Ubaguzi Hatutaki, "We Don't Want to Be Isolated" –

Ethnographic Case Study of Forest Policy in Zanzibar

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Forest degradation and high population density pose problems for Zanzibarian society, while Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (K-PFR) in North-Eastern Unguja restricts the access of the communities to forest resources, to which over 90 per cent of rural population depend on as their primary energy source. Existing studies have linked weak government and budget deficiency to current forestry activities. While also foreign funded projects have attempted to address this, no sustainable compensation mechanism for the restricted access have been instituted.

This ethnographic research attempts to analyse and deconstruct power within participatory forest management in K-PFR. The research is based on work done in Zanzibar between 2013–2020, through two development cooperation projects KIPPO and SUFO. As data, the research applies 43 individual interviews, few group interviews, as well as conversations, research diaries and policy papers. The theoretical framework is founded on ethnographic, development, postcolonial and globalisation theories.

The research finds complex and multi-layered levels of interest and power from international to local levels. International policy regimes have significant influence on national policies in Low-Income Countries. Furthermore, the research draws attention to the extension of monopoly on violence to the civil sphere, while the civil sphere holds significant interest towards this monopoly on violence. Moreover, this extension of state power through civil sphere is not recognised in the policies of the donor countries.

KEYWORDS: Development, development cooperation, civil society, natural resources management, ethnography, multilateralism, conflict, forestry, development policy, Zanzibar, Tanzania

TURUN YLIOPISTO
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Metsäkato, korkea syntyvyys ja väestöntiheys aiheuttavat haasteita Sansibarin yhteiskunnalle. Kiwengwa-Pongwen metsänsuojelualue (KPFR) Pohjois-Ungujan saarella rajoittaa metsäresurssien saatavuutta paikallisissa yhteisöissä, joissa 90 prosenttia väestöstä käyttää puuta ensisijaisena energialähteenään. Aikaisempi tutkimuksen mukaan heikko hallinto ja rahoituksen puute luonnehtivat nykyisiä metsänsuojelutoimia. Vaikka muut ulkomaalaisrahoitteiset hankkeet ovat yrittäneet ratkaista ongelmaa, kestävää kompensaatiomekanismia ei ole vakiinnutettu korvaukseksi rajoituksille.

Tämä etnografinen tutkimus pyrkii analysoimaan ja dekonstruoimaan valtaa metsänsuojelualueen osallistavassa hallinnossa. Tutkimuksen aineisto perustuu kahden kehitysyhteistyöhankkeen, SUFOn ja KIPPOn, kautta kerättyyn aineistoon vuosina 2013–2020. Tutkimus käyttää aineistonaan 43 yksilöhaastattelua, kahta ryhmähaastattelua, sekä muuta etnografista aineistoa, kuten tutkimuspäiväkirjaa, havaintoja, asiakirjoja ja keskustelumuistiinpanoja. Teoreettinen viitekehys rakentuu etnografisten tutkimusmenetelmien, kehitysmaatutkimuksen, postkoloniaalisen ja globalisaatiokirjallisuuden ympärille.

Tutkielman tuloksena syntyy kuva moniulotteisesta intressien ja vallan verkostosta – aina ruohonjuuritasolta kansainvälisille kentille. Tutkielma kommentoi kansainvälisten verkostojen vaikutusvaltaa kansalliseen päätöksentekoon, minkä lisäksi, tutkielma kiinnittää huomiota väkivaltamonopolin ulottamisen kansalaisyhteiskuntaan, osoittaen myös sen, mitä intressejä kansalaisyhteiskunnassa on osallistua väkivaltamonopolin ylläpitoon. Lopulta, tätä julkisen vallan ulottumista kansalaisyhteiskuntaan ei tunnusteta politiikkadokumenteissa, joiden pohjalta metsänsuojelupolitiikka on laadittu.

ASIASANAT: Kehitys, kehitysapu, kehitysyhteistyö, kansalaisyhteiskunta, luonnonvarojen hallinta, etnografia, multilateraalisuus, konfliktintutkimus, metsänkäyttö, kehityspolitiikka, Sansibar, Tansania

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & GLOSSARY

CoFMA	Community Forest Management Agreement - A legal agreement in Zanzibar allowing the community to manage and conserve local natural resources
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of OECD.
DFNR	Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Resources – A governmental department under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment. In this thesis, referred to as "Forestry Department".
GST	Geographical Society of Turku
KIPPO	Kiwengwa-Pongwe Protection and Open Civil Society –a GST development cooperation project during 2017–2019
K-PFR	Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve
K-P CFCN	Kiwengwa-Pongwe Community Forest Conservation Network *alias* MUMKI
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MUMKI	*Mtandao Wa Uhifadhi Wa Mazingira Kiwengwa-Pongwe*, see K-P CFCN
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Aid – Classified by OECD/DAC.
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – World Bank policies for developing countries.
SAP's	Structural Adjustment Programs
Sheha	District leader
Shehia	Municipality/district governed by Sheha
SUFO	Sustainable Forest Use and Food Security – a GST development cooperation project during 2013–2015.
VCC/SCC/FCC	Village/Shehia/Forest Conservation Committee – a village specific natural resources management and conservation unit responsible for communal protection activities. All of these abbreviations refer to the same organisations established based on CoFMA

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Ubaguzi Hatutaki was a cooperative during SUFO project.

1. INTRODUCTION

"The SCCs [Shehia Conservation Committees] *have the role of mobilizing, sensitizing and building the management capacities of the community members to enable their effective participation in the management of the forest resources in their respective areas and as well at KPFR* [Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve]. *This is to ensure that poor and marginalized groups, including women at village level are reached and fully involved in conservation and management processes."* (DFNR 2012, 30–31.)

The above quoted text is from the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (K-PFR) general management plan, overseeing the forest protection of a forest reserve in the island of Unguja, Zanzibar. It may sound familiar to many who have engaged in the development sector either working for a public or private institution or for a specific project in a low-income country. How did the community participation and management of the forest succeed, outlined in the quote?

This ethnographic thesis endeavours to analyse and understand the forest policy of the K-PFR, and the national and transnational powers related to policy making and development cooperation, particularly in Zanzibar. This thesis presents a deconstruction of the power within the policy of K-PFR and assesses the benefits and limitations of international policy formulation. Importantly, I analyse the asymmetric power relations between various actors contributing to Zanzibarian forest policy with a focus on the different power dynamics, relationships and interests therein: at grassroots, national and international level.

Methodologically I rely on reflexive ethnography as presented by Burawoy (1998), that is, I am researching the Zanzibarian forest policy from within, through having participated in interventions around K-PFR. As part of this study, I have been working with two development cooperation projects. These projects were operated by a Finnish Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Geographical Society of Turku (GST), a Zanzibarian CSO Mtandao wa Uhifadhi wa Mazingira Kiwengwa-Pongwe (MUMKI) and one government institution in Zanzibar, the Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Natural Resources (DFNR), henceforth referred to as the Department of Forestry. The two projects, namely Sustainable Forest Use & Food Security project (SUFO, 2013–15) and

the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Protection & Open Civil Society project (KIPPO, 2017–2019), were coordinated by students and university staff of GST in cooperation with the Department of Forestry, and the projects were funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). Conclusively, I use my experiences with KIPPO and SUFO projects, as well as interviews, to reify international asymmetric power relations and to research interests linked to forest protection activities.

Asymmetrical global power relations, the domination of *developed* countries over *development* countries is highly discussed topic in postcolonial literature. In this thesis, I rely on postcolonial theory through assessing power relations between global institutions and countries, while furthermore I will explicate structures, which indicate historically constructed power distribution (Bhambra 2007). Furthermore, I analyse the power of International Financial Institutions (IFI) through globalisation (Sassen 2007), and their significance to Zanzibarian forest policy.

Development (cooperation) itself is a highly contested term (e.g. Escobar, 1995). Development can be understood as an immanent quality, but in this case, I refer to development as a political project, which begun from the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Ever since, a plethora of organisations, funding instruments and state interventions, to which I refer as *development industry,* have been created to abolish poverty and increase the standard of living. Furthermore, as a hypernym for diversity of countries, I will be referring to their economic status instead of developed or development countries, in the case of Tanzania, a low-income country.

Participatory management refers to policy, which aims in increased civil participation and decentralization of the development. (Murphy 2008, Willis 2011 57–60; Matthies 2017, 150–151.) Also the Zanzibarian forest policy relies on community based management, namely, participation. Since the recession of early 1980's, a significant amount of state functions were privatised through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP's) paving way for participatory management in debt-ridden low-income countries (McMichael 2004, 124–131; Willis 2011, 50–54.). Finally, participatory policies have been accused of neoliberalism, increased control and contrary to its purported ethos, centralisation of power (Murphy 2008, Lewis 2008, Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hujo 2021, 349–350, Willis, 108–112), while there is examples of power concentration and failed compensation from

around the world (e.g. Ferguson 1990; 1994) as well as from Zanzibar (Benjaminsen 2017, 2018).

As part of United Republic of Tanzania, Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous island group in the eastern coast of Tanzania (Picture 1). Zanzibar consist of various smaller and two bigger main islands Unguja and Pemba. Both SUFO and KIPPO projects situated to Unguja, which is the island in concern for this thesis. According to the latest census conducted in 2012, Unguja's population was around 900,000, however currently the population of Unguja is very likely to be well over one million (e.g. NBS 2015, 18). The area of the island is approximately 1,660 km^2 (a comparison for the Finnish readers, the Åland island is about 1,580km^2). Poverty is widespread; according to World Bank (2017, 44) Poverty Assessment *Poverty in Zanzibar impacted more than 30 percent of the population, while the extreme poor accounted for around 10 percent of the population,* with poverty concentrating to the rural areas, while 21 per cent of the households earned less than 200,000 TZS (80-90 USD) per month. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 5–6.)

Picture 1 Zanzibar and location of K-PFR (Karppinen & Viitaniemi 2014, 9).

SUFO and KIPPO projects focused on an area in North-Eastern part of the Unguja island, the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (K-PFR), established in 2002 due growing rates of deforestation and population growth. A mix of poverty in addition to population density and lack of available farmland is causing considerable pressure towards the natural forests. Over 90 per cent of population use firewood as their primal source of energy (NBS 2005, 45; Kukkonen & Käyhkö 2014, 194, Benjaminsen 2017, 513) and annual forest change rate is recorded to be about -0,46 per cent (Kukkonen & Käyhkö 2014, 199), which is however a moderate rate in global comparison. Finally, there are only two natural forest areas remaining in Zanzibar, the Jozani forest and the Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 5–6.)

Zanzibarian legal framework and natural resources management in praxis creates an interesting blend of shared responsibilities between the state and the civil society. Zanzibarian constitution of 1984 defines, that "(1) There shall be Local Government Authorities for every Government Region, District and Area in respect of the Region or District or Area as the case may be." The lowest level of regional government is the *Shehia*, and the head of shehia is called *sheha.* Whereas often studies and reports dismiss the shehas as "patriarchal village elders", the sheha's position has a legal basis. The Regional Administration Act no. 8, 2014, enacted by the House of Representatives and president of Zanzibar (Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein), establishes the duties, as well as requirements of a Sheha: In order to be elected as Sheha, a person must be A. a Zanzibari; B. respectable person; C. a resident of the respective Shehia for not less than fifteen years; D. a person of proven integrity; E. aged forty years or more and D. having ability to read and write (The House of Representatives of Zanzibar 2014, 6).

Furthermore, Village Conservation Committees (VCCs) are forest conservation units based on shehia regional division. The status of VCCs are officialised through the establishment and ratification of the Community Forest Management Agreement (CoFMA), where the VCCs act as representational, civilian/community units. The Zanzibar Forest Act no. 10 of 1996 and various other legal procedures guide the management of forest resources and comprises of two main elements: 1. Joint Forest Management and 2. CoFMA, Community Forest Management Agreement. Joint Forest Management bases on a principle that the community is involved by the government to take some part in the forest management activities, whereas in CoFMA, the responsibility

of management and governing the forest is conclusively in the hands of the community. Furthermore, within each CoFMA, bylaws are agreed between the forest authorities and VCCs to administer the land use in three categories: 1. utilization (collection of dry firewood), 2. alternative use (agriculture, grazing) and 3. conservation. (On CoFMA, see Eilola, Fagerholm, Mäki, Khamis & Käyhkö 2014, 1244–1245; Benjaminsen 2017, 513–515; 2018, 50–51; Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 9).

As in participatory policies, Joint Forest Management and CoFMA are based on an idea of decentralised governance, where the responsibility and revenues of forest management are divided between community & Department of Forestry (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 9). Usually this is the case: the power is distributed to the VCCs, and they become the central authority to govern, monitor and sanction the forest use based on the established bylaws. Moreover, the CoFMAs include broad agreements in ceding access to forest areas, which now function as conservation areas, while these agreements are on occasion binding no less than 30 years. Often in return, the communities have received little or no compensation. (Benjaminsen 2018, 48.)

My research problem arises from a situation during SUFO project, where working with Department of Forestry, a publicly funded government institution under national budget and an organ of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Zanzibar, received critique from the MFA of Finland. Specifically, the basis for the critique was not operating directly with a Civil Society Organisation (CSO). Hence, during KIPPO, we tried to include a local NGO *Mtandao wa Uhifadhi wa Mazingira Kiwengwa-Pongwe* (MUMKI) into the project layout, taking a central position in coordination of KIPPO in Zanzibar. MUMKI was established in 2012 during SUFO by the communities' own initiative, focused on working as an umbrella organisation for ten Village Conservation Committees (VCC) around the K-PFR (Picture 1). Thus, with KIPPO, we had an implementing partner both in the government and in the civil society, whereas in SUFO, we were directly working only with the Department of Forestry.

During the planning, as we attempted to establish a central role for MUMKI, the organisation had very limited resources for project cooperation. For example, they had no office, hardly any English-speakers and very little *capacity*[1] to execute and monitor the project in a way necessitated by the MFA of Finland. Therefore, there were little

alternatives than to rely on the Department of Forestry, which was designed to have a lesser role providing technical assistance and follow-up of the project.

Therefore, large part of KIPPO project was designed to build managerial capacity for MUMKI. Project components included renovating an office building, acquiring transportation for guards, trainings and livelihood support among a few. The project cycle developed roughly into three phases: 1. Organisational capacitation: besides the material elements, this included provision of different trainings ranging from IT skills to project management and first aid. 2. Responsibilisation: through an external coordinator, the MUMKI organisation would take more responsibility of management of the KIPPO project (financial, administrative) and start to gather simple data to identify vulnerable spots, areas and specific issues. 3. Operation: the MUMKI would create and execute a small livelihood support and forest protection project in the communities, from the basis of the data and information gathered in the second phase. All of the elements were supplemented with very flexible frameworks leaving plenty of space for MUMKI to decide how and what should be done and supported.

Nonetheless, the KIPPO project ran into problems very quickly. For instance, as part of the responsibilisation, we were planning to hire an independent coordinator in Zanzibar external to the Department of Forestry to establish a distance, which was in our understanding conformity towards the instructions given by the MFA of Finland. However, hardships in coordinator recruitment, in committing to principles agreed in the starting seminar during 2017 and changes in top level management and positions within Department of Forestry made life very hard for us (during 2016–2017 there were three different directors for the Department of Forestry). Moreover, little or no connections could be established directly between GST and MUMKI, and all communication was between GST and the Department of Forestry. Thus, the project stuck to the first phase of the project cycle.

[1.] Capacity building is a term which is highly prevalent in humanitarian and development contexts. In these contexts, and in this thesis, capacity building refers to the functionality of organisations and institutions: the resources, knowledge, skills and know-how the organisation possesses.

These hardships were of different nature than what I had expected, and the problems entailed more than just Department of Forestry *"lacking capacity"*. After all, the GST had had three different development cooperation projects with the Department of Forestry before KIPPO (of which one I was involved with, SUFO), compared to which current challenges were unprecedented. As communicating with DFNR and through monitoring visits, I started to perceive specific language and behaviour towards KIPPO in the Department of Forestry: disinclination to engage in some project components and silence or ignorance towards mutually agreed project principles – which in my perception were too deliberate to be misunderstandings. Therefore, the problems concerning the very core of the project were pushed forward until their execution was impossible.

After KIPPO I pondered on few of these problems. The asymmetric power relations between us as so-called *Westerners* (coming from high-income country) and the Zanzibarians (coming from low-income country) potentially created a situation, where we were perceived to exert dominance over the management of the Forest Reserve. Namely, we ignored, subconsciously and unwarily, the political nature of natural resources management: as we tried to capacitate MUMKI to be more an independent organisation, simultaneously we touched the policy of natural resources management. Though KIPPO project was specifically planned from the needs and wishes of the communities, expressed during three years of interviews with individual citizens affiliated with SUFO project, we did not negotiate enough with the government officials to identify their interests and position, offering them an instrumental agency within KIPPO; only after the project had begun, we could clearly identify the crossing interests of civil society and the state, and the struggle of control over the forest resources. Thus, we had not identified a situation where government level policy of decentralisation exists simultaneously with high interest for maintaining centralised, governmental control over natural resources management.

In 2019 I was evaluating KIPPO, which brought the final touch to this thesis. I was thinking: if these protection activities are of voluntary nature in an economically low-income context, what different interests exists in participating in forest protection activities and how the (participatory) policies affect everyday civil life? Furthermore, why government's agenda appear to suggest high interest towards government control in natural resources management, while the policy seems depoliticised however democratic?

I wanted to do an ethnography of all the complex webs of different power regimes and inter-group dynamics, while admitting, that individually I was in a position of power and dominance directly conductible to colonial times.

This thesis is based on analysis of context, theory, interviews and policy papers. I focus on indications of *power relations* and different *interests* arising from my data: in the interviews, I have drawn attention to, selected and analysed explicit and implicit manifestations of different interests and power. I have analysed policy papers and their language: what do these policies suggest?

In this thesis, power is understood broadly and structurally. I follow Bourdieu (1977) in examining empirically how power manifests in strategic spaces (forest protection activities and organisations therein), what limitations it presents to collective action and exclusion of groups from this strategic sphere (who cannot participate in forest protection activities). Furthermore, the power discussed in this thesis has also hierarchical elements (domination) in Weberian sense: how the power concentrates possession of (or improve access to) natural resources into segments within the Zanzibarian society. Additionally, a Foucauldian connotation is present, but not widely discussed: how power is exercised, and how this performative power recreates and consolidates the centralised power. (Heiskala, 2001.)

The significance of this study is to present a case study from Zanzibar, providing a localised example to compliment the already extensive literature about natural resources management, as well as to create and recreate more specific knowledge about the development industry and policy formulation. This thesis relates to theoretical discussions of postcolonial, globalisation and development theory. Furthermore, I am especially eager to contribute to the concept of *global partnership for development,* the goal 17 in the United Nations' (UN) Agenda 2030 - the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). I hope that this thesis adds to the impressive collection of literature about understanding local contexts for development and achieving future in a liveable planet. What might appear good in theory or policy, faces ultimately complex webs of power, struggles, challenging dynamics and different concepts of living quality in their respective environments.

My research questions are:

1. *"How do different interests manifest themselves in Forest Management in Zanzibar?"*
2. *...and how power is distributed and exercised?*
3. *How development policy is discursively constructed and how global development politics prevail in them?*

In the next section (2) I will discuss the methodology, process and ethical principles of this thesis, after which, in section three I lay out the theoretical framework. Chapter four is analysis: first manifestations of asymmetry, and global inequality (4.1) followed by analysis of public governance in Zanzibar (chapter 4.2.), after which I move to policy paper analysis (chapter 4.3.). Chapter 4.4. is based on my interviews, and analyses the baseline for power and strategic spaces for forest protection activities, while in chapter 4.5 I deepen my analysis on the interests.. Finally, section five I summarize my findings and discuss relevant topics.

2. THE PROCESS AND THE DATA

2.1. Short Introduction to Ethnographic Thought

Cerwonka & Malkki (2007, 28) mention, that ethnography itself is not a *methodology.* This is to say, that ethnography is not a formula, an equation arranged in logical order providing identical calculations. As an ethnography, large part of this thesis has been conducted as an interpretative process, that is, participant observation.

One of the most prominent epistemological critiques in ethnography and sociology is towards the idea of *positivism*. In positivist science, often represented in natural sciences, objects or phenomena are examined from outside, in clinical laboratory or in their platonic ideal forms. Thus, there is deliberate attempt to control the environment and context in which the research is conducted, and moreover, researcher is objective towards the subject studied.

Accordingly, a central argument in ethnographical thinking is, that there is no separate and external (to human) universe, where phenomena exist without human interference, or personal bias. Contrarily, knowledge is cumulative, and new understanding is based on previously internalised knowledge, and thus our understanding is formed within cultural contexts, history, society and academia. (Cerwonka & Malkki 2007, 1–39; 173–175). For example, as we perceive a football – the exemplary object in this case – we must understand the existence of a sport called football, it's rules, social construction of it, while visually being able to distinct football from other forms of balls. Thus, accumulated knowledge affects the interpretations made from the phenomenon, and football does not exist outside the social construction.

Burawoy (1998), labels this epistemology as *reflexive science.* Hence, against the positivist idea of an objective scientific method, ethnography as reflexive science is relying on *heuristic knowledge*, that is, it utilises personal experiences, observations, and emphasises knowledge production through interpretation, and analysis of interpretation ("the lens of the researcher"). Thus, ethnographic knowledge employs different philosophical foundations for knowledge production than positivist science, and questions the mechanisms how scientific community produces knowledge.

As mentioned, the knowledge we assume, is based on previous knowledge, which then defines the researcher's *positionality.* Positionality refers to the position of the researcher: from which position the topic is studied from. Positionality implies that each piece of information we digest is based on our accumulated experiences and our development as human beings, which then creates a point of departure, a position from which the researcher is examining the research problem. (f.ex. Ruusuvuori & Nikander & Hyvärinen 2010, 19–20; Cerwonka & Malkki 2007, 25–27; Bhambra 2007, 147). In case of this thesis, I am studying the subject from the position of a project coordinator and a male Finnish citizen among several, and having participated through this positionality to the subject I am studying, I am more able to define the influence of my position.

