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Strategic Autonomy and the EU as a Global Actor: The Evolution, Debate and Theory of a Contested Term

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For all the attention on ‘strategic autonomy’ in the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy debate, the academic reflections on the term have so far been limited. Strategic autonomy is a prominent framework through which policy-makers discuss the EU’s response to global challenges, which raises the question to what extent its study can tell us more about the development of the EU as a global actor. This article discusses the evolution of the term ‘strategic autonomy’, the current policy debates that surround it, as well as how its emergence and implications can possibly be analysed through the use of International Relations theory. It argues that strategic autonomy should not be understood as a binary choice between dependence and independence or engagement and decoupling. By accepting the ambiguity of the term and its various meanings in today’s policy debate, it is possible to explore the grey areas of the EU’s struggle to manage its external interdependencies, as well as the implications in diverse policy fields, including foreign policy, security and defence, as well as trade.

Keywords: Strategic Autonomy, European Union, International Relations, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, Trade and Investment Policy, Realism, Liberal theory of International Cooperation, Constructivism

1 INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that the European Union (EU) is navigating an increasingly complex international environment marked by great power rivalry, a weakening appeal of the rules-based international order and tightening economic competition. ‘Strategic autonomy’ is the term of choice that EU and Member-State representatives use in order to describe the Union’s response to global challenges. The final revisions to this special issue were made at the time when Russia invaded Ukraine and war returned to the European continent. Also in this context, the need for the EU to become ‘sovereign’ and increase its capacity in approaching geopolitical crises was highlighted. According to the drafts available at the time of writing, the 2022 ‘Strategic Compass’ will be the latest document that formulates strategic autonomy

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as an aim for the EU's security and defence policy.¹ However, despite the current attention paid to matters of 'hard' security, the concept has long transcended the narrow application in the defence field and is nowadays also used to describe the EU's answer to global economic upheavals from supply chain disruptions to unfair trade practices. The European Commission's 2021 trade policy review places 'open strategic autonomy' front and centre, calling it a 'mind-set for decision makers'.²

For all the fuss in the policy debate, it is surprising that academic engagement with the term has remained limited. Strategic autonomy has been discussed prominently with regard to defence issues and the EU's relationship with NATO and the US.³ Recent academic contributions that discuss the EU's role as an international actor more widely make references to the strategic autonomy discourse as well.⁴ Despite being a contemporary phenomenon in the EU's foreign policy debate, it is not in the centre of academic analyses.

The neglect of strategic autonomy in the peer-reviewed literature is surprising, as the discussion of changes to Europe's strategic orientation links to greater global developments of entrenchment, in particular the growing competition between the US and China.⁵ The competition is exacerbated by a redistribution of power, technological transformation, contestation over international norms and governance, as well as an increased use of economic instruments for geostrategic objectives. These developments have a crucial impact on the EU's evaluation of its interdependencies, as risks of cooperation become more pronounced.

This picture of global politics informs the interpretation of strategic autonomy adopted in this special issue. The concept does not denote a binary choice between dependence and independence or engagement and decoupling. Instead, we explore the grey areas of the EU's struggle to manage its external interdependencies and the policy implications that flow from it. We understand strategic autonomy as the political, institutional and material ability of the EU and its Member States to manage

¹ European External Action Service, *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: For a European Union that Protects Its Citizens, Values and Interests and Contributes to International Peace and Security* (draft Nov. 2021).

² European Commission, *Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy* (18 Feb. 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_645 (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

³ J. Howorth, *Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: Threat or Opportunity for Transatlantic Defence Relations?*, 40(5) *J. Eur. Integ.* 523–537 (2018); L. Aggestam & A. Hyde-Price, *Double Trouble: Trump, Transatlantic Relations and European Strategic Autonomy*, 57(Ann. Rev.) *J. Com. Mkt. Stud.* 114–127 (2019).

⁴ S. Gstöhl, *The EU After Brexit: A Weaker or Stronger International Actor?*, 25(4) *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.* 503–522 (2020); R. Csernaton, *The Evolving Role of the European External Action Service in Security and Defence*, 26(1) *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.* 87–100 (2021); H. Delphin, *Above the Fog and the Fury: EU Strategic Policy Planning and the EU's Future in Times of Global Uncertainty*, 26(1) *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.* 35–54 (2021).

⁵ *Great-Power Competition and the Rising US-China Rivalry: Towards a New Normal?*, 66 *FIIA Report*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (B. Gaens & V. Sinkkonen eds 2020), <https://www.fiaa.fi/en/publication/great-power-competition-and-the-rising-us-china-rivalry> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022); E. Colby & A. Wess Mitchell, *The Age of Great-Power Competition: How the Trump Administration Refashioned American Strategy*, 99(1) *Foreign Aff.* 118–130 (2020); A. Wyne, *America's Great-Power Opportunity: How Strategic Competition Can Revitalize U.S. Foreign Policy* (Polity, Forthcoming 2022).

their interdependence with third parties, with the aim of ensuring the well-being of their citizens and implementing self-determined policy decisions.⁶

By exploring the evolution, the policy and strategy debates, and the theoretical embedding of the concept, this introduction makes the argument that there is value in academic reflection on strategic autonomy as part of the broader research agenda on the EU's global role. Why, by whom, and with what aim is the term used in policy debates? What does the emergence and widespread use of the term in the public discourse tell us about the changing nature of the EU as a global actor? What are the implications for the EU's global role? This special issue will provide some first answers to what we believe might constitute a broader research agenda in studies of the EU as a global actor.

