The Philosophy-Ladenness of Perception: A Philosophical Analysis of Perception in Husserl and Sartre

Abstract

<p>The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon<br />is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or<br />the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception.<br />Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and<br />Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon<br />is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the<br />phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is<br />“theory-laden” is true, then perception can also be “philosophy-laden.” These philosophers<br />have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual<br />knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher’s background philosophy<br />can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience<br />is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre rejects the<br />distinction between appearance and reality based on the assumption of the phenomenon. By<br />examining Husserl’s Ideas and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness I conclude that these<br />philosophers’ philosophical languages influence their perceptual knowledge. Philosophical<br />traditions affect the thoughts of perception.<br /></p>