ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect International Journal of Project Management journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman Vanguard projects as relay races: A historical case study on the building of Eurocan pulp and paper mill, 1965–1970 Juha Laurila a , ∗ , Tuomas Ahola b a University of Turku, FI-20014 Turku, Finland b Tampere University, P.O. Box 541, FI-33101 Tampere, Finland a r t i c l e i n f o Keywords: Vanguard projects Front-end Institutional theory Historical case study a b s t r a c t Previous research recognises the strategic role of vanguard projects in providing their initiators with avenues for entering new markets or gaining mastery over innovative technologies. This study makes a contribution to this research by focusing on the extent to which vanguard projects are under control and serve the interests of their principal initiators and the other actors involved. Simultaneously, the present study contributes to project management research by applying historical case study methodology on Eurocan, a vanguard project that a major Finnish forest industry firm Enso established in the mid-1960s to the wilderness of British Columbia, Canada. Our historical analysis encourages regarding vanguard projects as relay races in which several actors participate, largely in unanticipated ways. This is especially because the initiation of vanguard projects appears to be characterised by both the heterogeneity of the actors involved, a wide variety of actions taken by these actors to increase their centrality in the project organisation as well as abrupt changes among them and their relative importance over the project lifecycle. Together these characteristics make vanguard projects particularly prone to influence from external actors and events. 1 i o ‘ c s n a m e h o c – t t ( t c 2 o t a i P a s S w t w d 2 e i o e & r a & b f h R A 0 (. Introduction Firms occasionally establish projects that are immensely challeng- ng with respect to the firms’ size or previous experience. Such projects f entrepreneurial nature are often referred to as ‘first-of-their-kind’ or vanguard’ projects (e.g. Frederiksen & Davies, 2008 ; Tillement, Gar- ias, Minguet & Duboc, 2019 ); these projects represent deliberate and trategic efforts by firms to move away from their previous core busi- ess activities and venture forth into new markets or technologies. In ddition to influencing the futures of their initiators, vanguard projects ay be ground-breaking from the perspective of groups of firms or even ntire industries. For example, Delbridge and Edwards (2008) discussed ow the shipping industry substantively changed following the launch f the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 2 and the superyacht Tiawana. The onstruction of the Florence Duomo – the largest brick dome ever built during the 15th century serves as a further example. The building of he huge dome required the development of new kinds of lifting engines hat were later used and improved in consequent engineering projects Kozak-Holland & Procter, 2014 ). Vanguard projects are no exception to other projects in the sense hat the earliest phases of their lifecycle, i.e. the project front-end, are ritically important for their outcomes ( Edkins, Geraldi, Morris & Smith, 013 ; Williams, Vo, Samset & Edkins, 2019 ). Consequently, the ability∗ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: juha.s.laurila@utu.fi (J. Laurila), tuomas.ahola@tuni.fi (T. Ahol ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.03.005 eceived 2 March 2020; Received in revised form 2 March 2021; Accepted 16 March vailable online xxx 263-7863/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) Please cite this article as: J. Laurila and T. Ahola, Vanguard projects as rel paper mill, 1965–1970, International Journal of Project Management, httpsf the project to create value depends largely on the ability of its initia- or to initiate and direct the formation of a network of complementary ctors that are motivated to share information and resources when spec- fying the central elements of the project’s scope ( Matinheikki, Artto, eltokorpi & Rajala, 2016 ). During the front-end phase, diverse business nd non-business actors, each guided by their idiosyncratic objectives, eek to influence the relevant decision-making processes ( Williams & amset, 2010 ). However, from the perspective of the project initiator, hich is typically limited in its resources ( Pinto & Winch, 2016 ), dis- inguishing actors that are crucial from those that are less relevant, as ell as devising strategies for interacting with them, represent tremen- ous and still largely unsolved challenges ( Aaltonen, Ahola & Artto, 017 ; Olander, 2007 ). The front-end phase is also characterised by an xceptionally high level of ambiguity, emerging particularly from the teratively evolving objectives of the project and the motives of vari- us actors involved in its initiation, making it a challenging target for mpirical inquiry (e.g. Garud, Tuertscher & Van de Ven, 2013 ; Jones Massa, 2013 ). This ambiguity also partly explains why in previous esearch, the early phases of the project lifecycle have received less ttention than the later phases, such as implementation ( Artto, Ahola Vartiainen, 2016 ; David, Sine & Haveman, 2013 ; Hellgren & Stjern- erg, 1995 ). Therefore, it is not at all surprising that we do not yet ully comprehend how firms initiate vanguard projects, nor do we ade-a). 2021 article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ay races: A historical case study on the building of Eurocan pulp and ://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.03.005 J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] q a c e e e w c a u t l E c t m n t & G t L a p t p t s n n p B t n t a e c N c a F b b p c d n E t c b o i g v a t & t i a o t c v p t s f C w p p w c t i j p l a s T a i p 2 g s g t s s D h n a a c v l t t e a S M t p ( a p s a ( t t m buately understand the roles that other actors may play during the initi- tion process. In addition to increasing our understanding of the salient haracteristics of vanguard projects and how they are initiated, further xploration of these phenomena has the potential to support practition- rs in their corresponding efforts. Knowledge potentially resulting from mpirical research on the topic includes answers to questions such as hich kinds of project stakeholders are involved in the initiation pro- ess and when and how they get involved with it. To extend the current understanding of vanguard projects in general nd their early phases in particular, the present study joins the grad- ally strengthening stream of project research that draws on institu- ional organisation theory (e.g. Dille & Söderlund, 2011 ; Dille, Söder- und & Clegg, 2018 ; Söderlund & Sydow, 2019 ). Although many (e.g. ngwall, 2003 ; Söderlund, 2004 ) have criticised project research for oncentrating excessively on the present, those adopting an institu- ional theory lens posit that projects in general and vanguard projects or egaprojects in particular are influenced by the past actions, prevailing orms and expected futures of the institutional environments in which hey are initiated and implemented ( Biesenthal, Clegg, Mahalingam Sankaran, 2018 ; Matinheikki, Aaltonen & Walker, 2019 ; Morris & eraldi, 2011 ). Consequently, as institutional environments may ei- her constrain or encourage innovation ( Greenwood & Hinings, 1996 ; ounsbury & Crumley, 2007 ), approaching vanguard projects from this ngle makes us more sensitive to how the distinctive norms and rules revailing in this environment influence the emergence and unfolding of hese projects. As a start, the extraordinary novelty inherent in vanguard rojects produces a legitimacy threshold ( Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002 ) hat their initiators need to exceed. Vanguard projects are also highly usceptible to various coercive pressures. For example, we might recog- ise that the actions of a firm that is the first to invest in a new tech- ology or expand into a new market may be actively resisted by its eers that have failed to initiate a corresponding measure ( Midler & eaume, 2010 ). The institutional perspective also makes us sensitive to he mimetic responses ( Haveman, 1993 ) that even promising – although ot yet fully accomplished – vanguard projects may provoke amongst hose who operate in the same line of business. Taken together, such spects encourage studying vanguard projects and their institutional nvironments in a bi-directional setting in which both elements may ontinuously influence each other ( Beckert, 1999 ; Lamberg, Laurila & okelainen, 2017 ; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010 ). Methodologically speaking, the present study extends the previous onceptual understanding of the emergence of vanguard projects by nalysing a historical case of Eurocan, a pulp and paper mill that a innish firm Enso-Gutzeit (henceforth, Enso) built in British Columbia etween 1965 and 1970. Eurocan exemplifies a vanguard project largely ecause in the Finnish forest industry at the time, the establishment of roduction facilities typically took place on the home continent (or even ountry) of the respective firms. Initiating a project to build a new pro- uction facility overseas on the West Coast of Canada when Enso had either prior production experience nor industrial collaborators outside urope was a highly risky course of action, which, however, promised o yield significant financial gains for the company. For our study, Euro- an offers a fertile viewpoint from which to examine vanguard projects ecause both the initial idea for it and its further progress from the riginal investment decision to its eventual establishment were greatly nfluenced by stakeholders external to the focal project, such as the local overnment, firms and entrepreneurs with which Enso had not been pre- iously involved. Based on a historical case study drawing on a diverse rray of archival documents, interviews and public sources, we con- ribute to the ongoing discussion on vanguard projects (e.g. Frederiksen Davies, 2008 ; Tillement et al., 2019 ) showing that despite appearing o have purposefully initiated and accomplished a vanguard project on ts own, in many ways, Enso was provoked and constrained by other2 ctors. Although this group of ‘other actors’ was a unique combination f stakeholders related in different ways and to different degrees with he forest industry in general and Enso in particular, this group signifi- antly contributed to the Eurocan project. Moreover, several actors in- olved during the front-end phase of the project chose, for their own articular reasons, to exit the project coalition as the project proceeded o later stages in its lifecycle. More generally, the current study empha- ises the possibility that firms carrying out vanguard projects may, in act, be tools that others use to promote their own idiosyncratic interests. onsequently, by ignoring the contribution of these other stakeholders, e can only reach a partial understanding of why and how vanguard rojects emerge and are accomplished. Our main theoretical implications are formulated in form of three ropositions that are presented to the reader in the discussion section here they can be weighed against relevant literature a part of which we ould only identify after the conducted empirical analyses. The proposi- ions encapsulate our key findings on the front-end of vanguard projects nto three: substantial heterogeneity of the involved actors and their ob- ectives, continuous modifications in centralities of actors involved in ivotal decision-making processes, and frequent changes to the constel- ation of actors involved in the project. In addition, because our study lso makes a methodological contribution to project management re- earch we have allocated a sub-section of our discussion to these issues. his contribution includes both the clear differentiation between ‘micro’ nd ‘macro’ perspectives in historical project research and the underlin- ng some of the benefits resulting from combining different types of (e.g. ublic and private) archival data. . Theoretical background Within the literature on project organising and institutional or- anisation theory, we identified two domains highly relevant to our tudy. The first domain concerns the actors that may participate in van- uard