The replicability of research presents an interesting angle to ethnography. In centre of classical ideas of positivist science is the idea of replicability: validity of research is constructed through possibility to repeat the experiment and receive the same results. However, as ethnography is based on a reflexive epistemology, the positionality affects the replicability. Moreover, the positionality is both data and methodology – a mechanism to interpret the environment. To simplify, in case of ethnography, as systematic as the researcher is, it is unlikely, that different researcher will have exactly same results unless the environmental conditions are completely identical. This is to say, to attain identical results would require the history and personal experiences and accumulated knowledge of the researcher among wide variety of *external* conditions, such as culturalisation and personal life events, to be identical. However, this is not the case for ethnography alone, but for a variety of research. (Burawoy 1998, 10–13, 25–30.)

What reflexive science then does, is that it utilises the environmental influences to research the subject, whereas positivist science attempts to *control* the environment and minimise environmental influences. In this thesis, I am not trying to control the influence of international organisations to Zanzibarian forest policy to assess functionality, instead, through observing and construing the functionality of the policy, I attempt to assess the influence of international organisations. Through researching my own positionality and environmental influences, I attempt to reify operational power within Zanzibarian forest policy. (Burawoy 1998, 30.)

Conclusively, another researcher with the same data/material and experiences from same circumstances could have possibly ended up with other conclusions of Zanzibarian forest policy as I have. I, as a researcher, am bound by my cultural sphere, my education, social environment and world view. This means, that the generalisability of this research is limited – which I am not trying to achieve, while the conclusions I will make are, naturally, debatable. Finally, the results of this research are case specific, and based on my experiences working for more than eight years with forest policy in Zanzibar.

2.2. The Interview Data

This section is focused on the data and analysis of this thesis. I have been to Zanzibar four times, in 2014–15, 2015–16, 2017 and 2019. Each time I have had the honour to visit the same communities and meet with Department of Forestry to discuss current topics. Each of these trips have lasted 1–2 months.

As part of this thesis, I have interviewed 43 individuals in communities surrounding K-PFR (22 in 2015–2016 and 21 in 2019), a few livelihood groups from SUFO (in 2015–16) and MUMKI leaderboard in 2016, 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, I have had numerous supplementing discussions with persons in Zanzibar, who are representatives of Zanzibarian civil society, government officers or citizens not directly involved with the project, and all of the above I have memorised in my research diary. All of this, I will compliment with a few policy papers, to construe international influence in Zanzibarian forest policy.

In 2015–16 I collected my first set of data for this thesis. Accordingly, I interviewed 22 people during a project evaluation of SUFO for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The interview questions for this thesis can be examined in the Annex 1 & 2 marked with letter G and a number, for example G6. Apart from my study, the evaluation questionnaire itself was relatively structured and quantitative, a survey interview, while my plan for this thesis was to pose thematical questions during the interview as anything interesting came up. Thus, I created general, qualitative and non-structured questions for this thesis, which were then presented in no particular order, instead they were designed

to spark conversation as the topics became relevant. Therefore, the evaluation of project results for the MFA of Finland, and the research process of this thesis are intertwined.

I have recorded and partially transliterated the 2015–16 interviews. That is, the evaluation interview of 2015–16 is not completely relevant for my interests (questions such as "How often do you eat following food stuffs?"), and I have not transliterated these sections. I have selected the sections relevant for my interests based on my field notes, usually concentrating to the latter stages of the interviews: typically after 40 minutes from the beginning of the interview.

The second set, a total of 21 interviews, was collected during evaluation of KIPPO project in December 2019. Again, the exact purpose of the trip was to evaluate a development cooperation project, this time the KIPPO project. However, this time the evaluation was developed in a way which was more based on my assessment of issues concerning the project management and the forest reserve, hence, these interviews are more useful data for this thesis than the first set.

In more detail, there were several factors contributing to the usefulness. In general, the interview process of 2019 was similar to that of 2015-16: I was asking surplus questions to the evaluation interview on topics I found relevant. However, as KIPPO had a more society-leaning perspective, it allowed me to align my own research problem closer to the evaluation: KIPPO focused on management, forest protection and civil society through the VCCs and MUMKI, whereas SUFO focused on food security and livelihoods through the Department of Forestry and economic cooperatives consisting of local citizens (these cooperatives were not VCCs). Thus, the KIPPO project was closely connected to the subject of this thesis, whereas SUFO was not. Moreover, besides that the evaluation was significantly closer to my interests, the evaluation interview was a structured interview instead of a survey, furthermore, not seven pages long. Finally, besides that the environment was more favourable, I had more experience and knowledge than during 2015-2016.

Albeit I mentioned that my position as a researcher and as a project coordinator is intertwined, the evaluation of KIPPO and SUFO projects and this thesis are separate processes. After all, the main motif for the evaluations is the objectives set for the projects in their respective project applications, whereas this thesis discusses individually the

structures and influences concerning the whole forest management policy of Zanzibar, from the basis of my individual research questions. In particular, evidently, this thesis would not exist without both of the projects and the experiences attained thereof, and accordingly, this thesis uses partially same data and occasionally in reference, as shown in chapter 4.4 and 4.5. In these chapters, I have taken text, which I have written originally for the analysis of the evaluation. I have referred to the evaluation where the text is same, or similar enough. Furthermore, I have used graphs from the evaluation of KIPPO and incorporated them into this research. Similarly, the total number of participants in these graphs alter from that of this thesis: the evaluation of KIPPO considered a total of 33 interviewees, among which is the 22 interviews I have used for qualitative analysis of this thesis. (For the evaluations, see: Ajanko, Pyykkö & Viitamaa, 2016 [SUFO]; Viitamaa & Rintala 2020 [KIPPO]). Altogether, this study is broader than any of the evaluations and adheres to academic principles (whereas the evaluations do not).

The age of the interview participants is comparably old, with 57 per cent of the participants stating their age to be over 50 years, while only two participants (5 per cent) were under 30 years of age, who were both interviewed during 2019. However, on average, the participants were older in the 2019 round of interviews than during 2015-2016. The (old) age of the participants may be explained through local status: In Tanzania, the opinion of older people is respected more and thus they possibly are preferred to responsible positions (see Yousaf & Poncian 2018, 463–468). It is possible to consider that this applies for Zanzibar as well: while in 2019 the participants were older than in 2015–16, there were also more members of the VCCs among the participants, hence, older people hold more positions in the VCCs instead of the young.

Among all research participants, women were more represented with 59,1 per cent (26 participants) and men with 40,9 per cent (18 participants). The share of women as participants were higher in 2015-2016 than during 2019, albeit in 2019 we decided with my field colleague to interview in men-men and women-women pairs (I was interviewing men) as we felt that especially for women this created a safer space.

Most of the participants were members of the VCCs. Out of all participants 61 per cent stated to be part of a conservation committee. However, the share was higher during 2019, when out of 21 participants 15 stated to be a member of a VCC.

Furthermore, during 2019 I asked the participants directly why they participated in the interview. Majority of the participants referred to as being selected or called up to the interviews. Hence, the Sheha and MUMKI, through whom the interviews were organised, selected the participants for the interviews, however on occasion we wished for certain characteristics, such as young age. Moreover, most of the participants deemed that they were selected due to their activity within the forest protection activities. Furthermore, other people reasoned that they are very aware of the situation in the villages and thus participated. In a few cases, the husband was in the VCC and told the participant to come for the interview. Conclusively, there were participants who wanted to participate in the interviews because they had opinions they wished to express and others participated simply because they were told to, while I had limited opportunities to contribute to the selection process beforehand.

As mentioned, this thesis considers a total of 43 interviews. I have filled in the interview forms (Annex 1–3), through a translator, both during 2015–2016 and 2019. During 2019, I had a more ethnographic approach, than during 2015–16: besides recording the answers, I focused on observations of situations, subtleties, and feelings during the interviews and discussions. Occasionally, I've kept supplementing notes in notebooks and furthermore research diaries, but the interview forms with written answers constitute my most important data.

As mentioned, in 2015–2016 I focused exclusively on the interviews and recorded them, whereas in 2019 I did not. I made this decision because of difficult field conditions and my perception of change in the reciprocity of the interviewee and the interviewer, i.e. I felt that the interviews are affected by the existence of a recorder during an interview. To be more precise, this decision was influenced especially by my experiences in 2015–2016, when the most crippling factor was the bad audio quality of the recordings, which made the transliteration extremely arduous. Consequently, there was very limited, if no utility to the recordings: at times I doubted whether it's useful to spin five second excerpts for nearly fifty times before being able to understand anything that was said in thick Swahili-English accent. Retrospectively thinking, leaving the recorder home in 2019 was one of the best decisions I made during this thesis.

As mentioned previously, I felt the recorder changed the reciprocity of the interview. One aspect which illustrates the relevance of this, is that on both occasions in 2015–16 and 2019 the interviews were conducted with the staff of Department of Forestry working as translators. Considering this, while I was increasingly engaging in uneasy or sensitive topics in 2019, I wanted to create safer space for elaboration. Based on my earlier experiences and assessment of the field and Zanzibarian society, recorder could have potentially compromised trust in the interview situation, as there was potentially no understanding why the interviews would be recorded, why I am asking these questions and what would happen with the recordings.

To demonstrate, during the first rounds of interviews in 2016 I used considerable effort to explain my research and ask for consent for the recording: why I was recording and that the recordings would only be used, analysed and stored by me. However, as I was not sufficiently fluent in Swahili, I could not always ensure that the consent for recording was asked from every participant to my standards. Contrarily, the time spent on explaining and asking the consent was reduced with each interview, finally being a formality of mere few seconds. Furthermore, as KIPPO was more "abstract" project than SUFO, there were several participants who had never heard of it, and thus possibly could not understand the context of the interview. Thus, I deemed more sensible, ethical and reasonable not to record the interviews during 2019. Therefore, to me, who considered recording and transliteration of interviews a quality certificate, a holy and untouchable procedure crucial and immanent to qualitative analysis, it was a relief to read that also others have compromised the recording as a principal or most important method of ethnographical research. (Härkönen 2016, 190). Hence, I decided to leave the recorder home.

I have analysed the interviews by their content and thematised this content with Nvivo software (with varying versions, but always with the latest software available). I have used thematical genres to analyse the content, that is, searched for themes that arise from what is said during the interview. The themes in the interviews this thesis is interested in, are sources of conflicts, interests for forest protection and VCC activities and composition. Moreover, I have made small quantifications of characteristics of the interviewees (such as above), general opinions, or simply to put certain statements into

perspective. Furthermore, I have treated the interviews of 2015–16 and 2019 separately: the questions are too different to make comparisons.

In my analysis, I refer to the interviewees anonymously. Accordingly, I have kept the gender, affiliation (VCC member/non-member), and the year when the interview took place. Furthermore, as the interviews were made through a translator, the letters in the excerpts indicate who is speaking: T stands for interviewee (through **T**ranslator, whereas V stands for my name, Veikko.

As mentioned, I have written summarising, pondering and analytical research diaries from 2015, which are important for my analysis. Most actively I have kept the diary during field observations in 2015–2016 and 2019, but also occasionally during analysis and coordinating the KIPPO project. Most often, I have made summaries of working days (f.ex. "day 1 in the field"), but I have also used the field diary to record relevant information or "unofficial encounters": observations from discussions with government officers, Zanzibarians who are not part of the project and various other situations – discussions with people off-the-record which were informative from general perspective, politics or Zanzibarian or Finnish society. Most importantly, these diaries are research material connected to myself as a research instrument, providing an opportunity to return to past sentiments and to critically examine myself and my research process.

Furthermore, I have examined several policy papers: *Revised K-PFR General Management Plan 2012-16* (DFNR, FAO, WWF 2012)*, Zanzibar National Forest Resources Management Plan 2008 – 2020* (DFNR 2008, 19–61), *The Zanzibar Environmental Policy* (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 2013) and *Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy 2017* (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017). In discussion section (5) I have further visited a white paper "Era of New Cooperation", recently published by the MFA of Finland (2021b). The purpose of including these to my research is to test, whether Zanzibarian forest policy is linked to wider *policy regimes*, that is international organisations or actors which highly influence governance and management of natural resources globally, and therefore Zanzibar. Furthermore, I wish to assess the articulation of policy versus the concrete application of policy.

From these policy papers I construe influence: I draw links from Zanzibarian forest management to global policy framing through analysing their tone and language and assessing their compatibility with the reality around K-PFR. My study thus seeks to understand whether Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve is linked to global policy regimes, what kind of construct of power encircles Zanzbarian forest protection policy, whether it de facto decentralises governance and how it affects the everyday realities of living near the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve.

2.3. The Beauty of Ethnography – The Process and My Positionality

"We always understand through a set of priorities and questions, that we bring to the phenomenon / object we are researching". (Cerwonka &. Malkki 2007, 28)

I have written this thesis for seven years (2015–2021). My initial research plan of 2015–2016 was studying civil society, general global development industry and participatory policies in Zanzibarian context. Even though these ideas might sound similar to that of this thesis, my initial research plans and this thesis have hardly anything in common. Unfortunately, this also affected my list of references: I removed two pages of sources as I had removed the original text referring to these sources. However, in this self-reflective chapter I wish to analyse my process as a researcher, and the accomplishments and flaws of this research and its data.

The most constitutive element for this thesis and my positionality is global inequality. By this I mean, that the improbability to have been born as a Finnish citizen, is the biggest factor making this thesis possible. It is overwhelmingly psychological to jump from the lowest income quartile of Finland to the highest income quartile of Zanzibar in just a matter of twenty hours. Moreover, I will discuss the case specific asymmetries in more detail in chapter 4.1.

Choosing this subject for my thesis was founded upon my personal interests in global development. As the SUFO project ended, I saw an opportunity to visit Zanzibar one more time to gather research material for a thesis. Another reason for selecting this topic

was because I had dedicated significant pro bono work and effort for these projects, and it made sense to make use of my knowledge, practice and experience for developing this thesis focus.

My involvement with Zanzibar begun with my studies at the University of Turku. Early 2013, I decided to do Development Studies as a minor subject, and while so doing, received an invitation from the project management to attend a meeting organised by the SUFO project, which was planned to start in 2013. With encouragement of my then-roommate, I decided to participate in the meeting, which quickly led to becoming more engaged in issues relating to global development.

In 2013–2014 I visited Zanzibar for the first time, to conduct annual project monitoring for SUFO. This was my first practical work experience abroad, in a low-income country and undertaking research in general. In 2015 while participating in the final evaluation I sketched out a research framework for my master's thesis.

My second time in Zanzibar was During 2015–2016. During 2015, I had made research plans for this thesis, however the plans were made in a hurry: the decision to travel and to plan the evaluation and subject for my thesis were made only few months before travelling. The initial thesis framework focused on civil society in low-income countries, specifically Zanzibar and Tanzania. In addition, I included a critical analysis of the problems of participatory policies. However, while conducting field interviews, it became evident that my focus and questions (Annex 1 & 2) were irrelevant for the research participants. This can be considered as a typical challenge for starting-out ethnographers, *the confirmation bias,* that is, being sensitive only to data and information compatible with one's hypothesis. The problem was that I was too interested in criticism for criticism's sake, rather than the actual substance and reality of the situation in Zanzibar. This led to frustration, visible in my research diaries:

The question form turned out to be bad designed – as I actually had predicted. There were at least 3 questions / form which we're either not understandable or gave very bad answers (reliability poor). I really got frustrated going through the form which I knew was – well – stupid. (December, 2015)

After the first interviews and frustration in 2015–16, I changed my focus towards conflict-oriented view, as conflict was a recurrent theme during interviews. Accordingly, I started

to select participants for the interviews more carefully, people, who are involved in the forest protection activities as part of the VCCs. I asked whether the participants had experienced conflict in relation to forest protection activities, small details on the quality of this conflict, and about characteristics of the people who commit crimes in the forest. I had a further wish to interview people, who had committed illegal activities in the forest and were sanctioned, but these individuals were out of reach. Finally, I made enquiries about the activities of the VCCs, and how the members are selected. I wrote in my research log titled "Overcoming difficulties"*:*

On the third day of the interview, I seemed to finally hit the spot. (…) The problem until now has been that I cannot find "suitable answers" for my questions. Either people answer contradictory, or don't have relevant information otherwise, or are just tired to be interviewed in the heat for several hours. (December, 2015)

However, my endeavours in 2015–16 resulted in very shallow and incomplete information. I was disappointed while transliterating my interviews during summer 2016 and felt that the interviews do not possess sufficient explanatory power for coherent research. My experiences resonate very well with the sentiment "failing as a researcher", discussed in the introductory section of Johanna Ruusuvuori, Pirjo Nikander and Matti Hyvärinen's (2010, 14–17) book *Haastattelun analyysi [Analysis of Interview]*. Ruusuvuori, et al. (2010, 14–17) remind of the preconceptions and too determinate lenses of the researcher, and the importance of them to be "thrown aside". However, retrospectively thinking, I was unconscious of my preconceptions because at the time I thought this was exactly what I did: that my approach is automatically objective through utilisation of critical research on participation.

Additionally, there were other limitations to the interview situations. Often I had to present my questions in a hurry: the interviews were not to last over an hour in any circumstances: we had a schedule, and it was unconscionable to excessively consume the participants' time, while the reader should be reminded at this point, that my main mission in 2015–2016 was to conduct an evaluation for SUFO, with an survey of 7–8 pages. Conclusively, the research environment was not the easiest for a junior researcher.

In 2016, soon after returning from Zanzibar, I successfully applied for an internship with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Jordan. Thus I faced a six-month period without time to focus on my thesis.

More importantly, before Jordan in 2016, I had been coordinating a task group from GST to apply for funding for a further post-SUFO project. Due to Finnish general elections in 2015, changes in parliament and policies resulting thereof, we could not apply for funding in 2015. However, as 2016 came, the round of applications reopened for CSO projects to commence in 2017 and we resubmitted the application in spring 2016, exactly before I was leaving to Jordan. Few weeks after returning to Finland from Jordan, we received affirmative decision of funding from the MFA of Finland. This project was the KIPPO (Kiwengwa-Pongwe Protection & Open Civil Society) project, which ran for three years between 2017–2019.

Consequently, I travelled to Zanzibar in early 2017 to commence the project. During this trip, I networked with various local organisations, set timeframes and signed Memorandums of Understandings between Finnish and Zanzibari sides (GST, DFNR & MUMKI). This visit was called "starting seminar", to which I might refer to later in this thesis. During the starting seminar, I did not gather any official data (although I wrote research diary), however it put me in touch with my thesis again, and I recommenced writing and analysis of my interviews.

When analysing the interviews, I came to a conclusion, that the prevalence of the conflict, is not interesting, neither sociological, in itself, hence my subject should be in studying the conflict's underlying factors and attributes (i.e. Geertz 1973, 10). Moreover, especially after the launch of KIPPO and different problems we faced managing the project, I was interested to speculate which instances had a part to play in the multiple conflicts of interest.

My initial idea in 2015 was to discuss participation as an international, global level policy. In 2017 I tried to include completely new approaches, not very successfully. As mentioned, having been with the UNDP in 2016, I had novel experience from new level of development administration, and I was eager to incorporate, write and analyse through these newly attained experiences and skills. These experiences also contributed to the framework of KIPPO.

As I mentioned briefly in the introduction (p. 6–7), KIPPO faced difficulties in coordination and management. These will be assessed in more detail in Chapters 4.1. & 4.2. However, in 2018 I introduced the perspective of policy analysis to this thesis after these hardships in management. Thus, I included other material to my data to create a more complete review of Zanzibarian forest policy. As Laura Huttunen (2010, 39–59) concludes in her article, ethnographic field work encompasses more than interviews, it is a holistic process, and in order to examine policy, I needed policy papers.

However, as this thesis violates the good academic practice of narrowing the research topic to comprehensible limits, the inspection of policy documents is limited to a cursory view. Indeed, examining policy papers of the international organisations such as IMF and World Bank would have legitimate, considering their significance to my argument, that is, that these institutions hold major power in defining policy especially in low-income countries. Furthermore, the full understanding of this process (policy influence) from Zanzibarian perspective would have required more in-depth examination of IMF's and the World Bank's policy processes, whereas now I am relying on literature.

After including the policy papers and reaching a new checkpoint writing this thesis, I decided to include evaluation data of KIPPO and gather new, updated material. Looking at my field work from 2015–16, the data could only be satisfactory (perhaps for myself) after the 2019 interviews and including ethnographic elements of fieldwork to this thesis.

I travelled to Zanzibar in December 2019 for the evaluation of KIPPO project. As mentioned, in 2019, I focused on interest towards and outwards the forest protection activities and the VCCs. This time, I had the opportunity to plan the evaluation aligned with the subject of this thesis, and these questions can be inspected in Annex 3.

Power and positionality are always part of interview situations. As a white western man, especially when you are doing interviews related to a development cooperation project, something is usually expected from you. This is clearly seen in some interviews: sometimes the interviewees wanted to stress certain aspects which they thought were most concerning or acute. There was an expectation that we should return, have a new project and thus provide something for the communities. Conclusively, in the research material there is no "pure" answers when it comes to interviews, there is always *interest,* whether it is institutional or community-based interest.

Furthermore, the field interviews apart from one were conducted with the assistance of government officers, adding another layer of power to the interview situation. The dynamic between community and government were always present during the interviews. Therefore, some of the issues the informants would have said in other circumstances may have been left unsaid.

Despite these factors, most of the interviewees were not afraid to confront. I was given very honest accounts of failure during the interviews. For example, during 2015–16 a participant was directly expressing that we (GST & DFNR) should be removed and replaced in the management of forest. On another hand, interest (according to my experience) was sometimes very present: an informed VCC-leader advocated for the interests of his/her group directly through raising issues in management: through repetitively complaining about negligence towards management and protection activities and explicating what should be done. Repeating these aspects multiple times during the interview regardless of the topic discussed, left an impression of an attempt to influence decisions in favour of this particular VCC, albeit I am in no position to contest the relevancy of these criticisms.

However, the biggest disadvantage to the interviews and hence this thesis is my lack of knowledge in Swahili. Even though I have basic understanding of the language, I could only understand a few words in between during the interviews, due to fast-paced parlance, social customs *et cetera*.

The proximity of the subject to my personal life is ambiguous. The experience of working with the management difficulties of KIPPO, being vis-à-vis with all the subtleties of development and global inequality have brought all the issues directly under my radar. On the other hand, the proximity of my living sphere to that of Zanzibar is distant, only accessible through travelling.

