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# Love Thy (Elected) Neighbor? Residential Segregation, Political Representation and Local Public Goods

Oskari Harjunen, Tuukka Saarimaa and Janne Tukiainen

## Abstract

We study geographic political representation and geographic distribution of local public goods *within* local jurisdictions with at-large proportional representation elections. We use detailed geo-coded data on politicians, the electorate and elementary schools. Descriptive analysis reveals that poorer neighborhoods are under-represented and that local politicians have a strong support base in their home neighbourhoods. Based on randomized election outcomes due to personal vote count ties, geographic representation has a causal effect on school closures. The probability of closure is cut in half when a candidate living close to the school is randomly elected. High-income residents react to closures by moving away from the neighborhood, thus reinforcing segregation.

**Keywords:** Geographic representation, random elections, residential segregation, school closure.

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Replication files are available in the JOP Dataverse (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop>). The empirical analysis has been successfully replicated by the JOP replication analyst. Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

There is a growing body of evidence showing the importance of neighborhood context in shaping the long run life outcomes of residents (see e.g. Damm and Dustmann 2014, Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016, (Chetty and Hendren 2018, Chyn 2018, Chyn and Haggag 2019 and Laliberté 2021)). By residing in a particular neighborhood, people are exposed not only to particular types of neighbors, but also to a particular set of local public goods they are able to consume. Thus, the political decisions of where to locate public goods are crucially important in shaping the contextual environment of residents of different neighborhoods. If public goods are not provided equally to all neighborhoods, we should ask why this is so, and in particular, how residential segregation and local political forces are intertwined in shaping this inequality.

This paper concentrates on the political underpinnings of the provision of local public goods across neighborhoods. More precisely, we study the link between geographic political representation and geographic distribution of public goods *within* local jurisdictions using Finnish data spanning three municipal council terms from 2005 to 2017. The analysis is facilitated by detailed geo-coded data on the residential location of all municipal election candidates, the electorate and the location of local public goods. The electoral context for our analysis is an at-large open-list proportional representation (PR) system.<sup>1</sup> As opposed to a ward system, when the elections are held at-large voters can vote for any candidate in the municipality, and thus, there is no guarantee that all neighborhoods are equally represented or that politicians have incentives to cater to local voters.

We start our analysis by describing the geographic representativeness of municipal councils by comparing the residential distribution of local politicians and the electorate across small neighborhoods. This descriptive analysis reveals that neighborhoods with poorer and less-educated electorates are under-represented relative to their share of municipal population, both at the extensive and intensive margins. We also document that candidates get systematically more votes from the polling districts they themselves live in compared to other polling districts and that the additional amount of votes increases with the length of the candidates' residential spell in the district and with incumbency status.<sup>2</sup> This means that local politicians have a strong local support base, which may

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<sup>1</sup>According to the Database of Political Institutions (Scartascini, Cruz, and Keefer 2018), 94 out of 147 democracies employ PR, and about fourth of these use open-list procedures.

<sup>2</sup>Municipalities are divided into polling districts. The polling districts are only used to allocate voters to polling stations and for vote counting purposes.

incentivize them to cater to voters in their neighborhoods even though the elections are held at-large.

In the second part of the analysis, we ask whether the unequal geographic representation that we document translates into unequal geographic distribution of local public goods. We focus our analysis on closures of elementary schools as they have a well-defined geographic location and are a prime example of a local service where proximity is an important factor as young children need to attend the school on a daily basis. Moreover, the number of elementary schools in Finland diminished by a third during the time period of our analysis providing us with spatial and temporal variation in local service availability.<sup>3</sup> To make sure we can interpret our results as causal, we use election outcomes decided by a lottery, which takes place when there is a tie in personal votes within a party for the last seat of the party list. We find that randomly increasing the representation of a local school in the municipal council, which makes decisions on school closures, decreases the probability of school closure during the election term. The effect is large as in our lottery sample the probability of closing down a school during the election term roughly halves from about 20% to 10% when a candidate close to the school is randomly elected (as opposed to a candidate from the same party near another school). We also show that the effect does not depend on whether the candidates themselves have school-aged children suggesting that political motives, rather than their personal needs, are at play.

Finally, we examine what happens to the neighborhoods when a local school is closed. Using difference-in-differences (DID) methods, we find evidence of neighborhood re-sorting. High-income residents of the neighborhoods experiencing a closure of a relatively large school "vote with their feet" by moving away from these neighborhoods, thus reinforcing residential segregation.

We contribute to several strands of literature both in economics and political science. First, we examine political representation and its effects from a new angle of geographic representation at a very local level.<sup>4</sup> This is important not only because of the possible

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<sup>3</sup>Similar waves of school closures have taken place, for example, across the US (Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021), Denmark (Beuchert et al. 2018), the Netherlands (De Haan, Leuven, and Oosterbeek 2016) and Sweden (Taghizadeh 2020).

<sup>4</sup>A large body of empirical work has established a causal link between legislative representation of various groups and policies preferred by those groups (see e.g. Pande 2003 on minorities, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 on gender or Hyytinen et al. 2018a on occupational background.)

effects on the distribution of public goods and funds more generally, but also because interacting with one’s neighbors may affect politicians’ beliefs and preferences. To the extent that politicians are exposed to systematically more affluent and educated neighbors than the electorate in general as we document, their perceptions about public opinion may be biased (e.g. Broockman and Skovron 2018 and Enos 2017). Descriptive evidence on the within-jurisdiction geographic representation is still very limited as most candidate-level datasets analyzed in the literature lack the geographic detail of our data.

Our results are also consistent with the idea of friends-and-neighbors voting. Politicians have a core support base in their neighborhood and long-standing neighborhood ties are important for cultivating personal votes, for example, because social interactions facilitate information flows and accountability. We document this phenomenon in elections held at-large where voters can cast votes to individual candidates to express their preferences for locals due to open-lists (see also Carey and Shugart 1995, Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005, Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2016 and Campbell et al. 2019).

Second, our results contribute to the literature on distributive politics. Several studies show convincingly that representation in a legislative body matters for the geographic distribution of centralized spending (e.g., Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002, Knight 2008, Dragu and Rodden 2011, Brollo and Nannicini 2012 and Fiva and Halse 2016). However, as these studies focus on national or regional level spending, we still have an incomplete understanding of how distributive politics operate within local jurisdictions. This is a major gap in our knowledge as many important tasks have been delegated to local governments worldwide.<sup>5</sup> For example in Finland, municipalities are responsible for elementary schooling, primary health care, land use and zoning policies, public transportation and other such policies that influence the daily lives of the citizens. To our knowledge, we are the first to identify a causal link running from geographic representation to policy outcomes within local jurisdictions. I.e., we show that the residential location of politicians affects the location of local public goods.<sup>6</sup> Taken as a whole, our

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<sup>5</sup>Cox (2009) highlights this mismatch between theoretical (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996) and empirical work on distributive politics. Specifically, district level studies are not informative about how resources are distributed across different groups of voters.

<sup>6</sup>The contemporaneously written study by Folke et al. (2021) shows using Swedish data that given the overall level of representation in a neighborhood, those neighborhoods with more representation from the majority bloc have fewer building permits for multifamily homes approved, and fewer proposals to

findings suggest that the models of distributive politics are relevant also at the very local level.

Furthermore, prior research on geographic representation and spending mostly concerns ward-based systems where politicians have obvious electoral incentives to cater to their local ward. It is less clear that these incentives exist in at-large PR systems (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995, Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina 2008, Trounstine 2010 and Abott and Magazinnik 2020). Our results indicate that also in at-large election systems with personal votes, such as the Finnish open-list PR system, geographic representation and public good provision can be linked.

Finally, our results speak to the literature on residential sorting and neighborhood effects. Recently this literature has focused on how a neighborhood’s private amenities respond endogenously to its socio-economic makeup and how this reinforces residential sorting (e.g., Couture and Handbury 2020, Couture et al. 2020 and Su 2021). We highlight how residential sorting together with the local political system leads to inequality in representation and in publicly provided amenities across neighborhoods (see also Trounstine 2016 and Trounstine 2018) and how this may also reinforce residential sorting. Moreover, the link between residential segregation and the provision and quality of public goods across neighborhoods may be an important mechanism behind neighborhood effects, as suggested recently by Fogli and Guerrieri (2019) and Laliberté (2021).

## INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

**Finnish municipalities.** Finland has a two-tier system of government consisting of the central government and municipalities.<sup>7</sup> Municipalities have a large number of tasks. In addition to elementary schools, they are responsible for providing health and social care and other local public goods, such as public transportation and waste management. Municipalities collect roughly one third of total annual tax revenue collected in Finland.

