Russian nuclear energy diplomacy in Finland and Hungary

Abstract

<p>We compare Russian nuclear energy diplomacy towards <br />Finland and Hungary, where the Russian state corporation <br />Rosatom intends to build nuclear power plants by the 2020s. <br />Russian nuclear energy diplomacy features Rosatom working <br />with other state institutions, its own subsidiaries and an <br />extensive network of companies and R&D actors to support <br />Russian nuclear power projects abroad. Using the structuration <br />approach, we find three interests driving such diplomacy: <br />energy business and associated profits; modernization of the <br />Russian economy, including the diversification of its export <br />structure; while foreign policy interests are also involved, <br />considering the constraints emerging in EU-Russia energy <br />diplomacy in the oil and gas sectors, including the sanctions <br />since 2014. Some domestic actors in Finland and Hungary <br />make the linkage between nuclear energy and foreign policy <br />as explicit as do some western commentators. Seeking to <br />pursue these interests, Russian actors must accommodate <br />their considerable assets to the structural constraints they <br />encounter in the target countries. We identify four structural <br />dimensions The Russian actors are well endowed as regards <br />the resources, technology, and infrastructure dimension; <br />and the dimension of finance, business models, and <br />markets. However, on the institutional dimension they face <br />a less controllable environment. Regarding the ecological <br />dimension, they must conform to local safety requirements. <br />In both cases, Russian actors were able to strengthen <br />perceptions of joint interests with actors in the target country <br />facilitating the nuclear power plant projects, thereby paving <br />the way for the use of soft power.<br /></p>