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Finding Benefits over Reluctance – Promoting Finnish Trade during African State Visits in Finland in the 1980s

Jerkko Armas Veikonpoika Holmi 

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

ABSTRACT

In the mid-1980s, Finnish decision-makers pursued a policy of increased trade with the Global South. This article examines the contributions of Finnish policymakers and company representatives to the commercial aspects addressed during the state visits from Africa in the mid-1980s. The article concentrates on the visits of political leaders from Zambia and Tanzania in 1985, and from Kenya in 1987. These visits have been selected due to their temporal proximity, the commercial connotations in the schedule of the visits, the similarity of the visiting states, and the significance of the given Finnish official development assistance (ODA). The findings present answers to the question of what the premises and justifications were for and against these commercial contributions. The article presents an overview of the aspects that were crucial to the decision-making when Finnish actors conducted trade-oriented relations with African states. The findings indicate that despite the initial reluctance to make arrangements, the conducted visits led to an increased promotion of trade-related aspects between Finland and its counterparts. The most crucial achievements were offering Finnish companies a chance to present their knowhow to African political leaders and stimulating discussion between these parties, in conjunction with Finnish policymakers providing their assistance.

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Introduction

In the mid-1980s, the political and economic sphere of Finland broadened. Amid the Cold War struggle the Finnish government pursued a policy of increasing Finnish trade, business interests, and recognition across the world. During these years, state visits to and from Finland with African states were more active than previously. In addition to the aspects orientated towards development cooperation, connections between African states and Finnish companies occurred during these visits. This article concentrates on the visits of political leaders to Finland from Zambia and Tanzania in 1985, and from Kenya

CONTACT Jerkko Armas Veikonpoika Holmi  javhol@utu.fi

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in 1987. These three states were among the major recipients of Finnish Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 1970 and 1990.¹

This article examines the contributions for the commercial aspects of these visits from the Finnish point of view. The article endeavours to answer the question: What were the premises and justifications for and against these contributions? By providing these findings, the article presents an overview of the aspects that were crucial to the decision-making when Finnish actors conducted commercial relations with African states.

The subject of this article is becoming increasingly relevant as Finland is currently contending with slowing productivity, declining fertility, and increasing national debt; thus there is a need to find new solutions for economic growth. In 2021, a publication of the Foreign Ministry of Finland stated that 'now begins the time of Africa'. Finland is currently striving for an even stronger economic partnership with Africa in certain fields, as the continental market can provide great opportunities but also certain risks.² This research aims to provide insight into how to formulate these relations from the viewpoint of trade.

On diplomacy and state visits, trade and other concepts

In international relations, diplomacy is defined as the practise of representation, agreement, and mutual action between the interests of the counterparts. Relations between nations are the main venue of diplomacy and state visits one of its highest features. These visits are rarely conducted due to their time-consuming and costly nature. Relationships are often maintained through frequent connections between diplomats stationed in embassies.³ The impact of diplomacy, state visits, and international relations on trade have been researched by multiple scholars.⁴ Volker Nitsch identified that state visits often include aspects of economic relations and that 'heads of state are often accompanied by a high-ranking delegation of business people' characteristically 'with the largest trade potential'.⁵ The impact is greater from working visits, which are more focused on trade aspects, rather than more official state visits. There is less trade when the common features between the counterparts are limited.⁶

The role of Finnish diplomats and other representatives stationed abroad has been crucial for contacts at a political and commercial level. For Finnish trade, the most important functions concern monitoring the interests of Finnish exports and other potential openings. Generally, diplomatic activities correlate positively with exports and resonate with the political and social aspects of the relations with the Global South. The same practises define all trade.⁷

The internationalization of Finnish trade arose to new heights during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, Finnish policymakers actively aimed to promote the possibilities of Finnish companies in the Global South. This was the first decade of meaningful direct investments of Finnish companies abroad. National and international competition and the opportunities offered by the Global South justified such aims. As gaining access to new markets was increasingly important, the Finnish state assisted companies to pinpoint their activities abroad. Nevertheless, the state control on trade was reduced after the 1970s. This movement occurred in a shift from state-lead industrialization to encouraging competitiveness in international trade. The interest of Finnish companies was highly supported by Finnish state since 1979 establishment of Finnfund (Finnish fund for Industrial Development Co-operation). In the 1980s, the development cooperation funds were partly used to advance Finnish exports. The baseline was that internationally

competitive companies would benefit Finnish society. With the Global South, the state visits were often seen as one of the essential means of promoting Finnish trade as local African politicians played a crucial role in the economic life of Africa.⁸

Historically, the trade between Finland and the Sub-Saharan states was minimal despite the trade preferred special economic relations, which focused on securing imports of oil through high-level political visits and increasing Finnish exports.⁹ Therefore, the emphasis of this article revolves around the potential for trade and the Finnish actions that promoted such relations.

As both Aunesluoma and Remes point out, trade with Finland, however, had its own features. Products which many other countries acquired from the Global South were substantially acquired by Finland from the Soviet Union. Finnish trade with the Global South did not significantly alter from trade with other countries and was arranged similarly around the world focusing on export credits, guarantees for preferential treatments of imports, and agreements on cooperation.¹⁰

The influence of the ODA and developmental relations also needs to be considered, as they were crucial aspect of the relations with the African states. The difference between trade and the ODA was often impossible to distinguish, as the developmental relations with the Global South were framed to provide economic welfare for Finland. Similarly, aiming for the universal target amount of ODA set by the United Nations (UN) might have confused the division of the trade-oriented export credits and pure development cooperation funding. This was the case, despite the separate status of the development cooperation department within the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Simultaneously, the Finnish ODA tended to be partly tied to the import of goods from Finland and favoured countries with purchasing power.¹¹ In the 1980s, roughly two-thirds of the bilateral ODA received by African states returned to Finland as a payment for goods and thus the role of development assistance was more a means of funding Finnish exports to Africa. This relation between trade and aid also instigated critical discussion in Finnish society.¹²

For a small country like Finland, struggling to find its place in the international order during the Cold War, next to the autocratic Soviet Union, the role of the President in foreign policy was crucial. This also meant that due to the miniscule number of foreign policymakers, the relations were heavily prioritized. In the 1980s, The President of Finland Mauno Koivisto controlled the foreign policy output in a strict manner and directed the foreign ministry together with the foreign minister. For President Koivisto, the development cooperation was always a secondary mode of foreign policy, which was accomplished only during a positive balance of accounts. This viewpoint persisted despite the international moral principles and views on solidarity.¹³

For the Finnish promotion of trade, the visits of Finnish foreign political representatives have generally had a meaningful impact. Officials of the target country, Finnish companies, or Finnish embassies often proposed the motion for these visits. Usually, two to three countries were visited in one trip. These trips were aimed to provide openings for trade and increase the public image of Finnish exports. Representatives of the companies that had expressed their interest towards the designated countries constituted the accompanying delegation.¹⁴