The most important revenue source is the flat municipal income tax which the municipalities close schools made. Beach et al. (2019) and Carozzi and Repetto (2019) are also closely related as they analyze local level close elections in the US and Spain, respectively. However, neither of these studies use information on the residential location of the politicians themselves, and thus, do not link geographic representation and policy outcomes as we do.

<sup>7</sup>In 2022, a major reform introduced a third middle tier. This section describes the system during our analysis period.

palties can set freely. There is also a property tax, but importantly property tax revenue is not ear-marked for financing schools or in other ways to benefit the neighborhoods from which the taxes are collected, as is the case with US school districts. A central government grant system, consisting of 20% of total revenue, is used to equalize local cost and revenue disparities.

Municipal councils are the main seat of power in the municipal decision-making and the councils make the decisions on school closures. No official ruling coalition government is formed after the elections and councils decide by majority vote on an issue by issue basis. Municipal elections are held simultaneously in all municipalities and they do not coincide with national elections. The council term lasts for four years. Our data span three council terms: 2005-2008 (elections held in October 2004), 2009-2012 (elections held in October 2008) and 2013-2017 (elections held in October 2012).<sup>8</sup> During our analysis period, the council size was a step function of population and varied between 13 and 85, the median being 27. At the same time, median municipality size was 7262 and ranged from 773 to 603,968. Each municipality has a single electoral district and no geographic quotas are in place. As an example, in the 2008 municipal elections, the overall turnout was 61.2%, there were in total 38,509 candidates and 10,412 were elected.

Councilors are "leisure" politicians who receive small meeting fees while holding regular jobs. There is no evidence of large monetary gains from holding local office (Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö 2017) nor of incumbency advantage (Hyytinen et al. 2018b). Personal campaigning expenses are quite small. For example, in the 2017 elections, the total reported campaigning spending was 6.7 million euros (VTV 2017).<sup>9</sup> Despite the small personal monetary stakes for the politicians, these are high-visibility elections that concern positions of power over important policies.

The seat allocation is based on proportional representation (PR), using the open-list D'Hondt election rule. The elections are held at-large so that voters can vote for any candidate in the municipality. In the elections, each voter casts a single vote to a single individual candidate and they cannot vote for a party without specifying a candidate.

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<sup>8</sup>From 2017 onward the start of council term was moved forward from January to June. The 2017 elections were held in April 2017.

<sup>9</sup>The 2017 elections are the oldest elections for which the personal campaigning expenses are available online. Only councilors and vice-councilors have to report their campaigning expenses and expenses smaller than 800 euros need not be reported.

Moreover, the list order in the ballot is alphabetical so parties cannot use list order to signal their preferences. These rules mean that voters (as opposed to parties) decide which candidates are eventually elected from a given list, because the number of votes that a candidate gets determines the candidate's rank on her party's list. The total number of votes over the candidates of a given party list determines the votes for each party and this determines how many seats each party gets.

An important feature of this election system is that in many cases, there is an exact tie in the number of votes at the margin where the last available seat (or seats) for a given party list is allocated. For example, it is possible that a party gets  $k$  seats in the council and that the  $k^{th}$  and  $(k + 1)^{th}$  ranked candidates of the party receive exactly the same number of votes. The Finnish law dictates that in this case, the winner of the marginal seat has to be decided randomly. Typically, the seat is allocated by drawing a ticket (name) from a hat. We make use of these randomly decided election outcomes in our empirical analysis.<sup>10</sup>

**Elementary school system.** Municipalities are responsible for elementary education, which consists of a nine-year compulsory school starting in the year the child turns seven. Almost all elementary schools are public schools and they are free of charge. In most municipalities, school intake is catchment area based so that each address in a municipality is assigned to a catchment area of at least one school and children living within the catchment area of a particular school are guaranteed a place in that school. With this institutional setup, most children attend the school closest to where they live.

The number of elementary schools has declined and their mean size has increased substantially in Finland during the time period of our analysis as can be seen from the left panel of Figure A1 in the Online Appendix. The closures are related to declining enrollment, mostly due to migration from rural to urban areas. The migration has been driven especially by younger households so that the number of school-aged children has declined in many municipalities and remote neighborhoods. At the same time, school closures have taken place all over Finland as is evident from the right panel of Figure A1 in the Online Appendix. In more urban areas, school closures have taken place in search for economies of scale. A more detailed description of the school closure process is presented in the Online Appendix.

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<sup>10</sup>See Hyttinen et al. (2018b) for more details.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In this section, we consider theoretical arguments related to how geographic representation works in our electoral context of open-list PR at-large elections. We also consider how this system together with residential segregation is likely to allocate local public goods across neighborhoods and how changes in this allocation feed back to segregation patterns. These theoretical considerations are made in a context where perhaps the most important decisions that local politicians make are related to the question of *where* to locate local public goods (or bads). These are questions like, where to allow new housing construction to take place, which schools to close or which schools to give more resources to, what bus routes to maintain or where to open a new one.

The ideal of an at-large system is that representatives serve the interests of the whole jurisdiction instead of particular areas or neighborhoods within the jurisdiction. It has been acknowledged, however, that in reality this is typically not the case. Prior research has shown that people with higher incomes and education are more likely to participate in politics (e.g. Dal Bó et al. 2017 and Hall and Yoder 2022). Thus, to the extent that there is residential segregation within cities, we would expect that neighborhoods with higher incomes and education levels have more council members living in them. It has also been acknowledged that elected officials are most responsive to voters who turn out more, often socio-economically advantaged voters (e.g. Lahtinen et al. 2019 and Lindgren, Oskarsson, and Persson 2019). This responsiveness implies that socio-economically advantaged neighborhoods receive more public funds and better services. Thus, a link between neighborhood representation and the service level in the neighborhood can arise in at-large systems even without explicit geographic targeting of public funds.

It can be argued further that in at-large elections with personal votes, representatives may also have effective geographic constituencies in the following sense: they receive more voter support from their home neighborhoods compared to other neighborhoods with similar voter characteristics, and in turn make decisions in office that disproportionately benefit their neighbors. There are many reasons why this might happen.

The first reason is that politicians have a personal stake in providing and maintaining the quality of local services in their home neighborhoods as they themselves consume these services as citizen-candidates (Osborne and Slivinski 1996 and Besley and Coate 1997). Moreover, neighborhood house values align the interests of homeowner voters and

politicians from the same neighborhood as house values crucially depend on the quality of the neighborhood (e.g. Hankinson and Magazinnik 2021, Yoder 2020 and Hall and Yoder 2022). From the voters point of view, voting for a local candidate is a way to elect a representative that has their neighborhood's interests in mind.

The second reason relates to neighborhood social interactions as they provide the voters a mechanism to make the politicians informed about the local needs and to make them accountable by voicing their opinions and concerns in person. The possibility of this channel of influence provides voters an incentive to vote for candidates whom they know and frequently encounter. Most often these are the candidates from their neighborhood, for example, those whose children go to the same kindergarten or school as theirs. This channel also incentivizes the politicians to cater to local voters both because of the informational advantage of local needs and because they want to maintain good personal relationships with their neighbors.

The third possible reason concerns electoral incentives and allocation of public funds as a mean to cultivate personal votes. An important aspect to consider here is whether the politicians can think of local voters as their core voters or swing voters. On the one hand, candidates may have a valence advantage in their home neighborhoods due to neighborhood pride or name recognition. These reasons for local support may not necessarily lead to reciprocity from the elected politicians because they may take local core votes for granted and distribute public funds to swing voters elsewhere (Dixit and Londregan 1996). However, it is not clear that candidates can consider their neighbors as a certain core support base that automatically vote for them instead of other candidates from the same neighborhood. Given that in the Finnish context there are typically many candidates from each neighborhood, competition takes place also within the neighborhoods. Bringing home pork may be the only way ensure local support. Moreover, if vote buying by providing pork is more efficient among the core voters, for example due to information advantage over the local needs, public funds may be directed to local core voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996).

Political decisions concerning the location of local public goods may have a feedback effect on the socio-economic makeup of neighborhoods. For example, when an important public service is shut down from a neighborhood, we would expect that higher-income people are more able to relocate to another neighborhood with better services (e.g. Cou-

ture and Handbury 2020). This re-sorting may also lead to less representation of these neighborhoods in the longer run due to lower turnout.

## DATA

Our data come from several sources.

