



**UNIVERSITY  
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Economics

**Images of the futures in a 10-year perspective of  
immigrant families moved from Russia to European  
countries after the beginning of the full-scale invasion  
of Ukraine on 24.02.2022**

In seeking “the city which is to come”

Futures Studies

Master's thesis

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Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, up to 800,000 Russian citizens have left their country. This migration wave has a specificity compared to previous ones. Migrants are more educated, wealthier, with anti-war, anti-regime positions, and political motives for emigration rather than economic. This wave also differentiates internally. Generally, migrants in European countries experience more stability compared to the South Caucasian and Central Asian regions, where precariousness of living triggers a drastic decrease in the capacity for long-term planning. The families in this research settled in Finland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Croatia, and Great Britain, which reflected in their futures images and the envisioning process.

This research is an intersectional. The focus is on the images of the future under a specific angle: the futures of migrant families. How do Russian migrant families of the last wave anticipate and envision their futures in given European societies? Considering futures studies, this research aims to fill a gap between studies of individual and societal images of the futures since the family is a micro-social unit of individuals who are doing family (Dermott & Fowler 2020), including “doing” foresight. Hence, the personal and family future images are under integrative analysis.

The futures images were explored theoretically and empirically through contextual and structural frames. Additionally, families' experience of foresight practice was analyzed. The theoretical part contains a critical review of the contemporary research and conceptual analysis of the prominent ideas, including Polak's (1973), Bell and Mau's (1971), and Rubin's (2000), as well as theoretical grounds for the analysis of foresight activities (Minkkinen et al. 2019). The basic content-structural scheme of the image of the future was suggested. A mixed method was adopted for the deeper empirical exploration. Initial data was collected by semi-structured in-depth group interviews of the families, scaffolded by the PESTEC(V) framework. The modified Kinetic Family Drawing method and unstructured observation were incorporated into the interviewing. Data was analyzed through Causal Layered Analysis and Thematic analysis that also contained “six foresight frames”.

Through theoretical analysis core elements and origin of the image of the future were distilled. The coherent texts of four future images of the families were composed, namely, “A Man Called Ove” in “Tomorrowland”: “Healthy human socialist” Utopia; “Hobbit[s]” in the “Naked Harbor”: Inter-topia; “Blade Runner[s 2035]” in the “Westworld”: Dystopia; “The Road”: Apocalypse. The results of the empirical investigation primarily support theoretical assumptions and previous studies in the field. The core of the family future images contains strong, optimistic beliefs akin to faith. The reconstructed composition of the futures images inherits cultural civilizational patterns – a *utopia-eschatology-dystopia*'s carcass. Generally, the image of the future is heterogeneous. It contains overlapped elements of all foresight outcomes, but the scenario remarkably prevails, specifically the optimistic ones. The findings provide evidence that the family has its inner specificity in foresight practice: the members' leading-passive roles, the implicit power of beliefs, and the optimism-pessimism balance. The cultural identity impact is also evident.

This research argues for a multidisciplinary and intersectional character of the following investigations of such a complex phenomenon. Cultural, psychological, educational, and philosophic aspects might be considered first, also concerning family and migration studies. However, to maintain the specificity, i.e., futuristic aspect and holistic approach, the umbrella of futures studies is preferable. The main conclusion to be drawn from this work is that these families might primarily be considered an asset for receiving societies, at least, in the sense of internal family aspirations, their agency, and values towards a safe and prosperous future that, in the best scenario, might contribute to a peaceful and prosperous host society.

**Key words:** images of the future, migrant family, Causal Layered Analysis, foresight, Russian migrants.

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## 1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 up to 800,000 Russian citizens have been forced to flee their country due to various circumstances and moral reasons (Kamalov et al. 2025; Zavadskaya 2023), for example, the Russian immigrants are the second highest among other nationalities in terms of the number of migrated to Finland at that period (Paakkanen, 2024). Moreover, starting from 2022 leading position in acquiring residence permits in Finland based on the family ties belongs to Russian immigrants – almost one fifth (21,8%) of all applications for the first residence permit are from Russian applicants who aim to reunite with family. The number of applications for residence permit extension on the same ground from Russian family members is even higher in the same period – more than one in four applicants (27,1%). (Finnish Immigration Service 2025.)

This migration wave has its specificity compared with previous ones. Several studies (Borusyak 2022; Sergeeva & Kamalov 2023; Sergeeva & Kamalov 2024; Zavadskaya 2023; Kamalov et al. 2025) outline commonalities in the main motives of migration, namely, political reasons, fears, and real threats of political repression, the war in Ukraine, and military mobilization. Additionally, specific traits are attributed to them: they are predominantly more educated, wealthier, and have anti-war and anti-regime positions and are politically active, hence, this exodus might likely bring socioeconomic benefits to countries-recipient rather than security challenges (Zavadskaya 2023, 8).

Currently, this group of migrants is an object of researchers in the social and political sciences, for example, Sergeeva and Kamalov (2023) studied the well-being of migrants from Russia who fled to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Serbia after 24.02.2022 and revealed the specific phenomenon "extraterritorial authoritarianism" when about two third respondents experience fear of repressions from the state of origin even abroad, additionally, in average a quarter of them encounters discrimination that even higher in Europe. These characteristics are followed by a high level of strong feelings of guilt and responsibility for the war, which were reported by more than half of the respondents. (Sergeeva & Kamalov 2023.) "...the burden of originating from an autocratic country will follow migrants, regardless of chosen host country and the individual circumstances of migration" (Sergeeva & Kamalov 2023, 25).

One of the peculiarities of this wave, at least in the early stage, is the active use in media and regular conversation (Gunko 2023) of the particular term *relocant* for distinguishing them from

other Russian immigrants. The following brief review of linguistic analysis of that term demonstrates direct relation to the futures studies object since it appears fostered by the nuanced (self-)perceiving of the status and plans of the last wave of Russian migrants.

Gunko (2023) asserts that the first mention of the term *relocant* belongs to the Telegram channel “Relocation from Russia to the Free World”, initiated soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. She claims that “from a scholarly perspective the terms “relocation” and “relocants” can be viewed as marking a very time-specific cultural phenomenon and migration wave” (Grunko 2023).

The word is virtually a loan, a noun derivative from English *to relocate*, i.e., *the person who relocated*. Despite the earlier origination (approx. 2007) of the word in the Russian language and the close connection of its initial meaning with relocation under professional circumstances to another country, its usage rocketed in 2022 right during the massive exodus of foreign and Russian companies in summer (Borusyak 2022; Pavlova 2023; Perttu 2024). However, the meaning soon broadened almost to anyone who migrated after 24.02.2024, but mostly worked remotely. Perttu (2024) argues that in Russian internal or pro-authority media (‘propaganda’) the meaning of the word bears primarily negative connotation on the continuum from almost synonymic to ‘betrayer’ to more neutral ‘temporarily moved under the pressure of environmental factors’ (relocation of the company, overscored fears, friends’ or relatives’ opinion, etc.).

In the first phase of the exodus, a substantial number of international and Russian companies predominantly IT firms moved their businesses from Russia with staff relocation primarily to countries with zero or minimal visa requirements for Russian citizens, e.g., Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Serbia, Cyprus, Dubai, Israel etc. (Kamalov et al. 2023). Among other destinations, visa-free countries Georgia and Armenia became the most popular for the relocants (Kuleshova et al. 2023).

Despite the remarkable number of relocations organized by large companies, employees, particularly in international companies, constitute slightly less than a quarter of the population of migrants in March 2024 (Kamalov et al. 2022, 6). Hence, such a migration might be partly considered a ‘classic’ version of relocation under professional conditions. Moreover, according to Sergeeva and Kamalov (2024), the prevalent reasons to migrate are moral and political attitudes; in other words, it is not an “economic migration”. Although the vast majority of migrants averagely wealthier than the Russian population, they have lost substantially in incomes and quality of life (Sergeeva & Kamalov 2024).

However, Russian migrants of two sub-waves<sup>1</sup> in 2022 (February-March 22 and September 22), concisely use the word ‘*relocant*’ as a specific attribution underlining their status vs. *migrant*. Gusseinov (2022) argues that the word is applied as a full substitution to the traditional term ‘migrant’ or, more precisely, in the Russian language ‘эмигрант’ identical to ‘emigrant/emigrés’ that highlights the direction of migration – migration *from* (vs. immigration). The core discrepancies between earlier, narrower meanings and current broadened ones are predominantly in subjective time perception. Subjectively, by the last wave of migrants, ‘*relocation*’ implies the temporary character of exodus or living in a specific place compared to the assumingly permanent ‘*migration*’.

“The vast majority of respondents do not intend to return to Russia, at least not until the war is over, but many are yet to decide their final destination. <...> They find it difficult to accept their new status, which is why they prefer the term ‘relokanty’ to ‘migrants,’ ‘emigrants, or ‘refugees.’” (Kostenko et al. 2023)

Borusyak (2022) and Kuleshova et al. (2023) admit that this migrant wave is characterized in major cases by spontaneous, sporadic escape (up to 85%) to the most reachable but undesirable countries. Having the intention to move to the USA or European countries, they found themselves in an uncomfortable situation of countries *from* which people usually migrated, e.g., to Russia, not *into* (Borusyak 2022). At the beginning of the exodus, a minority of migrants in the South Caucasus reported their willingness to stay there (Kuleshova et al. 2023).

One and a half years later, measurement of the subjectively perceived sustainability of migrant lives demonstrated various levels of feeling of stability in countries of destination. The complex of specific in-countries conditions fosters different issues and obstacles such as discrimination by organizational or by local citizens (or both equally) and an essential rights threat (work, healthcare, residence permit). While the share of migrants who feel stable in Armenia is rather high (53%) (that is equal to or slightly less than in Germany, Serbia, and Israel), the rest of the migrants (in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey) admit a considerably lower level of stability. (Sergeeva & Kamalov 2024.)

Moreover, two years after the beginning of the exodus, the latter countries complicated the lives of migrants with new residential restrictions (Russia Post 2024). Additionally, in Georgia, the current

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<sup>1</sup> For instance, researchers at the European University Institute divide the entire wave into 3 waves: March 2022, September 2022 and Summer 2023 – Wave I, II and III correspondingly (OutRush 2024).

regime is gradually acquiring pro-Russian authoritarian traits that bring new fears to Russians who fled from their authoritarian power (Kamalov et al. 2025). Thus, precariousness is an attribute of the solid proportion of Russian migrants living there. “Merely 41% of Russian migrants consider their status as stable or somewhat stable regarding diverse rights in their host societies.” (Sergeeva & Kamalov 2024, 24). Sergeeva and Kamalov (2024) suggest an explanation that more experienced countries in migrant integration, with higher entry requirements but developed migration services, offer more options for better accommodation.

Another research project on Russian last-wave migrants in the South Caucasian region found that only about 5% of respondents declared their intention to stay there for over 3 years or the rest of life while the majority uses Georgia and Armenia as a transition temporary hub on their route to Europe, Israel, and the Americas (Exodus-22 2023).

According to Kuleshova et al. (2023), the major part of the spring 2022 migrants in Georgia and Armenia find it remarkably difficult to plan their future. Moreover, the spontaneous character of the exodus in combination with various uncertainties in the place of destination, e.g., employment and formal residence permit, had a drastic negative impact on the capability to plan for years and leave the only option of short-term planning. In cases when long-term planning serves to decrease feelings of uncertainty, such plans (half a year, year, and over) are considered by ‘relocants’ “something ephemeral that can break down at any moment due to the changing socio-political situation” (Kuleshova et al. 2023). The precariousness of life and specificity in that transitional move of a particular group of people from one country of exodus might be even considered as a new phenomenon of the “new minorities” constituting from the Russian *emigrés* population of the last wave (Lomakin 2024).

These phenomena of precariousness and uncertainty of migrant living have at least two important consequences in terms of this particular research on individual and social policy levels: 1) they hinder long-term life planning and, consequently, might distort the image of the future; 2) they might be an indicator of the potentially rising flow of migrants from several countries, most presumably Georgia, Turkey, Armenia, and Central Asian countries to Europe and Americas.

The families in this particular research are, if it is possible to say in this way, in the most ‘privileged’ group of the last wave of Russian migrants who moved and settled directly in the European countries – Finland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Croatia, and Great Britain – therefore, assumably, least uncertain and more stable position in that countries might be reflected in their capacity for creating their image of the future in the long-term perspective. But why is the study of

the image of the future of migrant families valuable for the theoretical and practical purposes in social science and futures studies, particularly?

Polak (1973, 22-23) claims that “formulation and description of images of the future may influence the future itself, and the social scientist may rewrite the history of the future,” and considers the image of the future as a tool for interdisciplinary social research (Polak 1973, 15). According to Bell & Mau (1971, 15), the image of the future as a research object provides comprehension of social change. Following Polak (1973), they stress the driving force of social science, particularly the study of the image of the future in such change since “the writing of history merges imperceptibly into the responsible act of creating history” (Polak 1961, 57, according to Bell & Mau 1971, 15) that, incidentally, strengthen the responsibility of the social scientist. Bell (2003, 81-86) argues that the study of the image of the future as a developmental construct is one of the nine major purposes of future studies in general and “[a] *basic concern of futurists*” (Bell 2003, 81). Rubin (2013, S40) asserts that images of the future “emerge as hopes, fears, and expectations, and therefore influence decision-making, choices, behaviour, and action”, and are highly impactful on human motivation in cherishing a positive future or avoiding a negative one.

In several contemporary migrant studies might be highlighted one common observation: migrants primarily demonstrate distinctively positive attitudes towards future in new country that might be explained either their fragmented and idealized information about country of destination or common human psychological trait to perceive imagined personal future more optimistically and ignore possible contextual barriers in reaching it (Koikkalainen & Kyle 2016, 764-765; Koikkalainen et al. 2020, 62). Koikkalainen et al. (2020, 57) suggest a specific term, “subjective hope,” for the description of such phenomena. Similar findings concerning personal future is found by Rubin (1997; 2013) where view of the personal future of young Finns and teachers is positive (in contrast with negative global societal future), and Kaboli and Tapio (2018) where young people (university students) with various culture origination are prone to demonstrate more optimistic personal future even within the darkest future image<sup>2</sup> generally. These observations trigger the question whether the personal optimistic image of the future is a specific common ‘in-built’ migrants’ feature or a regular human trait. Does it mean that future images of migrants’ families inherited the same characteristic? If it is indeed disbalanced to positively envision, should it somehow result in a special strategy to

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<sup>2</sup> As for the sidenote, phrase the ‘future image’ is used equally and interchangeably with the ‘image of the future’ throughout this text.

maintain that, or to critically inquire into the image to reconcile it with the reality of the reached country?

The problems of migrant families and the issue of their acculturation – “the changes that arise following contact between groups and individuals of different cultural backgrounds.” (Sam & Berry 2016, 11) – have been in the scope of researchers in social sciences for decades and are broadly represented in academic literature (see, for example, Dimitrova et al. 2014; Sun & Geeraert 2021; Sam & Berry 2016). However, the limited amount of research on the long-term future images of migrants who are settled down in the country of destination, specifically in future studies and with particular futuristic methods, is evident. Although studies of the future image of individuals with migrant background have been initiated (see, for example, Kaboli & Tapio 2018; Ryzhova 2022), nevertheless, research devoted to “migrant families” per se as a specific entity in futures studies is absent. The analogous situation might be highlighted considering the aforementioned research of Russian immigrants of the last wave – the focus of the study is particularly on the immigrant individuals rather than families. This research aims to fill these gaps and investigate images of the futures of migrant families from Russia who relocated to European countries. Following the detected ‘blind spot’ on the study area, I pose the following research question of this particular investigation:

- What are the probable and preferable images of the future in a 10-year perspective of migrant families who fled from Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24.02.2022? What are the possible implications for countries (societies) of destination?

This study possesses primarily an explorative and abductive character and aims to clarify theoretically the concept of the image of the future through the prism of migrant family life. The empirical part of the research involves collecting immigrant families’ viewpoints on a spectrum of issues in their internal (familial) and external (societal) context in various domains. Collected data is to be thoroughly analyzed to reconstruct future images of the families and to reveal their deeper, non-articulated attitudes, values, and worldviews behind the curtains.

Herein, ‘family’ is considered a specific micro socio-cultural system and a context for belonging individuals (Begun 2019, 240; Suppes 2022, 90) included in the higher sociocultural systems and contexts and possesses its agency for social change (Trussell 2018). The definition and treatment of the concept ‘family’ in this research is considered in two dimensions: legal institutional and sociological “family practice” (Dermott & Fowler 2020) approach.

The legal aspect is utilized for the clear identification of the social status of the aliens<sup>3</sup> who enter and reunify with each other to stay in Finland for a considerable period. That serves as a decisive criterion for their selection into a sampling group as a unity named 'Family'. According to the Finnish Aliens Act 301/2004 (Ministry of Justice 2023) that regulates the procedure of aliens' entrance and residing in Finland 'Family' implies solely nuclear family of spouses regardless their sex with or without unmarried minor (under 18 years old) children under custody of one of the spouses or both. Family ties of family members – marriage of spouses and children's custody – should be registered officially by the third-country national authorities or justified by Finnish authorities. Partners, regardless of sex, who have cohabited in the same household in like-marriage relations, are also considered family members. (Ministry of Justice 2023.) Thus, for research purposes, the term 'migrant family' implies the group of aliens tied as family members officially acknowledged by Finnish authorities.

Considering a sociological framework, Dermott and Fowler (2020) argued that family might be defined through a "family practice" lens "as a property of interpersonal relationships, rather than demarcating an institution that is constituted by a set of members" (Dermott and Fowler 2020, 6). Following Morgan (1996; 2011), they assert that distinct groups of people are interactively constructing family in meaningful relations and focus shifts from "what a family is" to "what a family do" (Dermott and Fowler 2020, 5). That perspective permits to highlight the aspects of "[individual] agency, flexibility and transformation" and reconciles influential in family studies approaches: traditional in sociology of 1970-80 "static" institutional view with biological ties, circumstances of co-habiting, heterosexual relations and generations in its core, and "families of choice", the later much broader concept with focus on personal life and relationships when individuals consider themselves as a family and blood kinship, sexual attributiveness and mutual householding might not determine their co-existing as a family. Thus, "family practice" prism aligns with the internal individuals' thinking about their family, how they "do" family, and deeply rooted and still influential societal conventional opinion and institutional definition of family as 'fixed fact', its structure, role, function, etc. (Dermott and Fowler 2020.)

The "family practice" approach is analytical and does not provide an exhaustive list of actions that constitute family; however, these practices are displayed and recognizable by individuals (and broader external society) as familial (Dermott and Fowler 2020, 6). It might be, for example,

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<sup>3</sup> A citizen of the third-country without Finnish citizenship. From the pool of third-countries the Member States of the European Union (EU) or Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland are excluded (Ministry of Justice 2023, 1-2).

‘parenting’ with manifested responsibility in parent-child relations, or ‘caring’ in grown child provision of the ageing parent. Thus, the process of doing, constructing a family might embrace individuals who are not “traditionally” acknowledged as a “family member”, especially in a case of deeply culturally rooted convention of the nuclear family with two heterosexual spouses and one or more children under parental custody, often tied with blood kinship.

I suppose that the “family practice” framework is also applicable in my research. ‘Working with the future’, ‘futurizing’<sup>4</sup> might be distinctively pointed out as one of such familial activities throughout family life. It might be, e.g., sporadic or regular discussing, negotiating, and intensive arguing short- and long-term plans up to familial conflict, analyzing future problems, circumstances in the ordinary family life course, or investigating barriers that hinder or facilitate reaching family goals. Based on Bowen’s Family System Theory in family therapy, the level of family functionality, or, roughly speaking, family ‘health’, is assessed among others by goal structure: the clearer developed goals, the more functional the family. In a broad sense, “goals exist to support the effective and efficient adaptation to change and threat” (Keller& Noone 2020, 43). Thus, it can be assumed that anticipation and visioning are “normal” in-built functions and practice of the family.

This familial practice of ‘futurizing’ is immanently intertwined with the constant process of decision-making and choosing future alternatives. In this part, that conjunct with the idea of the image of the future as a primary source of choice. Polak (1973), Bell and Mau (1971), Rubin and Linturi (2001), Slaughter (1991) argue the crucial meaning of the future images for the personal decision-making and social transformation under the driving force of visioned alternatives.

Specifically, from the perspective of the image of the future analysis, family is considered as a body of individuals with their traits and as a micro-social unit. Therefore, both the personal future images and the family future images are under analysis. Individuals form and are formed by the family context, whereas the family obtains its peculiar social internal patterns and external interrelations with broader socio-cultural contexts. Although, Polak (1973), Bell and Mau (1971) suggested their concepts of the image of the future primarily as an explanation of the drivers of social change, they claim that their concepts might be appropriate for the individual’s case (Polak 1973, 14; Bell & Mau 1971, 22-23; Slaughter 1991, 510). Rubin and Linturi’s (2001) concept is devoted specifically to the personal image of the future and its nature. Assumably, a family’s image of the future might be distinctive from separate individuals' images of the future, which could bring new insights in

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<sup>4</sup> This is working, mostly figurative term about the process of working with future in family that will be developed and clarified during the study.

terms of possible ways of acculturation of migrant families. Additionally, their analysis could reveal intergenerational, (ethno)cultural, and specific values inherited in the family which, according to Polak (1973) reflected and reinforced by the image of the future that in turn “may be thought of as time-bombs that explode somewhere in the future” with little control of these images’ creators (Polak 1973, 10).

Taking into account the family’s strong motivation to move to a better place to live, to settle seamlessly at the destination, and to stay for a long time, it is rather intriguing to explore how they envisage their future in the target country. How do Russian migrant families of the last wave anticipate their futures in given European societies? Do they plan to assimilate and dissolve in a new socio-cultural context? Or will they stand for the identity they brought from the place of exodus? What do they expect, and to what do they prepare? Lastly, what their images of the future might bring to the society they arrive in?

## 2 Theoretical framework

In their infinite struggle against nature and invaders to keep safe, to feed their families, and to survive, people should anticipate natural cycles and cataclysms, invasions of enemies, and hunger. However, in addition to the survival instinct, people should strive to live better (individually and with others). Therefore, the human image of the future might be a bizarre cocktail as a result of the conjunctions of anticipations and visions, when both can be personal or socially shared.

### 2.1 Image of the future: conceptual analysis

To keep an ‘up-to-date’ position in my study, I commence the review from the recent research, including my counterparts from the Master’s Degree program in Futures Studies (FFRC) and future colleagues, which contains the image of the future as a specific study object. Then I switched to the analysis of the most prominent researchers in the field of future image investigations. Herein, I put the disclaimer that the particular format and limitations of this type of research – Master’s Thesis – do not allow for conducting substantial theoretical analysis and imply a primary focus on the practical part. Therefore, the pool of revised works is slightly scarce. However, at the moment, from my perspective, theoretical findings are temporarily sufficient for the theoretical framework of this particular research.

#### 2.1.1 Review of recent research on the image of the future

Seneviratne (2024) while analyzing futures images of good life for urban youth in Sri Lanka considers core definition of the “image of the future” primarily grounded of the Polak’s (1973) and Bell and Mau’s (1971) views particularly as a vision – “envisioned transformative future” (Seneviratne 2024, 17-19) – that perceived, created and investigated through social constructionist and critical futures paradigms. Envisioning is suggested by Seneviratne “as a futures method and as a creative way to engage with future” (Seneviratne 2024, 18) within van der Helm’s (2009) and Ziegler’s (1991) approach.

Oertel (2024), in terms of images of the future, examines one of their categories – utopias, or desired future images “whose *raison d’être* is the desire for fundamental social change” (Oertel 2024, 15) that is primarily also can be attributed to vision. Oertel’s understanding is primarily derived from Bell & Mau’s (1971), Polak’s (1973), and partly Rubin’s (2013) models of the image of the future.

Vien's (2024) analysis of the image of the future of female entrepreneurs in ICT in its theoretical part is advancing throughout the critical review of concepts of Polak (1973), Mau and Bell (1971), Rubin (1998, 2013), Rubin and Linturi (2001), and Rogers and Tough (1996) and eventually resulted in vision as a preferable image of the future mostly based on ideas of van der Helm (2009). In Vien's viewpoint, "Following Beers et al. (2010), images of the future can be denoted as a hypernym of visions, as a vision can represent an image of a desirable future." Vien (2024, 21).

Fey (2023) in the process of analysis of the entrepreneurial women's imaginary role models and exploration of the images of the future combines the Polak's (1973), Bell and Mau's (1971) and Schick's (2022) concepts to theoretically argue "the shaping power of consciously anticipated, preferred images of the future" (Fey 2023, 24) on the societal and individual levels.

Oranen's (2023) study is devoted to mapping hopes and fears of the church community in 25-years perspective where the concept of the image of the future is originated primarily from Rubin's (1998; 2013) and Rubin & Linturi's (2001) studies and treated "as images, hopes and fears regarding the future<...>[that] together with perceived social reality and shared ideas contribute to the decision making and actions in the present" (Oranen 2023, 25-26). Additionally, following Beers et al. (2010), he admits that the future image and vision differ since the latter is positive and attributed solely to the future, whereas the former "can also deal with threats and negative futures as well" and "connected to present action" (Oranen 2023, 27).

Ryzhova (2022) claims that the image of the future is comparable with visions and scenarios, including relation to backcasting, and predominantly considers its influential aspect for the motivation and decision-making process (Ryzhova 2022, 21-24). The Rubin's (1998, 2000, 2013) and Rubin and Linturi's (2001) concept of the image of the future is primarily in the focus of the theoretical review with mentioning Polak's (1973), Inayatullah (1993, 1998), Bell and Mau (1971), Bell (1997a, 1998) and less frequently other authors.

In Keski-Pukkila's (2022) study, the images of the future relating to educational and vocational images and their source as a basis for decision making of high schoolers are under analysis. Author utilizes the concept of future images as a blended concept primarily based on Rubin and Linturi (2001) and Rubin (2013) ideas with few amendments of researchers in youth's studies: the worldview consisted "of perceptions, beliefs, values, images, interpretations, and norms about the world (Helve 1987, 13-14, according to Keski-Pukkila 2021, 14)<...>directed towards future (Mikkonen 2008, 81, according to Keski-Pukkila 2021, 14)" and "of beliefs, expectations, opinions, and assumptions of what the future might be like" but primarily focuses on "fears, hopes, values,

dreams and expectations” and the role of close social environment (media, other people) and personal experience in influencing the future images that eventually might be considered as “used future” (Keski-Pukkila 2022, 12, 40).

In Lamberg’s (2021) research on “sport-based companies and their potential in promoting physical activity,” the image of the future is primarily treated as a visionary term. Since normative aspect is one of the main in the study, the future images are examined from opportunistic and transformational perspectives of Rubin (2013), Rubin and Linturi (2001), Stevenson (2006), Polak (1973), Ziegler (1991), Bell and Mau (1971), and Slaughter (1991) concepts, e.g., “the change-making capacity of images of the future” (Lamberg’s 2021, 16) and the future is supposed to study by Lamberg primarily in its desired form.

Paju’s (2021) investigation of the images of the future of Estonian education contains theoretical inquiry of the concept of “anticipatory assumptions of educational leadership” (Paju 2021, 16) that is derived from the Rosen’s (1985), Pezzulo’s et al. (2009), Poli’s (2017), and Miller’s (2018) models of anticipation and anticipatory systems that steer behavior. Additionally, Paju treats the Rubin and Linturi’s (2004) concept of the future image and claims that image of the future distinguishes from the vision as a more complex future perspective, and in case of her specific study “the images incorporating hopes, fears, and threats seem more interesting than the visions of the preferred future” (Paju’s 2021, 20).

Kaboli and Tapio (2018) in the exploration of the alternative images of the future of young adults with multicultural backgrounds ground their theoretical framework predominantly on the Polak’s (1973), Rubin’s (1998, 2000, 2013), Rubin and Linturi’s (2001), and Bell (2003) studies. Kaboli and Tapio (2018) argue that images of the future are the representations of hopes and fears of their owners and consciously and unconsciously influence their decisions and behaviors. One of the core presumptions of the study is that the future image is included into a “feedback loop” between societal reality and decisions and behavior, therefore, the image of the future is influenced by the traits of the current societal period which is claimed “as the advanced phase of modernity” (Kaboli & Tapio 2018, 33). Based on the idea that the nature of the image of the future is the output of values, expectations, and experiences of individuals consciously and unconsciously generated, the Causal Layered Analysis (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009) for critical analysis of collected data is utilized in Kaboli and Tapio’s (2018) research.

### 2.1.2 Fred Polak's concept

Amid the process of writing this text, two volunteers from Jehovah's Witnesses rang the bell at my door. "Did you know that the Bible contains the image of a positive future?" – they asked. "I do know!" – my answer was super confident since their Biblical connotations directly related to the Polak's (1973) texts I had just read. A part of my ancient mystified consciousness inherited from savage descendants immediately tossed me a hint that such an event could not be a mere coincidence.

My analysis of Polak's concept pursues the primary aim to answer what the image of the future is structurally and how it appears. I intentionally do not analyze the content in depth since it requires profound and extensive philosophical, historical, cultural, and social study and a corresponding background<sup>5</sup>.

Polak (1973, 16-17) puts a sophisticated concept for analysis of the image of the future on the intersection of two core categories, "essence" and "influence". The "essence" contains the concept of oughtness ("*Seinmüssen*", "*Seinsollen*") or "an unchangeable course of events", "history as a book that has already been written" whereas the "influence" implies the powerfulness, the will ("*Willens*") or "possibility of human intervention", "history as a process that man can or cannot manipulate." Both of these categories can be optimistic or pessimistic (Table 1).

Table 1. Categories for the analysis of the images of the future (Polak 1973)

	<b><i>Essence</i></b> (unchangeable course of events)	<b><i>Influence</i></b> (capability to manipulate historical processes)
<b>Optimism</b>	Seinoptimismus (must be good)	Willensoptimismus (supposed possibility of human intervention)
<b>Pessimism</b>	Seinpessimismus (must be bad)	Willenspessimismus (rejected possibility of human intervention)

In Polak's distinction between 'essence' and 'influence', the internal counterintuitive aspect might be noticed. According to Polak, "[t]he essence categories refer to an unchangeable course of events" (Polak 1973, 17). The first question immediately arises: if the course of events is initially postulated as *unchangeable*, therefore, "the influence" category loses its core sense – no changes are possible,

<sup>5</sup> However, I inevitably react to the content endeavoring continue the conversation with those brilliant seminal ideas in relation to present days.

any effort fails in vain. Thus, my following analysis (including Polak's work) will treat the "essence" category more loosely as a "content" of the image of the future that can be 'colored' or better 'meaning-attached' from positive or negative attitudes or beliefs<sup>6</sup>.

Through the text, it occurs as if Polak periodically slightly contradicts himself when some of the eschatological concepts are considered *essence-pessimistic*. For example, "[t]he Egyptian preoccupation with death, evidenced by the Book of the Dead and the pyramid tombs, suggests that the prevailing attitude of the times was a very somber essence-pessimism." (Polak 1973, 24) However, later on, Polak argues that "eschatology and utopia both belong to the genre of positive images of the future" (Polak 1973, 176).

Perhaps, the 'positive' and 'optimistic' are not completely equal definitions since Polak discerns the optimistic and pessimistic attitudes from the image of the future, outlining their functional relationship (Polak 1973, 17): simplifying that claim, attitudes somehow determine or impact the future image. However, from my perspective, Polak makes a distinction between 'optimism-pessimism' in the essence of human's image of the future, precisely on the border of physical life. Thus, if the image of the future implies a better life after death, following Polak, this is an '*essence-pessimistic*' image. Moreover, if destiny (*fatum*) determines the life course, the image is '*influence-pessimistic*'.

From my perspective, the image of the future is more sophisticated and even contradictory than the mere division between two poles. Despite the undisputed fact of human death on Earth, in eschatological vision after death and possible apocalypse, the ultimate final is full of crystal-clear optimism ('essence-optimism') – you or your folks will obtain everlasting happiness. Hence, if someone *truly* believes in it (faith and hope), their future image is 'essence-optimistic'. However, that optimistic future is conditional. If you follow or obey particular rules that presuppose consciously active behavior: 1) unconditional faith (no room for doubts); 2) a specific list of mandatory rules to be followed (no room for mistakes, totally focused on behaving properly). Thus, the image of the future is optimistic in both domains: essence/influence. Apocalypse here, from my perspective, is not a pessimistic but a motivational (threatening) and illustrative picture for the best concentration on the main goal – salvation that can be obtained through hard labor (obedience). That image of the future is an end full of optimism, universal catharsis, which commences from the ubiquitous catastrophe with total purification from filth. And everyone who followed the Covenant

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<sup>6</sup> the clearer conceptualization of the future image's grounds and relations such as, e.g., belief, is below. I intentionally follow the Polak's ideas first in order to keep the narrative and logic coherence.

will stay living eternally in peace in a place where “material abundance [is] side by side with spiritual perfection” (Polak 1973, 22). Quite remarkable that Polak in description of the changing ancient Jewish future image to the initial Christian one – both contains eschatological component – argues that “Jésus completes and perfects the indirect influence-optimism of the Jewish image of the future, the unshakable faith in God coupled with invincible human determination” (Polak 1973, 53). From my perspective, “invincible human determination” implies direct and strong influence on your own life.

Polak argues that Paul’s version of Christianity teaching transforms the image of the future from the *influence-optimism* of the Jewish image of the future that further strengthening by Jesus (utopic society of loving each other men etc.) to the influence-pessimism based on postulate of God’s Kingdom establishment without human efforts: “When the Kingdom comes it will be by the hand of God, and not as a result of man's striving” (Polak 1973, 57). However, getting into Heaven spiritually implies not only humility and unconditional faith, but also following the commandments of Christ that, despite Paul’s interpretations, remain valid, and such a following requires considerable efforts and genuine commitment. Thus, although the Earth life is full of adversities and pains and sets a rather firm frame for human existence, human beings *themselves* determine conditions for life (to follow/not to follow). The destination to Heaven depends on humans’ determination to what extent they are ready to surrender the God. Additionally, the concept of hope for God’s Kingdom is unshakable. Therefore, not only from the point of *essence*, Heaven (all of its versions, spiritual or physical) remains as tremendously optimistic image of the future which is Polak’s “*essence-optimism*”, but from the point of *influence* the future image is optimistic since human can influence on their destiny after death during their Earth life. Such influence includes scrupulous following of commandments, spiritually obtaining God, and renouncing secular material entities to the complete ascetic way of life. It can sound paradoxical; however, active humility might be a pure ‘*influence-optimism*’.

A similar contradiction in *optimistic-pessimistic* characterizations is noticed in Polak’s explanation of the Utopia’s function. Polak argues that Utopia contains *essence-pessimism* as a specific reflection, inverted model of contemporary (to authors and epoch) society: “It springs out of rebellion against the existing order and gives expression to “divine discontent.” (Polak 1973, 177). However, the immanent trait of the Utopia as “influence-optimistic”, according to Polak, is placed it into the pool of “positive images of the future”.

Moreover, Polak (1973, 17) considers Marx's concept, following by physiocrats, deterministic and 'influence-pessimistic' since, akin to natural sciences, they suggested the idea of 'natural' economic laws that inevitably lead to a better world (e.g., to Marxists' communistic utopia). However, from my perspective, Marx should be deleted from this row, at least, for arguing the agency – the fighting of the working class in the last phase (see e.g. Manifesto of the Communist Party<sup>7</sup>). Hence, Marx's image of the future contains both *influence-pessimistic* and *optimistic* traits. That indeed remains physics: we cannot influence the natural laws, but we can investigate them to utilize in our creative activity, avoid or amplify them by our conscious actions to reach our goals.

From my perspective, such *contradictions* in Polak's eschatology and Utopias analysis might be a complexification of the image of the future rather than the indicator of logic distortion, i.e., the dualism of the optimistic vision contains the dialectical tension of two poles, 'optimistic' vs. 'pessimistic', that infuses the image with dramatism. That might increase the attractiveness of the image and become the driving force to follow it. Hence, despite Polak's claim that his analysis considers exceptionally "crystalized forms" (Polak 1973, 22) of the future images, the inner space of the 'crystal' bears its own dynamic.