The state visits of the three countries in this article have been selected for their temporal proximity, the commercial connotations of the visit, their mutual geographical

proximity, and the significance of the Finnish development cooperation. Additionally, the official documents of all three visits indicated that there were meetings between the visiting political leaders and the Finnish company representatives. This resonates with the research of Nitsch which separates state visits by their character and focuses on economy related ones, although the status of a visit is not always clearly identifiable.¹⁵

The focus of the article is on the identification of intentions and obligations of the Finnish counterparts. As Mitzen describes, commitments are 'action-oriented resolutions of issues', meaning that the Finnish policymakers and company representatives aimed to tally the intentions of the visitors and hosts, and proceed to make (joint) commitments to execute such pledges. Bonds are formed after the communicative processed.¹⁶

The research material and literature

The research material has been acquired from two groups of actors. Firstly, the official documents from the visits were obtained from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland in the Finnish National Archive (*Kansallisarkisto*, KA). Additionally, the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ulkoministeriön Arkisto*, UMA) have been utilized. These archives contain comprehensive material on how these state visits were conducted. The source material and viewpoints of the visiting African states have not been considered due to the difficulty of attaining the documents and because of the Finnish oriented focus of the article.

The format of the archival material has varied through the years. Sometimes the authors and the recipients of the diplomatic messages have been notified in the archived documents and sometimes not. The instructions for Finnish representation abroad emphasized the use of the name of the representative office, instead of the corresponding individual. To standardize the footnotes of the archival materials, the places of origin and target have been addressed.¹⁷

Additionally, archives from commercial counterparts are utilized along with scientific literature. Unfortunately, not all companies authorized the use their archives which in some cases means that the analyse is principally based on the governmental archives and other sources. The possibility for utilizing archival materials from commercial actors, however, provides an additional aspect to this research; exploiting less used and uncommon sources, which are more regulated than the governmental ones, broadens the study of Finnish foreign relations.

A certain lack of scientific literature constituted an additional challenge for this research. The literature available for this exact theme is limited. Thus, this research capitalizes on more booklet-like literature to explain certain aspects of the analysis, which places some ambiguity on the findings. The use of potentially ideologically charged framing of the subject from these sources has been avoided.

Official lack of interest, and responsibilities of Finnish companies: Zambian visit 1985

Relations between Finland and Zambia were largely based on the ODA which had been instigated in 1966 and the President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda visited Finland for the first time in 1968. The focus of the development cooperation mainly involved agriculture,

forestry, transportation, power production, and education. The fields of focus in a particular country were usually decided in unison between Finnish expertise and the needs of the subject. Due to ongoing development projects, Finnish ministers visited Zambia in 1983 and in January 1985. In 1985, along with the Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen, a delegation of representatives of Finnish export companies journeyed to Zambia.¹⁸ The Finnish trade balance with Zambia in the early 1980s was quite even, although, the trade only covered 0.1% of all trade to and from Finland. The main import from Zambia was copper ore and the exports were mainly industrial machines and equipment. The exports were largely dependent on the development assistance funds.¹⁹

In 1983, the chiefs of the Nordic embassies in Southern Africa suggested a visiting tour of the Nordic countries by President Kaunda. The reasoning behind this was his importance in the anti-apartheid movement. The heads of the commercial policy and development cooperation departments of MFA were reluctant to sanction this arrangement because of the lack of motives for such a visit. A similar opinion was indicated by other Nordic countries as well. In a meeting with the President Koivisto, the proposition for this visit was also discussed and the comments emphasize the reluctance:

If [the visit is] actualizing joint-Nordicly, then Finland:

- should not impede [the visit], but
- not, however, actively initiate the plan
- The president of Finland most likely is forced to serve as a host.²⁰

This hesitancy seemed to be the general opinion among Finnish policymakers. The unwillingness can be explained through Nitsch's findings: As trade relations between Zambia and Finland were very small scale, the Finnish government might have felt that a time-consuming visit would not be profitable.

Additionally, President Koivisto himself had objections towards furthering African relationships. According to the social democrat politician Pertti Paasio, Koivisto did not want to make a single state visit to Africa, as all the global aspects of foreign policy were dependent on Finno-Soviet relations. Koivisto himself explained that the reason was that none of these countries had faultless human rights situations and thus, an official Finnish state visit would only increase a negative reception in Finland. Similar arguments occurred in the Parliament of Finland. Additionally, it was Koivisto's view that the problem with the Global South was that they were much more eager to arrange state visits. The principle seemed to be arranging these faraway visits in collaboration with other Nordic countries.²¹

Ultimately, the Finnish embassies were simply to inform the Finnish policymakers whether foreign public servants or business personnel were to travel Finland. On such occasion, the work of the representative office was to clarify the proposals of the visiting personnel to enable efficient arrangements of these visits.²²

Despite the initial response, the plan progressed, and President Kaunda came to Finland as a part of his Scandinavian tour in early 1985. President Kaunda emphasized the possible economic aspects of the visit and how 'co-operation [could] be expanded to many other fields'.²³

From an economic point of view, the speech notes of President Koivisto highlighted the 'prospects of expanded trade' between the two countries but focused mainly on

development cooperation. The Finnish dependency on foreign trade and Finland's increasing volume of trade with the Global South was noted.²⁴ This was based on the interpretation of the interdependence between Global South and Global North, where the more equal trade was called for.²⁵ However, the expectations for non-ODA-related trade was not extremely high due to the worsening economic situation in Zambia. Additionally, the financial aspects were not initially to be discussed during this visit. Instead, it was hoped that the commercial prospects would follow in the long term and the visit would provide the groundwork for this.²⁶

Possibly, the trade related emphasis of the visit of President Kaunda was not fully concerned with promoting Finnish trade, but instead an endeavour to divert Zambian financial dependency away from the Republic of South Africa (RSA). This financial dependence of the so-called frontline states, fighting for the abolition of apartheid, was so significant that in Finland the fear was that the RSA would pursue its influence through financial coercion.²⁷

The second day of the visit included a hands-on visits to Finnish companies: the Anttila experimental farm of the agricultural company Hankkija and, the machinery company Valmet Oy, which was at that time mainly state-owned.²⁸ As the Finnish ODA in Zambia had focused on forestry it appears that the companies visited were selected for their expertise in this field.²⁹ Despite the commercial aspects, the Zambian delegation only included a compilation of foreign affairs officials.³⁰

The Vice president of Hankkija had agreed with the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland that the visit should concentrate on exhibiting attractions desired by the visitors. The Zambian delegate that had inspected the premises beforehand proposed a similar setup and praised its relevance for development projects in Zambia.³¹ These comments suggest that the main purpose of the visit was to display Finnish expertise in the field of agriculture and forestry instead of pursuing trade.