Nonetheless, proximity is not a meter of objectivity. As a white male, being engaged in issues around Zanzibar, Tanzania, Finland and development industry for seven years have created a very specific lens through which I perceive the issues in global development and Zanzibar. The core of this research relies on the empirical experience and specialisation I have acquired throughout these years, and this research is an attempt to understand the social and global phenomena affecting the policymaking, communities

and the preservation of the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reseve. The likelihood, that this research would present as very different if it was written by a Zanzibarian government clerk, does not question neither the credibility of my results, or the results of this (imaginary) Zanzibarian research. Either way, the results might be as credible in both cases, however from a different positionality. Hence with this research, I am bringing my own stethoscope (which is me) to the wide corpus of research from global development.

The methodology of this thesis has been applied as a process – the current form connected to this thesis around 2019, considerable time after I had started writing. It has been occasionally unburdening to read about methodological problems in which I can identify my own research, in other words, to read about mistakes after doing them first by myself. Cerwonka & Malkki (2007, 26–27) discusses the selection of field sites and the problem of generalisation of results, while Ruusuvuori, Nikander & Hyvärinen (2010, 14–15) discuss the disappointment towards the data you have just gathered. I have gone through all of these problems. Thus, only since Autumn 2019, this thesis has existed as an ethnography, which also influenced the collection of data during December 2019. However, understanding the positionality of the researcher, and the fundamentals of ethnography has helped me to finish this thesis.

The forest reserve and the natural resources management in Zanzibar exists in a complex and intertwining web of interests, power and institutions. In an ethnographic spirit I focus on grassroots level and endeavour to describe the situation through the field, to discuss wider, global phenomena. By examining the local, we can reveal global and international social developments. However, as Clifford Geertz (1973, 29) mentions, "Cultural analysis [ethnography] is intrinsically incomplete" and, I claim, the possibility of misinterpretation is more likely when moving away from small units (interviews) to larger ones (international policy).

To conclude, my position as the Finnish coordinator of KIPPO has influenced this thesis, and specifically, is part of this research. In general, with all the difficulties, the remote coordination of the project was consuming, however it provided me with insight and the very subject of this thesis. Occasionally during the KIPPO project, I was very frustrated and demotivated to continue. Furthermore, the heavy reporting principles and customs of MFA of Finland took a toll and have certainly contributed to the prolongment of the

completion of this thesis. Conclusively, these experiences have also influenced my assessment of issues relevant for this thesis. Due to all of this, I have decided that it would be misleading to try to vanish my personal voice from the narration and text of this thesis.

2.4. The Research Ethic

Due to the geography and power imbalance between subjects of this research, this research is also morally contestable; in Europe exhibitionism and exoticisation towards low-income African countries exists, and currently there is increasing criticism towards the imagery of so called "white saviourism", that is, the imagery which the development sector uses for advocacy and financing. Thus, in this chapter, I wish to make a moral argument for this thesis.

I have chosen this topic due to my own research interests and career plans. I have always been strongly opposed to global inequality, which in my view is the underlying reason for the majority of developmental and environmental problems and poor living conditions in the low-income countries. To summarise, the research framework arises from my moral position, but furthermore from my ambitions.

Colonialism is part of European social history, and still affects the modern states in the 2020's globally. Furthermore, elements of colonialism are present in this thesis, in my positionality, and as well the research problem, as I attempt to analyse power universe behind the policies of low-income countries from a high-income context. As KIPPO itself was problematic, I hope that this thesis also comments those inequalities subsumed in international development politics. It should be stated that even though management problems of KIPPO are discussed in this thesis, the thesis in itself is not a critique towards the Zanzibarian government, Department of Forestry, or the communities. Rather, my intent is to discuss the motivations behind international policy regimes, imbalance of power, indifference towards low-income contexts and the stipulation of policies in low-income countries from more influential power positions. Largely, I see the issues of Zanzibar, as well for many other low-income countries, originating from international policies, unfavourable position in global markets and the disproportionate distribution of power and resources around the world – all of which is grounded in colonial history.

Before collecting the first set of data, I wrote an ethical review for my supervisor and applied for research permit from the Department of Forestry. Since then, I never heard again of the research permit, except once, when I was asked to revise it due comments on political situation. This research permit will not be valid upon the completion of this thesis, while the original research plan attached to the permit might not reflect the contents and the essence of the final product, this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter is based on the original ethical review of 2015.

During the 2015–2016 interviews, consent for recording was asked from the participants, and they were informed about the additional questions for my study, while answering was voluntary. In general, the participants were present because of the KIPPO and SUFO projects, and thus were to be interviewed even without this thesis. Moreover, the participation to the interviews was seen as a part of participating in the SUFO project, while during KIPPO, I asked directly the reasons for participating in the interviews. During 2019 data collection, I did not ask for any permission, since I had few if any additional questions than that of the evaluation interview of KIPPO, while furthermore, I did not explicitly discuss this thesis in 2019 with the project participants nor the Department of Forestry.

The social environment in Zanzibar is conservative and religious values are strongly present in everyday life. Therefore, also this research might pose a threat to some individuals or even organisations. I have anonymised all participants: I refer to participants only through gender and their affiliation (with VCCs), while the data is only in my hands. I have left all information out, such as age, which might be identifiable (for example there were a few young participants) or detrimental to the position of any of the subjects of this research in society or vicinity. Thus, I have applied minor censorship to domestic issues, which might be very relevant for Zanzibar.

One central ethical problem to this thesis is how to present the results to the participants. In this case, especially problematic is understanding the concepts and the academy, the language barrier, and last but most importantly, reaching the informants to present results. As for 2019, it is questionable whether the informants have understood that they participate in this study and what the topic of this research is. This ethical problem I attempt to tackle with the sense of general beneficence of this research, moreover, I wish

that this thesis would contribute to the discussion of how to improve the living standard of those, who are the subjects of this research, and provide understanding of the unhealthy dynamics prevalent in international development cooperation. However, I attempt to present my findings in Zanzibar through selected individuals.

Political questions have not been asked, while I will not provide a political review of Zanzibar in this thesis. Furthermore, questions, which might trigger confrontation between the communities and government, have not been asked, or these issues have been dealt with sensitively. I have discussed a lot of political issues in Zanzibar with various Zanzibaris, but I will not discuss them directly in this thesis. In general, the people around K-PFR often hoped for more government assistance, and the relation between public servants and the communities is genuine, although conflicts of interest appear.

Finally, the SUFO and KIPPO projects have both arranged meetings between the government and the communities (& civil society), organising events where the communities have been able to express their opinions, concern and issues concerning the forest protection to government officials. Importantly, some participants even mentioned that government is "interested only when you are around". Thus, both of the projects have facilitated an important forum between government and the citizens of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, to discuss issues underlying the forest protection. I have no reason to doubt that the interviews and meetings conducted under the two projects (and this thesis), have provided the Department of Forestry with important information and allowed the communities to genuinely express their concerns, through which they might have influenced the management of K-PFR – and to all of this, I see this thesis as a continuum.

3. INTERNATIONALISM OR DOMINATION – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT

3.1. The Development Agenda

In this section, I will present theory and history relevant to development[1]. I seek to introduce which global factors and political movements have contributed to the formulation of Zanzibarian forest policy. My theoretical background relies on globalisation, development and postcolonial theory.

Since the Second World War world has experienced a few economic, or fiscal regimes. Hence, also the development industry has somewhat reinvented itself every decade. The most relevant context begins from the 1970's, when Keynesian economics were challenged. According to Keynes, markets would not sufficiently control the uncertainty of economic fluctuations, and argued, that national authority was necessary to flatten these fluctuations through economic stimulus and taxation. (McMichael 2004: 140–144.)

Between 70-80's, *monetarism* prevailed, and "the new monetary regime" argued, that states should not interfere with markets, and furthermore, free markets should determine the price of commodities and wages. Moreover, a central mechanism was to keep inflation rates low by slowly releasing money to markets. Importantly, orthodox monetarism didn't live for long but contributed to the understanding of economics as a scientific authority which is exempt of any ideology, while development through economy and free trade became mainstream as economists argued that state involvement hindered growth and that free markets are the most efficient means for development. (f.ex. Lal, Deepak 1985; Lal 2002). Furthermore, through deregulation of private financing and capital flows in 1970's, offshore capital markets grew rapidly, making private loans increasingly available. (Hujo 346–352; McMichael 2004: 124–129; 140–144.) Thus, state as an agent of change for development started to lose its significance as tariffs and trade barriers were

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[1.] As mentioned (p. 2) , Development industry in this thesis refers to the whole entity of organisations, state instruments, public and private funding instruments and customs which are engaged in so called development cooperation. Development cooperation as political interventionism refers to financial, technical or material assistance, which is GRANT based or low interest. The official development assistance (ODA) is defined and regulated by OECD (2020.) (See James Ferguson 1990, 8.)

aggressively dismantled, while the number of international NGO's increased drastically as the national funding and Official Development Aid (ODA, see OECD 2021) shifted its stakeholders from states to CSO's. (McMichael 2004: 140–150; Willis 2011: 51–60, 108–112.)

Consequently, the debt crisis struck the developing countries in 1980's. As the global markets for offshore money lending were deregulated, private banks granted loans with promiscuous conditions to low-income countries. (see McMichael 124–125). Effectively, this led to unsustainable financing: low-income states, motivated by the financial independence guaranteed by the loans of private lenders, loaned huge sums of money, which were then used unsustainably for corruption, militarisation, massive infrastructure projects, or simply to cover budget deficits. However, as the prices for commodities fell and dollar started to lose its worth due to over-circulation (excessive private lending through deregulation of financial markets), the U.S Federal Reserve Board reduced the circulation of dollars with aggressive monetary policies, hence interests rose and private loans were not as accessible anymore. Thus, low-income countries found themselves unable to pay the interests and repayments of their loans, and debt begun chocking their economies. (McMichael 2004, 124–131; Willis 2011, 50–54.)

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the High-Income Countries claimed, that they were not responsible for the debt crisis in Low-Income Countries, however, the IMF took over and promoted Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP's) reorganising the economies of Low-Income Countries. The SAP's included largely austerity measures; privatization of national companies, freezing of public sector wages, cuts in public spending, opening up for foreign investment and restricting the states' influence on national economy, and accordingly, the countries which sought debt rescheduling, had to comply with these requirements of the IMF (see McMichael 2004, 133–134). In addition, the World Bank was admitting Structural Adjustment Loans to cover the payments of earlier debts and interests. This led to a creation of a debt regime: International Financial Institutions (IFI) were able to dictate national and economic policies for countries, forcing states to IMF coordinated policy interventions. (Willis, 56–60, McMichael 2004, 130–134, 140–143.)

Economic policy presented above is often referred to with the term *Washington consensus*. Washington consensus originally refers to the Washington led organisations' (IMF, World Bank, and United States Department of Treasury) standard reforms to contain fiscal crises in Latin America (see Williamson 2000). Thus, the term encompasses an economic policy of the Washington led organisations: the central idea is, that the fiscal spending of a country should be at level with the GDP. More importantly, Washington consensus encompasses the methods utilised for achieving fiscal balance: efficiency and performance of the public sector, privatisation, taxation reforms, trade liberalisation and liberalisation of capital flows. Ergo, the concept has since evolved into a general term, a metaphor for economic policies which are considered appropriate for national economies, that is, market fundamentalism. To conclude, *Washington consensus* has had major influence in shaping economies of low-income countries. (Williamson 2000, Willis 2011: 58; Hujo 2021: 246–347; Murphy 18–19.)

However, while the economies stabilised, the SAPs had other major consequences, and some authors (McMichael 2004, 134–139) argue that they erased much of the development achieved so far, while others claim that we do not know what would have happened without the SAPs, since the whole world was in recession at the time (Willis 2011, 58–59). However, during the SAPs, unemployment and poverty increased, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose and the human welfare generally declined. In particular, Tanzania adopted a policy of economic liberalisation in 1986 in agreement with the IMF, during which wages collapsed by 83 per cent (between 1974–1988), while 90 per cent of income came from informal economy. (Tripp 1997, 3–13; McMichael 2004, 147.) At large, by 1992 more than 80 countries had privatized almost 7000 state enterprises and public services, such as water, electricity and telephone networks. (McMichael 2004, 141). Furthermore, commodity prices declined (an African coffee producer had to produce 30 per cent more coffee for the same wage), the purchase power declined, and food items became scarcer and more expensive (by 120 per cent in some cases). Overall, income of Africans declined on average 10 per cent (between 1980 and 1986) and unemployment tripled, infant mortality rose, public spending declined, school enrolment declined by 10 per cent and nutrition worsened (McMichael 134–139).

Hence, the foundations for the current power of IFIs was created during the debt and oil crises, and Washington consensus policies prevailed. From 1978 to 1992, more than 70

Low-Income Countries undertook 566 SAPs imposed by the IMF, which effectively led to the World Bank to control their debt through SALs. Furthermore, the restructuring did not erase the debt, instead, by 1992 it had increased with 61 per cent compared to 1982. (McMichael 2004, 139.)

The negative developments led the IMF to upgrade its policies in the late 1990's and commenced the so called PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) processes, which have replaced the SAPs as conditions for IMF/WB funding. These papers are formulated in liaison with civil society and donors, "in order to achieve a more participatory approach". (Willis 2011, 56–60.) Hence, participatory approach (see chapters 3.2.–3.3.) became a new development paradigm, which aims for consensus-based policy forming, increased civil participation and decentralization of the development. (Murphy 2008, Willis 2011 57–60.) Also Zanzibar has formed Poverty Reduction Strategies – during the writing of this thesis, I am aware of three *Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* -papers (MKUZA I–III), formulated in 2002 & 2010 & 2017 (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 2007; 2010; 2017). However, the PRSP process has been criticised of containing largely the same elements as SAPs did (Willis 2011, 59–60).

Thus we see, that development assistance is not apolitical, and there are conditions for countries to be assisted, still valid as of today. Furthermore, the consequences of colonialism on Low-Income Countries – institutional weakness, poverty and commodity extraction dependence – institutes the countries to an inferior position in multilateral cooperation and global markets. The SAPs were an extreme example of "aid conditionality" as they restructured states thoroughly, however currently, each donor country defines their own development focus, interests and policies, whether it is forests, climate change, education, women or investment trusts. (Willis 2011, 57–60.)

Accordingly, Philip McMichael (2004, xxxviii) argue, that the definition of development has changed from being *nationally* organised economic growth to being *globally* organised economic growth. The development project has largely moved from the Marshall aid era (reconstruction) to be a *globalisation project*. This means that in a way, as an indicator of development of a single country, is the extent of its integration into the global markets. (McMichael 2004, 154-158.) Thus, McMichael defines the current development project as a *globalisation project,* which advocates for redefinition of civic

and state responsibilities, privatisation, preference of corporate profit over social welfare and resource extraction over ecological values in order to compete in the global markets (McMichael 2004, 157). In contrast, however, we can contemplate whether these "civic responsibilities (and liberties)" or "ecological values over resource extraction" have existed at any point in history for the population geographically located in present day low-income countries. Albeit, McMichael (2004, 157) concludes that globalisation is a political, not a "natural" phenomenon.

I agree with Gurminder Bhambra (2007, 147), that it is not possible to discuss modern society without the context of colonialism: the Colonial Era has contributed to the scientific community and to our understanding of the world, more nuanced than we acknowledge. In reference to values presented by McMicahel in previous paragraph, in particular, there is a Western tradition of supressing the influence of colonialism out of existence. This is to say, that the western science and historiography discusses concepts such as nation-state simplistically, without discussing the influence of colonial era, thus creating a Eurocentric historiography. Concentrating on nation-state (that each distinctive people should have a nationality and a state), Bhambra (2007, 106–123) argues, that instead of originating the birth of nation-states exclusively to French revolution, the onset of nation-states was a continuum, a set of interconnected influences; colonialism influenced through experimenting policies in colonies, whereas colonies had their own traditions and administrative customs, which then influenced the development of European states, alongside the Napolean conquest of Europe. Conclusively, all of this reciprocal dominance and interaction contribute to, and constitute the formation of nation-states, that is, the nation-state is a result of this interaction. Thus, we cannot comprehensively explain the historical process of modern (national) states with only one factor (French revolution led to nation-states, globalisation project lead to domination of economic values over ecological globally), instead, modern states have been created through colonialism, which existed simultaneously with dismantling of feudalism, which have had different consequences in different geographical contexts at given time. Moreover, historic dominance lead to different consequences in different contexts, and formed also the western nations into such as of today. Thus, the influence has been bidirectional, and both sides in colonial world order has influenced the other.

Following Bhambras (2007) thought, I argue, that the mechanism for global governance through the IMF, WB and United Nations is constituted in colonialism. Global governance (McMichael 2004, 139–140) entails adoption of policies developed by multilateral organisations in nation-states through conditionality of access to markets, loans and assistance. However, the mandate and power structure of these organisations rely on history: the aftermath of the Second World War and colonial history, that is, the dominance of the west. For example, whereas Tanzania gained its independence from Britain in 1963, the UN was established (formally) in 1945, as well as the IMF and the World Bank as part of Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.

Global governance is subject to the decision-making power within the IFIs, whereas the dominance of the high-income countries is widely represented in these organisations. For example, an established custom is, that the president of the World Bank is from the United States, whereas the managing director of the IMF is European. Furthermore, whereas in the UN General Assembly each country has one vote per country, in the IMF and the WB (2021a) the number of votes are in relation to financial contributions. Thus, as of 2021, United States possessed 16.5 per cent of votes in the IMF, and if we compare to a country with similar population, Indonesia, the share of votes is 0.95 per cent (IMF 2021.) This dynamism of power is also recurrent in World Bank (2021a). Conclusively, in the case of the IMF and the WB, money is power.

As mentioned, United Nations slightly differs with each country having one vote in the General Assembly, however, the influence within UN is subject to institutional expertise. Importantly, the UN platform has seen relatively influential unions of Low-Income Countries such as Group of 77 (G-77), although it has also been successful in supressing such initiatives. One such initiative is the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was G-77 initiative attempting to improve the status of developing countries in trade and access to technology and finances. (e.g. McMichael 2001, 119–123.) Albeit the one country one vote policy, individual countries can influence UN especially through accumulation of professionalism and putting their own nationals in positions within the United Nations, which however requires institutional expertise, specialised state organs and governmental infrastructure – as well as money to finance the numerous sub organs of the UN – a capacity, that low-income countries often lack. (E.g. Novosad & Werker 2018.)

These global organisations hold major power globally in shaping the policies of nation-states (Murphy 2008, Sassen 2007, 179-183) and according to Saskia Sassen (2007, 18–44), this is a component of *globalisation*. According to Sassen (2007, 18–44), an inherent dynamic in globalisation is that global organisations adopt functions of nation-states, or *denationalize* particular components of the state. Hence, the regulating capacity of states is decreased through reconfiguring the states. Thus, part of the nationalised power and influence of states transform into global power and influence, through global networks in international organisations (Sassen 2007, 62–73).

Sassen (2007, 5-6) defines globalisation through two dynamisms: 1. the creation of global organisations (such as World Trade Organisation, IMF etc.) and 2. transforming the dimension of national into international (both private and public interactions). On the other hand, as Bhambra (2007, 153) points out, globalisation has existed for hundreds of years, however it has only recently negatively affected the high-income countries: the resource extraction from colonies for domestic production can be attributed to globalisation as much as outsourcing of European industry.

According to Saskia Sassen (2007, 62–69), the globalisation has resulted to even more broader networks of international companies and organisations, but their management have been increasingly centralised, concentrating to high-income countries. This is especially relevant for private companies, who might have outsourced their production to different parts of the world, while the manufacturing is managed from one financial centre in a high-income country. This is the case of IMF and World Bank as well, both of which headquarters lie in Washington USA.

In this chapter, I have presented dynamisms which influence policies in low-income countries, consequently, also the forest policy of Zanzibar. In the following chapters, I will deepen my focus into two policies mentioned in this chapter, the civil society led development and participatory approach.

3.2. Civil Society Organisations and Managerialism

Civil Society Organisation (CSO) and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) are similar and intertwining concepts. Usually these terms refer to organisations, which are active towards or in society, but are not public institutions attached to the state apparatus, instead they organise within civil society, that is, outside of public and private sectors (Koponen & Lanki & Kervinen 2007, 307–308). In this thesis I tend to prefer the term CSO instead of NGO, because organisations which stem from civil sphere are rarely entirely non-governmental. Hence, I consider NGO as a term often misleading: as we shall see, CSOs hold various roles in public and governmental affairs while in many instances they receive funding from governments.

In this thesis according to my findings (chapter 4.3.), CSOs are often functionalised and responsibilitised (made responsible) in public administration as a service provider – they are instruments for specific functions. In Zanzibar, the whole forest policy is constituted in civilian activity. Thus, I argue in chapter 4.3., that in Zanzibar, the VCCs stem from civil society, but are not non-governmental, instead, the policy organises civilian activity to execute government policy. However, it should be noted, that there are CSOs in Zanzibar which are more non-governmental than the VCCs and furthermore, the concept of civil society, or that of Non-Governmental Organisation, might alter substantially in Europe compared to Tanzania. Conclusively, CSOs and NGOs create a wide array of organisations with different motivations, activities and purposes and are thus difficult to contextualise into a single concept. (See Neumann & Sending 2006, 651–652.)

Since the 1980's CSOs have been in the centre of development agenda, and the number and funding of organisations have grown globally (e.g. Obadare 2004; Willis 2011, 108–123; Hegghammer, 95–96, 107–118). This shift towards more civil society focused development was accelerated by a shift in the development paradigm that states were no longer seen as agents for change, but instead the solution would come outside of the private and public sector. Sometimes civil society has been viewed as a *panacea* for all the world's development problems. (Lewis 2008, 41; Murphy 2008 27–29; Koponen & Lanki & Kervinen 2007, 307–308; Willis 2011, 108–123.)

As discussed earlier, it has been argued, that the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) still include largely the same elements as the SAP's did (Willis 2011, 58–60). Despite the

potentially progressive elements (decentralisation & democratisation) behind the participatory policies and PRSs, the decentralisation has both economic and political aspects: involving Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and civilians in public interventions potentially outsources both the expenses (see Murphy 2008), and the responsibilities of public administration, as civil society is *empowered* and *made accountable* simultaneously. Accordingly, investing in CSOs instead of public sector can be argued to be supportive of a low-invest public sector, the global markets, and the governance attached to it (Willis, 2011, 106). Some argue explicitly that this turn of focus (funding CSOs instead of state) have been a direct tool of privatisation of public sector in low-income countries (Obadare 2004, 159; Lewis 2008, 41; Murphy 2008, 27–29; Hujo 2021, 349–350; Willis, 108–112), while others theorise that this decentralisation is not transferral of power, instead it is transformation of power (Neumann & Sending 2006, 651–652; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Ferguson 1990; 1994).

