# TIME FRAMES

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## NEGOTIATING CULTURAL HISTORY

Edited by

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*For Eva*

# Acknowledgements

The idea of this book took shape at a roundtable held at the University of Turku on December 2, 2000. The symposium, called "Premodern meets modern. A Roundtable with Professor Eva Österberg", was arranged by two Cultural History research groups, the medieval and early modern group, and the modern research group. Each writer in this volume gave a paper in the symposium. Our original aim was to discuss the methodology and viewpoints of cultural history by bringing together cultural historians studying different periods. We felt a wider discussion on the foundations of our perceived chronologies would help to raise new questions for studying both the premodern and the modern, and of course for connecting and contrasting these two.

It is with great pleasure that we acknowledge our debt to a woman without whom our journey would not even have begun. When Eva Österberg visited Turku, she gave a talk about friendship. We felt this was singularly appropriate, and hope that this book will be accepted as a gift reciprocating her generosity of spirit. Books, as Natalie Zemon Davis writes in *The Gift*, were "the present most readily circulated among learned friends" in early modern Europe, and gifts of this kind "provided a frame of civility and friendly exchange for the discussion of subjects that might be new or controversial". Some traditions are worth keeping up, and we believe that our dedication itself ties us to the chronologies of both friendship and intellectual exchange. Eva's challenging comments and inspiring presence were a delight to us all, and, even more importantly, she forced us to think further.

It has often been said that women tend to prefer networking and joint effort in their undertakings, where men are more reliant on hierarchies and individual responsibilities. Such generalizations tend to make us

wince, but nevertheless, our book seems to speak for the female friendship approach. We gathered together from early on, we discussed our themes and developed our thoughts in an atmosphere of mutual support, and we want to acknowledge this rare pleasure. It is not often that one can have so much fun in our professional world of growing pressures and hardening competition.

Moreover, we wish to thank Keith Battarbee, who did not spare red ink when trying to mend our careless handling of the English language. Tom Linkinen, Ritva Hapuli, Maija Mäkikalli, Kaisa Vehkalahti, Hanna Holmberg and Kari Immonen took part in the symposium and deserve our warmest thanks. Furthermore, the writers, either individually or collectively, wish to express their gratitude to the following friends for enlightening discussions, reading parts of the manuscript, and contributing to our understanding of history: Teemu Immonen, Vesa Kankaanpää, Kimi Kärki, Sakari Ollitervo, Marika Räsänen, Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen, and Keijo Virtanen.

This volume is the first fruit of a new series published by the Department of Cultural History at the University of Turku. We are grateful to all our colleagues at cultural history, and particularly to Professors Kari Immonen and Hannu Salmi, for accepting our book in the series and supporting us in our schemes.

# INTRODUCTION: DECODING CHRONOLOGIES

Anu Korhonen & Kirsi Tuohela

Historians often have a tendency to focus closely on a certain period, if for nothing else then because of the wealth of their source material. Still, we also often feel the need for questioning traditional ways of periodization. The writers of this volume felt that it was about time we asked ourselves what working with time means for us. We decided to approach the great divide between the Modern and what went before, and with the help of some contemporary concepts and interests, we wanted to ask where we stood and how we could go forward. How do we deal with questions of continuity? How do we contextualize the past? How does the dialogue between the individual and the social operate in our investigations? For a historian, conceptions of time and conceptions of culture are inextricably linked. We believed that by looking at the ways in which we construct chronologies, not only by means of the traditional temporal concepts but by more thematically and empirically oriented ones, we could find fresh insights into how periodization actually works. At the same time, we wanted to discuss our ways of understanding cultural history.

Continuity, chronology and periodization are of course distinct concepts. Some historians, particularly those informed by poststructuralism or postmodernism, are wary of assuming much of a continuity between different time periods or chronological points. In practice, though,

continuities, timelines and trajectories of change are constructed in various ways in all historical study. Instead of scrutinizing these concepts as such, we have chosen to approach continuity from a wider and more empirical perspective. We will certainly discuss continuity and change, sameness and difference, historicity and contextuality, but in terms of how they can be understood in relation to three debates: spatial organization, constructions of experience, and the cultural embeddedness of individual agency. Chronology, then, refers to the activities historians engage in when trying to make sense of what happened in the past and fathom what changed, what remained unchanged, and why the order of things was the one it was.

Periodization, the main tool of the historian, is nothing more than a cultural contract.[1] This is not to devalue it: history as we know it could not exist or "be done" without the organizing and contextualizing effect of periodization. Whether we look for change and see that as the principal focus of historical scholarship, or want to downplay chronological developments and look at microscopically specific problems or phenomena changing too slowly to be noticed, we nevertheless take part in and construct timelines.[2] History lives *in time*, but if we refuse to question the temporal principles arranging time, we fail to recognize and develop our own tools.

One of the ways of reacting to this claim is to ask how our topics are placed in time, on what criteria, and what are the narratives we use to construct temporal sequences. A clear example is the fact that it is well nigh impossible to give one's title without referring to an epoch whether

[1] Eva Österberg, while discussing the concept of the renaissance, terms this stance "the postmodern position". She suggests that postmodernists often combine their theoretical stance with a demand that these constructions be abolished, but we hold that our awareness of the constructed nature of periodization does not necessarily entail its uselessness. Österberg herself seems to agree with our critical but cautious view. See Österberg 2000, 18-19.

[2] The same can be said of spatial narratives: as scholarly concepts, the European continent, the nation state, the parish, and the household are all agreements, deriving from different time periods and thus more anachronistic or applicable or less so, entering into interplay with our other organizing principles.

we give specific dates or not. What is the Renaissance? What do the Middle Ages entail? When did the Modern start? When did Pre-Modern turn into Early Modern, and why are they defined by Modernity anyway? Is Post-Modern part of the Modern, a reaction against the Modern, a true epoch, a reaction against epochs, or just a pose? We need these concepts, so we also need to think about them.[1]

There is more to periodization than this, however. Historical scholarship is full of theories and themes, innovations and interests, that are traditionally related to certain periods of time. We are taught to associate the middle ages with collectivity, the renaissance with individuality, the enlightenment with reason.[2] We attach temporal meanings to every subject we study, and although questioning the above mentioned stereotypes may not be in the focus of our chapters, we nevertheless want to look beyond them.

How, then, do we use chronological concepts here? First of all, we cannot escape seeing the past as a sequence of temporal points and periods. History is a continuum, fragmented and layered, perhaps, and consisting of discontinuities, but nevertheless a continuum. The narrative of periodization thus advances from premodern to early modern, to modern, and to postmodern.[3] Some things, certainly, are situated in the *longue durée*, so they stay virtually the same in the course of this sequence. But if their contexts change, are they really the same? We want to look at some concepts and themes which seem almost unchanging, yet cannot be separated from their specific temporal location. Our answer, evident in many of the articles that follow, is that we need to think about *historicizing* and how it can be effected. Our answer, then, is in the form of a question.

[1] And we decided to think about them not with a capital initial, but purposefully bringing them down from their seats, by using lower case letters that do not stand out from their immediate context.

[2] For example, for discussion on meanings attached to the term renaissance, see Österberg 2000, 10-12.

[3] There might be other names we could give these epochs, but here we wanted to look at the narrative of modernization, and use the terms associated with it.

Secondly, and as we already hinted at, periodization can be used as a contrasting device. The narrative of modernization is not short of turning points and dichotomies, and both the end of the premodern and the birth of the modern can be located anywhere between the late middle ages and our own time. It is not so much our aim to situate the modern—which would be a futile attempt anyway—but to examine how period concepts can be used and what we can do with them. We may need to criticize the thrust to dichotomize, but at the same time we cannot escape its organizing power. Periods and their dichotomies are tools, as Eva Österberg has shown, and we need to set the dividing lines in different places according to the questions we ask and the themes we think about.[1] But, what is the ideological content of defining all western history in terms of modern or non-modern? And what does this mean for our understanding of the non-western? Although we are not answering these questions, they are an underlying force in our analysis.

In this volume, temporal concepts are used in both these senses—as a sequence and as an organizing device. But what about our own end on the line of modernization, the postmodern? Postmodern, to us, mainly refers to "now", the time at the end of our open-ended sequence, which for us functions as the platform in relation to which we construct the past. It sets us apart from the modern, but it does of course carry methodological and theoretical meanings as well.

We are not—at least not all of us—avid advocates of postmodernism. Clearly, it is a problematic term, and it includes various strands of thought we cannot subscribe to, alongside others which we do embrace. If we do take part in the discussion about postmodern history or indeed try to apply some of its claims to our own work, the best instance to see this is certainly in the emphasis we put into the historian's role as the one who reads, interprets and weaves a narrative. Gabrielle Spiegel has put this beautifully in her answer to the debate about postmodernism:

> Our most fundamental task as historians, I believe, is to solicit those fragmented inner narratives to emerge from their silences. In the final analysis, what is the past but a once material existence, now silenced,

[1] Österberg 1997, 42; see also Österberg 2000, 11.

> extant only as sign and as sign drawing to itself chains of conflicting interpretations that hover over its absent presence and compete for possession of the relics, seeking to inscribe traces of significance upon the bodies of the dead?[1]

For us, too, the double bind of presence and silence, materiality and textuality, experience and sign, is what constitutes historical meaning. The sign draws not only interpretations, but also historians, the imaginers and narrators of the past that we nevertheless need to see as real.

Postmodernist approaches to history have often been criticized for presentism and for the lack of a sense of anachronism. Postmodernism willingly breaks up timelines: when the historical imaginer is seen to produce only fictions rooted in the past, everything is fitted into the now. In fact, seriously thinking about chronology could in itself be taken as evidence of our not being postmodern! We confess to a sincere belief in the past as an independent other, which we ought to try and reach through open dialogue, and this vision is not always easily assimilated into postmodern thought. We need to reject causality as a basis for historical explication, but we still believe in temporal realities, and in the past being out of our direct reach in time. Although the narratives of history can of course be characterized as being of a fictional nature, in the sense of being constructions and interpretations by the narrator, it does not necessarily follow that they are fictitious. As Simon Schama claims in *Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations)*, his well-known experiment in historical narrative as both fiction and "truth", the inventive faculty is always in full play when we are writing history, however austere and scholarly we claim to be. But,

> this is not a naïvely relativist position that insists that the lived past is *nothing* more than an artificially designed text. (Despite the criticism of dug-in positivists, I know of no thoughtful commentator on historical narrative who seriously advances this view.) But it does accept the rather banal axiom that claims for historical knowledge must always be fatally circumscribed by the character and prejudices of its narrator.[2]

[1] Spiegel 1992, 208.
[2] Schama 1991, 322.

We come back to the materiality of the past, and the reality of its meanings. We, too, believe in loyalty towards the past. History was lived by real people. For a historian, the past emerges as an ethical question: we may have to abandon simple claims to objectivity, but we cannot abandon respect.[1] Being respectful means giving voice to past otherness, but by interpreting, by trying to make sense of it with the help our own concepts. As any crafts(wo)men worth their salt, we need to keep our tools in order, and sharpen them to be able to perform our task more precisely and skilfully.

## Four positions

Earlier, we described periodization as a contrasting device. Periodization necessarily entails seeing and accepting difference.[2] Making this difference visible is what we call historicizing. Although seeing things as "historical" may sound like a trivial starting point, we maintain that it is in fact the greatest challenge a historian can face. Not only do we need to see the past critically, we need to criticize—historicize—our own concepts as well. This, in fact, is the prescribed medication against the thinning postmodern sense of anachronism.

Historicizing, naturally, involves periodization. We see our topics *in relation to* an implied or specific *other time*, that is, our own time, preceding time, or following time. What are the mechanics by which we create the impression of temporal underpinnings? In our narratives, we

[1] In a recent paper Hayden White suggested more or less the same, by saying that "Putting back together what God, time, man or nature has damaged is a delicate technical matter but also a matter of professional ethics hingeing on the difficult question of living men's responsibility to their predecessors." In White's poetics, historical reconstruction can be seen as bridge-building between the past and the present, much in the manner of ancient Greeks and Romans who held that construction, be it bridge-building or any other kind of building, was a sacred activity which attempted the impossible: joining together what the gods had put asunder. White 2001, 2/10.

[2] On history in the West being based on a clear division between self and other, now and the past, see de Certeau 1988, 3-4.

place both ourselves and our topic in time, and we create a relation between them. In the symposium where this book got started, Eva Österberg distinguished four different modes in the historian's stance towards the past, using the relationship between the modern and the premodern as an example.

In the first of these, the historian refuses to construct a relationship between the grand periods in the first place and finds her guiding principle in the phrase *don't connect at all.* This position involves looking for specific, unique analytical concepts and emphasising the dangers of anachronism. In its purest form, this stance may be impossible, but we might want to be aware of its dangers anyway. Is creating unique concepts possible? How far can we apply past concepts when we cannot escape our own culture?

Others want to understand differing periods by contrast, *connecting but contrasting* the premodern and the modern. However, contrasting as an analytical device easily leads too far, and the contrasts between periods become either blurred or overestimated. Creating temporal dichotomies is a useful first step, but we cannot really stop there.[1]

Österberg envisions a third stance, where a connection between the modern and the premodern is created through *cross-fertilisation of concepts.* Here analytical tools are applied across time, but with a clear consciousness of possible anachronism. Using the concept of gender, for example, has opened the most important new view towards the premodern during the last three decades, and lately, the same has been happening with the concept of race. Although these modern concepts, now applied from a postmodern perspective, do not exist as such in earlier cultures, their use can throw invaluable light on premodern and early modern culture, and, consequently, on modern culture as well.

Although this approach seems the most fruitful, Österberg goes on to remind us that there is a fourth possibility, applicable in some specific topics. One can also sometimes assume *continuity of concepts*, and look for

[1] Eva Österberg in her opening remarks of *Premodern Meets Modern. A Round Table with Professor Eva Österberg*, Turku 2.12.2000; for modernity versus premodernity, see also Österberg 2000, passim.

empirical content that has not changed over time. On the other hand, when the contexts of any concepts change, we can also find change in history through using the same analytical tools but historicizing them, and through them, the topic we are looking at with them.[1]

## Three debates

The essays in this book mainly contribute to and draw from three topical debates in historical study: individual and identity, emotions and experiences, and spatial organisation. These are all linked, and cannot be treated as separate subjects in our book either. We all approach them from our own standpoints, so they necessarily receive a different emphasis in each of the chapters. Our common aim, however, is to see these debates in terms of cultural history, and more precisely, in terms of our interest in chronology and methodology.

In the first debate we will tackle conceptions of the individual and question our understanding of personal agency as opposed to structures and collectives in history. What is the relationship between individuals and the cultures they live in? In appropriating cultural values and practices individuals put their conceptual apparatus to work both on a personal and a collective level, but we also find the individual embedded in the meanings culture projects.

Seeing early modern mankind as either a glorious specimen of new-found renaissance individuality or as a one-dimensional representative of his non-modern environment has long been a standard view of the historical commonplace book. Both outlooks are equally far from the truth, but how, then, should we conceive of the individual? Liisa Lagerstam approaches this dilemma from the perspective of one "ordinary" nobleman, Gabriel Kurck. In Lagerstam's view, the early modern individual was as much a result of cultural and personal formation as we are, but she reminds us of the importance of

[1] Eva Österberg at *Premodern Meets Modern*, 2.12.2000.

understanding the forces, resources and concepts through which this process can be envisioned in a different cultural context.

In her essay, Hanne Koivisto presents the intellectual, the quintessential modern individual, as a contradiction involving two opposing ideological trends. Like Lagerstam's early modern nobleman, Koivisto's modern intellectual is always entangled in the web of conflicting meanings offered by his culture. While the intellectual envisioned himself as an independent agent, he was also always constructed through an identification with a collective and its values. The idea of the intellectual leads Koivisto to question how concepts and conceptions are condensed into collective ideological frameworks appropriated in individual life choices.

Thinking about individuality and identity necessarily leads to questioning experience and interiority, and how they are appropriated in a cultural context. The individuals we encounter in the past were flesh and blood, and although we look at them through textual constructions, visual representations and material artefacts, they envisioned themselves in the context of everyday experience. This brings us towards our second debate. We see personal experience as culturally constructed and historically variable, and individuality both as a discourse and a lived reality for the people of the past. Looking at experience can help us reach narrative and analytical strategies for situating, embedding, individuals in their culture. We suggest that this view also offers an alternative methodological approach for historical research.

By juxtaposing questions of individuality with the history of Native American cultures, Riitta Laitinen weaves together the themes of periodization and experience. How do our analytical categories work when confronted with a non-western culture, where our ideas on periodization are stonewalled by different chronologies? Individual experience is constructed in a completely different way in a culture which does not recognize our modernity and its concepts, and the question is made doubly difficult by the nature of the available sources, not created by the subjects we study. In the Arizona desert Laitinen finds a possibility for historical analysis where European conceptual dilemmas are enriched by a different tradition, contributing its own frames of reference.

In her essay, Anu Korhonen looks at early modern emotion as a link between the individual and the collective, and outlines ways of interpretation towards reaching an understanding of emotional experiences. She also suggests that cultural constructions which involve a particularly slow pace of change provide us with a new conceptual challenge of chronology and historicity. How do we historicize something where historical change is almost invisible?

Kirsi Tuohela approaches the same challenge from a different perspective, that of women's experience of being ill in the modern period. In her view, the concept of experience, informed by Joan Scott and postmodernism, calls for a possibility of a non-universalising discourse, a way of analysis which would be able to approach historically specific instances where the individual and the collective meet. Illness and pain, bodily experiences which are at the same time profoundly personal and yet shared by all humans, present the historian with problems of both continuity and context.

Through questioning individuality and experience we arrive at a position where collectivity and individual agency need to be looked at in their specific historical settings, and without ascribing either the premodern or the modern subject with preconceived conceptual distortions. Our third debate, then, will set the experiencing individual in her physical surroundings. Historical spaces and spheres have traditionally been approached with the help of concepts like 'public' and 'private', but we want to ask whether this is the way in which they can really be understood. How do we tackle the problem of looking at past constructions of space with the help of our own concepts? Or should we do that at all? How, then, can one reach the otherness of past categories of thinking?

Marjo Kaartinen, who focuses on the early modern period, points out ruptures and discrepancies in the conceptual arsenal used in understanding women's spaces in particular. Kaartinen's approach stresses the importance of penetrating towards the sometimes contradictory meanings early modern people themselves attached to their own spaces. She asks whether anachronistic use of analytical concepts necessarily

results in one-dimensional interpretations of the past, and suggests that we should move from assumed continuity of concepts towards a more concrete examination of lived spaces.

Maarit Leskelä-Kärki brings the debate towards the modern, and examines women's involvement in religious life in terms of entering a collective sphere. She suggests that by using a different viewpoint, even those modern women who have been seen as withdrawing from public life can be placed on the arena of active involvement. Is religion a conservative sphere, or should it be viewed as an active social movement? Can we present the religiously active woman as following her own emancipatory course?

In Anne Ollila's contribution, the concepts of public and private are further examined by contextualizing the dichotomy in the setting of Finnish nineteenth-century salon culture. She questions whether the division between public and private is in actual fact misleading, because of the various presumptions it entails, particularly those concerning gender and nationalism.

In these essays, spatial concepts and gendered spheres allow us to question our deeply ingrained need to dichotomize and polarize our analytical concepts. Should we rather think in terms of more fluid and valorized perspectives?

## One trajectory?

Historicizing individual choices means examining their historical contexts. Studying culture involves penetrating through the level of the collective to the ways in which culture is appropriated. We see social institutions like work, marriage or family, and values, emotions or identities as culturally constructed, but also want to stress the level of personal everyday life. We analyse discursive practices that produce cultural categories, for example gender or understandings of privacy, but we don't see cultural meanings as homogeneous. We give space to social and individual differences, and wish to stress both change, and the particularity of any given past.

Nevertheless, we also feel the need to emphasize the dynamism of culture and its tendency to make use of conceptual continuities. Where, then, does all this lead us? In short, to questioning given ideas and shared concepts, and to searching for ways in which cultural history could perhaps provide new interpretations.

We do not pretend to have final resolutions or even a unanimously held opinion on how to perform cultural history, but our common aim is to take it seriously. In order to discuss where cultural history is going, we want to state our starting points as clearly as we can, and then set out on a voyage of discovery. Negotiating cultural history, for us, means discussing basic practices of historical analysis and concepts we have chosen to operate with. In our chapters here, we have tried to give space to seeing analytical tools in action.

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# EARLY MODERN MAN OF HONOUR

Liisa Lagerstam

The purpose of my chapter is both to problematize and to elucidate how the concept of the individual is not transhistorical, but historical. The ideas and practices associated with the understanding of what it is to be a human agent, a person or a self have varied from time to time, place to place and person to person. My own research project, like many other studies today, derives from a desire to understand why people in the past thought and lived as they did. In studying the nobleman Gabriel Kurck (1630-1712), I am intrigued by the questions: What did it mean to be an individual in seventeenth-century Swedish society? Why did Kurck view human nature in particular ways?

In the first part of the chapter, I will discuss problems and possibilities related to my attempt to interpret those complex personal and cultural resources that constructed Kurck's individuality. In the second part of the chapter, I will analyse some of the fundamental views of human nature that Gabriel Kurck appropriated during his education. I will argue that these views were mostly derived from classical humanist ethics woven together with orthodox Lutheran morality, and interpreted according to the needs of the Swedish aristocracy. The ideas of human character and behaviour which he learnt were meant to guide Kurck to manly virtuous agency and prudent judgement. The final goal was to establish his reputation as a man of honour.

## Reconstruction – a problematic possibility

I believe that there has always been a sense of personal singularity. However, the ways human beings have experienced and expressed their individuality are culturally constructed. These understandings are not neutral, universal or transhistorical, but categories and concepts created by humans in striving to understand and control their own world.[1] My initial intention in this article was to create order and try to reconstruct an early modern understanding of individuality, using Gabriel Kurck's life as a starting point. But the closer I have approached the issue, the clearer it has become that there is no single notion of selfhood or individuality in the early modern period. As the literary historian Stephen Greenblatt has pointed out, there is only the historian's need to reduce the intricacies of plural and complex human beings to controllable order.[2] Consequently, my emphasis has shifted from the early modern individuality in general to Gabriel Kurck's individuality in particular and to his specific understanding of human nature.

From a solely conceptual viewpoint, the difficulties involved in the reconstruction of Kurck's individuality derive from the fact that our self-expressive language is mostly post-Freudian, and problematic to apply to the pre-Freudian world. Early modern people had their own concepts for self-reflection, of which some were similar to ours, but even then, the meanings attached to them may differ. This can complicate the actual reconstruction and argumentation process,[3] since one is simultaneously dealing with postmodern, modern and early modern concepts and categories, which may be either theoretical or more commonplace.

When researching seventeenth-century individuality, one cannot avoid the debate in which the relative importance of individual agency and

[1] For example Oja 1999, 11-13.

[2] Greenblatt 1980, 8. On the variability and plurality of the historical subject, see also Maddox 1998, 173-175.