2 FOUR WAVES OF THE STRATEGIC AUTONOMY DEBATE

Contrary to what one might believe from the countless op-eds, speeches and position papers, the idea of European strategic autonomy is hardly new: it goes back over twenty years. The 1998 British-French St Malo declaration that led to the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy famously stated that '[t]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.⁷

The debate has come a long way since then. The first wave of the debate that broke in the 1990s focused mainly on the question of European military capabilities in the possible event of US disengagement from Europe.⁸ Driven by the instabilities on the Western Balkans and the inability of the EU for independent action, the creation of a defence and crisis management dimension of the European project became a priority. The second wave started to gather momentum in the 2010s after the wars in Libya and Syria as well as the crisis in Ukraine showcased the harsh realities Europe faces in its neighbourhood. As a result, the 2016 EU global strategy called for an 'appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy' as the basis for 'Europe's ability to

⁶ Based on *Strategic Autonomy and the Transformation of the EU: New Agendas for Security, Diplomacy, Trade and Technology*, 67 FIIA Report (N. Helwig ed. 2021), <https://www.fiaa.fi/julkaisu/strategic-autonomy-and-the-transformation-of-the-eu> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

⁷ Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo 4 Dec. 1998), https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

⁸ This does not mean that the strategic autonomy debate on defence was concluded. Instead we make the point in this report that the debate still reverberates today. See e.g., D. Fiott, *Strategic Autonomy: Towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?*, 12 Eur. Union Inst. Sec. Stud. Brief (2018).

promote peace and security within and beyond its borders'.⁹ The strategy and the discussion on its implementation put the term into use in the EU's policy discourse.

Maybe the idea would have slowly withered away as yet another term to describe the EU's defence ambitions, if it had not been for the election of Donald Trump as US President. This started the third wave of discussion on strategic autonomy. Not only did the Trump Presidency bring back lingering doubts about US commitment to European security, it also did not shy away from using US economic power to strong arm the EU with extraterritorial sanctions on Iran.¹⁰ Whether China's Belt and Road Initiative or US trade sanctions, geoeconomic power plays became more and more common. During the third wave of the strategic autonomy debate this geostrategic use of economic instruments became a pivotal point of discussion and risked limiting the EU's freedom to operate.

The fourth wave in the discussion followed the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020.¹¹ The EU's ability to act autonomously became more closely connected to questions of welfare, health and post-crisis economic recovery. The pandemic also gave new impetus to the geopolitical competition between the US and China and the defence of EU's economic interests. The safeguarding of European values in areas such as climate protection, human rights and data privacy also moved centre stage.¹² In its own adaptation of the strategic autonomy narrative, the European Commission started to promote reforms under the heading of 'open strategic autonomy' to adjust the EU's trade policies to an international environment in which distorting and coercive measures became increasingly widespread. Yet, the qualifier 'open' hints at the connected and proactive approach that the Commission wants to portray. Its recent trade policy review underlined that '[o]pen strategic autonomy emphasizes the EU's ability to make its own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement, reflecting its strategic interests and values'.¹³

⁹ EEAS, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels June 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹⁰ *European Strategic Autonomy: Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests*, 4 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper (B. Lippert & N. von Ondarza & V. Perthes eds 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2019RP04_lpt_orz_prt_web.pdf (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹¹ N. Helwig, *EU Strategic Autonomy: A Reality Check for Europe's Global Agenda*, 119 FIIA Working Paper (2020), <https://www.fiaa.fi/en/publication/eu-strategic-autonomy> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹² G. Grevi, *Strategic Autonomy for European Choices: The Key to Europe's Shaping Power*, Discussion Paper, European Policy Centre (2019), <https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Strategic-autonomy-for-European-choices-The-key-to-Europes-shaping-p~213400> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹³ European Commission, *supra* n. 2.

3 THE CURRENT DEBATE

What was once a debate on whether the EU's conventional military capabilities would suffice to maintain its security in a fragile post-Cold war context has transformed into something much broader.¹⁴ Today, the evolution of the debate on strategic autonomy is largely driven by three trends: the great-power rivalry between the US and China, the technological disruption that propels the digital transformation and the increasing use of leveraged interdependence.

The increasing great-power rivalry between the US and China exposes the EU to economic and security challenges.¹⁵ This competition impedes the proper functioning of multilateral organizations, the WTO in particular, and increases risks connected to the possible decoupling of technological standards, supply chains and export markets. With a looming shift of US attention to the Indo-Pacific region and instability in Europe's neighbourhood, new questions regarding Europe's autonomous defence capabilities are also being raised. The EU has recognized China as a systemic competitor, but it is still in search of the right approach given its close economic ties and multilateral cooperation with Beijing.

The technological disruption related to the digital transformation is another key driver of the debate. Europe is under pressure to innovate with regard to future critical technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The software and hardware that drive new technologies are increasingly complex, which increases their vulnerability, as the discussion on 5G security exemplifies.¹⁶

The risk of leveraged interdependence has become more pronounced over the last decade as states use economic ties to further their geostrategic goals. Strategies such as binding others through trade and investment relations are best exemplified by the Chinese Belt-and-Road initiative.¹⁷ More assertive powers use their dominant position in economic networks to coerce partners or opponents. The extra-territorial sanctions of the US on European businesses with regard to Iran constitute a prominent example of this weaponized interdependence.¹⁸

¹⁴ N. Tocci, *European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It*, Istituto Affari Internazionali (26 Feb. 2021), <https://www.iai.it/en/publicazioni/european-strategic-autonomy-what-it-is-why-we-need-it-how-to-achieve-it> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹⁵ Gaens & Sinkkonen, *supra* n. 5.

¹⁶ A. Ken Jakobsson & Marcel Stolz, *Principled Big Tech: European Pursuit of Technological Autonomy*, in *Strategic Autonomy and the Transformation of the EU*, 67 FIIA Report 105–127 (N. Helwig ed. 2021), <https://www.fiaa.fi/julkaisu/strategic-autonomy-and-the-transformation-of-the-eu> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

¹⁷ M. Wigell & A. Soliz Landivar, *China's Economic Statecraft in Latin America: Geostrategic Implications for the United States*, in *Geo-Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century: The Revival of Economic Statecraft* 164–181 (M. Wigell, S. Scholvin & M. Aaltola eds, Routledge 2018).

