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22 Players Run After the Ball for 90 Minutes, and in the End England Wins. German Views of the 1935 and 1938 Germany–England Football Matches

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the politico-diplomatic dimension of the 1935 and 1938 Germany-England football matches played during the National Socialist era. Despite being represented in both countries as international friendlies, these games proved highly politicized affairs because of the centrality of the British-German relationship in international affairs and the politization and diplomatization of international sport during the 1930s. The 1935 game, played in London, became the focus for a high-profile public campaign, led by trade union, Jewish, and other lobbying groups hostile to Nazi Germany, to ban the match. In turn, the 1938 fixture is famed for the Nazi salute, the ‘infamous gesture’ that British diplomats and Football Association officials instructed the England team to give before the beginning of the match. Using the archives of the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) and Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives) as well as a selection of German newspapers, this article provides an informed German perspective on both matches, which hitherto have been studied principally from a British perspective. Focused upon German aims, perceptions, political influences, and propaganda goals, this case study highlights the ‘soft power’ methods of totalitarianism in terms of both the adaptation of totalitarianism to football and the adaptation of football to totalitarianism.

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Research on Football in Nazi Germany

The first full international played between England and Germany took place at Berlin in May 1930. This match, like that played in the same stadium one year earlier versus Scotland, was seen as yet another step towards Germany’s postwar rehabilitation in the sphere of international sport. Following the First World War, the four British football associations had played the lead role in ostracizing German football, while making abortive efforts to persuade FIFA to follow suit. In the event, they moderated their stance during the mid-1920s, so that Football League and Scottish League clubs toured Germany from 1924 onwards. But it was not until 1929 and 1930, that is, after Germany’s readmission to the Olympic Games in 1928

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for the first time since the war, that the invitations of the Deutscher Fußball-Bund (DFB) for full international fixtures received positive responses from the Scottish Football Association (SFA) and then the Football Association (FA). Both matches reflected well upon the quality of German football. Thus, in 1929 Germany drew 1-1 with Scotland, and then one year later, watched by a capacity crowd, drew 3-3 with England, with the German press praising both the result and the match's significance on and off the field. Moreover, Dresdner SC's Richard Hofmann attained iconic status by becoming the first non-British player to score a hat-trick against England.

However, the next two Germany-England fixtures took place in very different circumstances. Played during the Nazi era, they proved far more controversial politically and diplomatically. Overthrowing the democratic Weimar regime, National Socialist rule was totalitarian, thereby rendering it much more difficult to conform to the traditional mantra stressing the separation of politics and sport. Traditionally, British governments and the FA upheld the distinctive autonomy of British sport. Significantly, in these two matches, the political and sporting leadership in Hitler's Germany espoused exactly the same goal—or so it appeared.

Looking back at National Socialist Germany, it is easy to assume that everything was part of Hitler's masterplan intended to take power and conquer the world, thereby leaving little or no room for anything other than strict ideological motives and procedures. After all, the system was designed to be totalitarian, and Germany was famed for its efficiency and ability to plan strategically. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that all aspects of sporting life were also planned, and then exploited as cultural diplomacy aka propaganda advertising the Nazi regime's achievements and Aryan supremacy to both domestic and foreign audiences.

However, without making apologies for the National Socialist system and its deeds, researchers have questioned, indeed challenged, such assumptions. Ian Kershaw, among others, has argued that in practice National Socialist administration, far from conforming to images stressing its methodical and well-organized nature, was frequently chaotic, controversial, and even inefficient, principally because of Hitler's reluctance to issue clear orders and the jealous rivalries dividing Nazi leaders.¹ According to Kershaw, this process, described as 'Working towards the Führer', meant that inner Nazi circles attempted to interpret Hitler's opinions and intentions, while representing themselves as the best interpreters of the Führer's will. For Kershaw, Stalin proved a much more efficient and competent administrator.

In National Socialist Germany, sport in general and football in particular possessed a clear political-diplomatic purpose. In July 1933 German sport was given its own leader, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, who as *Reichssportführer* was, in principle, in control of all sport in the country. The aim was to produce a healthy master race, physically capable of taking the lead in both the world as a whole and what was represented as the battle against the inferior races, emphasizing more physical national fitness than rational aspects, and, as happened in the Soviet Union, transforming individuals into functioning parts of the masses.² At first, producing top athletes was not the goal, but hosting the 1936 Berlin Olympics led distinctive performances in elite level sports to become a policy priority.

Despite failing to match the national standing of the gymnastics movement, the 1936 Berlin Olympics, or Max Schmeling, the superhero boxer, football proved a major German sporting activity. Certainly, it was no longer dismissed by nationalists as ‘an English disease’, as happened during the late nineteenth century; indeed, it was the most popular sport among the general public, and hence worthy of attention from the political elite.

The term, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, means going through history to understand and take control of the past honestly. The history of football during the Nazi era has been thoroughly researched as part of a process helping German historiography to understand and cope with the National Socialist past. Markwart Herzog, Nils Havemann, and Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling, among others, have rewritten Nazi Germany’s sporting history, albeit presenting contrasting interpretations on a range of sports including football.³ Inevitably, leading teams and players have been placed under close scrutiny. For instance, whereas Schalke 04 has carried the burden of its reputation of being the Nazi regime’s ‘favourite’, Bayern München assumed an alleged oppositional role.⁴ Austrian football after the 1938 Anschluss has often adopted the role of victim, even if research has revealed that, concerning football, much of this was mythical.⁵

Like sport in general, German football adapted quickly to *Gleichschaltung*, the process of synchronization to the demands of Nazi totalitarianism, even showing signs of eagerness when adapting to the new system. Thus Guido von Mengden, the DFB’s press secretary, spoke about how National Socialism had revived the game’s meaning and essence, while adding the highest values, that is, ‘honour’, racial consciousness, and the community of the German people.⁶ The DFB adopted to the new sporting instructions, as the regional series system (*Gau*) was created. The DFB became part of the *Deutscher Reichsbund für Leibesübungen* [German Reich League for Physical Exercise], a new centralized organization founded in 1934, with a special Football Department (*Fachamt Fussball*). Gradually, the DFB’s role diminished, as reflected by its dissolution in 1940; there was no room nor need for it because of the foundation of the *Fachamt Fussball* replaced it.

Notwithstanding the expulsion of Jews and ‘Marxists’, in reality, as recorded by Nils Havemann, no radical changes occurred in everyday football life for those who remained; indeed, in many ways, material circumstances improved because the new system was willing to allocate more resources to sport.⁷ Football as such largely continued as before, and the new political leaders used rhetoric that was easy to connect to old traditions. This statement neither diminishes the meaning and importance of the expulsion of Jews and ‘Marxists’ nor belittles the discriminatory and brutal nature of these measures, but it is merely to state the fact that the National Socialist regime adopted diverse strategies towards different sections of the population, the political spectrum, and society.

