



**UNIVERSITY  
OF TURKU**

# **Frame analysis of the 2019 trade dispute and Zainichi Koreans in South Korean newspapers**

East Asian Studies

Master's thesis

Faculty of Social Sciences

Author:

Natalia Vasileva

02.06.2025

Turku

The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check service.

Master's thesis

**Subject:** East Asian Studies

**Author:** Natalia Vasileva

**Title:** Frame analysis of the 2019 trade dispute and Zainichi Koreans in South Korean newspapers

**Supervisor:** Dr. Soc.Sci, Silja Keva

**Number of pages:** 79 pages

**Date:** 02.06.2025

The complicated relations between South Korea and Japan continue to present a “puzzle” for international relations theory. Their strategic and economic closeness suggests political closeness as well, however, that is not the case. The root cause of the repeated clashes is the so-called “history problem” – disputes and issues stemming from Japan's colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). Opposing attitudes to this “history problem” have become a part of South Korea’s and Japan’s national identities, affecting the foreign policy decisions they employ. Such foreign policy decisions, in turn, continue to produce and reproduce the dominant national identities, presenting a mutually constitutive relationship.

This study utilizes the poststructuralist approach to discursive national identity construction to explore how the trade dispute of 2019 was framed in South Korean newspapers, aiming to identify not only the dominant, but also alternative discourses, which could suggest possible solutions to the “history problem” and the ongoing clashes between South Korea and Japan. In addition, to add dimension to the study of (South) Korean national identity construction, frames of Zainichi Koreans – Korean minority in Japan – are also explored, as well as the effects of partisan leaning of the newspapers on the way they frame the issues.

Through the frame analysis of 4 South Korean newspapers, it was confirmed that the dominant discourse present in media is still that of South Korea as the victim and the one *remembering* the past and Japan as the aggressor and the one trying to *forget*. As Zainichi Koreans have also faced discrimination and hardships in their lives in Japan, essentially being victims juxtaposed to Japan’s oppression, they were also framed as Koreans – “one of us” as opposed to the Japan’s “other.”

However, alternative views were also identified, such as suggestions to not forget, but “overcome” the overbearing focus on the past, most prominently exhibited by the conservative Chosun Ilbo. This study argues that such discourse existing helped to make the subsequent resolution of the trade dispute possible and imaginable to the South Korean public, thus suggesting that we may see the “history problem” between South Korea and Japan resolved in the future if this alternative discourse continues to grow and develop to contest the dominant one.

**Key words:** Zainichi, South Korea, Japan, national identity, history problem, trade dispute, frame analysis.

## **Table of contents**

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Social and historical context</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	Zainichi Koreans	9
2.2	Trade dispute between South Korea and Japan	14
<b>3</b>	<b>Theoretical Framework</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Methodology and Data</b>	<b>25</b>
4.1	Research method	25
4.2	Selection criteria for South Korean newspapers and articles	28
4.2.1	Timeframe	29
4.2.2	Keyword	29
4.2.3	Topic	30
4.3	Data collection procedures and sample size	30
4.4	Analysis process	31
4.5	Methodological challenges	33
<b>5</b>	<b>Data analysis</b>	<b>34</b>
5.1	General frames	34
5.1.1	Conflict frame – how the trade dispute was reported on	35
5.1.2	Responsibility – who is responsible for solving the crisis	36
5.1.3	Economic consequences – what the trade dispute will lead to	41
5.1.4	Security – how the trade dispute affects national security of South Korea	47
5.1.5	Solution – how can the trade dispute be solved	49
5.2	Framing of Zainichi Koreans in the context of the trade dispute	51
5.2.1	Zainichi Koreans as Koreans	51
5.2.2	Zainichi Koreans as an issue in South Korea-Japan relations	52
5.2.3	Zainichi Koreans as victims of the trade dispute	54
5.2.4	Zainichi Koreans as experts on South Korea-Japan relations	56
<b>6</b>	<b>Findings and conclusion</b>	<b>61</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>64</b>

## 1 Introduction

The complicated relations between Japan and South Korea continue to be one of the key issues in the East Asian region, often being referred to as an unsolvable puzzle for the international relations theory (Jackson, 2018). Despite being strategic and economic partners, which would normally suggest positive relations and closeness, both countries are more often at odds than not to the extent of that antagonism being considered a core part of their national identities (Seo, 2024).

This antagonism stems from the period when Korea was colonized by Japan (1910 to 1945), which left many unresolved disputes commonly referred to as a “history problem”. Perhaps the most discussed issues in the South Korea-Japan relations coming from the colonial period are the “comfort women” issue, the territorial dispute of Dokdo-Takeshima, and the recurring issue of Japanese textbooks attempting to “whitewash” the history. However, these issues are not the only consequences of the colonial period: it has also created a Korean diaspora in Japan, with many Koreans coming to work in the metropole for various reasons. After Japan surrendered in 1945, presumably 600 000 Koreans (Streltsov, 2023) decided against repatriating, which left them “residing in Japan”<sup>1</sup> – becoming Zainichi Koreans.

With the Korean War and the establishment of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) that followed, Zainichi Koreans have effectively lost their homeland as it was when they left it, making Japan their newfound home. They have faced various struggles in their lives; from not having a legal status to not being able to use their Korean names or native language in fear of discrimination for being different.

As decades went on, the newly emerged Korean states went further and further from each other in terms of governmental and social structure, and even though there are still hopes of a reunion, it is undeniable that both DPRK and ROK present a different Korea from the one that existed when the first generations of Zainichi Koreans left their homes, thus making them a “diaspora without homeland” (Ryang & Lie, 2009).

However, it was not only the Korean peninsula that changed over the years; the Zainichi Korean community has also gone through various transformations. If at first the community

---

<sup>1</sup> In Japanese – 在日, *Zainichi*, lit. “residing in Japan.”

was rather consolidated, in the recent times there is a growing trend of naturalization among the Zainichi Koreans; at the same time, with the issues of diversity and multiculturalism getting more attention all over the world, many Zainichi Koreans are also leaving the “ethnic closet” to speak up about their identities (Ryang & Lie, 2009).

Considering all these historical and sociological changes, the question of what forms Korean national identity is still far from being clearly defined. There are two Korean states on the peninsula, and there are also Korean diasporas in different parts of the world – the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), USA, and, as mentioned above, Japan. Moreover, even inside these communities there is no universal understanding of what it means to be Korean, as each member defines it differently (Demelius, 2020). In the poststructuralist view of national identity, it may even never be defined as it is always changing and fluid. However, we can try to understand *how* it is constructed to gain better understanding of the events and processes unfolding in the Northeast Asia, as it is the national identity that often forms foreign policy – and vice versa (Hansen, 2006). As Seo (2024) points out, this could even be the solution to the puzzle of South Korea-Japan relations, where recognition of the antagonistic national discourses – and moving on from them – is the starting point for the countries to form sustainable bilateral relations as “tolerable” neighbors rather than ontological enemies.

This could be achieved through the closer look on the most recent hurdle in the South Korea-Japan relations, where the question of national identity came to the forefront of public’s attention as well. In 2018, a new development to the “history problem” unfolded with the South Korean courts ruling that Japanese companies should pay out compensations for their use of Koreans’ forced labor in the WWII. In response, Japan decided to retaliate economically and on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2019, restricted export of chemicals essential for semiconductor production to South Korea (CSIS, 2019). Later, Japan also removed South Korea from its list of “white countries” – trusted trading partners, exports to which do not require acquiring a special export license (Suetomi, 2019). South Korea responded by also removing Japan from its list of “white countries,” and the conflict continued escalating, leading to a series of subsequent mutual restrictions on trade from both the countries and, particularly, boycotts of Japanese products and companies in South Korea.

Deacon (2021) analyzed the discourses existing in South Korean and Japanese media on this dispute, coming to a conclusion that the dominant discourses on national identity of South Korea as the one *remembering* the past (the “history problem”) and Japan trying to *forget* it

served to present these antagonistic foreign policy decisions as something possible and imaginable. However, he admitted that alternative discourses exist too, albeit it was not possible for him to cover it under the scope of his work. In my own research, I aim to take a step further and closely analyze how the trade dispute of 2019 was framed by South Korean media to identify not only the dominant discourse on this conflict with Japan, but also possible alternatives that contest such discourse. In doing so, I hope to help in tracking possible changes to the dominant discourses. This research could also lay out basis for further studies on the effects of identity construction in media for the public and help us understand how it may be transformed in the future, possibly bringing change to the nature of South Korea-Japan relations.

So, the first research question of this research is formed to be the following:

### **1) How did news media frame the South Korea-Japan trade dispute?**

Moreover, in the trade dispute of 2019 the topic of Zainichi Koreans and how to understand which national identity they belong to was also discussed in South Korean media. For example, the biggest South Korean online retailer Coupang was forced to make a public statement clarifying its origins after it came under the fire of anti-Japanese boycotts for receiving investments from Softbank. Softbank is a Japanese investment holding company – but it was founded by a Zainichi Korean, Masayoshi Son, which several South Korean newspapers pointed out when reporting on this event (JoongAng Daily, 2019a). In this context, the Zainichi Korean identity of Masayoshi Son was presented as an important argument “for” Coupang being essentially Korean, with JoongAng Daily warning that it was important to avoid “casualties among our own.” In other words, Zainichi Koreans were also framed as “our own”, as opposed to being the Other – Japanese. But how consistent is this view?

As most Western and English-language research on Zainichi Koreans focuses on them being an ethnic minority in Japan (Howell, 1996; Weiner ed., 1997; Kim B., 2011) or as a diaspora (Lie, 2008; Lie & Ryang, eds. 2009), their relations with the Korean states are not explored in detail. This presents an obvious gap in understanding the construction of Korean national identity as well. If antagonism towards Japan is a core part of Korean national identity, how does that reflect on South Koreans’ perception of Zainichi Koreans, who are ethnically Korean but permanently live in Japan? Are they still perceived as Koreans, or are they viewed as foreign and Japanese, given that many of them were born there, speak Japanese as their

first language, and do not seek to return to Korea? Or, perhaps, there is a third way? Finding answers to the questions could help in discovering alternative discourses on Korean national identity as opposed to the dominant one, which is antagonistic towards Japan. Moreover, to circle back to Seo's study (2024), it could also offer insight on whether it is possible for South Korea and Japan to resolve their "history problem" by reformulating their identities as cooperating neighbors rather than conflicting enemies – which, arguably, Zainichi Koreans have partly achieved when constructing their own.

Thus, this paper aims to fill the identified gap and analyze how Zainichi Koreans were perceived and represented by the South Korean media amidst the trade dispute and anti-Japanese boycotts of 2019, where the question of national identity was especially important for the South Korean public. In line with this goal, the second research question of the study was formed as follows:

**2) How were Zainichi Koreans framed in South Korean media during the trade dispute between Japan and ROK?**

As the political leaning of the media outlets affects the way they report on the events and build the frames to make the information more digestible for their readers, the following sub-question is also considered:

**Are there any differences in how media from a specific side of the political spectrum report on trade dispute and Zainichi Koreans?**

To find out the answers, the primary research is conducted through a qualitative frame analysis of the newspaper articles published by 4 South Korean newspapers: Chosun Ilbo (conservative), JoongAng Ilbo (centrist-conservative), Hankyoreh (liberal) and Kyunghyang (liberal). The second chapter of this paper will give social and historical context to Zainichi Koreans and the trade dispute necessary to understand the nuances of the study. Chapter 3 gives a literature review on earlier research written on Zainichi Koreans and identity in international relations studies, as well as information on the theoretical framework of this research project. Chapter 4 describes methodology utilized in the research and selection criteria for primary data, as well as introducing said data. Chapter 5 presents in-depth analysis of the selected articles with chapter 6 discussing the findings and drawing conclusions for this research project.

## 2 Social and historical context

### 2.1 Zainichi Koreans

In English language and, subsequently, research on the topic, the term “Zainichi Koreans” refers to the group of Koreans who immigrated to Japan under its colonial rule over Korea, or the descendants of those immigrants. According to Itagaki (2015, p. 51), in 1909 there were only 790 Koreans living in Japan; however, as Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and thus made its people Japanese citizens, this number started growing.

The primary motivation for migration was work, however, it is difficult to say that it was completely voluntary. After the WW I, the imperial Japanese government started to expropriate farmlands from Koreans living in the rural areas, leaving them without the means to support themselves and thus indirectly forcing them to move to the mainland Japan, which needed cheap labor. This need grew even bigger with Japan engaging in war with China and USA and mobilizing its population for the military operations, leaving a deficit of workers, especially in the military sector. To cover this deficit, Japan started to forcefully import workers from its colonies, Korea and Taiwan.

During the WW II, Japan forcefully moved approximately 634 000 Koreans to Japan to work in mines, construction, manufacturing and machine industries. By 1945, the number of Koreans living in Japan grew to more than 2 million (Lee M, 2021), either through labor and military mobilization or by being born in the families of the Korean immigrants. After Japan’s capitulation, most of them returned to Korea, and by 1948, only around 600 000 of Koreans remained in Japan – who were to become the core of Zainichi Korean population in Japan. It is important to note though that the first generation of Zainichi Koreans did not intend to stay, and they were still holding hopes of eventually returning to their homeland, choosing to call themselves “*zainichi chosonjin*” – “Koreans remaining in Japan.” (Ryang & Lie eds., 2009, p.7).

Their legal status remained ambiguous due to a series of decisions made by the Japanese government. In 1945, with the universal female suffrage being implemented in Japan, the right to vote for the subjects of the state was restricted by their belonging to the domestic household registry, *naichi koseki*, which essentially left Korean and Taiwanese residents of Japan at that time without the right to vote (Streltsov, 2023). In 1947, the Japanese government implemented an alien registration system as opposed to residential registration

system, to which all non-Japanese residents of Japan were to be subjected. In 1950, the Japanese parliament approved the new citizenship law confirming that the Japanese nationality was to be acquired on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (by the nationality of either or both of the parents). However, in Japan, only the father's nationality could be the basis to acquiring the nationality, so only Japanese people with a Japanese father were to preserve their Japanese citizenship after the WW II. The only exclusions were made for the Ainu and Ryukyu, the native people of Hokkaido and Okinawa respectively (Debito, 2015, p. 716).

With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and Japan giving up its colonies and recognizing their independence from Japan, the Japanese government also announced its decision to strip the people of its former colonies residing in Japan of their Japanese citizenship (Lee, 2010, p. 170). At that time, the Korean war between Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly referred to as North Korea) and Republic of Korea (ROK, referred to as South Korea) had broken out on the peninsula. As Japan did not have diplomatic relations established with either of the countries at that time, the Koreans residing in Japan essentially became stateless. They were referred to as *chosenseki*, which semantically means "Korean national"; or, commonly, *zainichi*, which semantically means "residing in Japan", but was used to address specifically immigrants from the war or pre-war times and their descendants. Although this term can refer to, for example, a Zainichi Chinese or Zainichi American, it almost always implies precisely a Korean colonial-era population (Lie, 2008, p.10).

The separation of Korea into two states further complicated the status of Zainichi Koreans, as now they had to choose which country to affiliate with – as well as making it more difficult to return to the "homeland." Even the way they were referred to in their Japanese alien registration cards became a political question: their "home" was either *chosen*, which meant simply "Korea" and was not referring to any existing state, or *kankoku*, which started to mean Republic of Korea; although to Japanese authorities, both of these meant the same state of "statelessness and disenfranchisement" (Ryang & Lie eds., 2009, p.9).

In 1965, Japan established diplomatic relations with Republic of Korea, which allowed those Zainichi Koreans who affiliated with South Korea to receive an official national identification as South Korean nationals (*kankokuseki*) and the right of permanent residence in Japan. Those who chose not to follow this option were a minority and remained with the status of *chosenseki*, and even though it was intended to simply denote that their origins lied

somewhere on the Korean peninsula, after 1965 *chosen* came to be understood as being affiliated with North Korea. As Japan still does not diplomatically acknowledge North Korea (and North Korea not granting citizenship to any persons residing overseas except for their diplomats), Zainichi Koreans with the *chosenseki* identification did not hold a North Korean nationality, opposite to the common misconception; and for a long time, they experienced worse treatment than those who chose *kankokuseki* – for example, only in 1993 did they receive the same permanent residence status, “*tokubetsu eijuken*” (Streltsov, 2023).

This divide was reflected in the structure of the Korean organizations in Japan. The two biggest ones are the Korean Residents Union in Japan (also known as *Mindan*), closely linked with South Korea, and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (also known as *Chongryon*), which is considered to be pro-North Korea.

Chongryon was founded in 1945 and after its reorganization in 1955 became a very influential organization for Zainichi Koreans in Japan. Although originally most of them (98%, according to Ryang & Lie, 2009) came from the southern areas of Korea, they were one of the poorest groups of people in the postwar society, and DPRK appealed to them ideologically as the first communist state on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the northern leadership, together with Kim Il-sung, was perceived as the one being more “anti-Japanese” than the southern regime under Syngman Rhee. At the same time, North Korea was more economically stable and successful than South Korea, which further made it look more appealing. In 1959, Chongryon even started a repatriation program for Zainichi Koreans to return to DPRK – which was fairly popular for the abovementioned reasons, with nearly 93 000 Koreans choosing to leave Japan for North Korea (Okamura & Saito, 2022). However, on arrival, many of them were accused of being Japanese spies or belonging to an “enemy class” and subsequently subjected to repressions (Park, 2017, p.74).

With this, as well as waning prestige of North Korea as the Cold War went on and the Peace Treaty being signed between Japan and South Korea, Chongryon also gradually lost its influence over the Korean community in Japan. One area where they still preserved it was education: Chongryon founded many Korean ethnic schools in Japan, where they taught Korean language, culture and history, among other standard subjects taught in schools. Although their numbers are also dwindling in the past years due to lower birthrate and the continuing naturalization of Zainichi Koreans, going from 76 schools with 8323 students in

2009 to 64 schools with 5223 students in 2019, they are still the biggest network of ethnic schools in Japan (Yonhap News, 2021).

