https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367251364178
Cooperation and Conflict
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DOI: 10.1177/00108367251364178
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Rethinking interdependencies: 
Ideal-typical worldviews on 
small and medium powers’ 
economic security
Liisa Kauppila , Elina Sinkkonen   
and Ines Söderström
Abstract
Asymmetric and systemic interdependencies are increasingly viewed as security risks that could 
materialise as harmful outcomes for small and medium powers. While great powers have an 
arsenal of resources to decrease interdependencies, for smaller powers size constitutes a core 
vulnerability and becomes a key variable in their recalculations of economic security. This article 
(1) identifies potential harmful outcomes brought on by the competences of great powers, and 
(2) constructs three ideal-typical worldviews on small and medium powers’ economic security. 
In particular, it argues that smaller powers can view security risks of foreign ownership, supply 
disruptions and critical high technology cut-offs either through competitive global market capitalism, 
integrationist multipolarism or protectionist small state realism: by prioritising cost-effectiveness, 
balancing between efficacy and risks of interdependence or actively reducing vulnerabilities. The 
data originate from a large-scale Finnish Delphi panel, during which stakeholders proposed means 
to avoid the materialising of threat scenarios presented as comic art. Although the results are 
not generalisable as such, the study offers an empirically rooted introduction to considerations 
and tensions that all non-great powers encounter when enhancing their economic security under 
the current circumstances. As such, the article opens the ground for theorising and formulating 
strategies on de-risking.
Keywords
China-US rivalry, Delphi method, de-risking, economic security, Finland, great powers, 
interdependence, small and medium powers
Corresponding author:
Liisa Kauppila, Center on Global Orders and China, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Arkadiankatu 
23 B, FI-00100 Helsinki, Finland; Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, 
University of Turku, Turku 20014, Finland. 
Email: liisa.kauppila@utu.fi 
1364178 CAC0010.1177/00108367251364178Cooperation and ConflictKauppila et al.
research-article2025
Research Article
2 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
Introduction
The combination of increasingly confrontational US–China relations and the shock fol-
lowed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine have led to the proliferating view that the 
world has entered a new era of great power competition. This phase entails a fundamen-
tal shift in perceptions of a desirable exposure to global markets, as the post-Cold War 
liberalist view focusing on a positive cycle of mutual gains has given way to realist 
thinking that sees interdependencies as security risks, economic cooperation in zero-sum 
terms and technologies for their dual-use potential. Due to this change of perception, 
great powers are implementing protectionist policies that aim at reversing or limiting 
economic globalisation. These include, for example, the US export control regime affect-
ing companies outside the country, different types of sanctions, and Chinese export 
restrictions on critical raw materials of which European countries are dependent on. As a 
result, small and medium powers, which have greatly benefitted from economies of scale 
and open trade, are finding themselves in a highly uncertain and rapidly changing envi-
ronment that weakens their relative power position. After decades of globalisation and 
building specialised economies, it is difficult for smaller powers to drastically decrease 
their interdependencies similarly to great powers. Under these circumstances, smaller 
size constitutes a core vulnerability and becomes a key variable in small and medium 
powers’ recalculations of economic security, which at a minimum level corresponds with 
‘economic conditions necessary for survival’ (Buzan, 1991: 241).
This article is an explorative opening in the emerging research on small and medium 
powers’ strategies to adjust to economic interdependencies during an age of rapid tech-
nological, societal, and power political transformation. By drawing insights from an 
extensive Finnish online stakeholder exercise, we first propose a categorisation of 
potential harmful outcomes brought on by the relative competences of great powers. In 
doing so, we focus on two broad avenues enabling great powers to exercise their might 
over smaller actors: asymmetric interdependence that covers small and medium pow-
ers’ bilateral relations with great powers, and systemic sources of power, including 
weaponized interdependence (Farrell and Newman, 2019). Second, we construct three 
ideal-typical worldviews on small and medium powers’ economic security drawn from 
the stakeholder data and reflecting Buzan’s (1991) take on related perspectives on a 
liberal-mercantilist spectrum. Namely, these approaches are competitive global market 
capitalism, integrationist multipolarism and protectionist small state realism.1 As our 
approach focuses on the measures weaker powers can adopt either themselves or 
together with others in the face of great powers’ economic competences, this article also 
makes a contribution to studies emphasising small states’ agency in global politics (see 
Kolnberger and Koff, 2024; Panke, 2011; Pedersen, 2023; Thorhallsson, 2018; Wivel, 
2021). More specifically, we seek to answer the following two research questions:
1. What kinds of harmful outcomes can asymmetric and systemic interdependen-
cies expose small and medium powers to in an era of Sino-US rivalry?
1The authors wish to thank anonymous reviewer 2 for proposing these names for the worldviews.
Kauppila et al. 3
2. What kinds of ideal-typical worldviews characterise small and medium powers’ 
thinking on economic security in the face of these potential shocks?
The Finnish stakeholder exercise was organised in 2022–2023. Over the course of 
11 months, altogether 97 Finnish experts participated in an online panel that consisted 
of scenarios manifesting shocks of economic origin potentially faced by Finland in the 
short to long term. The threat scenarios were constructed by the authors’ research team 
in a process supported by such data-gathering methods as interviews of company 
employees and state officials. The core task was to propose changes that should be 
implemented to enhance Finland’s economic security to avoid or at least mitigate 
harmful outcomes created by asymmetric and systemic interdependencies. Based on 
the key idea of the Delphi method, the experts not only shared their views anony-
mously but also had a chance to build on each other’s views in their responses (Linstone 
and Turoff, 2002 [1975]).
As will be discussed in later sections, the Finnish empirical setting is characterised 
by the country’s distinct history, geographical location next to its former aggressor 
Russia, and well-established practices for enhancing economic security. These features 
enabled a successful running of a large-scale Delphi stakeholder exercise, which are 
known to suffer from drop-outs (e.g. Varho and Tapio, 2013). Although the results are 
not generalisable as such, the Finnish setting offered a fruitful platform to develop a 
preliminary, empirically rooted introduction to the broader considerations and tensions 
that all small and medium powers encounter when seeking to enhance their economic 
security under the current circumstances. The position of all these states is rather similar 
amid the current shocks of asymmetric and systemic interdependencies: although the 
available responses vary to a degree, in this context all non-great powers constitute 
weaker states with a limited ability to alter the global patterns that ultimately define 
one’s capacity to avoid shocks. As such, the article also opens the ground for further 
theorising and formulating of strategies on, for example, de-risking towards China (Von 
der Leyen, 2023) – a process that European states and political parties are only begin-
ning (Andersson and Lindberg, 2024).
Economic security and interdependencies
Since the Second World War, economic security has ranked high in most governments’ 
priorities across the world. Yet marrying ‘economic’ with ‘security’ is problematic when 
talking about capitalist systems. Most fundamentally, capitalism is a competitive system 
whose whole logic is based on the idea of winners and losers. In other words, its life-
blood is the ‘constant interplay of threats, vulnerabilities and opportunities’, which 
makes the aim of feeling secure in such a system absurd and almost a contradiction in 
terms (Buzan, 1991: 235). From this also follows that we can only talk about relative 
economic security: some units – be it companies, individuals or states – can meet their 
economic needs for survival better than others (Buzan, 1991: 234–235).
When states engage themselves in the task of seeking enough wealth from the competi-
tive markets to survive and thrive, they clearly benefit from the efficacies created by capi-
talist structures. In a nutshell, participation in the global market allows them to benefit 
4 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
from economies of scale, cross-border networks and specialisation. From a purely eco-
nomic perspective, these benefits are incontestable in comparison with a self-sufficient 
economy. Yet states’ primary goal is to provide security for the citizens and excessive 
dependencies on international trade may jeopardise this aim, as dependencies reduce 
states’ control over their own economy and expose them to security risks. It is not possible 
for large-scale economic systems to maintain a high level of economic specialisation and 
to be self-sufficient at the same time. Consequently, states must balance between reduc-
tion of vulnerabilities and efficiency of interdependence (Buzan, 1991: 236, 241–242).