[3] For reconstruction and argumentation as two sides of the historian's work, see Kalela 1999, 149-154.

social collectives is contested. Since Jacob Burckhardt published *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* in 1860, the early modern period has been identified as the great divide, the point from which onwards the new man began to liberate himself from the chains of the collective. This conventional modern narrative, in which the concept of the self is held almost to have been invented in the Renaissance, has been seriously criticized from various viewpoints during the past few decades.[1] At the same time postmodern researchers have challenged the modern concept of the highly-valued autonomous individual. In these discussions the dualistic debate over the individual-collective relationship has lost importance, since humans at all times are viewed as social and cultural constructions with multiple identities.[2]

Cultural history perceives humans and their lives in the past as social and cultural constructions, and stresses the interplay of cultural structures and individual agency.[3] I suggest that the formation Gabriel Kurck as an individual can be seen as taking place where the culturally constructed ideals and practices encountered his character—his mental and physical potentials. Therefore, however much the cultural structures particular to his time and place conditioned Kurck's actions and thoughts, the result—Gabriel Kurck and his life—was unique. Kurck's choices in life had to be made from the collectively constructed possibilities, but within these frameworks he had the ability to make his own decisions. Gabriel Kurck and his culture, "natural" and "artificial" in him, are inseparable. Consequently, his character and life should be interpreted as a complementary negotiation of personal resources and cultural contexts, as a network of specific and general, and as a mix of short-term changes and enduring continuities.

The applicability of my theoretical approach to the life of a seventeenth-century aristocrat has bothered me for a long time. Are my ideas too alien

[1] Österberg 2000, 9-20; Österberg 1999, 321-324.
[2] See for example Hall (1992) 1999, 29-44.
[3] Kaartinen 1999, 11-12; Korhonen 1999, 303-304.

to early modern discourses?[1] There appears to be coherence between postmodern and early modern views on self-formation, deriving fundamentally from the emphasis on the social nature of human beings. Stephen Greenblatt has argued that in the English context there is a correspondence between the postmodern notion of cultural self-construction and the early modern notion of "self-fashioning".[2] The Swedish seventeenth-century aristocracy's familiarity with the ideas of self-fashioning was based on their wide reading of international didactic and conduct literature. Man's ability to fashion himself, and his need to be fashioned, was an important element in the writings of the early modern humanist educators, such as Erasmus. Baldassare Castiglione in his popular dialogue *The Courtier* (first published in 1528) accepts that men make themselves and others, for such is the logic of the human condition. "Natural" is not possible for man, because he is a social animal. Yet, true courtiership is an art of apparent effortlessness, which should hide the long self-formative process of education.[3]

However, it should be noticed that values embedded in these two approaches to the self-formative process are divergent. The postmodern understanding of the constructed subject seems to imply manipulative control, by mostly hidden structures of power. Terms like control or norm carry negative connotations in our culture, since our system of values is linked to the ideals of modern culture. We want to believe, as stated in *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without distinctions of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other

[1] For example, the cultural historian Peter Burke has pointed out that a historian should consider how applicable her/his central analytical tools are to the time and culture of study. See Österberg 1997, 33.

[2] "Self-fashioning is in effect the Renaissance version of the cultural control mechanisms, the cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by governing the passage from abstract potential to concrete historical embodiment." Greenblatt 1980, 3-4. For self-fashioning, see also Peltonen 1999, 34-35, 125, 147.

[3] Gabriel had in his library *The Courtier*'s near counterpart Giovanni Della Casa's *Galateo* (1. edition 1558). See Lagerstam 1999, 70. On Erasmus' and Castiglione's ideas, see Bantock 1980, 62-64, 80-84.

opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status. The early modern world, on the other hand, was a place without equality in human dignity or rights, but infused with distinctions of every kind. In the value system of an extremely hierarchic culture, in which order derived from God, the various types of control had much more positive connotations. Julius Lipsius, one of early modern authorities studied by Kurck at the University of Uppsala, wrote that both the ruler and his subjects were all part of God's plan for human life in communities, in which the guiding principle was self-control within state control.[1]

## Gabriel Kurck – an honourable Christian nobleman

In my following case I try to reach the otherness of the past by analysing some contributing facets to Gabriel Kurck's understanding of what it is to be a person or a self. I will concentrate on Kurck's education between circa 1635 and 1655. Gabriel Kurck's understanding of selfhood was based on social affiliations and relationships. He was a Swedish Lutheran male, and through his lineage a member in the estate of nobility. By birth Kurck was a member in the elite circle of the old land-owning nobility, the aristocracy, who remained in a position of social, political and economic power in Sweden until the 1670s. The ideals and practices of Kurck's education related to his high position in the Swedish society of estates, in which each person was seen as related in a harmonious order of rights and duties to God and to other humans.[2] The destructive forces of chaos and disorder, which represented a threat to this divine order of society, could only be prevented through the stern self-control and wisdom of the governing elite. The reason why noblemen defined themselves as Sweden's governing elite has to be seen in the context of the nation's and the estate's recent history.

[1] For Lipsius, see Hale (1993) 1994, 212-213; Lindroth (1975) 1997, 182, 195.

[2] Englund 1989, 12-13, 27-48. In his autobiography Kurck remarks that since he was a baron, he was more a man of quality than people without noble rank. Kurck 1906 (1705), 44-45.

During the first half of the seventeenth-century the insignificant kingdom of Sweden grew into a great European power. The rise to military and political prominence in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) depended on the capacity to mobilize the nation's resources effectively, and from the 1620s onwards, a new centralized system of administration was established. From the beginning, the old land-owning nobility was assimilated into the bureaucratic machinery. One's duty to serve King, God and Country became one of the key virtues of the Swedish nobleman. As a reward for their co-operation, the nobility acquired a monopoly on high offices in the military and civil administration.[1] Consequently, the proper occupations for Gabriel Kurck were to serve his King and his nation as a public official or military officer. These functions also defined him as noble.

In order to meet the needs of the new extended centralized state system, the Swedish nobility reformed their system of education during the first decades of the century. In accordance with the humanist concept of human nature, it was thought that a person's innate positive capacities and desire for learning needed to be cultivated and fostered by means of good education.[2] Through proper training, a man could be brought to understand where his honour and duty lay. The goal was to fashion versatile civilized men of the world, for whom the power of words was as great as the power of the sword.

The general practices and ideals of aristocratic education were uniform during the time of Kurck's studies. There were three main phases in the programme: basic training at home, higher education at the university, and a study tour in Western Europe. The aristocratic curriculum comprized five fundamental elements. Firstly, it was coloured by Swedish classical humanism, which reached its point of glory in mid-seventeenth-century society. Educators drew on knowledge and models of classical antiquity, but added their own explanations and emphases. Secondly, the programme was encyclopaedic. It included studies in grammar, rhetoric,

[1] Englund 1989, 29-30, 83-89.

[2] For the new education system in Sweden, see for example Nuorteva 1997, 353-369, 382-386.

theology, mathematics, physics, mechanics, geography, astronomy, poetry, history, law, ethics, and politics. Thirdly, education was meant to be practical and oriented towards public duty in state service. Fourthly, the student's physical development was to be consolidated by exercises, such as riding, fencing and dancing. Fifthly, education brought wisdom, but it needed to be strengthened by experience.[1] The aim of Kurck's educational programme was to train the mind so it would wisely guide and control his actions, and to train the body so that it would promptly obey reason and good judgement.

Within this socially defined training programme, each student was considered to be unique. Tutors were instructed by parents to carefully observe the natural inclinations of their students, their different levels of ability and orientations of interest. Individual mental and physical differences were recognized, and each curriculum was constructed with regard to the personal potential of the individual learner.[2] Kurck wrote in his autobiography that he studied in Uppsala so well as he was endowed with the mental gifts given him by the Lord. He also tells us that he decided to become an officer, not only because he had a great interest in military service, but also considerable inclinations towards that area. Kurck's educators took his bent and wishes into consideration, and gave him a chance to concentrate his academic studies on history and practical mathematics.[3]

Two fundamental but contradictory views on human nature, prevalent during Kurck's time of study at the University of Uppsala, should be taken into account here. The official strict Lutheran view on human nature stated that sin and vice cannot be conquered by virtue, since human nature was totally corrupted by original sin. Salvation could not depend on any intellectual or moral achievements of the person, but was a gift of God's sovereign grace. God gave the only true rules of behaviour to Moses at Mount Sinai. Faith alone, not good works, was the guarantee of

[1] See for example Åslund 1992, 25-76; Lagerstam 1999, 15-28, 37-48.
[2] Annerstedt 1877, 257-259, 395-396.
[3] Kurck (1705) 1906, 16, 19.

man's morality.[1] The belief in human greatness, a central notion in classical virtue ethics, could lead to eternal damnation. However, attempts to reconcile the theological and pagan views on human nature were common. In Sweden, theologians were allowed to teach their negative view on human nature regarding matters of eternal life; but man as a natural and social being did not belong to the area of theological studies.[2] In other fields of study, a man's morality was not seen as opposed to his nature, but on the contrary as its fruit.

Before turning attention to classical virtue ethics, it should be noticed that in the mental and moral map of early modern individuals there was no clear distinction between secular and divine elements. Christian morality, appropriated through reading the Bible, singing the psalms and saying one's devotions, was an integral part of Kurck's everyday life. He was expected to love and obey God during all the hours of day. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, interpreted through the beliefs of the time, dictated what a good Christian was not allowed to do.[3] The concept of the good Christian life was also formed on the models found in the Bible. The first and foremost of these was Christ, but other important ones included Moses, and David, who appears to have been Kurck's personal favourite.[4]

The official Lutheran version of the Christian view of human nature was meant to apply to each and every person in the society. The humanist view of human nature, which was a contemporary interpretation of pagan ethics, was aimed specifically, however, at noble students. It was in moral philosophy where the value of individual achievement—virtue—was

[1] Lindroth (1975) 1997, 94-104, 132-137. It should be noticed that for example Philipp Melanchthon, whose influence was strengthening in Lutheran countries in this time, did not share Luther's negative view on human nature or virtue ethics. He thought that every man is endowed with certain inborn ethical principles from which his moral conduct may be directed.

[2] Lindroth (1975) 1997, 192-193; Blom 1993, 122-124.

[3] The essential books in Kurck's Christian education were Martin Luther's Small Catechism and Mathias Hafenreffer's compendium of Lutheran theology. For Christian ethics, see Kaartinen 1999, 31-35.

[4] In the old age Kurck composed settings of David's psalms. Kurck (1705) 1906, 202.

stressed.[1] The teachings were selected and interpreted according to the high status and practical needs of young noblemen, who were seen as the next generation of statesmen and generals to serve the powerful Swedish state. It was even stated in the constitutions of Uppsala University in 1626 that the most important aspect in the education of a young student was that he should not be taught to have humble ideas of himself: this would only lead to distrusting one's own powers and abilities to do great things. A man must have both self-confidence, and confidence in the nation's present situation, in order to be useful in the service of the state.[2]

The tendency to stress the moral dimension in the nobility's education can be seen throughout seventeenth-century, but it reached its climax during Kurck's years of study. Moral guidance was needed, since, according to the popular neo-Stoic philosophy, there was no escape from the evils of the world except by facing them actively with firm self-knowledge and self-control.[3] The unending enterprise of acquiring self-knowledge was one of the core ideas in humanist education. According to Donald Verene, the highest form of knowledge was to know one's own human spirit, in other words, to know what makes one human. Self-knowledge was meant to direct one to mastery of the self and wisdom of actions in the human world.[4] The guide to self-control and to virtuous action was moral philosophy. The personal virtues of man were at the same time virtues for society, presuming that humans are, as Aristotle said, social animals programmed by their nature to cluster into families and communities. The same essential moral principles guided both ethics, dealing with human relations between individuals, and politics, dealing with human relations of the whole community.[5]

[1] For example Lindroth (1975) 1997, 41-43.
[2] Annerstedt 1887, 223-224.
[3] Hale (1993) 1994, 209-212. For the Swedish aristocracy's notions of virtue, see Englund 1989, 83-89.
[4] Verene 1993, 2-9.
[5] Verene 1993, 8-9; Kaartinen 1999, 33-34. In Uppsala principles of virtuous worldly action were taught to Kurck by professors in the double subject ethics-politics. Lindroth (1975) 1977, 352-353.

There is reason to believe that Gabriel Kurck had a deeper understanding of moral philosophy. In his autobiography he tells us that in early 1650s he gave private classes at the university in Burgersdijk's ethics.[1] H. W. Blom notes that the general tendency in Franco Burgersdijk's neo-Aristotelian compendium of ethics is humanist and optimistic: to behave morally is a natural disposition, it is a trait of person's character, but has to be developed through training and acting morally. Moral rules can never be strict. The right action depends always on circumstances. What are needed are not absolute rules, but a safe dose of common sense. There were however some essential virtues, which in Burgerdijk's catalogue start with piety and continue with the always-important cardinal virtues - prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Burgersdijk's presentation of morality culminates in heroic virtue.[2]

The idea of heroic virtue, which had its roots in the classical world but was now coloured by patriotism, was attractive to the Swedish nobility, with the idea that the hero's perfect and divine virtue drove him or her to actions for mankind's best. Heroic virtue could be seen in generals and statesmen of the past, such as Caesar, but also in contemporary patriotic heroes, such as King Gustavus II Adolphus.[3] In the pragmatic ethical education, concrete models for human character and behaviour elucidated the nature and meaning of different virtues. Examples for Kurck to follow or to shun were taken from the Bible, classical literature and history.[4] In addition, role models from Kurck's own experience, such as his father, had an essential impact on his understanding of good human agency.

These views on good human character and behaviour were meant to direct Gabriel Kurck towards virtuous agency in society. But what was the reward of virtue? It was honour. I would suggest that the other worldly rewards, such as high offices and large fiefs, may be seen as honour's just by-products. In the early modern world, a sense of honour was important.

[1] Kurck (1705) 1906, 13.
[2] Blom 1993, 123-124, 126-138.
[3] For example Lindroth (1975) 1997, 191-192.
[4] History was considered to be the "magistra vitae", see Åslund 1992, 34-35, 46-47.

The patriarchal ideal linked a man's honour to his manhood.[1] The hierarchic ideal connected a man's honour to his position in society. The concept of honour was not only used to express one's manhood or social status, but also to define social group dynamics, and for the nobility the need for honour and the fear of dishonour were of great importance.[2] A person's sense of honour thus incorporated both individual and collective elements. For example, virtuous agency in military service and public office allowed Kurck simultaneously to gain personal honour and to display the collective honour of his family, estate and country.

Honour, in the thinking of the mid-seventeenth-century Swedish high nobility, was an attribute gained through lineage. However, Gabriel Kurck's honourableness was only partly given him with his birth, since no one could truly possess honour without virtue. The only way to attain honour was through virtuous action that demanded effort, a sense of duty and a superior moral standard. As illustrated in the art of the time, the virtuous life is a narrow rocky path leading upwards to the Temple of Honour.[3] Georg Stiernhielm's famous heroic poem *Hercules* (first published in 1658) is a powerful expression of the nobility's belief in man's natural greatness. In Stiernhielm's version of the classical fable *Hercules at the crossroads* the hero is a young Swedish nobleman who has to choose between the virtuous path of duty and the vicious path of pleasure. In all his actions the nobleman must defend his fundamental virtues—piety, prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude—otherwise he can never find his way to the Temple of Honour.[4]

This analysis thus suggests that Gabriel Kurck's understanding of what it is to be a person or a self was plural, relying on several different contributing views of human nature which were culturally and socially constructed, and drew on different traditions as well as on the particular socio-political situation in Sweden. The official Lutheran view on human

[1] A man could only earn honour if he demonstrated reason, strength and methods of control, which were the fundamental qualities of patriarchal ideal of manhood. Foyster 1999, 31-32.

[2] For early modern honour, see Foyster 1999, 5-10, 28-39.

[3] Lindroth (1975) 1997, 187, 190-191.

[4] Stiernhielm, *Hercules* (1658), passim.

nature as worthless was meant to guide Kurck in matters of eternal life; in worldly affairs, Christian morality obliged him to obey God's Commandments. The classical humanist view of human nature shaped Kurck's understanding of the self as a social being. In worldly society, he had dignity and reason, and he was capable of self-knowledge and self-control. The emphasis on self-respect, on honour, was defined by his high social status. Kurck's understanding of human nature gave him a basis to understand and interpret both himself and the culture he lived in. The views on human nature fashioned Gabriel Kurck's character, judgements and actions, and gave him the means to fashion himself as an honourable Christian gentleman.

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# THE INTELLECTUAL AS MODERN INDIVIDUAL: THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE INTELLECTUAL LEFT IN FINLAND IN THE 1930S

Hanne Koivisto

In this chapter, I wish to examine the question of the modern individual in terms of the role of the intellectual, using as a concrete example the self-definition of a group of Finnish Leftist intellectuals during the 1930s. I shall foreground certain features which associate the figure of the intellectual with distinctive modern characteristics, but also wish to ask to what extent the question of the intellectual offers more general insights into the history of western mentality. To what extent do the modern and the pre-modern constitute opposites, or do they form a continuum? I shall begin by situating the Finnish intelligentsia of the 1930s in its historical context, and then set out to analyse the question of the intellectual on the basis of an autobiographical *roman à clef* by the literary critic Raoul Palmgren (1912-1995): *30-luvun kuvat* ('Pictures of the 1930s', 1953). In this book, Palmgren re-tells the story of the period for himself, his friends and colleagues. The core of the novel is a *Bildungsroman* about the development of a young intellectual, but the milieu in which he lives is also described in extensive detail, and the novel can on one level be seen as an account of the ideological quest by the intelligentsia.

In the 1930s, public opinion in Finland was dominated by the political Right and patriotism. Early in the decade, in particular, there was a period of Right radicalism and intense opposition to the Left. By the middle of the decade, attitudes had become more liberal, but with the approaching threat of war, political tensions again increased. Communist activities

were banned throughout the decade, and the Left was therefore channelled into the more moderate Social Democratic Party; the radical Communist elite had fled the country in the aftermath of the Civil War (1918) and was now based in Moscow. No new generation of Communist leaders emerged within Finland during the inter-Wars period; instead, there emerged several small groups of 'cultural radicals'. Before the Second World War these had little significant contacts with the underground Communist Party, but in the post-War period some of them became very active in the now re-legalized Communist Party of Finland. During the 1930s, most cultural radicals were members of the Social Democratic Party.[1]

This new intelligentsia of the 1930s can be defined, I suggest, in terms of a number of distinctive characteristics. Firstly, the various associations and groupings of the radical Left, such as *Akateeminen sosialistiseura* (The Academic Socialist Society), *Tulenkantajat* (the Torchbearers), or *Kirjailijaryhmä Kiila* (the Wedge Writers) focused not on politics but on cultural questions. Secondly, the number of people actively involved was extremely small: maybe 20-30 persons in all, many of them active in a series of short-lived associations, as committee members etc., and writing for the press, working in the workers' theatres, and so on. Thirdly, this group of Leftist intellectuals was strikingly homogeneous. It was generation-specific: most of the members had been born during the 1910s, thus reaching adulthood in the early 1930s. Most of them were also from middle-class homes. Raoul Palmgren, for instance, was the sun of a judge, and came from a family including many clergy and officers. The intellectuals from working-class backgrounds, however, also considered themselves as members of the educated elite, since they had all attended academic grammar schools and taken their Matriculation Examination, the entrance requirement for university. Most of them had studied at university for several years, and they defined themselves, explicitly, as 'academic socialists'. Their opponents (both from the Right and from the Left) belittled them as 'salon communists'.[2]

[1] Sevänen 1994, 100-123; Rentola 1994, passim.
[2] Kalemaa 1984, 9-12, 33-38; Sallamaa 1994, 54.

The fourth characteristic of this young Leftist intelligentsia was their closeness: a strong sense of belonging together. Both political and intellectual activity was very intense during this period; there would be several events taking place each week, and these radicals spent their free time together as well. Their ties of friendship were strong, and many of them formed couples. A fifth distinctive, and possibly their most interesting characteristic was their powerful drive to define themselves as 'intellectuals', and to define the Leftist radical group as a whole as an 'intelligentsia'. They analysed themselves, their role in society and its cultural life, in their speeches, letters and other writings. They anchored their position in that of earlier generations of intellectuals, both individuals and groupings, and identified themselves with the models which these provided. As the decade came to an end, they then evaluated their experiences in their writings.[1]

The most detailed of these intelligentsia images is provided by Raoul Palmgren in his novel *30-luvun kuvat* ('Pictures of the 1930s'). One of the chapters, "The period and its human type," is set in the years 1933-35, when international collaboration for strengthening peace and promoting socialism enjoyed wide support, and the belief in progress was gaining support in Leftist circles. In one scene, a group of radicals are sitting together one evening, and one of them states: "I've been asking myself who we really are; and my answer is: We are the Finnish 1930s intelligentsia." In the novel this comment is followed by definitions of 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia', which are put into the mouth of the theoretician Helmer Adler, but which were equally shared, in my belief, by Raoul Palmgren and the other members of the group. The intelligentsia is differentiated from the educated class more generally, since examinations and degrees are not sufficient to turn anyone into an intellectual. The task of the intelligentsia is to act as the vanguard, operating outside the power elite, and thus free from its bonds and

[1] Koivisto 1997, 70-75. Arvo Turtiainen and Jarno Pennanen both wrote accounts of their time in prison, and Kaisu-Mirjami Rydberg published her own account, 'Viimeinen kesä' ('Last summer') in the magazine *Demokraattisen kansan joulu* ('Democratic People's Christmas') for 1945.

responsibilities. Freedom of thought is essential for intellectual honesty, for the intelligentsia is always committed to the quest for truth and justice. Its tools of thought, proclaims the novel, are theories and dialectical argument, in the spirit of Marx.[1]

## The intellectual as the representative of modern man

The definition of the intellectual offered in Raoul Palmgren's novel is interesting in a number of ways. The first premiss, that the intelligentsia is distinct from the educated class, locates the question of the role of the intellectual firmly within the question of the modern, in terms both of chronology and of content. Just as the beginning of the modern has been dated on the basis of a number of transitions, ranging from the rise of individualism and the nation-state at the renaissance, to the breakthrough of social thinking at the enlightenment or to nineteenth-century capitalism and industrialism,[2] different scholars disagree on when to date the emergence of the western intellectual, largely on the basis of their understanding of the concepts 'the intellectual', 'the intelligentsia', and 'the educated class'. If these concepts are understood as extensively overlapping with each other, then intellectual history can with justification be treated as an extended, continuous curve, as is done, for instance, by Alvin Gouldner, who sees the secularization process of the renaissance as liberating intellectual workers from the authority of the Church, favouring rational patterns of thought, and promoting a new culture of debate. Access to public debate was further eased by the dissolution of the bond of patronage between intellectual workers and the power elite. Control became weakened, and the opportunity arose for new forms of cultural product, linked with the rise of the fine arts market, the publishing industry, and the press. Within the European core, these new opportunities were already coming into existence by the seventeenth century, but by the eighteenth they had spread to the periphery as well.

[1] Palomeri 1953, 324-326.
[2] For example Österberg 1997, 30.