Polak's image of the future predominantly possesses traits of what is might be classified as a *vision*, "futures for the heart" (Bezold 2009, 84) or "preferable" (Voros & Poli 2019, 436) or desired (sometimes "preposterous") (Voros & Poli 2019, 435) futures. "By focusing on the idea of the future as the Other, the perfect antipode of the imperfect here-and-now, we automatically eliminate all those predictions of the future which do not stand in polar antithesis to the present" (Polak 1973, 22).

Vision *must be* positively charged and optimistic to obtain a fostering, pulling force. Even if some obstacles, problems, barriers hardship, and adversities are immanent to the path toward the future (Heaven, Valhalla, The Elysian Fields, etc.) for true Christians (Judaist, enlighten Hellens, Vikings, etc.), nevertheless, the ultimate goal, e.g., salvation and eternal bless/pleasure, is shining and magnetic akin to the eternal sun light. For the enlightened citizen, who realized the power of mankind (no matter with or without supernatural, divine power assistance), the social well-being, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, i.e., utopian construct as well possesses magnetized essence, the vision of the best of possible futures, reached by human beings themselves.

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<sup>7</sup> Marx et al. (2001)

### 2.1.3 Wendell Bell and James A. Mau's concept

The nature of the images of the future<sup>8</sup> and their consequences possesses intertwined but non-direct connections. People's behavior in the present is derived from the images of the future as a way of adapting to upcoming anticipated events or as a purposeful activity for creating a preferable future. At the same time, the present behavior conditions the future to some extent. Hence, studying the images of the future might partly provide clues for future developments. (Bell 1997b, 43.)

Bell and Mau (1971) assume that although the future has a similar conceptual nature to the past and present (which does not contain factual ultimate "truth"), except for the particular sensorily experiencing momentum, it is somewhat real. "...there are no past possibilities, and there are no future facts" (Robert S. Brumbaugh 1966, 649, according to Bell & Mau 1971, 9); hence, deterministic connections observed in the past cannot be directly extrapolated to the present and future. At the same time, "a "possibility" has some ontological status; it is not a pure Parmenidean nonentity" (1966, 649, according to Bell & Mau 1971, 9), and the reality of the futures derived from the reality of the present alternatives or possibilities where future is open to them, but still without clear determined causality. The reality of the future becomes more definite when it is purposefully designed, and the future might be analyzed through the lens of the possible future cause-and-effect connections or a deterministic model framed by probabilistic conditions. The images of the future, belonging to the past and present, themselves partially constitute possible future alternatives by orienting human behavior. Therefore, despite the non-factual nature, the future is real through its present possibilities. (Bell & Mau 1971, 9-10.)

In addition to the reality of the future, Bell and Mau (1971, 6, 10-12) discuss the historically and continually developing human mastery over nature, raising technological power, and freeing from the burden of everyday survival in harsh conditions. This is inevitably reflected in the image of the future of each historical epoch and supposes eternal changes in the content of the future image, transition from fatalistic and superstition ideas of the future to free social choice under secular morality.

Akin to Polak's concept of the image of the future, Lasswell's "developmental construct" – upcoming entities that are expected, anticipated, and simultaneously linked to past trends – contains

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<sup>8</sup> "By "past" we then mean the present memory experience of a thing past; by "future," the present expectation of anticipation of a future thing (Meyerhoff, 1960:8)." (Bell et al. 1971, 47)

the potential for social change when the focus in social research is shifted “from description and prediction to control” and “search for courses of action” (Bell & Mau 1971, 15-16).

In Bell and Mau’s (1971) description, the image of the future may include various types of future developments from the extrapolations of trends, cause-and-effect processes, to that constructed by the researcher, up to social engineering with experimental probes of alternatives. Individual and collective future images can be measured as attitudes and beliefs in regular cases of social study and further compared with the accomplished future developments (Bell & Mau 1971, 17). However, the most important in social change theory to be studied is the interrelation of future images and purposefully designed actions, or in other words, decision-making that can include *facts, values, beliefs, expectations, goals, and objectives*. (Bell & Mau 1971, 17-18).

Bell and Mau (1971, 18) argue that decision-making as choosing future alternatives, including “decisions not to decide”, is a core driver of behavior, and the future images are crucially impactful in this process. Eventually, Bell and Mau assert that a conception of social change is grounded on the images of the future” (Bell & Mau 1971, 19).

To explain the importance of the image of the future and the entire mechanism of social change with it, Bell and Mau suggest a cybernetic-decisional theory of social change. The image of the future lies in a core of social change drivers and is dependent on the set of human *beliefs* and *values* that are accepted as “true propositions”. In the suggested cybernetic-decisional theory of social change, Bell and Mau (1971, 20) specify three types of beliefs: about the past, the present, and causes and effects.

“Beliefs about the past” - the “memory” of a cybernetic system – individual or group beliefs about their history. “Beliefs about the present” – the basis for the social reality mapping for the course and the way individuals and groups live. That includes individual or group beliefs about themselves accompanied by “true” from important others' beliefs, the conceptualization of present facts, particular details, and situations, and worldviews. “Beliefs about causes and effects” contain beliefs about social causality, or how the world works. Each kind of belief, separately or together, might result in saving existing behavioral patterns, confining a variety of images of the future with the prevailing of distinct ones, determining a particular alternative and neglecting others, and the fatality of future images. (Bell & Mau 1971, 20-22.)

*Values* (of groups and individuals) – preferences and obligations – regarding and in combination with the mentioned beliefs establish criterial grounds for images of the future definition, e.g.,

preferred or unwished, for detecting hopes and fears, for the evaluating goals and estimating costs, and for analyzing the complex interrelation of alternative futures. In addition, Bell and Mau specifically speculate on the importance of reciprocal effects between values and images of the future. (Bell & Mau 1971, 22, 28.)

Thus, the analysis of the individual's image of the future considers personal beliefs and values that are related to the image, whereas analysis of a group's future images additionally requires examining the interplaying co-existing beliefs and values and identifying those that dominate. Although, according to the previously prevailing approach of social science, individuals' or groups' beliefs and values are influenced, constrained, and framed by a considerable amount of social and biological environmental factors, Bell and Mau stress the active role of humans in altering such environments that determine future developments. (Bell & Mau 1971, 22-23.)

Concise, elegant, and loose Bell and Mau's (1971, 23) definition of the image of the future as "an expectation about the state of things to come at some future time" that contains a fan of various alternatives, or "probable possibilities" rather than the only option gives plenty of space for interpretations. However, a set of frames or characteristics for further future image definition are suggested, namely: "levels of abstraction", the social unit size (individual-group), time horizon (near-far), physical location (here-there), social acceptance (shared-conflictual), levels of inspiration, influence, complexity, consciousness in creation, futures modality (probability, possibility, desirability). Polak's concepts of pessimism vs. optimism in future image content (worse or better the future in comparison to the present) and assumptions about the influential (for the future) factors on the control locus scale (controllable vs. uncontrollable) are also included. (Bell & Mau 1971, 23.)

Bell and Mau (1971) argue since human mastery and agency increase through history, decision-making based on the analysis of future alternatives that are inserted in the image of the future (and related to past, present, and future beliefs and values) eventually permeates all social levels up to microsocial systems and individual life "in advanced societies". The most important condition for the best decisions is the explicitness of the process. The further action (or actors' behavior) meanings are linked to a chain of 'images of the future – decision-making – action'. The final chain link – transformative action – under the shaping pressure of the exogenic impactful factors brings the future to the present and the cycle from the novel image of the future determined by beliefs and values to executed decision repeats eternally. (Bell & Mau 1971, 24-28.)

According to Bell and Mau (1971), knowledge about preferable, valued, and “achievable” futures and means for reaching them should prevail in futures studies and be incorporated into decision-making, dominating over “*accurate prediction or precise description*” (Bell & Mau 1971, 35). They argue that looking for “possibilities”, or seeds of change, and investigating the real possibilities of the future that are principally incarnated in the images of the future in the present implies a participatory approach when future creators should involve not only powerful social groups but also less powerful to count all possible interests (Bell & Mau 1971, 37).

#### 2.1.4 Richard A. Slaughter’s concept

Slaughter (1991) admits that future-oriented considerations possess constitutive force for the whole of mankind and narrows down the image of the future to vision and more strictly to a goal: “the things we want to achieve” (Slaughter 1991, 501). He argues that image of the future has active, purposeful, “pulling”, “cultural” force that serves even not for selection from alternatives (not speaking about prediction) but as a prism through which “worthwhile ground” can be seen and created further and a basis for the novel project launching (Slaughter 1991, 499-500). Slaughter (1991, 501) discerns the prevalence of the visual or abstractly symbolic character of the future images. Sources of the images of the future according to Slaughter (1991): media (incl. children’s), science fiction, and films.

Slaughter (1991) claims primacy of “human and cultural” over “scientific and technical” although the real position of these aspects of the future image completely opposite and human element utterly lost in future technology-saturated world, however, “to uncover ideological or epistemological questions...is the more important task” (Slaughter (1991, 506).

Slaughter (1991) argues that contemporary images of the future predominantly contain ideas of avoidance of negative phenomena, e.g., ecological issues, rather than representations of desired achievements. From his perspective, pessimism and dystopia prevailed tremendously and permeate social life, perhaps, their invisible impact is higher than we can imagine. The core drivers of “violent, cynical and otherwise negative” future imaging, especially among young generation are the basic human instincts remarkably enhanced by primarily communicative technologies and media, the dominance of the short-term opportunistic approach in politics and business with industrial worldviews, and the prevalence of thinking about future in terms of continuation of present tendencies or business-as-usual approach (Slaughter 1991, 511, 514).

However, from Slaughter's perspective, the socio-cultural potential for imaging the desired future currently is even mightier and more reachable; to improve future images, visionary components should be added to "breach the bounds of everyday assumptions and practices". Finally, future explorations must be prioritized. To materialize these measures future should be revalued, transformed in perception from the abstract entity, "empty space" to "a principle of present action" (Slaughter 1991, 503).

The principal purpose of futures workshops, promoted by Slaughter (1991) as one of the efficient means in critical futures studies, is to develop human capability in the creation and statement of desired future and in changing perception of the future from fearful and concerning, to make visioning a forerunner of social and cultural innovation. Such a transformation to a clear visionary process permits substitution of negative drivers in human motivation by "the highest and most advanced human motives" and redefining political, social, economic, and cultural domains. The critical futures study enables humans to reveal, critically analyze, diagnose, renegotiate, and reconstruct existing key values, presuppositions, and constitutive meanings, specifically those of hidden but remarkably forceful and attributed to a dominant worldview as assumptions. (Slaughter 1991, 510.)

#### 2.1.5 Anita Rubin's concept

Rubin (2013) distinguishes individual, organizational, and societal images of the futures, however, Rubin's concept of the image of the future implies predominantly a personal/individual one, which is the focus of the following analysis.

According to Rubin (2013, S40), image is systemic and contains "beliefs, expectations, opinions, and assumptions" about the possible future and "formed from knowledge and flavoured with imagination", "built with information about the past, perceptions from the present, cultural and social knowledge, personal taste, values, and needs, as well as the expectations of how things "normally" are".

Rubin claims that future images influence individual's decision-making, "estimations", "choices, behavior, and action" on conscious and unconscious levels; have "a strong impact on the attributes" of the future's content and "on human motivation", consequently decision-making provide aiming to future from "positive and desirable image" and averting "negative and undesirable future" (Rubin 2013, S41; Rubin & Linturi 2001, 268). Therefore, according to Rubin, images of the future possess "the ability to affect our life and fate". (Rubin 2013, S41; Rubin & Linturi 2001.)

The general purpose of the inevitable and infinite contemplation of the future is the overall life-management and individual coping in the present and correspondent contemplation implies construction of future oriented mental models that supposes “assumptions and assessments” (Rubin 2013, S40); hence, in the process of decision-making human’s behavior and attitudes are directed by the future images. (Rubin 2013, S40; 1998, 494-495.)

While analyzing Rubin and Linturi’s (2001) concept of the future image (Figure 2), at this moment, I intentionally split one of Rubin and Linturi’s quotations into two parts to underline a particular aspect that regularly stays hidden in the texts of followers of Rubin’s ideas. “As a conclusion, an image of the future is a mental construction dealing with possible future states.” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 271). That might be interpreted as a somewhat mental image that represents possible future states. In the next sentence authors continue: “**Composed of** a mixture of conceptions, beliefs and desires, as well as observations and knowledge of the present, which affect a person’s choices both consciously and unconsciously and which derive both from the reality and from imagination, it steers his/her decision-making and actions.” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 271). The bolded by me the word “composed” implies that image of the future contains all mentioned elements. However, Rubin and Linturi earlier in the text pointed out that

[t]he process of the formation of personal images of the future is illustrated in Fig. 1. The elements of which the image of the future is constructed are formed of (1) general knowledge about one’s social and physical environment, and (2) social knowledge and pressures a person receives from his/her social environment. This knowledge is then reflected to one’s identity, i.e., personal features and experiences, resulting as the time perspective, cognition about the future, emotions towards the future and the ideas of one’s possibilities. The images of the future are the end results of all of these elements. (Rubin and Linturi 2001, 271).

The first two sentences directly underline *the process of formation* of the image of the future as a *construction from* the elements that form it. Whereas the latter proposition is slightly confusing in terms of understanding the structure of the image of the future *itself*. Does it mean that all of these elements are included in the image of the future? Or rather, their interrelations resulted in a specific separate entity, the image of the future, which is a derivative of the combination of the initial elements?

Rubin (1997, 1998, 2000, 2013), Rubin and Linturi (2001) successively use interchangeably the image of the future as a composition of the mentioned elements and as the specific entity that is based on these elements, originating from them. However, at one of the latest works Rubin (2013, S40) claims that future images “emerge as hopes, fears, and expectations” and are future oriented

mental models that are “assumptions and assessments”, therefore, it can be supposed that the structural core of the futures image contains solely hopes, fears, and expectations in form of assumptions and assessments.

Putting aside for a while the detailed analysis of each component, for instance, identity<sup>9</sup>, my argument is that Rubin and Linturi’s concept profoundly explains the nature of the image of the future in terms of its origination rather than the image of the future itself. The image of the future is a particular entity – mental model – that is imagined as a derivative of all elements and their interrelations. Thus, speaking in Rubin and Linturi’s terms: general and social knowledge melted through the individual’s identity generate “the time perspective, cognition about the future, emotions towards the future and the ideas of one’s possibilities” (Rubin and Linturi 2001, 271) that eventually gives the birth to the future image itself.

Since individuals’ images of the future “are constructed based on diverse interpretations of the same socio-economic phenomena,” they might be “inconsistent”, “illogical,” with “incompatible with each other” elements, and “sometimes even irrational.” In the case of remarkable distinction up to the contradiction between individual’s and societal images, the social integration of the individual might decrease with the loss of feeling of safety (Rubin 2013, S41).

Rubin asserts that future image includes the subliminal elements, “or at least unanalysed and inconsistent” (Rubin 2013, S41); hence, the image creation is only partly intentional. Rubin argues that the non-articulated hidden images are remarkably effective, however, without pointing out in what sense of effectiveness. Hence, considering the author’s concept of the future image, they might be effective in determining decision-making. Rubin asserts that an individual’s future images, which contain partly unconscious and conflicting, intimidating elements of the future, are “a mixture of assumptions, beliefs, and straggly information from the media” and are never openly claimed. Moreover, a similar phenomenon might be attributed to a society where, in contrast with the “official truth,” the authentic images of the future of opinion leaders or authoritative persons are out of public discussions, which leads to unquestioned acceptance of the future in its presumed unchanged form. (Rubin 2013, S41.) This triggers one question: how can we be assured of the

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<sup>9</sup> From my perspective, the key individual element in the scheme – identity – might be widen since there could be other types of highly influential socio-culturally determined traits, e.g., religious or atheistic attitudes, nationality, language, citizenship, political attribution etc. Even more, the concept of identity might be upgraded to the concept of “personality” (instead of identity) since, for example, the innate personal characteristics such a temper, health and physical attributes, and other body and psychological aspects are in the core of the human being. However, I primarily interested in the ground fundamental mechanism and output of the process of interrelation of described elements, i.e. *how* the image of the future is produced and *what* is it structurally.

effectiveness of unseen images of the future since we are not able to analyze their content? I suppose that we can analyze, e.g., social discourse or behavior of an individual afterwards, after the decision is made, that might give us some hints of the motives (desires and, perhaps, beliefs), but, in my opinion, the image itself still stays hidden.

According to Rubin (2013), the strong differentiation between future images of powerful actors and social groups boosts conflicts in society and the political domain since the dominance of a particular image of the future in society is closely related to the power (Rubin 2013, S41). However, from my perspective, this connection is unclear (and intriguing): whether the most powerful can impose their image of the future or, vice versa, the most attractive image of the future can impact the power and even create new leaders, policy-makers, and ‘empowered’ actors? Consequently, in the last case, what should the characteristics of the image or its conditioning be to captivate the majority of humans?

From Rubin’s perspective, personal images of the future are constantly rearranged under the social and individual determinants. For example, future images of young Finns are inconsistent with the vivid distinction of the personal, social, and the entire world futures: the further from individual life, the gloomier the future-related aspects. The personal positive hopeful prospects are concurrent with a dangerous and threatening world future in the young individuals’ images. The view of personal successful life in the future is primarily modernistic and analogous to the prevalent in industrial society, materially based, where happiness is derived from economic prosperity and a successful professional career. Whereas the future perspectives of the world in the individuals’ future images bear predominantly characteristics of the information society and contain pessimistic expectations of global wicked challenges as an inevitable course of events. While pointing out the inconsistency and controversy of personal and social (world) future images and asking how individual success can be managed within the full of adversities external environment young people experience a substantial predicament and fail to answer. Almost the same discrepancy is attributed to the individual images of the futures of teachers and educators who consider the future of the surrounding environment, e.g., their own institutions, in a more optimistic way than the entire institutional system and society in general which is imagined much gloomier and related to the negative developments and issues. (Rubin 1997; 2013, S41.)

Rubin (2013) argues that such ambivalence of the future images hinders the ability of individuals for “realistic and sensible decision-making” (Rubin 2013, S42), leads to an incoherent worldview, useless interpretations of reality in terms of evaluation of personal possibilities, and various

consequences in further decision-making. Thus, the image of the optimistic personal future that contains uncritically perceived ambitions based on “mere hopes and wishes” (Rubin 2013, S42) might turn into its demotivational opposition in case of facing difficulties and failure in attempting. Moreover, the image of the future, which contains mainly the expectation of fears and threats materialization in the external world, might trigger passiveness in behavior. In some examples of Rubin’s (2013) research, the behavior of young Finns possessed features of complete indifference or opportunistic and hedonistic models. Additionally, Rubin (1998, 499) asserts that focusing on problematic issues in the present that are considered as negative future trends leads to reactive strategies rather than proactive exploration and creative strategies.

Nevertheless, according to Rubin, occasionally negative and frightening images of the future can fuel the motivation for fighting for a better future (Rubin 2013, S42). Moreover, “[i]f an image is powerful enough, one can use a great deal of resources and time in these processes” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 269).

Rubin’s (2013) findings boost the following contemplation. Since the content of the individual’s image of the future might be negative or positive,<sup>10</sup> which can result in both active or passive behavior, it turns out that the image’s content itself does not provide the decision-making. Something proximal between the image and the decision (and following behavior) determines the choice. As mentioned below, the future image is the model of the future’s “state of affairs” in Wittgenstein’s (Elkins & Naef 2011, 240) terms, but not the motivational ‘propellant’ itself. Hence, the question is – *what is that specific propellant?*

In the end of the analysis of Rubin and Linturi’s concept of individual image of the future I highlight two quotations: “A person’s images of the future derive from different, time-bound and value-related world views which, in the times of transition, can coexist and still include components and features contradictory to each other.” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 270) where the “world view is built upon these beliefs and interpretations [28]” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 275). Hence, the higher layer of future image origination is a worldview. The only question is: how can it be possible that a contradictory image of the future that determines our decision-making does not lead to a total behavioral mess? In a psychological sense, regular human behavior is primarily within logical frames and social norms. Does it mean that *partly* image of the future is not included in the process of decision-making?

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<sup>10</sup> Or in Polak’s (1973) concepts be “influence-pessimistic” or “influence-optimistic” correspondingly,

### 2.1.6 Preliminary observations, questions, and findings

From my perspective, the reviewed concepts of the image of the future bear both similarities and discrepancies and permit to discern basic elements of the future image.

I endeavor to reduce (hopefully without rough oversimplification and loss of meaning) the suggested concepts to the basic scheme to highlight the core model of the image of the future, its origination, and driving forces. Before that I put two premises that are key for the analysis: 1) I consider individual's image of the future since it is my main interest; the analyzed authors primarily study social system and corresponding image of the future, and claim that their concepts might be appropriate for the individual's case (Polak 1973, 14; Bell & Mau 1971, 22-23; Slaughter 1991, 510), Rubin and Linturi (2001) created the concept of specifically personal image of the future. 2) the image of the future is considered as an *inseparable* part of human activity<sup>11</sup> that supposes *decision-making*, and all analyzed authors also underline the decisive component in relation with future image; activity is treated by me in a wider meaning from the isolated practical act to the course of life in general as a chain of intertwined activities.

In a highly concise form, these ideas might be presented as such. Polak (1973) suggests the *visionary content* of the societal image of the future originated and affirmed *culturally*, and discerns the *valence* of the images (optimistic-pessimistic) upon the extent of human influence (agency) and essence (attractiveness and grandeur of the main narrative). In Polak's perspective, the creation of the image of the future is a lot of elites, "*aristocratie*" that are sufficiently imaginative.

Following Polak's cultural-historical analysis, it might be interpreted that the more influential humans the more optimistic their future (influence-optimistic) – optimism is an agency-dependent variable. Moreover, the image of the future obtains the highest value (essence-optimistic) when *the death is overcome* (eternal life after biological life "literally<sup>12</sup>" in the Other time and place and figuratively in proliferation of the tribe, in offsprings) and *the better life* no matter on Earth or in the Other world individually and among people *is established* no matter by whom: by supernatural power or by people themselves (millennials' views of Thousand Year Kingdom or Utopian ideal

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<sup>11</sup> I am bracketing the image of the future created as an art piece primarily for entertainment purpose, e.g., literature or visual. Such future images should be investigated separately, however, I do not argue that they are totally different to, for example, individuals' ones.

<sup>12</sup> I understand the weakness of this word; however, it means that belief or faith can be so strong that life after life is perceived as possible and real.

society). Virtually, Polak gifts us the *meaning of life* in Frankl's terms (see, for example, Soggie 2016).

The Polak's concept triggers a great number of questions, e.g., did the majority of lay people truly share the images suggested by a remarkably small group of educated elites? If not, what are their genuine prevalent images of the future? However, I try to focus on the structural components only. The socio-cultural image of the future is a de(and pre-)scribed for individuals' narrative of future possible states towards which assumingly predominantly positive emotions in individuals should arise (desired narrative), i.e., when personal beliefs almost match the proposed and interiorized imagined content. In that case, we deal with beliefs in the forms of religious faith or secular knowledge<sup>13</sup>, although that can be sophisticatedly mixed in an individual's worldview. Additionally, it might be assumed that the individual's strength of belief, strength of faith, is a crucial force for both maintaining the image of the future stable and assessing and reasoning the decisions (and following behavior) made upon one of the alternatives from the image. For example, in a highly simplified mode, if you strongly believe in divine states of affairs (supranatural power and a better life after the current life), you will inevitably live a better life eternally after mundane existence (and possibly, in some cases, during). If you strongly believe in human states of affairs (human mastery and high morale), you will inevitably live a better life during mundane existence (and, possibly, in some cases, eternally in the memory of next generations).

In Bell and Mau's (1971) concept, the image of the future is derived from the set of human beliefs and values, where beliefs and values that are in interrelation provide criteria to assess the future image for future choice are accepted as "true propositions". Bell and Mau discern the future image as a specific entity, however, the inner components and content structurally is not elaborated in details and the image of the future is defined as *expectation of future state of things*, or "probable possibilities" framed by set of features as such: "levels of abstraction", the social unit size, time horizon, physical location, social acceptance, levels of inspiration, influence, complexity, consciousness in creation, futures modality (probability, possibility, desirability) with added Polak's (1973) valence concept of content and agency. Although authors do not accentuate the emotional component, taking into account Polak's concept incorporated into the image structure, it might be assumed that it is also attributed to the future image. Also similar to Polak's idea, Bell and Mau assert (1971) that societal image of the future should be created by the particular representatives

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<sup>13</sup> In its broad sense, including moral dimension.

*who is able to imagine* how society should transform to the better state, e.g., social scientist, but in contrast with Polak they suppose taking into account of the wider social groups' ideas.

Slaughter (1991) does not provide the vivid structurally-content frame for the image of the future and almost equalizes the ideal societal image of the future and project or even a goal: “the things we want to achieve” (Slaughter 1991, 501), however, he admits that contemporary societal images of the future predominantly contain ideas of avoidance of negative phenomena. According to Slaughter, the core drivers of negative future imaging are the *basic human instincts* enhanced by technologies and media, an opportunistic and business-as-usual approach. Based on that, we can assume that the Polak's valence polarization might be attributed to Slaughter's concept. Additionally, it might be underlined the dominance of the societal *worldviews* (pessimistic and dystopic), including hidden but forceful, over the individuals' ones that drives particular assumptions about the future (“violent, cynical and otherwise negative”). To Slaughter's concept of future image elaboration is attributed a participatory approach – a collective critical study of the existing future images and the following construction of the desired futures.

The profound and multifaceted systemic concept of the individual image of the future, elaborated by Rubin (1997, 1998, 2000, 2013) and Rubin and Linturi (2001), might be condensed in the following way. According to the authors, the future image contains hopes, fears, and expectations in the form of assumptions and assessments about the future, i.e., emotions, beliefs, and the content of the future image itself are blended. These hopes, fears, and expectations are derived from the personal identity that manifests and ‘realizes’ through a culturally provided set of roles related to gender, age, and professional domain. Identity is derived from, based on, and intertwined with knowledge. Knowledge is considered as *general (structural* – “know-how” and “know-that” – and *pragmatic* knowledge – tools for information processing – both obtained, or more accurately, constructed within education) knowledge and *social* knowledge (*general beliefs* – “mostly hidden, deep presumptions...of how things are” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 275) upon which the worldview is built – and *ideas and values* – symbols from moral dimension that determine decision-making to maintain and enhance social integration). Grounded on the Rubin and Linturi's ideas, it can be eventually admitted that the image of the future is a mental model as a derivative of general and social knowledge reflected in the individual's identity (social roles) that generates “the time perspective, cognition about the future, emotions towards the future and the ideas of one's possibilities” (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 271).

For more convenient comparative analyses, I have composed a table with basic elements of the images of the future in Polak's (1973), Bell and Mau's (1971), and Rubin and Linturi's (2001) concepts ([Appendix 1](#)). Here, I attempt to distill the essential core model of the image of the future based on the aforementioned concepts as such: *the image of the future is a mental model in the form of assumptions that contains hopes, fears, and expectations which are derived, assessed, valuated, and interrelated with the knowledge and beliefs about the world and self that in turn are the intertwined components of the holistic worldview.*

Cutting the source of origin, we can suppose that *the image of the future is a mental model in the form of assumptions that contains hopes, fears, and expectations.* Now, let me critically analyze what hopes, fears, and expectations mean.

Considering standard account in analytical philosophy, *hope* implies a desirable object within boundaries of physically possible up to the improbable and excludes certain and simply logically possible (Department of Philosophy 2022). Desire as a particular state of mind is associated with specific acts, feeling and thinking in relation to good, pleasant, rewarded and needed by individual (Department of Philosophy 2015).

Fear is one of the strongest, usually negatively depicted, basic emotional states, unpleasant feelings, “highly negative affect and psychological excitation” (Gervaise 2011, vii) that are connected with specific responses of the organisms to a threat to their safety. It “is a central emotional state elicited by conditioned stimuli associated with punishment” (Gray 1991, 77), and “generally represents a transient response to a specific stimulus that connotes danger” (Hyman 2001, x). The crucial attribute of the threat is imminence and immediate character (Gillies 2018; Hyman 2001, x). I suppose that in the social research domain, ‘fear’ has been utilized in a more loose and less literal meaning and might be interpreted as not a direct reaction to a vital threat at the moment, solely to underline the negative emotive connotations of worse choice consequences in a figurative way. However, in some cases, future images in short-term view can be intensely fearful and horrific (e.g., imagining the death of the loving person or vivid apocalyptic vision akin to nuclear fire, etc.). Rogers and Tough (1996) in their research of critical, learning methods of global futures investigation by adults, the five-stage process *intentionally* includes a particular emotional stage for intentional expression of emotions, often highly intensive negative ones, akin to anger and fear. Nevertheless, when we consider 25-50-100 years perspective, the intensity of our emotional reaction toward long-term imagined threats might be considerably lower than ‘fear’. Not to interrupt the logic of my text, I will later suggest a more generalized definition of the phenomenon, instead of

‘fear’, which incorporates the latter as a subtype, but after the clarification of the whole future image’s machinery.

According to OED (2025), “expectation” is defined in several meanings: 1) a. “The action or fact of anticipating or foreseeing something; the belief that something will happen or be the case.” b. “A preconceived idea or opinion based on what a person has hoped for or imagined regarding a future event, situation, or encounter. Chiefly in *plural*.” 2) “The feeling or state of mind accompanying anticipation of something, *esp.* eager or nervous excitement about something viewed as likely or imminent.” 3) “The action or fact of expecting something as rightfully due, appropriate, or as fulfilling an obligation. Frequently with *of*.” 4) “*Mathematics* a. A quantity assigned to a given outcome of an event or trial, equal to the product of the probability of that outcome taking place and a numerical value assigned to it.” Hautala and Ahlqvist (2022, 4) claim that “...expectations exist in human cognition, and they are interpreted by reflecting the imaginaries (future) in today’s realities (now). Expectations are (sequences of) events that individuals deem likely to occur in the future.” It worth underlining, that in sociology of science and technology expectations primarily imply positive connotations, e.g., according to Borup et al. (2006, 286) they have performative nature and “are wishful enactments of a desired future”. However, Borup et al. (2006, 288) mention Merton’s “concept of self-fulfillment prophecy” when expectations bear negative connotations (Merton 1948, 193–210 according to Borup et al. 2006, 288). Hence, *expectation* as the act of conceiving of highly probable future developments or belief towards it might be combined with feeling or state of mind in two emotional poles: positive (when desired, hoped) and negative (when nervous). Roughly speaking, the image of the future as an assumption toward future alternatives is always accompanied by a blend of emotional conditions or states of mind ranging from negative to positive extremes.

Currently, based on the afore analyzed concepts we understand *what* the image of the future is in general (assumed expectations as belief towards future), *from what* the image of the future originates (from beliefs<sup>14</sup>), *by what* it accompanied (by emotions), *for what* it can be used (for decision-making), now I will commence to analyze *what kind of* assumption – image *itself* – might it be ontologically, and *how* the image of the future develops and ‘works’.

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<sup>14</sup> It should be noted here, that I intentionally united the concepts of knowledge and beliefs disregarding their nature (scientific, moral, social, about self, etc.). Herein, all types of knowledge: “knowing-that” and “knowing-how”, obtained systematically or in personal hectic life course, theoretical or practical, natural or social etc. I consider the species of beliefs or justified belief where the latter is as a “propositional attitude” (Dufva&Ahlqvist 2015, 252; Stanley&Williamson 2001; Department of Philosophy 2023). The only discrepancy I leave is beliefs about external world and internal one, i.e., Self.

### 2.1.7 Personal image of the future: diving under the socio-cultural level

Bell and Mau (1971) claim that an individual's image of the future study includes an analysis of personal beliefs and values connected with their images. Rubin (1997, 1998, 2000, 2013), Rubin and Linturi (2001) developed complex systemic model of the image of the future of individuals and meticulously proved the origination of all the elements: knowledge, beliefs, values, and identity as an integral personal characteristic that determine the image of the future. Rubin and Linturi (2001, 276) assert that personal identity, built from a set of social roles and knowledge, beliefs, and values, possesses social origination. It might be noticed that in all of the mentioned analyses in this thesis research, the image of the future has been studied within the sociological, historical, and philosophical fields predominantly as a socio-cultural phenomenon. However, the immediate bearer of the image of the future, the individual, possesses an ambivalent biosocial nature; therefore, for example, I suppose that the multifaceted complex of the individual's future image of the Rubin and Linturi (2001) might be augmented by additional components of personality. Despite the overwhelming temptation to commence this thrilling activity, following the limitation of this research, I attempt to make slightly clear the notion of the individual's image *itself* ontologically. This might help to unveil one of the mechanisms in the core of the personal image of the future that might have additional value for my research to initiate answering *how* the image of the future develops and 'works'.

#### 2.1.7.1 *Image (of the future): brief philosophic-ontological sketch*

The concept of the 'image of the future' sounds mundane and initially can be perceived as an intuitively understandable. However, any attempt to describe, at least what it means or what it contains, immediately triggers a mosaic of associations and reveals the tangled bulk of terms, features, and intertwined and contradictory notions. Commencing from the superficial and rather primitive observation, 'the image of the future' is the result of 'imagining of the entities that did not exist in the past and do not exist at present (at the moment)'. That still provides a vague clue on the matter, nevertheless, it demonstrates that we consider somewhat entities attributed to a specific mental process – 'imagination'.

Herein, I deliberately set the limits or the margins of conceptualization in endeavor to unveil core, most fundamental characteristics of 'image' ontologically predominantly within the philosophical area, however, with demarcation from the particular human and natural science areas, e.g., specialized psychology and psychiatry, art and design, physics, computer science etc. Such an exercise aims, primarily, to set more distinct frames for the subject of this research and does not

pursue the ultimate definition of the concept ‘image of the future’. Moreover, I intentionally omit the elaboration of the ‘future’ through the following concise ontological analysis since I believe that historical time perception and concept, from past via present to future, are supposed to be commonly shareable among the readers (and writer) of this text.

The habitual usage of the word ‘image’ that itself possesses a language trap immediately unconsciously suggests the substitutive analogue, synonymic counterpart from the particularly visual domain – picture – which not only leads to mere confusion in explanation but also fuels deep, long-term philosophic discussions. Indeed, in a rough dichotomy, on the one hand, the ‘image’ can be attributed to the visual, “iconic knowledge” domain where image bear the “nonverbal, iconic logos” and “pictorial meaning” (Elkins & Naef 2011, 35-36); on the other hand, this is a result of one of the higher mental functions – imagination – that akin to thinking can be highly abstractive, “imageless thoughts”, and “more than thinking through images” (Tateo 2016). The initial pictorial, visual connotations of the ‘image’ unintentionally limit the investigated matter, however, the ‘image’ is a multiperceptual (not solely visual) representation (Kulvicki 2006)<sup>15</sup>. In that respect, speaking about the imagination, the more adequate term ‘imagery’, or ‘mental imagery’ might be taken since the image (with vivid visual connotation) is not equal imagery (Department of Philosophy 2021), nevertheless henceforth I will use ‘image’ interchangeably with ‘mental image’ and ‘mental imagery’.

‘Mental imagery’ as a ‘substance’ of imagination that is *per se* a voluntary act (Department of Philosophy 2021) do not obtain immanently and inevitably the motivational force as, e.g. beliefs and desires, it is involuntary (Department of Philosophy 2019b; Department of Philosophy 2021), however, the image is a content for belief (van Leeuwen 2011, 67) and the connection between imagination and action-generation system is direct (van Leeuwen 2011; Department of Philosophy 2019b). Beliefs and desires facilitate the image causality, e.g., set the goals, “comment on the value to the agent”, “constrain imagining”, and invoke emotions akin to regular perception (van Leeuwen 2011).

To imagination, according to Kind (2001), the following core features, namely, 1) directedness (it is directed to a particular object), 2) activity (intentional doing of imagining), and 3) phenomenology (qualitative, experiential aspect)<sup>16</sup> are pertained inextricably and in the only combination of all three

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<sup>15</sup> However, Kulvicki (2006) argues that non-visual representations are genuinely pictorial.

<sup>16</sup> in contrast with, e.g., thinking and pretending, i.e. the imagination is experiencing of “having an image” (Kind 2001, 95)

characteristics. Kind (2001, 108) argues that image serves to “capture the object” of the imagination, akin to means for representation of the object, and the imagination cannot be imageless; it is inevitably imagery-based (Kind, 2001). Moreover, Tye (1988), following Stephen Kosslyn (see e.g., Kosslyn 1980), claims that mental images are pictorial.