From the perspective of small and medium powers, it is crucial that the benefits and 
security effects of interdependencies are not actor-neutral: the ways in which states can 
be affected by them depend on their relative power and national conditions. Also, the 
type of interdependence plays a role in dictating its potential effects on small and medium 
powers’ ability to enhance their economic security.
Interdependencies can be divided into asymmetric and systemic types. Asymmetric 
interdependence, as coined by Keohane and Nye (2012), is a source of power in the form 
of control over resources, ‘or the potential to affect outcomes’ (p. 10). Power in asym-
metric interdependence has two dimensions, vulnerability and sensitivity of the weaker 
actor. Vulnerability is more important than sensitivity, and it relates to ‘an actor’s liabil-
ity to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered’ (p. 
11). Sensitivity, in turn, refers to the time it takes for the outcome to hit the weaker party, 
as well as its costs in a framework where set policies remain constant. In other words, the 
ways in which power operates in asymmetrically interdependent relationships depends 
on the characteristics of both actors, and the weaker side can sometimes have a consider-
able leeway to mitigate negative effects. Yet, given the current crisis of the international 
order, small and medium powers are increasingly exposed to situations in which the 
established rules no longer protect them from the effects of great power politics. As a 
result, they are both more vulnerable and sensitive to different excesses of power than 
they were in a more solidarist system.
Systemic interdependence, in turn, stems from Strange’s (1987) idea of structural 
power. According to Strange, it is the ability to control security, production, financial 
markets and knowledge that gives certain states leverage over others, even in instances 
in which they do not intentionally seek to yield influence. In other words, power is not 
only exerted in bilateral asymmetric relations but lies in the ‘four major global structures’ 
(Strange, 1987), which create systemic interdependencies. Study of systemic interde-
pendencies has become more common in the 2000s due to increasing computational 
power, which has enabled the use of such new research methods as network analysis. 
Furthermore, such real-world events as the global financial crisis in 2007 have increased 
the demand for approaches looking at structures of interaction and interdependence 
(Winecoff and Young, 2023).
Building on network analysis, Farrell and Newman (2019) introduced the concept of 
weaponized interdependence. They argue that complex systems tend to form asymmetric 
network structures that give disproportionate power to actors in control of ‘critical net-
work hubs’, making it possible to weaponize interdependence on a systemic level. 
Technological development also plays a role in this new distribution of power, and net-
work hubs that enable information gathering (panopticon effect) or choking off economic 
Kauppila et al. 5
and information flows (choke point effect) are usually controlled by great powers. For 
example, around 70 per cent of global net traffic passes through Amazon Web Services in 
Northern Virginia (Farrell and Newman, 2019: 65), making it possible for the US authori-
ties to access vast amounts of information and make use of the panopticon effect. In a 
similar vein, the United States was able to play out the choke point effect by cutting the 
Iranian banks out of the SWIFT payment system in 2012 as a response to Iran’s nuclear 
programme.
Potential harmful outcomes of interdependencies in a 
changing world
Emphasising the abilities of great powers to utilise their relative power position through 
asymmetric and systemic interdependencies is not to argue that small and medium pow-
ers have no agency. On the contrary, they can dramatically enhance their economic 
security despite these vulnerabilities by, for example, forming unions, partnerships, alli-
ances and joint stocks of critical goods. However, temporal aspects greatly affect small 
and medium powers’ ability to utilise these strategies and hence mitigate the potential 
harmful outcomes of interdependencies. Given that great power politics clearly define 
the ethos of the global political economy, that is, whether states or the market are 
stronger, the current nature of Chinese and US economic policies is particularly deci-
sive in this regard.
In recent years, both the United States and China have adopted mercantilist policies. In 
essence, this means that they have actively reduced interdependencies over opting to ben-
efit from efficacies created by them. In particular, both great powers have sought to mini-
mise their reliance on each other with such drastic policy changes as industrial planning 
with heavy state subsidies, export controls and investment screening. At worst, the United 
States and China can force small and medium powers to choose their side in the 
competition.
Arguably, China started the race towards self-reliance with its Made in China 2025 
industrial plan (2015) and dual circulation strategy (2020) with the aim to reorient 
China’s economy towards domestic consumption and enhance its technological self-
reliance (García Herrero, 2021). Yet as strong government involvement in economic 
activities has characterised the Chinese system for long, the United States has made a 
more notable qualitative change in its approach. The first Trump administration placed 
tariffs on Chinese goods during the Sino-US trade war in 2018. The Biden administration 
kept these tariffs in place and introduced multiple new economic policies including 
export restrictions, the aim of which has arguably been to slow down Chinese economic 
development, not just to restrict China’s military advancements (Bateman, 2022). The 
US massive Inflation Reduction Act (2022) aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the 
United States with subsidies, and additional controls of outbound investments restricted 
capital flows (US Department of the Treasury, 2024). Chinese responses to these US 
policy moves have been mild, but since July 2023 China has placed export controls on 
various minerals needed in high tech production. 
Given the current mercantilist ethos of the global political economy, the asymmetric 
or systemic power position of great powers makes them well-placed to act out at least 
6 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
three types of economic competences, which enable them to bring about potential shocks 
to small and medium powers’ economic security. These categories served as the basis for 
the design of the Finnish stakeholder exercise (Table 1).
On the first row, investment leverage is a form of economic competence that creates 
security risks of foreign ownership. The foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows of the 
United States and China account for more than one third of the global total (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2023), and investors from 
both countries acquire real estate and make venture capital (VC) investments in overseas 
start-ups. Through this position of economic strength, China and the United States may 
inevitably gain control over resources of small and medium powers that can be used to 
promote their own foreign policy goals. These aims may contradict with the national 
interests and security of the target country in various ways and potentially cause or con-
tribute to the emergence of harmful outcomes. Generally, American investments are cur-
rently causing less unease in this regard in Europe, but Chinese investments are 
increasingly assumed to expose the host country to situations in which, for example, 
acquisitions of companies producing critical goods expose such states as Finland to sup-
ply security crises (Breslin and Mattlin, 2025; Kauppila et al., 2023: 37; Mattlin, 2020). 
Speculations over such events have increased along with the emergence of China’s stra-
tegic company acquisitions and contentious National Intelligence Law, which states that 
‘national intelligence work institutions may request that relevant organs, organisations, 
and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation’ (National People’s 
Congress, 2017). 
Security risks of foreign ownership constitute a risk category that small and medium 
powers can tackle through their national legislation. In the European Union (EU) area, 
most member states have established FDI screening mechanisms either before or after 
the EU Framework for Investment Screening came into force in 2020 (European 
Parliament and Council of the EU, 2019). Yet such mechanisms are never exhaustive and 
controls on VC investments, for example, are not common. Moreover, the security ben-
efits of investment screening must always be compared with their possibly negative 
impact on the business environment.
On the second row, supply chain dominance refers to great powers’ position as the 
primary nodes of the global economy, which gives them power to bring about supply 
disruptions. More specifically, due to such a standing, great powers can transform 
choke points and hubs into political weapons, as Farrell and Newman (2019) argue. In 
Table 1. Great power competences and their potential harmful effectsa.
Type of 
interdependence
Competences of great 
powers
Potential harmful outcomes on 
small/medium powers 
Asymmetric Investment leverage Security risks of foreign ownership
Asymmetric/systemic Supply chain dominance Supply disruptions
Asymmetric/systemic Core technology control Cut-offs of critical high technology 
aThe table is modified from Mattlin et al. (2023).
