Risk driven models & security framework for drone operation in GNSS-denied environments
Asiedu, Samuel (2023-07-07)
Risk driven models & security framework for drone operation in GNSS-denied environments
(07.07.2023)
Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty.
avoin
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on:
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2023073192405
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2023073192405
Tiivistelmä
Flying machines in the air without human inhabitation has moved from abstracts to reality and the concept of unmanned aerial vehicles continues to evolve. Drones are popularly known to use GPS and other forms of GNSS for navigation, but this has unfortunately opened them up to spoofing and other forms of cybersecurity threats. The use of computer vision to find location through pre-stored satellite images has become a suggested solution but this gives rise to security challenges in the form of spoofing, tampering, denial of service and other forms of attacks. These security challenges are reviewed with appropriate requirements recommended.
This research uses the STRIDE threat analysis model to analyse threats in drone operation in GNSS-denied environment. Other threat models were considered including DREAD and PASTA, but STRIDE is chosen because of its suitability and the complementary ability it serves to other analytical methods used in this work. Research work is taken further to divide the drone system into units based in similarities in functions and architecture. They are then subjected to Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The STRIDE threat model is used as base events for the FTA and an FMEA is conducted based on adaptations from IEC 62443-1-1, Network and System Security- Terminology, concepts, and models and IEC 62443-3-2, security risk assessment for system design. The FTA and FMEA are widely known for functional safety purposes but there is a divergent use for the tools where we consider cybersecurity vulnerabilities specifically, instead of faults.
The IEC 62443 series has become synonymous with Industrial Automation and Control Systems. However, inspiration is drawn from that series for this work because, drones, as much as any technological gadget in play recently, falls under a growing umbrella of quickly evolving devices, known as Internet of Things (IoT). These IoT devices can be principally considered as part of Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Results from the analysis are used to recommend security standards & requirements that can be applied in drone operation in GNSS-denied environments.
The framework recommended in this research is consistent with IEC 62443-3-3, System security requirements and security levels and has the following categorization from IEC 62443-1-1, identification, and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events and resource availability. The recommended framework is applicable and relevant to military, private and commercial drone deployment because the framework can be adapted and further tweaked to suit the context which it is intended for. Application of this framework in drone operation in GNSS denied environment will greatly improve upon the cyber resilience of the drone network system.
This research uses the STRIDE threat analysis model to analyse threats in drone operation in GNSS-denied environment. Other threat models were considered including DREAD and PASTA, but STRIDE is chosen because of its suitability and the complementary ability it serves to other analytical methods used in this work. Research work is taken further to divide the drone system into units based in similarities in functions and architecture. They are then subjected to Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The STRIDE threat model is used as base events for the FTA and an FMEA is conducted based on adaptations from IEC 62443-1-1, Network and System Security- Terminology, concepts, and models and IEC 62443-3-2, security risk assessment for system design. The FTA and FMEA are widely known for functional safety purposes but there is a divergent use for the tools where we consider cybersecurity vulnerabilities specifically, instead of faults.
The IEC 62443 series has become synonymous with Industrial Automation and Control Systems. However, inspiration is drawn from that series for this work because, drones, as much as any technological gadget in play recently, falls under a growing umbrella of quickly evolving devices, known as Internet of Things (IoT). These IoT devices can be principally considered as part of Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Results from the analysis are used to recommend security standards & requirements that can be applied in drone operation in GNSS-denied environments.
The framework recommended in this research is consistent with IEC 62443-3-3, System security requirements and security levels and has the following categorization from IEC 62443-1-1, identification, and authentication control, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events and resource availability. The recommended framework is applicable and relevant to military, private and commercial drone deployment because the framework can be adapted and further tweaked to suit the context which it is intended for. Application of this framework in drone operation in GNSS denied environment will greatly improve upon the cyber resilience of the drone network system.