Methodology and Theory

This study investigates how *Gleichschaltung* was viewed by the German media in the sector of sport. Hannah Arendt sees the roots of totalitarianism in a process in which the previous society is dissolving and is becoming so individualized that even the

educated people start to seek a new mass identity which saves them from the sense of helplessness.⁸ Simultaneously, the process can be seen as a case of totalitarianism adopting a flexible approach towards sport, allowing the sector a fair degree of freedom and encouraging business-as-usual images. Clearly, German journalists, living in a totalitarian state with an officially controlled media, were compelled to acknowledge various official constraints when writing about football, especially as fixtures played against foreign teams proved far more than a mere game. Against this backdrop, various questions can be asked of German journalists. For example, did they:

- attempt overtly to emphasise the footballing achievements of the Nazi political regime, including racist, anti-Semitic arguments, thereby proving the might of the 'Aryan' master race according to Nazi doctrine?
- play down the political dimension in order not only to avoid provoking adverse foreign media reaction but also to challenge foreign propaganda critiques of Nazi Germany?
- foster a sense of German national identity through sport?
- confine themselves to representing sport as sport, not politics, and, if so, how and why?

Using the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt (PAAA) of the German Foreign Ministry, the administrative archives of the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives), and contemporary German newspapers, this article, building upon my study available only in Finnish, provides a much-needed German perspective on these two Germany-England matches.⁹ Hitherto, these games have been studied principally from the British point of view through publications written by sport journalists, like David Downing, or academics, including Peter Beck, Richard Holt, and Brian Stoddart.¹⁰ Treating the *Gleichschaltung* process as a cultural and social phenomenon, as stressed by Herzog, this study follows Stoddart's view that the full power of sport as a political agency can be properly understood only by setting it in its cultural context and taking account of its interactions with other informal social institutions.¹¹ Newspapers will be studied to highlight the way in which the German media reported and represented football, with a specific critical focus placed upon commentaries admitting or denying the presence of politics, emphasising national identity and unity, employing expressions of battle and warrior rhetoric, or mentioning friendship policy.¹² Interestingly, research revealed that relevant articles were published in the sport sections of the papers rather than figuring in political editorials or commentaries.

Operating in a totalitarian state, all newspapers were at the mercy of the National Socialist Party. Covering as many party and non-party newspapers in key regions and large cities as possible, research was undertaken as to whether there were differences between party newspapers and those remaining in private hands. The newspapers consulted were *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung*, *Der Angriff*, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Hamburger Nachrichten*, *Hamburger Tageblatt*, *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, *Völkischer Beobachter*, and *Westdeutscher Beobachter*. Some were more ideological than others. Thus, *Völkischer Beobachter* was the leading Nazi Party newspaper, *Westdeutscher Beobachter* its West German local print, while *Der Angriff* was viewed as the mouthpiece of Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry.¹³ Other

papers, though not party organs, were forced to accommodate political realities, most notably, the fact that neither critiques nor opposition to the NSDAP was allowed. By contrast, *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung* was a picture-orientated periodical, concentrated on entertainment, leisure, cinema, and all sorts of public 'stars'. It evidently had very few political but very many commercial interests, offering entertainment for the masses and looking for as much circulation and financial income as possible.

Diplomatic Intermezzos before the 1935 Game

Traditionally, British governments, stressing the autonomy of sport, steered clear of sport, or at least attempted to give this impression in public. Thus, in 1935 the Baldwin government, stating the need to keep politics out of football, rejected the demands, advanced by a range of trade union, Jewish and other campaigning groups, to ban the fixture versus Germany because of the repressive policies of Hitler's regime and perceived use of the match for propaganda purposes.¹⁴ Publicly, both Sir Samuel Hoare, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, dismissed the case for a ban. As the latter informed Walter Citrine, the TUC General Secretary, it was highly undesirable that politics should be involved in a purely sporting affair.¹⁵ The match, he argued, needed no permission from the Government, and this had never been requested by the Football Association, a private non-governmental body.

For the German government, the match, due to be played at Tottenham Hotspur's ground, was welcomed as an opportunity to provide positive images of Hitler's Germany, boost the reputation of the Third Reich on and off the field, and project the human face of National Socialism through the ten thousand German fans scheduled to travel to London for the game. Hitherto, Britons, influenced by British media reports, were seen as possessing negative stereotypical impressions of Germans as militaristic, violent, shouting Nazi bullies, as typified by the way in which Foreign Office officials, when commenting on the forthcoming fixture, wrote about 10,000 'Nazis', not 10,000 'Germans'.¹⁶ Within this context, the German objective was to show the British authorities, media, and public that in reality Germans were quite ordinary, decently behaved people, that is, just like Britons. Responding to Simon's worries about the presence of so many Germans at a football ground located in an area of London containing a large Jewish and working-class population, Hoesch, the German Ambassador in London, reassured the Home Secretary that there would be no demonstrations, songs, Nazi slogans, and waving of swastikas by visiting supporters. Furthermore, he reminded Hoare that there had been no trouble when 15,000 Germans visited Paris for the France-Germany match played in March 1935.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the *Auswärtiges Amt* worried about the presence of so many fans in London. Far from intending to use their visit for overt political demonstrations, the *Auswärtiges Amt* sought to prevent such activities because of concerns about adverse propaganda impacts. In particular, it feared that visiting German fans – these were labelled by the German Foreign Office as '*Schlachtenbummler*', a slang term, literally meaning battle bums, used to describe fans following teams on their away games, but used in a less 'bellicose' sense – would prompt disturbances, and even become victims of physical attacks. In this vein, during early November, Erich Chemnitz, a Leipzig-based football journalist, urged the Ministry of Propaganda to ensure that any

political gestures, even non-political songs, liable to be misunderstood as political, were avoided.¹⁸ Although he did not expect German spectators to have political aims, Chemnitz feared that when abroad they would forget that were not in Germany.¹⁹ However, Der Reichs- und Preussische Ministerium der Innen (the Ministry for Internal Affairs) pointed to the recent trouble-free visits of German football fans to both Amsterdam (February 1935) and Paris (March 1935): 'without a doubt, we can count on peaceful play in England'. The archives confirm Holt's suspicion that Germany was not planning any political demonstration or disturbances, since these would undermine the government's ultimate goal, as stated above.²⁰

Der Reichs- und Preussische Ministerium der Innen feared also that the game's cancellation would damage preparations for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, weaken respect for Germany in foreign sporting circles, and boost the worldwide Marxist-Jewish campaign for an Olympic boycott. Seeking to raise the propaganda stakes, the Ministry claimed also that reliable sources indicated that the Prince of Wales, the son and heir of King George V, was scheduled to attend the England-Germany football game and urged that such points should be made known to the Führer.²¹