Intellectual freedom was further promoted by the increased ease of moving from one country to another, if conditions at home became too difficult. Gradually, there thus came into existence a communications network of intellectuals, scattered across Europe, and generating a sense of cosmopolitan unity. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, argues Gouldner, the numbers of intellectuals grew enormously, as a result of expanded educational opportunities, and the growth of the middle classes; he emphasizes the fact that most intellectuals came from middle-class (bourgeois) families. They thus gradually came to constitute a new social class, which saw itself as bearing responsibility for society as a whole, and as representing the people, and therefore as having both the right and the duty to promote communal values.[1]

Those scholars, on the other hand, who emphasize a distinction between the pre-modern and the modern, such as Anthony Giddens,[2] posit modernization as a precondition for the rise of the intelligentsia. 'Modernization' is here seen primarily as a social, economic and political process, mainly starting from the eighteenth century, in which 'society' and 'culture' became distinct from each other. The cultural debate initiated by the intellectuals is thus linked with the alienation characteristic of modernization: human alienation from nature, but also a process associated with capitalism by which the people become alienated from their living environment and work (labour), since these become dehumanized. Ultimately, individuals then become alienated from themselves. For the intelligentsia, one of the major concerns was the purpose of life, and the place of mankind within society. In the course of the nineteenth century, the intelligentsia thus became increasingly estranged from the educated class in whose hands power lay, and began to oppose the prevailing conditions.[3]

In the specific historical situation of Finland towards the end of the nineteenth century, under Russian rule, and up to Finnish independence in 1917, the nationalist movement had a need of an educated class

[1] Gouldner 1979, 1-3.
[2] Giddens 1991, 100-101, 105.
[3] Jenks 1993, 6-23; Karkama 1990, 119-129; Karkama 1994, 21-22 and passim.

committed to the formation of the new state and the education of the people, and the intelligentsia phenomenon was only of marginal significance. The earliest representatives of an oppositional intelligentsia were artists at the turn of the century, such as the poet Eino Leino and his mistress L. Onerva, in their bohemian years, who were fascinated by Nietzschean philosophy and opposed to the statist thinking dominant among the educated class. As the twentieth century advanced, more and more intellectuals began to see themselves as representatives of the working class and to look to international socialism, whereas the educated class leading the nationalist movement saw themselves as representing the nation, and their values were those of the international Right. (It goes without saying that both the intelligentsia and the educated class in time became disillusioned with their idealizations of the working class and the nation respectively.)[1] It is precisely this differentiation between the educated class and the intelligentsia which is foregrounded in the extract discussed from Raoul Palmgren's novel.

One of the features cited in the novel's definition of the intellectual was the duty to function as the vanguard of progress. As Zygmunt Bauman has commented, if the fundamental task of the intellectual is to function as the intellectual leader of the people, then as long as there are people to be led, intellectuals will continue to be needed.[2] The Leftist intelligentsia in Finland saw its task as not only the production of 'intellectual work' (commentary and critique, as well as works of art), but also as the defence of justice and truth, and as providing intellectual leadership on the road towards socialism.[3] The first two of these tasks had become well established in the profile of the intelligentsia by the end of the nineteenth century; the role of defender of truth and justice was especially personified in Émile Zola, who had indeed significantly contributed to the spread of the concept of the *intellectuel.* Zola and his colleagues were free agents, outside the structures of power, and this concept of the independent intellectual came to dominate the received profile for many decades to

[1] Karkama & Koivisto 1997, 13-19
[2] Bauman 1996, 120.
[3] See also Adler 1933, passim.

come.[1] Both Karl Mannheim and Julien Benda, for example, stressed this aspect, and were opposed to intellectuals becoming involved in the exercise of power or authority. On the other hand, in the early decades of the twentieth century, intellectuals became increasingly fascinated by politics, never more so than during the period between the two World Wars. More and more opportunities to participate in the exercise of social power became open to them, in public administration and in the formation of public opinion, mainly through the channels of the parties of the Right and the Left. In Leftist circles, Lenin was admired, both as a political leader and also as a Marxist thinker.[2] This politicization of the intellectuals has subsequently been interpreted in several ways. The magnificence and dynamism of the ideological scenarios, for example, has been seen as providing a substitute for religion, for people who had lived through times of uncertainty. Margot Heinemann, however, offers an alternative interpretation, which comes closer to the thinking of the Finnish intellectual Left in the 1930s; she argues that both socialism, and fascism, offered rational explanatory models for a world which was in many ways horrifying; they provided young thinkers with the basis for a worldview, and the promise of hope.[3] Raoul Palmgren and his colleagues, similarly, frequently appealed to the scientific and rational nature of Marxist thought; they were firmly convinced of the validity of Marx' teachings on economy and philosophy.[4]

These observations firmly locate the Finnish Leftist intelligentsia in the context of the modernization process and specifically of the inter-Wars period. Similarly, the human qualities which Raoul Palmgren cites in his novel as characteristic of intellectuals situate them clearly in the context of the question of modern mankind. The intellectuals perceived themselves as alert, critical, and morally upright. They emphasized their commitment to critical thinking and to debate, and their quest for honesty, truth and justice, even at the risk that this might lead them into rejecting their

[1] Charle 1992, 19-29; Eyerman 1992, 62-63.
[2] Charle 1992, 19-24; Harding 1997, 198-212; Timms 1988, 19-23.
[3] Heinemann 1988, 113; cf. Timms 1988, 19.
[4] *Marxilaisuus* 1937, 7; Sundström 1937, 12.

former ideals and switching their political stance, as happened with André Gide, whom they much admired. They saw themselves as an 'intellectual aristocracy', and for this reason able to present social critique, to analyse the social evolution of the past and the present, and to foresee the future, in advance of the rest of humanity.[1] This self-perception by the intellectuals thus embodies an optimistic belief in the potential for modern mankind, the best of western civilization. In this sense, the intellectual can be seen as the prototype, or template, of modern mankind, particularly from a traditional, masculine perspective. In Raoul Palmgren's novel, too, the intellectuals are entrusted with the task of representing certain values and ideals; they function as the expression of and trigger for social progress, like the protagonist of Maxim Gorky's novel *The Life of Glim Samkin*, strongly admired by readers of the radical Left. Raoul Palmgren was very impressed by this novel, and later gave it a central position in his critical study of Maxim Gorky's work.[2]

The roots of modern humanity, however, go back further in the history of western mankind than to the beginnings of the modern era or even to medieval Europe. Even in Aristotelian thinking, the characteristic features of mankind were identified as rationality, the ability to argue and to think critically, and self-awareness. Similarly, human ideals included the quest for the good, the true and the beautiful. The values with which members of the intelligentsia identified themselves were in fact fundamental western values, reminiscent of the Aristotelian virtues idealized by the aristocrats of the seventeenth century.

Following the Second World War, the social position of intellectuals has changed drastically. Today, individuals with a high level of education are employed on a larger scale and across a wider range of functions in society than ever before. The 'current affairs expert' intellectuals raised to prominence by the increasingly-influential media perform a role very different from the social critique of the traditional intellectual. The links between the intelligentsia and institutions of social power, including the universities, have become closer. It is therefore hardly surprising that this

[1] Palomeri 1953, 324-326; see also Koivisto 1997, 65, 77-78.
[2] Palmgren 1978, 312-322.

changed role of the intelligentsia has given rise to a variety of different interpretations. While some commentators still emphasize the continuity of the intellectuals' traditional critical role in maintaining western values and social responsibility, pointing to the contribution of thinkers such as Edward Said, some postmodern thinkers, on the other hand, cynically argue that the post-War collapse of values has undermined the traditional perception of the role of the intelligentsia, and assert that 'intellectuals', in the traditional sense, no longer exist.

## Individualism, collectivism, and the loneliness of the intellectual

In discussion of the transition between the premodern and the modern, attention has often been drawn to the question of the individual and of individualism. Modern mankind has typically been seen as characterized by a drive for individual self-fulfilment. The renaissance concept of the individual, and Kant's insistence on the autonomous moral individual free of authority, have been seen as the foundations of modern individualism, and opposed to the premodern understanding of mankind as bound to the collectivity and governed by norms. The distinctive characteristic of individualist mankind has been seen as continuous self-reflection, as expressed in the vision, implicit in confessional literature and autobiography, of the individual's life as significant, as worthy of narration. Yet usually life turns out to be a disappointment, pervaded by internal contradictions.[1] The counter-pressures of individual ambitions and social norms and demands lead to crisis and trauma, for—as Michel Foucault has shown—modern society can be considered even more norm-governed than premodern.[2] Similarly, Raoul Palmgren's novel "Pictures of the 1930s" is marked by disillusionments and crises of identity, in terms both of the quest for ideological ideals and for sexual fulfilment. For Palmgren, Freud's neurotic image of mankind revealed the sickness of

[1] Gusdorf 1980, 29-30; Karkama 1991, 144; Kosonen 1995, 62-63.
[2] For example Foucault 1998, 39-40, 88-90.

capitalist society, yet at the same time also offered a key to a more general understanding of human sexuality.[1]

Once a longer perspective is adopted, however, the concept of individualism as the distinctive characteristic of modern mankind becomes relativized. It has been noted, for example, that renaissance individualism was collectively oriented; it served the interests of the group. On the other hand, Eva Österberg has also both drawn attention to medieval individualism, and moreover pointed out the powerful element of collectivism in modern society, for the interaction between individuals and groups continues to be one of the basic conditions for human existence.[2]

In examining the Finnish Leftist intelligentsia of the 1930s, a highly complex field of tensions between individualism and collectivism can be observed. The quest for individual self-fulfilment, and the challenge to prevailing norms, were both points taken for granted in the intellectual way of life. Nonconformity, taking one's place at the margins of society, a bohemian lifestyle, and the search for sexual identity were important, as was also the demand that thinking should proceed without constraints, the demand for intellectual honesty. The former ideals led to conflict with society; the latter might well trigger internal conflict within the group. Raoul Palmgren's description of the decade is one of constant internal power struggles and ideological argument within the group, often putting considerable strain on personal relationships.[3] This feature is all the more striking in view of the crucial importance, as described in Raoul Palmgren's novel and confirmed by other sources, of membership in the group in order for the intelligentsia to survive.

Two alternative explanations may be offered for this powerful need for collective membership: on the one hand, their outspoken opposition to the power elite in society and politics; on the other, the new ambivalent status of intellectual workers within the class structure. Despite the recognition in Finland in the 1930s of democracy and freedom of

[1] Palomeri 1953, e.g. 328-338; see also Heath 1982, 61-79; Koivisto 2000, 290-293.
[2] Österberg 1996, 322-323.
[3] Palomeri 1953, e.g. 356-369.

thought, society's attitudes towards radicals on the Left were so hostile that it required great determination and endurance under stress for anyone to voluntarily become labelled as a supporter of a despised social model and its associated values.[1] In such circumstances, the group constituted for its members a source of support, and strengthened their faith in the correctness of the socialist path they had chosen. Yet at the same time, the intelligentsia found itself outside the recognized social class structure. Virtually all of them had left the social class in which they had been born. Those who had left the middle class had undertaken a total reversion of their political, religious and social norms; those from a working-class background had become estranged from their origins by their education.

Throughout the 1930s, tension persisted between the working class and the intelligentsia, notwithstanding the conviction of the intelligentsia that they represented the working class's interests. Socialist converts from educated backgrounds frequently found the working class vulgar, ignorant, and intellectually lazy, and held Social Democratic party officials, and the Party's moderate leader, Väinö Tanner, in particular contempt. The workers, for their part, experienced the intellectuals as arrogant 'rich kids', incapable of comprehending the realities of the working-class situation. The intellectuals' relationship with the Social Democratic Party was particularly tense; they were sharply critical of the Party's 'surrender', the watering-down of its ideals and principles; the Party, on the other hand, was worried by their dangerous radicalism. In 1937, the tensions led to the expulsion from the Party of the more outspoken intellectual members.[2] In all these ways, therefore, the Leftist intellectuals were isolated from the surrounding society. In order to continue, therefore, they needed to define their status and to reassure themselves that they were in the right. Zygmunt Bauman's observation fits

[1] Palmgren, for instance, continued to face difficulty in obtaining a tenured appointment, even after his withdrawal from politics, because he was considered politically untrustworthy.

[2] See Sallamaa 1994, 284. Jarno Pennanen (1937, passim) wrote an extensive commentary on his expulsion from the Party. See also Koivisto 1997, 83-89.

well: to speak of oneself as an intellectual should be interpreted as an open invitation to join the scattered ranks, since they were stronger collectively than as individuals.[1] Moreover, this sense of collectivity was further reinforced by the awareness of international solidarity, through collaboration with socialists and peace activists across Europe.

For some members of the intellectual Left, this experience of isolation culminated during the Second World War, in Finland as in other countries, in imprisonment. The State's police intelligence agency (*Etsivä keskuspoliisi*, 'Central Detective Police'; subsequently *Valtion poliisi*, 'State Police') had been monitoring radicals' activities throughout the inter-Wars period. By the outbreak of the Continuation War against Soviet Russia in 1941, there was more than adequate evidence to convict them of communist activities, treason, or desertion, and several were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences or to be kept in preventive detention. The men were separated in different prisons; the women were sent to the Women's Prison in Hämeenlinna, where they were able to maintain some kind of contact. The imprisoned intellectuals responded to their incarceration in different ways: some became even more firm in their beliefs; others went through serious intellectual and mental crises. For the women, however, a new solidarity was created between the intellectual and working-class women prisoners, transcending, for the first time, the barriers of social class.[2]

The outcome of the War restored their honour. Released from imprisonment, they were free to engage in political activity, and did so for several years. Within a few years, however, the newly-legalized Communist Party of Finland was torn by internal conflicts, and by the end of the 1940s, hardly any of the 1930s intellectuals still remained in its ranks.[3]

[1] Bauman 1996, 120; see also Gouldner 1979, 81-82.

[2] Rentola 1994, e.g. 287-291. Personal files survive in the archives of the State police for all the Leftist radicals, including reports of personal movements, interrogation protocols, and materials dating from their prison sentences, such as copies of letters. Other personal documents are preserved elsewhere, for example in *Kansan arkisto* ('The People's Archive'), e.g. letters, writings, and speeches. These materials are revealing for studying the impact of imprisonment on the prisoners' convictions, and also of social class tensions.

[3] See for example Palmgren 1981, 9-19.

The Finnish Leftist intelligentsia of the 1930s can be seen as very much a product of its time: as an expression of western modernization, with the marked political orientation which this took on in the 1930s. The role of the intellectual within the question of 'modernization' incorporates many different chronological strata, however, ranging from classical Aristotelian concepts of mankind through the various periods and achievements of western intellectual history to our own time. This chronological complexity is further emphasized by the intelligentsia's own desire to situate themselves in a line of historical progress taking in forerunners such as Voltaire, Émile Zola, and André Gide.

The 1930s can also be seen as the end of a line of development, for in the new situation after the Second World War the intelligentsia lost its credibility. It has been argued that today there are no more intellectuals; there is only the role of the intellectual, which may be taken up by anyone in the pursuit of a particular task, and then discarded.[1] The new Leftist radicalism of the 1960s, and the rise of single-cause political movements, both derive from different sources, however much they may share the goal of changing the world. During the 1960s, some of the 1930s intellectuals followed the new movements with enthusiasm, and the new generation responded to their writings with approval. Raoul Palmgren, however, withdrew after 1953 from political activity, and concentrated on his scholarly research into working-class literature.

[1] Giddens 1991, 91-94; Eyerman 1992, 58-60; Bauman 1996, 101-103; Saukkonen 1997, 332-335.

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# A NONMODERN SUBJECT, MODERN SOURCES AND POSTMODERN SCHOLARSHIP: MANUELITO, NAVAJO CHIEF, AND HIS LOVE FOR THE NAVAJO COUNTRY

Riitta Laitinen

When one is studying a non-western and a non-literate culture of the nineteenth century, one can face conceptual dilemmas of a similar nature to those one faces when dealing with the changes and continuities inherent in western premodern and modern culture. One can see a non-western, non-literate culture as very distant from the modern nineteenth-century reality, but on the other hand, when such a culture has been in contact with European cultures since the early seventeenth century, one may ask how much it has developed alongside them as opposed to separately from them. One can speculate, if nothing more, that a non-western, non-literate culture in the Arizona desert in the nineteenth century is as much caught between modern and nonmodern as European premodern culture was, even if its in-betweenness is of a different nature.

In this article I will explore the question of conceptualizing personal experiences and emotions in just such a nonmodern culture, through looking at a Navajo example from a period of war and of forced exile. I want to explore how the nineteenth-century sources, which were produced by the western Anglo-American culture, and the twentieth-century sources of Navajo oral tradition, express a historical figure's emotions and experiences and, above all, how we can understand them (both the sources and the experiences/emotions). To do this, I will view the sources in the light of some interpretations that scholars of the (late)

twentieth century have presented about the Navajo culture and the Navajo individual. With this exercise I aim to formulate some important questions about how we can talk about experiences and emotions of (a non-western and) a nonmodern individual.

## The problem of anthropology, history and sources

Anthropologists have put forward two propositions about the Navajos that concern us here.[1] The first is that, at least before 1868 when the Navajo reservation was established, Navajos had no larger communities than a residence group and therefore had no wider spatial or social identities, for example, regional or Navajo identities.[2] The second is that Navajos have a great love for their land, the Navajo country, which encompasses the whole area that the Navajo people occupy.[3]

These two theses seem contradictory when considering personal spatial relationships, and indeed they create some confusion when studying the history of Navajo societies or individuals. In the sources for Navajo history one can find supporting information for both propositions, and therefore it is particularly important to pay attention to the role of *upstreaming*[4]. Can it be defined how much and in what way such theses affect the interpretation by the historian? Or can it be defined at all? This question must be approached in relation to the sources.

The sources for Navajo history for Chief Manuelito's time (c.1820-1893) are either contemporary nineteenth-century Anglo-American

[1] Actually these are not explicit propositions, but rather constructions or interpretations formed through the anthropological research and the way that it is understood to describe the essence of the culture that it studies. See Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Farella 1993.

[2] Rocek 1995, 42-70; see for example Vogt & Albert 1966, 202-203, 233. (A larger Navajo cultural identity is, nevertheless, often presumed.)

[3] See for example Locke 1992 (1976), 4-5; McPherson 1992, 2-4; Farella 1993, 19; Kelley & Francis 1994, 20, 24.

[4] Making analogies between descriptions of cultures written in this century with the past stages of those cultures. In principle, making such analogies is not methodologically sound. *Upstreaming* assumes that cultures have remained unchanged, whereas words, customs and practices can in fact hold radically different meanings at various points of time.

sources, or Navajo sources from the twentieth century. It must be asked whether either of these sources, which are each in their own ways foreign to the nineteenth-century Navajo reality, can tell anything about Manuelito's life experience. Neither of the source groups is produced by the people that are studied. If, in addition to this, we are 'blinded' by the generalizations about Navajo culture mostly based on western academic studies on twentieth-century Navajo cultures, what can we say about a nineteenth-century Navajo life at all? Should we make a clear distinction between what the academic studies say about the Navajo culture and what the source materials say? Or, is there any difference between the problem of *upstreaming* and the problems that the nature of the sources creates? That is, are the sources as foreign to the nineteenth-century Navajo culture as are the twentieth-century academic studies?

## The sources and Manuelito

The nineteenth-century Anglo-American sources highlight Manuelito because most of the people in the Army and in the administration believed that Manuelito was one of the high chiefs of all the Navajos. His words about his homeland are thus interpreted to refer to the whole Navajo Nation, and also at some points to represent the voice of all the Navajos. This is the most basic context of this source group that we have to keep in mind when we interpret what they say about Manuelito's life. Navajos were dealt with as a nation and Manuelito as one of their leaders.

In the Navajo oral tradition, the corresponding basic context is that the Navajo historical stories are a twentieth-century interpretation of the people's own history. Manuelito's central role in the great Navajo story of war, survival and land probably has eradicated some of the experiences and emotions of Manuelito the person, to make way for Manuelito the cultural hero.

In order to get some kind of understanding of the relations between the world of the source material, the world of academic scholarship, and the world of Manuelito, we will now turn to take a closer look at the

anthropological portrayal of the Navajos and the portrayal of Manuelito in the sources.

## Navajo social system according to the anthropologists

Most anthropologists have divided the Navajo social organization into four levels: household groups, residence groups, middle-level groups and community level groups. The archaeologist Thomas R. Rocek has compared these classifications, and concludes that most scholars agree on what a household is and how it is defined (usually, a family living in a single hogan[1]). Some scholars include more hogans or an extended family. One of the main criteria is cooperation in daily routines. Scholars do not disagree much about residence groups either; again the size of the groups is the main difference. Rocek believes scholars know least about the middle-level units. He concludes that among those studying Navajo culture it is unclear if such a level of social organization even exists.[2]

There are varying answers to the question about units larger than a residence group, and this lack of consensus probably mirrors both variations in definitions or methodology, and seasonal, regional or temporal differences in Navajo society. However, for the most part, anthropologists consider that there is little evidence of close community integration playing an important role in Navajo society at least before 1868 when the Navajo reservation was established, and that integration after that has been built around more recent political, economic, or service institutions.[3]

From the historical sources it is easiest to find the classes of household and the larger community. Cooperation groups that are larger than households are also evident. It is nevertheless very hard to define the size and spatial characteristics of these groups. The scholarly interpretation of

[1] Hogan is the Navajo name for their original type of dwelling. A hogan may be round or octagonal, and conical or round roofed. Hogans are made of wood and earth.
[2] Rocek 1995, 42-70.
[3] Rocek 1995, 42-70.

the Navajo social system may lead a historian to see social identification through certain ready-made models, which emphasize the local connections. It also affects the historical analysis that the interpretations of Navajo social system are often simultaneously read as interpretations of general Navajo group identity.

## Anthropologists and Navajo love of their land

Studies of Navajo religion and philosophy most often focus on Navajos' relationship with the land. This is due to the fact that most religious or philosophical texts of the Navajo culture are connected with the land and places on the land. Through this approach, Navajos are presented as a culture/people inextricably linked with the Navajo country. This, in turn, creates an interpretation of a cohesive Navajo (national) identity, whether it intends to do so or not.[1]

It is highlighted that Navajo stories are associated with particular places and landscapes. As the stories are passed down by word-of-mouth, linking them directly with physical, visible places becomes central.[2] The stories that the scholars have collected all come from a time when Navajos occupied the whole of the current Navajo reservation; therefore the collected stories will include associations with places all over this area. If the stories are not understood as inherently containing the historical processes, they are interpreted to define the Navajo culture, its essence, as always having been linked with the whole Navajo country, at all times and in the minds of all proper Navajos.

In historical sources it is quite easy to find expressions of ties with the land and its places. It is, however, difficult to discern which areas the ties are connected with and which people they are shared with. The questions of personal, regional and national identification with land remain unclear.

[1] Laitinen 1999, 19-21; Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 7, 11-12, 16, 17; Farella 1993, 6 -14, 17, 19, 25.
[2] Kelley & Francis 1994, 2, 20.

The scholarly presentation of the Navajo culture may lead a historian to see shared identities where they may not exist.

## Manuelito's experiences in the sources

Manuelito is our example in considering this problem. What most is linked to Manuelito in the source material and also in the images of him in the twentieth century is his love for his country and his people. Therefore we will now look at how his experiences and emotions are actually presented in some American and Navajo source material. Manuelito himself did not leave anything for posterity to read. Some of his words are printed or written in official United States documents, as translated during discussions from Navajo to Spanish and then to English. Some of his words and thoughts come to us as related in Navajo oral tradition, both in accounts by his family and by other Navajos.