projects throughout their lifecycles. Research on integrated sys- ems has concentrated on firms providing bespoke turnkey solutions, uch as telecommunication networks and automation systems, and has hown how such firms occasionally initiate vanguard projects ( Brady & avies, 2004 ). More specifically, Frederiksen and Davies (2008) showed ow this happens as systems integrators either reactively respond to the eeds of a specific client or proactively develop the new technologies nd capabilities required, hence allowing the firm to serve new clients nd possibly enter new markets. However, vanguard projects are not ex- lusive to technology suppliers, as process industry firms also establish anguard projects to renew their production operations ( Artto & Turku- ainen, 2018 ). Research adopting a stakeholder management perspec- ive has highlighted the diversity of actors that may be relevant during he front-end phase of a project. These actors include contractors, op- rators, cities and provinces, citizen groups, investors, municipal actors nd even ministries ( Aaltonen et al., 2017 ; Aaltonen, Kujala, Havela & avage, 2015 ; Di Maddaloni & Davis, 2018 ; Lehtinen & Aaltonen, 2020 ; artinsuo, Vuorinen & Killen, 2019 ). Furthermore, some actors con- ribute primarily towards the market transactions necessary during the roject whilst others contribute primarily by offering knowledge to it Liu, van Marrewijk, Houwing & Hertogh, 2019 ). Powerful individuals re often crucial during the project front-end as well ( Sapolsky, 1972 ). In articular, Morris’s Management of Projects (MoP) framework empha- ised the central role of a sponsor for providing resources to the project nd being responsible for its success at a business or institutional level Morris, 1994 ). Following this logic, Zwikael and Meredith (2019) iden- ified and discussed several practices used by senior managers to support he initiation of projects. These practices include, for example, develop- ent of the business case for the project, investment logic maps and enefit distribution metrics. J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] p a ( c i p i b p d v p t a a a a s i a t a A s 2 t o ( c e t i a & p m i f t s m s L d e p f e t p e i s b 2 d a T g v a p t ( t p 2 c i p m s ( c t r v a v t d i L s v t ( s a a a r t A b r r t C w h c f t t t u e D t o d e n v t t i l F 2 e p u s v Studies concentrating on inter-organisational collaboration in roject-based industries have also highlighted the role of powerful nd influential individuals in the establishment of vanguard projects Ferriani, Cattani & Baden-Fuller, 2009 ; Schwab & Miner, 2008 ). As a ombination of these aspects, Manning (2010 ) argued that successful nter-organisational projects typically comprise a balanced mix of actors reviously known to the initiator along with newcomer actors possess- ng complementary and often scarcely available capabilities. Possibly ecause of their explorative nature ( Brady & Davies, 2004 ), vanguard rojects might also involve actors that are financially indirectly depen- ent on them. An example of financially indirect dependence is the in- olvement of Greenpeace in a wind farm project led by a UK energy com- any ( Frederiksen & Davies, 2008 ). Based on studies adopting an insti- utional theory lens, we might expect vanguard projects to also involve ctors such as consumer groups ( Ansari & Phillips, 2011 ), watchdog gencies ( Rao, 1998 ), political parties ( Tukiainen & Granqvist, 2016 ), ccreditation organisations ( Durand & McGuire, 2005 ) and shareholder ctivists ( Davis & Thompson, 1994 ). The second research domain particularly relevant to the present tudy concerns the processes through which vanguard projects are set n motion. These processes deserve more attention merely because the wareness of the diverse array of potential initiators of and contributors o the project front-end tells us little about how their various interests nd actions are materialised ( Garud, Gehman & Kumaraswamy, 2011 ). lthough at this point the high-level decisions concerning the project cope are already largely made ( Lessard & Miller, 2013 ; Williams et al., 019 ), there is much leeway for several potential paths along which hey may be advanced (e.g. Criscuolo, Salter & Ter Wal, 2014 ). More- ver, during this process often characterised by multiple distinct stages Edkins et al., 2013 ), stakeholders and their interests gradually be- ome visible ( Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010 ). The overall message from sev- ral studies is that major innovative projects arise in conducive con- exts characterised by close inter-organisational ties and an open shar- ng of information, resources and ideas across organisational bound- ries ( Boland, Lyytinen & Yoo, 2007 ; Davies & Hobday, 2005 ; Midler Beaume, 2010 ; Lenfle and Söderlund, 2019 ). A notable body of em- irical work concentrating on the project front-end from a stakeholder anagement perspective discusses the use of practices directed at align- ng the interests of stakeholders involved in the process or ‘inducing avourable stakeholder movement’ ( Aaltonen et al., 2015 ). Such prac- ices include front-end workshops ( Burger, White & Yearworth, 2019 ), hared information repositories ( Lehtinen & Aaltonen, 2020 ), argu- ent mapping ( Metcalfe & Sastrowardoyo, 2013 ), value co-creation ses- ions ( Liu et al., 2019 ), use of power and interest matrixes ( Olander & andin, 2005 ) and the establishment of joint inter-organisational coor- ination bodies ( Matinheikki et al., 2016 ). It has been argued that the overall approach for engaging stakehold- rs during the project front-end should be flexible instead of rigid to sup- ort emergent and open-ended interaction and spark active opposition rom them ( Aaltonen et al., 2015 ). Additionally, the MoP framework mphasises the importance of actively interacting with the project’s ex- ernal environment, including the local community, as well as relevant olitical actors ( Morris, 1994 ). In this line of thinking, careful consid- ration of the attitudes of actors potentially influenced by the project s important. Institutionally-oriented studies complement this line of re- earch by underlining that in these contexts, actors who wish to obtain enefits or avoid loss ( Biesenthal et al., 2018 ; Compagni, Mele & Ravasi, 015 ; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009 ; Matinheikki et al., 2019 ) form a fresh un- erstanding and interpretive frames that make their innovative activities ppear appropriate ( Hargadon & Douglas, 2001 ; Navis & Glynn, 2010 ). his line of thinking aligns with Midler and Beaume (2010) , who ar- ued that vanguard projects necessitate not only breaking against pre- ailing design rules and business recipes but also altering project man- gement tools and methodologies. In addition, the project initiator may urposefully choose to exclude other actors opposing the project or to ransfer the ownership of the project to further increase its viability3 Tukiainen & Granqvist, 2016 ). Methods used by initiators are likely o be highly context specific. For example, research-driven vanguard rojects ( Lenfle, 2016 ; Loch, De Meyer & Pich, 2006 ; Tillement et al., 019 ) may require replacing a traditional overriding planning and ontrol-orientated mindset with a more agile one ( Macheridis, 2009 ). Despite its potentially high relevance for an increased understand- ng of the emergence of vanguard projects, the extant literature has aid little attention to how the roles of the actors involved in them ight change over time. In fact, institutional theorists traditionally pre- ume that certain actors remain dominant throughout their progress Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002 ; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003 ). By ontrast, and in alignment with Hellgren and Stjernberg (1995) , we posit hat such dominance is likely characteristic of individual project phases ather than entire projects. This assumption would justify considering anguard projects as some sort of relay race, which could also explain t least a part of their unexpected outcomes. Previous studies on the erge of this idea include Schwab and Miner (2008) who showed how he control of inter-organisational projects in the pre-WW2 movie in- ustry in the U.S. lay with neither their original initiators nor other nvolved actors but somewhere between these two extremes. Similarly, indgren and Packendorff’s (2002) notion of ‘interactive entrepreneur- hip’ refers to the continuous, gradual interaction among multiple indi- iduals during vanguard projects. The ideas produced in this type of in- eraction are especially critical for new openings in emerging industries David et al., 2013 ). Analogously, we may presume that the actors re- ponsible for vanguard projects exceeding existing industry boundaries re especially dependent on both the fluency of their mutual interaction nd external support. More generally, the concept of a relay race has been used in several reas of management research. In micro-level studies, it has been used to efer to the systematic way with which organisations select successors to heir current heads (e.g. Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta & Amore, 2014 ). lthough such a perspective is not readily applicable to projects, in has een noted ( Pentland, Recker & Wyner, 2017 ) that the potential of the elay race concept is not so much in which actor has the most power and esponsibilities at each time, but rather in whether these new consecu- ively responsible actors have different interests and ways of operating. onsequently, we may expect more alterations in the course of projects henever the previously dominant actor is replaced with another that as different backgrounds and competences. An example of the latter ase would be the situation in which a major industrial firm takes the ormal responsibility of a project initially outlined by a small local en- repreneur. However, although the fluent handoff between the actors aking part is also considered essential in project management litera- ure (e.g. Trojanowska & Dostatni, 2017 ), its potentially even substantial nanticipated effects on the progress of projects are seldom acknowl- dged. Studies coming close to such a stance include Bakker, Knoben, e Vries and Oerlemans (2011) , who showed how the network connec- ions play a central role in defining when individual actors obtain an pportunity to participate in the project. Matinheikki et al. (2016 ) also iscussed how specific actions carried out by the initiator may influ- nce the structural, relational and cognitive characteristics of the entire etwork of involved actors. For example, the initiator’s actions may in arious ways enhance the development of trust-based relationships be- ween involved actors and facilitate the sharing of fine-grained informa- ion during the project. Previous research acknowledges the diversity of the actors involved n vanguard projects and the largely unanticipated firm and industry- evel outcomes that may result from this diversity ( Boland et al., 2007 ; rederiksen & Davies, 2008 ; Jones & Massa, 2013 ; Plowman et al., 007 ). However, we still know relatively little about how the differ- nt types of actors and actor involvement contribute to the course and rocessual unfolding of these projects. In particular, we lack a deeper nderstanding of how and in which circumstances those principally re- ponsible for vanguard projects may be influenced by their partners and arious other actors and in which ways these different actors may con- J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] t e o t t q t t 3 p ( V p ( o ( s t & s C m r Ü a r o a r h a a ( t e fi F a u o E c w o p s l t a e c o p 1 t C L t a T d i o w t o o p c u T t t E w c w E a t r b o s t m i t o c t t m o i m w M r b v h p L a r t ( t t c p ribute to the front-end phase. Notably, even research that acknowl- dges the various roles played by the different actors over the course f projects has largely bypassed the possibilities of the twists and turns hat result from various handoffs during these relay races to the even- ual project outcomes. Therefore, we formulate our two-part research uestion in the following manner: What kinds of interactions characterise he front-end of vanguard projects, and how might different actors contribute o their progress? . Method Methodologically speaking, the present study represents historical roject management research that has recently become more common e.g. Daniel & Daniel, 2019 ; Morris, 1994 ; Söderlund & Lenfle, 2013 ; an den Ende & Marrewijk, 2019 ). This stream of studies not only ays attention to the temporal and relational embeddedness of projects Engwall, 2003 ; Sydow & Braun, 2018 ) but also uses this understanding f how these projects unfold to inform other areas of project research Lenfle, 2014 ). In management research more generally, historical case tudies are typically justified by a need to establish, extend and refine he conceptual understanding of the respective phenomenon ( Hargadon Douglas, 2001 ; Kieser, 1994 ). However, instead of one, there are everal types of historical management research ( Maclean, Harvey & legg, 2016 ; Rowlinson, Hassard & Decker, 2014 ), which calls for a ore elaborate definition of how the research is applied each time. As a esponse, and in the spirit of the history to theory approach ( Kipping & sdiken, 2014 ), we focus on a single inter-organisational event. Hence, s history serves us evidence to develop and extend the previous theo- etical understanding of the emergence of vanguard projects, we focus n the events and interests that materialised in Eurocan. To justify our ttention to this specific project, we consider Eurocan in many ways a evelatory ( Tsoukas, 1989 ) and an exemplary ( Siggelkow, 2007 ) case of ow individual companies representing a specific industry end up initi- ting something that neither they nor their competitors have previously ccomplished. The Eurocan project took place in extreme circumstances cf. Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007 , p. 27) in several ways. First, at the ime, Eurocan represented a notable departure from the established op- rational conventions of the Finnish forest industry. Whereas individual rms had previously procured wood and refined it into paper and pulp in inland prior to exporting it, all these activities were now being moved broad. 1 Second, although several of Enso’s peers were – either individ- ally or with their domestic allies – planning respective actions, none f these actions compared with Eurocan. This was particularly because nso was the main partner in a foreign joint venture that was on the usp of building an entirely new production site overseas. Thus, there as no local industrial collaborator in the proposed area, which was ge- graphically extremely distant, and no Finnish forest industry firm had revious experience of the area. Third, by initiating Eurocan, Enso was howing its courage in taking up an industrial opportunity that a major ocal forest industry firm, MacMillan Bloedel, had turned down. 2 Fourth, he eventful process that preceded the formal investment decision offers n exceptional opportunity to extend the overall understanding of the mergence of vanguard projects (cf. Lenfle & Loch, 2010 ), not least be- ause Enso held onto this opportunity to expand despite three of the riginal six partners pulling out, one after another. The Eurocan pro-1 Although Enso knew the American continent as an exporter of paper and ulp and it had already acquired the Roermond paper mill from Holland in 963, these experiences were neither extraordinary among Finnish forest indus- ry firms nor of significant help in the Eurocan project. 2 Since the early 1950s, large amounts of publicly owned forests in British olumbia were granted for industrial use under specified terms. The Tree Farm icense (TFL) was a measure with which the province offered particular actors he rights to the wood resources in a defined area for a period of 21 years under predefined price. In 1965, after MacMillan Bloedel withdrew from the Kitimat FL, it was the last area still available for use under these terms. a a d p a 1 I i 4 uction facility was eventually completed more than five years after the nitial decision in late 1970. The second reason for selecting Eurocan as the empirical object of ur historical case study arises from the rich empirical material that e have been able to collect on it (cf. Siggelkow, 2007 ). In addition o obtaining corporate archival material and published studies and bi- graphies, we have also benefited from access to recorded interviews f individual managers who were originally involved with the Eurocan roject. In the collection of this dataset (see Table 1 below), we pro- eeded in a stepwise manner. In the first stage, we inspected the vol- mes of the Finnish forest industry’s flagship journal, entitled Paper and imber , which convinced us of the uniqueness of Eurocan with respect o its main initiator and the industry. In the second stage, to answer he research question then formulated, we began collecting data from nso’s archives. The focus was on Eurocan in the sense that whenever e found it mentioned in the minutes of the board of directors or the orporate advisory board, we recorded what had been decided and on hat grounds and copied the respective attached material. Decisions on urocan were typically based on briefs whose number between 1965 nd 1970, for example, exceeded 20. These briefs enabled us to follow he concrete measures and managerial interpretations pertaining to Eu- ocan over time. For example, we could recognise how and why Enso ecame interested in the project in the first place and what roles the ther actors played in this and later stages. We supplemented this per- pective by the archived Eurocan-related management correspondence hat we also collected. Although our analysis focused specifically on Enso, we could also ake inferences of the interpretations and interests of the other actors nvolved in Eurocan. For example, our archival data included the plans hat Enso’s foreign competitors had prepared for the Kitimat TFL. More- ver, we perused various responses that Enso obtained from different onsulting houses and competitors regarding the expansion of the ac- ivities related to the forest industry in British Columbia in general and he Kitimat area in particular. These sources, along with the Finnish edia coverage of the Eurocan project, significantly extended the array f aspects typically covered in formal decision-making documents. This s partially because Enso was a state-owned firm whose major invest- ents abroad were the subject of substantial criticism and scrutiny that as largely absent, for example, in the corporate minutes of meetings. oreover, the internal archival material also became gradually more eflective and diversified as Enso’s experiences of the Eurocan project uilt up. In addition to the archival material, we had access to four pre- iously conducted interviews in which three of Enso’s managers who ad been closely involved with Eurocan presented their views on the roject long after it had been finished. 3 Our intensive analysis of the wide array of archival sources (cf. enfle, 2014 ; Rowlinson & Hassard, 2013 ) intended to enable as rich s possible an understanding of both the unfolding of Eurocan and the ole of the various actors involved. Our analysis of Eurocan-related his- orical data largely conforms to stylised narrative organisational history Rowlinson et al., 2014 ). Therefore, after having all necessary informa- ion on the contextual background of Eurocan, we first wrote a narra- ive of its emergence in the form of a chain of logically and chronologi- ally related events (included as Appendix A ) organised into a coherent lot. In order to develop a detailed understanding on the patterns of ction amongst the involved firms and individuals, we paid particular ttention to any indication of abrupt changes influencing stakeholder ynamics in our data, such as public announcements made by firms to articipate in (or abandon) the Eurocan project. An example of such n event is Skeena Group’s decision to withdraw from Eurocan as a re-3 Two of these interviews (CEO Halle, December 22, 1987 and January 18, 988; and Mauri Skogster, March 23, 2006) were transcribed, and one (Kurt gnatius, February 23, 2006) was a three-page memo containing the notes of an nterview. J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] Table 1 Data sources. Data type Source and details Enso archival material Internal memos on Eurocan (42 items, 208 pages) Eurocan-related correspondence (31 items, 58 pages) Enso and Eurocan-related feasibility studies and surveys (14 items, 297 pages) Applications for the Kitimat TFL (3 items, 106 pages) News coverage of Eurocan (81 items) In-depth interviews 4 interviews with 3 informants: CEO Pentti Halle (twice) and managers Kurt Ignatius and Mauri Skogster (altogether, 134 pages of transcribed text) Corporate and industry histories (See Appendix C ) 9 corporate histories of Enso or its different units 13 corporate histories of Enso’s Finnish competitors 9 histories of the Finnish forest industry Other material 65 Articles from Paper and Timber (Volumes 1960–1975) Table 2 Main actors involved with the Eurocan project. Finnish firms Main objective in the project Main ways of operation Enso Increasing production capacity based on new low-cost raw material Expanding operations both in Europe and North America with the help of previous contacts with Finnish partners and by establishing new contacts abroad Kymi Continuing foreign expansion with other Finnish forest industry firms Participating in the project in a form in line with its concurrent joint venture with Finnish Kaukas Corporation in Germany Myllykoski Foreign expansion with other Finnish forest industry firms Participating in the project without other corresponding activities Tampella Continuing foreign expansion and other collaboration with Enso and opening new prospects for machine deliveries Participating in the project that was initiated simultaneously with the concurrent Pineville project with Enso North American firms Alcan Getting more activity to the region where it already operated Having ordered a preliminary study on building a paper and pulp mill to Kitimat Crown Zellerbach Expansion of its Canadian operations and blocking the entry of Europeans to the area Applying for the Kitimat TFL with special attention to the type of local wood resources MacMillan Bloeded No specific interests after having seceded from the Kitimat TFL that it had been granted None Skeena Group Expansion of the group members’ previous sawmill operations in the area Accepting to become a partner in the Eurocan project following the recommendation of Governor Williston Individuals Ben Ginter Initiating a new business activity that promoted his ongoing construction business and contacts with the local government Presenting himself as a necessary condition for the Finnish partners to obtain the Kitimat TFL Pentti Halle Enabling corporate expansion and renewal through a major new venture Proactive response to a new opportunity exploiting a wide array of new and previous contacts both in Finland and abroad Johann Nykopp Continuing corporate expansion to the North American market Supporting Enso’s initiative in line with their previous collaboration Mauri Skogster The successful completion of the project Balancing between the requirements of individual project partners Ray Williston Promotion of forestry use in Kitimat area with as wide an array of firms as possible Presenting the Kitimat TFL in the best possible light to Enso and its partners s 1 fi c t o p i i o s e w i N t r t p i s f t s e c t t t O r p m w t ult of disagreements with the latter’s CEO Ben Ginter in early August 965 (see Appendix A for more details and further examples of identi- ed abrupt changes). To write the case narrative, we used the evidence ollected from all the aforementioned sources and created a timeline hrough which Eurocan had unfolded. Thereafter, mostly with the help f archival evidence, we identified the motives of each actor to take art in Eurocan in the first place and the role they had played in the ndividual events. Table 2 below summarises the identified actors, their nterests in Eurocan and their primary logics of operation. Our analysis f the actors revealed a high degree of heterogeneity as they include everal Finnish firms out of which most produce paper but some also quipment used in this production, a number of North American firms ith distinct characteristics and interests as well as multiple powerful ndividuals representing both the public as well as the private sector. aturally, our understanding of the interests and activities of others han Enso was