Locke on Freedom, Moral Agency, and the Space of Reasons

Abstract

<p> <span>This paper argues that what interests Locke most is not whether we are free to </span><span>suspend desire but the nature of the liberty that suspension grants us, and that </span><span>Lockean liberty is essentially about deliberation that takes place in what has </span><span>nowadays come to </span><span>be called the space of reasons. This allows me to offer a novel </span><span>and balanced account that carefully designates both causal and rational elements </span><span>of Locke’s theory of moral agency: after having reached </span><span>a </span><span>judgment concerning </span><span>the best course of action, we are to take measures, if need be, so that this </span><span>cognitive achievement raises the corresponding conative element, namely an </span><span>uneasiness that determines our will. Locke’s ambitious theory </span><span>aims</span><span> to </span><span>incorporate two strong philosophical intuitions widely held incompatible: that </span><span>our will is free and that impulses affect our choices. The present interpretation </span><span>thus </span><span>throws</span><span> new light on the development of Western moral thought</span>.<br></p>