Existence Dualism in Kant and its Cartesian Roots

Abstract

<p> <span>We argue that Kant advocates existence dualism in a largely Cartesian vein. </span><span>In such a </span><span>dualism,</span><span>there are two basic kinds of </span><span>existence or ways of being</span><span>: </span><span>I</span><span>-</span><span>existence </span><span>and </span><span>categorial existence</span><span>. </span><span>I</span><span>-</span><span>existence </span><span>denot</span><span>es </span><span>my</span><span>existence</span><span>,</span><span>while</span><span>c</span><span>ategorial existence </span><span>denotes</span><span>, basically,</span><span>the existence of </span><span>ordinary things. </span><span>First, we show how</span><span> the route to existence is fundamentally different in the two cases. </span><span>Then we ask </span><span>whether they also indicate two ontologically distinct kinds</span><span>and argue that </span><span>I</span><span>-</span><span>existence </span><span>should be regarded as </span><span>the</span><span>fundamental kind</span><span>of existence in any case. </span><span>One </span><span>important </span><span>conse</span><span>quence </span><span>of </span><span>this </span><span>is that </span><span>I</span><span>-</span><span>existence stands outside the Kantian conditions of experience, </span><span>being the one</span><span>un</span><span>-</span><span>Copernican element left intact after Kant’s Copernican turn.</span><br></p>