According to Lewis (2008, 41) the rise of CSO's is intertwined with global managerialist practices, and managerialism has replaced states as the new modernizing agent of change. Accordingly, also the essence of CSO's has changed, becoming increasingly a bureaucratic tool for monitoring, evaluation and bureaucracy. Hence, numerous CSO's have adopted managerialist practices to answer to the demands of the development industry. (E.g. Mercer, Green, 2013.)

Civil society driven development has proven as problematic as any other development paradigm. A particular civil society study from Tanzania conducted by Claire Mercer and Maia Green (2013, 13) argues that in Tanzania, the civil society is mainly organised around competition for funding, while the field appear as an entity of programs primarily designed to build "civil societal capacity". Hence, the competition culminates around a network of support mechanisms, workshops and managerialist training (such application filling or "project management") through which the CSO's specialize, not to local conditions, but to generic CSO monitoring, auditing and other activities necessitated by international donors.

Moreover, this mechanism is very susceptible for global trends and currents. Often when the CSO's don't receive any funding, they become inactive, *dormant* CSO's. Furthermore, the main function for these CSOs then becomes to compete for the attention

of international donors (for recognition as civil society activity), and therefore being able to apply and receive funding activities, which would not exist without the funding. As a result, is an instable network of funding and a plethora of competing CSO's sharing these limited resources. (Mercer & Green 2013.)

In short, the support for civil society partially functions as "global governmentalism" through creating bureaucratic managerialism and consolidates market practices to this governmentalism (f.ex. Murphy 2008, 35–38). These organisations, which are created in the South are expected to A) achieve managerial practices to a degree that international funding becomes available or B) self-finance through market mechanisms. The sustainability is not defined through decentralisation, or for example through achieving governmentally specified functions and public financing in their respective countries. As a result, institutions are created, which are volatile for changes in development trends, while often these local organisations do not receive national funding (unlike in Finland for example) despite having public functions (e.g. in education, see Murphy 2008, 35–38).

On the other hand, Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann (2006) present an example from a western NGO, *Norwegian Afghanistan Committee* (NCA), which offer us perspective of different civil society functions between low-income and high-income countries. In this case, the MFA were both an opponent and a partner of the NCA, as NCA wanted Norway to ratify the banning of land mines, whereas the Norwegian MFA disapproved the ratification. In this case, the power and the expertise of the NCA surpassed the power of the Norwegian MFA leading Norway to ratify the global land mine ban.

What is more, a central feature is that NGO/CSO's are increasingly intertwined with state functions, as promoting policies seem to appear more legitimate through inclusion of "grass roots knowledge" also in international policy papers (chapter 4.3.). Thus, the central argument of Sending & Neumann (2006, 664–669) is, that power of the state does not stand against the power of civil society. Instead the civil society becomes a subject of a society or state and begins to encompass functions of a government or state, much in the way described by Sassen (2007) earlier. According to Sending & Neumann (2004, 669) *civil society is increasingly defined as a field populated by political subjects*, and

this does not stand against the state, instead political power is used *through* this organisational field. Conclusively, in high-income countries, the NGO's have become subcontractors and active proponents of public policy in domestic and foreign affairs (Sending & Neumann 2006) whereas, arguably, in low-income countries there is not significant domestic funding or leverage for CSOs.

Finally, the IFIs, NGOs and CSOs are a central proponent in global politics and policy framing. Both in the South and in the North the NGOs adopt functions providing services to state organisms and accumulate professionalism, validated through managerial practices. However, the most important financer for these organisations are high-income countries, and thus they also hold most of the leverage towards these organisations.

3.3. Participation – A Modern Policy

Participation usually refers to policy, which aims to engage normal citizens to the process of designing and implementation of a particular public policy (Matthies 2017, 150–151), in this thesis, the natural resources management. However, the pragmatism of this particular policy genre is far from simple, especially in low-income countries as people tend to have several livelihood activities among other obstacles for participation (f.ex. Mercer & Green 2013, 111–112). Furthermore, wide participation is hard to attain, as it would require people to participate in the planning processes of the project, hence, hold significant decision-making power. Thus often, the participation limits to activities and attending meetings. (Willis 2011, 113–120.) Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (2001) goes as far as calling participation as the new tyranny, referring to participation as a method of control and management of citizens.

The participatory policies have been in the focus of development theorists. Often their motif and legitimacy are constructed through empowerment of population in vulnerable positions, subsidiarity, democratisation and decentralization (f.ex. Matthies, Aila-Leena 2017, 149). The winner of the Nobel prize in economics, Eleonor Ostrom (1990; Gibson, Williams & Ostrom 2005) have suggested that democratic and local management of natural resources achieve the most sustainable results. However, as for participatory policies in Zanzibar, it can be contested whether they achieve this, or whether they are

democratic (Benjaminsen 2017, 506–508, 513–515). As for decentralisation or democratisation, some scholars argue, that these policies work in quite the contrary; the power of the IFIs have even increased dictating how the countries ought to form their development schemes, organise their public services, and natural resources polices. (Murphy 2008; Willis 2011, 57–60.) James Ferguson's (1990; 1994) doctoral dissertation showed, that participatory policies no less than strengthened the status and presence of the government in the project area.

Jonathan Murphy (2008, 38–40) argues that the PRS processes have not led to the decentralization of the development agenda. Murphy argues that the hegemony created by IMF loan conditionalities have created a situation, where participatory policies promote a form of top-down managerialism. Thus, the adoption of participatory managerialist practices as part of PRSs are a manifestation of power of the IFIs.

However, Mercer and Green (2013, 111–112) point out, that even though local CSO activists call the working in the CSOs volunteering, they benefit largely from the activities practiced within the CSO. For instance, the training received, networking and other forms of professionalism might raise the status of the persons either socially or economically when competing in job markets. This of course sounds good as it is, but is problematic from the point of inclusivity, that is, who gets to participate in the CSO's activities. Indeed, often those who already possess the resources get the privilege, which Mercer & Green (2013, 111) refers to as "keen local politicking", a situation, which is not unfamiliar for Zanzibar either (Benjaminsen 2017, 514). However, this professionalism is connected to the managerialism presented in earlier, while the managerial bureaucracy might not always be beneficial for the actual cause of the organisation *per se*.

In Zanzibar, the participation of local communities is organised through local legislature (CoFMA) and the VCCs (p. 4–5). The VCC consists of normal civilians living around the Forest Reserve, however, as I will argue, the status of these VCCs and their umbrella organisation MUMKI is not independent, and they work somewhat under the control of the Department of Forestry.

4. DEFINING STRATEGIC SPACES FOR CONSERVATION – AGENCY, RESOURCES AND INTEREST: AN ANALYSIS

4.1 The Asymmetry Between High-Income and Low-Income Countries

Before we go any further, let's relate all of the previous into context – Zanzibar. In this chapter, I will re-emphasise the asymmetrical position in development cooperation using KIPPO as an example.

To apply for a *development cooperation project* in Zanzibar, networking with local organisations, organising monitoring trips, arranging interviews, liaising with local organisations and actives – all aspects of the whole project of KIPPO, constitutes by definition of global inequality and asymmetric power relations. By this I mean – in all simplicity – is that no Tanzanian would have the equal opportunity to apply funding for a development cooperation project in Finland and receive similar experience than what the project participants in Finland have attained. Thus, perhaps stating the obvious, development cooperation from financial viewpoint is always unidirectional: from high-income to low-income countries. Thus, I'm studying the whole phenomena of global inequality from inside, from my globally privileged socio-economical position and from the perspective of development project management. Understanding this dynamism is in the core of understanding the dynamisms interlinked with development industry, sovereign nations and their citizens, hence, this thesis.

One of the most peculiar, or bizarre, examples of asymmetrical power relations concerning this thesis is the case of project coordinator selection for KIPPO in Zanzibar. This is an example of asymmetric power positions which have developed historically through colonialism and domination of the current High-Income Countries, the Western sphere. As I briefly mentioned in the introduction, we planned to hire an external coordinator for KIPPO project, which would have been legitimate for KIPPO's objectives. However, the recruitment failed due miscommunications and lack of desire to commit to certain project principles from the beginning, which in my analysis stem from global inequality (resources), history of colonialism (historical asymmetry of power), disproportionate power relations (modern asymmetry of power), and the reluctance

caused by these three factors. The separate project coordinator was introduced because we wanted to establish more independent project coordination and position for MUMKI.

As I briefly discussed, due to the funding instrument we were financed through, we received criticism from the MFA of Finland: the support for civil society organisations was supposed to be direct support for civil society organisations, CSO–CSO, not for governmental institutions (CSO–government as per SUFO). Thus, as we were working with public authority, the Department of Forestry, MFA of Finland argued that we should have selected a project partner which was a CSO, even though we had little, or no expertise from civil society in Zanzibar, except the VCCs and the recently established MUMKI, while our firm interest was in protecting the forests and supporting local population in the protection of the forest. Hence, while the resources for forest protection in Zanzibar were scarce, we were obliged to find another partner, a CSO, if we were to continue the forest protection cooperation in Zanzibar.

Thus, we attempted to shift our partner in Zanzibar. During SUFO in 2014, the local communities through VCCs formed an umbrella organisation for the VCCs, *MUMKI*. Therefore, we started planning the KIPPO project through supporting, and capacitating MUMKI to eventually help the organisation to coordinate the project by themselves. However, the planning of KIPPO was complicated, since the recently established MUMKI did not have English speaking members, office, computers, among other things. Accordingly, we designed the project into the three phases (p. 6): capacitating, responsibilisation and test, and finally, operation. During the first phases we would have been relying on Department of Forestry to provide practical consultancy, infrastructural assistance (cars, tools), and help with the hiring of the coordinator, while their role would gradually diminish. The idea was, that MUMKI will take primary responsibility of KIPPO through an independent coordinator, which the Department of Forestry would eventually monitor and assist wherever necessary.

None of this realised. We could not recruit a project coordinator in Zanzibar, instead, the same person worked as the project coordinator throughout the project. The role of the Department of Forestry in the implementing role did not diminish during any phases of the project. Instead, the Department of Forestry held tight grip of the project until the very end.

There should have not been misunderstanding concerning the coordination of the project. The project coordination was discussed throughout the project planning and furthermore during the opening seminar held during 2017, and later in various skype meetings. Thus, our objectives had been clarified and they were discussed on numerous occasions, and therefore should not have been a surprise for the Department of Forestry. However, in 2018, after the interviews of the shortlisted coordinator candidates, there was indication, that the issue was only being pushed further and ignored until nothing else than abandonment of the coordinator-scheme was possible in order to continue the project, hence, the project moved forward without an independent coordinator, and the temporary coordinator from the Department of Forestry became permanent.

Furthermore, a pinnacle and a reification of asymmetry was, when in late 2017 two junior project members (BSocSc) travelled – for the first time – to Zanzibar to interview the project coordinator applicants. Emphatically, the highest educational background for one of the applicants was doctoral degree. Thus, there were two Bachelors of Social Sciences interviewing and selecting far more qualified people for the position than we were ourselves, while furthermore, we were discussing forest policy in Zanzibar with government officials who might have twenty years of experience on the subject. Conclusively, the situation which was based on geographical inequality (we held the project funds), we were able do anything we want. This emphasises the perversity of the context: the global imbalance described in chapter 3.1. is reified in the project coordinator selection, as finances outfought qualification and understanding of local context – in the light of which the frustration of public authorities in Zanzibar becomes perfectly understandable.

Retrospectively, the project application process was somewhat asymmetric. While we developed the project application in cooperation with the Department of Forestry, we understood our positionality and legitimacy being in the interests and wishes of the communities (expressed during fieldwork in 2013–2016). Therefore, too little attention was given to the public authorities, and consequently, we made two miscalculations: 1. We took as granted that there was public interest and will in Zanzibar to extend the management of the Forest Reserve into communal level (in compliance of national policy, see chapter 4.3.), and 2. we assumed the viewpoint of the Finnish government, that the

government already possessed the required infrastructure and thus should not be directly eligible for the project support as our implementing partner.

What this suggests is, that the success of the project was restrained by the policies of the MFA of Finland through obligation to create new layer of management to the protection of the forest reserve. In order to support the forest protection activities in Zanzibar as a Finnish CSO, we were thus supposed to create another layer of organisation in Zanzibar: we could not fund public institutions, but we were supposed to find an "NGO" instead of utilizing already existing infrastructure in the area. Moreover, this led to us stepping out of our area of expertise and to comment the forest policy of the Forest Reserve, which was then met with reservations from the Department of Forestry. The problems as they mounted, were not communicated to us, instead, they were silenced to non-existence. Consequently, the framework of KIPPO was not completely relevant for the *development problem,* that is, protecting the forest.

However, all stakeholders of KIPPO had the motivation to use the funds for protection of the forest reserve. Nonetheless, this exemplifies how global policies influence policies outside their respective countries. Why did Department of Forestry then want to continue the cooperation although they disapproved the project components? That, I argue through these two conclusions:

1. The asymmetric power relations (based on history and wealth) gave unmerited advantage for the Finnish side to influence Zanzibarian forest policy and the built-in power structure in it. This caused resistance in our Zanzibarian counterparts, which remained uncommunicated because the Department of Forestry wanted to appear as conforming due…

2. … the Department of Forestry did not have the resources they were presumed to have (by us and the MFA of Finland), while duplicate layers of management and redistribution of power within Zanzibar created conflict of interest within the project structure. However, there was interest within the Department of Forestry to take advantage of KIPPO's funding, and in the next section, I will discuss this interest.

4.2. Striving for Resources in Zanzibarian Public Sector

When I arrived to Zanzibar most recently, in December 2019, the forest protection projects were no longer common in the department, in fact, KIPPO was the only forest protection project at the time, while some of the project officers told me that also themselves were now working in different sections of the department. However, this was recorded also before: during the starting seminar in 2017 there was high interest for building gravel in Zanzibar due to the growth in population and thus urban planning and construction (e.g. Ali, Suleiman Ali 2020). Albeit population growth has been an issue for Zanzibar for a period of time, gravel industry and the ecology attached to it was a global trend at the time (e.g. Rayasam, Renuka 2016). Nevertheless, during 2019 the interest in the Department of Forestry was in something else again, this time wildlife.

This dynamic and flow of focus can be argued to stem from development trends and emphasises the difficulty in maintaining sustainable activities throughout longer periods. In each period certain topics in development become more prominent, while others fade to background. This leads to volatility in development funding, sometimes termed "aid instability" (e.g. Bulíř & Hamann 2008), while also studies suggest, that the instability might in fact have positive effects on for example governance (Assongu & Nnanna 2019). Furthermore, some studies argue, that heavy reliance on development assistance can demotivate state investment into certain public sectors, and after the funding has finished, these sectors become defunded (Nadeem & Liu Zhiying & Ali & Younis & Bilal & Xu 2020, 10–11). Altogether, this seems to be the case with forestry in Zanzibar: when the there is no significant international interest in the forestry sector, the Department of Forestry has not sustained their domestic interest towards the forestry (as the whole name of the department, Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Resources suggests, the department is dealing with wider cluster of issues than forestry alone).

This indicates of a situation, where low-income governments are dependent on foreign funding, while susceptible flows of finances push governmental institutions to change their focus from one field to another instead of developing their policies and methods within identified sectors. Whereas Finland mentions forests as a sub-object of its four development objectives (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2021a), it seems that the previously vivid REDD+-sector has largely disappeared from Zanzibar. Notably, as I

argued in section 3.2., this dynamic is relevant for the civil society as well (Mercer & Green 2013). Conversely, changes of focus cannot be considered completely a negative aspect, since ideally also development industry and government departments evolve according to current needs, and with the best and most recent practices and research.

Grete Benjaminsen (2017) exemplifies in her article *The bricolage of REDD+ in Zanzibar: from global environmental policy framework to community forest management* the difficulties of imposing global policies and instruments to more localized context. Furthermore, Benjaminsen's (2018) other article, *Commodification of forest carbon: REDD+ and socially embedded forest practices in Zanzibar,* juxtaposes the social environment and conventions to global policy instruments *vis-à-vis*, concluding, that global market mechanisms can contradict social praxis in local contexts.

Both of the articles concern a particular REDD+ -project *Hima* (2010-2016), which aimed to protect forest resources through attaching the forest ecosystem to global carbon credit markets. In general, the REDD+ is a tool which aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). This is done through attaching the wood biomass and different forest management methods to the carbon credit markets. It is based on an idea, that through carbon sequestration and storage in the forest biomass developing countries are able to sell carbon credits to other nations, thus attaching the forest ecosystem to a market logic through commodification and setting a price tag for carbon dioxide emissions. These REDD+ schemes have been highly problematic, as for example the HIMA-project did not manage to sell single carbon credit during Benjaminsen's (2017, 518) study.

The most relevant aspect for this chapter in Benjaminsen's (2017) article is her attention towards the Department of Forestry, which I will relate to my own findings:

During the start of the KIPPO project, it was planned, that all the trainings were to be subjected for a review of options or publicly asked for bids. Thereafter, the materials would be reviewed both in Finland and Zanzibar to select the best option of most benefit. However, the Department of Forestry submitted only plans designed by the department faculty workers, to the extent they were able to offer. Even though this was discussed in starting meetings with the Department of Forestry, the idea did not realise, and these terms of references were never announced outside of the Department of Forestry, thus, the

project had very limited flexibility in arranging trainings outside the Department of Forestry.

I argue this to be indicative of resource depletion and low-level wages within the Department of Forestry, also described by Benjaminsen (2017, 515–516). In her article, she describes situations where the staff of Department of Forestry were reliable on the top-up salaries provided by the HIMA project, to a level which one officer in Benjaminsen's (2017, 516) study mentions "making it possible to send our kids to school". Thus, it can be argued, that the trainings were purposely kept within the Department of Forestry: within KIPPO, the Department of Forestry tried to maximise the funds which stay within the department, even when contradicting the objectives or mutually agreed principles. Furthermore, the trainings arranged provided much needed addition to low salaries of public servants, albeit, importantly, I argue that this dynamism can be traced to external factors than that of the Department of Forestry, or plain self-interest: the Department of Forestry has a hard time finding funding for its activites, after which resource deficiency follows, while furthermore, international and national obligations bind the department, due to which it must be creative with available funding (Benjaminsen 2017: 515–516).

Benjaminsen's (2018) article captures the depletion, which resonates with my experiences, and appears to influence the organisation still today. There was indication that the funds designated for KIPPO were used by the organisation to maintain their own activities (see Benjaminsen, 515). Finally, this resulted in a situation, where MUMKI did not for example receive the computer we bought for MUMKI (it stayed in possession of the Department of Forestry coordinator even though IT-training was organised for MUMKI). Furthermore, an individual coordinator was not selected, there was little or no effort in including MUMKI to coordination of project activities and most trainings were organised by the Department of Forestry. Consequently, this compromised the project objectives and outcomes. However, during KIPPO, MUMKI constantly remained active and organised own activities sometimes claiming to have spent own money to organise activities (which was tenaciously denied by the Department of Forestry). Importantly, it is worthwhile to notice, that not a single time during the discussions between GST and Department of Forestry, the objectives and methods of KIPPO were questioned, debated or dissatisfaction expressed before we were ready to implement the controversial project

outputs. Conclusively, I argue that the Department of Forestry is underfunded, and thus eager to creatively take advantage of funds, which are and were designed for more diverse uses.

As mentioned, the resource deficiency is affecting CSO's as well. In Unguja Zanzibar, exists another forest conservation area, the Jozani forest. The Jozani conservation area has a longer history than the Kiwengwa-Pongwe of being a protected area, while an (apparently) independent civil society organisation Jozani Environmental Conservation Association (JECA) is responsible for the management, ecotourism and protection activities of the Jozani Forest Reserve.

I have visited JECA and Jozani several times during years 2013–2016, and JECA has always appeared as a coherent organisation with impressive and professional activities and independent appearance. However, in 2017–18, monitoring personnel of KIPPO (of which I wasn't among) were visiting JECA, and the organisation was suffocating from lack of funding (see Pitzén, Humalajoki & Viitamaa 2018, 23–25). The intention for the visit was to network with the organisation and look for possible synergies, but the meeting transformed into JECA asking for funding and enquiring about potential donors, as the organisation was struggling as all projects had finished and donors left.

In Zanzibar the problem appears thus quite thorough: through the examples provided by JECA and MUMKI, I argue that the global policies create a supply of civil society organisations also in Zanzibar, which are overlapping structures to those which already exist, reinforcing Mercer & Green's (2013) argument discussed in chapter 3.2. Furthermore, the Department of Forestry indirectly takes advantage of these organisations to satisfy their lack of financing. In the case of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, networks for forest protection already exist as the Department of Forestry possess extensive specialisation towards the forestry, whereas we (GST) were pressured to support directly MUMKI by the MFA of Finland (chapter 4.1.). Furthermore, in this case as well, the public institutions remained unaffected: these organisations (JECA & MUMKI) are established through law (CoFMA), but they are not funded through public budget of Zanzibar. Instead, they are necessitated to attract funding from their activities or abroad. Thus, as Mercer & Green (2013) suggests, the organisations might establish temporary activity in the target countries, but fail to create a sustainable system of supporting these organisations

domestically, as in the case of JECA. The case of JECA stresses the situation, where individual financing becomes the most important determinate of sustained activities, while this financing is subject to market logic or volatile foreign funding.

However, importantly, JECA was able to create private revenue, but was unable to sustain it. After the international donor left, the revenue was submerged into the grey sector and unofficial employment: the civilians around the forest and those entrepreneurs with links and access to tourism sector hijacked the finances of the organisation and absorbed its revenues into the grey sector of individual entrepreneurs, past the organisation created to coordinate the ecotourism activities. Thus, rather, than non-profit CSO activity, the CSOs in Zanzibar resembles private enterprises: CSOs compete in a field of limited resources where the most efficient, profitable and successful triumph. Importantly, as we shall see in chapter 4.5. (p. 69–74) the expectations of the communities towards the CSO's are similar, furthermore stressing the issue, that the CSOs established in Zanzibar, and possibly in other low-income countries as well, are expected to create employment, revenue or otherwise beneficent status to its members to succeed. In the case of JECA, the grey sector and individual entrepreneurship was more profitable instead of seeking agency within the organisation, and thus the organisation it created was not sustainable. Thus, sustainability and success was not measured in level and quality of activity (which JECA achieved), but 1. ability to provide profitable and accessible employment, or 2. ability to conform to development principles and managerialist practices, and furthermore reactivity to development trends, to secure stable funding from abroad.

