Improving B2B Data Markets
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Markets for information are growing rapidly, thanks to the growing number of data sources.
Many businesses have taken notice to the indisputable benefits of data sharing and are taking
action to make their data available to potential buyers. Data is a non-rival good, and thus it can
in theory be sold to every potential buyer. In practice, this isn’t the case. Businesses that wish to
practice data sharing face many risks and obstacles.
Data markets are of monopolistic nature, which allows every seller to greatly influence their
pricing policy, instead of taking market price as given. A buyer looking to buy data from one or
multiple sources faces potentially formidable costs. Sellers on their part could make the market
more attractive by combining their data, but this requires a high level of trust between the
sellers. These are only a few examples that prevent the market from reaching a socially optimal
outcome.
The European Union suggests using neutral data intermediaries, that could collect data from
different suppliers, creating an effective single market for data. Contributing suppliers would be
compensated with increased access to other’s data, analytic services or licensing fees. This
solution constructs effective infrastructure for data markets but fails to set incentives which
would induce desired outcomes. Suppliers have an incentive to provide low-quality data in
hopes of gaining access to high-value data contributed by others. Additionally, the intermediary
cannot price the data effectively without creating some sort of scarcity.
I propose a model that utilizes the data intermediary solution and the VCG-mechanism. By
collecting and combining the contributed data into a single homogeneous dataset, the
intermediary can auction it by using the uniform price multi-unit Vickrey auction. Auctioning ݇
units of access rights to ݊ buyers, when ݇ < ݊, creates artificial scarcity which induces truthful
bidding. The intermediary collects data from the sellers individually, not allowing the sellers to
gain access to each other’s data, which reduces incentive to provide low-quality data. The
intermediary will then compensate the suppliers with the generated auction revenues.