**Candidates.** The first source is the election data provided by the Ministry of Justice containing candidate-level information on the candidates' age, gender, party affiliation, the number of votes they received, their election outcomes, and incumbency status. We have linked these data to Statistics Finland's data on the candidates' education, occupation, and socioeconomic status. Finally, we obtained addresses and coordinates for the candidates' residential buildings from the Digital and Population Data Services Agency.<sup>11</sup> Thus, we have candidate-level election data with a rich set of background characteristics and residential location for elections held from 2004 to 2012.

Most municipalities are divided into multiple polling districts and our election data also contain information on the number of votes received by the candidate from each of the polling districts in the municipality. Each polling district has a specific polling station where its residents go to vote. Importantly, polling districts have no other role in the elections as they are held at-large. Together with information in which polling district candidates live in, we can examine whether candidates receive more votes from their home polling district compared to other districts.<sup>12</sup>

**Candidates' neighborhoods.** Our data on the characteristics of the electorate in candidates' neighborhoods come from Statistics Finland's Grid and Zipcode Databases. These geo-referenced data contain information on age, education and income of the residents in 250 m x 250 m sized grids and zipcodes covering the whole of Finland. In the analysis, we will aggregate the grids to square kilometer level. The upshot of the grid level data is its spatial precision allowing us to focus on small neighborhoods, but due to confidentiality reasons grids with less than ten persons over the age of 18 do not contain socio-economic information. This means that sparsely populated areas are left out when using this data, whereas with zipcode level data the geographic coverage is

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<sup>11</sup>We could not match coordinate data for 668 out of the 115,540 candidates in these three elections .

<sup>12</sup>We can match a candidate's residence to a polling district because each building has a polling district code, which matches the code in the election results data. Unfortunately, this information is available only for candidates in the 2012 elections.

comprehensive.

Unfortunately, we are unable to perfectly match the polling districts to these neighborhood data as we do not have geo-referenced data on polling districts. However, since we know the home zipcode and polling district for all candidates, we can approximate the socio-economic make-up of the polling districts by averaging over candidates' zipcode information.<sup>13</sup>


**Elementary schools.** Our school data come from the Register of Educational Institutions maintained by Statistics Finland. The data cover all elementary schools and include annual information on the number pupils in different grades, coordinates for the school buildings and the year the school was closed. We use this data from 2004 to 2017 in our analysis.

Since we have coordinate information for all schools and candidates, we can assign the closest school for each candidate at the time of the election. With this distance based approach, we assume that the candidates represent the school that is closest to them.<sup>14</sup> Figure 1 illustrates our strategy for one election in one municipality with three schools. The schools are marked with a circle, a cross and a star (large symbols). The red circle means that this school was closed during the election term. The smaller symbols refer to the candidates' places of residence in the municipality. In the figure, a particular school is closest to the candidate when the candidate's symbol matches the school's symbol. Hollow symbols mean that the candidate was not elected while the filled symbols indicate elected candidates. In this municipal election, there were in total 64 candidates of which 21 were elected. The seat shares of the schools are 10%, 33% and 57%, respectively, and the school with the lowest seat share is the one that was closed.

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<sup>13</sup>Say there are three candidates living in a polling district and two of these candidates live in zipcode A and one in zipcode B. Denote the mean incomes of these zipcodes as  $zipinc_A$  and  $zipinc_B$ . The mean income in the polling district is calculated as  $(zipinc_A + zipinc_A + zipinc_B)/3$ . This of course results in some measurement error. Polling districts are typically geographically somewhat larger than zipcodes. Figure A2 in the Online Appendix illustrates this for one municipality we were able to obtain polling districts in GIS format.

<sup>14</sup>An alternative approach, would be to use the schools' catchment areas. However, we do not have data on the catchment areas for all municipalities for our time period.



**Figure 1:** Assigning candidates to schools.

Notes: The figure illustrates how we assign candidates to their closest school in one municipality with three schools.

## GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION AND LOCAL SUPPORT BASE

We start by examining geographic representation within municipalities. We first ask, whether the extent of representation is associated with the socio-economic makeup of the neighborhood. In this analysis, a neighborhood refers to a square kilometer sized grid or a zipcode. The grids are much smaller units than the zipcodes with mean populations of 66 and 1830, respectively. After that we ask, whether candidates receive more votes from their own neighborhoods compared to other neighborhoods. This analysis sheds light on whether candidates have a strong local support base, and thus, electoral incentives to cater to the voters in their neighborhood. In this analysis, a neighborhood refers to a polling district, which is the smallest geographic unit we have in the election data. In most municipalities, polling districts are geographically similar in size to zipcodes. In this analysis we use data from the 2012 elections.

To answer the first question, we run simple OLS regressions where we regress measures of neighborhood level representation on the income and education levels of the neighborhood's residents:

$$Representation_{im} = \alpha * Popshare_{im} + \beta * Sosecon_{im} + \gamma_m + u_{im}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Rerepresentation_{im}$  refers to either the prevalence of candidates or councilors in neighborhood  $i$  (grid or zipcode) in municipality  $m$ . We use three measures: the shares

of candidates and councilors residing in the neighborhood out of all candidates and councilors in the municipality and whether the neighborhood has any councilors.<sup>15</sup> We control for the neighborhood's share of municipal population ( $Popshare_{im}$ ) and municipality fixed effects ( $\gamma_m$ ).  $Sosecon_{im}$  is either the mean disposable income or education level of the neighborhood's residents. Mean income is standardized whereas education level is measured as the share of residents who are highly-educated, i.e. have a graduate degree.

The results for the zipcode level are presented in Table 1 where we report eight separate regression results in total. The corresponding results for the grid level are presented in Table A2 in the Online Appendix.<sup>16</sup> We highlight three findings. First, there seems to be no robust pattern with respect to neighborhood candidate share (models (1), and (5)). Second, the neighborhoods with higher mean incomes and better educated electorates have more representatives both in the extensive and intensive margins. This is true at both neighborhood scales as can be seen from Table A2 in the Online Appendix. Finally, the associations are also quantitatively substantial. For example, at the zipcode level, a one standard deviation increase in average income is associated with roughly 4.8%-point increase in the probability to have at least one councilor. Similarly, increasing the share of highly-educated by one standard deviation (5.3%-points), increases this probability by 8.9%-points.

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<sup>15</sup>Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table A1 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>16</sup>Mean income and education levels of a neighborhood are highly correlated, which is why we do not include them in the same regressions. Moreover, the interpretation of the models with both measures would also be somewhat problematic.

**Table 1:** Political representation and socio-economic structure of neighborhoods (zipcode).

Outcome:	Candidate share	Councilors (0/1)	Councilor share
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Standardized mean income	-0.002 (0.001)	0.048** (0.015)	0.003** (0.001)
Share of highly-educated	0.008 (0.013)	1.670** (0.342)	0.062** (0.019)
Outcome mean	0.108	0.791	0.108
N	2653	2653	2653
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table presents results from regressions where the unit of observation is a zipcode. Highly-educated refers to a person with a graduate degree. All the models include the neighborhood’s share of municipal population as a control. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

The key takeaway from this analysis is that neighborhoods with more affluent and better educated electorates have more representation in municipal councils. It also seems that the geographic differences in in the number of candidates are not the main explanation for these differences in representation, but rather how the candidates from these types of neighborhoods perform in the elections.

These results can be driven by a number of different mechanisms related to voter or candidate behavior and the mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Pinpointing the exact mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper and our data, but differences in turnout is one likely candidate (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). As it is well documented that turnout is higher among high-income and highly-educated voters (e.g. Lindgren, Oskarsson, and Persson 2019, Lahtinen et al. 2019, Akee et al. 2020 and Cantoni and Pons 2022), neighborhoods with more affluent and educated residents may have higher turnout. If voters vote for local candidates at roughly similar rates, the results we observe could be driven by neighborhood differences in turnout. In Table A3 in the Online Appendix, we present results from polling district level regressions where we regress the

district’s turnout on mean income and education level of the district while controlling for municipality fixed effects. Turnout is clearly higher in the polling districts with higher income and more educated voters. These correlations are rather strong given that we are measuring the socio-economic attributes of the polling district with some error as explained earlier. These result support the hypothesis of turnout differences being important, but of course we cannot rule out other important mechanisms.