Let us first look at what Manuelito's son Bob Manuelito told about his father at the age of 99 in 1969. Some parts of Bob Manuelito's stories seem clearly to be a son talking about his father, the (national/cultural) hero. Manuelito comes out in the stories as a peace-loving leader who tries to talk others out of unnecessary war but who, when the situation turns, becomes a heroic warrior. This is one of the descriptions by Bob Manuelito:

> He says during his time that he never did do anything to other people, but they made him do it. During his young days, he used to live in peace and be kind to all others all through his life. - - All this time old man Manuelito was one of the happiest Indians and great worker among his tribe.[1]

Bob Manuelito's stories about his father do, however, also illuminate the Navajo social system and way of thinking. Accounts of Manuelito's life from a youngster to a great leader, who was first against the war but then resisted surrendering to the army longer than many others, show a Navajo society where Ute Indians are turned back to their homes because they are

[1] Bob Manuelito, *American Indian Oral History Collection.*

trespassing on Navajo territory, where Manuelito gains a leadership role in which he is informed about Ute attacks on faraway Navajo camps, and where he is expected to attack those Utes. Manuelito is described as trying to talk to the tribe, but despairing because the territory is so big that he cannot talk to all the Navajos even if he traveled night and day.

Manuelito's relationship with his own smaller home area also emerges in Bob Manuelito's stories. Particularly this shows when Bob Manuelito tells about the time Navajos came back from forced relocation at the end of the Navajo wars (1868) and some Navajos stayed near the Army fort while others left for their old homes. Manuelito is described as acting as a leader of all Navajos during the march back, but was among those who left for home.

> But I thought I could leave, - - says my father, so he left to see what Tohatchi is looking like now, today. Manuelito has found that the old country was getting rich with animals, wild animals, antelopes, or whatever you call it. - - There were lots of water coming out from the mountain, from Mexican Spring and from Tohatchi Mountain. - - The father went back to the place where they used to live; he found everything in good shape; the old home that he left during the time of his chasing around from other Indians.[1]

The return to the own home area can be seen as very important in Bob Manuelito's story.

The government records contain occasional references to 'Manuelito's people'. For example, Captain Carey explains in one letter how Manuelito had told him that his people were under the impression that they would face massacre if they were to surrender.[2] 'Manuelito's people' could mean anything however—his family, his kin, his residence group, the people of his home area, all the Navajos. For the soldiers it most often meant the Navajo people (though during the war it also meant the people that stayed with him when he refused to surrender). For many twentieth-century readers the first reading of 'Manuelito's people' would be the Navajo people. From the context in the letters and other official material,

[1] Bob Manuelito, *American Indian Oral History Collection.*
[2] Capt. A.B. Carey to Asst. Adjt. General, 10th May 1864.

however, we can often see that it must refer to the smaller group of people following him or staying under his protection.[1]

In the official source material we also find descriptions of the relationships between various groups of Navajos. Manuelito is often described as cooperating with this or that chief in deceiving or outmaneuvering the army. In many places we can see that this cooperation is spatially local. In their everyday lives, Manuelito and other people moved around within a relatively small area, and the chiefs cooperating with Manuelito all lived in or near his area, which also happens to be the area of the Navajo country that was closest to the Army forts.[2]

In his remarks preserved in the official material, Manuelito states as his reason for not surrendering that he loves his country and will not leave it. It is also in conflict with what his people are supposed to do. Often quoted are the remarks that his god and his mother lived in the west and he would not leave them, and that he intended to die in his own country.[3]

> Then Manuelito brought in his stock; there were about 50 horses and 40 sheep. He said – "Here is all I have in the world. See what a trifling amount. You see how poor they are. My children are eating roots." Manuelito said the stock was so poor it could not travel to the Bosque now. Herrera said he was not authorized to extend the time set for him to come in. - - Manuelito said then—upon reflection—he concluded not to go. That his god and his mother lived in the West and he would not leave them. That there was a tradition that his people should not leave the Chusca Mountains, his native hills. That his intention was to remain; that he was there to suffer all the consequences of war or famine. That how he had nothing to lose but his life and *that* they could come and take whenever they pleased; but he would not move. That he had never done any wrong to the Americans or the Mexicans; that he had never robbed, but had lived upon his own resources; that if he were killed innocent blood would be shed.[4]

[1] This would also correspond with the twentieth-century Navajo way of using the expression 'somebody's people' to describe a socially cooperating set of families. Levy, Henderson & Andrews 1989, 366.

[2] Capt. A.B. Carey to Asst. Adjt. General, 10th May 1864; Kelly 1970, 161.

[3] Kelly 1970, 164.

[4] General James H. Carleton, 21st March 1865.

These remarks are often interpreted as Manuelito's love for the Navajo country as a whole, but they may just as well be linked to his affiliation with his family home.

These examples of how Manuelito is portrayed in the source material are quite telling and also quite representative. Even from this small amount of information we can see that it is possible to interpret Manuelito either as a great Navajo chief with undying love for the Navajo country and Navajo people, or as a local leader of great courage who wanted to protect his local following and loved his home. Most sensibly, from the perspective of our own culture anyway, we can see both at the same time.

How Manuelito experienced the war and the land, however, cannot be interpreted solely from the sources dealing directly with him. What is said about him must (naturally, we could say) be related to other source material from/about the period. We need to shed light on what kinds of things people did, where and with whom they did them, to be able to reach an informed opinion about how we can interpret Manuelito's experiences or emotions and what concepts we can use to do that.

## What does all this mean?

It thus appears that both of the anthropological theses that we began with may be 'right'. What is it actually that we base this impression on, however? Have we used Navajo concepts from the nineteenth century? Or have we somehow come to the conclusion that we can just as well use concepts both from nineteenth-century American sources, twentieth-century Navajo sources and twentieth-century scholarly material? It seems to me that it has been impossible to dismiss the use of other concepts in addition to nineteenth-century Navajo concepts, even though this leaves us in a state of uncertainty as to how much we can then actually say about the Navajo nineteenth-century experience.

So far it has also remained unclear whether we have actually used *upstreaming* or not in making our conclusions about our source materials.

In the sense that we have explored what kind of analogies to the anthropological propositions we can find, we naturally have done so. But an important question, in my mind, is whether it is possible or worthwhile to escape these kind of wider analogies? We have to start somewhere; we have to have some kind of preconception about the topics of our study. I feel that it is the detailed analogies that we must try to avoid. For example, we must avoid trying to place Manuelito into the specific social system that anthropologists studying later Navajo societies have constructed.

When considering the sources and the concepts used in them (and the concepts we use to interpret them), the situation is even more ambiguous. It seems that the only thing that we for certain need to do is to be diligent and consider the differences in concepts used. We must try to find tools to assess the nature of the sources and their relationship with each other and with the scholarly writings.

The Problems that Navajo sources create are not wholly unfamiliar to those studying European history. Many studies have been written where an outsider has produced the source material. For example, studies based solely on court records rely on what the court officials have written down about the defendants or their words. Similarly, the picture we can form about a peasant's life is filtered through the culture of the upper classes and official institutions.[1] An interesting question is whether there is a great difference between these kinds of sources and the sources about Manuelito. Is there a bigger difference between Navajo culture and western modern and postmodern cultures than there is between peasant, upper-class and postmodern cultures?

To make a short inquiry into Navajo oral tradition and its role as a source, we can look at an article by Judith Modell about ethnographies[2] and what their power and nature can tell us. According to the description by Modell about what kind of 'stories' people construct in encountering other cultures, we can place Navajo culture in between what European

[1] See for example Ginzburg 1976; Davis 1983; Le Roy Ladurie 1985.

[2] Ethnography here means the product of observing, reporting, and reflecting on encounters with another. Modell 1997, 482.

conquering cultures have done and what many indigenous conquered cultures have done. For example, Hawaiian ethnographies are incorporative rather than exclusive. This means that the Hawaiian images assimilate the alien and transform the stranger. European visions of the other are exclusive, in that they assume the unfamiliar to remain as such. Strangers are not made familiar, they are not assimilated. This focus on strangeness has produced a more resilient ethnography than the Hawaiian focus on assimilation. This, according to Modell, is important in defining who has the power and is in control. In her words, "Visualizing the encountered at a distance keeps everyone in their place."[1]

This kind of classification (not merely or necessarily this particular article) can help us in contemplating the nature of the source material we are using. When regarding Navajo culture and its encounters with strange cultures, we can determine that Navajo culture has been, like many other indigenous cultures, very inclusive, but at the same time has been a conquering culture. Navajo culture was formed through the assimilation both of other Indian peoples and of Spanish culture; it conquered new lands, and made clear its position as the one defining the others, for example, by mainly using the Navajo language in trade with other peoples.

We could interpret this to mean, following Modell's model, that Navajo 'ethnographies', as a result, have been very well maintained, they have had 'staying power'. But on the other hand, Navajos have also applied other peoples' concepts and 'ethnographies' to their own life and stories. Again, this would mean that Navajo stories can have 'remained intact' from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century and therefore can tell us something relevant about the nineteenth-century culture. It would also mean that nineteenth-century American sources can tell us something about Navajo culture, as Navajos have incorporated enough of the western culture to be described by its concepts.

Considering Manuelito, this could perhaps mean that Anglo-American soldiers understood enough of Manuelito's life and world for their

[1] Modell 1997, 490.

descriptions to be partially valid for us. Bob Manuelito's words, again, could be seen as carrying some of the nineteenth-century Navajo world with them.

This is a very straightforward and even a simplistic way of approaching the issue and the analysis here is not very deep (nor indisputable). But I find it fruitful to contemplate this issue even on this level, as it at least makes us aware of the intricate webs of encounters between cultures and the internal changes that they produce. Even if the answers we get are not conclusive and clear, we have gained something by considering whether our sources can tell us anything.

Modell's article gives us another possible direction to turn. When exploring the differences between anthropology and history and between the other and the past, she comes to the conclusion that reflection on the past belongs to the self, while reflection on the other is more 'external'. According to this approach Navajo oral sources are a reflection on the past, and the past belongs to the self, while nineteenth-century American sources and twentieth-century academic sources are a reflection of others. This reminds us of another side of the source material and must be taken into consideration when interpreting what the sources say.

When placing Manuelito in this context, we could also, however, draw conclusions quite opposite to those that we made above. Since Anglo-American sources reflect the other, that is, keep Manuelito in the distance, we should therefore see what they tell us about Manuelito's experiences as very suspect. Navajo sources then would be self-reflection, which could be seen as more tied to the definition of the self of today than the reality of the past.

It would need a study of its own for practically every kind of source that we use to really get to the bottom of this question. This of course cannot be done if we want to stick to studying our original topics. It is, however, important for everybody to consider this issue, in order to gain a deeper sense of the nature of the sources and their relation to the people we are studying.

This kind of reflection can help us place our sources in their particular contexts. In the case of non-western cultures this, more than mere

mechanical avoidance of upstreaming or of modern or postmodern concepts, can help us in relating ourselves with the sources and the sources with the objects of the study. Modell's words "We are not always what we imagine ourselves to be" may also help us place into some context both our own concepts, and those of people in the past.

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# CONSTRUCTING EMOTION IN A CULTURE OF HIERARCHIES: A LOVE STORY

Anu Korhonen

Once upon a time, love was the strongest and most arduous of all emotions. Princes and princesses, men and women—not to mention ballad singers—were all fascinated by its power to move both soul and body. Even Juan Luis Vives, one of the foremost humanists, was happy to conclude that nothing was greater than this passion: "Everything yields to victorious Love."[1] But, for all its strength and mystery, love also had to be contained by society, and not only that—it also had to be understood by its users, the ordinary lovers and loved ones of the past. But how can we, as historians, study emotions and the experience of feeling? My chapter deals with the troublesome history of emotion, and tries to define ways in which love and its sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history could be approached. More than on the way in which early modern people felt, however, my emphasis is on how we as postmodern historians might read that feeling. We cannot feel the love they felt some five hundred years ago, but is there a way to understand it from a distance?

The continuum from premodern to modern emotion has often been presented as a process of privatization: a change from collective ways of determining emotion and a belief in its direct effect on gesture, bodily reaction and social action, towards the idea of a more individual, secret

[1] Vives, *The Passions of the Soul* (1538), 24.

experience which constitutes identity on a very individual level.[1] Whereas premodern or early modern emotion is presented as publicly readable and open to manipulation, modern and postmodern emotion is seen as private, personal, and disclosed only in a mediated form. In this chapter, I will present an alternative parallel way to look at the change from early modern to modern emotion, by means of proposing a change in the conceptualizations of love.

I want to suggest that in early modern culture, love was an emotion which existed in and constructed hierarchies—an hierarchizing emotion—whereas in modern culture, it is seen rather as a socially equalizing emotion. The question here is not whether love was personal or social, but what its place was in early modern cultural hierarchy. What was primary in that culture? In contrast to our culture, where emotion is of primary importance as a force stirring social reactions, for them, order, hierarchy and society were primary, with all their differentiating conceptions of honour, class and gender. And why? Because the individual did not have the fundamental power to decide even over his own life—that power belonged to God, who presided both over society as a whole and, equally, over its humblest members.

## How do you feel?

How, then, should we start looking at emotions in a historical context? Is there a way to understand the emotional experiences of people in the past? It would be easy to state that we simply have no access to the minds of sixteenth-century people, but a historian would do well to reconsider. Is experience really so individual and so independent of cultural norms and knowledge that we should leave it untouched? Of course not. Emotion is tied with social interaction—it is indeed culturally constructed. No matter what its possible biological components are, no one constructs their

[1] See for example Stearns & Stearns 1986, 18-21; Lempa 2000, 169-171; see also Lutz 1988, 41-42.

emotional life independently and without access to socially determined ways of interpreting and understanding what is happening "inside" them.

By now it is evident that I am advocating (a mild version of) what is often called the constructionist approach towards studying emotion, but let us first look elsewhere. There have been two major influences that have especially interested historians of emotion in the past years. Since one of them, emotionology, was introduced by the American historians Peter and Carol Stearns and has found considerable favour within the historical field, it is well worth examining. Furthermore, paying some attention to emotionology can help us better understand the constructionist view as well.

Emotionologists have suggested that we should historicize emotion by distinguishing between emotion, or emotional experience, itself, and the norms and codes governing its expression.[1] To do this we must assume that it is possible to tell apart "true emotion" and its "cultural expression" —and then, in the view of the Stearns, historians should study the latter. Studying emotion norms, emotion theory, emotion words and indeed emotion behaviour, is what these historians call emotionology.

I wish to question, however, the dividing line between biological and cultural, or individual and cultural, in this scheme. Why should it be that "feeling emotion" is biological and beyond cultural control? Why should culture not affect our understanding of our own emotions in the first place? In fact, not only does culture set us the norms by which we make our emotions public, but it also gives us the concepts to name and know them.[2] It is difficult to even imagine how emotion would be felt without knowledge of how to process and name it. For us, emotion is thoroughly social, and a large part of it is produced through the existence of cultural models and prescriptions for feeling. Furthermore, we would do well to remember that biology as a field of knowledge, and ideas of what is considered biological, are not absolute but historical.

Constructions of emotion are part and parcel of the episteme of a certain age, the cultural reserve of knowledge and the particular modes of

[1] Stearns & Stearns 1985, 825; Stearns & Stearns 1986, 14-15; see also Lempa 2000, 172.
[2] See Lutz 1988, 44-45.

producing understanding that were possible and typical in a given culture. Early modern subjects were just as interested in naming, and thus interpreting and understanding, their emotional life, as we are. Their modes of knowledge, however, were different. This also made their emotions different, since it is only through the expression of emotion that we are able to understand both each other and the objects of our study. Emotion is not only something happening in ourselves, it is a fact of social life. It is, in fact, a relationship. It exists between people and in their relating to each other. And, if emotion exists for the individual and for her culture in a communicative process and in appropriation, it is clearly historical, it changes, and it is always tied to a cultural context.

Thus the dividing line of the historian's access lies not between pure, biological emotion and its expression, but in fact within the experience of emotion itself. Surely, part of this experience can be construed as being dependent on biology and only part of it is culturally moulded. Nevertheless, the historian's focus has to be in *how* emotion is cultural and historical. And there is no denying that it is that, too.

This brings us to the constructivist or constructionist view of emotion, first introduced in anthropology.[1] The constructionists see culture as an active force shaping our understanding and experience. Since the conceptual apparatus of the constructionist approach towards studying emotion was largely developed by anthropologists, the idea of culture applied here was also strongly influenced by the experience of fieldworkers among the "foreign" subjects of their study, where emotion concepts and emotional experiences were manifestly different from those of the researchers and thus resistant to interpretation. This is relevant to the historian's dilemma as well, since the protagonists of our study are also manifestly foreign, although in a temporal sense. For Catherine Lutz, for example, emotional experiences of everyday life are not "unmediated psychobiological events", but instead "built out of the raw materials of historically specific social experience, received language categories and speech traditions, and the potentials of the human body". She also sees

[1] See Abu-Lughod 1986; Lutz 1988.

emotion concepts as indexes of "a world of cultural premises and of scenarios for social interaction". Thus each concept becomes "a system of meaning or cluster of ideas which includes both verbal, accessible, reflective ideas and implicit ones".[1]

The point here is that whether we can envision a "pure" biological emotion or not, as historians we can only reach emotions after they have been cognitively processed, after they have been sensed or perceived, verbalized or expressed in other ways, for example in gestures or looks. Even if we feel the need to imagine a biological basis for emotions, in cultural terms those emotions only become facts once they are perceived or expressed. We need not worry about 'what' or 'how' emotions are prior to this processing: to that, we quite simply have no access—and anyway, it is a cultural construction that they are 'anything' before being processed!

I tend to think that it would be useful for a historian to move ontologically in the direction of seeing experience as consisting of what we can know, and not, in simplistic terms, of what cannot be approached and explained. By the same token, we might want to see 'reality' as the meanings we imagine and know it to carry, not as something existing independently and outside our frames of knowledge, entering our language only arbitrarily. Is it not the historian's task to try to follow the intellectual path of what we—or the historical 'they' of our study—understand the world to be? In a way we could see all of our world as constituted by expression, if we accept that the culture we are concerned with consists of that which is shared and understood in some way. Culture is indeed a communicative network, enclosing both the individual's personal efforts at interpretation, and the collectively constructed possibilities and frameworks of that personal interpretation. Thus, emotion as cultural fact, as well as our other ways of relating to each other, form a shared basis of understanding and exchanging meanings, in which we as individuals orient ourselves.

In historians' terms it is more fruitful to see culture as something we all take part in, are embedded in and indeed construct, than as the collective

[1] Lutz 1988, 210-211.

"outside" which forces itself into our individual "inside". We need not imagine a dividing line between culture and ourselves in this particular way, since culture consists of what we, both as individuals and as a collective, can and do think. The individual is a part of culture as much as culture is a part of the individual. Culture is not only the anonymous collective that enforces its laws on us; rather, culture is what we make of it. Since emotion is such a strong factor in our life, it becomes cultural simply by our taking it into the field of cultural production through feeling it, communicating it, and understanding it.

This is where we can find a solution to a problem frequently cited by critics of constructionism: does cultural construction make individuals wholly plastic and not responsible for their own actions? William Reddy and Heikki Lempa, for example, lament the supposed plasticity of individual experience in constructionist interpretations and call for "political criticism", a responsible moral stance which postmodern constructed individuals at first glance seem to lack. In fact, they both go further to complain that constructionism omits the individual altogether.[1] This to me seems wilful misunderstanding: we can only think in this way if we see culture as located outside of individuals and affecting individuals without their own initiative or control. There is no need to go this far.[2]

[1] Reddy 1997, 329; Lempa 2000, 173-174.

[2] Reddy claims that for the ethnographers he criticizes, "there is no limit to the extent to which personal feelings are socially, locally, culturally constructed" and that, to them, these "localized and fragmentary constructions - - fully determine identity and experience", but in fact none of them advocates this radical a view. Instead, like Reddy, they propose that emotion is partly discursive and communicative, and stress the fact that emotion cannot be reduced merely to cultural patterns. Reddy opposes the idea that culture could create emotions from scratch—for him, emotions are "managed" in different ways, but not invented by culture. To the constructionists, this should not be an unacceptable qualification: they, too, hold that culture, as a geographically and temporally layered and fragmented construct, conjures up different forms and formations of emotion, but does not create them from nothing.

In fact, Reddy's view comes very close to the emotionologists when, following what he terms a more cautious constructionist position, he calls for neutrality about the relation between actual emotional experience and emotional expression. The same is suggested by Heikki Lempa. I find a discrepancy here: Lempa, for example, is ready to accept that early modern discourse and thought patterns were different from ours, but then goes on to reject

To my mind, and for any sensible constructionist, even if people operate in meanings and even if operating with meanings is their mode of being, there is no reason to think that meanings blindly operate people. Why not assume an active subject who is nevertheless embedded in her culture, submerged in the meanings that are possible to share in that culture—a subject who uses and produces the culture? It is much more useful to envisage people functioning in discursive situations than assuming discourses which anonymously just produce each other. If discourses and meanings operate at all, they operate through, and only through, people.

Still, as William Reddy suggests, statements about emotions are not 'mere reports', describing, representing or constructing emotions, but rather, efforts to "offer an interpretation of something that is observable to no other actor", a private event of cultural significance. Talking or thinking about emotions actively tries to construct not so much the emotion, but the social relationship in which one feels the need to convey the emotional event.[1] As Reddy proposes, we shape, channel, contain and understand emotion by drawing from our cultural repositories of meaning, and we even embrace, revise or reject cultural structures in and through feelings. We make use of emotive utterances to manage our identities and to locate our experiences in their cultural framework. Yet, our emotive utterances fail to represent all there is to emotion. Emotives are attempts at conceptualizing experience, and what they do succeed in, is creating a tension between the individual and her culture.[2] We think about and communicate our emotions in terms of (cultural) narratives, as Michael Macdonald has alleged, and, taking the idea full circle, narrative analysis in turn allows us to look at other, past forms of experiencing.[3]

that our hegemonic discourse, which forces a clear demarcation between experience and expression, could itself be historical and open to questioning (or at least that it could be questioned in the way the constructionists propose). The constructionists, clearly, want to problematize our own conceptualizations as well as those of other cultures. See Reddy 1997, 327-329; Lempa 2000, 173-174.

[1] Reddy 1997, 330-331; Lempa 2000, 174.

[2] Reddy 1997, 331-332, 346.

[3] Macdonald 1992, 37, 61.

I want to stress my point yet again: I agree that there is indeed no exact correspondence between emotional experience and expression. Our utterances may fail to reach our experience in some respects, but they do not fail utterly. Is it not a profoundly human act to deal with emotion by feeling it in one's body, by recognizing it and giving it a name, and turning it into a narrative? The mystery of individual experience may not be wholly communicable, but neither is it wholly beyond culture and the reach of a cultural historian. Still, the place and meaning of the individual in culture does of course remain problematic even for constructionists. For example: what exactly is the role of the individual in conceiving her emotions? And how well does culture answer the individual's call for proper conceptual tools for understanding her emotions?

## The story of love

Let us now move to a more specific question to illustrate how emotions function in their cultural context: how should we see romantic love in terms of early modern emotional constructions? In early modern culture, love was situated in the hierarchical relationship of married partners or women and men in general, and between teachers and pupils, between landlords and tenants, between monarch and subject. In fact, love existed only as a hierarchical relationship, and it could only be understood in terms of hierarchies. In early modern thinking, order was of primary importance, and social and cultural hierarchies contributed to the sense of order.[1]

[1] My evidence of early modern romantic and married love comes from England, so my conclusions may not be directly applicable elsewhere in Europe. On love as situated in hierarchies, see Jardine 1996, 115-116. Historians have long debated whether romantic love existed before the eighteenth century, see Phillips 1988, 356-357. Although there may have been gradual changes in conceptualizations of love, and the role of romance varied on different social levels, there can be no doubt that early modern individuals were much taken with the idea of romance. It is perhaps curious that despite the evidence to the contrary, many historians feel the need to assume that there has been a time when western

Romantic love was certainly considered a constituent of marriage, but falling in love was not necessarily the primary reason for getting married.[1] Puritans taught that love grew gradually between suited partners and was actually something the husband and wife should cultivate and aim at, not something required of the bride and groom at the church door. Its basis was in each partner performing their duties in an honourable way which helped each to respect the other—and indeed honour and good name produced lasting love.[2] But even here the question of hierarchy comes into play: the early modern marriage was modelled as church and state were modelled, after a conception of hierarchical relationships and order. In early modern culture, marriage was a little commonwealth where rites of emotion functioned within power relations. Love could almost be seen as a prescribed emotion. It was a form of social glue which held together relationships, but it was subordinate to the idea of gendered and socially defined relationships in an orderly universe.