These schools and their students are often discriminated against, as Chongryon's affiliation with North Korea creates doubts whether the education offered by them is truly devoid of any ideological influence; further exacerbated by the negative image of North Korea that the public possesses due to DPRK admitting abduction of Japanese citizens in the period from 1977 to 1983 and the continuing nuclear tests and missile launches performed by the country. For example, in 2009, representatives of the far- and ultra-right activist group *Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai* ("Group of citizens who do not tolerate privileges for ethnic Korean residents in Japan", also known as *Zaitokukai*) performed a series of demonstrations in front of the Kyoto Chosen Dai-ichi Primary School, shouting abusive and discriminatory remarks and damaging school facilities. As a result, the organization was banned from performing demonstrations near ethnic schools and was ordered to pay *12.26 million yen* (\$126,400) in damages (Hurights Osaka, 2013). This was not the only attack organized by *Zaitokukai*, and in the end this movement and other cases of discrimination against *Zainichi* Koreans were "central" in pushing Japan towards stricter laws against hate speech (East Asia Forum, 2024). In 2016, Japan enacted "Hate Speech Prevention Act", that was intended to prevent manifestations of racial discrimination – but the law does not stipulate any penalties for such activities in fear of violating freedom of expression, which prompts criticism of whether it is really effective in curbing hate speech (The Mainichi, 2021).

However, the abovementioned does not mean that it is only the association with North Korea that prompts discrimination against *Zainichi* Koreans in Japan, or that those of them who have South Korean nationality live a careless life. Streltsov (2023) argues that a rise of nationalism and xenophobia in the Japanese society was a reaction to the series of public statements made by the Japanese leadership in 1990s and 2000s that admitted the "mistakes" of the colonial and military past, which clashed with the stance previously taken by the Japanese government. For example, until 1990s, Japan denied the coercive nature of "comfort stations", military-run brothels where women from Japanese colonies, including Korea, were recruited during WWII. This changed in 1993, when then-chief cabinet secretary Yohei Kono released a statement (so-called "Kono statement") in which the Japanese government admitted that

coercion during recruitment did take place and apologized for it<sup>2</sup>; later on, this statement has been challenged by some Japanese conservatives, including former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who said he did not believe the coercion had happened<sup>3</sup>, with the Japanese government going as far as considering re-examining and retracting this statement in 2014, which prompted a negative reaction from South Korea<sup>4</sup>. This is not the exhaustive representation of discussion on the “comfort women” issue, however, it shows the controversial nature of it – where its criticism understandably angers countries which suffered in the past from Japan’s colonial rule, it also finds domestic support from such organizations as Zaitokukai, who choose Zainichi Koreans as the subject of their discriminatory activities. Although Zaitokukai is not a massively popular organization, it is but an extreme example of anti-Korean sentiments existing in the Japanese society, which can also take form in less outrageous, but still hurtful ways.

In an article published in The Mainichi Shimbun on March 1, 2021, a Zainichi Korean journalist reports on microaggressions that Zainichi Koreans face in their daily lives to this day. He compares it to a “thousand cuts”<sup>5</sup>, referring to a “death by a thousand cuts”, a form of torture and execution originating from China, and drawing the analogy that even seemingly inoffensive statements can lead to mental illnesses such as depression if they accumulate over time. He gives examples of such “cuts” that Zainichi Koreans face: questions like “are you a North Korean agent?” or remarks like “if you want to complain, go back to your country”; as well as sharing his own experience. Although he was born and raised in Japan and speaks Japanese as his first language, he holds a South Korean passport and uses his real (Korean) name, which makes Japanese people compliment his Japanese language skills as if he was a foreigner, make fun of him for not being able to speak Korean, or ask him to explain the position of South Korean government when ROK-Japan relations are experiencing a crisis. He admits that none of that is obvious discrimination, but nevertheless it bothered him – as well as other Zainichi Koreans. The journalist also quotes a psychiatric social worker heading Zainichi Korean Counselling & Community Center (ZAC) in Kyoto, which conducts

---

<sup>2</sup> See Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 04.08.1993. URL: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/rp/page25e\\_000343.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html) (Accessed: May 1, 2025).

<sup>3</sup> Wartime sex slave urges Japanese PM to apologise during US trip. The Guardian, 2015. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/wartime-sex-slave-japan-pm-shinzo-abe-apologise-us-trip> (Accessed: May 1, 2025).

<sup>4</sup> Japan to review lead-up to WW2 comfort women statement. BBC. 28.02.2014. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26379645> (Accessed: May 1, 2025).

<sup>5</sup> A thousand cuts: A 'Zainichi' Korean reporter's deep dive into microaggression in Japan. The Mainichi. 01.03.2021. URL: <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210227/p2a/00m/0na/020000c> (Accessed: May 1, 2025).

counselling for those who faced discrimination through microaggressions: in the psychologist's words, this situation is a consequence of the way Japanese politicians address Korea-related issues and how they are later represented in Japanese media, which formed a “disdainful hostility” towards Korean people in the Japanese society – including Zainichi.

In other words, foreign policy actions have direct influence on people’s lives – especially when it is something connected to such a complicated phenomenon as the “history problem.” It is often the statements made by the politicians of either country on the historical issues that cause improvement or deterioration of the bilateral relationship; with the most recent example being the trade dispute of 2019, which is the topic of this research.

## **2.2 Trade dispute between South Korea and Japan**

The trade dispute between Republic of Korea and Japan took place from 2019 to 2023, but the reasons behind it can be traced back to a few years earlier. Ultimately, it can be called a consequential development of the tensions existing between South Korea and Japan regarding the shared “history problem”, which were briefly mentioned in the previous section, as well as domestic politics in both countries.

As mentioned above, the topic of “comfort women” is one of the recurring issues in South Korea-Japan relations. Following decades of controversies and polemics since the Kono Statement, in 2015 South Korea (led by then-president Park Geun-hye) and Japan (led by then-prime minister Shinzo Abe) seemingly reached an agreement that was mutually acceptable, with Japan insisting that it is “final” and that with this it considers the case of “comfort women” to be completely settled (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).

However, this proved to not be the case with the change of the South Korean leadership that happened after Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed from the office in 2016 as a result of a political scandal. As Dyachkov (2020) points out, in South Korea the inter-party power struggle does not leave room for any compromises, with the opposition taking a firm stance against the ruling party’s policies “as a matter of principle”, which had happened in this case as well: the center-left coalition that held the majority in the South Korean parliament at that time “fiercely” criticized the agreement signed by the conservative administration of Park Geun-hye. Furthermore, reputational damage sustained by Park Geun-hye in this scandal was so large-scale that the initiatives associated with her name also lost their popularity and support. As a result, in the presidential elections of 2017 that followed impeachment, all

candidates promised to review the agreement of 2015. The elections were won by Moon Jae-in, a liberal politician representing the Democratic Party of Korea.

Although Moon Jae-in did not openly scrap the 2015 agreement, his government did not rush to implement its stipulations; for example, the joint fund to compensate the victims of “comfort stations” were to be contributed to by both Japan and South Korea. Japan has contributed 1 billion yen (around \$10 million) to it, but the South Korean government reimbursed the fund for the same amount so as to not to use the money received from Japan and send it back. Eventually, the fund was declared “withering” and closed by South Korea in July 2019, which prompted criticism from Japan (Dyachkov, 2020, p.78).

This was not the only example of the South Korean leadership using the “history problem” in its foreign policy. As then-president of USA Donald Trump visited South Korea in November 2017, he was introduced to one of the “comfort women” at the welcome dinner; the dinner’s menu also included shellfish from the Dokdo (Takeshima) waters, which again angered the Japanese public, with Japan lodging a protest through diplomatic channels and Japanese media calling such move “anti-Japanese”<sup>6</sup>.

The tensions continued to grow in the following years as well. Another issue related to the colonial past that resurfaced was the issue of compensation for Japan’s use of forced labor, which was briefly mentioned in the previous section. In October of 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea upheld a 2013 ruling of the court of appeals, ordering Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corporation to compensate each plaintiff for using their forced labor during World War II (Lee & Lee, 2019). In November of the same year, the same decision was made regarding the lawsuit against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. To ensure that the compensation is provided, the shares held by the Japanese companies in South Korea-based entities were to be liquidated (Lee J., 2019).

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that Japan decided to retaliate economically, perhaps inspired by the trade war between USA and China, which was unfolding at the same time. On July 1, 2019, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) announced that it was imposing restrictions on export of certain chemicals and materials essential to production of semiconductors to South Korea, citing concerns over leakage of the

---

<sup>6</sup> Japan anger over South Korea's shrimp surprise for Donald Trump. The Guardian. 10.11.2017. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/10/japan-anger-south-koreas-shrimp-surprise-menu-donald-trump-sex-slave> (accessed: May 2, 2025).

sanctioned materials to North Korea as the reason for the decision, although a Japanese government official also mentioned “broken trust” with South Korea over the forced labor compensations as a factor (Lee J., 2019). Furthermore, on August 2, 2019, Japan excluded South Korea from its “whitelist” of trusted trade partners for export of goods and materials. South Korea followed the suite and on August 12, 2019, removed Japan from its “whitelist” as well.

As the conflict kept escalating, it started affecting other spheres of international relations as well. On August 22, 2019, South Korea announced its decision not to prolong the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. This agreement allowed both of the states to seamlessly share military intelligence on North Korea’s actions, and with its cancellation, it put at risk not only South Korea-Japan military cooperation, but also South Korea’s relations with USA, who is the main ally of both ROK and Japan in the region. The U.S., who considered GSOMIA to be the key to “common defense against North Korea”<sup>7</sup>, tried to encourage Japan and South Korea to resolve the conflict, albeit fruitlessly.

Furthermore, the South Korean public, seeing Japan’s actions as another manifestation of the country’s unwillingness to recognize the historical past, erupted in anti-Japanese boycott movements, refusing to buy products of Japanese origin or even refusing to travel to Japan. However, with Japan and South Korea being close trade partners with shared history, it was not always easy to assign the companies’ national origins. With the start of the boycott movement, several Korean companies such as Lotte, Daiso and Coupang were forced to clarify their origins as they came under the fire of boycotts. Notably, in Coupang’s case it was the fact that Japan-based Softbank Vision Fund made investments into the company that made consumers consider boycotting it. However, Softbank’s then CEO Masayoshi Son is a third-generation Zainichi Korean, who became a naturalized Japanese citizen only in 2015. As the anti-Japanese boycott movement kept gaining steam, the Zainichi Korean community in Japan had also raised concerns that such movement could lead to a worsening image of Korea and, by extension, Koreans, and hurt their already vulnerable position in the Japanese society even more<sup>8</sup>.

---

<sup>7</sup> Media Availability by Secretary Esper En Route to Tokyo. The U.S. Department of Defense. URL: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1927792/media-availability-by-secretary-esper-en-route-to-tokyo/> (accessed: May 3, 2025).

<sup>8</sup> 민단 도쿄단장 "재일동포는 목이 조여온다...국민상처 정치 이용 말았으면" [The chairman of the Tokyo branch of Mindan: “Koreans in Japan are feeling suffocated... Stop using the nationals’ wounds for politics.”]

As could be seen from CSIS timeline (2019), it was the period from the beginning of July to end of August of 2019 where the most active part of the conflict took place. With COVID-19 coming to the forefront of both domestic and international concerns, the conflict stalled, as well as attempts to resolve it as diplomatic contacts became increasingly difficult to organize due to the travel restrictions. It wasn't until the change of South Korean government, with the conservative politician Yoon Suk Yeol taking the office in 2022, when South Korea-Japan relations began to thaw. Yoon Suk Yeol restored GSOMIA<sup>9</sup> and in general showed willingness to cooperate with Japan and move on from the issue of unpaid compensations for forced labor<sup>10</sup>. With this, it could be said that the trade war between South Korea and Japan came to an end in 2023.

However, it is too early to say if the confrontation over the “history problem” is truly over. On April 4, 2025, the Constitutional Court of Korea decided to uphold the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol and remove him from the office, which puts the date of next presidential elections to no later than June 3, 2025. At the moment of writing, the opinion polls favor Lee Jae-myung, a liberal politician representing the Democratic Party of Korea (Statista, 2025). As mentioned earlier, in South Korea opposition tends to criticize the leading party's decision, and once again, similarly to Park Geun-hye, Yoon Suk Yeol's reputation has also been tainted by his attempt of military coup. It is not far-fetched to say that if an opposition candidate – this time liberal – wins the presidential elections of 2025, it is possible that there will be changes in South Korea's policy towards Japan and the “history problem” once again.

---

Chosun Ilbo. 19.07.2019. URL: [https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html) (accessed: May 3, 2025).

<sup>9</sup> Japan, S. Korea Confirm Normalization of Military Info-Sharing Agreement. Yomiuri Shimbun. 17.03.2023. URL: <https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20230317-97916/> (accessed: May 3, 2025).

<sup>10</sup> What's Driving the Japan-South Korea Thaw? The Diplomat. 21.03.2023. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/whats-driving-the-japan-south-korea-thaw/> (accessed: May 3, 2025).

### 3 Theoretical Framework

This chapter aims to shortly summarize the academic discussions relating to the topic of this research to put it into a broader academic context, as well as present the theoretical framework under which the study was conducted. At first, an overview of academic approaches to national identity and its place in international relations is given, with special focus on Korean identity; followed up by an overview of the English-language literature on Zainichi Koreans relevant to the topic of study.

As this research looks to explore how Korean national identity is constructed in relation to Zainichi Koreans, it is important to start with defining the concept of national identity. In general understanding, national identity is a shared sense of belonging to a nation or state, influenced by many factors, such as historical, contextual, normative, and so on (Verdugo & Milne, 2016, p. 1). However, it must be noted that the debates over how to define national identity remain one of the unsolved questions of social sciences as there are multiple views on this topic, with some academics even willing to abandon the concept entirely (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p.5). For this reason, I am not arguing that the definition given here is an encompassing definition of the concept but rather, as Weber (1949) referred to it, an “ideal type” meant not to describe reality, but help me in my analytical purposes.

The three dominant approaches to national identity in academic literature are essentialism (primordialism), constructivism and civic citizenship. Essentialism considers national identity to be fixed and based on such markers as language, history, blood, religion, culture and ethnicity (Geertz, 1973; Armstrong, 1982). In contrast, constructivism argues that national identity is a social construct that can be created, manipulated and disassembled by those in power to remain in power, and is a result of modern processes of state formation, education, and institutionalization (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Vlastos, 1998). Civic identity approach considers national identity to be unrestrained by ethnicity and culture – in this understanding, it is rather a legal membership based on citizenship, political values, and participation in democratic institutions (Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1995).

In the recent decades (1990s and 2000s), poststructuralism (or critical constructivism) is also gaining popularity in academic discussion on national identity. It builds upon Foucault's concepts of discourse as a historically contingent social mechanism of power and knowledge which shapes not only language but social reality and identity itself (Adams, 2017).

Poststructuralism views national identity as something dynamic and context-dependent and focuses on the discursive nature of national identity construction through language, power and representation (Wodak et al., 2009). Another aspect of the poststructuralist view of national identity is that it is relational and Self is understood in comparison with the Other (Campbell, 1998). Campbell (ibid.) also points out that the discourses on national identity are unstable and require constant reproduction to uphold their dominance.

In this study, I chose to use the poststructuralist approach, as, in my opinion, it is the most applicable when discussing Korean national identity. Essentialism sees ethnic and national ties as the “primordial attachments” that are natural (Geertz, 1973) or puts common ancestry and territory as the markers for belonging to the same national identity. However, it is not necessarily the case for Korean national identity. In his work “Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity” John Lie notes that before the 20<sup>th</sup> century, social class was more important in Korea than belonging to the same ethnicity or coming from the same territory; and the colonial period was the factor that helped to solidify the sense of national identity. He proposes the idea of “diasporic nationalism”, stating that the existence of Korean diaspora was essential to the development of Korean nationalism (and thus, the concept of Korean national identity overall).

Moreover, following the decades of separation and diverging political paths, North and South Korea, despite both being “Korea”, hold different political systems and values, which are also documented to be a part of how the Korean national identity is constructed. As Won and Huntington (2021) analyzed elementary school textbooks used in North and South Korea to explore how their national identity is presented to students, they found that the larger emphasis was placed on political differences between the states rather than shared ethnic and cultural heritage. In other words, to Koreans shared ethnicity does not necessarily equal that one would be considered as “Self” as opposed to the “Other.”

In this sense, the civic identity approach could be seen useful as it focuses on shared political values, citizenship and participation of citizens in social institutions that build the state’s political legitimacy rather than ethnic ties (Verdugo & Milne, 2016, p. 5). However, it would not be able to explain the relations between South Korea and Zainichi Koreans who hold South Korean citizenship. As Ryang (2009, p. 11) points out, Zainichi Koreans with South Korean nationality do not have a resident registration number that is needed for daily routines in South Korea and for this reason do not appear in the South Korean Information and

Security Agency database. They are also exempted from taxation and mandatory military service and are unable to vote in the South Korean elections or be elected in them, which makes their South Korean nationality “incomplete” (ibid., p.12).

As such, being ethnic Korean or even holding South Korean nationality does not mean automatic acceptance as “one of us.” Kim Joo-hwan (2015) in his essay on Korean identity starts by stating that he is not a Zainichi, “a victim of history of discrimination”; as in, he does not belong to the group of oldcomer Zainichi Koreans but rather is a newcomer – a Korean who “happened to be” born and raised in Japan to (South) Korean parents. He shares an anecdote of him taking a taxi in Seoul and talking to his mother in English, which prompted a question from the taxi driver on where the child was born. The mother chose to say “America”, rather than Japan, which Kim writes down as the first lesson he learned about his identity: “it is okay to be Korean-American, it’s not okay to be Korean-Japanese” (ibid., p. 441). He continues to mention that in his experience, South Koreans treat Zainichi as “traitors” who did not return to the homeland after its lengthy fight for independence; sharing an anecdote from attending a summer school in Seoul, where a discussion on the historical guilt between Japan and Korea happened. As Kim chose to defend Japan’s point of view, his classmates blamed him for “not really being a Korean”, arguing that he “would never take up the Japanese side” if he was (ibid., p.444). He ends his article with comparing himself to Zainichi Koreans, who, in his opinion, are like an island, with neither Japan nor (South) Korea willing to claim it. Therefore, he prefers to identify as an American because in America, he could pass and be accepted by the society.

This example shows how relation to the “history problem” can be a deciding factor in determining one’s national identity. To Kim Joo-hwan’s classmates, being Korean inherently meant opposing Japanese and taking Korea’s side in arguments on the historical past and associated issues. Deacon (2021) comes to a similar conclusion: he finds that South Korea’s and Japan’s dominant national identities are shaped through a “mutually constitutive relationship” where South Korea is looking to remember the past while perceiving Japan as an oppressor who tries to forget it; and Japan looking to distance itself from the past, considering it to be a rational action and perceiving (South) Korea as irrational for continuing to dwell on it. In turn, these identities shape the states’ foreign policy decisions, defining what is possible and imaginable politically, making clashes over the “history problem” a consequence of such dichotomy, with the trade dispute of 2019-2023 being one of the manifestations of it. In his research, Deacon continues to develop poststructuralist theoretical framework which focuses

on discursive identity construction and apply it to a case study of discourses employed by Japan and South Korea during the trade conflict of 2019, in an attempt to gain better understanding of the “history problem” existing between the two states.