¹⁸ H. Farrell & A. L. Newman, *Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion*, 44(1) Int'l Sec. 42–79 (Summer 2019).

These international trends force the EU to react. However, rather than providing a coherent concept, strategic autonomy represents a broad headline under which debates over the future course of the EU in international affairs unfold.

To start with, there is an intense debate between those with a narrow, often defence-related reading of the term strategic autonomy and those that have adopted a broad perspective of the idea. In the field of security and defence, the idea of strategic autonomy is indeed contested. Baltic and Central European Member States in particular are cautious given the possible consequences of a more self-sufficient Europe, specifically the risk of loosening transatlantic ties.¹⁹ Poland, for example, harbours long-held concerns that an independent and capable European defence capacity might undermine NATO and in turn reduce the incentive of the US to stay committed to European security.²⁰ With the deterrence of Russia as their primary interest, they are cautious not to send signals to Washington DC that could indicate a loosening of ties. German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer signed an opinion piece in late 2020 asserting that ‘illusions of European strategic autonomy must come to an end’.²¹ Her intervention showed once again the critical attitude to the concept in European defence circles, especially in the transatlantic-minded Member States that also include the Netherlands and Denmark.

While France has been consistently on the other side of the argument, underlining the need to accumulate sufficient strategic and material resources to sustain independent operational capacity, it also has a realistic view on the prospects of Europe’s military future and continuously invests in the transatlantic partnership.²² Tellingly drafts of the forthcoming strategic compass, underline ‘the ability to work with partners’ and strengthening ‘NATO and the transatlantic alliance’ in the same paragraph that proclaims the goal of strategic autonomy.²³ The concept is clearly not meant to be misunderstood as distancing from partners and alliances that European security depends on. The Russian war against Ukraine gives a new urgency to the debate on strategic autonomy in defence matters. Not only does the blatant attack against territorial integrity in Europe give the transatlantic alliance a new purpose. It is noteworthy, that also the EU and its member states have increased their commitment to traditional defence, for example by announcing

¹⁹ N. Helwig, J. Jokela, P. Kuusik & K. Raik, *Nordic-Baltic Perspectives on European Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy: A Northern Agenda for an Open and Secure Europe*, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute (May 2021), <https://icds.ee/en/a-northern-agenda-for-an-open-and-secure-europe> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²⁰ L. Strauß & N. Lux, *European Defence – Debates in and About Poland and France*, 1 SWP J. Rev. (2019), <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019JR01/> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²¹ A. Kramp-Karrenbauer, *Europe Still Needs America*, Politico Europe (2 Nov. 2020), <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-still-needs-america/> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²² A. Pannier, *Between Autonomy and Cooperation: The Role of Allies in France’s New Defense Strategy*, War on the Rocks (2 Nov. 2017), <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/between-autonomy-and-cooperation-the-role-of-allies-in-frances-new-defense-strategy/> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²³ EEAS, *supra* n. 1, at 8.

higher defence expenditures. A more capable Europe and a more even transatlantic burden-sharing might well be the results of this process.

Yet, strategic autonomy has for long been about more than hard security. Many EU officials interpret the concept of strategic autonomy beyond the traditional frames of defence alliances. EU High Representative Josep Borrel or European Council President Charles Michel discuss strategic autonomy from a global perspective, including concerns regarding the EU's economic and technological dependency and its ability to shape global norms and policies.²⁴ They refer more often to the EU's relationship with and dependence on China. Strategic autonomy frequently features in discussions on health security, climate change and the reform of the World Trade Organization.

In the context of economic policies, the EU's management of interdependence is discussed under the heading of 'open strategic autonomy'. Here the EU and its Member States are facing a separate debate, which is no longer concerned with hard security issues, but with the EU's ability to defend against economic distortion and coercion and others taking advantage of its external dependence on critical technology and resources. The dividing lines between Member States are also drawn differently. Critics from free-trade and market-oriented Member States, including the Nordics, put an emphasis on the 'open' part of the concept's equation and are concerned with potentially growing EU protectionism and state intervention in order to compete in the global economy.²⁵ Among the strongest sceptics are liberal economies relying on small and medium-sized businesses that stand to lose a lot from international trade barriers and single-market competition skewed towards big companies in, for example, France and Germany. Free-market-oriented countries are also questioning the extent to which the EU should use trade instruments to promote its values and to push more forcefully for carbon neutral production and human-rights standards, for example. Instead, an 'open' EU economy should adhere to WTO rules, keep trade-barriers low and increase competitiveness through the further liberalization and deepening of the single market.

Given the increased use of economic instruments for geostrategic goals, the economic and security related discussion cannot be neatly separated. The recent harsh sanctions against Russia show how the EU and its partners quickly retaliated with economic weaponry. More generally, the EU's push for strategic autonomy in areas such as trade and investment is seen not only as an economically beneficial move, but also as a geopolitical attempt to use its combined economic power in strategic or even coercive ways. This tension was visible when the EU concluded the Comprehensive Investment

²⁴ Helwig, *supra* n. 11.

²⁵ Helwig et al., *supra* n. 19.

Agreement (CAI) with China in late 2020. The conclusion of talks with Beijing was quickly interpreted in terms of the EU's relationship with the US, as media organizations reported discontent in the Biden team over the timing – just before the US presidential inauguration. The Polish Foreign Minister promptly criticized CAI on the grounds that the transatlantic ally needed to be consulted first.²⁶ In a politicized international environment in which industry and trade policies are readily interpreted from a geopolitical angle, there is little opportunity for EU politicians to advocate strategic autonomy without quickly entering the often reflexive and guarded debate on alliance relations.