incomplete; however, in our view, it was sufficient to eveal the most essential social dynamics involved, which was impor- ant because we focused mainly on the extent to and ways in which thet 5 roject was originally initiated and subsequently controlled by Enso and ts management or other actors. Thereafter, in the spirit of Langley’s (1999 ) temporal bracketing trategy, we produced a periodisation based on analytically meaning- ul distinctions between the events at the earlier and later phases of he Eurocan process. In this periodisation, we focused on the key is- ues that made Enso originally amenable to this vanguard project and xamined how other actors used these issues to inspire Enso to form a onvincing group of collaborators to obtain an opportunity and, even- ually, materialise it. This examination was done to further differentiate he types of actors involved, the roles they played and the interests that hey attempted to promote at different points over the project lifecycle. ur analysis further revealed that there were considerable differences egarding the centrality of observed actors in pivotal decision-making rocesses. As there were both actors such as Enso that were involved in ajor business decisions concerning Eurocan throughout its course as ell as actors such as governor Ray Williston that only played an impor- ant role until the Kitimat TFL decision in October 1965, we proceeded o evaluate the centrality of each involved actor over time. We based J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] o A d 4 v 4 c p p s i v l C w m w c w f h a o a v t c a w s n o v p i u A a i t M v c a o i j t w A m o F w t J T t p p o d a p 1 d t t b c a o t t 4 u a d o a n d T t a t c a w t m b ( n a i G f d m d 5 For example, as Halle recalled afterwards in an interview (Jan 18, 1988): ‘1939 was an extremely strong experience for me. I had to spend four-and-a- half months here in Canada and the pulp mills of the [U.S.] Southern states. I obtained many friendship contacts that lasted throughout my entire life’. 6 The events that gradually turned into the Eurocan project being initiated and accomplished were numerous. Therefore, the analysis from this point onwards only mentions the main aspects of these and the more detailed information is given in Appendix A . 7 For example, Ralph Loffmark was reported to have stated in a public speech in November 1965 that the warnings of overproduction were unfounded ( ( Wood, 1966 ), p. 1). A similar reassuring and encouraging message for further ur assessment of actor centrality primarily on events reported in both ppendix A and Table 2 below as well as further details related to these evelopments in our raw empirical data. . The unfolding of Eurocan project as a relay race between arious actors .1. Enso’s gradually strengthening receptivity to new openings As noted in the method section, our analysis of the Eurocan project entres on the early phases of its emergence. In the analysis of these hases, we are especially sensitive to which actors were in dominant ositions at each time and the sequence through which the baton was ubsequently handed over from one actor to another. From this start- ng point, it is natural to begin with how the formal initiator of this anguard project, Enso, became principally susceptible to such a chal- enging endeavour. We identify three reasons. First, at that time, Enso orporation had run out of growth opportunities in its home country here it had operated since the late 19th century. Put bluntly, as with any of its domestic competitors, the company suffered from a lack of ood supply in Finland, which had resulted from the previous signifi- ant expansion of this industry. Although Enso obtained one-fifth of its ood from its own forests, it was heavily dependent on Finnish private orest owners, many of whom sold wood only when market prices were igh. Because the same dependence on external wood resources also pplied to most of Enso’s domestic competitors, a significant expansion f production in Finland was infeasible. In addition, because of limited vailability and the high price of wood, the production of Enso’s least alued-added products became unprofitable, threatening respective cus- omer relationships. Second, Enso was a financially stable firm that benefited from tight ollaborative relationships with its domestic competitors. To begin with, s a state-owned and largest industrial company in Finland, Enso had al- ays enjoyed relatively large leeway in its operations, as long as it could how that they were in no clear contradiction with those of the Finnish ation. Moreover, because Enso was state-owned, it had less difficulty btaining funding from banks and even from institutional and private in- estors when compared with most family-owned or publicly listed com- anies. In any case, from the 1950s onwards, this leeway was further ncreased as the Finnish state loosened its tight foreign currency reg- lations used to protect the national economy ( Jensen-Eriksen, 2007 ). long with the establishment of the European Economic Community nd European Free Trade Agreements in the early 1960s, the increas- ngly free flow of foreign capital further encouraged Finnish companies o consider investments abroad, especially in Europe ( Järvinen, Ojala, elander & Lamberg, 2012 ). These activities were also partially moti- ated to serve as a response to the increasing expansion of North Ameri- an companies in the same region, of which their Finnish peers were well ware. 4 Simultaneously, Enso benefited from the mutually coordinated rganisational bodies and operational practices that the Finnish forest ndustry firms had built for their foreign operations. As a member of the oint marketing and sales associations Finncell and Finnpap, Enso joined he more general industry-level convention of independent operations ithin its home country and collaboration abroad ( Ahvenainen, 1992 ). s a slight exception to this pattern, Enso was also a partner in the do- estic Sunila pulp mill and while it had a minor machinery works of its wn, the company also had close collaborative relationships with other innish machinery suppliers. Third, much like most Finnish industrial companies at the time, Enso as managed autocratically by its CEO, Pentti Halle, who was expected o have a major say in developing the company ( Denoual, Hirvensalo, unnelius & Sonkin, 1977 ). In addition, Halle was an engineer who, prior4 This awareness is indicated, for example, in the industry tribune Paper and imber (August 1963, p. 389). i i d 6 o his appointment in 1962, had accumulated diverse management ex- erience, including several mill construction projects at Enso’s different roduction sites in Finland. This way he had also achieved the support f Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland, who greatly appreciated in- ustrial expansion in the different parts of the country. CEO Halle had lso been educated in the U.S. and had negotiated with American com- anies on individual paper machine deliveries to Finland since the late 940s; thus, he was familiar with the North American continent. 5 In ad- ition to being the CEO, Halle was the chairman of Enso’s board of direc- ors, which, in most cases, unanimously supported his proposals. Should he board of directors decide on something, the corporate supervisory oard, which consisted mainly of politicians, had little opportunity to hallenge the decisions based on technical or business concerns. When combined, these three reasons made Enso quite susceptible to mbitious new foreign openings. CEO Halle expressed this susceptibility, r even urge, in a subsequent interview: ‘We [Enso] just had to enter hese [foreign] market areas’. However, as long as there was no bait, he company could not gulp it. .2. An abrupt tempting offer from a previously unknown party The initiative towards the Eurocan project in spring 1965 was quite ndeniably in the hands of the North Americans who influenced Enso nd its Finnish peers both indirectly and directly. 6 With respect to the in- irect influence, Canadian politicians marketed the vast wood resources n both coasts of their country. Because of this marketing, Enso’s man- gement was aware of its Finnish competitor, United Paper Mills (UPM), egotiating over the opportunities in Newfoundland. With respect to the irect influence, Bodcaw, an American oil company, contacted Enso and ampella to exploit its forests for industrial purposes in Louisiana. Al- hough this only implied a minority share for the Finnish partners, their pt and principally positive response to this external initiative indicated heir potential interest in additional activities on the North American ontinent. It was in this situation when the actors from the British Columbia pproached Enso with their offer for industrial expansion in this area, hich had for a long time been advertised by Ray Williston, the Minis- er of Lands, Forests and Water Resources. With his colleagues, he pro- oted the province by referring to the new mills that had already been uilt there by Canadian, American and European forest industry firms Wood, 1966 ). Together, they produced an unbroken chorus to elimi- ate all potential suspicions against investments in the area. 7 Williston lso named the mills already in operation and those under preparation n his province, the latter including joint ventures by Feldmühle from ermany, Reedpack from Britain and SCA from Sweden. The message or the Finnish firms was thus that their foreign competitors had already ecided to take advantage of these local opportunities and that many ore would follow in the future. 8 However, a much more concrete step was still needed from the Cana- ian side before they could expect the Finnish firms to move forward.nvestments was also sent by the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority n April 1965. 8 Williston also boasted having ‘applications for six new pulp mills in his rawer’ (Frank Walden, Sun Business, early 1965). J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] T c w a w t t s E r U W a a f s c i p t t g t w a p C t i T t f q H p r m E n m a h t [ k [ t 4 n t p t h p h n p s O c U W p A o t g e a 2 r i i t w e c G t f M T n w q t a p i E s p s r m i m n D r m i l c s p o a v f i l 10 Only a little earlier, Ginter had failed to obtain a partnership in a resembling venture, which did not appear to discourage him at all. His long-term vision in his step happened when MacMillan Bloedel Corporation decided to se- ede the Tree Farm Licence (TFL) in Kitimat. TFL was an arrangement ith which the Province gave the license holder full logging rights for specified area for 21 years under pre-defined terms. When compared ith the prices in Finland, the wood cost would be minimal, but ob- aining TFL required the building of an entirely new production site in he area. However, the critical condition for expansion, i.e. wood re- ources, was up for grabs. Further, Canadian administrators considered nso, as well as any Finnish company, principally suitable candidate to eplace MacMillan Bloedel. Most important, in addition to preventing .S. companies from obtaining significant foothold in the area, Minister illiston insisted that local actors be involved with the project formed round the Kitimat TFL. As such, it was no surprise that such local actors also appeared. An luminium company Alcan, which also operated in Kitimat, benefited rom increasing activities in the same community. 