As I am also interested in exploring the Korean national identity in connection to its foreign policy and international relations with Japan, I choose to use this approach as opposed to conventional constructivism as well. When it comes to the relationship between national identity and foreign policy, conventional (or norm) constructivists argue that national identity determines national interests, which shape foreign and security policies, and are socially constructed through social interactions and norms (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015). However, Deacon (2021, p. 3) highlights a certain issue with conventional constructivism: while discussing *what* constructs identity, it does not pay much attention to *how* these ideations are produced and reproduced. Moreover, norm constructivism implies that the relation between national identity and foreign policy is one-way, as in, it is the identity that affects the policies, without considering the possibility of foreign policies affecting the construction of the national identity. Therefore, Deacon argues that it is necessary to use a more critical (or poststructuralist) perspective when discussing national identities, as such perspective focuses on discursive identity construction and the ways in which national identities and foreign policy practices coexist and affect each other.

Indeed, if we look at the history of South Korea-Japan relations, it could be noted that the political decisions had contributed to constructing both Korean and Japanese national identities by juxtaposing them against each other. The treaty of 1965 was supposed to settle all historical disputes between the two states and its nationals – the point that Japan adheres to when it comes to discussing the “history problem” in bilateral relations. However, in 2011 the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea ruled that the 1965 agreement did not consider the national interests “actively enough” when it came to the issue of “comfort women”, and, therefore, they were justified in seeking compensations from Japan. This decision gave “new life” to the fading discussion of the issue (Dyachkov, 2020) and further contributed to constructing the identity of Korea as the one *remembering* and Japan as the one trying to *forget*. As Deacon (2021) points out, such national identity construction defines what decisions and actions are legitimate and possible from the point of view of both countries, highlighting the mutually constitutive nature of national identity and foreign policy.

In other words, understanding national identity also means understanding the course the nation takes in its politics, both domestic and international. Looking at the way national identity is produced and reproduced can help in tracking the possible changes in national identity construction and predicting future developments in foreign policies employed by the state. As South Korea-Japan relations and their conflicts over the “history problem” are often treated as an unsolvable puzzle (Lee, 2013) where the negative sentiments towards each other are treated as an essential and core part of the national identities, analysis of national identity construction can assist in shedding light onto the question: is it possible for the “history problem” to be solved in the future if the national identities of Japan and (South) Korea will stop being antagonistic towards each other?

Finding answer to this question is possible if we examine alternative discourses existing in South Korea and Japan. In his research, Deacon identified how the trade dispute of 2019 acted to (re)produce the clashing dominant national identities of South Korea as the one *remembering* and Japan as the one trying to *forget* through the discourse analysis of national media of both countries. However, as he pointed out, this is not the only discourse of the trade dispute and national identity existing in South Korea (2021, p. 14), and study of alternative discourses will also be fruitful as it would help not to reify the “history problem” between the two states, as well as illustrate how and to which extent the dominant identity discourses are contested.

In line with this, the first research question is formed to be the following, as I aim to conduct a more detailed study of discourses existing in South Korea than Deacon through researching how the media framed the trade dispute of 2019:

**1) How did news media frame the South Korea-Japan trade dispute and anti-Japanese boycotts?**

Moreover, I aim to gain a deeper understanding of the (South) Korean national identity by combining Deacon’s poststructuralist approach to national identity construction in relation to the “history problem” with John Lie’s approach to Korean identity as one being shaped through its diaspora. As was discussed above, shared ethnicity is not enough to be considered Korean, with political opinions and attitude to the “history problem” playing a defining role in constructing the national identity. Since Zainichi Koreans possess both Koreanness and Japaneseness (Demelius, 2020), analyzing the ways they are seen and represented by South Korea can offer more insight on what is perceived as “Self” or the “Other” when it comes to

Korean national identity, and what is possible and imaginable when it comes to South Korean foreign policy towards Japan.

In English-language academic literature, research on how South Korea perceives Zainichi Koreans and how that relates to their definition of Korean identity seems to be scarce.

Generally speaking, English-language research on Zainichi Koreans started by looking at them as one of Japan's minorities, together with Ainu, Ryukyu (Okinawans) and Burakumin (Howell, 1996; Weiner ed., 1998); later being complemented by academic discussions looking at them through the prism of diaspora studies (Lie, 2008; Lie & Ryang ed., 2009). While Lie (2008) did note that the formation of Korean diaspora helped to form the sense of Korean identity, this relationship is not explored in detail.

Although there have been some studies made lately on this relationship (Gorbunova, 2020; Lim and Song, 2021), they had different focus, looking at it specifically from the point of view of diaspora studies. Gorbunova, aiming to find how Korean diaspora was perceived by South Korean public through discourse analysis of South Korean newspapers, finds that South Korean media, in general, holds a positive image of Koreans abroad, while recognizing their contributions to the economic development of South Korea and improvement of bilateral relations between the host country and South Korea. She also highlights that South Korean media's narratives often echo the narratives stated and developed by the government officials. However, that study mostly analyzes the media reports on Korean diaspora in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), USA and China, published in English language, which implies the global audience rather than domestic. It also does not present a detailed review of narratives and frames existing in South Korean media regarding Zainichi Koreans that would account both for the historical and sociological context of them existing in Japan, as well as the complicated history between ROK and Japan that inevitably affects their existence. Similarly, when applying a discursive approach to analyze South Korea's turn to "diaspora engagement" in its policies such as providing access to South Korean permanent residency and citizenship to Koreans living overseas, Lim and Song (2021) intentionally omit discussion on Zainichi Koreans from their analysis for the reason that the process of their institutional incorporation took place in a different context than the other Korean diasporas, both domestically and internationally.

As such, I aim to fill this gap by looking into how the South Korean national identity was produced and reproduced through the perception and representation of Zainichi Koreans, with the second research question being the following:

**2) How were Zainichi Koreans framed in South Korean media amidst the trade dispute between Japan and ROK?**

By doing this, I hope to contribute to research on the discursive construction of Korean national identity, as well as research on Zainichi Koreans and their relations with South Korea. Furthermore, with my study I hope to start laying down foundation for further research on how reproduction of identity through relation to the “history problem” in media affects the public’s perception of it by making the first step – analyzing the way it is framed on the example of the trade dispute. In other words, I am hoping to bridge the academic discussion on the discursive identity construction with empirical studies of media effects, which could also help in understanding whether the antagonistic nature of South Korea-Japan relations could be resolved in the future.

Furthermore, with looking for possible solutions to the “history problem” being one of the objectives, I deem it important to also consider political affiliation of South Korean media outlets to be analyzed. As discussed in Chapter 2, new developments in South Korea-Japan relations are often happening when there is a change in South Korean leadership, with progressive politicians such as Moon Jae-in seeking to reinforce the *remembering* narrative, while conservative politicians such as Park Geun-hye and Yoon Suk-yeol were more willing to consider closure to the issues associated with the “history problem.” As Gorbunova (2020) finds that South Korean media often echoes the narratives of government officials, exploring this angle could also contribute to understanding how South Korea-Japan relations could develop in the future. Considering this, the following sub-question will also be analyzed: **are there any differences in how media from a specific side of the political spectrum report on Zainichi Koreans?**

## 4 Methodology and Data

This chapter expands on the methodology chosen for the research and data selection process and is divided into five parts. First, the research method will be explained, followed by the description of selection criteria for data and subsequent explanation of how they were applied during the data collection procedures. The chapter is concluded with an overview of the analysis process, which will be presented in detail in the following chapter, and a disclaimer regarding the methodological challenges of this research.

### 4.1 Research method

To find answers to the posed research questions, this study employs a qualitative frame analysis of news articles published by South Korean newspapers on Zainichi Koreans amidst the 2019 trade dispute. Such choice is explained by my interest in discursive construction of (South) Korean national identity through the lens of Zainichi Koreans representation, which suggests using a qualitative research method. As for the choice for frame analysis, the explanation will be given as follows.

One concept important to the discussion of national identity not mentioned in the previous chapter is the idea of imagined communities developed by Anderson (1991). Anderson argues that since individuals in a nation-state cannot realistically interact with everyone else in the same geopolitical entity, they imagine a community they belong to and build their identity based on that image. Moreover, he believes that it was the development of book printing and print language that helped form a sense of national identity, as more people received access to the same texts presented in the same language and thus were able to understand and connect to each other. Although Anderson is traditionally viewed as a constructivist (Verdugo & Milne, 2016, p. 4), his concept of imagined communities is also used by poststructuralists such as Wodak et al. (2009) in their discursive analysis of Austrian national identity construction.

Whilst this understanding of national identity construction through (written) media primarily relates to the development of capitalist production methods and technology, it still rings true to this day. It could be argued that now it is even more relevant than ever, with the amount of information we consume in our daily lives. It is not realistic to form one's opinion on every single issue or concept we encounter, and we resort to intermediaries and tools that help us digest this information – books and book reviews, TV programs, newspapers, and, more

recently, social media, video essays or generative AI. In the case of more traditional media such as newspapers, one of the ways they make information more accessible to their readers is framing.

According to Entman, to frame means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient <sup>11</sup> in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993, p. 51). A frame, then, is a “socially shared organizing principle” that illustrates how media coverage can assist the public in sense-making of events; for the audience, it is a mental shortcut that makes even the most complex issues a more digestible thought structure (Winslow, 2017).

By selecting what aspects to make salient and what to keep obscure, those who do the framing exert their political power. As such, framing is never neutral – it always imposes a specific logic on the readers through the persuasive use of symbols, thus shaping the public opinion and eventually affecting political decisions (ibid., p.2). In this sense, the concept of frame is linked to power and knowledge – which are also the central elements of discourse in the Foucauldian understanding of it. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) also define media discourse as a set of interpretive packages with frames being at the core of each package. So, in studying frames and framing processes, we can understand how the discourses are produced and reproduced in the media and society, and how they affect legislative and public policy decisions.

To give an example on how media framing and frame analysis can interact with the ideas of discursive identity construction, a case of American national identity and the “war on Terror” can be considered. Campbell (1998), when writing about American national identity and its construction, pointed out that in the aftermath of the Cold war and the fall of the USSR, USA faced the crisis of representation as it lost its Other. It required the discourse of danger posed by the Other to reproduce its political identity; with Campbell prognostically stating that “reproducing the identity of “the United States” and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger” (ibid., p. 170). A few years later, the terrorist attacks on

---

<sup>11</sup> Entman defines salience as making a bit of information more memorable, meaningful and noticeable to the readers of a text (1993, 53).

September 11, 2001, served as a major turn towards presenting terrorism as the discourse of danger against which the US national identity was constructed.

In this process, media framing played a significant role. As highlighted by Winslow in his short frame analysis of the terrorist attacks (2017), to understand what happened and why, the public needed a sense-making technique – or a frame – when trying to process the tragedy of 9/11. In response, government and media constructed a “war on Terror” frame by representing attackers as “senseless evildoers intent on killing innocent Americans because they hated Americans’ freedom” (ibid., p.4). This frame ended up becoming the dominant discourse, determining what was imaginable and legitimate in the US foreign policy – namely, military action, rather than economic sanctions or diplomatic solutions. Winslow suggests that part of the reasons why the “war on Terror” became a successful concept was because it was less cognitively demanding for the public to form their opinions on the event, as there was already a frame and similar concepts from the past to process it with. As such, frame analysis can help in illuminating sense-making techniques utilized by different actors to explain the events and phenomena happening in reality to the public.

In a similar fashion, applying frame analysis to reports on trade dispute between South Korea and Japan with the focus on framing of Zainichi Koreans can illuminate how Zainichi Koreans are presented and explained to South Korean public, which, in turn, would also offer insight on how the (South) Korean national identity is constructed through the discourse existing in the society. After all, as Conway (2001) states, conflict between nations is a major factor in increasing the salience of national identity – which could also be applied here as for the South Koreans, the national identification of the goods and companies that produced them served as the basis for deciding whether to buy it or not.

Another use of news frame analysis is to “establish a starting point for studies of media effects” (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p. 152-153). In an earlier study conducted by Moon and Sung (2006), they found that Koreans’ exposure to negative news articles contributed to their negative perceptions of Japan and negatively affected their intentions of acquiring Japanese products. In this sense, the current research can serve as a starting point for similar studies of exploring the effects of media coverage of Zainichi Koreans on their relations with South Korean nationals, thus moving forward the understanding of this dynamic in sociopolitical context.

## 4.2 Selection criteria for South Korean newspapers and articles

As the sub-question of this research concerns the political leaning of the newspapers, a balanced selection is needed to avoid possible bias in the data to be analyzed. With this and time and resource limits of this research in mind, the following daily newspapers were selected: Chosun Ilbo (conservative), JoongAng Ilbo (conservative), Hankyoreh (progressive) and Kyunghyang Shinmun (progressive).

Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo are considered to be the major conservative newspapers in South Korea, with them jointly holding a 70% of the market prior to 1990s (Kwak, 2011). Traditionally, Chosun Ilbo is characterized by its pro-business stance, support for the U.S.-ROK alliance and opposition of left-leaning administrations, as well as criticism of North Korea's regime and more favorable view of Japan. JoongAng Ilbo is considered to be more moderate in its conservative views, however still influential (Jin & Kwak ed., 2018).

Later in 1990s, following the democratic changes in South Korea, liberal newspapers such as Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Shinmun (from here on referred to as Kyunghyang) emerged. These progressive outlets maintain adversary with right-leaning administrations, support progressive values and peaceful engagement with North Korea, while being more critical towards Japan than the conservative ones.

These media outlets have the largest daily circulations and have often been researched in Korean journalism studies (Kim, Y. & Kim, B., 2024; Kim, N. & Lee, S., 2022). For example, Lee & Paik (2017) analyzed framing of the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) pandemic by Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh in their news coverage amidst the outbreak in 2015. The researchers found that the way the newspapers framed the pandemic was largely affected by their partisan leanings, with Chosun Ilbo attributing responsibility for the outbreak to individuals, while Hankyoreh attributed it to the government and society. As my sub-question also aims to find out how partisan leanings of the newspapers affected their framing of Zainichi Koreans, using the same outlets in my research is more likely to produce results consistent with other studies in the field.

Furthermore, the following criteria were established when selecting data for the frame analysis.

#### 4.2.1 Timeframe

As a comprehensive overview of South Korean newspapers' publications on the chosen topic over the whole span of the South Korea-Japan trade dispute is not possible under the scope of a Master's thesis volume, this research was focused on the time frame from 1st of July, 2019, to 31st of August, 2019, as it was the period when the most of the negative coverage of the trade dispute was published (Lee & Chon, 2022). In addition to that, 15th of August is the National Liberation Day in Korea, celebrating the liberation of Korean Peninsula in 1945 from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule by the Allies, and most newspapers release pieces dedicated to the occasion, which are more likely to address the complicated history of Korea and Japan, and grievances associated with the colonial rule.

According to another study published by Choi and Lee (2020), mentions of terms related to “boycott” or “buycott” in South Korean online communities went from 408 cases on July 4th, 2019, to 591 cases on the next day, July 5th. Mentions of these terms peaked on August 16th, 2019 (670 cases) and subsided after August 20th. Therefore, I argue that this period was when the movement attracted the most attention from the general public, and analyzing the articles published during this period would help to fulfil the research goals.

#### 4.2.2 Keyword

To draw the most comprehensive sample of data for the research, I decided to select articles containing the keyword “재일” (*jaeil*, “residing in Japan”). This is an umbrella term for anything that “resides in Japan” – companies, embassies, exchange students, and also part of the terms used to describe Zainichi Koreans as well. The variety in terms to describe Zainichi Koreans in Korean language is one of the reasons for such a decision; there is no universal term as in English language, and these versions can be used: “재일교포” (*jaeilgyopo*), “재일동포” (*jaeildongpo*), “재일코리안” (*jaeilkorian*). The choice of what term to use can be up to personal preferences of the writer, but can also carry some connotations, which will be expanded on in the analysis chapter of this work. To avoid missing out on relevant data, I chose to collect my sample by using the umbrella term and then filtering out articles not relevant to the research topic.

### 4.2.3 Topic

As the purpose of this work is to analyze the image of Zainichi Koreans in the context of trade dispute between Japan and South Korea, these two topics were defined as the key criteria for selecting the relevant articles. Only articles containing both of these topics were selected, which allowed me to filter out i.e. articles reporting on recent activities of Zainichi Korean celebrities, art exhibitions organized by Zainichi Koreans, etc.

## 4.3 Data collection procedures and sample size

Considering the goals of this research is to find how the trade dispute of 2019 and Zainichi Koreans were presented by the South Korean media for the South Korean audience, primary data written in Korean language was collected. As this project started out in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the resources available for research, and a choice towards using online news media was made. This choice seems to be reasonable in the context of recent changes to the South Korean journalism as well, where online news media is overtaking traditional print in consumption. As Kim H. (Jin & Kwak ed., 2018) points out, in 2015 only 14,3% of South Korean households were subscribed to traditionally printed daily newspapers, as more and more people choose to read news online and on their mobile devices.

Following this decision, the data was gathered with the help of BigKinds (빅카인즈, [www.bigkinds.or.kr](http://www.bigkinds.or.kr)), an online news archive and analytics platform provided by the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), which is commonly utilized for analyzing Korean news media (e.g. Kim, Y. & Kim, B., 2024). This database provides access to daily and weekly news reports from media outlets affiliated with KPF and allows researchers to perform comprehensive research without omitting relevant data. In some cases, the commentaries to the articles, as well as English version of the same articles, were also analyzed to add context and expand the understanding of how the topics were introduced specifically to South Korean audience and how the audience interacted with the said articles.

To find the relevant newspaper articles, BigKinds' search tool was utilized with the following criteria: articles published from 1st of July 2019, to 31st of August 2019, containing the keyword “재일” (*jaeil*) and published by the following newspapers: Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang. This allowed me to organize large quantities of data more clearly and narrow my search for the relevant articles. The search results of BigKinds'

interface contain most of the important information for analysis, such as the date of publication, links to the original source on the newspapers' websites, type of articles (e.g. reports, editorials, opinion pieces), which section they belonged to (political, economic, etc.) and name of the journalists who wrote the articles. However, it does not show where exactly the articles were situated at the date of publication – and even having the link to the original does not help to locate it due to the online nature of the media, which presents a shortcoming of this data acquisition method, as analyzing the placement of articles and accompanying visuals such as font size would also help to understand their importance to the outlets in their framing process.