Meanwhile, it seemed increasingly likely that the match might be cancelled because the resistance in Britain seemed to be gathering momentum and the German attempt to represent the match as a goodwill game, and to gain propaganda value from it, would thus be in jeopardy. In this vein, Hoesch informed the British Foreign Office that the German Government would accept a cancellation, because its original aim of using the fixture to improve bilateral relations was in jeopardy.²² The German message was clear: if the match was to be cancelled, the initiative would have to come from the British side, and hence the blame would fall on the British Government and the FA, not Germany. This information soon became public and inevitably was reported in a political manner. Apprised of Hoesch's visit to the Foreign Office, the *Evening Standard* reported that the FA and the German embassy in London were prepared for the fixture's cancellation if requested by the British government. Moreover, the *Evening Standard* mentioned that Hitler was ready to withdraw the German team from the fixture.²³ Although interference upon Hitler's part was officially repudiated in the media, archival evidence indicates that Hitler was seriously considering German withdrawal.²⁴ Indeed, he had already instructed civil servants to cancel German participation and the supporters' visit, and 'asked' (i.e. ordered) the German Ministry for Internal Affairs to make the necessary arrangements in the event of the match's abandonment.²⁵

Naturally, neither the Foreign Office nor the FA knew about all this to-ing and fro-ing in and around Berlin but realised that they would have to accept all the blame for the game's cancellation. Even worse, any ban would be regarded as a diplomatic affront by Germany, thereby conflicting with the British government's prime foreign policy objective of seeking détente with Germany. As Holt argues, there is no evidence that there was any positive initiative to promote good British-German relations through football, but there was a determination not to let football damage the relationship.²⁶ Nor did the British government wish to be seen as surrendering to left-wing pressure exerted by the trade union movement to ban the match. The Foreign Office informed the German Embassy that the government had agreed to

meet TUC representatives but would emphasize to them that the game was totally unpolitical in nature. In particular, it was hoped that everyone who had an interest in the game ‘would do their utmost to reject the idea that a sporting event in England could be mixed up with political things.’²⁷

In the end, the match went ahead. There was no ban, and no disturbing intermez-zos occurred. England won 3-0, but the German team could claim a heroic fight and a decent result. The German fans behaved excellently, avoiding any sort of political complications, and were undisturbed by hostile demonstrators. The FA and the German sport leaders celebrated the event at Hotel Victoria, toasts were raised, and William Pickford, the FA President, praised the German players, while critiquing the TUC for attempting to politicize the game. Also, he hoped that such political interference, what Pickford described as the first of its kind, would also be the last.²⁸

German Tactics: No Politics!

Archival sources offer no evidence about either who took the initiative to arrange the fixture or whether the game was part of a German masterplan. However, it was clear that the German team was intended to prove that Hitler’s Third Reich was dynamic and strong enough to challenge the longstanding ‘Masters of the Game’. The most important thing was not so much to win – despite the draw achieved in 1930, such an outcome was deemed improbable – but rather to be accepted as a footballing equal by the motherland of football. After all, even the arrangement of a game *in England* was welcomed as evidence of the FA’s recognition of the quality of German football. Only one foreign fixture was played at home by England each season, and Germany followed in the wake of Spain (1931), Austria (1932), France (1933), and Italy (1934), the 1934 World Cup winners. Moreover, England remained undefeated on home soil by continental teams, and was considered by many as one of the strongest teams, if not the strongest, in the world. Of course, a German victory would be a huge bonus, but nobody at home would blame the German team if it lost.

Many German sport journalists probably thought genuinely that politics and sport should not mix, but they knew also that this was also the most prudent approach to adopt towards the match. Britons would not be won over by overt ideological propaganda, and it was well-known that the reputation of National Socialism was poor abroad. The best strategy was damage limitation, that is, the use of soft diplomacy measures. Therefore, the central objective was to stress that the Third Reich approached sport like Britain, and hence German newspapers treated the fixture as non-political. Tschammer und Osten asserted earlier in the year when Germany played at Paris:

The foreign newspapers have over and over again accused me of having politicized German sport. It is true! I plead guilty – I have done that. However, in a totally different way than is claimed. I have re-ignited the will and love for physical exercise in Germany. I have inculcated an enthusiasm for sport in our youth. That is, indeed, a *political* act. Even though physical exercise as such is anything but political, to a greater or lesser degree it nevertheless calls into being political *influence* by its very existence ... However, *one cannot make political issues with sport, and there is nothing that we in Germany aim less to do*. Sport simply stands between the people of different nations. It speaks the language of the heart; if we can only advance such human discussion over the borders of the nations, then a political *influence* will be achieved as well. I gladly

accept the accusation of giving physical exercise a political mission in *this* sense.²⁹ (author's emphasis)

In effect, as *Völkischer Beobachter* stated, the England-Germany match was represented as possessing the same meaning for both governments, that is, it was 'a sporting event without any political or religious hidden meanings'.³⁰ Other newspapers echoed this line. For the *Hamburger Tageblatt*:

No one should make a state act of this international match, no matter how important and purposeful it was for the image of German sport. In no way and in no sense! It should be what a sporting game always is or should be: a match between the selection of young sportsmen of two nations that are friendly to each other. But only a *match!*³¹

According to the *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, the image left behind by the German team was more important than the result. Notwithstanding 'the efforts employed by some to try to cancel the match even at the very last moment', the German footballers were going to enter the match with the sporting attitude to which the English people seemed so receptive, and 'show that there is room only for disciplined and morally indisputable people in the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler'.³²

Typifying the humility displayed towards the England team, the *Hamburger Nachrichten* conceded that an 'honourable result' would be enough. For the German media, England were the firm favourites, especially as it was adjudged to benefit from home advantage, tradition, the weather, and, most of all, the fact that its players, unlike their German counterparts, were professionals.³³ Paradoxically, Germany, though represented by amateur players, adopted a far more professional approach towards its national team as regards the selection, organisation, preparations, and tactics, but for German newspapers the fact that their players were amateurs, compensated only for the loss of earnings during the trip, reinforced their pre-match messages.³⁴ Indeed, the British press were encouraged in interviews with the tour party to highlight the fact that, say, Schalke 04's Fritz Szepan, the German captain, was a municipal clerk, and Karl Hohmann, the centre forward, was a cobbler by way of emphasising the amateur-professional dimension. In brief, no German player was a professional footballer.

