Enhancing Cyber Resilience of Smart hospitals against Ransomware attacks
avoin
Julkaisu on tekijänoikeussäännösten alainen. Teosta voi lukea ja tulostaa henkilökohtaista käyttöä varten. Käyttö kaupallisiin tarkoituksiin on kielletty.
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DOI
Tiivistelmä
The increased addition of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in connected medical technologies and electronic medical record systems into today's healthcare has created smart hospitals where clinical work and digital connections are closely linked. This connection between traditional healthcare and technology has greatly improved health services and care in this century. However, it also brings big security risks and a larger, more often targeted attack surface area. Ransomware has become one of the most harmful cyber threats to healthcare, with cases showing it can disrupt clinical services, endanger patient safety, and in worst cases cause death and large financial and legal problems.
This thesis provides a thorough review of ransomware threats in smart healthcare systems by combining existing research, cybersecurity guidelines, and real incident data to create a clear and evidence-based analysis. It focuses on the different ransomware threats affecting hospitals, evaluates how well current cybersecurity standards and defences work against these threats, and compares healthcare security with other critical infrastructure sectors. Through detailed gap analysis, the thesis points out ongoing weaknesses in both research and practical work, shown by the lack of a unified cyber resilience model that considers the special links between clinical workflows and digital systems in healthcare.
Based on these findings, the thesis offers its main contribution which is a set of specific policy recommendations designed for different groups in the healthcare sector including healthcare providers and managers, policymakers and regulators, technology developers and sellers, and the public. Rather than providing generic guidance, the recommendations address the distinct responsibilities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of each stakeholder group to help them know the right steps to take when facing ransomware incidents in hospitals. In broader terms, this work adds value by gathering scattered literature, highlighting key research gaps, and turning academic knowledge into practical policy advice, providing a timely and organized resource for those working to protect smart hospitals from growing ransomware threats.