9 However, at this tage, Alcan had no major role because it was taken by Ben Ginter, a lo- al entrepreneur and self-made man who had previously been involved n construction and brewing businesses. For him, collaboration with rominent forest industry firms also offered new contracts and main- ained contacts with the British Columbia government. Together with he Skeena Group, which with its sawmill operations had even more or- anic contacts with all companies involved with logging in the area, Gin- er met the principal demands provided by Minister Williston. In other ords, these companies excluding Alcan formed the group of actors that ctively offered the Kitimat TFL to Enso management and presented the otential project in the utmost positive light. Therefore, the few months after contact was established between the anadian group and Enso were quite eventful and included several ini- iatives from both sides. Enso’s management found the information on nexpensive wood resources and local support coming with the Kitimat FL of utmost interest because it offered a concrete and viable solution o the company’s raw material shortage and a potential opportunity for oreign expansion. The enthusiasm is expressed by CEO Halle’s subse- uent interpretation that ‘[in that situation] we had to act immediately’. owever, Halle appears to neglect that the local actors had just lost one rominent company which had already promised to accomplish a cor- esponding project and that they were now hastily seeking a replace- ent for this loss. The same enthusiasm also overpowered the fact that nso was offered and had taken the largest share of ownership in the ew company, Eurocan, which had been founded to apply for the Kiti- at TFL. Although there soon were both Canadian and Finnish partners board, without Enso’s activity, such a demanding project would not ave been possible. As Enso manager Mauri Skogster later described he overall nature of the emerging project: ‘It cannot be denied that it Eurocan] was an extremely challenging investment, especially if we eep in mind Finland at that time and the management resources that Finnish] companies offered for the founding of such industrial opera- ions abroad’. .3. Enso’s determined urge to move forward with the prospective project After Eurocan was founded as a company and a project to build a ew industrial site in British Columbia, Enso and its collaborators faced heir first challenge to formulate an attractive enough proposal for the ublic hearing three months later. To enable these rapid steps, following heir persuasion by the Canadians to join Eurocan, Enso’s management ad to then persuade its Finnish partners. This persuasion was at least artly alleviated by the fact that all Finnish forest industry firms had eard the overall positive message about the opportunities in Canada.9 Alcan had already ordered a preliminary feasibility study on the pulp and ewsprint mill in early 1962, and it strongly supported the applications at the ublic hearing in August 1965, particularly emphasising that it would like to ee the mill construction begin as soon as possible. t c b t 7 f the individual companies, Tampella was the easiest to persuade be- ause its CEO, Johan Nykopp, was the former Finnish ambassador to the .S., who was now directing his company towards new foreign markets. hile the joint minor partnership with Enso in Louisiana offered Tam- ella its first opportunity to supply forest industry machinery to North merica, taking part in Eurocan provided similar prospects along with pportunities to expand its paper and pulp production in the same con- inent. For both Kymi and Myllykoski, being a part of Eurocan appeared enerally appealing largely because they, along with other Finnish for- st industry firms, were also pondering the availability of raw material nd the increasing prices of wood in Finland ( Jensen-Eriksen, 2007 , p. 67). While the ‘leap’ across the Atlantic Ocean might have looked too adical or hazardous a manoeuvre for either of them individually, join- ng Eurocan with several others alleviated this risk. More generally, an nvestment in Eurocan implied that its Finnish partners no longer in- ended to import wood to Finland but instead planned to refine this ood into wood-based products abroad. Even though the Finnish companies involved with Eurocan knew ach other well before this project, they were now entering intensive ollaboration with some completely new faces, and the key person, Ben inter, had no previous experience in the forest industry. It was difficult o understand why he was appointed as the first CEO of Eurocan except or his various connections in British Columbia, including the one with inister Williston who would eventually decide upon the Kitimat TFL. 10 he value of this connection was further enhanced after Eurocan part- ers became aware that a competing application for the same license as going to be submitted by a U.S. company Crown Zellerbach. Conse- uently, this connection convinced the Finnish partners to believe that he Eurocan proposal needed to be as attractive as possible in which im Ginter appeared helpful, despite being a politically controversial erson 11 with whom Canadian industrial companies were not readily nterested in collaborating. As the deadline for submitting the TFL proposal became closer, the urocan partners inferred that promising an early start date for the con- truction of the mill would prove to be the proposal’s most critical as- ect. Therefore, whereas Crown Zellerbach promised to start the con- truction of its mill in 1970, Eurocan promised to have its mill already unning by that time. Consequently, however, the risks of not eventually eeting this objective rose accordingly. Nevertheless, an even stronger ndication of the Eurocan partners’ urge to win the race over the Kiti- at TFL was that they replaced the originally intended end product (i.e. ewsprint) with the same (i.e. kraftliner) as that of Crown Zellerbach. 12 espite this product’s apparent suitability for local wood supply and espective promise for the most extensive use of the local forests, the odification implied compromising Enso’s earlier objective of enabling ts domestic units’ move into more value-added paper grades. Nonethe- ess, the Eurocan partners – especially Enso’s CEO Halle – remained un- onditionally committed to the project, as Halle’s subsequent interview tatement indicates: ‘When we heard that Crown Zellerbach would pro- ose sulphate pulp mill [with kraftliner], we were forced to change our wn proposal because with the previous one consisting of groundwood nd newsprint mills we just would not get the [Kitimat] TFL’. Therefore, despite having both Canadian and Finnish partners in- olved, Enso took the main salesman’s role in the Eurocan project be- ore the public hearing for the Kitimat TFL. This role was also indicated n the final application, which emphasised the long history and estab- ished position of Enso and its Finnish partners in the business. More-he forest industry was also described in Kansan Tahto on October 8, 1965. 11 However, the potential impact of Skeena Group’s withdrawal was cross- hecked beforehand (CEO Halle’s correspondence, August 6, 1965). 12 The credibility of Crown Zellerbach’s choice of end product was increased y their application to the Kitimat TFL in 1964; in that proposal, they had found he quality of the local wood to be insufficient for newsprint production. J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] o o u s o t a n a F t b o e t a [ c 4 c F d t C t p t a t w a b p E h a t m s s t o i f f C b p t p f 1 r t r p t t t – i n T f s c l t p d a H s o i m w b n p T n p s d m a E i a m A s c r r w r t e t t a m d 4 1 ver, the application stressed that instead of threatening the interests f the local forest industry companies, the proposed mill would open p new markets for products manufactured based on local forest re- ources. The application also announced that more detailed planning f the mill would begin immediately after a positive decision and that he mill would be running four years thereafter. Eurocan’s application lso explicitly stated that the mill could expand to the originally planned ewsprint production in the future should more wood resources become vailable from adjacent areas. To continue to support its application, all innish partner company CEOs were present at the public hearing and he impression of their commitment to the project was further enhanced y Eurocan-related press conferences and a reception for the key persons f Kitimat and Vancouver before the event. 13 Overall, these measures xpressed the three months’ rush with which Enso and its collabora- ors prepared this vanguard project whose accomplishment would take t least four years. As Kurt Ignatius expressed in a later interview, ‘the Eurocan] decision was done hastily as at last there appeared to be a hance to obtain more wood’. .4. The rocky road to finalise the project It took less than one and a half months for Minister Williston to de- ide to grant the Kitimat TFL to Eurocan, which made major news in inland. In less than half a year’s determined effort, Enso and its Cana- ian and Finnish partners now had a major foreign investment oppor- unity in their hands. Naturally, even during this short period, first the anadian and only thereafter the Finnish actors had needed to struggle he most to promote the emerging project. However, realising this op- ortunity during the following years still required substantial effort on wo fronts. The first effort concerned maintaining the commitment of ll partners because from this point on, Eurocan would imply substan- ial financial investments at an increasing speed. In manager Skogster’s ords, ‘obtaining funding for the project was still on a knife’s edge’. In ddition to the demands of the international financiers, this was partly ecause at that point all partners were not equally committed to the roject. However, a more substantial obstacle against proceeding with urocan arose from within Enso because, despite supporting Halle in all is initiatives, the company board of directors now opposed Eurocan. In way, this opposition indicated that as the project was now becoming rue and the main responsibility of it was increasingly in Enso’s hands, any of the company top managers were not interested in it. This oppo- ition enforced Halle to turn towards Enso’s supervisory board to obtain upport. 14 However, this was not enough to ensure the overall accep- ance of Eurocan because Enso was a state-owned company whose new penings needed to be justified at the level of national politics. Although t was not yet known that Eurocan would eventually turn into the largest oreign investment ever from Finland, its apparently large scale and the act that Enso now had new overseas activities in Louisiana and British olumbia in the pipeline at the same time sparked intense political de- ate. The left-wing parties criticised the state-owned company for ex- orting substantial amounts of capital away from the home country. In he case of Eurocan, this critique was accelerated by the fact that the roject implied foreign expansion in an area located extremely distant rom its main production sites and facilities. 15 13 See Ahvenainen (1992, p. 561). 14 See Ahvenainen (1992, p. 554). In a subsequent interview (January 18, 988), Halle emphasised that the opposition from the board of directors was elated more to him than the project itself. In his view, a few board members ried to use it as an excuse to compel him to resign. 15 To eliminate these concerns, Enso’s Chairman Waris pointed to the cor- esponding investment plans that its major Finnish competitor UPM was still reparing for Newfoundland with Rauma-Repola, Nokia and Kajaani. However, his venture was later cancelled because of UPM’s failure to persuade the men- ioned firms behind the project ( ( Nordberg, 1998 ), p. 223), indicating to Enso hat this would be a critical aspect in Eurocan as well. t p e E h i G ( 8 The second front concerned more concrete – but nonetheless critical issues that also needed to be tackled. First, to avoid a further increase n the previous ownership stakes of the current partners in Eurocan, a ew partner to replace the earlier withdrawn Skeena Group was needed. he intention was to find a major North American industrial partner to urther facilitate the project. As such, Enso negotiated the matter with everal U.S. and Canadian companies that could bring significant lo- al support to the project. However, the negotiations were unsuccessful argely because the project scope was already fixed. Most importantly, he prospective partners were wary of joining Eurocan for only a 10% artnership share when their expectations were closer to 50%. 16 In ad- ition, they also disliked Ginter who, along with Williston, objected to substantial role being given to any potential new industrial partners. ence, Enso managers gradually learned that their present partners and upporters who had enabled Eurocan to obtain the Kitimat TFL at the utset mostly defined the players the company could collaborate with in ts completion. This also explains why the Finnish partners continued to ove forward on their own, even though most of their other operations ere almost 5000 miles away from Kitimat. Second, the technical planning of the Eurocan facilities turned out to e much more demanding than expected. After the final location of the ew mill had been decided, its technical layout was modified, and the roduction capacities of its various units were increased several times. 