At the experimental farm, Zambians were presented with Finnish farming techniques, farm machinery and forestry equipment. The timetable included a brief presentation and a rapid tour before a forestry work demonstration, which included various operations of logging. According to the customer magazine of Hankkija, the presentation focused on working in extreme conditions, and how this knowledge could be utilized in Zambia. The agricultural consulting company Finnagro also emphasized its services during the visitation.³²

The need to find new openings for agricultural trade was also perceived among Finnish policymakers. In the world of agreements on tariffs and trade, the Finnish agriculture was in a difficult situation. To export agricultural machinery, accessories, and produce additional support mechanisms from the Finnish state were needed.³³ At the same time, Africa was becoming a perfect place to market and sell these commodities.

President Kaunda was also taken to the headquarters of Valmet. The presentation there was only briefly mentioned in the newspapers, as a deal of 200 Valmet machines had already been delivered to Zambia. Concurrent with the visit, a new deal of an additional 700 tractors was negotiated. The timetable for Valmet was significantly narrower than in Hankkija.³⁴

The difference in the pictorial and text-wise content in the newspapers suggests that the visit to the Anttila farm was directed to public consumption in the media, while the visit to Valmet was held more in secrecy. As the newspapers described, the agricultural

side of the visit was to promote possibilities and the visit to Valmet focused on the completion of a new deal in privacy.

The discreetness of the Valmet meeting can be explained through the common aspects of all exports to the Global South. Export of machinery and services were commonly non-recurring actions and success in a singular deal was often more crucial than the recurring exports of bulk goods. Due to the longer terms of payment and the uncertainties in the recipient country, these deals required export credit from the Finnish state operative. In trade with low-income countries, the development cooperation was often the principal means of funding.³⁵ Valmet representatives needed privacy to both close the deal and to ensure credit from the Finnish government.

Furthermore, there was a connection between Hankkija and Valmet. Since 1981, the two companies had made an agreement that Hankkija would start to sell Valmet heavy machinery.³⁶ Thus, the product of the unfinished deal was on display during the demonstration. Despite the connection, the Hankkija visit seemed peculiar as the company had experienced significant financial struggles since 1983 and in late 1984 was declared to be a 'crisis company'.³⁷ This might imply that Hankkija was only chosen for the visit to contribute to the Valmet tractor deal.

After the state visit, the aide-de-camp of President Koivisto, Juha Engström sent a letter to the CEO of Hankkija thanking them for the arrangements regarding the visit. Engström admitted and indirectly apologized for the fact that the responsibilities had been largely relegated to Hankkija. Regarding the visit the only guidance given had been on the time frame. The contents of the visit had been for the company to decide.³⁸ This letter provides an intriguing aspect regarding the visit. The initial reluctance to arrange this state visit could have been the reason why the President's Office had authorized Hankkija to plan the visit independently.

The choice of companies also indicates there was a request from Zambia which explains the effort of the Finnish policymakers to distance themselves from contacts between Finnish companies and the Zambian delegation.

The Zambian visit did benefit Finnish trade. The official statistics of Finnish customs showcase that Finnish exports increased significantly. Since 1986, Finnish exports have been shown to have doubled in comparison to the years before the visitation. In the late 1980s, the imports again decreased mildly, and the balance of the trade became more beneficial for Finland.³⁹

Mixed preferences for the outgoing president: Tanzanian visit 1985

Since the 1960s, Tanzania has been the target of Finnish ODA and provided a 'strong basis' for the relations between the countries. In 1963, Julius Nyerere as the President of Tanganyika visited Finland for first time and the cooperation with unified Tanzania began in 1967. As the President of Tanzania, Nyerere visited Finland in 1976.⁴⁰ In the 1980s, the trade between Finland and Tanzania comprised roughly 0.1% of Finnish exports and imports and was mainly conducted through the ODA. Finland exported mainly machinery while the imports were mostly comprised of coffee. The trade had slowed due to the difficulties of trade guarantees and the unwillingness of creditors to participate in deals with Tanzania.⁴¹

In January 1985, the Nordic ambassadors informed the willingness of President Nyerere to visit the Nordics before the end of his presidential term in late 1985. The issue had surfaced during the visit of minister Väyrynen to Tanzania. President Nyerere's aimed to arrange a goodwill visit, 'a farewell tour', without any special agenda. Due to the unofficial nature of the visit, the working visit was hosted by the prime ministers of the Nordic countries.⁴²

The Finnish ambassador in Tanzania concluded that the visit would not be an opportunity to promote Finnish exports because President Nyerere no longer participated in domestic policy. An estimate of the composition of the accompanying delegation meant that displaying Finnish industry or meeting with business policymakers would not be feasible. As the themes of Finnish ODA in Tanzania had focused on forestry and agriculture the ambassador proposed that companies in these fields should be visited. As anticipated, the delegation consisted mainly of government ministers and political officers.⁴³

President Nyerere indicated that the principal aim of the visit was to assure the Finnish representatives that the ODA given to Tanzania was not wasted, despite the worsening economic situation in Tanzania.⁴⁴ In the late 1970s, the Finnish treasury had already been forced to concede some of the ODA-based loans they had given to Tanzania.⁴⁵ These aspects explain the unwillingness of the ambassador to recommend any commercial aspects during the visit. In discussions between the Prime Minister of Finland, Kalevi Sorsa and President Nyerere the trade between the two countries was only briefly covered in a vision on increasing bilateral trade.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the embassy of Tanzania in Stockholm, Sweden informed the MFA that for the visit they had contacted 'commercial circles' in Finland 'to look into the possibility of their input into the programme'. The embassy proposed a list of companies to partake in the visit: the pharmaceutical company Orion AB, the previously state-owned power company Imatran Voima (IVO) cooperating with Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO), Valmet, and a presentation of the interested business individuals in Finland organized by Finnfund.⁴⁷ The proposal seemed adequate as the Finnish ODA in Tanzania focused on industry, energy supply and agriculture and the agreements aimed to promote the sectors of water supply, forestry and mining. The interest of Finnish companies in Tanzania also targeted the mining sector and forestry.⁴⁸

In comparison to the visit of President Kaunda a few months earlier, a clear indication as to the desired representatives was declared. The request contained a plethora of commercial connections although the indications on the purpose of the visit had suggested otherwise.