To prevent evolving of the deeper ontological discussion on the concept of ‘image’ itself specifically attributed to the domain of visual imaginary (Department of Philosophy 2019b; Elkins & Naef 2011) and in account with my particular research in futures studies as a part of social sciences, I intentionally outline the hybrid character of imagination – propositional (non-imagistic) and imagery (van Leeuwen 2011, 71; Department of Philosophy 2019b) – that simultaneously practically valuable for this research along with the aforementioned essential traits of the ‘image’.

The essence of the image is its representativeness of the real object. An image is a model of the object; however, it is more than a mere perceptual representation. In Wittgenstein’s theory (Elkins & Naef 2011, 240) is claimed that images are constituted from elements proximal to an object, and a configuration of these elements is a “state of affairs”. In Wittgenstein’s view, “image can attest that the state of affairs it represents *could possibly* be a fact” (Elkins & Naef 2011, 240). Casey (1971) argues almost similarly that in imagination, “objects posited as pure possibilities” (Casey 1971, 476). Thus, the state of affairs can be true or can be false, objects can be real or unreal, but we cannot *perceive* unreal objects, although we can imagine them; therefore, images cannot be reduced to the inevitably perceived sensational objects (Casey 1971, 486). The ‘mental image’ is a mode of imagined object for presentation and apprehension of consciousness which “appears as a focal point of our attention” (Casey 1971, 487). The aforementioned description is primarily related to the ‘mental’, or somewhat ‘internal’ image of the individual consciousness. However, considering my research, we handle the external, physically presented by subjects to others, images that bear all the traits of the internal (mental) twins, appear in their *possible* forms, “a potentiality they [mental images] realize” (Casey 1971, 490).

According to Jonas (1966, 1973, according to Fossa & Franzini 2024, 4-5), ontologically image is human artifact related to a real object with *likeness*, *intentionality* (created by intention of imaginator), *incompleteness* (non-duplicative), *selection* (possesses essential features of the object), *alteration* (of the original object), *visibility* (pictorial, visual trait), and *neutralization* (inactive, fixed, with the loss of dynamic of organic forms). The characteristics proposed by Jonas primarily reflect the social incarnation of the mental images that we perceive as one possible form of the mentally represented object.

Summarizing this short ontological philosophic review, I suggest that the ‘image’ (of the future) we deal with in our research, in its more ordinary view, appears as a final result for the particular moment at present of ‘imagining’. Imagining is a representation through the mental imagery of the objects (*real* and/or *unreal*) in their *possible* forms as a state of affairs, that in our case, the *future* real or unreal objects in their *possible* forms, i.e., *future state of affairs*. They are neutral in conative terms, i.e., they are *not* beliefs or desires; however, they might be utilized by the latter as a content for the action generation or the imagination steering. These images are created *intentionally*, i.e., they are the result of voluntary direct imagination and cannot be hallucinations, free associations, or phantasms. The process of image creation (imagining) is *experienced* by the imaginator, hence, might be investigated phenomenologically.

What key observations might be inferred from this short preliminary analysis? From my perspective, considering fundamental ‘image’ characteristics, namely, *one possible representation of real or unreal objects*, clear circumstances limit or at least are conditioning my further investigation.

First, I will analyze images from collected data as fixed versions of the imagined within the given moment. The future state in such cases is analogous to Schrödinger’s cat, but squared: for an external witness, it can be dead and alive simultaneously in two dimensions – as an *image* itself and as an image of the *future*, i.e., “*possible possibilities*”. It is static compared to the dynamic mental image that is constantly reshaping and developing in the imagination of the imaginator, in some elements even to their oppositions. Moreover, the image is selectively incomplete.

Second, using the Polak’s (1973, 10) metaphor of time-bomb I would hardly guarantee that it inevitably “explode somewhere in the future” since in its pure initial essence it lacks the conative ‘detonator’ – beliefs and desires. Therefore, the latter forces should be considered specifically in conjunction with analyzed images that traditional approach for the futures studies.

Finally, mental image is ‘depicted’ verbally (textually, “non-imagistically”) and sometimes pictorially (in visual objects) and, consequently, are grasped and fixed materially, physically, in a final (however, one of the possible and incomplete) ‘frozen form’ for the external observer (me). Hence, figuratively speaking, sometimes my analysis of the image of the future is akin to art or literature critics’ work, whose interpretations of the ready-made and physically detached from the creator art objects or fictions, as-it-is, are produced in a highly speculative way.

### 2.1.7.2 Existing beliefs transform into the image of the future as a belief

Based on key takeaways from the previous analysis, the image of the future is the intentionally imagined by imagination ‘*possible-possible*’ *future states of affairs* that are not the *beliefs* and *desires* but are in twofold relations with them – image as a source of content of beliefs, and desires and beliefs as facilitators of the image cause. In the analysis above, *expectations* that are postulated as the core of the image of the future are considered as acts of conceiving of a highly probable future or *beliefs* towards it. Here we have a clear logical contradiction: either the *image* of the future is a *belief* (since expectation is a belief), or *expectation* is not the *image* of the future (since image is not a belief). The second Schrödinger’s cat is met. Moreover, the *desires* have disappeared from that scheme.

To resolve this contradiction, it might be assumed that a somewhat internal process is behind that where the image of the future is a fluctuating entity, in some conditions it might be belief, in other conditions it might be a mere representation of future states of affairs. Or the dynamic of the evolution of the image of the future is revealed, i.e., initially the image of the future is not a belief, then under some conditions it is transformed into a belief. Desires are a separate component that is not the belief and rigorously speaking, out of the image of the future, although, directly affect it. Assumably, desires are akin to an image of the future that might be developed. Beliefs and desires are, presumably, also in a tight dynamic interrelation, however, I put this analysis aside.

Taking into account that knowledge might be considered as species of belief, or “justified true belief” (Stanley & Williamson 2001; Department of Philosophy 2023), I hypothesize that initially ‘*possible-possible*’ *future states of affairs* are not beliefs, however in the process of foresight activities (e.g., futures workshop) they can be transformed into belief under the proper argumentation, i.e. during the process of construction of “futures knowledge” that might be assumed as “justified contingent plausibilities” (Dufva & Ahlquist 2015, 252).

From my perspective, or in my beliefs, grounded on findings in developmental psychology the proposition – image of the future is a developed belief – is highly probably true since the individual beliefs (knowledge and values) are the result of cognitive and affective development through learning in constructivist and developmental approaches (see, for example, Piaget 1965; Kohlberg & Hersh 1977; Vygotsky 1982; Wadsworth 1989; Hedegaard & Lompscher 1999; Engeström 2014, etc.). Moreover, in futures studies, the exploration of future developments is considered a learning process (see, for example, Masini 2006).

As it mentioned above, for example, Rubin (1997), Rubin and Linturi (2001), Rubin (2013) claim that the images of the future are “shallow”, “inconsistent”, and “controversial”, and the source of this phenomena is in the type of present social late-modern discourse. An additional reason might be suggested for the explanation of that – incompleteness of beliefs toward the future, i.e., the images of the future of respondents are *not* true, holistic *beliefs* about the world and self.

Predominantly, in the case of young people, through empirical and systematic learning and socialization, they might obtain incomplete “know-that” beliefs. That results in a particular image of the external ‘deteriorating’ societal world far beyond their close social reality and its future, for instance, it can be represented in the media and the educational and cultural sphere. At the same time, the specific image of the inner ‘successful’ (e.g., in Seneviratne's (2024) image of decent life) is tightly connected to their inner social environment (family, friends, and valuable adults). But, in case of “know-how”, adolescents might have extremely scarce beliefs, at least, of two types: *how* to deal with similar problems and *how* to envision another type of future instead of mere approximations into the future. Even more scarce beliefs might be about the Self. Presumably, young people possess limited “know-that” (about personal traits, aims, and capacity<sup>17</sup>) and limited “know-how” (personal capabilities and skills) related to the Self. The latter might also be of two types: how to solve problems in general (theoretically and practically) and how to manage personal future specifically (theoretically and practically).

Their desires also possess analogous characteristics and origination of immature personality, including neuro-cognitive level and the limbic system and prefrontal cortex specifically (see, for example, Sharma et al. 2013) that indicate that reflexive capabilities and function of planning have recently appeared and are under development up to approx. 25 years old (see, for example, Blakemore & Choudhury 2006; Sharma et al. 2013). Such a mixture of beliefs is blended with desires and leads to the specific situation. Simply speaking, they possess limitations in answering the following questions: what to desire, how to desire, what kind of internal and external world is and *can be*, and how to live in this personal and social world and to plan a personal and social future world.

Undoubtedly, currently an extensive array of theoretical and practical research in field of learning and personal development in general and particularly in developing futures thinking are accumulated (see, for example, Bishop & Hines 2012; Jones et al. 2012; Masini 2013; Levrini, et al.

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<sup>17</sup> In other words – agency as “capacity to act” (Department of Philosophy 2019a)

2021). The aforementioned short analysis is suggested solely for illustration of one of the fundamental mechanisms of an individual's image of the future.

One of the promising findings that might support my idea of a possible state of the image of the future as an 'immature belief' is suggested by Seneviratne (2024). It is detected the contradiction between Rubin's (1997, 2013) and Rubin and Linturi's (2001) results and results of her research where "the youth in Sri Lanka envisioned bright futures for the country and community" (Seneviratne 2024, 73) comparing to dark picture of young people in Finland (Rubin 1997). Seneviratne (2024) assumes two reasons for that: 1) the focus of research (and participants) on "good life and desired futures", 2) the act of envisioning itself fosters individuals' positive view and permits them to handle challenges and constraints. Thus, presumably, through envisioning activity, the image of the future might be transformed into a belief.

From my perspective, one more argument might be provided for the inconsistency and fragmental character of the image of the future of individuals: the future state of affairs in 'far-far-away' environment (far in time and far from imminent living space) is not a part of decision-making chain, argued by Bell and Mau (1971, 21) and Rubin (2013, S40; 1998, 494-495.) and is obtained no matter how from a mere *representation* of the external social context. Individuals simply do not consider such a *possible state of affairs* to making their decision they *have* to make at the immediate moment. They are not under the pressure to choose the alternative inevitably, and, consequently, to behave correspondingly.

Nevertheless, according to Rubin, occasionally negative and frightening images of the future can fuel the motivation for fighting for a better future (Rubin 2013, S42). Acknowledged and powerful leaders are more optimistic (Bell 2003, 84). "Planfully competent" adolescents further become more socially accomplished adults, overoptimistic illusive images support in mastering their own environment, overcoming vulnerability, and reaching long-term goals (Bell 1997b, 43). Vice versa, ignorance can be a source of the pessimistic images of the future (Bell 1967, 222, according to Bell 2003, 84).

The third hypothesis might also be provided for the explanation of the discrepancies between the bright individual future and the dark social one. The positive attitudes, i.e., beliefs and desires, are the fundamental conditions for life in general. At least two basic arguments might be provided based on the psychological findings: for example, the concept of meaningful life of Frankl and self-actualization of Maslow (Rowan, 1998; Soggie 2016) and the core behavioral equation that reward should be higher than risk to act in the classical behaviorist approach. Hence, the personal image of

the future of a psychologically stable individual might highly likely to be disbalanced to positive images of the future that are beliefs (I know that I know-that and -how) and desires (I wish/will) merely to live.

The fourth assumption is that the socio-cultural specificity (identity) might vary in different societies.

The fifth hypothesis, individual image is composed from the vision (of personal future that is a belief) and assumed scenarios (of the outer milieu that are not beliefs).

The first preliminary conclusion from the theoretical exploration is the following. The image of the future might be analyzed as a belief in combination with desires. Or better, the images of futures as a system of beliefs and desires, i.e., unpacking the whole scheme, as a composition of “knowledge-that” and “knowledge-how” of the future world and the Self in their interconnectivity. However, while the process of analysis, we should constantly be concerned that we can encounter the second type of image of the future – mere future ‘*possible-possible*’ *states of affairs* that are not a belief.

Consequently, the second preliminary conclusion is: the maturation of the images of the futures to the state of beliefs might imply the developing of the system of beliefs about world, self, and particularly beliefs toward future, in its the most widen sense as future of world and future of self in combination with desires primarily by means of learning.

Based on the first conclusion, myriad variations of the content of images of the futures are the “knowledge-that” of the futures. In the next subchapter, the “knowledge-how” as a species of beliefs towards the futures and an *instrumental aspect* of how to deal with futures – *foresight* – will be considered. The analysis of the image of the future in terms of specific tools permits to revelation of the instrumental gap in the image of the future of individuals and especially families as a micro-societal entity. The main idea is as such: the image of the future presumably contains the results of the specific foresight activity with the futures, akin to practices in the strategic organizational foresight field<sup>18</sup>. Hence, whilst analyzing the image of the futures, we can detect the elements of such ‘foresight artifacts’ and then hypothesize whether entire of these artifacts exist in the futures images, in what proportion, and then suggest methods to develop the images of the future through specific learning foresight activities.

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<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Gordon et al (2020) about the half a century history of the foresight activities and frameworks development.

Despite the general comprehension of the image of the future essence and nature, several questions remain, for example: 1) How is the *image of the future* specifically imagined, or how does imagination create it? 2) How is the level ('high-low') of the future evolvments' probability within the process of conceiving determined? 3) By what 'entity' is such conceiving proceeded? 4) How do existing beliefs arbitrate what (kind of) image of the future will become the belief, i.e., expectation or vision? Are desires involved in the process of such selection, or do they immanently and directly determine part of the futures images? 5) How are emotions interrelated with beliefs and desires towards the future? Why do we literally name one type of expectations 'fears' and another 'hopes'?

I leave beyond the limits of this theoretical analysis and the whole research these questions, however, I will endeavor to consider them during the empirical stage of the research and, at least, touch in the discussion chapter of my thesis.

## **2.2 The image of the future: structural frame**

Polak (1973, 13), Bell and Mau (1971, 17-18), and Rubin (2013, S40; 1998, 494-495) directly claim that one of the fundamental features of the image of the future is its purposefulness for decision-making. My argumentation throughout the whole thesis keeps this statement in a basic conditional element for the future images' investigation. The family actively lives its life, making an uncountable number of decisions daily. They can be routine and insignificant, but from time to time, they might drastically impact the family's future. As aforementioned, in family therapy planning, long-term future is in-bult 'normal' family activity, and absence of such practice is highly likely of the indicators of family's disorder.

Following another key concept for my thesis from Dermott and Fowler (2020), family is a social dynamic construct "being constituted by the activities of members", and as a micro-social unit, it functions as a group (Handel 2002). Hence, it is quite natural that members elaborate their life goals and course together, therefore, they inherently have to possess and negotiate personal images of the future, considering the family's ones. Furthermore, they investigate and/or create a common future of the family as a particular social unit for further decision-making, specifically by the family and for the sake of the family, simply speaking, what the family will do next. This peculiarity unites the process with organizational strategic foresight in its core: foresight methods aim to reveal driving forces for future developments, which are utilized by strategic decision making and strategy development in organizations (Iden et al. 2017).

According to Minkkinen et al. (2019, 2), foresight is a “systematic inquiry into longer-term futures, including emerging and novel issues, which in turn enables present decision-making and action”. Moreover, following Dufva and Ahlqvist's (2015) foresight concept, Minkkinen et al. (2019, 2) underline the actor (human)-related character of the foresight as a sensemaking practice of people having their personal traits, and plurality in various, systematically linked foresight processes. Additionally, Minkkinen et al. (2019, 2) place under the foresight ‘umbrella’ “explicit foresight, futures research and futures thinking in general” that appropriately supports my idea of analysis of the family (as a group of individuals) future image through the lens of foresight.

The main argument of Minkkinen et al. (2019) is that the interdisciplinarity and complexity of foresight, and the variety of its practices constitute the “cairn” of foresight approaches and might be systematized and analyzed through a two-dimensional scheme where one of the axes is a “level of perceived unpredictability” and the other “level of pursued change”. Regarding these dimensions, a six-frame typology (Figure 1) of foresight is suggested.




Figure 1. Six foresight frames (Minkkinen et al. 2019, 5)

The first (lower) level of pursued changes: counting from closed to open systems (in terms of perceived unpredictability), “predictive”, “scenaric”, and “critical” frames are suggested. This level implies foresight that serves to explore and describe futures and build resilience. The second (higher) level of pursued changes: counting from closed to open systems, “planning”, “visionary”, and “transformative” frames are depicted. This level includes foresight that is applied to “normative influencing”. In other, quite rough words, the plurality of foresight approaches permits not only to forecast (somehow) and prepare for the futures but also to create novelty and design the futures (Minkkinen et al. 2019, 7).

Thus, considering the multifaceted structure of the image of the future and its key features, the six foresight frames of Minkkinen et al. (2019) might be utilized for the analysis and description of the family future images. Although foresight implies mostly organizational or specially organized processes of inquiring activities, from my perspective, such a framework contains core elements of a holistic image of the future as a *combination of results* of the mentioned foresight activities. Leaving aside the initial aim of Minkkinen et al. (2019, 1) to suggest “an element of successful foresight systems”, from my perspective, each image of the future might be *structurally* analyzed through this framework to detect each element within the image. However, for this analysis, the framework might be slightly tailored.

In my opinion, the creation of the image of the future of the family compared to purposeful activity of an organization does not imply a highly structured set of functions, particular goals (profit/non-profit), and business processes that require systematic (also highly structured and professionally, instrumentally enabled) foresight inquiries for responsible decision-making. Therefore, the result – the future image itself – in the family might be merely the output of the imagining *ad hoc*, “here-and-now” which is discussed, agreed, and verbalized (depicted) in a dimly amorphic and even incoherent or controversial manner. That does not mandatorily aim to make the family’s decision in every case in comparison to a documented and structured description for the decision-maker in the organization. The family’s future image is simply a result of joint imagining and interlocution of a small group of intimately connected individuals. Therefore, the family future image may contain ‘imprints’ of foresight activities, fragmented pieces and ‘debris’ of foresight results – specifically mentioning the Rubin’s (2013, S42) observation of the individual images of the future as “inconsistent”, “illogical” with “incompatible with each other” elements, and “sometimes even irrational.”

Thus, the content of each frame is converted from action-related description to artefacts as results of the mentioned processing, i.e., *predictions (forecast)*, *scenario(-s)*, *futures critique*, *plan(-s)*, *vision*, and *transformative novelty*. Assumably, the presence or absence of these artefacts in the given image of the future of the family might be considered of the criteria of the wholeness and balance between ‘passively anticipated’ and ‘actively envisioned’. Voros (2019, 434) supposes that “predictive” (probable) and “explorative” (possible) modes of pondering about the future relate to anticipation compared with the “normative” mode of the preferable future.

Adjusting the Minkkinen et al. (2019, 6) conceptual framework, each artefact might be defined as follows. *Prediction(forecast)* – formally calculated or heuristically assessed probabilities of future

outcomes, e.g., extrapolations, modelling. *Plan* – determined systematically, means and steps to gain needed future results, including backcasting. Both prediction and plan are related to a high level of human control and a reasonable approach. *Scenario* – possible future alternatives in deep uncertainty. Scenario planning is an invitation to think about futures in the “what-if” modality rather than predict (Schwartz, 1996, p. xv). *Vision* – desired goals of a high level of operationalization that tames futures uncertainty to some degree, however, remarkably less elaborated than plans, e.g., “sustainability visioning, policy visions” (Minkkinen et al. 2019, 6). Plausibility and desired transformative essence confront in vision. In a generic term, “a vision is an image of a desirable future”, where the image is a “simple, metaphorical representation of a complex real-world phenomenon” (Beers et al. 2010, 725). However, in some cases scenario tends to become virtually an elaborated vision akin to “transformative scenario planning” in Kahane’s (2012) approach. *Futures critique* – challenged existing present assumptions about the future developments “without explicit transformative intention” (Minkkinen et al. 2019, 6); however, it is not the image of the future per se. *Transformative novelty* – expanded scope of present possibilities, opportunities, and generated novel paths in the present without clearly depicting future consequences. In the last two cases, the level of uncertainty is the highest.

The modality of imagined futures primarily disperses on the scale *possible – probable – preferable* as a basic concern upon the alternatives of the futurist (Bell 1997b, 42).

An image of the *possible* future contains future alternatives, sometimes purposefully constructed, that consider the current “obstacles and limitations as transcendable” and “problems as opportunities” (Bell 1997b, 42). That implies creative work, avoiding conventions and analyzing blind spots and new directions of human activity.

The *probable* future image predominantly includes the ‘business-as-usual’ model when present events, phenomena, and actions evolve in their observable ‘usual’ forms under unchangeable conditions (Bell 1997b, 42-43). However, contingency (*‘if’* mode) is considered in every case of futures exploration, hence, the *probability* itself is challenged and disputed since *‘if’* casts a level of extent of the particular future occurrence.

Voros (2019) suggests the enhanced and more nuanced spectrum of futures with “preposterous” (“ridiculous” and “impossible”), “plausible” (“could” happen based on objective positive knowledge), and “projected” (“business-as-usual” most probable extrapolation). Voros adds as a specific entity “wild card” – a low-probability event with considerable impact, which can be

plausible, possible, or preposterous. All types of futures modes are included in the “potential” future which lies ahead of the present moment (Voros 2019, 434-437).

These futures states are primarily compatible with “six foresight frames” (Minkkinen et al. 2019) and might serve for more precise categorization of future modes within the images of the futures, especially while analyzing empirical data and the process of codification.

### 2.3 Futures Ownership: agency in futures envisioning

Human agency as a general “capacity to act” (Department of Philosophy 2019a) is a golden thread that runs through all of the concepts of future images and foresight activities, which are under theoretical analysis in my research.

One of Polak’s (1973) key criteria for the civilizational images of the future analysis – *influence* – possesses two poles related to social capacity to act in striving to the best future. Successively exploring through centuries of mankind history, Polak (1973) depicts the fluctuations in the images of the futures of the core idea of Kingdom of God (or Heaven, or the Elysian Fields, or Valhalla, or the Field of Reeds, etc.) from that of established on Earth (Other condition of life) to that of totally in spiritual dimension (Other space of better life); from accent on salvation of society (tribe, people, peoples, ‘brothers in God’, etc.) to individual salvation; from eschatology to Utopia<sup>19</sup>. In any case, the ultimate point is the eternal condition of happiness and bliss of human beings that supposes avoidance from earthly suffering and obtaining of material (flesh, body) true pleasure or spiritual ecstasy.

However, such undulations do not transform the *must-be* optimistically charged image of the future itself – *essence-optimism*. The pulling force of the future vision stays stable and vivid. To reach this point, one must be enduring, persistent, patient, courageous, and strong. Attaining this ideal goal requires, concerning prevalent moral societal concepts in the particular historical period, total obedience and humility of a recluse, for example, active taming of the flesh, or active and decisive behavior of warrior akin to Viking, Hellenic hero, or “*ecclesia militans*” (Polak 1973, 68).

Likewise, Bell and Mau stress the active role of humans in altering such environments that determine future developments, although individuals' or groups' beliefs and values are influenced,

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<sup>19</sup> “The utopist is not only concerned with that which can be, in theory (although this is a necessary precondition for the realization of a utopia), but with a voluntaristic that which must be (Seinwollen and Seinsollen). He is not creating a mere counterimage, a sample social order, for society's amusement, but a serious ideal image, and example, to be considered and followed” (Polak 1973, 175)

constrained, and framed by a considerable amount of social and biological environmental factors (Bell & Mau 1971, 22-23).

Rubin (2000) analyses human agency through the lens of identity formation, as an in-built and inseparable part of personal identification. Rubin argues towards the holistic character of perceiving by individuals of the internal personal and external social and global world – “world is no longer "out there"” Rubin (2000, 34). Hence, their identity construction is challenged simultaneously by “modernity” (industrial society) and “post-modernity” (information society). Rubin implicitly attributes individual agency to personal and external futures, however, she primarily analyzes it through the frame of individual adaptiveness and coping strategies, which can be *legitimizing* (conformism and conservatism), *resistant* (critiques of social reality and non-conformism), and *projecting* (flexibility, openness, and reflexivity). Rubin claims that contemporary young people acquire a weak, hybrid, changeable “late-modern identity” that is reflected in their images of the future. Virtually, Rubin transfers the analysis of the futures images from the ontological to the axiological domain and, narrowly, to morale. Since the age is characterized by “moral constipation”, “emotional flatulence”, and ‘diarrhea of personal consumerism’ as well as “global fears, anxiety, and destruction”, the image of the future of young people might inherit and reflect that (Rubin 2000, 45). Eventually, Rubin poses a question: “In order to cope in late-modernity, must individuals themselves change, or it is more beneficial to try and change their environment?” (Rubin 2000, 46).

Likewise, Minkkinen et al.’s (2019) “six foresight frames” contain human agency as a key variable in both axes of their scheme: the level of pursued changes and the level of perceived unpredictability. It might be interpreted as agency towards human (internal, personal) course of life and control of outer (social, global) milieu. If it were depicted on Minkkinen’s et al. (2019) diagram, the agency line could be a diagonal ray that leaves the center of the coordinate axes (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Agency ‘degree’ in the "six foresight frames" (Minkkinen et al. 2019)

All of these concepts treat agency concerning the decision-making process, supposing that the individual or society in general will (or will not) act per one of the future alternatives attributed to the futures images. However, I assume that another type of agency might not be less important – agency in the image of the futures creation. The very act of envisioning as a species of general agency might also be valuable to consider in terms of individual or family future images in the case of this research. Whose future does the family embrace? How deep is their independence in their own future creation? Who is directly and indirectly involved in the process of envisioning the future?

In contrast to Polak's attribution to *influence-pessimism* of the recluse and *influence-optimism* of the warrior, it might be suggested the equality in terms of *individual influence* – both are individually influential by their efforts on the way to the best future<sup>20</sup>. However, they are forceless in terms of any type of impact on the *essence* of the image of the future, its content. From my perspective, all the mentioned concepts from ancient times to Christianity and later to the Enlightenment age bear the stamp of *influence-pessimism* in terms of changing or *influencing the image of the future itself* rather than achieving it. As aforementioned, the optimistic image itself is set in stone.

The initial phase of changing the status quo in influence-optimism or influence-pessimism in the capability to alter the image of the future itself can be attributed to the period of the Renaissance, when the idea of self-determination and free will flourished. Spiritual fathers and philosophical thinkers have played a significant role in Polak's (1973) argumentation towards ideological shift from eschatological images of the future to Utopia (in their variations) with acknowledging an active human power<sup>21</sup>. They are heralds of free human will (but under God's observation). One of the vivid examples of that approach is Molino's concept of free will (see, for example, Masini 2009): despite God's absolute knowledge of all infinite futures paths, humans are free to choose any of them.

However, I assume that the nascent bourgeoisie, rather than old aristocracies, pushes the imagination of the less 'enlightened' groups – laymen – toward the idea of self-determination in terms of a novel, more secular image of the future. The former can imagine the best future on Earth in its practical sense, e.g., how to substantively weaken long-lasting dependence of human beings on nature with its hunger and diseases, and ways (technological, economical, organizational) to

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<sup>20</sup> Primarily, after death

<sup>21</sup> "Nothing less than the entire relationship between human and superhuman power was at issue. The boundary between the two had shifted in the transition toward direct influence-optimism concerning self-determination of destiny." (Polak 1973, 95)

reach it *within* the mundane life, before death. But it is worth underscoring that idea of tenets of the Lord's hand and its Kingdom as the ultimate destination with a better life might co-exist in a bourgeois worldview with a pragmatic approach and counting on physical laws in technological advancement.

Polak's (1973) analysis contains one remarkable premise: the image of the future, or, as aforementioned, vision, is developed and elaborated by an extremely thin layer of 'enlightened' people – notable, highly educated, powerful, and quite often fanatically enthusiastic. “Thinking about the future requires faith and visionary powers, mixed with philosophic detachment, a rich emotional life, and creative fantasy.” (Polak 1973, 22)

Sometimes these traits are combined in one person, sometimes not; in any case, it is hardly believable that the lay people *en masse* comprehended in tiny details and nuances the sophisticated image of the future of coeval thinkers. For instance, as Polak (1973, 76-77) mentions, the chiliastic sects flowering and the peasant insurrections outburst coincided when, in my opinion, the clear and simplified religious ideas of equality (at least before God) and fairness in the image of the future are explicated and falls to the fertile ground of secular viewpoint on the (unfair) world order. Perhaps, the true image of the future of an oppressed society was not so optimistic and inherently logical and coherent as it was depicted by holy scriptures and preached by priests and prophets.

From my perspective, the appearance of influence-optimism in terms of *independent design* of the image of the future (and vision as an organic part of it) also might coincide with the gradual loss of confidence in divine, doctrine of salvation, and all ancient sanctuary dogmatic principals and attributes, the loss of faith in His omnipotence. Simultaneously, it was followed by the rise of confidence in human might through the scientific knowledge development, technological progress, and increasing accessibility to education (mass enlightenment). However, this transition in the domain of *influence* does not automatically imply the appearance of the capability to create an essence-*optimistic* image of the future, or vision, as forceful, pulling, fascinated, and positively charged as it was offered by religion or utopias earlier.

Western civilization since the epoch of the Enlightenment has been experiencing a constantly strengthening crisis of, figuratively speaking, gradual 'God's cancelling'. “The social, philosophical, and religious movements all united in one thing only: in undermining the belief in future salvation from earthly misery by divine intervention.” (Polak 1973, 139). While obtaining rational ideas of free will and self-determination through the constantly developing educational institution, individuals got rid of the ancient concept of destiny and ultimate destination. Such a

liberation vanishes pre-ready image of the future, but does not automatically suggest the substitution. “Modern man does not bring the *sacrificium intellectus* to faith; rather he sacrifices signs on behalf of reason. Any sign which actualizes the Other-worldly in this world is objectionable. Demythologizing is basically de-imaging” (Polak 1973, 216)

A free will implies conscious responsibility for *self* and a clear vision to live own life *purposefully*, in other words, a believable substitution for, e.g., the religious conception, that possesses similar magnetism, fostering hope and faith in it. From my perspective, particularly that jigsaw element of the future image of the individual, *self-vision*, is lacking the most. That allows, for instance, politicians to suggest to societies a fan of fascinated, but often false, substitutions (somewhat highest ideals) for the lost part of the future images. In that sense, Bell and Mau’s (1971) – in traditions of positive scientific approach – stress the role of social scientists and their responsibility in creating the images of the futures.

Although Bell and Mau’s “making possidictions” (1971, 37) considers involvement of different groups of populations, the accent is on the particular representatives *who is able to imagine* how society should transform to a better state. That scheme does not drastically differ from the previous ones, the social researcher akin to Biblical Mag brings ‘Gospel’, or akin to socialist utopist proposes the next “*L’Organisation du Travail*” (Polak 1973, 116), i.e. the ready-made vision top down for societies and individuals and by what deprives them of opportunity to be active creators of their own images of the future (Polak’s *influence-pessimism*). With regards to this research, it might be possible that the prints of the mentioned ‘highest visions’ are reflected or echoed in the family’s future images, or, probably, clearly evident.

One of the attributes of contemporary time is that the Utopian vision, with the core ancient intact concept of “social peace and justice” (Polak 1973, 111), is ridiculed and gradually surrenders to Dystopia. Supposed to be liberated from divine intervention through the ‘God’s cancelling’, or Polak’s (1973) “de-eschatologizing”, human beings, almost throughout the whole twentieth century, had been witnessing the catastrophic failure of the terrifying mass communist’ experiment of primarily Marxists’ Utopia materialization. Additionally, to described by Polak (1973) “de-utopization”, the result of that action of free will unintentionally, from my perspective, could become the vaccination against any types of utopias, facilitate the perception of the ‘real-life’ consequences of ‘independent’ human activities, and strengthen societal sarcasm toward bright utopic concepts of the aforementioned social peace and justice.

One of countless examples, also mentioned by Polak (1973, 107) – Godwin's ([1768]) “Man in the Moon”, the physical place on the natural Earth satellite with all attributes of a paradise solely for upstanding and blessed men – gives place for the Vuorensola’s “Iron Sky” (Johnston 2012) with the Nazi colony on the Moon materializing the 4<sup>th</sup> Reich. The most remarkable element in that upside-down transformation of the main idea (the Moon as a Heaven for the blessed vs. the Moon as a fortress for evildoers) is the origin of these works. The former is a product of an English historian and priest, bishop, i.e. typical representative of the elite of the Enlightenment, whose texts were predominantly oriented to the thin layer of well-educated people who were able to read and comprehend their message. Whereas the latter is the unprecedentedly successful result of crowdfunding, where thousands followers-patrons-future spectators spent their money for screen visualization of a fully entertaining cyber-punk dystopia, typical *mass* media. I assume that if almost three centuries ago Sir Godwin had a technical (and moral) possibility to raise funds from lay people to entertain them and make a profit, the future image might be slightly different than pious pastoral.

On one hand, the idea of hope and salvation – in Other time or Other place – in religious heritage has been deeply entrenched in culture (and consciousness) as a reliable way to eliminate or avoid all at once everything that hinders, simply speaking, to live better. It can be explained, perhaps, that incremental alleviation and improvement of human life and eventual avoidance of adversities have been perceived as impossible for centuries since the acute time-shortage of individual life, within which it was almost unreal to notice remarkable betterment. Therefore, to imagine the worst variant of developments during life is much easier than creating a desirable image of the bright future and fulfilling it.

On the other hand, Dystopia as a genre and the way of thinking about the future is also a consequence of losing confidence in the omnipotent, all-forgiving, salvaging, joyful, and optimistic image of God. Since the individuals have been left by science and enlightenment for themselves to create and reach the image of the future by their own intelligence and skills, the feelings of a weak and lonely creature that occurred to stand upfront the cruel, complex, and wicked world aroused progressively. “There is fear of life and fear of death; there is a standing on the edge of the abyss of nothingness. All that remains is a tragic-heroic acceptance of one's destiny. One by one, all exits to the future are closed off.” (Polak 1973, 143). Even technology that liberates human beings from natural adversities is demonized as something that eventually brings the ultimate apocalypse rather than eternal flourishing, peace, and reassurance.

In the end, what can replace the image of a bright, protecting, and omnipotent attractive being in the image of the future of modern man? Instead of creating the optimistic and attractive desired futures images saturated with magically helpful technologies since its appearance science fiction has been suggesting “a hysterical attitude towards all that is far away and "foreign," which conceals an even more acute time-neurosis: a fear of the onrushing stream of time with the ever more drastic changes it brings, a fear that the unknown may be undesirable.” (Polak 1973, 191) The fear of the unknown is truly an essence-pessimistic view.

It might be hypothesized that the clear bright image of the future (vision) is debunked and ostracized, but own (personal, group, social) capability to design something unique, tailored (personified), and indeed pulling, attractive, and meaningful is not fully obtained.

Finally, whose image of the future really is? Roughly speaking, of ‘creators’ (prophets/priests/intellectual elite/scientists) or ‘consumers’ *en masse* (lay people)? For whom the *process of imagining* a better life is indeed *influence-optimistic*?

### 3 Material and method

Primary data in this research is predominantly collected by semi-structured in-depth interviews of the family respondents (Saunders & Lewis 2012, 158 - 161) with incorporation of the modified Kinetic Family Drawing (Handler & Habenicht 1994) method and unstructured observation of the interviewees. Purposive sampling is used: families (of various structures) who departed from Russia after February 24, 2022. Snowballing and invitations via social media platform (<https://web.telegram.org/>) channels have been applied to recruit the informants.

The structure of the nuclear family has been taken into consideration, i.e., if the family consists of two partners/guardians, they both participate in the interview as a mini-group. It has been suggested to families to invite children to the interview; however, left completely to the parents' discretion. The number of children and official approval of marriage are neglected; however, children-related questions have been asked in the interview, e.g., if the couple does not have children at the moment of the interview, the questions have been formulated in an imaginary conditional state. The demographic and formal status of the family have been recorded; however, all the data is anonymized.

The data from the interviews on the first stage have been analyzed through Causal Layered Analysis, or CLA (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009; Kaboli & Tapio 2018) for the final composing of coherent and consistent texts of future images of the families. In addition to CLA, the data collected on the first stage is analyzed through the Thematic analysis (Saunders et al. 2019, 651-660).

