions, including mainstream media. At the same time, the number of alternative information channels has multiplied, which partly explains the emergence of a high volume of online misinformation. If citizens' confidence in political institutions is weak, they can seek solutions to societal problems through informal means of participation. To emphasise this, a number of studies have found that high political trust predicts people's tendency to engage in institutional participation such as by voting, whereas a low level of trust is linked to the use of informal methods, such as participating in demonstrations and boycotts (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999; Mattila, 2020).

In an era of diminished trust in institutions, social media platforms might provide users with alternative views and narratives to mainstream political news. Thus, it may appear to be a more appealing channel of political communication for those with lower political trust. Previous studies have found that social media consumption and exposure to certain types of content can undermine political trust (e.g. Ceron, 2015). However, we do not know if decreased political trust associated with non-voting can further encourage people to use social media for political purposes, such as sharing political content and participating in political debates. The main aim of this study is to fill this gap.

Before turning to the empirical analysis, in the theory section, we discuss social media as a political resource, as well as the relationship between trust and political participation. In the first part of the theory section, we focus more on the positive and negative resources that social media platforms offer for political participation. In the second part, we discuss the relationship between trust, distrust, and political participation. Then, we briefly present the study context, Finland. After the literature review, we formulate our research hypotheses. We then present our data, methods, and results. In the discussion section, we present the implications of our findings and consider potential limitations and further research settings.

Theoretical background

Social media and political participation

Participation in civic and political activities enables people to make their voices heard in public affairs, holds authorities accountable, and empowers people to act on their own

behalf (Verba et al., 1995). When political participation is channelled through social media networks, individuals can share their stories and be at the centre of their own universes. Investigations of the effects of network type confirm that weak-tie discussions are the strongest predictor of civic behaviours, and online networks entail greater exposure to weak ties than do offline networks (Baym, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). Similarly, social network size been found to affect participation so that individuals with larger social networks are more engaged in civic participation (Putnam, 2000; Son & Lin, 2008). Therefore, social media platforms that typically extend social networks enable individuals to become crucial catalysts of collective action processes as they activate their own social groups.

Previous studies have acknowledged social media's importance as a resource for political participation (Boulianne, 2015). As popular social media applications have become widespread in society among all sociodemographic groups, also in Finland (e.g. Ertiö et al., 2020; Koiranen et al., 2019), they possess a potential for increasing democracy and adding diversity to political discussions. Social media's significance arises from large social networks, which provide diverse information and political knowledge and offer new opportunities for political and civic action (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Gustafsson, 2012). In this respect, informal and mundane everyday political discussions on social media platforms seem to be important for the formation of political opinions (Ekström & Östman, 2013; Mascheroni & Murru, 2017). Social media also facilitates convenient, more flexible forms of participation (Boulianne, 2009; Gustafsson, 2012). Finally, it also facilitates connections with like-minded people, increasing social capital that is positively linked to participation (Steinfield et al., 2008).

However, despite multiple positive outcomes reported past research, social media and its algorithmic filtering have also been seen to indirectly facilitate political polarisation by affecting the information users encounter online (Bakshy et al., 2015; Levy, 2021; Spohr, 2017). Social media potentially break network ties, condensing people into bubbles of similar people that act as echo chambers, repeating similar political content from users to others (Boutyline & Willer, 2017). The echo chambers created by isolated networks reinforce already adopted beliefs and exclude opposing views by reducing also informational diversity (Kaakinen et al., 2020). Previous research has shown that politically active users in particular are more likely to network in identity bubbles shared with similar users (Koivula et al., 2019).

Social media is a widely useful mobilisation tool because it allows for the organisation of political activities of different target groups without significant financial investments (Youmans & York, 2012). The lack of restrictions on social media also means that content is rarely modified by social media providers, allowing for a relatively free dissemination of radical ideas and providing easy access to extremist views (Van Dijk & Hacker, 2018). This also means that social media is a critical tool for radical movements that seek to mobilise groups not present in the formal arenas of political institutions (Hollewell & Longpré, 2021; Thompson, 2011). In this context, trust may become an essential factor determining how confident people are that institutions will function as they expect (Hetherington, 2005). On the other hand, if there is no trust, people may prefer to use some more informal routes to participate. We will discuss mechanisms between trust and participation in more detail in the next section.