Kauppila et al. 7
an ultimate situation, great powers can also discriminate or sanction smaller states for 
political reasons (e.g. Bøje Forsby and Sverdrup-Thygeson, 2022). Moreover, over-
concentration of supply in itself causes supply disruptions, as an example from the 
medical sector showcases: in 2018, there were global shortages of piperacillin-tazobac-
tam antibiotic because there was an explosion in the one Chinese factory producing its 
active ingredient (Access to Medicine Foundation, 2018; Mattlin et al., 2023). In addi-
tion to pharmaceuticals, other critical industries in which China is a key player in supply 
include, for example, specific water management and wind power technologies 
(European Commission, 2020; Wang and Wang, 2019). While the United States has 
traditionally focused on higher-end goods, its strategic reshoring efforts have led to an 
increase in its share of supply in the above-mentioned industries, too (e.g. Dray, 2023). 
As a result, China’s strong standing may sometimes be replaced with a Sino-US domi-
nance. Overall, China and the United States rank the first and the second in the global 
merchandise exports, with their respective 14.2% and 8.5% shares (World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), 2024).
Smaller powers have limited resources to prepare for supply disruptions and political 
sanctions. For example, although the possibility of major supply disruptions of Chinese 
antibiotics is widely known, the resources of Finland to relaunch domestic production as 
a precautionary measure differ vastly from those of the United States. In a similar vein, 
while Norway had no option but to adjust to China’s unannounced sanctions on its 
salmon exports in the aftermath of Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize, the United States would 
have an arsenal of means to prevent such a situation.
The third-row category, core technology control, refers to great powers’ strong 
standing in the development, delivery and servicing/overhaul of the most advanced 
technological devices. In essence, they have the ability to expose small and medium 
powers to cut-offs of critical high technology: situations in which problems in the 
availability and functioning of technology may cause major turmoil for people and 
the national economy (Mattlin et al., 2023: 18). According to the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, China and the United States were the largest and the third 
largest high-tech exporters in 2022, if the EU27 are counted together (Léon et al., 
2022). Moreover, China is the world leader in various green transition technologies 
such as advanced batteries, solar panels, windmills and electric vehicles. The EU area 
is reliant on China on these technologies, with consequences for energy security. 
Recently, China has also made significant advances in high-end medical technology 
as part of its self-reliance drive. It has a strong standing in, for example, global in-
vitro diagnostics markets and notable innovations in artificial intelligence (AI)-
assisted medical imaging and surgery robots (Economist and Intelligence Unit, 2019: 
6; Yu, 2020).
The fast tempo of technological breakthroughs further exacerbates the weak position 
of small and medium powers by shortening the reaction time actors have in adapting to 
changes. Moreover, although many smaller powers rank high in innovation indexes, it 
would be impossible for them to produce many of the high-technology products domesti-
cally. This dilemma was evident during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the demand for 
high-end medical equipment and their spare parts was high all over the world and there 
was competition for limited resources.
8 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
Running a stakeholder exercise in Finland
Worldviews on economic security always evolve in a distinct national context characterised 
by historical, geographical and institutional factors. These features also inevitably shape the 
risk perceptions of the above-mentioned types of interdependence and potentially harmful 
outcomes brought on by competences of great powers. In the following subsection, the 
Finnish empirical setting is introduced to provide context for the stakeholder panel. After 
that, the process of running the exercise and its methodological choices are described.
Empirical setting
The empirical setting of Finland is that of an open economy that ranks high in global inno-
vation indexes and is tightly connected to global investment and trade flows. As a country 
standing at the northernmost edge of Europe, Finland is mostly separated from the rest of 
the EU countries by the Baltic Sea and located next to its former aggressor Russia. It has 
overlapping economic networks with the rest of the Nordic countries, which can be exem-
plified by Sweden’s status as one of Finland’s largest investor countries and trading part-
ners (Statistics Finland, 2024). The Finnish economy also has strong ties to both the United 
States and China. While the United States constitutes a more significant investor country in 
terms of annual flows, in terms of trade Finland is dependent on both countries.2 Especially 
different types of batteries, artificial fibres, laptops, mobile phones, solar panels and mag-
nets constitute critical dependencies on China (Kaaresvirta et al., 2023), while trade with 
the United States is more focused on services (Statistics Finland, 2024). After years of non-
alignment, Finland became a US ally through its NATO membership in 2023.
Finland has a long tradition of monitoring and regulating foreign ownership. The 
country has had statutory controls over FDI in place uninterruptedly since the 1930s 
(Rajavuori and Mattlin, 2023). The current legislation, Act on the Screening of Foreign 
Corporate Acquisitions, subjects non-EU/European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
acquisitions of security critical companies to monitoring but does not apply to greenfield 
investments, new foreign companies set up in Finland (Act on the Screening of Foreign 
Corporate Acquisitions, 2020). Unlike most EU countries, Finland has also controlled 
non-EU/European Economic Area (EEA) real estate transfers since 2020 (Act on 
Transfers of Real Estate Requiring Special Permission, 2022). The act was largely a reac-
tion to Russia’s invasion of Crimea, and particularly aimed at monitoring Russian trans-
fers, which then accounted for one third of all acquisitions.3 The current government 
(2023–) is planning to tighten the legislation and ban Russian real estate transfers.
2The US has been among the top three investor countries in Finland throughout the 2020s, and in 
2022, it was the third largest export and seventh largest import country. In 2021, China’s share of 
Finland-bound FDI was only 6%, which is roughly in line with the longer trend. In the late 2010s, 
however, China’s share peaked, as the world’s largest sports equipment firm Anta acquired the 
Finnish Amer Sports. In 2022, China was Finland’s third largest export and third largest import 
country (Statistics Finland, 2023).
3Finnish state official, interview, 23 March 2023.
Kauppila et al. 9
Given the history of having fought two wars with Russia (1939–1940, 1941–1944), 
Finland has also had established practices and legislation for tackling market disturbances 
since the post-war years. For example, statutory emergency stockpiling was initiated as 
early as in the 1950s (Emergency Stockpiling Act, 1958). The current Finnish model stands 
out in international comparison as a network of private and public actors. In practice, the 
National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) (2024) executes the government’s goals by 
tasking companies with such duties as obligatory storing of medicines and enhances indus-
try-specific situational awareness together with companies. In addition to national efforts, 
Finland collaborates closely with other Nordic countries in enhancing its resilience in the 
face of supply disruptions (Wigell et al., 2022). Also, the recent openings on strategic 
autonomy have highlighted the potential for EU-level collaboration on these issue areas 
(European Commission, 2023; García Higuera and Weichert, 2023). Yet materialised 
union-wide efforts are few, and limited acts of solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic 
underlined the continued importance of national efforts.
Method
During the stakeholder exercise, an online panel of 97 Finnish experts proposed 
means to enhance Finland’s economic security in the face of potential shocks arising 
from asymmetric and systemic interdependencies. The panel consisted of research-
ers, businesspeople, representatives of non-governmental organisations, state offi-
cials, decision-makers/politicians and general citizens with specific knowledge of 
the exercise’s themes. Some of the panellists ( ‘generalists’) were invited to partici-
pate in all three questionnaire rounds, whereas others (‘sectoral experts’) joined the 
exercise to share their views on specific scenarios. The panellists were selected with 
an expertise matrix, a cross-tabulation ensuring that all relevant stakeholder groups 
and types of knowledge are represented and none are completely lacking (e.g. Varho 
and Tapio, 2013) (Appendix 1). Researchers were slightly overrepresented in the 
exercise as a whole, and a proportionally large businesspeople and state official par-
ticipation characterised some of its parts. Strong researcher engagement was, in part, 
a conscious choice that supported the real-time format of our Delphi exercise: given 
the nature of researchers’ profession, they were expected to share research-based 
arguments that other panellists could find useful in drafting their own responses. 