Next we turn to the question of candidates’ local support base and their electoral incentives to cater to local voters, as opposed to all voters in the municipality. The election results data at the candidate-polling district level allow us to compute for all candidates in the 2012 elections the share of votes that the candidate received out of all the votes given in a particular polling district. Using this vote share, we estimate the following regression model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Votesha_{ip} = & \beta_0 Own_p + \beta_1 Own_p * Residence_i + \beta_2 Own_p * Incumbent_i \\
 & + \beta_3 PartyShare_i + \beta_4 Similarity_i + \gamma_i + \delta_p + u_{ip}. \quad (2)
 \end{aligned}$$

That is, we regress candidate  $i$ ’s vote share out of all the votes given in polling district  $p$  ( $Votesha_{ip}$ ) on a dummy variable indicating the polling district where the candidate herself lives ( $Own$ ). In addition, we interact this dummy with the residence spell (in years) in the polling district ( $Residence$ ) and with incumbency status ( $Incumbent$ ). The first serves as a proxy for the strength of local ties, whereas the latter proxies overall candidate quality and recognizability. We rely on within candidate variation across the polling districts by including candidate fixed effects ( $\gamma_i$ ) and we also control for polling district fixed effects ( $\delta_p$ ).

Furthermore, we add two variables to control for potential confounders related to voter segregation across neighborhoods.  $PartyShare$  measures the vote share of the candidate’s own party in the polling district, which controls for residential segregation with respect to party affiliation.<sup>17</sup>  $Similarity$  is a dummy variable that equals one if the candidate is highly-educated and if the share of highly-educated in the candidate’s own district

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<sup>17</sup>As an extreme example, consider a municipality with only two districts and two parties. If the voters of the parties are perfectly segregated into different districts, we would not be able to separate the own district vote premium from partisanship as candidates would only get votes from their home district. E.g. Brown and Enos (2021) report substantial segregation of voters with respect to party affiliation in the US.

is above the median of all districts. In other words, it equals one if a highly-educated candidate lives in a relatively highly-educated district.

The results, presented in Table 2, indicate that candidates' vote share is roughly 1.5%-points higher in their own district compared to other districts in the municipality. Given that the mean of the outcome variable 0.3%, the own district vote premium is indeed substantial. As the regressions include candidate fixed effects, we are perfectly controlling candidate quality as well as their overall campaigning ability and effort. However, these fixed effects do not capture possible campaigning efforts that are targeted towards their own neighborhoods.

**Table 2:** Candidates' vote shares from own polling district.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own district	1.554**	1.522**	0.574**	0.552**
	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Own district × residence spell			0.048**	0.047**
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Own district × incumbent			2.258**	2.239**
			(0.141)	(0.141)
Own party vote share		0.015**		0.015**
		(0.002)		(0.001)
Voter similarity		0.032**		0.032**
		(0.008)		(0.007)
Outcome mean	0.299	0.299	0.299	0.299
N	679,690	679,690	679,690	679,690
R-squared	0.41	0.41	0.45	0.46
Candidate FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Polling district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table presents results from candidate-polling district level regressions where the dependent variable is the candidate's vote share (%) of the polling district. Only municipalities with more than one polling district are included. Columns (1) and (2) include all candidates from these municipalities. In columns (3) and (4), the data is divided into two samples based on the median number of polling district in all municipalities (4). Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

In column (2), we add the party and voter similarity controls. Both of the measures have a positive sign and are statistically highly significant, but the own district vote premium is virtually unaffected by these additional controls of voter segregation. This supports the interpretation that the own district vote premium is indeed related to voter preferences for local representation and is not a result of similar candidates and voters sorting into same neighborhoods.

In column (3), we add the two interaction terms. The results indicate that the own district vote premium is higher both for candidates who have resided in the district longer and for incumbents. One explanation for these results could be that candidates with longer residence spells and incumbents are more easily recognizable as locals. Moreover, a longer residence spell may signal to voters that a candidate is more likely to stay in the neighborhood and continue to promote the interests of the residents. The findings are also in line with the notion that long-standing neighborhood ties are important for cultivating personal votes (e.g., Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005 and Jankowski 2016).<sup>18</sup> They are less in line with targeted campaigning being the reason behind the vote premium. Of course, we cannot rule out endogeneity issues in the sense that locally successful candidates may be more likely to become incumbents and long-time residents.

Taken as a whole, the results in this section show that the poorer and less-educated neighborhoods are left behind in geographic representation. Furthermore, the results indicate that candidates enjoy a large local vote premium, and thus, should have electoral incentives to cater to their local support base.

## **EFFECTS OF REPRESENTATION ON SCHOOL CLOSURE**

We have shown that political representation is unequal in geographic terms and that candidates have a strong support base in their neighborhood. In this section, we examine whether this matters for policy outcomes, i.e. whether there is a causal channel running from geographic political representation to geographic policy outcomes. To achieve this, we ask whether electing a given candidate has an effect on the probability that the

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<sup>18</sup>In Table A4 in the Online Appendix, we show that these results are not an artifact of the number of polling districts in the municipality. We divide the data into two samples based on the median number of polling district in all municipalities. The results in both samples are qualitatively similar, although there are some quantitative differences.

elementary school closest to that candidate is closed during the council term.

Our main model specification can be written as:

$$Closure_{it} = \alpha + \delta * Elected_{it} + \beta' X_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where  $Closure_{it}$  is a dummy variable that equals one if the school closest to candidate  $i$  was closed during council term  $t$ . The dummy variable  $Elected_{it}$  is equal to one if candidate  $i$  was elected into the municipal council for election term  $t$ .  $X_{it}$  include school and candidate level control variables and council term fixed effects, and  $u_{it}$  is the error term.

Our interest lies on the parameter  $\delta$ , which measures the effect of increasing the representation of the school in question by one councilor on the probability that the school is closed down. A simple OLS estimation of equation (3) would likely suffer from omitted variable bias as many other factors besides political representation affect school closures. Many of these factors are unobservable to us and likely correlated with the election status as the same economic, demographic and social factors influence both the demand for schools in neighborhoods and candidate selection and voting decisions.

To estimate  $\delta$  consistently we resort to randomly assigned election outcomes by including in our analysis only the candidates whose election status was decided by a lottery. This makes sure that  $Elected$  was randomly assigned. Concentrating on within party vote ties also ensures that the party composition of the council remains the same regardless of which candidate is elected. Moreover, we omit lotteries where all the involved candidates have the same closest school as these lotteries do not provide useful identifying variation (results are robust to including them).<sup>19</sup>

In order to increase precision and to examine the robustness the results, we create an additional sample by including the candidates whose election status was decided by a margin of a single vote. This sample is constructed in the following way. For each party list, we define the pivotal number of votes as the average of the maximum number of votes among the non-elected candidates and the minimum number of votes among the elected candidates. The distance to getting elected for each candidate is the number of votes of the candidate minus the pivotal number of votes of her party list. We include

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<sup>19</sup>We include all municipalities with at least two schools in the estimations. In the elections between 2004 and 2012, 419 candidates had an eligible tie (different schools) within their party list for the last seat(s).

in this alternative sample those candidates whose distance was less or equal to one. As long as these candidates were not able to precisely manipulate the number of votes they got and the within-party election threshold, the election status for these candidates is as-good-as-random. This increases our sample size to 1540.<sup>20</sup> Also for this larger sample, we use the same eligibility criteria that the candidates involved in the close elections and ties are assigned to different schools.

Balance tests reported in Table A5 in the Online Appendix verify that both the candidate and school level covariates are balanced across the control and treatment groups in both the lottery sample and the sample that combines the lottery and the one vote margin candidates.<sup>21</sup> Importantly, also the distance to the closest school is balanced across the groups suggesting that the groups are comparable in geographic terms. The last two variables in Table A5 show that the treatment group has more representation both at the intensive and extensive margins than the control group. These also reveal that the average school seat share is roughly 20% and that almost all schools have at least some representation.

In Figure A3 and Table A7 in the Online Appendix, we compare the municipalities with close elections (lotteries and one vote margin) to all municipalities. Figure A3 shows that close elections have taken place all over Finland in almost all municipalities. Table A7 further illustrates that municipalities with and without close elections are indeed very similar on average.<sup>22</sup>

Table 3 reports our main causal results from OLS regressions using the lottery sample (Panel A) and the one vote margin sample (Panel B). According to the results using the lottery sample, there is a clear and rather large effect of representation on school closure. Column (1) presents the most parsimonious model for the lottery sample, from which we see that, on average, 20% of the schools of the lottery losers are closed down, whereas for the winners school closures happen only half as frequently. Moving to the right of Panel A, we see that adding school and candidate level controls and council term fixed effects

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<sup>20</sup>We do not make use of a regression discontinuity design, because we would need to omit the lottery sample as it constitutes a mass point exactly at the treatment cutoff.

<sup>21</sup>Table A6 presents descriptive statistics for the lottery and one vote margin samples and for all non-elected and elected candidates. The candidates in the lottery and one vote margin samples are slightly younger and much less likely to be incumbents compared to all elected candidates.

