

From ashes to international peace cities

Comparison of identity creation and development in Hiroshima & Nagasaki mayoral Peace
Declarations 1947–1990

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Abstract

Aim of this thesis is to shed light on the differences and similarities between Hiroshima and Nagasaki identity development after the atomic bombings. I analyse the discourses that the city mayors created in annual Peace Declarations held in the memorial ceremonies of the atomic bombings from 1947 to 1990. The memorial ceremonies are held on the days that the atomic bombs were dropped and are nationally and internationally recognized events.

I utilize discourse analysis to examine the Declarations. The term “discourse” has multiple definitions, but I adopt the definition of “an interactive, fluid processes of meaning making”. Ordinary people can influence the identity of a city but in this thesis, I focus on the official discourse created by the city mayors.

I found that both cities wanted to be known as messengers of peace. Nagasaki mayors said that peace movement started from Nagasaki because the city was the last atomic bombed city. Hiroshima mayors emphasized the city’s influence in the global movement for peace through an abstract concept of *Spirit of Hiroshima*. Nagasaki was left in Hiroshima’s shadow on the international arena, and in Hiroshima Peace Declarations the city’s international identity was emphasized in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s Nagasaki took a more aggressive role when challenging the government on the issue of nuclear weapons and compensation for the survivors. At the beginning of 1990s Peace Declarations of both cities started recognizing foreign victims of Japanese imperialism and foreign atomic bomb survivors.

Key words: Japan, atomic bombing, identity, communal memory, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, discourse analysis, peace.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Rise from the rubbles – creating new identities

During Meiji restoration Japan had made its goal to become like the Western nations – strong imperialist power. Outside threat of Western militaries and economies created a surge in nationalism and militarism.¹ Meiji leaders were convinced that their country was in danger of Western attack and that strong military and efficient government had to be established. The earliest of the reforms increased the government's authority.² Tensions between Japan and the United States had grown from the 1930s onwards as Japan started colonizing parts of Asia and the Pacific. Japanese officials expressed desire to free Asia from Western imperialism – ironically by colonizing the areas themselves.³ Eventually, Japan started military altercation with the United States and dragged the country into the Second World War by bombing the US navy in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.⁴

After years of bloody battles Japan received a final ultimatum from the US called Potsdam Declaration on July 26th, 1945. The document stated that the country would not be enslaved but treated justly. However, Japan would lose its colonized territories, militarists would be purged, and the country would be occupied. There was no mention of the role of the emperor which made Japanese officials suspicious. Japanese military personnels' identity had been constructed on the servitude and loyalty towards the emperor, and omission of the role of the imperial line from the treaty made them disregard the proposal.⁵ On August 6, 1945, the United States decided to end the war by dropping an atomic bomb which detonated about 580 meters above the city centre of Hiroshima. Around 70 000 people died instantly to the blast.⁶ Japan was given three days to surrender, and as the government remained silent, another atomic bomb was dropped onto Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. There are different estimates for the number of the dead. Approximately 70 000 people had died in Nagasaki and 140 000 in Hiroshima by the end of December 1945.⁷ According to John W. Dower considering the

¹ Beasley 1963, 155.

² Ibid., 135–136.

³ Ibid., 259.

⁴ Ibid., 270–271.

⁵ Jansen 2000, 657–658.

⁶ Okuda 2010, 28.

⁷ Okuda 2010, 27–32.

diseases caused by radiation the Japanese government estimates that total of 300 000 to 350 000 people died due to the atomic bombings.⁸

Even though the bomb dropped in Nagasaki was bigger and more powerful, it did not cause as much damage as the one dropped in Hiroshima. The bomb was dropped in Urakami valley where surrounding mountains buffered the blast and heat rays protecting the city centre. Nevertheless, large-scale destruction reached 2.5 kilometres from the hypocentre. Although the mountains protected people from the blast, the radiation killed people years after the event.⁹ The area was inhabited by many Catholic Christians and 8500 of 12000 parishioners died.¹⁰ The Nagasaki bomb had significant consequences to the Christian community in Japan, which has influenced the memory of the bombing. Effects of radiation were not yet known, and it was believed that nothing will grow in Hiroshima and Urakami valley for 70 years. Scientist expressed that the bombs had sterilized the areas making them inhabitable for decades.¹¹

The survivors have had their experiences documented over the decades. They tell similar stories. Many people woke up in rubble of collapsed buildings. Heat and blast from the bomb had peeled the skin of the people they saw. They saw bodies everywhere. They searched for their loved ones, sometimes finding them stuck under the debris. Some had to leave their loved ones behind as they could not lift the debris and the fires were closing in. They saw people wandering around looking like zombies with peeled skin hanging from their arms. Though the cities were reconstructed, and despite the predictions, plants started to grow again, the fear of radiation illnesses lasted for decades.¹²

The decision for dropping the bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been a debated question in US politics and historical research. The official US narrative has been that the bomb was dropped to prevent the invasion of Japan's main island, and the deaths of tens of thousands of US soldiers. However, the Soviet Union was about to enter the war against Japan, and many believe it is likely that the country would have surrendered soon without the use of nuclear weapons. The official US narrative comes into question even more when considered that the

⁸ Dower 1995, 48–52.

⁹ Diehl, 2018, 15–16.

¹⁰ Elmendorf 2011, 150.

¹¹ Diehl, 2018, 19–20.

¹² Casella 1989, 136–140; Selden 1989, xix–xxii.

bombing of Nagasaki happened before Japan's high command had time to assess Hiroshima bombing and Soviet entry to the war. From the 1960s onwards declassified documents have revealed that the US top-level policymakers hoped that the bomb would deter Soviet Union from expanding in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.¹³ The decision of using the bomb was not therefore only an issue of making Japan surrender.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became significant events for identity formation on a national level. Ran Zwigenberg points out that although Japan lost the war, it became a moral winner because of the bombings. Japan had become the "only A-bombed country".¹⁴ James Orr writes in his book *The Victim as a hero* that the idea of the Japanese as innocent war victims became first unifying myth after the war as the country got to claim leadership on global ban-the-bomb-movement.¹⁵ Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to be depicted as the symbols of Japan's suffering.¹⁶ The victim-narrative has been part of the reason Japan has had difficulties recognizing its war guilt, which has strained its relations with China and Korea over the decades.

Building of new identities begun after the war when Japanese cities started to design reconstruction plans. Hiroshima and Nagasaki officials believed that due to the special nature of the destruction in their cities they needed special assistance from the government.¹⁷ The direction for the development of the cities was laid down in the immediate years after the war. American reconstruction adviser John D. Montgomery was appointed for the position for about a month in 1946, and according to Ishimaru Norioki Montgomery's philosophy was to build Hiroshima as a city- and a monument of peace.¹⁸ Hiroshima city officials made a proposal for a special law to reconstruct Hiroshima as a city of peace. Getting support from SCAP was the only way for Japanese government to accept the law so the city officials approached General Headquarters directly. Eventually, Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law Central passed through the diet on May 10th, 1949.¹⁹

Chad Diehl explains in his book *Resurrecting Nagasaki: Reconstruction and the Formation of Atomic Narrative* that when representatives of Hiroshima and Nagasaki met in Tokyo to

¹³ Dower 1995 48–52.

¹⁴ Zwigenberg 2014, 26.

¹⁵ Orr 2001, 7.

¹⁶ Naono 2019, 341.

¹⁷ Diehl 2018, 14.

¹⁸ Ishimaru 2009, 829–833.

¹⁹ Hamai 1967, 153–168.

discuss the title of Nagasaki's reconstruction law on May 3 in 1949, Hiroshima city officials had already submitted a proposal to National Diet for the city to be built a "peace commemoration city". Swiftness of Hiroshima officials meant that they were able to dictate that Nagasaki should not be allowed to use the word "peace" in its construction law for in their view that would dilute of the meaning of "peace city". Diehl writes that Hiroshima officials even requested the Diet to deny Nagasaki's special construction law altogether. Despite Hiroshima's efforts, Nagasaki was able to have its special reconstruction law which became to be called Nagasaki International Cultural City Construction Law. The result of this dispute was that the two cities started building different identities.²⁰

Diehl writes that although there were many visions for Nagasaki's new identity after the bombing, municipal officials controlled the conversation and had the greatest effect on defining the city's future. The officials took inspiration from the city's past when Nagasaki was a port of international trade and cultural exchange. According to Diehl cherishing the city's international history was always a priority for the officials. Some survivors criticized the municipal vision which they thought ignored the memory of the bombing, but they were not organized or powerful enough to challenge the discourse created by the officials.²¹ However, the citizens approved International Cultural City Construction Law which emphasized the city's historical past in 1949 when staggering majority of people (98,6%) voted in its favour.²²

In 1949, the United States agreed to give the two cities all the needed resources for reconstruction. In Nagasaki, large amount of money was given to constructing of Christian buildings, which contributed to the international aspect of reconstruction. Peace Park, Peace Hall, and other facilities started to be planned and built in Urakami valley in 1951.²³

In Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was built near the hypocentre, and inside of it, Peace Memorial Museum was designed by famous architect Kenzo Tange.²⁴ In the 1950s city officials were talking about demolishing A-Bomb Dome, now an iconic symbol of the atomic bombing. It was only in 1966 that the Municipal Assembly voted to preserve the building.²⁵

²⁰ Diehl 2018, 13.

²¹ Diehl 2014, 498.

²² Diehl 2018, 35.

²³ *Ibid.*, 37–38.

²⁴ Norioki 2003, 97–98.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

In Nagasaki Mayor Tagawa Tsutomu approved the rebuilding of Urakami Cathedral in 1958 despite many anti-war and peace movements protesting that the ruins should be left as a symbol of the tragedy. The Catholics of Urakami wanted to remove the ruins and heal from the trauma by rebuilding the cathedral.²⁶

1.2 Research question and method

Commemoration ceremonies for the victims have become annual events which are broadcasted on national television. In the ceremonies Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors give speeches called Peace Declarations. In this thesis I examine the ways in which the mayors define their cities in those Peace Declarations and compare the two cities' development, identity creation, and history politics after the bombings.

The goal of the thesis is to map out and compare the development of Nagasaki and Hiroshima cities' identities in the context of commemoration of the atomic bombings. I analyse how the commemorations of the bombings have evolved in the two cities. The focus is on the official discourse created and recreated by the city mayors. I explore how the mayors define their cities and the memory of the atomic bombings in their Peace Declarations. Comparison of the two a-bombed cities has rarely been done. This thesis aims to shed light to the differences and similarities between Hiroshima and Nagasaki's identity development.

As primary source I use the Peace Declarations held in Peace ceremonies from the year 1947 onward in Hiroshima and from 1948 in Nagasaki till 1990. I limit the period under review to around the end of the Cold War and the end of the Showa period when international politics as well as the contents of the Declarations changed considerably. I use both the English translations and the Japanese versions of Peace Declarations. English versions of Hiroshima Peace declarations can be found on the city's website. For Nagasaki Peace Declarations' translations, I have used online translators DeepL and Google translate. The translations are not always great quality thus I use them only to understand the basic ideas of the speeches and use the original Japanese versions in the deeper analysis.

Previous research on Peace Declarations has mainly been done in Japanese. I use Kawano Noriyuki and Luli van der Does' article "An Empirical study of Hiroshima's identity in Peace Declarations and their English translations 1947–2018" where they use qualitative and

²⁶ Diehl 2018, 146–147.

quantitative methods comparing the Japanese versions and English translations of the speeches, and the mayors to each other's. I also refer to Okuda Hiroko's book *Genbaku no kioku: Hiroshima/Nagasaki no shisō* (2010). She explores the memorialization of the atomic bombings in a broader context from a national and international perspective. There is also a short section on Hiroshima city's webpage explaining the history of Peace Declarations. As for the literature, I use to contextualize the early development of the cities, most significant ones are Chad Diehl's *Resurrecting Nagasaki: Reconstruction and Formation of Atomic Narratives* and Ran Zwigenberg's *Hiroshima: Origins of global memory culture*.

I apply qualitative methods, specifically discourse analysis. For methodological literature, I use Miika Pyykkönen and Heli Valtonen's article "Diskurssianalyttinen historiantutkimus" published in an edited volume *Sanat siltana menneeseen: Kielelliset lähestymistavat historiantutkimuksessa* (2022). Pyykkönen & Valtonen write that discourse analysis is used to study how meanings are created in different social situations and contexts. *Discourse* has many meanings and definitions.²⁷ In this thesis I employ the definition of discourse as *an interactive, fluid processes of meaning making*²⁸. Discourses are created in social interactions and can change through time and space. It is possible for multiple contradictory discourses to be present in the same societies. Therefore, the discourses of the Peace Declarations which I focus on cannot at full length reveal the identities of the cities, for there can be multiple different ideas of what "Nagasaki" or "Hiroshima" means to people. Nevertheless, I believe that the Declarations give insight to the identities created and recreated by the city officials.

Discourse analysis is a methodological and theoretical package because it contains theoretical and philosophical assumptions about the world.²⁹ The most important theory for this thesis is social constructionism. Social constructionism means that our knowledge of the world is constructed in social processes. Utterances are not objective and neutral but are historically and culturally specific. Our views of the world are not objective, but we adopt conceptual frameworks from our societies.³⁰

I utilize the concept of collective memory. "*Collective memory* refers to complex social process in which a society or social group constructs and reproduces its relation to the past.

²⁷ Pyykkönen & Valtonen 2022, 43.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁹ Jørgensen & Philips 2002.

³⁰ Burr 2015, 3–10.

CM mainly refers to those cultural practices and social knowledge about the past that influence emergence, transformation, and extinction of social identities.”³¹ This means that identities are constructed through social interactions. Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are in their own part recreating and defining their cities’ identity through the memorialization of the past and planning of the future. Remembering the past gives people a sense of belonging to a group that has collectively experienced something – even if some individuals have not experienced the events first hand. The past becomes part of collective identity.

In this thesis I assume that mayors in their speeches repeat but also recreate the identity of their city. I do not assume that they can completely invent their cities’ identity from scratch as they too adopt ideas and perspectives already existing in their society. People in power do not live in a vacuum but are influenced by the world around them thus it is possible that the mayors’ ideas originally have been created among the ordinary people. To try to understand the whole picture of the cities’ identity development, one would have to analyse different actors. Due to the limits of the thesis, I have decided to focus only on the Peace Declarations. I assume that the mayors as politically powerful individuals can shape the identities of their cities but remain careful as not to overestimate their influence.

1.3 Peace ceremonies and Peace Declarations.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony is held in Peace Park. In 1947, first Hiroshima Peace festival was held in Nakajima Island, located in the city centre, in front of peace tower that was built specifically for the occasion.³² Peace Memorial Park was created on the spot in the 1950s with a cenotaph in front of which the ceremony begun to be held.³³ At the time the bomb was dropped, 8:15 am bells are rung for one minute after which mayor holds the Peace Declaration.³⁴ The ceremony has had many names over the decades. Okuda writes that first memorial ceremony in Hiroshima was held in 1946 with a name “Reconstruction festival”. According to Okuda the atomic bomb was praised as an instrument of salvation for the people. The event was renamed “Peace Festival” in 1947. There have been other variations of the name during the decades but after 1975 the name has remained Peace Memorial

³¹ Ijabs 2014, 991–993.

³² Zwigenberg 2014, 36.

³³ Miyamoto 2012, 133.

³⁴ Peace Memorial Ceremony, www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/english.