This assumption also proved right during the process.4
4In part, the overrepresentation of researchers is also spurious and can be explained by the gen-
eralist/sectoral expert division of the panel. Additional sectoral experts were invited to join each 
questionnaire round, and many of the researchers possessing these knowledge types (e.g., ‘game 
industry’) also held knowledge of the more general knowledge types (‘competences of great pow-
ers’), making them add onto the numbers in both slots. With other stakeholder groups, this was 
not the case to the same extent. Moreover, some of the stakeholders labelled as ‘researchers’ held 
a strong background either as civic sector experts or state officials, making them able to view the 
issues from various standpoints in their responses. See Appendix 1 for more information on the 
logic of the matrix.
10 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
The scenarios fell into the previous section’s three risk categories, and they depicted 
either a shock or a risky situation with a high likelihood for shocks (Table 2). While 
great powers’ control over resources was a core element in each narrative, we aimed at 
scrutinising a wide variety of causes and triggers through which great powers’ actions 
can intentionally or unintentionally expose small and medium powers to situations that 
reduce their economic security. Bearing in mind that our selection of cases could not be 
exhaustive, we included causes ranging from sanctions to discriminatory trade prac-
tices. As states’ liability to suffer costs due to great powers’ actions varies not only 
nationally but within societies, we also selected different sectors of society as empirical 
scenes of each scenario (Appendix 2). Each alternative future was written into a comic 
art threat scenario with an everyday life situation as the main plot (Appendix 3). In 
tangible terms, they were inspired by real-life events, previous research (e.g. Panke, 
2011; Pedersen, 2023; Thorhallsson, 2018) and insights of sectoral experts gained in 14 
semi-structured interviews. Target years varied, allowing the panellists to ‘practice’ 
short- (2027), mid- (2030) and longer-term (2035) threats. Security risks of foreign 
ownership were events that could unfold soon, whereas the likelihood for the two other 
types of scenarios would grow as great power rivalry intensifies and China’s techno-
logical prowess advances.
In most scenarios, China’s control over resources was at the core of the setting, but 
there were also scenarios focusing on the competences of the United States or both great 
powers. With scenarios manifesting systemic interdependence – supply disruptions and 
cut-offs of critical technology – also the mutual relations and competition between China 
Table 2. Threat scenariosa.
Questionnaire 1 Questionnaire 2 Questionnaire 3
Security risks 
of foreign 
ownership 2027
Acquisitions of 
technology companies
(mobile game company 
gathering personal data)
Transfer of real 
estate ownership
(Arctic tourism 
and sports 
facilities)
Venture capital 
investments in start-
up companies
(quantum computing)
Supply 
disruptions
2030
Discriminatory 
practices limiting access 
to pharmaceuticals 
(antibiotics)
Sanctions on 
green transition 
materials, 
components and 
minerals
(wind energy)
Political retaliation 
limiting access to 
components needed 
in critical services 
and industrial 
processes (water 
treatment)
Cut-offs of 
critical high-
technology
2035
Maintenance of advanced 
military technology
(F-35 fighter jets)
Cybersecurity of 
advanced health 
technology
(home dialysis 
machines)
Supply of chemicals 
for advanced 
research and 
development 
activities (helium)
aThe table is also presented in Kauppila and Sinkkonen (2023a).
Kauppila et al. 11
and the United States were portrayed as important triggers. The stronger emphasis on 
China was a choice dictated by the key requirement of scenario-building: the panellists 
must find the narratives plausible. In a situation in which Finland was applying for a 
NATO membership and the United States was perceived possibly more favourably than 
ever, it would have been challenging to focus equally on harmful outcomes caused by 
both great powers.
The panellists shared their views anonymously, answers became visible in real time 
and original responses could be edited in light of the gathered knowledge. These fea-
tures – anonymity, expertise, feedback and iteration – are crucial in disaggregative 
policy Delphi studies, which aim at producing a diverse set of elaborated views 
(Linstone and Turoff, 2002 [1975]; Tapio, 2003). The chosen application of the method 
differs clearly from the traditional consensus-seeking Delphi studies: the aim of stake-
holder interaction is not to make the experts agree or align with each other but to pro-
duce more thought-out and justified views that have been debated and hence tested by 
one’s peers (Tapio, 2003).
Anonymity, in particular, was viewed as a useful feature for the purposes of the 
research; most importantly, it allowed notable experts to speak out and disagree on sen-
sitive issues without a fear of being labelled. Moreover, anonymity of Delphi studies is 
considered to mitigate the impact of a bandwagon effect, the tendency of individuals to 
align their views with those of others (Linstone and Turoff, 2002 [1975]).5 Also the 
logic applied in the exercise differed from conventional forecasting Delphi studies, 
which rely on participants’ ability and willingness to anticipate complex future develop-
ments. While the benefit of this methodological choice was that it left the duty of fore-
casting to the research team drafting the scenarios, its key challenge was the inevitable 
‘lack of ownership of futures images’ among the panellists (Zimmermann et al., 2012). 
In other words, the respondents had to accept the content of the scenarios as the starting 
point of the exercise, even if the narratives did not correspond with their own concep-
tions of the future. In our study, comic art enhanced the level of immersion and hence 
alleviated the problems arising from this dilemma. Moreover, we offered participants 
the opportunity to express their criticism about the exercise, as to minimise interference 
with the main task.
Overall, the response rates for all three rounds were high for a Delphi study: 92%, 
78% and 87% of those who accepted the invitation logged onto the exercise platform. 
This was most likely a result of engaging each panellist through a phone call, personal-
ised email or face-to-face invitation and sending out a large number of targeted remind-
ers. Moreover, as underlined by the panellists themselves, the application of the method 
raised curiosity and motivated the experts to the task.
5It should, however, be noted that Finland has a small population, and few non-Finns speak flu-
ent Finnish. For this reason, the pool of suitable experts for any specific Finnish-language Delphi 
panel is narrow. Moreover, given that many well-known experts have a highly distinct style of 
argumentation and writing, some panellists may not have remained completely unrecognisable to 
each other in the exercise.
12 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
Three ideal-typical worldviews on small and medium 
powers’ economic security
In the following analysis, a data set of approximately 500 stakeholder comments6 is 
organised into three worldviews on economic security: competitive global market capi-
talism, integrationist multipolarism and protectionist small state realism. These belief 
systems reflect alternative readings on what small and medium powers’ economic secu-
rity is and how it can be enhanced. The worldviews were identified and constructed 
based on individual arguments instead of profiling respondents as representatives of 
ideal-typical worldviews. As such, they stand out as somewhat simplistic ideal-typical 
belief systems rather than expressions of real-life thinking, which is always more 
nuanced. In analysing the data, this became clear in that sometimes a single stakeholder 
comment reflected elements of at least two worldviews. Some respondents, for example, 
pondered two alternative strategies in one lengthy answer.
The approaches are compared by analysing their key differences, ranging from idea-
tional basis to the role of technology (Table 3). In addition to the country-specific char-
acteristics and methodological issues outlined in the previous section, the timing of the 
panel most likely shaped the respondents’ views: the exercise took place in the aftermath 
of Russia’s massive attack on Ukraine, from May 2022 to March 2023, at a time when 
also China’s ambivalent stance on the war was a much debated topic both in Finland and 
internationally. Although the timing created a sense of national urgency and hence moti-
vated the panellists, it also created a possible bias. In the construction of the exercise, this 
potential bias was considered by making the current Russia-related debates explicit in 
the textual backgrounders that accompanied each scenario. In this way, we sought to 
ensure that the panellists were aware of the dominant ideas that possibly coloured their 
thinking regarding China, too. Hence, the panellists were more likely to assess them 
critically when drafting their responses. In the last section of the analysis, we seek to 
highlight the contexts in which the bias might have been particularly strong.