Married love was seen as companionship and mutual understanding. Whether Catholic or Puritan, it rested on a helpmeet philosophy: love was a relationship between a husband and a wife complementing each other, but not equally: rather, married partners were essentially differentiated parts of the same whole.[3] Love was elevated in the conjugal relationship and told apart from lust and physical attraction precisely *in order to create order*. Emotion was squeezed into the acceptable cultural model. The wife's mode of expressing her love was submission; the husband's, his wisdom in governance of the household. The wife's love consisted of fear

society did not see love as a priority. See for example Flandrin 1979, 114-115; Macfarlane 1987, 123, 174.

[1] Macdonald 1981, 89-91.

[2] Wilson, *The Rule of Reason* (1551), sig. O6v; Fenton, *A Forme of Christian Pollicie* (1574), 261-265; Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike* (1584), sig. B2v-B4v; Wright, *Display of Dutie* (1589), 24-25; Cleaver, *A Godlie Forme of Householde Government* (1600), 172; Ste. B., *Counsel to the Husband* (1608), 84-85; Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties* (1622), 29, 44-46, 76-78.

[3] Vives, *The Office and Dutie of a Husband* (1550), sig. C7v; Wiltenburg 1992, 71-72; Rose 1988, 30-32, 126-129.

and reverence, the husband's of patience and "entire affection".[1] This is where we can see the hierarchizing nature of love in action. When emotion was tied to gendered ideals of partnership which resembled any unequal but personal relationship—such as that between master and servant, or teacher and pupil—it constructed intimacy at the same time as it made visible the hierarchy between the partners. Love did not imply or construct equality. On the contrary, love itself erected and maintained hierarchical positions.

The Puritan ideology of love was not, however, the only one early modern people ascribed to. In contemporary emotion theory, affect was produced by outward sensory stimuli. Love was a product of goodness and beauty—which of course is in accordance with the Puritan theory—but for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists as well as love poets and romance writers, beauty could be of a much more mundane variety. Early modern men complained about beautiful women enticing them to lust, and explained that since their gaze could not escape the visions of earthly beauty that women put forth, they could not help falling in love with the most unsuitable wenches. Men, all in a trance, were enflamed with hot burning fire and could not slacken their desire; flames of fancy wounded them incurably, like a cockatrice that killed with its sight; and they were "frantike in affection, fond with fancy, or pained with a thousand perplexed passions".[2]

Thus romantic love presented a threat to male self-control, although married love was also a criterion of manliness.[3] Falling in love carried a hint of impending catastrophe: an attachment to a wrong mate could not end happily, and popular literature abounded in tragical exempla and warnings for young men and women that demonstrated the current idea

[1] This can be graphically seen, for example, in the table of contents of William Gouge's *Of Domesticall Duties*, where the above mentioned are set as corresponding duties of wives and husbands.

[2] Examples of passages like these can be find anywhere. See for example Walter, *Spectacle of Lovers* (1530), sig. A3; Greene, *Card of Fancie* (1587), 65; Ling, *Politeuphuia* (1597), fol. 28v-29; Greene, *Alcida* (1617), 28.

[3] Hodgkin 1990, 30; Fletcher 1995, 95-96; Gowing 1996, 176; Breitenberg 1996, 57; Fletcher 1999, 427; Foyster 1999, 75, 139.

of romantic order, or, more specifically, dangers lying in breaches of that order.[1] Early modern romantic notions insisted on self-mastery and regulation of emotion; love was supposed to be controlled by reason like any other emotion. Reason, in fact, had to be the governing force here, for that was the proper sign of manhood and indeed humanity. On the other hand, emotions themselves created unreason: Michael Macdonald has demonstrated that love was indeed seen as one of the main causes of madness.[2] Society was a masculine conception, and patriarchal notions stressed man as the head of the family, head of the household, and head of the state—all of them hierarchically ordered.

As we can see, even here order and hierarchy play an important part. The danger of violent love lay in the threat it posed to order and honour. Moreover, the relationship between man and woman is not only gendered but also set in a hierarchical framework. Woman was seen as an object to be reacted to. The love to be reckoned with had to be a male prerogative.[3] Women were thought to love more than men, and to be more susceptible to emotion,[4] but this did not result in their love being considered an active force in society. Quite the contrary: in consequence, they called forth love.[5] Women were loveable and loving, so men reacted by loving them in turn. Also, they were beautiful, which theoretically allowed them so much power over men that it had to be curbed by strict ideals of subordination in marriage.[6] In patriarchal terms, the woman's proper role was thus in engendering emotion. We might want to argue against this view by saying

[1] See for example Erasmus, *Proverbes or Adagies* (1539), sig. D1; Wright, *Display of Dutie* (1589), 16, 24; Romei, *The Courtiers Academie* (1598), 37; Cawdray, *A Treasurie or Store-house of Similies* (1600), 255; Deloney, *Strange Histories* (1612), sig. G1-G1v; Raleigh, *Sir Walter Raleigh's Instructions* (1632), 21-22. See also Macdonald 1981, 90; Rose 1988, 168-169.

[2] Macdonald 1981, 94-95.

[3] In Gouge's household manual, for example, the word love was mainly used of husbands' emotions. For wives, the stress was on acceptance of the husband's authority. Gouge, *Of Domesticall Duties* (1622), passim. See also Kelly 1986, 46.

[4] Romei, *The Courtiers Academie* (1598), 62-63.

[5] Vives, *The Passions of the Soul* (1538), 15; Romei, *The Courtiers Academie* (1598), 29, 35-36; Buoni, *Problemes of Beautie* (1606), 21-22.

[6] Kelly 1986, 44; Mendelson & Crawford 1998, 110.

that in reality, women were also active in love affairs and their emotions counted, but their role is always a question of perception and interpretation. In social ideology, love was placed in a gendered and class-bound slot, on the crossroads of emotion theory and everyday practice. Hierarchical relationships were the bricks and emotions the mortar of which society was built.

## Towards the modern

I suggested earlier that my interpretation of the changes in love is parallel to the idea of emotion becoming individualized and privatized in modern society. The parallel lies in the fact that as emotion for us is considered inner, personal, individual, and a constituent in identity formation, we also believe that emotion precedes other social factors, whereas for early modern people, emotion was expected to bow to social hierarchy. For us, the individual is the key to social systems, but in early modern conceptions of the social, God and not the individual was the source of order. Thus, for us, love precedes other social relationships: it can, for example, make unequal partners equal, or at least level the differences. In modern culture, personal emotion is seen as a "democratic" force: it belongs to everyone, we all have a right to our feelings whether we can act on them or not, and nobody has the right to question the validity of our emotions. In our ideology, emotion is such a primary force in our individual identity that it almost enters the field of human rights and our value as human beings. On the level of emotions, we are all equal. This idea was not possible in early modern culture, because equality, if it existed, was a destructive force. Equality implied disorder, not order. In fact, early modern thinkers could not come up with the concept of equality as we know it. In this sense, history of emotions can be seen as participating in the master narrative of modernization as democratization.

Where my idea differs from the privatization theory is that I do not believe early modern emotion to have been any less intense or any less important in one's life than it is now. Reading early modern sources it is

quite evident that experiencing passions and perturbations, and the continuous moral and personal reflection on them, were clearly constituents of a self, and of an identity. The essential difference lies not in how privately one felt, but how emotion was culturally perceived and what its effect and importance in an individual's life was thought to be. For example, love's threatening violence and ability to create chaos still exist, but how this is placed in its social context has changed. Where, for us, the incalculable forces of emotion create a delicious possibility of crossing cultural borders and even creating understanding between them, the early modern mind only saw potential for eventual disaster in hierarchically misplaced attractions. Romeo and Juliet may have been from feuding families, but they were compatible in terms of age, class, and ethnicity. Early modern playwrights could not have written an honest romance of a young white poor man in love with an aged black wealthy woman (a concept full of contradictions in itself and certainly unthinkable for our early modern writer) without overly tragic or—more probably—comic consequences. In their mind, love did not possess power to equalize these differences. We tend to wish it did.

This also has implications for how we view the gender system. Gender, like class or race, contained an unquestioned hierarchy in early modern society. In postmodern society, we are trying to unravel gender hierarchies by proposing a different kind of difference and using other cultural categories, such as conceptions of emotion, to back up our emerging idea of equality. Ideals of equality in love thus forge definitions of the individual and her role in society. Moreover, conceptions of emotion can be seen functioning when we define the rights of the individual, by implying a relationship between the inner and the outer, private and collective, psychology and sociology, and eventually, experience as dictated by culture. Love, like any other emotion, is contained and regulated by social and cultural forces, but it can also affect how those forces are conceived of.

Again, this shows that emotions are culturally and historically constructed, and change—and that we cannot really understand a past culture without looking at and problematizing its emotional constructions.

We cannot assume our own emotional schemes to be working in the past. We have to be more careful in trying to recognize emotional reactions and reconstructing early modern experience.

I want to stress that there is a major clash between pre- or early modern and postmodern in terms of situating emotion and the individual in a social and cultural framework. We have appropriated emotion theory along with individuality and ideals of democracy so thoroughly that they have become an unquestioned basic principle in our culture, and this makes it very difficult to meet the premodern without the expectation and a desire to see a mirror image of ourselves. Can we understand the experience of an early modern individual who loved differently? Even though the totality of her experience is beyond our reach, shedding some of our own conceptions with the help of clashing with the otherness of hers is certainly possible. In the end, is not all our negotiation of emotion precisely the same kind of clashing with otherness? Emotion is where culture and the individual meet, and we can only handle emotions as individual subjects bartering cultural tender. We can recognize love in others, be they of an earlier age or our own contemporaries. Despite our differences, the early modern lover does disclose her emotional experience in the historian's sources. She loved like we do—but, at the same time, wholly unlike we do.

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# BEING ILL IN THE PAST: HISTORICIZING WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES OF BODY AND ILLNESS

Kirsi Tuohela

In this chapter I aim to make sense of women's experiences of being ill in late nineteenth-century culture. Women of this period suffered from epidemic illnesses and fevers, had injuries and problems with their eyes, and were consumptive, depressed or hysterical, just to mention some of their disorders. What mostly interests me is the experience of depression, being melancholy, or tired, but here I am writing in a frame of the more general experience of illness.

One woman of the late nineteenth century who wrote about her sickness is the Swedish author Victoria Benedictsson, who suffered from depression and fatigue, a state of mind that she herself called suicide mania. In the last short stories that she ever wrote, the theme of depression emerges clearly. The following example comes from the story *From the Dark* (translated from the Swedish by Verne Moberg). The text is about a woman called Nina, who sits in a corner of a dark room and is figured in the story only as a fragile voice, a melancholy and depressed mind:

> In the corner, shielded by drapes at the side of the stove, the dark was thicker than elsewhere, and nothing could be seen from there. Everything had vanished into the gaping gulf of the projected shadow. But up from the gulf where a glint of light fell, there was something resembling a chaise longue, and from the hollow-eyed dark above it, the nerves of a sensitive

person would have registered the sensation of a sharp glance as well as seductive, unnaturally enhanced hearing.

"There is a sick point in my brain," said a voice from the dark, speaking slowly with melancholy uniformity and contralto timbre. "It was already developing when I was a child, and it's this that has grown. All that has wounded me and weighed upon me has rested its tip on this single point; now the wrapping is soft and the resistance broken."

The man did not move, but his wise, deep-lying eyes gazed compassionately into the dark, where the voice was generated. [1]

My concern in this chapter is how to interpret this kind of expressions of depression as a historian, how to approach the experience of illness in cultural and historical terms. Many would recommend leaving depression to psychiatry and psychoanalysis. One could refer to Freudian theory and state that depression comes from inability to bear the loss of maternal ties and incapability for early separation.[2] From a biological point of view, one could see depression merely as a dysfunction in the brain best treated chemically with modern medication. As a historian, however, one explains human behaviour differently. Depression, like illnesses in general, are located in a not so easily defined area between biological and cultural. Some aspects that can be explained culturally are at the focus of this chapter. How, for example, did Victoria Benedictsson come to link depression with childhood, in her story *From the Dark*? Why was she so determined that a physically weak point existed in the brains of the depressed?

The method used here to try to answer these questions is that of historicizing. This is one of the basic issues that has been extensively discussed by historians, and has lately prompted many questions in the field of women's and gender history, too. In this article the historicizing method, and the problem of how to historicize things that are easily considered non-historical, such as experiences of the body and state of health, is approached from a theoretical perspective. The historicizing method is discussed more than the (hi)story of illnesses itself. This discussion is mostly constructed around the concept of continuity, but the

[1] Benedictsson 2000 [1888], no page numbers.
[2] See for example Kristeva 1989.

aim is also to see this method in relation to the principle of contextualization. The theoretical frameworks mainly come from poststructuralism versus hermeneutical body history. References to empirical material are from my own field of study, the cultural history of women's writing about illnesses in late nineteenth-century Scandinavia.

## The poststructuralist perspective

Joan Wallach Scott has borne the mantle of a poststructuralist historian since the days she started to adapt poststructuralist ideas to social history, women's history and gender issues.[1] She has delivered a version of the historicizing method that owes much to thinkers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and their ideas about the role of language and the formation of cultural meanings.[2] Scott's key concept, since the late 1970s after reading the poststructuralists, is that difference between the sexes is culturally and historically constructed. She started to use the term 'gender' to more clearly point the argument of the constructed nature of sexual identity and has ever since continued to denaturalize the category of 'women'.

Scott has written extensively about the history of feminism, which she treats as a collective identity.[3] As such it is constructed and invented, not natural, although Scott admits that it really seems to be harder to historicize feminism and the category of 'women' than for example the category of 'worker'. In a recent article, she notes that in her book about the history of feminism, *Only Paradoxes to Offer*, her aim was to try

[1] Her seminal article "Gender: a useful category of historical analysis" was originally published in 1986, and again in *Gender and the Politics of History* in 1988 (revised version 1999).

[2] Scott 1999, 4.

[3] Scott does not refer to ideology when talking about feminism, but rather seems to understand it as an "invented tradition", in Eric Hobsbawm's terms. Feminism is a produced continous (hi)story of women's activism and political capacity that is born in a process of collective and retrospective identification. Scott 2001, 285-286.

> to demonstrate that feminist identity was an effect of a rhetorical political strategy invoked differently by different feminists at different times. These sections constitute a critique of the notion that the history of feminism, or for that matter the history of women, is continuous.[1]

Scott clearly argues that feminist identity is an invented, constructed category that needs to be historicized, but what is also of interest here is that she thus comes close to abandoning continuity as a historical fact. She states that she aims to present a critique of the notion that the history of women is continuous; instead, she wants to argue for discontinuity, disharmony, differences and synchronia in the history of feminism, rather than diachronia and "a vision of uninterrupted linear succession".[2]

Scott's historicizing method works as a counterpart to actions of naturalizing and universalizing and mainly focuses on the question of how to historicize sex or gender. To put it briefly, Scott's basic idea about historical analysis relies on particular and concrete cases from the past. From the particular, she moves towards the context and the culture that surrounds the case. The purpose of her historical analysis is to construct an explanation in which one explains how a particular case came into being, what sort of processes and discursive interactions produced it. The explanation is thus not causal in its traditional meaning, but contextual and discursive. The cases from the past must be historicized, which can be achieved by placing them in their context and discursive networks—not in a causal chain that constitutes continuity. The explanation cannot come from outside, but must be found in the context of the case itself.[3]

Scott's method means that constructing continuity is not an appropriate method for historical analysis, it is rather a narrative strategy and a means of fiction. In accordance to this she means that we should problematize such concepts as the history of women, for example, and the continuity that we assume exists there. She argues that when constructing the knowledge called 'history of women', we at the same time naturalize and universalize the category of women by assuming that there is such a

[1] Scott 2001, 286.
[2] Scott 2001, 286-287.
[3] Östman 2000, 285-286.

category "as such" and that it has persisted through the ages. Instead of constructing a single narrative called 'history of women', we should historicize the practices that produce "men and women": we should analyse the concrete and particular practices through which sexual differences are produced.[1] In her introduction to the Round Table *Premodern Meets Modern* (see the Introduction), Eva Österberg commented that some historians relate different periods to each other by showing their differences and contrasting them, while others prefer to abandon all connections and focus on the uniqueness of each epoch; similarly, Scott's answer to the question of how to relate periods to each other would be: Don't connect them at all.[2]

Scott writes about the role of narrative in formation of identities in her article *Fantasy Echo. Construction of Identity.*[3] She claims that imagination plays an important role in the formation of identities, and sets out to show how this happens. She suggests that one aspect in fantasy (and by the same token, in identity formation) is that it operates as a narrative. She refers to Slavoj Zizek, who claims that narrative is a way of resolving "some fundamental antagonism by rearranging its terms into temporal succession", and continues that in retrospective identities (like feminism), contradictory elements are likewise rearranged diachronically, becoming causes and effects. Thus, mutually constitutive elements are understood to operate sequentially. One example she gives is the advent of modernity, which is seen as implying "the loss" of traditional society. Scott, however, sees qualities said to belong to traditional society as a constitutive foundation for modernity. Moreover, these qualities of traditional society come into separate existence only with the emergence of modernity, and cannot be seen apart from it. In Scott's view, the relationship between the traditional world and modernity is synchronic, not diachronic.[4]

When trying to write a history of women's experiences of illness with Scott's historicizing method in mind, one needs to answer two questions:

[1] Scott 1999, 206-207.
[2] Scott 2001, 289.
[3] Scott 2001.
[4] Scott 2001, 289.

what is the category of women one studies, and what is the object of study in the experience of illness? In Scott's line of thinking, the category of 'women' is a culturally constructed and historically variable phenomenon which works as a collective identity. According to her way of thinking about historical analysis, one cannot just start by looking at women's experiences in the past as such, but should study the very different ways in which the categories of 'woman' and of 'ill person' were produced in different times. A historian should not assume continuity, either in the experience of being woman, or in the experience of being ill.

## Attempt at a body history

The basic question in the history of the body is how to understand and explain the state of the body and the attitudes and emotions towards it in a remote time and place. What are the means of analysis available? Is there some continuity or universality in the way human beings experience their bodies and their state of health? It is clear that diseases have their own "natural history", which includes periods of great epidemics and of elimination after effective medication, but it is far from easy to establish whether the human experience of things like fever or stomach-ache varies. What means can be used to acquire knowledge about bodily experiences in the past in the first place?

Barbara Duden is a German historian who has written women's history from the perspective of body history. She argues against postmodern approaches, both in historical analysis and in feminism, commenting that deconstructivist critical scholars (postmodernists; she names particularly Judith Butler) have turned everything into discursive categories and transformed even events and persons into "texts". Such formulations she sees as demeaning and dehumanising, and calls for bringing people back into history.[1]

[1] Duden 1994, 158-159.

Duden has done research on how women patients in the German town of Eisenach around 1730 perceived their bodies.[1] Her starting point is the idea that the body has been expelled from history. Duden argues that the body and its environment have been consigned to opposing realms: on the one side are the body, nature, and biology—stable, unchanging phenomena; on the other side are the social environment and history, realms of life subject to constant change. She concludes that with the drawing of this boundary the problem of how the body was perceived is also placed outside the sphere of social history.[2] Duden contests this dichotomy between the non-historical body and the historical world; her ambition is to overcome this dualism and historicize the body too. In her preface to *Beneath the Skin*, she writes about her hope of giving a history of the female body. Her effort to historicize the body can thus be seen as an attempt to historicize a category that is for us self-evident, natural and non-historical.

The body Duden wants to write a history about is the body beneath the skin, the inner body. She argues that even the historians of the body have mainly not been interested in this, but concentrated on bodily manifestations; in these studies the body itself is always a vehicle of activities like sleeping and eating, feeling joy and sorrow, giving birth, ageing and dying; and as such the body is always thought of as a physiologically stable entity. Duden's problem has been how to really historicize the body and body perception, and get away from the idea that the body is essentially an anatomico-physiological collection of organs, especially when thinking about the inner body. Her method of historicizing the body results, as she puts it, in "a very real perception of the inner body, one so strange that it was some time before I could accept that it had ever existed".[3]

The female body that Duden found in over 1800 case histories that Doctor Johannes Pelargius Storch recorded during his life time was "a vanished body perception", an "extinct" and "strange" body perception

[1] See Duden 1997.
[2] Duden 1997, vi.
[3] Duden 1997, viii.

that cannot be seen as a part of sociogenesis of the modern body. Duden, like Foucault, sees the birth of the modern body as a process that goes back only two hundred years. The modern body was created as an effect and object of medical examination. The birth of clinical, investigative gaze gave birth to the modern perception of "the body" by fixing it as what the clinical gaze perceived.[1] What Duden found in Storch's case studies was something different, a strange body perception.

For Storch and his female patients, the "body" was opaque, a place of hidden activities. It could not be opened or seen like the modern body. The inner body was a place of metamorphosis, where fluids changed and transformed their form, colour, consistency and place of exit. Things that were seen as threatening the body and making it sick were not material or somatic, but phenomena like anger or dancing at night.[2] All these notions made Duden conclude that she was dealing with a body perception that was foreign and strange to her as a modern individual. Nevertheless, she stresses that it was fundamental for her to study the modern body perception and its origins first before she could understand the bodily experiences of the women of Eisenach in the 1730s. She notes that we perceive the body in present-day culture as something material and physical, something that we have and possess, an attitude that none of Dr. Storch's patients had.

Duden's method of interpreting her sources and gaining an understanding of them was a questioning of her own perception and way of ordering things. She read her way into the sources through deep study, and only gradually did the outlines of a perception of the "body" foreign to her emerge.[3] Although Duden sees differently the sociogenesis of modern medicine and the body, sexuality, reproduction, hygiene, and health after reading Storch's case histories, she rejects any continuity between the writings of this eighteenth-century doctor and modern culture: historicizing the body leads her to stress discontinuity. Seeing modern body perceptions as historically conditioned opens her eyes also

[1] Duden 1997, 2-4.
[2] Duden 1997, 104-109, 140-141.
[3] Duden 1997, 104-105.

to see early eighteenth-century medical practices in their own historical context, as a part of a period-specific culture that is foreign to modernity.[1] Although Duden uses traditional society, and body perceptions in Eisenach in the 1730s, as a vehicle for contrasting time periods, she does not write a narrative where these contrasting elements are rearranged diachronically. They do not operate sequentially—which means that she has two stories to tell.[2]

## Continuity

Both historians, Barbara Duden and Joan W. Scott, are critical of continuity, which they see as incompatible with the principle of historicizing. Assuming or constructing continuity easily implies an essence that goes beyond historical specificity and the "true" historical nature of things. Both of these historians have de-naturalized categories that used to be regarded as self-evident and non-historical: that of women and that of body. Their means of analysing historical material, nevertheless, are significantly different from each other.