Conclusively, this private enterprise model of CSOs is somewhat contrary to our understanding of civil society, and furthermore the policies of donor countries, which I will discuss next.

4.3. Policy – From Ideals to Contradictions

Policymaking, national and global, as a political process, has been adopted in Western governments as self-evident (f.ex. Shore & White, 1997, 6). Although it is not my intention to question whether foundations for good government or a stable society lie in sound policies, my intention is to analyse the power architecture of Zanzibarian forest policy and whether the policies reflect the Zanzibarian environment and society or not. In connection to the issues described above, I attempt to establish an analysis of policy papers that the state actors (Finland and Zanzibar) publish, and whether praxis is aligned with the policy.

Defining policy itself is a philosophical task. The concept is abstract and multidimensional. Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005, 35) point out that in anthropologic study it is more important to analyse what is done in the name of policy, than what the policy actually is. In short, policy usually refers to a certain manner of approach, by which f.ex. public services, foreign affairs or national issues are dealt with.

According Shore & White (1997), policies can be interpreted in several ways. The most important aspect is, that policies are always representations of their period and its political systems:

> *"[They can be read] as cultural texts, as classificatory devices with various meanings, as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some people and silence others. --- they also contain implicit (and sometimes explicit) models of society. (Shore & White 1997, 6)."*

Shore & White (1997, 6) concludes, that policies can be studied as "a total social phenomena". Furthermore, all policies are political processes and have become the cornerstone of modern societies and governing, especially in the sense, that the governed become to govern other governed.

Often, policies possess a bilateral dynamic, as in culturalisation. The policy seeks to externally *subjectify* their subjects, which means, that the subject internalises and identifies with the values and norms of the policy, after which the subject begins to perform the policy, thus contributing to the policy through internal *subjectification* by

thinking, feeling and acting in a specific manner established by the policy. (Shore & White 1997, 7)

Often policies and their agenda rely on technocracy, perceived neutrality. Their central mechanism of influence lies in argumentation through objectivity, and utilization of neutral, rational and conceptual language. However, each governmental policy is constituted in the political foundation of the ruling party – while political parties are, well, political. Specifically, through neutral connotations and professional language, policies appear to be exempt of any ideological binds. Thus, policies hold a principle of *instrumentalism*, that is, they are avoid and above any moral, ideological, or political linkages, contrarily, they are pure instruments for effectiveness. Accordingly, often policies share the same tendencies as morality: they pursue universality, hence, disguise the individual, political, cultural or ideological motives behind the policy formation and thus the policy authors attain a more anonymous, generalized and rational-collective universal mask. (Shore & White 1997, 8–9.)

Conclusively, Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005) discuss in their article "Toward an Anthropology of Public Policy", that Anthropology is crucial in bringing political processes into scrutiny amongst this performative neutrality of policy. Furthermore, Wedel et al. (2005) argue, that anthropological and ethnographic analyses of the policy processes can bring crucial understanding of the world in change, different power regimes and discuss disguised social processes, thus working as a corrective measure for positivist policy processes.

The Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve General Management Plan 2012–2016 (2012) can be described to be a form of policy document, laying out visionary lines as well as strategic objectives. Moreover, the listed authors are an international group: the document mentions FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) and WWF (World Wildlife Fund) as core partners with the main implementor, Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar through Department of Forestry.

The document (DFNR 2012) offers four different programmes, with 15 different strategic objectives with 92 different interventions and outputs, and the financial scale of the management plan is 1,019,000 USD for the period of five years. Importantly, the

document outlines its main source of funding government allocations supplemented with investments from international donors.

The scale of the management plan is ambitious and utilises language specific for development industry, which is abstract, intangible and jargon specific, as in the following example: *"Establish multiple use management subprograms through participatory planning and management with forest dependants."* (DFNR 2012, 17). The management plan mentions (with 55 pages total, including prefaces, summaries, strategic outcomes listed etc.) capacity building 16 times, participation 10 times and community 121 times: *"KPFR has determined to work hand in hand with these organizations to minimize resources use conflicts, ensure effective participation, democracy and sustainable management."* (DFNR 2012, 9.) Many objectives are not defined, and their role remain ambiguous: *"By 2016, communities around KPFR have developed and implementing environmentally friendly forest and non forest related income generating activities (IGAs)."* (DFNR 2012, 22.)

The phraseology of the paper is neutral, technocratic and conforming to western liberal values (democracy) and uses abstract concepts (such as sustainable management). Furthermore, "hot topics" are included (participation). In fact, who would oppose to effective participation, democracy and minimisation of conflicts or *implementing non-forest related income generating activities*? However, the document rarely defines how this is achieved (although the document mentions this being the *general role* of the *Reserve Management Team* to ensure) (DFNR 2012, 31.).

Next, let's turn our focus on a Finnish policy the "Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy 2017" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017). The policy defines and establishes the essence of civil society for Finnish development cooperation:

> *The nature of civil societies involves dynamism, polyphony, innovation and a critical review of the functioning of society's structures and activities. Civil society actors have an important role in increasing people's knowledge about civil rights and obligations, helping to ensure that the voice of the most vulnerable people is heard, accumulating social capital, strengthening inclusion and promoting political and legislative reforms. In a polyphonic society, governments can better respond to the diverse needs of the people and promote democracy at the various levels of society. By promoting accountable governance and institutions and by monitoring their activities, civil society can support respect for human rights and the status of the most vulnerable groups. At its best, civil society provides opportunities for people to participate and influence peacefully and actively in societal development and public decision-making. However, it needs to be remembered that due to their diversity, civil societies also include actors that are not committed to promoting human rights and do not promote or enhance democracy or sustainable development.* (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017, 5–6)

The phraseology of this definition of civil society can be concluded to be normative and Western. Importantly, as a tool of foreign policy, each country has the sovereignty to define their own national policies, interests and social constructions. However, this policy, this excerpt, nor the whole document, fails to a) recognise the diversity of civil societies or CSOs in developing countries. Although it mentions the polyphony, it continues to define the essence of desirable civil society, civil society as independent actors, operating in a space which is not defined by political or governmental interests. b) The document does not recognise the history of CSO led development paradigm, the political burden towards these CSOs to adopt functions in public organs described in previous chapters (i.e. Murphy 2008), c) offers a function and significance to civil society close to that of media through monitoring, and contributing to the public policies through advocacy: "*By promoting accountable governance and institutions and by monitoring their activities, civil society can support respect for human rights and the status of the most vulnerable groups.*" Through this excerpt it is possible be understand, that the civil society has a monitoring role external of that of the state apparatus, and that through advocacy, the civil society can keep pressure on administrative organs through publicity.

As also the Definition of Finnish Policy for Civil Society 2017 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2017, 5–6) suggests, each country take their individual measures to define, enable and limit the functioning of civil society in their respective countries. In conclusion, the document and the definition does not comment the political ecology, conditions and the operation environment for CSO activity laid out in other policy papers, such as PRSPs or policies similar to that of the KPFR General Management Plan (DFNR 2012). Thus, the international and national development policies creates a highly complex operational environment, as well as an elusive concept of civil society.

Crucially, by placing the civil society as major component of an *implementer* of public management or policy, states and international community blur the differentiation between the public and the private, the state and the civil society, and also the ability of civil societies to monitor the transparency of administration and management – through placing the civil society inside the state apparatus and public operation.

To be more specific, through participatory policy in natural resources management in Zanzibar, the Zanzibarian civil society engaged in forest protection is not conforming to

the concept which the MFA of Finland has on civil society. In participatory natural resource management, the communities and civilians become an active tool for the management of the forest. Thus, allegedly, the VCCs become organs of state's conservation policies. This means, that the civil society in form of VCCs is blended into a state organ, the Department of Forestry, instead of being an independent feature of society. This is clearly seen in the Zanzibar *National Forest Resources Management Plan 2008 – 2020* (DFNR 2008, 34) which directly identifies for example the responsibility of law enforcement on civil society, alongside other stakeholders:

RESPONSIBILITY	STAKEHOLDERS					
	Government agencies	Local authorities	Local Communities	Civil societies	Private sectors	International agencies /communities
1. Policy frameworks						
Formulation of policy, legislation and regulation	■	■	■			■
Laws enforcement	■	■	■	■		
Revenue collection	■	■	■			
Sectoral planning and budgeting	■	■		■		■
2. Core management activities						
Establishment	■	■	■			
Protection	■	■	■	■	■	
Harvesting and utilization	■	■	■		■	
3. Facilitation and monitoring						
Research and coordination	■			■		■
Information system	■	■	■	■	■	■
Extension and education services	■	■	■	■		■
Human resources development	■	■		■		■
Funding	■	■	■	■	■	■

Table 1 Stakeholder analysis of Zanzibar National Forest Resources Management Plan 2008 – 2020. (DFNR 2008, 34).

Importantly, the document neither defines *law enforcement* and is thus ambiguous, to be more specific, it is not specified what role the communities and civil society has in law enforcement. Consequently, the civil society can have for instance a *monitoring role* in law enforcement, (which would conform with the view of the MFA of Finland). Furthermore, the document uses passive tense, which further blurs the meaning – whether it refers to the present or future: *"Stakeholder analysis takes into account roles and responsibilities of all organizations, agencies and firms that exist in Zanzibar and*

overseas which are directly or indirectly involved in the utilization and management of forest resources in Zanzibar." "All stakeholders are responsible for securing funding." (DFNR 2008, 34-36.) Therefore, the ambiguity and undefined language of this policy document leaves space for interpretation, possibly intentionally, as it leaves freedom for a plurality of interpretation, and thus, alignment. Interestingly, as we shall see in chapter 5.5., the civil society (VCCs) have an active, enforcing role in law enforcement. Conclusively however, through policy, the government can simultaneously be policy-conforming and have non-conforming policy execution.

Moreover, from the basis of my research in Zanzibar, there is little evidence on the participation of civil society to the planning of public policies and policy reforms (see 75–76), albeit the civil society is well represented in the policy documents. Including the civil role in public policies through participation and implementation, without agency in planning and decision making is a dynamic documented well in international research, also discussed in chapter 3.3. (f.ex. Storeng, de Bengy Puyvallée 2018, 928; Willis 2011, 113–120)

Wedel et al. (2005) argue, that when negotiating and applying global policy frameworks to local settings, the implementation of these policies receives national and local elements from established social praxis and conventions and creates new subjectivities. This tendency can be developed a bit further: when policy is discussed, you also discuss the existing environment and societal relations. Thus when, the government of Zanzibar negotiates a forest protection policy, the government also negotiates with existing local social hierarchies and existing conflicts of interests in addition to global interests, in an attempt to construct a subjectivity for forest protection, a "protection active". This can be difficult.

This is well visible in the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve. While the forest protection is dependent on legal frameworks of Zanzibar, CoFMA, and local bylaws, ambiguous mix of different domestic power regimes contribute to the protection policy and subjectivities. According to my experiences with KIPPO, the state and government have interest to maintain their central power in the planning, policy making and legal rule of the forest reserve. In this, the government utilize normal civilians, the civil society, creating a subjectivity of a *forest protection active*. Thereafter, the individual adopts this

active role, subjectivity, after which the individual is ready to govern those to be governed – the communities depending on the forest – through the decision making of the Department of Forestry.

Law enforcement is done in cooperation with the government authorities and the civil society, and the disobedient are most often subject to local, community and district-based by-laws and incidents are dealt locally. Conclusively, on top is the legal architecture of Zanzibar, that has been created in negotiation with global elements, (the participation & Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty papers MKUZA I–III) and the CoFMA gives the local civil society units, the VCCs, the power to implement, preserve the forest and manage the issues locally. However, through national law, the Department of Forestry have the highest authority to control the policy, however, the global policy initiates the new subjectivity, "a class" of forest protection participants, and existing local social hierarchy affects the access to the subjectivity, that is, who gets to participate.

The civil society around Kiwengwa-Pongwe is to an extent defined by the interest that the state and the international community show towards this civil society. When placing the civil society and the civil society organisations in the heart of the management and implementation, the state becomes an advocate for civil society only in the case that the civil society complies with the interests of the state and the public policy. Through this arrangement, the government can privatise the management to the civil sector and produce cost efficient services and attract international funding. Those organisations, which are not beneficial or criticise the governmental procedures, are easily left out. For example in K-PFR, where the local unit for conservation is the VCC, the VCC is a customized civil society organisation which sole function is to manage the forest and engage local communities in its protection. Importantly, the Department of Forestry initiates the creation of these units through CoFMA. Furthermore, in practice, they receive a status of a state apparatus (through CoFMA), but consist of actives which are not acknowledged as state employment. The government maintains its control over the VCCs, alongside by being the supreme legislator as mentioned, through defining the resources at disposal for these organisations. As presented by KIPPO, the state can keep competing organisations (MUMKI) at bay by defining the appropriate space for agency. In turn, by involving the civil actor in the concrete management, the government institutes

its legitimacy through international policy, to apply for funding through bilateral relations with other nations and international organisations.

"MUMKI is MUMKI. They must do own decisions and activities, even though the government is supervising. MUMKI has the power to do ANYTHING in the forest. Now the department do a lot /is a stumbling block for the money consumption. Three months before she sent a request for the department, but nobody has answered." (Male, VCC member, 2019)

In KIPPO, this was visible through the project getting mixed up as part of the conflict of interest between the communities and the Department of Forestry. As the project was targeting a CSO, MUMKI, some of the Department of Forestry officers accused MUMKI (and communities) of lying, being untrustworthy, lacking capacity and general indolence (although this does exist, corruption and malpractice on community level in page 70–72). What is more, on occasion Department of Forestry officers identified themselves as being members of MUMKI, which emphasises the blur of civil and state actors in Zanzibar, and the utilisation of civil society activity by the government. However, in my analysis, the accusations represented an attempt to convince the Finnish KIPPO delegation that the resources provided by the project were in more sustainable hands in the public management, than with the communities. Nevertheless, The Zanzibar Environmental Policy (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 2013, 9–10) recognises the civil society in different way, and thus there is a contradiction of policy and action:

"Currently, there is increasing number of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that have keen interest in environmental matters in Zanzibar. These groups have made significant achievements in terms of community mobilization, tree planting, cleaning of the surrounding environment, environmental advocacy etc., especially at village level in rural areas."

During my field visit especially in 2019 these contradictions became evident as ever. The conflict was reciprocal: the communities or members of MUMKI were accusing the government of dominating certain project elements, such as constructing the office, and not being supportive to the ambitions of the organisation. The following statement, given during an individual interview, underlines the issue: *"The state doesn't work well, government doesn't care. Government is supposed to have budget for VCC to work, so not working effectively."* (Male, MUMKI&VCC member, 2019.) However, as we see in chapter 4.5, there was also significant interest towards government institutions from the

communities, and the participatory policies were viewed as a pathway to (governmental) employment and increase in leverage.

Conclusively, these examples are exemplary of the contradictions and conflict of interests between the community (civil society) and the state, and they underline the complex environment where KIPPO attempted to function. Due to international policies and trends in global development the public sector is underfunded, while on the community level the government and political parties are desired as a hierarchy and employment opportunity, with abundant power and resources. Nevertheless, simultaneously, government activity is restricted by multiple facets of international policies and opportunity seeking citizens, while these international policies unintendingly touch the social structures and hierarchies within the Zanzibarian society.

UNINTENDED INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS OVER FOREST RESOURCES IN ZANZIBAR



Figure 1. Illustration of links of influence of global governance on community level and governmental level interests. By influencing society through regulation, global governance also influences interests and negotiations of power on goernmental, and community level.

These layers of conflict of interest in all levels were imperceptible until an attempt to comment the forest policy during KIPPO. The high-income donor countries publish

policies which are vaguely in line with the policies of the IFIs, which conditionalise their financial assistance in low-income countries. As follows, the international community influences the formulation of policies in low-income countries. Accordingly, the international community attempts to transfer power to the civil sphere with conflicting results, while the governments such as the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar are trying to maintain their power, while conforming to international policy. Consequently, Zanzibarian government attempts to control the civil society.

The civilians negotiate their power through civil society, while maintaining high aspirations of reliable income towards Zanzibarian government. Thus, the Zanzibarian government is left in crossfire – that is, pressure coming from all directions, international and from citizens. By commenting the Zanzibarian forest policy, the KIPPO project came in touch with all of the layers of the conflict of interest, exposing the multiply influences of different power regimes.

Finally, in this complex web of resource deficiency, differentiating, crossing and even contradictory aspirations and interest, the government of the Zanzibar is obliged to publish a following mission:

[Chapter 3.2 Mission:] *Integrating environmental conservation principles to realize long-term social and economic benefits through active participation and collaboration with stakeholders.* (DFNR 2012, 31.)

4.4. Strategic Spaces of Conservation: Baseline and Attitudes

"Yeah because I said that we don't have any alternatives… for our income. And the forest is there. When I go there I can get a 5000 shilling now, then my [family]… we can survive." (Male, VCC member, 2016).

Underlying motivation for forest protection activities stem from the importance of forest resources (p. 4) and furthermore, household income levels in Zanzibar (p. 3). Importantly, besides firewood, forests also protect the ecosystem and contribute to livelihoods and subsistence economy: building poles, honey, herbal medicine, charcoal production, pasture for domestic animals and slash-and-burn agriculture are widely used commodities and techniques. As for livelihoods, the most important livelihood in rural Zanzibar is agriculture, while World Bank (2017, 67–74) estimates service sector to be the biggest employer in the whole of Zanzibar. Generally, Zanzibarians often have several livelihoods, which limits the time available for forest protection activities. Conclusively, low income levels and firewood dependency create a challenging environment for forest conservation, especially as CoFMAs usually restricts the access to collect firewood. (E.g. World Bank 2017, 68–74; Benjaminsen 2017, 511–513; Benjaminsen 2018, 49–50; Eilola et al 2014, 1245.)

Each village is entitled to a community forest area/wood lot as compensation for giving up access to the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (K-PFR), however, often these wood lots are insufficient for the demand and consumption of the community; during these five years not a single person has mentioned that the community wood lot is sufficient for needs. Furthermore, in many cases, the community-specific community forests are exploited by other than entitled communities, which then creates tensions between communities. Consequently, in various communities there was tendency for participants to accuse other surrounding villages for forest destruction and unsustainable use of forest products: *"They* [we] *protect the forest, but people from elsewhere come and exploit the forest."* Thus, the insufficient compensation against demand for forest resources creates the baseline for the challenges in K-PFR protection. (Female, VCC member, 2019.)

Accordingly, especially during 2015-16 conflict was widely reported by the participants: 15 out of 22 participants reported classifiable cases of conflict, while four cases remained

unclassifiable due to language barrier or otherwise ambiguous answers. Two people out of 22 reported, that there is no conflict in connection to forest protection. Thus, majority of participants had experienced conflict in connection to the conservation efforts.

There were varying descriptions of conflict, and some participants described several characteristics. Out of those 15 participants who mentioned conflict during their interview, six stated that conflict happens between communities, while five participants mentioned conflict within community. In addition, six people mentioned threat of violence (mental and/or physical), five participants linked conflict directly to incidents during confiscation of illegally gathered forest resources and one person mentioned the availability of farming land a factor contributing to the conflict(s). Conclusively, the various attributes of conflict indicate of widespread intra- and inter-community deprivation of forest resources.

Notably, although violence was mentioned often during 2015–2016, most of the interviewees stated also that "there has not been major incidents" and no one admitted having been a direct victim of assault or any other physical violence. A case from 2016 illustrates the threat of violence, and furthermore coping mechanisms – walking away and adding people to the patrols:

T: (First words inaudible due to an airplane) …patrol one day, she went with other two guys, two… two… two… people, one was an old man. Then, they see somebody who are cutting tree and (inaudible/all that is slip the) firewood. So when they want to caught him, she started fighting. [She said]: I… I will figh… I will kill you. So you have to go. The next… you are not (inaudible)… anything will happen to people... Yeah. They just go away, because they don't have power. Some of them they try to take their tool… like an axe and banga (bush knife). That is, harassment from those people who are doing illegal (inaudible word/people) down the forest. Other one… make them… (Female, VCC Member, 2016)

T: "They say, if they are few, they fight with each other, but if they are many, the problem (inaudible). So now they decided to… to be 10 gro… 10 people." (Female, VCC member, 2016.)

Indeed, the patrols are important in forest protection (Gibson, Williams & Ostrom 2005) and for the VCC members (discussed in more detail in chapter 4.5.). In the case of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, according to my interviews, the government organises the patrols inside the forest reserve, whereas the communities organise patrols in the community forests and vicinity of the forest. Furthermore, in general, collection of forest materials is highly regulated also outside the protected area and owning tools such as chainsaws is strictly prohibited. Conclusively however, without government officials, the entrance to

the forest reserve is prohibited even for the VCC members, whereas VCC members monitor the forest use everywhere else, although there is exceptions to this discussed later (for example collecting dry wood from the forest reserve is permitted in some communities).

According to my interviews and government officials, the VCCs and the government had increased their protection activities in forest protection – primarily through patrolling, that is through increased presence, force and law enforcement. Possibly for this reason, in 2019 the situation generally appeared to have calmed down and conflict was not as frequently mentioned as in 2016. In fact, almost all of the participants in 2019 stated, that the state of the forest and the situation had improved, excluding the most northern communities, which (not uniformly though) mentioned that the state of the forest actually had declined and disputes do happen.

The forest protection activities in Kiwengwa-Pongwe, including patrolling, depend on VCCs, which are established in each community under a CoFMA; CoFMA is the legal basis and establishes the responsibility of conservation activities to communal level (see p. 4–5). During the writing of this thesis, I worked with a total of 11 VCCs around the Forest Reserve.