Ideational basis
The identified worldviews reflect different stances on the fundamental dilemma of the idea 
of economic security: more extensive participation in the global market enhances one’s 
6The responses were given in Finnish. The excerpts included in the analysis are translated by the 
authors. The data is stored on the University of Turku server and the exercise platform with pass-
word-protection. It is not published at a depository, but the metadata (description of the data and 
the data-gathering process) is published at https://etsin.fairdata.fi/. Moreover, the comic art threat 
scenarios are published in their entirety at https://sites.utu.fi/forac/en/raportti/. Given the nature of 
the research problem, it was considered important to name the research team analysing the expert 
views, whereas opening the data for a broader research community was assumed to have a negative 
impact on the experts’ willingness to join the exercise. The main reason for this was the practical 
reality of conducting Delphi exercises in a small country like Finland: the small pool of experts 
and their possibly distinct style of argumentation may risk making the panellists recognisable from 
the dataset (see Note 4).
Kauppila et al. 13
T
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14 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
susceptibility to vulnerability but creates efficacy through specialisation. The first world-
view, competitive global market capitalism, leans towards efficacy in enhancing economic 
security. As such, it reflects the core values and ideas of the US-led liberal order: free and 
open economy, individual liberty, globalisation etc. In ideological terms, it is located at the 
liberal end of the liberal-mercantilist spectrum (see Buzan, 1991: 242–248), and it has 
overtones of laissez faire/libertarianism. Hence, it resists the idea of compromising or 
changing one’s fundamental values even when navigating in the risk environment charac-
terised by asymmetric and systemic interdependencies. In practice, this means that state 
intervention is either entirely overlooked or less oversight is suggested in the economy due 
to the high costs of security enhancing interventions. As one panellist proposed: ‘hindering 
acquisitions through legislation will have a negative impact on Finland’s competitiveness. 
On the contrary, investment processes should be streamlined’.
Proposing a minimal level of state intervention in enhancing economic security does 
not, however, necessarily mean that the need to mitigate vulnerabilities would be down-
played; risks can simply be tackled through other means. Companies are considered to 
have the most comprehensive knowledge of supply chains and stand as rational actors 
that should have ‘the understanding that companies are not automatically sold to those 
that offer the most’, as one panellist argued. Indeed, it is emphasised that economic free-
doms come with duties, and ‘not all responsibility in a society can be put on the shoul-
ders of state officials’, as the same expert continued. In other words, ‘. . . an entrepreneur 
has an ethical responsibility for their services and the consequences of the investment 
(moral > money. . .)’, as another panellist framed it.
The second worldview, integrationist multipolarism, maintains an equal balance 
between mitigating vulnerabilities and seeking cost-effectiveness in enhancing economic 
security. The interventions of the state may, at times, prioritise tackling vulnerabilities 
over the best of the economic actors and national economy, but generally, these actions 
are limited in scope and do not alter the dynamics of the markets to a large extent. In 
other words, the worldview is located in the middle of the liberal-mercantilist spectrum: 
economic security is generally enhanced by liberal economic policies, but the state is 
responsible for intervening whenever a potential crisis is expected to critically risk the 
wellbeing of its citizens. In practice, this means that the state may oblige companies to 
certain statutory duties, such as stockpiling of antibiotics. As such, the worldview reflects 
the ideals of a mixed economy, welfare state and close state-business collaboration. For 
the proponents of this worldview, state regulation is often viewed to be dictated by neces-
sity, either due to information gaps, lack of resources or hard realities of business, as 
three experts underlined:
We should be able to shift a lot of responsibility onto individuals, but our awareness is not 
really up to all this freedom.
If one is to interfere with economic incentives alone, the resources of a small state soon appear 
to be insufficient. . .
Kauppila et al. 15
Companies should reach a situation in which the exits of one supplier or supplier country . . . 
do not let the entire business collapse. This is difficult for small newly established businesses 
and an extra cost for big companies, which is why it may be that certain fields should perhaps 
be encouraged to diversify through regulation.
The third belief system, protectionist small state realism, is clearly located at the mer-
cantilist end of the liberal-mercantilist spectrum. In reflecting the eroding solidarism and 
rising nationalism among the members of the international system, the worldview priori-
tises mitigation of vulnerabilities over cost-effectiveness in enhancing economic secu-
rity. In a realist spirit, national security is viewed as the highest foundational value and 
hence the state’s actions in its name may override freedoms of economic actors and 
individuals (see Jackson, 2000: 170–172). Economic dependencies, as such, are viewed 
as questions of national security, and the risks of asymmetric and systemic interdepend-
encies are proposed to be tackled through measures that compromise or even abandon 
some of the key principles of liberal capitalism. Most fundamentally, this means that the 
idea of an open economy is questioned:
Is it really up to date to allow all kinds of economic activities to everyone, when we see what 
kind of destruction Russia has caused in Ukraine and how China clearly consolidates power. . .?
While economic nationalism is clearly a guiding light of this approach, some of the 
interventionist arguments are also protectionist: they favour state intervention to boost 
domestic industries. Indeed, the need to tackle interdependencies can also justify changes 
that limit foreign actors’ role in the national economy, as one panellist proposed:
The Finnish authorities should expand the scope of the Act on the Screening of Foreign 
Company Acquisitions. We produce a lot of critical technology, which is of interest to foreign 
companies and investors. This is not only about data security or supply security but also about 
a possible ‘new Nokia’ gliding into foreign ownership.
Whose economic security
Another difference between the worldviews is the prioritised referent objects of eco-
nomic security, that is, the entities that are protected (Buzan and Wæver, 1998). All three 
belief systems view the state as a key referent object of economic security. Hence, it is 
the economic conditions for the survival of the state that the worldviews are concerned 
with. Yet as competitive global market capitalists and integrative multipolarists value the 
efficacies of capitalism to a great extent, providing economic conditions for the survival 
of companies is emphasised, too. Hence, also the firm constitutes a prioritised referent 
object of economic security for them. In comparison with the proponents of the two other 
worldviews, integrative multipolarists also explicitly emphasise the individual as a refer-
ent object: interventions are only made when individuals’ wellbeing calls for it. As for 
protectionist small state realists, nation is an additional prioritised referent object: drastic 
interventions, including extensive stockpiling, are proposed to make the people survive 
in exceptional circumstances.
16 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
It is also clear that context matters is defining which referent objects of economic 
security are prioritised over others. In the exercise, this was seen in that, for example, 
integrative multipolarists clearly emphasised the need to secure the survival of individu-
als more than that of the state when discussing supply disruptions on antibiotics. For 
protectionist small state realists, the nation stood out in this context, too. As for critical 
high technology cut-offs affecting the maintenance of F-35 fighter jets, the majority of 
the respondents were most concerned with the survival of the state – no matter what 
worldview their answers represented. In discussing the security risks of foreign owner-
ship, the proponents of all worldviews emphasised their prioritised referent objects more 
equally.
Outlook on risks of interdependencies
The nature of the risks of asymmetric and systemic interdependencies as very real vul-
nerability consequences is acknowledged across all three worldviews. However, the out-
look on them varies. For competitive global market capitalists, such risks are a ‘normal’ 
state of affairs, something whose existence must be accepted if one is not to compromise 
liberal values, as one panellist argued: ‘in an open society, it is not possible to mitigate 
all risks, although reducing their number is desirable’. Such an outlook reflects the origi-
nal nature of liberalism as a programme for desecuritisation: an attempt to reduce the 
number of issues viewed as threats (Buzan and Wæver, 1998).
The competitive global market capitalists, however, also underline that China is not 
the only potential danger; economic security may also be reduced due to actions taken by 
large companies and liberal democracies themselves, as one panellist put it:
China is often viewed as scary, and stereotypically as a data collector. It would be more 
important to note how Facebook (Meta) collects data on Finns in Finland and in Europe, how 
much data they possess and how much they already use and sell it. For me, e.g., Facebook will 
be a bigger threat in 2027.
Moreover, competitive global market capitalists remind us that driving ‘classification 
into “dangerous” countries and others’ is an impossible task, as the situation changes 
constantly.
The integrationist multipolarists underline that the world order is changing and, con-
sequently, adapting to it calls for taking a new outlook on risks of interdependence. In 
addition to pandemics etc., some – but certainly not all – economic transactions related 
to authoritarian states pose particular dangers, which must be considered in crafting state 
interventions:
. . . not all Chinese investments should be blocked. A risk assessment should focus on evaluating 
the investment’s larger significance for Finland’s national security and supply security.