Many historians who have read their Foucault share Joan W. Scott's opinion about the constructed and non-self-evident character of identities,[3] but Scott goes further and tries to answer the question of how identities are established. She asks what mechanisms were used in the past to create these collective and retrospective identifications, and sets out to explicate how such mechanisms operate, introducing 'fantasy' (imagination) as an analytical tool.[4] History, argues Scott, is "a fantasized narrative that imposes sequential order on otherwise chaotic and contingent occurrences". Using women's history or the history of feminism as an example, Scott writes:

[1] Duden 1997, 184.
[2] "Two Methods – Two Bodies", Duden 1997, 1.
[3] Duden, too, is influenced by Foucault. Duden 1994, 156.
[4] Scott 2001, passim.

> What might be called the fantasy of feminist history secures the identity of women over time. The particular details may be different, but the repetition of the basis narrative and the subjects' experience in it means that actors are known to us—they are us.[1]

The identity of 'women' is then produced by repetition of the same story and by retrospection on this sameness. With this argument, Scott is strongly critical of continuity as a historical fact, and sees it as a vehicle in formation of identities, rather than as a characteristic of the past itself.

Duden, too, sees continuity as generating essentialist ways of thinking. She opposes the kind of continuity she thinks social history and history of ideas are often guilty of: they produce narratives where circumstances vary over time but the focal object of the study remains same. The object of study is seen from the perspective of present as a self-evident thing. Duden's favourite example is the body: usually we think we know what the body is, and fail to see the historical conditions of our own understanding like we should as true historians. We are too keen on seeing sameness and continuity, and unwilling to confront "Unpässlichkeit", things that do not fit in and refuse to make sense.[2] Duden's own method of analysis in historical research stresses difference, discontinuity, and distance. We should not take anything as known, granted or self-evident; on the contrary, we need to try to distance ourselves even from the most familiar, and patiently encounter mismatching features. The method of distancing[3] is especially needed in body history and history of mentalities, which are in quest of different, remote and foreign ways of perceiving, unfamiliar to the present.

## How can we continue?

My main task in this article has been to ask how the experience of illness and of depression in the context of women's writing in the late nineteenth

[1] Scott 2001, 290.
[2] Duden 1994, 156.
[3] 'Befremdung' or 'Distanzierung', Duden 1994, 153-154.

century can be historicized, turning for assistance to poststructuralist and hermeneutical approaches.[1] In Joan W. Scott's terms, the starting point would be that people do not have experiences, but are constructed in experiences: thus, people do not have experiences of depression whose underlying cause is a disease called depression, but rather, they are constructed as depressed persons in cultural interaction. This post-structuralist view focuses on language, and practices of naming, and its strength lies in showing how we live in multiple discourses, how the subject is constituted and how weak and fragile, historical and changing it is. One of the problems of this approach, however, is that it leaves a depressed and broken mind untouched: it offers an analysis of how we come to be defined in a particular way, but offers no comments on how to move on. The perspective of the Other is also missing, and scholars with a mission to understand the other and the unknown (like myself) have to look for theoretical help elsewhere, too. The German body history tradition represented by Barbara Duden relies on potential empathy (Erlebnisspotential[2]), a sympathetic understanding of the alien. In order to be able to understand the past and its people, this approach happily acknowledges that it needs to assume the subject who constructed these understandings alien to historians of another time and place. Duden and other critics of the postmodern do not want to preach the end of the subject, but quite the opposite: to find the values in it.

Reading testimonies of depressed women and other "broken souls", or following the silent tragedies of those who really have "lost their minds", easily leads us to admit that we do have use for the subject, the self, the sense of unity and uniqueness. It is cruel and absurd to preach the death

[1] Barbara Duden can be seen as a hermeneutic historian in her attempt to create a dialogue with past in which the presence of the past and her own presence meet. Only through this process, states Duden, can she gradually begin to understand both past ways of thinking and the limits of her own thinking. This is a process in which not only the past changes from alien to understandable, but also the historian's own understanding changes. Duden writes that her method has been to search for "attitudes that are directed by practice" (Praxisleitende Vorstellungen) and that in order to find those she has been obliged to make use of "a hermeneutical help construct". Duden 1994, 162-163.

[2] Duden 1994, 159.

of the subject to those who "really" have lost their lust to live and their ability to sense themselves as "one". In order to achieve a theoretically honest and ethically sustainable position, we need to integrate ideas that seem to display all too crucial differences. A theoretical gap seems to exist between poststructuralist and hermeneutic approaches. The solution that I am offering is conscious and freely chosen "schizophrenia": I am willing to admit the unstable, fragile and culturally constructed nature of the self, while not denying the value of that "illusion" or construction of self both in everyday life and in the practical work of historical analysis. Simultaneously seeing and admitting the claims of both postmodern and hermeneutic body history, and also recognizing the theoretical gap between them, may mean living with a slight paradox. A gap which one is unable to bridge theoretically, one may nonetheless be able to live with while practising historical studies. I assume that is annoying but not fatal.

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# PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF EARLY MODERN WOMEN'S LIVES

Marjo Kaartinen

Avoiding anachronism is one of the major principles in history studies. Anachronism means assuming a thing, an idea, or a concept to be part of the past when it is in fact only part of our own culture. It is a major difficulty in the study of history that in most cases words are our only link to the past, since we mainly analyze written sources. Terms and concepts are historians' tools, and therefore always central for our studies. Words can also be our pitfalls. When we accept temporality as given, we accept chronology, and avoiding anachronism becomes essential. It should follow from this that the people who lived in a different time frame from ours must be given the possibility to speak with their own voices and concepts.

In the following I will discuss two concepts, *public* and *private*, as tools in the study of the premodern western world. That world was essentially gendered and patriarchal. My focus will be on studying gender, and more specifically women. The dichotomy of public and private is widely regarded as a part of our self-understanding and culture: they are among the concepts with which we read ourselves, our lives, and the world around us. It is commonly accepted that the heyday of the ideology of public and private was in the nineteenth century, in the birth of the

modern individual and the modern way of life.[1] This ideology was based on the patriarchal notion that women were subjected to men,[2] and it suggested a strict gendered division: men were of the public world, while women occupied the private.[3] In our culture this division has been so generally accepted that it occasionally escapes us that the division is cultural. The dichotomy between public and private is not essential to culture *per se*.

Most of us feel safe using the concepts of public and private because of their fundamental role in our own culture. This is not surprising. As Mary Ann Tétreault puts it, the dichotomy is protected by the family romance. What else could indeed be safer than the warmth of the ideal family? Behind family romance, however, lies a formidable ideology: patriarchy and the gendered distribution of power.[4] We readily accept that patriarchy is not a safe ideology. Even if not directly fighting against it, historians should at least be aware of the patriarchal structures of society in order to be able to understand the ways in which society is constructed. Therefore, I propose 1) that public and private are concepts of *our* culture, and should not be used as analytical tools when we explore premodern culture, and 2) that renouncing these two is a positive political act, speaking against the blind acceptance of patriarchal norms, as well as speaking for the feminist standpoint that both women and men of the past should be given an equal voice.

Both these propositions certainly require explanation. I will discuss the first one at length, and then return briefly to the second one, because I

[1] Habermas 1989 places the birth of the authentic public sphere in the eighteenth century. His analysis is notoriously insensitive to the issue of gender and leads into a view of the public which in practice excludes women from it completely. See Goodman 1992 for a very useful reading of Habermas. Lefebvre's space is more fluid than Habermas's sphere; ever since his revival especially in the Anglophone world after 1991 (when *The Production of Space* was first translated into English) Lefebvre's influence on conceptualizing space has been enormous.

[2] Davis 1975, 127; Mendelson 1985, 199-200; Mendelson 1987, 1-2; Amussen 198, 140-144; Orlin 1994, 98, 126.

[3] Massey 1994, 193. It can be seriously questioned whether the ideology was actually seen in everyday reality even in Victorian England. See for example Clark 1995, 27-28.

[4] Tétreault 1998, 90.

believe that the feminist standpoint will be self-explanatory once we have discussed the first proposition.

I do not claim that my first proposition is original, but for historians it is evidently still somewhat radical.[1] Several objections can be raised, and in the following I will explore my proposition by arguing, vaguely emulating the Renaissance fashion, against some viewpoints that might be presented against mine. The first objection is perhaps the most obvious, namely the argument that these terms, both public and private, were in use before the modern era. This is true, but it is of crucial importance to keep in mind that they were used in a different sense than we use them. To grossly simplify, in order to make my point clear, let me give an example. When we read *private* in early modern English letters we should usually read *secret*, and 'secret' certainly is different from 'private' in our minds. It is widely accepted by scholars that for early modern English people 'private' was not a positive concept in the way we perceive it; in fact it often indicated something illicit, especially illicit sexual acts.[2]

It can also be argued, of course, that we are entitled to make use of our own concepts when we analyze the past, or even that this is exactly what we must do, since they are all the concepts we have. Both these arguments are sound. Here we come to the point Eva Österberg makes regarding present-day concepts in the search for historical answers: that the modern concept can be a key to the past.[3] Indeed it can, and this is the only acceptable way we could use private and public: to analyze what these

[1] Numerous scholars have voiced their doubts about the validity of the terms especially if applied to premodern world. More than a decade ago Diane Willen wrote that "it is anachronistic to assume that women who acted solely within the context of household religion necessarily felt themselves oppressed or even relegated to a separate, private sphere. The very existence of two spheres, private and public, at least in the modern sense, remains problematic for Tudor and Stuart England." Willen 1989, 155-156. See also Willen 1988, passim. Lately the most influential historian to utter doubts has been Amanda Vickery who seriously questions the division and attests that the spheres of early modern women and men were multiple and overlapping. Vickery 1998, 9. See also Clark 1995, 2; Poole 1995, 1; cf. Amussen 1988, 68; Hanawalt 1998, 73; Jagodzinski 1999, 2-3, 13; Gowing 2000, passim.

[2] Gowing 2000, 134.

[3] Österberg 1997, 33.

concepts meant for (premodern) people. For instance, if we study suffragettes, to take an example from the modern period, it is natural that we analyze these terms from the suffragettes' point of view and attempt to interpret their fight against patriarchy, men's assumed hegemony over women. If the dichotomy was relevant to their fight, it is relevant for the researcher in her attempt to understand the objects of her study. But if the concept is not relevant, it is not the researcher's place to plant a new concept, or a new meaning to a concept in the past.

My point is that we do not always remember to first consider the sensibilities of the object of our study, but simply assume certain things from our present-day position. We assume that women occupied the private and men the public even though we know—and so many researchers have pointed this out—that there were no clear-cut distinctions in the distribution of space between men and women in the early modern period.

This trend is, luckily, turning. As a good example, political history—a discipline which is often considered conservative in its approaches to history —acknowledges the role of women in one world we would intuitively call public, that of politics.[1] This acknowledgement has come gradually, as political historians have reconsidered how politics should be defined. Women have been given a voice, and that voice, when it has been heard, has revealed a new kind of political world. If we accept others than men of the ruling elite as active agents in politics, there is not much we can do to keep women from stepping into the picture, even in premodern times.

Today it is clear to us that women were politically active and influential even before suffragism. The great revolutions of the eighteenth century, the American and the French, would have been significantly different without women's involvement. It is interesting to note that the propaganda arguing for the separation of women's and men's different spheres followed, not preceded, these revolutions that proved the power

[1] See Hunt in Kerber et al. 1989, 577; Mendelson & Crawford 1998, 13; Chalus 2000, 672-673, 691; Wilkinson 2000, passim.

and relevance of women in politics.[1] Without a doubt, the idealization of the family and the separation of men and women's spheres in the nineteenth century was at least partly a child of these revolutions.

This brings us to the second objection: the argument that it is not clear what we are talking about when we discuss public and private. Do we mean public and private spheres, the dichotomy against which the late eighteenth century bluestockings fought? Or, do we mean the gendered division of public and private space?

A clear distinction can be made between *spheres* and *space*: when we talk about separate spheres, imaginary or not, we are discussing an ideology, spoken for by both men and women when they wanted to keep society safe from change, and by men when they wanted to ensure there were spheres of life which only they could access. But we must also remember that this was an ideology not supported by everyone. Not everyone, even in the deeply patriarchal premodern society, was wholly in favor of patriarchy in its fullest sense, and there were men and especially women who attempted to stay free of its oppressions. I believe it has been clear for feminist historians for almost three decades that the ideology of separate spheres never took full root. It goes without saying that the division did not apply to early modern society, which would make it rather frustrating if one were to look for it.

This leaves us with the discussion of public and private *space*. It can be argued that there were some spaces which were private, and others that were public. This is true. My point is, however, to stress that this division is not very relevant to most cases in our discussion of premodern society. Homes, for example, were both private and public; they were always open for friends and meetings. They were also open to the eye of the society, be it neighbors or officials. It would be similarly difficult to define the nature of the multifaceted salons of seventeenth-century France or eighteenth-century England.[2] In our terms, they were private in the sense that not everyone was welcome, and yet they were public in the sense that their

[1] Landes 1988, 2; Goodman 1992, 15-16; Hunt 1992, 153-154; Kierner 1998, 101. See also Berlanstein 1997, 156-157, 170.
[2] Harth 1995, passim.

literary products were brought to public attention. Going much further would be futile.

I do not want to argue against common sense and insist that there was no gendered space in the early modern world. On the contrary, in order to fully understand the past in general, understanding the gendering of space is essential, and it is something we will need to study in more detail and extent. What I want to stress is that it is not very fruitful to analyze the privacy or publicity of, for example, men's clubs. It is much more important to explore questions such as why women were not allowed to join, or what the ideologies behind these exclusions were. Or, to take another example, it is much more relevant to analyze the political and cultural world of a political home like the Fox family's Holland House as such and include in the discussion both the women and men who spent time there, than to analyze whether the house was public or private during these political meetings. If women were excluded from some discussions, it is then relevant to ask why this was so, what they themselves thought of it and what this exclusion might tell us of premodern culture. This is the only way to get a grasp of the patriarchal ideology, and perhaps even the entire pattern of early modern culture.

Many readers may no doubt now be wondering if the phenomena discussed above were not something that we could better call semipublic, semiprivate, or meta-space;[1] this is the third objection. Since I find meta-space the best term for what is not solely private nor solely public but in between these two, I will use this term in the following, and ask whether we could talk of meta-space instead of attempting to give up the concepts of public and private altogether.

Let us take a closer look at the term. Meta-space would be, as said, a combination of public and private or, more importantly, it would lie somewhere between these two. Tétreault notes:

[1] Tétreault 1998, 85.

> Meta-space consists in all areas of human interaction where dimensions of private and public space intersect and overlap, erasing actual though not ideological boundaries that separate life into public and private spheres.[1]

When discussing the premodern world, I and many others cannot find areas of human interaction in which our 'private' and 'public' do not overlap. This means that the world, if we accept the division into private, public, and meta-space, would look like this:




If my suspicion proves to be justified, then all premodern life happened in meta-space. Even if we accept this description, does it really lead to anything? As a concept or a tool for research, meta-space offers no new illuminating revelations about the past, since it cannot problematize the lives and thoughts of people of the past. Moreover, if everything happens in the middle, does it not lose some of its fascination to us?

Space itself too, of course, is a term more of our time than of the past. I believe, however, that studying the spaces in which people lived in the past through their perception of place can provide us with relevant and new information about those people. Therefore, we should not ask if women could go into what we consider public spaces or walk on the streets (which they certainly did). It is much more interesting to ask what women did and where, and how they themselves defined those places. If they defined them as public, we have found a key to the past. But, more

[1] Tétreault 1998, 85.

importantly, it is now a key they have given us, not one that we have made.

For example, I have long been struggling with young Fanny Burney's negative attitudes toward public weddings; she found them detestable.[1] But what was it that she disliked? She does not elaborate on this, but assumes we will know. But *we*, being strangers to her world, do not know. What was the public she was talking about? Was it that the wedding was open to everyone to attend? Hardly. Was it that the wedding was announced so that a large crowd could attend? This is more likely, since she mentions "the frightful mob". Was it that public simply indicated a big wedding? I find this the most probable alternative. Burney would have preferred something with fewer people. If the reader is familiar with Fanny Burney's youth, she knows that she seemed to be rather shy of people but was nevertheless socially very active. Her public and her private are not very clear to us, and if we wanted to use the term meta-space here, we could say that Fanny Burney lived her life in meta-space. She was seldom alone, even in her home except for the moments when she wrote in her bedroom or read alone. Her bedroom she mentions as her private space. Yet again, what is important is not what was private or public or meta-space, but what Fanny Burney and other early modern people thought of the different places they lived in and how they used them.

The fourth objection to my proposition would have to be the question of power. It is, certainly, an often reiterated notion that when we talk about space, we are speaking about power. The Foucauldian notion of *exclusion* conveys the idea of power relations regarding space.[2] In practice, no space is uncontrolled. Therefore, my opponents might argue that public and private remain valid categories for research because these two have different power relations to the people who use the spaces. This I admit; as I pointed out earlier, it is feminist scholars who have most criticized the use of the public/private dichotomy in our discipline, and previously in other disciplines, because they wanted to question the assumed patriarchal power relations in the home and in the world. One

[1] Wednesday, July 20 1768 (Burney: Early Journals, 17-18).
[2] Foucault 1986, 26.

reason for this is that we should not accept the surface concept of power in the past in the first place.

When we take the concepts of power and public and private and mix them together, we can agree with Kilian, who notes that "publicity and privacy - - are expressions of power relationships in space, and hence both exist in every space".[1] The reader is no doubt now aware that in my opinion what exists in everything does not necessarily always allow us to problematize the past in the most fruitful terms, whereas variations in the phenomenon would. Ruptures certainly often give away more of the society. What actually follows from Kilian's idea is that we have to admit that there is no such thing as public and private, at least in the early modern period, not even in terms of power. Once again, we are on a ground that is constantly shifting, porous, and even dependent on an individual viewpoint. What was public and what was private in the premodern era eludes us because these categories do not constitute the specific past we would like to appropriate.

If we return to the question of *spheres*, I would like to maintain that the ideology of (the separate) public and private spheres is always a construct of power, and more specifically of hegemonic, patriarchal power. It is a long-standing cultural construct molded by the Church, by states, and by individuals who attributed power to men. As regards space, I believe that space is determined by each individual at each time she uses space. Therefore, instead of spheres, it is more fruitful to discuss spaces, which allow more variation in the question of power also. This would in effect make the discussion on power more revealing. And once again, when we study power relations—or anything else for that matter—in spatial terms, we should not define space before our analysis; characterization of the space should be the result of our scholarly exploration.

The fifth and final objection derives from the question of power, and the problem of exclusion and inclusion. Here I will use religious expression as my example. We can ask, with good reason, if premodern people who withdrew from the world to religion were actually occupying

[1] Kilian 1998, 115-116.

the most private of all imaginable spaces.[1] Could not in these cases the categories of public, private, and meta-space be valid? Let us take this under a closer examination and discuss cloistering women first. When we think of monks and nuns we think of meditation, inward thoughts and movement deeper and deeper into one's mind. Thus, for a devout woman, entering into a convent would mean that she wanted to completely renounce the world and give herself to God. Was this not what we would call a private act? The answer is No. On the contrary, this was, again in our terms, the most public act one could commit. To give up one's individuality for a religious community was a 'public' act, and so was living in that community. Even living in constant prayer should not be seen as 'private'. Communication with God was 'public' because with him one had no secrets—and all the nun's secrets had to be surrendered to her community as well.[2] The whole point of these religious institutions was to aspire to God together, working as individuals in a group toward a common goal. Ideally, nothing was private or secret just as nothing God or his messengers revealed to a mystic was for her ears alone.

Divine knowledge was meant to be shared and preached, not only with one's fellow-members in the religious community but with all Christians. Actually, there is not much in traditional Christian theology that supports individualism. Everything a Christian does, she does for others. If love is the key point of Christianity, selfishness is automatically out of the question. Christian ethics stressed nothing as much as the well-being of the community and the individual's duty to carry out her life so that she would benefit others, and serve the common good. Therefore, I believe that it took a long time for modern individualism to emerge: the slow process of secularization had to be under way before selfishness could actually become a virtue. This did not happen in the premodern era. Accepting the category of the 'private' thus now becomes even more difficult.

What then, for example, about women's religious self-expression during the seventeenth century? During this period there were perhaps more

[1] See Altman 1995.
[2] See Jagodzinski 1999, 13.

expectations than ever before that women marry, have children and be responsible for their early education. Women, it was hoped, would be good Christians and express an especially deep faith in God. All this they were to do in their homes. It has been stated over and over again that the ideal woman stayed at home and was seldom seen outside its protective walls. This was the ideal, but the practice, even for Puritan women, was of necessity very different. I find it an important lesson in history that we keep in mind that what was written about the ideal woman did not necessarily correspond with what women were, or even with what they were expected to be. Women had to move around and do things.

The seventeenth century is a time when we see some women withdrawing to solitude in order to seek God and mend their ways, and even write about their experiences. Religious expression could take many forms, and seeking solitude was one of them, though exceptional. The motive was similar to that of cloistering oneself: to distance oneself from worldly temptations.[1] It must be kept in mind that most early modern women were by our standards very devout, yet only a few resorted to extreme measures. One of those elite women who periodically sought solitude was Mary Rich, Countess of Warwick, who retired into seclusion after making a pact with God in exchange for her only son's life. But seclusion did not mean solitary confinement. Women such as the Countess of Warwick or the late medieval anchoresses were never completely secluded or away from people, but actually quite often their homes or dwellings were centers of great activity. Anchoresses often were spiritual leaders of their community—this is hardly what even we would call private. Mary Rich, too, although not an actual leader, had a large social circle to attend to, even in her seclusion. In her diary she occasionally complains that her social duties take her away from her duties toward God.[2]

That the Countess's religious expression largely resembles monastic religiousness is supported by the very fact that she kept a diary. In fact I

[1] This is why Lady Grace Mildmay chose not to attend court or leave her country manor. She was not sure of her willpower to resist temptations. See Warnicke 1989, 65.
[2] Mary Rich, Diary (BL, Additional MS 27351, f. 15).

find it quite significant that Protestant women in the seventeenth century resorted to devotional diaries. This was their way of expressing themselves with the community—not so much with God, because this is what they did in prayer. In their diaries and journals, they marked down their prayers, their discussions with their mentors, their visits to church, and other daily activities. It is well understood that early modern diaries, like letters, were not what we would call private;[1] they were, in some sense, always intended for other eyes. A mother would write for her children in reserve for the days when she would no longer be there to give them consolation and spiritual advice. Diaries gave women an opportunity to show their excellence, and religious excellence, of course, was a woman's most important and most suitable virtue, since it furthered all other womanly virtues. Their religion was not only to seek that what was inward, but there was always some kind of mission involved, within the family or even within a larger group of people. There were, of course, some religious groups, such as the Quakers, who allowed women to speak and preach in the congregation. Speaking to others meant sharing one's faith. As we see, what we would like to call 'privacy' is rather irrelevant regarding religious issues, too, and it should be seriously questioned whether it is at all relevant to call this kind of activity semipublic, public, or happening in meta-space, since from our standpoint, these boundaries are hazy and blurred.