#### 3.1 Sample characteristics

Finally, nine families migrated from Russia to North, West and Central European countries namely, Croatia, Hungary, Finland, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom, have been involved in the research. In all cases, except one, two heterosexual spouses have participated in the interview. In one interview a junior adolescent has joined the parents. 19 informants have been engaged in total. Age groups of spouses are as such:

- 4 pairs: 30-35
- 2 pairs: 36-41
- 2 pairs: 42-50
- 1 pair: about 60

Five families have one or two children. Professional sphere of spouses: IT, creative business, service, higher education, medicine, forestry, scientific research, and analytics. Period of the interviews: July 2024-November 2024. Primarily, the interviews have been conducted online through the Microsoft Teams application for videoconferencing. Two families have been interviewed face-to-face on-site at their homes. All the interviews have been transcribed in the Russian language, and further, within the first stage of initial categorization, codes have been translated into English. Thus, the original meanings and context remain almost authentic as is possible in intercultural or interlanguage content.

### **3.2 Collecting data through interviews and observation**

The research questions of my research possess primarily exploratory and partly explanatory and descriptive character rather than evaluative (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2019, 444). Furthermore, the entire approach of the study is abductive and grounded on a postmodernist constructionist basis, which implies both a particular theoretical framework utilized in advance to commence the investigation. However, while the knowledge is socially constructed through the research theory might be augmented and reconsidered. There is no objective, quantifiable data to be collected for further revealing of strict natural laws, dependencies, and correlations to control and manipulate, for instance, human behavior. The key subject matter is meaningful social substance: experience, meanings, motives, interpretations – the open and hidden social and personal reality and relations to be reconstructed in the ‘researcher-informant’ dyad.

To match the aforementioned approach and properly answer the research question, a qualitative, or semi-structured, in combination with an in-depth interview, has been chosen as a key method to collect information. Kvale (1996, 27), Warren et al. (2001, 85), and Brinkmann (2013, 21) virtually equalize ‘semi-structured’, rarer ‘unstructured’ and ‘qualitative’ since even in in-depth unstructured life interview, e.g., in ethnography, inevitably commences from the main question which contains the request to describe personal life in details. Therefore, despite the nuanced variations of the interview definition, e.g., Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2019, 437-438) and Brinkmann (2013, 20-21) clearly distinguish ‘semi-structured’ and ‘in-depth/unstructured’, in this thesis ‘semi-structured’ cojoined with ‘in-depth’ and is interchangeable with ‘qualitative interview’. Even though, the interview in this research from the beginning is navigated through pre-ready thematized guide and preliminary questions within the themes, nevertheless, the interviewer has rather high degree of freedom to construct narration in conversation with the informants following the evolving meaningful topics rather than being stuck to the firm frame of the guide with the fixed questions in

a particular order. Brinkmann (2013, 18) highlights a crucial trait of the qualitative interview that revelations, spilled beyond the structure, might be more valuable for understanding key meanings than mere answers to the pre-structured questions. Hence, the flexibility of the conversation within the guided interview is a more efficient way to facilitate the expression by the informants of their own opinion, concerns, questions, and meaning, i.e., “to talk about certain themes, rather than to specific opinions about these themes” (Brinkmann 2013, 19)

The qualitative interview as constructionist rather than positivist “knowledge-producing conversations” tends to be the most resourceful instrument of discovering societal issues and aspects of personal life (Brinkmann 2013, 3; Warren et al. 2001, 83). The ‘heart’ of the qualitative interview is a conversation, although structured and purposeful under control of the researcher it possesses dialogical character and provide more active, or at least more open role for the interviewer in knowledge-producing process (Kvale 1996, 6; Brinkmann 2013, 21; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2019, 439). “The interviewee’s statements are not collected – they are co-authored by the interviewer” (Kvale 1996, 183).

Considering the construction of the knowledge about family futures, particularly, the interviewer, even being the guiding facilitator, should keep the deliberately naïve position (Kvale 1996, 33) since presuppositionless conversation permits both to grasp novel phenomena and to reflect and avoid own researcher’s bias. Moreover, the knowledge about the futures cannot be true or false and pre-determined since futures have only to come. Therefore, futures knowledge might be created through learning and challenging the prior existing positions of the future creators, which is highly valuable for widening the spectrum of alternative futures (Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015, 252). Thus, (mutually) constructing images of the future through the dialogue, the interviewees might more deeply and broadly envision the family’s future life, unveiling hidden unconscious views, beliefs, and motifs. However, being ‘naïve’ the interviewer simultaneously should stay focused and specific in discussion particular themes (Kvale 1996, 33-34), especially keeping in mind that nowadays interviewees quite often might be well-prepared to be informant in such type of a conversation (not saying that they can be also professionals in that). Therefore, to avoid predictable, superficial, and trivial knowledge, researchers should be cautious in taking interviewees’ words for granted in any case (Brinkmann 2013, 4-5,19). Perhaps, that is why such a fragile balance of the researcher between study scope and ‘freedom of speech’ equalizes the qualitative interview with a “craft, if well carried out, can become an art” (Kvale 1996, 13).

The ‘organically in-built’ method that augments and strengthens the qualitative interview for the purpose of my research is an observation. Although my research questions do not contain phenomenological aspects per se, data collected from observation during the interview might (and have) enhanced the interpretations of the meanings and partially shed light on the process of ‘practicing’ foresight by the family. It is rather challenging to determine the role of the researcher as an observer in, for instance, Saunders et al.’s (2019, 384-385) terms: “observer-as-participant” or “participant-as-observer”. Being actively involved in the future knowledge creation through the conversation with the family, researchers are constantly balancing in terms of the ‘degree of detachment’. The equation includes keeping proper distance to stay focused on the study purpose, and, simultaneously, holding emotionally and inter-subjectively (for the ‘inter-view’) closeness to maintain rapport and a trustful atmosphere. In any case, the observation commences from the first moment of meeting with family and continues multiply while transcribing and analyzing the recorded visual and audio data.

### 3.2.1 Kinetic Family Drawing

To facilitate the beginning of the interview, to create a more relaxed psychological atmosphere, and to promptly engage family into the specific imaginative space the insignificant modification of projective psychodiagnostics method Kinetic Family Drawing (KFD) is used (Handler & Habenicht 1994). At the beginning of the interview, the informants are asked to draw together a picture akin to, for instance, a family photograph of their family on one regular day in 10 years ahead, when family members are doing something in a particular environment.

During the initial phase of drawing (up to 10 minutes), which is unguided, spontaneous comments are recorded by the interviewer. After the picture is done, participants discuss it in-depth and can add any details to the picture. The quality of the drawing is ignored and can be rather schematized. In case the drawing is unapplicable, e.g., physically, or strictly rejected by the interviewees for any reasons, the same concept is utilized, but informants are asked to imagine and verbalize it as a mere picture description.

In addition to facilitation, another purpose of the KFD application is to enrich the raw data directly related to the future images collected from the family. Originally created for the analysis of the child's perception of the family, the method suggests its core research value – to reveal the family's internal essence from functional and interpersonal sides with its own dynamic (Handler & Habenicht 1994). That aligns with the key concept of the family in my thesis – “family practice” as a core system factor of the family (Dermott and Fowler 2020). Hence, scenes of family which is

doing something in the future as imagined by its members might uncover important ‘actors’ and interpersonal ties and relations which indeed are embraced by the ‘real family’, i.e., individuals who doing something together as a family unit. In such a case, the nuclear family, e.g., parents and child/children (if spouses have children) might be extended and include others, for example, relatives, grandparents, etc., who also ‘do’ this particular family equally. Moreover, in addition to the result of the drawing, the process of creation of the family picture itself might provide with valuable for analysis tiny details either for the images of the future verbalized during the drawing or for the investigation of the peculiarities of the ‘foresight’ activity of the family, i.e. in simple words – how family do foresight. Although the process of the family future images is out of the scope of this dissertation, such data might bring accents and nuances for the images, for instance, emotional mode, irony, controversy, or incongruency, and hidden beyond the direct speech elements.

### 3.2.2 Structure of the interview guide: PESTEC(V)

The structure of the interview guide ([Appendix 2](#)) is organized through the PESTEC(V) framework for both future states: probable and preferable future images. Respondents have been asked to imagine both internal and external traits of the future family context (life), considering political, economic, social, technological, ecological, cultural/values, and additionally geographic domains. From Bell et al.'s (1971) perspective, the development (and further analysis) of the images of the future might relate to the nature of polity, economy, and society, their dynamics, potential for change, and direction of transformation (Bell et al. 1971, 48-49).

Thus, the purpose of such a structure is threefold: 1) to embrace core spheres of the future external broad societal and internal micro-social contexts of the family in possibly comparable way to compose them further into coherent and interrelated (outer social and inner familial) images; 2) to scaffold the conversation by specific meaningful parts which logically intertwined and permit to move smoothly from one domain to other in a flexible way and to provoke the imagination and discussion, especially when the informants are breviloquent; 3) to set in advance the initial thematic skeleton that is highly valuable for the interview conducting, transcription, and further more amenable analysis (Kvale 1996, 177-178).

The first aim follows the key for my whole thesis concept of the family as a particular micro-social group of individuals doing “family practice” (Dermott and Fowler 2020), or in this case, specific familial activity of future planning. The last one might also be considered a particular form of foresight akin to organization, since the family is a rather stable micro-social group, although without firm organizational frames, rules, and regulations. PESTEC in its variations (PESTLE,

STEEPC, etc.) is one of the widely cross-disciplinary used frames for the driving forces (broad social context) analysis, especially in strategic scenario planning (see, for example, Schwartz 1996; Ralston & Wilson 2006; Kahane 2012; PESTLE analysis 2014; Cox 2021). In this research, PESTEC(V), or political, economic, social, technological, ecological, cultural(values) domains, have been taken as a core structure for the future external and internal family's context investigation.

Considering the scaffolding of the interview, it is worth underlining that the entire domains, except 'geography' and 'politics', are spread through the conversation freely, following the emerging ideas from the interviewees. Hence, the interviewer can (inter)weave the narrative seamlessly, but cover all the parts. In case the informant struggles with following the narrative or is merely reluctant to reveal all details, the interviewer can choose the next domain to continue the conversation.

Eventually, almost always, such narration permits moving back and forth through the content, unveiling novel details in previously discussed domains. Solely 'geography' always commences the main body of the interview since it almost directly derived from the previous part – Kinetic Family Drawing – where family in addition to fun psychological warming activity initiates the discussion of the elements of the futures images and, as a rule, that contains description of particular place, location of the family activities. Similarly, 'politics' is postponed specifically to the final part of the interview, which supposedly may be tightly connected with rather sensitive content (and often is indeed intertwined) that might drastically hinder the conversation in the early phase of the interview. Hence, discussion on future political issues emerges when the atmosphere in the interview is quite trustful and informants are more open in their opinions. Moreover, political discourse might arise organically through the conversation; therefore, in the final stage of the interview, it is easier to involve family in the potentially hard topic.

### **3.3 Causal Layered Analysis and Thematic Analysis**

The raw data have been analyzed through Causal Layer Analysis (CLA) (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009; Kaboli and Tapio, 2018) as a specific analytical method in futures research since it obtains the potential for deconstructing and reconstructing the 'text' of family life in-depth considering its consciously reflected by members and unconscious elements. Inayatullah has succeeded in the operationalization of the discourse analysis through critical analysis of the 'text' that serves to "undefine' the future" rather than predict (Inayatullah, 1998, p. 816).

The CLA is a coherent and congruent method of analysis in this particular research since it is grounded on non-positivist discourse analysis derived from the poststructuralist postmodernist

approach. CLA is the result of transforming the theoretical framework or broader philosophic movement – ‘post-structuralism’ – to a methodological approach and, moreover, to a specific analytical method in futures research (Inayatullah, 1998). For post-structuralism, scientific fact cannot be a direct reflection of a real object, it exists within the context of the language or linguistic system. “*In poststructuralism, life is not to be defined solely by science, but by the layers of history and future creations captured in wider senses of language, thought and experience*” (Williams 2014, 17).

The *who* (and *how*) speaks or writes is not less important (perhaps, more) than *what* is spoken or written *about* (as well as, who reads what is written), e.g., Foucault’s ‘discourse’ “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, 49) or Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ of the oppositions (*différance*) to find meaning behind the written or spoken text (Rekret 2019).

The CLA includes four domains of analysis as follows: 1) Litany (conventional agenda); 2) Systemic causes (political, economic, historical, technological, and environmental aspects); 3) Worldview, or Discourse (deep cultural, paradigm entities, values, and assumptions); and 4) Mith/Metaphor (unconscious archetypal images and stories). The method serves to analyze visible (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> layers) and hidden (3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> layers) challenges, issues (‘discourse’), and, accordingly, possible solutions (Kaboli and Tapio, 2018).

‘Litany’ is a conventional agenda on the surface, where commonly understandable *cause-and-effect* ties are circulating through daily headlines, and solutions are direct, obvious, and momentary, or “instrumental” scenarios, provided by corporations or government (Inayatullah 1998, 821).

‘Systematic causes’ is a more complex and complicated layer on which compound societal causes, including political, economic, historical, technological, and environmental aspects of the upper layer (Kaboli & Tapio 2018, 36) and relative solutions tend to appear: “policy oriented” scenarios realized by various social groups in partnership (Inayatullah 1998, 821). The ‘Worldview’ dimension includes deep cultural, paradigm entities, values, and assumptions that drive specific social behavioural patterns and ‘keep the order’ of social things, including power expression and relations (Slaughter 2008, according to Kaboli & Tapio 2018, 36). Therefore, solutions on this level are aimed at the paradigm shift, and “scenarios intend on capturing fundamental differences” and involve “people or voluntary associations” (Inayatullah 1998, 821). Finally, in the ‘Myth/Metaphor’

domain unconscious archetypical<sup>22</sup> images and stories, carefully camouflaged by language, lay where solutions are hardest to find, “scenarios are equally discrete but articulate this difference through a poem, a story, an image or some other right-brain method” that can be created by “leader or artist” (Inayatullah 1998, 821); however, they might have a long-term character (Inayatullah 2008, 12).

The CLA ‘superpower’ is in its coherent and consistent complexity. One can move in the analysis up and down several times, revealing various aspects and deconstructing the full ‘text’ of the human individual, social, organizational, and cultural life, subsequently providing initially invisible and unexpected alternative scenarios.

Thus, the process of principal analysis through the CLA implies an initial coding of the transcribed interviews, using layers of Litany, System, Discourse, and Metaphor as coding categories in a systematized table manner. In addition to CLA, the data collected on the first stage is analyzed through the Thematic analysis (Saunders & Lewis 2019, 651-660). The thematization contains two pre-sets of topics: 1) the PESTEC(V) domains (Cox 2021; PESTLE analysis 2014); 2) the “six foresight frames” (Minkkinen et al. 2019).

The first thematic frame – PESTEC(V) – is initially composed with CLA domains in a matrix view, thus, codification of the data units on the first step is simply attributed to cross-domain themes. Additionally, each PESTEC(V) domain is divided into two sub-themes to register codes accordingly, the external (societal) context of the family and the internal (family) context (Table 1).

Table 2. Initial coding matrix (CLA and PESTEC/V)

	External	Internal	External	Internal	External	Internal	External	Internal	External	Internal	External	Internal
Litany												
System/ Social causes												
Worldview/ Discourse												
Myth/ Metaphor												
	Political		Economic		Social		Technological		Ecological		Culture/Values	

<sup>22</sup> in the Jungian sense (Jung 1971, according to Kaboli & Tapio 2018, 36)

The NVivo application has been used for coding. The process of deconstruction and recoding of the initial interview data has been cyclic since during the analysis new meanings and themes emerge. The final images of the family's future are presented below as coherent and consistent texts of each revealed image.

The last phase of the analysis through the 'CLA-PESTEC(V)' frame contains one of the most important parts of the whole analytic work – reconstruction of the images in a narration-related view. Kvale (1996, 4, 184) claims that the interview, akin to mutual wandering, is evolving through (and by) the story or stories of the “travelers” within the *conversation*<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, it is worth returning to the reader of the research analysis the original form of the narration, or, in other words, telling the story “based on true events”, or considering not realized aspects of the futures images – “based on the true futures events”.

The analysis through “six foresight frames” (Minkkinen et al. 2019) is conducted by a similar, but simpler procedure. The pre-set themes, namely, *predictions (forecast)*, *scenario(-s)*, *futures critique*, *plan(-s)*, *vision*, and *transformative novelty*, form the analytical frame and correspondent coding. Thus, it can help to structurally analyze the interviews and to reveal the patterned modalities of the family's foresight practice.

### 3.4 Ethical considerations, limitations of the study, and AI using

#### 3.4.1 Ethical considerations and data processing

Polak (1973, 13) claims that the development of the future images is “intimately related” to ethics since it supposes “responsible choice between alternatives”. Similarly, “*social responsibility*” as a peculiarity of the social scientist who designs the future is argued by Bell and Mau (1971, 37). Likewise, they underscore the awareness in this process because of its possible impact. These ethical considerations are specific to futures studies and complementary to the basic rules and principles for scientific research.

Whilst planning this study, doing research on each stage and writing this text I adhere Research ethics at the University of Turku (University of Turku n.d.), follow good research practices principals, and ethical principles of research with human participants specifically, including principals for lawful processing of personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Publications Office of the European Union 2016; TENK 2019; TENK 2023). The

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<sup>23</sup> “...in the original Latin meaning of *conversation* as “wandering together with”” (Kvale 1996, 4)

fundamental principles I have been guided through the whole process of research conduct are reliability (the overall quality of research), honesty (transparency, fairness, and biases avoidance), respect for colleagues and broader respectful attitudes toward society and cultural heritage, and accountability for the research (University of Turku n.d.).

All informants have been invited to participate in this research voluntarily with absolute freedom to refuse, discontinue their participation, and withdraw their consent at any time they decide. The information on the content of the research, the particularities of processing of personal data and research conduction practicalities (the procedure itself and what is expected from researcher and informants, place, length, and used means, specificity in data processing, including personal data) has been given to informants triple time: 1) during the recruiting (by posting the information in three Telegram communities, via email, or by messaging through Telegram or WhatsApp, or orally in call); 2) after the preliminary consent to participate and before the interview through the form of consent; 3) in the beginning of the interview when they have been orally asked whether they understand the information about the research and their participation and agree to participate.

The Informed Consent Form contains required information under ethical principles of research with human participants and principles for lawful processing of personal data under the GDPR (Publications Office of the European Union 2016; TENK 2019, 12-16). The potential research participants have been informed through the consent form about the purpose of the research and its specific details, persons and their contacts who control and process the information and personal data, the contact data of the officials at the University of Turku with regards of the data processing, using and storing, and the rights of participants considering participation and collected data. All the abovementioned information has been provided to participants in their native language (Russian), including the text of the form of consent. The consent form is translated into English for the supervisor's revision and correction before the interview. The final version of the consent form sent to participants is in Russian ([Appendix 3](#)).

It is worth highlighting that in several cases, informants have preferred to give their consent orally at the beginning of the interview instead of signing the consent form. Such a compromise is a result of negotiations with informants who have demonstrated reluctance in signing any papers primarily based on the perspective of disclosure of their positions and attitudes related to sensitive topics, e.g., political issues, intimate details of the family life, etc. Nevertheless, finally, all the participants have given their consent openly in written or verbalized form.

The design of the research implies a specific requirement of participation in the interview of both spouses/partners/guardians simultaneously, except in the case when the parent/guardian is the only person who is a caregiver for the children. Since the families have been invited to participate in any composition of family members, additionally, to the two main informants, the participation of minors under the age of 15 has been expected. The participation in such cases is decided solely by parents. This research contains only one case where a child under 15 has participated in the interview. Additionally, to parental consent, I have provided the young respondent with the information about the research and asked (and have been given) for the separate consent orally at the beginning of the interview.

To protect the privacy of the research participants, the codification of their names is applied in the analysis, and this text, especially in the case of direct quotations. Additionally, I have consistently removed the direct mentioning of countries and places of living of families in this text, except the cases where it is worth mentioning for illustration of the specific phenomena and does not violate the privacy.

While conducting the interview, two options have been chosen for data collecting: 1) video- and audio recording (the whole interview from the beginning when participants give consent); 2) audio recording only when the informants ask to switch off the shooting. For the recording, the Microsoft Teams application provided by the University of Turku has been utilized. Moreover, all records remain in my private closed (safeguarded by password) directory on the UTU server and will be partly utilized for further research purposes. The recordings that will be considered out of the scope of the next study are to be deleted completely. In all cases, the transcription of the interviews has been made simultaneously with the recording and later downloaded to my personal computer (safeguarded by my fingerprint) for further processing. The subscribed interviews in \*.docx format will be stored up to the end of the utility and then will be deleted totally. The Microsoft Excel on my computer and NVivo, provided by the University of Turku, have been utilized for the data analysis. Both applications are operated on my personal computer locally without a web connection. The informants have been informed about these details at the beginning of the interview.

### 3.4.2 Limitations of the study

One of the main concerns related to both ethical considerations and quality of the research, “*freedom from bias*”, which implies minimization of prejudice and personal bias. This might also be one of the key ways to provide objectivity in qualitative research (Kvale 1996, 64). Taking into consideration my background and life circumstances, the case of my family might also be included

in the same research sample based on selection criteria. Thus, such characteristics condition my way of research and communication with interviewees. Throughout the entire study, I have constantly reflected on the mentioned features of my position and tried to maintain neutrality in addressing informants and later in data analysis.

The second limitation belongs to the interview as a method, naturally, since it deeply involves the researcher in the process of knowledge construction. That has been discussed above in the corresponding subchapter about collecting data through interviews and observation. For example, the content and the structure of conversation during the interview also matter since the topical structure might have immediate implications on the narrative. I suppose that my adherence to principles of objectivity might be proved among others by the coherent character of results in my research with other studies where similar phenomena have been analyzed.

The third limitation is derived from the type of interview: online or on-site. I have conducted two interviews of nine on-site. Although families in all interviews behave rather naturally, and I have not noticed difficulties in communication and in observation in general, online interview slightly limits the freedom of natural behavior of family members, especially if the family has young children. For example, sometimes connection hinders listening or observation of some details, not speaking about the distracting character of interruptions caused by network cuts. Overall, observation at home provides a more saturated family context with tiny peculiarities, compared with online. Additionally, being at home with family in one physical space, it is easier to create and maintain rapport and a more intimate connection.

The fourth limiting specificity is the sample's characteristics. Considering the contemporary diversity of family composition, it is hard to generalize outcomes, interpretations, and conclusions to all migrant families who moved from Russia after 24.02.2022 to European countries. Families in my research are heterosexual pairs with or without children. I have no data regarding various types of families, for example, with homosexual spouses, with the elder generation living in one place with nuclear families, families with one child's caregiver, etc. Moreover, even though in each interview spouses participate together, I have not received the entire family image since parents prefer to avoid discussion, even with the adolescents, "adult" topics of the family's future. However, sometimes parents address some questions to them, for instance, about technologies in the future. As I mentioned earlier, only in one interview adolescent informant has participated with parents, but exclusively four topics have been moderately discussed with the child's engagement: the child's future education path and possible professional choice, relations with grandparents,

future technological aspects, and communication with local society (friends and language). When the economic and political agenda emerged in conversation, parents have claimed that it is time to go to bed, and later, they have slightly disavowed their child's ideas about the personal future, mentioning immaturity. I suppose that this is quite a regular situation, and parents as key responsible adults in the family are the only decision-makers towards future grand issues of the family.

Another sample characteristic that hampers the generalization of conclusions is the country-specific conditions of the families. These countries might have rather specific policies with regard to migrant families in addition to the specificity of the countries themselves and their socio-cultural and natural environments.

Finally, the size of the sample is evidently too small to make generalizations with strong argumentation.

### 3.4.3 AI use disclosure

I have used Large Language Models (Artificial Intelligence, AI) while doing my research in three cases: search for scientific information, assistance in translation and meaning clarification, and proofreading. Whilst utilizing the AI tools, I have followed the corresponding regulations recommended by the University of Turku (European Commission 2025; Turun yliopisto 2023; Turun yliopisto 2025)

In addition to Volter (the University of Turku Librarian data base [https://utuvolter.fi/discovery/search?vid=358FIN\\_UTUR:VU1](https://utuvolter.fi/discovery/search?vid=358FIN_UTUR:VU1)), Google search and Google scholar I have utilized primarily ChatGPT (<https://chatgpt.com/>), and significantly rare Claude (<https://claude.ai/>) and Gemini (<https://gemini.google.com/>) for the search of the most prominent relevant academic works and scientists who study similar to my research topics. In every case, when AI provides such information, I cross-check it in Volter and regularly download or read academic materials from the Volter database.

In limited cases I have asked AI (predominantly ChatGPT) to clarify some linguistic nuances, for example, while I have developed criteria for coding in English some phrases and collocations which are originally in Russian I have discussed with AI and asked it to provide me relevant examples and contextual use to translate into English meaningful information more precisely. Similarly, I have requested the accurate translation from Russian to English of chosen idiomatic or colloquial phrases from the informants' speech, but without sharing sensitive personal data.

Additionally, I have rarely utilized the translator DeepL (<https://www.deepl.com/>) for checking the accuracy of my English writing. For instance, I have inserted several sentences written by me personally in English into the translator and checked the output in Russian to adjust maximally my initial thoughts to grammatically correct English writing without meaning losses. Additionally, I used DeepL and Google Translate for translation from Finnish and Swedish to English or Russian of several sources.

Finally, I have used the Grammarly application (plague-in to the Microsoft Word) as a proofreader for the whole text of the thesis specifically for grammar check avoiding changing the meaning of the text and author's style.

All the above-mentioned AI applications I used are in free-of-charge versions.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Reconstructed images of the future of immigrant families moved to five European countries from Russia after 24.02.2022

The combination of particular methods for the collection and analysis of raw data through CLA and thematic analysis permitted to reconstruction of substantively abundant families' images of the future. Herein, in the main body of the thesis, I present a condensed description of the future images (Tables 3, 4, 5). They contain both *external*, or wide societal context of the family life, and *internal*, or own family context organized through two core frames: CLA (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009; Kaboli and Tapio, 2018) and PESTEC(V) (Kahane 2012; Cox 2021; PESTLE analysis 2014).

The first fundamental frame for the reconstruction is the structure of the CLA – Litany, System/Social Cause, Worldview/Discourse, Myth/Metaphor. The divided external and internal future images of the family as a main result of the analysis are represented accordingly to these four layers, where each layer follows the PESTEC(V) structure. However, it is worth adding that, as expected, additional themes have been revealed through the analysis. They are not completely out of the PESTEC(V) scope, nevertheless, they have vivid specificity. For example, within the social and cultural domains, the additional distinct theme – “cultural-language identity of the family” – has emerged. A similar situation is with the closely connected novel theme – “family integration into the society of the destined country”.

Considering the PESTEC(V) structure of the interview and themes for the following coding and analysis, almost every image includes content related to these domains. In cases when the external context on global, national, and local levels has been mentioned, these levels are not completely covered in all PESTEC(V) domains since family endeavors to envision higher levels of the surrounding milieu primarily *in connection* with family life. That also leads to thin, easily penetrated boundaries between internal and external contexts, directly related to the family as a micro-social unit. For instance, depiction of the future local community, including neighbors, acquaintances and friends from time to time converts into inner family social context, as well as in cases when family speculates on the topic of maintaining relations with grandparents at higher levels, e.g., global or national politics logically becomes the embedded part of the family life. Therefore, external levels obtain specific traits and represent rather fragmented circumstances.

The division of the internal and external images of the future of families is intentional. Such a presentation permits 1) to observe surface and hidden details distinctively, with nuances; 2) to

analyze them separately since, as might be noticed, external and internal future images do not completely match. Despite the parallel representation of both lines in pairs, in some cases, the internal image of the family's future might be relevant to other external images of the future. For instance, it is highly arguable to strictly attribute the material wellbeing to the utopic image solely, it might be, at least in some basic details (type of house, place of living, lowest probable gross income of the family), also relevant to the 'inter-topic' image (see below).

Moreover, I hypothesize that family members rather often discuss and analyze internal context and external milieu as isolated entities. Primarily, my direct questions have challenged their statements and forced them to reconsider or at least reflect on their inner view in consideration of the outer environment. But even such intentional pushing from the researcher quite often fails in changing informants' minds concerning the internal family image that, in turn, might be a sign of revealed strong basic beliefs toward the inner family's future. That is discussed in a separate sub-chapter below. Some of the quotations from the interviewees can demonstrate it:

AP2W: I mean, it's probably not going to be bad.

AP2H: No, we are considering it. I just don't personally believe that everything will be so bad, that is, it's going to be worse than ever. <...>

AP2W: Our timeline, own our family [timeline], and timeline of some sort of worlds up there – it's kind of a little bit different. <...> And it seems to me, that I am somehow as well, look, yes, something will be there, some beautiful or awful events will happen. But this picture [point out the family picture from the first drawing stage of the interview], it seems to me, that is – sand on the ocean bottom, that it would be like stability, as you said, some kind of calmness and, as it were, **regardless of what happens there**, so that we would kind of move towards it. That's how I see it, that's why it's hard for me to reconcile what will happen in the outside world, what somehow affects the timeline of our family[difficult].

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KL7W: ...you know, it's just very difficult to combine local and maximal [country and global external context], i.e., I believe that summer will be hotter, that will be worse, possibly, but it does not relate to the country. I think it will happen everywhere, and compared to that, in this country, it will not be so bad. So, I think, like nowadays, summers will be hotter, something like that, I imagine.

R: Will these possible changes affect your family directly, for better or for worse? How will you feel some kind of impact in 10 years?

KL7W: **No, I don't think so.** I guess, like, this is kind of like this quick [reflection].

Right now, I'm only responsible for myself. And we're going to have a child, and of course, if the environment gets bad, I'm going to feel guilty that I brought him into this

world where he's probably going to be worse off in 30 years, but otherwise, no. I don't think that...

KL7H: **I think it's going to be better.** For example, there are obsolete factories that continue to operate; heavy industries that are being fought to make them less harmful to the environment. And I think 10 years from now, this problem will be less than it is now.

However, I attempt to suggest coherent and logically consistent images either inside each of them or considering two distinctive lines: external and internal.

The last remark concerning the futures modes: preferable and probable. In all interviews, families have been asked to imagine the future in the two mentioned modes; however, such logic of the conversation eventually hinders the speculations and, in some cases, has been perceived by informants as slightly artificial and almost fantasy-looking, and they have returned to the regular, spontaneous way of imagining. As:

1FEH: Even ideal, it can't be ideal because of many objective factors. Yeah, I can say, that the whole green world is fragrant – that's impossible, and even in an ideal case it will be impossible!

Hence, in the several interviews I asked to estimate the probability imagined by families, and it has turned out that it was rather high – 70-80-90%, especially when families mention their own internal projections and plans. For example:

3 DVH: 20% of these random nuclear f...ck-ups, let's say. And 80% in our own strength. I am more or less sure that it is realizable, based on the economic situation we are in now and based on our skills.

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R: You have drawn this scenario...actually, a picture of your future and the scenario as it develops, tell me, and how likely is that? In your experience exclusively.

KL7H: I think it's 90% likely, and I have confidence. Of course we can't be sure about the child, because it might not work out either. But if it works out with the baby, then everything we've been saying all this time is...

KL7W: Yes, yes, I agree with that!

R: Tell me, what if I were to ask you a slightly different question, saying, "What is your image of your desired future?" Would this picture that you have drawn now coincide with what you would like as your future? If not, what differences would there be in this sense?

KL7W: Well, it's pretty much the same. I mean, I wouldn't want an ecological catastrophe - it's scary, and I would really like to be able to reunite with my parents,

because it's very hard for me, but at the same time I wouldn't want to live with my moms in the same house. I mean, that means more money, because otherwise it's kind of unclear where to put it. So, I mean, these are probably all the differences between the future, the ideal future for me and the one that I drew, that we discussed.

KL7H: In my head, too, kind of, what we drew is good and what we as a family are striving for. And in the ideal, it's about the same, but we'll be more well-off people. So, we'd have more resources and we'd be able to afford an easier, more comfortable life. Yes.

Thus, speaking in a slightly humorous manner, the (least) probable image of the family might be calculated by the formula: *Probable image*=*Utopic*\*0,7. Nevertheless, one observation is almost undeniable – families primarily believe in their positive scenarios.

Finally, four images of the *external* future and three images of the *internal* future have been reconstructed. The combinations of the external and internal images have compound names alluded to movies to grasp the essential meaning of the highly complex envisioning metaphorically. However, I try to avoid oversimplification and total reduction since each mentioned movie has its own composite narrative and specific idea. The family images of the futures are the following.

**“A Man Called Ove” in “Tomorrowland”** (IMDb 2015a, 2015b). Utopia. (Table 3)

*The main idea of the metaphor:* fully integrated and materially well-off immigrant family with distinctly countered original cultural identity which fluently speaks language of the major culture of the destined country in a slightly annoying, hectic, but genuinely kind, friendly and warm soul manner suggests new life meanings and friendship for the local single widower who is on the edge of suicide. The setting of family life and human relations is a highly technologically saturated world inhabited by an advanced ideal society without inequality, discrimination, war, and other vices, and destructive behavior.

**“Hobbit[s]” in the “Naked Harbor”** (IMDb 2012a, 2012b). Inter-topia. (Table 4)

*The main idea of the metaphor:* generally, materially well-off family experiences difficulties in integration and anxiety imposed by real or alleged perceiving by locals from major culture of the destined country of family's original cultural-language identity; maintaining friendly, but shallow relations with locals, nevertheless, family tries to detach from the local issues and politics and to dissolve completely in the society to be inconspicuous “like hobbits far from the world”<sup>24</sup> avoiding feeling of shame of being others, but holding own cultural-language identity. The setting of family

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<sup>24</sup> A direct quotation from one of the interviews.

life is a world in crisis and an individualistic society with a tendency toward conservatism and isolationism, with hidden biases, prejudices, slightly discriminatory attitudes, and distinctions in society toward migrants and particular social groups in conjunction with unacceptance of human vices and destructive behavior.

**“Blade Runner[s 2035]” in the “Westworld” (IMDb 1982, 2016). Dystopia. (Table 5)**

*The main idea of the metaphor:* under the threat of direct discrimination, deporting, prisoning, or local environmental crisis in the current country of destination family hides away and finally moves to the "third" country, but never to the country of exodus. The setting of family life is an emerging technocratic, unsafe, and socially economic dysfunctional world where a small group of marginals dictates society, including control of behavior through unethical techno solutions.

**“The road” (IMDb 2009). Apocalypse.**

*The main idea of the metaphor* has been mentioned by one of the interviewees as a pure implementation of the existing movie’s script in real life. The main character, the father, in desperate hope, attempts to bring his adolescent son to a livable place with “good people” in a fatally destroyed and dying post-apocalyptic world.

The reconstructed images of the futures within layers are below in a table view, except for the fourth. The latter is the rarest image mentioned without details; however, it exists in several interviews as a specific reference to the highly unlikely possible apocalyptic future.

Table 3. “A Man Called Ove” in “Tomorrowland”: “Healthy human socialist” Utopia

<i>Layers</i>	<i>External future context</i>	<i>Internal future context</i>
<i>Litany</i>	<p>Global political conflicts have been resolved with the following 50-80 peaceful years. Russia, as a safe and democratic country, reintegrates into the global system. Based on the highly developed and steadily progressing economy, social well-being in the country<sup>25</sup> has slightly increased. The great breakthrough in AI results in omnipresent and affordable digital (AI) automatic assistance, unmanned and robotized efficient high-tech solutions for industries, public, households, and individuals, including transportation, totally renewable energy, environmental protection, medicine and health, media consumption, learning, communication, and work. Global climate has changed negatively, but insignificantly, partly compensated by human measures for keeping the environment livable and clean.</p>	<p>In 10-year perspective the average family has fairly settled with children (with distinctly rare exceptions) and pets (dogs or cats or both) at the country of initial or planned destination in urban environment preferably in a small town, the capital city satellite or, at least, in a mid-size of small town not far from the downtown, but in any case, surrounded by green nature zone either forest or park close to water (lake or sea) with pleasant ecological conditions.</p> <p>Family lives keeping friendly neighbourhoods and good communication with locals, in addition to international ties. The family's yearly calendar of important celebrations has been enriched by highly socially valuable and massively celebrated local national dates or events. All family members have acquired a second citizenship in the country of destination. If they wish, spouses participate in local social and political life. The family speaks fluently at least one official language; children are akin to natives. Offspring study at local schools or universities whenever they want. Families have an average of two children, or rarely more or less, in correlation with the material situation in the family. Family maintains strong ties both with growing and emancipating children and the older generation, and cares about them, but prefers to live separately from the grandparents.</p> <p>Family will never return to Russia; however, periodic visits to Russia are still wishful, and family keeps relation to cultural and social roots, e.g., using native language as internal familial, having among friends and acquaintances primarily Russian speaking, providing additional language environment to children. Family may openly demonstrate its national attributiveness (symbols, language) in a country of destination.</p> <p>The family prospers materially, preferably resides in its own house or at least rents a townhouse. Having a car is dependent on the practical needs of the family, and travelling at least once a year is customary for leisure time. The family's probable and</p>

<sup>25</sup> ‘Country’ in images description means ‘country of family destination’.