In the early 1980s, many Finnish export companies had declared their interest in development projects in Tanzania. The pharmaceutical company Orion and the tractor company Valmet had already established affiliates in the area.⁴⁹ At first, the MFA proposed a visitation to Orion and the mining company Outokumpu which had majority state ownership at the time. The destinations of the finalized programme were the production plant of Outokumpu and the experimental site of the majority state-owned chemical industry company Kemira.⁵⁰ At the Kemira site, the purpose was to showcase Valmet's agricultural machinery as President Nyerere had requested to see the tractors in natural surroundings. Additionally, the aspects of fertilizing farmland and crops were presented as Kemira had previously exported fertilizers to Tanzania through the ODA.⁵¹ It is possible

that the schedule of President Nyerere simply did not match with the companies initially proposed and the Finnish hosts were forced to seek alternatives. On the other hand, the visits were located in companies corresponding with sectors of Finnish ODA projects in Tanzania.

Alternatively, policymakers do tend to promote industries which are close to the government or are viewed to have significant financial advantage for the state finances. If an industry is in some way under the control of the government, the policymakers may also market such products during state visits.⁵² This could also have been the deciding factor of which companies to showcase.

The schedule at the Outokumpu production plant contained brief verbal introductions and a short tour of the facilities. Most of the time reserved for Outokumpu were allocated to a lunch in the restaurant Kulosaaren Casino.⁵³ The explanation for this might have been a goldmine project in Tanzania conducted by Finnish companies Outokumpu and Kone in 1983–1984. Kone had also already hosted the Tanzanian minister of minerals Paul Bomani in 1983. Along with the Tanzanian state-owned mining company Stamico they had formed Kahama Gold Mines Ltd. to open a gold mine near Lake Victoria. The Finnish contribution to this project was to provide education, technical support, and equity capital through the Finnish ODA. The profitability of the project was questioned in 1985 and the baseline during the visit was that if the project would be covered in the discussion, the Finnish eagerness and interest in it should be emphasized. Outokumpu had also delivered hardware and provided smelting plants to many African countries in the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁴

The interest of Outokumpu partly stemmed from the waning of Finnish mines. To compensate for the lack of resources and to promote their interests, Outokumpu invested in mining destinations and partners from all over the world.⁵⁵ Outokumpu was, in the late 1980s, along with Valmet, one of the eight largest receivers of Finnish interest subsidies to promote exports.⁵⁶ Kone and Outokumpu were also praised by Finnfund for their prolific enterprises abroad. Thus, Finnish financing operative found them a trustful partner in otherwise high-risk, high-reward ventures in Africa, despite the funding coming from Finland.⁵⁷ In this aspect, the 1985 state visit had a crucial role in ensuring the gold mine project continuum between the partners.

Due to the status of the visit as a 'farewell tour', it might have been that the meetings between these two companies were aimed at presenting possibilities rather than concrete decisions. The lack of archival material from Outokumpu also indicates that the visit itself lacked any tangible results.

After the visit, in his letter to Prime Minister Sorsa, President Nyerere emphasized the importance of the tour of the Outokumpu premises by providing 'a new and encouraging view' on the goldmine project. Regarding Kemira, Nyerere heightened the discussion on 'agricultural modernisation' by seeing Valmet tractors at work. Nyerere also mentioned the dinner hosted by minister Väyrynen where he had been given an opportunity to 'meet a number of Finnish businessmen and have useful talks with them'. In his letter to President Koivisto, President Nyerere described the company visits as merely 'interesting and helpful'.⁵⁸ The lack of information on the business meetings in the archival materials of the foreign policy actors suggests that the connections were conducted between the respective countries and Tanzanian representatives and Finnish Foreign ministry merely provided the arena for those connections.

However, the visit of President Nyerere contained an intriguing peculiarity. As President Nyerere had indicated that he would not be aiming to renew his presidency thus ending his political career, the promotion of trade seemed extraordinary – especially when it was also suggested that this should be avoided by the Finnish ambassador. In the case of Nyerere, the Finnish political leaders might have wanted to ensure the chances of trade before the change of regime. Change always had its own risks and the continuity of commercial aspects was desirable.

For those companies seeking profit and maximum yield for their investment, the minimization of any risks was preferable. The Global South included higher risks and reduction of these risks was often possible through financial safeguards provided by governmental institutions.⁵⁹ It could have been that the Finnish state was forced to act on behalf of the companies to decrease these risks.

The economic aspects are also often bypassed during the first visit of a head of state to a particular nation and are larger after repeated visits.⁶⁰ Thus, the continuity on these connections might have relied on a principle of continuity in relations, as commitments to predecessors' agreements.⁶¹ Moreover, the financial situation in Tanzania was proposed to improve after the next presidential election. The Finnish ambassador was convinced that the Tanzanian political officers had means and willingness to enhance the economics, but they could not agree with President Nyerere.⁶² The change in regime was thus likely to advance the preliminary improvements conducted during the visit of President Nyerere to Finland.

The change of leadership seems to have had an influence on the bilateral trade. The Finnish exports to Tanzania declined from 1986 onwards and the Finnish imports increased only briefly before plummeting after 1987. The balance of the trade was slightly in advance for Finland.⁶³ Despite the visible advances in Tanzania, the real contribution of development cooperation with Finnish exports can be questioned.⁶⁴

Commercial interests combat against public criticism: Kenyan visit 1987

The Finnish development cooperation with Kenya began in the late 1960s and since the early 1980s Kenya received an increased ODA. Through the 1970s and 1980s numerous ministerial visits were conducted between the countries. The Finnish funding had focused on the rural areas in the sectors of water, health, agriculture, electrification, and forestry. In trade, Kenya had preference in the trade balance and the Finnish imports were heavily focused on coffee (90% of all imports). The Finnish exports were mainly paper-related products and machinery.⁶⁵

The initial proposition for the state visit to all the Nordic countries in September 1987 came from the office of President of Kenya Daniel arap Moi. President Koivisto was in favour of the visit only if it was conducted by visiting multiple Nordic countries.⁶⁶

The low level of trade and the trade balance favourability of Kenya were highlighted in Finland. This was explained as stemming from the Finnish high consumption of coffee. Kenyan coffee imports benefitted from the duty-free aspects of the trade. A significant growth in trade was still not anticipated and the development assistance-oriented projects had the most potential. The interest of Finnish companies was acknowledged, but the developments of these connections were largely left to be responsibility of the

interested companies alone. The Finnish government was to merely provide the venue to discuss these aspects.⁶⁷

The state visit had problems even before it commenced. The Nordic tour of was drastically shortened as the state visits to Norway and Sweden were withdrawn by the Kenyans. This was due to the heated debate in Norway and Sweden on Kenyan human rights violations. Similarly, Denmark cancelled the visit, because of the proximity of the 1987 Danish general elections.⁶⁸

This alteration meant that the themes of the visit had to be re-formulated without a joint-Nordic agenda. In the Finnish press, the decision to proceed led to negative reportage. The Finnish policymakers' declaration that human rights issues would be discussed only if the Kenyans initiated such discussions caused increased criticism. The state visit also led to an unauthorized protest outside the Presidential palace which was disassembled by the police.⁶⁹