A Sporting Event and a Glorious Defeat

Surprisingly, German newspaper reports of the match were just like everyday sports journalism. The papers were far more preoccupied describing the game, recording the experiences of the German fans in London, and emphasizing the good-natured and friendly reception they received in Britain than touching upon anything that might be deemed political. As a result, newspapers devoted considerable attention to human interest stories featuring both players and the fans, such as reporting how some German players had been given paper sick bags because some of them had never flown before,³⁵ how the fans who came by sea were affected by high winds,³⁶ and how people from different parts of Germany and with different habits mixed and became acquainted on board the ships.³⁷

Even *Völkischer Beobachter*, when describing the team's arrival in London, followed suit by concentrating upon non-political themes, like tourists in awe; thus, reports

pointed to traffic driving on the left, everything being so vast, the use of traffic lights, and so on. The paper claimed also that Britons wondered why German fans did not bring any mascots with them.³⁸ As a result, it proves difficult to find any political messages in *Völkischer Beobachter's* coverage of the game, excepting some slightly sarcastic and gloating remarks about the failure of the allegedly Marxist trade union movement to stop a match which the British Government and people wanted played. After all, Britain was a sporting nation. As regards the match's alleged Marxist dimension, *Berliner Tageblatt* admitted that Communist leaflets were distributed during the team's visit, but these represented the views of only a small segment of the population.

Generally speaking, most people echoed Simon's viewpoint, that is, it was a football match and had nothing to do with politics. Indeed, the *Berliner Tageblatt* welcomed the fact that even the *News Chronicle*, which was no admirer of Hitler's Germany, had stated that a sports field was not an arena for political confrontation and a quarrel with the German people.³⁹ However, this did not prevent *Berliner Tageblatt* critiquing in the same edition the Baldwin government's policy towards the League of Nations.⁴⁰ After the game, the front page headlines of *Hamburger Nachrichten* were largely dominated by England, but because of British-Italian relations in general, not football.⁴¹

The German government's success in excluding political statements from the match and the media was confirmed by Sir Frederick Wall – until recently he had been FA Secretary – in a quote published by *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*:

If some deplorables are drawn to unsportsmanlike conduct by the emergence of the German team, then the overwhelming majority of the English spectators will shout them down as *one* man. A football match between two national teams has nothing to do with politics. Sport is not for agitation, but for reconciliation!⁴²

In brief, as asserted by the *Hamburger Nachrichten* about pre-match German commentaries, 'Sporting spirit triumphs over political agitation.'⁴³

In turn, German newspapers celebrated the result. The match was lost, but the visit was viewed as a success in every sense; thus, their team was praised for a decent result, a masterful battle, a courageous effort, heroic resistance against invincible odds, a self-sacrificing game, an indomitable sporting spirit, and so forth. As *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* claimed, 'Despite being 0:3, it was a success for German sports.'⁴⁴ Or Germany was – to quote *Frankfurter Zeitung* – 'Beaten after a brave battle.'⁴⁵ *Berliner Tageblatt* made poetry of defeat achieved in a sporting manner:

The straight defeat loses all bitterness by the fact that our players did their best and lost to an overwhelming opponent after the most energetic resistance, in an exemplary competition in which the referee awarded a free-kick only four times, and the opponent had all the advantages on its side. The 70,000 spectators had no reason for any display of displeasure during any stage of the game.⁴⁶

Westdeutscher Beobachter resorted to military allegories: 'A football game lost and a battle won!' and 'They went down with flying colours.'⁴⁷ The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* cherished how the orderly German crowds and spectators had revealed to the English the false images projected by anti-German propaganda. Moreover, it reported a favourable military connection, when citing a pre-match communication from an

English officer to an attendant working with the German national team: 'I am convinced that the German team shall fight just as fairly as the German soldier did in the World War.' According to *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, this wish had been confirmed.⁴⁸

Völkischer Beobachter was more than satisfied. It pointed out that the English team had all the advantages on its side and that the German side had gone to its limits in the battle and lost honourably. Germany had faced the best team that England could name: 'And the best British team is identical to the best team in the whole world.'⁴⁹ *Der Angriff*, the newspaper of Goebbels and the Ministry for Propaganda, representing the defeat as 'honourable', reminded readers that the English players were professionals.⁵⁰ The newspapers were also very eager to report and quote the British press' lavish praise of both the German team and the excellent conduct of the German fans in and around the stadium, comparing the latter favourably to previous visits by fans from Italy and Spain as well as Scotland.⁵¹

The German media highlighted also the celebratory meetings of the Anglo-German Fellowship and the FA post-match banquet. Speaking at both events, Tschammer und Osten took the opportunity to reassure Britons that, contrary to anti-German propaganda, sport in the Third Reich possessed no military objectives. He added that naturally it was a duty for every man to defend his country, and he was sure that the British citizens agreed with this view. However, sport was quite another thing, sport could be only voluntary and joyful. Advancing reconciliation between nations better than any verbal advice, sport became an important factor in the spheres of culture and education. The aim of the Third Reich's sport policy was clear: 'We will make an effort to try to reach the eternal dream of humanity, to find the harmonious balance between body and soul.'⁵² From the German perspective, it was a job well done in almost all possible senses, but not a political game-changer; thus, Goebbels recorded only the result, 3-0, in his diary, without commenting further.⁵³ It is likely, even if it was not mentioned specifically, that both the English and the Germans compared the match's sporting spirit favourably as compared to the unsporting and violent 'Battle of Highbury' fought between England and Italy one year earlier.

Clearly, virtually everything published about the match concentrated upon sport, especially human-interest stories, not politics. This proved the case even when domestic readers were the newspaper's actual target group. Of course, this might be interpreted as an indirect political act in the sense that readers got what they actually wanted, that is, to read about football, their passion, without having to face overt political sermonizing on the sport pages. The regime benefited also. By keeping the public contented and creating an atmosphere of normality, it sent a message that the new National Socialist political system offered the same possibilities and pleasures as its Weimar predecessor, only more efficiently. There was, it appears, no German masterplan as such – the archives yielded no documentary evidence of that – but it was practical politics in the sense of offering Hitler's regime extra-sporting advantages with very little effort.

Germany versus England, May 1938: More Problems

England's visit to Berlin in May 1938 was framed by an increasingly tense international situation. Thus, the match, played at the Olympic Stadion, was sandwiched

between the *Anschluss*, Germany's takeover of Austria (March 1938), and the May War Scare Crisis (20-1 May 1938) resulting from the escalating pressure placed by Hitler to annex Sudetenland, the German-speaking parts of Czechoslovakia. Despite continuing worries about Hitler's objectives, the fixture complemented the British government's appeasement policy towards Germany; indeed, this strategy had received fresh impetus in May 1937 following Neville Chamberlain's appointment as prime minister.