After applying these search filters, 100 newspaper articles were found. To check the relevance of these articles to the research topic, a preliminary reading of all selected articles was conducted to filter out those which did not mention both Zainichi Koreans and trade dispute at the same time. After filtering, 39 newspaper articles were left, which were used for the frame analysis.

#### **4.4 Analysis process**

Alozie (2005, p. 66) proposes the following steps in identifying new frames: general reading of the articles while making remarks about their content, followed by another, more thorough reading to find out the repeating topics and categories; and, finally, a detailed analysis of the data at hand.

Following this method, the analysis process for the data started with skimming the contents aiming to both filter out irrelevant articles and indicate themes and frames for a deeper analysis. During this process, remarks were made on each article with the title, date published, and a summary highlighting the parts relevant to the research topic.

Subsequently, the recurring themes and possible frames were noted during the second reading, which served as a basis for coding the articles. The occurrence of frames was marked down by utilizing simple yes-no categories. This was done manually in a table format, with all articles listed and separated by newspapers, which were then marked down by the presence (“v” mark) or absence (“x” mark) of the recurring themes and frames, with color coding to assist visual understanding of the data.

The frames were not pre-determined and were established inductively, however, the frame typology suggested by Semetko and Valkenburg in their research (2000) was referenced. This

typology highlights the following frames: a *conflict* frame that puts focus on conflict between individuals, groups or institutions to grasp the readers' attention; a *human interest* frame that presents events through mentioning individuals or describing the events through emotional lens; *economic consequences* frame that focuses on the economic effects of the events or issues; a *morality* frame that reports events in connection with moral prescriptions; and a *responsibility* frame that assigns responsibility for solving reported issues to a certain group. After the second reading, it was clear that it would not be possible to adopt this typology without any changes made; for example, no articles containing the *morality* frame were identified, while, by the criteria established for data selection, the *conflict* frame was present in all selected articles as all of them reported on the trade dispute – and analyzing this generalized frame would not yield satisfactory results for answering the research questions. Moreover, it was found out that the news articles also framed Zainichi Koreans in few different ways – as compatriots, as victims of the dispute, as experts, and as a recurring topic in Korea-Japan relations following their colonial past – which required an in-depth analysis of each of these frames as it directly correlates with one of the research questions posed.

Therefore, the process of extracting frames was done intuitively and inductively with the adjustments made throughout the readings and analysis. As a result, the following frames were established: a “conflict” frame and its four sub-frames - “economic consequences”, “solution”, “responsibility” and “security”; and a set of 4 additional frames addressing Zainichi Koreans directly: Zainichi Koreans as Koreans, Zainichi Koreans as victims of the trade dispute, Zainichi Koreans (and their treatment in Japan) as a historical issue in Korea-Japan relations and Zainichi Koreans as experts on South Korea-Japan relations. The final step with the in-depth analysis of frames found in the collected data will be presented in the following chapter.

Few important notes left to mention is that in the following chapter, my own English translations of the analyzed data are presented, in some cases complemented by the original Korean quotes. In terms of Korean names and terms, as throughout this work, the Revised Romanization system is used. With the names of Zainichi Koreans, who often have both Korean and Japanese names, the version most widely used and accepted by English-language academics and media is utilized: i.e., Masayoshi Son and not Son Jeong-ui. This is not intended to be a representation of my own opinion on what name fits better or is more accurate to represent one's identity but is done solely to keep it consistent with other sources and thus assist the readers in understanding who I am referring to.

#### 4.5 Methodological challenges

While frame analysis proves to be useful in media and communication studies to identify the ways in which information is presented to the public, it has considerable challenges as well. One of them is the ambiguousness of the concept of framing itself, as pointed out by Entman in calling it a “fractured paradigm” (1993). Moreover, Matthes (2009) finds that many frame analysis studies suffer from poor methodological transparency and inconsistent coding procedures; he also points out that many researchers do not consider the visual elements of the data and only analyze textual content. To avoid these issues, I have tried to be as transparent as possible about definitions employed in this study and the steps I have taken to perform the research in this given chapter. Unfortunately, analyzing the visuals was not possible due to the data collection method employed, as mentioned earlier, which presents a limitation of my research.

Furthermore, regarding the reliability of my frame analysis it is necessary to mention that I have been the sole coder of the data, relying on my knowledge of Korean language to read through the articles. Although I have tried to be as objective as possible in my frame analysis as an outsider to the societies I study, I recognize that there still might be some bias present in my interpretations due to my cultural and educational background and experience, as well as language limitations as I am not a native Korean speaker. Aware of this, I try not to make any judgement of the opinions and frames identified in the data but merely present them as I interpreted them through my own lens. To further prove or disprove my findings, comparative or critical research is welcome.

## 5 Data analysis

This chapter will expand on analysis of the primary data to answer the research questions posed:

- 1) **How did news media frame the South Korea-Japan trade dispute and anti-Japanese boycotts?**
- 2) **How were Zainichi Koreans framed in South Korean media amidst the trade dispute between Japan and ROK?**

The following sub-question will also be studied:

**Are there any differences in how media from a specific side of the political spectrum report on the trade dispute and Zainichi Koreans?**

To answer them, general analysis of frames extracted from the data will be presented to understand the general course of newspapers amidst the trade dispute; followed by analysis of how Zainichi Koreans were framed in that context with the focus on the second set of frames, while also taking note of the differences between the ways the conservative (Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo) and liberal (Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang) utilized those frames.

### 5.1 General frames

This section summarizes analysis of frames present in the data to give context on the course of newspapers during the most active phase of the trade dispute. In particular, the conflict frame and its sub-frames will be analyzed: economic consequences, solution, responsibility and security.

Following the data selection criteria established in the previous chapter, 39 newspaper articles were chosen for analysis: 12 from Chosun Ilbo, 6 from JoongAng Ilbo, 10 from Hankyoreh and 11 from Kyunghyang; with an extra article selected from Hankyoreh for comparison of reports on one event between the newspapers. Most newspaper articles fitting the criteria were published in August (N=27) compared to July (N=12), as the conflict was escalating and more retaliatory measures were taken from both sides, which warranted increased reports from the media.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the criteria for data selection was that the analysis unit (news article) had to report on the trade dispute between South Korea and Japan. By this definition, the conflict frame was present in all news articles selected for analysis, as all of them reported on a conflict in some way; however, it was not the only frame detected in the data, as the context and intention behind utilizing this frame differed from article to article. With this and other extracted frames in mind, the frames were organized as seen on the below figure.




Figure 1. Scheme of extracted general frames

Based on the readings, the frames were represented in data in the following way:

Table 1. Mean Scores of General News Frames Identified in the South Korean Newspapers

Newspaper	Conflict	Economic consequences	Solution	Responsibility	Security	N
<i>Chosun Ilbo</i>	1	0.66	0.08	0.41	0.08	12
<i>JoongAng Ilbo</i>	1	0.16	0.5	0.5	0.33	6
<i>Hankyoreh</i>	1	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.2	10
<i>Kyunghyang</i>	1	0.36	0.18	0.63	0.18	11

*Note.* Scores range from 0 (not present) to 1 (absolutely present).

### 5.1.1 Conflict frame – how the trade dispute was reported on

Generally, when talking about conflict, the newspapers framed it as a continuation of the “history problem”, placing it in the broader context of South Korea-Japan relations and connecting it to the earlier decisions on forced labor compensations made by the South Korean courts. In the analyzed data, the trade dispute was never reported on as an isolated event but rather was framed as a way to continue the discourse of Japan being the aggressor

against which South Korea must stand and defend itself, which is consistent with Deacon's findings (2021).

Deacon (ibid, p. 13) also points out that a notion of "resolute response" from South Korea as a whole was present in the media discourse as analyzed, referring to the joint efforts of the domestic industries to overcome the export restrictions and materials shortages by developing their own solutions and production lines and the efforts of the public to boycott Japanese-made products and services. He mentions that Moon Jae-in, while not calling for boycotts in his public speeches, commended the South Korean public for the exhibited "civil consciousness" and praised their support in opposing Japan's policy decisions; thus, alluding that the dominant discourse in South Korea at that time framed boycotts as something positive.

However, I have identified an alternative view present in all newspapers regardless of their political leaning. Often, the trade dispute and boycotts were framed as a negative event that was more likely to damage South Korea in different ways rather than help it. One of the arguments some of the newspapers used was that it could worsen the treatment of Zainichi Koreans; while others also pointed out the economic consequences and security threats that could stem from the escalation of the conflict. Almost all articles assigned responsibility for provoking or solving the conflict to a political actor, although, similarly to Lee & Paik's (2017) findings, it differed between the newspapers who they considered to be responsible for it; and some of the newspapers suggested possible solutions to the conflict.

As this frame was present in all of the articles, the detailed analysis of it will be given through the analysis of its sub-frames presented below, as it will help to understand the nuances of how the conflict was reported more clearly.

### 5.1.2 Responsibility – who is responsible for solving the crisis

As can be seen from Table 1, after the conflict frame, the responsibility frame was the one adopted most frequently by all newspapers with the exception of Chosun Ilbo, which focused more on the economic consequences of the ongoing trade dispute. However, there was a difference in who the newspapers assigned responsibility for solving the crisis to, often affected by their partisan leaning. In other words, this is the frame where the differences between the editorial political opinion was the most evident.

#### **Chosun Ilbo**

While all newspapers agreed that part of the responsibility to resolve the issues lied with the Japanese government, the conservative Chosun Ilbo held a strong opinion that it was the Korean government at that time (left-leaning Moon Jae-in's administration) whose actions lead to escalation of the conflict to such a serious degree. This can be explained by their differing political outlooks, however, there are grounds to suspect that it was even more than that.

Chosun Ilbo, while maintaining pro-government position throughout its history, had also periods of strained relationships with the government when a left-leaning administration was in charge – for example, in 2001 it was one of the major newspapers investigated for alleged tax evasion by the government officials on orders from then-president Kim Dae-jung; as a result, the head of the newspaper was arrested and prosecuted (Jin & Kwak, 2018, 143). At that time, Chosun Ilbo claimed that it was a retaliatory measure for their criticism of Kim Dae-jung's policies aimed to grow closer with North Korea through cooperation. Similarly, in early 2019, Moon Jae-in ordered to reopen some cold cases related to sex and corruption scandals involving Chosun Ilbo's top executives (The Korea Times, 2019) – which could also explain the newspaper's strong criticism towards the president and his policy decisions, which was apparent in the majority of analyzed articles and was reflected in their use of frames as well, such as this one.

To illustrate this, the editorial column titled “*We Succeeded in Overcoming ‘Colonialism’, So Why Do We Act Like a Failed Country?*” (Chosun Ilbo, 2019a), written by Chosun Ilbo's chief editor Yang Sang-hoon, even argued that South Korea should move on from being too focused on the historical issues and work on improving relations with Japan (while keeping South Korea's national interests in mind), thus presenting an alternative view on the discourse of *remembering* the past.

To make his argument convincing, Yang Sang-hoon recalled the history of South Korea-Japan relations, going back to the normalization treaty of 1965. He mentioned that after the treaty was ratified, the former president Park Chung-hee made a public statement addressing the citizens of ROK, where he talked about the problems in Korea-Japan relations and South Korean society. According to the journalist, some of the things mentioned in Park's statement were relevant still, such as the following quote, which Yang Sang-hoon praised as realistic and pragmatic:

*“If we only look at the past, they [Japan] are mortal enemies. However, in this tense international society, even if they were enemies of yesterday, if it is necessary for our present and tomorrow, wouldn't [cooperating] be a wise response for the sake of our country and people?”*

Just as Park Chung-hee was critical of blind anti-Japanese statements, deeming them as a result of “*victim mentality and inferiority complex*”, Yang Sang-hoon also criticized the South Korean administration that was in office at that time for not wanting to recognize that South Korea had caught up to its former oppressor and was “*acting as if we failed to overcome our past.*” However, it did not mean that Yang Sang-hoon was advocating for unconditional forgiveness for Japan, as he ended the article with a warning addressed to the Japanese citizens and Shinzo Abe, speaking through the quotes of Park Chung-hee: that South Korea is closely watching Japan’s attitude to Korean people, and “*if the feeling that Japan is an untrustworthy nation is rekindled in the hearts of our people, the agreement [on normalizing the relations] will have no meaning whatsoever.*”

Another piece where this usage of frame was apparent was written by Chosun Ilbo’s correspondent in Tokyo, Lee Ha-won. The piece addressed the “Korea fatigue” (*kankoku tsukare*, 韓国つかれ) that was developing in Japan in response to the complicated relations between the two countries. When explaining the phenomenon, Lee Ha-won frames it as Moon Jae-in’s administration’s fault:

*“Since the Moon Jae-in administration came to power, the 2015 comfort women agreement was abrogated and the 1965 claims agreement was also denied, so this term, which means “Korea fatigue” is becoming a hot topic in Japan.”* (Chosun Ilbo, 2019b).

Moreover, in Lee Ha-won’s view, this “Korea fatigue” is what gave way to Shinzo Abe’s retaliation against South Korea, as it allowed him to gain support from the Japanese citizens and media:

*“‘Kankoku Tsukare’ was the background for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to take economic retaliation for diplomatic issues. Although it is a policy of economic retaliation for diplomatic issues, the Japanese people showed great support for it. Some Japanese newspapers that had been previously trying to understand the Moon Jae-in administration are also changing their tone.”*

When giving his evaluation of the situation, Lee Ha-won was quite pessimistic, going as far as calling it a “collapse” of “pro-Korea forces in Japan”, as well as highlighting that the Moon Jae-in administration decided not to prolong the agreement on military information exchange between South Korea and Japan (GSOMIA) – which to the reporter sounded akin to something unthinkable:

*“The Moon Jae-in administration, which **even** decided to terminate GSOMIA, is seen by Japan as engaging in “revolutionary diplomacy,” as Kyoto University professor Hiroshi Nakanishi points out. As a result, the pro-Korea forces that have formed in Japan for over 50 years since the normalization of diplomatic relations have collapsed, and hostile public opinion toward Korea is spreading invisibly.”*

### **Hankyoreh**

On the other hand, chief editor of the progressive Hankyoreh Lee Jae-hoon assigned responsibility for the conflict to Shinzo Abe and his policies in the editorial titled “*‘Strong Japan’ and the Republic’s responsibility*” (Hankyoreh, 2019a). Where Chosun Ilbo blames Moon Jae-in and his decisions for the “Korean fatigue”, Hankyoreh attributes the rise of anti-Korean sentiments, including hate-speech against Zainichi Koreans, to the domestic situation in Japan, where it became a way for the Japanese to vent off their frustrations over their lives, which, in his opinion, Shinzo Abe was using for his own political gain:

*“The loser group, abandoned by society, generally chooses two options. They can become the “Satori (enlightenment) generation” that loses interest in politics and success and is satisfied with the given reality, or they can become net right-wingers who resolve their dissatisfaction with reality through hostility and hatred toward social minorities such as Zainichi (South Korean nationals or chōsen-seki). <...> Abe’s politics are moving toward a “strong Japan” using these two as nutrients. The Abe government’s export restrictions on Korea, which shook the Korea-Japan relationship to its core in 2019, are a cross-section of this trend.”*

Nevertheless, in parallel to Chosun Ilbo, criticism towards Japan did not mean unconditional support for the South Korean government. In fact, Lee Jae-hoon used the example of Shinzo Abe’s “strong Japan”, where “*the individuals exist for the state*” and not the other way around as it should be in a democratic society, as the way to criticize the South Korean government for intending to dismantle some of the labor and safety regulations such as delaying the implementation of 52-hour working week or shortening the time required to review process

safety reports and hazard/risk prevention plans that South Korean companies must prepare to prevent workplace accidents. To Lee Jae-hoon, this circled back to the root cause of the trade dispute: with the South Korean Supreme Court ruling that the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement could not settle the individual claims, the government signaled that *“the state cannot trade individual dignity.”* However, by implementing such anti-labor measures, the South Korean government was also violating its own citizens’ individual dignity – which, to Lee Jae-hoon, seemed contradictory with the stance Republic of Korea was taking on the international stage. Thus, to eliminate the contradiction and not to fall to the same vices as Japan, the state must *“no longer use the economic crisis as an excuse to put individuals at risk”* – as such is the *“solemn responsibility of a republic, which is different from a monarchy.”*

### **JoongAng Ilbo**

In contrast with Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh, conservative JoongAng Ilbo (2019a) took a milder approach, assigning responsibility for the crisis to Japan and its lack of historical awareness in an article reporting about the visit to South Korea of the Japanese civic group “NO MORE Japanese invasion”, which comprised of Japanese and Zainichi Koreans. The article quoted three members, a Japanese person (male), a Zainichi Korean (female), and a Korean pastor, all in their 60s and 70s. All of them cited Japan’s unwillingness to recognize its history as a reason for the crisis in Korea-Japan relations. The article also calls on the history of Korea-Japan relations all the way to the Imjin war (1592–1598), where Japan invaded Korea on multiple occasions (*“If Japan had **truly** reflected on the invasion of Joseon after the Imjin War, there would have been no modern Japanese invasion history”*).

### **Kyunghyang**

The progressive Kyunghyang also framed Japan as the one being responsible for the conflict, for example, in a column written by a professor of sociology at Chung-Ang university, Lee Na-young. It talked about two movies that were released at the end of July 2019 *“amid the boycott of Japanese products triggered by the Japanese Abe administration’s export restrictions on Korea”* (Kyunghyang, 2019a). Even though the article is positioned as a review piece, through this lens of cinematic analysis the author subtly gave her opinion on the trade dispute and who was responsible for solving it.

At first the article described the movie called “*The main battlefield*”, which talked about Japan’s far-right nationalists and their attitude to the issue of “comfort women”. Then it reviewed the second movie, which was a biography of one of the “comfort women”. In particular, it mentions that Kim Bok-dong, the protagonist of the movie, donated her belongings to the students of Zainichi Korean schools in Japan, highlighting the connection between them.

The author ended the article asking the audience to “*estimate how our anger toward Japan should go through the two movies*”, implying that there is no forgiveness to be offered until Japan apologizes for the crimes of the past, and that Japanese government is the one responsible for solving this issue (Kyunghyang, 2019a).