Now that hopefully I have convinced the reader that public and private should be left out from most of our historical analyses, unless we study past people's conceptions of the very terms, it is time to return to my second proposition. I suggested that renouncing these two concepts was a positive political act, speaking against patriarchy and for the feminist standpoint that both women and men of the past should be given an equal voice. Why is this so? Because unquestioningly supporting the patriarchal notion of separate spheres and a gendered division of space, by reading these concepts into the past where they cannot explicitly be traced, works

[1] Angel Day, the famous author of a popular early modern letter-writing manual, divided letters into two categories, general (familiar) and special (required higher style). See Day 1586, 18-19.

against seeing women in the past as free agents.[1] What we should rather do, as historians, is to look beyond the standard beliefs of the time, although not ignoring them, and examine what individuals thought, what they did, and perhaps how they responded to the patriarchal message. We must see the sphere of opportunities that premodern women had, and not to expect too much of them, nor assume too little of their possibilities. Only then can we see the past with the colors it deserves and give the women we study a well earned opportunity to present us, their appreciating audience, their manifold ideas and the full spectrum of their lives.

[1] As feminist historians importantly note, no term should be taken as granted, and we should begin with the term gender. Mary Baker and Susan Pitt note that traditional feminist historiography was androcentric, and concentrated on showing how androcentric the past world was. Women and their actions were read through male ideals and male expectations which, not surprisingly, led into depressing results. But when gender is not accepted as an inherent structure but as a cultural category, it is possible to view premodern women's history with new eyes and challenge some concepts which have been taken for granted for too long. See Baker 1998, 373-375 and Pitt 1998, 379-398.

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# PASSIVE TO ACTIVE:
# THE LIVED SPACES OF A RELIGIOUS WOMAN

Maarit Leskelä-Kärki

The main character in this chapter is a Finnish woman, Aune Krohn (1881-1967), whose life was guided by deep religiousness. She is the key figure in my analysis of the meanings of women's religiousness in relation to their lived spaces and to the concepts of private and public.

Aune Krohn was the youngest daughter of the academic and literary Krohn family in Helsinki. Her father, Julius Krohn, was Professor of Finnish language, well-known folklorist, and poet, and one of the prime movers of the mid-nineteenth-century Finnish nationalist movement. She had two brothers, Kaarle and Ilmari Krohn, who both became professors, and two sisters, the writers Helmi Krohn-Setälä and Aino Kallas. Julius Krohn's accidental death in 1888 dramatically changed the family's life, and when Aune came of age she was ordered by her brother to stay home and take care of her mentally ill mother, Minna Krohn, who never recovered from her husband's death. Aune spent her years from nineteen to thirty-six nursing her mother in Helsinki. During these years, Aune experienced a religious awakening and took up various kinds of religious activities as a translator of religious texts, writer and teacher in religion. She also became active in religious organisations and did charity work. The years taking care of her mother were at times hard. Between her many duties, Aune suffered also herself from mental difficulties, and sometimes

loneliness and mother's illness were unbearable. Aune stayed couple of times in sanatoriums resting and taking care of her own health.

Aune's life took a second important turn when her mother died in 1917, and she could afford herself a house on the countryside with her close friend, Liisa Tarvo. The friends had met in the Young Women's Christian Association, where Liisa worked as a secretary for a while. Liisa had tuberculosis, which was one reason why Aune wanted to share her countryside home with her friend. Aune lived the rest of her life in this small house, "Toivola", in Hattula, Parola, in southern Finland. She continued to work as a writer, translator and speaker, and also took private pupils. Together the friends became a kind of centre of religious life in Hattula: during the 1920s and 1930s they organized Bible circles and discussion evenings, and gathered around them other women interested in discussing religion, Christianity, ethics and morals. They were active members of the parish. As a speaker Aune Krohn attended many organisations from early on, and gave speeches for example in the Young Women's Christian Association and the Young Student's Christian Association. In her private archives at the Finnish Literature Society, hundreds of these speeches are extant, together with her newspaper writings, articles and manuscripts, and her personal correspondence with her family. All this material reveals an active woman, with a strong calling in her life. She lived her life in privacy, however, preferring solitude and withdrawal—and this is the picture of her which has survived in the few memoirs written by members of her family, where she is only briefly mentioned[1]. She is portrayed as a withdrawn, lonely, depressed woman, whose life was full of disappointments. Her numerous activities have been ignored. This evident contradiction raises the questions addressed in this chapter: Why is a woman like Aune Krohn not seen as an active figure? Does religion not offer a place of emancipation and a wide field to work in?

This contrast in the life of Aune Krohn reveals religion as a fascinating area in analysing women's places and spaces, since it can be seen both as having diminished and expanded women's opportunities. Examining

[1] See Kallas 1947, 202-210; Setälä 1966, 175-176, 238-239, 311; Rekola 1997, 116.

religion reveals, how these categories of public and private have been shifting and changing. In the following, I will continue to address the theme concerning the concepts of private and public, but in contrast to Marjo Kaartinen's article, I will examine these categories in the modern era, at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time the public and the private were still defined as they had been during the nineteenth century, when the idea of separate, gendered spheres was most dominant. By the beginning of the twentieth century, women's spheres were actively widening in Finland, but the ideology of women's proper roles was still deeply rooted.[1] I intend to show how multiple women's spaces could nevertheless be, even within the patriarchal religious sphere. My aim is also to make some comparisons and reflections between the situation at the turn of the century and the research on premodern times.

I agree with Marjo Kaartinen in not taking the categories of private and public for granted; rather, I will ask how far they are valid categories when discussing the lives of religious women. Through an examination of the empirical material, I will suggest that religion offered various areas for women to act, both private and public—and often areas "somewhere in-between". I will not concentrate on the concepts as such, but use them as tools and ask what kind of meanings these different kinds of spaces offered for women themselves, and what it means to categorize individual lives under theoretical concepts like these. In this way, my chapter is almost a direct continuation of the previous one.

## Changing categories of private and public in the lives of religious women

Although, historically speaking, women have been excluded from much of the official life of the churches (for example, not being allowed to act as priests), they have been active participants in religious life in many other ways. Frequently, religion has proved one of the few channels where a

[1] For comparison, see Marjo Kaartinen's chapter in this book.

woman could be active and create her own identity outside the roles of wife and mother. Susan Hill Lindley has made an extensive historical overview of women's relationship with religion in America, and shows how women "stepped out of their places" both by acting as religious leaders or rebels against certain religious prohibitions, but also by staying in their roles as good wives and mothers and at the same time actively influencing their community's religious life.[1]

During the last twenty years, numerous studies concerning religious women in premodern times have been published. Making use of historical perspectives on gender and other social and cultural historical topics, everyday religious experiences, attitudes and practices of ordinary people have begun to be explored.[2] These studies have shown how medieval and early modern women implemented their religious thinking in their lives, for example as penitents or mystics. Such roles also offered women possibilities to participate in public life in various ways. Women's opportunities to play a significant role in religion widened especially from the twelfth to the fourteenth century.[3] For example, Maiju Lehmijoki-Gardner has shown in her dissertation how medieval Dominican Penitent women conducted their faith and spirituality not by withdrawing from the world to closed religious spaces such as convents, but within their ordinary lives. Through their active and public presence in the secular world, they were thus negotiating women's places in public sphere and ways of leading an active, spiritual life—although, as Lehmijoki-Gardner says: "Women's prayerful, inner spirituality was clearly easier to accept than their active and socially displayed piety."[4]

Research focusing on the modern era has seriously neglected analysis of the meanings of religion. The nineteenth century has predominantly been seen as a century of secularisation, and compared to other social movements

[1] Lindley 1996, x, and passim.

[2] Bynum 1984, 3-4; Coon et al. 1990, 3-4: Hall 1997, vii; Kaartinen 1999, 17; Lehmijoki-Gardner 1999, 17.

[3] Bynum 1987, 13.

[4] Lehmijoki-Gardner 1999, 15. However, it is important to remember Kaartinen's viewpoint, presented in the previous chapter, that entering a convent can be regarded as a highly public, not private, act.

and changes during that century, religion has been allocated to a conservative, passive, and invisible role. The process of emancipation has often been seen as emancipation from religion as well: the Swedish historian Inger Hammar notes that (feminist) research has been blind to religion, and that historians have tended to analyse texts and practices in a context lacking a theological and religious dimension. Hammar also points out that it is not enough merely to raise religion as a topic of research and acknowledge its meaning in the lives of women. She also demands a careful pondering of the contents, meanings and practices of religiousness. We should be able to answer what *kind* of religiousness was important in the lives of different women in different times, in order not to group all religious women under the same heading and same category. We also need to see the differences and hierarchies inside various religious practices.[1] Quite a similar viewpoint is argued in the book *Lived religion*, which stresses the analysis of religion as part of everyday life. It is crucial to take seriously people's everyday self-understanding and experiences. David Hall and Robert Orsi stress that we cannot begin analysis with concepts that are strictly formulated beforehand; we need to be open towards religiousness as it is formed and experienced in everyday life, within different practices and between people.[2]

Looking at the few studies which do examine religion as a part of women's lives during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, we can see that religion functioned both as a hindrance and as a stimulus for women's thinking and actions. We might ask if religion enjoyed a "boom" during the nineteenth century, or if women's religiousness rather tells more of continuity than rupture between premodern and modern times. Because of their role as mothers, women have fulfilled an important role in transmitting religious thinking and practices. Religiousness has also been one of the greatest virtues of women. It has been noted that during the nineteenth century the secularisation process mainly affected men, who participated in life outside the home and in the debate leading towards the modern world of urbanisation, capitalism and industrialism.

[1] Hammar 1999, 32-43; Hammar 2000, 58.
[2] Hall 1997, passim; Orsi 1997, 7-10 and 16-17.

In these discussions, religion was regarded as unimportant. But it remained at the centre of education in the home, especially for girls, who did not leave home for school but stayed with their mothers.[1] Therefore, in the nineteenth century, seeing religion as something private and passive (as in the accounts of Aune Krohn's life) contrasts to the male-constructed public sphere.

Religion thus maintained a strong hold on women within the privacy of the home. Yet at the same time, it also began to offer women opportunities to educate themselves and find work in society outside the home. In the Finnish Church, the office of deaconess was the first one to be open for women, and it came to provide an important option for many unmarried girls who wanted to devote their lives to helping others and working for God.[2] Similarly, the missionary movement began to offer work for women at the turn of the century.[3] Education of women in teacher training colleges was also largely guided by religious values. In the Nordic countries, women's philanthropic work was usually conducted under the Lutheran idea of calling, which offered clearly defined spheres for men and women to act in society. The most important role for women was as mothers inside the home, which was seen as the woman's place in the late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century "cult of domesticity". This has been a widely debated topic within feminist studies since the 1970s. It is notable, however, that this view of a woman's place in society also included the idea of extending the boundaries of the home and extending one's maternal role in society more widely, by helping the poor ones or by working in the missionary movement. Again we can see how the private and the domestic are complex concepts, and people's everyday life could

[1] Ollila 1998, 18-21.

[2] For more on deaconesses, see Lindley 1996, 128-134; Kauppinen-Perttula 1999, passim; Markkola 2000, 118-123.

[3] Kena 2000, passim; Seland 2000, passim. In the United States, women's active participation in the missionary movement, and the establishing of women's separate missionary organisations, already took place from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards. Lindley 1996, 70-90.

move beyond ideologies.[1] At the same time as religion offered the ideal of a good woman's (narrow) place in the society, it also gave women space to move and to expand their role in society. Religion also built hierarchies and maintained social differences between women. Inside the early women's movement, for instance, early activists, whose thinking was based on religious values and incorporated the traditional Lutheran idea of separate gender roles, met younger women who either rejected religious thinking or used religious ideas to legitimate their radical ideas on an active, powerful and visible role for women in society.[2]

## Life in private or public?

The life of Aune Krohn shows concretely how the very private and the very public are mixed, and how one can view the same life on the one hand as extremely private and solitary, and on the other hand as an active life full of participation in various public spaces. Because Aune's work took place in the sphere of religion, it has been more difficult to see her as an active woman. This has a significant context in the internal traditions of religious movements. When religious organisations and movements developed and became more organized and hierarchical, women were usually excluded from leading posts and visible activities; they thus remained invisible for researchers, too.[3]

Religion defined Aune Krohn's way of life, her closest relationships and her work. Even as a little girl, she was fascinated about religion; she took her inspiration from religious discussions with the family's cook in the kitchen, where they read Bible and sang hymns. Aune was raised like a girl from a typical Finnish educated and nationalist family of that time.

[1] See for example Lützen 2000, 150-153 and passim. For more on the Lutheran idea of calling, see Hammar 2000, 28-33.

[2] Hammar 2000, 53-55; Markkola 2000, 138-140.

[3] This process has taken place within different religious movements and in different historical times. See for example Bynum 1987, 17; Helander 1987, 30-31, 204-205; Sulkunen 1999, 92-97; Seland 2000, 82.

Religion was part of her upbringing, but, unlike many others, Aune was not able to learn religion from her mother Minna, due at least partly to her difficult relationship with her mother suffering from mental illness. Minna Krohn did not talk about her religiousness, although she did have intensive religious periods, and became acquainted with a woman from the Free Church movement. For Aune, therefore, religion was something to be found by oneself; it was a strong calling, which guided her whole life. In her older days she mentions that her religious awakening began during her twenties—the same period when her mother became ill and Aune started to take care of her. She went through a long time of religious searching, when she was influenced by Methodist and Lestadian gatherings, and listened to lay preachers. Aune mentions that she found what she was looking for outside the official Church and its preaching; yet later, her religious activities took place within the framework of the Lutheran parish. For Aune's religious orientation, social awakening was also important: she wanted to direct her skills towards helping other people and working for the common good—it was only fate (or coincidence) that she did not end up as a deaconess, but as her mother's companion. At the same time she started to earn her living with translations of religious books, writing poems and children's stories, and teaching religion.[1]

From her letters and other archive material, it is evident that Aune did not regard herself as an active, modern woman; rather, she had a sense of belonging somewhere else or in some other time than her sisters, who she regarded as beautiful, cosmopolitan "women of the world", capable of

[1] Aune Krohn discussed her religious awakening and its background in a few letters to her sister Aino in 1945—at a period when she maintained a very active correspondence with both of her sisters. Her friend and companion Liisa Tarvo had died in 1938, and Aune needed someone to open up to about her feelings, her sufferings, and her everyday life and its practical matters. These few letters are the only sources in which we can hear about Aune's religious awakening in her own words. They are, of course, the reminiscences of an old woman reflecting on her life and capturing her experiences in order to tell a story. Nevertheless, they are the only means for me to interpret Aune's religious choices. Aune Krohn's letters to Aino Kallas 18.11. 16.12. and 23.12.1945, FLS. For more about Aune's religious awakening, see Leskelä-Kärki 2001.

everything.[1] Her response to the emerging modern world was conservative, and she did not feel comfortable adjusting to the new ways of living, to the way young people behaved in the 1920s and so on. With her strong calling and the view of life acquired in her childhood home, she felt that she was alone. She also suffered from her own upper-class background because of her urge to help the unfortunate. Even when Aune was a girl she preferred quietness and the peace of nature—it looks as though religion was a kind of a runaway place for her from the world outside.[2] This aim she was able to fulfil when she bought her house in the countryside and could build a home suitable for her identity and live with a friend who had the same calling in her life. But again we can find a contrast: the women did not live in total seclusion, but gathered around them a circle of other religious women, organized gatherings, and Aune worked as a writer and speaker. It is possible to recognize ambition and even a will to power in the way in which she spoke about her work and its importance.

For Aune, religion meant an intellectual orientation. She dissociated herself from those revivalist movements which stressed emotional and sensual expression and lacked doctrine. In Aune's opinion they created conceptual confusion. She saw that women, especially, were easily led to this kind of religious practice, but her own perspective on religious life was different. From early on she studied Lutheran doctrine and theological texts, looking for a conceptual understanding of religion. Together with Liisa and the other women, they discussed religious questions and tried to educate themselves. Aune regarded religion as something that should give also women serious intellectual resources in their lives:

> I remember once when I told you I was reading Granfelt's Dogmatics. You were horrified, and asked whether I was required to read it. I laughed in my heart, because, of course, nobody had forced me to read it: on the contrary, the ministers were amazed at a layperson—and a woman at that!—who was reading dogmatic and academic texts. But I have had a

[1] Aune Krohn's letter to Helmi Krohn 11.9.1907, FLS.

[2] For the connection between religion and solitude, see for example Gilpin 2001.

> need for clarity of concepts, not just to be pious and have religious feelings.[1]

Part of Aune's religiousness was this on-going dialogue between emotion and intellect, which she constantly referred to in her writings and speeches, and also in her own way of life.

Historically, this distinction between emotion and intellect has been an important question in relation to religious experience. For example, in medieval times the most emotional, ecstatic and extreme religiousness was the most highly appreciated, and the ideal one should aim at. Some studies claim that extreme bodily and sensual behaviour connected with mysticism is more often found among women mystics.[2] However, premodern culture was sensual in all kinds of ways, not merely regarding religion—it was a particular way of positioning oneself in the culture. Thus religious expression was related to behaviour in the culture in general.[3] Ecstatic religiousness is also an important part of many later religious movements; for example, in Finland the revivalist movements started from an ecstatic experience by a young shepherd girl in a village in western Finland in the mid-eighteenth century. From the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries one can find many ecstatic women preachers, but gradually the official Church and the nationalist movement separated themselves from this uncontrollable religious behaviour. They had no sympathy with emotionally-based religious movements. The Lutheran religion and church became an integral part of the young nation, as it began to construct its identity under Russian rule.[4]

[1] Aune Krohn's letter to Aino Kallas 16.12.1945, FLS (translation Maarit Leskelä-Kärki).

[2] The particular characteristics of women's mystic bodily experiences have been debated extensively. See for example Bynum 1987, passim; Heinonen 1999, passim. The viewpoints may differ in some ways, but it is still possible to find continuities within this phenomenon.

[3] Thanks for this important comment to Anu Korhonen.

[4] Sulkunen 1999, 92-97 and 134-137. Religion played an important role in the lives of Finnish people well into the twentieth century. The functions of religion in most people's everyday lives can be regarded as relatively stable until the 1950s or 1960s. Thus the role of religion in Finnish society is of long duration.

Aune Krohn's religious background can be traced to this nationalist construction of religion, which aimed at the idea of educating the people towards good citizenship. One cornerstone of this citizenship was solid Lutheran religion. It is important to see Aune's religiousness and her work in this context. She was the daughter of a prominent and influential nationalist leader; her mother also worked for this ideology as a school mistress, writer of children's books and children's magazine. Aune's idea of helping the people from the lower classes, being of use in the society and preaching her beliefs was part of this nationalist and religious context. She responded in her own way to the questions of her own time, and saw that she had a task in society.

The meanings of private and public in Aune's religiousness are thus highly complex. It seems evident that for her religion was not an intimate, private concern. From a young girl, she wanted to find people to talk to about religion, and she felt very lonely and sometimes depressed in her childhood home, where nobody possessed such a strong belief and conviction as she did.[1] Aune found no soul mate in her family, and thus the friendship with Liisa Tarvo became very important for her. In a way Aune found her identity as religious woman when living with Liisa. An important part of Aune's religious values is conveyed in her public speeches and writings, which tell about the urge to testify about one's own beliefs. She wrote some religious books, and newspaper articles on various subjects: preaching, the meaning of suffering, mental illness, friendship, how one should confess God's word, and so on. It is clear that she wanted to exercise influence with her writing.

Yet her religiousness also needed privacy and solitude, where Aune could analyse things. It was sometimes perhaps a hiding-place from the world's cruelty and the loneliness from which she suffered especially after Liisa's death. At the same time, religion can also be seen as an area which

[1] This is interesting since all the Krohn sisters and brothers regarded religion as an important part of their life. Ilmari Krohn, for example, was deeply religious, and Helmi Krohn in her old age discovered spiritualism, to which she subsequently devoted her life, for example establishing the Finnish Spiritual Society. The different religious views of the various members of the family just do not seem to have met each other.

offered her ways to be active in different public spaces. Religiousness meant a public presence, playing an active role in organisations, taking a stand on matters in one's surroundings, and declaring one's own belief to a wider audience. Her most active years were between 1910 and 1938. The public for Aune usually meant women's meetings and gatherings, but she also had contacts with clergy, took part in some translation projects of theological texts, wrote for religious magazines and translated over a hundred books.

In Aune Krohn's life religiousness can be defined simultaneously as a private and individual and as a public and social matter. It cannot be said that Aune deliberately chose religiousness as a means to act in the society—it is hard to imagine that she would have aimed at an influential and visible role in the society. Nonetheless, social, and sometimes public activities became an important part of her religiousness. Her conviction urged her to take part, although it was difficult for her character. Thus we should not overestimate her public role: rather than public, Aune's religiousness could be interpreted as social.

It can also be questioned why public actions tend to be seen as active and emancipating, and privacy and passivity are regarded as linked together. What do we then refer to as public or private? Why is staying at home for example not seen as a possibility to build one's identity and to be an active part of one's own surroundings? And does not Aune's house, with its social gatherings, like many other houses of religious women before and after, represent something different from a closed and intimate place, and break the boundaries of our concepts?

## Emancipative religiousness?

After speculating about all this, would it be possible to view religion as an emancipating force, and see Aune as the active subject in her own life, who chose her way of living and her work consciously and saw value in it? I certainly want to answer yes to this question. But for a historian the answer is not that simple. We have to think over what it means to

interpret individuals in certain ways, and ask ourselves what kind of attitudes and presuppositions there are behind our interpretations. When we are analysing a life-story, we are at the same time constructing it. We can never reach the "true life-story" or the "true emotions and thinking" of our research subjects. The stories we come to tell are always partial, they recount one imaginable life-course, "one plausible version of what happened and what it meant".[1] Why then do I need to tell this particular story of Aune's life?

In the context of this chapter I understand emancipation differently than it is usually understood; or rather, I want to widen our understanding of this concept. It is fascinating to view Aune's life-story through this concept, since it had such a strong meaning at her time—and that did not refer to religion's role. Usually emancipation has referred to liberation from oppression. At the turn of the century it was mostly used to refer to the emancipation of the working class from capitalism, or women's emancipation process from patriarchal rule. For many, emancipation meant freedom of religion or liberation of thinking from religion's chains. Thus looking at a life of a religious woman at the beginning of the twentieth century through the concept of emancipation raises very different connotations. It urges one to ask how one could view religion as emancipative.

We cannot see Aune Krohn's life in the context of liberation from something, since her life-course was very much ordered from outside—by her brother, who ordered her to stay home, and by her economic situation, which in part forced her to search for translations and other work in order to make her living. She certainly did not herself think of herself as an emancipated, modern woman of the twentieth century. But from our point of view, there is a possibility to interpret her way of life and her choices as instances of emancipation—even if rather differently than her contemporaries did. She made individual choices, particularly after her mother's death, which were aimed at constructing her own subjectivity. She bought a house, fulfilled her dream of living in the

[1] Stanley 1992, 7.

countryside in peace and quiet with nature, started a life of her own with her friend, found meaningful work to do, and had a strong conviction to guide her life. She wanted to analyse theological questions and concepts, and to make an influence in society by telling about her beliefs; she saw herself as a learned woman holding the right convictions, although she sometimes felt incapable of pondering religious questions.