Importantly, the VCCs are not representative of their communities and thus possibly contribute to the conflict around the Forest Reserve. Specifically, in a typical Shehia around the Forest Reserve, population vary by crude estimation (according to the interviewees) between 1000-4000 people, but only 10-30 people belong to the conservation committees. What is more, this emphasises the focus of this thesis: the research participants consist of a very segmented group of people, as most of my interviewees were part of the VCCs. Conclusively, the small number of VCC members compared to community population keep the seats in the committee highly contested.

There is slight indication, that established and influential community members end up in positions in the conservation committees, which is then indicative of that there is various benefits and interest towards the VCCs. One aspect is by being eligible to be participants in development programmes. (Also, Benjamisen 2017, 514.) Namely, development projects often form cooperatives, such as the livelihood cooperatives during SUFO, to deliver project outputs to the participants. However, during my research there were cases

between 2015-2020, that the project participants of SUFO & KIPPO were wives of Shehas (*Sheha,* see p. 4), and furthermore, some project components were targeted for influential community members. In case of KIPPO, the improved stoves that were built as part of the project, were in some cases built to houses of already influential community members. Furthermore, children of Shehas. ended up in positions in the VCCs and MUMKI. Thus, whereas development projects are legitimised through *vulnerability*, there is always a risk of supporting the already established elite (e.g. Ferguson 1990; 1994; Benjaminsen, 514).

However, the apparent favourism and nepotism connects to a myriad of established social customs in Zanzibar, and despite sounding bad, it is not a black-and-white issue. That is because these individuals might be precisely those, who can contribute to social change and pro-environmental behaviour in their communities through their influence. In Zanzibar, there is a very delicate balance between choosing the most effective and purposeful partners and ending up supporting the already established influential community members, which is associable to both community and organisational level: private and public.

To be more precise, occasionally, to tackle a development problem of a project requires very specific selection of participants. For example, during SUFO-project (2013–2015), livelihood cooperatives were the target of support. The idea behind the cooperatives of SUFO was, that few participants receive training within their respective cooperative, after which these participants disseminate the training within the cooperative, and further to the wider community through adoption of improved livelihood mechanisms and social interaction in the cooperative. Thus, in the case of SUFO, selecting those individuals that were motivated (most likely to actually share the fruits of the trainings), was given importance, in order to successfully spread the benefit to wider community – instead of emphasising vulnerability or non-affiliation.

Moving on, importantly, each district have their unique practices and needs: studying the deforestation patterns and drivers in Zanzibar, Kukkonen & Käyhkö (2014) concluded, that each district has their unique, non-generalisable patterns. Having said this, there is also considerable variation between the VCCs in composition and activity, and thus the issues I have described and will describe, are case specific. Furthermore, local settling

customs and variation to each individual CoFMA-agreement make the communities and their practices non-generalisable. For example, a member of a particular VCC reported that they include ex-offenders as members. Thus, in this area in concern, those who had been destroying the forest, were made to protect it, a practice, which was not replicated in any other committee. The system of locally agreed *shehia*-bylaws in CoFMAs, and national law create a complicated legal architecture. However, typically, contradictions and disputes are settled locally while only repeating offenses lead to national courts and fines.

Having established some general findings, I will now move to analyse attitudes concerning forest protection, after which I will move to analysis of interests towards the conservation of Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve.

In 2015–2016 I enquired opinions towards NGOs and development sector in Zanzibar. All of responses were positive, excluding one participant, who had a negative stance towards people "coming from the mainland", that is continental Tanzania, or Tanganyika. However, the participant also insisted that development projects in general are very positive as they provide income and education. Thus, the attitude towards development sector in Zanzibar is very positive, and during 2019 I did not ask any further questions.

More importantly, in 2019, I focused on the attitudes towards the VCCs and the forest protection, which were also both highly supported. (see Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 19–22.) High support for development projects can be explained through lack of social security, whereas high support for VCCs within the participants may be explained through the members' *privilege of being available for support* through the VCCs. This means, that as a member of a VCC (or a cooperative during SUFO), you are more eligible for support than non-members. Furthermore, and even more importantly, the VCCs provide access to, and control over local forest resources.

The importance of the VCCs for their members is visible in a strong feeling of ownership both towards the VCCs and the forest products. Ownership in general is a strong indicator of interest, and exists in all levels of management, from community to government; as discussed before there was strong sense of ownership towards KIPPO project and protection activities by the Department of Forestry discussed earlier in chapter 4.2.

Figure 2 represents this dilemma: while the VCCs were perceived as accessible for most of the people communally, when shifting the attention to other communities a rejection followed. Thus, even though neighbouring communities were seen to cause problems in the communities of the participants, their participation in the forest protection activities through VCCs was rejected.



Figure 2: Who can be part of the VCCs?, taken from the evaluation of the KIPPO project (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 19), thus the N is greater than that of this thesis (see p. 14). Furthermore, these counts are at best directional, since these two questions (Annex 3, 2.10) were one of the most modified during the interviews, and thus inconsistent. In the beginning we only asked question "I can be part of a VCC, if I want to", but modified it after the first interview, and later added "for this village" as we discovered how people understand this question.

Hence, a variety of reasons was given for disagreement with the statement "Everybody can be part of a VCC, if they want to". The most recurring explanations for exclusion were 1. remoteness (distance) to the forest reserve, 2. lack of community specific knowledge and understanding of local issues 3. lack of critical general knowledge in forest protection. On the other hand, a vast majority agreed completely to the statement "Everybody in my village can participate in the forest protection activities", and there was no difference in the attitudes when separating the answers by gender. Conclusively, the sense of ownership towards the VCCs override the demand to scale up protection activities.

In general, the management of the forest was approved. Particularly, the level of management was widely seen as improved, with 15 participants stating positive improvement:

"V: Do you think the management of the K-PFR has improved or worsened in the last three years? How?

T: Now better, because they have a work plan. Every month they have a meeting. They plan and organise, and this dynamic has improved." (Female, VCC member, 2019.)

I classified all the answers to the question above (Annex 3: 2.16), under a few topics. Most of the answers were very general "it's good", "they know better what they are doing", while better planning, improved cooperation between the VCCs, improved mobilisation, changes in the personnel of the Department of Forestry, and improvements in patrolling were mentioned.

Indeed, the most supported form of forest management was the co-operated patrolling between VCCs and the Department of Forestry. When asked what should be improved or done differently in Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area protection (Annex 3: 2.5), 11 participants answered patrolling, either by increasing the number of patrols or by better cooperation. In my analysis, the support for patrolling might be explainable through a few points (in no particular order): 1. the members of the conservation committees gain legitimacy and recognition of their work through patrolling with government officers, 2. there is interest towards patrols through confiscation of illegally harvested forest resources (incentive, profit), and 3. it is the most efficient way of protecting the forest and sending signal to communities. The participants mentioned to benefit from patrolling through financial benefit (money) and firewood, and these answers were prevalent in both sets of interviews from 2016 & 2019, discussed in more detail in chapter 4.5.

Moreover, there were people, who insisted that their protection activities were disapproved, since they were not part of the VCCs. In the following excerpt, we can identify a high demand for patrolling activities likewise for those, who are not part of the VCCs emphasising the significance of patrols for the communities:

When he go to the patrol, he is alone, in the (inaudible) but he, see some people cutting the tree (inaudible/because, they take him back) he… the police officer didn't care. Didn't care because they say he is not a member of the committee. So he cannot do anything about the patrolling. But he willing to… to patrol in the forest. (Male, unaffiliated, 2016.)

However, the patrolling appears somewhat disorganised: as for the VCC members, there is no IDs to identify them as VCC members/forest guards. Moreover, through this excerpt, it is possible to create two arguments: 1. there is high interest towards patrolling in communities in general level, and 2. the agency for forest protection is not legitimised only through environmental values (importance of forest protection); the protection activities of those, who participate voluntarily without the membership of a VCC, have less significance and receive less endorsement than those who belong to the VCCs. Thus, the belonging to the VCCs is both acknowledgement and privilege. Regardless that it is not appropriate that "anybody" can start patrolling by themselves, the VCCs appear to have somewhat a monopoly of protection activities, which is verified by government officials, in this case the police officer in the excerpt.

In conclusion, the sense of ownership towards VCCs and decreased value of protection activities of those outside the VCCs indicate of high intracommunal power of the VCCs. As mentioned, the communities inhabit from 500 to 3000 people, whereas the VCCs usually consist of only 10–30 actives. Therefore, the amount of people belonging to VCCs is small compared to the population of the communities. Thus, the major interest towards the VCCs, besides the financial/resource benefits of patrols, may be their influence towards the community issues, and their control over natural resources. Having established a degree of interest towards the VCCs through discussing attitudes, I will now deepen my focus on interests towards protection activities in communal level, in more detail.

4.5. Strategic Spaces of Conservation: Interests, Access and Power

Trying to analyse factors contributing to the conflict described earlier, I attempted to identify interests within the community towards the protection activities and the VCCs during 2019. As a general and open question, I asked whether the participants, as individuals or as a community, profit or suffer from the forest protection activities (Annex 3, 2.11–2.13). Most of the answers were positive, with 16 people out of 22 answering that they profit from the forest protection activities (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 67.)

Specifically, the biggest profit mentioned was the access to collect dry firewood from the forest, mentioned by ten individuals. Five individuals paid attention to direct income either for individual purposes or for the good of the community, while three persons mentioned the potential for ecotourism activities. Moreover, environmental benefits (such as fresh air, recreational possibilities, or hampering of erosion) were mentioned by three individuals, a value also recurrent in Benjaminsen's (2018, 49–50; 53–54) research: the forest does not have exclusively subsistence or economical values, but also ecological values. Furthermore, one person mentioned that he had gained a plot to cultivate (agroforestry) through forest protection. Thus, majority of direct elaborations described livelihood or economical advantage provided by the forest protection activities. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 67.)

Six out of 22 persons mentioned that the protection of the area causes more suffering than profit for the communities. In this category, the answers contained loss of access to the forest (four persons), that the protection activities only benefit a privileged few (two persons) and not being able to collect firewood (two persons). (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 67.) Importantly, three out of six participants (of those who answered that communities suffer more from forest protection activities) were members of the VCCs. Alternatively, there were five persons among the 2019 interviews (out of total 22), who stated that they are not part of the VCCs, of which three (60 per cent) answered that communities suffer more than profit from protection activities. Furthermore, out of these three participants two mentioned that only the members of VCCs profit from the protection activities, and the biggest negative income of the Forest Reserve for the community members is the loss of access to forest. Conclusively, half of those answers, which stated that the protection activities have predominantly negative influences on the communities, came from

participants who were not part of the VCCs; thus, my research material (keeping in mind the small sample) indicates that "suffering" is more prevalent within those, who are not members of the VCCs.

Even though the participants expressed the protection activities to be profitable when asked directly, there were indirect suggestions of negative consequences elsewhere in the interviews. Hence, majority of participants mentioned both elements of profiting and suffering during the interview. Thus, I went through complete interviews and categorized all mentions of interest as pull (positive interest to participate) and push (negative interest to participate) factors, and organised them thematically to *table 2*.

Some references of interests received duplicate or multiple categorisations. For example, a participant mentioned, that "*Only VCC profit. VCC members profit, when they get some support. It is profitable [when they get] f.ex. seedlings."* (Male, unaffiliated, 2019.) This particular answer was marked both a pull factor for "Income for VCC members" and a push factor for "Income for VCC members only (benefit a few)". Next, I will discuss the analysis concerning all elements of interest, disseminated in table 2.

PULL FACTORS (POSITIVE)		
ECONOMIC	SOCIAL	IMMATERIAL/ ENVIRONMENTAL
- Income for VCC members [16 references] -Firewood [13 ref] - Livelihoods (such as ecotourism) [9 ref] - Land for cultivation [4 ref] - Possibilities for income through corruption [3 ref] - Access to projects and support [3 ref]	- Environmental values and awareness [4 ref] - Communal development and social benefits [3 ref][1] - Social acceptance and social pressure [2 ref]	-Access to education [5 ref] - Benefits from improved environment [4 ref][2]

PUSH FACTORS (NEGATIVE)			
ECONOMIC	MANAGEMENT	PHYSICAL	SOCIAL
-Lack of incentives or income from protection activities [14 ref] - Income for VCC members only (benefit a few) [2 ref][3]	- Lack of interest from government [6 ref] - Lack of transparency or corruption [4 ref] -Favourism & nepotism [3 ref] -Lack of power in decision making [2 ref][4]	- Time availability [2 ref] - Distance [1 ref] - Size of VCCs[5] Furthermore as mentioned before: -Poverty	- Too tight family connections [2 ref] - Social pressure and conflict [1 ref]

Table 2. Push and pull factors towards forest protection activities and VCCs among 22 participants in 2019. These references have been linked to being positive or negative by their content, not by the positive or negative connotation of the interviewee. (Viitamaa & Rintala, 24.)

[1]*F.ex. revenues used for schools or otherwise in community*
[2]*Such as increased rainfall*
[3]*Directly mentioned with negative sentiment by two participants.*
[4]*Lack of power in terms of community: the community has insufficient power to influence decisions.*
[5]*Unclear whether mentioned directly by participants*

Among all participants pull factors received more references than push factors. A total of 49 references were made for positive interest and 34 for negative interest before further thematic analysis. If we count all the references disseminated in the table 2, a total of 66 references were identifiable as positive interest, and 37 as negative ones. Furthermore, some other interests were mentioned, which are not in the table: firstly, negative interest for forest destruction due *fear of punishment through increased patrolling* was referred to by two people. I did include this reference, since it concerns illegal forest use, not the protection activities themselves, which is the table's focus. In addition, this interest would have economic, social and physical dimensions. Furthermore, I did not include *political interest,* mentioned by one person. Political linkages can work both ways: as enabling or restricting and would thus need further study and analysis to be classified as either a pull or push factor. Overall, economic interests receive the most references within both the push and pull factors. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

Hence, income for VCC members was mentioned 16 times during the interviews by 12 participants and is thus highly likely to have significance for the motivation to participate in protection activities through the VCCs. Moreover, firewood was mentioned 13 times during the interviews, and is thus likely to be among the biggest motivators for protection activities in general. The income for VCC members can be viewed as both a push and a pull factor, since it benefits only few members of the community, but maintains a high interest towards the VCCs as the members are *perceived* to benefit economically, which was somewhat verified by the participants in this study. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

However, the incentives are also perceived as a major constraint among the VCC members which hinders the scaling up of activities. As follows, one participant mentioned that the participants get about 2000 TSZ (0,75 EUR) for a day in training. Thus, this form of daily allowance cannot be considered as a large pull factor or financial benefit, and the lack of incentives was indeed the most recurrent push factor, mentioned by a total of 14 participants. However, the *perception* of economical profit appears occasionally disproportionate among those, who are not part of VCCs: *"Sometimes VCC members get money. If he would be a member, he would get money. Also, as part of a project, he would benefit from this. [Talking about millions] Even 1-2 million."* (Male, unaffiliated, 2019) (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

The exact truth about the compensations and financial profitability of the activities is likely to be found closer to the first mention than the latter. However, views like the latter might have social consequences concerning the legitimacy of the management of the Forest Reserve: if the benefits obtained from forest protection are perceived unrealistically, or are de facto contributing to wider inequality within the communities, there is increased potential for discord within the community. (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

The previous excerpt has also been classified as *favourism & nepotism*, which is prevalent in some communities. The complete prevalence of this phenomenon cannot be estimated from the basis of my data, since majority of the participants belonged to the VCCs, and thus presumably would have been reluctant to reveal misconducts. However, there was several mentions of malpractice in my interviews:

Cannot be joined because of the leader. Somebody wanted to join, but couldn't. I don't know why they don't take people into VCCs. The leaders don't select or elect people, even when there are applicants and people who are willing. "Go and ask the leaders". [There is 30-25 in the VCC / 3000 in the community] (Female, unaffiliated, 2019)

Benefit for few people, not for all. Maybe for 50 peo ple, not for the rest. (Female, VCC member, 2019.)

Need more information about forest protection. Talk only with VCC members. Here is more than 1000 people. Met only 14 members. Need to scale up activities. (Female, VCC member, 2019.)

These excerpts further stress the problems in representativeness and accessibility of the VCCs. Furthermore, as discussed in previous chapter (4.4), the sense of ownership appears strong towards the VCCs: through dominance and exclusion, the VCCs stay in hands of the same people, who gather the profits of the protection activities, which furthermore creates possibilities for fraud.

Direct lack of transparency and corruption was mentioned by few participants, which again is likely to be a localised problem, and should be generalised with caution, and each VCC decides individually how the profits from confiscated forest resources are used:*"[Translator: something she is hiding. I want to know.] When participating in the patrols, they get firewood. Also, from the products which are brought to the VCC. But always they don't know where the money goes."* (Female, VCC member, 2019)(Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

However, there were several mentions, as another participant was accusing some VCC-members of fabricating travel allowance receipts:

"Some people are really disappointed, they dont get any support for the community, for example travel allowances.

-> there has been some fabrication of travel allowance receipts. There have been incidents, where the sum [cost] *has been left empty, whereas other sections are filled in properly. This has made it possible to draw bigger sum than the actual cost of the travel would have been by writing the sum after the signing of the receipt* [and keeping the difference]. *Not all is done through the department."* (Male, VCC member, 2019.)

People can apply for travel allowances when they participate in seminars, education or other meetings concerning the forest protection activities. However, again, cases like this are of very local nature and cannot be generalised for the whole system, but is evidence for the argument that the community members are benefitting from the membership of the VCCs, as it allows control over the funds and resources within the community. Furthermore, it can be considered whether the receipt fabrication is contributed to by the low financial compensations from forest protection activities.

Likewise, as in some of the previous statements, some of the incentives are exclusively in connection to the VCCs, as in the case of fire suppression, which is exclusively VCC activity: *"When they get firewood, and little money from fire suppression"* (Male, VCC member, 2019). Another such activity is patrolling. As discussed earlier, patrolling is the most supported forest protection activity. In addition, the patrolling is restricted to VCC membership, and furthermore, likely the most profiting:

Ahh ok, for example when the guards, they… they maybe… maybe the people come to cut the tree so that they will be taken by the forest people from Department of Forestry, and (inaudible) to pay, so when sellings maybe 100,000 shillings, they take 50,000 of that money, and give to the guard who did work. Yeah. (Female, VCC member, 2016.)

Nevertheless, a significant motivation for VCC-activity is in their control and authority over the natural resources. Thus, the dominance might benefit the participants more than the economical advantage. This argument is also strengthened by the previously mentioned factor, that those who were not part of VCCs, stated significantly more often that the communities suffer from the protection activities more than they profit. Various participants mentioned that forest resources which have been illegally obtained from the

forest are used by persons who participate in the patrols, by the community, or sold elsewhere, which then function as form of incentive. The excess control of these confiscated resources from government was seen unfair: (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 25.)

"It is not fair. Because they don't participate the VCC to protection. The system doesn't encourage protection. It would be important. For example, they went for patrolling, an found logs, they called to the Department of Forestry and they took half of the logs away." (Male, VCC member, 2019.)

From this statement two things can be concluded: 1. there is high demand for forest products, and 2. through the VCCs, which control the forest management municipally, the participants gain access to forest products by two means: firstly through the community forest area, and secondly, through confiscation of illegally obtained forest products, which both are perceived as important incentives for forest protection activities.

Indeed, sometimes the cooperation with the government creates conflict of interest, indicative of a power struggle between the VCCs and the Department of Forestry. The same participant, as in the previous statement, continues: *Furthermore, they just took the criminal away, even though the issue could have been resolved locally, and in a way that locally it would be discussed that from where, and especially why this guy gets involved in illegal activities."* (Male, VCC member, 2019).

Here we can see the significance of the Shehia-specific bylaws regulating the forest protection activities. As mentioned, only repetitive offenses lead to national sanctioning. The CoFMAs are tailored to each community, and each community have different customs on how they manage the protection activities. This applies also for sharing and distributing forest resources. For example, some communities allow the whole community to get firewood from the forest: "*Communities do benefit. There is a time, when people are allowed to go in the forest to collect firewood. They get firewood in the village. They notify the time in the village when they are allowed to go into the forest."* (Female, unaffiliated, 2019)

Many participants stressed community-wide benefits of the protection activities. Although the previous reference was the only one during 2019, which explicitly stated that the whole community is allowed to collect firewood, there are other cases of pro-

communal activity. As for a few VCCs, the money attained from protection activities were spent collectively. This participant stated that the money is used in social ways, for example by renovating schools: *"When they make patrols, they get firewood, which they can then sell in the stone town. This profits the community."* (Female, unaffiliated, 2016). Furthermore, during KIPPO several social and community initiatives were spontaneously (not specified in the project plan) initiated, for example tree plantations were planted in near vicinity of the schools by students, among a few. These activities emphasises the social dimensions of forest protection activities.

Moreover, some participants mentioned that there is increased availability of forest resources because of the forest protection: "*She said that… she agree completely because, the… Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest reserve provide, other… resources for them. So if there is no conservation they cannot get, these… product, forest product."* (Female, unaffiliated, 2016).

It is significant who decides who get collect firewood and how people are notified. Benefits (such as collecting dry firewood) and social initiatives are crucial for the legitimacy of the whole protection scheme, and without (restricted) access to forest to collect dry wood (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 26), or other forms of proper compensation mechanisms, also conflicts are likely to emerge.

On the other hand, two persons who were not part of VCCs mentioned directly the loss of access to firewood:*"Because there is a protected area, they are not allowed to enter the forest, and thus hard to get [lit. they don't get] firewood and space/plot for cultivation".* (Male, unaffiliated, 2019) Importantly, this stresses the uniqueness of each community, VCC and their forest access protocol. As most of my participants were VCC members, while majority stated the positive availability of firewood to be attributable to the forest protection activities (table 2), further study would be needed to capture the extent of deprivation and surplus: to whom the firewood is available. However, we can conclude that the VCCs possess high decision-making power concerning the forest resources, monopoly for the protection activities and that there is further high expectation for the VCCs to deliver both income and forest products.

Moving on, the participants perceived the government to be in charge of the decisions made over the forest area and issues concerning forest products (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 21).



Figure 3: Perception of decision-making power in K-PFR. Figure from the evaluation of KIPPO project (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 22). Thus the N=33 is again slightly different.

Referring to the KIPPO-evaluation (Viitamaa & Rintala, 2020), the answers concerning the decision-making power were clear: majority of participants perceived the government being the most powerful actor concerning the forest reserve, and there was no difference whether the participants were VCC members or not. Thus, if we ignore the "in collaboration" -answers, 23 per cent of the participants stated the power to manage the forest to be in the communities, while 61 per cent stated the power belonging to the Department of Forestry.