<sup>22</sup>The reason why the occurrence of close elections is not correlated with municipal population is due to larger number of council seats and parties, and larger party lists in the larger municipalities.

has virtually no effect on the point estimates, which is consistent with the balance tests reported in Table A5.

**Table 3:** Effect of representation on school closure.

<i>Panel A: Lottery</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.204**	0.282**	0.329**	0.305**
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Elected	-0.108**	-0.101**	-0.099**	-0.097**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
N	419	419	419	419
R-squared	0.023	0.064	0.096	0.108
<i>Panel B: One vote margin</i>	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	0.186**	0.260**	0.207**	0.213**
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Elected	-0.062**	-0.061**	-0.065**	-0.064**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
N	1540	1540	1540	1540
R-squared	0.007	0.045	0.063	0.064
P-value for effect difference	0.122	0.172	0.247	0.258
School controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election term FE	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The school controls include the number of pupils in school. The candidate controls include age, sex, children in the family or not, incumbency and occupation status. The  $p$ -values are for the test of the statistical significance of the difference of the coefficients for Elected in the two samples with the same model specification. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

In Panel B, we present the results including the candidates where the last seat(s) was decided by at most a one vote margin. In this case, the effect of representation is slightly smaller. However, the differences in the point estimates in Panel A and B are not statistically significantly different from each other at conventional significance levels. Moreover, the baseline closure rate for the close elections losers is lower in this sample

(column (5)) making the relative effect more comparable to the lottery sample. Again the point estimates remain the same after adding controls and council term fixed effects.

We have explored the robustness of our results by concentrating on candidates who do not move during the council term and by concentrating on only on those municipalities that had school closures. First, roughly 20% of the candidates moved during the council term. We re-estimated the models using only those candidates who did not move during the council term. These additional results are reported in Table A8 in the Online Appendix and they are very similar to those presented in Table 3. Second, in Table A9 in the Online Appendix, we report results of models using only those municipalities that had school closures. In this sample of municipalities, the overall closure rate is higher, but in relative terms the magnitude of the effect is similar compared to the main results.

The results so far provide clear revealed preference evidence that local politicians want to prevent school closures in their neighborhoods. To understand what motivates the councilors and how they can achieve their objectives, we study the heterogeneity of the effect in various dimensions. This allows us also to evaluate whether the effects are larger in circumstances we would expect them to be. These results are presented in Tables A10–A14 in the Online Appendix. In each table, we split the sample with respect to the variable of interest and report the effect and control group mean of the outcome for each sample. It is important to compare the effect to the outcome mean because the school closures rates vary substantially depending on the sample, and thus, simply comparing point estimates would be misleading.

We start by asking how a single councilor can influence policy. We consider five explanations: proposal power, council majority, within-party bargaining, coalitional bargaining and pivotality on council voting. We can rule out the first two based on the balance tests reported in Table A5 because almost all schools in our estimation samples have some representation, and because majorities are rare and a candidate elected in our close elections rarely results in the school getting a council majority.

It is useful to think about coalitional bargaining in terms formal parties or schools as the relevant players (see Baron and Ferejohn 1989). We hypothesize that councilors whose school is under closure threat may be able to persuade their own party members to vote against the closure. If this is the case, perhaps school closures take place less often when a school gains more representation in the largest party in the council. In Table A10,

we report results separately for instances where the close elections took place within the largest party or not. We find no evidence that schools are less frequently closed when it receives more representation in the largest party compared to some other party in the council. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence of frequent within-party splits in closure votes presented in Online Appendix A. If we think about schools as the relevant players it is interesting to note that the candidates elected in our close elections increase the already sizable seat share of their schools, and thus, increases the school’s bargaining power within the council (see Table A5). This suggests that within council coalition formation and bargaining related to school closures is a potential channel of influence for individual councilors.

To shed some light on the question of pivotality, we estimated separate models for municipalities with a council size below and above the sample median. According to Table A11, the effect is larger relative to outcome mean in the sample of municipalities with small councils and the effect is statistically significant only in this sample. This result could be driven by the fact that in smaller councils an individual councilor is more likely to be pivotal in the council decision-making. Moreover, in smaller councils, a single councilor can be more persuasive in informal within-council discussions. Unfortunately, without more information on what goes on in the council and other informal meetings, it is difficult to know conclusively what is driving these differences.

We hypothesize that the electoral incentives and other forms of accountability are related to two aspects: how important the school is to the neighborhood’s residents and how many residents or voters are affected by the potential school closure. We use school size as a proxy measure for both aspects. The absolute size of the school (number of pupils) directly measures how many citizens are affected, and thus, may lobby the candidate to preserve the school. Moreover, it serves as a proxy for school quality.<sup>23</sup> We use the relative size of the school (school’s share of all pupils in the municipality) as a proxy for the share of voters who are affected by the closure of the school. We divide our sample based on the median of absolute and relative school size and estimating separate models for these samples. According to Table A12, the effect relative to the baseline

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<sup>23</sup>As some of the schools we are analyzing schools that are quite small, it could be, for example, that in these schools different age cohorts have to share a classroom and the teacher. Larger schools are also able to provide a larger variety of subjects. Of course, this only a proxy measure and some parents may prefer smaller schools.

closure rate is systematically larger when the school is large in absolute terms, whereas the the relative effect size does not vary substantially with respect to relative schools size. This result is consistent, although not conclusive, with the idea that representation matters more when the policy choice is more important to the residents.

In addition to school size, the importance of the local school may depend on how inconvenient or costly school closure would be in terms of school commute. We measure this cost simply as the distance between two schools: the school closest to the candidate and the closest school to this school in the same municipality. For example, in Figure 1 for candidates assigned to school C we measure the distance between schools C and A. We divide the sample based on the median of this distance measure (roughly 4km in both the lottery and one vote margin samples) and estimate separate models for schools where the distance is either below or above the sample median. From Table A13, we see that the effect relative to baseline is larger when the distance is larger, but only slightly.

Finally, we analyze whether the effects are larger when the school closure is likely to directly affect the politicians' own families. This will inform us whether their actions are motivated by personal interests. To this end, we split our sample based on whether the candidates themselves have young children (12-year-old or younger) who are currently or in the near future likely to attend the local school. Roughly 35% of the candidates in the lottery and one vote margin samples have young children. According Table A14, the effect does not vary systematically depending on whether the candidates have young children or not. Therefore, we do not find evidence suggesting that direct personal gains from the local school motivate the councilors' decisions regarding school closures.

Taken together, these additional results suggest that local politicians have more influence in small councils and that they want to prevent school closures in their neighborhood to cater to local residents rather than to obtain personal non-electoral gains. Although these results together with the substantial vote premium that candidates receive from their own neighborhoods (see Table 2) point to an important role for electoral incentives, we cannot rule out other mechanisms, such as better knowledge about local needs compared to the needs of other neighborhoods or non-electoral accountability related to frequent day-to-day encounters with their neighbors.

## SCHOOL CLOSURES AND RESIDENTIAL RE-SORTING

In this section, we examine residential sorting near closed schools using a staggered DID (event study) design for school closures that took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015.<sup>24</sup> We concentrate on these closures because our neighborhood data is available from 2010 to 2018 and we want to have enough pre- and post-treatment observations for testing pre-treatment trends and to have enough time for residential re-sorting to take place.

In this analysis, we use zipcode level panel data using only those zipcodes that have or had just one school during the analysis period. We make this choice because our neighborhood measures are at zipcode level and it is unclear what would happen in zipcodes with more than one school. For example, would the pupils of the closed school transfer to another school in the same neighborhood or to a school in another neighborhood? When there is only one school, the treatment is more clear cut. Furthermore, we use nearest-neighbour matching based on school size and zipcode population of the last pre-treatment year.<sup>25</sup> This both increases the comparability of the treatment and the control groups in terms of school size and the number of people affected by the closures and facilitates clearer interpretation in our heterogeneity analysis below.

Using the matched data set, we estimate the following event study specifications:

$$y_{kt} = \sum_{\tau=-3}^3 \delta_{\tau} D_{\tau,kt} + \gamma_t + \alpha_k + u_{kt}, \quad (4)$$

where  $y_{st}$  is the outcome of interest for zipcode  $k$  at year  $t$ . The dummy variable,  $D_{\tau,st}$ , indicates the year relative to year of closure of school  $s$ . The negative values of  $\tau$  indicate the pre-closure years and the positive values indicate the post-closure periods. At  $\tau = 0$ , the school no longer exists. The specification includes zipcode and year fixed effects and we cluster the standard errors at the zipcode level. We use the Sun and Abraham (2021) method, which is robust to treatment effect heterogeneity (eventstudyinteract command in STATA).<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Note that we cannot use the randomly elected candidates as an IV for school closures because it does not satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, increasing representation may have effects on other neighborhood level public goods besides schools.