### 5.1.3 Economic consequences – what the trade dispute will lead to

The third most utilized frame was the economic consequences frame. This frame was utilized the most by Chosun Ilbo, being identified in 8 out of 12 analyzed articles. On the contrary, JoongAng Ilbo did not utilize this frame as frequently – out of the analyzed 7 articles, it was identified only in one of them, a column written by Choi Ji-young, the head of the industry team at JoongAng Ilbo. From the progressive newspapers, Hankyoreh put a bigger focus on this frame, with Kyunghyang featuring it slightly less.

In general, this frame was used by the newspapers to call attention to the possible consequences of the trade dispute and the boycotts of Japanese goods, trying to make the information more digestible for their readers.

#### **Chosun Ilbo**

For example, on 9<sup>th</sup> of July, as the trade dispute was just starting, Chosun Ilbo published an interview with Masao Okonogi, professor at Keio University, which talked about the reasons behind the economic retaliation from Japan, public opinion in Japan regarding this issue and possible development of the crisis. When discussing the possible consequences of the crisis, Masao Okonogi mentions that “*if there is no cooperation [between the countries], in the extreme case scenario [the crisis] could **affect Zainichi Koreans**, as well as the agreement on fisheries between Japan and Republic of Korea*” (Chosun Ilbo, 2019c). In another article, Chosun Ilbo also tried to keep the readers informed on escalation of the crisis by reporting on additional retaliatory measures that the Japanese government was preparing, such as possible early recovery of loans extended to Koreans and Korean companies or tightening screenings

of the residence and immigration status for Zainichi Koreans, corporate expatriates, and international students (Chosun Ilbo, 2019i). Once again, in this context Zainichi Koreans were framed as possible victims of the crisis in the same row as South Korean citizens would be, which shows that they were still considered Korean above all, and that their status and treatment matters both to the newspaper and its readers.

In yet another article, Chosun Ilbo (2019e) reported about Japan-related boycotts in the financial sphere, mentioning how various Korean banks removed services related to Japan (such as bonuses for visiting Japan or buying items at stores in Japan). In particular, it mentioned that “*Some mom cafes are also spreading false rumors [잘못된 소문] that Shinhan Financial Group and Shinhan Bank are Japanese companies with Japanese funds*”. The article continues to report that it is not true, quoting statements made by Shinhan that “*it was founded by Zainichi Koreans, not Japanese*”, and that “*it is not fair*” to be grouped into the category of Japanese companies. The reporter ended the article with the words confirming Shinhan’s belonging to South Korea (such as that Shinhan Financial Group's largest shareholder is the National Pension Service).

It is interesting to note that in South Korea, mom cafes (online communities for mothers living in the same neighborhood) are considered to be “*among the nation’s most influential consumers*” (The Korea Times, 2017). It is common for them to exercise their buying power to bring change, such as forcing the South Korean company Kleannara to suspend its sales of sanitary pads that were found to cause rashes, menstrual irregularities and other side effects and refund the customers who had bought them; and they are also a strong political force to reckon with, making a presidential candidate Ahn Cheol-soo’s approval rating plummet by refusing to vote for him in the elections of 2017 after he promised to cut support for building kindergartens. On the opposite, Moon Jae-in chose to meet with the representatives of mom cafes during his election campaign – which won him the support of these communities in the elections and beyond. The support was so strong that on his 100<sup>th</sup> day in the office (August 19, 2017), mom cafes even made the sentence “*Thank you, Moon Jae-in*” the most-searched keyword on the nation’s biggest portal Naver (The Korea Times, *ibid.*).

As such, by mentioning that these “*mom cafes*” are spreading “*false rumors*” and giving arguments for the opposing point of view (one of them being that Zainichi Koreans are **not** Japanese, but Koreans), the article published by Chosun Ilbo seems to criticize these communities and their actions – and, by association, the Moon Jae-in administration.

Aside from explaining to readers the effects of the trade dispute and the boycotts, the newspapers have also utilized the economic consequences as the way to frame the boycotts as justified or not justified.

### Hankyoreh

For example, in two of the analyzed articles Hankyoreh reported on hateful statements shared by the Japanese leadership of DHC, a Japanese cosmetics and health supplements company, and its subsidiary, DHC Television. The remarks shared on the YouTube broadcast hosted by DHC Television mocked the Korean boycott of Japanese products, as well as the Statue of Peace symbolizing comfort women, and stated that it was Japan who developed and spread *hangul*, the Korean alphabet<sup>12</sup>; furthermore, it was revealed that the chairman of DHC also had previously said that Zainichi Koreans “*exert undue influence on Japanese politics, media, and law*” and should “*go back to their home country.*”<sup>13</sup> After mentioning these quotes, Hankyoreh went on to also share the consequences of such actions:

*“Companies have also started boycotting DHC. Cosmetics shop 'Lalavla' (GS Retail), which ranked second in the number of directly operated stores (168) as of the end of last year [2018], announced on the 12<sup>th</sup> [of August], “We have decided not to place additional orders for DHC products in our online and offline stores. We plan to move products that have already been purchased to the back of the shelves.” A Lalavla official said, “It was a decision that took public sentiment into consideration,” and “Sales on the 11th have already decreased by about 5% compared to the previous Sunday.”*<sup>14</sup>

In the second article on this topic, Hankyoreh added that other famous South Korean cosmetics shops such as Olive Young and LOHB’s also joined the measures by not “*ordering additional DHC products or recalling the products altogether.*”<sup>15</sup> Although there is no outright praise for such measures, there is no negativity towards it either, compared to other reports focusing on how damaging it is to boycott *everything* Japanese; the tone of these articles (“*instead of providing an explanation [and apologizing], DHC closed the comment*

---

<sup>12</sup> DHC 에 <에반게리온> 작가까지... 잇따른 혐한 발언에 시민들 ‘분노’ // From DHC to the artist of <Evangelion>... Citizens are 'angry' at a series of anti-Korean comments. 12.08.2019. URL: [https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/905425.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/905425.html)

<sup>13</sup> “일본인, 아시아 유일한 유럽인” DHC 회장 인종주의적 망언도 했다 // The chairman of DHC even made such racist remarks as “Japan is the only European state in Asia”. 13.08.2019. URL: [https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/905570.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/905570.html)

<sup>14</sup> See Footnote 12.

<sup>15</sup> See Footnote 13.

section on Instagram”; “it was *belatedly* revealed that Yoshiaki Yoshida, the chairman of DHC, <...> posted on DHC’s official website three years ago, “(Zainichi Koreans) are a bad influence on Japan”) is different and with the way the articles are structured, it could be argued that boycotts of DHC and its falling sales are presented as a rightful consequence rather than something to abstain from.

Moreover, in the same article Hankyoreh even shared more details about a Korean cosmetics company, Kolmar Korea, facing similar retaliation from the public and its customers after its chairman, Yoon Dong-han, played a video of a far-right YouTuber at a monthly company meeting attended by about 700 employees. The video, which criticized the Korean government’s response to Japan’s trade retaliation, included comments such as, “*Abe is an amazing leader for not hitting Moon Jae-in in the face with his fist.*” With the incident became public, Yoon Dong-han stepped down from his position, but Kolmar Korea, as well as other cosmetic brands such as Innisfree and Etude House which are manufactured by Kolmar Korea, experienced “*a drop in stock price and sales*” after the South Korean netizens spread a list of Kolmar products calling to boycott them. Once again, Hankyoreh did not criticize such consequences and reported them in a matter-of-fact manner, which, together with the rest of the article, made it look as if they saw it as a just consequence for such an action, albeit done by a Korean figure, – in this case, perhaps for the reason of the newspaper sharing the opposite political opinion and being very critical of Shinzo Abe.

### **JoongAng Ilbo**

On the other hand, as the boycott movement kept escalating, the newspapers had also started bringing attention to how they can result in “unintended victims.” One of such articles is an opinion piece by Choi Ji-young published in JoongAng Ilbo titled “*Collateral Damage*”<sup>16</sup>, which talked about how the boycotts of Japanese goods started to affect South Korean companies. At first, the article describes the boycotts as a strictly civil movement that opposes government involvement, as well as violence, vowing to only boycott products of Japanese origin. However, according to Choi Ji-young, even with these precautions the movement still caused some collateral damage on the home soil.

---

<sup>16</sup> 콜라트럴 데미지 // Collateral damage. JoongAng Ilbo. 20.08.2019. URL: <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23557505>

The first company that Choi Ji-young mentions is Lotte, which was founded by a Zainichi Korean Shin Kyuk-ho. Due to this, the columnist quotes that “*consumers have demanded Shin Dong-bin [CEO of Lotte] to come forward and clarify whether it is a Japanese company or a Korean company.*” Even though the article does not mention any public statements made by Lotte representatives in relation to such demands in 2019, Choi Ji-young goes on to give an example that in 2018 Lotte made 95 trillion won and had 130,000 people on its payroll in South Korea, while in Japan Lotte’s sales made 5 trillion won while employing about 5,000 workers.

The second company that the columnist mentions is Coupang, a South Korean e-commerce company. It was said to receive investment of \$1 billion from Masayoshi Son, chairman of a Japanese company Softbank, as well as \$2 billion from Softbank’s Vision Fund. Due to such ties, the company was also labelled by consumers as a “Japanese” company and had to issue a statement clarifying its Korean origins and that 99% of its business is done in South Korea. To support this, Coupang provided some data, saying that the company “*created 25,000 jobs in Korea and pays 1 trillion won in labor costs per year.*” When reporting this, Choi Ji-young calls it “*ironic*” that Masayoshi Son, whose investments led to this issue, is actually a Zainichi Korean in 3rd generation, “*who has succeeded in Japanese society overcoming all kinds of discrimination.*”

The article concludes with the mentions of two more companies, Lotte Liquor and Bohae Brewery, who suffered from the rumors labelling them as Japanese-owned as well. Both companies had to issue statements clarifying its Korean ownership and denying being sold to Japanese brewery Asahi Breweries.

Choi Ji-young calls for a careful examination whether there is a “*matador from the rivalling companies*” who tries to interfere with the “*pure boycotts*” to gain advantage over its competitors and ended the piece saying that she hoped for “*smart consumption to minimize collateral damage*”. Interestingly enough, the English translation of this article goes a bit further and issues a stronger statement: “*We must watch closely to avoid undesired casualties amongst our own*” (JoongAng Daily, 2019) – and in this context, it is obvious that mentions of Zainichi Koreans in her article were used as an argument towards confirming that the companies suffering from the boycotts are Korean, thus also confirming that they were seen and represented as Koreans and a part of their own.

This opinion was supported by Chosun Ilbo and Kyunghyang, who framed this news in a similar way. Similarly to the article about Shinhan Bank mentioned earlier, Chosun Ilbo set to dismantle the “*false rumors*” that “*Coupang's largest shareholder is Chairman Son Jeong-ui [Masayoshi Son], a Zainichi Korean, and [therefore] Coupang is a Japanese company*” by using the same arguments – that 99% of its business is done in South Korea and that the company significantly contributes to the South Korean society by employing 25 000 local workers, as well as “*investing trillions of won to build logistics infrastructure and develop cutting-edge technologies.*”<sup>17</sup>

### **Kyunghyang**

Meanwhile, Kyunghyang’s approach seemed to be slightly different from JoongAng Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo, as it did not forget to mention that it’s Japan’s economic retaliation that is “*unreasonable*” in the first place and saying that it would be “*difficult*” to calm down consumers’ antipathy against Japanese companies amidst the trade conflict. However, it also reported on Coupang’s case and mentioned that the basis for claims that it was a Japanese company was the investments from Softbank, led by Masayoshi Son, who is a Zainichi Korean. While it quoted Coupang’s statement, which pleaded the consumers not to confuse them for a foreign company “*just because foreigners have a high percentage of stakes*”<sup>18</sup>, there are no signs that Masayoshi Son himself is considered to be a foreigner – on the opposite, the fact that he is a Zainichi Korean seems to be used by Kyunghyang as an argument for how unreasonable boycotting Coupang is. To further support this, it also quoted experts stating that “*there have been increasing cases of domestic companies attracting overseas equity investment recently, so it’s meaningless to single them out based simply on their nationality*” and “*consumers should pay close attention [to what they are boycotting] as boycotts had often led to mass production of “unfair victims”* – which, in this case, could mean both South Korean companies and Zainichi Koreans and their enterprises and livelihoods.

---

<sup>17</sup> '일본기업' 소문에 발끈...쿠팡 "우린 자랑스러운 한국기업" // Coupang gets angry at rumors of them being a 'Japanese company'... "We are a proud Korean company". Chosun Ilbo. 18.07.2019. URL: [https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/18/2019071802069.html](https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/18/2019071802069.html)

<sup>18</sup> “일본계 아닙니다” 다이소·세븐일레븐 등 해명 진땀” // “We are not Japanese companies”: Daiso, Seven Eleven and the others explain, wiping off cold sweat.” Kyunghyang Shinmun. 06.08.2019. URL: <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908061012001>

#### 5.1.4 Security – how the trade dispute affects national security of South Korea

The next one to follow was the security frame, which covered concerns related to GSOMIA. GSOMIA is a “General Security of Military Information Agreement”, which allows Japan, South Korea and USA to exchange military intelligence on North Korea. This frame concerned North Korea and its nuclear problem as well.

GSOMIA cancellation was one of the measures the South Korean government considered as an answer to Japan’s economic retaliation, eventually deciding in favor of this decision on August 22, 2019. However, even before the decision took place, the media tried to explain to its readers what it could mean for the future.

For example, JoongAng Ilbo reported on the lecture of Kang Sang-jung, a professor emeritus at Tokyo University, focusing specifically on the security frame, putting it into the title of the article: “*If GSOMIA is terminated, Japan will be disadvantaged... Korea-US relations will also be damaged.*”<sup>19</sup> The article mentioned that there were proponents of the cancellation who argued that it will “*show example*” to Japan, while the opponents warned that such measures could lead to a crisis in the South Korea-USA alliance. It went on to report on Kang Sang-jung’s opinion on the matter, who considered the crisis between Japan and South Korea to be a consequence of improvements that happened in inter-Korean relations earlier. To him, as reported by JoongAng Ilbo, the solution to the crisis lied in proving to Japan that united Korea was better for them and continuing to foster contacts between the countries on the civil society and private sector levels. As the anti-Japan boycotts were directly discouraging such contacts, he assessed them negatively and viewed them as something that could further damage the bilateral relations. Similarly, Chosun Ilbo echoed this framing in their own report on this lecture, sharing the same quote from Kang Sang-jung on how termination of GSOMIA can damage US-ROK relations, as well as his prediction that the US will try to be a mediator in keeping the agreement [which did happen in the end]; Chosun Ilbo also chose to share Kang Sang-jung’s warning that “*the one who ultimately holds the key (to the Korea-Japan*

---

<sup>19</sup> 강상중 도쿄대 교수 "지소미아 파기시 日 불리...한·미 관계도 금 간다" // Professor Kang Sang-joong of the University of Tokyo: "If GSOMIA is terminated, Japan will be disadvantaged... Korea-US relations will also be damaged." JoongAng Ilbo. 07.08.2019. URL: <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23546275>

issue) is North Korea," and "if a rift will open between the South and the North, normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea may proceed without Korea."<sup>20</sup>

Hankyoreh featured an interview with another academic expert of Zainichi Korean origin, Jeong Yeong-hwan, a professor at Meiji Gakuen university, where he expressed similar opinion that it was the inter-Korean reconciliation that prompted Japan's more aggressive foreign policy approach:

*"Japan is taking strong measures to not only shake the Claims Settlement Agreement system, but also to put the brakes on reconciliation between South and North Korea."*<sup>21</sup>

"The Claims Settlement Agreement system" here refers to the 1965 treaty that settled the claims related to Japan's colonial rule and established diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. By saying that Japan is intending to shake them, Jeong Yeong-hwan alludes that Japan is willing to go as far as endanger diplomatic relations with South Korea overall.

Similarly to Kang Sang-jung, Jeong Yeong-hwan also highlighted that cooperation between South Korea and North Korea is necessary to resolve issues with Japan:

*"Since the North is in some ways more politically active than South Korea, there is a possibility that it will move (toward normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan). <...> However, there is a possibility that the North will give up on historical and human rights issues while prioritizing regime security and peace issues. <...> It seems that the North is watching the ROK-Japan relationship and calculating how much they should demand of Japan. That is why cooperation between the South and the North is necessary."*

However, with the issue of North Korean nuclear program still existing in the region, the reconciliation is not as easy – which was also part of this frame, as evidenced by Chosun Ilbo's interview (2019i) with Lee Su-won, chairman of the Tokyo branch of Mindan, a pro-South Korea organization of Zainichi Koreans. It was quoted to be an "obstacle" on Mindan's reconciliation with Chongryon, a pro-North Korea Zainichi organization, just as it obstructs

---

<sup>20</sup> 민주당 찾은 在日교수 "日제품 보이콧, DJ가 슬퍼했을 것" // Zainichi Professor Visits Democratic Party: "Kim Dae-jung would have been sad over the boycott of Japanese Products". Chosun Ilbo. 07.08.2019. URL: [https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/07/2019080701852.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/07/2019080701852.html)

<sup>21</sup> "아베, 한국을 2015 년으로 되돌리려 해... '타협적 화해'는 위험" // "Abe wants to turn Korea back to 2015... 'Compromise reconciliation' is dangerous". Hankyoreh. 14.08.2019. URL: <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/905667.html>

North and South Korea from reconciling as well. In other words, the reconciliation issue between South and North Korea was challenging the relations of Zainichi Koreans as well.

### 5.1.5 Solution – how can the trade dispute be solved

The solution frame was the one I identified in the data the least compared to the rest. It is important to note that when identifying this frame, I differentiated it from the *responsibility* frame by focusing not on *who* is responsible for solving the dispute and the crisis, but rather *how* it can be done, analyzing whether the newspaper articles offered concrete measures as a solution to the trade dispute. Following this definition, I have found that the solution offered by most of the articles was private exchanges and local government cooperation as a way to dissipate animosity between citizens of the two countries and move towards a better future built on the basis of mutual understanding. Government-to-government solutions were rarely discussed, perhaps for the reasons that, as discussed in the Section 5.1.2, the responsibility for solving the crisis officially – and finding that solution on a diplomatic level – was often assigned to either the South Korean administration or the Japanese government. The *solution* frame, then, presented alternative solutions to the official diplomatic reconciliation.