<i>System/ Social cause</i>	<p>Global economy with renovated international institutions and novel consensus provides cooperative stability, including, e.g., global environmental protection policy. The destined country with a democratic, well-turned, and self-regulated, slightly left-oriented political system maintains political freedom and local communities that are strengthening. Market economy provides a progressing common well-being and global competence of the country. Civic economy prevails. Social policy leads to betterment in the social sphere. The education system is 'de-systemized'. De-urbanization is emerging. Technological advancement of the country permits it to act as a testing ground for technological innovations and drives transformations in the socio-cultural domain. The country of destination promotes a green agenda and demonstrates environmentally friendly policies. Sharing models in agriculture is emerging.</p>	<p>desirable gross income per year varies remarkably (70,000 – 340,000 euros) and is derived from the spouses' professional area; however, the household budget permits paying rent or mortgage and purchasing unexpected large items, akin to major household appliances, and completely avoids skimping on food. Both spouses in a family work primarily according to their professions; however, partly the character of the work has changed to more creative and entrepreneurial. Daily family householding routine has been alleviated through advanced tech solutions (various digital assistance).</p>
<i>Worldview/ Discourse</i>	<p>Globalization returns as the principal model. Country's internal politics and state governance are characterized by transparency, plurality, stability, and low volatility, but a dynamic political landscape, and priority of concrete human needs in policies. The economy is more socially oriented, and the whole societal well-being is a value. Tolerance, peacefulness, humaneness, empathy, compassion, cooperation, honesty, and critical thinking are key attributes of a law-abiding society that values safety, human freedom, individual human life, privacy, personal happiness, zero tolerance for human exploitation, and unacceptance of violation. Local society in general demonstrates respectful and helpful attitudes towards the (migrant) family, which can openly demonstrate self-identity and uniqueness related to the culture of exodus. Society values free national</p>	<p>Based on the stable broader socio-economic and political situation and the local community life conditions, the family has seamlessly and fully integrated into the society as representatives of the middle or upper-middle class in the destination country. One of the indicators of successful integration is the family's stable income. Structural transformations of the labor market fostered by ubiquitous AI applications are highly likely to strengthen the working capabilities of spouses rather than take away their jobs.</p> <p>The family has genuinely respectful attitudes toward local culture and society and shares core values and viewpoints with the receiving society. Additionally, to host societal values, the family promotes the value of equal treatment of all nationalities, freedom, equality, and openness to the world. Spouses are proud of successful immigration. Internal family social values contain a conscious attitude to life, proactivity, creativity, flexible thinking, behavior, adaptability, and peacefulness. Safety and peaceful existence, stability, material, psychological, and physical wellbeing, tranquility, and family privacy, measured, stress-free, but workful life is valuable for the family. The family highly values children's development, care, and support, as well as grandparents. Internal family nexus is augmented with feelings of belonging to family, values of mutual respect, open</p>

<p>education and cares about the living place and nature, being environmentally oriented in general.</p>	<p>communication, honesty, trust and reliability, love, and consideration of the happiness of all family members. The family strives to keep their own self-identity and uniqueness, and identity or mentality connected with the culture of origin, simultaneously, feeling belonging to the host society. While family is reluctant to actively share political views, more active and openly discussing spouses are inclined to demonstrate left-centric or left-liberal positions. The family values and respects nature.</p>
<p><i>Myth/ Metaphor</i></p> <p>"History will take another turn to thaw in all relations." "Human-centric society" lives "In the 21st century, [where] everything is evolving by leaps and bounds!" and "AI, like in the 90's the internet blew up the world and turned everything upside down!". "Tsiolkovsky was right – the Earth is only a Cradle of Humankind!". The era of "Noosphere" is coming.</p>	<p>Place of destination is a 'safe harbor' for family where spouses feel comfort and confidence in a place of destination, as at "birthplace".</p> <p>"We won't really feel like 'true' [major nation of destined country] (makes air quotes, smiles). Yes, I'm laughing now, but still — even as immigrants, we'll feel that we belong to [major] culture." Russian citizenship is not a "sacral value", but "I would like to live in a world where I am not ashamed to be Russian, where my child is not ashamed to be Russian!". "We're not 'sovok' [Soviet] anymore, but we're not really modern Russia either. We're kind of in this in-between stage — the ones trying to figure out on our own what to believe in, what we care about, and what holidays feel right to celebrate."</p> <p>"I don't know what it will be like out there with visits, online, who knows what else will come up in 10 years. Maybe our "doubles" will be traveling the world and we'll be quietly warming ourselves by the fireplace in the meantime." and "Pet robo-dogs from Boston Dynamics that fetch, clean up, etc."</p>

Table 4. "Hobbit[s]" in the "Naked Harbor": Inter-topia.

<i>Layers</i>	<i>External future context</i>	<i>Internal future context</i>
<p>Litany</p>	<p>A hot phase of regional conflicts in the Middle East, between China and Taiwan, and in Ukraine has ended around 2028 with a massive, prolonged impact, including the following sequential global political crises. In 2035, the period of stabilization commences, however, the novel global political and economic crisis is evolving. Putin is a Russian leader; between Russia and</p>	<p>The family has friendly, but shallow relations with locals. Family neighbors are mostly expats. Spouses have acquired almost sufficient (at least intermediate) levels of official local language for daily life and work communication. Family avoids any participation in political activities, including voting, sometimes being detached from the local political life and societal issues.</p>

	<p>the country of destination are still tensions. The country's economic well-being slightly declines. Technological development is moderate and gradual, but it adds efficiency to the economy. Climate has changed remarkably in a negative way: global warming, sea level rise, coastal inundation, an increase in droughts, fires, and tsunamis. Biodiversity declines. Countries have been divided into two groups: environment-friendly and environment-careless. The environmental situation in densely populated regions is deteriorating. The rise of the negative environmental impact of early "green" energy technologies is evident.</p>	<p>Family's material situation is rather stable even in crisis with sufficient income for the habitual life quality for the whole family. Possible family budget cuts postpone childbirth.</p> <p>Although, family is more technologically advanced than local society of "belated adopters" it experiences cognitive overload caused by technological abundance and prefers to live without highly advanced technologies in household.</p> <p>Connection with older relatives is maintained, however, remarkably hindered due to the strict migration policy. Other relatives (e.g., siblings) care about maturing grandparents, but grandparents have likely passed away. The family is hesitant to renounce Russian citizenship and is deeply interested in studying Russian by a child at a high level. In addition to local, the family celebrates specific official dates of the country of exodus (International Women's Day - March 8th, Victory Day - May 9th) and even visits Russia for that.</p>
System/ Social cause	<p>Conservatism in governance. Democracy is shrinking, simultaneously empowering the political establishment. Political freedom remains in general, however slight restrictions on rights and freedom of speech are evident. Global economic inequality and financial aid from richer countries to poorer countries. Protectionism in a country's economic policy prevails with a substantial reduction of immigration, however, labor migrants are still economically beneficial. Socially-oriented policy is supposed to be for the care of the citizens of the host country primarily. Basic social services are affordable for the middle class. Economic inequality in society is remarkably increasing, caused by the incapability of part of the population to utilize novel technologies; however, AI implementation inconsiderably transforms working patterns. EU resists in adoption of automated services, e.g., unmanned transportation. The internal political regime in Russia is less oppressive, however, out of the normality.</p>	<p>Generally, family experiences slightly insufficient integration into the local society, and somewhat precarious existing in a country of destination.</p>
Worldview/ Discourse	<p>Generally individualistic society in a country of destination is patterned by 'overtolerance' and self-censorship. Societal attitudes towards immigrants in a country vary. Hidden biases, prejudices, slightly discriminatory attitudes, and distinctions in society toward migrants and particular social groups, with unacceptance of human vices and destructive behavior, still exist.</p>	<p>A well-fed family is a fundamental value. The family feels anxiety about local societal attitudes towards them as Russians, including potential discrimination against children in school and hindering career promotion caused by Russian citizenship. Spouses' maturation triggers additional anxiety towards the future, including possible unemployment (age discrimination) and</p>

The technological "explosion" is unforeseen and abrupt is coupled with conservatism in technology supplying for the individuals vs. industrial utilization. Ethical concerns connected with digital (AI) assistants are evident. Technologically driven transformations in the socio-cultural layer have progressed insignificantly. The global environmental crisis has been primarily caused by "system fatigue" rather than human activity.

health issues. Family specifically values the cultural identity of the major population of a country of destination, considers that mastery of the official language in the destination country wins over locals, and tries not to differentiate from local society, up to complete social dissolving to be inconspicuous and to avoid shame for being Russian.

Spouses feel guiltiness and anxiety of leaving grandparents in loneliness in ageing. Family's views contain belief that lay people are insufficiently prepared for political choice, can harm the political system, and powerless. Techno conservatism of the family includes perceiving of the AI development as threatening and slight distrust to complex technologies in general.

Myth/  
Metaphor

"The [country] will be completely safe from any political conflicts because it is tucked away in the very heart of this vast [Europe] union — and by the time anything reaches it, well...". However, "Chaos is forming in 'socialistic' countries" and "the economic stability of the country is derived from early profits from colonialism that now ended". Hence, "Time to time every country needs slight protectionist politics", therefore, "That's enough! Let's close! We are continuing social policy in a closed type!" "Traditional [controversial] attitudes towards someone's arrival. For example, the question "where are you from?" is a very peculiar question." "I'm not saying that gladly, I'm stating a fact, we are a privileged group of white people, and I think we are less susceptible...privileged not in the sense that I think we are better, I mean, the world is set up in a way that makes life easier for white people." "Medicine is a horrible shithole here and it won't be fixed in 10 years!". "In terms of society, I don't know, I think it's going to kind of really divide a little bit into those who embrace artificial intelligence and learn faster how to use that shovel, it's kind of like a cyborg story in fact". "The planet, I think it's going to be bad in 10 years!" "The number of people being born is breaking all records, so no one will have time to clean up the poop behind them, and it will be worse there!"

Citizenship of an EU country is a "normal" citizenship. "Of course, you still feel the difference in mentality — it's fun to chat, but you're not going to bare your soul, so to speak. The level of certain experiences or problems that someone from the former USSR — from that region — understands is probably a bit more serious, let's say, than what the [local national], who've grown up in really good conditions, have ever dealt with." "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." "As long as there are no... um... global surprises of any kind, we're like hobbits far from the world — unnoticed by others, and unaware of the world ourselves" akin to "sand on the ocean bottom". "Integration means you don't stand out — I guess, somehow, we don't stand out. People from the outside see us as integrated. Maybe on the inside, we're not sure how we feel, but at least from the outside, no one singles us out, no one puts a yellow star on us... They don't brand us with numbers or send us off to special districts for people like us!" "Then again, I guess over the next ten years, we'll change too — some things will fade from our minds, and we'll become more [major nationality in a country of destination] in that sense. And I feel like we have a better chance of that happening than most people who move here. Russians."

"It is necessary to run faster to stay at the same level!"

"Politicians argue, but it's ordinary people who suffer!"

"Personal assistant - "Tamagochi" - will absorb all personal life of the child and if "You developed dumb system – it adopts all your behavior!"

Table 5. “Blade Runner[s 2035]” in the “Westworld”: Dystopia

<i>Layers</i>	<i>External future context</i>	<i>Internal future context</i>
<i>Litany</i>	The possibility of a global, high-scale war has dramatically increased during 10 years, conjoined with polarization, arming, and defending against Russia. The EU has collapsed. Putin invades Finland and Poland, hot conflict between Western countries and Russia has commenced. The government deports Russian citizens. The country's economy experiences inflation. Taxes have risen. The system of common well-being has collapsed. The remarkable gap in economic well-being between poor and rich countries is widening. Global overpopulation is evident. A chain of global environmental catastrophes has happened, caused by climate change. Acid rains. Water pollution and illnesses in overpopulated regions are more severe than ever. A huge number of climate migrants, including a substantial share of illegal immigrants. The AI is smarter than the vast majority of the Earth's population.	Under the threat of direct discrimination, local environmental crisis (e.g., floods or extreme heat), in the current country of destination family moves to another country, but never to Russia.
<i>System/ Social cause</i>	Global environmental agreements have been completely violated; corresponding international institutions have been weakened, and climate consensus is hardly possible. In some countries, technologically empowered smart marginals control and rule the population. In a country of destination, radicals have taken power in crisis, and an authoritarian (monarchic) model of governance is being established. More right internal politics lead to immigration-prevention policy. Custom tariffs have been implemented in the local economy. The medical sphere is underfinanced and malfunctioned. AI is actively utilized for human behavior control. Interpersonal communication decreased. Legislation changes to more discriminating towards Russian citizens.	A global catastrophe might drastically negatively impact on child's future. Highly precarious and risky daily life of the family in total crisis.
<i>Worldview/ Discourse</i>	The libertarian model in the socio-economic sphere prevails. Mainstream country policy – isolation and national protectionism, including the less socially-oriented state. No one is interested in the immigrant family staying in the country. Multiculturalism erodes local national identity, that coupled with the rise of nationalistic attitudes in a society. Humankind is powerless to prevent the global environmental crisis and climate change.	The spouses' self-perception contains a pejorative xenophobic connotation.

<p><i>Myth/ Metaphor</i></p>	<p>"It seems to me that in 2030, some horrible [happens]!". "Russia is an empire of evil!" and "Something like a full-on Iron Curtain coming down, where you'd need exit visas to leave Russia...". "Just let there be no war! And otherwise, all Russian speakers will have a bad time, I'm afraid, and we will be sent to the ghetto up north beyond [remote province in a country of destination] there [if Putin invades the country]. There, that certainly scares me, to put it mildly". "[A] chip that's sewn under your ear. And yes, with a certain amount of time, you can read out information from it, which is like a flash drive, all your emotions, everything you saw, everything you heard, and it's all recorded" "[a]nd don't forget to make babies!".</p>	<p>"Just let there be no war!"</p> <p>"I have now stopped operating with the concept of "permanent residence" and changed it to "place of basing," which is a place where your things that are not with you are lying around, and when you enter, you are not asked, "What is the purpose of your arrival?".</p> <p>"...we always keep that [risk of a flood] in the back of our minds...We just don't want to end up with a traumatizing experience later on — like, 'Oh no, we built our whole life here,' just like our grandparents did in the USSR, building and building their entire lives — and then everything fell apart. To avoid that kind of situation, we try to keep our minds open. That's all."</p> <p>"In your [wife's] picture then it's goodbye to everything, just f.ck everything, because then the far right will win everywhere, it'll be like Texas vs. the Mexicans and in your picture of the world, I think it's really easier to buy ammo and canned goods than to try to fix things up."</p>
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Table 6. "The Road": Apocalypse

<i>Layers</i>	<b><i>External future and Internal future context</i></b>
<i>Litany</i>	<p>Nuclear war in nearly 10 years is possible. "...walking through the forest. Maybe, nuclear forest. I don't know, we'll go to the lead farm to get gasoline". "Taking into account that someone corrects the nuclear doctrine of the nuclear state, this option can't be ignored at all."</p>
<i>System/ Social cause</i>	<p>Social collapse.</p>
<i>Worldview/ Discourse</i>	<p>Keep your mind open and be adaptive.</p>
<i>Myth/ Metaphor</i>	<p>"I had to try harder not to "catastrophize" myself somehow!", but "I was imagining a nuclear explosion all the time!". It will lead to consequences akin to in "a movie, "The Road" with Viggo Mortensen. It's about a man and his young son surviving an environmental disaster on Earth". "I might add, because I think we have one important, one important factor that affects the way we build and predict everything, is that we both agree to go to Tibet at any time, if something goes wrong. And it seems to me, and this is now really on the level of a kind of joke. And it gives you a lot of inner peace, because there is no option in your head that something somewhere may not work out for various reasons, because you always kind of realize that, if anything, we will finally go to Tibet, to the temple to communicate with the Dalai Lama, to paint pictures, to meditate."</p>

## 4.2 Structural analysis of the images of the futures

The structural analysis of the families' images of the futures has been conducted through the slightly tailored "six foresight frames" concept of Minkkinen et al. (2019). The thematic analysis methodology has been involved, and the initial thematization has been organized by the pre-set themes, namely, predictions (forecast), scenario(-s), futures critique, plan(-s), vision, and transformative novelty for the corresponding coding. While the analysis has progressed, the novel codes evolve to specify the elements of the family's foresight results. The exploration contains a quantitative aspect that implies simple frequency analysis: calculating of informants' statements with similar values (attributed to one or other themes). Quantitative analysis does not contain robust statistical data processing and serves solely for the illustrative purpose, and demonstrates a tendency.

Two attributes have emerged quite early in the initial phase of the coding of the family statements – *global*, *societal*, and *family* futures as a logical separation of the external family environment and internal family life. In my codification, *global* future inserts the whole world, international affairs, and other than family destination countries and societies, including the country of exodus (primarily Russia). The *societal* future contains, particularly, the country of family destination (in one case planned for further migration) that includes all types of surrounding family entities from the political governmental level to local close societal, e.g., neighbors. The *family's* future includes the family with its relation to extended family and close familial circles (relatives).

It is worth highlighting that in many cases it is quite challenging or mere impossible to separate all three futures since they are tightly intertwined (Table 7). However, primarily it is manifested in some logical and coherent narrative or image when the family is exposed to societal or global impacts, e.g., either global environment issues and war, or societal and family contexts are inseparable, e.g., friends, neighbors, coworkers, social attitudes, etc. The number of cross-sections of these levels demonstrates rather an expected logical situation: the closer the milieu, the more it is interconnected. However, the direct influence from the far outer circle is also highly evident.

One remark, regularly the lower lever does not have the "real" impact on the higher, e.g., the family might not have any intentions to actively change the global or societal level. It means that the family has vision, hopes, beliefs, expectations, or scenarios and rarely plans toward a higher level, e.g., active participation in political life, social activism, or volunteering. Also, in the families' future images, the societal level rarely influences the global, except in specific cases, e.g., when the country of destination operates internationally or has a connection with the country of exodus. In

contrast, the highest levels might have an impact of the various degrees of possibility and intensity on the family future or global to societal.

Table 7. Number of statements concerning the external and internal future family contexts

	<i>Family future</i>	<i>Societal future</i>	<i>Global future</i>
Family future	405	78	24
Societal future	78	260	51
Global future	24	51	123

Several examples of cross-section of various contexts of the futures are below. For instance, *global* and *societal* futures in this vision are inseparable.

1 FEH: It is the question of stability that is the most important for me personally, so that there are no global, national or, I don't know, I don't know, for example, [country of destination] left the EU and stayed with the [previous local currency], for example, again. Or there suddenly Russia squeezed out a part of [country of destination], and there are consequences of that there too.

It is an ideal picture when everything is stable, everything is good, people live peacefully, go about their business, enjoy life and are proud of the fact that they live here and not somewhere else.

*Societal* and *family* futures in the following statements are tightly intertwined.

R: Straightforward question, but nevertheless, how do you think it will be with taxes?

8SAW: I know it's still gonna be high. Nah, I don't think there's going to be any loosening up. Maybe there will be some new ones, but I don't see any radical changes.

8SAH: There is money that we received, yes, roughly speaking, hands and then it was taken away from us in various ways: by renting or buying, loans, buying groceries and so on and so forth. Here it turns out, there's just money that we have and that's been taken away from us. And this percentage, it, kind of, always depends on the fact that the world lives well - it means that less is taken away from us, badly lives - it means that more is taken away. Well, in 10 years, they will take away more.

\*\*\*

8SAW: I don't know, it seems to me there will be less interaction, there will be less voice communication, it seems to me. We'll be communicating more with computers, not with other people, and since we have, as I think we have, as it seems to me, individual development is very much encouraged now less than team interaction, it seems to me that, like, I don't know, kids will have less friends. They're not going to want to have a bunch of friends that they have to call, talk to, text with.

\*\*\*

2APW: Well, yes, but I think, kind of... When we described as we... even house, neighbors, well, kind of, nobody [puts] any tags on our doors. As you [husband] told, integration is when you are not standing out, maybe, kind of they don't single us out, they consider us integrated from their viewpoint. Perhaps, inside, it's unknown how we will consider ourselves. But, at least, from outside people don't distinguish [us], [they don't put] a yellow star.

2APH: They don't tag us with numbers, I don't know, don't bring us to special districts for the same people as we are.

\*\*\*

R: But in 10 years, where you live, you will know all your neighbors, and your neighbors will all know you?

6OIShH: Yes!

6OIShW: Yes!

6OIShH: And we'll know the rector of the church, I'll have a good relationship with the bartender at the pub, all the ones there. We'd love to!

*Global* and *family* futures might be directly connected or in a chain *global-societal-family*, for example, through the family's vision, values, and plans.

1FEH: Of course, I want there to be no war, I want people to be able to resolve conflicts by communicating, not by force. That's why we teach our kids if some a conflict happens – not to fight, to communicate!

\*\*\*

7KLW: Well, I say so, okay, I imagine that we have a child. Moms come one by one for a relatively tangible period of time; I mean, a couple of months. Let's hope that there will be a thaw and they will give parental visas and all this kind of thing.

Eventually, I have elaborated a two-line matrix that incorporates the entire codes/themes based on the modified “six foresight frames” (Minkkinen et al. 2019) and external and internal family contexts (Table 8). It must be underlined that absolute numbers or share (percentage) of each foresight outcome should not be perceived as statistic variables to be rigorously analyzed by quantitative methods. These rough numeric calculations serve primarily for illustrative purposes and for unveiling the tendency in composition of the family future images.

Table 8. Number of statements attributed to "six foresight frames" concerning the external and internal family futures

	<i>Family future</i>	<i>Societal future</i>	<i>Global future</i>
Scenario (possibility)	174	155	90
Vision	108	64	15
Prediction (forecast)	100	88	23
Plan	55	0	0
Futures critique	5	11	12
Transformational novelty	0	2	1

Based on the table above, it might be supposed that immigrant family's future image is a *scenario*-based dynamic script with crossroads, ramifications and various narratives rather than static picture. Additionally, it might be assumed that family tries to elaborate alternatives to be prepared to or to realize in the next decade.

*Visions* and *predictions* are the second most noticed future modalities that are attributed to the family images of the future. It might be interpreted as if the family has both a rather clear ideation about a desirable future and a corresponding level of confidence to predict future developments.

*Plans* are also presented in the family image creation being less frequently detected than the three abovementioned foresight results although. That is in turn quite understandable intuitively since family soberly realize their limits in capabilities to steer external context and their own life course.

*Futures critique* and *transformational novelty* are the rarest foresight outcomes in a family's future pondering. The former is mostly connected with societal and global context when family members challenge each other or their own existing present assumptions about future developments. Future critiques have been detected in the discussion of various societal and familial issues, whereas transformational novelty is connected solely with technological aspects of the external futures.

An example of futures critique:

4OEW: Will Europe be drawn into the conflict between the West and the Russian Federation? I don't know, but if it does, I'm afraid we will be affected. Well, us, as our family, then we will have to figure out what to do.

Incidentally, the *futures critique* considers societal and family issues and might be grounded in informants' values:

7 K LW: Despite the right are coming to power, it seems to me, it's important to understand that between Hitler's fascism and, for example, national protectionism is a huge gap! It doesn't mean that all people who want to close a bit the country they now want to measure skulls – it's not the case! I mean any state from time to time needs slight protectionist policies, and it doesn't mean that everything will be cruel and bad. Although I don't share the right, as a rule, I don't share right views.

The limited number of futures critique elements in the family foresight might be partly connected with the leading role of the interviewer in problematizing the informants.

An example of transformational novelty:

1 FEH: If there was a teleporter, or there, as in Strugatsky's, there was a machine that makes you a meal out of nothing, a ready-made dish, well, that's cool! Of course, it's a game changer, as they say, but it changes everything. No hunger, people don't have to work anymore, they get what they want thanks to this one machine, conditionally universal.

Expectedly, families are more ready to speculate on the internal family future context rather than the outer one. Although it is a less frequent practice, they also tend to seize the opportunity to envisage external future evolvments, especially societal future, since it is the closest family's milieu, while contemplating more about alternative scenarios and forecasts compared with visioning.

Through the exploration of the types of foresight outcomes, the additional, quite evident attributes of the scenarios have emerged almost from the initial analytical stage – the degree of scenarios' probability. Since the strict typology of the probability level measurement is unavailable, I set the empirically drawn criteria for such attribution. First, the three levels of the probability have been established – high, moderate, and low – with drastically simplified distinctions between the degrees: 1-30%, 31-70%, 71-100%. These numeric intervals serve as mere scales for the attribution since, in some cases, informants utilize digits (percentage) for the scenario probability estimation, for example:

8 SAH: Well, it's not principally. I think that it is some hybrid scheme. Well, we in principle work remotely now.

8 SAW: I [work] highly likely from home.

8 SAH: But I probably from home, well, fifty-fifty perhaps.

\*\*\*

9DVW: Well, I think ten to nine...oh [no]! Nine to one that we'll stay.

\*\*\*

9DVH: I mean more than 80%, assumingly, of people already technologized.

Although in the vast majority of cases the level of probability has been attributed voluntarily, I have predetermined the elementary scales based on the special words' connotations. Considering the original language of the interview, Russian, it turns out that translation of the words-markers of the level of probability is rather dependable on the context and quite often any phrase or word, for example, akin to “Я думаю, что...or I think that” might have various tones of probability. In some cases, it means more confident close to logical reasoning, but in others, “I think” might be “I guess”. Nevertheless, I have constructed the approximate scale using, for instance, “верю, скорее всего, скорее/I believe, most likely, highly likely” as high probability, “мне кажется, я думаю, допустим/it seems to me, I think/guess, let's assume” as moderate probability, and “слабо представляю, совсем даже не уверен, я не чувствую/hardly imaginable, I'm not even sure, I don't feel” as low probability. In the rearrest cases, informants use phrases that accurately posit the probability of the statement, e.g., “the probability of that is not very high”. The total number of statements regarding to degrees of the scenarios' probability is in Table 9.

Table 9. Number of statements concerning degrees of the scenarios' probability

	<b>Family future</b>	<b>Societal future</b>	<b>Global future</b>
High probability	97	92	39
Moderate probability	41	32	15
Low probability	23	34	28

This more scrupulous analysis allows for measuring, to some extent, the level of overall family confidence and belief in their future. The general observation is that families are fairly confident or believe in their future projections. Combining with the next attribute – sentiment or emotional pole of the future development – the images of the futures become more contrast (Table 10).

Table 10. Number of statements that contain emotional connotation towards foreseeing future developments in the external and internal family future contexts

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Moderately positive</b>	<b>Moderately negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>
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Scenario:

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Moderately positive</b>	<b>Moderately negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>
High probability	65	88	20	18
Moderate probability	15	31	12	13
Low probability	6	22	16	22
Scenario-“dichotomy/ ramification”	14	26	7	13
Prediction (forecast)	31	38	19	13
Plan	4	5	2	0
<b>Total</b>	135	210	76	79

Considering the emotional charge of the foresight results of the family, the positive estimation of the future developments in external and internal future contexts prevails. However, families tend not to overestimate the level of control over uncertainty and are evidently cautious in their scenarios, forecasts, and plans. Vision is excluded from this attribution since it inherently implies the positive image of the desired future (as one of the informants has mentioned – “*wishful thinking*”).

The separate analysis of *global*, *societal*, and *familial* contexts might bring tiny details into the family’s perception of uncertainty on these levels (Tables 11, 12, 13 correspondingly).

Table 11. Number of statements that contain emotional connotation towards foreseeing future developments in the internal family future context

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Moderately positive</b>	<b>Moderately negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>
Scenario:				
High probability	30	48	7	3
Moderate probability	8	23	7	4
Low probability	3	8	5	5
Scenario-“dichotomy/ ramification”	8	16	5	3
Prediction (forecast)	11	17	9	2
Plan	4	5	2	0
<b>Total</b>	64	117	35	17

Table 12. Number of statements that contain emotional connotation towards foreseeing future developments in the societal future context

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Moderately positive</b>	<b>Moderately negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>
Scenario:				
High probability	33	43	11	9

	<i>Very positive</i>	<i>Moderately positive</i>	<i>Moderately negative</i>	<i>Very negative</i>
Moderate probability	6	13	7	7
Low probability	3	12	9	12
Scenario-“dichotomy/ ramification”	4	11	2	8
Prediction (forecast)	23	28	12	9
Plan	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	69	107	41	45

Table 13. Number of statements that contain emotional connotation towards foreseeing future developments in the global future context

	<i>Very positive</i>	<i>Moderately positive</i>	<i>Moderately negative</i>	<i>Very negative</i>
Scenario:				
High probability	15	12	7	13
Moderate probability	1	4	5	9
Low probability	2	3	6	16
Scenario-“dichotomy/ ramification”	5	7	1	8
Prediction (forecast)	6	6	3	7
Plan	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	29	32	22	53

Grounded on the tables above, it might be noticed that in addition to the least attention to the global context in general, the (moderate)positive pole of the future developments shifts to the highly probable scenarios on all levels. Whereas the very negative scenarios are the low probable on social (9 and 12) and global levels (6 and 16). Moreover, comparing global and social contexts, the former leads among very negative connotations (16), especially concerning the relatively smaller number of scenarios on the global level in total: global – 136, societal – 262. One parameter is evidently out of the expected – the number of positively estimated forecasts on the societal level (51) compared with at least familial (28).

As aforementioned, these numbers are non-statistical variables and demonstrate solely a common tendency. Furthermore, the content and structure of the conversation during the interview also matter since the topical structure might have immediate implications on the narrative. Nevertheless, it might be supposed that families predominantly ponder the nearest milieu that relatively more tightly intertwines with family daily life. However, supposedly, in terms of prediction, families

manifest a higher level of confidence considering positive future societal development surrounding them.

One might have noticed in the tables the term “scenario-dichotomy/ramification” I apply between scenarios and prediction. Likewise, other additions to the initial coding frames, this concept has appeared naturally within the analysis. Minkkinen et al. (2019, 9) classify the “if-then” construct as a prediction. The core idea initially is perceived as clear, strict, and direct *cause-and-effect* logic: if something happens, then another, consequently, occurs. I suggest considering a supplementary idea. Leaving the central firm *cause-and-effect* construct, it might be added the second line “if not-then” akin to algorithmic dichotomy “1-0”: if something happens, then another, consequently, occurs, but if something does not happen, then something else, consequently, occurs. Regularly, informants remain the second option behind the scenes; however, such a branch is evidently assumed and in some cases is manifested, e.g., by the other family member. For example:

1FEH: I believe if we stay in [country of destination], everything will work out, then they will be totally integrated, they will have other mentality.

Later spouse reveals the second option:

1FEW: Maybe at the end of the year we’ll move to Denmark.

Hence, the full version of family’s future developments is as such: if we stay here then they will be, but if we do not stay here then they will not be; and, furthermore, if we move to another country then they will not be (or they will be in another state). It is hardly imaginable absence of the second option. “0” option “if not” in contrast with programming implies another “1” or other quality of “if”, it is not an empty option. Thus, I have distinguished this type of future development as “scenario-dichotomy/ramification”. In several interviews, informants present several equivalent consequences from the “if” that enhance branching: if... then ...or...or. For example, an informant discusses if the family reaches a particular milestone in their life, then several professional careers are equally probable:

2APW: Well, one option is I am, kind of, a free researcher [laughing], a free artist. Well, kind of, I don't know, invited consultant, such a kind of individual...well, that is one option. The other option – I simply work employed, probably, in [current] profession. Also, it may be a PhD. Well, in short, something says that there is no specific wish.

In cases where I coded by “prediction (forecast)” only are certainly one-way developments without options, one-directional projections based on strong beliefs. For instance:

2APW: Well, not “probably”, but **definitely will** be more [climate migrants]!

The central observation from the content of predictions is the specificity in topics, namely, fundamental societal principles, values and characteristics including ecology in a country of destination, family values, future of children in particular sense, technologies, climate, relatives, cultural-language identity. Below several examples are provided for illustrative purposes.

1FEH: I believe they will orient to these human principles.

\*\*\*

R: What do you think? What kind of situation will there be in 10 years? Political, internal, and external.

5EDMH: I believe that everything will be good.

R: Let’s unwrap this thesis.

5EDMH: Society will be rich and satisfied. It will be independent of the outer factors. And it will be comfortable for us to be in this society. <...>

5EDMH: Well, I agree that [local nationality] very carefully treat nature, and they will not harm ecology by their own efforts.

\*\*\*

R: But in 10 years, where you live, you will know all your neighbors, and your neighbors will all know you?

6OISHH: Yes!

6OISHW: Yes!

6OISHH: And we'll know the rector of the church, I'll have a good relationship with the bartender at the pub, all the ones there. We'd love to! <...>

6OISHH: Well, judging on the successes of [country of destination] economy, everything will be good [with technological development]. <...> That’s definitely going to be a trend, who knows how far it will progress, but we, no we count and assume that in 10 years the situation will become, will be much better than now.

\*\*\*

7KLH: Yes, yes, nothing threatens us here! But I should add, I want to add that, as I said earlier, I don’t think that anything threatens our family even in the worst [societal] scenario because [country of destination] during the last 100-plus years looks like a country which cares about its citizens. That’s why everything must be [good].<...>

R: In other words, all those attributes [democracy, free market, inviolability of home or property] remain for 10 years.

7KLW: I believe.

7KLH: Yes, for me, it's like it's a given, I mean, there's not even a doubt on the horizon for 10 years. <...>

7KLW: I believe that over time – I always rely on some history – over time in any case world becomes more, more human. Even if we see some spikes in violence the global trend is humanity though.

\*\*\*

R: What are your own views [in the future]?

2APH: I will adhere to liberal, well, liberal more left.

\*\*\*

1FEH: Absolutely the same [as currently]. Absolutely, the same technologically. Nothing will change at all!

\*\*\*

7KLH: All voice assistants must be in 10 years. It looks like AI and all these capacities turn into not just supporters, but into full-fledged assistants. And it will be in [a country of destination].

\*\*\*

R: What language will be common in your family in 10 years?

7KLH: Russian.

7KLW: Yes, Russian.

\*\*\*

R: A simple question. Do you acquire the language of the country of your destination? Am I right?

8SAW: Yes.

8SAH: Yes.

R: And your kids will study at a local school or kindergarten, and they will study and speak the language of your country of living?

8SAW: Yes.

8SAH: Yes, yes.

\*\*\*

4OEW: But the youngest will not be in a high school at that time, he will be in a secondary school.

\*\*\*

8SAW: They [grandparents] will definitely stay where they live now.

8SAH: Yes, but everyone's location will be different.

\*\*\*

R: Do you suppose some climate change of global character in 10 years?

5EDMH: Is it necessary to say if it's better or worse? Of course, change will be!

\*\*\*

3DVH: Temperature's rising, it's definite!

\*\*\*

3DVH: I mean, from the firm traditions, the New Year [celebration] is a really firm tradition.

<...>

R: Try to determine five holidays that you definitely will celebrate.

<...>

3DVH: New Year [informant counts other local celebrations] and our birthdays.

\*\*\*

R: Tell me, if you imagine your family's holidays and traditions, in 10 years, what holiday will you celebrate 100% of the year?

5EDMW: Christmas. Yes, of course, the New Year and birthdays. [Informant mentions one more local holiday].

\*\*\*

4OEW: I think we'll never belong there. We'll be king of...a little bit alien always. Yes. Whatever we have, but that's my idea now, whatever level of [official language in a host country] I have, let's say, I'll still be slightly other.

Some of these examples of the prediction and scenario-“dichotomy/ramification” specifically might be chosen for the demonstration of a particular common phenomenon derived from the analysis of all families' future images. The boundaries between “six foresight frames” are thin, if not to say, transparent and flexible. In some cases, a prediction that sounds akin to a plan converts into a vision, for instance, in this passage:

6OIShH: And **we'll know** the rector of the church, **I'll have a good relationship** with the bartender at the pub, all the ones there. **We'd love to!**

The informant uses the future simple tense for describing certainly developed future elements and finalizes with the modal form that points out the desired future. In another example:

1FEH: A **highly probable possibility** is that we live in peace, work, time is approaching – permanent residence permit, time is passing, we study a language, pass tests, apply for citizenship. Even under conditions of a new legislature, new laws that complicate the process...