<sup>25</sup>We match two control units for each treated unit. The results are robust to using one or three control units (not reported). Descriptive statistics in Table A15 in the Online Appendix indicate that the matched control group is quite similar to the treatment group.

<sup>26</sup>We show in Figures A4 and A5 in the Online Appendix, that we obtain very similar results when


The outcome we are interested in is the prevalence of different income groups in the zipcodes. In particular, we want to understand whether the high-income families move away from the neighbourhood as local public services deteriorate. We make use of the Zipcode Database by Statistics Finland where the adult population is divided into three groups based on income deciles constructed annually at the national level: low-income (deciles 1 and 2), middle-income (deciles 3 through 8) and high-income (deciles 9 and 10).

We focus on effect heterogeneity with respect to school size. School size captures two important aspects. First, the larger the school, the more people in the neighborhood are affected by the closure (due to our matching procedure, both in absolute and relative terms), and second, as explained earlier school size may be correlated with school quality. We use a cutoff of 90 pupils in the school to divide the sample into small and large schools. With 90 pupils, we would expect the class size at each grade to be 15 pupils. This cutoff is somewhat *ad hoc* and we analyse robustness with respect to this choice.

The event study plots (point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for  $\delta_\tau$ 's) based on equation (4) are presented in Figure 2 for the small schools (under 90 pupils) and in Figure 3 for the large schools (at least 90 pupils). Starting from Figure 2, there is a slight downward trend in the total population in the zipcodes with a school closure both pre- and post-treatment. This is not surprising given that diminishing enrollment is one of the main reasons for school closures. However, individual point estimates are not statistically significant after the closure. This slight downward trend is visible with the middle-income residents (deciles 3 through 8). There seems to be no systematic pattern in the development of low- (deciles 1 and 2) and high-income groups (deciles 9 and 10), although these estimates are quite noisy. It seems that the small drop in total population is driven by the middle-income group (deciles 3 through 8). In sum, there seems to be no clear pattern of residential re-sorting after school closures when the schools are small.

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using the Imai, Kim, and Wang (2021) method for matching DID, which also allows treatment effect heterogeneity in staggered designs.




**Figure 2:** Effect of school closures on residential sorting, small schools.

Notes: The Figures plot the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study regressions using zipcode level panel data.  $N = 2941$ . The outcomes are the logs of total population and the number of neighborhood residents in the national level income deciles (1 and 2, 3 through 8 and 9 and 10). The schools in the sample had under 90 pupils prior to closure. Event time is the year relative to the year of school closure. School closures included in the analysis took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The omitted period is -1. The regressions include year and zipcode fixed effects. Standard errors used for confidence intervals are clustered at the zipcode level.

Results are different for the sample of larger schools. According to Figure 3, there again seems to be a downward trend in total population in pre- and post-treatment periods that is driven by middle-income residents.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, there is a decline in the number of high-income residents after closure which is statistically significant and fairly substantial (5.1% decline four years after the closure). This group also exhibits a

<sup>27</sup>The Imai, Kim, and Wang (2021) method results in different pre-trends, yet the main results are robust (Figures A4 and A5).

clean common pre-trend three years prior to closure. The decline in high-income residents appears to be accompanied by a slight increase in the number of low-income residents, although the point estimates are not statistically significant for this group. Thus, when the closed school is relatively large and possibly of higher quality, high-income residents vote with their feet suggesting that school closures reinforce residential segregation.<sup>28</sup>



**Figure 3:** Effect of school closures on residential sorting, large schools.

Notes: The Figures plot the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study regressions using zipcode level panel data.  $N = 532$ . The outcomes are the logs of total population and the number of neighborhood residents in the national level income deciles (1 and 2, 3 through 8 and 9 and 10). The schools in the sample had at least 90 pupils prior to closure date. Event time is the year relative to the year of school closure. School closures included in the analysis took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The omitted period is -1. The regressions include year and zipcode fixed effects. Standard errors used for confidence intervals are clustered at the zipcode level.

<sup>28</sup>In Figure A6, we report event study plots for different school size cutoffs. The results are very similar to those in Figure 3.

## CONCLUSIONS

We have studied the link between geographic political representation and geographic distribution of local public goods within local jurisdictions using detailed geo-coded micro data spanning three municipal election terms. We have produced four novel findings. First, neighborhoods with poorer and less-educated electorates are under-represented relative to their share of municipal population. Second, candidates have a strong local support base suggesting that they have electoral incentives to cater to voters in their neighborhood, even though the elections are held at-large. Third, based on randomly decided election outcomes, geographic representation has a causal effect on the geographic distribution of local public goods. Finally, deterioration of local public goods, in our case through school closures, seems to lead to residential re-sorting with respect to income of the residents. We conclude with some thoughts on the external validity and policy implications of our findings and highlight interesting avenues for future research.

It is important to note some limitations of our findings in terms of external validity. Although open-list PR systems are prevalent worldwide, the details in the systems and the tasks assigned to local jurisdictions may influence the link between geographic representation and local public good provision in nuanced ways. Finland is also a country with relatively low income inequality, very little ethnic diversity and residential segregation. Problems related to under-representation may be exacerbated in countries and cities with higher levels of segregation. Moreover, our causal results related to the likelihood of school closure come from a subset of candidates who were involved in close races for the last party seat(s). Concentrating on these marginal candidates facilitates causal inference, but provides us with a local effect that may not capture more general effects across a wider distribution of politicians. On the one hand, the candidates who occupy the last seat of the party have less political experience and may have less political power and skill to influence the council decisions. On the other hand, these marginal candidates are electorally vulnerable, and thus, may have stronger electoral incentives to cater to local voters compared to electorally safer candidates. Furthermore, our results related to residential re-sorting due to school closures are identified from less populous areas and they may not generalize to more areas with larger populations.

The important policy question that our results raise is how can we make political representation geographically more balanced. We consider two factors: voter mobilization

and election system reforms.

First, if the under-representation of poorer and less-educated neighborhoods is mainly due to lower turnout by the socio-economic groups in these neighborhoods (e.g., Lindgren, Oskarsson, and Persson 2019, Akee et al. 2020, Hall and Yoder 2022 and Yoder 2020), policies designed to mobilize voters may be important. However, evidence on the effectiveness of interventions mobilising nonvoters (so-called get-out-the-vote) is not encouraging in this respect. For example, Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck (2014) summarize the findings from 27 experimental mobilization interventions. They find that on average, these mobilization strategies actually widen disparities in participation and representation by mobilizing well-represented citizens more than the under-represented. On the other hand, making local and national elections concurrent has been shown to increase turnout while narrowing representational disparities (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022). Moreover, increase in turnout and representation of disadvantaged groups due to major enfranchisement reforms typically result in large shifts in policies (e.g., Husted and Kenny 1997, Cascio and Washington 2014 and Fujiwara 2015). Whether mobilization interventions in countries that already have a broad franchise can be designed more effectively to alleviate the geographic differences in participation should remain high in the research agenda.

Second, when it comes to comparing election systems in terms of balanced geographic representation, perhaps the most interesting comparison is between at-large and ward systems. At a first glance, a ward system seems to offer clear benefits as it guarantees that all neighborhoods get at least some representation. Recent evidence also indicates that moving from at-large to a ward system indeed improves minority representation (e.g. Abott and Magazinnik 2020). However, the comparison between at-large and ward systems involves subtle trade-offs. For example, Mast (2022) and Hankinson and Magazinnik (2021) show that the ward system worsens the so-called not-in-my-backyard problems and suppresses local housing supply. Moreover, Trounstine (2020) shows that this type of stringent land use regulation exacerbates residential segregation. The effects of moving to a ward system on geographic representation also crucially depend on districting as the large literature on optimal districting and gerrymandering indicates (e.g., Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina 2008 and Gul and Pesendorfer 2010). Moving to wards in a PR system may also have drastic effects on the number of parties due to Duverger’s law (Duverger 1959). In addition, according Beath et al. (2016), at-large systems tend to select higher quality

candidates compared to ward systems. Analyzing these important trade-offs should be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Finally, our results show that the effects of school closures are more far-reaching than policy-makers may have thought. Their indirect effects on neighbourhood segregation and geographic balance of political representation constitute an important consideration when deciding on school closures or the geography of local public good provision more generally (e.g. Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021).