Trust and participation

Trust in political institutions is a significant element of democratic health. Overall, trust is higher in countries with stronger political stability and higher social trust (Rothstein, 2003). However, in societies where trust in institutions is low, approval of citizens' civic activities could increase transparency, which might in turn enhance their trust in the government and the justice system (Warren et al., 2014). Because citizens have become empowered through social media tools, they can demand respect and force governments in particular to listen to their opinions (Kirkpatrick, 2011). This was well exemplified during the Arab Spring, when civilians rebelled against their autocratic leaders and mobilised crowds to participate in demonstrations using social network sites (Choudhary et al., 2012; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). In this regard, recent evidence also indicates that extremist groups seek to exploit social media to expand their reach and credibility to achieve demarginalization (Ganesh & Bright, 2020).

Political trust appears to be associated with people's behaviour in consuming media, especially in their media choices (Ceron, 2015; Klein & Robinson, 2020). A comparative study of European countries showed that the media outlet from which political information is obtained is connected to political trust. Specifically, those who consume news from social media report lower levels of political trust than those who rely on traditional news media sites as information sources (Ceron, 2015). Similarly, a previous cross-sectional study conducted in Sweden has found that consuming traditional news media is associated with increased political trust (Strömbäck et al., 2016). This association has also been observed in the past before the rise of social media. Norris (2000), for example, developed the hypothesis of a 'virtuous circle' in which the news media are seen to create a positive image of political institutions, especially among those consumers who trust and are committed to the political system.

However, compared to traditional news media, the use of social media increases the likelihood of encountering 'antipolitical and antisystem information,' which can negatively affect political trust (Ceron, 2015). A recent study provides a more detailed view of the relationship between social media use and political trust by highlighting the importance of the actual content consumed on social media, particularly how this content relates to a person's partisan predispositions, as the same content can increase trust or distrust, depending on whether it supports a person's political attitudes (Klein & Robinson, 2020).

Although social media nourish the formation of interest groups and increase users' connectivity, as well as formal political participation, they may support the growth of groups based on distrust and spread alternative political information (Ceron, 2015; Hmielowski et al., 2014). There is supporting evidence that weakened trust, together with an abundance of media choices, partly explains why people increasingly reject traditional and mainstream media outlets and turn to social media for political information (Noppari et al., 2019; Turcotte et al., 2015).

Today, many formal political activities and political parties, for example, are essentially featured on social media. Therefore, it is expected that online and offline participation are strongly interlinked (Bode et al., 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). However, that does not obviate that social media can also act as an alternative channel to participate. We argue that political trust is a critical moderating factor because social media groups can serve as

a conduit for participation for those who do not trust formal political institutions and actors to function up to their expectations. It has been noted that diminishing political trust threatens the legitimacy of the governance system, which stimulates and motivates different protest behaviours through social media, especially in authoritarian countries where traditional media are heavily controlled (e.g. Bekmagambetov et al., 2018).

Past research has also well established that low political trust is generally associated with non-institutional participation in liberal democracies (Braun & Hutter, 2016; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999), whereas high trust predicts the likelihood of formal participation such as voting and contacting politicians (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). In this respect, social media can offer political options for those rejecting formal arenas for participation by challenging the political mainstream. For example, Facebook groups can be set up to push for societal change in protest against the dominant political hegemony (Sormanen & Dutton, 2015).

The case of Finland

The study focuses on Finland, a multiparty parliamentary democracy usually ruled by coalition governments. The six major parties are the Social Democratic Party of Finland, the Centre Party of Finland, the National Coalition Party, the Left Alliance, the Green League, and the Finns Party. The average turnout in national elections has remained relatively stable over the last two decades in Finland. The turnout in the Parliamentary elections has ranged between 67.9% and 72.1% in 2003–2019 (OSF, 2019a). In municipal elections, the lowest turnout, 55.1%, was during the COVID-19 period in 2021. In other Municipal elections in the twenty-first century, the turnout has ranged from 55.9–61.2% (OSF, 2021). The lowest turnout has been in the European Parliament elections, where 40.0-42.7% of eligible voters have voted during this century (OSF, 2019b).

In terms of digital media consumption, Finland can be regarded as a mature information society in which mobile phones, computers, and internet have been used extensively for more than two decades (Räsänen, 2006). In recent decades, various social media platform services have become popular, and they are also increasingly used for political activities (Koiranen et al., 2019). However, it is essential to note that the proliferation of online applications and services has not entirely reduced the differences between population groups in Finland (Purhonen et al., 2021). For example, social media use for political purposes is embedded within digital divides determined by educational level (Koiranen et al., 2019).