#### **JoongAng Ilbo**

The frame of local and private contacts as a solution to the dispute was particularly evident with JoongAng Ilbo. It dedicated two articles specifically to featuring local and civic contacts and advocating for their importance in improving the bilateral relations, one of them being a report on the Japanese civic group “NO MORE Japanese invasion”, which was discussed earlier, and the other one being an opinion piece from one of the editors titled “*Even if the central government fights, exchanges between local governments and the private sector must continue.*”<sup>22</sup>

This article opened with a story about memorial service for Fumiko Kaneko, a Japanese anarchist and a wife of Pak Yol, a Korean activist who fought against imperial Japan. She was quoted to having contributed “*to the anti-Japanese movement of Koreans in Japan, defending the independence movement, and criticizing the Japanese suppression policy*”. The article reports that such events might be suspended due to the trade dispute, as the local governments

---

<sup>22</sup> 중앙정부는 싸워도 지자체·민간 교류는 이어져야 // Even if the central government fights, exchanges between local governments and the private sector must continue. JoongAng Ilbo. 29.07. 2019. URL: <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23538061>

re-considered their politics in relation to the dispute. The journalist admitted that “*the entire nation needs to respond firmly to Japan's economic retaliation*” but presented an opinion that local and private exchanges need to continue, as they could serve as an exit strategy out of strained relations, and suspending or cancelling them would bring more harm to South Korea-Japan relations mid- and long-term.

### **Kyunghyang**

Kyunghyang also supported this point of view, reporting about a forum organized by a non-profit organization “One Korea” with the goal of promoting cultural understanding between China, Korea and Japan, highlighting that one of the members of the promotion committee for the festival is a chairman of the Chongryon association. It also mentioned One Korea Festival, another event which was held by the organization “*with the hope of reversing the recent atmosphere between Korea and Japan and moving toward a path of mutual prosperity, with the attendance of approximately 1,000 overseas Koreans and Japanese citizens.*”<sup>23</sup>

Alternatively, the newspapers also saw public opinion as a power that could pressurize politicians into coming up with a solution:

“*People of both countries should realize the seriousness of situation and push politicians to resolve the issue by forming a strong **public opinion** that “it can’t continue like this.”*”<sup>24</sup>

The soft power of both countries was also not ignored, with popular culture often being quoted as something that could bridge the divide between the two countries and improve the situation in the future by influencing the younger generations.

### **Hankyoreh**

In different pieces, Hankyoreh proposed that both countries should work together to “*prioritize relief of the victims [“comfort women” and victims of forced labor]” and find “a solution or support that the victims can accept.*”<sup>25</sup> In the editorial piece published by this

---

<sup>23</sup> 일본서 ‘3·1 운동 100주년 기념’ 한·중·일 포럼 개최 // Korea-China-Japan Forum Held in Japan to Commemorate 100th Anniversary of March 1st Movement. Hankyoreh. 22.08.2019. URL: <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908222041005>

<sup>24</sup> “*日기업, 청구권협정 틀 안에서 자발적 보상 고려해야*” // Japanese companies shall consider voluntary compensation within the framework of the Claims Agreement. Chosun Ilbo. 09.07.2019. URL: [https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/09/2019070900297.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/09/2019070900297.html)

<sup>25</sup> “*일본 전 변협회장 “아베 정부, 미쓰비시 등 강제징용 배상 막지 말아야*”” // Former Japanese Bar Association President: “Abe Government Should Not Block Compensation for Forced Labor from Mitsubishi, etc.” Hankyoreh. 31.07.2019. URL: [https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/903935.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/903935.html)

newspaper, the author states her belief that “*if Korean and Japanese citizens go beyond nationalism and put human rights, freedom, and democracy at the centre, there will definitely be a point of meeting.*”<sup>26</sup> To make her argument more convincing, she told the story of Kenji Utsunomiya, a Japanese lawyer and former chair of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, who opposed hate speech against Zainichi Koreans and criticized the Japanese government’s decision to block compensation for victims of forced labor from being paid, and said that his actions were “*not taking Korea's side*”, but rather him simply fighting for “*human rights regardless of nationality.*”

Hankyoreh also featured a column by Vladimir Tikhonov (Park No-ja), where he proposed another solution: South Korea should “*solidarize with and empower Japanese activists who can resist Abe*”<sup>27</sup> rather than boycott Japanese products. To him, as reported by Hankyoreh, a true victory over Abe’s Japan would be for Korea not to follow Abe’s Japan in its right-leaning politics: instead of *forgetting* the past, Korea should show an example by *remembering* it, apologizing and compensating the victims of the massacres and sexual crimes committed by the Korean military in Vietnam; as well as work on improving the integration of minorities into the South Korean society – something that Japan failed to do with Zainichi Koreans.

## 5.2 Framing of Zainichi Koreans in the context of the trade dispute

In the collected data, Zainichi Koreans were mainly framed in 4 main ways: they were seen and represented as Koreans in all of the analyzed articles, and in some of them they were also framed as victims of the trade dispute, as a continuous topic in the difficult history of Korean Japanese relations, or as experts on South Korea-Japan relations, being featured in thematic reports and interviews.

### 5.2.1 Zainichi Koreans as Koreans

Regarding the first frame, most of the articles separated Zainichi Koreans from other Koreans living in Japan, such as exchange students, work expatriates, or “new-comers” who moved to

---

<sup>26</sup> 두번 잘린 변호사, 우쓰노미야 겐지 // Twice-Cut Lawyer, Utsunomiya Kenji. Hankyoreh. 01.08.2019. URL: <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/904188.html>

<sup>27</sup> 아베의 일본, 반편교사로 삼을 나라 // Abe's Japan, a country to learn from. Hankyoreh. 30.07.2019. URL: <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/903903.html>

Japan after the normalization of ROK-Japan relations in 1965. Nevertheless, they still framed them as Koreans and part of the nation.

The newspaper articles also highlighted Zainichi Koreans' patriotism toward Korea on number of occasions. For example, the article by Chosun Ilbo that reported on Shinhan Bank being an unfair victim of the anti-Japanese boycotts, also quoted the following Shinhan statement:

*“Zainichi Koreans have a **patriotism** that goes beyond imagination despite being discriminated against in Japan.”<sup>28</sup>*

JoongAng Ilbo also did it in the article dedicated to Korea's National Liberation Day published on 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2019. This article used the history of soccer rivalry between South Korea and Japan as a metaphor for their relations and, when reporting on South Korea's first win against Japan, chose to do it the following way:

*“The Korea-Japan match, which was a preliminary match for the 1954 Swiss World Cup, was more like a war for the players. After running and falling repeatedly, Korea won 5-1. When the Taegeukgi [South Korean flag] was raised on Japanese soil, the players and **Zainichi Koreans shed tears**. <...> After liberation, the first field in which Korea surpassed Japan was soccer. <...> As Korea-Japan relations worsened due to Japan's economic retaliation, interest in the [upcoming] match [scheduled for December 2019] is already growing.”<sup>29</sup>*

Here, even though the first cited match was between Japan (the country they were living in) and South Korea, Zainichi Koreans were reported to have supported South Korea to the point of shedding tears when the Korean team won – which undoubtedly shows where their affiliation lied with, and, by extent, the way they were perceived by South Korean media even 65 years later.

### 5.2.2 Zainichi Koreans as an issue in South Korea-Japan relations

This frame put the treatment of Zainichi Koreans into the same row as such controversial topics as the issue of the fisheries agreement, claims for unpaid labor performed by Koreans

---

<sup>28</sup> 금융권 '일본 주의보'...日 관련 이벤트·신상품 줄줄이 취소 // Financial sector on 'Japan alert'... Japan-related events and new products canceled one after another. Chosun Ilbo. 06.08.2019. URL: [https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601368.html](https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601368.html)

<sup>29</sup> 일본을 가장 먼저 앞지른 건 축구였다 // “The first thing in which we surpassed Japan was soccer”. JoongAng Ilbo. 14.08.2019. URL: <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23552763>

under Japan's colonial, comfort women, the territorial dispute over Dokdo-Takeshima islands and other issues stemming from the period of Japan's colonial rule.

One of the first examples of this frame is a column by Chosun Ilbo's chief editor mentioned earlier, which talked about Park Chung-hee's legacy. When talking about Park Chung-hee's efforts rebuild South Korea, the chief editor also mentioned Zainichi Koreans and their treatment being one of the points that required attention when normalizing Korea-Japan relations, among the others:

*“In normalizing Korea-Japan relations, President Park focused on settling the past, establishing a basic relationship of mutual benefit and equality, the issue of claims, the issue of the fisheries agreement, the issue of the treatment of 600,000 Korean residents in Japan, and the return of cultural assets.”*

This frame was also evident in reports on the aforementioned incident with DHC by two of the newspapers (Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh, which dedicated two articles to this topic) where a program broadcasted on YouTube by DHC Television, a subsidiary of the Japanese brand DHC, shared anti-Korean remarks. The broadcast was discussing the ongoing trade dispute and anti-Japanese boycotts in South Korea, with panelists sharing such comments as *“Korea is a country that heats up quickly and cools down quickly, so we should just quietly watch”*<sup>30</sup>, *“(Japan) established elementary schools, created Korean textbooks, and was the one to unify and spread the Korean alphabet”*, and criticizing the Statue of Peace meant to symbolize comfort women by joking that *“is it okay for me to show my genitals if I claim it to be modern art?”*. While Zainichi Koreans were not brought up on this specific broadcast, both of the newspapers mentioned the case of DHC's chairman, Yoshiaki Yoshida, previously making disparaging remarks about Koreans living in Japan on the company's website and his support for far-right political parties. As reported by Chosun Ilbo, in 2016 Yoshiaki addressed Zainichi Koreans living in Japan saying *“we don't need fake Japanese people. Go back to your home country.”* Hankyoreh also quoted this, but in a slightly different way:

*“Despite the situation escalating to this point, instead of offering an explanation, DHC Korea has closed the comment function on its official Instagram. **Furthermore**, when it was*

---

<sup>30</sup> "韓, 금방 뜨거워졌다 식어" "일이 한글 배포"...日 DHC 방송국, 혐한 방송 논란. "Korea quickly heats up and cools down", "Japan distributes Hangeul"... Japanese DHC broadcast station in controversy over anti-Korean broadcast. Chosun Ilbo. 11.08.2019. URL: [https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/11/2019081100382.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/11/2019081100382.html)

belatedly revealed that Yoshiaki Yoshida, the chairman of DHC, was an extreme right-wing businessman who had posted on DHC's official website three years ago, "***(Korean residents in Japan) are a bad influence on Japan, so they should go back to their home country,***" some even called for "***DHC to be kicked out of Korea.***" Some netizens responded by reporting the "DHC Television" YouTube channel to YouTube for "hateful or malicious content" or declaring their participation in a boycott with the hashtag "#GoodbyeDHC" on social media. A petition titled "Petition to kick out Japanese products from DHC" was also posted on the Blue House National Petition Bulletin Board."

Here, the fact that the DHC chairman made hateful remarks towards Zainichi Koreans was presented as the tipping point for boycotting DHC products or even calling for a ban of their products on a national level. In other words, these remarks were considered and represented as an attack on one's own and something that is serious enough to warrant a negative reaction and action on their behalf; and despite holding a different editorial political opinion, both Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh put them to the same level as insults towards comfort women or distortions of history, which are two of the main factors regularly souring South Korea-Japan relations.

### 5.2.3 Zainichi Koreans as victims of the trade dispute

As briefly mentioned in the previous section, some articles also framed Zainichi Koreans as victims of the dispute; it was usually done to highlight how damaging the dispute could be, in an attempt to bring attention to the dispute and assign responsibility to the political actor they viewed as the one responsible for solving the conflict. Perhaps the article where this frame was the most dominant was an interview with Lee Su-won, head of the Tokyo Branch of the Mindan organization, published by Chosun Ilbo.

Even the title of the article used strong emotional words to bring up attention to the issue:

*"Koreans in Japan are feeling suffocated... Stop using the nationals' [국민] wounds for politics."*<sup>31</sup> The interview focused on how Zainichi Koreans were feeling about the effects of trade conflict and anti-Japanese boycotts in South Korea on their lives, with Lee Su-won comparing it to "*being strangled with cotton*" – as in, being killed slowly. In his opinion,

---

<sup>31</sup> 민단 도쿄단장 "재일동포는 목이 조여온다...국민상처 정치 이용 말았으면" // Chairman of Mindan's Tokyo Branch: "Koreans in Japan are feeling suffocated... Stop using the nation's wounds for politics". Chosun Ilbo. 19.07.2019. URL: [https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html)

even though the conflict started with export restrictions that would hurt large companies, eventually it would affect small and medium-sized self-employed business owners and lower trust in South Korean companies overall, as well as make the Japanese government be stricter with the procedures and regulations they “*relaxed or turned a blind eye to*”, thus “*tightening [the cotton] around our necks.*”

Lee Su-won was also concerned by the growing anti-Korean sentiments in Japan – he mentioned that since the ‘Hate Speech Prevention Act’ was enacted in Japan in 2016, the number of threats towards Zainichi Koreans in Japan had decreased significantly but started growing again with the escalation of the trade dispute, with some protest being spotted in Shinjuku in the wake of it. To him, this conflict between South Korea and Japan was “*directly related to the human rights*” of Zainichi Koreans:

*“The more 'hate speech' there is, the more difficult our lives will become. We will be anxious about simply walking down the streets, and [the Japanese] will look more closely at the products that we are selling to find fault with them. I don't know if the Korean government is paying attention to this. It doesn't seem to be so.”*

In the last two sentences, Lee Su-won’s resentment towards the South Korean government was clear: it was also felt throughout the rest of the interview. He was seemingly dissatisfied with the South Korean government and Moon Jae-in’s administration’s actions which led to the escalation of the conflict, blaming him as much as Shinzo Abe for using the historical issues between the two countries for their own political gains. Moreover, he was not happy with the way Moon Jae-in treated Mindan at their meeting at G20 Summit in Osaka in 2019:

*“He said that there needs to be reconciliation between Mindan, which supports South Korea, and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), which is pro-North Korea. <...> In fact, the Korean community of Mindan felt **alienated and uncomfortable** during that event. It’s important for our fellow Koreans living in Japan to reconcile, but for that to happen, issues like the North Korean nuclear program and the abduction of Japanese citizens<sup>32</sup> must be resolved.”*

---

<sup>32</sup> As noted in Chapter 2, the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea from 1977 to 1983 presents a serious issue for Zainichi Koreans in Japan regardless of their political or organizational affiliation; for example, the funding to Korean ethnic schools was withdrawn on the grounds of no progress being made on the abduction issue (The Mainichi, 2022).

However, he mentioned that Moon Jae-in was not the first South Korean leader to use the lives of ordinary people as pawns in the political strife:

*“Former President Lee Myung-bak over Dokdo, former President Park Geun-hye over comfort women, and all previous presidents have done the same. They have repeatedly brought up old issues and fought and negotiated with each other. Every time this happens, the only ones who suffer are the people. I hope the leaders stop using history they want to forget and the people’s wounds for politics.”*

Even though this criticism addressed previous conservative leaders too, in the context of other articles published by Chosun Ilbo it is clear that Zainichi Koreans were framed as victims of the dispute to, among other things, also highlight the shortcomings of the South Korean administration at that time, which is also apparent from the quote chosen to be the title of the interview: **“Stop using the nationals’ wounds for politics”**, which reads as being aimed at Moon Jae-in and his administration.

This frame was also apparent in another article published by Chosun Ilbo (2019b) which talked about “Korea fatigue” growing in Japan amidst the crisis:

*“Several Japanese newspapers that had tried to understand the Moon Jae-in administration have also changed their stance. The worsening public opinion in Japan is flying like an invisible arrow to [Zainichi] Koreans living in Japan, expatriates, and international students.”*

Once again, the newspaper represents an opinion that the trade dispute and the crisis in bilateral relations with Japan is Moon Jae-in’s fault, and his actions were hurting Koreans – including Zainichi.

#### 5.2.4 Zainichi Koreans as experts on South Korea-Japan relations

Aside from these frames, Zainichi Koreans were also often regarded as experts on Korea-Japan relations. One of the experts featured in dedicated articles by all 4 newspapers was Kang Sang-jung, an honorary professor at the University of Tokyo. The newspapers chose to report on his lecture on Korea-Japan relations at the National Assembly on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kim Dae-jung’s death on August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2019. The article published by JoongAng Ilbo highlights that Kang Sang-jung is the first Zainichi Korean to become a full-time professor at Tokyo University, and that he is *“considered an intellectual who is well-informed*

*about both Korea and Japan*” (JoongAng Ilbo, 2019c); at the same time, Chosun Ilbo (2019g) chose to also stress that he is “*a Zainichi Korean who opposed Japan’s far-right politics and often met with the former president [Kim Dae-jung]*”. Interestingly enough, there was a difference in the titles of both articles: while JoongAng Ilbo called him “Kang Sang-jung, a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo”, Chosun Ilbo called him “a Zainichi professor who met with the Democratic Party”, with “Zainichi” being written in *hanja* and not *hangul* – which signals that the newspaper saw his Zainichi Korean origins even more important than mentioning his name in the title.

There was a certain difference in the ways the newspapers chose to frame the lecture: JoongAng Ilbo chose to extensively focus on the security angle, dedicating the piece to GSOMIA and the possibility of it being cancelled, which was discussed earlier in the section dedicated to the security frame.

Chosun Ilbo gave a shorter, but more comprehensive overview of the lecture, highlighting the professor’s closeness with Kim Dae-jung. It quoted the professor criticizing the anti-Japan boycotts and saying that Kim Dae-jung “*loved Japanese pop culture*” and “*he would have been saddened*” by the state of affairs between South Korea and Japan. Unlike JoongAng Ilbo, this article gives a different reasoning to why the crisis happened: “*the domestic political support of the Abe administration is very weak, so it has no choice but to take a strong stance against Korea.*” It also mentions the economics angle not reported by the other newspapers, saying that the trade dispute and restrictions could be a way for South Korea to become more independent from Japan by developing “*small and medium-sized enterprises [to cover for the industries affected by the restrictions]*.” However, the conclusion is similar to JoongAng Ilbo: the article also mentions GSOMIA and the risks that come with it not being extended, and advocates for continuing to develop civil and private contacts as a way to bring change.