Besides security and the economy, there is a third dimension of the strategic autonomy debate that relates to the EU's normative basis.²⁷ Here, the debate on strategic autonomy is criticized for its focus on a distinct European identity. A speech by Emanuel Macron in which he underlined the 'European civilization' as distinct from the American and Chinese traditions is seen as an example of the emerging identity politics behind the strategic autonomy concept.²⁸ Experts have since then warned of a European civilization narrative that is built on exclusive values and even ethnic features of what it means to be European.²⁹ From this perspective, the autonomy and sovereignty debates are in contrast with the universal and open character of European values and – as a result – undermine the transformative power of EU foreign policy.³⁰ Others have underlined that Europeans have good reasons to highlight their historical experience and the lessons they learned from it – not as a way to pitch a European identity against those of others, but as a case for promotion of civic principles.³¹ The strategic autonomy discourse thus reflects the traditional debate in the EU on whether it should focus on its normative power marked by engagement, or whether it should adopt a more protective agenda backed up by defensive military and economic means.

²⁶ Tweet by Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau (22 Dec. 2020), <https://mobile.twitter.com/RauZbigniew/status/1341454786747641859> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²⁷ N. Helwig in this special issue.

²⁸ Speech by French President Emmanuel Macron at the Ambassadors' conference (27 Aug. 2019), <https://lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

²⁹ R. Balfour, *Against a European Civilization: Narratives About the European Union*, Carnegie Europe (6 Apr. 2021), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/04/06/against-european-civilization-narratives-about-european-union-pub-84229> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022); H. Kundnani, *What Does It Mean to Be 'Pro-European' Today?*, *The New Statesman* (4 Feb. 2021), <https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2021/02/what-does-it-mean-be-pro-european-today> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

³⁰ B. Tallis, *'Strategic Autonomy' Is A Dangerous Myth: The Importance of Identity and Multiplicity for EU Strategy, Policy and Practice*, European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (3 Sept. 2021), <https://www.coe-civ.eu/the-coe/civilian-crisis-management-contexts/details/strategic-autonomy-is-a-dangerous-myth> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

³¹ M. Leonard, *The Meaning of Pro-Europeanism – A Response to Hans Kundnani*, *The New Statesman* (22 Feb. 2021), <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2021/02/meaning-pro-europeanism-response-hans-kundnani> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022).

4 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND IR: A LENS TO STUDY EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

How does the strategic autonomy concept relate to different theoretical approaches in the study of the EU's role in international relations? In the following, we will discuss three broad theoretical schools in International Relations (IR) research – realism, liberal theories of international cooperation and constructivism – and discuss what relevance they possibly hold for the strategic autonomy debate (see Table 1).³²

Table 1: International Relations Theories and Strategic Autonomy

	<i>Realism</i>	<i>Liberal Approaches</i>	<i>Constructivism</i>
Assumption and logic	Anarchy and power competition limit depth of cooperation	Shared interests for global cooperation despite anarchy	Identity and social interaction shape international cooperation
Strategic Autonomy as a result of ...	Balancing or band-wagoning strategy	A bargaining process between different EU actors	Discursive processes; 'Othering' on the basis of distinct values
Strategic Autonomy as a driver for ...	Hard power capabilities	Institutionalization of EU foreign policy	Value based foreign and trade policy
Main focus of strategic autonomy in EU's foreign policy	Protecting security and economic interests	Shaping of the multilateral order in line with EU interests	Promotion/protection of norms and values globally

The natural starting point for any discussion on IR theory is realism. Per William Wohlforth, it 'provides a foil against which many other schools of thought define themselves and their contributions'.³³ Realism is a tradition that spans millennia, from the Ancient Greece of Thucydides all the way to the present. Despite being a broad church, in its modern incarnation realists agree on certain key premises. They see the international system as anarchical, inhabited by rational, egoistic states bent on survival. In such a world of self-interested states, uncertainty over the intentions of others prevails.

³² It would, of course, be possible to present other, for instance, broadly poststructuralist, feminist, neo-Gramscian or postcolonialist readings of European strategic autonomy. Such exercises are, however, beyond the scope of the current special issue.

³³ W. C. Wohlforth, *Realism*, in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* 131–149, 131 (C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal eds, Oxford University Press 2018).

This places states – most important of which are the great powers – in an incessant competition for power, which is the key currency of the international realm. As a corollary, realists argue that states are preoccupied with relative as opposed to absolute gains in (mostly material) power resources.³⁴ Finally, given that states are rational egoists with their own interests at heart, values and morality hold little sway in international life. They are window dressing for designs of the powerful at best, detrimental diversions from interest-based pursuits at worst.³⁵

Beyond these core assumptions, however, a considerable amount of variety emerges. Contemporary realists diverge, for instance, over how much power states desire to remain secure. Offensive realists maintain that states' lust for power is insatiable. They are eternally fearful of others' intentions, rendering interstate cooperation extremely difficult.³⁶ Defensive realists expect states to be able to cooperate under certain conditions, for instance, in the presence of nuclear weapons, when prevalent weapons systems favour defence as opposed to offense, or the state is surrounded by weak or non-threatening neighbours.³⁷ Yet others argue that states do not in fact balance against other states' power, but against threats.³⁸ Another point of contention pertains to the stability of certain power balances in the international system: some regard multipolarity (a system with three or more great powers) as less stable than bipolarity (two great powers),³⁹ while post-Cold War realists have debated the stability of a unipolar, one-superpower world.⁴⁰ Neoclassical realists, in turn, have sought to move beyond the level of the international system, introducing intervening variables like 'domestic politics, state power and processes, leaders' perceptions and the impact of ideas' into their analysis.⁴¹

What, then, are the potential avenues that the many brands of realism provide for the study of EU strategic autonomy? The EU's development of military capacity has, since the late 1990s, brought to the fore two sets of arguments. Some realists contend that Europe is, in fact, balancing against the unipolar power of the United States both externally by creating a new alliance formation under EU

³⁴ For a useful summary of these assumptions, see *ibid.*

³⁵ J. J. Mearsheimer, *Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order*, 43(4) *Int'l Sec.* 7–50 (Spring 2019); see also A. Hyde-Price, *EU External Action from a Realist Perspective*, in *The External Action of The European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories* 151–164 (S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz, eds, Bloomsbury 2021).