However, as it was perceived that government hold the power concerning decision making in the forest, the activities of the VCCs were occasionally considered government activity by outsiders:

"they are not devoted to protect the forest. And some of them… say there is two women who are… are making offense there… to… after being punished, they say that we are not going to go voting… because the government is… abuse us. (Female, VCC member, 2016.)

In general, the responsibilitation of the government was a recurrent theme throughout the interviews. The government, instead of communities, was seen to be finally responsible for both the protection activities and the consequences created by the establishment of the forest reserve. This participant stressed, that government has the final responsibility of the forest, and as well compensating the communities if a protected area is established:

"What he said that he say that they didn't know overview… Of the villages there, they are living near by the forest, so they look to the forest as their alternative livelihood for their own business. So, if the government made to be the K-P forest to be sustainably managed, so they can do two things:

1. to increase support in patrolling and something like that, to make sure that the forest there is well protected. But also, (2.) to the people who are living in that area, to look other alternative sources of income in order to live there, to… to get well livelihood."

(…)

(P4)No no no, no volunteers, now they are fighting with other members around the village, because of that forest, so they can get a relief, because nobody can go to the forest. So they just… they can just wait there or maybe they can do another thing, rather than fighting with each other for the forest. Because now, they are just getting misunderstanding with those people who are going to forest. (Male, VCC Member, 2016.)

More generally, it is likely, that the VCC activists view themselves as government cooperatives more than we (Westerners) view them as Community Based Organisation (CBO), or CSO actives. This is interesting remark, and is quite logical, since the VCCs are an integral part of the official protection activities promoted by the Department of Forestry. Sometimes in the interviews, there was expectation of paid labour, or even continuous work, and even though VCCs should be in charge of the protection activities, there were recurring demands of increased government attention and presence in protection activities.

Another feature I wanted to research was the VCC participants' status, and especially whether participating in the forest protection affects the local status of the participants. In 2016, I asked some participants directly about it:

V: (…) does she feel that the patrolling has like eh, reduced her local status here in the village or like eh, improved?

T: Currently reduced, only because the amount they go for patrol. (Female, VCC member, 2016)

However, even though the participant acknowledged that the patrolling had affected her status, she later insisted that the wider community, the majority, appreciated the forest protection activities and her contributions. Those people who do not appreciate the

protection activities, were perceived to be involved in illegal activity. This stance was doubled by another participant: *"Other people appreciate, the patrolling and every support they. But other people who are involved in forest (inaudible) they don't appreciate clearly."* (Female, VCC member, 2016.)

In 2019 I had another angle to this issue. Instead of asking the participants directly, I had a few questions of enquiring about whether the participants could contribute to the decisions concerning forest protection, and whether the personal appearance affected their ability to participate. While most of the participants were positive about inclusivity and wide participation, a participant in 2019 perceived that if you do not participate in the forest protection activities, you have no respect in your community.

"V: Do personal characteristics (who you are) affect your status in MUMKI or VCCs?

T:Yes. The training and amount of volunteer work contributes. If he doesn't participate, he does not have value."

Some participants stressed the role of social status in being selected to the conservation committees: *"She has been selected as a member, and she works as one, and wants to be one. She is accepted by the community, that's why she can participate."* (Female, VCC member, 2019).

A total of nine people were positive about personal characteristics not affecting the accessibility of the VCCs, while five participants gave negative accounts. However, the amount of negative accounts on influence of personal characteristics slightly implies the existence of such conventions. According to this participant, the VCC members are selected on "face value", and that the selection process is untransparent: *He's good, but VCCs only choose between them in an inner circle. They don't choose you even if you were good or competent.* (Male, unaffiliated, 2019)

Even though it was admitted that sometimes being involved in the protection activities spark controversies, a degree of social pressure and environmental values favourable of the management of the forest reserve have been established, to flip the balance of attitudes more towards a general acceptance of the protection activities. As some participants indicated to possess environmental values, also social pressure seems to function as a pull factor, whereas earlier they have contributed to conflict and abstinence from protection

activities: *"Affects. Some people hate him because he tried to get people to give up on illegal activities. Now people understand him when they have received awareness."* (Male, VCC member, 2019.) (Viitamaa & Rintala 2020, 26.)

Finally, expectations towards VCCs work in two ways: there is both realised value to the forest protection activities (incentives, forest resources, payments and confiscated resources from patrols) and expected value: the communities link high economical potential to the forest reserve, through ecotourism potential and official use and protection of the forest. The latter is source of confusion for communities: there is consciousness about money is being moved, but they don't know where it ends. This latter expectation can be realistic or unrealistic, but functions as a destabilising and unmotivating agent.

Furthermore, throughout the whole management chain of the forest reserve, the forest protection exploits a dynamic of *othering*, and offers agency for the participants, in *us versus them* fashion. From international policy regimes (who blame the governments, appear to protect the communities) to local government (who blame the community) and the communities (who blame other communities and government), there is plenty talk of "not we, but the others" in all levels. By shifting the blame of the problems to other instances, these institutions cover individual interests in various levels of forest management.

There exists a strong ownership towards the VCCs and the forests, indicating, that both these elements have significant value for the population near the forest reserve, and that the forest and the VCCs are subject to competition and struggle. The status of the VCCs is consolidated through law, CoFMA, extending the mandate for law enforcement to the VCCs. The direct profits attained from forest protection are thus in the possession of the VCCs, creating a construct which I have and will term *the monopoly of forest protection*.

5. DISCUSSION

In this thesis I have studied the forest policy in Zanzibar at all levels. My research questions were following: 1. How do different interests manifest themselves in forest management in Zanzibar?; 2. …and how power is distributed and exercised? and 3. How is development policy discursively constructed and how global development politics prevail in them?

Benjaminsen's (2017, 2018) research concerns Norwegian funded HIMA-project, which intended to support communities through sequestration of carbon dioxide-emissions and selling of carbon credits. Through HIMA, various CoFMAs were made, while the compensation mechanism, income from carbon credit, was intended to provide compensational income. However, the project failed to create any income through carbon credit markets (Benjaminsen 2017, 518).

HIMA-project represents a failed attempt to create self-financing through market mechanisms, while little other compensation mechanisms have taken place since. The HIMA-project worked in the same area as KIPPO, hence, this thesis concerns the same area as HIMA. As presented in my study, the VCCs have remained influential organs through which the access to forest resources is negotiated in communal settings. Moreover, according to my interviews, economical expectation exists in relation to these conservation committees as well as towards the forest. Importantly, some of the participants still referred to HIMA in 2019, which thus might have contributed to economical expectations towards the forest. However, as every-day interest, the subsistence-based forest use appears to be more significant factor than the economic expectations. Finally, through their influence, the VCCs are susceptible for corruption, while the interest to fund forestry related subjects in Zanzibar have withered.

Zanzibarian forest policy creates multifaceted webs of power relations. In principle, the conflict between communities arises from the situation, that within Zanzibarian forest policy the monopoly on violence is extended to civil sphere. Whereas normal civilians are highly dependent on forest resources, they also work as monitoring and sanctioning organ of the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve. The public policy of Zanzibar directly

places the rule of law and sanctioning partially on the shoulders of lowest level of administerial hierarchy, by promoting the Shehia-level VCCs and civilians to the status of forest guards, that is, law enforcers. The CoFMA based lowest level jurisdiction, the bylaws, and arbitration of disputes can be perceived compliant to subsidiarity principle, however, the role of the VCCs, especially in law enforcement, creates several challenges in Zanzibarian context.

The power and enforcing qualities of these VCCs blur the division of civil and governmental sphere in Zanzibar. While the international and governmental levels perceive these units to be in the civil sphere, in the eyes of the civilians they are government organs, while the activities of the VCCs are often linked to government activity. This challenges the concept of civil society for the development industry: while the development industry views the VCCs and the MUMKI as CSOs, there is high expectancy for government affiliation and support within the VCCs and their activities; the community aspires for more government incorporation, recognition and support, however, the management is wished to remain communally representative.

Among other things, the low variation to the leading members of MUMKI and VCCs is suggestive of concentration of power of individual groups within communities. This was reported in all levels of management during the studying process. Benjaminsen (2018, 54) refers to *wakubwa* (big man) as a unit in social hierarchy in Zanzibar. Wakubwa is a term, which is used when referring to powerful and influential individuals, through which various benefits are obtained and negotiated (Benjaminsen 2018, 54). There might be truth to this claim, considering the low variation of individuals in decision making organs. However, this might be a normal social setting in the conservative and patriarchal society of Zanzibar, while cultural changes are slow and challenging by nature. My finding is, that the VCCs work as central units of power in the communities, which makes decisions concerning crucial resources and negotiates the access to land, through which normal subsistence and low-income economical activities are coordinated in communal settings, and for this reason, I argue that these organs only work when the community gets to decide the representatives.

The government and the VCCs increased their monitoring activities in the forest during 2013-2020. The most visible action was to increase patrolling and guards in the forest.

This claim was validated in the interviews, as majority of the participants answered that the most improved forest protection measure is the patrolling. In general, force was a common theme talked in the last years of KIPPO. Guarding of the forest have been suggested to be among the most important actions in forest conservation (e.g. Gibson et al 2005), while governments might have an important role to play in mediating inter-community conflict in contests over natural resources (e.g. Fjelde & Uexkull 2012). In Zanzibar, the uttermost importance of the forest activists has always been in mainstreaming of pro-environmental thinking, in however privileged positions they live, within the Zanzibarian society.

However, there appears to be significant interest exactly towards the patrols *per se*, and the public authorities must take caution that profit through punishment and confiscation of forest resources do not develop into interest as such, or, that the patrols develop into a substitute for other failed compensation mechanisms. The interest towards patrols have existed throughout my time in Zanzibar, and even in 2019, the patrols were still the most anticipated output. Some of the participants even wished for direct interventions: *"To add more soldiers. The government to add soldiers. Together with the village members."* (Male, VCC Member, 2016). It is likely, that the VCC inclusion to the law enforcement (monopoly on violence), is experienced as legitimacy of the VCCs and credibility of the entire protection scheme – patrolling contributes to the consciousness of the actives that "they are taken seriously".

Often when asking for what should be improved in the forest protection, the participants answered "they need to add more people", shifting the responsibility of improving the forest protection measures towards the Department of Forestry. Thus, even though the VCCs are locally powerful, the biggest agency for forest protection was seen to stem from governmental agency:

She said that there should be… (inaudible) supported. They should be supported with the materials for patrolling… also when they find the (inaudible) in the forest, the department should give at least two (inaudible/that who) go together. (Inaudible due a plane or noisy car/And then she say the) identity [identification] *for the conservation committee members. (…)* (Female, VCC member, 2016.)

Benjaminsen (2018, 53–54) mentions in her article term *ndugu*, which refers to brother/sisterhood between villagers and in general in human-human interactions. The organisation of patrolling challenges this type of social bond, as can be interpreted from the following account:

"He say that he's polite, and that work you need somebody who is not polite. Because (V: Yeah.) if they catch somebody who are, (inaudible/filling not too … say that) he is so... polite. He don't think he can manage. (…) Also, also… because there are, in this village they are family. So he can go there and see somebody who are… cutting trees, when you look at her face, it is your sister. It is very difficult for him… to quarrel with them." (Man, unaffiliated, 2016.)

This particular participant implies that the forest conservation creates divisive and destructive dimensions towards the social bonds between families and communities. This argument is further strengthened by the recurrent theme of us and them -speaking. Thus, as such the protection of K-PFR has also conflict-oriented potential. However, during 2019, most of the interviewees stated, that conflict had reduced in the forest through increased patrolling.

I relate the power of VCC members into the concept of *global classes* from Saskia Sassen (2007, 164–189.) Sassen analyses the effects of globalisation, and the different denationalised social classes, which are born through creation of transnational networks and globalisation. Sassen uses the term class widely, which allows me to take creative advantage of the concept and use my sociological imagination, to construct a concept of *participatory global class.* Through the participatory class, three dimensions are negotiated:

The first dimension is *strategic space.* In the case of Zanzibar, the international network of different policy regimes (IFIs and the development policies of high-income countries) create a new strategic space, the participatory space for forest protection and novel social interactions. These participatory strategic space restructures the subsistence economy of communities in Zanzibar to form a participatory global class, which starts to act in this strategic space created by international influences. Hence, the VCCs' mandate is rooted in transnationalism: they organise the resources locally through national law, which is influenced by international networks. Conclusively, these global classes are thus embedded in transnational networks, without participating in these networks: *"A*

denationalized class emerges out of both kinds of processes as groups strategically attempt to secure the opportunities created by a functioning global system and are at the same time constrained by national systems." (Sassen 2007, 168.)

The second dimension is the *reorganisation of collective action*. The nature of natural resources as necessities and the new strategic spaces within the participatory framework form new ways of collective action through *strategic partnership and competition*, restructuring and incorporating traditional social practices in globally rooted forms of organisation. The strategic partnership is formed with other VCC members, which activates competition towards the VCC membership.

As the third dimension, the forest protection renegotiates the *value attached* to the natural resources. In this case, the value is not created necessarily in economic terms, but through control and access to the necessity, that is the forest resources. Thus, the control is the value attained for participating in the forest protection activities. The international policy regime thus restructures the supply of these resources and establishes control and distribution of these resources through the global participatory class and its organisations. Moreover, it reconstructs the power architecture within Zanzibarian society, by adding the participatory class and defining its authority. Thus, the power as value then becomes the subject of contestation alongside the material resources. Thus, in Weberian sense, the participatory policies in Zanzibar establishes agglomeration of resources and control (dominance) over certain segments of Zanzibarian modern society.

Moving up a level, the governments of low-income countries are often in difficult positions, and their leeway for national policymaking is significantly restricted. As discussed, the international organisations put their own policy pressure, requirements and conditionalities for funding, while each sovereign donor (high-income) country insert their own policy pressure towards those instances, that wish to apply for funding, thus creating a multiscalar policy universe. Hence, if a state is pursuing financing or support for their sovereign policies, they must adhere to both different policies of the IFIs, different countries and to rules set by OECD for the Official Development Aid (ODA) (see OECD 2021). However, the congruence of these policies remain somewhat untouched by this research. Nevertheless, conclusively, this is visible in Zanzibarian

policies, especially through their ambiguous phraseology, which suggests that the Zanzibarian government wants to keep their doors open – through ambivalence, the Zanzibarian policies are conforming to maximum amount of incongruent development policies originating from multiple sources.

The government of Zanzibar are under an immense pressure from everywhere: as semiautonomous part of Tanzania, it is under pressure from the Tanzanian Union government, as part of international community under pressure of Western values (and funds), and as legitimate government of Zanzibar, it is highly responsible for the living standard and expectations towards the development of society of its subjects, the citizens of Zanzibar.

Embracing the development jargon in public policies keep the departments afloat: they are able to produce meaningless documents which fulfil the requirements of the donors. Mission and vision are described in very an abstract way, where the text seems to comply with the strategies of development industry and policies such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, scrutiny of national documents offers very little concrete action: mission can be stated, but how the mission is achieved is not covered in detail. Keeping doors open is the lifeline of low-income public sectors, while on the other hand, the abstract language functions as to distance the policies from real life: the operational mechanisms of dominance and control remain invisible.

As discussed in chapter 4.1, KIPPO adopted the views presented to us by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland. Hence, this included that we accepted the definition of civil society by the Finnish MFA. However, as I have presented, there is considerable mismatch between the policy-in-action (diluting control to civil sphere, civil society as state organs) and how the MFA defines the civil society and the role of civil society organisations: from monitoring role of policy to domination in practice. In order to qualify for funding, the Zanzibarian government govern through civil society and thus the CSOs become powerful institutions of governmental power.

Likewise, adapting the thoughts of Sending & Neumann (2006), power is not a zero-sum game, hence, if civil society is reposibilitised, it does not consequently lead to reduction in state's power. This tendency I have described as *utilisation* of the civil society. Civil society organisations are created in order to persuade foreign investment or development

assistance. Thus, the global policy of civil society promotion is not promoting the liberal concept of civil society presented in policy papers, but instead drives the civil society into government. For instance, in Zanzibar the MUMKI cannot be seen as a Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO), however, the government exploits the organisation to control the participatory management of Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve and possibly, to attract foreign investment. Hence, the organisation might have genuine aspirations, however by keeping the organisation non-capacitated enough, the government maintains managerial power, while simultaneously being able to report to international organisation as a conforming environment of current, civil society inclusive policies, in order to circumvent its budget deficits.

The high-income countries refuse to admit their power positionality in policy papers and how this positionality works in their advantage. The MFA of Finland (2021b) published "a white paper" *Era of New Cooperation* concerning multilateral cooperation, and its support for the "Alliance for Multilateralism" advocacy group. Through three excerpts, three central points can be summarised for this discussion:

1. It presents very geographical, European values as taken:

The European Union (EU) is in itself a product of multilateral cooperation. It is also one of the staunchest defenders of multilateral cooperation, the rules-based international system and international law. However, the internal and external challenges facing the European Union are undermining its unity and effectiveness. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the EU to defend its interests or to act as a global champion of European values and the rules-based international system. (The Ministry of Foreign affairs of Finland 2021b)

2. However it questions the skewed power distribution in multilateral organisations…:

The need to reform the international system is widely recognised. The need for reforms is particularly urgent in the UN, the actor at the core of the global order, in which the difficulty in reconciling the interests of major powers, emerging powers, developing countries and developed nations is hampering change. (The Ministry of Foreign affairs of Finland 2021b)

3. … only to later repudiate their power position:

Weakened multilateral cooperation is not in the interests of any country. It is particularly damaging to small countries, such as Finland. They can only influence global developments within the framework of an international order that encourages cooperation instead of the furthering of narrow national interests and the law of the strongest. (The Ministry of Foreign affairs of Finland 2021b)

With positioning itself within the “small countries”, this paper is not acknowledging its own position in the political ecology of these multilateral organisations, where high-income countries such as Finland can influence global developments through accumulation of specialist professional public servants, who possess the required expertise to influence decisions, which then influence national policies. Poorer countries often lack this field of specialisation, expertise in advocacy. However, in order to create genuine multilateral relations, it would be important to create institutions, which acknowledge these asymmetries of power, especially when the decisions of the multilateral organisations often have consequences highly more significant for those countries, which have limited capabilities to influence the policymaking within the organisation. Importantly, that is, to create genuine *partnership for global development.*

When looking back at the scheme of KIPPO and this thesis, I argue, that development industry has a built-in mechanism of aid-conservativism. Simple projects, which do not comment or criticise anyhow the pre-existing policies (national or global), do not engage in genuine endeavours to decentralise management, do not comment national power structures, and include simple, traditional, non-innovative elements, appear as the most successful ones. For the governments of low-income countries, they are easy to accomplish and affordable, while the government institutions receive additional, uncomplicated funding for their shoestring budgets. It can be discussed, whether this is hampering progress, as in the case of KIPPO, resource deficiency was greatly compromising the ability to discuss project items genuinely.

During my time in Zanzibar, SUFO was very easy to manage, as it simply contained tree planting and procurement of tools and trainings, while the Department of Forestry was provided additional funds for petrol and salaries. During KIPPO, when we wanted to outsource project components to different CSOs while actively capacitating MUMKI, things suddenly became very difficult. However, this is understandable also through the obligations of governmental departments to their national government, sovereignty, history of colonialism and the bureaucratic procedures of certain countries (bureaucracy in developing countries, e.g. de Soto 2000).

The participants participating in forest protection activities vision themselves as anticipating or having agency in government institutions: there is expectation of government labour, increased status in local community and vision of participating in the governing structures of government. The distinction between CSO-based resources management and government-based resource management are shallow.

Furthermore, this expectation versus reality turns into expectation towards government, the Department of Forestry. The resources attained from illegally logged and confiscated materials are expected as direct benefit for those who participate in protection, whereas government investment in the protection activities is highly anticipated. The government institutions have a crucial role in mitigating these individualistic expectancies and mitigating the controversies between different communities and individuals.

Zanzibar as part of Eastern Africa, is subject to intensifying climate change, and the ecological consequences are already visible. The ecological hazards facing Zanzibar are unexpected rain patterns, alternating precipitation, drought and erosion (intensified by loss of forested land). According to international studies, these also affect the stability of states and contribute to intercommunal conflicts. (Fjelde & Uexkull, 2012; Buhaug, Benjaminsen, Sjaastad & Theisen 2015; Witmer, Linke, O'Laoughlin, Gettelman & Laing 2017; Uexkull, Croicu, Fjelde & Buhaug 2016.)

According Hanna Fjelde and Nina von Uexkull (2012), states have the potential to be the most important mitigating force concerning instability through creating an inclusive society. Their meta-analysis suggests, that there is no direct causal relationship with climate change and conflict, albeit they argue, that this relationship is also flawed since the conflicts are often examined through civil versus state dualism. The article argues that the conflict is often trans- and intracommunal instead of armed group versus state: the conflict prevails between communities or groups of people, who have different access to resources.

There is an echo for this case in Zanzibar: as the public authorities are not exactly in direct control of the resources, the conflict of resources (forest products) is contested between communities and groups of people, who have differentiating access to resources and

authority. For instance, it is more feasible to attack the VCCs instead of the state when contesting for forest resources. Thus, also the conflict for the forest resources is outsourced to the communities, an argument, which is legitimised through my interviews around K-PFR, and helps to explain the communities' requests for support from the government. However, I do not claim, that there is an ongoing, open conflict in Zanzibar, although it is possible that the conflict is mitigated through the increase in patrolling. On the contrary, I argue, that participatory natural resources management might create mechanisms for states to suppress opposition through engaging communities to confront each other instead of the state: to outsource the conflict to community level to weaken opposition and maintain authority in eyes of the international community.

Conclusively, the potential for conflict over natural resources in Zanzibar is much higher, than prevalence of conflict between the communities. There is economic and political marginalisation, poverty, high population density, natural resource dependence and ecological instability in Unguja, out of which also conflicts might emerge. The public institutions must thus administer and mitigate those tensions caused by the situation.

Finally, to conclude this thesis, I will discuss the current crisis of the development industry. The collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the civil war in Ethiopia offer us a few cases which (arguably) can be seen to have links into our case in Zanzibar. In this thesis, I have presented the multilayer structure of different power regimes contributing to a development project in Tanzania. Furthermore, I have offered a glimpse into different power networks and distribution of power within a country. The cases of Ethiopia, Afghanistan and KIPPO, requires us to look at the roles of states in 21st century.