Meanwhile, Kyunghyang featured Kang Sang-jung’s lecture as a part of the broader piece that reported on the Democratic Party trying to “*put the brakes*” on anti-Japanese sentiments being spread by some of the party members, as further escalation started to be seen as a harmful outcome both for politics and ordinary citizens. As such, the title of the article mentioned not Kang Sang-jung, but Lee Hae-chan, the leader of the Democratic Party at that time (“*Lee Hae-chan: “Economic retaliation and the Olympics must be separated” Putting the brakes on*

*anti-Japanese agitation*”<sup>33</sup>). The article quoted Lee Hae-chan saying “*economic retaliation and sports exchanges should be separated. We should not oppose participation in the Olympics at the party level,*” as well as other party members negatively assessing the ongoing escalation, such as calls for a 'Tokyo travel ban' and the 'NO JAPAN' signs being hanged on the streets of Seoul by district heads belonging to the party. The reporter stressed that the movement should be not “anti-Japan”, but “anti-Abe”, and further spreading of anti-Japanese sentiments could cause collapse of “*the solidarity between the anti-Abe forces in Korea and Japan.*” To further support this statement, the article quotes Kang Sang-jung and his lecture, during which the professor called for Japan to admit and recognize its historical past but also highlighted that further escalation of saying “no” to everything Japanese will only hurt both countries and that the contacts between Japan and Korea need to be encouraged, not cut. Once again, when mentioning Kang Sang-jung for the first time, the article represents him as a “*Zainichi Korean political scientist*” and “*the first Korean **national** [국적자] to become a full professor at the University of Tokyo.*”

Hankyoreh also reported on this lecture; however, the article did not mention Kang Sang-jung’s identity as a Zainichi Korean at all – therefore, it was not in the original data set that was collected and was sourced additionally to give a more complete picture on the news reports. Instead, the title focused on him being a professor from the University of Tokyo who called for Japan to recognize its past (“*Kang Sang-jung, professor from the University of Tokyo: “Japan should be humbled in the face of history*”<sup>34</sup>). The article overall is more critical of Shinzo Abe than the others, using Kang Sang-jung’s words to highlight that the export restrictions imposed by Japan were most likely his doing rather than Japan’s government decision: “*I don't think Japan's export restrictions implemented last month were a plan meticulously prepared by the Japanese government. I think it was a reflection of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's strong will.*” At the same time, it mentioned how Kang Sang-jung “*highly*” praised Moon Jae-in and his efforts on improving relations with North Korea, viewing it as a possible solution for the crisis in South Korea-Japan relations – as reported by Hankyoreh, South Korea being a mediator between North Korea and Japan could bring them

---

<sup>33</sup> 이해찬 “경제보복과 올림픽은 분리해야” 반일 선동에 제동 // Lee Hae-chan: "Economic retaliation and the Olympics must be separated" from anti-Japanese movement. Kyunghyang Shinmun. 07.08.2019. URL: <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908072134015>

<sup>34</sup> 강상중 도쿄대 교수 “일본 역사 앞에 겸허해져야” // “Kang Sang-jung, professor from the University of Tokyo: “Japan should be humbled in the face of history”. Hankyoreh. URL: <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/904864.html>

closer and change Japan's approach to Moon Jae-in's administration. The article also talked about GSOMIA and its possible cancellation, joining other newspapers in presenting it as something that could damage South Korea-U.S. relations and break the trilateral alliance between South Korea, USA and Japan. At last, the report mentioned that Kang Sang-jung "appealed to the Korean media and public" by saying that the anti-Japan boycotts "were not good" for both countries, and gives the same explanation for the crisis as Chosun Ilbo: "As seen in the House of Councilors election results last month, there is not strong public support (for Abe's internal policies), <...> so [Abe's administration] has no choice but to take a strong stance against Korea." It is interesting to note the Hankyoreh's article did not give outright negative assessment to the boycotts unlike other newspapers when reporting this lecture.

However, it was not only academics whose opinion is respected and well-regarded. For example, there was a certain degree of pride whenever Masayoshi Son (and his wealth) was mentioned. Masayoshi Son, a third-generation Zainichi Korean, rose to the ranks of the wealthiest entrepreneurs in Japan through his investments into technology and communications, at some point even surpassing Bill Gates in his wealth (Chowdhury, 2024). As such, the South Korean newspapers framed him as an expert in economics: out of the 40 newspaper articles analyzed, he was mentioned in 4 of them. It is also important to note that in these reports, the South Korean newspapers exclusively used his Korean name, Son Jeong-ui, – thus highlighting further his Korean origins.

His opinion or his connections were deemed worthy of attention: two of the newspapers (Kyunghyang and JoongAng Ilbo) featured a dedicated article, with Kyunghyang reporting on Masayoshi Son's meeting with Moon Jae-in and JoongAng Ilbo publishing an interview with Masayoshi Son's younger brother, Taizo Son, where the topic of the trade dispute was discussed.

Kyunghyang (2019d) made a point that Masayoshi Son "is known to be a third-generation Zainichi Korean," and thus "attention was focused on whether they would also discuss the Japanese government's trade retaliation measures against Korean companies", but "the Blue House stated that a separate discussion on this matter did not occur." Nevertheless, the article represented Masayoshi Son as someone knowledgeable about economics and investments, highlighting that Moon Jae-in requested him to help out young entrepreneurs and "help us [Korea] enter the global market by utilizing SoftBank's global network." In the

context of the trade dispute, it is difficult to imagine a South Korean president to be requesting such help from a CEO of any other Japanese company – but here it was seen and reported as a positive thing, and Masayoshi Son’s background was undeniably a key factor behind it.

Meanwhile, JoongAng Ilbo (2019e) took an interview with Taizo Son, a younger brother of Masayoshi Son, and chose to highlight this connection (and, again, Masayoshi Son’s wealth) in the title without even mentioning Son Taizo’s name: the article was called “*The reason why the younger brother of the 2 trillion won billionaire Son Jeong-ui only invests in crazy people.*” Although the article goes on to describe Son Taizo’s background and achievements as well, this detail shows that he is not as well-known as Masayoshi Son is by the average readers. To present Son Taizo to them, the article focused on him being a third-generation Korean who also achieved the billionaire rank with his business decisions and investments, - and that he was now investing into Korea, which prompted the interview. The interview went on to ask Son Taizo about what he invested into and why, and in the very end asked of his opinion on how to resolve the ongoing “*chill in Korea-Japan relations.*” When answering this question, Son Taizo did not give a definite answer and said that it was important to first define the questions being asked, as it would help to “*come up with your own solutions in the process of finding the answers.*” To Son Taizo, such questions were “*What is the most ideal relationship between Korea and Japan?*” and “*Why did the current conflict situation arise?*”, and he concluded with expressing hope that “*the media in both countries will refrain from reporting in a fragmentary and sensational way.*”

These examples show that the South Korean newspapers recognized the mixed Koreanness and Japaneseness of Zainichi Koreans, seeing them as a “bridge” between Japan and South Korea that could either explain the course of their relations or offer insights and solutions to the problems that arise within them. In the analyzed articles, they were considered to be a part of their own, and even with the multiple in-depth readings there were no signs of them being perceived as foreign or “Other” detected, which answers the second research question and confirms that Zainichi Koreans were still seen as Koreans even amidst the trade dispute.

## 6 Findings and conclusion

This chapter presents the key findings of the study, which examined how the trade dispute of 2019 and Zainichi Koreans were framed in South Korean media in an attempt to find out how it relates to the discourses on South Korean national identity. Through a frame analysis of 39 news articles published by 4 newspapers (two conservative outlets – Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo; and two progressive – Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang), five general frames were identified: *conflict* as an umbrella frame, further nuanced through the subframes of *economic consequences*, *solution*, *security* and *responsibility*. Furthermore, in relation to specifically Zainichi Korean representation, the four main ways in which they were framed were “Zainichi Koreans as Koreans”, as “victims of the dispute”, as “experts on South Korea-Japan relations” and as a part of the “history problem”, grouped together with such issues as Takeshima-Dokdo, “comfort women”, agreement over fisheries and the forced labor dispute.

This study was mostly built on Deacon’s work on how the South Korean national identity was produced and reproduced through the discourse on the “history problem” (2021). That research identified the dominant discourse present in South Korean media regarding the trade dispute: for South Korea, the trade dispute was a continuation of the “history problem”, in which Japan was represented as an aggressor, which made Korea the victim of said aggression, thus requiring from the nation to mobilize their efforts to oppose it. In my own research, I aimed to explore the existing discourse and frames in detail, seeking to identify not only the confirmation for the dominant discourse, but also alternative discourses contesting it; which was the goal behind the first research question.

In terms of the *conflict* frame, I was able to confirm Deacon’s findings: the conflict, that is, the trade dispute, was never reported on in a vacuum. It was always framed as a new development of the “history problem” discourse in which the (South) Korean national identity was forged vis-à-vis Japan. Amidst this context, the anti-Japanese boycotts were presented as a justifiable reaction from the public to Japan’s economic aggression. However, the alternative views were also found: while Deacon highlights how Moon Jae-in commended the South Korean public for their “civil consciousness” and united support in opposing Japan, I have found that through the use of the *economic consequences* frame, the South Korean media also presented voices of how the boycotts (and, by extent, the trade dispute) were damaging to South Korea’s economy, Korean companies and Koreans themselves – including Zainichi Koreans in this description. In this context, Zainichi Koreans’ involvement in businesses that

came under the fire of boycotts (such as Masayoshi Son) was framed as an argument towards the Koreanness of such businesses. Furthermore, the damaging nature of the trade dispute was also highlighted through the use of the *security* frame, with South Korean media warning that further escalation of the conflict can be damaging to the relationship between USA and South Korea, and, subsequently, give the playing field to North Korea where it can take the initiative to engage in normalizing its relations with Japan without South Korea's involvement – which was framed as being a security threat as well.

In terms of *responsibility* frame, the situation was similar. Similarly to Deacon, it was found that all newspapers agreed that responsibility for the trade dispute partly lies with the Japanese government and its unwillingness to admit and apologize for its historical past as an aggressor, which reproduced the dominant discourse of South Korean national identity as the one trying to *remember* the past. However, this was not the only way the frame was utilized, as Chosun Ilbo, a conservative newspaper, also used it to criticize the liberal administration of Moon Jae-in and suggest an alternative view that South Korea could also if not *forget* the past, at least move on from focusing on it and seek alternative ways of interacting with Japan, thus presenting a discourse alternative to the dominant one and showing that opposition to Japan does not necessarily have to be the defining element of South Korean national identity. This is, perhaps, the most important finding of this study with regards to its goals of identifying the alternative discourses – I argue that the presence of this alternative view in the South Korean media and, by extent, public consciousness, made the subsequent resolution of the trade dispute in 2023 imaginable and possible. In other words, if there was no public support for such ideas, Yoon Suk-yeol would not be able to go through with it; this highlights the mutually constitutive relation between the national identity and foreign policy and gives grounds to think we might be able to see the “history problem” resolved in the future if this alternative discourse continues to grow in influence. At the same time, Hankyoreh pointed out that South Korea is also the one trying to *forget* its own problematic historical past such as actions in the Vietnam War, which suggests we could see some future developments from this angle as well.

In terms of specific framing of Zainichi Koreans, all of the analyzed articles portrayed Zainichi Koreans as Koreans, with their treatment being framed as an essential issue in Korea-Japan relations and a part of the “history problem”; these results were also found to be consistent with Deacon's conclusion (2021) that (South) Korean identity is constructed vis-à-vis Japan in their relation to the shared “history problem”. In other words, I argue that framing

Zainichi Koreans as Koreans was done by the newspapers precisely for the reason of them also being on the “victim” side of interactions with Japan.

To summarize, in regard to the first research question, the findings were also consistent with Deacon’s work: despite the political leaning of the newspapers, they all acted to reproduce South Korean national identity as the one trying to remember the past while Japan tried to forget it. However, as pointed out earlier, alternative views were also present, with the conservative Chosun Ilbo suggesting moving on from the “history problem” and cooperating with Japan more closely as a possible course of action moving forward. Considering this existing discourse, it is perhaps not surprising that the trade dispute was resolved when a conservative candidate, Yoon Suk-yeol, took the presidential office.

To answer the second research question posed, this study argues that South Korean media did not see or represent Zainichi Koreans as the Other, but rather “one of us”, who are also suffering from Japan’s retaliatory measures and unfair treatment in the Japanese society. However – to answer the sub-question posed – partisan leaning of media outlets affected the way they reported on the events, as they tried promoting their ideas and agenda, which is found to be consistent with other studies of South Korean journalism (Lee & Paik, 2017; Jin & Kwak, 2018). This could be seen most vividly on the example of the conservative Chosun Ilbo, which used the identified frames, including framing Zainichi Koreans as the victims of the dispute, to criticize the liberal administration of Moon Jae-in. Meanwhile, progressive Hankyoreh, which was most outspoken against Shinzo Abe and his policies, used the frame of Zainichi Koreans and their treatment by Japan as an issue in South Korea-Japan relations to further justify anti-Japanese boycotts (the case with DHC sharing discriminatory remarks about Zainichi Koreans). JoongAng Ilbo and Kyunghyang, however, demonstrated more moderate views and generally adhered to the dominant discourse on the “history problem.”

Due to the scope of this project, only a short period of time was examined. To gain a better understanding of the existing media discourses on South Korean national identity including the alternative views, a comparative study could be performed, i.e. how Yoon Suk-yeol’s decisions to end the trade dispute with Japan were framed in South Korean media in 2023. Moreover, as this study only examined the ways Zainichi Koreans were framed during a specific point of time, future research could explore how South Korean public receives and interprets such frames and how that affects their understanding of Korean national identity and interactions with Zainichi Koreans.

## References

- Adams, R. (2017). Michel Foucault: Discourse.  
<https://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/11/17/michel-foucault-discourse/>
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections of the origins and spread of nationalism*. London, England: Verso.
- Armstrong, J. A. (1982). *Nations before nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “Identity.” *Theory and Society*, 29(1), 1–47.  
<https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468>
- Campbell, D. (1998). *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (2nd ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Choi, Y.-H., & Lee, K.-H. (2020). Korean consumers’ political consumption of Japanese fashion products. *Journal of the Korean Society of Clothing and Textiles*, 44(2), 295–309. <https://doi.org/10.5850/JKSCT.2020.44.2.295>
- Chowdhury, H. (2024, September 28). *Masayoshi Son is the \$100 billion gambler who went from dirt track to tech titan — and he isn’t done betting yet*. Business Insider.  
<https://www.businessinsider.com/masayoshi-son-softbank-gambling-man-lionel-barber-technology-2024-9>
- Conway, S. (2001). War and national identity in the mid-eighteenth century British Isles. *The English Historical Review*, 116 (468), 863– 893.
- CSIS. (2019). Timeline of Japan-South Korea relations. <https://japankorea.csis.org>
- Deacon C. (2021). (Re)producing the ‘history problem’: memory, identity and the Japan-South Korea trade dispute, *The Pacific Review*, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1897652

- Debito A. (2015). Japan's Under-Researched Visible Minorities: Applying Critical Race Theory to Racialization Dynamics in a Non-White Society. *Global Studies Law Review*, 14 (4): 695–723. URL: [https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law\\_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13](https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13)
- Demelius, Y. (2020). Multiculturalism in a “homogeneous” society from the perspectives of an intercultural event in Japan, *Asian Anthropology*, DOI: 10.1080/1683478X.2019.1710332
- Dyachkov I.V. Collective Memory and Politics: ‘Comfort Women’ in Current Relations between South Korea and Japan. *Russian Japanology Review*. 2020;3(2):68-87. (In Russ.) <https://doi.org/10.24411/2658-6789-2020-10009>
- East Asia Forum (2024, June 13). Why Japan is failing to curb hate speech. <https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/06/13/why-japan-is-failing-to-curb-hate-speech/>
- Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communications*.
- Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 95(1), 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1086/229213>
- Geertz, C. *The interpretation of cultures*. New York, NY: Basic Books. [https://search-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.utu.fi/view/work/bibliographic\\_entity|bibliographic\\_details|1667767](https://search-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.utu.fi/view/work/bibliographic_entity|bibliographic_details|1667767)
- Glosserman, B., & Snyder, S. A. (2015). *The Japan-South Korea identity clash: East Asian security and the United States*. Columbia University Press.
- Gorbunova, E. (2020). Korean Diaspora in the South Korean media discourse: changing narrative. *Diaspora Studies*, 13(2), 170–188. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2020.1752968>

- Hagström, L. (2015). The 'abnormal' state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan. *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(1), 122–145.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113518356>
- Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K. (2015). Japan and identity change: why it matters in International Relations. *Pacific Review*, 28(1), 1–22.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.969298>
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (1st ed.). Oxford: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203236338>
- Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K. (2019). Narrative power: how storytelling shapes East Asian international politics. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(4), 387–406.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1623498>
- Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (1983). *The Invention of Tradition* (1st ed., Vol. 15). New York: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295636>
- Howell, D. L. (1996). Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary Japan. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 31(1), 171–190. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200949603100107>
- Hurights Osaka (2013). Rise of Hate Speech in Japan.  
<https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2013/12/rise-of-hate-speech-in-japan.html>
- Itagaki R. (2015). The Anatomy of Korea-phobia in Japan. *Japanese Studies*, 35 (1): 49–66.  
DOI: 10.1080/10371397.2015.1007496
- Jackson, V. (2018). Buffers, Not Bridges: Rethinking Multilateralism and the Resilience of Japan-South Korea Friction. *International Studies Review*, 20(1), 127–151.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix040>

- Jin, D. Y. & Kwak, N. (2018) *Communication, digital media, and popular culture in Korea: contemporary research and future prospects*. 1st edition. Blue Ridge Summit: Lexington Books.
- JoongAng Daily (2019a, August 21). Avoiding collateral damage. <https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2019/08/21/columns/Avoiding-collateral-damage/3067018.html>
- Kim, B. (2011). Changes in the Socio-economic Position of “Zainichi” Koreans: A Historical Overview. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 14(2), 233–245. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyq069>
- Kim, J. (2015). Islands Adrift: Korean-Japanese Relations, National Identity, and the Zainichi. *The Massachusetts Review*, 56(3), 440–445. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24494422>
- Kim, N., & Lee, S. (2022). Analyzing partisan news coverage of COVID-19 with machine learning/deep learning algorithms, network analysis, and topic modeling methods. *Information Society & Media* 23 (1), 69–105. <https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002832164>.
- Kim, Y., & Kim, B. (2024). How do the news media, academia, and the public view the metaverse? Evidence from South Korea. *Technological Forecasting & Social Change*, 198, 122980-. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2023.122980>
- Korea Times (2019, May 21). Korea’s No.1 newspaper accused of inventing experts’ quotes. <https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/amp/southkorea/politics/20190521/koreas-no1-newspaper-accused-of-inventing-experts-quotes>
- Korea Times (2017, August 24). Korean moms flex muscles across board. <https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20170824/korean-moms-flex-muscles-across-board>