It might have been that the Finnish policymakers decided to proceed for the greater good. As the state visits to Norway and Sweden were replaced with a state visit to Romania, Finland was seen as the only possibility to keep Kenya committed to Western affiliation. The visit to Romania was seen as signal that if the critique increased, Kenya would find friends in other places in the world.⁷⁰ The defection of Kenya could have also hampered Finnish objectives. Just before the state visit, in the Nordic foreign minister meeting Finland received assurances on support for the candidacy as a non-permanent member in the United Nations Security Council. The Finnish periodical *Seura* questioned whether the whole state visit was conducted to 'fish for African votes' for the UN election.⁷¹

Due to the nature of President Moi's primary state visit, the programme for the visit was conducted differently from the African visits to Finland in 1985. It included more formalities and ceremonial events than meetings with commercial representatives. Although, the Kenyan willingness had been that the places visited should be institutions and companies relevant to the bilateral relations. The Kenyan delegation was not accompanied by distinctive commercial representatives.⁷²

Before the visit, the interest of Finland in trade topics was formulated to simply emphasize the interest towards Africa and willingness to trade. To address this eagerness, a special meeting was arranged between Kenyans and Finnish foreign trade and development cooperation representatives. This meeting was arranged to help President Moi become 'acquainted with [Finnish] products and know-how'. The possibilities of increased trade were to be kept separate from the development cooperation which focused on the initial development sectors.⁷³ The promotion of the knowledge resonated the ampler Finnish view on providing development to help the industrialization of the Global South.⁷⁴

The Kenyan embassy in Stockholm had requested that the Finnish hosts should invite representatives from the conglomerate Berner Oy, the insurance and financing company Fennia, the raw material supplier Bang and Co. Oy, the multi-sector cooperative EKA, and the Association of Finnish Flower Wholesalers to the meeting.⁷⁵ The meeting with the Finnish foreign trade and development assistance representatives included two officials from the Finnish Foreign ministry and four company representatives. Despite the Kenyan requests, the companies present were those already

operating in Kenya: the oil refinery company Neste, which was at the time largely state-owned, the power company Imatran Voima (IVO), and the construction companies Lemminkäinen and YIT.⁷⁶

IVO had been consulting in Kenya since 1984 and had been preparing large energy transmission projects in the area. IVO had been seeking development assistance funding for these projects due to their rural connection. Lemminkäinen had been working in Nairobi since 1981 in road construction projects. The future aims of the company were to expand the projects to other fields of construction. Lemminkäinen had been interested in working in Africa since the mid-1970s.⁷⁷

The focus of YIT had been in rural water supply projects and it had been working in the area since 1981. The positive results had led to additional input and the second phase of the water supply project was ongoing during the state visit. YIT had also been in a consortium with other European companies in another water project of which the funding was to be discussed during the visit. Since 1985, Neste had been providing consultancy services to the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) and aimed to improve the status of these services in the future. The advisory work of Neste was also argued to be included in the aid programme.⁷⁸

The Neste discussions could have been problematic as in early 1987 the Kenyan representatives had made a proposition to alter the development assistance to focus on oil. The MFA was uncertain about this proposal due to the probable domestic policy issues and financial interests of the management level in Kenya.⁷⁹ This had been the case for the construction project of Lemminkäinen in Liberia in the late 1970s and also Outokumpu had similar experiences from southern Africa.⁸⁰ Despite these uncertainties, the development cooperation delegate signed a memorandum with an indication towards funding between Neste and NOCK.⁸¹ The Kenyan Minister of Energy Nicholas Biwott indicated that the fuel distribution project was contested in Europe which could have been the tipping point for the Finnish to favour the project.⁸²

It is significant that the composition of the meeting representatives favoured companies that already had a distinctive status in Kenya. The discussions were thus targeted to broaden the already initiated commercial connections in Kenya and ensure continuity instead of providing new opportunities for other Finnish companies.

In addition to the arranged commercial meeting, Neste Oy had requested that minister Biwott would make a separate visit to the company headquarters. Originally, it had been planned that Biwott would travel to Finland alone, but his visit was merged with the state visit. Additionally, Lemminkäinen Oy had requested to have a 'half an hour' meeting with him during the Neste visit. Kone Oy also informed the MFA that Biwott himself had been interested in visiting their factory premises because of the subsidiary company of Kone in Kenya. The interest of Kone Oy might have derived from a similar baseline as in Tanzania as surveys on the possibilities of mining chemistry minerals had been conducted in Kenya in the early 1980s.⁸³

The Foreign Ministry of Finland did not object to these requests, if Minister Biwott would also participate in the discussions at the ministry, along with the Minister of Finance George Saitoti.⁸⁴ The foreign policy representatives clearly did not want to obstruct these additional negotiations if they had an input with a ministerial delegation. This implies that the companies had their opportunity to promote their own relationships too.

Despite the positive indications, there were some issues with the Finnish commercial project of the sugar company Suomen Sokeri in Kenya. Due to repayment problems, the Finnish export credit agency had a multi-million-mark outstanding account in Kenya.⁸⁵ The foreign ministry had received the correspondence between the Kenyan Minister of Finance and Suomen Sokeri in which a new repayment plan was scheduled. Due to the lack of a definite solution, the issue might have been side-lined during the state visit.⁸⁶

Overall, Lemminkäinen and Neste met multiple Kenyan representatives and three other companies also took part in one meeting or another during the state visit. It was clear that the interests of these companies were the most pronounced during the Kenyan state visit.

Of the state visits from Africa to Finland in the mid-1980s, the Kenyan one seemed to have the most notable consequences for Finnish trade. Both the Finnish imports and exports increased and most significantly the balance of trade with Kenya was positive since 1988.⁸⁷

Conclusion

In this article, the Finnish actions promoting trade related aspects during the African state visits in 1985 and in 1987 have been thoroughly considered. The findings indicate that Finnish policymakers endeavoured to enable increased commercial contacts between African states and Finnish export companies, even though the activities were sometimes strained.

The Finnish policymakers, notably President Koivisto, had a tendency to be reluctant during the initial motions on potential visits from Africa. Mostly the opposition stemmed from the unimportance of these trade relations. The reluctance of Finnish foreign policy officers was visible but due to the diplomatic nature of the visit they were still the ones responsible for the arrangements. The common dislike of trade-related discussions originated from the limited possibilities, the problematic financial situation in the African states, and the Finnish trade preferences elsewhere. Due to the uncertainties, the potentially beneficial connections might have been rendered too risky. The aspects considered were mainly focused on trade and development assistance and subjects related to bilateral relations – the universal ideological approaches, such as morals of the ODA and the responsibilities of the Global North, were mainly disregarded. Consequently, it seems that the financial possibilities merged with a more ideological framework of developmental issues. The attitude towards these three state visits seemed to be a certain kind of ‘yes, but’ approach where there were clear indications about both the reluctance and the eagerness of the Finnish foreign policy representatives. Because of this dichotomy and the lack of substantial trade-related connections, the Finnish companies with the needed experience were allowed to act freely within their own framework.