³⁶ J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W.W. Norton & Company 2001).

³⁷ J. W. Taliaferro, *Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited*, 25(3) *Int'l Sec.* 128–161 (Winter 2000–2001).

³⁸ S. M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press 1987).

³⁹ K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley 1979).

⁴⁰ Compare S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton 2008); C. Layne, *The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the Pax Americana*, 24(2) *Cambridge Rev. Int'l Aff.* 149–164 (2011).

⁴¹ N. Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation*, 36(1) *Rev. Int'l Stud.* 117–143, 118 (2010).

auspices, and internally by building autonomous capabilities.⁴² Variations of the argument also focus on Europe's forays as 'soft balancing', diplomatic and institutional coalition building to contest the United States,⁴³ or 'leash-slipping', the building up of military capabilities not to challenge the US position but to pursue a more independent foreign policy.⁴⁴ Others rebut these claims, arguing that the development of autonomous EU capabilities merely complements American power and NATO, thereby bolstering US unipolarity.⁴⁵ On the part of Europe, this constitutes an example of 'bandwagoning' with the stronger state.

While these debates remain relevant, recent developments in the EU's neighbourhood coupled with the shifting power balance in the system create complications. The European threat environment has evolved through Russia's increasing assertiveness. When this is coupled with heightened fears of US retrenchment,⁴⁶ EU strategic autonomy can convincingly be analysed as balancing, but not against the United States. Instead, the Union's concern is regional, namely Russian power. Similarly, the bandwagoning argument holds sway. On the one hand, Europe hitching its cart to the US may, as in the past, be motivated by the acknowledgment that balancing against America's preponderant power is futile (ergo irrational). On the other hand, the US remains a *status quo* power in the face of Chinese and Russian revisionism, and maintaining the current (liberal) international order is likely in the EU's interests – also in terms of achieving strategic autonomy.⁴⁷ Of course, each of these accounts can be further complicated by looking at the EU not as an aggregate, but as a collection of independent Member States with potentially conflicting interests.⁴⁸ Some members, France for instance, might be inclined to pursue an EU 'pole' independent of the US (and other great powers). Here strategic autonomy is clearly an example of balancing behaviour. Others, like Germany, might be happy to hedge their bets between a resurgent China, a declining US and, especially in current circumstances, a regionally (re) assertive Russia.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Baltic states and Poland would prefer to

⁴² B. R. Posen, *European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?*, 15(2) Sec. Stud. 149–186 (2006).

⁴³ T. V. Paul, *Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy*, 30(1) Int'l Sec. 46–71 (2005).

⁴⁴ C. Layne, *The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment*, 31(2) Int'l Sec. 7–41 (2006).

⁴⁵ Brooks & Wohlforth, *supra* n. 40.

⁴⁶ G. Martin & V. Sinkkonen in this special issue.

⁴⁷ Compare L. Cladi & A. Locatelli, *Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism*, 33(2) Contemp. Sec. Pol'y 264–288, 282 (2012).

⁴⁸ J. Ringsmose, *Balancing or Bandwagoning? Europe's Many Relations With the United States*, 34(2) Contemp. Sec. Pol'y 409–412 (2013).

⁴⁹ On hedging see A. Toje, *The EU Security Strategy Revised: Europe Hedging Its Bets*, 15(2) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 171–190 (2010).

bandwagon with the United States, regarding strategic autonomy as a distraction at best, or a dangerous escapade at worst.

The second set of approaches are liberal theories of international cooperation that trade under various banners, including liberal institutionalism, liberal internationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and democratic peace theory.⁵⁰ Of course, liberal ideas have an illustrious history dating back to Immanuel Kant, John Locke and Adam Smith. Despite differences between approaches, the liberal tradition in IR encompasses certain core assumptions. These include the idea that states possess a shared interest in cooperating and, thus, creating ordered spaces to achieve absolute (as opposed to relative) gains grounded upon expectations of diffuse (as opposed to specific) reciprocity.⁵¹ International institutions facilitate such cooperative endeavours by providing regularized fora for learning about the interests, preferences and constraints of others, reducing transaction and enforcement costs, and ultimately legitimating outcomes.⁵² Crucially, institutionalized cooperation can take place without a powerful authoritative actor (a hegemon) in an anarchical international system, although cooperation may be easier in the presence of such an actor.⁵³ On the other hand, even a disproportionately powerful state may have an interest in tying itself to international institutions in order to reap the long-term benefits of cooperation – as the US has done within the post-Second World War liberal international order.⁵⁴ As institutions develop they may also assume a life of their own, enabling, constraining and socializing their members, or even becoming agents in their own right.⁵⁵ While often state-centric in its institutionalist variant, some liberal theorists are attentive to the link between democracy, cooperative disposition and peace,⁵⁶ while liberal

⁵⁰ See e.g., R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press 1984); G. J. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton University Press 2012); A. Moravcsik, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, 51(4) *Int'l Org.* 513–553 (1997); B. Russett & J. R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (W.W. Norton 2001).

⁵¹ See e.g., Ikenberry, *supra* n. 50, at 62–66; R. O. Keohane, *Reciprocity in International Relations*, 40(1) *Int'l Org.* 1–27 (1986); J. G. Ruggie, *Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution*, 46(3) *Int'l Org.* 561–598 (1992); R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books 1984).