One can find many contradictions in Aune Krohn's life. On the one hand she was a shy, quiet and depressed woman, who lacked self-confidence and rhetorically denied herself and her ambitions. On the other hand we can see in her a woman with a strong belief and conviction, which urged her to write, speak in public and take part in public debate. Solitude and sociability, lack of confidence and will to influence—her life is constructed around these polarities, and this is why we cannot see her life under one heading or category. A similar conclusion should be made every time we try to write about past lives—there is never one truth to be found.

We could try to interpret Aune Krohn in the same way as the Finnish historian Juha Siltala has interpreted the nationalist (Fennomane) women of the late nineteenth century. They lived and worked with other people for the common good. Siltala argues that individuality and collectivity interacted fruitfully in their lives, and they lived their best moments when working for the common good together with others. Strong attachment to one idea, conviction and finding a connection to other women offered a possibility to build a new kind of identity.[1] This differs from the modern idea of an individual subject, usually referred to when discussing people living at the beginning of the twentieth century. Our postmodern understanding of individuality and our culture's high valuation of independent and autonomous subjects makes us perhaps incapable of fully understanding past women's (or men's) collective or social ways of life. We tend to speak in negative terms about dependency on intimate relationships, but the people who Siltala refers to found joy and comfort in relating themselves to others. Reading the past can thus give new

[1] Siltala 1996, 44.

perspectives on our values and attitudes, and give us tools to understand things differently.

Religion can be seen as emancipating for Aune in the sense that it offered her a means to construct her way of life and to find meaningful ways to act. Even though Aune distanced herself from the women's movement, one can find parallels when she talks about the importance of women's intellectual education or when she defends her right as a laywoman to read theological texts. Although she moved within the relatively limited area of religion, and never wanted to widen her sphere as a translator towards other kinds of literature, it is possible to see her as creating new ways and spaces to act. To find the histories of different women in the past we must be ready to see value and various aspects in this kind of life, too.

By interpreting Aune Krohn's life in terms of emancipation and looking at the different spaces she moved in, I want to see the life of a religious woman as full of possibilities, not only hindrances and boundaries. In this way, we can view the means religion offered for women to act in society—not to diminish their freedom, but rather to offer a rational, intellectual work and view of life; at least, this is what religion meant for Aune and her close women friends. We need to be sensitive to the meanings which women themselves have given to their faith and spirituality.

## Conclusion: Connections between religious women

How could we then see the religiousness of a woman from the modern era in relation to the tradition of women's religiousness, or compare it to that of premodern religious women? It is difficult to speak about tradition, which is typically understood to mean continuity and universality in religious experiences and actions. It is hard to find a valid answer to the question whether religion has been a place of emancipation for women in different historical times. Yet, there is reason to conclude that religion has been an important area for women to act and construct identities. At times when women's other possibilities to be active in society or to create

identities have been fewer, religion has played an important part. In medieval times there were various kinds of religious women, who conducted their spirituality in different ways: as beguines, penitents, mystics, nuns, ordinary religious women in the home, and so on.[1] Then, and also in the early modern period, religion was the central thing that constructed people's understanding of the world, of social relationships and personal happiness.[2] In modern times, from the eighteenth century onwards, women have been important in the revivalist movements, in doing charitable work or spreading the word of Christianity as missionaries. Religion offered for women for a long time an area to concentrate on spiritual and intellectual matters and to create identities. It has been a means to legitimate women's place in the society, but also a means to see things differently.

Religion's meanings in individual lives and the ways of being active in this area have always depended on specific historical and cultural situations. We can recognize some long-term cultural processes in the relationship between women and religion, but in order to make a deeper analysis and gain wider understanding on women's religiousness we need to take a closer look at the specific time and place where our research subjects lived.

In Aune Krohn's case, religiousness must be seen in context in order to see how it relates to the time and place she was living: to early twentieth-century Finnish nationalist culture, to Nordic Lutheran traditions, to women's widening opportunities in society. She was an upper-class woman, whose life was deeply connected to religion and who was able to fashion her identity and her life's work around her conviction. My duty as a researcher is also to understand and make understandable the personal, individual characteristics of her conviction. In this way I am also enabled to make the differences between women visible. Aune Krohn's life-story shows how a religious woman's life can be viewed as an active or even

[1] Bynum 1987, 23 and 26.

[2] Lehmijoki-Gardner 2000, 17. See also Davis 1997, where we can have a close look on how religion functioned in many roles in the lives of seventeenth-century women—in Jewish, Protestant and Catholic contexts.

emancipative one. My analysis shows contradictions in her views and behaviour, which also form an essential part of her religiousness. This complexity we do not need to diminish or undervalue, but rather, to try to show the whole picture—and be ready to leave open spaces in the life-story we tell, too.

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# QUESTIONING THE CATEGORIES OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC: SALONS IN NORDIC COUNTRIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Anne Ollila

The private/public dichotomy has offered a conceptual and theoretical framework for many historical studies. Consequently, we need to analyse how the division between private and public has been created in historical research, and how historians have reinforced the division with their work.

I agree with Marjo Kaartinen that the Habermasian idea of the authentic bourgeois public sphere has led many scholars to overestimate the private/public dichotomy.[1] The idea of the bourgeois public sphere and descriptions of the historical and social conditions necessary for the emergence of such a sphere have been very influential in historical and social studies. Yet these studies have mainly concentrated on a limited set of features of the bourgeois public sphere: scholars have investigated the history of the Press and of public space (coffee-houses, conversation clubs, associations etc.) and the way in which public communication has been constituted. They have thus analysed the most outstanding features of the bourgeois public sphere, but ignored semi-public or contradictory elements.

In my opinion, if we want to question and deconstruct the categories of private and public, we need to analyse multiple meanings of these categories: how this dichotomy has been invented, why it has been so significant in modern culture, why it has been reinforced in academic

[1] See Marjo Kaartinen's article in this book.

research and what inner contradictions it presents. This means that we need to historicize both the concepts of private and public as such, and the meaning allocated to them in modern academic theory. In this article I will analyse the categories of private and public as a part of modern thinking but will also outline a critical interpretation to the nineteenth-century salon system in the Nordic countries without making fixed presumptions concerning basic concepts.

## Substance of modern thinking

Modern thinking can be seen as heavily based on dualistic categories. It is typical of modern western thinking to make distinctions which emphasize binary contrasts. Although dualistic thinking can also be found at other times and in other cultures, nineteenth-century western society particularly emphasized models and ideas in which culture can be defined in terms of dualistic categories.[1]

It was crucial for modern thinking to stress gender difference. Consequently, much attention was paid to defining and inventing differences between men and women. Men and women were encouraged to live in separated spheres, and were expected to have complementary characters and duties.[2] The practice of gender difference was emphasized, created and supported by many social customs and rules, but the concept was also promoted by intellectuals who reinforced it through their writings and actions. An increased stress on dualistic gender difference might also be connected with the decline of society structured on rank; as the post-feudal estates diminished in significance, new hierarchies and power structures arose by strengthening gender differences.

Many intellectuals developed social theories based on the division between private and public. This division supported the idea of gender difference, because the sphere of home and the family (private) was considered the appropriate domain of women, whereas activities outside

[1] See Sahlins 1987, 143-145; Pulkkinen 1996.
[2] Nicholsson 1986, 43-45; Laqueur 1994, 17-21; Häggman 1994, 186-189.

the home relating to political or economic activity (public) were defined as the appropriate concern of men.

Nineteenth-century Finnish nationalism has been described as a Hegelian and Snellmanian project, but the consequences of this project have not yet been fully understood and analysed. Both G.F.W. Hegel and J.V. Snellman created social theories which strongly emphasized gender difference and separate spheres for men and women.[1] Snellman argued that men were hardened to ruthless competition and to dispute social questions but they would lose their peace of mind if they could not have a refuge at home with their wife.[2]

I think it is challenging to analyse Hegel's and Snellman's texts from the viewpoint that their texts are not 'objective' descriptions of nineteenth-century society and culture, but merely participant contributions to the social discourse which created and supported social and political power: they legitimated the prevailing power structures and men's leading position in society. According to this view, civil society was defined as a masculine domain.

One important part of the Hegelian and Snellmanian tradition was to interpret the nation as a social subject with a will of its own. The Hegelian and Snellmanian notion of the nation is problematic, since it is based on the presumption that a nation can have only one will and one voice.[3] This theory of the nation denies the possibility of social and political debate, and it also excludes other interpretations of society. Therefore, it has been a very powerful way to silence political discussion and to prevent certain groups from participating in political and social action. In nineteenth-century western society, women, workers and other marginalized groups were those who were denied political rights.

Modern thinking is strongly based on emphasising the dualistic character of gender difference, including political and social interpretations of citizenship as a masculine feature. Historians did not

[1] Hegel 1972; Snellman 1928-1931.
[2] Snellman, J.V.: Kootut teokset XI, 132.
[3] Pulkkinen 1996.

analyse or question the gender system of modern culture and modern thinking until the rise of women's history and gender studies.

There has been a strong tendency to study nineteenth-century society in the terms posed by the Hegelian and Snellmanian tradition, without acknowledging those phenomena which do not conform to this tradition. In addition, the private/public dichotomy has also been extrapolated to premodern eras, and they have been studied in terms of these dualistic categories. Historical studies have thus been strongly steered by a dualist framework in conceptualising and analysing both modern and premodern society.

My conclusion is that the strict division between private and public is highly problematic precisely because it is based on the presumption that culture can be defined and analysed by binary contrasts. Dualistic categories can be useful tools for research in sharpening theoretical concepts, but they can also be phenomenally misleading and analytically debilitating.

## Gender and salons

More recently, women's history and gender studies have emphasized that the division between private and public was less strict and distinct than has been previously thought. Many scholars have questioned the private/public dichotomy, since it takes for granted certain presumptions concerning gender difference and separate private and public spheres. Previous analyses and descriptions of this dichotomy have often tended to turn into normative accounts of how this dichotomy has affected the lives of women and men; new studies have emphasized that the division between private and public was fluid, and continuously re-shaping itself, through the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.

It is important to note the inner contradictions in the private/public dichotomy, and the ways in which people have challenged it at different times. One example can be found in the 'salon system' in Finland and other Nordic countries in the nineteenth century. Salons were important

social gatherings, and their character was highly public: middle-class people gathered together to be seen and to make a favourable impression. These social gatherings were ruled by established rituals and strict norms of behaviour, but these rules and norms could also be questioned and tested.

Educated women hosted literary and musical salons. Although these social gatherings took place in private homes, they were a step towards public life. The salons were semi-public, providing women with new opportunities for widening their sphere of activities.[1] Because the division between private and public is very complicated and open to various interpretations, the representative and semi-public character of salons gives good reasons for questioning the dichotomy.

The term 'salon' had multiple meanings. It could be simply defined as a drawing-room and a place for social gatherings. On the other hand, a salon was often connected with notions of social competence, evaluated by reference to taste, style and manners. As literature and music were usually discussed at these social gatherings, performance and judgement became an important mode of entertainment: piano playing and literary reading were followed by conversation.[2] Salons could also be linked with political activities; in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the authorities suspected French and German salons of political criticism and radicalism.[3] Consequently, in Finland people avoided using the term 'salon', since it might arouse suspicion among the Russian authorities; instead, the educated class invited guests to social gatherings which were called 'assemblée', 'soirée' or 'sällskap'.

It can be somewhat difficult to make a clear distinction between literary salons and other social gatherings. One crucial feature in literary and musical salons was that the programme for the evening was planned beforehand and gatherings took place on a certain day of a week. Careful planning demonstrated the semi-public character of these meetings.

[1] Nordisk salonkultur 1998; Holmquist 2000.
[2] Mäkeläinen 1972; Scott Sörensen 1998, 123-124, 129-131; Holmquist 2000, 19-21.
[3] Wilhelmy 1989, 38-39, 48-49, 63-64; Vincent-Buffault 1991, 113-115; Goodman1994, 5-6.

Salons were also criticized by some men, who were opposed to women's participation in public debate.[1] They argued that a good housewife and a mother should not be interested in salons, but should concentrate in housekeeping. This controversy is one example of how men and women disputed and defined their spheres: and despite the resultant disagreement over women's roles, a few men's hostile attitude could not prevent women from participating in salons. The most important Finnish literary salons at the end of the nineteenth century were hosted by two women: the author Minna Canth in Kuopio, and Elisabet Järnefelt's famous literary club in Helsinki.

Although the salon system in Finland and in other Nordic countries did not reach such a large scale as in France or Germany, it bore resemblances to salons in Paris or Berlin, even if it lacked their style and elegance. A salon was a place where men and women could meet, discuss and train their social and artistic skills. The Danish historian, Anne Scott Sörensen, has argued that in the Nordic countries the literary salons of outstanding men have become a myth which has been looked back upon with nostalgia,[2] but women's participation and central role in the salons has not previously attracted serious attention. It seems, however, that salons were more important for women than for men—as Swedish historians have put it: the family was too limited for women, but the public sphere was too large for them.[3] Thus the semi-public character of salons offered women an appropriate forum; but this also reveals that salons had different significance for women and for men; for women it was a place which opened new opportunities (as some men also noticed, when they tried to prevent women from participating). On the other hand, salons were not merely places for arguing about women's roles; they also offered a place for fun and flirting. Both men and women enjoyed lively discussions and artistic entertainment, as well as each other's company.

I would argue that the most important ignored feature of the salon system was the fact that there was not merely one single type of salon, but

[1] Häggman 1994, 185; Kindstedt 1999, 316.
[2] Scott Sörensen 1998, 121.
[3] Mansén 1998, 383; Holmquist 2000, 188.

several different kinds, which displayed certain similarities, but also fulfilled different functions. It would be misleading to try to construct a single typification of a salon; rather, a historical analysis of the salon system needs to avoid simplification of the phenomenon, and aim to emphasize and analyse its multiple features.

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# FINAL COMMENTS: RECODING CULTURE

Kirsi Tuohela & Anu Korhonen

When we set out to write this book, we intended to discuss periodization, chronology and the different ways of motivating and understanding crucial turning points in the past. Our project was also to create an arena where we could negotiate some of the principal analytical tools and concepts, and methodological practices, of cultural history. Although our intentions were not modest to begin with, the book became a process that offered more than we expected. Writing and discussing it enriched our thinking, and where we thought we would find boundaries, we found possibilities. We set out with personal fields of interest, and allocated concepts to be dealt with, but could not keep our fingers off each others' portions. In the end, we feel the same themes entered into all of the chapters, with slightly different emphases and viewpoints, but with the same enthusiasm.

But why did we become so engrossed with our concepts and themes? We feel it testifies to the unity of our particular field of historical study. Cultural history has its own bag of tricks, of practices and ways of looking at things, so naturally cultural historians have much to say to each other. Historicizing, as a term that draws attention to the fact that we are working with time, but also as an analytical demand and a proposed method, was among these practices. Every writer of this book has done her best to present a carefully considered version of how to understand it. There is nothing new, of course, in a book on historical methods, to insist

that history means studying temporal phenomena. However, we feel that the idea of historicizing deals with time in a fresh way.

The second theme traditionally mentioned while defining cultural history is of course culture. We thought going over that territory again would be futile, and quietly meant to leave out yet another definition. But, in fact, the question of what culture means as a field of study, analytical concept, and explanatory force emphatically came to lie in our focus. How does it relate to the singular lives and efforts of the people of the past? What is it that the individuals are embedded in? It is of course in empirical research, in following the lead of our sources, that this question can be answered most fully, yet what emerges in this book is a view into culture as the plural, fragmentary, layered and often contradictory network of meanings by which we live. It is a totality, but a totality filled with discrepancy. It is a web, and like a web it has a lot of holes in it. It is in the nature of culture to be constructed and experienced, discursive and lived, collectively shared and changing in time. In the following, we want to take a last look at some of the themes that stand out in our book. These, we feel, are elements through which culture is indeed lived and understood—and studied.

## On gender

One of the most basic cultural practices is creating difference, and more specifically, giving meaning to sex difference. Our book includes an emphatic notion of gender, but not as an homogeneous tool or programme. Instead, we present different varieties and aspects of gender analysis. Some of us have based their argument on empirical material produced by men and focus on men as their topic (Liisa Lagerstam, Hanne Koivisto and Riitta Laitinen), whereas others refer to material written mainly by women and also concentrate on explaining women's experience (Maarit Leskelä-Kärki and Kirsi Tuohela). The nature of the source material affects the questions we can ask, but gender analysis is not dependent on the sex of the producer of the material. It is important to

stress that gender is not only a question of sources, but an analytical viewpoint and a cultural stance, and that it involves both theory and praxis.

The writers have also wanted to stress that gendered practices and gender history are not the domain of women. We can be of either sex, and still be interested in gender—and in studying either or any gender. So, when we talk about men, we mean men and not people. 'Man' is not the universal yardstick any more than 'woman' is, but we also need to study both sexes. We are aware that the interpretations of individuality would be different if Gabriel Kurck was called Gabriella, or if instead of Raoul Palmgren one had chosen a female intellectual—if indeed one would then choose an intellectual at all. Still, being aware of gender must not limit our choice of subject.

The construction of gender can be an intricate question in many ways. Not only must we talk about who wrote our sources and whom these narratives represent, but also reflect on the culture that produced the producers of the texts and what their discursive practices allowed or enabled them to see. For example, as postmodern scholars we can be aware of Navajo culture as a matrilinear society where women had a strong role, but need to read nineteenth-century sources produced by men from a different culture, whose gaze did not and could not comprehend women as political agents. The Navajo chief, then, is a good example of the layered process of both producing and interpreting gender. The gendered nature not only of subjects and agents, but also of concepts and practices is found across cultural and period boundaries. Gender seems to be one of the most fruitful areas to apply Eva Österberg's idea of the cross-fertilization of concepts.

Despite the slightly different ways of analysing gender we share its basic premises. We may have different ideas of how to use concepts like 'patriarchy' and 'emancipation', 'feminine' and 'masculine', but we all consider gender to be a crucially important cultural construction, different in different times and places. We are sceptical of universalizing and essentializing formulations of the gender system, and want to stress the importance of the particular historical situation which we strive to

understand. Still, it seems we are agreed that gender is indeed a cultural master category: there are no gender-neutral cultural sectors or periods. It can be found and analysed everywhere people meet and organize themselves, negotiate material and immaterial goods, order space and inhabit it, and create sentences and meanings in order to make the world comprehensible to themselves.

## On cultural construction

Gender as a cultural construction suggests the idea that relationships between sexes are created and enforced in symbolic structures as well as everyday practices. The same, however, can be said of other symbolic systems and practices. Perceptions of the body, experiences of illness and emotion, ideas of privacy and the public sphere, definitions of individual virtues and social goals are all culturally constructed as well. And while being constructed and appropriated, they change. As historians, we need to stress the element of change in these relationships, and approach their otherness in other cultures with care. We need to avoid reductive readings of the past, especially when it comes to categories we easily feel are "natural" or universal, like those of 'woman' and 'man'. In fact, we need to engage with, even clash with, the otherness of the past and let it undermine our own conceptions. We must fasten our inquisitive gaze on the way in which knowledge of "natural" sexual difference, or "natural" spatial division, or "natural" bodily experience, has been produced and established, and indeed believed to be "the truth", in various historical situations.

When studying cultural difference and approaching cultural construction, it is more than necessary, however, to keep level-headed about historiographical fashions. We do not subscribe to pure poststructuralist thinking and assume that there is nothing to be found but representations and discursive practices. Nor do we embrace the pure constructionist approaches where individuals are wholly pliable and created only by their culture. For us, the past includes real people who

worked and relaxed, inhabited places and encountered each other, experienced loss and joy. This fact makes history all the more exciting, and also theoretically challenging. At the symposium where this book started, over the coffee table, Maarit Leskelä-Kärki asked Eva Österberg whether she thought we were approaching another "turn" and if so, what it might be. Eva did not hesitate for very long, but suggested we were entering an ethical turn. We wonder if our inclination to emphasize the flesh and blood of the people of the past, to imagine them as living and breathing, is indeed part of this turn. Although we are aware of the theoretical complexities of entering into dialogue with the past, it is about time to stop reducing people to texts.

Whether it is the teachings of the "linguistic turn" or our experience of working with past sources, we have been made aware of language, meanings, narratives, and symbolic structures which constitute our own culture, as well as the other cultures we are studying. This leaves us no turning back to unreflective acceptance and unproblematic application of the tools and concepts we use. Still, we seek to emphasize agency and the possibility of saying something about the "reality" of the past, even if it is known to us only in a mediated form. As Kathleen Canning has asked us to do, we might raise the question of whether discourses can figure as anything but fixed hegemonic systems, if we do not take into account the interventions of agents who render them contingent and permeable.[1] When we look at culture as a web of meaning, we also need to think about the subjective agents who use and create those meanings.

## On difference

Historical studies may concentrate on continuity and the *longue durée*, or they may emphasize the particularity of a given moment, but they always have to face discontinuity and change, too. In order to answer any question concerning the past, the historian has to have an eye for seeking

[1] Canning 1994, 377.

and recognizing difference. The difference we began with was the one between the premodern and the modern. Chronologies can of course be discussed endlessly, and without ever reaching agreement on where the proper turning points between periods can be found. We can even doubt if chronological terms are diachronic at all, but rather simply synchronic constructs, as Joan W. Scott has suggested.[1] Whether we want to apply Scott's version of radical discontinuity or a more tempered approach of situating gaps and ruptures, we nevertheless need to aim at "getting the joke",[2] recognizing the specificity of past modes of thought and deed. Only by recognizing difference can we enter into dialogue with and follow past thinking.

Facing otherness or analysing difference need not be dichotomizing, and this is indeed one of the basic points made in this book. Seeing oppositional structures and using polarizing concepts may be a useful starting point in historical research, but once we start looking at the past in any detail, those initial propositions become more or less meaningless. This process is evident in most chapters of our book, and it is indeed ingrained in the culture we are studying as well. Difference between the sexes is created and enforced all the time, and terms like 'private' and 'public' are used to distinguish between places as well as actions. Reason is separated from emotion, and the lived told apart from the written. The individual is conceptualized in relation to community, society, other individuals, God or her own "inner essence", because people need to categorize and name aspects of their lives in order to make them understandable and communicable. What we as historians need to do is to look carefully at these practices of differentiating and conceptualizing, and also suggest ways in which they differ from something earlier, or something that came after, or something that is ours.

Difference as a historian's tool implies something quite practical when applied to our everyday practice of reading sources. It can however be argued that difference also has a more complex meaning in historical studies. The past is undoubtedly foreign to us, and writing history can be

[1] Scott 2001.
[2] The metaphor derives from Darnton 1991, 82.

seen as a practice of producing knowledge of difference. We create others as much as we encounter, interpret and give voice to them. We choose who we encounter and what words we mediate as their voices.

The past is therefore partly our own creation. Again, there is nothing particularly new in this idea. What historians have not paid enough attention to, however, is the way in which we encounter the other and produce knowledge of the other. Even poststructuralist historians, who stress the historicity and specific cultural context of their subject matter and purport to avoid all universal theories, may have a tendency to ignore this question. We find it important to see the object and subject of our study, the people in the past, as strangers whose difference implies its own rationality. Although we produce knowledge about them and even think we can gradually grow to understand their ideas, choices and practices, we do not set out to conquer their foreign world. A lot of it remains unknown when we step out of the dialogue. We cannot know all about them, and should not pretend to do so. For us, the past is not a foreign continent to be totally mapped, conquered and colonized with the arms of knowledge. Something, however, we can know, and every encounter that makes the past a bit more familiar is a cause of joy. History, after all, is not about easy familiarity, but about pleasurable encounters.

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