Protectionist small state realists, in turn, highlight the particularity of the ‘authoritar-
ian threat’. In a pure act of securitisation, they hence construct the risks of asymmetric 
and systemic interdependencies as something that call for exceptional attention and 
Kauppila et al. 17
justify extraordinary responses (Buzan and Wæver, 1998) as one panellist summarised it 
in the context of the weaponised wind power dependencies:
Energy self-sufficiency and independence of Finland (and the West) from China (and Russia) 
are existential questions. Every step toward these aims reduces the chances of autocratic leaders 
to decide upon the future of us and our children.
Time orientation and nature of risk management efforts
Since competitive global market capitalists view the risks of asymmetric and systemic 
interdependencies as a normal state of affairs, the nature of the proposed risk management 
efforts is not different from actions that ‘make sense anyway’ in a capitalist system. This 
means that existing structures are made more efficient and resilient. Hence, in practice, 
there is no need for drastic just-in-case changes but efforts that equally enhance the cur-
rent level of cost-effectiveness. Most importantly, competitive global market capitalists 
emphasise correcting shortcomings that prevent businesses from thriving and markets 
from functioning in a healthy manner. For example, the panellists argued that companies 
should run supply chain stress tests, stockpile some key components and improve their 
cybersecurity practices. In addition, regulation should be lowered to attract all kinds of 
foreign investments since it allows the target of the investment to make responsible 
choices. Patents of critical products should be dissolved, if need be, and limited resources 
– including antibiotics and natural resources – should be used rationally. Risk awareness 
should be enhanced through free media rather than through state-led efforts.
Given that integrationist multipolarists acknowledge that liberal open economies – 
such as Finland – could now face shocks that are particularly dangerous, they focus on 
building capacity to act if need be. However, they hold the view that the cost-effective-
ness created by the market should not be completely abandoned just in case. Hence, the 
time orientation of their risk management efforts is perhaps best described as anticipa-
tory. In essence, this means that integrationist multipolarists favour efforts that enhance 
awareness, incentivise readiness improving practices across the society and softly guide 
economic actors towards interdependencies that are less risky. In concrete terms, the 
efforts proposed in the exercise included, for example, state-led attracting of invest-
ments, data gathering on foreign ownership and developing (international joint) funding 
structures that enable domestic technologies to emerge. The focus is hence primarily on 
‘carrots’ instead of ‘sticks’.
Since protectionist small state realists underline that the authoritarian threat is exis-
tential and that risks of asymmetric and systemic interdependencies call for exceptional 
attention, they must be mitigated to a degree that the likelihood of potential dangers is 
actively reduced or eliminated. In other words, the proponents of this worldview advo-
cate for ‘a closure against things perceived as threatening’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998). 
The time orientation of interventionist risk mitigation efforts is hence preemptive: costly 
actions are taken based on the possibility that future crises materialise (see Anderson, 
2010). These efforts are often ‘sticks’, that is, they focus on controlling, banning and 
restricting, and they may also have a strong protectionist twist. Hence, they violate the 
normal rules of politics in liberal capitalist states (see Buzan and Wæver, 1998). In con-
crete terms, the exercise’s protectionist small state realists proposed efforts that may 
18 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
include legislative tightening on foreign ownership, subsidies to domestic production 
and extensive stockpiling.
Ideal source of wealth and overseas partners
Whether wealth should ideally come through self-reliance or a division of labour and 
economies of scale constitutes a key difference between the worldviews. These pref-
erences also clearly reflect alternative readings of the ability to rely on the other 
actors of the international system in managing risks of interdependencies. Competitive 
global market capitalists continue to adhere to the value of globalisation and maintain 
a high level of trust in international collaboration. Therefore, functioning global mar-
kets suffice and suitable partners for enhancing economic security can be found any-
where, including in China. By expressing a persistent belief in the ideas of free trade 
and open economy, some of the proponents of this worldview in our panel even 
viewed the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine as evidence of no need to 
turn inwards:
Global supply chains have enabled the world to spin around under these exceptional 
circumstances . . . global supply chains have been rather resilient, and disruptions have focused, 
above all, on specific parts of them.
The proponents of integrationist multipolarism, in turn, express a medium level of 
trust and lean towards regional self-reliance in the most critical goods and services. This 
reduces dependencies in critical products and yet saves the costs of reorganising eco-
nomic activities at home. For Finland, the EU member states constitute the key overseas 
partners in, for example, securing a sufficient supply of antibiotics and coregulating data 
gathering. Moreover, other like-minded partner countries can be relied on in re-establish-
ing supply chains and producing high technology, a field in which some panellists 
emphasised the need to form a ‘bloc of techno democracies’. China collaboration should 
be limited but can still be continued in certain sectors.
Finally, protectionist small state realists have a low degree of trust in International 
Relations and a corresponding desire for a high-level of self-reliance in critical products. 
Often this aim overrides any other ideals, including green transition, as one panellist 
argued: ‘energy production and its maintenance should be secured to be self-sufficient in 
all situations . . . no matter how energy is produced’. Although the arguments expressing 
this belief system in our panel were highly sceptical of the EU’s ability to enhance prepar-
edness together because of the Covid-19 failure, the high costs of reaching self-reliance 
were acknowledged. As a solution, some panellists viewed such contributing sub-regional 
arrangements as the Nordic joint stockpiling and production of medications as a tolerable 
option: ‘Regional (Nordic) collaboration could ease the burden of costs and pave the 
ground for new companies without amplifying political, logistical and moral risks’. China 
collaboration, in turn, was proposed to be limited to the least risky fields or completely 
ended.
Intriguingly, choosing not to have partners or coregulate emerging technologies but to 
‘go alone’ can also positively influence other like-minded countries’ ability to mitigate the 
Kauppila et al. 19
risks of interdependencies in the long term – while contributing to the national economy 
through the logic of protectionism. As one panellist argued, Finland could adopt a tighter 
than average legislation on digital data security by, for example, setting regulations on 
operating systems used in Finland. This would encourage domestic innovations and give 
rise to new growth industries ( ‘new Nokias’). Although foreign actors’ ability to enter the 
market would first be limited due to tighter legislation, such safer products could soon be 
popularised in other like-minded countries, too.
Role of technology
The proponents of competitive global market capitalism view technology as a means of 
enhancing the efficacy of businesses and markets. They also underline that technology 
can create alternatives for critical products – without relying on state intervention. In our 
exercise, the panellists proposed, for example, technologies to recycle critical minerals 
since they can make wind power parks and water management facilities more cost-effec-
tive and less prone to supply cuts. Moreover, they argued that the risk that data leaks to 
a foreign owner of a technology company can be mitigated through encrypting technolo-
gies that prevent applications from, for example, gathering real location data.
The integrationist multipolarists believe in the power of technology in building capac-
ity to act if need be. For example, one panellist proposed setting up state-owned 3D 
printing facilities for producing different spare parts and components during crises. 
Many experts also considered national investments in research and development activi-
ties to be crucial since they ensure that sufficient domestic knowledge base exists if a 
crisis occurs.
Protectionist small state realists, in turn, harness technology to a tool of control and 
oversight. These control technologies can also be viewed through a protectionist lens, as 
a way to enhance national competitiveness: ‘Finland should also invest heavily in coun-
ter espionage, which at best could emerge as a new growth industry’.
Coverage in the exercise: visibility of the worldviews in the scenario 
responses
Although each approach was visible in all nine sets of responses, there was variation in 
their case-by-case coverage. Competitive global market capitalism was not the most 
common worldview in any scenario, but it was clearly more visible in the responses deal-
ing with security risks of foreign ownership. This suggests that perceptions of asymmet-
ric interdependence remain more positive than those of systemic interdependence. In 
other words, it is still considered possible for small and medium powers to rely on for-
eign investments – even Chinese capital – to seek cost-effectiveness. With risks related 
to systemic interdependence, that is, supply disruptions and cut-offs of critical high tech-
nology, the threat perceptions were stronger, and few panellists prioritised efficacy over 
mitigation of vulnerabilities.