The most controversial politico-diplomatic aspect of the match centred upon the England team's 'infamous Nazi salute'. Guided by Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, FA officials instructed players to make the 'German salute' during the pre-match ceremonies as a gesture of friendship, a.k.a. appeasement, towards Germany.⁵⁴ The players were reluctant, but finally complied following advice about its perceived value in helping British-German relations at a time of growing international tension.⁵⁵ Subsequently, players' memoirs, most notably those published by Eddie Hapgood and Stanley Matthews during the 1940s and after, treated the salute more critically, since their memories were filtered by the experience of living through the lengthy Second World War and the resulting critiques of appeasement as a futile unprincipled policy.⁵⁶

For Germany, the fixture was welcomed as providing an excellent propaganda opportunity. The national team's sixteen-match unbeaten record, alongside the fact that, following the *Anschluss*, Austrian players became eligible to represent Germany, encouraged German newspapers to speculate about a first-ever victory over England. *Der Angriff* published a series of articles, entitled '*Sturm gegen England*' [*Storm against England*], in which Hans Saalbach described how continental teams had already come close to ending English footballing primacy.⁵⁷ Nor, despite concentrating upon sport, did he overlook National Socialism's role in raising sporting standards, particularly making Germany the best amateur team in the world. This comment was in conflict with the outcome of the 1936 Olympic football tournament, which was won by Italy and in which the German team, watched by Hitler, was eliminated in the early stages. Now the 1935 match appeared, nostalgically, ever more heroic. Indeed, Saalbach even questioned some refereeing decisions accepted by German papers in 1935. He concluded that 'It will be breathtaking to see how offensive the German Eleven plays this time, and if it fulfils all the hopes attached to it, it could even be in a position to beat the English national team!'⁵⁸

Völkischer Beobachter did not speculate about the result, at least not directly, but left its readers guessing. After expressing confidence in the German team, it referred to the unique English ability to raise the team's play to a state of fury in which its opponents could no longer breathe. Even so, *Völkischer Beobachter* remained hopeful: 'To witness this *fighting storm*, to overcome it and to *strike back* yourself, that would be the miracle that our team would have to bring about, so that the match against England would be the experience that we all dream about. Anyway, we shall see.'⁵⁹ (original italics) For *Völkischer Beobachter*, the match proved also a rehearsal for the World Cup, scheduled to commence in France one month later.⁶⁰ In this vein, *Hamburger Nachrichten*, representing the national side as 'our World Champion candidates', stated that the team 'in front of the powerful 100,000-strong audience will

certainly throw everything it has into finally achieving a victory over the team that once was the teacher of the game.⁶¹

Forecasting a possible victory over England, several newspapers represented the match, alongside next day's fixture versus Aston Villa, as offering an excellent test for the World Cup. For them, Germany was one of the favourites to win the title.⁶² As mentioned above, such optimism was not totally unfounded, given the team's lengthy unbeaten record, including recent draws with Hungary and Italy. Indeed, the team was nicknamed the *Breslauer Elf* [the Breslau eleven] after its 8-0 demolition of Denmark at Breslau one year earlier. Significantly, when discussing the possibility of a historic footballing victory, no substantial references were made to either nationalist or political arguments, let alone to world politics, the Aryan race, or National Socialism. Saalbach, for example, merely mentioned how National Socialism had advanced sport in general. Nor did newspapers articulate the nationalist pride and hubris reported by, say, Stanley Matthews when describing the mood of people at Berlin.⁶³

In the event, the media's optimism proved unfounded. England secured a decisive 6-3 victory, leaving no room for explanations. Most of the Nazi regime's elite attended the match, thereby exerting pressure upon players to secure a good result. Hitler, though expected, was absent, possibly still traumatized by watching Norway's victory over Germany at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, reportedly the only football game he ever attended. Henderson, whose reputation is often burdened by appeasement, had a good time sitting alongside his Nazi hosts, even offering them his binoculars so that they might see England's magnificent goals better. His hosts were not amused and took their leave immediately after the match.⁶⁴ For Matthews, when England scored its final goal, the crowded terraces of the Olympic Stadion seemed 'as lifeless as a string of dead fish.'⁶⁵

In fact, German newspapers took defeat very sportingly. The only excuse that they could find was the traditional one, the triumph of professionals over amateurs. All agreed that the better team had won, thereby prompting them to concentrate upon the fixture's sporting angle, while steering well clear of nationalist or political commentaries. Thus, the media praised the England team, admitted that the German team had been a disappointment, and avoided the 'honourable battle' aspect. As *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* wrote, as regards football, the two teams had been on quite different levels, and quite different classes.⁶⁶ Even Saalbach, who no doubt hoped that a German victory would crown his *Sturm Gegen England* series, was forced to adopt an apologetic tone in his conclusion: 'The sun shines on the English football crown.'⁶⁷

Hamburger Nachrichten revisited the challenging question posed earlier in the year by the *Anschluss*: how to form a successful German national team composed of German and the 'Ostmark' (former Austrian) players, especially given their different playing cultures and styles?⁶⁸ The German team, including one Austrian, Pesser, had lost to England, while the Ostmark players lost two of their three matches versus Aston Villa. For the German football authorities, the central question was what kind of team should represent Germany at the World Cup. Following these four games, bringing three defeats, World Cup success looked more problematic. Indeed, one month later, a combined team of Germans and Austrians was eliminated in the early stages by Switzerland.

Interestingly, the ‘infamous salute’, which has figured so prominently in both British histories of the match and players’ memoirs, proved perhaps the game’s most political feature, and yet it passed without any particular drama or enthusiasm displayed by the German press. Only a few newspapers even mentioned it. Some British newspapers mentioned that there had been a photograph and comment on the front page of *Völkischer Beobachter*: ‘The action of the Englishmen in raising their right arms in greeting during the playing of the German National Anthems and in taking leave of the spectators with the German greeting at the end of the game was particularly well received.’⁶⁹ However, this must be due to some sort of mix-up, since no such photograph nor text is to be found on the front page in question. *Der Angriff* took the trouble to thank the guests for the gesture: ‘A fine gesture of Eddie Hapgood and his comrades, and it was celebrated and acknowledged by the crowd.’⁷⁰ Even this comment was not on a front page and seemed somewhat out of place, since the decision to salute had been made by Henderson and FA officials, not the players.

Final Assessment of the Political Aspect Two England vs Germany Matches

From the German perspective, the 1935 and 1938 Germany-England football matches were classic cases of soft power, international football acting as an instrument of German propaganda. The fact that the games took place and that Germany could manage decent results was considered an achievement itself. As argued above, newspaper coverage of both matches was surprisingly apolitical, thereby indicating that despite the regime’s ideological foundations not all nonpolitical issues were regulated or manipulated. Journalists could continue to write about such seemingly ‘harmless’ issues in the same way as before, without reference to political objectives. However, this did not mean that what was written and published was neither influenced by the political circumstances nor possessed a political meaning. Quite the opposite, ‘non-political’ was probably the best obtainable result for the system in many senses. Against this background, this case study highlights the ‘soft power’ methods of totalitarianism in terms of both the adaptation of totalitarianism to football and the adaptation of football to totalitarianism.