In the latter statement, the highly probable scenario transforms to a prediction that switches to a plan and finalizes it with another prediction. I have coded the entire vignette as a highly probable scenario based on the assumption that the initial idea is conditioned by the level of probability or the informant's confidence. However, it might be more valuable to analyze more meticulously and to tag the pieces of the information more precisely. But it might turn out into a continuous process while the number of “foresight debris” rockets exponentially.

One more case of the intrusion from one frame to another:

9DVH: And **I hope**, and, **probably**, the health sphere will be technologically much better because it's not about sci-fi, but about economics as well.

“*I hope*” is a marker of the vision or desirable future whereas “*probably*” indicates the level of scenario viability. And this piece of information I have coded simultaneously as a vision and as a highly probable scenario. In the next sample, the situation is reversed compared to the latter.

R: Well, a highly probable scenario is the relaunch of the situation in Russia, and the political configuration will be changing, right?

6OIShH: Yes.

R: To what direction?

6OIShH: Well, to better, I hope to better...yes, to better in that sense that the re-negotiation of these agreements will be followed by the appearance of new institutions which will work more efficiently.

A highly probable scenario turns out to be a vision (hope) that flows to the prediction.

Continuing the demonstration of evidence of fluid foresight outcomes, I have chosen one dialogue. In several rather limited cases, *future critiques* transform into *scenarios* during the conversation and spouses' arguing. As an example, in one of them, the first *scenario* is derived from *futures critique* originating in the belief that, based on societal values, or better, assumingly attributed to societal

values that are manifested in the critique of the spouse's assumptions towards the future. Whereas the second *scenario*=(*plan*)*prediction* is based not only on the assumed societal values but also on the present experience/knowledge (also belief) and is expressed in the form of planned actions or prediction, which is hardly detected.

7 KLW: ...you know, kind of, we live in such a world, when it is understandable that not all misters care that something is going or is not going there if it [AI] will begin to take away. It might take considerable time for the government to reflect on it and to help. But many people by that moment will already be below the poverty line.

7 KLH: Well, you understand that if the labor force in the form of robots is cheaper than labor in the form of humans, these same capitalist people will quickly kick out all humans and replace them with robots.

7 KLW: Well, and what?

7 KLH: But if it is a big trend that the big percentage of unemployment will be, so to speak...

7 KLW: That is the thing I'm afraid of! That is what I've particularly said!

7 KLH: ...which must be handled by the state.

7 KLW: But now it handles?

7 KLH: More or less.

7 KLW: It seems to me not! That's what I think. <...>

7 KLW: And you assume that the state will begin to take on the responsibility of co-preserving the welfare of those people who are left behind?

7 KLH: Yes, yes, in a sense, that there will certainly be income, let's say. What we're doing is agriculture, for example, and agriculture will not need so many people, and robots will do it. It's going to grow enough. Well, it will be like that: just healthy human socialism, but it will be very soon, but it's like a possible scenario.

The decomposition of the spouses' dialogue to highlight the mentioned transformation of the futures critique into two scenarios is below.

The first spouse's belief: "*we live in such a world when is understandable that not all misters care that something is going or is not going there if it [AI] will begin to take away*"

The first spouse's future critiques: "*It might take considerable time for the government to reflect on it and to help*".

The first scenario: *“many people by that moment will already be below the poverty line”*. And, using the spouse’s counterargument, I complete the scenario by adding its beginning: *“capitalist people will quickly kick out all humans and replace them with robots”*.

The second spouse’s knowledge: *“if the labor force in the form of robots is cheaper than labor in the form of humans”* and experience: *“these same capitalist people will quickly kick out all humans and replace them with robots”* – which are both beliefs.

The first spouse’s future critiques: *“That is the thing I’m afraid of! That is what I’ve particularly said!”*

The second scenario-dichotomy leads to a prediction: *“if it is a big trend that the big percentage of unemployment will be”* <...> *“which must be handled by the state”* And speculating further with usage of the spouse’s speech: *“many people by that moment will NOT be already below the poverty line”*.

The first spouse’s future critiques: *“But now it [the state] handles?”*

The second spouse’s knowledge: *“More or less”*

The first spouse’s future critiques: *“It seems to me not! That's what I think.”* *“And you assume that the state will begin to take on the responsibility of co-preserving the welfare of those people who are left behind?”*

The second scenario-prediction full completion: *“if it is a big trend that the big percentage of unemployment will be”* <...> *“which must be handled by the state”* And speculating further with usage of the spouse’s speech: *“many people by that moment will NOT be already below the poverty line”* *“there will certainly be [unconditional] income let's say. What we're doing is agriculture, for example, and agriculture will not need so many people and robots will do it. It's going to grow enough. Well, it will be like that: just healthy human socialism, but it will be very soon, but it's like a possible scenario”*.

The intersection of six types of foresight results in families’ statements are in the Table 14 below.

Table 14. Number of statements attributed to overlapping foresight frames concerning the external and internal family futures

	<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Prediction</i>	<i>Vision</i>	<i>Plan</i>	<i>Futures critique</i>	<i>Transformative novelty</i>
Scenario (possibility)	337	31	25	8	13	
Prediction (forecast)	31	181	7	2	3	
Vision	25	7	161	1	2	
Plan	8	2	1	54	0	
Futures critique	13	3	2	0	24	
Transformative novelty	2	0	0	0	0	

As a preliminary summary of this subchapter, the metaphor could be exploited for the depicted phenomenon. “Six foresight frames” of Minkkinen et al. (2019) might be imagined as a palette of three primordial – red-*prediction*, yellow-*scenario*, blue-*vision* – and two basic, but supplementary colors, white-*plan* and black-*futures critique*. Countless combinations of these colors provide infinite variations of future development hues. Pure *plan*-white, as an extremely normative, certain, and controllable, is a result of the additive mixing of three basic colors: *vision-scenario-prediction*. *Futures critique* is also a compound from the primordial. However, the method of mixing is drastically different – substrative, through layers of vision-scenario-prediction, compared to the additive method for the white color. Lastly, the *transformational novelty* might appear in a highly unexpected, unusual, or even preposterous mixture of any of these colors. Such a metaphor is vividly compatible with the main subject matter of this research – the images of the futures constantly being depicted within the family’s foresight activity.

### 4.3 Image of the family future as an optimistic, unshakable belief

While coding through “six foresight frames”, I have included additional attributes (themes): *hope*, *expectation*, *belief*, and *fear*. These words in variations (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs) have been openly verbalized through almost every interview, therefore, it is the simplest way to distill “pure” concepts in the family’s images of the futures. Thus, I have marked statements where informants utilize specific words concerning future developments: “надеяться – to hope”, “ожидать – to expect”, “верить – to believe”, “бояться/тревожиться – to fear/to be anxious” with their stemmed derivatives.

The core meanings from lexical, philosophic, and futures studies perspectives of this vocabulary are analyzed and described in the corresponding theoretical chapter above. In short, they might be defined as such: 1) *hope* – desirable future, also tagged in analysis as vision, always positively colored; 2) *belief* – concept of “knowledge-that” and “knowledge-how” of future world and self in their interconnectivity where future knowledge is a “justified contingent plausibility” (Dufva & Ahlquist 2015, 252); an attitude “governed by a *norm of truth*” (Department of Philosophy 2023) with the highest level of probability, almost prediction, however, the statements have been marked both as highly likely scenario and prediction depending on the connotations in particular context and supplementary words; 3) *expectation* – might be defined as belief likewise, additionally marked as highly probable scenario, can be both positive and negative; 4) *to fear/to be anxious* – emotional characterization of the future development that have been additionally codified by the correspondent’s sentiment, e.g., “fear – very negative, anxiety – moderately negative”.

It might be assumed that these easily distilled attitudes towards the future constitute the core of the image of the future, i.e., the fundamental elements, since they have been openly manifested within the interviews (Tables 15, 16). Undoubtedly, they might be solely a part of the core, and further problematizing the conversation with the informants might reveal more attitudes. It is obvious that beliefs primarily “live” in predictions and forecasts; however, they might be combined with highly probable scenarios, visions, and serve as an argument for futures critique. The greatest number of beliefs is attributed to the future societal environment of the family that might be interpreted by the importance of predictability of the family milieu or, more correctly, the family’s confidence in the stability of the livable surrounding space. Expectations tend to be rare in families’ statements in general, probably it might be explained by the frequency of operating with specific vocabulary. Hope is the absolute leader in this improvised ranking. The distribution of hopes demonstrates a similar tendency mentioned earlier – family likely envisions its own future rather than outer, however, as in the case with beliefs, the societal (closer) future is also in the family’s focus. Fears are dispersed almost evenly, but the values compared are almost infinitesimal, hence, any speculation is highly conditional and unreliable.

Table 15. Number of statements that contain specific attitudes attributed to “six foresight frames” in the internal and external future contexts

	<i>Belief</i>	<i>Expectation</i>	<i>Hope</i>	<i>Fear</i>
Prediction (forecast)	23	1	3	1
Scenario:				

	<i>Belief</i>	<i>Expectation</i>	<i>Hope</i>	<i>Fear</i>
Dichotomy/ ramification	3	0	1	4
High probability	14	2	4	4
Moderate probability	0	0	1	2
Low probability	0	0	2	3
Vision	2	0	41	0
Futures critique	1	0	0	3
Plan	0	0	0	0
Transformative novelty	0	0	0	0

Table 16. Number of statements that contain specific attitudes towards foreseeing future developments in the global, societal, and family futures

	<i>Belief</i>	<i>Expectation</i>	<i>Hope</i>	<i>Fear</i>
Societal future	27	3	20	9
Family future	16	2	25	8
Global future	12	1	10	7

Further analysis has been devoted to the emotional modality of beliefs and expectations (Tables 17, 18, 19). Unsurprisingly, the future family images have eventually become remarkably more shining while enriching the thematization by supplementing concepts. The positively charged beliefs are distributed throughout all internal and external family contexts, whereas the optimistic family view is primarily attributed to the societal level of the family's future.

Table 17. Number of statements that contain beliefs and expectations with emotional connotations towards foreseeing future developments in the internal family's future

	<i>Belief</i>	<i>Expectation</i>
Very positive	6	0
Moderately positive	6	0
Moderately negative	2	1
Very negative	1	1

Table 18. Number of statements that contain beliefs and expectations with emotional connotations towards foreseeing future developments in the societal future

	<i>Belief</i>	<i>Expectation</i>
Very positive	10	0
Moderately positive	10	1

	<b><i>Belief</i></b>	<b><i>Expectation</i></b>
Moderately negative	2	1
Very negative	3	1

Table 19. Number of statements that contain beliefs and expectations with emotional connotations towards foreseeing future developments in the global future

	<b><i>Belief</i></b>	<b><i>Expectation</i></b>
Very positive	2	0
Moderately positive	5	0
Moderately negative	1	1
Very negative	4	0

Rather than their quantification, the most intriguing is the unveiling of the content of these fundamental attitudes.

The openly declared positive beliefs of the internal family context are connected with future employment, comfortable local immediate and whole society, and physical environment in a country of destination, future of unhindered communication with grandparents and their quality of life, and technologies for humans. The societal future beliefs relate to similar topics since they are often inseparable. Additionally, the stability of current social and economic models in the country of destination is mentioned, as well as the global bettering context that influences the societal level. The global optimistic beliefs contain a more peaceful and human world with technological conveniences. In all three cases, Russia is mentioned in a positive context.

The negative connotations on the global level – war or even an apocalyptic world end, moderate social deterioration in Russia, and worsening climate. The societal negative beliefs relate to the climate negative impact, societal consequences of global conflicts, and health in one case, and specific technology. Negatively colored beliefs toward the familial internal future context are interrelated with global threats only.

As in the previous case with negatively connotated beliefs, family fears primarily relate to the global and societal level, that highly impactful on the internal family future context. The fearful topics contained in the family image of the future originate from the political landscape (right shift, migration policy) and corresponding social discriminatory attitudes, war, ecology and climate change, and work-related issues.

It worth underlining that “fear” and “belief”-stemmed words use seven of nine families whereas “hope” variations permeate all interviews. Being visions, hopes predominantly compensate family’s fears and negative beliefs and are abundantly presented in families’ images of the futures in the previous subchapter.

Switching from the digits and pseudo-statistical analysis to deep qualitative exploration, I suggest delving into *belief* as a broader concept than mere word connotation. In every interview, I have repeatedly encountered one phenomenon – the overall image of the future is disbalanced with prevailing visions and highly probable positive scenarios (that have been revealed through the further analysis described above). Moreover, in every case when I have challenged families’ assumptions or spouses have critiqued each other, for instance, about the probable impact of issues in the higher global or societal contexts on the family future, the family or one of the spouses resists it even when *their own* statements and arguments have been openly used for debating. Such problematization occasionally has slightly declined the positive view; however, almost always the informants attempt to somehow mitigate the force or the intensity of consequences of the negative impact, to accommodate the bigger external future image to the internal family’s future.

Furthermore, in some cases, the interviewees by themselves promptly adjust the position immediately during the verbalization of the forecast by diminishing the negative effect, for instance, of the global issues to the societal level to maintain the external milieu comfort or at least livable for the family staying in a place of the destination. The following extracts from the interviews illustrate this phenomenon.

R: *Will those rising changes [growing number of global environmental cataclysms, e.g., fires, tsunamis, biodiversity losses, emissions] somehow influence your life specifically in 10 years?*

6OIShH: *Hmm...*

6OIShW: *I think, not those, first of all.*

6OIShH: *Well, yes, I mean, probably, yes, but I don’t think it will somehow influence our daily life, but, probably, it somehow affects some long-distance communications. I mean, [the country of destination] government will decide to take fewer flights to [the country of destination] airports because it very seriously worsens something. Or something like that. I mean some possible restrictions. I think that some local restrictions might be, e.g., I don’t know, in exchanging products globally, circulation of the products in the world, in transportation. Something like that. Well, highly likely, it won’t be radical, highly likely, it will be some inconvenience rather than...*

R: *Well, you mean that you will not expect some radical changes in the climate or environment in that sense in 10 years, right?*

6OIShH: *Radically not, radically not. We don't expect.*

R: *What's your opinion?* [addressing another spouse]

6OIShW: *Yes, I don't expect too, perhaps, nothing like that.*

\*\*\*

8SAH: *Well, it's rather interesting, it's necessary to look at how these masses move and from where and what flows, because in reality, perhaps, it moves from poles to the equator. And according to the idea, if we look at the Northern Hemisphere above the equator, then all those who live above the equator, well, they have problems from above. Those who live below don't affect them much.*

8SAW: *You're kidding! This hit is appearing here!*

8SAH: *Hit, at least, doesn't affect much over there... Well, some flora, fauna, something can perish, but at least, your [in a country of destination] ecology in terms of land and water purity will remain [same high quality]. <...>*

8SAH: *Yes, but in densely populated regions, they, of course, will deteriorate; the situation there, the water will worsen. People will get sick more. Kind of, Asia, Arabic [countries], Egypt. These parts. America. Highly unlikely they will manage ecology in time, but the number of people being born is breaking all records, so no one will have time to clean up the poop behind them, and it will be worse there! But it's highly unlikely that it might reach us in 10 years. Yes, it seems to me, cannot.*

8SAW: *You mean, you think that everything will be okay there, at our place [of residence]?*

8SAH: *Yes, yes! Everything is okay, I mean. <...>*

8SAH: *Well, in short, hardly believable that in 10 years some changes can happen which severely affect agriculture in that location. Well, [spouse] says that they will affect. Well, at least, water, air, nature will be clean, therefore, they will be comfortable for life. I mean, the global changes which are related, among others, to climate will slightly impact the standards of living, the way of living.*

R: *You mean, in that sense, your family will not be affected or negatively impacted by these changes, right?*

8SAH: *Yep.*

8SAW: *Probably, yes.*

\*\*\*

R: *You mean, the economic situation will be better than now in society in general, and, in that sense, your family will live comfortably, right?*

9DVH: *Highly likely, yes. At least, I don't want to believe in some catastrophe. And I do not have any feelings that it will [happen]. I mean, at least, there will not be worse, maybe it will be same [as now] there.*

9DVH: *Yes, yes. <...>*

9DVH: *I worry about climate change because, indeed, everyone notices that it is becoming hotter here, and we feel it ourselves. Well, I mean, people who have lived here for a long time. They say that [climate] has changed radically, that they used to shovel snow out of the mom's garage, roughly speaking, all winter, but now there is no snow at all!*

9DVW: *Yes, it's very hot in the summer.*

9DVH: *We were last summer, there was this right here when this whole thing was a hit-wave, and it's unclear how long-term it is. It could have very large negative consequences. [country of destination] among others is highly dependent on tourism, depends very much on. If everything were so sad, it could result in some really very bad changes in the economy...so, whatever...*

<...>

R: *But what are your feelings in terms of environmental, local and global, changes in 10 years? How can it affect your family? If to summarize.*

9DVH: *Well, I feel that the climate can become better...Oh! Worse! Sorry, negative...it is one of the negative drivers. I mean, probably, people will become more conscious, but they will not fix the climate. And then... then it will, in a sense, worsen the quality of life here, but the boundaries, I want to believe, the boundaries of survival will remain ...will not change.*

In several cases, the interviewees promptly adjust their positions during the verbalization of the forecast (without external critiques) diminishing or somehow (non-arguably) eliminating the negative effect. For instance, they can decrease the negative impact of global issues to the societal level to keep the external milieu comfortable or, at least, sufficient for staying family in the place of destination, figuratively speaking, changing clothes on the go.

2APH: *Well, not probably but definitely become more [climate immigrants]! Well, more, but not so more than it will be intolerable for the system.*

\*\*\*

3DVH: *Well somehow it will definitely have an impact if it does, but I'm of the opinion that crises will be much more frequent now and just due to the acceleration of everything. So, this will probably be every year. Maybe everyone will get used to crises, it will no longer feel like a crisis, but just very rapid development.*

\*\*\*

5EDMW: Well, I think that in 10 years, and if we take [country of destination] in particular, everything will remain at the same level, if not some external processes are not good. Yes, and there will still be bad processes, because countries can't agree among themselves, that's all. And if everything goes well and smoothly, and political conflicts are somehow resolved, which I believe in, then I think everything will be smooth. That we will live as we live: communicate, make friends, work to the best of our abilities, bring something to political life, to [local] life, I mean to work life, yes, to give ourselves there, to get money, and this cycle will go on like that.

\*\*\*

7KLH: But a tactical nuclear weapon...it's highly probable that someone will use it. But after that, there will be a thaw.

Moreover, the resistance to the challenging statements might be emotionally charged with vigor.

AP2H: In your [wife's] picture then it's goodbye to everything, just f.ck everything, because then the far right will win everywhere, it'll be like Texas vs. the Mexicans and in your picture of the world, I think it's really easier to buy ammo and canned goods than to try to fix things up!

Furthermore, in some cases, informants clearly admit their positive attitude towards the family's future since the opposite strategy is meaningless.

AP2W: How do we plan our life? How is it possible in 10 years? What conditions do we consider? Perhaps, we consider more positive conditions that either something will be back...

AP2H: Either roses will rise, or a donkey will die, either me or the padishah.

\*\*\*

3DVH: Well, yes, yes, it's impossible not to think about it at all, it seems to me, it's just stupid. But, to live thinking every time that tomorrow the dam will be broken, it's also dumb. It's a 50-50 probability. Maybe it will be broken, maybe not – nobody knows. But such an outcome, of course, is possible.

To wrap up the discussion without losing belief, family might add the ultimate argument – its own adaptive behavior – as a coping strategy even in the totally apocalyptic scenario.

AP2W: Yeah, in some way, either some kind of normalcy will return, or we'll just find a way around it. I mean, it's probably not going to be bad.

\*\*\*

R: Does it bring some considerable details into the picture that you've told me and drawn?

3DVH: Do you mean the house [in the picture from the KFD]?

R: The house, your way of living, your life in general.

3DVH: No, no!

3DVH: We'll rent the boat. But if there is the apocalypse, we'll just steal it. That's it. Well, no!

3DVW: I don't feel like this brings anything to our description, our way of living. You'd better then ask how we will invest our money. Based on the last description, I'd be a little more careful in terms of money investment. But considering our social way of living, if there is no apocalypse, if...just a moment, I will also draw a cat in the picture ... then it will not affect much our way of living.

Or, in the rarest cases, one of the spouses finalizes by the total apocalypse as the option out of further logical consideration of any type of human future, but still leaves the second equally probable option.

7KLW: I mean, I believe either the nuclear explosion will be, or it won't be worse.

Finally, as mentioned above in the subchapter with reconstructed images of the family's future, in some cases, families distinctively separate external (global or societal) and the family's internal future context to maintain the familial images of the future predominantly positively stable.

AP2W: Our timeline, own our family [timeline], and timeline of some sort of worlds up there – it's kind of a little bit different. <...> And it seems to me that I am somehow as well, look, yes, something will be there, some beautiful or awful events will happen. But this picture [point out the family picture from the first drawing stage of the interview], it seems to me, that is – sand on the ocean bottom, that it would be like stability, as you said, some kind of calmness and, as it were, **regardless of what happens there**, so that we would kind of move towards it. That's how I see it, that's why it's hard for me to reconcile what will happen in the outside world, what somehow affects the timeline of our family [difficult].

The core takes away from the analysis is the following: a genuine family's image of the future contains, in the core, emotionally charged beliefs of its positive perspectives, and the family is ready to creatively defend these beliefs by sophisticated arguments and justifications, even if they initially suffer from slight inconsistency and alogism. Family demonstrates sustainable capability to complete the logical scenario by adjusting external future context or by leveraging their adaptive capacity and coping strategies to reach better futures, including the darkest obstacles. Thus, the overall image of the family future contains the unshakable shining core, which is predominantly disbalanced towards the positive, more optimistic pole.

#### **4.4 Observations and brief analysis of how families construct the images of the future**

Whilst the interview, as a guided conversation, has specific common themes and structure, the observation I have applied predominantly possesses an informal and unstructured character. Since the research questions are primarily content-related, the process of creating the images of the future by families formally is out of the scope of the study. However, as it was supposed initially, the observation has provided tiny details and nuances that enrich the data collected within the interviews. The surface layer of observation has added accents and emotional reactions for clarification of meanings and connotations. The deeper layer sheds light on the phenomena hidden under the seemingly regular family's 'board meetings' where the future plans are in focus.

It is hard to qualify my position in the interview with certainty: "observer-as-participant" or "participant-as-observer" (Saunders et al. 2019, 384-385). The main aspect is that, being informed that I utilize videos for further analysis, including the process of the future images' creation, informants engaged in the conversation smoothly and behaved rather naturally (to some extent). Hence, I might become a pure observer, especially during the inner conversations and arguing between family members and relatively long monologues. Whereas, more active involvement in conversation, for example, natural supportive and reflective responses, problematization or critique, and moderation of the discussion in general, distracts my attention from the observations and transforms me into the participant-as-observer. Hence, I could observe more scrupulously afterwards through the video records primarily. But in any case, these observations do not pretend to exhaustively phenomenologically depict the family experiencing common future envisioning, i.e., foresight practicing.

The first phase of the interview – Kinetic Family Drawing (Handler & Habenicht 1994) – immediately commence to facilitate revealing of particularities of families relations: who leads, who incline to hiddenly resist, who is ready to share deeply, and, finally, whose image of the future starts to dominate despite the instruction to draw together on one A4 sheet of paper with any type of means. I have suggested that families negotiate the picture freely, before or during the process, without additional restrictions and conditions. The chosen pictures for illustrative purposes are in [Appendix 4](#). Some of the pictures contain critical personal information and are not published. In one of the interviews, drawing was not suitable for participants since they took part remotely from

different places, thus, the same concept was suggested but in spoken form when spouses described a mutual picture verbally<sup>26</sup>.

The main body of the interview continues widening the understanding of chosen patterns and features, specifically in the cases when informants forget about the researcher while intensely arguing with each other. The key observations might be suggested as follows.

The first common and rather expected observation. One of the spouses is leading in conversation. The specific elements in leading have not been defined, e.g., gender or peculiarities of spouses' background. The leader might be either one or another family member. In one of the interviews, the spouse openly forces the partner to suggest their own ideas more actively without realizing that the common leading style certainly hinders vis-à-vis participation in the dialogue.

R: Try to describe what kind of society you see in ten years' you live in? You can start immediately from the closest surroundings, e.g., who are your neighbors?

(approximately half a minute silent pause, one of the spouses is distinctly ready to begin but waits for the partner staring at him with impatience, the partner indecisively glimpses from time to time at the spouse)

4OEW: Are you frozen?

4OEH: Yes. I imagine a neighbor. Old lady-neighbor.

4OEW: Well, talk first, or it turns out that you, kind of, are led by me, taking my thoughts, writing me off!

4OEH: Well, I am always writing you off (smiling). Neighbors.

4OEW: Friends, neighbors, I don't know... You (addressing the researcher) mean society in general, or...how can I formulate the question?

(Researcher explains, the following dialog is proceeding with the constant leading of the latter spouse. Later in the same interview)

4OEW: Why do you always repeat after me, look at me, and try to answer with generic phrases?!

4OEH: Well, you're so smart. (smiling)

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<sup>26</sup> The deeper analysis, e.g., psychological interpretations of the pictures themselves, is also out of the research scope. The content of the drawings has been utilized both in facilitating the conversation as a starting point and in augmentation of the final images of the family futures received from the verbal interview. All of them are in the text in the corresponding subchapter.

4OEW: Why? I definitely hear that you're trying to say something (demonstrates in the air by hand gestures something big and mimics the spouse): "Oh! Now I'm gonna say something cool!" But you should say as it is! If you don't agree – say that you don't, you think differently!

4OEH: But if I agree?!

4OEW: It's impossible!

4OEH: Why?!

4OEW: Because you can't agree with me for such a long time!

However, it must be highlighted here that such leadership is limited, and it certainly meets open or slightly hidden resistance in one specific situation. In all cases, one spouse, even being led in conversation, might begin actively arguing or manifesting a more optimistic view if the positive basic scenario/vision of the family future is under threat. This phenomenon has been explained in the previous subchapter concerning the beliefs in the family's future. I suppose that leading in conversation does not inevitably imply domination in family decision-making, i.e., the image of the family future is constructed in silent resistance too. For example, in one of the interviews, the female spouse actively participated in the conversation while encouraging family members to join. Quite often, she has verbalized rather pessimistic views related to family safety and stability. Generally reluctant in communication, her partner openly resists and demonstrates confidence in speech to eliminate the spouse's dark forecasts.

5EDMW: Just let there be no war! And otherwise, all Russian speakers will have a bad time, I'm afraid, and we will be sent to the ghetto up north beyond [remote province in a country of destination] there [if Putin invades the country]. There, that certainly scares me, to put it mildly. (After that, the spouse continues to describe two scenarios while one of which is optimistic and the other is with elements of discrimination, and finalizes the passage with the following) But, unfortunately, we are not secure from some situations that we are unable to influence, whatever we want to!

R: (addressing another spouse) What do you think? What kind of situation will there be in 10 years? Political, internal and external.

5EDMH: I believe that everything will be good.

R: Let's unwrap this thesis.

5EDMH: Society will be rich and satisfied. It will be independent of outer factors. And it will be comfortable for us to be in this society.

The second vividly observable phenomenon that is partly evident from the previous example is the imbalance of optimism-pessimism between spouses. Without exception for this group of informants, the wives are predominantly less optimistic in forecasting or at least more cautious in scenario estimations than their husbands, which might lead to the process of disputing.

Occasionally, they admit it openly. Chosen quotations are below.

1FEH: I don't want to move to another country because of the children. Although [husband's name] says that they are very flexible, and it will be easier for them than for us. Well, I realize that in any case it's a huge stress and I, probably, hardly imagine that we are going to move somewhere right now. I definitely can't reject anything, I don't know what is going to happen tomorrow, sorry, roughly speaking. With current events, you are scared to plan something further than, I don't know, a week, a month, because you don't know what will happen.

(Further in the same conversation, husband manifests full confidence and optimism)

1FEH: For me personally, the future doesn't differ, and it's possible to neglect that, from the ideal, saying in this way. and usually, it seems to me, that's the way it has worked out for us. (looking at wife) We plan something and try to reach it. It is somehow realized unrelatedly to the external factors (staring at each other, wife with an emotion of slight doubt on the face, husband immediately stands up and comes out with the child)

1FEH: I am listening, I just need...

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9DVH: Well, in short, on a 10-year horizon, we don't have expectations that climate will chase us out from here, speaking so, but I think that because of other social and some other relationships we will have to cope with. Even if the climate is not so good on such a horizon, we'll be surviving in this climate. And let's see, up to [grown] children leaving [home].

9DVW: Well, I don't know. If to delve deeper, then, yes, we'll have to, probably, before the 10 years is to come, think about moving somewhere to a more comfortable place. And in principle, it isn't improbable.

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3DVW: In our family [husband's name] optimist, I am a pessimist.

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4OEW: Yeah, well, I am a pessimist, pessimistic about life in general, although I would like to be an optimist.

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9DVW: And when I can't forecast something, I always choose quite a bleak picture to be ready for it.

The third observation is about the habituality of the foresight practice in the family's life. Almost every interview has demonstrated that an enhanced and nuanced image of the future primarily develops within the course of the interview, i.e., supposedly, families have not discussed much about future developments in long-term perspectives before the conversation. The only parameter of the family's future is undoubtedly and needs no discussion – children will go to school/university

(if they are of a corresponding age). Partly, the unhabitual character of foresight practice in families is proved by specific mention after the interview (and gratitude). Even when one of the partners has been reluctant in the beginning, at the end, they feel more enthusiastic.

6OIShW: Forbidden, tabooed theme of future designing, of somewhat future. That's why, the only thought that occurred to me now is that it is worth thinking about it somewhen.

As one of the informants admits, they have never dive into their future before and it was "*realistic*". Another has claimed "*a nice aftertaste after conversation*" and one has jokingly stated that "*we don't need to pay for the session of psychotherapy by future*".

The fourth takes away from the observation is that even though wives can be less optimistic, spouses have consensus about their family future, especially considering the internal familial context. The most evident disputing has been occasionally manifested in discussions on societal future developments (see quotations in the previous subchapter). However, this is the subject of more detailed analysis since consensus might be a repercussion of the invisible pressure of the more powerful spouse's position.

The final easily detected phenomenon is difficulties in long-term planning under precarious obstacles. In several cases, one of the spouses has claimed this issue openly.

1FEW: With current events you are scared to plan something further than, I don't know, a week, a month because you don't know what will happen.<...> After 24 of February it became totally impossible for me to imagine something, something far-reaching, far-reaching plan because I understand that everything is not as you plan at all You can imagine one thing but in fact there will be another. I mean, could I imagine that my country invades its neighbor? No! I did not imagine that at all!

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7KLW: It's very scary and complicate to plan because always something appears out of the blue and everything is going to go to hell.

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6OIShW: Well, I mean, during these two and a half years, I'm strenuously forbidding myself to think beyond the nearest month.

Considering that some of these families have immigrated to their current (at the moment of the interview) places of destination relatively not long ago, they might have experienced the echoed feeling of precariousness. Another interpretation is derived from the previously mentioned phenomenon that wives are more cautious in their future projections. An additional parameter might

be taken into consideration – age. Those females who have mentioned difficulties in future planning are about forty and above, which might affect the process of immigration in general, hence, strengthening the pessimistic view. Finally, the long-term planning capability might be drastically undermined by one unimaginable, preposterous event – war – that has shaken all possible beliefs and visions and established precariousness as a single sustainable principle of foresight practice for these informants.

## 5 Discussion

This study aimed to describe probable and preferable images of the future in 10 10-year perspective of families who immigrated from Russia to five European countries after the beginning of the full-scale invasion the Ukraine on 24.02.2022. The results of this qualitative research might be characterized as multilayered and multidirectional.

I have explored these images theoretically to distill their core elements and origin, and empirically through contextual and structural frames, and analyzed to some extent how families experience foresight practice. Theoretical part contains critical review of the contemporary research and conceptual analysis of the most prominent studies devoted to the image of the futures, including Polak's (1973), Bell and Mau's (1971), Rubin's (2000) and Rubin and Linturi's (2001) as well as theoretical grounds for the analysis of foresight activities (Minkkinen et al. 2019). The basic content-structural scheme of the image of the future was suggested.

A mixed method was adopted for the empirical exploration. Initial data in this research was predominantly collected by semi-structured in-depth group interviews of the families. The modified Kinetic Family Drawing method and unstructured observation of the interviewees was incorporated into the process of interviewing. Snowballing and invitations via Telegram channels used to recruit families according to purposive sample characteristics.

The data from the interviews was analyzed through CLA (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009; Kaboli & Tapio 2018) and Thematic analysis (Saunders et. al. 2019, 651-660) that additionally contained PESTEC(V) framework (Schwartz 1996; Ralston & Wilson 2006; Kahane 2012; PESTLE analysis 2014; Cox 2021) and "six foresight frames" (Minkkinen et al. 2019) as pre-determined themes. Finally, coherent and consistent texts of four future images of the families were composed (Tables 3, 4, 5 above), and a structural analysis of the results of the family foresight activity was conducted.

The discussion below mostly follows this logic and highlights consistent and debatable outcomes of my research, but does not repeat the structure of the theoretical part and augments it.

### 5.1 Image of the future: beliefs, faith, and agency

This research dares to engage in the dialogue which has been commenced about 70 years ago by Polak (1973) in his meticulous historic-socio-cultural analysis of civilizational images of the future. Polak's (1973, 13), Bell and Mau (1971, 38) primarily attribute the creation of the societal images

of the future to elites or social scientists who are capable of imagining the ways of social transformation to a better world and the image of this other world per se. In contrast with “aristocratic” “crystalized images of the future” prioritized by Polak (1973, 22), this empirical research is devoted to “the vaguer phenomena of thought about the future” (Polak 1973, 22) of lay families in particular circumstances.

Polak nearly in desperate claims that humans in the modern age being “dedualizing and dedeifying” lost their capacity for futurizing and imaging, and akin to Sisyphus, they exist to the death in vain, tightly tied with *fati*, incapable of surmounting themselves and their temporality (Polak 1973, 217, 235). Virtually, Polak heralds the crisis in designing the images of the future of Western civilization, loss of creative capacity and will, leaving aside general acceptance of idealized images to please the “momentary present” and, consequently, to almost demolish the “real future that which the possible future”. His main concern is modern society being in “the lethargy of our present essence-pessimism” due to a lack of future images that contain “a renewed influence-optimism” (Polak 1973, 20-21). One of the attributes of contemporary time is that the Utopian vision with the core ancient intact concept of “social peace and justice” (Polak 1973, 111) is ridiculed and gradually surrenders to Dystopia.

Half a century later, sounding in refrain with Polak’s ideas might be found in Rubin’s works. Characteristics of modernity – materially prosperous happiness – in the personal future, and features of the information society – gloomy expectations of the global wicked issues – in the world future co-exist in the individual images of the future of young Finns and educators. Additionally, in the latter case, systemic and societal futures are primarily related to the negative developments and issues. (Rubin 1997; 2013, S41.) Moreover, Rubin (1998, 499) claims that considering solely problematic issues in the present that are developing as negative future trends might lead to reactive strategies rather than proactive exploration and creative strategies. Rubin’s findings reaffirm Polak’s argument related to “essence/influence-pessimism” towards societal or global future.

The results of this research are primarily compatible with these studies in general: families foresee their own futures much brighter than the global future. Akin to respondents in Rubin’s (1997; 2000) research, families in this study manifest a vision of a materially prosperous and comfortable life. However, families’ degree of optimism toward the *societal* future in a country of destination is relatively similar to the internal *familial* that evidently differs from the predominantly problematic character of the societal futures of individuals (Rubin 2000, 83). This contrast might be the subject for further research, and currently it can be interpreted as a specific immigrant phenomenon.