Integrationist multipolarism was the most common worldview in responses dealing 
with supply disruptions, that is, risks created by not only asymmetric but also systemic 
20 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
interdependence. This tendency may suggest that systemic interdependence is perceived 
to force states to take such precautionary steps that in other contexts would seem exces-
sive. Moreover, this worldview was clearly the most visible line of argumentation in the 
entire panel across all cases; there were no sets of responses with integrationist multipo-
larism as the least dominant approach. This is unsurprising since the two other world-
views are rather radical. Moreover, in many of the scenarios the depicted crisis was only 
about to unfold, or its impact would be somewhat limited. Had the panellists been pre-
sented with full-blown chaoses, the responses may have been more radical.
Protectionist small state realism was more visible when pondering responses to the 
risks of foreign real estate transfers than in other cases. This reflects the fact that territo-
rial integrity is perceived as a fundamental component of national security, and hence 
related vulnerabilities can be justifiably tackled with exceptional means unacceptable in 
other contexts. Protectionist small state realism was also the second most common belief 
system in responses dealing with supply disruptions, which suggests that several stake-
holders began to consider systemic interdependencies dangerous enough to justify dras-
tic actions.
It is also likely that Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine at the time of conducting the 
exercise made several panellists lean towards protectionist small state realism either in 
the entire exercise or in pondering individual scenarios. At least some panellists expressed 
rather liberal views in other scenarios but favoured strong state intervention in real estate 
ownership. This mostly likely reflected a broader trend in Finnish thinking: as the risks 
of Russia dependencies materialised across Europe, the Finnish stances on Russian own-
ership of real estate and mutual trade radicalised. Although the real estate transfer sce-
nario and other scenarios in which this worldview was most visible dealt with China, it 
is likely that these negative – even hostile – perceptions of Russia were projected into its 
partner, too.
Conclusion
Asymmetric and systemic interdependencies are increasingly viewed as security risks 
that could materialise as harmful outcomes for small and medium powers. Due to sys-
temic factors and their relative power position, weaker actors often cannot adjust to 
these vulnerability consequences with the means available to great powers. In identify-
ing three ideal-typical worldviews from Finnish stakeholder data, this article has pro-
vided food for thought for understanding the considerations and tensions that small and 
medium powers encounter when seeking to enhance their economic security in the face 
of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical high technology 
cut-offs.
For the proponents of competitive global market capitalism, economic security is 
about prioritising cost-effectiveness over mitigation of vulnerabilities. Adjusting to the 
potentially harmful outcomes of asymmetric and systemic interdependencies is simply 
possible by streamlining liberal market economies. In a global environment increasingly 
dominated by protectionist arguments, such a belief system can almost be considered a 
form of ideological resistance. Integrationist multipolarism balances between liberalism 
and mercantilism, that is, favouring both a partial surrender to the global market and a 
Kauppila et al. 21
reduction of interdependencies in recalculations of economic security. Protectionist 
small state realists, in turn, put ‘all in’ to avoid the kinds of vulnerability consequences 
that, for them, represent existential threats. In proposing some legislative changes that 
compromise the foundational values of liberal democracies, they would make changes 
that also mould the identity of the state.
There were also outlying arguments that did not fit to any of the three main world-
views as well as entire missing belief systems. It is possible to adjust to potentially harm-
ful outcomes of interdependencies through granting Indigenous peoples a stronger say 
on their land and by making decision-making more inclusive. Indigenous people possess 
extensive knowledge of local conditions, and they are by default critical of such issues as 
selling local land, which can improve decision-making and related risk management. It 
was also argued that curbing conspicuous consumption of resources would reduce risks 
associated with interdependencies, as by using limited resources for need instead of 
greed capitalist structures would become more efficient and some problems associated 
with supply chain vulnerabilities could be avoided. These proposals were somewhat par-
allel with the competitive global market capitalists’ idea of managing risks by becoming 
a ‘better’ version of oneself. The above-mentioned outlying suggestions make demo-
cratic societies function more effectively in all circumstances. As for missing belief sys-
tems, no Marxist views contesting the capitalist markets as a provider of economic 
security stood out in the data. Such a worldview would emphasise the class as a referent 
object of economic security.
A key aim of this article was to open the ground for further theorising of small and 
medium powers’ strategies to adjust to economic interdependencies during an age of 
rapid technological, societal, and power political transformation. While the need for 
states to balance between reduction of vulnerabilities and economic gains of interde-
pendence has been recognised and conceptualised decades ago (Buzan, 1991: 236, 
241–242), it is necessary to consider time-specific features when pondering acceptable 
levels of interdependencies. By bringing insights from timely examples of and stake-
holder discussion on asymmetric and systemic interdependencies, this study has updated 
and deepened the analytical discussion on economic security with such temporal dimen-
sions. At the same time, it has demonstrated that Buzan’s original conceptualisation has 
stood the test of time. We also wish to highlight that relative economic security is a 
moving target, requiring fast adaptive measures and continuous theorising especially 
due to deepening great power rivalry and rapid technological development. Two years 
after the data collection we can already see some small changes in the relative impor-
tance of competences of great powers presented in Table 1. For example, the relative 
importance of supply chain dominance in the field of critical minerals has slightly 
increased after further export restrictions. Also core technology control appears to con-
stitute an even more critical competence, due to the growing role of Chinese companies 
as standards-makers and technological leaders from whom others hope to gain techno-
logical transfers.
To achieve the goal of theorising on small and medium powers’ strategies, we have 
provided two matrices proposing abstract categories and variables that have the potential 
to function as a useful starting point for prospective studies. The first matrix scrutinised 
the potential harmful outcomes of asymmetric and systemic interdependencies on small 
22 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
and medium powers in the face of great powers’ competences. Clearly, the matrix does 
not offer an exhaustive take on all related competences and outcomes. Had the stake-
holder exercise been more extensive, it would have been possible to include, for exam-
ple, great powers’ standards power, which can be seen in their vast resources and ability 
to dictate the development of both official and de facto standards. The potential harmful 
outcomes of this form of interdependence on small and medium powers are, for example, 
opportunity losses, as standards-makers are at the forefront of technological develop-
ment and create the markets (Heikkilä and Rajavuori, 2024). Expanding the matrix is a 
suggested topic for prospective studies.
The second matrix suggests variables that differentiate ideal-typical worldviews on small 
and medium powers’ economic security. While these categories emerged as a result of an 
inductive analysis, they were also in line with existing literature on economic security. Most 
notably, Buzan’s take on the idea and concept is visible in the categories. Similarly to the 
matrix on competences and harmful outcomes, further research can expand this typology.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the Finnish empirical setting, research design, 
methodological choices and the timing of the stakeholder exercise all affected the quality 
and broader usefulness of the findings. Finland’s distinct history and practices of crisis 
preparedness inevitably coloured the respondents’ views. Had the exercise been organised 
in a country without a strong state-enterprise collaboration in preparing for market distur-
bances, the findings may have been rather different. In a similar vein, risks of foreign 
ownership may have been perceived differently in a country that has not been at war with 
its militarily stronger neighbour. Moreover, the exercise’s timing in the immediate after-
math of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine most likely had a more drastic impact on the 
data in the Finnish context than in many other countries. While the war was a critical moti-
vational factor for the panellists, it also most likely sharpened the panellists’ views on 
interdependencies in general and those related to Russia’s partner China in particular.