These conclusions might be surprising, given Nazi Germany’s character as a totalitarian state capable of unprecedented horrors. However, such findings correspond with other aspects of National Socialist propaganda, which was not always cut from the same cloth, and was in fact seldom outwardly aggressive in fields which were not directly political and remained in the hands of professional circles. For example, even Goebbels lacked the desire to make scores of overtly propagandist fiction or historical films because he appreciated that people would not be interested. Obviously, there were exceptions, such as films focused upon the role of Frederick the Great, Bismarck, or the *Hitlerjunge Quex* (1933), but basically films were intended more for recreation than education. Likewise, my research on academic contacts between Nazi Germany and the rest of the world revealed that professors unfailingly warned their superiors to avoid using political propaganda or talking about National Socialism, since it was adjudged as bound to backfire.⁷¹ In such matters, it seemed more prudent to adopt

a 'business as usual' approach, that is, to appeal to the great tradition and reputation of German science, and to exclude politics as much as possible.

The attitude towards sport seems to have been similar. Thus, it was deemed vital to claim to other countries that in the Third Reich sport had nothing to do with politics, simply because that was the best Germany could hope for. Most Germans, whether or not they were Nazis, obviously knew they could not convert foreign audiences to a pro-Nazi stance (except in very isolated cases), so the only tactics available was that of damage limitation and to diminish the likelihood of what they called foreign *Greuelpropaganda*, propaganda of Nazi horrors.

This seems to have been the order of the day also for domestic propaganda. There is very little trace of any political nuances in the newspapers, at least in the case of these two matches, since it was assumed to be a waste of time to educate readers of sports pages about politics. In the ten newspapers researched for this study, not one mentioned the Aryan race, only one touched on the Jews (and even then only once briefly), while Marxists and Communists were only occasionally referenced in a somewhat dismissive manner. In brief, all newspapers vehemently denied any role for politics in German sport.⁷² There was of course some 'battle rhetoric', and praise for bravery, stamina, self-sacrifice, and so on, but not in a way differing from the usual sports rhetoric. After all, military metaphors have always been commonplace in sports journalism under all political systems. In fact, Simon Martin's study of Italian fascism shows that at the time there was more overt politicization in Italian fascist sports journalism than can be found in National Socialist Germany.⁷³ Perhaps this is not surprising, since Mussolini's Italy enjoyed greater footballing success than Hitler's Germany.

Sport was not a politics-free zone in the Third Reich, but on the whole it was left to mind its own business, at least while it proved reasonably successful, conformed to the demands of the totalitarian system, and complied with the general lines of state policy, such as expelling Jews from its ranks. Otherwise, sport was not a first-priority issue. Adaptation proved relatively easy for the sport sector, especially as the new regime often allocated more resources to sport than its Weimar predecessor, and the sport sector knew what was expected of it. Besides, after the 1938 defeat by England, German players did not face the kind of treatment experienced by Soviet footballers following their loss to Yugoslavia at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics.⁷⁴ The Soviet national team was dissolved, and some players banned.

However, this did not mean that football played a non-role in the totalitarian system. It is possible to argue that the very nature of this 'business as usual' approach, 'it is only sport', and the mundane everyday aspect of football and so on, was much more effective in persuading the hesitant, uncertain, and suspicious elements in German society that the National Socialist regime was not so bad after all. Sepp Herberger, the legendary manager of the German national team, famous for the 1954 World Cup victory, *Das Wunder von Bern*, recalled life in the Third Reich:

As Hitler had come to power in 1933, my closest circles advised me not to set myself offside and made me believe that this was a good cause that was to be led by honourable men, and, in the end and in my political inexperience, I gave in to this pressure and became a member of the party, the same way as one usually joins any association.⁷⁵

Hitler's totalitarian regime left so many treasured aspects of everyday life intact that people could live with it, and even appreciate its achievements. Football faced two alternatives: either adapt and flourish or oppose and perish. For those individuals and organizations which had a choice – as the vast majority did – the latter alternative was not really an option. It would have meant abandoning all prospects of enjoying one's passion and instead be singled out as an enemy, whereas for the majority adaptation meant improved facilities, better training, and more resources. Therefore, people had either to commit a heroic professional suicide or to adapt—and then justify adaptation to themselves while belittling the political dimension. Admittedly, some people were enthusiastic about the new regime, but most involved in sport cared more for their sport than politics. Moreover, sport had often possessed a nationalist dimension, so that people could persuade themselves that, in reality, the National Socialism regime was merely modernizing and popularizing old ideals, perhaps in a somewhat brutal manner, but nevertheless familiar enough. This represented one side of the adaptation process articulated by Hannah Arendt, among others—how the bourgeoisie could find the wisdom from its everyday life in totalitarianism. In Arendt's case, the ultimate proof was the banal, mundane demeanour of the mass murder in the Adolf Eichmann trial in 1961.⁷⁶ It is the 'ordinary' that can be much more effective in strengthening totalitarian power and sustaining it than totalitarianism's more ostentatious and colourful manifestations. Besides, even in the political sense, National Socialist Germany had got what it had most wanted in the two Germany-England fixtures played in the mid-late 1930s. Both ended in defeat, but this was a side issue since English footballing supremacy was deemed a fact of 1930s' football. For German newspapers, 'every English player is an artist', 'the English team functioned like clockwork', and its performances proved 'the crowning of positive cooperation.'⁷⁷ Twenty-two men ran after the ball for ninety minutes, and in the end England always defeated Germany, and still did for decades to come, allowing for a couple of previous draws, and this lasted until the late 1960s. Then it all changed, so that after the 1966 World Cup, fifty-two years passed before England did better in a World Cup than Germany. The National Socialists could barely have even dreamt of this. I dreamt of this.

Notes

1. Ian Kershaw, 'Working towards the Führer', in *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison*, ed. Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 88–106.
2. Barbara Keys, 'The Body Political Space: Comparing Physical Education under Nazism and Stalinism', *German History* 27, no. 3 (2009): 395–413; Brian Stoddart, 'Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations: England versus Germany, 1935', *Soccer and Society* 7, no. 1 (2006): 33.
3. For example, see articles in: *Die 'Gleichschaltung' des Fussballsports im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland*. Irseer Dialoge, Band 20, [The 'conforming' the sport of football in the National Socialist Germany], ed. Markwart Herzog and Sylvia Heudecker, Schwabenakademie Irsee, 1. Aufgabe (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2016); *Hakenkreuz und rundes Leder. Fussball im Nationalsozialismus* [The Swastika and round leather. Football in national socialism], ed. Lorenz Peiffer and Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2008).