Ceremony (*Heiwa kinen shikiten*).³⁵ Nagasaki City holds Peace Memorial Ceremony in front of the Peace Prayer Statue at Nagasaki Peace Park. The event is also called Peace Prayer Ceremony which emphasizes the activity of praying for peace.³⁶ The audience is seated in tents and the ceremony is held in front of Peace statue which was installed in 1955. The statue is of a shirtless man with Buddhist and western influence intended to point humanity towards peace.³⁷ The national government has incorporated the ceremonies in the discourse of “only A-bombed nation” in their media coverage.³⁸

In 1947 Nagasaki citizens wanted to have a memorial event for the atomic bombing as well, but it seemed the city officials were more focused on making Nagasaki a city of trade and tourism. Citizens felt especially upset as the sister city Hiroshima was holding a grand peace festival on August 6th. Nagasaki’s officials decided to hold a “peace trade festival” from August 9th till 15th 1947.³⁹ First “cultural festival” was held on August 9, 1948, emphasizing the city’s identity as a city of cultural exchange. Many felt that the festival did not commemorate the bombing enough. After that the city has had annual ceremonies for commemorating the atomic bombing and it also built Peace Park where the event is held. “Atomic bomb” and “peace” were considered too much of a taboo by the city officials to be used in the Ceremony during the Occupation era. Themes of abolition of nuclear weapons and permanent world peace were only added after the Occupation ended.⁴⁰

According to Zwigenberg due to censorship the mourning of the dead was possible only through connecting the destruction with peace hence the names of the parks, ceremonies and museums having the word “peace” in them. In Hiroshima, some mourners were angry at how politicians turned their moment of grief into planning the future peace city.⁴¹ It seems that the Occupation guided the way the atomic bombings started to be memorialized and those practices have continued to this day.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony has become a notable event nationally and internationally. Over the years special guests have attended the ceremony. They include

³⁵ Okuda 2010, 156–157.

³⁶ Okuda 2010 164.

³⁷ Diehl 2018, 123.

³⁸ Okuda 2011, 18.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2018, 27.

⁴⁰ Okuda 2010, 164, 168.

⁴¹ Zwigenberg 30–34.

Prince Takamatsu and his wife in 1954 and many prime ministers such as Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1985 and Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996. Foreign visitors include Desmond Tutu in 1986 and United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1982. Nagasaki has been somewhat in the periphery when it comes to the remembrance of atomic bombings which is evident in the number of famous visitors. However, it has become common for Japan's prime ministers to visit Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony after Hiroshima's.⁴²

Memorial ceremonies have been held in Nagasaki and Hiroshima every year after they started except one. In 1950, the Peace ceremony both in Nagasaki and in Hiroshima was cancelled due to Korean war breaking out. In fact, all gatherings that could be interpreted as "anti-occupation forces" were prohibited that year.⁴³ The United States' fear of unrest and communism prevented the events from happening.

Peace Declarations are almost always held in front of Cenotaph for the atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park or in front of the Peace statue in Nagasaki Peace Park. They are read aloud to an audience after the time of the bomb detonating.⁴⁴ They are televised, streamed, and published in different newspapers across the world. In their spoken form the way different words are emphasized can affect the meanings of the message. The spoken versions might also be slightly different from the written ones available online. In this thesis, I analyse the written versions due to difficulties in accessing the video forms and because I am interested in the image the cities want to give to a wider international audience who most easily can access the written versions.

Based on the differences between Peace Declarations of different mayors, it seems that the mayors have had power in shaping the speeches. It is difficult to analyse which parts of the speeches are personal visions of the mayors, especially without having information on the philosophy and politics of each mayor of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Nevertheless, it is still possible to analyse the discourses that the speeches create.

Since 1974, Nagasaki Declarations have been made by a committee.⁴⁵ The committee consists of the mayor, academics, survivors, and representatives of peace movements.⁴⁶ Despite the

⁴² Okuda 2010, 169–170.

⁴³ Ibid., 169–170, 159.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 173.

⁴⁵ Okuda 2010, 169.

⁴⁶ Matsuura et al. 2014, 77.

speeches being planned by a group of people there is a recognizable style and content in the speeches of each Nagasaki mayor.

From Hiroshima city website translated Peace Declarations from the year 2003 onward can be found on Arabic, English, Chinese, Portuguese, French, German, Korean, Russian, and Spanish. The most recent Nagasaki Peace Declaration can be found on the city website translated to Chinese, English, Korean, Russian, French, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Dutch, and German.

Length of Hiroshima Peace Declarations has increased drastically over the decades. Kawano and Does tell in their 2018 research that the number of words in the Declarations during the years 1988–1990 was five times that of the 1954 Peace Declaration.⁴⁷ Based on my own research there is a similar trend in Nagasaki Peace Declarations.

Throughout this thesis I pay attention to how the cities' names are written in the Declarations. Japanese language has three writing systems. Okuda says that there seems to be a difference in memories depending on which characters are used to write “Nagasaki” or “Hiroshima”.

Written in kanji 長崎 and 広島 the names represent pre-war era and historical continuity.

When written in katakana Nagasaki ナガサキ and Hiroshima ヒロシマ are associated with atomic destruction and are often used in English slogans. Lastly hiragana is the first writing system learned by Japanese children. The cities' names written in hiragana ひろしま/ながさき give a nostalgic impression of a hometown.⁴⁸ Kanji is used officially in city names so it can be also seen as a neutral expression.

Below are the tables of publicly elected mayors of the cities after World War II till 2024. I have decided to write Japanese names the last name first, as is done in Japanese language.

Publicly elected mayors of Hiroshima

Hamai Shinzō	1947–1955
Watanabe Tadao	1955–1959

⁴⁷ Kawano 2018, 74.

⁴⁸ Okuda 2011, 11–28.

Hamai Shinzō	1959–1967
Yamada Setsuo	1967–1975
Araki Takeshi	1975–1991
Hiraoka Takashi	1991–1999
Akiba Tadatoshi	1999–2011
Matsui Kazumi	2011–

Publicly elected mayors of Nagasaki

Ohashi Hiroshi	1947–1951
Tagawa Tsutomu	1951–1967
Morotani Yoshitake	1967–1979
Motoshima Hitoshi	1979–1995
Itō Icchō	1995–2007
Tagami Tomihisa	2007–2023
Suzuki Shirō	2023–

I combine chronological and thematic structures in this thesis. The chapter 2 proceeds chronologically. I explain how the occupation affected commemoration of the bombings. I analyse how the censorship of the occupation is visible in the speeches and how it guided and restricted the way of identity formation of the two cities. I explore the ways Peace Declarations changed after the occupation ended and the themes that repeat in them. I especially note how the names of the cities are used when written in different writing systems and what they are associated with. I also discuss the past identities that are forgotten in the Declarations. Chapter 3 is written thematically. I focus on how Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors represent their cities in the Declarations through international and national politics. I

explore the mayors' diplomatic efforts in the United Nations to gain international recognition for their cities. I also examine how the mayors have occasionally positioned their cities against the Japanese government on nuclear weapons' issues and the treatment of survivors. Throughout the work I highlight the similarities and differences in the Peace Declarations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and contextualise them.

2 Recreation of Nagasaki and Hiroshima

In this chapter I explore Nagasaki and Hiroshima's identity development from the early days of rebuilding to the 1970s. I analyse how the bombings are depicted as a sacrifice in both cities' Declarations. In chapter 2.1 I argue that the occupation had a great impact on the early identity formation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I analyse how the occupation authorities affected the Declarations by restricting what was allowed to be said and favouring the American perspective of the events. The cities had to navigate in the climate of the beginning Cold War. I analyse the ways Nagasaki and Hiroshima Peace Declarations describe their cities and the bombings. In the case of Nagasaki, Christianisation is a key theme. With Hiroshima it is how with leadership of Mayor Hamai Shinzō the city profiled itself as the peace city of the world. In chapter 2.2 I investigate how the Declarations changed after the occupation ended. I analyse the Christian elements in Nagasaki Peace Declarations. I examine the ways the cities names are used in different writing systems and the meanings they emulate in the Declarations. Throughout the chapter I contextualize the Declarations by explaining about the significant events in Japanese society that influenced Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In chapter 2.2.1 I shortly discuss the pre-war era identities and histories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that are not remembered in the Declarations.

2.1 Limited possibilities during the occupation

Japan was occupied by Allied forces from its defeat in World War II in 1945 till San Francisco Peace treaty on September 8th, 1952. During the war there were plans to divide Japan into occupation zones as was done in Germany, but the beginning of Cold War and the observed difficulties in governance in Germany lead to the US implementing the occupation by itself.⁴⁹ During the occupation Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) had the total authority over Japan's government and its people. Controversial American military hero general Douglas MacArthur was assigned to the position of SCAP.⁵⁰ The abbreviation is often used to refer to the occupation authorities in general, as is done in this thesis from now on.

Americans wanted to make Japan a democracy. Most radical of all the reforms was the new liberal and democratic constitution that earned the nickname "Peace constitution".⁵¹ The start

⁴⁹ Togo 2005, 37.

⁵⁰ Schaller 1985, 8.

⁵¹ Tipton 2015, 205–206.

of Cold War changed the occupation policy and had lasting impact on Japan's democratisation and demilitarisation. While the purging of militarist ultranationalist officials and politicians from Japan's government was the initial plan, the focus of SCAP policy was soon directed at the Communists and alike. More than 200 000 individuals were purged from public office, but most remained in political outcast status less than five years. Hans Baerwald states that purges were not entirely successful because social order was prioritised as a complete purge could create "chaos, confusion and communism".⁵² The United States was concerned that the Japanese communists might create an alliance with the Chinese Communist Party.⁵³ The US prioritized its new Cold War anti-communist policies over pacifying and democratising Japan.

There was a widescale censorship after the war. However, SCAP did not censor all discussion about the atomic bombing but focused on what might create resentment in Japanese people. SCAP wanted to spread the American narrative of the war and atomic bombings. For example, towards the end of the occupation the officials allowed the publishing of Nagai Takashi's *Bells of Nagasaki, Nagasaki no kane*, which describes the bombing of Nagasaki. In the book Nagai depicts the bombing as a necessary sacrifice for ending the war, and he was also an anti-communist.⁵⁴ American censors added an appendix about Japanese atrocities in Manila in the book. This was to give context and justification for the atomic bombings.⁵⁵

Otsuki Tomoe writes in the article "Reinventing Nagasaki: The Christianisation of Nagasaki and the revival of an imperial legacy in postwar Japan" as well as in his doctoral thesis "God and the Atomic Bomb: Nagasaki's Atomic Bomb Memory and Politics of Sacrifice, Forgiveness and Reconciliation" about the Christian history of Nagasaki. Otsuki argues that American occupation had a significant role in making Nagasaki a Christian city whereas before that the Christians and the Urakami area were seen as "others". Christianity came to Nagasaki when daimyo Ōmura Sumitada welcomed Jesuits in his territory and converted to Christianity. He gave Jesuits the area of Urakami. Nagasaki became important city for international trade. Shōgun Hideyoshi Toyotomi begun to see the growing Christianity as a threat and banned its practice in 1587.⁵⁶ The Urakami area was a refuge for prosecuted

⁵² Baerwald 1977, 99–103.

⁵³ Diehl 2018, 101.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 97.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 106–107.

⁵⁶ Otsuki 2016a, 48–49.

Christians from the 1700s to the 1900s. Ban on Christianity was lifted in 1873 but Christians continued to be isolated from the rest of the population.⁵⁷

The atomic bomb was supposed to be dropped in the old city centre of Nagasaki but due to weather conditions it was accidentally dropped on Urakami valley. When learning about the mistake Buddhist and Shinto priests interpreted the atomic bombing as a divine punishment for the worshippers of wrong god and the “impure” *burakumin*⁵⁸ who lived in the area.⁵⁹

General McArthur believed that Japan needed Christianity to protect it from Communism and implemented Christianisation project around the country. Especially Nagasaki was given resources for building churches and Christian institutions. Nagasaki officials saw Christianisation of the city’s identity as a way to boost tourism and get funds from the Occupation authorities. The number of Christians did not rise a lot in Japan but SCAPs efforts of Christianisation influenced Nagasaki’s development into International Cultural City.⁶⁰

One can see a parallel between where the bomb landed in the cities and what role it has in their identities. In Hiroshima the bomb was dropped in the centre of the city, and it has become central part of its identity. In Nagasaki the old town and the international history with it was spared, and the bomb destroyed one area of the city. The atomic bombing became one area of Nagasaki’s identity, for Hiroshima the experiment became much more central. Of course, the development of the cities’ identities is a more complicated issue, but I find the spatial aspect of the bombings compared to the “place” of the bombings in the cities’ identities an interesting detail.

The effects of censorship were visible in the first Peace Declarations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Declarations were short and carefully worded and mostly focused on remembering the dead. Context of the bombing was omitted. Who dropped the bomb or why was not discussed. Perhaps the context was not deemed unnecessary as almost everyone present had lived through the events. Obviously, expressing any anti-American sentiments

⁵⁷ Otsuki 2016b, 395–399.

⁵⁸ *Burakumin* are a discriminated outcast group of ethnic Japanese whose status comes from premodern era. Their ancestors likely engaged in slaughtering cattle and other practices considered unclean in Buddhist belief. Aoki 2009, 182–190.

⁵⁹ Otsuki 2016b, 400.

⁶⁰ Otsuki 2016b, 400–411.

would have caused the city troubles, but the Declarations did not guilt Japan for the war or the bombings either.

According to Zwigenberg, Hiroshima was a city in ruins and faced severe financial difficulties. The officials took the course of trying to capitalize on the symbolism of Hiroshima in order to acquire funds for reconstruction. This resulted in officials favouring the transformation narrative over other possible explanations for the tragedy.⁶¹

First democratically elected mayor of Hiroshima was Hamai Shinzō in 1947, and he held the office for four terms in total, 1947–1955 and 1959–1967. He had a great impact on rebuilding Hiroshima as city of peace.⁶² Hamai’s memoir “A-bomb mayor – Warnings and hope from Hiroshima” was first published in 1967 and the English translation was published in 2010.⁶³ All his Peace Declarations were relatively short, but the first ones were especially concise. He wanted to have funding for rebuilding the city, so it is understandable he did not want to agitate SCAP by blaming the US for the destruction.

Kawano Noriyuki and Luli van der Does explain that Hamai’s Declarations often centred around mourning the destruction and loss of lives, but that he also expressed that the atomic bombing was necessary for ending the war. Hamai’s core message was one of reflecting on the sins of the past and building a peaceful future. In their study through linguistic analysis Kawano and Does made a list of 15 most used words of each Hiroshima mayor’s Peace Declaration. Hamai’s most frequently used word was *zaiaku* 罪悪 which means crime or sin but could also mean guilt.⁶⁴

In 1947 Hamai held a speech, in which he described the destruction. He stated that Hiroshima had become city of death and darkness right after the bombing. He then said that the atomic bomb has brought about a “revolution of thought”: Mankind has realized the value of peace. Hiroshima citizens were described striving for world peace. Hamai urged the citizens to become forerunners of a new peaceful civilization.⁶⁵ The identity of Hiroshima and its

⁶¹ Zwigenberg 2014, 24.

⁶² History of Hiroshima: 1945–1995 Part 22 Article 1.

⁶³ 「原爆市長」英語で出版 被爆と復興の歩み伝える, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun 4.11.2010.

⁶⁴ Kawano & Does 2018, 81.

⁶⁵ Hiroshima Peace Declaration 1947.

citizens as forerunners of peace was established already in the first Peace Declaration. This mission has continued through the decades to the present.

Hamai depicted atomic bombing as a lesson multiple times during his first two terms as the mayor 1947–1955. He believed that Hiroshima citizens should convey that lesson to the rest of the world. The lesson seemed to be that war during the atomic age leads to humanity's self-destruction, and therefore humanity should avoid all wars and strive for world peace. He did not say why the lesson was given to Hiroshima or by whom, which indicates carefulness around placing the blame on either side of the war.

In 1948 Hamai said: "Putting this lesson to practical use is the only way to give meaning to the sacrifice of those victims who are at rest beneath the earth, and must be the greatest contribution we can make to the welfare of all mankind."⁶⁶ Giving meaning to the sacrifice of those who died is depicted as a motivation for "learning a lesson" and spreading its message around the world. It is likely that in that point of time people of Hiroshima were still trying to grasp what had happened. To me there is something grim about calling the death of atomic bomb victims a "sacrifice". It gives the impression that the atomic bombings and death of hundreds of thousands of people were necessary. In the atmosphere created by the Occupation it might have been the most viable direction in describing the deaths. Hamai said that putting the lesson to use is a way to give meaning to the deaths of people but calling the deaths a sacrifice is in itself also a way to give meaning to them.