In terms of research design, the selections made in the above-mentioned typology 
on competences and harmful outcomes coloured the findings, too. For example, if 
great powers’ standards power had been included in the exercise, the discussion on 
tackling opportunity losses could have revealed additional worldviews. When it 
comes to the subcategories of harmful outcomes, that is, the topics of the scenarios, 
the case selection inevitably affected the data, too. For example, if ‘killer acquisi-
tions’, buyouts eliminating potential innovations or companies, had been included, 
protectionist small state realism may have emerged as a more visible category. For 
prospective studies adopting a similar research design, Thorhallsson’s (2018) shelter 
theory offers various additional elements to be used in building threat scenarios.
As for the dominance of China-related scenarios, most likely the increasingly negative 
Western perceptions of China provoked stronger responses than may have been the case 
with the United States – at least at the time of running the exercise. This could be different 
in the current environment characterised by President Trump’s policies, and conducting a 
more US-focused exercise would be a fruitful idea for prospective studies. The slight 
overrepresentation of researchers as panellists, in turn, may have made idealist views 
more common, as researchers in general do not need to think along the lines of executing 
things – unlike state officials and businesspeople. Moreover, the comic art format affected 
the data by possibly making some respondents share more provoked and emotional views 
Kauppila et al. 23
than they would have in response to a different set of scenarios. For example, more report-
style non-visualised scenarios may not have activated respondents’ emotional level to the 
same extent. Also, the fact that the panellists had to respond to scenarios whose content 
they did not necessarily agree with ( ‘lack of ownership of futures images’) may have 
sharpened their expressions.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the ForAc Project’s Primary Investigator Mikael Mattlin, Scientific Advisor 
Shaun Breslin, Senior Researcher Outi Luova, and Project Collaborator Matt Ferchen for fruitful 
feedback and productive discussion during the stakeholder exercise, and the former two for excel-
lent comments on an earlier version of this text. We are also grateful to Comic Artist Tuuli Hypén 
for collaboration and great artwork. Finally, the excellent and meticulous comments of the two 
anonymous reviewers truly enabled us to take this manuscript to the next level. Reviewer Two’s 
comprehensive feedback will help us to report similar studies in the future, too.
ORCID iDs
Liisa Kauppila  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9361-1219
Elina Sinkkonen  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3532-2910
Ethical considerations
The participants of this study are over 18 and the research design poses them no threat or harm, as 
the data are anonymised. According to The Finnish National Board on Research Integrity, and 
based on an evaluation discussion with the University of Turku’s Data Protection Office, no formal 
ethical approval is required for a study that adheres to the principles of the Helsinki Declaration, 
as is the case with this research.
Consent to participate
All interviewees provided written informed consent prior to participating. All stakeholder panel-
lists provided informed consent on the online platform before responding to the actual survey.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/
or publication of this article: This study was funded by the Research Council of Finland, grant 
number 338145.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship 
and/or publication of this article.
Data availability statement
The ForAc Project’s metadata (description of the data and the data-gathering process) is available 
at https://etsin.fairdata.fi/. Moreover, the comic art threat scenarios are published in their entirety 
at https://sites.utu.fi/forac/en/raportti/.
24 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
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Author biographies
Liisa Kauppila is a Researcher at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland and Centre for East 
Asian Studies, University of Turku. Her former projects at the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs and Turku University have focused on China’s economic engagement in the Arctic and 
Nordic countries. She combines methods of Futures Studies with IR in her work.
Dr. Elina Sinkkonen is Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
and holds the title of Docent in East Asian Studies at the University of Turku. Her recent research 
projects have focused on authoritarian regimes and the role of technology in great power politics.
Ines Söderström was the Research Assistant of the ForAc project at the University of Turku. She 
has a Master’s degree in East Asian Studies from the University of Turku, and a Bachelor’s degree 
in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Currently, 
she works as an Analyst at the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.
Kauppila et al. 27
Appendix 1
Composition of the stakeholder panela.
Research Business
Civic 
sector
Public 
sector
Decision-
making Citizens
Competences 
of great 
powers
Supply chain 
dominance
6 2 2 6 2 1
Core tech 
control
8 6 4 5 3 1
Investment 
leverage
7 4 2 8 2 1
Vulnerabilities 
of Finland
Supply 
disruptions
6 3 3 4 2 1
Cut-offs of 
critical high 
technology
6 6 4 4 4 1
Security risks 
of foreign 
ownership
5 5 3 7 2 1
1st 
questionnaire
Pharmaceutical 
industry
2 2 1 1 1 1
Game industry 1 3 1 1 1 1
Defence 
industry
3 3 2 4 2 1
2nd 
questionnaire
Real estate 
industry
2 1 1 1 5 2
Wind power 
industry
2 3 1 3 2 1
Health 
technology 
industry
2 2 2 2 1 2
3rd 
questionnaire
Quantum 
computing 
industry
4 2 3 2 1 1
Water 
management 
industry
2 2 1 1 3 1
Research and 
technology 
industry
9 1 3 2 2 1
aThe table also appears in Kauppila and Sinkkonen (2023b).
Many panellists could have represented various stakeholder groups of the horizontal row. In 
this matrix, they were, however, placed according to their profile instead of institutional affilia-
tion because they were instructed to share their personal views in the exercise. Most panellists had 
knowledge of various issue areas of the vertical row, and hence they were located in multiple slots.
28 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0)
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Sc
en
ar
io
 5
: W
in
d 
po
w
er
 s
up
pl
y 
cr
is
is
Po
ss
ib
le
 s
lo
w
in
g 
do
w
n 
of
 
gr
ee
n 
tr
an
si
tio
n
Lo
om
in
g
x
x
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 im
po
se
d 
du
e 
to
 o
th
er
 u
ni
on
 
m
em
be
r 
st
at
e’
s 
bi
la
te
ra
l r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 a
 
gr
ea
t 
po
w
er
En
er
gy
C
hi
na
Sc
en
ar
io
 6
: H
om
e 
di
al
ys
is
 m
ac
hi
ne
s 
cy
be
ra
tt
ac
k
D
eb
ili
ta
te
d 
lif
e-
su
pp
or
tin
g 
de
vi
ce
s
M
at
er
ia
lis
ed
x
M
al
ic
io
us
 t
hi
rd
-p
ar
ty
 h
ac
ki
ng
 h
ig
h-
te
ch
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 a
 g
re
at
 p
ow
er
H
ea
lth
ca
re
C
hi
na
Sc
en
ar
io
 7
: Q
ua
nt
um
 
co
m
pu
tin
g 
po
rt
fo
lio
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
T
al
en
t 
ex
od
us
, i
nd
us
tr
ia
l 
es
pi
on
ag
e
M
at
er
ia
lis
ed
x
x
Li
be
ra
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
gr
ea
t 
po
w
er
s’
 d
om
in
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 m
os
t 
ad
va
nc
ed
 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
C
hi
na
Sc
en
ar
io
 8
: W
at
er
 
su
pp
ly
 a
nd
 s
ew
ag
e 
cr
is
is
Po
ss
ib
le
 c
ut
s 
in
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
ie
s 
of
 c
ri
tic
al
 s
er
vi
ce
s
Lo
om
in
g
x
x
R
et
al
ia
to
ry
/c
ou
nt
er
-s
an
ct
io
ns
 r
es
ul
tin
g 
fr
om
 g
re
at
 p
ow
er
 fr
ic
tio
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
sh
el
te
ri
ng
 p
ow
er
 a
nd
 a
 c
om
pe
tin
g 
gr
ea
t 
po
w
er
W
at
er
 s
up
pl
y
C
hi
na
/U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
Sc
en
ar
io
 9
: H
el
iu
m
 
su
pp
ly
 s
ho
rt
ag
e
Im
pe
de
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y
M
at
er
ia
lis
ed
x
N
on
-g
re
at
 p
ow
er
–r
el
at
ed
 e
xt
er
na
l e
ve
nt
s 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 g
re
at
 p
ow
er
s’
 d
om
in
an
ce
 
of
 li
m
ite
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
C
hi
na
/U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
Kauppila et al. 29
Appendix 3
Example comic art threat scenario.