⁵² J. Sterling Folker, *Neoliberalism*, in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* 114–131, 120 (T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith eds, Oxford University Press 2013); In the broad literature, institutions are variously understood 'as formal or informal institutions, physical organizations, as well as rules, norms and practices and even belief systems and ideologies'. T. Tiilikainen, *Theory of European Integration as Challenge to IR Theories*, 5(4–5) *Global Aff.* 477–484, 478 (2019).

⁵³ Keohane, *supra* n. 50.

⁵⁴ Ikenberry, *supra* n. 50.

⁵⁵ M. N. Barnett & M. Finnemore, *The Power of Liberal International Organizations*, in *Power in Global Governance* 161–184 (M. N. Barnett & R. Duvall eds, Cambridge University Press 2005).

⁵⁶ Russett & O'Neal, *supra* n. 50.

intergovernmentalism proposes attention to both domestic and international bargaining to explain (un)cooperative outcomes and, ultimately, institutionalization.⁵⁷

From the standpoint of liberal theories of cooperation, recent debates over the concept of strategic autonomy provide ample possibilities for further research. The notion brings to the fore collective action problems within both the Union and its Member States, such as how to approach the Covid-19 pandemic, the climate crisis or growing interstate competition. Wrangling over strategic autonomy thus unfolds in domestic politics of the Member States, between different Member States on and outside EU institutional fora, as well as within and between the EU institutions. These bargaining processes can produce both cooperative outcomes or discord and thus influence EU potential for achieving strategic autonomy.

Beyond processes of bargaining and negotiation, it is likewise possible to explore the actual institutionalization of the concept and its implications. For instance, committed actors – whether Member States or other ‘norm entrepreneurs’⁵⁸ – can push for and against the strategic autonomy agenda in different EU fora, whether in the Council, the European Commission or the European Parliament. The notion can also function as a central rationale for setting up new institutions, with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) being recent cases in point. The idea of strategic autonomy can also gather legitimacy through institutionalization, and thus ultimately enable and constrain the conduct of EU institutions and the Member States themselves, or even socialize them to adapt their interests. More broadly still, strategic autonomy can be understood as the EU’s attempt to make sense of its own agency in an age where the sinews of the liberal international order writ large are loosening.⁵⁹ In fact, a key component of strategic autonomy is the ability to influence the rules, procedures, and even value base of key global institutions like the WTO or WHO.

A third lens through which strategic autonomy can be approached is constructivism. In contrast to realism and liberal approaches to international cooperation, it starts from the assumption that reality does not exist independently but is constructed and reproduced through our interactions.⁶⁰ Applied to the subject at

⁵⁷ A. Moravcsik & C. Emmons, *Liberal Intergovernmentalism and EU External Action*, in *The External Action of The European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories* 181–196 (S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz eds, Bloomsbury 2021).

⁵⁸ M. Finnemore & K. Sikkink, *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, 52(4) *Int’l Org.* 887–917 (1998).

⁵⁹ G. J. Ikenberry, *The End of Liberal International Order?*, 94(1) *Int’l Aff.* 7–23 (2018). For a recent discussion on EU autonomy and the evolving liberal international order see B. Fägersten, *European Autonomy in a Changing World Order*, in *The European Union in a Changing World Order: Interdisciplinary European Studies* 23–46 (A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, N. Bremberg, A. Michalski & L. Oxelheim eds, Palgrave 2020).

⁶⁰ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press 1999).

hand, also the EU as a global actor does not exist independently from its social environment. Instead, the external action of the EU is shaped by its identity and its interaction with others.⁶¹ As with the other theoretical approaches, constructivism comes in different shapes and forms. Role theory is an often used approach to analyse the EU's global role.⁶² The approach emphasizes the interactive processes between the actor's behaviour and external contestation that leads to a constant re-evaluation of the EU's role performance.⁶³ Critical constructivism underlines that the European identity is constructed in distinction to an 'Other'.⁶⁴ By emphasizing European norms and values, for example in the enlargement process, the EU emphasizes distinctions to third states and draws boundaries. Liberal constructivists, however, counter this claim and highlight the post-national and inclusive character of the European integration process.⁶⁵

Constructivism provides a rich menu to dissect strategic autonomy. The genesis and evolution of the concept can be interpreted as a result of the current discourse and interactive processes in the EU. Here it can be highlighted that there is not one interpretation of strategic autonomy and instead the meaning of the term depends on the policy context and the perception of different actors. For some Member States the notion of strategic autonomy is interpreted through the prism of their immediate security concerns and the negative prospects of weakening transatlantic relations. Others, based on their national identity and concomitant interests, take a different view and emphasize the need to sustain independent resources in a more competitive global context. Not only is the term perceived differently, it can also be actively interpreted in different ways in policy discourses. Elites evoke the concept of strategic autonomy as a 'justificatory device'⁶⁶ to argue for a certain policy or course of action.

The debate between critical and liberal constructivists relates strongly to the debates on strategic autonomy and European sovereignty. While critical constructivists would interpret the emphasis on the protection of European values and the narrative of a 'European civilization'⁶⁷ as a process of 'othering', liberal constructivists would emphasize the EU's international projection of norms as a key characteristic of strategic autonomy. Both constructivist camps would ultimately

⁶¹ B. Rumelili, *Constructivism and the Role of the 'Other' in EU External Action*, in *The External Action of the European Union 197–212* (S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz eds, Bloomsbury 2021).

⁶² See also N. Helwig and K. Mustasilta in this special issue.

⁶³ S. Harnisch, *Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts*, in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses 7–35* (S. Harnisch, C. Frank & H. W. Maull eds, Routledge 2011).

⁶⁴ D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (University of Minnesota Press 1992).