According to Okuda Hiroko those who died at the bombings are represented as passive victims in both cities' declarations but on the other hand as active "sacrifices" for greater good. Okuda notes how the word "victim" is written in the speeches. *Giseisha* 犠牲者 has a meaning of a sacrifice. According to her it carries a risk of glorifying their death as dying for the modern nation state.⁶⁷ Based on my analysis in Peace Declarations the word *giseisha* means "a sacrifice for the world peace" or "a sacrifice for ending the war" instead of dying for nation state. Christian elements in Nagasaki Peace Declarations suggest that "the victims" could be interpreted even as God's sacrifice for ending the war.

⁶⁶ original "この教訓を生かすところ、地下に眠る犠牲者の犠牲を意義あらしめる唯一の道であり、世界人類に対する最大の貢献でなければならない". Hiroshima Peace Declaration 1948.

⁶⁷ Okuda 2010, 178–179.

Nagasaki started rebuilding its identity slightly different to Hiroshima. The first Peace Declaration of Nagasaki was presented on behalf of the citizens of Nagasaki by Mizokami Tarō who was a vice-chairman of City Council in 1948.⁶⁸ In the speech he stated that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki ended the World War II, bringing peace to the world. He said that for this reason Nagasaki is the most impressive place in the world for it could turn around the tragedy. He continued that citizens of Nagasaki plead the world “No more Nagasaki”⁶⁹, that is, for the atomic destruction not to be repeated.⁷⁰ The city’s bombing was associated with the ending of Second World War. It is almost as if Nagasaki had agency to end the war.

There is a contradiction with the use of the city’s name. “Nagasaki” in kanji should be associated with the war ending but to the contrary in “No more Nagasaki” the city’s name in katakana is associated with the destruction and horror of the bombing. Difference in writing system used implies a difference in meaning. The difference in written form would not always be clear in spoken speech. In this instance the written form must have been obvious since the slogan was in English and foreign words are written in katakana in Japanese.

It is notable that the slogan “No more Nagasaki” is used already in the year 1948 Peace Declaration. According to Okuda Hiroko the more famous slogan “No More Hiroshima” was first used in an article by American correspondent for the UP News in Tokyo, Rutherford M. Ports, as he described the efforts of Methodist minister Tanimoto Kiyoshi in 1948.⁷¹ In Hiroshima Peace Declarations the phrase was not used until 1983, although similar sentiments were expressed before that. The usage of the slogan is interesting because it is an indirect way of judging the atomic bombing. From the occupier’s perspective it was a justified action. Hiroshima Declarations of the era do not express the same sentiment although it existed.

The theme of associating Nagasaki with the wars end continues in 1949 Declaration. Nagasaki Mayor Ohashi said that the history books of World War II should clarify that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki city ended the war.⁷² Nagasaki is written in kanji. Ohashi is implying that Nagasaki had a great role in achieving peace in the world. Instead of expressing

⁶⁸ Okuda 2010, 165.

⁶⁹ original “ノーマア・ナガサキ”.

⁷⁰ Nagasaki Peace Declaration 1948.

⁷¹ Okuda 2010, 158.

⁷² Nagasaki Peace Declaration 1949.

resentment for the bombing mayor emphasized that the bombing of Nagasaki was the last event of the war, and therefore the city should be associated with peace.

The special reconstruction laws are mentioned in both cities' 1949 Peace Declarations. Nagasaki Mayor Ohashi Hiroshi said that people of Nagasaki pledge that they will build a city of culture and peace and that the people will act as a driving force for peace.⁷³ After telling that the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law had been passed by the diet, Mayor Hamai stated: "We sincerely pledge ourselves to the creation of world peace and the culture of mankind to strive for a bright new age and the peaceful use of atomic power."⁷⁴⁷⁵

Tense national and international situation is best reflected in the fact that the Peace ceremonies were cancelled in 1950. *The Washington Post* published an article saying that Hiroshima did hold memorial services, but it was not called peace ceremony for the fear that Japanese communists would link the event with "Communist Stockholm peace campaign".⁷⁶ According to Chad Diehl, Japanese Communists criticised the atomic bombings but were silenced by the occupational forces. Thus, any critique of the bombings became associated with communism.⁷⁷ When Korean war broke out in 1950 SCAP ordered thousands of communist publications to shut down.⁷⁸ Despite the censorship it seems that it was still possible to publicly appeal for atomic bombs not to be used ever again. On July 17th, 1950, *The Washington Post* had an article about Hiroshima Mayor Hamai Shinzo urging for a nuclear bomb ban for Korean war during a world tour were he and other Japanese leaders spread their message for peace.⁷⁹

Uneasy situation is still visible in the 1951 Peace Declarations. Hiroshima speech of 1951 was called "Mayor's speech" instead of Peace declaration. Whereas Hiroshima speech of 1951 was shorter than the previous, Nagasaki's 1951 declaration was over twice as long as the previous ones. The name of the speech was still Peace Declaration but instead of the mayor Citizens Conference for Promoting Peace (CCPP) held the speech.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ HPD 1949, Official English translation.

⁷⁵ original: "世界各地の平和愛好者と相提携して原子力時代をして恒久平和と新たなる人間文化創造の輝かしい時代たらしめるべく献身せんことを誓うものである".

⁷⁶ Hiroshima Marks Fifth Anniversary Of A-Bomb. *The Washington Post* 07.08.1950.

⁷⁷ Diehl 2018, 127.

⁷⁸ Diehl 2018, 100.

⁷⁹ Hiroshima Mayor Urges A-Bomb Ban In Korean War. *The Washington Post* 17.07.1950.

Interestingly, right at the beginning CCPP brought up Japan's imperial war aggression. It is notable that the atomic bombing was placed in such context, as it is usually omitted in the Declarations.

“In the past half century, we, the Japanese people, have carried out imperialist aggression and invaded neighbouring countries in Asia by force of arms but the greatest of modern weapons, atomic bomb, ended the war.”⁸⁰

Nagasaki along with Hiroshima was said to have been a Japan's sacrifice and worlds testing ground.⁸¹ Here too the word sacrifice is used to describe the deaths of people.

CCPP presents a narrative that would have been favoured by SCAP. Influence of SCAP comes to question especially as the last year's ceremony was banned. The use of the atomic bomb was being justified by Japanese people's wrong doings. The atomic bombings were depicted as inevitable sacrifice in achieving peace. With the available information I cannot assess how CCPP wrote the Declaration and were there any outside pressures from the Occupation authorities. However, I doubt that SCAP was directly involved in making the 1951 Nagasaki Peace Declaration. It is possible that CCPP might have been influenced by Nagai Takashi's 1949 book *Nagasaki no kane* (Bells of Nagasaki).

Chad Diehl explains that Catholic leader Nagai Takashi's book *Nagasaki no kane* greatly influenced the Japanese public's image of Nagasaki atomic bombing. First publication came with an appendix of Japanese atrocities in Manila because General Charles A. Willoughby insisted it. According to Diehl, Nagai interpreted that the bombing made Urakami Catholics martyrs for a greater cause. Nagai saw atomic bombing not as a punishment but display of God's love. Nagai called it Urakami sacrifice placing the bombing into a Christian discourse instead of Nagasaki city discourse. Nevertheless, his work became a significant influencer of the popular memory of Nagasaki bombing.⁸²

At the end of the book Nagai presented his speech to be read in a funeral service of the victims of the atomic bombing. In it he stated:

⁸⁰ The original: “われら日本民族は過去半世紀帝国主義的侵略を行い武力をもってアジアの隣国を侵してきたのであるが、近代兵器の最高峰、原子爆弾によって戦争は終止符をうたれたのであった”.

⁸¹ NPD 1951.

⁸² Diehl 2018, 65–94.

“Nagasaki, the only holy place in all Japan—was it not chosen as a victim, a pure lamb, to be slaughtered and burned on the altar of sacrifice to expiate the sins committed by humanity in the Second World War?”⁸³

SCAP favoured Nagai’s antiwar, Christian description providing him with rationed printing paper, and making *Nagasaki no kane* a bestseller that influenced the public image of the Nagasaki bombing even after the occupation.⁸⁴

During the first years after the bombings, tourism was significant aspect in rebuilding the cities. Hiroshima tourist industry used the bombing as a resource. In the early years after the war many souvenir sellers had the word “atomic” in their names or in the products they sold. Zwigenberg calls tourist brochures made after the war Orwellian for they for example had pictures of wounded people and orphans. The city was in a way forced to turn to tourism as a means of gaining funds because 80 percent of its tax base as well as the industrial infrastructure was destroyed in the bombing. Memory of the atomic bombing was thus commercialized.⁸⁵

For Nagasaki the atomic bombing is one of the tourist attractions among others. The city has a long history as a port of trade and cultural exchange. Diehl argues that removal of the ruins by Nagasaki officials shows that their vision was to build international cultural city and that addressing the suffering caused by the bomb was never their top priority. One of the groups that had suffered from the bombing, the Urakami Catholics, supported the reconstruction of the city for culture, trade and tourism.⁸⁶

Hiroshima officials started quickly building their city into an international city of peace. By the end of the occupation era both cities had identified themselves as messengers of peace. Authority for their position was constructed slightly differently in the Declarations. Nagasaki was the last city to be bombed so it was interpreted that peace started from Nagasaki. Hiroshima was “given a lesson” through the atomic bombing and therefore had the duty of teaching the world about atomic annihilation and what war in the era of nuclear weapons could mean. Due to censorship during the occupation remembrance of the atomic bombings had to be connected to peace.

⁸³ Nagai 1949, 107.

⁸⁴ Diehl 2018, 95–118.

⁸⁵ Zwigenberg 2014, 39–44.

⁸⁶ Diehl 2018, 2.

All three Nagasaki Peace Declarations from this era were presented by different individuals and groups. It could be that the Declarations were also planned by the groups who presented them. Only one of Declarations was presented by the mayor. The Nagasaki Declarations, and perhaps the whole event, were still seeking their form. Hiroshima Declarations were all made and presented by Mayor Hamai, so they have a consistent form and content.

Early Declarations depicted the deaths from atomic bombings as a sacrifice. The word that it was necessary thing for the war to end. The American perspective. There was no room for expressing resentment towards the winners of the war. However, it can also be interpreted as the citizens themselves giving a purpose for the deaths in their mourning. Discourse that Nagasaki is pleading to the world, humanity's love and wisdom, to create peace. Active role in shaping world based on their experience of the bombing. Because Nagasaki's atomic bombing was the last event of the war, and made Japan surrender, Nagasaki has become a place of peace and supposedly had a power to bring peace even in the future.

2.2 Development after the occupation

The occupation officially ended in San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8th, 1952. However, the US maintained a right to maintain bases in Japan.⁸⁷ The end of the occupation did not cause any surge in anti-American perspective in the Peace Declarations. There was still no blame placed on anyone for the atomic bombings or the war itself. The influence of the United States was strong in the country, and it had become friendly ally to Japan. Perhaps there was still no room for such critique in the Declarations during the 1950s.

According to Okuda Nagasaki Peace Prayer Ceremony began to be held in grand manner only after the occupation ended. She suggests that the cautiousness of Nagasaki during occupation era might have been influenced by cautiousness that had developed to many of the citizens living in an atmosphere where they had to hide their Christianity.⁸⁸ However, this interpretation comes to question when considering that most of Nagasaki citizens were not Christian and as previously discussed the Christian identity of Nagasaki was created after the war. Perhaps the city did not feel like investing on a memorial ceremony because the atomic bombing was not seen as essential to the identity of the city, and remembering the destruction

⁸⁷ Tōgō 2015, 212.

⁸⁸ Okuda 2010, 165.

of the atomic bomb might upset the Occupiers. Nevertheless, the ceremony developed into an important event in the city after the occupation.

Hiroshima Mayor Hamai used an expression that could be interpreted as accusatory in his 1953 Peace Declaration. In the official English translation, it seems that Mayor Hamai said that the bombing caused a crime. In the translation he said: “the scars of the crime perpetrated by that single bomb still linger among us.”⁸⁹ In the original version Hamai said that the bomb *left behind* scars of crime/sin (*zaiaku*) and not that it perpetrated them.⁹⁰ The past tense verb he used *nokoshita* means left behind thus the English translation gives perhaps a wrong impression on what Hamai said. The translation could be interpreted that Hamai accused the bomber although in the sentence the bomb is the agent creating scars of crime instead of the United States. He continued that the scars remind of the terror of war and that the lesson is not to use these weapons against each other’s. The sentences are ambiguous, but they could be interpreted that the people who experienced the bombing carry the scars of crime with them and that war itself is a crime. It could also be that Hamai wanted to express some sort of anger towards the atomic bombing, and this way was indirect enough for the political climate.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki started gaining more visibility in Japan after Japanese fishing boat was hit by radioactive fallout from the US hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean on March 1954. The crew experienced acute radiation symptoms and one of the members died in September same year. This caused a controversy and exposed the Japanese public to the effects of radiation. The government quickly established aid for the crewmembers. The victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki started gaining more sympathy from the public. Hiroshima and Nagasaki expressed dissatisfaction on how quickly the government was willing to help the crew of Lucky Dragon but the victims of atomic bombing in Nagasaki and Hiroshima had had little aid. The cities started lobbying the government which eventually led the government to create research and treatment funds for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims.⁹¹

After the Lucky Dragon incident, Hiroshima Mayor Watanabe Tadao (1955–1959) started to request the government to help the victims of the bombings in Peace Declarations. Watanabe

⁸⁹ HPD 1953, Official English translation.

⁹⁰ original: “しかも 1 個の原子爆弾がのこした罪悪の痕は、いまなお、消えるべくもなく続いている。” HPD 1953.

⁹¹ Naono 2019, 341–345.

brought up the survivors and their medical struggles in the 1955 Declaration: “Six thousands [sic] of those who are suffering from A-bomb aftereffects are not still entitled to receive a proper medical treatment and are struggling against a hard life. Furthermore, ninety-eight thousands [sic] of survivors are incessantly threatened by the anxiety that they might be contracted with the A-bomb disease.”⁹² Watanabe was also the first Hiroshima mayor to advocate for the ban of atomic and hydrogen bombs.⁹³ Experience and ongoing struggles of the survivors were present in Hiroshima Peace Declarations from 1955 onwards even though there were not always explicit requests for government aid.

For some reason there is no similar shift in Nagasaki Mayor Tagawa’s Peace Declarations. Survivors struggles for medical aid are not mentioned during the era. He said Nagasaki citizens have been awakened and were determined to lead the way in peace and called for creation of world based on ethics and love. During his terms Nagasaki Mayor Tagawa Tsutomu often expressed that the world should be build following the principles of love, ethics, and justice. “Wisdom of humanity” is also an expression he repeated in his Declarations.⁹⁴ The experience of atomic bombing was presented as a past event and that the only thing left was mental anguish, that was mostly turned into a positive strive for peace.

There were occasionally some Christian elements in Nagasaki Peace Declarations. In 1957 Nagasaki Mayor Tagawa said that the citizens were “baptized in karmic suffering and misery”⁹⁵ and were working towards become “holy apostles for lasting peace”⁹⁶. It is notable that in the 1957 Declaration Tagawa used plenty of religious words which were not present in his other declarations. Overall Nagasaki Peace Declarations of the time are not particularly religious. However, occasional presence of religious words while knowing the influence of *Nagasaki no kane* shows that they had become a significant part of the discourse.

Mayor Morotani Yoshitake used the word baptism twenty-one years later. In 1978 Mayor Morotani begun his Declaration by saying “Today marks the 33rd year since we were baptized by that abhorrent atomic bomb.”⁹⁷ The expression he used, *senrei wo ukeru*, means

⁹² NPD 1955, Official English translation.

⁹³ Kawano & Does 2018, 83.

⁹⁴ NPD 1954–1964.

⁹⁵ “業苦と悲惨の洗礼を受けた長崎市民...”.