For example, in several contemporary migrant studies might be highlighted one common observation: migrants primarily demonstrate distinctively positive attitudes towards future in a new country that might be explained either by their fragmented and idealized information about the country of destination or by common human psychological trait to perceive imagined personal future more optimistically and ignore possible contextual barriers in reaching it (Koikkalainen et al. 2016, 764-765; 2020, 62). Koikkalainen et al. (2020, 57) suggest specific terms “subjective and objective hope” for describing such phenomena where the *subjective* level implies identity, social personality, and individual agency, and the *objective* relates to the external world, which might or might not provide opportunities to achieve personal goals.

However, further observations of asylum seekers who remain for a prolonged period in the country of destination demonstrate the opposite phenomenon to this research. Refugees, being in specific obstacles in reception centers, encounter with reality of particular bureaucratic procedures and generally “live in transit”, which causes changes in their mindset toward the country of destination, previously perceived as paradise (Koikkalainen et al. 2020, 62). Evidently, families in this research have drastically different initial conditions and formal basis for residence permit (primarily work-related) and correspondingly, another experience in settling in a country of destination.

Despite the remarkably more positive families’ future images on the societal level, the global level is still less shining, and global issues are the focus of families’ contemplations. However, their estimations bear milder traits; for instance, dark scenarios of climate change and dramatic global conflict possess primarily low probability. Moreover, the impact of the global cruelties on the immediate family’s milieu is alleviated (by families’ speculations), which affects their decision to stay in the country of destination. Additionally, the global conflicts are somehow resolved, and human-made ecological problems, as a rule, are mitigated by technological solutions. In rare cases, an apocalyptic scenario is possible, but it is beyond elaboration in a family’s foresight practice because of its dramatic, unchangeable course and repercussions. Family demonstrates potential adaptability and capacity in finding coping strategies even in highly uncertain and harsh conditions. However, it is worth underlining that their repertoire is limited by avoiding behavior or reactivity in terms of affecting the source of the external problem, that also consistent with Rubin’s findings (2001, 69-96).

Continuing possible interpretations of the dualism of the image of the future, further analysis might be beneficial, especially from the socio-cultural perspectives. I hypothesize that “de-eschatologizing” and “de-utopization” in Polak’s terms (1973) of the societal (civilizational) images

of the future do not possess ultimate character. Having vanished from the socio-cultural and political agenda, the dualistic model is still alive on the individual and, considering my research, familial level. Utopic and apocalyptic dialectics of the family's image of the future inherit eschatological and utopian traits, but are framed by human life or the life of the offspring. In every scenario, except the gloomiest nuclear apocalypse (which more frequently is alleviated by the improbability of high scale and intensity), after the dark times sun will rise: conflicts are resolved, agreements are renegotiated, climate change is mitigated by techno solutions, and Putin dies, etc. Kingdom of Heaven will come, and blessed is she who believes.

The discrepancies between the utopic vision of the society of destination of migrant families and, for instance, the cultural majority in the host society, akin to several examples of young Finns who possessed features of complete indifference or opportunistic and hedonistic models (Rubin 1997; 2013), or Western society in general might be tremendous. The migrant family has its own utopic view of the future of the country of destination, because, perhaps, they have recently left the country where dystopic scenarios are highly probable and partly implemented.

According to Polak (1973), after the collapse of Marxists' utopia, "The bond between the image of the future and political power has been cut away, and now we have gotten ahead of ourselves, arriving at the one-dimensionality of our own time" (Polak 1973, 124). From my perspective, it is a highly debatable idea since Western civilization, including the political level in general, strives to follow the utopic concept of the Age of Enlightenment even though it is not declared akin to Campanella, Bacon, or More. For example, the current General Secretary of NATO, in his inauguration speech, claims that alliance countries should increase their defense expenditures to "preserve our way of life" (Rutte 2024). But what does he indeed mean by this formula? Does it mean that European countries currently (in the present) have already reached the harmony and happiness of human beings here-and-now, and the only goal (in the future) is to maintain the status quo? I suppose that from the point of view of migrant families in this research, *they (EU countries) have*, at least, some of them where families have moved in.

Pondering comparatively, Heaven on Earth for the majority population of the wealthiest Western countries (at least, EU and USA) has been already materialized: safe, comfort, no hunger, any types of pleasures (physical and mental) are accessible; in sum, it is interesting, meaningful and satisfying life and even to die is not already scary (long life-span) and in some countries is not painful (legal euthanasia). In that sense, the better life – Utopia – is almost there. There is no more necessity in the image of a better future for individuals *beyond* the death line. Left liberal-democratic idea of the

society of well-being for everyone, depicted in Enlightenment utopias as “human happiness and the general human welfare” (Polak 1973, 109), for the prevalent in the population sector of the middle class commences fading as a pulling image of the future. Although the moderate social inequality is an inherent and indispensable attribute of every Western society, nevertheless, the welfare systems allow the whole population to somehow avoid fierce fighting with nature for feeding the family and maintaining its life. The Kingdom of the Lord is already on Earth.

This routinized Present for Western civilization at the same moment might be a pulling, fascinating Future for the families in this research. This vision evidently contradicts the current official socio-cultural agenda and future narratives of Putin’s regime, virtually converting current ideology into a death cult, akin to ancient Egyptians or North European tribes. The only discrepancy is that one should die fast, and as a posthumous award will be a heroic glorification in the memory of the prospering (by means of life insurance premium) family. Giving (perverse) meaning of life, active formation of the attractive image of the future glorious warrior instead of the emptiness of meaningless routine existence in debt, on three low-paid jobs, in eroded, unsettled social reality – this is a current official discourse in Russia.

This is a quotation from Putin’s speech on meeting with mothers of those drafted into war in Ukraine: “But you know, one idea occurs to me. I have already mentioned it once. In our country, about 30,000 people die in traffic accidents, and about the same number from alcohol. Sometimes it happens, unfortunately, that one’s life takes such a turn. Life is complicated and diverse. It is more complicated than something that is written on paper. After all, we are all in the hands of God, Allah, or Christ, talking about those who believe in the higher powers. It does not matter what religion they profess. What matters is that we are all mortal; we are all in God’s hands. And one day, we will all leave this world. This is inevitable. The question is how we lived. With some people, it is unclear whether they live or not. It is unclear why they die – because of vodka or something else. When they are gone, it is hard to say whether they lived or not – their lives passed without notice. But your son did live – do you understand? He achieved his goal. This means that he did not leave life for nothing. Do you understand? His life was important. He lived it, achieving the result for which he was striving.” (Presidential Executive Office 2025). Striving to death is definitely another image of the future that pulls (and has pushed) families in this research.

In the theoretical part, I have challenged myself with the following questions: how can it be possible that a contradictory image of the future that determines our decision-making does not lead to a total behavioral mess? In a psychological sense, regular human behavior is primarily within

logical frames and social norms. Does it mean that *partly* the image of the future is not included in the process of decision-making? These questions have also been triggered by the contradiction revealed by Rubin (2000) and lately reaffirmed by the outcomes of this research. Through the analysis, the probable answer has emerged.

The capacity to envision the image of the future might be remarkably shaken by a considerably impactful event that drastically changes the habitual environment and vividly contradicts their previous experience and attitudes, e.g., war. People lose their capability to produce long-term projections cause of precarious life that in turn is derived from novel experience and milieu. Three informants from my research report such a phenomenon, underlining that present, completely unexpected events have broken their confidence in planning future, for instance, beyond one month. However, the family's core image of the future remains "in safety".

To restore balance between the existing image of the future and a drastically novel one, including a totally unforeseen milieu, assumingly, the family might behave in two ways: to accommodate its image of the future or to leave the current environment and move into a more predictable environment that matches their image of the future. The second option is the case of families in this research. Their images of the future are a super-pulling power that forces them to change the country. According to Rubin, occasionally negative and frightening images of the future can fuel the motivation for fighting for a better future (Rubin 2013, S42). I suggest slightly enhancing this formula: the attempt to substitute optimistic future images with outer negative and frightening images of the future can fuel the motivation for fighting for a better future. Moreover, "[i]f an image is powerful enough, one can use a great deal of resources and time in these processes" (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 269). The latter has become these families' case.

Rubin and Linturi (2001, 275) argue that "world view is built upon these beliefs and interpretations", and an individual image of the future is a derivative of the worldviews (Rubin & Linturi 2001, 270). For Polak (1973, 217), the future image is a twofold entity: "the matrix of faith" and "its alma mater" when faith is charged by the image of the future with powerful dynamism of "the believing imagination". Thus, the variable – strength of faith – matters in determining the genuine image of the future that is capable of leading. The unshakable character of the family's images of the futures provides a ground for considering the genuine image of the future as a belief in general. Whereas this does not eliminate the probability of amendments that might be presented in the future images as '*possible-possible*' future states of affairs, which are not strong beliefs and, consequently, are not considered in the decision-making.

Additionally, I dare to suggest that Polak's (1973, 217) "dedefying" does not inevitably imply the loss of capacity for futurizing and imaging. The subject of faith might be substituted, specifically mentioning the fact that some of these families manifest secular viewpoints. To summarize in a highly generic form: families believe or *have faith* in their prosperous future, the prosperity of the society in a country of destination, and the low probability of the total world apocalypse. The world somehow recovers after the large-scale upheavals. Probably, they leave the world collapse in their future images akin to an eschatological model – a cathartic final-final event, doomsday, Final Judgement before the dawn and eternal bliss. The Polak's dualism and dialectics are still there – Utopia and Eschatology are embraced by one image of the future.

Rubin (2013) asserts that ambivalent image of the future might hamper to make realistic and sensible decisions and specifically image of the (over)optimistic individual future – "mere hopes and wishes" (Rubin 2013, S42) – might result in demotivation in case of facing the difficulties and failure in accomplishment attempting. This might be irrelevant to the case of the families in this research since they, in contrast with young Finns, are experienced and socially and personally mature people with their own stories of success. Moreover, their images of the future *predominantly* contain hopes (desired future, visions) and wishes that motivate them to behave appropriately.

This might be supported by Polak's (1973) argument that the image of the future must be optimistic to have a pulling force. In that sense, participating families possess their (over)optimistic images of the future in the almost "dedefied" utopic form. Moreover, their confidence in low probability of the darkest external scenarios align with their experience and knowledge: they know examples from human history when mankind overcomes whisked challenges or, at least, know the human capability to invent means to mitigate negative impact, and sometimes families know the specific technologies, how deal with these issues. Hence, in contrast with young Finns and educators, they have "knowledge-what" and "knowledge-how" – the core of belief, and the "essence-optimism" in Polak's terms.

The phenomenon of the optimistic image of the future might be treated more deeply since another study of young audiences demonstrates their genuinely positive images of the future. For example, Seneviratne (2024, 73), studying Sri Lankan youth's future envisioning, has found that young people have a remarkably bright image of the future of their country and community. Seneviratne (2024) suggests two reasons: 1) focus of research (and participants) on "good life and desired futures"; 2) the act of envisioning itself fosters individuals' positive view and permits them to handle challenges and constraints.

Likewise, Angheloiu et al. (2020) research devoted to the exploration of the young (16-17 years old) people's images of the 20- and 50-year ahead futures manifests predominantly an optimistic viewpoint towards societal and global futures among the majority of respondents of this age. The study has two stages: an initial survey and a following workshop for futures envisioning. Even though the optimistic views have decreased during the workshop still the overall imbalance to the positive future developments has remained. Additionally, their beliefs relate to technological advancements that help tame wicked challenges. Angheloiu et al. (2020, 4) deduce that it might have a two-side nature – “the ‘optimism of youth’” and a high level of agency, confidence in their impactful and powerful actions.

These two examples that partly align with the results of my research trigger further pondering on the sources and stability of positive images of the future. More thorough analysis is needed with consideration of various factors and variables, first of all, the research methods for the exploration of the future images. The initial purpose of future envisioning, settings, specific methods, the degree of researcher engagement and moderation (more proactive – more observing), and so forth might be impactful factors in terms of the final “essence-influence” modality.

My research question does not cover the deeper analysis of the socio-cultural and historical discourse in the country of exodus. However, I dare to assume that an active striving socialist utopia is not connected in the historical memory of people born in the USSR or modern Russia with optimistic sentiments. Highly likely, it relates to suppression of any seditious thoughts about democracy, freedom, and just by semantic substitution or distortion up to its antipodes, and oppression of individual will to build such a society.

Human beings, almost the whole twentieth century, had been witnessing the catastrophic failure of the terrifying mass communist' experiment of primarily Marxists-Leninist Utopia materialization. The best metaphors are well-known as “1984” and “Animal Farm: A Fairy Story” by George Orwell. From my perspective, one of the significant outcomes of that might be the vaccination against any type of *declared* utopias, facilitating the perception of the real-life consequences of human activities, and strengthening societal sarcasm toward bright utopic concepts of the aforementioned social peace and justice. The word “Utopia” has become almost a forbidden curse, *but not the concept itself*. It might be intriguing to receive feedback from Polak on the statement that utopia is still alive, at least, in visions of migrant families moved to the country of destination as a place where such a utopic society is highly probable.

In this research, I codified hopes and utopic projections as a *vision* – desired future – more inclined to the concept of Polak (1973) rather than the operationalized definition in organizational foresight – shared audacious goals. According to Bezold (2009), despite its “unreal” (not related to reality) character and absolute novelty concern, vision is a type of future image intertwined with commitments to create it. It reflects values and purpose and is able to raise personal aspirations, to motivate and regulate efforts. In that sense, families’ images of the societal and global future might not be attributed to vision and be “mere hopes and wishes” (Rubin 2013, S42) since families do not manifest their *goals* and *commitments* to act correspondingly towards external future contexts. They are not politicians or revolutionists. This predicament in a certain defining vision highlights the problem of agency.

The key watershed in vision as aspiration, i.e., *wish* of the better future, and vision as volition, i.e., *will* to change the present for the sake of a better future – Polak’s (1973) “essence-optimism” and “influence-pessimism”. The formula “*I wish a better future*” does not inevitably imply “*I strive towards a better future*”. Only a specific conative component fuels humans to reach the “Other” (in Polak’s terms), even sacrificing their lives, akin to revolutionary-obsessed minds. In such a case, vision (of a better future) must be transformed into a plan (how to get to the better future).

Families in this research demonstrate colorful and shining images of the future of their families, societies, and, if we consider the low probability of their fears and dark scenarios, the global context. Moreover, they genuinely believe in their images of the future. However, their plans hardly embrace the family itself. The only stable points of their plans – children’s growing, some elements of their material conveniences, work, or rarer education, language of the country of destination, and getting new passports (citizenship). Solely highly controllable elements of their life might be inserted into the family plan.

Nevertheless, once again, families do have utopic images of the better societies. Furthermore, they have crucially important paradigm level (Meadows 2009) – values and corresponding behavior – in their images that are compatible with society in the country of destination on both layers, local and societal in general. That aligns with Bell and Mau’s (1971, 22, 28) claim that values in reciprocity with the images of the futures serve as a criterial base for evaluating goals and estimating costs, and for analyzing the complex interrelation of alternative futures.

Families *wish* and *will* have friends among locals and good neighborly relations, they *wish* and *will* study the local language, they *wish* and *will* celebrate local valuable holidays, they are ready to work hard to become a part of the host society. Finally, they clearly realize that their attitudes and

behavior should contain, by using the words of one of the family, “*equal and friendly relations with everyone as you want to be treated by them*”. But they do NOT have plans to transform the society or the global context in general.

Rubin (2013) also argues that the image of the future, which contains mainly expectations of fears and threats materialization in the external world, might trigger passiveness in behavior. From my point of view, it might be considered from another angle. Undoubtedly, families primarily estimate external future developments more negatively, and the global context (relatively) darker. However, fear and threats of families result in their own potential active adaptive behavior even in the gloomiest scenario. It might be defined as reactivity since the family does not strive to change the external source of the problem and change the course of events. Simultaneously, it might be the sign of highly proactive behavior since they envision future negative evolvments and imagine “*plan B*” – to move to another country, or to “*buy canned food*”, or to “*steal the boat*”.

Comparing with familial image of the future they do not have remarkably vivid conative components in their societal visions. They wish, genuinely desire, and cherish their images of the better – peaceful, safe, democratic, humanistic, just, diverse, free, equal, environmentally friendly, technologically saturated and materially prospering – stable society, and they predict with high level of confidence this better societal future.

But they do not plan, or are hardly capable of changing the present social reality. They are ruled by their images of the future and make decisions on the ground of the utopic images of the future, but that leads to specific coping strategies in their life course: if the milieu (and local societal images of the future) contradict their own view they have “*plan B*” – to move to a better place again. They failed in their country of exodus to reach their utopias and moved to other countries with societies that more matched their desired future images. Herein, I intentionally leave apart the ethical component and analysis of the family’s morale toward political issues akin to Rubin’s (200, 46) questions, e.g., should they proactively change the external contexts or not? That might be the subject of another type of research. Their own personal and familial maximum in terms of maintaining stable and prospering democratic society is to participate in election as voters (after getting the right in the host country), rarer in social activism, in exclusive cases in political activism, and, primarily, to keep and to promote among children their values and beliefs related to that societies.

Thus, the concern remains: should we consider such family coping strategies as passiveness or proactivity? Are their desirable future images of the external future developments full-fledged *visions* or non-volitional *hopes*? Is this “influence-optimism” or “influence-pessimism”?

## 5.2 Cultural identity, type of immigration, and images of the future

One more aspect related to the futures images of the families in this research has evidently become apparent – the cultural-language identity. All families claim adherence to their native language and tradition to celebrate the New Year holiday in a 10-year perspective, as Russians do. Moreover, some of them admit that they strive to keep their cultural language uniqueness and hope to bear attributiveness to the culture of the country of exodus without hiding and ostracism. Several families confess that it is impossible to integrate into the society of destination to such a degree that their identity or mentality will be totally changed to the local culture.

Rubin (2000, 7), Rubin and Linturi (2001, 276-282) assert that images of the future of individuals are derived from the personal identity, where the latter is constructed from the set of social roles. Primarily, in their model of future image formation, Rubin and Linturi (2001, 276-282) focus on gender, age, and professional identity as affiliated with roles. This model of personal identity origination, from my perspective, might be widened by, at least, inserting cultural identity and ethnicity as fundamental characteristics that attribute the individual to a particular culture, i.e., in the case of families in this research, to the major culture of the country of exodus.

Families in this research have not been specifically asked about their national or cultural attribution. The only direct questions have been asked about the main familial language and the most important holidays to be in the family’s yearly calendar in 10 years. However, they mention the theme of ethnicity or cultural identity while, for instance, discussing the process of integration, communication with neighbors, and children's education. These topics evidently affect the images of the futures of families both in their visions of future society and their anxiety toward negative scenarios related to politically-social discourse (see, for example, reconstructed images in the corresponding chapter above in Tables 2, 3, 4).

According to Pisarevskaya et al. (2020), ‘identity narratives’ and ‘cultural diversity’ topics demonstrate increasing attractiveness among researches from earlier 1990s and have ranked high among others including dual identity from 2000s. Hence, I assume that in future studies related to future images of immigrants the theme of cultural identity might also be one of the specific subjects.

Maehler and Daikeler's (2024) scrupulously conducted meta-analysis of 44 quantitative studies related to the formation of cultural identity of the first-generation adult migrants concerning the culture of origin and of residence. The core outcome of the study demonstrates substantial discrepancies between the higher degree of identification of this migrant group with the culture of origin compared with a moderate degree of identification with the host culture. Thus, the first-generation migrants are primarily 'two-cultural identity' individuals.

The families in my research primarily admit this phenomenon, but in the future 'tense' – they expect or predict their limitation in completely identifying with the culture in the country of destination. It can be illustrated by a rather vivid word created by one of the informants – "*Finnified*<sup>27</sup>" – as a description of the final result of the integration that definitely cannot be imagined by him. It is hard to speculate about the foreseeing of the degree of such identification. These families are clearly confident in the smooth integration of their children and, consequently, their cultural identification with the host society.

Such projections also might be the subject for further research in futures studies in terms of the cultural identity of individuals and families, since they might play a specific role of "self-fulfilling prophecy" when expectations bear negative connotations (Merton 1948, 193–210, according to Borup et al. 2006, 288). Moreover, supposedly, two main coping strategies revealed through the families' future images analysis: more open demonstration of identity of the culture of origin, keeping the uniqueness, but being belonged to the host society, and almost total blending in with local major culture and society with mentioning of internal projected feelings of remaining of something from the culture of exodus. Two different degrees of foreseeing socio-cultural identification.

Additionally, Maehler and Daikeler (2024) analyze various variables and phenomena that are evidently significant in terms of cultural identity formation, for example, length, age, gender, region of origin, migration type (voluntary-involuntary), cultural distance (values), etc. Several findings of my research might be in consonance with these particularities. For example, "language acquisition" or "behavioral adaptation", i.e., extrinsic adaptation, takes significantly less time than intrinsic – the formation of the cultural identity itself (Maehler & Daikeler 2024, 471). The informants in my research clearly underscore these two peculiarities in their future envisioning as predicted or highly probable in 10 years.

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<sup>27</sup> Literal translation from Russian, specially created word "офинился"

Likewise, the female “traditional” roles in families akin to caregivers and homemakers, lack of contacts with host culture (and similar structural factors) might hinder adaptation in a new setting and support using habits and patterns of the culture of origin (Maehler & Daikeler 2024, 472). Probably, in rare chosen cases in my research, women's anxiety toward successful integration in the future might be partly explained by these structural circumstances. Or women's pessimism in general might be interrelated with their roles and additional fears toward a safe and comfortable future of family and children specifically. However, the last two assumptions are highly speculative considering the small size of the sample and the absence of similar research in relation to the *future* of migrant families rather than with their *past* and *present* experience.

One more aspect might be underlined with regard to the migrant status of the families – the type of migration. Maehler and Daikeler (2024, 471) have revealed that immigrants with voluntary motives of moving demonstrate a slightly higher level of identification with the culture of origin than those who migrate involuntarily. The case of families in my research has a slightly diverse character in terms of the reasons for migration.

From one point of view, all of them are voluntary immigrants who have mainly work-related formal reasons for the residence permit. However, all of them have been forced by their fears, especially toward the future of children, political disagreement with the regime and potential prosecution, and value-based considerations. Moreover, part of them have moved under the immediate threat of being mobilized to war. Therefore, the analysis of their future family projections from the perspective of integration and cultural identification might concern the blended character of migration drivers. It is hard to consider with certainty whether these families are either voluntary or involuntary migrants.

However, they do have obvious peculiarities compared with *relocants* mentioned in the introduction who have been forced to move to, for example, former Soviet Republics or Turkey. Formally, only one family from this research has *relocated* in its initial meaning of this word – moving under professional reasons – since the international company-employer has suggested to one of the spouses-employee to move to another country where it has a branch. But still, the real reason for the move is the family's decision *to emigrate from Russia*.

The families in this research have not even mentioned the word ‘relokant’ in their more than 1.5-hour-long conversations. They evidently do not report a high level of precariousness compared with *relokants* to, e.g., the South Caucasian region, where only about 5% of respondents in a study of the last wave migration from Russia have declared their intention to stay there for over 3 years

(Exodus-22 2023). All of the families in my research plan to obtain citizenship in the country of destination and are highly likely to stay for a long period in the host country. At least, they definitely envision their future in the country of destination in a 10-year perspective. As I hypothesized in the beginning of the research, despite the scenario-based, contingent character of families' images of the future, they are in the least uncertain and more stable position in their (European) countries, that is reflected in their capacity for the creating their image of the future in the long-term perspective. These families are not *relokants* – they are closer to 'classic' *immigrants* who aim to settle in the host country.

Further, considering the long-term vision capacity, even though three (of 19) informants from my research openly admit their difficulties with long-term planning and one of the informants has been fairly reluctant to share their own thoughts, all families are capable of envisioning their future in 10 years rather extensively. Nobody has strictly refused to participate in the conversation, even when connected with sensitive topics. Undoubtedly, such a type of research – face-to-face deep interview in real time – initially supposes a high level of own genuine families' interest. They have been informed about the form and possible content of the interview; therefore, they voluntarily shared the information in-depth (to some degree).

Additionally, the observations from my research support findings from another research of this migrant wave as a non-economic migration (see, for example, Sergeeva & Kamalov 2024). Similar reasons for the emigration of these families from Russia are in the moral and political domains, and they have lost remarkably in quality of life and, in the majority of cases, in income. That aspect is reflected in their images of the future and relates to families plan and visions in education (not only language learning, but professional development and re-training for new labor settings in the host country), career (e.g., diversification of sources of income, finding job according their high qualifications, and entrepreneurial endeavors), and overall family's material wellbeing.

However, the results of the analysis of the images of the future of these families cannot be generalized to the whole population of migrant families with identical traits (age, gender, country of destination, length of residence, (in)voluntary character of migration, professional attributiveness, etc.). For example, the rejection to participate that I have encountered after addressing some families during the recruiting might indicate distinct peculiarities, for instance, of the process of integration. According to Maehler and Daikeler (2024, 474), there is a possibility that immigrants with a low level of identification with the culture of the country of residence avoid participation in

surveys at all. Therefore, the families who refuse to participate in the interview might have different images of the futures compared to participants in my research.

Although the families of this research might be classified as more or less ‘regular’ voluntarily moved migrants, they differ even from the pre-war in Ukraine and post-Soviet migrants. For instance, the studies of Russian migrants in two Finnish regions (South and North Karelia<sup>28</sup>) demonstrate that migrants-“newcomers” moved in the last decade especially after the Crimea annexing by Russia and full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022 differ in their reasons and political attitudes comparing to “old” post-Soviet generation of Russian migrants. That even provokes obvious tension among the Russian migrant community there (Pöllänen et al 2023). Assumably, this also might be an indicator of the phenomenon from Maehler and Daikeler’s (2024) study – interrelation between longer duration of residence in the host country with a higher level of identification with the culture of the country of origin (Maehler & Daikeler’s 2024, 472).

These peculiarities of the profile of the migrant families in relation to their images of the future might also be a specific topic for further research. From my perspective, the images of the family future might be considered akin to analytical instrument to reveal factors similar to the aforementioned. It might be beneficial to explore deeply the *future* family images to discern determining or highly impactful factors of family life (and individual members) for their integration and cultural identification in the host society. Thus, some elements of the images of the future could be intertwined with particular familial traits or circumstances. Therefore, the revealed correlations might provide images of the future with potential for argument-grounded speculations about the capacity and features of the future migrant family integration in the initial phase of their residence. That in turn might be useful for the well-timed help for migrant families since acculturation strategies that imply either identification with the culture of origin or the culture of the country of destination might be highly impactful on the mental health and well-being of migrants (e.g., Choy et al., 2020; Yoon et al., 2013 according to Maehler & Daikeler 2024, 455).

### **5.3 Inconsistency, illogical character, and controversy are debris of scenarios?**

Rubin (1997; 2013) claims not only the controversy, but also the inconsistency of two parts of one individual image of the future: individual and societal or global. Such inconsistency, according to Rubing (2013, S41), might relate to subliminal elements of the images of the future that are out of

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<sup>28</sup> The second area in Finland after the Uusimaa, in terms of number of Russian migrants in the last three years (Statistics Finland 2024)

analysis. The results of this research resonate with Rubin's findings. The more researcher pushes the interviewees with clarifying or reflective questions into pondering their images of the future, the more their images become logical and consistent. This might partly be supported by the outcomes of the structural analysis of the families' images of the future.

As aforementioned, the primary content "unit" of the families' future images is a *scenario*. Through the conversation with the interviewer and between each other family members develop rather ramified and logically based scenarios by digging out the initially unconscious (non-verbalized) elements of the futures puzzle to complete the narrative. The "six foresight frames" (Minkkinen et al. 2019) as an analytical framework for the family images of the future have remarkably enhanced the understanding of the character and internal dynamics of the futures images.

The image of the futures of each family is a complex conglomerate of results of the family's foresight practice of almost all six types suggested by Minkkinen et al. (2019). From the perspective of structural analysis, the family image of the futures can hardly be reduced to, for instance, only vision. Being inclined to highly probable positive scenarios and visions, nevertheless, the futures images contain predictions, plans, less frequently future critique, and transformational novelties in exclusive cases. Moreover, the boundaries between "foresight frames" are thin and intertwined in informants' statements. Almost all types of foresight results of the families are interconnected and, from time to time, follow each other or overlap and become a blend, for instance, vision and highly probable scenario, vision and prediction, etc. It might also be interpreted that individuals keep two future modes almost in parallel – the desired future and the possible or probable future, i.e., one image simultaneously has two modes. This might serve as additional evidence of the theoretically analyzed model of the image itself as a '*possible-possible state of affairs*' that might be interconnected with conative and emotional aspects and beliefs. However, it is a separate, distinct entity in origin.

Furthermore, the degree of scenario probability and emotional attribution to them diversifies the overall structural composition of the images of the futures. Hence, despite the primarily static form of the four reconstructed images of the futures, the prevalence of scenarios in them and variation of probability degree and emotional attributiveness allows me to assume that the *script of the future* or *screen-play of the future* might be a better-fitted concept name for the family's futures image.

It is necessary to underscore the origin of the four images above: they have been reconstructed by the researcher. This approach is close to psychoanalysis. When the psychoanalyst/therapist attentively listens to the client's thoughts and associations, asks clarifying questions, and, finally,

reconstructs the full image of the issues and interprets them through the theoretical (highly symbolic) framework of psychoanalysis. The CLA itself is the method, partly rooted in Jungian archetypal analysis in its “Myth/Metaphor” layer (Kaboli & Tapio 2018, 36). The clear discrepancy of my analysis from psychoanalysis is its depth: my interpretations are rather shallow and do not treat semiotics. Hence, names and the composed content of the families’ images of the futures are not in a strict sense *theirs* – they are *mine*. I am a final composer. Or treating the art metaphor – I am an art critic who generalizes concrete images (pictures) and attributes to them augmented symbolism.

However, two factors slightly shift the pure analytical approach to the constructivist pole. First, the guide of the interview and, second, its semi-structured character, which results in the framing of the informants from the beginning of the conversation by the PESTEC(V) scaffolding and the conversation’s narration. Families do not have the absolute opportunity for free associations and imagining whatever they want. The constructivists and knowledge-producing nature of the interview imply not only a more open role of the interviewer, but also a more robust elaboration of the consistent plot from the interviewees, especially as a reaction to the researcher’s reflective questions and critique of the spouse. “The interviewee’s statements are not collected – they are co-authored by the interviewer” (Kvale 1996, 183).

The outcome of the future knowledge construction (through foresight practice) of families is in multiple fragments of various future envisions. It is hard to name that *strategic foresight*, it is not presented as a consistent and coherent text with key drivers, 4-6 basic scenarios, and recommendations for the strategic management for decision-making (vision creation). However, scenarios, forecasts, visions, and plans are there. Moreover, these foresight “debris” are primarily families’ own projections rather than the researcher's interpretive reconstruction.

Summarizing, the analysis through the “six foresight frames” (Minkkinen et al. 2019) might be utilized as a supplementary instrument to CLA for a more authentic and dynamic image (script) of the future. However, from my perspective, further research with the integrated “six foresight frames” could be designed differently. The structural analysis through the “six foresight frames” might be conducted before or simultaneously with the CLA to timely reveal the narratives of dynamically unfolding futures in external (societal) and internal (familial) contexts. Moreover, the result of the unveiling of visions, scenarios, and forecasts might provide extensive grounds for further work with families (if they wish). That might contain, for instance, the following crystallization of the family vision and elaboration of possible scenarios to help the family to strive

for their own audacious goals, being prepared for alternative ramifications of the external milieu, or even adjusting the milieu to the family's future aspirations. Additionally, such activity per se might assist in the formation of the own family's foresight practice as a habitual (scientifically instrumentalized) familial practice. In other words, in response to the Rubin's (2013) observation of the inconsistency of future images, it might be possible to reach consistency with particular efforts and by specific methods, switching from a primarily analytical to a constructivist approach or melding them in a proper proportion.

#### **5.4 Individual and family images of the future: psychological aspect**

Within the observations of families in this research, one phenomenon has been evident throughout all interviews: particular topics triggered specific behavioral reactions of the informants. In some cases, they become more inspired, talkative, and creative, whereas other themes drive their reluctance, hinder an immediate answer, or result in a scarce and concise answer that obviously affects the image of the future. The only topic that distinguishes the whole pool rather distinctly – future technological developments. Even if the informant demonstrates skepticism in future development advancement, the willingness to speculate about this topic is quite evident. At the same time, it is quite difficult to determine in a certain way the list of themes followed by the opposite pattern – reluctance or predicament: sometimes it relates to politically colored issues, sometimes to other relatives, sometimes to values. Moreover, reluctance might be triggered either by emotionally negative sensitive content or lack of knowledge (or mere embarrassing feelings towards personally received own personal incompetence). Despite the trivial character of my observation, it might be useful in enhancing the exploration, analysis, and understanding of the role of two key entities: imagination and emotions. Presumably, the former process directly determines the content abundance of the future images, whereas the latter is intertwined with a conative aspect of the image of the future and further decision-making.

Bell et al. (1971) in a suggested “Paradigm for the Analysis of Time Perspectives and Images of the Future”, consider human nature as one of the key factors for social change. Being put into the political, economic, and social system, humans affect the possible future alternatives. For the social scientist specific human characteristics that impactful for social transformations are in a focus, namely, general traits on a scale “good-evil”, the degree of flexibility, capacity and limits for (self)development and its velocity, agency degree and susceptibility for external forces, and improvement or deterioration concerning social changes. (Bell et al. 1971, 47-48.)

Despite the predominantly sociological approach for the analyses of the individual's image of future in futures studies, human's characteristics, its personality, cognitive and affective aspects are conceptually considered to some extent (see, for instance, Polak 1973; Bell & Mau 1971; Rubin & Linturi 2001; Kaboli & Tapio 2018). These characteristics are equally attributed to human psychology, i.e., subjects of psychological studies. Thus, from my perspective, specifically regarding cognition and affect, two key elements might be underscored for the more scrupulous investigation of the individual and familial image of the future: imagination and emotions.

Rubin (2013) claims that images of the future “are formed from knowledge and flavoured with imagination” (Rubin 2013, S40). This statement underlines a novel, detached from past or present contexts, component of the future images. Similar approach – equalizing imagination with novelty and innovation – quite regular for foresight practice, for example, “out-of-radar knowledge”, i.e., “wild cards”, “black swans” and “weak signals”, is primarily activated “through imagination and creative actions” rather through logical reasoning (Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015). However, the interrelation between each act of short-term or long-term future envisioning and imagination might be more complex and wider. Virtually, any type of involuntary or voluntary foresight activity is a result of imagination as the leading faculty in dealing with any “unreal” objects (Pott et al. 2022; Vygotsky 1982, 436-454). Creating the novelty involves operation with ‘old’ images that result in a new combination of previously collected images through interrelation with reality, as well as producing absolutely new images that are completely detached from reality (Vygotsky 1982, 453). Moreover, in such processes, “realistic” thinking, abstract logical reasoning is inseparable from the imagination (Pott et al. 2022; Vygotsky 1982, 436-454).

Furthermore, imagination and emotions initially in a reciprocal nexus (Pott et al. 2022; Vygotsky 1982, 436-454) and considering the foresight activity, such reciprocity is likewise attributed to it (van Leeuwen 2011; Bulley et al. 2020). Imagination and future envisioning can drive emotions similar to those triggered by the perception of the real (sensed) world and in real (present) time. Probably, a less optimistic or more cautious view of the future of women in my research likewise relates to specific potential responses triggered by anxiety as a consequence of their specific role as a caregiver for offspring. This question might be investigated further.

Polak (1973, 13-14), Bell and Mau (1971, 21), and Rubin and Linturi (2001, 271) insert into their concepts emotions primarily related to hopes and fears, which are included in the image of the future as elements. However, from my perspective, this affective component in its interrelation with

imagination might be elaborated further to augment the concepts with human natural traits that impact and induce the future images of individuals (and groups).

The deeper analysis of the emotive component of futurizing is also beneficial for a clearer distinction among various types of future projections, their drivers. Image of the future itself (as a mental imagery model) cannot be fearful or hopeful; the valence to it is attributed by emotional reaction derived from the process of comparing the future image with beliefs. However, this is the result not only of conscious imagining but also of unconscious processing of the informational input. It also should be noted that although it could be unconscious, it is always *intentional* (in contrast with Rubin (2013, S41), purposeful, toward the decision-making.

Concerning, for instance, that expectations can be in two modalities – positive (desired) and negative (fearful, threatening) – it can be supposed that the ‘rightness-wrongness’ of the future alternatives’ choice is appraised by emotions since of inherently (biologically) attributed to them, among others, *evaluative* mechanism. Taken for granted, for instance, Matthen’s (1998) statement that fear is one of the emotions that are “biological universals”, it might be assumed that the image of the future is also under the ‘pressure’ of ancient behavioral patterns.