⁶⁵ Rumelili, *supra* n. 61.

⁶⁶ V. Sinkkonen & H. Vogt, *Connected in Freedom? Reconstructing a Foundational Value in EU and US Foreign Policy Discourses*, 17(3) *J. Transatlantic Stud.* 341–369 (2019).

⁶⁷ Balfour, *supra* n. 29.

highlight that values are at the core of the debate of strategic autonomy and analyse how they translate into an EU foreign policy that either protects or promotes a European way of life.

In sum, strategic autonomy can help us approach the study of the EU's global role from different theoretical angles. As an unorthodox lens, it lends a common, multi-theoretical frame to the analysis of different dimensions of EU foreign and security policy. At the centre of studying EU strategic autonomy is always the question of how the EU reacts to the emerging risks that develop in its interactions with the wider world. Depending on the area of analysis, this can be a re-evaluation of its trade and investment policy, the doubling-down on the normative basis of its foreign policy, or the 'hardening' of its defence or crisis management instruments. In the next section, we introduce the findings of the articles in this special issue.

5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

Based on the multi-theoretical and inclusive frame outlined above, the contributions to this special issue dig deeper into several dimensions and cases of the strategic autonomy debate. In his contribution, Niklas Helwig chooses a constructivist framework to analyse the strategic autonomy debate and its effects on the EU's global role.⁶⁸ Based on a role theoretical framework, he puts forward the hypothesis that the reason for the attractiveness of the term lies in its ambiguity. Whether the EU or Member-States officials argue for EU actions to further market-liberal, normative, or security goals, they can relate their aims to the overall concept of strategic autonomy. Hence, the discussion between different narratives of the EU as a market, normative or realist power is as open as ever, as the current debates on reforms of the EU's foreign and security policy exemplify. Whether the ambiguity of the strategic autonomy concept is constructive or destructive remains open, yet some of the Member States already complain that the concept rather stands in the way of a well-defined EU approach to international affairs.

Katariina Mustasilta applies a role theoretical model to the concrete case of EU conflict prevention.⁶⁹ While the EU's traditional approach to conflict prevention mirrors its self-conception as a 'normative' and 'civilian power', the security challenges of recent years have led to a prioritization of 'harder' security and defence capacities within the EU. Especially here, the notion of strategic autonomy has been translated into a focus on defence capabilities, security partnerships as well as resilience, while preventive engagement has been deemphasized. The focus

⁶⁸ Helwig, *supra* n. 27.

⁶⁹ Mustasilta, *supra* n. 62.

on strategic autonomy has real implications for the effectiveness of the EU, as the Union's role performance, focused on geopolitical impact, might end up weakening the Union's agency in conflict prevention.

The younger debate on strategic autonomy in matters of EU trade and investment policy is analysed by Tobias Gehrke.⁷⁰ His contribution sheds light on the changing priorities of the EU's economic policies and how they relate to the larger structural shifts that we see in the global economy. The concept of 'open strategic autonomy' that the European Commission promotes is part of a larger global reassessment of the benefits and risk of economic interdependence, visible also in the US, for example. The ebb and flow between economic liberalism and realism is a well-documented phenomenon in world politics and is now captured in a wide set of policy readjustments of the EU's trade and investment policies.

Tero Poutala, Elina Sinkkonen and Mikael Mattlin analyse the EU's response to the growing risks of 'weaponized interdependence'.⁷¹ Their contribution shows that the strategic autonomy concept has evolved from the military dimension to include a broader set of security concerns, such as the risks of 'predatory' foreign investments in strategic industries. They focus on Chinese strategic investments in two thematic industries – critical maritime transport infrastructure and 5G – and discuss the EU's activities to ensure a better screening of investments. While the EU attempts to 'de-weaponize' its interdependence, limitations to its capacity to act remain, as the Union has limited competence on issues related to the national security of the Member States.

The article by Garret Martin and Ville Sinkkonen analyses the US stance towards strategic autonomy.⁷² It tackles the apparent puzzle of the first year of Joe Biden's term in the White House, namely why Biden – a pro-European President by disposition – is not proving more amenable to transatlantic relations in general, and European strategic autonomy in particular. The article suggests that the answer can be found in the interplay between the history of transatlantic relations, international and domestic structural factors as well as the on-going ideational contestation over US grand strategy. In the end, the authors underline the difficulty of instituting a sustainable major reform of the transatlantic relationship. In their assessment, the US approach to Europe will, in the future, most likely oscillate between 'primacist' tendencies driving for sustained US leadership, especially in defence matters, and a 'benign neglect' of Europe in an age marked by strategic competition with China. Neither scenario bodes particularly well for the future of EU strategic autonomy.

⁷⁰ Gehrke, this issue.

⁷¹ Poutala et al., this issue.

⁷² Martin & Sinkkonen, *supra* n. 46.