⁹⁶ “われら長崎市民は、(...) 恒久平和実現の聖なる使徒たらんとの素志を新たにする (...)”.

⁹⁷ NDP 1978. Original “あの恐ろしい原爆の洗礼を受けてから、今日ここに三十三年目を迎えた...”.

to be baptized or to receive a baptism. The mayor probably did not mean that the city was made part of Christian church by the atomic bombing but used baptism in a more figurative manner. The expression is likely used to indicate that something significant happened that changed the course of the city. The term does not necessarily have a Christian meaning although it is associated with it. I am unsure if Mayors Tagawa and Morotani were Christians themselves. Nevertheless, the usage of such expression continues the discourse Nagai Takashi created in his work.

Some Hiroshima Declarations also have the term “sacrifice”. Hamai had used it during his first terms. In 1957 Hiroshima Mayor Watanabe Tadao said “As we stand today before the Cenotaph symbolizing the costly sacrifice offered by those who perished in the disaster (...)”⁹⁸. It is unlikely that costly or precious sacrifice *tōtoi gisei* had any reference to sacrificing for the Christian god or necessarily to any god. According to jisho.org -web dictionary the word *gisei* is used to refer to a casualty or a victim. In the example sentences there is a sentence where “*gisei ni suru*” to victimize is used in a context of “at a cost of something”, “People usually become famous at the cost of their privacy.”⁹⁹ Thus the word *gisei* has multiple meanings. Much like in English language, “sacrifice” does not always have a religious meaning. It is possible that in some instances even in Nagasaki Declarations the word was not used in a Christian context. However, the term was not often used and was absent in the later decades’ Declarations of both cities.

The year 1960 was turbulent in Japan. US-Japan Security treaty was being revised in 1960 for US military to be allowed to use facilities in Japan. New addition to the treaty was made that obligated the US to defend Japan in a possible conflict. The treaty was opposed hard by the opposition which feared that Japan might be dragged into American imperialist warfare.¹⁰⁰ The renewal was seen as exposing Japan to the threat of nuclear warfare as the U.S. would have permanent stations in Japan and would incorporate Japanese Self Defence Force into American nuclear strategy in East Asia.¹⁰¹ The revision met a lot of resistance in the Diet and prime minister Kishi decided to push the vote through. After Socialist Party members had tried to block the speaker of lower house from leaving his office and had been forcibly

⁹⁸ Hiroshima Peace Declaration 1957, Official English translation. Original: “われわれは本日、原爆死没者の払った尊いぎせいを象徴するこの慰霊碑の前に立って...”.

⁹⁹ “人は通常、自分のプライバシーを犠牲にして有名になる”.

¹⁰⁰ Togo 2010, 60–62.

¹⁰¹ Naono 2018, 228.

removed by the police, Kishi pushed his way through to the lower house rostrum and called a vote while the opposition was not present. The revision was passed through the lower house. This undemocratic way of handling the situation caused an uproar, and while the treaty itself received criticism the protests were also directed towards the prime minister. The country saw its history's largest protests with approximately 30 million people taking part. On June 10th protesters blocked a car carrying the U.S. ambassador and President Eisenhower's press secretary, who eventually had to be rescued by a helicopter. On June 15th when students broke into the diet building and police drove them away, one of the students was trampled to death. The US President Eisenhower's visit to Japan had to be embarrassingly cancelled last minute due to security concerns. The protests died out in July when prime minister Kishi resigned.¹⁰²

The troubled times continued. On August 6th, 1963, Hiroshima Peace Park was stage of violent battle between the police and students protesting Japanese Communist Party's resistance on nuclear test ban treaty during Ninth World Conference Against Nuclear Weapons. The incident caused an outcry in the citizens and hibakusha who felt that the sanctity of the park had been defiled. Many expressed that the park should not be used for political event at all, and the city prohibited political parties to hold events in the park in 1964.¹⁰³

The mayors did not speak about the political disputes in Peace Declarations of the time. Compared to the future decades the Declarations rarely commented on current events in the 1960s. Regarding the security treaty revision, Mayor Hamai was an independent liberal¹⁰⁴ so it might have been that he did not oppose the treaty and thus did not comment on it. It is also very likely that Peace Declarations were not seen as an appropriate place to comment on such dividing issues. It seems that Hamai did not feel that the ceremony was a place to comment on domestic politics and wanted to dedicate it just for remembrance and opposing the spread and development of nuclear weapons.

In his third and fourth term (1959–1967) Mayor Hamai commented more on international issues in his Peace Declarations. In 1963 he said, “we have kept appealing to the people of the world for the past eighteen years that the tragedy of Hiroshima should never be allowed to repeat itself.” Tragedy of Hiroshima is written in kanji “広島の悲劇”. The city's name does

¹⁰² Kapur 2020, 1–8.

¹⁰³ Zwigenbreg 2013, 121–122.

¹⁰⁴ Zwigenberg 2013, 126.

not itself mean the atomic bombing but is still associated with it. As previously mentioned, when written in different writing systems of the Japanese language the city's names tend to hold different meanings. Written in kanji the city's name is associated with pre-war era and historical continuity. In this example however the name in kanji is associated with the atomic bombing.

In the quotation above, Hamai also emphasized how the city and its citizens have been active in trying to prevent another nuclear bombing and that they were united in trying to achieve abolition of nuclear weapons. He continued by expressing slight optimism about the pact for partial banning of nuclear weapons concluded between the US, the UK, and Soviet Union. In his last two Peace Declaration in 1965 and 1966 Hamai warned that war in nuclear age means suicide and that Hiroshima's appeal was the abolition of nuclear weapons and complete renunciation of all war.¹⁰⁵

There is a significant and clear development in Mayor Hamai Shinzō's Peace Declarations. The contents of the Declarations had moved from the first carefully constructed words about world peace to condemning wars that the US was taking part on. Although the after-war censorship and political tension ending played a role, towards the end of his terms as mayor Hamai had also gained experience as a politician and had exported the Hiroshima message across the world. Hiroshima was a city that was concerned about worldwide affairs, especially those that the United States and other powerful nations were taking part in. The city was actively trying to influence the people of the world and politicians to create peace for mankind through abolition of nuclear weapons and renouncing war.

During the 1970s and 1980s remembering the past tragedy became less important in Hiroshima Peace Declarations and focus was on the present and future. As the Declarations grew longer more time was given to the efforts of peace making and commenting current events. Hiroshima Mayor Yamada Setsuo was the first mayor to include "Hiroshima" written in katakana in his Peace Declarations. He commented on international issues in his Declarations such as Vietnam war and was the first Hiroshima mayor to call peace a fundamental human right.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ HPD 1964–1966.

¹⁰⁶ Kawano & Does 2018, 84.

The mayors use slogans and expressions to define their cities. Mayor Yamada Setsuo defined “the heart of Hiroshima” in 1973 Peace Declaration after saying that photographs of bombed Hiroshima had been recently released. He said that: “The impact of these [photographs] has resulted in a renewed intellectual and emotional realization of the hatred of war and desire for peace that form ‘the heart of Hiroshima’.”¹⁰⁷ The phrase “heart of Hiroshima” is written in katakana ヒロシマの心. In later Peace Declarations the phrase is translated as “Spirit of Hiroshima”. In 1977 Mayor Araki said: “Peace - the spirit of Hiroshima. Hiroshima has been constantly labouring in pursuit of peace.”¹⁰⁸ Whereas western philosophy divides human into body and mind, the Chinese concept of heart combines the two. Heart is the source of emotion and thought in Chinese culture.¹⁰⁹ Japan having been influenced by China for hundreds of years has similar concept of heart. In Japanese the symbol *kokoro* 心 has the meaning of a heart but is used to indicate what we would call a spirit, mind, or soul. The organ itself is called *shinzō* 心臓.

Interestingly right after describing “Spirit of Hiroshima” in 1973 Declaration, Mayor Yamada said that “Hiroshima” should not be repeated.¹¹⁰ In this sentence Hiroshima is also written in katakana. This is the most obvious example of the name of the city having multiple meanings even when written in the same characters. *Spirit of Hiroshima* is meant to describe the core meaning of the city. Hiroshima is a symbol of peace but also it is a feeling that can take over someone’s mind so that they realize the value of peace. On the other sentence “Hiroshima” means atomic destruction. It is a hell realized on earth. This sort of double meaning is inevitable. Because the city is well-known for the atomic bombing all around the world, its name evokes image of a mushroom cloud. Using “Hiroshima” this way is rhetorically strong expression that evokes those perceptions and images in people’s minds. However, Hiroshima has not wanted to build its whole identity on the destruction and suffering of the people thus the name of the city is also used in a more positive association of peace.

¹⁰⁷ HPD 1973, Official English translation.

¹⁰⁸ HPD 1977, Official English translation. Original: “平和、それはヒロシマの心である。ヒロシマは平和を求めつづけてきた。”

¹⁰⁹ Yu 2009, xiii.

¹¹⁰ HPD 1973.

Mayor Araki used Hiroshima in katakana to express the atomic destruction in 1982 Peace Declaration. He said “Hiroshima is not merely a witness of history. Hiroshima is an everlasting warning for the future of mankind. If Hiroshima is ever forgotten, it is evident that the evil will be repeated and human history be brought to an end.”¹¹¹ All the “Hiroshimas” are written in katakana. This example highlights the multiple meanings of katakana Hiroshima ヒロシマ. In the first sentence the city is the actor, but in the latter two the name of the city means the atomic bombing and the destruction, Hiroshima is a historical event.

Nagasaki mayors do not use the name of the city in different writing systems as much in their Peace Declarations as Hiroshima mayors do, but there are still some slogans and expressions where the city’s name is used. In 1958 Peace Declaration Tagawa Tsutomu said the slogan “Peace begins in Nagasaki” “平和は長崎から”. The mayor continued that Nagasaki citizens will do their best to establish world peace as the pioneers of lasting world peace.¹¹² The slogan refers to the interpretation of history that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki ended the Pacific war, which was emphasized in the first Peace Declarations. The slogan also highlights the city’s efforts in creating world peace, and it is used still to this day. The name of the city is written in kanji which highlights the city’s current efforts. If the name was in katakana, it would more clearly mean that peace came from the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. The slogan emphasizes the citizens current efforts in establishing peace and being “the pioneers of peace”.

In another instance katakana version of the city name is used. In 1979 Mayor Motoshima used an expression “Nagasaki of that day” “あの日のナガサキ” in which the name of the city is written in katakana. He said that “Nagasaki of that day” should never be repeated on earth.¹¹³ From 1986 onwards Motoshima started Peace Declarations by addressing first Japan and then the world and pleading for them to hear “the voice of Nagasaki”. Nagasaki was written in katakana. The voice of Nagasaki was the message of peace that the people of Nagasaki had been trying to spread to the world.

When studying the connections of the words in Hiroshima Peace Declarations Kawano and Does note that Hiroshima in kanji is related to peace, humankind, and the world whereas

¹¹¹ HPD 1982, Official English translation.

¹¹² NPD 1958.

¹¹³ NPD 1979.

Hiroshima in katakana is related to nuclear weapons, victims, and experience of the bombing.¹¹⁴ However, in the expression *Spirit of Hiroshima* the city name in katakana is connected to peace. Kawano and Does research general trends in their paper, but closer inspection shows that ヒロシマ can be used in the context of the atomic bombing as well as peace. Based on my analysis Nagasaki in katakana is used similarly to Hiroshima in katakana, but it is used less frequently than Hiroshima in Hiroshima Peace Declarations. Using different writing systems is ultimately a rhetorical tool that is mainly targeted towards the Japanese audience, and it might be that the usage was not always carefully thought through. At some point certain writing systems in certain contexts and expressions came to be the custom.

Responsibility of the bombings was usually ignored in the speeches, but there were some exceptions. In his first Peace Declaration in 1979 Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima wondered why the responsibility of a bombing is being ignored and said that “we are angry”.¹¹⁵ It is unclear if he was blaming the US or Japanese government for the bombings since neither is mentioned. However, in 1991 he criticised an unnamed US senior official for defending the atomic bombings. Motoshima said that the citizens complain in anger and called the bombings genocide and against international law.¹¹⁶ Although the United States was never directly accused the tone of the Declarations mentioned was still accusatory.

Overall, Nagasaki mayors expressed more anger in the Peace Declarations than Hiroshima mayors did. In 1967 Mayor Morotani said that we Nagasaki citizens feel strong anger and hatred towards production, possession and testing of nuclear weapons for the purpose of destruction and killing.¹¹⁷ In 1973 Morotani stated that when we Nagasaki citizens think about the devastation of the atomic bombing, we feel a new sense of resentment and indescribable sadness.¹¹⁸ Although Hiroshima Mayor Yamada criticizes the development of nuclear weapons and human rights’ violations he did not outwardly state negative emotions in the way that Mayors Morotani and Motoshima did. He did not express any resentment or anger for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. It is worth a mention that Morotani did not express anger in all his Declarations, and he did not blame anyone for the atomic bombing of the city.

¹¹⁴ Kawano & Does 2018, 78–80.

¹¹⁵ NPD 1979.

¹¹⁶ NPD 1991.

¹¹⁷ NPD 1967.

¹¹⁸ NPD 1973.

However, the expressions that were there showcase that it was possible to convey such emotions in Peace Declarations.

It is noteworthy that the cities do not acknowledge each other in the early Peace Declarations despite being the only two cities experiencing atomic bombing and having the same mission of abolishing nuclear weapons. CCPP mentioned Hiroshima in 1951 Nagasaki Peace Declaration but after that there were no mentions of the sister city for two decades. Nagasaki is first mentioned in Hiroshima Peace Declaration in 1975, when Mayor Araki said that the city is joining Nagasaki to renew their determination to establish true world peace.¹¹⁹ Nagasaki Mayor Morotani likewise said at the end of the 1975 Nagasaki Peace Declaration that the city is deepening its co-operation with Hiroshima.¹²⁰ It took 30 years from the bombings for there to be a mention of the other a-bombed city in Hiroshima Declarations. There was a 24-year gap in mentions of Hiroshima in Nagasaki Declarations. This does not of course mean that there had not been any contact or joint efforts previously.

It could be interpreted that the mayors did not mention the other city because the city's identity was threatened by the other. Especially knowing the competition with regards to special construction laws, it might be that similar competition continued even after the laws passed. Both cities seemed to want to emphasize their role in creating world peace and ignored the efforts of the other in the Declarations. Perhaps the Peace Ceremonies were also intended to be events for the in group of citizens to remember their own struggle and their own dead relatives and reaffirm their identity and mission going forward. Although the cities wanted to give a universal message it seems that their own citizens were the most important audience.

2.3 The forgotten past

When it comes to communal memory there are also events from the past that are forgotten. This is inevitable since past is full of bigger and smaller events that are not considered important for whatever reason and thus there are not communally remembered through memorial days, -events nor statues. Issues arise when a collective forgets the pain and suffering it caused to others while the victims remember it very well.

¹¹⁹ HPD 1975.

¹²⁰ NPD 1975.

Japan has for decades been accused of historical amnesia when it comes to its imperialist past. Although Japanese politicians have made apologies and have given financial compensation to countries and groups of people, those who remember the atrocities have not felt that Japan is sincere in its apologies. After San Francisco Peace treaty Japan paid reparations to South-east Asian countries but the money was not used as a compensation for the damage caused but economic co-operation was prioritized. Thus, the money supposed to compensate for Japanese imperialism was used to help boost Japan's economy.¹²¹ Visits by prime ministers and other high officials to Yasukuni shrine that has enshrined Japanese class A war criminals has created tensions between Japan and its East-Asian neighbours. Korea and China interpret the visits as the officials justifying Japan's past actions.¹²²

Japanese colonial and imperial past were mostly absent in the Peace Declarations apart from Nagasaki Peace Declaration of 1951 when the CCPP mentioned Japanese imperialism. The war or reasons that lead up to it are not remembered but only the atomic bombings. Based on the discourses created in Peace Declarations, one might think that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were just innocent bystanders who happened to get hit by the war. This was not the case. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a part in Japan's military endeavours.