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT**

Oskari Harjunen (oskari.harjunen@aalto.fi) is assistant professor at Aalto University School of Engineering, Otakaari 4, FI-02150 Espoo, and senior researcher at VATT Institute for Economic Research. Tuukka Saarimaa (tuukka.saarimaa@aalto.fi) is assistant professor at Aalto University School of Business and School of Engineering and Helsinki GSE, Ekonominaukio 1, FI-02150 Espoo. Janne Tukiainen (janne.tukiainen@utu.fi) is professor at University of Turku, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, FI-20014 University of Turku, and associate research professor at VATT Institute for Economic Research.

## **Online Appendix**

Love Thy (Elected) Neighbor? Residential Segregation, Political  
Representation and Local Public Goods

Oskari Harjunen, Tuukka Saarimaa and Janne Tukiainen

## Appendix A: Details and anecdotal evidence on school closure process

The process for a school closure typically starts with municipal bureaucrat(s) responsible for education producing an analysis and a report of the municipal school network. The report may contain a proposal for school closures and an analysis of the associated economic savings. The council or its preparatory organs (education committee and municipal board) may use this information to draft a proposal on school closures that the council votes on.

Tantarimäki (2011) provides a case study of 11 rural school closures and lists arguments made in the closure debates. Besides the debates in the council, there are public hearings in which citizens and interest group can have their say. Typically arguments in favour involve both costs savings and higher quality teaching. Also the need for investments to repair the school building are mentioned. Typically arguments against include longer school commutes for the children, higher costs of organizing public school transit, risks of students and taxpayers moving to other municipalities, which would decrease both central government transfers and the tax base. Arguments against also mention that the school is an important communal center also for other purposes than education, and thus, may have spillovers to the local community through closures of other public services and private businesses (see also Lehtonen 2021). In summary, the debate is mainly about the economic benefits for the whole municipality versus the costs to the community living close to the school.

We do not have systematic data on council votes on school closures as the records of council events are kept at each individual municipality. However, we collected some examples of how closure decisions are reported in local newspapers and online sources (Article 1, Article 2, Article 3 and Article 4). Unfortunately, the articles are in Finnish, but they report that in all of these examples votes have been close and there are within party vote splits in almost all parties.

Logrolling seems unlikely as voting on closures is typically not a frequently repeated event in the same municipality. It also seems that the closure decisions are often not bundled together. For example, in our estimation data of the municipalities that had school closures only 10% of municipalities had more than one closure during an election


term.

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
Tantarimäki, S. (2011). Mitä lakkautuksesta opimme? Kyläkoulun lakkauttamisen perusteet, prosessi, säästöt ja vaikutukset viimeaikaisessa keskustelussa. Tapaustutkimuksena vuonna 2007 lakkautetut kyläkoulut Korpilahdella, Kurikassa, Lammilla, Siilinjärvellä, Sysmässä ja Urjalassa. Turun yliopiston koulutus-ja kehittämiskeskus Brahean julkaisuja B: 2.

## Appendix B: Additional figures and tables



**Figure A1:** Number of elementary schools and geography of school closures.


Notes: On the left panel the blue bars depict the number of elementary schools during each year (left axis), the black line the mean size of schools (right axis) and the red vertical lines the election timing. The right panel depicts a map of school closures by election term.



**Figure A2:** Polling districts and zipcodes in the municipality of Kuopio in 2019.


## Lottery

## One vote margin




**Figure A3:** Municipalities with close elections.

Notes: The shaded municipalities had at least one close election (decided by a lottery or by one vote margin) in the 2004-2012 elections. Municipal borders are from 2012.




**Figure A4:** Effect of school closures on residential sorting, small schools using Imai et al. (2021) method.

Notes: The Figures plot the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study regressions using zipcode level panel data. We implement here the Imai et al. (2021) method with R-package PanelMatch. We match two controls for each treated unit based on Mahalanobis distance using school size and zipcode population. The outcomes are the logs of total population and the number of neighborhood residents in the national level income deciles (1 and 2, 3 through 8 and 9 and 10). The schools in the sample had under 90 pupils prior to closure. Event time is the year relative to the year of school closure. School closures included in the analysis took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The omitted period is -1. Standard errors are block bootstrapped at the municipality level and account for matching weights.



**Figure A5:** Effect of school closures on residential sorting, large schools using Imai et al. (2021) method.

Notes: The Figures plot the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study regressions using zipcode level panel data. We implement here the Imai et al. (2021) method with R-package PanelMatch. We match two controls for each treated unit based on Mahalanobis distance using school size and zipcode population. The outcomes are the logs of total population and the number of neighborhood residents in the national level income deciles (1 and 2, 3 through 8 and 9 and 10). The schools in the sample had at least 90 pupils prior to closure. Event time is the year relative to the year of school closure. School closures included in the analysis took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The omitted period is -1. Standard errors are block bootstrapped at the municipality level and account for matching weights.



**Figure A6:** Sensitivity of effect of school closures on residential sorting with respect to school size cutoff.

Notes: The Figures plot the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from event study regressions using zipcode level panel data. Only zipcodes with one school are included in the analysis. The sample sizes are 700 for top-left, 650 for top-right, 593 for bottom-left and 407 for bottom-right, respectively. The outcome is the log of number of neighborhood residents in the 9 and 10 national level income deciles. The schools in the sample had at least 60, 70, 80 or 100 pupils prior to closure date. Event time is the year relative to the year of school closure. School closures included in the analysis took place in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The omitted period is -1. The regressions include year and zipcode fixed effects. Standard errors used for confidence intervals are clustered at the zipcode level.

**Table A1:** Descriptive statistics for neighborhood representation measures.

	(1)	(2)
	Square km grids	Zipcodes
Candidate share	0.021 (0.034)	0.108 (0.175)
Councilors(0/1)	0.401 (0.490)	0.791 (0.406)
Councilor share	0.019 (0.035)	0.108 (0.172)
Observations	5744	2655

Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for neighborhood representation measures used as outcomes in Table 1. Standard deviations are presented below the means in parentheses.

**Table A2:** Political representation and socio-economic structure of neighborhoods (grid).

Outcome:	Candidate share	Councilors (0/1)	Councilor share
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Standardized mean income	0.000 (0.000)	0.052** (0.016)	0.001** (0.000)
	(5)	(6)	(7)
Share highly-educated	0.010** (0.003)	1.054** (0.103)	0.036** (0.005)
Outcome mean	0.021	0.401	0.019
N	5733	5733	5733
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table presents results from regressions where the unit of observation is a square kilometer grid. Highly-educated refers to a person with a graduate degree. All the models include the neighborhood's share of municipal population as a control. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A3:** Turnout and socio-economic structure of polling districts.

	(1)	(2)
Mean income	2.584**	
	(0.194)	
Share highly-educated		57.43**
		(8.334)
N	2062	2062
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents results from regressions where the unit of observation is a polling district. All the models include the polling district population as a control. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A4:** Candidates' vote shares from own polling district.

	#-districts		#-districts	
	$\leq 4$	$> 4$	$\leq 4$	$> 4$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own district	1.706**	1.441**	0.911**	0.418**
	(0.145)	(0.098)	(0.110)	(0.042)
Own district x residence spell			0.024**	0.051**
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Own district x incumbent			1.603**	2.330**
			(0.155)	(0.167)
Own party vote share			0.038**	0.014**
			(0.003)	(0.001)
Voter similarity			0.691	0.017**
			(0.468)	(0.006)
Outcome mean	1.255	0.273	1.255	0.273
N	17,443	662,247	17,443	662,247
R-squared	0.54	0.37	0.58	0.43
Candidate FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Polling district FE	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table presents results from candidate-polling district level regressions where the dependent variable is the candidate's vote share (%) of the polling district. Only municipalities with more than one polling district are included. Columns (1) and (2) include all candidates from these municipalities. In columns (3) and (4), the data is divided into two samples based on the median number of polling district in all municipalities (4). Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A5:** Covariate balance at candidate level.