Considering negative emotions, imprints of avoidance, fight, and defensive responses attributed to mammals (Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Sütterlin 1990, 381, according to Gray & McNaughton 2003, 38) are partly detected in families’ future images in my research. For instance, “Plan B” in dystopian scenarios is clear evidence of avoidance patterns; additionally, rarely in several interviews, the potential for future defensive behavior is discernible. Gray and McNaughton (2003, 38) argue that even extensive “human cultural refinements” do not principally differentiate from the defensive and aggressive behavior of other mammals and equalize man and other primates.

Despite the abovementioned similarities in behavioral patterns, one remarkable factor must be considered – temporality. Families in my research discuss a 10-year perspective, and I do not observe, indeed, highly intensified emotions akin to fear, even though they operate with fear-related words. Their negative connotations are highly likely might be attributed to various levels of anxiety. Fear is a strong emotion that directly connotes danger – a specific stimulus associated with punishment, whereas anxiety arises when stimulus is absent or even not immediately threatening, but “associated with frustrative nonreward and novel stimuli” or “lack of control over events” (Hyman 2001, x; Gray 1991, 77).

Anxiety, in Gray's (1991) argumentation, is a primary emotion, not a blend of other emotional states, and fear is one of the subspecies of anxiety, "the most important other subspecies being what Amsel called "anticipatory frustration."" (Gray 1991, 77). Hence, herein one terminological clarification might be valuable, since "fear" as a strong emotional connotation concerning the image of the future is widely exploited in futurists' works (cf. Bell & Mau 1971; Polak 1973; Rubin 2000, 2013).

I suppose that the situation might change dramatically when families from my research sample inevitably will be forced to make a decision and act. At a particular moment, when their beliefs do not match the perceived information from the environment (novel stimuli), they lose control over events or something immediately threatens them, anxiety arises up extreme fear. The difference in temporality – long-term horizon and short-term perspective – and, consequently, behavioral patterns, remarkably differ.

Moreover, the reciprocal character of emotions is also evident. In the preface of this thesis, I mentioned contemporary sociological research of new wave migrants from Russia to light visa requirements where one of the traits is remarkably evident – sudden exodus and precariousness in new circumstances drastically hinder the long-term planning and even if people endeavor to somehow plan the future, they openly admit to themselves that these plans are "ephemeral" (Kuleshova et al. 2023).

Coping in highly stressful situations (as migrant families are experiencing) can vary and among other factors depends on the time perspective and subjective certainty of the events when the more certain threats (subjectively perceived) the more reactive the coping strategy, e.g., the "anticipatory coping" is actually for the critical event in the near future (Schwarzer & Luszczynska 2008, 22). In contrast, "proactive coping" implies the subjects' vision and building resources "that facilitate promotion toward challenging goals." (Schwarzer & Luszczynska 2008, 23.) Thus, "anticipatory frustration" (Gray 1991, 77) triggers "anticipatory coping" (Schwarzer & Luszczynska 2008, 22).

The abovementioned anticipatory-related phenomena induce further contemplations towards anticipatory theories in futures studies. The basic statement is that anticipation is inseparably immanent to action in a reciprocal relation with the milieu by constructing and reconstructing the predictive model of the environment and the owner of the model itself (Shick 2022; Poli 2010; Miller et al. 2019). This statement is discussed primarily in a time-irrelevant manner using Rosen's initial term "a later instant" (see, for example, Rosen 1985, 341, according to Poli 2010, 8). Without a profound analysis of this model, I assume that long-term future projection and short-term

forecasting might have peculiarities since the environment in the long-term perspective might change drastically, to an absolutely unpredictable or unimaginable (e.g. black hole).

For example, “anticipatory coping” (Schwarzer & Luszczynska 2008) and “anticipatory practices” (Hautala & Ahlqvist 2022) are obviously different, taking into account that the former is a reactive coping strategy for the critical event in the near future, whereas the latter implies future knowledge production in long-term horizon through imagination. Thus, the concept of anticipation concerning the individual’s (and family’s) images of the future might be highly valuable in connection with the emotive and conative aspects. However, for further development of my research, the discrepancies in temporality between anticipation in the immediate milieu and the imagined one in long-term perspective and corresponding characteristics might be investigated more deeply, i.e., how far and in what conditions individuals (and families) can efficiently anticipate.

From my perspective, to make the long-term projections *true propositions* that can be *anticipated* (instead of mere cognitive logical projecting through a ‘cause-and-effect’ scheme), the holistic model of the development of future image as belief might be applied. It can be possible to emulate the imminent situation in the far future, figuratively speaking, to apply “zoom” by imagination and stimulation of the emotional and conative components, akin to the emotional engagement phase of the futures workshops, suggested by Rogers and Tough (1996). But again, that might be elaborated later.

In addition to direct behavioral response to the potential threats in the milieu that echo in the family’s future images, another type of *evaluation* of future projections and further decisions is evident – *values*. This phenomenon is more vividly detected in families’ future images who value a peaceful and decent life, which prevails over a rather evident anxiety towards potential difficulties in integration into the host society. Bell and Mau (1971, 22, 28) argue that values are in reciprocal interrelations with the image of the future; they serve to evaluate goals and estimate costs. Polak (1973, 13-14) underlines “ideas, ideals, values, and norms” as primary forces in societal history. Additionally, to my open question about the family’s values in a 10-year perspective that caused a slight initial quandary, families share their values and attitudes in relatively contextual statements that require further interpretations from the researcher. In rare aforementioned cases, values of one of the family members act as a ground for futures critiques and problematize future images or foster their elaboration. It is observable through the process of conversation that, presumably, these value-based appraisals are intertwined with emotions.

Probably, for the families in my research, anxiety towards potential social obstruction, caused by their values, and fear, related to family members' physical safety in the society of origin, are more intensive than anxiety towards insufficient linguo-cultural identification. Likewise, their striving for future belonging to the host society with similar values might be a dominant trigger of the prevailing joyful ("appetitive") emotional reaction produced by imagination that, in combination with conations, fuels the family's desires. That affective conglomerate is highly likely attributed to the futures images of the families. Thus, the relations between emotions, beliefs, values, conations, and images of the future possess complex and sometimes intricate character. However, the investigation of their interdependencies might be beneficial not only for more correct and less contradictory analysis of the future images themselves, but also for helping families to reflect their attitudes and to shape their envisioning for the smoother settling into a novel milieu.

### **5.5 Whose futures are in the family's images of the future?**

One of the elements of my research remains unanalyzed and vague – who is indeed involved into the creation of the family's image of the future? Stepping from the "family practice" (Dermott & Fowler 2020) approach, foresight activities of family and correspondingly their results – family's images of the future – highly likely might involve individuals who constitute family in general. The foresight activity might be one of the family practices that maintain the family as a sustainable micro-social unit.

Families in my research, except one informant, possess primarily a cultural identity that is tightly connected with the country of exodus – Russia. One remark from my side, I avoid generalization that Russian cultural identity is predominantly attributed to all families in my study, since I have not investigated this phenomenon thoroughly. However, taking for granted that they have been living before the emigration in Russia and have not reported directly any peculiarities towards cultural identification, except Russian, I hypothesize that they might have specificity in "doing" family.

For instance, Soliz (2007) claims that in cases when families maintain communication with grandparents in case of supportive communication and parental encouragement positively impact on the perception of a common ingroup identity, and grandparents may have significant role in transmitting values. Assumably, the difference between cultures in Soliz's study (one of the ethnicities in USA) and in Russia might be possible.

However, according to Romanov (2013) communication with the younger generation and specifically communication about family with grandchildren is highly valuable for grandparents in

Russia, even higher than any other external communication. Moreover, such communication is significantly and positively connected with the communication satisfaction between grandchildren and grandparents. Such communication, as in Soliz's (2007) study, becomes one of the channels for transmitting values and beliefs from the elder generation, sometimes even counterfactual to the dominant cultural norms, ideals, and values. (Romanov 2013.)

Undoubtedly, my direct questions in the interviews related to family relatives and specifically to the elder generation deliberately highlight this topic and might have a slightly distorting character for further interpretation. However, through all family cases, spouses demonstrate emotionally saturated concerns towards their maturing parents and manifest genuine interest in maintaining relations with them in a 10-year perspective, even though they project an increase of constraints, e.g., migration policy tightening. Moreover, in one case, one of the spouses has openly claimed total disagreement with their own parents concerning attitudes towards war. However, spouses not only have not cut the communication with the elder generation, but also consciously support daily intercommunication between children and grandparents through videoconferencing. In another case, an adolescent family member manifests their own wish to communicate with their grandmother and underlines its importance, which is also depicted in KFD when the nuclear family sits around the table and has a chat with the grandmother via videoconferencing. However, it is worth underlining that in all cases, families rather confidently foresee that grandparents will live separately from the nuclear family.

Thus, supposedly, connection with grandparents might have a corresponding effect on the family's future images both in direct relation – how the family cares about the elder generation in the future, and indirectly – how values and beliefs implicitly spread and might influence the image of the future. The aforementioned phenomena might become a subject of my further research, specifically within the “family practice” (Dermott & Fowler 2020) framework. In addition to a specific role of the (elder) relatives incorporated into the nuclear family foresight activities, another phenomenon might be impactful in terms of the family's futures images – the internal family's power balance. Who is more dominant and, hence, more influential on the family's futures? Bell and Mau (1971, 22-23) claim that analysis of a group's future images additionally requires examining the interplaying co-existing beliefs and values and identifying those that dominate.

Considering external family future developments, it might be valuable to compare and contrast outer discourse and inner futures. Rubin asserts that an individual's future images that contain partly unconscious and conflicting intimidating elements of the future are “a mixture of

assumptions, beliefs, and straggly information from the media” (Rubin 2013, S41). Even though this research does not aim to analyze social discourse in comparison with families’ images of the future, nevertheless, it is highly probable that their images contain news agenda that coincides with the time of the interview or is fairly recent. For instance, mentions of the nuclear war, tactical nuclear weapon, “red button” which might be pressed by one well-known person, and Russian official nuclear doctrine are distinct connotations of top news in September-October 2024 concurred with part of the interviews. Likewise, imagined potential consequences of current governmental decisions made in migration policies in the country of destination trigger the family’s anxiety and generate images alluded to dark historical events exaggerated by Russian media. Similarly, the global agenda of climate change permeates the external future context of the families: they are aware of global warming, the ocean rise, the increasing number of droughts and fires, rarer, of the biodiversity loss.

Although these events in the future societal and global contexts are rather diverse, they remain a weaker booster for the potential decision-making than the internal family's future image. Families in my research evidently resist the imagined external adversities and in a highly confident manner claim about their staying, settling, and deep integration in the host country in 10 years, despite potential coastal inundation and heat-caused fires. Moreover, they believe that either the intensity of these events will be moderate or humans will find technological solutions, hence, they do not need to elaborate on this scenario – the milieu remains livable.

This phenomenon – strong belief in highly positive and disbelief in highly negative scenarios – provides me with an assumption that this composition requires a specific approach. The genuine image of the future of these families embracing their prosperity in a prosperous, benevolent society in 10 years is an unshakable core. Extremely simplifying, this core *is a true image of their future*, whereas the rest of their imagined entities are not their image of the future; they are just logically consistent scenarios, or *‘possible-possible state of affairs’*. At this point, it becomes rather understandable Polak’s (1973) desperation towards the incapability of (his) contemporaries to create a pulling image of the future. The *strength* of faith in the future image determines aspirations to follow it. Probably, the force of faith is a highly important variable, and the image of the future in general is not a rational construct, but a religious-like entity that needs primarily deeper culturological analysis and corresponding methods for its development.

It is highly debatable that in a democratic society, the primary source of bright and inspirational images of the future is “*aristocratie*” (Polak 1973, 13) or “social science community” (Bell & Mau

1971, 38), even though they are highly imaginative and socially responsible. From my perspective, their idealized concepts might have the destiny to become wishful thinking. As the results of this small research demonstrate, the internal family's image of the future is a rather sustainable essence. Thus, being creative in designing the future, it is worth being a "social reflector" and constantly negotiating images of the futures of individuals, families, communities, professional groups, and society in general. The good news is that not all parts of the family's images of the future are strong, unshakable beliefs, and there is plenty of space to substitute negative, hardly believable scenarios with forceful aspirations towards the betterment of the surrounding world. Hence, there is an opportunity, instead of reconciling the shining utopic pulling core of the prosperous family future with their "real" capabilities, to find ways to make emotive, conative, and epistemic components of the image of the future well-balanced and holistic. "...the researcher should strive to give as much consideration to the formulation of positive idealistic images of the future as to negative and cynical ones", to construct "desirable self-fulfilling propositions" (Bell & Mau 1971, 39).

Perhaps, today's social and political landscape, including the rise of populism, is the natural, organic reaction of the lay people who are tired of sophisticated and highly smart but completely incomprehensible images of the futures. Perhaps, this is the call for clarity and simplicity in front of the rocketing complexity of the future world. Or, on the contrary, it is high time to learn by everyone how to anticipate unpredictable possibilities and prepare for plausible ones, and simultaneously how to create desirable, audacious goals and persistently reach them without division between *elitist* and *mass* image of the future. The future image is not a hat, no one can merely bring it and put it on someone's head.

Virmajoki (2022) argues that human ability to investigate future is historically limited where the history itself conceived through the prism of the present point of view, "the present state of the world reinforces its own hegemony, continuity, and inevitability", therefore, eventually in study futures we face "epistemological and conceptual predicament with respect to future possibilities" (Virmajoki 2022, 8). For this particular research, that argument adds one warning to account – the outer future in the family future images is highly contingent, or, figuratively speaking, even fragile. The only thing that gives us optimism is that the capacity of imagination can be developed as a skill (Kind 2022); thus, at least, the images of the future might become more sophisticated.

## 5.6 Possible implications for the host countries

The sub-question of this research relates to the possible implications for countries (societies) of participating families' destination. This inquiry is less elaborated than the family's images of the future. Taking into account that families in this research have moved to five different countries, it is quite challenging to completely equalize their situations in host societies. For the proper and balanced analysis, each case should be treated separately, and in addition to families' images, the external (country) context might be explored in depth, for example, media, social and political discourse, family and migration legislation, and the tendency of its changing. This can demand another research. Hence, I attempt to investigate this topic slightly and suggest ideas in a highly speculative manner.

The findings of this research in general support the existent argumentation of current expert analysis that this migrant wave from Russia is hardly might be considered as threaten for the receiving countries (see, for example, Zavadskaya 2023). Looking through the prism of families' futures images it can be supposed more benefits for the host societies, at least, in two dimensions: socio-economic and value-based.

All of these families mention in their visions and highly probable scenarios the economic prosperity and material well-being of their families. That is tightly intertwined with their projected future work-related activities and rising wealth. Despite the yearly level of expected family income varying rather substantially, it indicates that the lowest values are close to the average and higher than in the host country. Part of the informants are interested in supplementary professional activities and small businesses running in a 10-year perspective. Part of them (women) who are temporarily unemployed are planning to study and acquire new professional skills and specialties. The simplest assumption might be made from these observations: these families are supposed to be economically active and productive for the countries of destination. Considering their current professions and envisioned career advancement, it is highly probable that they will generate at least the mean level of taxes (not speaking about their potential assets, e.g., houses, cars, etc.). Moreover, some of them openly claim that they are ready to pay high taxes and do not expect their decrease, and completely agree with the tax policies in the transparent, socially-oriented system.

Furthermore, all of these families state their determination towards learning the local official language up to the advanced level and integrating into the society as deeply as it is possible for the first-generation migrants. With few exceptions, they plan to obtain citizenship in the country of destination. All families with existing and planned children foresee them as fluently speaking the

official country languages, studying in a primarily local system of education, and completely becoming part of the society, sometimes up to acquiring local mentality. This provides confidence in families' future as new citizens that are highly likely to belong to the resident society rather than isolate from it. At the same time, the aspect of integration is interrelated in the families' futures images with their anxiety towards the successfulness of the integration. Some of them mention whether the receiving society will treat them equally with others concerning their Russian origin. However, in general, the families' images of the futures are full of optimistic views regarding the host society.

One more factor, connected with potential impact on the host society, is an active civil position and political involvement of family members. It is hard to define these families as revolutionists. A small portion of informants claim that they will possibly participate in social and political activism. However, almost all of them are ready to become voters as soon as they acquire the corresponding right, and some of them manifest their interest in participation in social activities on the local, municipal level. These attributes are not only connected with families' expectations towards the degree of integration, but also demonstrate their potential input into the development of local communities.

However, from my perspective, a more beneficial aspect of the overall impact of these families is their values and attitudes. They openly and indirectly declare identical to the host society's principles. The core of them is constituted from tolerance, peacefulness, humaneness, empathy, compassion, cooperation, honesty, safety, freedom. Thus, such coincidence gives a hint that host societies might receive loyal members who share common societal ideals even though insignificant part of them need currently additional support.

## 6 Conclusion

The research presented in this thesis offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the images of the future of nine families immigrated from Russia to five European countries after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 24.02.2022. Being cross-sectional, this research augments the pool of: migrant studies of the last migrant wave from Russia, family studies devoted to specific family practice – future foreseeing and planning, and, predominantly, futures studies since the image of the future is a “*basic concern of futurists*” (Bell 2003, 81). Benefiting from a multidisciplinary origin, futures studies initially have the unique “right” to embrace corresponding findings from various domains.

Considering futures studies particularly, this research aims to fill a gap between studies of individual and societal images of the futures since the family is a micro-social unit of “belonging” individuals who are *doing* family (Dermott & Fowler 2020). Despite the existing multifaceted and sophisticated analysis of the future image as a specific subject: historic-socio-cultural on civilizational level (Polak 1973), sociological on social and individual levels (Bell and Mau 1971; Slaughter 1991; Rubin 2000) – the space for further exploration might be found.

Concerning family’s images specifically, the deeper psychological level might provide valuable details for better understanding such a complex and complicated entity. At least, cognitive, first of all, imagination, and affect aspects, i.e., emotional and conative factors, might become topics for the next steps in depth. Figuratively speaking, in terms of prominent physicist Richard P. Feynman, “there’s plenty of room at the bottom” (Feynman 2011). This might be productive, specifically in terms of the development of the creative transcendental power of imagination to foresee a preposterous future.

This research attempted to apply the “classic” foresight analytic frame, PESTEC/V for the scaffolding of the interview of micro-groups (mainly pairs) of individuals. Moreover, for the immediate deep engagement of the family into the imaginative space, one of the projective psychological methods – Kinetic Family Drawing (Handler & Habenicht 1994) – has been applied. That facilitates a trustful and more relaxed atmosphere from the initial phase of the interview. Another novelty is in the structural analysis of the family’s futures images through the foresight framework (Minkkinen et al. 2019). The latter endeavor treats the classification of the whole foresight sphere for the specific analysis of the image of the future on the lowest micro-social layer. In combination with CLA (Inayatullah 1998; Inayatullah 2009; Kaboli & Tapio 2018), these

methods enhance the interpretational capacity of analysis that results in more distinct, abundant, and dynamic images of the future. However, further methodological investigation might be fruitful, especially in exploring the integration of hermeneutics and a constructivist approach.

This research partly highlights the patterns in the futures images which might be assumingly attributed to Western culture: eschatology, utopia, and dystopia. However, it also might be a common human cultural pattern that is detached from a particular cultural identity. Additionally, unveiled in this research, cultural identification as an important factor might be analyzed more thoroughly in its interrelation with aspects from migrant studies. Moreover, the term “the image of the future” itself might be considered in cultural analysis from other angles, for instance, supposing that it primarily contains *scenarios*, or images in a dynamic, as a main element, it might be possible to define it as the *script of the futures*. Finally, *faith* and its force as a specific variable could also be an intriguing subject matter that overlaps with cultural and religious phenomena. To discuss all these topics more reasonably and with evidence, additional cultural analysis of the (family) future images might be beneficial.

A wider and more profound philosophical grounding is needed to analyze the image of the future more voluminously and deeper. This is one of the ‘natural’ limitations of this Master’s degree research. However, to keep particular focus and to be specific in the subject of analysis, it is worth discerning philosophical domains through which the future image might permeate, for instance, ontological, epistemic, or axiological. The latter almost always emerge with the content of the futures images, especially when the terms “interpretation” and “discourse” arise. Hence, in some cases, maintaining the narrower scope might help to enrich understanding of “the image of the future” as a specific subject *itself*, regardless of our *evaluation* of its content. Nevertheless, ethical and moral aspects remain an important part of analysis.

Migrants, their families, ways of their migration, and integration (acculturation, assimilation, accommodation, etc.) in the host country have been the focus of a great number of studies for decades. However, the aspect of envisioning their futures specifically might bridge their cruel past and harsh present with their bright and prosperous futures. Futurists might deeper analyze both families’ own futures ‘scripts’ and external societal (including media, formal and informal institutions, authorities, and their policies) discourse towards the future while reconstructing the coherent, holistic, and mutual image of the future of the host society and arriving families. A specific focus of research that merges family and futures studies could be a deeper investigation of the migration, triggered by the war. All these explorations might be valuable, first of all in a

pragmatic sense – to help families to settle seamlessly and to genuinely belong to the society of destination more deeply, to gain twofold benefit: for families and the host societies.

Finally, from the perspective of family studies, it seems highly intriguing to dive deeper into the family life matter and course. This research slightly unveils the process of the family's futurizing. Further phenomenological study might shed more light on the family experience behind the curtain. How does doing foresight together influence the family? How do family members experience it? How and what are the meanings of the future developed? Who is the dominant visionary or futures script writer? Thus, intersectional connection might be fruitful both for the family and futures studies that can also result in practical instruments for assisting families in their futures envisioning and maintaining family balance and harmony.

Thus, the findings of this research may have implications for various spheres related to the futures of migrant families in a theoretical and empirical sense. Additionally, to maintain a holistic approach and temporal, futuristic component, it is worth keeping the subject under the umbrella of futures studies, since at its core is *the image of the Future(s)*. But the ultimate goal of such scientific explorations is effective practical assistance for families in their settling in the country of destination and smooth integration, as well as efficient measures for the host society for the incorporation of migrant families to strive reaching a common better future for all despite the origin in the past and here-and-now adversities.



Figure 3. The image of the future of the migrant family (AI Copilot generated)

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Comparison of three basic concepts of the image of the future

Table 20. Comparison of three basic concepts of the image of the future

	<i>Polak</i>	<i>Bell &amp; Mau</i>	<i>Rubin &amp; Linturi, Rubin</i>
<i>Level</i>	Societal	Group/Individual	Individual
<i>Definition</i>	The “imagined Other”, “not-self”, not the present reality	“an expectation about the state of things to come at some future time” “probable possibilities”	“a mental construction dealing with possible future states<...>composed of a mixture of conceptions, beliefs and desires, as well as observations and knowledge of the present, which affect a person’s choices both consciously and unconsciously and which derive both from the reality and from imagination, it steers his/her decision-making and actions” (Rubin and Linturi 2001, 271)  A mixture of beliefs, expectations, opinions, assumptions, assessments, and “straggly information from the media” “formed from knowledge and flavoured with imagination” (Rubin 2013)  “emerge as hopes, fears, and expectations” (2013, S40)
<i>Key features</i>	Essence (unchangeable course of events)/Influence (capability to manipulate historical processes)  Eschatology/Utopia/Dystopia	“levels of abstraction” the social unit size (individual-group) time horizon (near-far) physical location (here-there) social acceptance (shared-conflictual) levels of inspiration influence complexity	Conscious/Unconscious Intentional/Unintentional

		consciousness in creation futures modality (probability, possibility, desirability).	
<i>Core driving force</i>	Man's inner dualism. "categorize and reorder reality within the self (présent reality) and in relation to perceptions of the not-self (the Other)" (Polak 1973, 1)	Comparing with values	
<i>Source</i>	Culture, e.g. myths and legends, art	Beliefs about past, present, future, causes and effects (social causality)	"Mixture of conceptions, beliefs and desires, as well as observations and knowledge of the present"
<i>What for</i>	Social change	Social change mostly	Overall life-management and individual coping in the present
<i>"Foresight modality"</i>	Vision	Anticipation/Vision	Mixture
<i>Valence</i>	Optimistic/Pessimistic	Hope/Fears Optimistic/Pessimistic	Ambivalence Hope/Fears Negative/Positive
<i>Normative valence</i>	Should be optimistic	Should be optimistic, but "possidictions"	Hope should be real
<i>Serves for decision-making?</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes "...realistic and sensible decision-making" (Rubin 2013, S42)
<i>"Who creates?"</i>	"aristocratie" "élite in a given society" (Polak 1973, 2)  "Thinking about the future requires faith and visionary powers, mixed with philosophic detachment, a rich emotional life, and creative fantasy." (Polak 1973, 22)	Social scientist with involvement of different groups of populations	Identity (person in many social roles)  Identity derived from General and Social Knowledge
<i>Where applicable</i>	Western civilization	Western civilization "Advanced society"	Presumably western civilization
<i>Time perspective</i>	Thousands of years	Century(-ies)?	Life-course

## Appendix 2 Interview guide framework

### 1) General instructions in the beginning. Free storytelling for the family.

Imagine your family in 10 years from now. Try to pretend that all possible details, e.g., environment, conditions, surrounding people, even tiny features, would be useful. You can close your eyes or leave them open. Focus on that time for 30 seconds. “What is the year? How old will you be in 10 years? Who are you? Where? What surrounds you? Who? Etc.”

### 2) Kinetic Family Drawing

Please, draw a picture of your family doing something sometime in 10 years. It can be any of your immediate ideas. There are no limitations. If there is a constraint, some clarifying questions are possible. What are these people doing? Discuss it before or within the process of drawing and use any of the means to depict it. The quality of the picture does not matter at all, it can be schematic. If you don't like to draw, imagine this picture and tell me in detail.

### 3) The in-depth interview after the storytelling phase

If something from the content below is in the free storytelling, it can be skipped or clarified during this phase.

Table 21. PESTEC(V) scheme for the interview

<b><i>Domains</i></b>	<b><i>Internal circumstances</i></b>	<b><i>External circumstances</i></b>
<i>Geography</i>	Where will you live in 10 years? A city, a small town, a village, or a farmstead. What is the climate? Will you live close to nature (sea, lake, river, forest, etc.)?	What is the country or region where your family will be in 10 years?
<i>Social</i>	Do you live in 10 years with your children or with someone from the extended family (parents, aunts/uncles, siblings)? Or both? If your children will live separately, where are they? What do they presumably do, and what do their lives look like? Where do your closest relatives live (parents, aunts/uncles, siblings)?	In what society will you live locally and nationally? Briefly describe the people surrounding your family, maybe your neighbors or local communities. Will you have any ties with them? How do they communicate with your family? How will people in general in the country communicate with your family members? What are their attitudes towards your family? Maybe you can imagine any specific cases of the social context of your family, considering, for instance, education (school, college, or university) and healthcare institutions.
<i>Economic</i>	What is the economic situation of your family in 10 years? Do you live in your own house or apartment? Did you purchase it on your own family's means	What will be the economic situation in the country you living in?

	or with a mortgage? Or do you rent the apartment? Do you have a car or cars? Are you independent and financially free, or maybe you have some constraints, even a limited family budget? Are you (both) employed? Or do you have your own (maybe, family) business (what kind of)?	A free market liberal economy with minimal state participation or a mostly state-driven market economy. Taxation policy?
<i>Technological</i>	Could you imagine the impact of 10 years of technological developments on your family life? Any of the pretended cases in your household: solutions, gadgets, devices, systems.	Will the country your family lives in be technologically advanced? Could you provide examples of everyday life technology solutions in your family's regular life and society in general (transportation, work, entertainment, social sphere)?
<i>Ecological</i>	Does your family experience the impact or influence of environmental issues?	What is the ecological situation in general? Are there any environmental issues? Have people mostly overcome the global climate problems?
<i>Cultural</i>	Does your family keep and follow your own family's traditions and rituals? Are they closely connected with the country you moved from? Or do you adopt new customs from the major culture you live in? Or do you have a mixture of them? Are your kids bilingual, or do they mostly speak the language of the country you live in? Do you have strong attitudes toward preserving your native language in the family?	Do you celebrate some holidays with your local friends and neighbors/local community? Do you celebrate the national holidays of the country (culture) of your departure or destination? Or equally? Do you feel that your family is completely integrated into the cultural context of the culture you live in?
<i>Values</i>	What will be the most essential values for your family in the future?	What will be highly valued in the society of your future living (material/human/spiritual values)?
<i>Political</i>	Will there be any elements of political life in your family? Will your family be interested in politics at all? Maybe you will discuss it regularly inside your family, participate in some political actions, or try to avoid politics as much as you can.	What will be the political situation in the country where you live generally? What is the character of the governance? What is the situation with political rights and freedom? Will the state be highly socially oriented? Or, on the contrary, it mostly provides opportunities for self-caring/self-organizing/self-standing. Or even neglect citizens. What will be the main social policies of the state, e.g., education, social care, healthcare, migration policy, family policies, etc.?

#### 4) "Milestones"

Tell me a brief story about how your family's life has evolved from now to this imaginary future. Try to come up with core milestones and events, e.g., in 3-4-year periods.

## Appendix 3 Informed Consent Form

### Согласие на участие в исследовании представлений о будущем семей-мигрантов из России в Европе

Уважаемый участник!

Спасибо за то, что согласились принять участие в исследовании!

#### Основная цель исследования

Проанализировать представления о будущем *семей*, которые переехали в *страны Европы* из России после 24.02.2022. Полученные данные будут использованы только для исследовательских целей, а также на основе полученных результатов могут быть подготовлены рекомендации принимающим странам в области семейной, миграционной, социальной политики.

#### Основной исследователь

*Андрей Евгеньевич Мельников*, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/aemelnikov>, студент магистратуры Futures Studies (Исследования будущего) Финляндского Центра Исследования Будущего (FFRC), Школы экономики Университета г. Турку, Финляндия: <https://www.utu.fi/en/study-at-utu/masters-degree-programme-in-futures-studies>)

#### Научный руководитель

*Петри Тапио*, профессор, Финляндского Центра Исследования Будущего (FFRC), Школы экономики Университета г. Турку, Финляндия, <https://www.utu.fi/en/people/petri-tapio>


#### Участники исследования

*Семьи*, которые в данном исследовании понимаются как те, которые считают себя таковыми и включают в себя одно-два поколения, при этом, официальная регистрация, например, брака и количество детей не важны. Возможна любая конфигурация, например, партнеры/супруги (родитель(и)/опекун(-ы)) и, при наличии, ребенок/дети любого возраста, но исключая старшее поколение, бабушек и дедушек.


Предполагается, что у участников исследования гражданство России или Беларуси (возможно сочетание, когда партнеры/супруги имеют гражданство любой из этих стран).

Наличие гражданства ни коим образом не проверяется и отмечается только со слов участников.


*Графическое изображение семей-участниц исследования*



Вариант 1. Двое супругов/партнеров.



Вариант 2. Двое родителей/опекунов и ребенок/дети.



Вариант 3. Родитель/опекун и ребенок/дети.

### Как проходит интервью?

Семья-участник приглашается к беседе в достаточно свободной форме по вопросам, связанных с образом будущего семьи. В процессе беседы вас также попросят нарисовать вашу семью через 10 лет, которая чем-то занимается.

Семья, в которой **два партнера/супруга**, приглашаются к участию в интервью именно в таком составе - **два человека одновременно**, исключение составляет семья, где родитель/опекун участвует один, если он/она самостоятельно воспитывает ребенка/детей.

*Участие детей* вместе с родителями в интервью *возможно*, однако, решение об этом принимают сами родители/опекуны при явно выраженном согласии со стороны ребенка. Ребенок 15 лет и старше должен будет отдельно выразить (подписать) информированное согласие на участие в интервью.

### Место интервью

Интервью будут проходить лично либо посредством видеоконференцсвязи. Это предполагает, что семья находится в том месте, где ей наиболее комфортно и нет отвлекающих факторов. Лучше всего у себя дома. Для видеоконференцсвязи используется программа Microsoft Teams с записью аудиовидеодорожки и параллельным транскрибированием.

Если вы находитесь в г. Турку или в его окрестностях, например, в пределах одного часа пути на общественном транспорте от центра Турку до места вашего проживания, то при желании, интервью может быть проведено лично у вас дома.

### **Длительность интервью**

Около 1 - 1,5 часов.

### **Использование данных, собираемых в исследовании**

#### **1. Кто собирает, хранит, имеет доступ и распространяет данные исследования**

Ответственная организация: Финляндский Центр Исследования Будущего, Университет г. Турку, Финляндия, [www.utu.fi/ffrc](http://www.utu.fi/ffrc).

*Уполномоченный по защите данных Университета Турку:* <https://www.utu.fi/fi/tietosuoja/dpo>, [dpo@utu.fi](mailto:dpo@utu.fi)

*Сбор и контроль данных:* Андрей Евгеньевич Мельников, [andrey.a.melnikov@utu.fi](mailto:andrey.a.melnikov@utu.fi), студент магистратуры Финляндского Центра Исследований Будущего, Университет г. Турку, Финляндия.

*Контроль данных:* Петри Тапио, профессор Университета г. Турку, Финляндия, [petri.tapio@utu.fi](mailto:petri.tapio@utu.fi)

#### **2. Цель использования данных**

Данные, полученные в ходе интервью, будут использованы исключительно в целях исследовательского анализа. Все персональные данные будут скрыты для невозможности идентификации личности участников. При описании результатов исследования в данной магистерской работе и (или) дальнейшей публикации в открытой печати или сети интернет интервью будут представлены только в переработанном обобщенном виде и анонимизированны, при этом, в случае публикации прямой речи (цитат) участников, будут использованы псевдонимы.

Данные, полученные в ходе интервью, не будут передаваться третьим лицам.

#### **3. Период и способ хранения данных**

Данные интервью будут храниться настолько долго, насколько это будет целесообразно и необходимо для проведения исследовательского анализа. После этого данные будут удаляться безвозвратно.

Данные будут храниться в цифровом (электронном) виде на компьютерах лиц, осуществляющих сбор и контроль данных, а также в закрытой (логин-пароль) директории хранилища данных программы Microsoft Teams официального аккаунта Университета г. Турку, к которому имеют доступ только лица, осуществляющие сбор и контроль данных.

Аудиовидеозапись интервью будут удаляться сразу после транскрибирования и коррекции текстового файла, т.е. данные интервью будут храниться только в виде текстовых файлов с использованием кодировки и (или) псевдонимов для скрытия настоящих имен.

**Любой участник исследования в любой его момент имеет право прекратить свое участие и потребовать удаления всех данных, полученных от него в ходе проведения исследования.**

**Если вы и ваш партнер(партнерша)/супруг(супруга) согласны на участие в исследовании с учетом вышеописанных условий, подпишите, пожалуйста, оба данное согласие (см. ниже) и отправьте отсканированный документ на адрес [andrey.a.melnikov@utu.fi](mailto:andrey.a.melnikov@utu.fi). При участии в интервью ребенка (детей) 15 лет и старше, им(ими) также должно быть выражено отдельное согласие подписанием данной формы.**

*Участник 1:*

**Я, \_\_\_\_\_ \_согласен(согласна)**

фамилия, имя, отчество

**на участие в исследовании с учетом вышеописанных условий \_\_\_\_\_**

подпись, дата

*Участник 2:*

**Я, \_\_\_\_\_ \_согласен(согласна)**

фамилия, имя, отчество

**на участие в исследовании с учетом вышеописанных условий \_\_\_\_\_**

подпись, дата

*Участник 3:*

**Я,** \_\_\_\_\_ **согласен(согласна)**

фамилия, имя, отчество

**на участие в исследовании с учетом вышеописанных условий** \_\_\_\_\_

подпись, дата

*Участник 4:*


**Я,** \_\_\_\_\_ **согласен(согласна)**

фамилия, имя, отчество


**на участие в исследовании с учетом вышеописанных условий** \_\_\_\_\_

подпись, дата

### Appendix 4 Pictures from the Kinetic Family Drawing phase




Picture 4. Family on vacation on one day, 10 years ahead



Picture 5. Family on vacation on one day, 10 years ahead



Picture 6. Family on vacation on one day, 10 years ahead



Picture 7. Family on vacation on one day, 10 years ahead



Picture 8. Family on vacation on one day, 10 years ahead