Finland is one of the Nordic welfare states. Previous studies have indicated that the Nordic model of universal services contributes positively to political trust (Mattila & Rapeli, 2018). Furthermore, prior research has shown that institutional performance measured by satisfaction with government performance and the economic situation explains the level of political trust in Finland remarkably (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016). In the last two decades, the right-wing populist party, namely the Finns Party, has become popular in Finland, as have populist parties in many other Western democracies (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The Finns Party has gathered support from the groups dissatisfied with the current political establishment and lost confidence in the political institutions and the mainstream media (Bäck & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2014; Saarinen et al., 2020).

The Finns Party has succeeded, especially in online environments, for mobilising voters who have lost confidence in mainstream parties and experience distrust towards political

institutions (Ylä-Anttila, 2020). In this context, however, it should be noted that the Finns Party has also become institutionalised as a central part of the Finnish party system, which is sometimes reflected in contradictions within the party, especially in the online environment (Hatakka, 2017; Hatakka et al., 2017). Therefore, as social media constantly provide new platforms for bringing out criticism, it is by no means clear that all online activists disappointed in the political system would be mobilised to vote for the populist party.

Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to analyse the relationship between online and offline participation as well as the moderating effect of political trust. By drawing on the existing literature, we develop three study hypotheses, which are then tested by using representative population-level survey data.

First, it has been proven that offline and online political participation are strongly interconnected (Boulianne, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; Min, 2010). Those who are already active in politics can take greater advantage of social media technology to organise their activities. This could mean that there is a strong cumulative effect in political participation. That is, the same individuals might participate in politics online and offline. From these starting points, *we hypothesise that offline and online political participation are strongly connected (H1)*.

Second, higher institutional trust has also had a positive relationship with active political participation and lower voter turnout (e.g. Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Mattila, 2020). Moreover, civic engagement on social media platforms seems to reinforce social trust among activists, who use social media to coordinate civic activities and, through this mechanism, increase trust in government (Warren et al., 2014). In this respect, we also predict that political trust is positively associated with online participation. Thus, our second hypothesis *is that increased political trust increases online political participation (H2)*.

Finally, based on earlier research, people who were less interested in politics but used social media for seeking political information often engaged in political discussion (Bimber et al., 2015). In addition, social media use increases accidental exposure to political information, which can expand users' knowledge about political topics (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016). Finally, social media can be seen as an informal way to bring out critical voices and possible distrust towards the current administration if one has a low level of confidence that politicians and political institutions will act as expected (Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Kaase, 1999). Therefore, *our third hypothesis is that low political trust increases political activity on social media among non-voters (H3)*.

Research design

Participants

We derived our data from a population survey conducted in Finland. The survey mainly asked about internet and social media use, as well as general attitudes towards digitalisation and political issues. Questionnaires were sent to 8000 18–74-year-old Finnish speakers who were selected from the Finnish Population Register Database using a simple random sampling technique. The survey was carried out in late 2017 and early 2018.

The respondents answered either by mail or by completing the questionnaire on the Internet. One reminder was sent to the survey respondents by mail. In total, 2011 respondents answered by mail, and 459 responded via the internet. Thus, our data consist of 2,470 respondents from Finland with a response rate of 30.9%. We addressed the age bias using post-stratification weights to balance the sample's age distribution to correspond to the official population distribution of Finnish citizens according to Official Statistics of Finland.

Measures

Variables related to online political activity were measured using four single items similar to those used by Koivula et al. (2019). First, we differentiated those users who only followed political discussion sometimes. After that, we classified as online participants those who had used social media to participate in political discussions at least sometimes. Then, we counted as online participants those who shared political content on social media at least sometimes. Finally, we defined as online participants those who created political content on social media at least sometimes. Overall, we had a variable with three categories labelled 1 'Not participating', 2 'Following", and 3 'Participating'. According to data, 25.9% of Finnish citizens participated politically, and 22.9% followed political content on social media.

For the first independent variable, we used a variable labelled 'voting activity,' which considered respondents' voting activity in the Finnish elections over the last five years. Our objective was to find the respondents who would never vote. In this regard, we took into account the voting decision of the respondents in three separate elections held in the short term: the 2017 municipal election, the 2015 Finnish parliamentary election, and the 2014 European parliamentary election. We combined respondents' voting activity for each election to create a single binary variable that measures whether a respondent abstained from voting in all elections. The four youngest cohorts (1996-1999) were removed from the analysis because they could not vote in each election.