17 hese modifications were largely made because the original plans did ot predict a sufficiently high profitability for the mill to convince the otential foreign financiers, who also required independent feasibility tudies that would have proved the eventual success of the project. In ad- ition to delays in the respective planning and construction work, these odifications almost doubled the original project budget. One positive spect, however, was that the local government continued to support urocan and granted the additional logging rights needed to meet the ncreased production capacities. Third, well before the Eurocan project was completed, minor dis- greements between the Finnish partners and Ginter had turned into ajor quarrels, with the latter eventually initiating legal proceedings. 18 s a result, the major project Enso originally formed in response to a udden opportunity with several local and Finnish collaborators had be- ome a project that Enso handled as more or less its own, with the two emaining Finnish partners, Kymi and Tampella, as Myllykoski had al- eady dropped out. Although the holding company arrangement that as formed soon thereafter made it easier for the Finnish firms to ar- ange Eurocan’s ownership relations in line with their own needs, it fur- her complicated finding new partners, not to mention a buyer for the ntire company. This complication was partially because the prospec- ive new owner of Eurocan could not guarantee to continue to hold on o the Kitimat TFL that secured the necessary wood supply. In any case, fter starting its operations, the Eurocan mill continued to operate for al- ost four decades until 2009, when its owner at that time, West Fraser, ecided to shut it down. .5. Epilogue According to our analysis, the story of Eurocan began in the early 960s with Canadian politicians internationally advertising the vast un- apped forest resources of British Columbia to pulp and paper compa-16 This was the case, for example, with Owens-Illinois for which Eurocan ap- eared as an opportunity to enter the disposal paper products business. How- ver, an internal memo dated October 18, 1966, concerning the financing of urocan encouraged the taking of a calculated risk even before a new partner ad been found because of its overall attractiveness. 17 Detailed descriptions of these changes can be found, for example, from an nternal memo dated February 26, 1969. 18 The Province, November 19, 1969. Disagreements between Eurocan and inter were also discussed in the transcript of the interview of Karl-Erik Ekholm May 22, 1970). J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] Table 3 Changes in the involved actors’ main objectives across the early developmental phases of the Eurocan project. Actor Main objectives for involvement or withdrawal Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Enso Finding new ways to expand previous operations Eventual end to the long-term lack of wood Success in the competition over logging rights in Kitimat Personalised commitment to an honourable outcome Ben Ginter – Extension of previous local business activities and governmental prestige An opportunity to head a major industrial endeavour in a familiar setting Lack of reasons to hold on to a costly effort preventing other activities Kymi – Belonging to the same industrial alliance with Enso Expanding previous production with new wood resources Keeping the commitments to the remaining domestic partners Tampella – Simultaneous joint expansive activities and belonging to the same industrial alliance with Enso Turning into a prominent machine supplier in North America Keeping the commitments to the remaining domestic partners Myllykoski – Belonging to the same industrial alliance with Enso Expanding the production of its previous main product with new wood resources Little reason to hold on to an increasingly costly project with a less attractive end product Skeena Group – Extension of previous local sawmilling operations – – US p aper companies – – – Participating in a promising project, but on their own terms n s e a w C a m t c t e w s i t c fi c p w t r t r 1 G i G h a i c s s t 5 v a t s v e a i s s a o p S t 5 c o w W t D a o E i e & 2 o t t a c a p i a o t ies around the world. Information about business opportunities over- eas also reached Enso, a Finnish paper company with its current op- rations situated thousands of miles from Canada, but that was desper- tely in need of cost-effective sources of additional wood. Combined ith the availability of complementary partners, financial means and a EO that was not risk adverse, this need resulted – following the twists nd turns discussed above – in the establishment of a paper and pulp ill in Canada that was opened in 1970. As Table 3 bel ow indicates, he four early phases of the emergence of the Eurocan examined above learly differed from each other with respect to the actors involved and he objectives that involvement in the project served for them during ach phase. The changes in these objectives then also largely explain hy these actors aimed at or remained in a central or a peripheral po- ition in the project or eventually withdrew from it. In order to further clarify these actor-related dynamics, Fig. 1 below llustrates how the centrality of actors involved in Eurocan evolved over ime, linking them to important project milestone events discussed in the ase narrative. On the one hand, the figure signals that the three Finnish rms situated in the middle, Enso, Kymi and Tampella, remained both entral and committed to the project from the early front-end of the roject all the way until the mill was in operation. On the other hand, e see that several other actors that played a significant role in the es- ablishment of the project, such as the Skeena Group and Myllykoski elatively soon came to realise that Eurocan no longer served their in- erests and, consequently, withdrew from the project as indicated by the ather sudden decreases of actor centralities (1965 for Skeena Group and 966 for Myllykoski). Fig. 1 also indicates how the centrality of Ben inter first increased during 1965 when, after having been interested n industrial activities in the area, he started to head the project. Later, inter’s centrality significantly decreased in 1968 after which he neither eaded nor had a significant ownership stake in Eurocan. In addition to ctors that were formally a part of the project, the figure highlights how n 1966 and 1967 there were also actors, specifically U.S.-based paper ompanies, that negotiated with central Eurocan actors concerning pos- ible participation following the Kitimat TFL decision; however, as no atisfactory agreement was reached, even their peripheral position in he project shortly ended. . Discussion The current study increased the understanding of the emergence of anguard projects as processes involving multiple heterogeneous actors9 nd largely unanticipated sequences and eventual outcomes. The his- orical perspective adopted in the current study suggests that instead of ystematically formulated intentions of firms and powerful individuals, anguard projects can emerge from a sequential interplay between sev- ral actors, each guided by their own idiosyncratic interests. Further, lthough this interplay may materialise in different forms, the principal nitiators of vanguard projects remain particularly dependent on at least ome other actors at different phases of the project. Consequently, our tudy describes vanguard projects as relay races, where different actors dvance – and even lead – the project in turn. We close the paper by utlining its two main theoretical contributions. First, we extend the revious understanding of how vanguard projects emerge and proceed. econd, we join and contribute to previous project management studies hat have also applied historical case study methodology. .1. Vanguard projects as relay races between heterogeneous actors Contributing to the research on the early phases of the project lifecy- le ( Artto et al., 2016 ; David et al., 2013 ; Hellgren & Stjernberg, 1995 ), ur study highlights the diversity of both the actors involved and the ays in which they contribute during the course of a vanguard project. hile earlier research emphasises the role of resourceful systems’ in- egrator firms as the principal initiators of vanguard projects ( Brady & avies, 2004 ; Frederiksen & Davies, 2008 ), our focal firm, Enso, was paper manufacturer that initiated Eurocan to expand its production perations abroad. Instead of reactively responding to market pressure, nso was proactively exploring opportunities for increasing its presence n the international marketplace. This observation is consistent with the xplorative character associated with vanguard projects (cf. Frederiksen Davies, 2008 ; Schüßler, Wessel & Gersch, 2012 ; Tillement et al., 019 ). Our findings further underline the need to step out of the previ- usly dominant generic actor typologies and extend the potential initia- ors of vanguard projects from those who are formally responsible for hem to those who, in pursuit of their idiosyncratic objectives, sketch nd advertise them at the outset and support them throughout their ourse. The Eurocan project looks like an attractive offer that Enso first lmost blindly fell for; thereafter, Enso gradually and stubbornly accom- lished its objective with the help of a diverse set of other actors, includ- ng entrepreneurs, politicians and industrial organisations. Similarly to s discussed by Aaltonen and Kujala (2010) , the idiosyncratic interests f other involved actors became gradually visible to Enso through con- inuous dialogue and interaction. In this light, a vanguard project re- J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] Ben Ginter Skeena Group Enso Kymi Tampella Myllykoski US paper comp. 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Eurocan company founded TFL decision Plant outline ready Const- rucon start Plant ramp up Project milestone events Skeena group withdraws Kymi, Myllykoski, Tampella and Skeena commit Deadline for confirming project Public hearing for Kimat TFL 1965 High actor centrality Low actor centrality Low actor centrality Ginter resigns from presidency Fig. 1. Involvement and centrality of actors in Eurocan across the project lifecycle. s b b t S t s p & & u n o e d d t P t m g v s m t 1 d h t h n p F e m t i t p G p t s M g p c c d d a e a d n n t P a h l o o embles a meeting of minds of those who are primarily susceptible to reaking the prevailing industrial traditions and of those who are capa- le of formulating ideas that enable a break away from path-dependent rajectories ( Aaltonen et al., 2017 ; Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch, 2009 ). pecifically, the central role of Enso’s CEO, Pentti Halle, throughout he Eurocan project resonates strongly with earlier research that has tressed the strategic role of importance of individual entrepreneurs and roject champions in project organising ( Ferriani et al., 2009 ; Gattiker Carter, 2010 ; Lindgren & Packendorff, 2002 ; Morris, 1994 ; Schwab Miner, 2008 ). However, our analysis extends the previous studies by nderlining that even such powerful entrepreneurs face the constant eed to strike a balance between the various and partly contradictory bjectives of the heterogeneous actors involved with vanguard projects, specially at their early phases. For example, in addition to the slight ifferences between Enso and its Finnish partner companies, both Cana- ian partners had quite distinctive objectives for their involvement with he Eurocan project. Accordingly, we propose the following: roposition 1. The front-end of a vanguard project is characterised by ex- reme levels of heterogeneity regarding involved actors and their objectives . The current study sheds further light on the alternating and comple- entary roles that actors may play throughout the lifecycle of a van- uard project. Although any new opening requires at least one ‘moti- ated insider’ to start ( Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010 ), the present study hows that this motivated insider may repeatedly change as the project oves forward in its lifecycle. In the observed case, the role of Ben Gin- er, the Canadian-based entrepreneur, was particularly