Nagasaki and Hiroshima were military cities even before the Pacific war. Nagasaki did not have military personnel in its area but Mitsubishi facilities and arms factories.¹²³ Mitsubishi had a significant effect on Nagasaki's economy. Otsuki says that Nagasaki was "Imperial Japan's fortress city" during Asia-Pacific war. During Meiji period Mitsubishi shipping company started to gain an important role in Nagasaki's economy and transformed the city into military economy. Mitsubishi factories in Nagasaki produced for example military ships, ammunition, and torpedoes. Slave labour from Japan's colonies was also used in these factories. In 1910 Nagasaki was third largest ship-building site in the world.¹²⁴ Hiroshima castle was used as military headquarters during Sino-Japanese war in 1894. Military and imperial symbols are still left in the castle area and Yoneyama states that the existence of these symbols can be seen as a failure to reconcile the memories of colonialism and imperialism.¹²⁵ Nowadays Nagasaki is one of the largest manufacturing sites of military

¹²¹ Sumio 2017, 422.

¹²² Kingston 2018, 441.

¹²³ Otsuki 2016a, 9.

¹²⁴ Otsuki 2016a, 60–63.

¹²⁵ Yoneyama 1999, 46.

goods in Japan. Although the production stopped at the end of the war, Mitsubishi group started producing torpedoes, anti-submarine ships and other military equipment when the Korean war broke out.¹²⁶ In the Peace Declarations the cities do not remember their militaristic pasts but present themselves only as victims of war.

Otsuki Tomoe writes in his doctoral thesis “God and the Atomic Bomb: Nagasaki’s Atomic Bomb Memory and Politics of Sacrifice, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation” that Nagasaki had become more passive than Hiroshima when it came to protesting nuclear weapons. This was because partaking in antinuclear or antiwar movements had come to be regarded as anti-Mitsubishi in Nagasaki by the 1960s.¹²⁷ Kamata and Salaff write that Mitsubishi’s influence had effects on the consciousness of the citizens as the fear of unemployment discouraged peace- and antinuclear activism.¹²⁸ This could have been one of the reasons Nagasaki was overshadowed by Hiroshima in antinuclear advocacy and the creation of the identity of a peace city. However as discussed, Nagasaki Peace Declarations had more expressions of negative emotions than Hiroshima’s. In the 1970s and 1980s Mayors Morotani and Motoshima expressed more resentment for the bombing than Hiroshima mayors did. Based on my analysis of the Peace Declarations Nagasaki depicted itself as a peacemaker and protested nuclear testing even before the 1970s. Therefore, the presence of Mitsubishi in the city did not completely pacify the citizens nor the politicians and the city constructed itself a peaceful image.

Hiroshima was especially willing to forget its past because its former identity was heavily associated with military. Using its past for identity of military city was difficult in the time of peace.¹²⁹ Before Japan’s defeat Hiroshima had advertised itself as military capital that had served as Emperor Meiji’s headquarters during the first Sino-Japanese war.¹³⁰ Remembering this past was completely absent in the Peace Declarations. Mayor Hamai referred to some kind of crime or sin of war, but the expression was quite vague and likely was not a reference to Hiroshima’s military past but a comment on war in general. The city does not remember its past nor take responsibility for it. On the one hand, considering that Hiroshima titles itself *the* peace city it might be that they feel discussing the militaristic past would undermine the peace

¹²⁶ Otsuki 2016a, 411.

¹²⁷ Otsuki 2016a, 142; 251.

¹²⁸ Kamata & Salaff 1982, 46.

¹²⁹ Diehl 2018, 14.

¹³⁰ Zwigenberg 2014, 42.

message. On the other hand, not openly dealing with its past, the city risks looking hypocritical.

Japan has not dealt with its fascist past the same way that Germany has. One reason for this is that after the war American Occupation and war trials mainly focused on the conflict between Japan and the United States. American authorities also created a narrative where ordinary Japanese people were just following orders and were innocent victims of the system. James Orr points out that in Germany the occupying forces were mainly victims of the Nazis whereas Japan never encountered its Asian victims the same way.¹³¹

The mayors, although working for world peace, are politicians who do not want to upset their potential voters. Considering the victimhood culture. Japan started to be seen as victimize only in the 1990s Peace Declarations. Although the expressions the mayors use refer to collective guilt, the history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as part of the machine is not brought up.

It was in the 1990s when the topic of Japan as a victimizer was brought up in the Peace Declarations. What brought surface the uncomfortable past is the issue of foreign labourers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who died or were exposed to the atomic bombs. About one tenth of all the atomic bomb victims were Korean and most of them returned to the peninsula after the war.¹³² The foreign atomic bomb victims and victims of Japanese imperialism started demanding compensation in the early 1990s. Hiroshima Mayor Hiraoka Takashi was the first mayor to state that Japan inflicted great suffering on people of Asia during its colonial war.¹³³ It was during that time that the mayors started to demand compensation also for the foreign victims in Peace Declarations. The shift is significant because it crumbles the nationalist image of the atomic bombings, and the image of the Japanese as *the* victims of the war.

Despite these change the cities did not acknowledge their past role in Japan's empire-building efforts in the Declarations. The regret the mayors expressed is one of the Japanese collective, and the roles of the cities is not explored. Perhaps the city officials and the citizens felt that the Declarations are not the right place for deeper remembrance of the cities' negative past.

¹³¹ Orr 2001, 11–16.

¹³² Duró 2020, 280.

¹³³ Tachibana 1995, 329; 344.

They were meant to reaffirm the citizens' and other listeners' desire and action towards global peace, while remembering the victims of the atomic bombings.

During the occupation era the cities were not able to mourn and remember freely the atomic bombings. The events had to be tied into the ideal of peace and thus the remembrance ceremonies became "Peace Memorial Ceremonies". The United States was not blamed for the bombings in the mayors' speeches. Nagasaki Peace Declarations were more upfront in stating that atomic bombs should not be used again. Nagasaki Declarations made a case that the city had a great role in ending the war. The logic was that the atomic bombing of Nagasaki was the thing that made Japan to accept the peace treaty. Hiroshima Mayor Hamai called the bombing a lesson and Hiroshima citizens' mission was to teach it to the rest of the world. Nagasaki officials wanted to emphasize the city's international past as a trade port and the atomic bombing was just one aspect of the reconstruction of its identity. For Hiroshima the atomic bombing became much more defining event in its identity formation. Hiroshima had pride itself as a military city before the wars end, and that identity was not viable at the time of peace, thus it had to create a whole new identity.

After the occupation the Peace Declarations slowly started to comment more on wars and international issues. The mayors used expressions "Spirit of Hiroshima" and "Peace comes from Nagasaki" to brand their cities as messengers of world peace. Both cities Peace Declarations had similar themes and the mayors commented on similar issues. The so-called Lucky Dragon incident of 1954 was a significant event in the awareness of the effects of radiation in Japan, and both Nagasaki and Hiroshima gained sympathy from the public. Nagasaki Peace Declarations had occasionally words linked to Christianity. Mayor Tagawa said that the city was baptized and that it had become a holy apostle of peace. He emphasized love, justice and ethics in his Declarations. During the 1960s and 1970s the mayors commented more on international issues and the remembering of the bombings started becoming less important. This was especially the case with Hiroshima mayor Araki. Compared to Hiroshima mayors, Nagasaki Mayors Morotani and Motoshima voiced more anger in their Declarations although it was not clearly directed at anyone. Mayor Yamada was the first to use Hiroshima written in katakana. Both cities wanted to be seen as the city that creates world peace. Nagasaki was "the place where peace comes from", and peoples' desire for peace was the creation of "Spirit of Hiroshima".

The cities forgot their past. From Nagasaki comes peace but also Mitsubishi torpedoes.

3 Hiroshima and Nagasaki as leaders of global and national peace movements

In chapter 3 I examine how Hiroshima and Nagasaki built their identities in the international and national fields during the 1970s and 1980s. In the first chapter I examine how the cities became active in international diplomacy and advocated for abolishment of nuclear weapons through the UN. I discuss the messages the cities wanted to give to the international audience, and how they believed that their message was able to change the world politics. To contextualize the mayors' international endeavours I utilize Jette Baagø Klockmann's article "Remembrance Diplomacy by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the UN 1976–2015" and Miyazaki Hirokasu's article "Hiroshima and Nagasaki as models of city diplomacy". In the later chapter 3.2, I focus on the ways Hiroshima and Nagasaki criticized the national government during the era. It was reviled to the Japanese public that the US had brought nuclear weapons to Japan with the government's secret approval for decades. The revelations made Nagasaki and Hiroshima express criticism towards the government in the Peace Declarations. Another issue where Nagasaki and Hiroshima positioned themselves against the government was the issue of hibakusha compensation. I examine the ways the cities showed support for hibakusha in Peace Declarations.

3.1 International cities

During the 1980s the number of Japanese cities that declared themselves nuclear free rose significantly. These declarations were mostly symbolic. Kawaguchi Toru explains the rise in number of declarations in the context of internationalization and Cold War relations. Much like in Europe, there was a widespread anxiety about nuclear war in Japan. Kawaguchi writes that public opinion against nuclear weapons rose in Japan around the time of the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 when the public noticed that even the UN cannot be relied on to reduce armament in the world. Anxiety over nuclear weapons moved hand in hand with a fear of militarization in Japan. Municipalities started taking a stronger stance on security issues which previously had been seen as exclusively the central government's territory.¹³⁴ The era was a time of municipalities rising to the occasion and using their power to influence the national and foreign governments.

¹³⁴ Kawaguchi 2011, 47–49.

In the 1970s and 1980s Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors started representing their cities in UN assemblies such as Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament where they held speeches about the atomic bombings. Their goal was to institutionalize remembrance of the atomic bombing in the UN and influence the world opinion on nuclear weapons.¹³⁵ The mayors collaborated with survivors and had success in partnering with the UN and other international organisations. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that was ratified by 50 states came into effect in January 22nd, 2021, and is regarded as a result of decades of collaboration between Hiroshima & Nagasaki mayors, atomic bomb survivors, various NGO's and UN diplomats.¹³⁶

According to Miyazaki Hirokazu meeting of Mayor Araki and Mayor Morotani with Secretary-General Kurt Josef Waldheim in December 1976 was a key event in the history of the cities' international diplomacy. They gave an account of the bombings and made requests to the UN such as that a team of experts should be appointed to conceptualize a roadmap for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The mayors also suggested a permanent photo exhibition in the UN headquarters as well as a traveling exhibition to the member states, and that UN would send representatives to the annual memorial events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This meeting led the way for other collaborations with the UN. The mayors attended the first Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament on May 1978, and during the second Special Session in 1982 they were also invited to give speeches. In the early 1990s both cities hosted UN Conferences on Disarmament Issues.¹³⁷

Jette Baagø Klockmann assesses in her article "Remembrance Diplomacy by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the UN, 1976–2015" that the mayors have benefitted from the government's growing interest in co-operating with other nations and organisations in international affairs. The cities were not acting alone but the Japanese government backed them up. Japanese government has used the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in its foreign policy efforts for disarmament for decades. For example, Fellows from UN Disarmament Fellowship that have visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki have officially been guests of the government and it has been the government's job to report on the visits to the UN. The cities also brought a letter of introduction from Japan's prime minister to the

¹³⁵ Baagø Klockmann 2018, 523–524.

¹³⁶ Miyazaki 2021, 1218.

¹³⁷ Miyazaki 2021, 1220–1221.

meeting with Kurt Waldheim which showed the dependency of the cities on the Japanese diplomatic network.¹³⁸

Baagø Klockmann writes that in practice institutionalising the collective memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the UN meant that the mayors worked towards trying to get the atomic bombings to be regularly commemorated. She states that the mayors deployed two kinds of remembrance activities to reach this goal: sharing testimonies and encouraging world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki and witness the outcomes of the atomic bombings.¹³⁹ These methods were also used and repeated in the Peace Declarations as the mayors talked about their efforts in the UN assemblies to the public.

Baagø Klockmann associated the invitations to visit the atomic bombed cities to Annette Wiewieroka's concept of "witnessing the witness".¹⁴⁰ Wiewioroka writes about the rise of "witnesses for the witness". She explains that people visiting Auschwitz-Birkenau gain knowledge about "what truly happened" while experiencing the place and hearing testimonies.¹⁴¹ Similar concept is visible in Peace Declarations. Mayors believed that through visiting Hiroshima and Nagasaki and "witnessing the witnesses" world leaders would truly start working towards abolition of nuclear weapons. The mayors seemed to believe that experiencing the ruins and the museums and hearing the stories of the survivors, people would gain knowledge of what the world was to become if nuclear war broke out.

During the time of internationalisation Hiroshima Mayor Araki talked a lot about the visits of world leaders and what they had said about Hiroshima in his Peace Declarations. In 1981 Peace Declaration Mayor Araki said that Pope John Paul II had visited Hiroshima on February and said: "In particular, he [the pope] emphasized that to remember Hiroshima is to abhor nuclear war and to commit oneself to peace."¹⁴² In the next year's Declaration Mayor Araki said "When Dr. Olof Palme, Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, and Mr. Sandro Pertini, President of the Republic of Italy, came to Hiroshima, they were horrified to witness the cruelty of the atomic disaster. They expressed their profound fear that there could be neither winner nor loser in a nuclear war."¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Baagø Klockmann 2018, 526–529.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 523–524.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 532.

¹⁴¹ Wiewioroka 2006, 136.

¹⁴² HPD 1981, Official English translation.

¹⁴³ HPD 1982, Official English translation.

These international visits validated Hiroshima's identity as the peace city of the world. Especially the visit of the pope must have been significant for Hiroshima. The pope is the leader of the Catholic world, and his doings interests many people. When telling about the visits of these world leaders, Araki repeated what they had said about Hiroshima. The visitors joined the identity discourse in their speeches and validated Hiroshima's identity.

During 1970s and 1980s both cities' declarations were long. The 1988 Nagasaki Declaration was 1575 characters long and Hiroshima Declaration of the same year 1344 characters. In the 1960s the Declarations were half, sometimes even one third of the length of the later declarations. The number of issues mentioned in the Declarations had increased, and sometimes they were list-like reports of current affairs.

Mayor Araki repeated what he said in the Second Special Session for disarmament in the UN in the 1982 Peace Declaration. He said: "we propose (1) that the leaders of the nuclear powers and other nations should visit Hiroshima to confirm the true nature of the disaster of the atomic bombing (...)".¹⁴⁴ Hiroshima had over the years tried to commemorate the bombing in the city planning so it is no wonder that the mayor believed that visitors could "confirm the true nature" of the bombing. However, Hiroshima was not a preserved city in ruins. Hiroshima was a buzzing green city, and the effects of the bombing could be seen and heard only if one sought those out. Of course, visitors of high profile would be taken to planned visits in the museum and Peace Memorial Park and would hear the stories of hibakusha. It seems that Mayor Araki believed that these exhibitions and discourses recreated decades after the bombing could still hold "the true nature" of what happened.

Interestingly, Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima expressed doubt about Hiroshima and Nagasaki being able to convey the reality of the bombings in the 1988 Peace Declaration. First, he described the aftermath of the bombing with graphic details mentioning a boy with burnt skin dragging in his hands and charred corpses lying around. He then said that the destruction and despair caused by the bomb had never been seen in history of humanity and wondered if the materials left in Nagasaki and Hiroshima are able to convey even one-tenth of the devastation.¹⁴⁵ Despite this he still seemed to believe in the power of witnessing the witness since in the next years Peace Declaration he advised each city should "look at the reality of

¹⁴⁴ HPD 1982.