Our second independent variable was political trust. During the operationalisation process, we followed the study of Schneider (2017), who pointed out that trust in parliament and political parties differed remarkably from trust in legal institutions such as courts and police, which are sometimes understood as components of political institutions (e.g. Hooghe & Marien, 2013). In addition, Norris and Inglehart (2019, pp. 272–273) used measurements that included questions about trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Accordingly, we focused on trust in politicians, political parties, and the Finnish parliament by asking respondents to present their opinions on a five-point scale that ranged from 1 (not trustworthy at all) to 5 (very trustworthy). In the analysis, we used a summed mean variable labelled 'political trust.'

The models also considered the effects of general social media activity, which we measured by considering users' activity on social network sites. We used general social media use as a control variable because earlier research shows that general social media use affects individuals' online political participation (Kim & Chen, 2016). Moreover, we also considered users' sociodemographic backgrounds by controlling for gender (three categories), age (in years), and education, which have recently been linked to Finnish social media users' aspirations to use social media for political purposes

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the applied variables.

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Online political activity	2,363			1	3
None		0.51	0.50		
Following		0.23	0.42		
Participating		0.26	0.44		
Voting activity	2,363			0	1
Non-voting		0.07	0.26		
Voting		0.93	0.26		
Political trust	2,347	2.64	0.81	1	5
Control variables					
Use of social network sites	2,333	2.51	1.43	1	5
Education	2,292			1	3
Primary		0.14	0.35		
Secondary		0.53	0.50		
Higher (at least Bachelor)		0.32	0.47		
Gender	2,359	1.54	0.50	1	3
Age	2,363	53.58	14.98	22	74

Notes: The descriptive statistics consider the cohorts that have been eligible to vote in the European Parliament 2014, the Finnish Parliament election 2015 and the Finnish Municipal Election 2017.

(Koiranen et al., 2019). The categorizations and descriptive statistics of the applied variables are shown in Table 1.

Analysis strategy

We began the empirical study by analysing the differences between voters and non-voters when predicting online political activity. Next, we analysed the association between political trust and online political activity measured by following political content and participating online. Finally, we considered the interaction between political trust and offline participation. In each model, we employed multinomial logistic regression and held the control variable (age) constant. Accordingly, we equated the models with each hypothesis as follows:

H1: $P(Y1,Y2) = X1 + C1..C4.$

H2: $P(Y1,Y2) = X2 + C1..C4.$

H3: $P(Y1,Y2) = X1 + X2 + X1*X2 + C1..C4.$

Here, Y1 refers to the probability of following political content, and Y2 refers to the probability of participating politically on social media. X1 stands for voting, and X2 represents experienced political trust. C1..C4 refers to the control variables age, gender, education, and social media activity, which we controlled for in each model.

We performed the analyses using the Stata 16 programme and presented the main results of the hypotheses as multinomial logit coefficients (B) with robust standard errors and statistical significances. To illustrate the interaction effect in a more interpretable and descriptive manner, we post-estimated the estimations as predicted

probabilities and showed them in the figure utilising the user-written coefplot package (Jann, 2014).

Results

The results of multinomial logistic regression analysis are shown in Table 2. Model 1's results supported our first hypothesis, as voting activity was found to be a strong predictor of political participation (B = 1.20, $p < .001$) and the following of political content (B = 1.13, $p < .001$) on social media. In this respect, social media platforms seem to be participation channels for those individuals generally engaged in the political system. In addition, the results revealed that younger, highly educated men and users who are generally active on social media had a higher probability of participating on social media for political purposes.

Model 2's results did not support our second hypothesis, as political trust did not increase the probability of political participation (B = -.09, $p > .05$) or following political content (B = .07, $p > .05$) at the population level. The effect of voting remained similar across Models 1 and 2. This indicates that there was no confounding effect of political trust on the relationship between online and offline participation.

Finally, we considered the interaction between political trust and voting activity in Model 3. Specifically, we analysed whether the effect of political trust varies according to participants' voting behaviour. According to the analysis, the interaction was statistically significant (B .78; $p < .05$) in terms of participation, so the result supports our third hypothesis. The effect was not significant when predicting the following of political content. The more in-depth analysis indicated that individuals who had higher distrust toward political institutions and were inactive voters had a high probability of online

Table 2. Likelihood of following political content and participating politically on social media by voting activity, political trust and control variables. Multinomial logit models.