4. See for example Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling: *Der FC Bayern und seine Juden. Aufstieg und Zerschlagung einer liberalen Fussballkultur* [FC Bayern and its Jews. The rise and destruction of a liberal football culture], 2, erweiterte Auflage (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2013); Markwart Herzog, 'Die drei "Arierparagrafen" des FC Bayern München. Opportunismus und Antisemitismus in den Satzungen des bayerischen Traditionsvereins', in *Die 'Gleichschaltung' des Fussballsports im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2016), 75–113.
5. Regarding myths about Austrian football, see *Fussball unter Hakenkreuz in der 'Ostmark'* [Football under the Swastika in 'Ostmark'], ed. David Forster, Jakob Rosenberg, and Georg Spitaler (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2014).
6. Rudolf Oswald: Guido von Mengden: 'Der anpassungsfähige Idealist', in *Hakenkreuz und rundes Leder*, 293 (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2008).
7. Nils Havemann, 'Die "zweite Gleichschaltung" des Fussballs im Nationalsozialismus. Der deutsche Fussball und der DFB nach 1933', in *Die 'Gleichschaltung' des Fussballsports im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2016), 28, 29.
8. Hannah Arendt, *Totalitarismin syntty* [Birth of totalitarianism]. Suomentanut Matti Kinnunen (Tampere: Vastapaino 2013), 388, 389.
9. The need to consult the German archives stated originally by Allen Guttman, was reiterated by Brian Stoddart: Stoddart, 'Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations', 30; Vesa Vares, *Pallon herruus. Kuningaslajin valta ja lumo* [Mastership of the ball. The power and spell of the Kingly discipline], (Otava: Helsinki 2018).
10. Peter J. Beck, *Scoring for Britain, International Football and International Politics 1900-1939* (London: Routledge, 2012), 180–97; David Downing, *The Best of Enemies. England v Germany. A Century of Football Rivalry* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), 26–43; Richard Holt, 'The Foreign Office and the Football Association. British Sport and Appeasement, 1935-1938', in *Sport and International Politics: Impact of Fascism and Communism on Sport*, ed. Pieter Arnaud and Jim Riordan (London: Routledge, 1998); Stoddart, 'Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations: England versus Germany', 1935.
11. Markwart Herzog, 'Die "Gleichschaltung" des Fussballsports im Nationalsozialismus. Politische, organisatorische und rechtliche sowie ökonomische und soziokulturelle Aspekte', in *Die "Gleichschaltung" des Fussballsports im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland*, 19; Stoddart, 'Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations', 31.
12. The attempt to discover expressions of 'Otherness' or enemy images had to be abandoned, as virtually none could be found in newspaper articles.
13. See, Rudolf Stöber, 'Presse im Nationalsozialismus', in *Medien im Nationalsozialismus* [The media in the national social system] (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh/Wilhelm Fink, 2010), 275–94.
14. Beck, *Scoring for Britain*, 180–97; Downing, *The Best of Enemies*, 26–43; Holt, 'The Foreign Office and the Football Association. British Sport and Appeasement, 1935-1938'.
15. Beck, *Scoring for Britain*, 190–2.
16. *Ibid.*, 184, 185.
17. Luftposttelegramm [Aerial post telegram], Hoesch, November 20, 1935. R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, Bundesarchiv (hereafter BA), Berlin.
18. Letter, Reichs- und Preussische Ministerium des Innern, to Herrn Staatssekretär und Chef des Reichskanzler, Betr. Fussball-Länderkampf England-Deutschland, November 28, 1935, R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA.
19. Chemnitz to Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, November 6, 1935, Auswärtiges Amt, Akten, RZ 207/Band 244125, Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts [Political archive of the Foreign Ministry] (hereafter PAAA), Berlin.
20. Letter, Reichs- und Preussische Ministerium des Innern, to Herrn Staatssekretär und Chef des Reichskanzler, Betr. Fussball-Länderkampf England-Deutschland, November 28, 1935, R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA; Holt, 'The Foreign Office and the Football Association', 56, 57.

21. Letter, Reichs- und Preussische Ministerium des Innern, to Herrn Staatssekretär und Chef des Reichskanzler, Betr. Fussball-Länderkampf England-Deutschland, November 28, 1935, R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA. – On December 3, 1935, the death of Princess Victoria, the Prince of Wales's sister, led to the cancellation of all royal engagements. Soon afterwards, in January 1936, the Prince of Wales became King Edward VIII upon the death of George V.
22. Telegram, Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro, November 29, 1935. R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA.
23. Excerpt, Evening Standard 29 November 1935. Hitler and the German Match, R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA; See also Stoddart, *Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations*, 41.
24. Telegram, Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro, November 29, 1935. R43-II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA.
25. Excerpt, Staatssekretär, Chef der Reichskanzlei, gez.Dr. Lammers to Herrn Reichsminister des Innern z.Hd. des Herrn Staatssekretärs Pfundtner, November 28, 1935, Auswärtiges Amt, Akten, RZ 207/Band 244125, PAAA.
26. Holt, 'The Foreign Office and the Football Association', 53, 54. Stoddart is of the same opinion. See Stoddart, *Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations*, 38.
27. Letter, Deutsche Botschaft in London to Auswärtiges Amt November 29, 1935. Auswärtiges Amt, Akten, RZ 207/Band 244125, PAAA. 27.
28. Newsletter, Empfang aus Anlass des deutsch-englischen Fussballspieles, December 5, 1935. R43- II/1434 Reichskanzlei, BA.
29. 'Keine politischen Geschäfte mit dem Sport!'; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, November 29, 1935. Like most reports, this was unsigned, and hence it is impossible to name the author.
30. 'Fussballkampf England-Deutschland', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 4, 1935.
31. 'Das grösste Fussballereignis des Jahres', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, December 4, 1935.
32. 'Angriff auf England', *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, December 3, 1935.
33. See for example 'Auf dem Wege zum grössten Fussball-Länderspiel', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 2, 1935; 'London begrüsst die deutschen Spieler London begrüsst die deutschen Spieler', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 3, 1935; 'Der Tag des grossen England-Spiels', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 4, 1935. In fact, after the game, some German papers appealed to the fact that it had rained during the game.
34. Stanley Rous, the FA Secretary, was impressed by the German team's use of air travel for the match. Prior to the Second World War, England's tours used lengthy and tiring rail/sea travel.
35. 'In guter Stimmung nach England', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 3, 1935; 'Auf dem Wege zum grössten Fussball-Länderspiel', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 2, 1935.
36. 'Der Länderkampf', *Kölnische Zeitung*, December 5, 1935; 'Der Schlachtruf; Hinein!', *Der Angriff*, December 5, 1935.
37. 'Der Schlachtruf; Hinein!', *Der Angriff*, December 5, 1935.
38. 'Fussballkampf England-Deutschland', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 4, 1935.
39. 'London vor dem Spiel', *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 4, 1935.
40. 'Baldwins Rede', *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 4, 1935.
41. 'England zieht Kriegsschiffe aus dem Mittelmeer zurück', 'Versönliche Geste Englands gegenüber Italien', '3:0 geschlagen!', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935, 'Der Tag des grossen England-Spiels', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 4, 1935.
42. 'Der Tag des grossen England-Spiels', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 4, 1935.
43. 'Sportgeist siegt über politische Hetze', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 4, 1935.
44. 'Trotz 0:3 ein Erfolg des deutschen Sports', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935; 'Tapferer Widerstand der Deutschen Elf', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935; 'Unsere tapferere Fussballelf besiegt', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, December 5, 1935.
45. 'Nach ehrenvollem Kampf unterlegen', *Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 5, 1935.