- Kwak, K. (2011). From “revolutionary changes” to “things as usual”: The political role of online media in South Korea. *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture & Policy*, (141), 87–97.
- Kyounghwa, L. (2019). The Mutual Gaze of Okinawans and Zainichi Koreans in Post-War Japan: From 1945 to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion. *Japan Focus*, 17(8).
- Lee, J. (2019, July 16). South Korean forced labor victims to seek Japan’s Mitsubishi asset sale. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkoreajapan-laborers-mhi/south-korean-forced-labor-victims-to-seek-japans-mitsubishiasset-sale-idUSKCN1UB0HO>
- Lee, M. (2021, October 18). Do the country’s new anti-bias measures have any teeth? Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-17/koreans-in-japan-hate-speech-case-highlights-workplace-racism>
- Lee, S. (2013). Burying the Hatchet? The Sources and Limits of Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation. *Asian Security (Philadelphia, Pa.)*, 9(2), 93–110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.795547>
- Lee, S., & Lee, S. (2019). Decision of the Korean Court on Japanese Forced Labor re New Nippon Steel Corporation (Supreme Court, Case 2013 Da 61381, Final Judgment). *The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 7(1), 88-132. <https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340118>
- Lee, S., & Paik, J. E. (2017). How partisan newspapers represented a pandemic: the case of the Middle East respiratory syndrome in South Korea. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 27(1), 82–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2016.1235592>
- Lee, Y., & Chon, M.-G. (2022). “Don’t Go, Don’t Buy”: Understanding the Motivations of the Anti-Japan Boycott Movement in South Korea During an International Conflict. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 15(1), 6–31. <https://doi.org/10.34891/zjpg-xg89>

- Lie, J. (2008). *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity*. eScholarship, University of California.
- Lim, T. C., & Song, C. (2021). Ideas, Discourse, and the Microfoundations of South Korea's Diasporic Engagement: Explaining the Institutional Embrace of Ethnic Koreans Since the 1990s. *International Journal of Korean History*, 26(2), 41–82.  
<https://doi.org/10.22372/IJKH.2021.26.2.41>
- Lippmann, W. (2004). *Public opinion (Unabridged republication.)*. Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications.
- Matthes, J. (2009) What's in a Frame? A Content Analysis of Media Framing Studies in the World's Leading Communication Journals, 1990-2005. *Journalism & mass communication quarterly*. [Online] 86 (2), 349–367.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015). Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion, December 28, 2015.  
[http://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/na/kr/page4e\\_000364.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html)
- Miller, D. (1995). *On nationality*. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Moon, S.-J., & Sung, J.-Y. (2006). Exposure to negative media issue and anti-Japanese sentiment. *Korean Journal of Broadcasting and Telecommunication Studies*, 20(5), 70-105. (In Korean).  
<https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE01109954>
- Morris-Suzuki, T. (1998). *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (1st ed., pp. vii–vii). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315701202>
- Okamura R., Saito Y. (2022). Endangering the Right to Ethnic Education: Japan's Exclusion of Chōsen Schools from the Tuition Waiver Program. *Japan Focus*, 20 (3), no. 1.  
URL: <https://apjff.org/2022/3/Okamura.html>

- Park, H.-J. (2016). News Reporting on Comfort Women: Framing, Frame Difference, and Frame Changing in Four South Korean and Japanese Newspapers, 1998-2013. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 93(4), 1006–1025.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016644560>
- Park, C. S. (2015). Korean Media Often Allied with Ruling Political Parties. *Newspaper Research Journal*, 36(2), 265–278. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0739532915587297>
- Park S. (2017). Inventing aliens: immigration control, ‘xenophobia’ and racism in Japan. *Race & Class*, 58 (3): 64–80. DOI: 10.1177/0306396816657719
- Reese, S. D. (2007). The framing project: A bridging model for media research revisited. *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), 148–154. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00334.x
- Ryang, S., Lie, J.. (2009). *Diaspora without homeland: being Korean in Japan* (1st ed., Vol. 8). University of California Press.  
<https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520098633.001.0001>
- Semetko, H., & Valkenburg, P. (2000). Framing European politics: a content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 93–109.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.x>
- Seo, J. (2024). Diagnosing Korea-Japan relations through thick description: revisiting the national identity formation process. *Third World Quarterly*, 45(6), 1106–1121.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1937098>
- Statista. (2025, April 24). Leading candidate for the next president South Korea 2025.  
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1549781/south-korea-leading-candidate-for-the-next-president/>
- Streltsov D.V. (2023). Koreiskoe menshinstvo v Yaponii: problemi diskriminacii i socialnoi dezadaptacii [Korean minority in Japan: problems of discrimination and social

- maladaptation]. *Vostochnaya Aziya: fakty i analitika* [East Asia: Facts and Analytics], 4: 22–38. (In Russian). DOI: 10.24412/2686-7702-2023-4-22-38
- Suetomi, J. (2024, July 10). *Additional restrictions added to METI's licensing policies and procedures on exports of controlled items to the Republic of Korea*. Global Sanctions and Export Controls Blog. <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/additional-restrictions-added-to-metis-licensing-policies-and-procedures-on-exports-of-controlled-items-to-the-republic-of-korea/>
- Tamir, Y. (1995). *Liberal nationalism* ([New ed.], Vol. 47). Princeton: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400820849>
- The Mainichi (2022, December 18). “Zainichi” Koreans demanding Japan end discriminatory policy in Kyoto rallies. <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20221216/p2a/00m/0na/026000c>
- The Mainichi (2021, June 2021). Editorial: 5 years on from anti-hate speech law, Japan must do more to end discrimination. <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210629/p2a/00m/0op/022000c>
- Verdugo, R. R., & Milne, A. (Eds.). (2016). *National identity : theory and research* (1st ed.). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing, Inc.
- Vlastos, S. (1998). *Mirror of modernity: Invented tradition of modern Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Yan, F. (2020). *Image, Reality and Media Construction A Frame Analysis of German Media Representations of China* (1st ed. 2020.). Singapore: Springer Singapore. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9076-1>
- Yonhap News Agency (2021, May 25). Chōsensōren wa `minzoku kyōiku no mohan'. [North Korean media praises Chongryon as "model for ethnic education"]. Retrieved from <https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20210525001100882>

- Weber, M. (1949). *The methodology of the social sciences*. New York: Free Press.
- Willemien, M., & Linström, M. (2012). Qualitative news frame analysis: a methodology. In *Communitas*, 17, 21-38.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351884528\\_QUALITATIVE\\_NEWS\\_FRAME\\_ANALYSIS\\_A\\_METHODODOLOGY\\_Communitas](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351884528_QUALITATIVE_NEWS_FRAME_ANALYSIS_A_METHODODOLOGY_Communitas)
- Wimmer R.D. & Dominick J.R. 2006. *Mass Media Research. An Introduction*. (8th edition). Canada: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Winslow, L. (2017). Frame analysis. In *The sage encyclopedia of communication research methods* (Vol. 4, pp. 584-586). SAGE Publications, Inc,  
<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483381411.n210>
- Wodak, R. (2009). *The discursive construction of national identity* (2nd ed.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780748637355>
- Wodak, R., & Reisigl, M. (1999). DISCOURSE AND RACISM: European Perspectives. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28(1), 175–199.  
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.175>
- Won, C., & Huntington, A. (2021). What it means to be Korean: national identity in North and South Korean elementary textbooks, 1960-2019. *Comparative Education*, 57(2), 267–289. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2020.1812237>

## Primary data

Chosun Ilbo. (2019a, July 10). 우리는 '식민' 극복 성공했는데 왜 실패한 나라처럼 행동하나. (u-li-neun 'sig-min' geug-bog seong-gong-haess-neun-de wae sil-pae-han na-la-cheo-leom haeng-dong-ha-na). [We succeeded in overcoming "colonialism," but why do we act like a failed country]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/10/2019071003030.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/10/2019071003030.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019b, August 25). '혁명 외교'와 '韓國 쓰카레'. (hyeog-myeong oe-gyo'wa 'hanguk' sseu-ka-le). [“Revolutionary diplomacy and Korea fatigue”]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/25/2019082501620.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/25/2019082501620.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019c, July 9). "日기업, 청구권협정 틀 안에서 자발적 보상 고려해야". (il-gi-eob, cheong-gu-gwon-hyeob-jeong teul an-e-seo ja-bal-jeog bo-sang go-lyeo-hae-ya). [Japanese companies shall consider voluntary compensation within the framework of the Claims Agreement.]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/09/2019070900297.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/09/2019070900297.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019d, August 3). 아베 1월부터 준비 지시, 도쿄관가 "100 개 보복 리스트 있다". (a-be 1wol-bu-teo jun-bi ji-si, do-kyo-gwan-ga "100gae bo-bog li-seu-teu iss-da). [Abe orders implementation of additional retaliatory measures from January, Tokyo official says "We are preparing 100 retaliatory measures"]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/03/2019080300138.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/03/2019080300138.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019e, August 6). 금융권 '일본 주의보'...日 관련 이벤트·신상품 줄줄이 취소. (geum-yung-gwon 'il-bon ju-ui-bo'tss-jyeoh gwan-lyeon i-ben-teu-tbs-sin-sang-pum jul-jul-i chwi-so). [Financial sector's 'Japanese Watch'...Cancellation of daily related events and new products one after another].

[https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601368.html](https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601368.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019f, July 18). ‘일본기업’ 소문에 발끈...쿠팡 "우린 자랑스러운 한국기업". (il-bon-gi-eob-t so-mun-e bal-kkeun-tss-ku-pang "u-lin ja-lang-seu-leo-un han-gug-gi-eob). [Coupang gets angry at rumors of them being a 'Japanese company'...

"We are a proud Korean company"]

[https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/18/2019071802069.html](https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/18/2019071802069.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019g, August 7). 민주당 찾은 在日교수 "日제품 보이콧, DJ가 슬퍼했을 것". (min-ju-dang chaj-eun jae-il-gyo-su "jyeoh-je-pum bo-i-kos, DJga seul-peo-haess-eul). [Zainichi Professor Visits Democratic Party: "Kim Dae-jung would have been sad over the boycott of Japanese Products".]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/07/2019080701852.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/07/2019080701852.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019h, August 11). "韓, 금방 뜨거워졌다 식어" "일이 한글 배포"...日 DHC 방송국, 험한 방송 논란. (han, geum-bang tteu-geo-wo-jyeoss-da sig-eo" "jyeoh-i han-geul bae-po"tss-jyeoh DHC bang-song-gug, hyeom-han bang-song non-lan). ["Korea quickly heats up and cools down", "Japan distributes Hangul"... Japanese DHC broadcast station in controversy over anti-Korean broadcast.]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/08/11/2019081100382.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/11/2019081100382.html)

Chosun Ilbo. (2019i, July 19). 민단 도쿄단장 "재일동포는 목이 조여온다...국민상처 정치 이용 말았으면". (min-dan do-kyo-dan-jang "jae-il-dong-po-neun mog-i jo-yeo-on-da-tss-gug-min-sang-cheo jeong-chi i-yong mal-ass-eu-myeon). [Chairman of Mindan's Tokyo Branch: "Koreans in Japan are feeling suffocated... Stop using the nation's wounds for politics".]

[https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html](https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/07/19/2019071901624.html)

Hankyoreh. (2019a, August 19). '강한 일본'과 공화국의 책무'. (gang-han il-bon-t-gwa gong-hwa-gug-ui chaeg-mu). ["'Strong Japan' and the Republic [of Korea]'s responsibilities"] <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/905334.html>

Hankyoreh. (2019b, August 12). DHC 에 <에반게리온> 작가까지...잇따른 험한 발언에 시민들 '분노'. (DHCe jag-ga-kka-ji-tss-is-tta-leun hyeom-han bal-eon-e si-min-deul t-bun-no-t.) [From DHC to the artist of <Evangelion>... Citizens are 'angry' at a series of anti-Korean comments]

[https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/905425.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/905425.html)

Hankyoreh. (2019c, August 13). “일본인, 아시아 유일한 유럽인” DHC 회장 인종주의적 망언도 했다. (il-bon-in, a-si-a yu-il-han yu-leob-in-te DHC hoe-jang in-jong-ju-ui-jeog mang-eon-do haess-da). [The chairman of DHC even made such racist remarks as “Japan is the only European state in Asia”]  
[https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/905570.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/905570.html)

Hankyoreh. (2019d, August 14). “아베, 한국을 2015 년으로 되돌리려 해... ‘타협적 화해’는 위험”. (a-be, han-gug-eul 2015nyeon-eu-lo doe-dol-li-lyeo hae-tss-t-ta-hyeob-jeog hwa-hae-t-neun wi-heom). [“Abe wants to turn Korea back to 2015... ‘Compromise reconciliation’ is dangerous”].  
<https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/905667.html>

Hankyoreh. (2019e, August 22). 일본서 ‘3·1 운동 100 주년 기념’ 한·중·일 포럼 개최. (il-bon-seo t-3-tbs-1-un-dong 100ju-nyeom gi-nyeom-t han-tbs-jung-tbs-il po-leom gae-choe). [Korea-China-Japan Forum Held in Japan to Commemorate 100th Anniversary of March 1st Movement.] <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908222041005>

Hankyoreh. (2019f, July 31). 일본 전 변협회장 “아베 정부, 미쓰비시 등 강제징용 배상 막지 말아야”. (il-bon jeon byeon-hyeob-hoe-jang te-a-be jeong-bu, mi-sseu-bi-si deung gang-je-jing-yong bae-sang mag-ji mal-a-ya). [Former Japanese Bar Association President: “Abe Government Should Not Block Compensation for Forced Labor from Mitsubishi, etc.”]  
[https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society\\_general/903935.html](https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/903935.html)

Hankyoreh. (2019g, August 1). 두번 잘린 변호사, 우쓰노미야 겐지. (du-beon jal-lin byeon-ho-sa, u-sseu-no-mi-ya gen-ji). [Twice-Cut Lawyer, Utsunomiya Kenji]  
<https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/904188.html>

Hankyoreh. (2019h, August 8). 강상중 도쿄대 교수 “일본 역사 앞에 겸허해져야”. (gang-sang-jung do-kyo-dae gyo-su te-il-bon yeog-sa ap-e gyeom-heo-hae-jyeo-ya). [“Kang

Sang-jung, professor from the University of Tokyo: “Japan should be humbled in the face of history”] <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/904864.html>

Hankyoreh. (2019i, July 30). 아베의 일본, 반면교사로 삼을 나라. (a-be-ui il-bon, ban-myeon-gyo-sa-lo sam-eul na-la). [Abe's Japan, a country to learn from.] <https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/903903.html>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019a, July 23). 20 번째 한국 찾은 일본 시민단체 “일본 침략 역사 반성합니다”. (20beon-jjae han-gug chaj-eun il-bon si-min-dan-che te-il-bon chim-lyag yeog-sa ban-seong-hab-ni-da-te.) [A Japanese civic group came to visit Korea for the 20th time: “We oppose Japan’s invasion”] <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23533355>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019b, August 20). 콜라트럴 데미지. (kol-lae-teu-leol de-mi-ji). [Collateral damage]. <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23557505>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019c, August 7). 강상중 도쿄대 교수 "지소미아 파기시 日 불리...한·미 관계도 금 간다". (gang-sang-jung do-kyo-dae gyo-su "ji-so-mi-a pa-gi-si jyeoh bul-li-tbs-tbs-tbs-han-tbs-mi gwan-gye-do geum gan-da). [Professor Kang Sang-joong of the University of Tokyo: "If GSOMIA is terminated, Japan will be disadvantaged... Korea-US relations will also be damaged."] <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23546275>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019d, July 29). 중앙정부는 싸워도 지자체·민간 교류는 이어져야. (jung-ang-jeong-bu-neun ssa-wo-do ji-ja-che-tbs-min-gan gyo-lyu-neun i-eo-jyeo-ya). [Even if the central government fights, exchanges between local governments and the private sector must continue.] <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23538061>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019e, August 6). 2 조 갑부 손정의 동생, 미치광이만 골라 투자하는 이유. (2jo gab-bu son-jeong-ui dong-saeng, mi-chi-gwang-i-man gol-la tu-ja-ha-neun i-yu). [Why Masayoshi Son’s younger brother invests only in crazy people. JoongAng Ilbo.] <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23545669>

JoongAng Ilbo. (2019f, August 14). 일본을 가장 먼저 앞지른 건 축구였다. (il-bon-eul ga-jang meon-jeo ap-ji-leun geon chug-gu-yeoss-da). [“The first thing in which we surpassed Japan was soccer”] <https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23552763>

Kyunghyang Shinmun. (2019a, July 28). ‘주전장’과 ‘영화 김복동’. (ju-jeon-jang-t-gwa t-yeong-hwa gim-bog-dong). [The Battlefield' and 'The Movie about Kim Bok-dong'] <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201907282038025>

Kyunghyang Shinmun. (2019b, August 6). “일본계 아닙니다” 다이소·세븐일레븐 등 해명진답. (il-bon-gye a-nib-ni-da-te da-i-so-tbs-se-beun-il-le-beun deung hae-myeong jinttam). [We are not Japanese companies”: Daiso, Seven Eleven and the others explain, wiping off cold sweat.”] <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908061012001>

Kyunghyang Shinmun. (2019c, August 7). 이해찬 “경제보복과 올림픽은 분리해야” 반일선동에 제동. (i-hae-chan te-gyeong-je-bo-bog-gwa ol-lim-pig-eun bun-li-hae-ya-te ban-il seon-dong-e je-dong). [Lee Hae-chan: "Economic retaliation and the Olympics must be separated" from anti-Japanese movement.] <https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201908072134015>

Kyunghyang Shinmun. (2019d, July 4). 문 대통령 만난 손정의 “한국, 인공지능에 집중투자해야”. (mun dae-tong-lyeong man-nan son-jeong-ui te-han-gug, in-gong-jineung-e jib-jung tu-ja-hae-ya). [Masayoshi Son, who met President Moon, said, "Korea should focus on investing in artificial intelligence."]  
<https://www.khan.co.kr/article/201907041758001>