	M1		M2		M3	
	Following	Participating	Following	Participating	Following	Participating
Voting activity	1.13***	1.20***	1.08***	1.21***	0.25	−0.52
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.77)	(0.94)
Social media activity	0.70***	1.11***	0.70***	1.11***	0.70***	1.12***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Secondary	0.38	0.79**	0.35	0.79**	0.37	0.80**
	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.30)
Higher education	0.57*	1.30***	0.53*	1.34***	0.53*	1.33***
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.31)
Female	−0.37**	−0.49***	−0.38**	−0.48***	−0.39**	−0.49***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Age	−0.03***	−0.02***	−0.03***	−0.02***	−0.03***	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Political trust			0.07	−0.09	−0.24	−0.80*
			(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.38)
Voting activity * Political trust					0.35	0.78*
					(0.31)	(0.39)
McFadden's Pseudo-R	0.21		0.21		0.21	
Observations	2,282		2,269		2,269	

Robust standard errors in parentheses Base category: None (online political activity) *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$



Figure 1. Probability of online participating according to political trust by voting activity, predicted probabilities with confidence intervals (95%).

participation. Conversely, political trust has no effect among voters. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 1.

Discussion

In this study, we found that those citizens who were active voters were also more likely to participate online for political purposes. In addition, our analysis proved that low political trust seems to be crucial factor behind online participation if the conventional participation through voting is unattractive. These people may refrain from formal participation because of frustration or disappointment but participate by producing political content and engaging in discussions on social media.

Drawing from Ekman and Amnå (2012), we suggest that social media provides an informal channel for those individuals who want to participate in political discussions on social media but do not participate in a formal way. If something triggers them to participate, they might become active online. There is evidence that social media increases users' exposure to alternative political content aimed at challenging political institutions (Ceron, 2015; Klein & Robinson, 2020), which may explain why people who do not trust politics to begin with tend to favour social media as their information source. In light of our results, it would appear that distrust can also drive participation and content creation if one is not engaged with a formal political system by voting. In this regard, it would seem that there is a vicious circle of distrust present in the political content of social media: distrust can increase with certain types of content consumed, and further, distrust can lead people to create new content.

Overall, our findings show that, in the context of contemporary Finnish political online discussion, two very different groups of people are represented. The first consists of citizens who actively participate formally by voting. Citizens from the second group have low levels of political trust, and they do not vote. We assume that these two groups at the opposite ends of the political trust continuum represent rather different political and ideological views. In this respect, political trust may partly explain why political discussions are likely to result in conflicts and become polarised (e.g. Tucker et al., 2018). As previous research indicates, low political trust leads to the use of alternative,

anti-political media sources. For such people, social media can sometimes become an echo chamber in which all sorts of fake news or disinformation spread effectively (e.g. Colleoni et al., 2014).

Our findings present interesting avenues for future research to study social mechanisms related more specifically to online participation. For example, we confirmed that education is a related online political activity. Previous research indicated that education is a significant predictor of voting activity and political participation (Lahtinen, 2019), political trust (Hooghe et al., 2012), and digital participation (Koiranen et al., 2019). Consequently, future research should pay more attention to the moderating effect of education on the relationship between voting and political trust when predicting online participation.

Naturally, our study has its limitations, which should be considered in upcoming research and when interpreting the results. First, our results can be sensitive to the non-response bias related to the fact that active voters generally participate in surveys more often. Past research has found that surveys can underestimate population differences in voting (Lahtinen et al., 2019). In this respect, it is also possible that our results underestimate the difference in political trust between non-voters and voters. Second, we concentrated comprehensively on *all social media* users, but we acknowledge that different social media platforms have different roles in political participation (Warren et al., 2014). For example, citizens increasingly use Facebook as a civic communication tool to gather, mobilise and organise information (Warren et al., 2014), whereas Twitter has become a crucial part of daily politics, especially among politicians (Koiranen et al., 2018). Finally, our data were cross-sectional and did not enable us to test causal inferences. We suggest that future studies utilise longitudinal data to investigate whether the effect of political trust on the relationship between voting behaviour and online participation exists between and within individuals over time.

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