The commercial potential and expertise of Finnish companies were visible and acknowledged during these visits. The Finnish companies seemed to have some eagerness and interest to arrange tours for the visiting political leaders. The companies were interested in the possibilities the African states could provide and needed support from the Finnish state: The fulfilment of the potentials required monetary contribution from both the Finnish foreign officials and Finnish companies. The companies had their freedom to conduct these connections if the state endeavours were also fulfilled.

When the official state visits were scheduled, deciding which companies should be visited seemed to have mainly three characteristics. Firstly, companies that already had experience in foreign trade or in development projects were included. This meant that these companies were accustomed to the modes of trade available with the visiting states and familiar with the aspects to be considered in the negotiations. Thus, these state visits did not really provide new opening for a broader group of actors, but simply aimed to upkeep and deepen the already created connections.

Secondly, the produce or knowhow of the selected companies were viewed in Finland to be crucial to the recipient country. Usually, the Finnish foreign policy advisers had identified these needs. This implies that the Finnish state wanted, to a certain level, to control the connections between the foreign representatives and Finnish companies, despite allowing the companies to meet with the representatives quite freely. The choice of companies seemed to focus on certain fields which were both the main export areas from Finland and crucial for the infrastructure in the Global South. It appears that Finnish counterparts tried to cover the requests stated by the visitors beforehand, although this was not always possible. In fact, most of the companies visited were somewhat different than the ones requested and more fitting to the Finnish agenda – half of the company visits were allocated to the companies majorly owned by the state of Finland at the time.

Thirdly, the relationship between the Finnish government and its favouring the facilitation of visits to certain enterprises cannot be overlooked. It seems that the principal aim was to ensure that the trade between the African states and Finland was conducted through experience rather than interest. This limited the financial and political risks in openings of new business ventures to African states with the support of the Finnish state treasury. Possibly this was the reason why the interested and already involved companies were mandated to take the responsibilities for these visits. There was no risk letting the already familiar companies meet up freely with the African political representatives.

On a few occasions, the emphasis of Finnish policymakers on trade related issues was connected to an ampler view of Finland's foreign policy role in Africa and in the world. By providing favourable economic relations with African countries, Finnish policymakers could also ensure political like-mindedness and common understanding on important issues. The commercial connections can be partly perceived to be used to promote this aspect of the state visits. Nevertheless, the foreign political feats achievable from the increased trade relations seems to have been a minor aspect. For Finno-African relations, the trade was trade, and the politics were politics, and thus kept separate. Overall, the Finnish stance towards these state visits reveals basic features of Finnish foreign policy. When the counterpart is viewed to be non-crucial, or even to some extent unimportant, a certain lack of interest occurs among the Finnish policymakers.

The intriguing question for the future is whether the Finnish code of conduct was similar to other trading partners in the 1980s or was the administration of this policy due to the ODA driven economic relations or due to the small scale of trade between both sides. Additionally, the possibilities for further analysis of the viewpoints of Finnish export companies on Finnish relations towards the Southern African states could yield a more comprehensive interpretation of this period: Were the Finnish companies making the decisions independently on such commercial connections? Was the role of Finnish state merely to provide the fallback clause for the project funding? The possibility to attain additional archives from foreign trade companies and their representatives could provide an increased outlook on the subject.

Notes

1. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 329; Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, passim; Kansan Sivistystyyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 55, 94; Hirvonen, *Basic Statistics on Finnish Aid*, 13; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.–5.9.1987, Speech drafts. Ua:51, KA; Kiljunen, *Finnish Aid in Progress*, 24–30; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, Appendix 3/3; Remes, *Lähimarkkinoita ja kaukomaita*, 53; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 32–4; and Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 134–5, 141–2.
2. *Kaupapolitiikka* 3/2021 (my translation from Finnish).
3. Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 6–7, 9, 30; Koivisto, *Kaksi kautta II*, 236; Mitzen, “From representation to governing,” 112–20, 130–2; Nitsch, “State Visits,” 1798–9; Rose, “The Foreign Service,” 23–6; Susiluoto, *Diplomatian taiturit*, 25–6, 29–31.
4. For example, Beaulieu et al., “Presidential Marketing”; Head and Ries, “Trade missions”; Nitsch, “State Visits”; Rose, “The Foreign Service”.
5. Nitsch, “State Visits,” 1797–1799, 1804.
6. Beaulieu et al., “Presidential Marketing,” 309–10, 319–21; Hoffman et al., *Suomen taloudelliset kehityskaasuhteet*, 13; Nitsch, “State Visits,” 1798, 1803–1809; Mitzen, “From representation to governing,” 137; Rose, “The Foreign Service,” 29–30. Nitsch focuses on state visits of German, French and American leaders between 1948 and 2003. Nitsch categorizes factors of commonality being for example geographical distance, common language, colonial link, or common currency. Similar factors can also be found from Andrew Rose’s research.
7. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 324–5, 332; Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 78–81; Kansan Sivistystyyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 59; Mitzen, “From representation to governing,” 112–5; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 43; Remes, *Lähimarkkinoita ja kaukomaita*, 23, 58–9, 93, 99; Rose, “The Foreign Service,” 22–6; *Ulkomaanedustuksen käsikirja*, 141–4; Voutilainen, “Developing Countries and Investments,” 65; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 129.
8. Arto, *Kohti kumppanuutta*, 33–4; Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 285–94, 322–5, 331–2; Björklund, *Valmet*, 227; Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 158; Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 177; Kiljunen, *Finnish Aid in Progress*, 24–30; Kansan Sivistystyyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 57, 66, 69; Kuisma, *Kuparikaivoksesta suuryhtiöksi*, 402–7; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 1–2, 18, 69–70; Page, *How Developing Countries Trade*, 53–5; Remes, *Lähimarkkinoita ja kaukomaita*, 97, 99, 114–6; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 258; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 140–1.
9. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 326; Hoffman et al., *Suomen taloudelliset kehityskaasuhteet*, 13–7; Kiljunen, “Pohjoismaiden ja SADCC-maiden,” 197–8; Kansan Sivistystyyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 52–3; and LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 48; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 43; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 127, 136, 139.
10. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 322, 332; Remes, *Lähimarkkinoita ja kaukomaita*, 87–9, 96–7; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 218; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 136–7, 140.
11. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 327–34; Arto, *Kohti kumppanuutta*, 35–6; Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 171; Kansan Sivistystyyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 70; Page, *How Developing Countries Trade*, 83–6; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 108–9; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 249–55, 258–9; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 128–31, 135, 139–42.
12. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 326–7, 330–3; Hirvonen, *Basic Statistics in Finnish Aid*, 29; Kiljunen, *Finnish Aid in Progress*, 18; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 23, 35; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla* 108–9; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 220–1, 256–7.
13. Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, passim; Paasio, *Minä ja Mr Murphy*, 33–8; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 221–2; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 127.
14. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 324; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 76–82, 89; Remes, *Lähimarkkinoita ja kaukomaita*, 23, 58–9.
15. Nitsch, “State Visits,” 1799–1801. Nitsch’s research provides a basic examination on the effects of diplomatic visits on trade, which supports the analysis of this research, but does not provide concrete answers to the research questions, because of its different approach on visits.