The "donor" countries have a legitimate argument in demanding the transparent use of their funds, and freezing assets after failing to do so. Accordingly, I do not contest, that each country should not have their own foreign policies based on their national interest. However, I wish to point out, that the role of development assistance, and the industry around it, is inherently political and often the motive for funding is disguised. For instance, in Afghanistan, World Bank was funding about 30 per cent of public budget through only one reconstruction programme *Sehatmani*, while World Bank (2021b) estimated that 28.4 per cent of national budget could be covered with domestic revenues

at the end of July 2021. After the Taliban takeover, the World Bank among all other donors freezed all of their development funding in Afghanistan, while only NGO's remained functioning inside Afghanistan. As a result, health care sector in Afghanistan was on the verge of collapse in early September while the country was facing severe drought, lack of food and starvation, COVID-19 pandemic and economic collapse. (Loy, 2021.)

The case of Afghanistan is of course an extreme one but raises questions about the conditionality of international funding. Basically, in the case of Afghanistan, the international community had the leverage to cut 75 per cent of Afghanistan's domestic spending. This sets the whole development industry in dilemma, where on the other side is moral principles, human rights and good governance, and on the other side, humanitarian situation, suffering and death.

The second case, Ethiopia. In 2019, Abiy Ahmed, the president of Ethiopia, received a Nobel Peace Prize for liberating the society of Ethiopia by dismantling the suppression of media, ending the centuries old conflict with neighbouring Eritrea and steering the country to a transition towards democracy. However, the Ethiopian society was not ready for the internationally acclaimed reforms, and the reputation of Abiy Ahmed has deteriorated since.

One could argue, that in the case of Ethiopia the transition was too much too soon. TPLF, the party of Tigray, which is one of Ethiopia's ten autonomous self-governing ethnic states, refused to join the project of the Abiy's new Prosperity Party. The 2019 elections in Ethiopia were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, while Tigray organised own elections despite the disapproval of Ethiopian authorities. This led to the conflict between the Ethiopian federation and the Tigrayan TPLF. (E.g. BBC 2021)

Background for this intranational conflict lies in history of the Ethiopian state: in 1991 the TPLF was highly influential in toppling the communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, and soon after seized the most influential positions in the state apparatus. While the Tigrayans amount to approximately 7 per cent of Ethiopia's population, the Tigrayans were dominating political positions, using disproportionate power in the Federation.

Furthermore, the recent decision from Ethiopia to expel seven senior UN Staff (e.g. United Nations 2021) undermines the controversies some developing countries have towards multilateral organisations, albeit the decision from the Nobel peace prize awarded government is exceptional, and again, an extreme example.

Accordingly, these two examples show few dynamics in vulnerable societies: firstly, the example of Afghanistan, captures the affluence of foreign funding, the vulnerability of this funding and finally the consequences and dominance through vulnerability and affluence. Secondly, the Ethiopian example allows us to examine the weaknesses of the states of low-income countries. In the case of Ethiopia, the dismantling of the concentrated power led to the ignition of centuries old power struggles. It is a lesson for the whole development industry and international community. If we are to dismantle concentrated power within a society, we must consider the struggles and history of those concentrations of power, which potentially are also social constructions, and assess the potential implications carefully.

I argue that in Zanzibar both sets are visible: 1. The volatility of the funding has not led to sustainability. On the contrary, the state departments move between current development trends and cease functions, which are no longer “hot topics”. Having said this, the demand for the development of forest management in Zanzibar has not disappeared: the ecological situation and firewood dependency are still highly relevant in Zanzibar. However, the affluence of donors has shifted the focus away from forest conservation.

2. The community level controversies described in chapter 4.5. make the situation inflammable: without state authorities and its control the communities would lack necessary means for détente when negotiating the distribution of natural resources between communities. Dismantling public administration of authority regarding forest issues thus have potential for conflict, as social customs and hierarchy are rapidly exposed to a reconfiguration of power through participatory policies.

Through my study, I argue that creating overlapping layers of management blurs the coordination of protection activities and creates unnecessary and low-committed management. In principle, the forest loss in Zanzibar is easy: replace the loss of biomass with tree plantions equivalent of that of the loss, and finally nudge for energy transition

in the society step-by-step (which by no means is easy). Political inclusion is possible also through public institutions and strengthening of the government.

In the case of Zanzibar, as public authorities must a) adjust to requirements of international donors, b) mediate their visions against their best knowledge, c) manage the communities to participate in the protection activities, while d) ensuring that controversies do not inflate while managing the corruption and power struggles on civil level and finally, e) the public institutions have to prioritise their own estimations of most acute issues with the available funding domestically and internationally, failure in any of these aspects might result in deprivation of funds altogether.

Hence, the current international regime is not devoid of colonialism in a sense, that those power-assertive countries in international organisations have the possibility to influence other countries through policy, to which the other countries have very limited influence on themselves. Furthermore, in the spirit of Bhambra (2007), concepts such as participation are utilised in these policies unequivocally, without consideration of history and social structures of nations, which are subject to these policies.

Politics and policy has never been, and never will be, avoid of lobbying and external influence. However, while development assistance must not be confused to humanitarian assistance, development cooperation is sometimes (incorrectly) presented or advocated to be based on neutrality, legitimised through vulnerability, while its normative foundations are acknowledged (rich must help the poor). However, from the previous sections we can conclude, that development assistance is never completely neutral (conditions), the targeting of the vulnerable is difficult (social structures and reach), while its normativeness too, is questionable (reconfiguration of states).

Conclusively, the development assistance is highly political and a tool for foreign policy: the donor countries list their interests through which the development assistance is allocated. For instance, Afghanistan has a history of policy advocation and political influencing through development cooperation (i.e. Hegghammer 2020, 187–194). Again, only to discuss the embedded values of development cooperation and without justifying either of the parties, the case of Afghanistan shows us a direct example of a dualism: the international community was funding the allegedly highly corrupted government of Afghanistan for years and froze the funds only after the ultraconservative Taliban seized

the power. Having established this connection, I argue that the development assistance has multiple loopholes for finance mismanagement, while only the most blatant violations of human rights lead to consequences: the freezing of assets. Thus, alternatively, there is also considerable liberties in the management of the funds, and trust between parties is a considerable factor.

Furthermore, values conceived *universal* are, after all, contested. Thus in contrast, those regimes, who advocate for normative assistance and cooperation (such as for democracy, decentralisation or participation) must have specific instruments through which this funding becomes available. Finally, this assistance is legitimate if the values are transparent.

KIPPO project and the evidence I have provided in this thesis concern only one, minor funding instrument. Furthermore, perhaps contrarily to my argumentation, low-income states are supported in various ways, while this thesis was inspired by the policy pressure towards not supporting a state department. However, it does not prevent me to suggest reconstruction of the flows of development assistance.

The development assistance seems more transparent the fewer organisations are involved: thus, we should consider more low-threshold pools of funding, through which southern NGOs could directly access funding. In KIPPO, the GST applied for funding and The Department of Forestry executed. Notably, however, this policy is already utilised, most commonly through embassies or other foreign representation in a country.

Furthermore, financing for public institutions should be made increasingly available. As part of ODA in Western countries, I am tempted to suggest that public departments could apply for funding likewise civil society can, with a commitment to themselves invest some 20-25 per cent of project funds, as to get the rest 75 per cent as grant funding. In this fashion, western governments could fund societies as they wish ab accordance with their own policies, while southern countries could pick those donors with whom they comply about the development of modern societies. When having to invest in these schemes themselves, the southern governments would take interest into investing in these sectors potentially more sustainably. Crucially, the impacts of climate change require mitigation, and governments have the most important role in ensuring decent living conditions for their citizens.

Thus, my central argument is, that if there is no public (governmental) agency for change, there will be no change. In Zanzibar, the Department of Forestry must either embrace the concept of civil society in policies, or dismiss the concept of civil society in forest management. Through both of the alternatives, the communities can be engaged to an inclusive natural resources management.

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ANNEX 1

Interviewer(s): _____
Date / place:_____

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 Name of livelihood group in SUFO project: _____

1.2 Respondent's

Name: _____

Age: _____

Sex: _____

Marital status: (single / married / divorced / widow)

Education / profession:_____

Shehia: _____

1.3 Did you participate in this individual interview before (three years ago)?

1.4 Age and gender of other household members (excluding the respondent). (Household meaning those people that live together and eat together at least four times a week.)

Age	Male	Female
0-10		
11-18		
19-30		
31-50		
51->		

1.5 Mark five most important livelihoods with numbers from 1 to 5. (Number 1 is the most important, 2 the second most important etc). Mark down also if the option is mainly subsistence (producing goods just for own household use) livelihood or a source of income (household gets money from the activity).

Livelihood activities	Importance	Income source	Subsistence
Farming			
Beekeeping			
Charcoal production			
Credit / loan			
Employment outside home			
Fishing			
Fuel wood collection / selling			
Handicrafts			

ANNEX 1

Livestock			
Poultry / eggs			
Seaweed farming			
Small business			
Support from family			
Tailoring			
Tree nursery / planting			
Vegetables			
Other?			

1.6 Have you received training or other support concerning your livelihoods? (Yes / No)

Livelihood	Topics covered in the training / support received	Provider of training/support	Time of training/support

G.1. Do you think there is too many NGO's working in Kiwengwa? How do you feel about development projects in general?

_____
_____
_____
_____

1.7 Has your standard of living changed during the last few years? If yes, why? When? How?

_____
_____
_____

ANNEX 1

2 FOOD SECURITY

2.1 How often do you consume the following foodstuffs?

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	A few times a year	Seasonally	Never / very rarely
Fruits						
Veggies						
Tubers						
Dairy products						
Fish / seafood						
Meat						
Eggs						
Grain products						
Beans / peas / other pulse						
Bought goodies (sweets, soft drinks etc.)						

2.2a. For those food items listed under “monthly”, “few times a year” or “never or very rarely”, what are the limiting factors of their usage? (E.g. availability, prices, quality, regulations etc.)

ANNEX 1

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

2.2b. Do you feel healthy and nourished? What about your family?
You: yes / no Family: yes / no

_____
_____

2.3 What foodstuffs do you produce in your household for own use / for selling or trading? What foodstuffs do you need to buy?

What do you produce?	For what use	If sold, where?	Need to buy
Fruits			
Vegetables			
Tubers			
Eggs			
Dairy products			
Meat			
Fish			
Grain products			

2.4 Describe your household's daily meal routine (e.g. breakfast, lunch, dinner or snacks).

_____
_____
_____

ANNEX 1

3 FARMING

3.1 Do you keep book or records on your crop production? (Yes / No)

3.2 Do you see any benefit in keeping book or records of your production?

_____
_____
_____

3.3 Has the bookkeeping training given to the livelihood groups helped you with keeping record of your private livelihood? How?

_____
_____

3.4 What are main problems / challenges in enhancing crop productivity?

Area of possible problems	Why?	Coping mechanisms?

3.5. Question for people in livelihood groups that practice farming: has the training received by the livelihood group affected your personal farming practices? How?

_____
_____
_____

4 FOREST USE AND CONSERVATION

4.1 Which forest products you or someone in your household use and how often?

Resource	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Rarely or never	Collect / buy
Fire wood					
Charcoal					
Building materials					
Fodder					
Honey / food plants / medicine					
Other?					

Does your household do the collection or do you buy them?

_____

4.2 Weekly usage of fire wood? Bundles: Big _____ or small _____

4.3 Has the time spent in collecting fire wood gotten longer or shorter in past three years? Why?

_____
_____
_____

4.4 Do you buy fire wood or charcoal? (Yes / No)

Share of bought fire wood / charcoal of total fire wood usage: _____

4.5. Do you have a fuel saving stove? Yes / No

How has it affected your everyday life?

_____
_____

4.8 Does your household participate in tree planting? (Yes / No)

In which form of tree planting does your household participate and how is it organized? (You can mark multiple options.)

Purpose		Private	Communal	Livelihood group	NGO	Governmental	Other
Wood lot							
Agroforestry	Shade for crop						
	Soil quality						
	Fruits / herbs						
Biodiversity / conservation							
Building material							
Fences							
Fire wood							
Shade / decoration							
Other?							

5 PROJECT RELATED QUESTIONS

5.1 Have you participated in the SUFO project planning? How?

_____
_____

5.2 Do you feel you were heard during the project?

Yes / No

ANNEX 1

_____
_____

5.3 If you didn't participate at all, what was the reason?

_____
_____

5.4 Describe your attitude towards protection of Kiwenga-Pongwe forest area?

	I agree completely	I agree mostly	I disagree mostly	I disagree completely
1. Protection of Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area is important.				
2. Do you need more information concerning forest protection?				
3. I want to participate in protection of K-P forest area.				
4. Protection activities are easy to put into practice.				
5. Protection activities are efficient and working.				
6. Protecting K-P forest area supports my livelihoods.				

Other comments? _____

5.5 Have you participated in the protection activities of Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest?

Area planning		
Other planning activities		
Meetings		
Monitoring / patroling		
Tree planting and other forestry work		
Village Conservation Committee	Member	
	Participant	
Fire suppression		
Other?		

If not, how would you like to participate in protection activities?

_____
_____

5.6. What do you think needs to be improved or done differently in Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area protection?

_____
_____

ANNEX 1

G.2. Do you think K-P area is managed fairly? Are locals taken into account in managing the forest?

_____
_____

G.3. Do you think DFNR (or government) should take more responsibility in governing the K-P forest? Or is involving FCC's a good system?

_____
_____

G.4. What do you think civil society is? What do you think about civil society?

_____
_____

G.5. What do you think about public institutions such as DFNR?

_____
_____

G.6. Which of the two would you have rather governing the forest?

_____
_____

G.7. Do you think that participatory governing is a good system?

_____
_____
_____

G.8. Do you think the establishment of FCC's have reduced local indifference and controversies?

_____
_____
_____

5.7 Have you heard of the MUMKI (Mtandao/K-P CFCN)? Yes / No.
If yes: where?

_____

5.8 Do you think MUMKI (Mtandao) is needed? Yes / No / Not sure what they do
Why is it needed or why is it not needed?

_____
_____

ANNEX 1

G.9. Do you feel that MUMKI is open for member applications? (Do you think you can participate in activities organised by MUMKI?)

_____
_____

G.10. Do you feel that MUMKI and FCC's take locals into account in managing the forest?

_____
_____

5.9. Do you have any comments or criticism about how the SUFO project would have worked better? (e.g. about trainings, material help, information sharing, choosing groups etc).

_____
_____

Thank you for your participation! Asante sana!

ANNEX 2

Interviewer(s): _____
Date / place:_____

LIVELIHOOD GROUPS

Markings in parenthesis ( ) are either alternatives for understanding, specifications or supplementary questions, and not necessarily obligational for translating.

1. Name of livelihood group in SUFO project: _____

2. Who are in the groups?

	Male	Female
0—18		
19—30		
31—50		
51 —		

3. Who is responsible of following duties / has access to following resources?

Duty / resource	Responsible person(s) by name
Bookkeeping	
Funds / savings	
Knowledge / training	
Planning / organizing	
Selling products	
Tools and machines	
Transports	
Materials (e.g. livestock, fabrics, foodstuffs..)	
Work space or storage	
Other?	

4. What funding sources your group has? Do you participate in other projects?

_____

_____

ANNEX 2

5. What products your livelihood group produces? How many items and what is their value? In what period of time/ how many times per year?

Product(s)	Number of items & their value	Monthly / yearly?

6. Does your livelihood group produce for subsistence, or for selling? Where do you sell the products? (Salim: most groups farm for subsistence)

_____

7. Is it easy to get your products sold? Why / why not? (Amount of waste?)

_____
_____
_____

8. Does your livelihood group keep record of expenses & incomes?

Yes / No

9. What else your livelihood group records?

_____
_____

10. Has bookkeeping / cost & benefit analysis made your group more effective? (Yes / No)

11. How is the profit / products divided among the group members? (Answer with the share of products used for different purposes.)

	Shared amongst all members	Investments to tools / materials	Group savings	Other
Money income				
Products				

_____
_____
_____

12. Describe how well does your group work together. Is there any issues with co-operation or getting decisions or needed actions done?

_____
_____
_____

13. Describe the overall economic situation of the group. Is it good, average or bad? Why?

_____
_____
_____

14. Describe the future expectations of the group.
(Additional question after answer to 16: 16.1. Does the future seem secure [stable] or challenged?)

_____
_____
_____

15. Has the state mentioned in questions 14.-16. changed during the past few years?

_____
_____
_____

16. What kind of problems are faced regarding the livelihood your group practices? (For example limited funds, energy shortages, pests & crop diseases, markets, land ownership etc.)

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

16.1 Do you have any coping mechanisms for these? (How you deal with the situation / How are the problems tackled)?

_____
_____
_____

17. Has SUFO been helpful in developing your livelihood?

YES / NO

18. Have the trainings from SUFO made a change in the production or working methods? How?

_____
_____
_____

18.1. Has the information from the trainings been shared among the group members? How (e.g. individual discussion, group meeting, something else)?

_____
_____

19. What should have been done otherwise by the project? What expectations were not met?

_____
_____

Thank you for your participation!

G.1. Is there members of any FCC's present?

G.2. Do you think that the forest is managed better now than before?

G.3. How are the members selected to FCC's?

G.4. Do you think you have the possibility to join activities of the FCC's? What about being chosen to the leader board?

G.5. Which would you have rather patrolling in the forests, the DFNR, police or FCC's?

G.6. Do you feel the participatory forest management is a good system? Which instance would be most suitable to guard the forest?

G.7. Do you feel the community is involved in the forest activities? Do you find this beneficial? Why do you think it's done?

G.8. Do you think there is less local indifference towards forest protection than before? What about conflicts?

G.9. Do you think that the forest is managed better now than before?

G.10. Do you trust civil society organisations? Can you tell a difference between civil society organisations and public institutions (such as DFNR)?

ANNEX 3

Interviewer(s): _____
Date: _____
Place (village): _____

Individual Interview

1. BACKGROUND
Age: _____
Sex: _____
Village: _____

[These questions do not need to be asked, fill in later etc]
Has participated in "official" forest protection activities? Yes / No
Is member of VCC? Yes/No
Is member of MUMKI? Yes/No

1.1. Have you heard of KIPPO project? Yes / No

1.2. Has KIPPO project been beneficial / no / not sure what it is about?
_____

2. ATTITUDES REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF K-PFR

2.1 Have you heard of the Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (K-PFR)? Yes / No.

2.2 Are the location and boundaries of the forest reserve clear in your opinion?
_____

2.3 Describe your attitude towards the protection of Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area.

	I agree completely	I mostly agree	I mostly disagree	I disagree completely
1. Protection of Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area is important.				
2. I want to participate in the protection of K-PFR.				
3. Protection activities are easy to put into practice.				
4. Protection activities are efficient and working.				

5. Protection activities are easy for me to do.				

[SPACE FOR ELABORATION]

2.4 What kind of information would you still need more regarding forest protection?

_____
_____

2.5 What do you think needs to be improved or done differently in Kiwengwa-Pongwe forest area protection?_____
_____
_____

2.6. Do you think the state of the forest in the K-PFR has improved or worsened in the last three years / recently? How?

_____
_____
_____

2.7. Are you familiar with the work of the village conservation committees (VCC)? Yes / No.

2.8. Are you a member of VCC? Yes / No

2.9. What do you think about the work of VCC's?

_____
_____
_____

2.10.

Everybody can be part of a VCC, if they wan't to.	Agree completely	Agree mostly	Disagree mostly	Disagree completely
Anybody in this village can be part of the VCC if they wan't to.				

2.11. Do communities profit or suffer from the protection of K-PFR?

_____
_____

2.12. How about your village?

_____
_____

ANNEX 3

2.13. If you think yourself, how do/would you profit from the forest protection individually?

_____
_____
_____

2.14 Has the patrolling in the forest changed recently? How?

_____
_____

2.15. Is there any other changes in forest protection activities?

_____
_____

2.16. Do you think the management of the K-PFR has improved or worsened in the last three years? How?

_____
_____
_____

2.17. Who do you think makes the decisions about the forest?

_____
_____

2.18. What about your community or village?

_____
_____

2.20. What about you? Can you contribute *[to the decisions made about the forest or in the communities]*?

_____
_____

2.19. Do you think the management of K-PFR is fair?

_____
_____
_____

2.21. There is a new type of improved stove. Have you heard about them? *[If no, inform about the stove, what it costs and possible government support or loan.]* Is it possible for you to get one or could those be shared?

_____
_____

2.22. Do you think it is a good idea to get one *[improved stoves and loan]?* Yes/No

Why?

_____
_____
_____

ANNEX 3

3. ATTITUDES REGARDING MUMKI

3.1. Are you a member of MUMKI? Yes / No

3.2. Have you heard of MUMKI? Yes / No. *[If no, jump to 3.6]*

3.3 Have you participated in MUMKI's activities? Yes / No. If yes, which activities you participated? Do you know, if MUMKI has held any events in other villages? What about events in this village, that you didn't participate?

Activity	Participated	Held in this village	Held in other village

3.4.2. Did you find the activities useful? Why/how?

_____

_____

3.5 Describe your views concerning MUMKI.

	I agree completely	I mostly agree	I mostly disagree	I disagree completely
1. It is easy to find information about MUMKI				
2. It is easy to participate in MUMKI's activities				
3. It is easy to give MUMKI feedback.				
4. I/Anybody can be part of MUMKI if I want to.				
5. MUMKI is managed fairly.				

3.6. Have you contacted MUMKI in any subject? Yes / No.

If yes, why did you contact MUMKI? Did you get assistance with the issue?

_____
_____

3.7. How could MUMKI be improved?

_____
_____
_____

3.8. Do personal characteristics (who you are) affect your status in MUMKI or VCC's?

_____

3.9. Do men do same or different protection activities as women?

_____

3.10. Which activities do you think is more interesting for women/men? Why?

_____
_____

3.11. Is MUMKI needed / not needed?
Why?

_____
_____

OTHER

4. Do you have anything else that you would like to tell us? For example any suggestions?

_____
_____
_____

5. Did you participate in this / similar (KIPPO) interview two years ago?
Yes / no

6. Why did you participate in this interview today?

_____