46. 'Nach tapferem Kampf unterlegen', *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 5, 1935.
47. 'Deutschland – England 0:3 (0:1)', *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, December 5, 1935.
48. 'Trotz 0:3 ein Erfolg des deutschen Sports', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935.
49. 'Der Verlauf des Fussballspiels Deutschland-England', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 5, 1935; 'Das Fussballspiel des Jahres', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 6, 1935.
50. 'England – Deutschland 3:0', *Der Angriff*, December 5, 1935.
51. 'Unsere tapfere Fussballelf besiegt', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, December 5, 1935; 'Englands Fussball-Sieg über Deutschland', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935; 'Englische Presse ist begeistert', *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, December 5, 1935; 'Nach der Länderkampf', *Kölnische Zeitung*, December 5, 1935; 'England siegte – Bravo Deutschland!', *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 5, 1935.
52. 'Die Brücke des Sports', *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 6, 1935; 'Deutsch-englische Sportfreundschaft', *Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 6, 1935; 'Deutsch-englischer Abend in London', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 6, 1935; 'Anglo-German Fellowship', *Kölnische Zeitung*, December 6, 1935; 'Das Fussballspiel des Jahres', 'Der Reichsportführer bei der Anglo-German-Fellowship', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 6, 1935; 'Empfang durch den englischen Fussball-Bund', *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, December 5, 1935; 'Die kulturelle Sendung des deutschen Sports', *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, December 6, 1935.
53. Joseph Goebbels, *Tagebücher. Band 3: 1935-1939*, [Diaries, Volume 3], ed. Ralf Georg Reuth. 3. Auflage (München – Zürich: Serie Piper, 2003), 916, 917. Goebbels states also 'Ein guter Eindruck sonst.' [Otherwise, a good impression.] There are so many other issues in the same context that it is not exactly sure if he means the football match or some other event, but the entry indicates that his impression of the match was favourable.
54. See Beck, *Scoring for Britain*, 6, 7.
55. Downing, *The Best of Enemies*, 48-51; Matthews, *The Way It Was*, 117-120.
56. E.A. (Eddie) Hapgood, *Football Ambassador* (London: Sporting Handbooks, 1944); Stanley Matthews, *Feet First* (London: Ewen and Dale, 1948); Stanley Matthews, *The Way It Was: My Autobiography* (London: Headline, 2000), 116-17.
57. Hans Saalbach, 'Sturm gegen England', *Der Angriff*, May 13, 1938.
58. Hans Saalbach, 'Greift Deutschland an?', *Der Angriff*, May 14, 1938.
59. 'Fussball-Länderkampf Deutschland-England', *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 13, 1938; 'Vertrauen für die deutsche Elf', *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 14, 1938.
60. 'England's Elf wird...', *Berliner Tageblatt*, May 10, 1938; 'Fussball- Länderkampf Deutschland-England'. *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 13, 1938; 'Vertrauen für die deutsche Elf'. *Völkischer Beobachter*, 14.5.1938.
61. 'Gegen England und Aston Villa', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, May 13, 1938.
62. 'Gegen England und Aston Villa', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, May 13, 1938; 'Sport und Spiel. Grosse Fussballtage im Olympiastadion', *Kölnische Zeitung*, May 13, 1938; 'Greift Deutschland an?', *Der Angriff*, May 14, 1938; 'Englands Elf wird', *Berliner Tageblatt*, May 10, 1938; 'Fussball- Länderkampf Deutschland-England', *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 13, 1938; 'Vertrauen für die deutsche Elf', *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 14, 1938.
63. Matthews, *The Way It Was*, 116-17.
64. Downing, *The Best of Enemies*, 52-5.
65. Matthews, *The Way It Was*, 86.
66. 'England siegte 6:3', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, May 15, 1938; 'Etwas Kritik zum Länderspiel', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, May 15, 1938; 'Deutschland verlor gegen Englands Profis 3:6', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, May 15, 1938; 'England schlägt Deutschland 6-3', *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, May 15, 1938; 'Englands Fussballkunst siegte', *Kölnische Zeitung*, May 15, 1938; 'England offenbarte Fussballkunst', *Berliner Tageblatt*, May 15, 1938.
67. Hans Saalbach, 'Sturm gegen England. XII. Das dramatische Finale vom 14. Mai 1938', *Der Angriff*, May 15, 1938.
68. 'Sport-Zeitung', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, May 16, 1938. Aston Villa won Football League Division Two in the 1937-38 season.

69. See for example 'England's Soccer Triumph in Berlin', *The Daily Telegraph*, May 16, 1938; 'Did Not Give the Nazi Salute', *Belfast Telegraph*, May 16, 1938; England's Nazi Salute – May 1938. <https://www.appeasement.info/englands-nazi-salute-may-1938/>. – I thank the reviewer for this information.
70. Hans Saalbach, 'Sturm gegen England. XII. Das dramatische Finale vom 14. Mai 1938', *Der Angriff*, May 15, 1938.
71. See for example Vesa Vares, 'Kulturpolitik als Aussenpolitik – Berichte deutscher WissenschaftlerInnen über die nordischen Länder an das Auswärtige Amt in den 1930er Jahren'. *NORDEUROPAforum* 21, no. 2 (2011): 39–75.
72. 'Vor dem Länderkampf gegen England', *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, November 30, 1935; 'Scharfe Sprache gegen die englischen Gewerkschaft', *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, December 2, 1935; 'Der Tag des grossen England-Spiels', *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, December 4, 1935; 'London begrüsst die deutschen Spieler', *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 3, 1935; 'London im Zeichen des grössten Sportereignisses des Jahres', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, December 3, 1935; 'Das grösste Fussballereignis des Jahres', *Hamburger Tageblatt*, December 4, 1935; 'Das Fussballspiel des Jahres', *Völkischer Beobachter*, December 6, 1935.
73. See the numerous highly nationalist and even bellicose citations in Simon Martin, *Football and Fascism. The National Game under Mussolini* (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2004), 130–2, 188–94, 197, 198, 204, 205, 210, 211.
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