16. Mitzen, "From representation to governing," 120–30; Susiluoto, *Diplomatian taiturit*, 25–6, 29–30.
17. *Ulkomaanedustuksen käsikirja*, 94–6. Personal letters are noted in format "From N.N to N.N".
18. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 329, 340; Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 167; From Liusaka to Helsinki. 3.1.1985. 18-2 SAM, UMA; Kaarakka and Rajala, "Yli 60 vuotta," 62–3; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 35, 52; Memo of relations between Finland and Zambia, undated, Ua:23, KA; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 110–1; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 260; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 42. Companies were Valmet Oy, Nokia Oy, Jaakko Pöyry Group, Lemminkäinen Oy, Makrotalo Oy, Finnmap Oy, and Outokumpu Oy.
19. Memo of relations between Finland and Zambia, undated, Ua:23, KA; Memo no 42, 7.1.1985. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. Ua:23, KA; Speaking notes 12.2.1985. Ua:23, KA; Tullihallitus, *Ulkomaankauppa 1984*, 3, 6; Tullihallitus, *Ulkomaankauppa 1989*, 3, 6.
20. Memo 492, 29.7.1983. Foreign ministry of Finland. Ua:23, KA (my translation from Finnish, layout of the text is kept original). The remarks are dated 10th of August 1983.
21. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 329; Koivisto, *Kaksi kautta I*, 269; Paasio, *Minä ja Mr Murphy*, 38–9. President Koivisto however did not interfere his spouse, Tellervo Koivisto, to visit African countries privately.
22. *Ulkomaanedustuksen käsikirja*, 145–9.
23. Aide-de-camp to the president of the republic. Helsinki 5.2.1985. Ua:23, KA; From Lusaka to Helsinki. 15.6.1984. Ua:23, KA; From President Koivisto to President Kaunda, 14.9.1984. Ua:23, KA; From Zambian embassy in Stockholm to Helsinki. 6.9.1984. Ua:23, KA; From Lusaka to Helsinki. 15.6.1984. Ua:23, KA; From Lusaka to Helsinki 28.11.1984. Ua:23, KA. Similar commentary had been made after President Kaunda's visit in 1968. Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 43.
24. Speaking notes 8.2.1985. Ua:23, KA; Speaking notes 12.2.1985. Ua:23, KA. Koivisto utilized this connection to President Kaunda in 1989 to alleviate the criticism pinpointed towards Martti Ahtisaari actions in Namibia. Koivisto, *Kaksi kautta II*, 505–6.
25. Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 129.
26. From Lusaka to Helsinki 28.12.1984. Ua:23, KA; Memo 160. 13.2.1985. Foreign ministry of Finland. 18-2 SAM, UMA; Memo 231. 30.4.1984. Foreign ministry of Finland. 18-2 SAM, UMA; Memo 231. 30.4.1984. Foreign ministry of Finland. 18-2 SAM, UMA.
27. From Cape Town to Helsinki 31.1.1985. Ua:23, KA; From New York to Helsinki 12.2.1985, Ua:23, KA; Sundman, "UKTJ, pienois-UKTJ," 7–14; Kiljunen, "Pohjoismaiden ja SADCC-maiden," 192–204; Kansan Sivistystyön Liitto, *Kolmas tasavalta*, 79; TT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 9, 39; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 112. The Frontline states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
28. Junka, *Valtionyhtiöt 1975–2008*, 3, 39–41; LTT, *Valtionyhtiöt markkinataloudessa*, 13, 19.
29. Kaarakka and Rajala, "Yli 60 vuotta," 63; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 28, 42.
30. Aide-de-camp to the president of the republic. Helsinki 5.2.1985. Ua:23, KA; Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 269.
31. Hankkija Memo 21.1.1985, Ua:23, KA; Programme draft. 31.1.1985. 570:867, ELKA. Field of education had been the central request already in initial visit of vice-president Kamanga in 1966. Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 42.
32. Booklet "State Visit of His Excellency The President of The Republic of Zambia Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda," Ua:23, KA; "Do it yourself training" Undated. 570:867, ELKA; "Forest work demonstration" Undated. 570:867, ELKA; From Hankkija to the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland. 18.2.1985. Ua:23, KA; Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 269; Saroilta, 3/1985, "Sambian presidenttiä kiinnostivat konehuolto ja metsäkoneet." Ua:23, KA; Suomen Soliaalidemokraatti, 22.2.1985, "Presidentti Kaundan jalanjäljissä." Ua:23, KA.
33. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 296–300.
34. Keskisuomalainen, 22.2.1985, "Rekiretkellä – ilman hevosta." Ua:23, KA; Suomen Soliaalidemokraatti, 22.2.1985, "Presidentti Kaundan jalanjäljissä." Ua:23, KA; Turun Sanomat, 22.2.1985, "Pelkkä rotusorron kielto ei riitä." Ua:23, KA; Valmet Corporations, Programme. 16.1.1985. Ua:23, KA. The idea was that the tractors would have been assembled