¹⁴⁵ NPD 1988.

the atomic bombing of Nagasaki” and think about cities role in nuclear age and in achieving peace.¹⁴⁶

Nagasaki Mayors Morotani and Motoshima did not present invitations for the world leaders in their Peace Declarations. However, when a high-profile person had visited the city, it was mentioned. In 1977 Morotani said: “The fact that a representative from the United Nations has participated in this ceremony for the first time is a great sign that the United Nations has made great progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons and total disarmament.”¹⁴⁷ It is evident that Morotani believed that the message of Nagasaki combined with a physical visit to the atomic bombed area were so powerful that it could bring forth world-wide nuclear disarmament. Peace Prayer Ceremony of Nagasaki was so powerful that by simply attending it the United Nations had made great progress. Of course, official visits can be symbolically powerful, and likely the visitor had a schedule during which they would visit the atomic bomb museum and would “witness the witness”.

During the era, the focus of the Declarations was on global events and there was a heightened sense of hope for disarmament and world peace. Mayors took a more active international role and commented more on international issues and wars in the Declarations than previously. For example, in 1973 Hiroshima Peace Declaration Mayor Yamada commented on Vietnam war, Japan-China relations, nuclear tests of the US, Soviet Union and People’s republic of China and France.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, Nagasaki Mayor Morotani expressed joy for peace in Vietnam and Japan and China normalizing their diplomatic relations but worrying about continues nuclear testing.¹⁴⁹ The mayors often commented on nuclear testing and development.

Increased collaboration showed in the Declarations as the mayors acknowledging the other city. They would mention the joint efforts and visits to the UN with the other city’s mayor. Still, the Peace Declarations were mostly about their own cities, which suggests that the Declarations were significant part of identity building. Mayors of the other city did not partake in the discourse of the other city. Mayor of Nagasaki did not speak about “Spirit of Hiroshima” and mayor of Hiroshima did not speak of “peace coming from Nagasaki” or

¹⁴⁶ NPD 1989.

¹⁴⁷ NPD 1977, own translation.

¹⁴⁸ HPD 1973.

¹⁴⁹ NPD 1973.

“voice of Nagasaki”. It is understandable as both cities, despite collaborating, were still competing from similar identities.

Mayors commented on the UN assemblies in the Peace Declarations. In 1982 mayor Motoshima stated: “Dear Citizens of Nagasaki, in the wake of the Second United Nations Special General Assembly on Disarmament, the grassroots movement against nuclear weapons has gained momentum around the world. (...) Let us ignite a stronger and more widespread peace movement within and outside our country, (...) Let us unite our efforts in Nagasaki as the starting point of this movement and pave the way for the abolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of lasting world peace in preparation for the Third United Nations Special General Assembly on Disarmament.”¹⁵⁰ The mayor was involving the whole city in the preparation for the assembly in spirit. This emphasized that the mayor was not doing all the work but representing the citizens’ will in the UN.

After the Third Special Assembly both mayors expressed sorrow for the failure of the final report. Motoshima stated that the failure shows that there is an increasing need for rise of citizens’ movement and multilateral dialogue in the world.¹⁵¹ Mayor Araki lamented over “representatives more concerned with narrow national interests” preventing the assembly to adopt the final resolution calling for comprehensive global disarmament. He continued by reaffirming the city’s determination in nuclear disarmament and renewed the city’s appeal for example for establishing a new international peace research facility in Hiroshima.¹⁵²

Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima had a more people led approach to achieving world peace. He talked about grassroot movements and citizens’ great role in creating world peace. Hiroshima mayor was also speaking of the citizens but was emphasizing the city’s role as *the* peace city. Thus, Hiroshima Peace Declarations mentioned the city’s name more and more directly define the city as Nagasaki Peace Declarations had a lot more mentions of people’s movements. For example, in 1984 Nagasaki Peace Declarations Mayor Motoshima stated that international public opinion and strong groundswell of grassroots movements have prevented an outbreak of nuclear war.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ NPD 1982, own translation.

¹⁵¹ NPD 1988.

¹⁵² NPD 1988.

¹⁵³ NPD 1984.

Both cities tried to depict themselves as the leaders of global anti-nuclear movement. In 1982 Mayor Motoshima told that grassroots movement against nuclear weapons has gained momentum and that this movement started from Nagasaki.¹⁵⁴ In 1984 Hiroshima Peace Declaration Mayor Araki stated after talking about Cold War arms race: “Popular campaigns against nuclear arms have arisen spontaneously, and ‘the Spirit of Hiroshima’ has permeated the whole world to strengthen the groundswell of international public opinion in the cause of peace.”¹⁵⁵ Motoshima presented Nagasaki as the starting point of movement for peace which is in line with the identity discourse that begun already in the early years after the bombing. He did not elaborate on the statement of peace starting from Nagasaki which implies that this was seen as a given fact. Mayor Araki depicted Hiroshima as a leader of worldwide anti-nuclear movement, or at least that the peace ideal that the city has exported had influenced the creation of anti-nuclear movements across the world. Araki clearly saw the role of Hiroshima significant in people’s desire for a nuclear free world.

Mayors Araki and Motoshima launched Mayors for Peace organisation in 2nd special session of General assembly for disarmament in 1982. The organization was first called World conference of Mayors for Peace through inter-city Solidarity. In the UN document it is stated that the organization “aims to contribute to the realization of lasting world peace by raising the consciousness of citizens on an international scale regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons, and by working on the resolution of the various problems that threaten the peaceful coexistence of humanity, such as famine and poverty.”¹⁵⁶ As of April 2024 the organisation has 8378 member-cities and on its website it states that its purpose is “to contribute to the attainment of lasting world peace by arousing concern among citizens of the world for the total abolition of nuclear weapons through close solidarity among member cities as well as by striving to solve vital problems for the human race such as starvation and poverty, the plight of refugees, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation.”¹⁵⁷

The First World Conference of Mayors for Peace was held on August 4th – 9th 1985 in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Result was two appeals carrying the name of the cities. The two cities were at the centre of the organisation, and it is interesting that there wasn’t a joint

¹⁵⁴ NPD 1982.

¹⁵⁵ HPD 1984, English translation.

¹⁵⁶ UN document E/C.2/1997/2/Add.2, 6 Mar. 1997, 82; Inter-city solidarity newsletter, No. 3, 10 Oct. 1994.

¹⁵⁷ “About us”, mayorsforpeace.org.

appeal made but both of the cities had their own appeals. The appeals are named after the place they are made in. In 2017 the Conference was held only in Nagasaki and thus only “Nagasaki appeal” was made. Mayor of Hiroshima has permanently been appointed the president of the organisation and Nagasaki as a vice president, but there are other vice president cities as well.¹⁵⁸

To review, the cities had always expressed themselves as authority on war and nuclear weapons issues through the experience of the atomic bombings. During the 1970s and 1980s both cities’ mayors emphasized their city’s role in creating the movement towards abolition of nuclear weapons. Hiroshima Mayor Araki talked about how *Spirit of Hiroshima* had filled the world and influenced the birth of a global peace movement. Nagasaki Mayors Morotani and Motoshima emphasized the city’s role as the birthplace of antinuclear peace movement. The two cities thus fought over who had created the global antinuclear and peace sentiment while still collaborating in the international arena trying to get the world leaders to hear their message. During his terms Mayor Araki spent a significant amount of time in telling what world leaders said about Hiroshima in UN assemblies in his Peace Declarations. Both cities’ mayors expressed a belief that by visiting the cities people could understand the effects of the atomic bombings and would be convinced of the necessity of abolishment of nuclear weapons and the need for humanity to live in peace. Despite Nagasaki mayors’ efforts to build an identity of the birthplace of the peace movement, it was Hiroshima that had taken an active role in creating an image for itself as the city of peace right after the war and now got more visitors and international recognition. World leaders thus visited Hiroshima more often than Nagasaki. Hiroshima also took the lead in creating Mayors for Peace -organisation.

3.2 Against national governments

There has been a schism in Japanese domestic politics between peace- and anti-nuclear movements and the conservative political groups that have ruled the country most of the post-war era. Pacifism is a cultural norm deeply embedded in Japanese culture.¹⁵⁹ The governments have tried to navigate between the domestic pacifist atmosphere and realist foreign politics while trying not to harm the security relationships with the US.¹⁶⁰ After the war Japan’s new

¹⁵⁸ “Our history 1985”, mayorsforpeace.org.

¹⁵⁹ Ogawa 2011, 374–375.

¹⁶⁰ Orr 2001, 38.

constitution rejected war in Article 9 where it is stated that: “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”¹⁶¹ Even though Article 9 prohibits maintaining a military, Japan did establish Self-Defence Forces in 1954.¹⁶²

Although the revisionism regarding Article 9 has been a relatively modern thing, Japanese governments have struggled to uphold the ideal of pacifism in the realities of Cold War for decades. Japan had made the atomic bombings as its national tragedy and created a peace-loving image of itself domestically and internationally.

Over the decades the mayors had expressed pride in Japan as a peace-loving nation and brought up Japan’s constitution. These expressions increased during the time of internationalisation. For example, in 1972 Yamada talked about UN conference where threats to human survival were discussed and it was concluded that total abolishment of nuclear weapons should be urgently achieved. Yamada said that the event was in accordance with Japan’s constitution.¹⁶³ In 1976 after talking about Japan ratifying Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nagasaki Mayor Morotani said that it was a great step in asserting Japan’s nuclear-free policy internationally and that he looked forward on Japan’s active efforts in nuclear disarmament.¹⁶⁴ In both instances the mayors emphasize Japan’s role in creation of nuclear free and peaceful world.

In 1979 Motoshima stated that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and promotion of disarmament are essential for a peace-loving nation (*heiwakokka* 平和国家), and that this must be the central issue of Japan’s foreign policy.¹⁶⁵ In 1981 Araki also called Japan a peace-loving nation or peaceful nation (*heiwa* = peace *kokka* = nation).¹⁶⁶ In 1978 Araki called Japan a forerunner in peace and urged Japan to create a worldwide consensus against war and nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁷ In 1980 Araki said that Japan should take initiative in bringing about a

¹⁶¹ Constitution of Japan, Article 9.

¹⁶² Jones 2023, 35.

¹⁶³ HPD 1972.

¹⁶⁴ NDP 1976.

¹⁶⁵ NPD 1979.

¹⁶⁶ HPD 1981.

¹⁶⁷ HPD 1978.

World Summit Conference on Peace where leaders of Soviet Union and the United States would meet.¹⁶⁸ Clearly, Mayor Araki believed that Hiroshima could guide the government in international politics.

The tone towards the government changed during the 1980s in both cities Peace Declarations. Miyazaki writes that during Mayor Motoshima's terms (1979–1995) Nagasaki started collaborating more with civic society. During this time Nagasaki Peace Declarations became increasingly antagonistic towards the national government. Motoshima diverted radically from his predecessor's when he used spoken language for the first time in Peace Declaration in 1981.¹⁶⁹ For some reason in 1986, 1988 and 1989 the Declarations were written in the usual formal way. The change to more casual way of speech can be interpreted as Motoshima positioning himself closer to the ordinary people. It appears that Motoshima's successors have continued to use spoken language in their Declarations. Hiroshima Peace Declarations started to be written in spoken language almost two decades later from 1999 onwards.

There was a great scandal when in 1981 former US Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer revealed that the US had been bringing nuclear weapons to Japanese ports for decades with Japanese governments' secret approval. The nuclear weapons were allowed to be carried by ships but not unloaded to the land.¹⁷⁰ In 1971 Japanese Diet had passed resolution called "Three Non-Nuclear Principles", in which it was stated that Japan was not to possess or develop nuclear weapons, nor allow them on its territory.¹⁷¹ This policy was announced already in 1967 by then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, and was widely accepted by conservatives and progressives alike.¹⁷² Japanese society had developed strong ideal of peace so the fact that the government had broken its promises caused a terrible controversy.

There had long been suspicions of the US holding nuclear weapons in Okinawa, which the country took in its control during the Pacific War. In fact, according to Rabson in 1969 Okinawa Reversion Agreement Japanese prime minister Satō Eisaku and the US president Richard Nixon secretly signed what was later become to be know "secret nuclear understanding". The US was to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa but "--United States

¹⁶⁸ HPD 1980.

¹⁶⁹ Miyazaki 2021, 1222.

¹⁷⁰ New York Times 20.05.1981; Ibid., 19.05.1981.

¹⁷¹ Rabson 2021, 5609.

¹⁷² Akaha 1985, 75.

for the defence of countries in the Far East including Japan, in time of great emergency the United States Government will require the re-entry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan". Existence of this agreement was denied officially but the minute draft was discovered by Satō's son in 2009.¹⁷³ "The peace-loving nation" of Japan had allowed weapons of mass destruction on its territory for decades.

In 1981 Nagasaki Peace Declaration Motoshima reminded the listeners of Japan's three non-nuclear principles and said that the principle of not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought into the country has been shaken. He spoke directly to Prime minister Suzuki Shunichi and asked him to address the rumours about nuclear weapons brought to Japan.¹⁷⁴ In 1983 Motoshima repeated his request to Japanese government¹⁷⁵, and in 1984 he re-iterated that Japanese government should confirm in advance if foreign military vehicles coming to Japan contain nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁶

During the time Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors were promoting for Japan to become nuclear free zone and for Japanese government to do as much as it can for nuclear proliferation. I would imagine that the revelation that the government had approved the entrance of nuclear weapons on Japan's ports felt like a betrayal. The governments had acted in secrecy against the peaceful image that Japan had built over the decades, and that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were contributing to.

Interestingly Hiroshima Mayor Araki never mentions the controversy, although one would assume that it is in the heart of all what the city stands for. He might have addressed it indirectly in 1981 Declaration by saying: "As citizens of a peace-loving nation we sincerely hope that our government will take the lead in these peace efforts, while maintaining its commitment to the three anti-nuclear principles"¹⁷⁷. One way to research whether mayor Araki had challenged the government more on the issue on other occasions would be to search for articles about it in Chūgoku Shimbun -newspaper. Unfortunately, I have no access to the archives, and can only assess the message he gave in the Declarations.

¹⁷³ Rabson 2021, 5609.

¹⁷⁴ NPD 1981.

¹⁷⁵ NPD 1983.

¹⁷⁶ NPD 1984.

¹⁷⁷ HPD 1981, Official English translation.

Regarding the revelation, there is a clear difference in the way Nagasaki and Hiroshima mayors positioned themselves towards the government. Motoshima was siding with antinuclear activists against the government whereas Araki's approach was more indirect. Araki was still calling Japan "a peace-loving nation" which could be interpreted as ignorance towards the issue, but it could also be seen as a message to the government to act according to the peace ideal.

There was another incident with US nuclear arms in Japan that was revealed at the end of 1980s. Navy warplane carrying a hydrogen bomb had rolled off an aircraft carrier with a pilot onboard 70 miles from Okinawa in 1965, and the plane lying about 5 kilometres deep was never recovered.¹⁷⁸ Japanese government was not informed of the accident at the time.¹⁷⁹

There appeared to have been rumours that the aircraft had entered Japan's territory. Mayor Motoshima said in 1989 Peace Declaration that it is said that in December 1965, a hydrogen bomb-carrying aircraft entered Yokosuka Port after falling from a U.S. aircraft carrier near Okinawa. He stated that it is the governments duty to investigate what happened.¹⁸⁰ The aircraft that fell off the carrier did not arrive to Yokosuka. Hans Kristensen writes that the aircraft carrier arrived in Yokosuka two days after the accident and had other nuclear weapons on board.¹⁸¹ So in the end nuclear weapons had entered Japanese territory even though the specific hydrogen bomb-carrying airplane that fell into the ocean had not.

In 1989 Araki took a stronger stance against the government compared to the previous scandal. Araki stated that the government should return to the pacifist ideals of the constitution and should restrain the military spending and cooperate with other countries to make Asia-Pacific a nuclear free zone. He said that the government should discover the truth about the airplane that sank near Okinawa and to urge the US government in "strongest terms" to respect Japan's national policy.¹⁸² Araki's response in the Declaration was a lot stronger than in 1981. This time Araki took a clear stance against the government in its military funding and advised it in its foreign policy practises. Perhaps his attitude towards the

¹⁷⁸ Los Angeles Times, 09.05.1989.

¹⁷⁹ Kristensen 1999, 14.

¹⁸⁰ NDP 1989.

