Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Normativity and Grammar

Abstract

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</p><p>In the <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i>, Kant distinguishes two viewpoints on the world. The first, “determining” perspective arises out of cognitive judgments that subsume particulars under conceptual rules. The second, “reflective” perspective sees the represented manifold as a purposive whole without having a concept under which to subsume it ready at hand. Kant’s paradigm example of the latter perspective is the judgment of beauty. This paper argues that Wittgenstein drew a similar distinction in the early 1930s. In an early discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein distinguishes two perspectives on grammar. The first, “discursive” perspective treats grammar as a conceptually formulated system of rules. The second, “intuitive” perspective “overlooks”, or surveys a grammatical system as a whole. Wittgenstein’s description of the latter perspective resembles Kant’s account of the reflective perspective. In accordance with Kant, Wittgenstein also connects the “intuitive” perspective to aesthetics. In what is perhaps his most sustained discussion of aesthetics, Wittgenstein defends a conception of aesthetic judgment as normative yet partly founded on a subjective response arising from looking at an aesthetic system as a whole. Such a normative yet partly subjective judgment is also involved in our grasp of grammar. </p><p> <br /></p>