Variable	Lottery (N = 419)		One vote margin (N = 1540)	
	Control mean	Difference	Control mean	Difference
Age	46.79	-0.109 (1.329)	47.98	-0.240 (0.674)
Male (0/1)	0.569	0.032 (0.046)	0.605	0.024 (0.022)
Children (0/1)	0.313	0.067 (0.048)	0.332	0.026 (0.025)
Number of children	0.725	0.111 (0.132)	0.725	0.041 (0.064)
Incumbent (0/1)	0.332	0.014 (0.042)	0.339	0.042 (0.023)
Student (0/1)	0.038	-0.009 (0.016)	0.026	-0.002 (0.008)
Unemployed (0/1)	0.043	-0.009 (0.018)	0.023	0.016 (0.009)
Entrepreneur (0/1)	0.156	0.065 (0.038)	0.192	0.025 (0.020)
Managerial employee (0/1)	0.204	0.017 (0.045)	0.192	0.015 (0.020)
Distance to school (km)	3.334	-0.573 (0.525)	2.829	-0.110 (0.205)
Number of pupils in school	129.4	10.85 (10.49)	127.9	1.498 (6.928)
School seat share	0.202	0.021 (0.016)	0.172	0.033** (0.010)
School has representation (0/1)	0.948	0.052** (0.017)	0.950	0.050** (0.009)
School has seat majority (0/1)	0.095	-0.013 (0.030)	0.044	0.021 (0.017)

Notes: Each row in the table refers to a separate bivariate regression where the dependent variable is reported on the first column and the explanatory variable is election status (*Elected*). The control mean refers to the constant in these models and the difference refers to the coefficient on the explanatory variable *Elected*. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A6:** Means and standard deviations of candidate characteristics in different samples.

	Lottery	One vote margin	All non-elected	All elected
Age	46.74 (13.37)	47.86 (12.69)	47.22 (13.71)	49.19 (11.68)
Male (0/1)	0.58 (0.49)	0.62 (0.49)	0.59 (0.49)	0.63 (0.48)
Children (0/1)	0.35 (0.48)	0.34 (0.48)	0.31 (0.46)	0.32 (0.47)
Number of children	0.78 (1.42)	0.74 (1.28)	0.61 (1.09)	0.65 (1.20)
Incumbent (0/1)	0.34 (0.47)	0.36 (0.48)	0.07 (0.25)	0.58 (0.49)
Student (0/1)	0.03 (0.18)	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.21)	0.02 (0.13)
Unemployed (0/1)	0.04 (0.19)	0.03 (0.17)	0.07 (0.25)	0.03 (0.16)
Entrepreneur (0/1)	0.19 (0.39)	0.20 (0.40)	0.11 (0.31)	0.20 (0.40)
Managerial employee (0/1)	0.21 (0.41)	0.20 (0.40)	0.19 (0.39)	0.26 (0.44)
Observations	419	1540	79706	29409

Notes: The table presents mean candidate characteristics in different samples. Standard deviations are presented below the means in parentheses.

**Table A7:** Descriptive statistics for municipalities with and without close elections.

Sample:	Lottery		One vote margin		Other municipalities	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Population	16,669	44,682	16,451	35,243	17,135	43,149
Share under 15 (%)	17.80	3.373	17.65	3.691	17.21	3.586
Income per capita	23,368	4009	23,218	3655	22,976	3935
Turnout (%)	63.99	5.708	62.66	6.12	62.73	6.057
Council size	32.58	10.60	32.788	11.31	32.02	11.75
Number of schools	8.576	9.639	8.395	8.549	8.168	9.730
N (municipalities)	198		605		913	

Notes: The descriptive statistics are calculated over three election years: 2004, 2008 and 2012. Turnout and council size data are missing for 23 municipalities and income per capita for 12 municipalities.

**Table A8:** Effects of representation on school closure (non-movers).

<hr/> <hr/>				
<i>Panel A: Lottery</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.200**	0.286**	0.348**	0.326**
	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Elected	-0.091*	-0.085*	-0.080*	-0.080*
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
<hr/>				
N	379	379	379	379
R-squared	0.016	0.063	0.115	0.122
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<i>Panel B: One vote margin</i>	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	0.188**	0.263**	0.199**	0.207**
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Elected	-0.060**	-0.060**	-0.062**	-0.062**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
<hr/>				
N	1397	1397	1397	1397
R-squared	0.007	0.044	0.066	0.068
<hr/>				
School controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election term FE	No	No	No	Yes
<hr/> <hr/>				

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The school controls include the number of pupils in school. The candidate controls include age, sex, children in the family or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A9:** Effect of representation on school closure (municipalities with closures).

<i>Panel A: Lottery</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.339**	0.438**	0.554**	0.504**
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.180)	(0.175)
Elected	-0.171**	-0.162**	-0.154**	-0.157**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)
N	246	246	246	246
R-squared	0.038	0.086	0.129	0.164
<i>Panel B: One vote margin</i>	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	0.301**	0.410**	0.313**	0.301**
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Elected	-0.091**	-0.091**	-0.095**	-0.095**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)
N	929	929	929	929
R-squared	0.011	0.069	0.085	0.087
School controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Election term FE	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The school controls include the number of pupils in school. The candidate controls include age, sex, children in the family or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A10:** Effect heterogeneity with respect to being from the largest party in the council.

	Lottery		One vote margin	
	Largest party	Not largest party	Largest party	Not largest party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected	-0.044	-0.126**	-0.068*	-0.060*
	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.024)
Control group				
outcome mean	0.209	0.200	0.208	0.167
N	185	234	687	853
R-squared	0.158	0.156	0.081	0.065

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The models include election term fixed effects and the following controls: number of pupils in school, candidates' age, sex, if they have children or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A11:** Effect heterogeneity with respect to council size.

	Lottery		One vote margin	
	Council size $\leq 27$	Council size $> 27$	Council size $\leq 27$	Council size $> 27$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected	-0.163** (0.060)	-0.046 (0.042)	-0.106** (0.034)	-0.033 (0.022)
Control group outcome mean	0.307	0.109	0.269	0.113
N	203	216	706	834
R-squared	0.168	0.167	0.082	0.041

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The models include election term fixed effects and the following controls: number of pupils in school, candidates' age, sex, if they have children or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A12:** Effect heterogeneity with respect to school size.

	Lottery		One vote margin	
<i>Panel A: Absolute school size</i>	Small	Large	Small	Large
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected	-0.087	-0.097**	-0.098**	-0.048*
	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Control group				
outcome mean	0.294	0.108	0.278	0.093
N	210	209	773	767
R-squared	0.245	0.207	0.148	0.038
<i>Panel B: Relative school size</i>	Small	Large	Small	Large
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elected	-0.128*	-0.065	-0.089**	-0.049
	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Control group				
outcome mean	0.259	0.146	0.235	0.137
N	209	210	770	770
R-squared	0.156	0.127	0.083	0.057

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The median absolute school sizes are 92 in the lottery and 76 in the one vote margin samples whereas the median relative school sizes are 14% and 13%, respectively. The models include election term fixed effects and the following controls: number of pupils in school, candidates' age, sex, if they have children or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A13:** Effect heterogeneity with respect to school distance.

	Lottery		One vote margin	
	Below median	Above median	Below median	Above median
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected	-0.057 (0.046)	-0.129* (0.054)	-0.045 (0.025)	-0.081* (0.032)
Control group outcome mean	0.131	0.268	0.135	0.239
N	209	210	770	770
R-squared	0.133	0.128	0.056	0.068

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The median distance in both samples is roughly 4km. The models include election term fixed effects and the following controls: number of pupils in school, candidates' age, sex, if they have children or not, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A14:** Effect heterogeneity with respect to candidates having children under the age of 12.

	Lottery		One vote margin	
	Has children	No children	Has children	No children
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected	-0.090*	-0.082	-0.045	-0.100**
	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Control group				
outcome mean	0.207	0.197	0.169	0.219
N	274	145	1009	531
R-squared	0.142	0.192	0.066	0.093

Notes: The table presents results from linear probability models where the outcome is school closure (0/1). The models include election term fixed effects and the following controls: number of pupils in school, candidates' age, sex, incumbency and occupation status. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A15:** Descriptive statistics for schools and zipcodes in the residential re-sorting analysis.

	Not closed all	Not closed matched	Closed
Number of pupils	128.31 (116.63)	49.53 (52.36)	48.40 (52.36)
Population	1845.15 (2177.05)	773.58 (1204.54)	784.80 (1285.17)
Residents in deciles 1 and 2	295.48 (362.96)	149.76 (245.84)	149.51 (234.88)
Residents in deciles 3-8	881.56 (1075.68)	383.28 (632.15)	392.80 (726.45)
Residents in deciles 9 and 10	289.88 (428.43)	97.19 (153.44)	96.26 (134.45)
Highly-educated residents	135.10 (291.26)	37.14 (109.65)	32.51 (69.64)
Observations	1104	281	140

Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for schools and zipcodes used in the re-sorting analysis. Standard deviations are presented below the means in parentheses.