¹⁸¹ Kristensen 1999, 14.

¹⁸² HDP 1989.

government had changed over the years, and other issues with the government had accumulated and were influencing his opinion.

In 1990 Motoshima continued his strong stance. He demanded the government to tell the truth about the incidents as many people have suspicions that nuclear weapons have been brought into the country.¹⁸³ Motoshima was a divisive figure. He was shot by a right-wing gunman in January 1990 because he had angered right-wing groups when he had said in 1988 that Emperor Showa was responsible for the Pacific war and if Emperor had ended the war sooner Nagasaki and Hiroshima would not have been bombed. He was seriously injured but managed to recover and was re-elected in 1991.¹⁸⁴ He is upfront in his Declarations and was not afraid to challenge the government.

Although Araki hardened his talk at the end of 1980s, he was still more “diplomatic” than Motoshima. Perhaps Mayor Motoshima was more upfront himself as a person and politician but the fact that the Nagasaki Declaration were planned by a committee, could have also influenced the messaging. The incentive for challenging the government in Nagasaki Declarations could have come from the citizens who were drafting the Declarations.

Another aspect where the mayors conflicted with the government was the issue of compensation for the atomic bomb survivors. Mayors asked for relief measures for the atomic bomb survivors in Peace Declarations. In general messaging around the topic was not particularly hostile but it could still be interpreted as a form of critique towards the government for having not helped the survivors.

The survivors had asked Japanese government to take responsibility of the bombings as the US had made Japan to waive all claims in San Fransisco Peace treaty. From the US perspective the atomic bombings were a cause of Japanese state’s acts of war.¹⁸⁵ Neither international or Japanese hold either country responsible and the government has been reluctant to compensate non-Japanese and Japanese individuals except veterans, military persons, and their families. It has stated that citizens are obligated to accept and endure some level some loss as a result of war. Survivors were able to get Hibakusha Medical Law passed in 1957 but it was regarded not enough and the struggle for aid continued. One reason for the

¹⁸³ NDP 1990.

¹⁸⁴ *The Nihon Keizai Shimbum* 31.10.2014; Miyazaki 2021, 1222.

¹⁸⁵ Tachibana 1995, 337.

inadequacy of Hibakusha Medical Law was that the definition of “hibakusha” was restricted and excluded many survivors.¹⁸⁶ The Japanese government positioned hibakusha assistance as a social welfare measure to avoid requests for redress from other groups of war sufferers.¹⁸⁷

Japanese government started assessing hibakusha aid policy in 1979 after Japanese Supreme court ruled in favour of Korean Son Jin-do who had filed a lawsuit against Japanese government for not recognizing him as hibakusha.¹⁸⁸ He had been in Hiroshima during the atomic bombing.¹⁸⁹ Son suffered from radiation related illnesses and had come to Japan to get treatment for them, but the Japanese government did not give him an official hibakusha health certificate that would have made him eligible for health benefits. The court pointed out that Hibakusha Medical Law did not specify that it would only be applied to Japanese citizens and Son Jin-do was able to access medical care. The government appointed a seven-member panel to assess the existing hibakusha laws. Survivors hoped that the final report of the panel would advocate for more relief measures and would provide a legal rationale. However, the final report published in December 1980 stated that the Japanese government had no legal responsibility for the bombings and that state compensation for hibakusha would be unfair to all other people who had suffered from the war. The report concluded that the government should address hibakusha issues as welfare issues as it has been doing.¹⁹⁰ In 1980s Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations *Hidankyo* made demands that the government should compensate the survivors, that the bereaved receive condolence money and pension, that medical care of hibakusha is the state’s responsibility and that all hibakusha receive pension with a bonus for the handicapped.¹⁹¹

After Mr. Son’s court case the issue of government compensation was included in both cities Declarations. Mayor Araki said in 1979 that the government had started to re-examine the aid measures for survivors.¹⁹² He stated that the problems faced by people exposed to radiation is an international issue, probably referring to the case of Son Jin-do. As previously mentioned in chapter 2.2, Hiroshima Mayor Watanabe brought up aid for survivors during his term 1955–1959. This was a time when the public got to know about the effects of radiation and

¹⁸⁶ Naono 2010, 110–117.

¹⁸⁷ Naono 2019, 345.

¹⁸⁸ Naono 2010, 115–116.

¹⁸⁹ *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun* 25.08.2014.

¹⁹⁰ Naono 2010, 115–117.

¹⁹¹ Tachibana 1995, 339.

¹⁹² HDP 1979.

nuclear weapons due to Lucky Dragon -incident. After Watanabe's term Hiroshima mayors did not mention survivor aid in Peace Declarations. Mr Son's case must have brought the issue on the surface on public discourse, and from 1979 onwards Mayor Araki appealed to the Japanese government to give medical relief for the survivors as national compensation. He mostly mentioned it in the last paragraph of the Declarations. This meant that although Araki would not always spend much time talking about the issues survivors faced, the city would still express support for the victims in Peace Declarations. For example, at the end of the 1984 Peace Declaration he said: "(...) we call upon the Government of Japan to promote and strengthen relief measures for atomic bomb survivors and bereaved families under the principle of national indemnification (...)".¹⁹³

From the end of the 1980s mayors started to include foreign survivors in their Peace Declarations. Although Korean Mr. Son's case brought up the issue in national consciousness in the first place, compensation measures for the foreign victims in the Declarations were not directly demanded until a decade later in Hiroshima Declarations. Mayor Araki mentioned it first in 1990 Peace Declaration. He said that he hoped the government would help hibakusha living in Korean peninsula and the US and elsewhere.¹⁹⁴ The recognition of foreign victims of the bombings seems to be part of a trend of acknowledging foreigners in general. During the same era the Declarations started to note the suffering Japan caused to Asian people during its imperialist era.

Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima was more active in asking for the government to aid the Japanese and foreign survivors during the 1980s. Motoshima started asking the government to establish international medical centre for the Japanese and foreign survivors in Nagasaki Peace Declarations from 1983 onwards. This is likely because Nagasaki Declarations were made by a committee during the time and one can see that the topics in the Declarations are closer to ordinary people, whereas Hiroshima Declarations were clearly made by a city official. During the era, Hiroshima Mayor Araki spent a lot of time talking about international political issues and visitors in the city and the ordinary people and grassroots movements were not included as much as in Nagasaki Declarations.

To conclude, Peace Declarations had become more directly political in nature in 1980s. Mayors had started to comment on international and national issues regarding peace and

¹⁹³ HDP 1984.

¹⁹⁴ HDP 1990.

nuclear weapons. This meant that occasionally Hiroshima and Nagasaki positioned themselves against the national governments. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s Nagasaki and Hiroshima mayors started asking the government to also compensate the foreign victims of the bombings. After 1979 Hiroshima and Nagasaki took it upon themselves to challenge the government for not compensating the victims of the bombings enough. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are taking the side of the victims who are demanding for compensation from the government, but they do not criticize the government for not handling the issue sooner. They ask for compensation and the government to take a responsibility. Nagasaki Mayor Motoshima was more aggressive in demanding the government to act according the three non-nuclear principles and to help the Japanese and foreign hibakusha than Hiroshima Mayor Araki.

4 Conclusion

The conflict between peace movements and Japanese government continues till this day. I got to witness the friction myself in 2023. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony 2023 was held outside in the scorching heat of August. Prime minister Kishida was giving his speech when I heard protesting screams from somewhere in the city. They were far away, and the ceremony continued as normal. Later that day marches were held in the city centre where people were demanding Kishida to resign and Japan to take a stronger stance against militarization and do more for peace and abolishment of nuclear weapons. The protesters were playing drums and holding signs while riot police were keeping the order around them as they marched. Peace movements are a significant part of Japanese society.

The goal of this thesis has been to map out the differences and similarities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki's identity development after the atomic bombings. From the beginning of the reconstruction the cities had to form their identity regarding one another. Hiroshima city officials pushed for peace city discourse and managed to almost monopolize it. Nagasaki was originally barred from using the word "peace" in their special construction law. In the end Nagasaki officials accepted Hiroshima's request as they wanted to emphasize the international history of the city. Hiroshima and Nagasaki started rebuilding different identities.

The American Occupation 1945–1951 affected the way the atomic bombings were able to be remembered. During the first years after the war, occupation authorities wanted to spread their interpretation of the atomic bombings and controlled what was allowed to be said. This affected the way bombings became to be memorialized through peace. The goal of the US was for Japan to become liberal democratic nation of peace, but the Cold War realities made the authorities change their goal into keeping order and preventing the spread of communism. Criticizing the atomic bombings became impossible if one did not wish to be labelled a communist.

The occupation authorities funded the rebuilding of Christian monuments in Nagasaki and helped to publish Catholic Nagai Takashi's book *Bells of Nagasaki* affecting the Christianization of the city's identity. There were some Christian elements in Nagasaki Peace Declaration such as a theme of sacrifice and baptism. However, these words were not often used, and Christianity was not a reoccurring theme in the Nagasaki Peace Declarations, thus I do not want to overemphasize the Christian identity of Nagasaki based on my research.

However, these occasional Christian elements made the Declarations different from Hiroshima Declarations.

Both cities' Declarations described the atomic bomb deaths as a sacrifice. Okuda Hiroko argues that the word carries a risk of the deaths being glorified as dying for the nation state, but based on my analysis in the Declarations the word was used in a context of dying for the war's end and for peace. Calling the deaths a sacrifice is also a way to give meaning to the deaths and honour the victims. This interpretation is backed by the fact that the word was used the most in the early years after the war when there was the greatest need to explain the events.

Long serving Hiroshima Mayor Hamai Shinzō (1947–1955, 1959–1967) had a great role in leading the city towards the identity of a peace city. He depicted the bombing as a lesson that the citizens had the duty to teach the rest of the world. Mayor Yamada Setsuo (1955–1959) was the first to use the expression “heart of Hiroshima”, later translated *Spirit of Hiroshima*. The expression was used to indicate peoples' desire for peace and motivation for working towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. Hiroshima mayors emphasized the city's role in creating global peace movement through *Spirit of Hiroshima*, almost as if the whole world had followed the lead of Hiroshima. The global movement against nuclear weapons was depicted as the result of *Spirit of Hiroshima* penetrating people's minds and hearts.

Nagasaki mayors similarly described the city as the starting point of global peace movement. The Pacific War ended to the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and thus peace came or begun from Nagasaki. The phrases used gave the impression that Nagasaki would have had some sort of power to end the war. Mayor Motoshima (1979–1995) pleaded the word to hear the *voice of Nagasaki*. This voice was a message that Nagasaki should be the last place on Earth to be atomic bombed and for love to guide people to create peace in the world.

Although kanji is officially used to write city names in Japanese, katakana writing was often used to write the names of the cities in Peace Declarations. Sometimes it meant the atomic bombing, other times it was connected to peace. In both *Spirit of Hiroshima* and *voice of Nagasaki* the cities' names are written in katakana and associated with peace. In the slogans “No more Nagasaki” and “No more Hiroshima” the names in katakana mean the atomic bombings. Therefore, the names written in katakana don't have a one specific meaning but

rather are used as an emphasis. The usage of the cities' names in Peace Declarations shows how the bombing and peace were intertwined in their identities.

Both cities wanted to be seen as the starters of global anti-nuclear peace movement which was emphasized especially when the cities started to influence international politics. Hiroshima and Nagasaki begun international diplomacy through the United Nations in 1976. During the 1970s and 1980s focus of Hiroshima Mayor Araki's (1975–1991) Peace Declarations was on how he had represented the city in UN assemblies, and how the world leaders and other influential people had commented on the city. Nagasaki was left in the shadow of Hiroshima in the international field. Nagasaki officials co-operated with Hiroshima officials and the mayor gave speeches in the UN, but Nagasaki Peace Declarations were not focused on those events the same way Hiroshima Peace Declarations were. Mayors Morotani (1967–1979) and Motoshima did not mention the international efforts of the city as much as mayor Araki did. Hiroshima came to be more internationally recognized as the peace city.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki mayors expressed a belief that by visiting their cities people could “witness the witness” and understand the horrors of the atomic bombings. This would convince the visitors of the need for world peace and abolishment of nuclear weapons. Mayors seemed to believe that their cities were able to convey what truly had happened, although once in 1988 Peace Declaration Mayor Motoshima expressed doubt about it. Because of the belief in witnessing the witness, they invited world leaders and ordinary people to visit their cities in the Declarations. Especially Hiroshima was able to get world leaders to visit and to validate the identity Hiroshima had created.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were integrated into the identity of Japan as the only a-bombed nation and into creating a peaceful image of Japan. The mayors contributed to this image in their Peace Declarations by calling Japan a peaceful country and talking about the spirit of Japan's “peace constitution”. However, the tone towards the state changed in the 1980s. Nagasaki became more opposing towards Japanese government during the 1980s. Mayor Motoshima was vocal in his Peace Declarations to urge the government to reveal the truth about multiple occasions where it was suspected that Japan had had nuclear weapons on its territory. He also advocated for the government to open an international medical centre for atomic bomb survivors. At first, Hiroshima Mayor Araki seemed to have taken more restrained approach on the controversies, and thus Hiroshima did not seem to

challenge the national government the same way that Nagasaki did. In this regard there was a clear difference in the roles that the cities took. Nagasaki was more critical of the government.

Nagasaki also sided more with the hibakusha and grassroots anti-nuclear movements than Hiroshima in Peace Declarations in the 1980s. The survivors demanded compensation and healthcare from the government and for the state to take responsibility of the atomic bombings. In 1979 the issue of compensation rose to the public conversation and Peace Declarations started to mention the survivors regularly. Nagasaki Peace Declarations had more mentions of the foreign survivors. This way the city crumbled the image of the atomic bombings as solely a national issue. Towards the beginning of the 1990s Hiroshima Peace Declarations also became more antagonistic towards the government.

Although Nagasaki and Hiroshima have wanted to be known as peace cities, they have also contributed to Japan's imperialism in their past. This history is not remembered in the Declarations. Hiroshima used to pride itself as a military city, but after the war such identity had to be abandoned. Nagasaki still has a significant military industry that has employed many of its citizens over the decades.

Hiroshima has over the decades become internationally recognized as the atomic bombed city and the peace city. Most of English academic research on the topic of this thesis has been written about Hiroshima, and from time to time it proved quite challenging to find information about Nagasaki's city- and identity development. It seems that the efforts of the city officials at branding Hiroshima internationally as the atomic bombed peace city have been successful.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Declarations are significant ways for the cities to spread their message of peace. Although originally spoken in Japanese the fact that they are translated to major languages shows that the cities want them to be read by people across the world. However, the complexities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima's identities cannot be assessed properly only through Peace Declarations that specifically have been written for the remembrance of the atomic bombings. The speeches should not be overinterpreted because many things contributing to the identity of the city are not mentioned in them. Peace Declarations are just one instance where the mayors have created and recreated their cities' identities specifically from the perspective of the atomic bombings and peace work.

There is a lot of room for research on the development of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities. Broadening this research could be done by analysing other instances where the mayors have commented on the role of the city and other issues for example by researching newspaper articles. More information of the mayors could be searched and incorporated in the analysis. Focus could also be broadened to the citizen groups analysing how ordinary people have influenced the communal memory and the identities of the cities “from below”. This could include peace- and antinuclear organisations, hibakusha associations and other local people’s movements. Perhaps there would be some differences between the official discourses and the ones created by the citizens and some possible conflicts between the citizens and the officials. All these research topics would contribute towards giving a more complex and truthful image of the identities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This thesis has been an attempt to fill a little the gap in research of the two atomic bombed cities. I have contributed to the lacking English research on Nagasaki city, but more could be done on explaining the development of Nagasaki after the atomic bombing. The topic is likely to stay relevant in the future as the cities continue their efforts at abolishing nuclear weapons in the world.