Sergey Utkin analyses the perspectives among Russian academics and politicians on the EU's strategic autonomy debate.⁷³ While the EU's ambition is treated with a degree of hope for a more balanced world, scepticism over the EU's ability to develop as an independent power centre prevails. The article highlights that also Russia is contemplating its sovereignty and autonomy in a changing international environment, even though its situation and priorities are different. Attention is also paid to the transatlantic bond, which is interpreted very differently – with constant suspicion in Russia towards the EU as a tool in the Western challenge against Moscow.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The special issue uncovers some preliminary findings on the research questions raised in this introduction. A key question that the contributions address is, why, by whom, and with what aim the term strategic autonomy is used in the policy debates. The defining feature of strategic autonomy is that there is no universally accepted and concretely defined meaning of the term. Instead, its ambiguity invites a variety of agents to fill the concept with life and thus contributes to its widespread use. We find that the use of the term can be broken down by actors who deploy it in different settings and in pursuit of various objectives. In the field of external economic relations, one prominent actor framing the strategic autonomy debate is the European Commission. Gehrke shows how the directorate general for trade uses the term 'open strategic autonomy' to underline the need to bolster the EU's economic resilience, while maintaining the core of its trade-liberal stance of the previous decades.⁷⁴ In the security and defence field, the agents of the strategic autonomy debate are scattered across EU institutions and Member States. However, per Mustasilta they are united in their prioritization of 'internal security and geopolitical needs' as part of the strategic autonomy debate, as opposed to the EU's normative agenda.⁷⁵ In addition, Member States are key agents in the development of the strategic autonomy discourse. The case of the EU's foreign direct investment screening exemplifies how 'much of the "heavy lifting" on implementing EU policy goals still falls upon Member States with varied economic and security interests', which ultimately hampers an effective EU response, as Poutala et al explain.⁷⁶ Eventually, strategic autonomy is 'what the member states make of it', especially in those areas where they have ultimate control over how to deal with their respective external dependencies.

⁷³ Utkin, this issue.

⁷⁴ Gehrke, *supra* n. 70.

⁷⁵ Mustasilta, *supra* n. 62.

⁷⁶ Poutala et al., *supra* n. 46.

Of course, the ambiguity of European strategic autonomy also presents potential for (intentional or not) misunderstanding on the part of external actors. In the case of Russia and the US there is clearly space for different interpretations of the term. Per Utkin, from Russia's vantage point, the notion has potentially positive and negative connotations.⁷⁷ In the period before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, strategic autonomy could have been a gateway to better EU-Russia relations in a more 'multipolar' world. In the post-2022 context, it could rather constitute a mere 'rebranding' of the European pillar of a transatlantic alliance that maintains an antagonistic relationship with Russia. For the US, in turn, Martin and Sinkkonen illustrate how strategic autonomy creates a dilemma⁷⁸: its achievement can simultaneously make Europe a less pliant partner for America's global forays – for instance in the competition against China – but also alleviate the perennial burden sharing problem in the transatlantic relationship. This could coincidentally make Europe a more attractive partner in the long run, and free up US resources to focus more on the Indo-Pacific. The US stance on EU strategic autonomy thus oscillates curiously between negative, agnostic, and positive perceptions.

But what does the emergence and widespread use of the term in the public discourse tell us about the changing nature of the EU as a global actor? As the articles in this special issue reveal, the strategic autonomy debate reflects a general trend in global politics of 'pulling up drawbridges' and focusing on a defensive posture in international politics. However, there is a particular European flavour to the debate on the continent, as no other entity was built on and has invested in the multilateral, rules-based and liberal order as much as the EU. This gives a significance to the discursive and policy changes. Here the crucial question is whether a hardened EU means that it loses its selling point as a normative power. In her contribution Mustasilta points to the trade-offs between a more geopolitically focused EU and its role as an actor in conflict prevention.⁷⁹ Gehrke outlines the EU's delicate balance in combining trade defence with its emphasis on openness and multilateral cooperation.⁸⁰ Overall, we detect certain growing pains of the EU as a geopolitical actor in the making – these issues are captured well in its evolving strategic autonomy discourse.

The special issue also discusses the implications and recommendations for the EU's global role. As Helwig concludes in his article, there remains a risk that the ambiguity of the strategic autonomy concept might turn out to be destructive

⁷⁷ Utkin, *supra* n. 73.

⁷⁸ Martin & Sinkkonen, *supra* n. 46.

⁷⁹ Mustasilta, *supra* n. 62.

⁸⁰ Gehrke, *supra* n. 70.

rather than constructive in the further development of EU foreign policy.⁸¹ This would be the case especially if the ‘meta debates’ on the term do not translate into concrete policy initiatives. Based on this special issue, we recommend emphasizing the positive agenda of strategic autonomy. Often, the term is seen as divisive, as observers overemphasize or even willingly misinterpret the independence aspect. However, as discussed in-depth in our contributions, strategic autonomy is about much more than just the breaking of ties. The structural pressures of the changing international environment are likely to persist, and the EU and its Member States need to address questions of how to respond and position themselves. The Russian war against Ukraine underlines the pressure for the EU to adapt to new international realities. Member States should embrace the ambiguity of the strategic autonomy concept and live with the fact that no one will ever conclusively define the notion. Instead of losing sleep over terminological issues, they should move to implementation. Towards that end some concrete policy developments are discussed in this special issue, for example with regard to foreign direct investment screening or the EU’s trade policy.

The contributions to this special issue, along with the conceptual and theoretical exposition in the introduction, illustrate that it is indeed possible to envisage a fruitful research agenda around the concept of strategic autonomy. The notion clearly resides at the juncture between practice and theory, straddling policy parlance as well as academic reflections on the evolution of the EU’s global actorness. While critics of the concept in the policy world and the research community are quick to point to its aspirational and ambiguous qualities as shortcomings,⁸² there is another, more nuanced reading. On the level of policy formulation and implementation, the notion of strategic autonomy allows the EU – which the late John G. Ruggie once called ‘the first “multiperspectival polity”’ to emerge since the advent of the modern era⁸³ – to assume different approaches in managing its multifarious external dependencies. For scholars, strategic autonomy presents a thematic around which students of the international arena from multiple theoretical traditions can converge to explore and understand the Union’s actorness in a changing and ever more complex twenty-first-century world order.

⁸¹ Helwig, *supra* n. 27.

⁸² C. Major & C. Mölling, *Less Talk, More Action*, online, *Internationale Politik Quarterly* (2 Dec. 2021), <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/less-talk-more-action> (accessed 9 Mar. 2022); Tallis, *supra* n. 30.

⁸³ J. G. Ruggie, *Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations*, 47(1) *Int’l Org.* 139–174, 172 (Winter 1993).