illustrative; in 965, Enso and other Finnish partners let him to head Eurocan largely ue to his ties in the local business environment. However, despite also aving an own equity share in Eurocan, Ginter soon lost interest in he project, indicated as early as 1966 in his willingness to no longer ead the project. Then in 1968 when the mill construction started, he o longer found common ground for collaboration with the Finnish artners which eventually had to take over his ownership stake. The10 innish firm Myllykoski serves as another example of actor changes: ven though this firm had been involved in the project from its earliest oments with a sizable equity share, as a result of the changes in the argeted end product, the firm chose to withdraw from Eurocan already n 1966. These observations suggest that in vanguard projects, even he central actor’s opportunities to manage the group of the involved artners may be more limited than in other projects (e.g. Tukiainen & ranqvist, 2016 ). This is in part because, as the project moves forward, articipating actors’ ability to influence other actors is partly based on he former’s importance in the ongoing project phase. Although the ame effect has been observed across successive projects ( Schwab & iner, 2008 ), here we highlight a resembling phenomenon within van- uard projects. In alignment with Hellgren and Stjernberg’s (1995 ) separation of the roject into a distinct planning and distinct implementation phase, each haracterised by a different set of actors, and with Edkins et al. (2013 ) haracterisation of the project front-end as a process involving multiple istinct stages, our findings support a view of the complementary and ynamic roles of the actors involved in project lifecycle phases. For ex- mple, early on, various foreign and domestic peers and stakeholders ncouraged Enso to establish ambitious overseas ventures before and t the time of its initial decision about Eurocan. Although Enso had to ecide over the project, these other actors such as Ben Ginter and Gover- or Williston also had a major impact on this decision and the successive eed that it then caused for Enso to persuade its Finnish peers to join he project. Consequently, we propose the following: roposition 2. New actors may join a vanguard project and participating ctors may choose to withdraw from it throughout the entire project lifecycle. Regarding the establishment of vanguard projects, earlier research as stressed the importance of the context; that is, vanguard projects are ikely to emerge in business environments characterised by strong inter- rganisational ties and the open sharing of ideas and resources across rganisational boundaries ( Boland et al., 2007 ; Davies & Hobday, 2005 ; J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] M i E w t w p C q v a a s t o r H h e t B w t l t a r E t o s ( s s l w i i a w t 2 s s p o ( T P e P c 5 m D E f S c n p a t ( i t M e c t t q e p w A c r t a a t h s p M o a a h o m V D M s c s t b i o c p m l u a v T i ( w u h a t p 6 m g i idler & Beaume, 2010 ; Lenfle and Söderlund, 2019 ). Contrasting the mportance of existing ties, the evidence presented above shows that nso’s management could not have initiated or accomplished Eurocan ithout the initiatives of actors to whom it had no previous connec- ions. For example, without the initial contact from Canadian diplomats ho got in touch with Enso and its domestic competitors, the com- any might never have heard about the business opportunities in British olumbia. Thus, our findings imply that the business environment in uestion needs to be seductively presented to the potential executors of anguard projects. In this vein, Matinheikki et al. (2016 ) discussed how ctions of the project initiator may shape the surrounding network of ctors around it, including the formation of new relational ties and con- equent changes in actor centralities. The previous literature on institu- ional theory has also found that explorative ventures may be initiated r catalysed by geographically or otherwise distant or coincidentally elated actors (e.g. Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016 ; Lounsbury, 2007 ). owever, in contrast with these prior studies, we found that even stake- olders relatively distant from the industry in question, such as a gov- rnor of a province in a faraway country, may attract a prominent actor o break away from the traditions of itself and its peers (cf. Midler & eaume, 2010 ). By keeping attention on these aspects (e.g. the price of ood) that most blindingly contrasted with the circumstances in which he Enso and its Finnish partners operated in their home country, the ocal actors encouraged the Finns to enter a business environment that he latter otherwise knew little about. We observed that the actor occupying the most central position in vanguard project may be influenced by its peers’ similar and concur- ent activities. For example, we mentioned the expansive projects that nso’s Finnish, German and Swedish competitors were involved with at he time when Eurocan was set underway. This finding extends previ- us work which underlines that innovation typically requires both fea- ible ideas and tangible resources that a single actor does not possess Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006 ). Furthermore, we showed that Enso eized, accomplished and maintained Eurocan despite several succes- ive setbacks in the project’s different phases largely because of its col- aborative ties to the other actors involved. These included Ben Ginter, ho headed Eurocan for a number of years, before later first distanc- ng himself from a central position and finally from any involvement n the project after it had become evident that the scope of the project nd objectives of other involved actors no longer adequately aligned ith Ginter’s own objectives. This finding conflicts with those institu- ionalist studies (e.g. Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009 ; Garud et al., 002 ), which expect the fate of new openings to lie in the hands of a ingle powerful actor. Although our findings cannot eliminate the pos- ibility of such a supreme and self-sufficient project entrepreneur, they rovide substantial reason to consider vanguard projects as the results f interplay of multiple actors, interests and situational contingencies David et al., 2013 ; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008 ; Tillement et al., 2019 ). hus, we propose the following: roposition 3a. Actors involved in a vanguard project are susceptible to ngage in efforts to increase or decrease their centrality in it. roposition 3b. Centrality of actors involved in a vanguard project is sus- eptible to influence from external actors and events. .2. Towards the extended use of historical case studies in project anagement research Our study extends historical research in project organising (e.g. aniel & Daniel, 2019 ; Hughes, 2013 ; Lenfle & Loch, 2010 ; Van den nde & Marrewijk, 2019 ) by underlining the value of combining dif- erent types of archival data. Both Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) and öderlund and Lenfle (2013) have warned project scholars of the two lassic pitfalls of historical research: presentism and finalism. Although o all-encompassing solutions are available for these challenges, ex- licitly justifying methodological choices is always appropriate. Indeed,11 lthough historical organisation and management research is charac- erised by a clear distinction between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ perspectives e.g. Kipping & Üsdiken, 2014 ), this is much less the case with histor- cal studies in project organising research. By looking at recent his- orical studies on projects (e.g. Hughes, 2013 ; Lenfle & Loch, 2010 ; arshall & Bresnen, 2013 ), we can observe that the adopted level or lev- ls of analysis may remain implicit. Consequently, it is not always fully lear whether the findings of these studies apply to individual firms, he project organisations involving multiple firms or larger communi- ies repeatedly carrying out projects in the institutional environment in uestion. We hope that our study can act as a step towards more clearly xplicated levels of analysis in the future. The historical approach applied in the present study relies on both ublic and private archival material as its primary data source, which as supplemented and validated with material from secondary sources. lthough these secondary sources typically include autobiographies and orporate and industry histories, there may also be opportunities for ret- ospective interviews of key individuals. In the present study, the his- orical approach especially aimed at reaching as accurate as possible n understanding of the role that each actor played in the emergence nd accomplishment of the Eurocan project in the contemporary insti- utional environment of that time. As a result, for example, we found ow strongly Enso relied on other companies and local actors’ ideas and upport throughout the project duration to the extent that the whole rocess intermittently appeared more externally than internally driven. ost essentially, these kinds of insights required a systematic review f Enso’s archives, which revealed the impulses that the company man- gers obtained from previous plans for the project by its competitors, s well as from other actors’ suggestions and encouragement on the one and and warnings and discouragement on the other. Our reliance on archives internal to a single firm complements much f the historical project literature that mostly relies on diverse archival aterials, such as documentaries ( Kozak-Holland & Procter, 2014 ; an den Ende & Marrewijk, 2019 ), newspaper articles ( Daniel & aniel, 2019 ), corporate project narratives or reports (e.g. Lenfle, 2014 ; arshall & Bresnen, 2013 ; Söderlund & Tell, 2009 ; Winch, 2013 ) and cientific articles (e.g. Kwak, Walewski, Sleeper & Sadatsafavi, 2014 ). A haracteristic of much historical project research is its heavy reliance on econdary sources produced by external ‘middlemen’. Without denying he value of these sources, we can say that they leave room for research ased on the empirical material at least largely produced by the actors nvolved with the projects in question. Although it is often difficult to btain access to such material, gaining this material is worthwhile be- ause of the potentially novel and accurate insights that it may yield. In roject management research, Lenfle’s (2016 ) study on the Sidewinder issile draws extensively on the project head, McLean, and is an excel- ent recent example of this. In the present study, access to project doc- ments and the other sources enabled the identification of individual spirations and more collectively shared objectives over the course of a anguard project in a historically and institutionally specified context. hese documents also permitted at least a partial differentiation of the mpact of individuals from that of collective actors, such as companies cf. Battilana & Dorado, 2010 , p. 1435; Suddaby, 2010 , p. 17). However, e need to keep in mind that even internal documents, such as min- tes of meetings or their attachments, are not without bias because they ave been prepared for particular purposes. Thus, multifaceted archival nd public sources should be used as much as possible to do justice to he complicated nature of project management and other organisational rocesses. . Conclusion The present study on the building of Eurocan pulp and paper mill akes two contributions to project management research. First, it sug- ests that the principal initiators of vanguard projects have only lim- ted control over these projects throughout their course. This is because J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] t i t a o fl e i b w s D A t F t t t d A p 20%) repre es of del’s and B red in the Ki f all S e esta . with ration rate A rrespo projec rom a be pr to Fin esult EOs o presen ial tho lle gn aft pansio itish C tentio ancia o resi pani eyerha ocan he initiation of vanguard projects tends to unfold like a relay race n which various actors participate according to their idiosyncratic in- erests. This heterogeneity of the actors involved and abrupt changes mong them and their centrality in relevant decision-making processes ver the project lifecycle makes these projects particularly prone to in- uence from external actors and