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Appendices

Abstract in Finnish

Pro gradu -työssäni “From ashes to international peace cities: Comparison of identity creation and development in Hiroshima & Nagasaki mayoral Peace Declarations 1947–1990” analysoin ja vertailen Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin kaupunkien identiteettikehitystä ja atomipommitusten muistamista toisen maailmansodan lopusta kylmän sodan loppuun asti. Alkuperäisaineistona käytän kaupunkien pormestareiden rauhanpuheita, jotka esitetään vuosittaisissa muistosereonioissa kummassakin kaupungissa. Ajallisen rajauksen syynä on Showa-kauden loppu ja kylmän sodan loppu, jolloin sekä kansainvälinen maailma ja Japanin kansallinen konteksti sekä puheiden sisältö muuttuivat.

Tutkielman aikana huomioin, miten kaupunkien nimet on kirjoitettu rauhanjulistuksessa ja mitä merkityksiä niille annetaan. Japanin kielessä on kolme kirjoitustyyliä: hiragana, katakana ja kanji. Se miten kaupunkien nimet on kirjoitettu vaikuttaa niiden välittämiin merkityksiin. Kanjilla kirjoitettuna Hiroshima ja Nagasaki tuovat mieleen sotaa edeltävän ajan ja historiallisen jatkumon. Katakanailla kirjoitettuna kaupunkien nimet puolestaan tuovat mieleen pommituksen. Yleisesti katakanoilla kirjoitetaan vierasperäiset sanat ja kanjia käytetään virallisesti kaupunkien nimien kirjoituksissa.

Japani oli Yhdysvaltojen miehittäjä toisen maailmansodan lopusta San Franciscon rauhansopimukseen 8.9.1951 asti. Aluksi Yhdysvaltojen tavoite oli tehdä Japanista mallikelpoinen liberaali demokratia, ja sen uusi perustuslaki edusti näitä arvoja niin paljon, että se nimettiin ”rauhanperustuslaiksi”. Kylmän sodan alku kuitenkin muutti Yhdysvaltojen päämääriä, ja Japanin demokratisointi jäi kesken. Monet sota-ajan poliitikot, jotka oli puhdistettu hallinnosta, eivät pysyneet viittä vuotta pitempään syrjäytettyinä. Miehityksen aikana vallitsi sensuuri. Tietoja atomipommituksista ja niiden vaikutuksista pimitettiin, mutta kaikkea keskustelua aiheesta ei sensuroitu. Yhdysvalloille oli tärkeää välittää heidän näkemystensä pommituksista.

Nagasakissa atomipommi tiputettiin Urakami-laaksoon, jossa asui katolilaisia kristittyjä. Nagasakin pommituksen mielikuvasta tuli kristillinen kertomus uhrauksesta, kun miehitysviranomaiset julkaisivat Nagai Takashin *Bells of Nagasaki* -teoksen, jossa hän tulkitsee pommituksen olleen uhraus Kristilliselle jumalalle ja nosti Urakamin katoliset marttyyriin asemaan. Nagaille oli suuri vaikutus siihen, miten Nagasakin pommitusta

muistettiin. Nagasakin rauhanmuistoseremoniaa kutsutaan myös rauhan rukous seremoniaksi. Nagasaki on ollut tärkeä paikka Japanin kristityille. Se oli kristillisen lähetystyön keskus Japanissa ja Urakamin alue tarjosi turvaa vainotuille kristityille Edo-kaudella. Nagasakissa on historiallisesti ollut paljon eurooppalaisia vaikutteita, mitä viranomaiset ryhtyivät vaalimaan sodan jälkeen. Nagasakin viranomaiset halusivat korostaa jälleenrakennuksessa kaupungin kansainvälistä historiaa ja kulttuurien välistä kohtaamista. Aluksi heillä ei juuri ollut kiinnostusta muistaa atomipommitusta, mutta kaupunkilaiset halusivat seurata Hiroshiman esimerkkiä ja järjestää samanlaisen muistotilaisuuden.

Hiroshima ryhtyi nopeasti sodan päätyttyä rakentamaan itselleen identiteettiä rauhankaupunkina. Kaupunki halusi omia rauha-sanan, ja sai sen itselleen, kun kaupungit pyysivät hallinnolta itselleen erityislakeja jälleenrakennukseen. Vuonna 1949 hyväksytyjen lakien nimiksi tuli Hiroshimalle ”rauhanmuistokaupungin rakennuslaki” ja Nagasakille ”kansainvälisen kulttuurikaupungin rakennuslaki.” Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin jälleenrakennus lähti siis eri suuntiin jo ensimmäisinä vuosina atomipommitusten jälkeen.

Luvussa 2 käsittelen puheiden kehitystä kronologisesti miehityksen aikana ja sen jälkeen. Ensimmäisissä rauhanjulistuksissa miehitys näkyy siinä, että ne olivat ilmaisuiltaan rajattuja ja lyhyitä. Atomipommitukset liitettiin osaksi rauhaa, eikä pommituksille annettu juuri minkäänlaista kontekstia. Sotaa ei suoraan kritisoitu, eikä puheissa etsitty syyllisiä tuholle. Hiroshiman pormestari Hamai Shinzō kuvasi rauhanjulistuksissaan kaupungin atomipommitusta opetuksena, jonka Hiroshiman asukkaiden tuli välittää koko maailmalle. Ensimmäiset Nagasakin rauhanjulistukset olivat eri tahojen tekemiä, mikä kertoo siitä, etteivät ne olleet vielä vakiintuneet pormestarin pidettäväksi. Niissä korostettiin Nagasakin roolia sodan loppumisessa, sillä Nagasakin atomipommituksen jälkeen sota loppui. Puheista välittyi kuva, että Nagasaki oli erityinen, ikään kuin sillä olisi ollut voimia lopettaa sota.

Nagasakista tuli kristillisempi kaupunki uudelleenrakennuksen myötä. Yhdysvallat antoi kaupungille rahallista apua erityisesti kristillisten rakennusten ja monumenttien rakentamiseen. Yhdysvallat myöskin auttoi katolilaisen Nagai Takashin *Nagasakin kellot* -kirjaa tulemaan menestyskirjaksi antamalla sen painatukseen säännöstelltyä paperia. Nagai tulkitsti atomipommituksen olleen uhraus Jumalalle maailmansodan lopettamiseksi, ja Urakamin katolisista tulleen marttyyreja. Rauhanjulistuksissa Nagasakin identiteetti kristillisenä kaupunkina näkyi toisinaan, kun niissä esiintyi sanoja kuten apostoli ja kaste.

Kokonaisuudessaan julistukset eivät olleet erityisen kristillisiä ja niissä korostettiin enemmän maallisia asioita.

Sana uhraus toistuu kummankin kaupungin rauhanjulistuksissa. Nagasakin rauhanjulistusten kohdalla on houkuttelevaa tulkita niiden viittaavan Nagain tulkintaan atomipommituksesta. Se ei kuitenkaan ole ainoa vaihtoehto, sillä sana esiintyy myös Hiroshiman julistuksissa, joissa sitä käytetään tarkoittamaan rauhan puolesta uhraamiselle. Voi olla, että Nagasakin julistuksissa on myös tällaista monimerkityksellisyttä. Okuda Hiroko esittää, että uhraus-sanana käytössä piilee vaara, että kuolemat liitetään

Miehityksen jälkeen puheet tuomitsivat ydinaseet suorasanaisesti eivätkä ainoastaan toivoneet maailmanrauhaa. Pormestarit käyttivät iskulauseita ”No more Nagasaki” ja ”No more Hiroshima”. Sloganeilla tarkoitettiin, ettei ydinaseita tulisi enää käyttää ja Nagasakin pormestari halusi etenkin korostaa, että Nagasakin tulisi jäädä viimeiseksi atomipommitetuksi kaupungiksi. Käsittelen alaluvussa Nagasakin iskulausetta ”Rauha alkaa Nagasakista” sekä Hiroshiman rauhanpuheissa usein esiintyvää konseptia ”Hiroshiman hengestä”.

Alaluvussa 2.3 käsittelen Nagasakin ja Hiroshiman unohtettua menneisyyttä. Erityisesti Kiina ja Korea ovat syyttäneet Japania sen imperialistisen menneisyyden unohtamisesta. Myöskään Hiroshima ja Nagasaki eivät tunnu muistavan, että kaupungeilla oli rooli Japanin imperialistisessa laajentumisessa ja sotateollisuudessa. Aihe on myös tärkeä Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin kohdalla siitä syystä, että japanilaisessa yhteisössä on tapana nähdä maa toisen maailmansodan uhrina, koska se on ”ainoa atomipommitettu maa”. Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin atomipommitusten muistaminen on vahvistanut tätä näkökulmaa, ja kaupungit ovat olleet rakentamassa Japanin kansallista identiteettiä ”ainoana atomipommitettuna maana”.

Hiroshimassa oli ensimmäisen Kiinan ja Japanin sodan aikana armeijan päämaja. Nagasakissa Mitsubishin tehdas työllisti monia ihmisiä ja tuotti sotateollisuudelle tarvikkeita. Mitsubishillä on edelleen vahva asema kaupungissa, ja sen Nagasakin tehdas on yksi Japanin sotateollisuuden suurimmista. Vaikkakin tehdas on voinut vaikuttaa siihen, etteivät kaupunkilaiset ole uskaltaneet työnmenetyksenpelossa vastustaa ydinaseita ja sotaa, ei tämä juuri ole näkynyt rauhanjulistuksissa. Hiroshima ja Nagasaki alkoivat mainitsemaan Japanin kolonialistisen menneisyyden vasta 1990-luvun taitteessa rauhanjulistuksissa, mutta eivät kuitenkaan reflektoineet omaa osuuttaan siinä.

Luvussa 3 käsittelen 1970- ja 1980-lukuja kahden eri teeman kautta. Ensimmäisenä käsittelen kaupunkien kansainvälistymistä ja miten rauhanjulistukset heijastelevat sitä. Kaupungit aloittivat virallisesti yhteistyön toistensa kanssa ja osallistuivat Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien aseidenriisuntaa käsitteleviin erityisistuntoihin vuodesta 1978 alkaen. Analysoin rauhanjulistuksista, millaisen roolin kaupungit ottivat tuona aikana. Alaluvussa 3.2 käsittelen sitä, miten kaupungit ovat vastustaneet Japanin hallitusta, kun ovat katsoneet sen toimivan rauhanvastaisesti.

Alaluvussa 3.1 käsittelen Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin kansainvälistä roolia ja imagon rakennusta. Pormestarit osallistuivat Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien erityisessioihin pyrkien saamaan atomipommitukset muistetuksi YK:ssa. He pitivät kokouksissa puheita, joissa he kertoivat atomipommituksista ja kutsuivat maailman johtajia käymään kaupungeissaan. Analysoin, miten tapahtumat näkyivät rauhanjulistuksissa, ja kuinka Hiroshima ja Nagasaki pyrkivät rakentamaan identiteettejään kansainvälisellä tasolla. Erityisesti Hiroshiman pormestari Araki ilmaisi rauhanjulistuksissa useasti haluavansa maailmanjohtajien tulevan käymään Hiroshimassa. Hän uskoi, että käynti saisi johtajat työskentelemään ydinaseiden hävittämisen ja rauhan puolesta. Hiroshima oli aktiivisempi ja sai vierailijoikseen muun muassa paavi Johannes Paavali II:n vuonna 1981 sekä YK:n pääsihteeri Javier Pérez de Cuéllarin vuonna 1982. Hiroshiman rauhanjulistuksissa korostuukin sen kansainvälinen rooli. Pormestari Araki raportoi kansainvälisestä tunnustuksesta, jota kaupunki sai osakseen. Vierailijat olivat tärkeä osa kaupungin identiteetin validointia. Nagasakin pormestari Motoshima korosti ruohonjuuritason- ja kansanliikkeiden vaikutusta maailmanrauhan ja ydinaseriisunnan tavoittelemisessa. Morotani ja Motoshima kummatkin korostivat Nagasakin rauhanviestin olevan niin vaikuttava, että jos kaikki sen kuulisivat, ei sotia enää olisi. Pormestarit puhuvat vähemmän kansainvälisistä vierailijoista, kuin Hiroshiman pormestarit, ja he saivatkin niitä vähemmän. Jo rauhanajan alusta alkanut kehitys, jossa Hiroshiman viranomaiset lähtivät aktiivisesti rakentamaan Hiroshimasta rauhankaupunkia, johti siihen, että Nagasaki jäi Hiroshiman varjoon kansainvälisellä areenalla.

Alaluvussa 3.2 analysoin, sitä miten Nagasaki ja Hiroshima kritisoivat Japanin hallitusta rauhanjulistuksissa. Tarkastelen, millaisen kuvan pormestarit luovat kaupungeistaan suhteessa kansalliseen hallitukseen. 1980-luvulla kansalaisille paljastui tapauksia, joissa Yhdysvallat oli tuonut ydinaseita Japanin alueelle, vaikka Japanin hallitus oli päättänyt niin kutsutusta kolmesta ydinasevastaisesta periaatteesta, jossa kiellettiin Japania pitämästä hallussaan, valmistamasta tai sallimasta ydinaseita alueelleen. Hallitus oli kuitenkin kaikessa

hiljaisuudessa katsonut läpi sormien, kun Yhdysvallat oli tuonut omille tukikohdilleen ydinaseita Japanissa. Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin reaktioissa huhuihin oli eroja. Nagasaki oli pormestari Motoshiman johdolla aggressiivisempi kritiikissään hallitusta kohtaan, kun Hiroshiman viesti oli maltillisempi ja diplomaattisempi. 1980-luvun lopussa Hiroshiman viesti muuttui kuitenkin myös tuomitsevammaksi, kun se katsoi hallituksen toimivan rauhanvastaisesti. Hiroshima ja Nagasaki kritisoivat hallitusta myös atomipommeista selviytyjien hoitamatta jättämisestä. Pyyntö hallitukselle selviytyjien auttamisesta tuli osaksi Hiroshiman pormestari Arakin rauhanjulistuksia vuodesta 1980 alkaen.

Nagasakin rauhanjulistuksissa esitettiin useammin vihan ja katkeruuden tunteita kuin Hiroshiman. Esimerkiksi vuonna 1973 pormestari Morotani sanoi kaupunkilaisten olevan vihaisia ja katkeria atomipommituksesta. Näitä tunteita ei kuitenkaan suoraan esitetty ketään kohtaan. Kenties Nagasakilla oli enemmän tilaa ilmaista tällaisia tunteita. Voi olla, että kansalaisten äänen annettiin kuulua Nagasakin rauhanjulistuksissa Hiroshimaa enemmän. Kyseessä voi myös olla, että pormestarien erilaiset persoonat ja ilmaisutyyli vaikuttivat ilmaisuihin.

Nagasaki on jäänyt Hiroshiman varjoon rauhankaupunki-identiteetin rakentamisessa ja atomipommitusten muistamisessa. Tämä on näkynyt myös akateemisessa tutkimuksessa, jota on tehty huomattavasti enemmän Hiroshimasta. Rauhanjulistuksissa on paljon samaa, mutta olen keskittynyt pääosassa niiden eroihin. Hiroshima rakensi itselleen identiteettiä rauhankaupunkina atomipommikokemuksen pohjalta. Nagasaki osin Hiroshiman painostuksesta osin omien virkamiestensä vaikutuksesta keskittyi enemmän kansainvälisen historiansa vaalimiseen ja atomipommimuisto jäi taka-alalle. Se kuitenkin seurasi Hiroshiman esimerkkiä muistaen atomipommitusta rauhan käsitteen kautta. Kummatkin kaupungit halusivat esittää itsensä rauhan välittäjinä, ja korostivat omaa roolia kansainvälisen rauhan- ja ydinpommien vastaisen liikkeen aikaan saajina. Loppuluvussa ehdotan, että Hiroshiman ja Nagasakin identiteettikehitystä voisi tutkia kansalaisjärjestöjen kuten rauhanliikkeiden ja hibakusha-järjestöjen kautta. Mikäli haluaa laajentaa tutkimusta kaupunkien pormestarien luomasta diskurssista, voisi tutkia muita instansseja, joissa pormestarit ovat määritelleet kaupunkejaan.