- in Tanzania. Memo no 42, 7.1.1985, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Ua:23, KA. Valmet tractors were also presented at Hankkija's Anttila farm. Programme draft. 31.1.1985. 570:867, ELKA.
35. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 332; LTT, *Suomen ja kehitysmaiden väliset*, 23–35, 43.
 36. Björklund, *Valmet*, 232–3; Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 206–16. The agreement was terminated in 1987 due to the failing sales. Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 259–60.
 37. Häikiö, *Satoa ja katoa*, 229–60.
 38. From Presidential Palace to Hankkija 22.2.1985. 570:867, ELKA; Programme draft. 31.1.1985. 570:867, ELKA.
 39. Tullihallitus, *Ulkomaankauppa 1984*, 3, 6; Tullihallitus, *Ulkomaankauppa 1989*, 3, 6.
 40. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 329, 340; Memo 8.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo No. 557, 17.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo 18.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Speaking notes. 18-2 TSA; Memorandum 8.5.1985. Ua:30, UMA; Malinen, *Kehitysapu täysremonttiin*, 87–8; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 260, 410–3; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysysteistyö*, 47.
 41. Artto, *Kohti kumppanuutta*, 39; Malinen, *Kehitysapu täysremonttiin*, 82–4; Memo 18.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Speaking notes. 18-2 TSA, UMA; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 119.
 42. From Dar es Salaam to Helsinki 21.1.1985. Ua:30, KA. From Dar es Salaam to Helsinki 29.1.1985. Ua:30, KA; From Stockholm to Helsinki. 26.4.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memorandum 8.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo 7.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Malinen, *Kehitysapu täysremonttiin*, 84.
 43. From Dar es Salaam to Helsinki 30.4.1985. Ua:30, KA; From Stockholm to Helsinki. 20.5.1985. Ua:30, KA. The ambassador described the commercial efforts as “waste of gunpowder”.
 44. From Dar es Salaam to Helsinki 24.4.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo 8.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo No. 366, 17.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA.
 45. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 333.
 46. Memo no. 607. 11.6.1985. 18-2 TSA, UMA.
 47. Auer and Teerimäki, *Puoli vuosisataa Imatran voimaa*, 270; From Stockholm to Helsinki. 26.4.1985. Ua:30, KA; Junka, *Valtionyhtiöt 1975–2008*, 3; LTT, *Valtionyhtiöt markkinataloudessa*, 12.
 48. Hirvonen, *Basic Statistics on Finnish Aid*, 11; Kaarakka and Rajala, “Yli 60 vuotta,” 63, 69; Memo No. 557, 17.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Memo 8.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Speaking notes. 18–2 TSA, UMA; Speaking notes. 18–2 TSA, UMA; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysysteistyö*, 27–8, 60.
 49. Björklund, *Valmet*, 233–6; From Dar es Salaam to Helsinki 30.4.1985. Ua:30, KA; Malinen, *Kehitysapu täysremonttiin*, 92; Memo 18.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA.
 50. Draft no. 1 8.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; From Helsinki to Dar es Salaam 23.4.1985. Ua:30, KA; From Helsinki to Dar es Salaam. 15.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Junka, *Valtionyhtiöt 1975–2008*, 3, 39–41; LTT, *Valtionyhtiöt markkinataloudessa*, 12, 19; Telex from Helsinki to Stockholm 22.5.1985. Ua:30, KA.
 51. Helsingin Sanomat, 30.5.1985, “Presidentti Nyereren ohjelma.” Hcc:12, KA; Photos 11817:1108, ELKA.
 52. Beaulieu et al., “Presidential Marketing,” 310–1, 322–4.
 53. From Outokumpu to Foreign ministry 28.5.1985. Ua:30, KA. The archives of Outokumpu had not made available for the research.
 54. Finnfund appraisal of Kahama Gold mines project. 8.1.1984. 1945:11655, ELKA; Kuisma, *Kuparikaivoksesta suuryhtiöksi*, 358–65; Memo 28.5.1985. Ua:30, KA; Salpakangas 23.8.1983. 1552:11655, ELKA; Speaking notes. 18-2 TSA, UMA. Kahama is town in northwestern Tanzania.
 55. Finnfund appraisal of Kahama Gold mines project. 8.1.1984. 1945:11655, ELKA; Kuisma, *Kuparikaivoksesta suuryhtiöksi*, 360–6, 379–80; and Voutilainen, “Developing Countries and Investments,” 65–6.
 56. Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 138–9. Between 1988–1991 eight largest subsidy receiving Finnish companies comprised 75% of all interest subsidies.

57. Finnfund appraisal of Kahama Gold mines project. 8.1.1984. 1945:11655, ELKA.
58. From Nyerere to Koivisto 5.6.1985. Ua:30, KA; From Nyerere to Sorsa. 18-2 TSA, UMA.
59. Voutilainen, "Developing Countries and Investments," 65, 68.
60. Nitsch, "State Visits," 1810-3.
61. Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy*, 30; Mitzen, "From representation to governing," 126-34. *Pacta sunt servanda*.
62. Memo 8.5.1985. Background material 2.5.1985. Ua:30, KA.
63. See note 39 above., 6.
64. Malinen, *Kehitysapu täysremonttiin*, 97.
65. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 329, 340; Finnidan projektit Keniassa 1987, undated. Ua:51, KA; From Nairobi to Helsinki, 10.8.1987, No NBO-268. Ua:51, KA; Kaarakka and Rajala, "Yli 60 vuotta," 62-3; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.-5.9.1987, Tausta-aineistoa. Ua:51, KA; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.-5.9.1987, Speech drafts. Ua:51, KA; Kiljunen, *Finnish Aid in Progress*, 46; Memo No. 101, 6.2.1986. Ua:51, KA; Rekola, *0,28% itsekkyyden asteikolla*, 124; Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö*, 260; Tiedonantaja, 4.9.1987, "Kenian presidentti aloitti kohutun Suomenvierailun." Ua:50, KA; Ulkoasiainministeriö, *Suomi ja kehitysyhteistyö*, 67-8; Ulkoasiainministeriö Memo No 633, 24.8.1987. Ua:51, KA; Väyrynen, *Stability and Change*, 139.
66. From Helsinki to Nairobi 22.1.1986. Kcc:21, KA; From Nairobi to Helsinki 24.1.1984. Hcc:21, KA; From Nairobi to Helsinki 11.7.1986. Hcc:21, KA; From Nairobi to Helsinki 18.9.1984. Hcc:21, KA; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.-5.9.1987, Tausta-aineistoa. Ua:51, KA; Memo No. 487, 31.7.1986. Hcc:21, KA.
67. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 336; From Nairobi to Helsinki, 10.8.1987, No NBO-268. Ua:51, KA; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.-5.9.1987, Speech drafts. Ua:51, KA; Memo No. 101, 6.2.1986. Ua:51, KA; Ulkoasiainministeriö Memo No 633, 24.8.1987. Ua:51, KA.
68. Artto, *Kohti kumppanuutta*, 39-40; From Nairobi to Helsinki 14.8.1987. Hcc:21, KA; From Oslo to Helsinki 18.8.1987. 18-2 KEN, UMA; From Nairobi to Helsinki 24.8.1987. Hcc:21, KA; From Nairobi to Helsinki 19.8.1987. Ua:50, KA; Kenian presidentti Daniel T. Arap Moin virallinen vierailu Suomeen 3.-5.9.1987, Tausta-aineistoa. Ua:51, KA; Koivisto, *Kaksi kautta II*, 236-237; Uusi Suomi, 19.8.1987, "Presidentti perui vierailunsa." Ua:50, KA.
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74. Aunesluoma, *Vapaakaupan tiellä*, 331-2.
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ORCID

Jerkko Armas Veikonpoika Holmi  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2263-9924>

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