events. Second, our study provides one xemplar of how historical case studies can be systematically applied n project management research. Here this especially implies relying on oth public and private archival material as our primary data source, hich was supplemented and validated with material from secondary ources. eclaration of Competing Interest None. Time Event Spring 1965 Enso and Tampella join Bodcaw as minority ( Pineville Kraft in Louisiana Spring 1965 A group of Canadian politicians and business visited Finland to advertise the forest resourc Newfoundland April 1965 (Enso CEO Halle hears about) MacMillan Bloe of the Kitimat TFL May 1965 First connection between Enso management followed by an immediate indication of a sha apply for the Kitimat TFL May 1965 CEO Halle personally informs Klaus Waris of 12 May 1965 CEO Halle signs a letter of intent on behalf o partners with the Skeena Group regarding th of a pulp mill 18 May 1965 The founding of Eurocan Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd Ginter as its original partners May 1965 Finnish Kymi, Myllykoski and Tampella Corpo local Skeena Group join the project alliance 24 May 1965 Enso board of director proposes to the Corpo Board that Eurocan would be founded and co financial measures would be granted 28 May 1965 Enso Corporate Board (ECB) accepts Eurocan that the necessary funding will be acquired f that the machinery used in the new mill will Finland Summer 1965 Ben Ginter arranges Minister Williston’s visit Early August 1965 Skeena Group withdraws from Eurocan as a r disagreements with Ben Ginter 23 August 1965 Eurocan general meeting 27 August 1965 Public hearing for the Kitimat TFL with the C all other Finnish Eurocan partner companies 7 October 1965 Kitimat TFL granted to Eurocan 29 January 1966 Eero Riihikallio mentions Ben Ginter’s potent bowing out of the Eurocan project to CEO Ha April 1966 Two members of Enso board of directors resi disagreements over the company’s foreign ex 7 October 1966 Deadline for confirming the project to the Br Government 14 October 1966 Enso ECB supports company management’s in acquire a new foreign partner to carry the fin caused by Eurocan 1966–1967 Eurocan mill capacity is increased by 30% August 1966 Ben Ginter openly expresses his willingness t the position as the Eurocan CEO November–December 1966 Enso negotiates with the North American com Illinois, Prince George Pulp and Paper and W the latter’s potential partnership stake in Eur result Late 1966 Myllykoski withdraws from the project 12 cknowledgements An initial draft of this manuscript was presented at the 10th Interna- ional Project Business Workshop organized at Aalto University, Espoo, inland June 7-8, 2019. We thank the participants of the workshop for heir insightful and constructive comments on the paper. The first au- hor is also grateful to Juha-Antti Lamberg for originally paying atten- ion to the Eurocan endeavour and his collaboration in the collection of ata. ppendix A. A chronology of events related to the Eurocan roject Implication to the project progress partners of Strengthens the collaborative tie between Enso and Tampella corporations sentatives Increases the Finnish companies’ awareness of the Canadian business opportunities withdrawal Opens Enso management a prospect of potential expansion in British Columbia en Ginter terest to Establishes a necessary liaison for proceeding towards the project timat TFL Guarantees formal support for the project preparation unila blishment Expresses Enso’s initial interest in the project and establishes the first local contacts to promote it Enso and Establishment of a legal entity eligible for applying for the Kitimat TFL s with the Increases the overall credibility and local acceptability of the group of actors involved dvisory nding The main partner Enso management reaches a formal internal agreement upon the project t pending broad and oduced in Formal acceptance for the project reached at Enso with two relatively significant preconditions land Strengthens the connections between Williston and the Finnish Eurocan partner companies of Weakens the local involvement with the project Project company partners gather formally prior to the public hearing f Enso and t Eurocan (and its newly emerged competitor Crown Zellerbach) completes the necessary procedure required for granting the TFL Guarantees Eurocan the necessary wood resources, but simultaneously forces it to prepare and present detailed mill construction plans within a year ughts of Enso management recognises the potential loss of the only remaining Canadian partner from the project er n projects Removes internal opposition from Enso management over the Eurocan project olumbia Compels the Eurocan partners to come up with finalised project plans ns to l burden Encourages Enso management for further partnership negotiations with Canadian and U.S. companies Provides more suitable financial prospects, but also much more preparation for the project gn from Reminds the Finnish partners of their dependence on Ginter and compels them to persuade him to continue es Owens user of without a Shows the Finnish partners that they can only accomplish the project on their own Compels the other Finnish partners to increase their ownership stakes accordingly (Continued on next page) J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] onsul vestin omple ishes n exp eers roads pani ect n plan York bstan m 15% ngly ptimis ut is n timb nes st other A area siana sh Co 1965 British h con the m est in ne wo 966 to th for d the 56 toTime Event April 1967 Technical planning by H.A. Simons (International) C Engineers completed Spring 1967 J.F. Slaney & Co finishes its report on the wood har investments July 1967 Market research by Stanford Research Institute is c Kidder, Peabody & Co. and Richardson Securities fin report on project funding needs with the help of a statement by Coverdale & Colpitts Consulting Engin July 1967 Mill area clearing works and construction of forest begin August 1967 Prudential Insurance and three other insurance com reach an agreement over funding the Eurocan proj February 1968 Sandwell Consulting Engineers selected as the mai of the new mill April 1968 Consortium led by The First National Bank of New provides immediate funding for the project May 1968 Groundwork construction for the mill begins Spring 1968 Ben Ginter resigns from Eurocan presidency and su decreases his ownership stake in the company (fro 3%); the Finnish partners raise their stakes accordi October 1968 The original profitability calculations prove to be o and, as a result, the planned paper production outp further increased by 18% with almost doubled saw output Spring 1969 Mill construction contract signed December 1969 Installation of the sawmill and paper production li Early 1970 The start-up of the sawmill and installation of the machinery September–October 1970 Start-ups of the paper machines 1 and 2 Fall 1970 Ben Ginter withdraws from Eurocan ownership December 1970 Eurocan project completed ppendix B. Actors mentioned in the study in alphabetical order Actor Overall description Alcan Canadian Aluminium company operating in the Kitimat Bodcaw An U.S. oil company that had offered its forests in Loui Crown Zellerbach A major U.S. forest industry firm operating also in Briti Karl-Erik Ekholm CEO of Kymi until 1965 and member of the board from Enso A major state-owned Finnish forest industry firm Feldmühle A major German forest industry firm operating also in Ben Ginter A self-made business entrepreneur mostly involved wit Pentti Halle CEO of Enso from 1962 to 1973 Kurt Ignatius Enso marketing director from 1962 to 1970 Kajaani A minor privately-owned Finnish forest industry firm Kymi A major privately-owned Finnish forest industry firm Ralph Loffmark British Columbia’s Minister of Trade and Commerce in MacMillan Bloedel A major Canadian forest industry firm Myllykoski A minor family-owned Finnish forest industry firm Nokia A major Finnish industrial conglomerate with some for Johann Nykopp CEO of Tampella from 1962 to 1972 Owens-Illinois A major U.S. glass manufacturing company Rauma-Repola A major Finnish firm involved in both forest and machi Reedpack A British paper and packaging firm Eero Riihikallio Enso forest manager Skeena Group A group of sawmills operating in the Kitimat area SCA from Sweden A major Swedish forest industry firm Mauri Skogster An Enso engineer and Eurocan general manager from 1 Tampella A major Finnish privately-owned firm involved with bo United Paper Mills (UPM) A major Finnish privately-owned forest industry firm West Fraser A major Canadian forest industry firm Klaus Waris Governor of the Bank of Finland from 1957 to 1967 an Ray Williston Minister of British Columbia Lands and Forests from 1913 Implication to the project progress ting Enables the start of the construction of the mill production site g Enables the start of the building of wood transporting infrastructure ted; its ert Enables application for project funding Enables the forthcoming mill groundworks es Enables mill operations after its construction would be finished ner Enables proceeding with the machinery orders and related operations Enables starting of the mill construction works Starts the final technical completion stage of the project tially to Project turns practically into a Finnish foreign venture tic er Increases planning work and somewhat delays future machinery installations because, instead of one larger paper machine, the mill is converted to operate with two smaller ones Finalises the technical characteristics of the mill art The final mill construction stage begins Initial production and construction operations continue simultaneously Gives the Eurocan partners the first indications of the actual capacity of the new mill Eurocan becomes literally fully owned by Enso and its Finnish partners Kymi and Tampella Project ends with two months delay, but with doubled costs and significantly changed end product, mill technical lay-out and ownership structure to Enso and Tampella for industrial use lumbia to 1975 Columbia struction and brewing businesses in British Columbia id-1960s dustry operations rks industries 1970 and its head thereafter est and machine works industries Chairman of Enso Corporate Advisory Board at the time of Eurocan decision 1972 J. Laurila and T. Ahola International Journal of Project Management xxx (xxxx) xxx ARTICLE IN PRESS JID: JPMA [m5GeSdc; April 2, 2021;1:32 ] Appendix C. List of corporate and industry histories collected for the study Ahvenainen, J., 1992. Enso-Gutzeit Oy, 1872 − 1992, 2: 1924 − 1992. Gummerus, Jyväskylä. Ahvenainen, Jorma. 1976. The History of the Star Paper 1935–1960. Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia; 13–14. Alajoutsijärvi, Kimmo. 1996. Rautainen pari: Kymmenen ja Valmetin suhde 1948–1990 [Cast-iron couple: The relationship between Kymi and Valmet corporations, 1948 1990]. Jyväskylä Studies in Computer Sci- ence Economics and Statistics, Vol. 31. Arponen, Jyri. 1993. Suomen paperiteollisuuden sijoittuminen Eu- roopassa [The geographical positioning of the Finnish paper industry in Europe]. Europe-Institute, Turku. Enckell, Jarl. 1973. Kaukas Corporation 1946–1971. Master’s Thesis. Lappeenranta University of Technology. Hakkarainen, Niilo. 1993. Oravanpyörässä [In a squirrel wheel]. WSOY, Juva. Heikkinen, Sakari. 2000. Paperia maailmalle- Suomen paperite- htaiden yhdistys Finpap 1918–1996 [Paper to the world: The Finnish paper marketing association, 1918–1996]. Otava, Helsinki. Hoffman, Kai. 1989. Sähkötekniikan taitaja Strömberg 1889–1989 [The electricity expert Strömberg, 1889–1998]. ABB Strömberg, Vaasa Kaartinen, Vesa. 1989. ABB Strömberg 1889- 1989. ABB Strömberg, Helsinki. Karonen, Petri. 1992. Enso-Gutzeit laivanvarustajana: Oy Finnlines ja Merivienti vuosina 1947–1982 [Enso Corporation as a shipowner: Finnlines and Merivienti, 1947–1982]. Enso-Gutzeit, Helsinki. Kuisma, Markku. 2006. Metsäteollisuuden maa [The land of the for- est industry]. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki. Kuisma, Markku. 2004. Kahlittu raha, kansallinen kapitalismi: Kansallis-Osake-Pankki 1940–1995 [Shackled money, national cap- italism: Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, 1940–1995]. Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki. Kulha, Keijo. 1981. Isännän jäljet [The marks of the master]. 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